Terry Thurmond Lawsuit

Case 1:23-cv-05443-MHC Document 1 Filed 11/28/23 Page 1 of 46
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
LATERRAL ENGLAND, in her

capacity of administrator of the
ESTATE OF TERRY THURMOND,
deceased; CRYSTEN JACKSON, as
next of kin and natural guardian of the
minor children of decedent; and
NIYAH THURMOND,
Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO.
v. [JURY TRIAL DEMANDED]
____________________
CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA;

CORRECTHEALTH CLAYTON,
LLC; MILLENIA MEDICAL
SERVICES, INC.; LEVON ALLEN,
in his official capacity; DIONTE
MCCAULEY, in his individual and
official capacity; FRED DENSON, in
his individual and official capacity;
RANDY GADDY, in his individual
and official capacity; DERRICK
DOYLE, in his individual and official
capacity; ELLONTE JOHNSON;
DANILO JONES, in his individual and
official capacity; TAMEIKA SMITH,
in her individual and official capacity;
JESSICA CASTELLANOS; PETER
LONGONJE; DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Laterral England, as administrator for the estate of
Terry Thurmond, deceased, Crysten Jackson, as next of kin and natural guardian of
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Mr. Thurmond’s two surviving minor children, and Niyah Thurmond, Mr.
Thurmond’s adult daughter, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby file
their Complaint for Damages:
INTRODUCTION
1. This action arises out of the homicide of Terry Thurmond at the Clayton
County Jail, which was proximately and/or actually caused by Defendants.
2. Plaintiffs seek money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.
3. Plaintiffs assert Mr. Thurmond suffered death due to excessive force,
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, medical neglect, and
discrimination based on his disability.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This honorable Court has jurisdiction over the federal questions
involved in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 42 U.S.C. §§
12133, 1983, 1988.
5. The proper venue is the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division,
as all acts complained of occurred in Clayton County, Georgia.
6. Clayton County and the Sheriff’s Office of Clayton County were
presented notice of Plaintiffs’ claims, where applicable, within twelve months
after Mr. Thurmond’s death; moreover, the respective entities were provided with
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sufficient information and time to resolve such claims pursuant to O.C.G.A. §
36-11-1 and all other applicable statutory provisions but failed to do so.
PARTIES
7. At all times relevant hereto Terry Thurmond was a citizen of the United
States and a resident of the city of Hapeville, Georgia.
8. Plaintiff Laterral England is Mr. Thurmond’s sister and the appointed
administrator of Terry Thurmond’s estate, a true and correct copy of the Order
appointing Plaintiff as executor is attached hereto as “Exhibit A.”
9. Plaintiff Crysten Jackson is the natural guardian and next of kin to Mr.
Thurmond’s two surviving minor children.
10. Plaintiff Niyah Thurmond is the adult daughter of Mr. Thurmond.
11. Defendant Clayton County, Georgia (“Clayton County” or “County”)
is a political subdivision of the State of Georgia, a “public entity” within the
meaning of Title II of the ADA, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Defendant Clayton County owns and maintains the Clayton County Jail (“Jail”)
and is responsible for providing constitutionally adequate conditions for pre-trial
detainees and inmates at the Jail, as well as establishing customs and policies for
such purposes. Defendant Clayton County had a duty to provide for the medical
care of pre-trial detainees at the Jail, including the provision of constitutionally
adequate mental health services.
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12. Defendant Levon Allen (“Allen”) is the Sheriff of Clayton County.
Sheriff Allen is sued in his official capacity as the head of the Clayton County
Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO” or “Sheriff’s Office”). As a constitutional officer, the
Sheriff and deputies in his office, have a duty to operate the Jail in a
constitutionally sound manner. Furthermore, the Jail is a “public entity” within
the meaning of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104, and is
therefore subject to Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., and Georgia
sheriffs and their deputies act as “arms of the state” in developing, promulgating
and implementing use-of-force policies and procedures, the classification and
housing of inmates, as well as the hiring and training of jailers.
13. Defendant Ellonte Johnson (“Johnson”) was a Clayton County Deputy
Sheriff at all times material hereto and is being sued in his individual and official
capacity.
14. Defendant Randy Gaddy (“Gaddy”) was a Clayton County Deputy
capacity.
15. Defendant Dionte McCauley (“McCauley”) was a Clayton County
Deputy Sheriff at all times material hereto and is being sued in his individual and
official capacity.
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16. Defendant Fred Denson (“Denson”) was a Clayton County Deputy
capacity.
17. Defendant Derrick Doyle (“Doyle”) was a Clayton County Deputy
capacity.
18. Defendant Danilo Jones (“Jones”) was a Clayton County Deputy
capacity.
19. Defendant Tameika Smith (“Smith”) was a Clayton County Deputy
Sheriff at all times material hereto and is being sued in her individual and official
capacity
20. Defendant Correcthealth Clayton, LLC (“CorrectHealth”) is and was,
at all times material hereto, a private for-profit Georgia Corporation that contracts
with Defendant Clayton County to perform a traditional government function
under color of state law in the Jail by providing administrative services, physician
care, nursing care, emergency medical and sick-call services, medical records
management, and medication management, as well as other related services,
including the provision of mental health services for the Jail’s mentally ill
population.
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21. Defendant Millenia Medical Services, Inc. (“Millenia”) is and was, at
all times material hereto, a private for-profit South Carolina Corporation that
contracts with Defendant Clayton County and/or Defendant CorrectHealth to
perform a traditional government function in the Jail under color of state law by
providing administrative services, physician care, nursing care, emergency
medical and sick-call services, medical records management, and medication
management, as well as other related services, including the provision of mental
health services for the Jail’s mentally ill population
22. Defendant Jessica Castellanos was, at all times material hereto, a
private contractor at the Jail performing a traditional government function under
color of state law and is being sued for professional negligence as a nurse while
acting within the course and scope of her employment or agency for Defendant
Millenia and/or Defendant CorrectHealth.
23. Defendant Peter Longonje was, at all times material hereto, a private
contractor at the Jail performing a traditional government function under color of
state law and is being sued for professional negligence as a nurse while acting
within the course and scope of his employment or agency for Defendant Millenia
and/or Defendant CorrectHealth.
24. Plaintiff has been diligent in attempting to learn the identities of all the
parties responsible for the wrongdoing herein alleged; however, Plaintiff believes
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additional parties do exist that are not named due to Plaintiffs’ inability to
discover their identities or the extent of their involvement at this time. To that
end, Does 1 through 10 are parties that have not yet been identified but who are
liable for the injuries alleged in this Complaint.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
25. Terry Thurmond was transported to Clayton County Jail from
Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport after he was arrested on the concourse
for trespass when he was unable to provide the date and time he arrived or how
he got on the concourse.
26. Mr. Thurmond had been detained at the Jail previously and his history
of mental health issues and hypertension was known to the Sheriff’s Office, and
the employees and contractors at the Jail, including Defendants CorrectHealth
and Millenia.
27. At the time he was classified and processed into the Jail’s population,
the medical intake or screening identified Mr. Thurmond as having a mental
impairment or a mental health history or issue and classified him for placement
into a “mental health unit.”
28. Defendant Allen’s office, who had the authority and responsibility for
implementing the Jail’s policy and procedures for the classification and
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assignment of inmates, assigned Mr. Thurmond to Housing Unit 1, which was
known to house mental health inmates.
29. Although Mr. Thurmond was housed in a unit for those with mental
health problems, he never received any medication or treatment for his mental
health issues.
30. This was true even when he began to exhibit signs of a mental health
crisis and called for help from the officers and medical personnel at the Jail over
an hour before the mental health episode that led to his death.
31. When the jailers eventually responded, it was in response to various
reports or calls that indicated Mr. Thurmond was experiencing significant mental
impairment and exhibiting erratic behavior. An “Active 53” call came over the
radio.
32. At no point was there any report or call that indicated Mr. Thurmond
was a danger to any inmate or officer.
33. CCTV of the incident shows that Mr. Thurmond was lying on the
second floor as though sleeping and leaning under the rail, while one or two other
inmates held him and talked to him.
34. Mr. Thurmond was not a danger to others and the interaction between
the inmates was not violent, as inmates held on to Mr. Thurmond with minimal
force and appeared to be trying to calm him down.
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35. Mr. Thurmond became noticeably more erratic and excited after the
officers arrived and immediately began to pull, wrestle and beat him back from
the rail, after which Mr. Thurmond stood up and became even more erratic in
trying to get away or escape the officers while on the second floor.
36. Mr. Thurmond’s reaction to the officers was such that it was observably
clear he was experiencing mental impairment that substantially limited his ability
to rationally respond or process the use of force by the officers.
37. It was known by the officers and personnel at the Jail that he had such
impairment.
38. Mr. Thurmond was hit with Taser shocks when he tried to escape the
use of force while on the second floor, causing him to fall to the ground, after
which five or six officers quickly gained control of him by placing him in the
prone position and pinning his legs and arms behind his back using their hands,
knees and weight to hog-tie Mr. Thurmond.
39. Once the officers gained control of Mr. Thurmond, they remained on
top of him for over twenty minutes while he lay face down with his hands and
legs pinned behind his back.
40. He died on the spot where he was taken down.
41. The Clayton County Medical Examiner’s Office (the “Medical
Examiner”) ruled Mr. Thurmond’s death at the hands of his jailers a homicide.
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42. In the video of the incident, and as the Medical Examiner noted, the
officers gained control over Mr. Thurmond around the 7:19 p.m. mark, but they
continued to press down on his neck, shoulder, back and lower body until 7:36
p.m.
43. Mr. Thurmond informed the officers that he was no longer resisting and
can clearly be heard saying he quit and that he gives up.
44. Mr. Thurmond can also be heard complaining about his breathing and
losing feeling, yet the officers continued to pin him down in the prone position.
45. Other inmates observed and signaled to the officers that Mr. Thurmond
could not breathe.
46. Georgia law enforcement officers are trained to stay off the neck when
apprehending or subduing an individual.
47. Nevertheless, at least one officer, Defendant Jones, used the knee-to-
neck restraint while Mr. Thurmond was lying face down on the ground in the
prone position, and maintained that position after Mr. Thurmond had expressed
compliance and the difficulty he was having with breathing and loss of feeling.
48. Another officer, Defendant Denson, stepped on Mr. Thurmond while
Mr. Thurmond was physically restrained in the prone position by Defendants
Jones, Gaddy, McCauley and Johnson (collectively with Defendant Denson,
“Restraining Officers”), not resisting, and after his pleas for help.
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49. Mr. Thurmond was not resisting after the 7:20 pm mark on the video,
and he could be seen and heard struggling to stay alive, with at least seven officers
visibly in earshot when he said I quit and pleaded for help.
50. After Mr. Thurmond pleaded for help, the Restraining Officers
continued to apply pressure to Mr. Thurmond’s neck, shoulder, torso, as well as
his legs, while he was prone.
51. As he lay there dying, several officers who were not restraining him
observed the events without rendering aid.
52. Defendant Smith recorded part of the response to Mr. Thurmond’s
mental health crisis on a phone or handheld mobile device.
53. A nurse eventually arrived on the scene and waited nearly five minutes
before checking Mr. Thurmond’s breathing, and nearly six minutes before
performing any chest compressions.
54. Inexplicably, an officer kneeled on or around his neck area after the
nurse arrived while the other officers continued the prone restraint with the nurse
observing and Mr. Thurmond lying unresponsive face down.
55. Defendant Jessica Castellanos, the nurse that arrived on the scene, took
at least ten minutes to arrive from when she heard the call.
56. Defendant Castellanos can be seen entering the CCTV video from Jail
around the 7:33 p.m. mark, upon which she has several conversations with the
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officers and stands around waiting while Mr. Thurmond lay unresponsive face
down.
57. Defendant Peter Longonje was the on-duty nurse assigned to respond
to calls for medical assistance, or to the unit in which Mr. Thurmond was housed,
but did not arrive to render aid until the chest compressions were already well in
progress and shortly before EMTs arrived.
58. Defendant Castellanos observed or should have observed that Mr.
Thurmond was unresponsive and lying face down on the ground as soon as she
entered the housing unit.
59. When Defendant Castellanos walked up to Mr. Thurmond after
stopping to talk to an officer, she did not immediately initiate CPR compressions
despite observing Mr. Thurmond unresponsive and lying face down on the
ground.
60. Neither Defendant Castellanos nor any of the officers administered
CPR on Mr. Thurmond until 7:39 p.m, almost six minutes after Castellanos
arrived on the scene.
61. Defendant Denson, the officer that stepped on Mr. Thurmond,
performed compressions after the nurse intervened, although he never attempted
to render aid when Mr. Thurmond was in obvious need prior to the nurse’s arrival.
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62. By the time Defendant Castellanos applied a defibrillator to Mr.
Thurmond, eight minutes had passed from the moment she arrived.
63. Neither Defendant Castellanos or the on-duty nurse came with a
portable oxygen tank, which also further delayed lifesaving medical treatment.
64. Because Defendant Castellanos arrived without a portable oxygen tank,
she had to leave the scene for over six minutes to go back and get it.
65. The hold that killed Mr. Thurmond has been studied in multiple peer-
reviewed scientific journals and by the U.S. Department of Justice, with the
conclusion being that compressing an arrestee in the prone position with weight
on their back and/or abdomen restricts breathing and other vital functions, and
these conclusions have been widely accepted and adopted in medical and policing
organizations.
66. The United States Department of Justice has warned law enforcement
for decades about the dangers of prone restraint: “The risk of positional asphyxia
is compounded when an individual with predisposing factors becomes involved
in a violent struggle with an officer or officers, particularly when physical
restraint includes behind-the-back handcuffing combined with placing the
subject in a stomach-down position.” National Law Enforcement Technology
Center, Positional Asphyxia—Sudden Death at *2 (June 1995).
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67. Georgia law clearly establishes that an officer cannot use his or her knee
and body weight on a non-resisting subject in the prone position.
68. Psychiatric illnesses and high blood pressure are factors that are known
to compound the risk of death for individuals restrained in the prone position.
69. Defendants Clayton County and Allen, along with other Jail personnel,
had a duty to reasonably accommodate Mr. Thurmond’s mental impairment.
70. Mr. Thurmond suffered from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and high
blood pressure, and this information was known or should have been known by
the officers and medical personnel at the Jail, including the nurses and medical
contractors of Defendants CorrectHealth and Millenia.
71. These factors, combined with the unnecessarily long time period, made
use of the prone restraint by the officers tantamount to use of deadly force against
Mr. Thurmond.
72. As a result of being physically restrained in a position that significantly
impaired his breathing for an extended period of time, Mr. Thurmond suffered
cardiac arrest.
73. Mr. Thurmond also died because the Restraining Officers, the
Observing Officers, and Defendant Castellanos failed to render aid once it was
readily apparent, he was not resisting, had lost consciousness, and/or was
unresponsive.
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COUNT I
EXCESSIVE AND DEADLY FORCE
(Restraining Officers)
74. CCSO’s Rules and Regulations define reasonable force as that minimal
force needed, superior to the opposing force used by a subject, which will enable
the officer to establish control over or to prevent or terminate an unlawful act.
75. CCSO’s Rules and Regulations define excessive force as force that is
in excess of that reasonably required to establish control over or to prevent or
terminate an unlawful act of violence.
76. CCSO’s Rules and Regulations only authorizes officers or employees
to use lethal force to protect themselves or others from what is reasonably
believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm.
77. The Restraining Officers individually and collectively used an
objectively unreasonable lethal restraint in violation of Mr. Thurmond’s clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights by physically restraining him in a position
known to cause death long after such officers had established control over Mr.
Thurmond.
78. Defendant Jones’ placement of his knee to the neck of Mr. Thurmond
was an objectively unreasonable use of force that violated clearly established law
and caused Mr. Thurmond to suffer prior to his death and also caused his death.
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79. Defendant Denson stepped on the deceased in a manner that was
objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established law and caused Mr.
Thurmond to suffer prior to his death and also caused his death.
80. The prolonged prone restraint used by the Restraining Officers long
after they had established control, and long after Mr. Thurmond expressed his
non-resistance was objectively unreasonable and violated clearly established law,
which caused Mr. Thurmond to suffer and also caused his death.
81. The Restraining Officers’ continued use of the prone restraint after
complaints he could not breathe, and after he lost consciousness, constituted an
unreasonable use of force that violated clearly established law and caused Mr.
Thurmond to suffer prior to his death and also caused his death.
82. The continued use of the prone restraint by Restraining Officers for
over ten minutes after he pleaded for help prevented or delayed timely medical
aid and constituted an unreasonable use of force that violated clearly established
law and caused Mr. Thurmond’s death, and his suffering prior to death.
83. At all times material hereto, Defendant Doyle was acting in a
supervisory capacity as a Captain and directly participated in violating Mr.
Thurmond’s federal rights, as such Defendant is liable in his individual and
supervisory capacity for the violation of Mr. Thurmond’s clearly established
constitutional protection from excessive force.
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84. Mr. Thurmond never presented an imminent threat of bodily or deadly
harm to any Responding Officers or other inmate.
85. A reasonable officer would have known that restraining Mr. Thurmond
in the prone position for almost twenty minutes, including fifteen minutes after
he pleaded for help, was objectively unreasonable and would violate clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights.
86. As such, the Responding Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
87. The Responding Officers are liable to Mr. Thurmond’s estate for the
pain and suffering he endured prior to his death, and to Mr. Thurmond’s heirs for
the full value of his life as a result of his death which was caused by a violation
of clearly established constitutional protections.
88. Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney
fees under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
COUNT II
FAILURE TO INTERVENE
(Restraining and Observing Officers)
89. An officer has an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the
constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement
officers.
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90. Defendants Smith and Doyle stood on the first floor and observed,
communicated with, and assisted the Restraining Officers while they restrained
Mr. Thurmond in the prone position for an extended period of time, despite Mr.
Thurmond being under the control of Restraining Officers and pleading for help.
91. Defendant Denson stood over Mr. Thurmond on the second floor and
observed, communicated with, and assisted the rest of the Restraining Officers
while they restrained Mr. Thurmond in the prone position for an extended period
of time, despite Mr. Thurmond not resisting, being under control and pleading
for help.
92. Defendant Doyle at times observed and at times physically restrained
Mr. Thurmond.
93. Defendant Denson at times observed and at times stepped on Mr.
Thurmond while he was laying prone.
94. Defendants Smith, Doyle and Denson (“Observing Officers”) observed
the Restraining Officers kneeling on Mr. Thurmond’s neck, back, torso and legs
with the full weight of their bodies for an extended period of time after Mr.
Thurmond was no longer resisting, was under control, and complained about not
being able to breath and losing feeling in his extremities.
95. The Observing Officers were in a position to intervene to stop the
Restraining Officers from using unnecessary and deadly force on Mr. Thurmond.
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96. Given the amount of time Mr. Thurmond was forcibly restrained while
not resisting or otherwise helpless, the Observing Officers and each of the
Restraining Officers had a reasonable and realistic opportunity to intervene but
chose not to do so, thereby displaying deliberate indifference to Mr. Thurmond’s
constitutional rights.
97. The Observing Officers and Restraining Officers failed to meet their
duty to intervene to prevent the violation of Mr. Thurmond’s clearly established
constitutional rights under § 1983 by other officers and are civilly liable under §
1983 for such failure to intervene. Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir.
2008); Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.2d 1402, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998).
98. The individual and collective failure to intervene was a violation of Mr.
Thurmond’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.
99. As a result of this failure to intervene, Mr. Thurmond experienced pain
and suffering and lost his life.
100. Defendant Jessica Castellanos had a duty to intervene and stop the
Restraining Officers from continuing to restrain Mr. Thurmond in the prone
position when she arrived because it was clear Mr. Thurmond was in need of
immediate resuscitation efforts after being subjected to excessive and deadly
force.
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101. Medical intervention would have been safe and reasonable under the
circumstances.
102. Defendant Jessica Castellanos chose not to intervene despite the
reasonable opportunity to do so, and her failure to intervene is actionable under
§ 1983 because she was performing a traditional government function under color
of state law.
COUNT III
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO MEDICAL NEED
(Restraining and Observing Officers)
103. The Restraining Officers and the Observing Officers failed to render
aid themselves nor did they immediately seek or obtain emergency medical care
for Mr. Thurmond, even after he appeared to lose consciousness and became
unresponsive.
104. The Restraining Officers and Observing Officers intentionally delayed
Mr. Thurmond’s access to life saving emergency medical care and treatment by
continuing the use excessive force after Mr. Thurmond called for help and was
not resisting, even after Mr. Thurmond became unresponsive or appeared to lose
consciousness.
105. The Restraining Officers and Observing Officers delayed and
obstructed Mr. Thurmond’s access to life saving medical care by intentionally
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failing to call for emergency medical care, and by failing to report that Mr.
Thurmond was in need of immediate resuscitation.
106. When the nurse eventually arrived on the scene, the Restraining
Officers further denied Mr. Thurmond access to immediate lifesaving emergency
care and resuscitation, and intentionally delayed treatment, by continuing to
physically restrain him in the prone position while he lay dying instead of
allowing Mr. Thurmond to receive chest compressions, oxygen and/or
defibrillation as soon as the nurse arrived.
107. Mr. Thurmond had a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
immediate emergency care when he called for help and/or lost consciousness
after being subjected to Taser deployments and restrained in the prone position
for an extended period of time.
108. The Restraining Officers and Observing Officers were aware that Mr.
Thurmond needed serious medical help and delayed request for such assistance,
which constitutes deliberate indifference to his serious medical need for
immediate lifesaving care, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
109. As a result of the deliberate indifference of the Restraining Officers and
Observing Officers to Mr. Thurmond’s serious medical need, he experienced pain
and suffering, and death.
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110. Because this disregard was more than gross negligence, the Responding
Officers and Observing Officers are liable under § 1983 for their deliberate
indifference to Mr. Thurmond’s serious medical need.
111. Because the response of the Restraining Officers and Observing
Officers was objectively insufficient, such officers are liable under §1983 for
their deliberate indifference to serious medical need.
COUNT IV
PRACTICE OR PATTERN OF DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO
MEDICAL NEED
(Clayton County and Allen)
112. Prior to Mr. Thurmond’s death on November 28, 2022, Defendant
Clayton County had knowledge of the unconstitutional policy, custom or practice
of deliberate indifference to the serious medical need of inmates at the Jail.
113. Victor Hill, the former Clayton County Sheriff, was convicted in
criminal court for constitutional violations, most of which included acts or
omissions that were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical need of
inmates and pretrial detainees.
114. Victor Hill established an unofficial policy or custom of projecting a
tough image that equated toughness with disregard and deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights, including the constitutional right to adequate care. This sort
of disregard for basic rights was in line with Hill’s description of the Jail as
“Georgia’s toughest para-military jail.”
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115. The officers of Jail routinely violated the constitutional rights of
inmates, intentionally disregarding their serious medical needs as part of the
policy or custom established by Victor Hill.
116. Five officers at the Jail used excessive force to break Melvin McDay’s
jaw when he was brought in as a pretrial detainee for jaywalking in December
2020, but the officers and staff at the Jail ignored his cries for medical assistance,
forcing Mr. McDay to seek medical treatment on his own after he was released
four days later, at which time his jaw had to be surgically repaired.
117. Gabriel Arries, who was bipolar, was deliberately denied access to
critical medical care after Jail guards used excessive force with a Taser and
restrained him unconstitutionally, while also beating him. They did not get him
immediate medical attention after he sustained his injuries which further
exacerbated the injuries, especially his brain injury. Mr. Arries was jailed for
disorderly conduct in February 2021 when he experienced a mental health crisis
while at the Atlanta airport as a result of missing his medication. Jail personnel
knew he needed medication for his mental health emergency, but instead he was
brutalized and left without access to treatment for his serious medical need.
118. Jail staff and officers knew Tiana Hill was pregnant when she was
processed into the Jail, but refused her requests for prenatal care. When she went
into labor, Jail officers and staff disregarded her requests to go to the hospital and
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made her wait over twelve hours, and only took her to the hospital after she
delivered her stillborn child.
119. Inmates and pre-trial detainees who had suffered at the hands of their
jailers were routinely denied access to medical care, as in the case of Marshall
Roberson, who was punched and beaten by jailers at the Jail. When Marshall’s
parents went to bond him out, Jail staff told them he was no longer there without
any explanation. His parents found him near a tree not far from the Jail, where he
complained he was beaten up by jailers. Marshall died within three or four hours
from when his parents found him near the tree.
120. Jamie Mills requested a bottom bunk because she was not physically
capable of safely reaching the top bunk. Her jailers ordered her to get on the top
bunk regardless. She fell and shattered her hip trying to get on the top bunk on
December 8, 2020. The jailers did not allow her to get an X-Ray for seven days
despite the excruciating pain she was in in her swollen and disfigured hip area.
121. After Victor Hill was removed from his office, the interim Sheriff did
not stop the unofficial policy, custom or practice of disregarding the serious
medical need of pretrial detainees at the Jail.
122. In fact, the interim Sheriff informed inmates that “This is is still Victor
Hill’s jail. Nothing’s changed.”
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123. Allan Willison, who was severely beaten on at least two occasions,
began to complain about excruciating pain in his left testicle that had swollen to
the size of a tennis ball in November of 2022. He was not provided any
prescription pain killers and he was not allowed to go see a urologist until January
19, 2023. Despite his urologist saying he needed to have surgery immediately, no
one at the Jail responded to such calls and Mr. Willison passed away soon after.
124. This policy, custom and practice of disregarding the serious medical
needs of inmates was the moving force behind the deliberate indifference to Mr.
Thurmond’s serious medical need by the Restraining Officers and the Observing
Officers.
125. Mr. Thurmond’s pain and suffering, as well as his subsequent death,
was proximately caused by this policy, custom and practice of deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of inmates and pretrial detainees.
126. Defendants Clayton County and Allen have a constitutional duty not to
delay or deny inmates access to medical treatment in the face of serious medical
need.
127. Prior to November 28, 2022, Defendant Clayton County and Allen
adopted the policy, custom and practice of intentionally delaying or denying
inmates access to medical treatment, especially for injuries sustained at the hands
of officers or jailers.
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128. Because these violations reflected a policy, custom or practice,
Defendant Clayton County is liable under §1983.
129. Plaintiff is also entitled to recovery of costs, including reasonable
attorney’s fees under §1988.
COUNT V
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO MEDICAL NEED
(Castellanos, Longonje, CorrectHealth and Millenia)
130. Defendant CorrectHealth is a private entity that contracts with Clayton
County to perform a traditionally governmental function of providing health care
to inmates and pretrial detainees at the Jail, which includes medical screenings,
reviewing medical and mental health history, conducting behavioral
observations, and providing emergent care and/or crisis intervention, as well as
providing necessary medications or referrals.
131. Defendant Millenia is a private entity that contracts with Defendant
Clayton County or Defendant CorrectHealth to perform a traditionally
governmental function of providing health care to inmates and pretrial detainees
at the Jail, which includes medical screenings, reviewing medical and mental
health history, conducting behavioral observations, and providing emergent care
and/or crisis intervention, as well as providing necessary medications or referrals.
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132. Defendants CorrectHealth and Millenia, as well as their employees,
agents or contractors, have a duty to provide constitutionally adequate medical
care to the inmates at the Jail.
133. Defendant Castellanos was an employee, agent or contractor for
Defendant CorrectHealth or Defendant Millenia, and arrived on scene in response
to the call for medical assistance without any medical equipment.
134. Defendant Castellanos was at all times acting within the course and
scope of her employment when she delayed medical assistance to Mr. Thurmond
by her inadequate response time, and her subsequent disregard for the need to
begin assessing and resuscitating Mr. Thurmond immediately upon arrival.
135. Defendant Longonje, the on-duty nurse that evening, heard the call but
did not arrive to provide medical assistance to Mr. Thurmond for over twenty
minutes and thereby failed to respond for all practical purposes.
136. As a Licensed Practical Nurse, Defendant Castellanos knew that Mr.
Thurmond’s life was in danger but disregarded that risk because of the custom or
practice of delaying or denying emergency medical care to inmates, especially
for inmates seriously injured by the Jail’s guards or personnel.
137. Defendant Castellanos is liable for violations of §1983 for her
deliberate indifference to the serious medical need of Mr. Thurmond for her acts
and omissions under color of state law.
27
138. Defendant Longonje is liable for violations of §1983 for his deliberate
indifference to the serious medical need of Mr. Thurmond under color of state
law.
139. Defendants CorrectHealth and Millenia are liable under §1983 for
policies or customs that caused Mr. Thurmond’s injuries in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
140. Defendants CorrectHealth and Millenia, along with their agents,
employees, or contractors, have primary responsibility for the medical care of
inmates or pretrial detainees at the Jail, such that officers and other Jail personnel
defer to Defendant CorrecHealth on questions of medical care, including
medication management, mental health assessments, and determinations about
the necessity of emergency medical care.
141. Despite their contractual and constitutional obligations, Defendants
CorrectHealth and Millenia had a policy, custom or practice of unreasonably
delaying or completely failing to provide medical care to inmates at the Jail,
especially when it came to emergency medical care necessitated by the
unconstitutional violations of officers and personnel at the Jail.
142. Despite their contractual and constitutional obligations, Defendants
CorrectHealth and Millenia had a policy, custom or practice of unreasonably
delaying or denying inmates with serious medical needs, access to treatment at a
28
hospital, or outside emergency medical services, especially when it came to
inmates who needed to be hospitalized or admitted as a result of injuries sustained
from excessive force or other unconstitutional acts or omissions of Jail officers
or personnel.
143. These policies, customs or practice of delaying or denying emergency
medical assistance to inmates were widespread and routine.
144. They were also intentional, willing and the moving force behind the
deliberate indifference to Mr. Thurmond’s serious medical need on November
28, 2022, which was brought on by the unconstitutional acts and omissions of the
Jail’s officers and personnel.
145. Despite knowledge or notice of such custom or practice, Defendants
CorrectHealth and Millenia tacitly authorized its employees, agents or
contractors to unconstitutionally delay or deny emergency medical care by not
hiring, training or supervising its employees and agents to provide emergency
medical care in the Jail or send inmates to the hospital, and by not reporting,
disciplining, or terminating employees, agents or contractors that delayed or
denied emergency medical care.
146. Mr. Thurmond’s pain and suffering, as well as his subsequent death,
was directly and proximately caused by Defendant CorretHealth’s and Defendant
29
Millenia’s policy, custom and practice of deliberate indifference to the serious
medical need of pretrial detainees and inmates.
COUNT VI
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS
(Clayton County, Allen, CorrectHealth, and Millenia)
147. Defendant Clayton County has a constitutional duty to provide
constitutionally adequate medical care to pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth
Amendment, which includes the duty to provide adequate mental health care.
148. Defendants CorrectHealth and Millenia, and their employees, agents or
contractors, have the primary responsibility for the care and treatment of inmates
who present a danger to themselves, which includes an initial medical assessment
regarding any mental health diagnosis, monitoring their behavior for signs of
mental impairment, and administering or prescribing medications as necessary.
149. Defendants CorrectHealth and Millenia, and their employees, agents or
contractors were responsible for performing mental health crisis interventions,
and ensuring that a physician was present or on call twenty-four hours a day for
emergency medical or mental health care, as well as having a mental health
specialist on staff for crisis intervention.
150. Defendants Clayton County, Allen, CorrectHealth and Millenia knew
that Mr. Thurmond had serious mental impairment when he was processed into
the Jail, and needed either immediate mental health referral, medication or crisis
intervention.
30
151. Defendants Clayton County, Allen, CorrectHealth and Millenia knew
that Mr. Thurmond was actively suffering a serious mental health crisis based on
calls for help from Mr. Thurmond and other inmates that warranted an immediate
mental health referral, medication or crisis intervention.
152. Despite knowledge that Mr. Thurmond was actively suffering a serious
mental health crisis, Defendants Clayton County, Allen, CorrectHealth and
Millenia failed to make an immediate mental health referral, administer the
proper medication, or provide any mental health crisis intervention to reduce the
risk of self-harm and the unnecessary use of deadly force on Mr. Thurmond.
153. Mr. Thurmond’s death arose after officers responded to reported
attempts to harm himself or erratic behavior as result of a mental health crisis
aggravated by not having his medication or other adequate medical or mental
health accommodations or treatment.
154. These failures were a part of pattern or practice of disregarding the
mental health needs of inmates or pretrial detainees at the Jail by Defendants
Clayton County, Allen, CorrectHealth and Millenia.
155. Defendants Clayton County, Allen, CorrectHealth and Millenia had
notice of this pattern or practice of deliberate indifference to the serious need of
pretrial detainees for immediate mental health referrals, prescriptions or adequate
crisis intervention.
31
156. As a direct and proximate result of the deliberate indifference of
Defendants Clayton County, Allen, CorrectHealth and Millenia, to the serious
mental health crisis needs of Mr. Thurmond, he was met with deadly force.
157. This custom or practice was the moving force behind the actions or
omissions of the employees, agents or contractors of Defendants Clayton County,
Allen, CorrectHealth and Millenia, who were all deliberately indifferent to the
mental health needs of Mr. Thurmond and such indifference foreseeably resulted
in Mr. Thurmond’s mental health crisis and his deadly encounter with the
Restraining Officers.
158. As such, Defendants Clayton County, Allen, CorrectHealth and
Millenia and Defendant CorrectHealth are liable under § 1983 for violating Mr.
Thurmond’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
159. Defendant Clayton County continued to retain, hire, approve, ratify and
rely upon Defendants CorrecthHealth and Millenia, and their employees, agents
and contractors, to provide adequate mental health care to inmates or pretrial
detainees experiencing mental health crises despite the pattern and practice of
inadequate care to such individuals.
160. Defendant Clayton County violated Mr. Thurmond’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights by its ratification of the pattern and practice of blatant
disregard for the serious mental health needs of inmates and pretrial detainees at
32
the Jail by private contractors, as well as staff or personnel acting in their role as
Clayton County employees, officers or jailers.
161. Defendant Clayton County’s ratification of this pattern and practice
was the moving force behind the deliberate indifference to Mr. Thurmond’s
serious mental health need by private contractors and officers.
162. As a proximate result of Defendant Clayton County’s ratification of a
pattern and practice of disregard, Mr. Thurmond experienced suffering and death.
COUNT VII
UNCONSTITUIONAL VIOLATIONS OF ADA
(Allen and Restraining Officers)
163. Defendant Allen and the deputies of his office act as arms of the state
in setting use of force policies, and when exercising the power to fire and hire
deputies.
164. The Jail is a public entity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) and 28
C.F.R. § 35.104.
165. The State of Georgia is liable for money damages caused by
unconstitutional violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by
Defendant Allen and the deputies under his office. United States v. Georgia, 546
U.S. 151, 155-160 (2006).
166. Mr. Thurmond was an individual with a disability within the meaning
of Title II of the ADA because he suffered from a mental impairment that, without
33
the proper medication or treatment, substantially limited or restricted one or more
of his major life activities.
167. Mr. Thurmond was qualified to receive accommodations and mental
health services or medications, to ensure effective communication with other
inmates and Jail personnel and staff despite his mental impairment, as well as to
prevent him from posing a threat to himself.
168. As an arm of the State of Georgia, the deputies and jailers controlled
where Mr. Thurmond was housed and what mental health or medical services he
received.
169. Mr. Thurmond was denied the benefits and services that would have
allowed him to function and take care of himself in Jail by reason of his disability.
170. This denial of services was not because providing such services or
medication would have caused an undue burden or fundamentally altered the
nature of the services provided at the Jail, but because accommodation of Mr.
Thurmond’s mental illness was not in-line with the policy and practice of making
the Jail Georgia’s toughest para-military jail.
171. Mr. Thurmond was placed in a medical unit or infirmary although he
was not actually provided any mental health care for his mental impairment
during or before his mental health crisis, despite the aforementioned knowledge
and calls for crisis intervention.
34
172. Mr. Thurmond was otherwise discriminated against due to his disability
by the Restraining Officers, who used excessive force because Mr. Thurmond
had a mental health episode and not because of any legitimate need to subdue or
control Mr. Thurmond, as the Restraining Officers punitively restrained Mr.
Thurmond in the prone position for nearly twenty minutes after he stopped
resisting and was under their control, using the type of force that was in-line with
the announced policy of being a para-military jail.
173. As a result of these unconstitutional violations of the ADA, Mr.
Thurmond died an excruciating death.
174. These violations of Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and its
implementing regulations, by officers acting as arms of the State of Georgia were
unconstitutional as described herein, and Plaintiffs are entitled to money damages
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.
COUNT VIII
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
(Castellanos and Longonje)
175. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1, Plaintiffs attach as “Exhibit B,” an
Affidavit setting forth the qualifications of the person signing the document, and
at least one act of negligence committed by Defendant Castellanos, and any other
nurse or medical personnel responsible for the acts and omissions identified in
the Affidavit.
35
176. Defendant Castellanos delayed life saving care, arrived inadequately
prepared to care for Mr. Thurmond, and failed to take primary responsibility for
the medical care of Mr. Thurmond despite observing him lying face down on the
ground while unresponsive.
177. Defendants Castellanos and Peter Longonje, and any other employee,
agent or contractor of Defendants CorrectHealth or Millenia responsible for the
acts and omissions identified in the Affidavit, failed to exercise the required
degree of care and skill in the care and treatment of Mr. Thurmond, particularly
in the response to his mental health crisis, including but not limited to the failure
to timely respond with the required care and skill and with the necessary medical
equipment.
178. Defendants Castellanos and Longonje failed to exercise the reasonable
degree of care and skill ordinarily employed by nurses under similar conditions
and like circumstances.
179. Defendant Does responsible for the acts and omissions identified in the
Affidavit failed to exercise the reasonable degree of care and skill ordinarily
employed by nurses, clinical supervisors, mental health professionals, or medical
assistants, under similar conditions and like circumstances.
36
180. As a direct and proximate result of the delayed response, and the
negligence of Defendant Castellanos upon arrival, Mr. Thurmond suffered pain
and succumbed to fatal injuries inflicted on him by the Restraining Officers.
181. As a direct and proximate result of the failure to respond or the
negligence of Defendant Longonje and Defendant Does, who were employees,
agents, or contractors of Defendants CorrectHealth or Millenia, Mr. Thurmond
suffered pain and succumbed to fatal injuries inflicted on him by the Restraining
Officers.
COUNT IX
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
(CorrectHealth and Millenia)
182. At all times material herein, Defendant Castellanos, Defendant
Longonje, and Defendant Does were employees, agents or contractors of
Defendants CorrectHealth or Defendant Millenia (collectively, “Private
Contractors”), and were acting within the course and scope of their employment,
agency or contract.
183. At all times material herein, Defendants Castellanos and Longonje were
employees or agents of Private Contractors, who entered into a contract by and
between Defendant Clayton County or each other, to provide medical care,
mental health services, and nursing services to inmates or pretrial detainees at the
Jail with, at minimum, the degree of care and skill required under O.C.G.A. § 51-
1-27.
37
184. Private Contractors, individually or collectively, are vicariously liable
for the negligent acts and omissions of Defendants Castellanos and Longonje that
were committed in the course and scope of their employment, agency or contract.
185. Private Contractors, individually or collectively, are vicariously liable
for the negligent acts and omissions of Defendant Does that were committed in
the course and scope of their employment, agency or contract.
186. Private Contractors are vicariously liable for the pre-death injuries and
suffering of Mr. Thurmond, as well as the death suffered by Mr. Thurmond, due
to the negligence of Defendants Castellanos and Longonje, and any other
employees, agents or contractors responsible for the acts and omissions identified
in the Affidavit.
COUNT X
NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETENTION, TRAINING AND SUPERVISION
(CorrectHealth and Millenia)
187. Defendant CorrectHealth negligently hired and retained Defendant
Millenia to provide medical care and skilled services to inmates and pretrial
detainees at the Jail despite knowledge of Defendant Millenia’s record of hiring
and retaining unqualified and untrained nurses, or its track record of not
providing the appropriate number and level of medical staff to the Jail.
188. Defendant CorrectHealth negligently failed to maintain policies,
procedures and budgets, for its employees and contractors, that would provide
38
for adequate medical care and mental health services to be provided to inmates
and pretrial detainees with mental illnesses.
189. Private Contractors negligently failed to properly train and supervise
employees, agents and contractors, including Defendants Castellanos and
Longonje, to provide pretrial detainees like Mr. Thurmond with appropriate care,
but retained such nurses, medical assistants, or mental health professionals even
though they were not properly trained.
190. As a direct and proximate result of the negligent hiring, training and
supervision by Private Contractors, individually and collectively, Mr. Thurmond
suffered and experienced death.
COUNT XI
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES
191. The acts and omissions of Defendants described herein constitute
willful misconduct, malice, oppression, and an entire want of care, and caused
Mr. Thurmond’s suffering and death, such that Plaintiffs are entitled to punitive
damages under state and federal laws.
192. Plaintiffs are also entitled to recovery of costs, including reasonable
attorney’s fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for constitutional claims.
39
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for trial before a jury and judgment against
Defendants as follows:
a) That Plaintiffs recover all general, special, compensatory, derivative and
punitive damages as well as costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 and prejudgment interest.
b) That Plaintiffs recover for the expenses of litigation, including for reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11;
c) That all issues be tried before a jury; and
d) For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
This 28th day of November, 2023.
REYNOLDS LAW GROUP, LLC
By: /s/ Isaac Tekie

Isaac Tekie
GA Bar No. 558190
Thomas E. Reynolds, Jr.
GA Bar No. 778864
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

3390 Peachtree Road, N.E., Ste. 1100
The Lenox Towers
Atlanta, Georgia 30326
888.665.0241 (T)
888.677.1453 (F)
40
EXHIBIT "A"
EXHIBIT "B"
intervention tools and likely decreased Mr. Thurmond's chances of survival; (5) The CPR
compressions delivered by the officers were noted to be inadequate, with some compressions
being shallow and out of cadence, potentially affecting the effectiveness of the CPR procedure.
Compressions should have been 2 to 2.4 inches into the chest at a rate of 100 to 120
compressions per minute. Overall, the observed deficiencies indicate a failure to meet the
recommended nursing response for cardiac arrest, and the deficiency likely negatively impacted
Mr. Thurmond's chances of survival.
For the foregoing reasons, it is my professional opinion that the treatment that Mr. Thurmond
received from CorrectHealth and its employees/agents during his detention at Clayton County
Jail during the November 27, 2022 medical emergency was professionally negligent, and did not
meet the reasonably skilled and competent standard of care applied to LPNs.
Further, Affiant sayeth Not.
�;
Annette Elliott-Sullivan MSN, RN
I, the undersigned Notary Public, in and for said State and County, hereby certify that Annette
Elliott-Sullivan, whose name is signed to the foregoing Affidavit, and who is known to me,
acknowledged before me on this day that, being informed of the contents of said Affidavit, he
executed same voluntarily on the day the same bears date.
Given under my hand and seal this 1....\ day of f\uqu.\-\:: , 20]3.
Notary Public
My Commission Expires: � \ • 13. 1-02..1
SEE
/TTAC
Ir-
CALIFORNIA NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT
A notary public or other officer completing this certificate

verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the
document to which this certificate is attached, and not the
truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.
State of California
County of Los Angeles
, 20 :23 before me, Alexandria Ortiz/ Notary Public,
personally appeared,· Ahae.,-itt.. ' E \ \) o±t- �u \\\ \}CA n
who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s)
is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed
the same ih his/her/their authorized capa.city(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the
instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the
instrument.
I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing paragraph is true and correct.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.

········�
Notary Public • California
ALEXANDRIA ORTIZ
Los Angeles County

Commission # 2444166
z
�
-
y Comm. Expires Apr 13, 2027
(Seal)

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Case 1:23-cv-05443-MHC Document 1 Filed 11/28/23 Page 1 of 46

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

LATERRAL ENGLAND, in her

CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA;

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Laterral England, as administrator for the estate of

their Complaint for Damages:

County Jail, which was proximately and/or actually caused by Defendants.

2. Plaintiffs seek money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title

II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.

3. Plaintiffs assert Mr. Thurmond suffered death due to excessive force,

deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, medical neglect, and

discrimination based on his disability.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

involved in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 42 U.S.C. §§

12133, 1983, 1988.

5. The proper venue is the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division,

as all acts complained of occurred in Clayton County, Georgia.

6. Clayton County and the Sheriff’s Office of Clayton County were

presented notice of Plaintiffs’ claims, where applicable, within twelve months

sufficient information and time to resolve such claims pursuant to O.C.G.A. §

States and a resident of the city of Hapeville, Georgia.

8. Plaintiff Laterral England is Mr. Thurmond’s sister and the appointed

appointing Plaintiff as executor is attached hereto as “Exhibit A.”

Thurmond’s two surviving minor children.

10. Plaintiff Niyah Thurmond is the adult daughter of Mr. Thurmond.

11. Defendant Clayton County, Georgia (“Clayton County” or “County”)

is a political subdivision of the State of Georgia, a “public entity” within the

and is responsible for providing constitutionally adequate conditions for pre-trial

care of pre-trial detainees at the Jail, including the provision of constitutionally

adequate mental health services.

12. Defendant Levon Allen (“Allen”) is the Sheriff of Clayton County.

Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO” or “Sheriff’s Office”). As a constitutional officer, the

constitutionally sound manner. Furthermore, the Jail is a “public entity” within

the meaning of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104, and is

and implementing use-of-force policies and procedures, the classification and

housing of inmates, as well as the hiring and training of jailers.

13. Defendant Ellonte Johnson (“Johnson”) was a Clayton County Deputy

14. Defendant Randy Gaddy (“Gaddy”) was a Clayton County Deputy

15. Defendant Dionte McCauley (“McCauley”) was a Clayton County

16. Defendant Fred Denson (“Denson”) was a Clayton County Deputy

17. Defendant Derrick Doyle (“Doyle”) was a Clayton County Deputy

18. Defendant Danilo Jones (“Jones”) was a Clayton County Deputy

19. Defendant Tameika Smith (“Smith”) was a Clayton County Deputy

20. Defendant Correcthealth Clayton, LLC (“CorrectHealth”) is and was,

with Defendant Clayton County to perform a traditional government function

management, and medication management, as well as other related services,

21. Defendant Millenia Medical Services, Inc. (“Millenia”) is and was, at

contracts with Defendant Clayton County and/or Defendant CorrectHealth to

providing administrative services, physician care, nursing care, emergency

medical and sick-call services, medical records management, and medication

management, as well as other related services, including the provision of mental

health services for the Jail’s mentally ill population

22. Defendant Jessica Castellanos was, at all times material hereto, a

private contractor at the Jail performing a traditional government function under

Millenia and/or Defendant CorrectHealth.

contractor at the Jail performing a traditional government function under color of

and/or Defendant CorrectHealth.