FTGuide To Bond and Money Markets

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Do you want to develop a good working knowledge of FT FT Guides
Glen Arnold, PhD has held positions of

key financial terms? Guides
Professor of Investment and Professor
of Corporate Finance, but came to the
Looking to invest your savings? FINANCIAL TIMES Guides BOND AND
MONEY
BOND AND MONEY MARKETS

conclusion that academic life is not nearly as Keen to learn more about money market instruments?
BOND AND
much fun as making money in the financial
markets. As a wealthy investor in his early
50s, Glen now spends most of his time
Curious about financial markets in the modern MARKETS
running his own equity portfolio (see www. economy?
MONEY
glen-arnold-investments.co.uk) and a property The Financial Times Guide to Bond and Money
development company from his offi ce in the Then this is the book for you. Markets is a practical and easy-to-follow
heart of rural Leicestershire. introduction to the global wholesale financial
markets. Bestselling author Glen Arnold shows
Glen is the author of the investing classics
The Great Investors, The Financial Times
Guide to Value Investing, The Financial Times
Guide to Investing and Get Started in Shares. The Financial Times Guide to Bond and Money Markets is your
MARKETS you how bond and money markets work, where
they are located, and explains their impact on
everyday life.
definitive introduction to the financial marketplace. This book The Financial Times Guide to Bond and Money
He wrote the market-leading university
textbooks Corporate Financial Management, provides an authoritative and comprehensive guide to the workings GLEN ARNOLD Markets includes:
Modern Financial Markets and Institutions and of the modern financial system. It will help you understand key
• An overview of bond and money markets
Essentials of Corporate Financial Management. bond and money market terms and will demystify the different
types of markets, explaining the role of money market instruments • Government, international and corporate
He is also the author of three definitive books bonds
and revealing how fluctuations in the marketplace can affect your
on finance written for the professional market: • Interbank and Eurocurrency markets
own money strategies.
The Financial Times Handbook of Corporate • Treasury bills and commercial paper
Finance, The Financial Times Guide to the The Financial Times Guide to Bond and Money Markets:
Financial Markets and The Financial Times • Repurchase agreements and certifi cates
of deposits
Guide to Banking. All of these books are • Provides an easy-to-follow guide to bond and money markets
available from Financial Times Publishing. • Bills of exchange and banker’s acceptances
• Helps you understand the various markets and their functions
• Financial concepts and mathematics
• Explains in-depth finance theory and mathematical structures • Bond and money market securities valuation
• Features comprehensive graphs and real case studies from the • Central banking influences on interest rates
Financial Times
ARNOLD
FINANCE
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CVR_ARNO1799_01_SE_CVR.indd 1 06/07/2015 08:30

THE FINANCIAL TIMES
GUIDE TO BOND AND
MONEY MARKETS
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A01_ARNO1799_01_SE_FM.indd ii 7/7/15 8:46 AM
THE FINANCIAL TIMES
GUIDE TO BOND AND
MONEY MARKETS
GLEN ARNOLD
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PEARSON EDUCATION LIMITED
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First edition published 2015 (print and electronic)

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ISBN: 978-0-273-79179-9 (print)
978-0-273-79180-5 (PDF)
978-1-292-00542-3 (eText)
978-0-273-79181-2 (ePub)
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for the print edition is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Arnold, Glen.
The Financial Times guide to bond and money markets / Glen Arnold
pages cm
Includes index.
ISBN 978-0-273-79179-9 (print) -- ISBN 978-0-273-79180-5 (PDF) --
ISBN 978-1-292-00542-3 (eText) -- ISBN 978-0-273-79181-2 (ePub)
1. Bonds--Handbooks, manuals, etc. 2. Money market--Handbooks, manuals, etc.
3. Investments--Handbooks, manuals, etc. I. Title.
HG4651.A76 2015
332.63′23--dc23
2015020242
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
19 18 17 16 15
Front cover image © Kord.com/Getty Images
Print edition typeset in 9.5/14pt Stone Serif ITC Pro by 35
Print edition printed by Ashford Colour Press Ltd, Gosport
NOTE THAT ANY PAGE CROSS REFERENCES REFER TO THE PRINT EDITION
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CONTENTS
About the author vii

Preface viii
Acknowledgements x
PART 1
AN OVERVIEW 1
1 Introduction to bond and money markets 3
PART 2
BOND MARKETS 27
2 Government bonds 29
3 Government bonds around the world 61
4 Corporate bonds 103
5 Credit ratings for bonds 147
6 High-yield and hybrid bonds 175
7 International bonds 205
PART 3
MONEY MARKETS 237
8 Interbank and Eurocurrency 239
9 Treasury bills and commercial paper 263
10 Repurchase agreements and certificates of deposit 279
11 Bills of exchange and banker’s acceptances 297
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vi CONTENTS
PART 4
VALUING BONDS AND MONEY MARKET
INSTRUMENTS 309
12 Financial concepts and mathematics 311
13 Bond valuation 333
14 Money market securities valuation 363
PART 5
SOME VARIATIONS ON A BOND THEME 381
15 Securitisation 383
16 Central banking influence on interest rates 419
Index 460
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Glen Arnold, PhD, has held positions of Professor of Investment and Professor
of Corporate Finance, but came to the conclusion that academic life was not
nearly as much fun as making money in the financial markets. As a wealthy
investor in his early 50s, Glen now spends most of his time running his own
portfolio (www.glen-arnold-investments.co.uk) and a property development
company from his office in the heart of rural Leicestershire. He is happy to
share his ideas with fellow enthusiasts and so writes a regular Deep Value Shares
newsletter on the investment website ADVFN.
Glen is the author of the number one best-selling investment book The
Financial Times Guide to Investing as well as the investing classics The Financial
Times Guide to Value Investing, The Great Investors and Get Started in Shares. He
wrote the market-leading university textbooks Corporate Financial Management,
Modern Financial Markets and Institutions and Essentials of Corporate Financial
Management. He is also the author of three definitive books on finance: The
Financial Times Guide to Banking, The Financial Times Handbook of Corporate
Finance and The Financial Times Guide to the Financial Markets. All these books
are available from Pearson Education.
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PREFACE
Everybody’s life is touched by financial markets. This was painfully brought

home to us when markets built on badly thought-through finance collapsed,
triggering the long recession in 2008. Millions were thrown out of work, wages
were cut, governments went bust and interest rates were slashed. Clearly we all
need to have some acquaintance with what these financial instruments are
and how these markets work.
This book is a simple, easy-to-follow guide to bond and money markets, which
assumes no prior knowledge of finance. The emphasis is on gaining an under-
standing of the underlying concepts in the first half of the book, the impor-
tance of these markets and ideas in the practical world of finance. Later I
introduce those elements of quantitative finance that are absolutely essential.
This way, I hope, the essence of this technical subject is explained without
bamboozling the reader with an overload of mathematics.
It explains:
● the jargon used in the debt markets
● the wide variety of bond markets, from sovereign bonds to junk
● the vital role of money market instruments, ranging from commercial paper
to interbank lending
● the valuation of these securities and how value changes as interest rates
change.
Who might find the book useful?

● Market professionals needing a succinct, down-to-earth guide to throw light
into an area of knowledge that they know they need to fulfil their roles effec-
tively and advance their careers.
● People working at banks, insurance companies, lawyers’ offices and account-
ing firms needing to develop a good working knowledge of key financial
terms and functioning of the main markets.
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PREFACE ix
● University students needing more depth on bond and money markets than
is provided by their main course texts.
● Those curious minds who realise they need to understand the financial mar-
kets to comprehend the modern economy.
● Private investors who might consider putting some of their savings in these
markets.
I hope you enjoy the book.
Glen Arnold
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Susan Henton, my personal assistant, helped tremendously with this book.

I thank her for her thoughtful, diligent and meticulous contributions to so
many sections.
I would also like to thank Christopher Cudmore, my editor at Pearson

Education, for his enthusiasm, encouragement and support for this project.
The production team at Pearson did a great job of turning a raw manuscript
into a book. I would like to thank Lisa Robinson, Melanie Carter, Vivienne
Church, Jen Halford and Kelly Miller.
Publisher’s acknowledgements
We are grateful to the following for permission to reproduce copyright material:
Table 2.11 courtesy of FTSE Group; tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 3.1, 3.2, 3.5, 5.3, 5.4,
7.2, 7.3 and 11.2 courtesy of Thomson Reuters; table 9.6 courtesy of Moody’s
Investors Service; table 9.7 courtesy of Standard & Poor’s; table 10.1 courtesy of
Euro Repo Index.
Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 courtesy of Agence France Trésor; figure 3.6 courtesy of
Bundesrepublik Deutschland Finanzagentur; figures 4.6 and 4.7 courtesy of
www.advfn.com; figure 8.2 courtesy of the European Central Bank; figures
15.3, 15.5, 15.6 and 15.7 courtesy of the European Covered Bond Council.
All Financial Times articles © The Financial Times Limited. All Rights Reserved,
except Article 7.2, printed courtesy of Andrew Macdowall.
In some instances we have been unable to trace the owners of copyright material,
and we would appreciate any information that would enable us to do so.
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PART 1
AN OVERVIEW
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO BOND
AND MONEY MARKETS
Bond and money markets are vital parts of the global financial infrastructure.
They provide financing requirements for, and are essential to, the daily finan-
cial management of governments as well as thousands of corporations and
financial institutions. They also provide alternative sources of investment
returns for savers. A country’s economic strength will be reflected in the value
placed by the financial markets on its government-issued borrowing instru-
ments. Similarly, the financial strength of a corporation or a bank is indicated
by the rates of return it has to offer to borrow in the bond or money markets.
The difference between bond markets and money markets is a time or maturity
issue. The term to maturity (or simply term or maturity or tenor) is the
length of time remaining until the borrower pays the stated amount to the
lender who owns the bond or money market instrument. Generally, money
market instruments have maturity dates of one year or less, and bond markets
deal in instruments with maturities in excess of one year.
As you can see from the extract from the annual accounts of the giant drinks
company Diageo (Table 1.1), a firm requires good understanding of a great
many different debt instruments to carry out the efficient management of its
financing requirements, and it is crucial that this aspect of running a firm is
expertly executed. The debt instruments employed by Diageo are typical of
those used by large corporations, ranging from a simple bank overdraft to the
more esoteric hedging instruments, and may be in different currencies and
have different maturity dates. At this stage the titles of these instruments are
going to seem confusing jargon, but by the end of the book you will have a
sound understanding of terms such as commercial paper, medium-term notes
and interest rate hedging.
To keep track of all its financial instrument obligations and to ensure that a
company has sufficient finance for its needs throughout a year at the lowest
cost is a skilful undertaking and requires a complete understanding of the
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4 PART 1 AN OVERVIEW
Table 1.1
Repayment Currency Year end 2013 2012

date interest £ million £ million
rates %
Bank overdrafts On demand Various Various 111 38

Commercial paper – US dollar Various – 23
Bank and other loans Various Various Various 163 165
Credit support obligations 2013 Various Various 72 130
Guaranteed bonds 2013 2013 US dollar 5.2 – 478
Guaranteed bonds 2013 2013 Euro 5.5 983 –
Guaranteed bonds 2014 2014 US dollar 7.375 529 –
Fair value adjustment to – – – – 14
borrowings
Borrowings due within one 1,858 1,230

year and bank overdrafts
Guaranteed bonds 2013 2013 Euro 5.5 – 926

Guaranteed bonds 2014 2014 Euro 6.625 853 805
Guaranteed bonds 2015 2015 US dollar 5.3 493 477
Medium term notes 2018 US dollar 4.85 132 127
Bank and other loans Various Various Various 21 44
Fair value adjustment – – – 187 235
to borrowings
Borrowings due after one 8,233 7,399

year
Total borrowings before 10,091 8,629

derivative financial
instruments
Fair value of foreign currency – – – (205) (210)

forwards and swaps
Fair value of interest rate – (3)
hedging instruments
Total borrowings after 9,886 8,416

derivative financial
instruments
Source: Diageo plc, Annual Report 2013, Note 17
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1 INTRODUCTION TO BOND AND MONEY MARKETS 5
complexities of the bond and money markets. If a firm can achieve efficient
management of its financing requirements, its customers may also benefit
through lower prices. If a firm mismanages its financing, and has to pay
exorbitant interest rates on the money it needs to borrow, then these ineffi-
ciencies may well result in higher consumer prices or company liquidation.
Structure of the book

The first seven chapters of this book provide an introduction to the bond mar-
kets, followed by four chapters describing the different money markets. Only
when you have a firm grasp of the nature of these instruments do we look at
the mathematical structures required for bond and money valuations. Thus
maths is reserved for Chapters 12 to 14.
Then, in Chapters 15 and 16, we examine some of the more unusual securities
that have evolved from the markets, such as bonds where the interest paid to
investors depends on monthly mortgage payments from thousands of home
owners, or the trading of agreements to notionally deposit money and notion-
ally receive interest at a future date.
Finally, we consider the importance of central banks to the workings of these

markets and how the authorities try to control inflation through altering inter-
est rates in the money and bond markets.
Bonds
The concept of governments, companies and other institutions borrowing
funds to invest in long-term projects and operations is a straightforward one,
yet in today’s sophisticated capital markets, with their wide variety of financial
instruments and forms of debt, the borrowing and lending decision can be
bewildering. Is the domestic bond market or the Eurobond market the better
choice? On what terms, fixed- or floating-rate interest, with collateral or
unsecured? And what about high-yield bonds or convertibles? The variety of
methods of providing long-term finance is almost infinite.
A bond is a long-term contract in which the bond holder lends money to

the bond issuer.1 Basically, bonds may be regarded as merely IOUs with pages
of legal clauses expressing the promises made. In return for the loan of money,
1
Also called the debtor or borrower.
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the issuer promises to make predetermined payments in the future which

consist of an interest component, known as the coupon (usually regularly,
once or twice a year), and the payment of a capital sum, the face value (par
value or nominal value) of the bond, at the end of the bond’s life. Straight-
forward bonds like this are known as plain vanilla bonds (or conventional
bonds), but bonds come in a variety of types. Some do not promise a capital
repayment, they just keep paying the coupon in perpetuity. Others do not
offer a regular coupon, just a lump sum at the end of a period of time; these
are known as zero coupon bonds. Some bonds have features such as floating
rates of interest, ‘bullet’ or ‘balloon’ payments (all explained later).
Primary and secondary markets

Bond issuers obtain funding by issuing new bonds on the primary market,
where the sale is usually handled by one or a syndicate of dealers and/or
brokers, who earn commission by selling the issue to investors. After this
initial sale, the bonds may be traded on the secondary market between
investors, either through stock exchanges for listed bonds or, more likely, over
the counter. Over the counter (OTC) trading is trading carried out between
two parties directly (dealer-to-dealer or dealer-to-investor) as opposed to
exchange trading which is carried out on a highly regulated public market.
Bonds may change hands several times before their maturity.
The secondary markets are sometimes very liquid; that is, those organisations
lending their surpluses to borrowers by buying bonds are able to get at their
capital (turn it into cash) by selling quickly to other investors without the risk
of reducing the price significantly, and the transaction costs of releasing the
cash are low. But most corporate bonds have pretty poor liquidity, with most
primary market investors buying them and then holding until maturity,
resulting in very few secondary market trades.
Shorts, mediums and longs

Bonds with up to five years left until they mature and pay their principal
(the amount that the issuer agreed to pay the owner at the maturity date) are
generally known as shorts, but the boundary lines are often blurry; medium-dated
(intermediate) bonds generally have remaining maturities of between 5 and
12 or 15 years; longs are bonds with remaining maturities of over 12 years.
An alternative classification is ultra-shorts, up to 3 years; shorts, 3–7 years;
mediums, 7–15 years; and longs, over 15 years. The time to maturity for bonds
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when they are first issued is generally between 5 and 30 years, but it should be
noted that a bond is classified during its life according to the time remaining
to maturity, not the maturity when it was issued, so a 30-year bond which has
only 4 years left until it matures, is a short.
A number of firms have issued bonds with a longer than usual maturity date –
IBM and Reliance of India have issued 100-year bonds, as have Coca-Cola and
Walt Disney (Disney’s was known as the ‘Sleeping Beauty bond’). There are
even some 1,000-year bonds in existence – Canadian Pacific Corporation is
paying a dividend of 4% on a 1,000-year bond issued in 1883 by the Toronto
Grey and Bruce Railway and due to be repaid in 2883.
Bonds, equity, bank loans and overdrafts compared

Both bonds and equities (shares in companies) are generally negotiable
securities, i.e. they can be traded on financial markets. The advantage a bond
possesses over a share is that the investor is promised a return. Bond investors
are exposed to less risk than share investors because the promise is backed up
by a series of legal rights, e.g. the right to receive the annual interest before the
equity (share) holders receive any dividend. So in a bad year (e.g. no profits)
bond investors are far more likely to receive a payout than shareholders. This
is usually bolstered by rights to seize company assets if the company reneges
on its commitment to pay coupons or redeem bonds at maturity. If things go
very badly for the firm, there is a greater chance of saving the investors’ invest-
ments if they are holding its bonds rather than its shares, because on liquida-
tion the holders of debt-type financial securities are paid from the proceeds
raised by selling off the assets first, before shareholders receive anything.
Offsetting these plus points are the facts that bond holders do not (usually) share
in the increase in value created by an extraordinarily successful business, and
there is an absence of any voting control over the management of the company.
For a company, bonds offer the advantage of long-term borrowing, often with
a constant interest rate for, say, 15 years; the original lenders cannot withdraw
the capital they lent from the company or increase the interest rate (this is the
most common case, but, given the potential for innovation here, there are
bonds that allow these things). An overdraft may have a variable interest rate
and can be withdrawn at short notice, leaving the company in need of finance.
It also has to be renewed, maybe every six months, and there is a real danger
that the lender will refuse to ‘roll over’ (continue) the debt at a future renewal
date, or may demand a much higher interest rate to continue the lending.
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Term loans from banks are often more difficult to obtain in the size required by
larger companies, and they frequently cost more over the lifetime of the loan.
Of course, bank overdrafts and loans have the advantage that they are available
even to the smallest firms, whereas the bond market is generally open for large
firms only.
Fixed-interest securities
Bonds are often referred to collectively as fixed-interest securities. Most
bonds are indeed fixed rate, offering regular coupon amounts agreed at the
outset, but some are variable, with the interest rising or falling every few
months depending on a benchmark interest rate (e.g. Libor, the London
Interbank Offered Rate – discussed in Chapter 8). Other bonds vary the interest
paid for a particular three or six months depending on all sorts of factors, e.g.
the rate of inflation or the price of copper. Nevertheless they are all lumped
together as fixed interest to contrast these types of loan instrument with equit-
ies that do not carry a promise of a return.
Fluctuating values
The value of a bond – the price at which it is trading between investors on the
secondary market – may fluctuate considerably during its life, and this value
reflects the changes in the prevailing interest rate. Bonds are usually issued, but
not always, with a nominal value of £100 or $1,000 (or €1,000, etc.). They
may have any nominal value, but typical ‘lots’ are 100, 1,000, 10,000 and
50,000 of, say, pounds, euros or dollars. A five-year £100 bond issued with a
coupon of 5% means that it will pay £5 per year, which is 5% of its nominal
value of £100. After five years have expired, the issuer will have made five
payments of the £5 coupon to the current holder, or ten of £2.50 if it pays
semi-annual (every six months) interest, and the eventual holder receives the
nominal value of £100 at the end of the term.
If, during those five years, the interest rate that investors demand for bonds of
a similar risk class and time to maturity rises, the market value of the bond will
fall to compensate for its coupon rate of only 5%, so that its rate of return
reflects the prevailing interest rate.
To put it simply, if a five-year £100 bond is issued with a coupon of 5% and

market interest rates for bonds with similar risk and length of time to maturity
remain at 5% for the five-year life of the bond, its value will remain at £100
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throughout its life. However, this is unlikely to be the case, as the value of a
bond will fluctuate throughout its life to take into account the prevailing rate
of interest. Interest rates may change daily and the value of bonds changes
accordingly. If interest rates on alternative, equally risky bonds rise to 6%
when the bond has three years left to maturity, the bond will be a less attractive
investment were it still to be offered for sale at £100. It is offering the following
deal: in one year receive £5, in two years another £5, and in three years £100
plus the final £5 coupon, i.e. 5% at a time when other bonds offer 6% for the
same risk and maturity.
For investors to obtain the current going rate of 6%, the bond must offer
secondary market traders £5 per year plus a capital gain over the next three
years. This will occur if the price of the bond drops to £97.327 (take this
on trust for now, you will be able to calculate this yourself after reading
Chapter 13). At this price, investors gain £2.673 by buying at £97.327 and
receiving £100 on maturity three years later.
The capital gain is worth £2.673 ÷ £97.327 = 2.746% over three years, or
0.915% per year. Add that to the coupon of £5 per year on an investment that cost
£97.327, which in percentage terms works out at 5.137% per year, £5 ÷ £97.327
= 5.137%, and you obtain (approximately) the 6% that investors in bonds of
this risk class and maturity are now requiring. These are rough calculations
to give you the gist, precision comes in Chapter 13 – then you’ll see how the
overall rate of return does work out at exactly 6% once we take into account the
timing of compounding (interest received on the interest in the three years).
So the bond selling in the secondary market is rather like a bank account that
offers the following deal: you put £97.327 into the bank account and the bank
pays you 6% interest per year. Each year you withdraw £5. At the end of three
years your bank account contains £100. However, while a bank account might
produce this type of deal if you agree to hold your money there for the full
three years, the bond has the advantage that you can choose to sell the bond
to another investor at any point during the three years.
Conversely, if general interest rates that investors are now accepting for this
risk class fall to 2% when the bond has three years to maturity, then it will
seem an attractive investment at £100, because it is offering a better rate of
interest than is current, and its price will rise to £108.652. Investors are accept-
ing a capital loss of £8.652 over the three years but being compensated with
three lots of £5.
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In both these cases, the bond will still be worth its face value (£100) at the end
of its life.
The size of the bond markets

Bonds are the most significant financial instruments in the world today, with
more than $90,000,000,000,000 ($90 trillion) in issue in 2013 – see Figure 1.1.2
To put this number into perspective, the UK’s annual output (gross domestic
product, GDP) for one year is about £1.5 trillion.
Bonds come in all shapes and sizes, from UK government bonds to Chinese
company bonds. Of this vast volume of $90 million million bonds3 outstanding
Figure 1.1 Amounts outstanding in the world bond market

Source: Data from the Bank for International Settlements
2
Included in the BIS figures for domestic bonds are a small fraction of money market
instruments.
3
This includes all currencies, even though they are summed in US dollars.
M01_ARNO1799_01_SE_C01.indd 10 7/7/15 8:46 AM

(not yet redeemed – the capital has not been repaid), about $70 trillion are
issued in the domestic bond markets of countries, that is issued within
the country in its currency by resident issuers, under the jurisdiction of the
authorities there. In addition to these domestic bonds there are another $20
trillion of bonds issued outside the domestic markets on the international
bond markets. These are issued outside the market where the borrower resides.
These can either be outside the jurisdiction of the country in whose currency
the bond is denominated – thus a bond denominated in pounds sterling
but issued in Switzerland is outside of the control of London regulators and
government (a Eurobond) – or issued by foreigners in a country’s currency in
and under the rules of that country (a foreign bond).
Most bonds are bought by investment institutions such as pension funds,

insurance companies, etc. When bonds are bought and sold on the secondary
markets between investors the returns in the market place can be quite
volatile. See Figure 1.2 for US government bonds and US shares (stocks), which
Figure 1.2 A comparison between real (inflation removed) annual returns on US

government bonds and US equities (calculated by imagining that each year bonds or
shares are bought on 1 January and sold on 31 December and taking into account
both income (interest or dividends) and capital gains or losses over the year resulting
from selling to another investor at the end of the year)
Source: Data from Barclays Equity Gilt Study 2014
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shows some large ups and downs over a ten-year period. As we saw in the
example of the 5% coupon bond, if the rates of return investors demand
from bonds in the future rise, then the price of the bond can fall, sometimes
dramatically as in the case of 2013. Thus there are years when bond prices fall
by a larger percentage than the percentage coupon rate, resulting in an overall
negative return for the year for an investor who buys at the beginning of the
year and sells at the end.
It might be difficult to discern from this figure, with it being only for a ten-year
period and one subject to a severe shock in 2008, that it is generally the case
that bond returns are less volatile than share returns. This is better illustrated
in Figure 1.3, which shows the returns on UK government bonds (gilts) over
each of the years from 1900 to 2013. These are not interest rates that the
government paid, rather they are the combination of the cash coupon received
Figure 1.3 UK annual real gilt returns 1900–2013, percentage (real means after
excluding inflation)
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as a percentage of the secondary market price at the start of the year, plus the
capital gain or loss in the secondary market over 365 days for bonds with 15 or
20 years to run before the government redeems them.
Note that there are many years where the return was negative. However, a
comparison with the equity markets’ returns shows that government bond
returns were far less volatile than equity returns – see Figure 1.4. Shares quite
often show annual returns up and down more than 15%; bonds show this
relatively infrequently.
Governments issue bonds to finance the gap between what they raise in taxes
and what they spend. Bonds from strong nations, such as the UK, the USA or
Germany, are considered (almost) risk free with regard to the likelihood of the
issuer not paying coupons and/or the principal, or breaching some other con-
dition in the agreement, i.e. default risk, and so give relatively low rates of
return because of their small risk factor. If a country is in economic trouble,
with high levels of borrowing, investors may become nervous that they will
Figure 1.4 UK annual real equity returns 1900–2013, percentage

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not receive their coupon payments and the return of the principal, and there-
fore be less willing to hold these bonds unless they offer higher interest rates.
This happened to Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland in 2011, causing their
bonds to be deemed a riskier investment and investors to require higher rates
of interest to invest in them.
Bond issuance
Financial institutions, usually an investment bank, may assist a firm to issue
bonds. This is known as underwriting and they generally guarantee to the
issuer that the entire issue will be sold. They then try to sell the bonds to investors,
taking the risk that they may not be able to sell the whole issue. Alternatively
they may act as a distribution agent for the issuer, trying to sell on a best-
efforts basis, but not guaranteeing the sale. A third possibility is that the
investment bank organises a private placement where one or more large
financial institutions are lined up to receive the whole of a forthcoming bond
issue. Companies, by paying commission to the financial institutions, benefit
from both their professional experience and skill in selling issues of bonds and
their reputation with investing institutions.
Credit ratings
To assist investors in assessing the likelihood of a borrower defaulting there are
teams of analysts working for credit rating companies who look into the
detail of the strengths and weaknesses of the borrower and give a rating to its
creditworthiness – a triple-A, AAA, Aaa rating means that the borrower is very
unlikely to default. Lower ratings, single-A, B, C or D, indicate that there is
progressively more risk of default. Details about credit ratings and the agencies
that issue them are in Chapter 5.
Corporations issue bonds to raise finance for operations or expansion plans.

These bonds may be rated in accordance with their company’s rating or may
have a rating of their own. They carry a higher risk of default than reputable
government bonds and so must pay a higher rate of interest. However, com-
panies may find that the payments they have to make on bond coupons are less
than they would have to pay for a similar size loan from a bank. They may also
find that it is easier to raise large amounts of money by means of a securities
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issue, whereas a bank may not be in a position to offer the total amount
required. When a company issues bonds, it has some control over what cove-
nants or restrictions are placed on the issue. Covenants are conditions with
which the bond issuer must comply (such as limiting the amount of debt a
company can take on).
Securitised and covered bonds

Banks are the main issuers of securitised or covered bonds, bonds which are
secured on assets from the regular and predictable income which companies
receive from sources such as mortgages, loans, leases, trade receivables, credit
card payments, etc.
Securitised bonds are issued by an entity separate from the owner of the cash
flow and therefore can have a separate credit rating which may well be a higher
rating than the company/bank as a whole is given. Thus, for example, a bank
might set up a separate company which receives monthly income from 1,000
house mortgage payers. This separate company issues bonds secured against
the mortgage rights it holds, and the bond interest is paid out of the mortgage
receipts from 1,000 households. The interest on these bonds may be fixed at
the time of issue or floating relative to a benchmark interest rate such as Libor,
a standard rate of interest for loans.
Covered bonds are secured on the cash flows from mortgages, public sector
loans or other loan receipts, but the assets (e.g. 1,000 mortgage rights) remain
on the balance sheet of the issuer, usually a bank or financial institution, which
retains control over them. Thus the covered bond holder has the security of
both the assigned assets, e.g. the cash inflows from 1,000 mortgages, and the
promise from the issuing firm to make good any shortfall if the securitised
assets are not sufficient. Covered bonds usually are perceived as very low risk
due to the reliability of the assets they can draw on.
Some technical terms for bonds

● Yield is the return achieved from the bond. There is a whole host of different
yields. The two main ones are:
● Current yield (also called interest yield, flat yield, income yield,
simple yield, annual yield or running yield) is the annual income
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received divided by price of the instrument. In our earlier example with a

bond offering a £5 annual coupon and selling in the secondary market for
£97.327, the current yield is £5 ÷ £97.327 = 5.137%.
● Yield to maturity (also called redemption yield or gross redemption
yield) is the most important and is the one quoted in bond charts and
tables. It is the annual rate of return offered on the bond taking into
account all remaining coupon payments and the capital gain or loss on
the bond between its current price and the redemption face value. For our
example bond offering £5 per year and a capital gain over three years of
£100 minus £97.327 the yield to maturity is 6%. An explanation of yields
and the calculations is in Chapters 12 and 13.
● Put option can be added to the bond holder’s set of rights in the initial
agreement. It gives the holder the right but not the obligation to demand
that the issuer redeems the bond before its normal maturity date, i.e. to sell
it back to the issuer at a price that was fixed when the bond was first issued.
If interest rates have risen, resulting in the bond price falling, an investor
might seek to sell the bond to the issuer at the agreed price. The mere
existence of the right to receive full payment for the bond without recourse
to selling in the secondary market generally ensures that the price remains
above par value. This extra advantage for the holder has to be paid for –
usually achieved by the issuer offering a lower yield in the first place.
● Call option (callable bond) gives the bond issuer the right but not the
obligation to repurchase the bonds from the holder at a defined price; the
issuer can insist that the bond holder sell at a price at certain dates during
the life of the bond. Issuers may exercise this option if they no longer need
the funding or if they think they could reissue replacement bonds at a more
favourable yield rate (this may happen if market interest rates for this risk
class and time to maturity have fallen since the bond was first issued, i.e.
the bond price has risen). They are also aware that some bonds place tight
covenant restrictions on the firm so it is useful to be able to buy them back
and issue less restrictive bonds in their place. Finally, exercising the call may
permit the firm to adjust its financial leverage (that is the amount of debt
relative to shareholders’ equity capital) by reducing its debt. For these call
privileges the issuer will pay a higher coupon rate from the outset. In other
words, the bond will be sold for less than it would without the call feature
(and this also applies to secondary market prices). The fact that the bonds
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can be called back for redemption at any time is obviously not something
bond holders favour without offsetting compensation, especially when the
bond price would otherwise have risen significantly above the par value.
● Usually bonds are set up with a bullet structure, where regular payments
made reflect the interest only and the whole of the principal amount (face
value) is repaid at maturity. Balloon interest means that the coupons paid
on a long-term bond rise over time. Thus bonds issued to finance the con-
struction of a wind turbine field might pay low coupons in the early years
when income is poor and expenses high, but then, after the first three years,
the coupons grow larger.
● Principal is the amount that will be repaid on maturity, typically £100,
£1,000 or $1,000. It has various names: face value, par value, face amount,
redemption value or maturity value.
● Coupon rate is the amount of interest paid per year expressed as a percent-
age of the principal. Typically it is paid twice a year, or semi-annually, but it
could be paid more or less frequently than this. It is also known as interest
rate, dividend or nominal rate.
● Zero coupon is when a bond does not pay interest/coupon payments, but
is redeemed for face value at maturity. The return that an investor receives
on these bonds is achieved by buying the bonds at a discounted price
which is less than face value. So a five-year zero coupon bond that will be
redeemed at £100 might be selling at £60 today. Using the discounted
purchase price and the time to redemption, it is possible to work out the
annual yield during the life of the bond, which in this case works out at
10.76% (see Chapter 13 for the calculations).
● Convertible bonds can be converted at the insistence of the holder into
shares or other securities of the issuing company, usually equity shares.
● Floating-rate notes (FRNs) (also called variable-rate notes) have a variable
coupon reset on a regular basis, usually every three or six months, in relation
to a benchmark or reference rate. The typical term for an FRN is about
5–12 years.
● Bond funds are collective investment vehicles which enable small/retail
investors as well as major financial institutions to invest in a broad portfolio
of bonds. Some are listed on stock markets, others are traded over the
counter in tailor-made deals.
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Money markets
Money markets are a source of short-term finance for governments, corpora-
tions and other organisations. There are times when these organisations are in
need of funds for merely a day, a week or the next three months. They thus
need a place where they can borrow to make up a shortfall; the money markets
fulfil this role. Banks are an alternative source of short-term finance, but in
many cases the money markets are cheaper and involve less hassle.
At other times an organisation may have surplus funds and instead of keeping
that money as cash or in current accounts at banks, earning little or no interest,
it chooses to lend it out to those needing short-term funds by purchasing
money market instruments from them.
While we, as individuals, borrow to make up shortfalls or lend surpluses (e.g.

by withdrawing or depositing money in our bank accounts) and do so in tens,
hundreds or maybe thousands of pounds or euros, governments and com-
panies borrow or lend in millions of pounds or euros. Thus the money markets
are termed wholesale markets rather than retail markets.
Interest often comes from discount pricing

When manufacturing firms, financial institutions, governments, etc. find
themselves in need of short-term funds they often sell an instrument which
carries the promise to pay, say, £10 million in 30 days from now. For many of
the money market instruments the purchaser of that promise will not pay
as much as £10 million because they want to receive an effective interest
rate for lending. So they might pay, say, £9.9 million. Thus the security is
sold for less than face value. The discount is the difference between face
value and purchase price. The yield, the rate of interest gained by the holder,
occurs when the instrument reaches maturity and the face value is paid by
the issuer to the holder. In this case the return, if the instrument is held to
maturity, i.e. for 30 days, would be £100,000, which equates to 1.01%
(£100,000 ÷ £9,900,000 = 1.01%). To compare returns on different financial
securities, it is necessary to work out the annual rate, which is explained in
Chapters 12 and 14.
(Note that while most money market securities are issued at a discount, this is
not true of all of them. Certificates of deposit and interbank deposits (banks
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lending for short periods to each other), for example, are issued at their face
value and then redeemed at a higher value.)
Secondary trading in the money markets

With many money market instruments the original purchaser is able to sell
the instrument in the secondary market on to another investor before
maturity if they want to raise some cash themselves; thus these securities are
said to be liquid or negotiable. So, staying with the example, after 20 days the
original lender might sell this promise to pay £10 million in a further 10 days
for, say, £9.96 million. Thus a profit can be made by trading the instruments
on the secondary market before they reach the redemption date – in this
case £60,000.
However, it must be noted that a loss may be incurred by selling in the

secondary market. If, say, the original lender can only attract buyers at a price
of £9.87 million then it makes a £30,000 loss. This low price may occur if,
say, interest rates on similar financial instruments with 10 days to maturity
are now yielding a higher rate of return because lenders have become more
wary and are demanding higher rates of return to compensate for higher
risk – a lot can change in the financial markets in 20 days. The potential
secondary market purchaser would be silly to pay a price higher (receive a
lower yield) than the going market rate for this particular issue when there are
better deals to be had – i.e. the potential buyer has an opportunity cost
(the return on the best alternative use of their investment money) and so the
best the original lender can get is £9.87 million, if it has to sell. If it can avoid
selling for another 10 days then it will receive the full £10 million from the
borrower/issuer.
The discount and rate of interest (yield) earned are dependent on the risk
level and the maturity of the instrument. The maturity is the length of
time between issue of the instrument (start of borrowing) and the time it is
redeemed when money due is paid (original maturity), or the length of time
between when a security is priced or purchased in the secondary market and
the date of redemption (current maturity). The maturity length can vary
from overnight (borrowing for just 24 hours) to 3 months to 1 year (or more,
occasionally). Interest is measured in percentage points, which are further
divided into basis points (bps). One basis point equals 1/100 of a percentage
point.
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There are various types of money market instruments:
● Treasury bills are government-issued money market instruments. Most

governments round the world issue Treasury bills, often at government-run
auctions, and some countries’ bills are regarded as ‘risk-free’, better defined
as the lowest chance of default compared with all other financial securities.
There is a strong secondary market in these bills, and their secondary market
price (and hence their yield) will fluctuate according to current conditions.
(There is more on Treasury bills in Chapter 9.)
● Commercial paper is a very popular way of raising money for large,

well-regarded companies. For example, a corporation wishes to borrow
£100 million for two months. It issues commercial paper with a face value of
£101 million, payable in 60 days’ time. A purchaser is prepared to accept
the promise of the company to pay out in 60 days and so buys some of the
commercial paper, paying £25 million for one-quarter of the total issue
at a discount to the face value. In 60 days’ time, the purchaser collects
£25.25 million from the corporation. It has earned £250,000 in return for
lending the corporation £25 million. (More detail on commercial paper can
be found in Chapter 9.)
● Repurchase agreements (repos) are a way of borrowing for a few days using
a sale and repurchase agreement in which securities (e.g. government
bonds) are sold for cash at an agreed price with a promise to buy back the
securities at a specified (higher) price at a future date. The interest on the
agreement is the difference between the initial sale price and the agreed
buy-back, and because the agreements are usually collateralised (secured)
by government-backed securities such as Treasury bills, the interest rate is
lower than a typical unsecured loan from a bank. If the borrower defaults
on its obligations to buy back on maturity the lender can hold on to or
sell the securities. Banks and other financial institutions use repos very
regularly to borrow money from each other. Companies do use the repo
markets, but much less frequently than the banks. (There is more on repos
in Chapter 10.)
● Local authority issues are short-term instruments issued by local authorit-

ies to finance capital expenditure and cash flow needs. They tend to be
regarded as relatively safe investments. There is a strong market in local
authority bills and bonds in many European countries, notably France,
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Italy and Germany, where individual federal states issue them regularly.
There are also many bill issues by companies close to governments, e.g.
the French railway, SNCF, or the German postal service, Deutsche
Bundespost.
● Certificates of deposit (CDs) are issued by banks when funds are deposited
with them by other banks, corporations, individuals or investment compa-
nies. The certificates state that a deposit has been made (a time deposit) and
that at the maturity date the bank will pay a sum higher than that originally
deposited. The maturities are typically one to four months and can be nego-
tiable or non-negotiable. (You can find more on this in Chapter 10.) There
is a penalty on the saver withdrawing the money before the maturity date
(they are term securities). A company with surplus cash can put it into a
negotiable CD knowing that if its situation changes and it needs extra cash,
it can sell the CD for cash in a secondary market.
● Bills of exchange and banker’s acceptances are commercial financial
instruments, often linked to international trade (exports), which enable
corporations to obtain credit or raise money and to trade with corporations
at low risk of financial inconvenience or loss. Once issued, they may be
traded on the secondary markets. (There is more on these instruments in
Chapter 11.)
The markets in short-term money

Money markets exist all over the world as a means of facilitating business.
Domestic money market means that the funds are borrowed and lent in the
country’s home currency and under the authority of the country’s regulators.
There are also money markets outside the jurisdiction of authorities of the
currency of their denomination – these are the Euro money markets. This is
nothing to do with the currency in Europe: they were termed ‘Euro markets’
long before the euro was dreamed up.
Money markets are used by a wide variety of organisations, from treasury

departments of corporations to banks and finance companies (e.g. raising
large sums in the money markets to then provide hundreds of loans to people
wanting to buy cars on hire purchase deals). Pension funds and insurance
companies maintain a proportion of their investment funds in liquid, low-risk
form (they lend on the money markets) to meet unpredictable cash outflows, e.g.
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following a hurricane. These markets are also used by central banks to influence
interest rates charged throughout the economy – for example, changing base
rates at banks through the central bank conducting repo deals in the market
will have a knock-on effect on mortgage rates or business loan rates.
In the modern era, rather than having one or a few market locations or
buildings in which money market instruments are bought and sold, we have
organisations arranging deals over the telephone and then completing them
electronically. The process of bringing buyers and sellers together is assisted by
the many brokers and dealers who tend to operate from the trading rooms
of the big banks and specialist trading houses – they regularly trade money
market securities in lots worth tens of millions of pounds, dollars, etc. Some
of them act as market makers, maintaining an inventory of securities and
advertising prices at which they will sell and, slightly lower, prices at which
they will buy. By providing these middle-man services they assist the players
in the market to quickly find a counterparty willing to trade, thus enhancing
liquidity. They are said to be traders in STIR products, that is short-term
interest rate products.
Some of the trades are simply private deals with legal obligations to be enforced
by each side, but some are conducted through a central clearing house, with
each party responsible for reporting the deal to the clearing house, which set-
tles the deal by debiting the account of the buyer and crediting the account of
the seller. The clearing house then holds the security on behalf of the buyer.
The risk of a counterparty reneging on the deal (counterparty risk) is reduced
by trading through a clearing house because the clearing house itself usually
becomes a guarantor to each party.
Case study
Vodafone
You can get some idea of the importance of money markets to companies from
Table 1.2 showing investment amounts taken from Vodafone’s annual reports.
Vodafone keeps a large amount of cash and cash equivalents in reserve: over
£7 billion in 2013. Cash equivalents are not quite cash but they are so liquid that
they are near-cash (near-money or quasi-money). They are financial assets that
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can easily be sold to raise cash, or which are due to pay back their capital value
in a few days, with low risk regarding the amount of cash they will release. These
are mostly money market instruments.
Vodafone keeps such a large quantity of money available in this highly liquid and
low-risk form so that it can supply its various business units with the cash they
need for day-to-day operations or for regular investment projects. Also, it is useful
to have readily accessible money to be able to take advantage of investment
opportunities as they fleetingly appear (e.g. the purchase of a company).
Alternatively, the cash and near-cash is there because the company has recently
had a major inflow – perhaps it sold a division or has had bumper profits – and it
has not yet allocated the money to its final uses, such as paying billions in divid-
ends to shareholders, launching a new product, buying another company or simply
paying a tax bill. In the meantime that money might as well be earning Vodafone
some interest, so the money that is surplus to the immediate needs of Vodafone’s
various business units is gathered together and temporarily lent to other organisa-
tions in the money markets.
Vodafone also uses the money markets to borrow money. For example, at 2013
year-end it had more than £4 billion owing to purchasers of its commercial paper.
This was borrowed (and had to be repaid) in sterling, US dollars, euros and
Japanese yen. But this is not the half of it. Vodafone had arrangements with banks
to borrow via commercial paper as much as US$15 billion and £5 billion at any one
time. The banks committing to this deal will generally make arrangements for other
investors to supply this finance if Vodafone wishes to borrow this way to meet
short-term liquidity requirements at any point in the year.
Table 1.2 Money market holdings and cash taken from Vodafone’s annual
reports, 2008–2013
Cash and cash equivalents 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
£m £m £m £m £m £m
Cash at bank and in hand 1,396 2,762 896 745 811 451
Money market funds 3,494 3,190 5,015 3,678 3,419 477
Repurchase agreements 2,550 600 – – 648 478
Commercial paper – – – – – 293
Short term securitised investments 183 586 – – – –
Other – – 341 – – –
Cash and cash equivalents as 7,623 7,138 6,252 4,423 4,878 1,699
presented in the balance sheet
(statement of financial position)
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Money market funds

Despite the wholesale nature of the money markets entailing the transacting
of large sums of money – usually £500,000 or $1,000,000 is the minimum
transaction size – it is possible for private individuals with funds available
for lending in thousands of pounds/euros/dollars rather than hundreds of
thousands to participate in the money markets. They can do so via money
market funds administered by financial institutions and set up to invest in
money market instruments by pooling the savings of many people.
Corporations may also deposit money in money market funds to obtain good
rates of interest through professional management of the fund. They also value
being able to withdraw their money from the fund without the need to deal
with the selling of the underlying securities in the secondary markets – in most
cases investors in money market funds can gain access to their money within
hours: ‘same-day’ access. It is also possible to put in place a sweep facility so
that money is automatically transferred from a bank account (paying little
interest) if it exceeds a stated balance to a money market account (paying more
interest) and vice versa – this can be done at the end of each day.
With much of the rest of the financial sector, money markets went through
a crisis in 2008. A money market fund, Reserve Primary Fund, had invested a
substantial proportion of its funds in Lehman Brothers’ short-term debt. When
Lehman Brothers went bust the fund was unable to return to investors the
amount they had paid into it. This ‘breaking of the buck’ is a great sin in the
money market world – all money market funds are supposed to be incredibly
safe. What made it worse was the subsequent freezing-up of credit markets:
investors in funds could not withdraw their money at short notice as per the
agreement. The market became illiquid because the money market funds could
not find buyers for the securities they held and so could not raise cash at the
moment when a high proportion of their investors clamoured to withdraw cash.
A proposal was floating around the corridors of power of the European

Commission in 2014 to reform the rules for money market funds. In Europe
there is over €450 billion invested in constant net asset value (CNAV) or
fixed-value money market funds which promise the return of a euro/dollar
put in, while paying out the interest they receive from Treasury bills, etc. to
investors. The variable net asset value (VNAV) money market sector is even
larger. These funds fluctuate in value each day depending on the market value
of the underlying investments; they may go below the initial €1 value. The
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proposal is to force CNAV funds to hold 3% of their assets in cash as a buffer

against ‘runs’ by investors, so that those wanting their money returned quickly
can have it without too much strain caused by funds having to sell securities in
a hurry.
However, there were howls of protest that the loss of interest on 3% of the fund
was too much to bear at a time when money market funds were struggling to
make even a 0.1% return in a year for investors because interest rates were so
low – see Article 1.1. In 2015 the politicians decided to abandon the 3% buffer
rule. Instead they insist that most CNAV funds switch to a ‘low-volatility
NAV’, which means they can only hold money market instruments which
mature within 90 days. The other 10% of CNAV are allowed to escape this rule
if they are aimed purely at ‘retail’ investors or if they invest 99.5% of their
assets in government debt. (In the article, ‘AUM’ is assets under management
– the amount they are investing for others.)
In July 2014 the regulator in the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), gained the power to force some CNAV funds to scrap their fixed
$1-a-share price structure, permitting the fund to continue even if the under-
lying money market investments, e.g. commercial paper, add up to less than
$1 per share. This applies to funds invested in corporate debt and municipal
(local authority) debt. Those that buy only federal government debt or are sold
only to retail investors are exempt, so they stay as CNAV funds.
Article 1.1
Money funds at risk of big drop

in assets
By Christopher Thompson and Stephen Foley
Financial Times November 21, 2013

Global money market funds are projected to lose around a third of their assets
under management next year as the combined forces of record low interest rates
and new regulations batter the multi-trillion dollar industry.
Incoming rules from regulators in the US and Europe could trigger outflows of at
least 30%, according to Moody’s, the credit rating agency. Under US and European
regulators’ proposals money market funds are potentially moving from a stable $1
or €1 net asset value to one that will fluctuate according to the market value of the
underlying investments.
➨
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‘If the regulation comes in as proposed we expect a 30% or higher decline of AUM
because of the likely switch to “variable net asset values” by most managers,’ said
Yaron Ernst, a managing director of global managed investments at Moody’s.
Money market funds, which act as reservoirs of easy-to-access cash, are a crucial
source of short-term financing for banks and companies worldwide. They are used
by corporates and others to diversify short-term cash holdings and are widely
perceived as low risk.
‘We are overwhelmingly invested in senior bank debt of less than three months’
maturity . . . the default risk on those assets is almost non-existent according to
long-term studies,’ said Martin Curran, a senior portfolio manager at Royal Bank
of Scotland. ‘With variable net asset values a corporate cash manager puts £1 into
a MMF to pay his bills, but it might not repay £1 the day after – he can’t afford to be
in that position, and particularly if he’s managing millions of them.’
In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed limiting
investors’ ability to withdraw their cash from money market funds during times of
market stress, and is currently weighing whether this idea is better than a floating
NAV, or whether it can combine the two. The changes would only affect part of the
industry. The SEC plans to exempt funds that invest only in super-safe government
securities, and those targeted at retail investors, who are seen as less likely to start
a run on a fund.
The gloomy Moody’s prognosis comes as low interest rates, which squeeze funds’
already wafer-thin margins, have led to declines in assets under management for
many funds.
‘Fees have already been waived for more than a year by most MMF managers,
which reflects the stress on the industry’s business model,’ said Mr Ernst.
Euro-denominated money market funds shed €127bn of assets between June 2011–
13 according to Moody’s figures. HSBC estimates that the US industry has seen
assets decline from $4tn in 2009 to about $2.7tn.
Regulators say they want to bolster money market funds and avoid a run on
the market in the event of a financial crisis, which would lead to global finance
freezing up.
Source: Thompson, C. and Foley, S. (2013) Money funds at risk of big drop in assets,
Financial Times, 21 November.
© The Financial Times Limited 2013. All Rights Reserved.
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PART 2
BOND MARKETS
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CHAPTER 2
GOVERNMENT BONDS
Most governments issue bonds in their domestic currency to raise money

when their tax receipts are less than their expenditure. There is a robust inter-
national market for these bonds when the national currency is strong and
stable, such as the currencies in Figure 2.1; this data from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) shows the percentage of foreign currencies kept
in reserve by 144 reporting countries.1 These currencies are known as hard
currencies, that is, they are from countries where there is relative economic
and political stability and the currencies are widely accepted in payment for
goods or services.
If the national currency is unstable or weak for whatever reason the govern-
ment may be able to issue bonds denominated in a foreign hard currency,
usually the US dollar. This makes them more attractive to investors because
they are viewed as less risky than domestic currency bonds because the
government is committed to paying interest and principal in, say, the US
dollar, regardless of inflation or exchange rate movement in that country.
Bonds issued by a government either in the country’s own currency or in
another currency are usually known as sovereign bonds.
Following the round of financial crises, most governments have had to issue
more bonds to permit deficit spending (i.e. not raising enough in taxes to
cover outgoings to boost the economy). Statistics from The Economist from
a range of countries show the enormous amount of debt some countries
1
Foreign currency reserves or foreign exchange reserves (FOREX reserves or FX reserves)
are held by the national central bank or other monetary authority. They usually consist of a
range of hard foreign currency and bonds issued by other governments (popular usage of the
term usually also includes gold reserves, shares and the ability to draw money from the IMF).
These are saved to reduce the risk of not being able to pay off international debt obligations, thus
increasing the confidence of overseas creditors that the country will not default. They also allow
the purchase of the domestic currency, thus influencing monetary policy and exchange rates.
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30 PART 2 BOND MARKETS
Figure 2.1 Currency composition of foreign exchange reserves 2013

Source: Data from www.imf.org
owe – see Figure 2.2. For every person in Italy, the government owes more
than $39,000. It is even worse in Japan, where the government owes over
$98,000 per person. In both cases the debt is mostly bought domestically
rather than lent by foreigners, and so the risk of a foreign lenders’ strike or
a major outflow of interest payments is less worrisome. Nevertheless, that is
an awful lot of borrowing.
Bonds issued by reputable governments are the most secure (least risky) in the
world because they are very aware of the need to maintain a good reputation
for paying their debts on time. Furthermore, for countries able to issue in their
own currencies, should there be a cash flow difficulty, they are able to print
more money or to raise taxes, to ensure they have the means to pay the bonds’
coupons or the bonds’ redemption value. But if money creation is taken
too far, raised inflation may be the result, putting off potential lenders in that
currency.
We first look at the UK government bond market to get a feel for the
workings of these markets and then, in Chapter 3, consider the US, French,
German, Japanese, Chinese and emerging (underdeveloped) government
bond markets.
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2 GOVERNMENT BONDS 31
Figure 2.2 Total public debt for a selection of countries: total amount outstanding
in $USbn
UK gilts
In most years, in common with other countries in the world, the British
government does not raise enough in taxes to cover its expenditure –
see Figure 2.3, which shows the amount the UK public sector (central and
local government) had to borrow between 2000 and 2014 to make up this
deficit and to maintain stability and restore confidence. Note the significant
rise following the 2008 financial crisis as the government borrowed to cover
falling tax receipts, boost aggregate demand and bail out the banks.
In addition to these ‘net borrowing’ amounts the UK government issues new

debt instruments to raise money simply to repay old debts that become due.
Thus, the gross borrowing (gross issuance) is actually much larger – of the
order of an extra £50–60 billion per year.
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Figure 2.3 UK public sector (central and local government) net borrowing 2000–2014
(the difference between expenditure and revenue)
Source: ONS Public Sector Finances, March 2014 www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_360531.pdf
While most of the gap between UK government receipts and expenditure is

covered by selling bonds to investors, the government may also borrow via its
National Savings and Investments arm, such as through premium bonds,
and raise income from selling off assets, e.g. Royal Mail shares, Lloyds Bank
shares.
UK government bonds are called gilts because in the old days they were very
attractive certificates with gold-leaf edges (gilt-edged securities). Lending to
the UK government by buying gilts is one of the safest forms of lending in the
world; the risk of the UK government failing to pay is inconceivably small –
it has never done so, although a few doubts did creep in following the high
government spending during 2010–2011 when the volume of gilts outstand-
ing grew enormously – see Figure 2.4. There are so many gilts held by investors
and financial institutions that they equal more than 75% of the amount of
output that UK citizens produce in one year (GDP).
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Figure 2.4 The amount of UK government gilts in issue up to 2014 and gross
issuance (includes gilts sold to replace maturing gilts being redeemed)
Source: Debt Management Office www.DMO.gov.uk
Issuing gilts
The UK government issues most gilts through auction via the Debt
Management Office (DMO) and each issue receives a unique identification
number, an ISIN (International Securities Identification Number). Gilts are
issued with a par (face) value of £100. This is the amount guaranteed to be paid
on maturity to the holder, who may or may not be the original purchaser.
Their maturity can be 5, 10, 30, 40, 50 and recently 55 years, and during the
time to maturity they pay a twice-yearly coupon, the amount of which reflects
the current and expected future rates of interest at the time of issue.
Most are conventional bonds, but since 1981 gilts have been issued which
offset the effect of inflation; the coupons and principal paid on these are linked
to the Retail Prices Index (RPI) over the life of the bond and are known as
index-linked gilts. Table 2.1 gives examples of conventional and index-linked
gilts.
In March 2014 there were 72 gilts in issue with a total outstanding value
(including inflation uplift for index-linked gilts) of about £1.4 trillion and of
varying maturities – see Figure 2.5. The maturity of a gilt is measured by the
remaining time left to redemption.
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Table 2.1 Examples of two gilts, the 4¼% Treasury Gilt 2039 and the 2½%
Index-linked Treasury Stock 2024
Coupon amount Name of gilt Maturity ISIN
4¼% Treasury Gilt 2039 GB00B3KJDS62
£100 × 4¼% ÷ 2. Thus Those issued in The gilt will mature in 2039 The ISIN is a
£2.125 will be paid on recent years are at which time the final unique number
set dates at 6 monthly called Treasury coupon and the par value identifying
intervals to the gilt holder Stocks or of £100 will be paid to each gilt
Treasury Gilts the holder
2½% Index-linked 2024 GB0008983024

Treasury Stock
£100 × 2½% ÷ 2. Those issued in The gilt will mature in 2024 The ISIN is a
Thus £1.25 plus an recent years are at which time the final unique number
increase to take inflation called Treasury coupon and the par value identifying
into account will be paid Stocks or of £100 plus an increase each gilt
on set dates at 6 monthly Treasury Gilts to take inflation into
intervals to the gilt holder account will be paid to
the holder
Source: www.DMO.gov.uk
The UK authorities define the maturities of gilts as:
● ultra-short conventional up to 3 years

● short conventional 3–7 years
● medium conventional 7–15 years
● long conventional 15–50 years
● ultra-long conventional over 50 years
● undated
● index-linked various
An analysis of the 72 gilts in issue is as follows:
● 40 conventional, with more than £1 trillion of nominal value.
● 24 index-linked, with over £300 billion of nominal value (including the

inflation uplift). Of that total, 19 are subject to an inflation uplift in the
coupon with a three-month inflation indexation lag (a coupon payable
today is raised by inflation that occurred up to a date three months ago) and
5 (issued before 2000) subject to an inflation uplift lagged by eight months.
The coupon and principal payment of these is increased according to the
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Figure 2.5 UK gilts in issue 12 March 2014, in millions of pounds

Source: DMO, Quarterly Review January–March 2014
change in the RPI. The RPI is published monthly by the Office for National
Statistics and measures the change in price of a representative basket of
retail goods and services.
● Eight undated older gilts issued between 1853 and 1946 with no redemption
date. They pay their coupons in perpetuity, but can be redeemed at the dis-
cretion of the government – see Article 2.1. Most pay semi-annual coupons
but some pay interest each quarter. Their nominal value is £2.6 billion.
● More than 170 STRIPS of gilts (discussed later in this chapter).
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Article 2.1
UK to repay tranche of perpetual

war loans
By Elaine Moore
Financial Times October 31, 2014

One of Britain’s oldest and most unusual national debts is to be repaid, marking
the end of an era for a government bond that can trace its lineage back to the
18th century.
As Europe marks the centenary of the Great War, the Treasury has announced it
will redeem bonds issued in 1927 by then chancellor Winston Churchill to refinance
money borrowed to fund it.
Around 11,200 investors hold the 4% Consolidated Loan, the vast majority of whom
are individuals with less than £10,000. Now the government is seeking to take
advantage of falling borrowing costs on global capital markets by refinancing the
debt at a time when long-dated gilt yields are at a 60-year low.
The ‘4% Consols’, as the bonds are known, are perpetual gilts which have no fixed
redemption date, giving the government the right to repay them at any time.
On February 1 all investors will be repaid their principal, marking the first time in
almost 70 years that the British government has repaid a perpetual bond.
‘This is a great example of pragmatic and attentive debt management on the part
of the UK government. I hope that this move is the first of many to cut the interest
bill and save taxpayers money,’ said Toby Nangle, head of multi-asset allocation at
Threadneedle Asset Management, who has argued that the UK could save £300m by
exercising its right to call the larger £2bn perpetual ‘War Loan’. Threadneedle is
the second-biggest holder of the bond.
The government said it was looking into the practicalities of repaying the loan,
which has a 3.5% coupon and trades below face value.
‘Some investors had doubted whether the 3.5% coupon war loan would ever be
bought back by the Treasury but this is now clearly on the table,’ said Michael
Riddell at M&G Investments, which also holds the bonds.
The UK has one of the world’s oldest government debt markets and the consolidation
of bonds over the years means that the debt redeemed has its origin in the South
Sea Bubble crisis of 1720 and the Napoleonic and Crimean wars.
On Twitter, George Osborne, the chancellor, wrote: ‘We’ll redeem £218m of 4%
Consols, including debts incurred because of the South Sea Bubble. Another finan-
cial crisis we’re clearing up after.’
Source: Moore, E. (2014) UK to repay tranche of perpetual war loans, Financial Times, 31 October.
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Figure 2.6 When gilts will be redeemed

Source: DMO, Quarterly Review January–March 2014 www.dmo.gov.uk/documentview.
aspx?docname=publications/quarterly/jan-mar14.pdf&page=Quarterly_Review
The average maturity for conventional gilts currently outstanding is about

15 years, and for index-linked is 21 years – see Figures 2.6 and 2.7.
When gilts are sold by the government with a nominal value of £100, only the
20 Gilt-edged Market Makers (GEMMs)2 can submit competitive bids at the
auction. They may do this for themselves or for their clients. For conventional
gilts, all those who bid above the minimum needed to sell the bonds pay the
price they bid (a multiple price auction). For index-linked gilts the pricing
at the conclusion of the auction is different: all bidders pay the same lowest
accepted price rather than each paying the price at which they bid (a uniform
price auction).3 In return for exclusive access to auctions GEMMs must commit
2
GEMMs are a group of commercial banks/financial institutions/brokers, the number of
which has varied between 20 and 30, and at the time of writing is 20.
3
The index-linked market has fewer similar gilts already trading in the secondary market
to allow investors to gauge where to pitch their bid, therefore they face the danger of over-
pricing if they have to pay the price they offer. This ‘winner’s curse’ problem is off-putting
to investors and so to attract them, the DMO prices all index-linked bonds at a level that
will sell the bonds – even if a particular investor bids a very high price it will pay the same
as the other successful bidders. The conventional gilt market is much more liquid, with
many more comparators for bidders to gauge where to pitch their bids, and so the winner’s
curse disincentive does not have much of an impact, thus the DMO can get away with
charging higher prices to some buyers.
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Figure 2.7 Gilts in issue 12 March 2014

Source: DMO, Quarterly Review January–March 2014
to making a secondary market for gilts by providing continuous prices at

which they will buy or sell for the gilts in which they deal.
As well as GEMMs submitting competitive bids at the auction, they can take
up the post-auction option facility (PAOF), which enables successful bidders
to acquire up to an extra 10% of their allocation at the average accepted (strike)
price at conventional auctions and at the single clearing (strike) price at index-
linked auctions.
Following an auction GEMMs can trade in the secondary market directly with
investors, making available advertised prices between 8am and 5pm every
business day in all those gilts in which they are recognised as market maker.
They quote two prices: the bid price is the price at which they will buy, the
offer price is their selling price. The difference between the bid price and
the offer price is known as the dealer’s spread, i.e. their potential profit. They
are also able to trade gilts anonymously with each other through interdealer
brokers (IDBs), who act as intermediaries for GEMMs. IDBs are required to
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post deals done on their screens for all other GEMMs to see. Below is the list of
GEMMs and interdealer brokers at the time of writing.
GEMMs Interdealer brokers
† Barclays Bank plc BGC Brokers L.P.

BNP Paribas (London branch) BrokerTec Europe Limited
Citigroup Global Markets Limited Dowgate
Credit Suisse Securities GFI Securities Limited
Deutsche Bank AG (London branch) ICAP WCLK Limited
Goldman Sachs International Bank Tullett Prebon Gilts
† HSBC Bank plc
* Jefferies International Limited
JPMorgan Securities plc
Lloyds TSB Bank plc
Merrill Lynch International
Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc
Nomura International plc
Royal Bank of Canada Europe Limited
† Royal Bank of Scotland
Santander Global Banking & Markets UK
Scotiabank Europe plc
Société Générale Corporate & Investment Banking
* The Toronto-Dominion Bank (London branch)
UBS Limited
† STRIPS market participant

* Retail GEMM
Table 2.2 shows details for the gilts issued over a one-month period. Note a
strange phenomenon in 2014: index-linked issues could be sold at a yield of
less than zero before taking into account the inflation uplift, e.g. while the ‘⅛%
Index-linked Treasury Gilt 2019’ has a nominal coupon yield of positive one-
eighth of 1% per year, it sold at a price of £105.83. The capital loss of £5.83 over
the five years (because it will be redeemed at £100 (plus inflation)) means that
the yield will be negative 0.918% per annum before inflation uplift. This is an
indication that investors were so desperate to invest in ‘safe-haven’ assets with
both high default protection and some inflation protection that they accepted
returns guaranteeing a real-terms reduction of capital value. Bid to cover ratio
means the amount investors offered to buy relative to the amount offered for sale.
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Table 2.2 Examples of the results of gilt auctions
Auction Gilt name Indexation Amount Bid to Average Yield at

date lag for issued cover accepted average
index-linked (£m ratio at price (£) accepted
gilts nominal) auction price (%)
12 June 0⅛% Index- 3 months 1,469.76 2.78 105.830 −0.918

2014 linked Treasury
Gilt 2019
10 June 2¾% Treasury 3,250.00 2.04 99.383 2.820
2014 Gilt 2024
3 June 1¾% Treasury 4,028.42 1.61 99.095 1.936
2014 Gilt 2019
28 May 0¼% Index- 3 months 1,209.97 2.56 112.068 −0.065
2014 linked Treasury
Gilt 2052
15 May 4½% Treasury 2,181.56 2.00 118.591 3.243
2014 Gilt 2034
Source: www.dmo.gov.uk
Primary market for retail investors

As well as being able to buy gilts in the secondary market through GEMMs,
individuals may bid at auctions providing they have applied for and been
accepted into the Approved Group of Investors.4 The DMOs auction calendar
is published up to a year in advance (see www.dmo.gov.uk), but greater details
of the gilts to be offered for sale are announced a week or so beforehand.
Approved Group investors can then obtain a prospectus and application form.
They may make one non-competitive bid per auction between £1,000 and
£500,000 (nominal prices) and they pay the average price set by the successful
competitive bidders for conventional gilts and the lowest accepted price for
index-linked gilts. Each bid must be a multiple of £1,000. Buyers send payment
large enough to more than cover the cost – the exact amount will not be
known beforehand as this depends on the results of the competitive auction.
After the auction refunds are made for the difference between the amount sent
and the amount actually paid.
Investors wishing to bid for more than £500,000 nominal in a competitive bid
must submit their bids through a GEMM stating the price they wish to pay. If
4
A piece of bureaucracy designed to exclude money launderers and other financial criminals.
Application forms are available from the DMO. The approval process takes a few days.
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the bid is below the price required to sell the gilts available they will receive no
bonds, or only a proportion of those bid for.
Syndication and mini-tenders

Some gilts are sold by syndication, a process whereby the DMO appoints
a group of investment banks to manage the sale of the bonds on its behalf.
Lead managers and co-lead managers (the chosen banks) market the issue to
investors. They ‘build a book’, that is, they converse with potential investors
and gain indications of offers for the bonds. When the size of the book (serious
offers) reaches the DMO’s sale objectives, the book is closed and bonds are
allocated to investors at the prices previously discussed. In the period follow-
ing the financial crisis the DMO increased the use of syndications significantly
because it had to sell a vast quantity of gilts and the banks were capable of
actively finding buyers.
Mini-tenders also take place between the major auctions. They are smaller
issues which supplement the main auction sales, and are designed to tap into
emerging pockets of demand for particular gilts.
Supplementary issues
If a gilt already in issue is ‘supplemented’ (more issued) it keeps the same
ISIN number – see Table 2.3, where we can see the details of a 3¾% Treasury
Gilt with a redemption date of 2021, issued originally on 18 March 2011 with
an initial issuance of £2.75 billion and paying a coupon of £3.75 annually
in two equal semi-annual payments made on fixed dates six months apart;
with gilt GB00B4RMG977 these payments are on 7 March and 7 September
each year.
Since it was first sold, the government raised more money with this gilt, ending
up with a total issuance of nearly £28 billion. The purchase (market) price of a
gilt varies, depending on the coupon offered, the general level of interest rates
in the markets, dealers’ perception of future interest rates, and present and
expected inflation rates. For gilt GB00B4RMG977 the initial price was £100.80
and the subsequent prices varied between £98.91 and £114.49. At maturity it
will be worth £100 and as a gilt approaches maturity its price will become ever
nearer to its par value.
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Table 2.3 Issuance details of Treasury gilt GB00B4RMG977
Gilt name ISIN code Issue Clean Yield Nominal Cumulative

date price at at amount total amount
issue issue issued in issue
(£) (%) (£ million) (£ million)
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 18-Mar- 100.80 3.657 2,750.000 2,750.000

Treasury 2011
Gilt 2021
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 06-Apr- 98.91 3.878 3,807.112 6,557.112
Treasury 2011
Gilt 2021
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 03-Jun- 102.88 3.414 3,603.787 10,160.899
Treasury 2011
Gilt 2021
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 06-Jul- 102.03 3.510 3,572.947 13,733.846
Treasury 2011
Gilt 2021
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 02-Sep- 108.59 2.762 3,000.000 16,733.846
Treasury 2011
Gilt 2021
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 05-Oct- 113.37 2.239 3,574.970 20,308.816
Treasury 2011
Gilt 2021
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 19-Oct- N/A N/A 440.000 20,748.816
Treasury 2011
Gilt 2021
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 02-Dec- 111.85 2.382 3,298.400 24,047.216
Treasury 2011
Gilt 2021
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 12-Jan- 114.49 2.084 3,282.568 27,329.784
Treasury 2012
Gilt 2021
3¾% GB00B4RMG977 17-Jul- N/A N/A 379.000 27,708.784
Treasury 2012
Gilt 2021
From the clean price (the price of the gilt excluding any accrued interest since
the last coupon was paid – see later in the chapter) and yield at issue we can
gain an impression of how the prevailing rate of interest for securities with a
similar risk and maturity changed over the period March 2011 to January 2012,
falling 157 basis points. Indeed, interest rates usually change daily, even if usually
by very small amounts.
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Who buys gilts?

Table 2.4 shows that the main purchasers of gilts are outside of the UK. Also, in
recent years, one buyer has gone from being quite small to being dominant:
the Bank of England bought large amounts of gilts on the secondary market to
lower interest rates and try to revive the post-crisis economy (see Chapter 16
for a discussion of this ‘quantitative easing’).
Table 2.4 Distribution of UK gilt holders December 2013
(£ millions) at end Q3 2013 Q4 2013
Overseas 393,937 413,104

Bank of England (Asset Purchase Facility) 373,561 367,486
Insurance companies and pension funds 370,019 365,027
Monetary Financial Institutions* 122,458 133,349
Other financial institutions and other 88,779 89,882
Households 16,882 12,093
Local authorities and public corporations 2,206 2,155
TOTAL 1,367,842 1,383,096
* ‘Monetary Financial Institutions’ replaced the ‘Banks’ and ‘Building Societies’ categories in January 2011
and excludes Bank of England holdings.
Source: DMO, Quarterly Review January–March 2014 www.dmo.gov.uk/documentview.aspx?docname=
publications/quarterly/jan-mar14.pdf&page=Quarterly_Review
Article 2.2 discusses the operations of the DMO, with particular reference to
the necessity to sell gilts to overseas investors.
Article 2.2
Hard times force UK seller of gilts on

a globe-trotting journey
By Elaine Moore
Financial Times May 21, 2014

In a modest office beneath the shadow of one of London’s newest skyscrapers, the
man responsible for selling Britain’s debt to investors around the world is explaining
why he has stopped spending so much time at his desk.
➨
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‘I think that since the crisis, I have gone out to Asia at least once a year,’ says
Robert Stheeman. ‘That didn’t happen before – [I] barely travelled. But the investor
base is more diverse now.’
The UK’s unprecedented need to borrow hundreds of billions of pounds from the
markets since the financial crisis has pushed Mr Stheeman, a 54-year-old former
investment banker, into the limelight over the past few years. As chief executive of
the UK’s Debt Management Office he is charged with ensuring the country is able
to borrow as much as it needs at the lowest rate possible.
The UK’s centuries-old system of raising funds by selling bonds – known as gilts
after the gilded edges of the old paper certificates – has created one of the most
liquid markets in the world.
Keeping up a dialogue with gilt investors is no longer a case of inviting pension

funds and insurance companies for tea at the DMO’s London office. Mr Stheeman
must instead go out into the world to sell – hence the trips to Asia.
International investors are now the largest holders of UK debt, with £413bn – just
under a third of the total – as of December. Keeping those investors engaged is not
simply a matter of air miles, and the job is made more challenging by the fact that
the UK does not know exactly who its overseas investors are.
Many of the central banks and sovereign wealth funds that now buy large volumes of
gilts do so through nominee accounts, which do not reveal the underlying investor.
‘We have an idea who they are,’ he says. ‘Although they don’t like to show their hand.’
Composed and fond of answering a question with the aid of a chart, Mr Stheeman
personifies the stability he wants investors to associate with the market. But he
acknowledges substantial changes in the past decade.
In 2004–5, the country raised £50bn through gilts sales. Six years later, at the peak
of the crisis in 2009, the UK had to convince the markets to absorb gilts worth
£228bn. This financial year, it plans to raise £127bn.
The rise of overseas investors has also necessitated a change of strategy. Pension
funds and insurance companies face liabilities in the future and want long-term
investments. Overseas buyers prefer short-term investments. The result is that the
number of short-dated bonds issued by the UK has grown rapidly since 2008.
‘One concept I try to convey to [the government] is that we can’t force people to buy
our debt,’ says Mr Stheeman. ‘What we can do is to put in place a framework that
makes it attractive to invest in.’
There have been occasions since the crisis began when the allure of gilts seemed
under threat. Following the introduction of the Bank of England’s gilt purchasing
programme – known as Quantitative Easing – a bond auction drew fewer bids than
expected for the first time in years. A few years later, credit rating agencies
stripped the UK of its triple A grade, citing sluggish economic growth.
Despite these stumbling blocks, demand has remained strong as investors have
sought the relative haven of UK government debt.
➨
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What he is certain about is that the UK’s need to raise very large amounts of money
will remain for years to come.
‘The debt stock has increased so dramatically that it cannot go back to pre-crisis
levels for a long time,’ he says. ‘Not for a generation.’
Gilts remain the main way in which the UK government finances the shortfall
between what it spends and what it receives in tax revenues, and borrowing costs
have been falling steadily since the 1980s when they exceeded 16%. Yields are
expected to rise when the BoE finally raises interest rates above 0.5%.
Source: Moore, E. (2014) Hard times force UK seller of gilts on a globe-trotting journey,
Financial Times, 21 May.
Prices and returns

The coupons on different conventional gilts can have a wide range, from 1%
to 8¾%. This often reflects just how much interest rates have fluctuated in
the past; the coupon percentages were (roughly) the rates of interest that the
government had to offer at the time of issue. These original percentages are on
the face value only and are not the rates of return offered on the gilt to a buyer
in the secondary market today. So, if we take an undated (with no redemption
date, going on for ever) gilt offering a coupon of 2.5% on the nominal value of
£100, we may find that investors are buying and selling this bond at a price of
£50, not at its nominal value of £100, but still receiving the coupon of £2.50.
This gilt therefore offers an investor today a yield of 5%.
If we take a redeemable Treasury 10% with five years to maturity currently

selling in the secondary market at £120 we glean that it pays a coupon of
£10 per year (10% of the nominal value of £100). And investors in the secondary
market will receive a current yield of £10 per year for each £120 paid, which
equates to 8.33%, worked out as follows:
Coupon rate £10

Interest yield = = × 100 = 8.33%
Market price £120
Accounting for the capital loss over the next five years: the investor pays
£120 but will receive only £100 at maturity, a loss of £4 per year over the
five years, or as a percentage of what the investor pays £4/£120 × 100 = 3.33%
per year. The yield to maturity, YTM (redemption yield), is approximately
M02_ARNO1799_01_SE_C02.indd 45 7/7/15 8:47 AM

8.33% − 3.33% = 5% (greater precision comes in Chapter 13). The general

rules are:
● If a dated gilt is trading below £100 the purchaser will receive a capital
gain between purchase and redemption and so the YTM is greater than the
current yield.
● If a dated gilt is selling at more than £100 a capital loss will be made if held
to maturity and so the YTM is below the current yield.
Of course, these capital gains and losses are based on the assumption that the
investor buys the gilt and then holds it to maturity. In reality many investors
sell their bonds a few days or months after purchase, in which case they may
make capital gains or losses dependent not on what the government pays on
maturity but on the market price another investor is prepared to offer. This, in
turn, depends on general economic conditions, in particular projected general
inflation over the life of the gilt: investors will not buy a gilt offering a 5%
redemption yield over five years if future inflation is expected to be signific-
antly higher than this.
As we have seen, bond prices and yields move in opposite directions. If our
five-year gilt purchased for £120 offering a coupon of 10% with an approx-
imate redemption yield of 5% is trading in an environment where general
interest rates for that risk level rise to 6% because of an increase in inflation
expectations, investors will no longer be interested in buying this gilt for £120,
because at this price it yields only 5%. Demand will fall, resulting in a price
reduction until the bond yields 6% – the bond’s market value will then be
£116.85 (see calculation method in Chapter 13). A rise in yield goes hand in
hand with a fall in price.
Quotes
Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, from the Financial Times, show the ‘mid-prices’ half
way between the bid and the offer prices of the government-approved dealers,
GEMMs.
Remember, the current redemption yield shown in the FT is relevant only

if you are an investor on that particular day paying the price shown. This
figure may change daily, reflecting interest rate changes. However, holders
M02_ARNO1799_01_SE_C02.indd 46 7/7/15 8:47 AM

Table 2.5 Gilts – UK cash market on 9 June 2014 – conventional gilts, maturity terms
under 15 years
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Table 2.6 Gilts – UK cash market on 9 June 2014 – conventional gilts, maturity terms over 15 years
48
www.ft.com/gilts
................ Red yield .................
Jun 9 Price £ Day’s W’ks Int Red Day’s W’ks Mth’s Year 52 Week Amnt Last Interest
M02_ARNO1799_01_SE_C02.indd 48
chng chng yield yield chng chng chng chng £m xd date due
High Low
Over Fifteen Years
Tr 4.75pc’30 ............ 119.83 –0.45 –0.32 3.95 3.19 +0.03 +0.07 +0.02 +0.34 126.11 115.50 28,716 28/05 7 Jun/Dec
Tr 4.25pc’32 ............ 113.35 –0.45 –0.33 3.73 3.26 +0.03 +0.07 +0.02 +0.30 118.75 109.05 34,598 28/05 7 Jun/Dec
PART 2 BOND MARKETS
Tr 4.5pc’34 .............. 117.01 –0.48 –0.37 3.83 3.34 +0.03 +0.07 +0.02 +0.26 122.28 112.57 25,501 26/02 7 Mar/Sep
Tr 4.25pc’36 ............ 113.37 –0.49 –0.38 3.73 3.38 +0.03 +0.06 +0.03 +0.24 118.17 108.92 25,952 26/02 7 Mar/Sep
Tr 4.75pc’38 ............ 122.49 –0.54 –0.43 3.86 3.39 +0.03 +0.06 +0.03 +0.20 127.24 117.68 24,601 28/05 7 Jun/Dec
Tr 4.25pc’39 ............ 113.94 –0.51 –0.41 3.71 3.42 +0.03 +0.05 +0.03 +0.18 117.87 109.28 19,280 26/02 7 Mar/Sep
Tr 4.5pc’42 .............. 119.28 –0.56 –0.45 3.76 3.43 +0.03 +0.05 +0.04 +0.14 123.05 114.24 26,001 28/05 7 Jun/Dec
Tr 3.25pc’44 ............ 95.86 –0.49 –0.39 3.37 3.48 +0.03 +0.05 +0.04 +0.10 98.22 90.69 23,778 13/01 22 Jan/Jul
Tr 4.25pc’46 ............ 115.63 –0.59 –0.49 3.66 3.45 +0.03 +0.05 +0.04 +0.09 118.71 109.84 20,873 28/05 7 Jun/Dec
Tr 4.25pc’49 ............ 116.75 –0.62 –0.54 3.62 3.43 +0.03 +0.05 +0.04 +0.05 120.05 110.52 19,301 28/05 7 Jun/Dec
Tr 3.75pc’52 ............ 106.49 –0.59 –0.51 3.50 3.44 +0.03 +0.05 +0.04 +0.03 109.48 100.30 19,761 13/01 22 Jan/Jul
Tr 4.25pc’55 ............ 118.68 –0.66 –0.56 3.56 3.41 +0.03 +0.05 +0.04 +0.02 122.22 111.43 23,416 28/05 7 Jun/Dec
Tr 4pc’60 ................. 113.86 –0.67 –0.57 3.49 3.40 +0.03 +0.05 +0.04 +0.01 117.49 106.48 18,764 13/01 22 Jan/Jul
Undated
Cons 4pc ................* 97.09 –0.62 –0.53 4.09 4.12‡ +0.03 +0.05 +0.04 +0.01 99.91 90.45 257 22/01 1 Feb/Aug
War Ln 3.5pc ........... 83.57 –0.52 –0.45 4.16 4.19‡ +0.03 +0.05 +0.03 +0.10 85.52 77.76 1,938 21/05 1 Jun/Dec
Cn 3.5pc’61 Aft .......* 81.43 –0.49 –0.42 – 4.30‡ +0.03 +0.05 +0.03 +0.10 83.84 77.71 17 23/03 1 Apr/Oct
Tr 3pc’66 Aft ...........* 68.36 –0.41 –0.35 4.36 4.39‡ +0.03 +0.05 +0.03 +0.10 70.42 64.91 40 26/03 5 Apr/Oct
Cons 2.5pc .............* 58.57 –0.36 –0.31 4.24 4.27‡ +0.03 +0.05 +0.03 +0.10 60.43 55.54 177 26/03 5 Ja/Ap/Jul/Oc
Tr 2.5pc ..................* 59.69 –0.37 –0.32 4.16 4.19‡ +0.03 +0.05 +0.03 +0.10 61.59 56.64 287 23/03 1 Apr/Oct
Source: Thomson Reuters
7/7/15 8:47 AM
Table 2.7 Gilts – UK cash market on 9 June 2014 – index-linked
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of the gilt to maturity will receive the yield that was obtainable at the time
of purchase.
Redemption yields for gilts are quoted daily online by the Debt Management
Office at www.dmo.gov.uk. Other sources of information on prices, and on
the gilts market generally, are websites, e.g. www.bloomberg.com, www.
fixedincomeinvestor.co.uk, www.hl.co.uk, www.londonstockexchange.com,
www.selftrade.co.uk, www.iii.co.uk and www.fitchratings.com.
Investors buying and selling gilts in the secondary

market
Institutional investors in bonds deal directly with the GEMMs (the primary
dealers). Non-institutional investors can buy or sell gilts through brokers, who
contact the GEMMs, dealing on the telephone or online. They need to state the
nominal value of the gilts they want to deal and whether they want to trade at
best (the best price currently in the market) or with a limit on the price they
are prepared to pay (or sell for). High street banks, some building societies,
independent financial advisers and even some solicitors and accountants will
buy or sell gilts for clients.
The settlement day, the date on which transfer of gilt and payment occur, is
usually the next business day after the trade is conducted (T+1), although
other settlement dates may be negotiated between the buyer/seller and the
GEMM. The CREST system run by Euroclear organises the transfer between
investors and maintains records of ownership transferred in the secondary
market, usually an electronic record rather than paper certificates. (Euroclear
also does this for another 30 bond markets internationally.)
Retail investors can also buy and sell gilts in the primary and secondary markets
via the DMO’s Gilt Purchase and Sales Service using Computershare (www-uk.
computershare.com). It is first necessary to fill in forms to become an Approved
Group of Investors member. The investor is not able to specify the price or a
maximum/minimum price at which the purchase/sale of gilts is to be made.
Computershare maintains the main register of holdings of gilts under con-

tract from HM Treasury. It will send out coupons (‘dividends’) and redemption
monies to arrive on the due dates.
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Since 2010 retail investors have been able to buy and sell gilts and other
bonds through the London Stock Exchange’s electronic Order book for Retail
Bonds (ORB) where lots can be very small (minimum £1) and the costs of
trading are relatively low. The London Stock Exchange authorises dedicated
market makers to state bid/offer prices (some are GEMMs). Buyers and sellers
are able to set limits on the prices they are willing to pay/accept or simply
ask a broker to trade at the current market price. Small investors can now
see ORB gilt prices on free financial websites (e.g. www.advfn.com, www.
londonstockexchange.com).
Other ways for small investors to gain exposure to the gilt (and/or corporate
bond) market is to buy units in a unit trust or shares in an investment trust that
specialises in the type of bonds they are interested in. They gain professional
management and diversification but will pay fees (sometimes more than 1%
per year, which is a lot as a proportion of the annual interest on gilts of, say, 3%
or 4%). Exchange traded funds are another alternative. Collective bond funds
such as these are discussed in The Financial Times Guide to Investing (Glen
Arnold, 2014, Pearson).
Taxation on gilts
The investor’s tax bracket influences the return they receive. Currently there
are four tax brackets applying to a person’s marginal taxable income and
capital gains. The interest on gilts is taxed but the capital gains are not, thus
higher-rate tax payers are better off if they select gilts with a greater proportion
of the total return coming from capital gains rather than coupons. The
Financial Times provides a helpful table (Table 2.8) showing the best value
gilts in terms of after-tax returns in the four tax brackets. Note that the ‘GRY’
(gross redemption yield) shown here is actually a yield calculated after the
deduction of tax. So, for example, looking at other databases on 13 June 2014,
the gross redemption yield (before tax deduction) for the Treasury 1.75% 2022
is 2.62%, whereas in the so-called ‘GRY’ shown in Table 2.8 it is 1.68% for the
40% tax bracket investor and 1.59% for the 45% tax bracket investor. Again
note the way in which the prices of index-linked bonds were pushed so high
in 2014 that they all provide a negative return after tax and assuming inflation
of 3%.
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Table 2.8 Gilt issues: best value versus tax status
Stock Price GRY Real

% yield %
Non Taxpayers
Conventional 1–5 Years Treasury 4.5 2019 112.84 1.68

Conventional 5–15 Years Treasury 4.25 07 Dec 2027 115.29 2.88
Conventional >15 Years Treasury 3.25 2044 97.88 3.35
Index Linked 1–5 Yrs TSYI/L 3MO 1.25 2017 Rg 110.08 –1.53
Index Linked >5 Yrs TSYI/L 0.125 2044 105.89 –0.07
20% Taxpayers

40% Taxpayers

45% Taxpayers

Best performing bonds are selected on highest yield for each marginal tax rate based on closing mid price.
Gilts exclude double-dated and rump issues. Prices quoted as £ per £100 nominal. For Inflation-linked gilts:
year-on-year inflation.
GRY = Gross Redemption Yield. Data compiled on: May 30th 2014
Source: Barclays plc
Cum-dividend and ex-dividend

Between each six-monthly coupon payment the interest accrues on a daily
basis. When you buy a gilt you are entitled to the interest that has accrued
since the last coupon. You will receive this when the next coupon is paid. That
is, you buy the gilt cum-dividend. Gilts (and other bonds) are quoted at clean
M02_ARNO1799_01_SE_C02.indd 52 7/7/15 8:47 AM

prices (flat prices) – that is, quoted without taking account of any accrued
interest. However, the buyer will pay the clean price plus the accrued interest
value (called the dirty price or full price or invoice price or full accrual
price) and will receive all of the next coupon. So, if you buy a gilt four months
before the next coupon is due, you would pay the clean price, say £101, plus
60 days’ accrued interest, i.e. two months of accrued coupon since the last
was paid. The accrued interest for a bond that pays coupons every six months
is calculated by taking the annual coupon and dividing it by two to obtain
the half-yearly coupon. This number is then multiplied by the fraction of the
half-year that has already passed. So, if the bond pays an annual coupon of 7%
and is currently quoted at a clean price of £101, the dirty price is:5
Dirty price
= clean price
⎧ annual coupon Actual number of days since last coupon payment ⎫⎪

+⎨ × ⎬
⎩⎪ 2 Actual number of days in coupon period ⎭
Dirty price = £101 + (£7/2 x 60/182) = £102.1538

If you bought just before the coupon is to be paid, the situation is different.
There would not be enough time to change the register to make sure that the
coupon goes to the new owner (you). To allow for this problem a gilt switches
from being quoted cum-dividend to being ex-dividend (xd) a few days
(usually seven) before an interest payment. If you buy during the ex-dividend
period, the person you buy from will receive the coupon from the issuer and
this will be reflected in the price you pay.
Index-linked gilts
There is a danger with conventional gilts – inflation risk. Say, for example, that
you, along with the rest of the gilt-buying community, think that inflation over
the next ten years will average 2.5%. As a result you buy ten-year gilts that have
a redemption yield of 4.8%, giving a comfortable real income over and above
the expected cost-of-living increases. However, two years later inflation starts
to take off (oil prices quadruple, or the government goes on a spending spree).
Now investors reckon that inflation will average 6% over the following eight
years. As a result your gilt yield will fail to maintain your capital in real terms.
5
Note that the ‘actual number of days since last coupon payment’ is to the settlement day,
when the buyer actually takes possession of the bond (the day of the deal is usually one day
before settlement day).
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With UK government index-linked stocks the coupon amount and the

nominal value to be paid on redemption are adjusted according to the Retail
Prices Index. The deal here is that the gilt initially offers to pay £100 at the end
of its term, say ten years away. It also offers to pay a low coupon, say 0.25%.
The key thing about index-linked bonds is that neither the capital sum on
maturity nor the coupon stays at these levels unless inflation is zero over the
next ten years.
Suppose inflation is 4% over the first year of the bond’s life. The payout on
maturity would rise to £104. However, this inflation-linked uplift happens
every year (more specifically, the uplift for inflation occurs every six months).
So, if over the ten years the inflation measure has risen by 60%, the payout on
the bond is £160. This means that you can buy just as many goods and services
at the end with the capital sum as at the beginning of the bond’s life (if you
paid £100). Furthermore, the coupon rate also rises through the years if infla-
tion is positive. So after the inflation experience in the first year, the coupons
for the first six months of the second year go up by 4%, (£0.25 ÷ 2) × (1 + 0.04)
to £0.13. The situation is slightly more complicated than this in that the infla-
tion figures used are those for three months preceding the relevant coupon
dates, but this example illustrates the principle.6
Any future rises in inflation lead to further growth in the coupon, so that the
last coupon will be 60% larger than the initial coupon rate if inflation over
the ten years accumulates to 60%, paying £0.40 per £100 nominal.
Because most investors hold index-linked gilts to maturity secondary market

trading is thin and dealing spreads are wider than for conventional gilts.
Many governments now issue index-linked bonds – a sample is shown on the

Financial Times website, see Table 2.9. ‘Break even inflation’ means the rate of
inflation that would make the returns from conventional gilts and index-
linked gilts the same. This is implied by the difference between gross redemp-
tion yield on conventional government bonds and the pre-inflation–uplift
return offered on an index-linked gilt of the same maturity. That is, if you
observe the gross redemption yield from a conventional gilt to be 2.8% over
ten years, and you know that the capital repayment and coupons from a ten-
year index-linked bond are increased by inflation, what inflation rate would be
required so that the index-linked bond return would also be 2.8%, given its
6
For bonds issued prior to July 2005 the lag is eight months.
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Table 2.9 Index-linked bonds issued by a number of governments
Price Yield Month Break even Value

return inflation* Stock
Jun 11 Jun 11 Jun 10
Can 4.25% ’21 130.98 0.09 0.07 –0.79 2.08 5.2

Fr 2.25% ’20 115.88 –0.32 –0.35 0.17 0.98 20.0
Swe 0.25% ’22 100.45 0.27 0.27 0.10 1.35 26.4
UK 2.5% ’16 336.71 –1.74 –1.75 –0.22 2.63 7.9
UK 2.5% ’24 330.17 –0.24 –0.24 –0.97 3.07 6.8
UK 2% ’35 206.13 –0.04 –0.03 –1.17 3.42 9.1
US 0.625% ’21 103.84 0.08 0.07 –1.30 2.11 35.8
US 3.625% ’31 137.97 0.74 0.73 –2.05 2.25 16.8
Representative stocks from each major market

* Diff between conventional and IL bond. † Local currencies. ‡ Total market value. In line with market
convention, for UK Gilts inflation factor is applied to price, for other markets it is applied to par amount.
Source: Merrill Lynch Global Bond Indices
current price and coupon?7 ‘Value stock’ means the volume in issue expressed
in the local currency, e.g. the UK 2.5% 2016 has £7.9 billion in issue.
Inflation-linked bond issues are taking off across Europe – see Article 2.3.
Article 2.3
Europe on track to sell record

amounts of inflation-linked debt
By Elaine Moore
Financial Times June 12, 2014

Europe is on course to sell more government debt linked to inflation than ever
before, in spite of the looming risk of deflation across the region. So far this year the
supply of bonds tied to eurozone inflation has reached €52.9bn, more than two-thirds
of the entire supply of inflation-linked bonds in 2013 and close to the full year’s
supply in 2012.
➨
7
This is far from an agreed scientific way of estimating the market’s expectations of future
inflation. Many other factors play a role in pushing yields on gilts up or down – for example,
pension funds may increase their buying of linkers (index-linked bonds) to better match
their liabilities, thereby encouraging higher prices and lowering yields.
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On Wednesday, France issued its largest inflation-linked bond since the financial
crisis began, selling €3.5bn of 15-year debt. France is the exception within
inflation-linked bond issuers because it sells bonds tied to the Europe-wide measure
of goods and services as well as one connected to domestic inflation.
Clearly inflation in Europe is extremely low but there is a lot of discussion in
the markets about whether it will stay that way and the strength of appetite for
inflation-linked bonds shows that not all investors think it will.
The latest inflation-tied debt issuance, which was sold via BNP Paribas, Crédit
Agricole, HSBC, Nomura and Société Générale, was notable for the level of interest
it drew from UK and domestic investors, said one banker. The bond was priced to
yield 20 basis points more than the country’s existing inflation-linked note which
matures in July 2027.
Inflation-linked bonds have performed poorly for investors in recent years, as
global inflation stayed low. However, they are seen as a hedge against the possibility
of inflation increases.
‘Demand is high for inflation protection at these levels,’ said Jonathan Gibbs, a
fund manager at Standard Life Investments. ‘Investors with liabilities linked to
inflation, such as pension funds, will be using the opportunity to buy into these
bonds.’
In May, Spain issued its first inflation-linked bond, which attracted orders of more
than €20bn. Last week Germany added €1bn to its existing inflation-linked bond
due to mature in 2023.
Source: Moore, E. (2014) Europe on track to sell record amounts of inflation-linked debt,
Financial Times, 12 June.
STRIPS
Some conventional gilts, following issuance by the government and trading
on the secondary market, can be stripped. A gilt STRIPS (the letters stand for
Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal Securities) occurs
when the gilt is separated from its coupons and the gilt and its coupons all
become zero coupon bonds. Thus a five-year gilt could become eleven separate
zero coupon bonds, each with its own ISIN, one for each six-monthly coupon
plus the original bond. Twenty-nine gilts have been stripped, resulting in
164 separately traded instruments, and the STRIPS have a value of around
£1.8 billion. They are traded at a discount to their redemption value and once
stripped can be reconstituted. Only GEMMs can strip gilts.
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Table 2.10 UK government STRIPS, some examples
Gilt name Redemption date Clean price Dirty price Redemption

(£) (£) yield (%)
4% Treasury Principal Strip 07 March 2022 82.094598 82.094598 2.565673

07 March 2022
Treasury Coupon Strip 07 March 2022 82.094598 82.094598 2.565673
07 March 2022
Treasury Coupon Strip 07 June 2022 81.283016 81.283016 2.610852
07 June 2022
1¾ Treasury Principal Strip 07 September 2022 80.473389 80.473389 2.654188
07 September 2022
Treasury Coupon Strip 07 March 2024 75.730615 75.730615 2.874803
07 March 2024
Source: DMO, 10 June 2014 www.dmo.gov.uk/
The motivation for stripping is that investing institutions might offer a higher
price because they can obtain the exact maturity profile and interest rate they
are looking for. The problem with conventional coupon-paying bonds is that
long-term buy-and-hold investors have to reinvest the money paid as a coupon,
say half way to maturity. What reinvestment interest rate might you get three
or four years down the line? It might be more or less than the yield to maturity
that you originally bought into, which distorts the overall return received.
With STRIPS the rate of return is fixed for the full term because there is only
one payout. Table 2.10 shows some of the STRIPS available – details are
updated daily on the DMO website. Of course, the clean and the dirty market
prices are the same because there are no payments made each six months,
therefore no coupon interest is accruing day by day.
Islamic UK government bonds

The UK government is determined to make London a world centre for the
issuance of bonds that comply with sharia law (see Chapter 7 for more detail).
In 2014 it pioneered western government sovereign borrowing in sukuk – see
Article 2.4. It will not pay interest because this is forbidden under sharia, but it
will pay annual profit.
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Article 2.4
UK sukuk bond sale attracts £2bn

in orders
By Elaine Moore and Thomas Hale

Britain has become the first western country to issue an Islamic bond, attracting
orders of more than £2bn from global investors for its sale of sharia-compliant debt.
London’s maiden ‘sukuk’ will pay out profits based on the rental income from three
government-owned properties in lieu of interest, which is forbidden under Islamic
religious law.
The £200m sale, which comes days before the start of Ramadan, was heavily over-
subscribed by investors in the UK, Middle East and Asia, attracting orders of £2.3bn
– 10 times higher than the amount sold.
British grocer Tesco issued a sukuk in 2007 through its Malaysian arm and Ocado,
the independent online grocer, borrowed £10m in a sharia-compliant loan in 2009.
Some of the UK’s largest property companies have already expressed interest in the
idea of raising finance through Islamic bonds said one banker, but so far only one
domestic company – small Yorkshire-based manufacturer International Innovative
Technologies – has borrowed money in the UK via a bond that complies with
Islamic religious rules.
South Africa and Hong Kong have stated interest in planning Islamic bonds of their
own and Luxembourg is expected to issue a €200m bond this year.
‘The issuance of a UK sovereign sukuk sets a precedent for the western financial
world with the high demand hopefully encouraging further issuance from western
countries and corporates,’ said Humphrey Percy, chief executive of The Bank of
London and The Middle East.
The UK’s five year Islamic bond will pay out an annual ‘profit’ of 2.036%, set at the
same rate as the yield on the UK’s equivalent five-year government bond.
HSBC, Malaysia’s CIMB, Qatar’s Barwa Bank, National Bank of Abu Dhabi and
Standard Chartered were responsible for marketing the bond. According to HSBC
more than a third of the issuance went to UK investors, with the remaining bonds
sold in the Middle East and Asia.
The sale is small in terms of overall sukuk issuance, which has exceeded $21bn this
year according to Dealogic, but was popular with Islamic investors in search of
high grade debt.
Source: Moore, E. and Hale, T. (2014) UK sukuk bond sale attracts £2bn in orders,
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Fixed-interest indices
The FTSE (owned by the London Stock Exchange) creates indices for a variety
of securities. The ‘FTSE Actuaries UK Gilts Index Series’ provides an indication
of returns on bonds of various classes over time. Table 2.11 shows the perfor-
mance over one month and one year of collections of bonds, e.g. a representa-
tive group of twelve bonds with less than five years to maturity. The column
labelled ‘Total return’ includes both interest payments that the bond accrues
Table 2.11 Gilts – UK FTSE actuaries indices
Price Indices Jun 16 Day’s Total Return Return Yield

Fixed Coupon chge % Return 1 month 1 year
1 Up to 5 years (12) 99.62 –0.05 2282.80 –0.44 –0.25 1.49

2 5–10 years (9) 172.49 –0.04 2963.71 –1.09 –1.55 2.39
3 10–15 years (4) 190.35 –0.02 3324.36 –1.46 –1.65 3.00
4 5–15 years (13) 176.16 –0.03 3047.63 –1.19 –1.48 2.63
5 Over 15 years (15) 255.06 +0.16 3531.54 –1.44 +1.56 3.38
6 Irredeemables (1) 354.85 +0.18 4112.78 –1.85 +2.75 4.17
7 All stocks (41) 160.93 +0.03 2872.10 –1.04 –0.04 3.05
Index-Linked Jun 16 Day’s Month Year’s Total Return Return

chge % chge % chge % Return 1 month 1 year
1 Up to 5 years (2) 319.07 –0.01 –0.65 –2.01 2376.40 –0.65 –0.06

2 Over 5 years (21) 489.18 +0.11 –2.00 –0.27 3568.47 –2.00 +0.70
3 5–15 years (7) 413.78 +0.00 –1.41 –2.84 3090.17 –1.41 –1.48
4 Over 15 years (14) 569.60 +0.17 –2.31 +0.99 4088.01 –2.31 +1.75
5 All stocks (23) 461.40 +0.09 –1.85 –0.31 3403.30 –1.85 +0.81
Yield indices Jun 16 Jun 13 Yr ago Jun 16 Jun 13 Yr ago
5 yrs 2.02 2.00 1.15 20 yrs 3.36 3.37 3.12

10 yrs 2.84 2.83 2.17 45 yrs 3.39 3.41 3.45
15 yrs 3.20 3.21 2.78 Irred 4.17
....Inflation 0 %.... ....Inflation 5%....
Real yield Jun 16 Dur yrs Jun 13 Yr ago Jun 16 Dur yrs Jun 13 Yr ago
Up to 5 yrs –1.09 2.56 –1.09 –1.51 –1.72 2.57 –1.72 –2.06

Over 5 yrs –0.06 21.21 –0.06 –0.15 –0.10 21.32 –0.09 –0.18
5–15 yrs –0.20 9.35 –0.20 –0.61 –0.31 9.38 –0.31 –0.73
Over 15 yrs –0.04 27.45 –0.03 –0.07 –0.06 27.52 –0.05 –0.09
All stocks –0.08 19.26 –0.07 –0.18 –0.12 19.40 –0.12 –0.22
FTSE is making a number of enhancements to the FTSE Actuaries UK Gilts Index Series which are effective from 28 April 2014.
Please see the FTSE website for more details: www.markets.ft.com
Source: FTSE Group
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and the payments that have actually been made which are reinvested in the
index as well as capital gain or loss. The base value for the total return index is
a figure that was set years ago, equal to the total market value of the group of
gilts at the base (starting) date divided by the starting index value at that date
(often 100) but which is subsequently adjusted to allow for changes in the
constituents of the group and the nominal amounts of the constituent gilts.
The table also shows the average yield to maturity currently available to a
buyer of this group of gilts. The price indices, in the second column, labelled
‘Jun 16’ (the day of the download), is an arithmetically weighted index based
on the dirty price and weighted by the nominal amount outstanding (it does
not allow for that part of the return from coupons).
The ‘real yield’ (after deduction of inflation) for the index-linked securities
(final section) is shown for bonds with a variety of maturities and is based on
different assumptions with regard to future inflation.8 ‘Dur yrs’ is the length of
the duration in years, a measure related to price volatility of the collection
of bonds (see Chapter 13).
8
A greater range of real yields based on assumptions of future annual inflation rates of 0%,
3%, 5% and 10% can be seen at www.ftse.com.
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CHAPTER 3
GOVERNMENT BONDS
AROUND THE WORLD
Having covered the main characteristics of government bonds in the last

chapter we now briefly describe a few other significant national markets. There
is also an overview of developing country bonds. Finally, this chapter covers
bonds issued by local authorities, such as in the US municipal bond market,
and by organisations that while not strictly government owned have a close
relationship with the central government.
Sovereign bond risk and return

Most countries issue government bonds which are similar in format to UK
gilts and each country and their bonds are given a credit rating by one of the
credit rating agencies. The three biggest and best-known agencies are Moody’s,
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, but there are others; recently the Chinese agency
Dagong has made headlines by downgrading the UK and the US. The rating
they give indicates the relative risk of default – see Figure 3.1 for some of
Standard & Poor’s credit ratings in June 2014. Only a handful of countries are
regarded as very safe, ‘triple A’ rated – all of the AAA-rated countries are shown
in Figure 3.1, along with countries on a slightly lower rating, AA or A, and
those with a greater degree of risk. Triple A ratings allow countries to issue at a
low real (after allowing for anticipated inflation) yield. Other countries, such
as Greece and Uganda, are regarded as having more risk and so will have to pay
a high-risk premium (a higher rate on the coupon) to entice investors to buy
their bonds. Credit ratings are discussed further in Chapter 5.
As communications have become easy and international flows of invest-

ment money commonplace, all bond markets worldwide are interconnected
and interest rates have become linked. So, in general, bonds pay similar rates
of interest if they carry the same risk (and inflation is anticipated to be the
same). Table 3.1 shows the interest rates for a few of the bonds of the leading
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Figure 3.1 Credit ratings for some countries

Source: Data from Standard & Poor’s website June 2014 www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/
ratings-list/en/us/?sectorName=null&subSectorCode=&start=0&range=50
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Table 3.1 Benchmark government bonds on 11 June 2014
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government issuers when issuing in their currency. Benchmark securities

are those used as market indicators, the bedrock yields. In the bond market
the usual benchmarks are the prices and yields of bonds with 2 years, 5 years,
10 years and 30 years to redemption. These issues tend to be more liquid
(traded more) than other bonds.
The Financial Times website also has a table displaying the spreads on
ten-year benchmark bonds. That is, the number of percentage points of gross
redemption yield above the ten-year German government bond (Bund) and
above the ten-year US government bond (Treasury bond or T-bond) offered
on a ten-year government bond from another country. Thus, Table 3.2 shows
an investor in New Zealand government bonds (denominated in NZ$) will
receive 3.06% per year more than an investor in German bonds (in euros)
and 1.83% more than an investor in US bonds (in US$). The additional yield
may compensate for greater anticipated inflation, greater perceived risk (such
as exchange rate change risk) or other factors, e.g. the relative tendency for
central banks to push down ten-year bond yields through their quantitative
easing programmes (buying bonds, pushing up their prices and lowering their
yields – see Chapter 16).
Table 3.2 Government bonds – spreads over ten-year bonds and US Treasuries
Jun 11 Bid Spread Spread Bid Spread Spread

Yield vs Bund vs T-Bonds Yield vs Bund vs T-Bonds
Australia 3.80 +2.42 +1.19 Netherlands 1.63 +0.25 –0.98

Austria 1.70 +0.32 –0.91 New Zealand 4.45 +3.06 +1.83
Belgium 1.87 +0.47 –0.76 Norway 2.66 +1.27 +0.04
Canada 2.35 +0.94 –0.29 Portugal 3.33 +1.95 +0.72
Denmark 1.41 +0.02 –1.21 Spain 2.64 +1.25 +0.02
Finland 1.61 +0.22 –1.01 Sweden 1.82 +0.43 –0.80
France 1.75 +0.36 –0.87 Switzerland 0.77 –0.62 –1.85
Germany 1.41 – –1.23 UK 2.71 +1.33 +0.10
Greece 5.72 +4.34 +3.11 US 2.64 +1.23 –
Ireland 2.44 +1.05 –0.18
Yields: annualised basis.
Italy 2.79 +1.40 +0.17
Japan 0.61 –0.78 –2.01
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3 GOVERNMENT BONDS AROUND THE WORLD 65
US Treasury bills, notes and bonds

The Bureau of the Fiscal Service, part of the United States Department of the
Treasury, is responsible for managing US government securities. It borrows
money from investors by issuing securities backed by the full faith and credit
of the US government. It also administers TreasuryDirect, which offers online
electronic dealings (purchasing and redeeming) to individual investors as well
as financial institutions. The largest investors in US Treasuries are China and
Japan, which wax and wane with respect to keenness to hold US debt – see
Article 3.1.
Article 3.1
Foreign investors dump Treasuries

at record pace
By Tracy Alloway and Vivianne Rodrigues
Financial Times August 15, 2013

Worries over the end of the Federal Reserve’s bond-buying programme spurred
foreign investors to sell US Treasuries at the fastest pace on record in June.
The Treasury showed that outflows of longer-term US securities, which include
government debt as well as equities, reached $66.9bn in June. Foreign investors
sold $40.8bn worth of Treasury bonds, the highest monthly sell-off on record.
June’s sell-off in US securities coincided with a wider downturn in fixed income
markets as investors fretted over the future of the US central bank’s ‘quantitative
easing’ policy; deflating asset prices and roiling many big market participants.
The central bank could start to ‘taper’ its unprecedented monetary stimulus later
this year and end bond purchases in 2014, Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman, said in June.
A decision to wind down the central bank’s emergency economic policies would
indicate that the US economy is recovering but could also spur more bouts of
market volatility, analysts say.
After selling Treasuries in May, private foreign accounts based in the Caribbean,
Belgium and Luxembourg – a proxy for hedge funds – bought back a combined
$19bn of US government debt in June.
‘I wouldn’t be surprised to see a big swing back in flows when July figures come
out,’ said Mr Miller [director of fixed-income strategy at GMP Securities]. ‘There’s
only so much large holders of Treasuries can sell, [as] they all need to keep exposure
to the Treasury market, given its depth and liquidity.’
➨
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China remained the biggest investor of US government bonds but pared back its
holdings by $21bn to $1.28tn between May and June. Japan, the second-biggest
investor, cut its holdings by $20bn to $1.08tn.
Total outflows of $66.9bn surpassed the $59bn seen in November 2008, just after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers which sparked the global financial crisis.
Source: Alloway, T. and Rodrigues, V. (2013) Foreign investors dump Treasuries at record
pace, Financial Times, 15 August.
The US Public Debt stood at nearly $17.5 trillion in February 2014. But about
$5 trillion of that was accounted for by one area of government owing another
area of government money, thus the net amount (owing external investors)
was around $12.5 trillion. Nearly $12 trillion of Treasury-issued marketable
securities are held by outside investors, including notes, bills, bonds and
TIPS (explained on page 67) – see Figure 3.2. Most of the rest is owned by
government-managed trust funds and savings bonds.
Figure 3.2 US government public debt, February 2014
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US Treasury securities are initially sold at government-run auctions; the auction

bids are based on the yield amount and every bidder pays the same price,
which is set by the auction. The securities are issued electronically, although
some older ones exist in paper form. At the auctions, only banks, brokers
or dealers may make competitive bids, up to a maximum of 35% of the total
amount on offer, and they are allocated some, or all, of the requested amount.
Individuals may participate in the auctions through TreasuryDirect or through
a broker (or bank), up to a maximum of $5 million, and they are guaranteed to
receive the amount requested, but they will pay the price that is the outcome
of the competitive bid auction. At the close of the auction all non-competitive
bids are accepted, followed by competitive bids starting with the lowest yield,
until the amount of bids accepted reaches the sum the government wishes to
raise at that particular auction, and that yield becomes the accepted bid.
Treasury bills (T-bills) range in maturity from 1 day to 52 weeks, with 4-week
(28 days), 13-week (91 days) and 26-week (182 days) bills being the most
common. They are sold at a discount to par value by auction every week, except
for the 52-week bills which are auctioned every 4 weeks. They are zero coupon
securities, i.e. they do not pay a dividend; any gain for an investor results from
the difference between the purchase price and the selling price.
Treasury notes have a coupon payable every six months. They have a maturity
of two, three, five, seven or ten years and are sold at roughly monthly intervals.
Notes are sold in increments of $100. The minimum purchase is $100.
Treasury bonds are auctioned every few months, have maturities greater than
10 years (usually 30 years) and pay interest twice per year. Bonds are sold in
increments of $100. The minimum purchase is $100. Notes and bonds are
referred to collectively as Treasury coupon securities.
Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) are index-linked bonds whose

principal value is adjusted according to changes in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI). They have maturities of 5, 10 or 30 years and interest is paid twice yearly
at a fixed rate on the inflation-adjusted amount. TIPS are sold in increments
of $100. The minimum purchase is $100. If an investor buys in the primary
market $100,000 of TIPS offering a 2% annual coupon (1% per six months)
with 10 years to maturity, and inflation in the first six months is 1.5%, the
principal amount rises to $101,500. The first semi-annual coupon will be 1% of
the new principal amount, i.e. $1,015. The upward adjustment of principal
amount for inflation occurs before each of the subsequent coupon payments,
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thus raising the coupon by the CPI. At maturity the investor will receive the
final principal amount including adjustment for ten years of inflation. To
protect against deflation the holder receives at maturity the adjusted principal
or the original principal, whichever is greater.
Treasury floating-rate notes (FRNs) were introduced in January 2014. Auctions

of FRNs take place each month, with original issues in January, April, July and
October, and reopenings in the other months, that is, the auction of additional
amounts of a previously issued security. They pay quarterly a rate of interest
that varies according to the rates on 13-week T-bills (a slightly higher rate is
given – ‘spread over bills’). FRNs are sold in increments of $100. The minimum
purchase is $100. Article 3.2 explains that the US Treasury has chosen to intro-
duce FRNs as a way of attracting lenders worried that interest rates might rise
unexpectedly over the life of the bond (a fixed-rate bond would then fall in
price, but with the coupons rising on the FRN, it may maintain its price).
Article 3.2
Why Uncle Sam needs some novel

sweeteners for its bonds
By Gillian Tett
Financial Times January 31, 2014

This week the US government delivered two pieces of noteworthy news. One caused
a splash: the Federal Reserve announced another $10bn cut in its monthly bond
purchases, the second time it has tapered. Cue Twitter alerts and headlines.
But the real drama came a few hours earlier, when Uncle Sam successfully sold
$15bn of two-year floating-rate notes to investors in the first innovation in federal
debt for 16 years. The sale of these bonds that reset according to market rates – thus
avoiding any losses if rates rise – attracted a startling $85bn of orders; not that you
would have noticed from following the media, whether social or mainstream.
On one level this disparity is no surprise. Government bond auctions tend to be
technical affairs. The Fed’s taper, by contrast, is replete with drama for global
investors, particularly since it could trigger more volatility for emerging markets.
But investors and taxpayers would be foolish to ignore the ‘floaters’. What they
show is the degree to which Treasury officials are hunting for ways to ensure the
US can keep selling its debt to global investors when interest rates rise. And
the outcome of those discreet experiments could prove critical to whether that
much-debated taper will play out smoothly – or not.
➨
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The issue at stake partly revolves around the manner in which the Treasury sells
government debt. In the past this was done in a straightforward way: bonds carried
fixed interest rates, and most of these were either short-term bills or 10-year ones.
Until recently US officials saw little reason to change this approach as demand was
sky high.
But now a business-as-usual course is starting to look dangerously complacent.
Never mind the fact that the US debt pile has doubled to $17tn in the past decade;
and ignore recent fiscal fights and the threat of a new debt-ceiling showdown.
The other challenge haunting the Treasury is the maturity profile of the debt.
In the past three decades this maturity has averaged 58 months, meaning it must be
renewed almost every five years. During the financial crisis it declined to four years
– half the average maturity of most European countries. That produced one oft-
ignored benefit: because the Fed has kept rates ultra-low, total interest costs have
not risen as fast as total debt. Just like a homeowner on a floating mortgage, low
rates have meant low monthly interest payments for the Treasury. Indeed, interest
payments now represent 6% of federal outlays; two decades ago it was 15%.
But this benefit comes with a sting that mortgage borrowers know well: if rates
increase, interest payments could balloon. And if investors panic about inflation,
higher rates or fiscal sustainability, that squeeze could be more intense.
The good news is that the Treasury is aware of this danger, and trying to prepare. In
recent months it has had success in raising the average maturity profile by selling
more long-term bonds. This stands at 66.7 months, and officials say that by 2020 it
could reach 80.
Treasury officials are also trying to help the market absorb future rate rises by
offering a more flexible range of instruments. This week’s experiment with floaters
is one move. However, the Treasury is also selling inflation-protected bonds and
officials are getting more proactive about asking large investors – including Asian
buyers – what moves will keep them purchasing Treasuries. In March 2014 there
were 32 bills being traded, 219 Notes, 64 Bonds, 38 TIPS and 321 STRIPS. Treasuries
interest payments are exempt from local and state taxes, but not from federal
income taxes.
Source: Tett, G. (2014) Why Uncle Sam needs some novel sweeteners for its bonds,
Financial Times, 31 January.
US STRIPS
Treasury STRIPS are similar to UK STRIPS, sold at a discount with maturities
of 9 months to 30 years. US government notes and bonds may be converted
to STRIPS by financial institutions and government securities brokers and
dealers, who create STRIPS after purchasing the non-stripped notes or bonds.
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They then ask the Federal Reserve (US central bank) to record the separation
of coupons and face value with separate number identifiers on its computer
system. The individual coupons and principal can then be traded as zero
coupon securities by dealers. The minimum face amount needed to strip a
fixed-principal note or bond or a TIP is $100 and any par amount to be stripped
above $100 must be in a multiple of $100. STRIPS may be reconstituted – this
might be worthwhile if the package of zero coupon STRIPS is selling in the
market at less than the complete Treasury security.
Secondary market
US government bills, notes and bonds are traded in an active and liquid
secondary market (in an over-the-counter market rather than on a formal
exchange), with dealers posting bid (buying) and ask (selling) prices, and
trades conducted over the telephone or by electronic communication. The
central actors in the secondary market are the primary dealers (largest banks
and brokerages in New York, Tokyo and London), which often act as market
makers. Notes and bonds usually trade in $1,000 denominations. Settlement
normally takes place one business day after a trade. Primary dealers also trade
with each other directly or through interdealer brokers who match up buyers
and sellers, usually with the advantage of anonymity for the participants.
Retail investors buy or sell through banks and brokerage firms.
Prices for notes and bonds are quoted as a combination of whole dollars and
as a fraction of a dollar. This may be in decimal terms, i.e. a fraction of 100, but
more often the fraction used is 1/32nd of a dollar. Thus a US Treasury bond price
has two parts: (1) the handle, that is, the main number (the first), and (2) the
32nds, that is, the number expressed as a fraction of 32. This can be confusing
because a decimal point might be used to separate the handle from the 32nds,
despite the fact that the number that follows is not a fraction of 100 but of 32.
Table 3.3 shows the prices of US Treasury notes and bonds of varying
maturities on 27 March 2014. The price for a $1,000 five-year note consists
of (a) 99 and (b) 19¾ of 32. (Thankfully our numbers are separated by a dash
rather than a decimal point.) To convert into a percentage to determine the
dollar amount for the bond we first divide 19¾ by 32. This equals 0.6171875.
We then add that amount to 99 (the handle), which equals 99.6171875. So,
99–19¾ equals 99.6171875% of the par value. If the par is $1,000, then the
price is $996.171875.
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Table 3.3 Prices of US Treasury notes and bonds, 27 March 2014
Coupon Price Yield
2-year 0.375 99–27½ 0.45%

5-year 1.625 99–19¾ 1.71%
10-year 2.75 100–14½ 2.70%
30-year 3.625 101–15½ 3.54%
Source: Data from Bloomberg.com www.bloomberg.com/markets/rates-bonds/government-bonds/us/
This price, which is slightly lower than the face value, demonstrates that the
current interest rates (market yields) are higher than the coupon yield of 1.625%,
$1.625 per $100. Often notes and bond prices are quoted just with a yield
figure, as it is then possible to work out what the market price would be.
(These calculations are explained in Chapter 13.) Some very active issues may
be quoted in 64ths of a point – in this case a + sign is added to the 32nds.
Some traders/writers use even more convoluted and confusing conventions
and fractions. It is definitely a weird system, time honoured, but weird.
French bonds
The French Treasury, Agence France Trésor (AFT), is responsible for borrow-
ing to finance the public debt – for 2013 this figure was €169 billion. With
this added to the total, France owed investors a sum equal to more than 90%
of annual output. Most of this was raised by selling medium- and long-term
securities. AFT sells by auction on fixed dates government bonds with a face
value of €1 and a minimum bid of €1 million. Any institution affiliated to
Euroclear France1 and holding an account with the Banque de France (the
central bank) is eligible to bid at the auctions, and they are able to sell the
securities on to retail investors. Bids are made and the Treasury accepts the bids
from the highest downwards until the target amount is achieved. Bidders pay
varying prices according to their bids. The bonds issued are as follows:
BTFs (bons du Trésor à taux fixe et à intérêts précomptés) are government bills
with which the government covers its short-term cash position fluctuations.
They have a maturity of one year or less and are auctioned every Monday.
1
A system for settling trades in securities: the simultaneous transfer of cash to the seller for
payment and securities to the buyer. It also performs the functions of safekeeping and asset
servicing (‘custody’) of these securities.
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BTANs (bons du Trésor à intérêts annuels) are auctioned on the third Thursday
of each month and are two- to five-year bonds with a fixed annual rate of
interest. Since the 1st of January 2013, new benchmark securities created on
medium-term (maturities of two and five years) are issued under the form of
OAT (Obligation Assimilable du Trésor), as it is the case for long-term secu-
rities (10 years and more). The specific name of BTAN for medium-term
securities has indeed no more the utility it had originally. Existing BTAN
continue to be tapped in order to maintain their liquidity.
OATs (obligations assimilables du Trésor) are auctioned on the first Thursday
of each month and range in maturity from 7 to 50 years. They are mostly fixed
rate, but some have floating rates, pegged to the TEC 10, an index of long-term
government bond yields; these are called TEC 10 OATs (because the yield on
a bond with close to ten years to redemption is used). There are some index-
linked bonds, linked either to the domestic consumer price index, OATi, or
to the eurozone price index, OAT€i. Once issued OATs may be supplemented
by further issues. Interest is paid once per year. OATs may be STRIPS.
Figure 3.3 French government fixed-rate and index-linked bonds in issue by

redemption year. Nominal amounts in € billion in April 2014
Source: Agence France Trésor, Monthly Bulletin, May 2014 www.aft.gouv.fr/documents/%7BC3BAF1F0-F068-
4305-821D-B8B2BF4F9AF6%7D/publication/attachments/23525.pdf
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Figure 3.4 French government bond maturity dates. Securities issued during the first
quarter of 2014 and total issuance
In 2014 the total of these bonds in issue was over €1.4 trillion – see Figures 3.3
and 3.4. Primary dealers commit to market making in OATs in an OTC market.
Note that the majority of French debt is held by non-residents – see Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5 Holders of French government debt at the end of 2013

* Undertakings in Collective Investment in Transferable Securities
German bonds
In Germany, the German Finance Agency, Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Finanzagentur (BDF), is tasked with managing German government debt.
During 2014 it planned to issue securities totalling €205 billion – see Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 German securities issues for 2014
Security Share 2014 Volume 2014 €bn
Schaetze 2Y 25.4% 52
Bobl 5Y 23.4% 48
Bund 10Y 26.3% 54
Bund 30Y 3.4% 7
Capital market 78.5% 161
Bubill 6M 10.7% 22
Bubill 12M 10.7% 22
Money market 21.5% 44
Source: Data from www.deutsche-finanzagentur.de
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The BDF sells via pre-announced auctions arranged by the Bundesbank, the
German central bank, with 6-month, 12 -month, 2-, 5-, 10- and 30-year matur-
ities, with a nominal value of €1 and a minimum bid of €1 million. Only the
37 members of the Bietergruppe Bundesemissionen (Bund Issuance Auction
Group) can place bids at the auctions. Bids may be competitive or non-
competitive. Competitive bids are made as a percentage of the nominal
price and successful bidders pay the actual price bid, with bids being accepted
from the highest downwards. Non-competitive bids are settled at the weighted
average price of accepted bids. A detailed auction timetable is available from
the BDF (www.deutsche-finanzagentur.de). The bills are discount securities
and the bonds pay interest once per year.
Unverzinsliche Schätzanweisungen (Bubills) have maturities of 6 and

12 months. They are auctioned most months and generally account for less
than 5% of German government securities outstanding in the secondary
market.
Bundesschatzanweisungen (Schaetze) are two-year Federal Treasury notes.
New Schaetze are issued four times a year, thus at any one time there are
eight in issue. They made up about 11% of government debt in 2013.
Bundesobligationen (Bobls) are five-year Federal Notes. There are 3 new
Bobl auctions per year and 15 series of Bobls are in issue. Bobls account for
about 21% of German government securities outstanding in the secondary
market.
Bundesanleihen (Bunds) are 10- and 30-year Federal bonds and form the
majority of German government debt, around 60%. There are about
40 bunds in issue. In 2014 three new 10-year bunds were issued, each with a
volume of €18 billion. Three issues of 30-year bunds add up to €7 billion.
Some bunds may be stripped.
The total amount of German government securities outstanding was over

€1.1 trillion at the beginning of 2014 – see Figure 3.6, which shows the total
value of bunds, etc., even if they have only a year or two left to redemption.
There is considerable trading on the secondary market, at over five times the
amount of securities in issue traded each year. The yield to maturity offered
on German government bonds usually forms the reference or benchmark
interest rate for other borrowings in the euro currency. In other words, it is
the lowest rate available, with other interest rates described as so many basis
points above, say, the ten-year bund rate.
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Figure 3.6 The remaining time to maturity of German government securities,

December 2013
Source: Bundesrepublik Deutschland Finanzagentur www.deutsche-finanzagentur.de/en/institutional/
secondary-market
During the darkest days of the eurozone financial crisis investors were so
concerned about default risk that they were willing to pay very high prices
for government bonds from those countries perceived to be safest. They did
this to such an extent that the yield fell to below zero (the capital loss over the
holding period outweighed the coupon income). Then with deflation came
widespread holding of negative yield bonds – see Article 3.3.
Article 3.3
Investors be warned: the bond

market must turn some time
By John Authers
Financial Times February 27, 2015

Records were made to be broken. There were plenty of headlines for new equity
highs this week, particularly the first new record close in 15 years for the UK’s
FTSE 100. But a high after 15 years does not necessarily trigger much cause for
alarm. Even if this is not an obvious time to buy UK stocks, it is hard to make the
case that they are overblown.
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But then comes the bond market. Here, history suggests that prices have entered
into new and undiscovered territory. But because that territory is so new, history
has few precedents to help predict what might happen next.
This week’s publication of the annual Barclays equity-gilt study demonstrated that
UK gilts have outperformed stocks over the past 25 years – a remarkable outcome
that implies that bonds’ outperformance cannot be sustained. Over the longer
term, as Neil Collins details elsewhere in these pages, equities have comfortably
outperformed.
But by the standards of government bonds, UK gilts are not that impressive.
Negative yields, meaning that investors are in effect paying the government for the
privilege of looking after their money, are now available on bonds from Germany
and Switzerland. This sounds crazy. Why would anyone do this?
In fact, negative yields can be explained by a number of factors. First, there is the
fear of deflation. If you think the buying power of money will decline, it makes
sense to buy a bond whose value will also decline.
Second, there is second-guessing the actions of central banks. If they will be buying
at whatever price, then buy bonds, even at a negative yield, and sell to them later.
The European Central Bank is about to launch into indefinite bond purchases, and
the Bank of Japan is in the midst of a continuing bond-buying campaign. They can
print money so they can be relied on to buy.
Third, there are demographics. As populations age, so it makes sense for more
people to buy bonds that provide an income in retirement, and for more pension
funds to buy them so that they can afford to make guarantees for the future. This
is particularly true when governments change regulations to force them to do so,
thereby arguably forcing them to lend cheap to the state.
Fourth, there is supply. There are fewer safe assets than there used to be. US
mortgage-backed debt is, naturally, no longer considered to be in that category; the
number of corporations with the top triple-A credit rating is also now negligible;
and government bonds issued by peripheral eurozone countries are now regarded
as very risky.
Hence, naturally enough, the few truly safe assets that are left become even more
valuable – to the point where investors will even accept a negative yield.
Finally there is demand. Foreign exchange reserve managers have steadily bought
bonds, particularly Treasuries, as insurance against crises. China’s huge build-up
of Treasury bonds, which arguably kept rates artificially low, was dubbed a ‘savings
glut’ as long as a decade ago. Now, the eurozone’s huge and growing trade surplus
should deepen that savings glut – and force bond yields down.
In the short term, it is eminently possible for bonds’ price rise to continue, even
though they have reached a historic extreme. The experience of last year, when
substantially nobody was ready for bond yields to pivot downwards once again,
makes that clear.
Richard Batley, economist at Lombard Street Research, points out that the
money coming from the ECB and the Bank of Japan will be more than enough to
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counteract any decline in the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, according to
their announced plans.
But investors may have learnt the wrong lesson from 2014. Yes, bond yields can
continue to fall, and even go negative. But that does not mean that they can never
reverse.
Demographics have helped bonds (and equities) for the past three decades, and are
in the process of reversing in the western world and even in China. Once there
are fewer savers as a proportion of the population, and more people gradually
selling bonds as they live into their retirement, so this will be a big headwind for
bond prices. And at some point, central banks will stop offering their support, even
if that point is still in the future.
And the pain when they do could be considerable. Investors have grown accustomed
to low or even negative interest rates, and have developed a range of securities to
act as a proxy for the safe income-producers that government bonds used to be.
Look at the growth of real estate or infrastructure investing, for example, or the
popularity of high-yielding dividend stocks.
All of these assets would be affected if and when the bond market finally turns.
And the steady exit of banks from fixed-income markets, under pressure from
regulators, means that they would not be there to ease the process as bonds finally
turn. There have been a few indicators in the past two years that the bond market
is vulnerable to short and sharp turns – such as the ‘taper tantrum’ in spring 2014,
when yields rose, or last October’s ‘flash crash’, when they fell.
The chief warning of the Barclays study, even though history provides so few pre-
cedents, is that the bond market must turn at some point, and that when it does
that turn could be violent.
Source: Authers, J. (2015) Investors be warned: the bond market must turn some time,
Financial Times, 27 February.
Japanese bonds
The Japanese Ministry of Finance issues Japanese government bonds ( JGBs),
paying interest semi-annually. In March 2014, the Japanese government had
outstanding debt of ¥1,025 trillion ($10 trillion). Medium- and long-term bonds
made up nearly 80% of this. Auctions take place regularly (usually monthly)
according to a published calendar. Maturities on JGBs can be 2, 5, 10, 20, 30
or 40 years. Inflation-indexed JGBs are also issued for 10-year maturities and
floating-rate JGBs for 15-year maturities. Japanese institutions purchase the
majority (about 70%) of these bonds (see Figure 3.7), but retail investors are
able to purchase 3-, 5- and 10-year bonds.
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Figure 3.7 Breakdown of holders of Japanese government bonds and T-bills,

December 2013 (BOJ is Bank of Japan, the central bank)
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance www.mof.go.jp/english/jgbs/publication/newsletter/jgb2014_05e.pdf
The unit face values of JGBs are:
● ¥10,000 for JGBs for retail investors (3-year fixed rate, 5-year fixed rate,
10-year floating rate)
● ¥50,000 for 2-, 5-, 10-, 20-, 30- and 40-year
● ¥100,000 for 10-year inflation indexed, 15-year floating rate.
Many JGBs are traded in the over-the-counter secondary market, but trade has
been severely constrained by the impact of the enormous quantity of buying
by the central bank – see Article 3.4. Foreign investors are encouraged, but still
hold less than 10%. A few are traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and other
exchanges. The average time to maturity of bonds and T-bills combined is
seven and a half years – see Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8 Time-to-maturity structure of outstanding Japanese government bonds in

December 2013 – for redemption years stretching from 2013 to 2052
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance www.mof.go.jp/english/jgbs/publication/newsletter/jgb2014_05e.pdf
Article 3.4
Kuroda always looks on the bright

side, but reality is dark
By Ben McLannahan

For Bank of Japan governor Haruhiko Kuroda, things are always looking up.
The 2% target for inflation will be met before long, he keeps saying. Growth in the
economy is well above potential. And liquidity in the bond market is ‘not very low’.
Really? People actually in the Y854tn ($8.4tn) Japanese government bond (JGB)
market – the world’s second largest – tend to give a different story. Dealers say the
BoJ’s commitment to buy up about 70% of net issuance by the government has
forced almost everyone else out, and institutions complain that they cannot buy
or sell when they want to. In fact, in the fiscal year to March, the turnover of JGBs
fell to a record low. One risk of such a gummed-up market is that it sends out false
signals. At the moment, for example, the 10-year yield seems stuck at about 0.6%,
while core inflation – excluding the recent tax increase – is about 1.3%.
A second, more serious risk is that thin trading magnifies the effects of a sudden
sell-off. In March, the market wobbled after the BoJ said it would buy fewer bonds
than expected. Given that reaction, how can the bank dare to hint about an exit
from its buying policy?
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Credit Suisse has already calculated that, if the bank keeps buying bonds at its
current rate, it will hold nearly 40% of all outstanding five to 10-year JGBs by
next March – nearly double its current share.
Source: McLannahan, B. (2014) Kuroda always looks on the bright side, but reality is dark,
Chinese bonds
China’s government bond market was established in 1950, but that experiment
by the Communist Party was closed down in 1958. With the economic reforms
of the 1980s the Chinese bond market was re-established and is now one of
the largest in the world, having grown exponentially during the 21st century.
Unlike most debt markets the Chinese one is generally closed to foreign issuers,
investors and intermediaries, except for investments via qualified foreign
institutional investors (QFIIs), which are a select few foreign financial institu-
tions allowed to invest in the Chinese securities market. Even then, they can
do so only up to their quota limit.
The amount of bonds (government plus corporate) outstanding at the end of
2013 was over Rmb 35 trillion (about £3.4 trillion) – see Article 3.5.
The bond market is split into three roughly equal portions: (1) government
bonds consisting of Treasury bonds and bills, savings bonds and local govern-
ment bonds, and central government bonds; (2) policy bank bonds, issued
by the Agricultural Development Bank of China, China Development Bank
and Export–Import Bank of China; and (3) corporate bonds, most of which
are issued by state-owned enterprises and a few private corporate entities and
financial institutions (they also issue medium-term notes, commercial paper).
There are two main types of government bonds traded in China:
● Treasury bonds – these have maturities up to 50 years. They are issued at
auctions with no set pattern of issuance
● financial bonds – these are issued by banks and financial institutions and are
heavily backed by government-owned or controlled institutions. They are
traded in the interbank markets.
Wary of foreign investment and control, most domestic debt is still purchased
by state-owned or state-controlled financial institutions, thus concentrating
risk in quasi-government-owned institutions instead of spreading it among
many investors. The secondary market is very thin.
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Article 3.5
China bond market emerges from

the shadows
By Josh Noble
Since the days of Marco Polo, China has been stuck with the label of the world’s
largest untapped market.
At roughly $4tn, China’s domestic bond market is the world’s fourth largest, and
far larger than the Shanghai equity market’s $2.4tn. It is also growing about 30%
a year.
Yet for global investors, Chinese credit has been almost entirely off limits, with
opportunities limited to relatively small offshore markets – whether in US dollars
or renminbi – where a small number of mainland companies have chosen to borrow.
But change is afoot as financial reforms crack open the door to domestic Chinese
bonds.
‘As the market opens up, it’s going to become one of the most important capital
markets in the world,’ says Geoff Lunt, Asian fixed-income product specialist at
HSBC asset management.
Singapore on Tuesday joined London and Hong Kong as financial centres where
investors can apply for quotas under China’s renminbi qualified foreign institu-
tional investor scheme. Holders of RQFII licences can use renminbi that they hold
offshore to invest directly in domestic Chinese assets, from bonds to stocks to
money market funds.
The recent expansion of RQFII – totalling Rmb400bn ($65bn) but of which just
Rmb130bn has been allocated – is the latest step in Beijing’s broad, long-term
goal of improving access to China’s domestic financial markets. A sister pro-
gramme denominated in US dollars has also been expanded to attract more foreign
investment.
HSBC, which in July became the first big international bank to get an RQFII
licence, says it plans to use its licence to launch funds targeting China’s domestic
bond market. Central banks are also getting in on the act as they look to diversify
their holdings away from the US dollar. In April, the Reserve Bank of Australia said
it planned to invest about 5% of its reserves in Chinese government debt.
‘Liquidity is better onshore, and the yield pickup is also higher. That’s why a lot of
central banks have got their own quotas to place funds onshore’, says Jack Chang,
chief executive of ICBC Asia asset management. His company, whose clients include
central banks and sovereign wealth funds, plans to make its first investment in
onshore fixed income later this month.
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However, few are expecting the swift demise of the offshore – or ‘dim sum’ – bond
market, which is subject to international legal and regulatory standards and offers
much simpler tax and repatriation rules for those seeking to exit investments.
Source: Noble, J. (2013) China bond market emerges from the shadows, Financial Times,
23 October.
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Emerging markets
Less well-developed economy governments may issue bonds in their domestic
currency or in the major hard currencies such as the dollar or the euro.
Table 3.5 shows a sample of government bonds from emerging countries for
which the coupons and principal will be paid in dollars or euros (there are also
a couple of high-yield corporate bonds for Bertin and Kazkommerts). Credit
ratings from Standard & Poor’s, ‘S’, Moody’s, ‘M’, and Fitch, ‘F’, are discussed
Table 3.5 High yield and emerging market bonds
Jun 16 Red Coupon Ratings Bid Bid Day’s Mth’s Spread

date price yield chge chge vs US
S* M* F*
yield yield
High Yield US$
Bertin 10/16 10.25 BB Ba3 0 114.79 3.48 0.13 –0.72 2.82
High Yield Euro
Kazkommerts Int 02/17 6.88 B Caa1 B 99.88 6.91 0.03 –0.47 6.86
Emerging US$
Bulgaria 01/15 8.25 BBB− Baa2 BBB− 104.00 1.21 –0.03 0.37 1.14
Peru 02/15 9.88 BBB+ Baa2 BBB+ 105.59 0.95 0.41 –0.01 0.88
Brazil 03/15 7.88 BBB− Baa2 BBB 104.76 1.18 0.03 0.05 1.07
Mexico 09/16 11.38 BBB+ A3 BBB+ 123.27 0.86 –0.05 –0.10 0.39
Philippines 01/19 9.88 BBB Baa3 BBB− 132.51 2.34 0.00 –0.02 0.65
Brazil 01/20 12.75 BBB− Baa2 BBB 150.12 2.94 – –0.35 1.23
Colombia 02/20 11.75 BBB Baa3 BBB 144.23 3.18 –0.01 0.02 1.48
Russia 03/30 7.50 BBB− Baa1 BBB 115.25 4.32 0.16 –0.21 2.63
Mexico 08/31 8.30 BBB+ A3 BBB+ 143.20 4.62 0.00 0.06 2.02
Indonesia 02/37 6.63 BB+ Baa3 BBB− 113.25 5.59 – 0.10 2.11
Emerging Euro
Brazil 02/15 7.38 BBB− Baa2 BBB 103.89 1.10 0.10 0.08 1.08
Poland 02/16 3.63 A− A2 A− 105.63 0.15 –0.18 –0.34 0.12
Turkey 03/16 5.00 NR Baa3 BBB− 105.40 1.74 0.05 0.16 1.71
Mexico 02/20 5.50 BBB+ A3 BBB+ 121.02 1.59 0.04 –0.12 1.03
US$ denominated bonds NY closer; all other London close. * S – Standard & Poor’s, M – Moody's, F – Fitch.
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in Chapter 5. Note the additional yield that must be offered on these bonds
(‘Spread vs US’) compared with what the US government has to pay despite
the currency of coupons and principal both being US dollars. This is due to the
extra risk of default.
Frequently, these bonds are issued under UK or US law to reassure lenders that
should default occur there will be greater protection than under the issuer’s
law. The benefit of this was shown in the case of Greece’s default in 2012 – the
majority of its sovereign debt was issued under local law and those holders
were forced to accept 74% losses in a ‘bond exchange’ (meaning they swapped
the original bonds for lower-value ones). The minority holding the few governed
under English law were repaid at par. Mind you, it is not always that easy. Take
the case of Argentina’s bonds, issued under US law. They defaulted in 2001.
Following a deal with most of the bond holders (they got about 35 cents on
the dollar) the country refused to pay anything to those who did not agree
to the reduction (24% of the holders). The ‘holdouts’ (mostly hedge funds)
fought in US courts for years and won a number of judgments – an Argentine
ship was seized in Ghana at one point; the president is reluctant to fly abroad
in her plane in case it is seized – which in 2014 resulted in a ruling that they
should receive full payment including interest – see Article 3.6.
Article 3.6
Argentina row triggers interest in

defaulted debt
By Elaine Moore
Financial Times July 2, 2014

1984 was not a good year for North Korea. That was the year western banks
declared Pyongyang in default on debt it had sold in the previous decade, sealing
off a possible avenue of funding for the reclusive state.
Yet the defaulted loan did not disappear. Instead, it was repackaged a decade later
by French bank BNP into Swiss franc and Deutsche mark denominated debt and
has been traded ever since.
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North Korea’s defaulted debt exists in a sort of twilight state, paying no interest but
invested in by those who believe that the country cannot remain severed from the
wider world forever. No payout on the loans is in sight, but prices on the securitised
loan certificates have moved between 60 cents on the dollar to less than 10 cents
over the years, depending on news from the country and indications about the
future of sanctions.
Now the battle between Argentina and investors who hold the country’s defaulted
bonds has reawakened interest in markets such as those North Korean certificates,
part of a small and illiquid world of hyper-exotic distressed debt.
If the ‘hold out’ hedge fund investors receive the money that New York judge
Thomas Griesa says is due to them, they could stand to profit not only from the
discount at which they purchased the bonds but on unpaid interest due since
the default.
So-called past due interest can be the source of spectacular gains to investors
patient enough to wait for it.
When Iraq defaulted on sovereign bonds in the 1980s, borrowed in part to fund a
war with Iran, the unpaid interest spanned over two decades before the country
restructured its debt in 2006. Vietnam repaid past interest on loans that had traded
at less than 5 cents on the dollar in the 1990s when it rejoined capital markets and
Liberian debt, which also traded at less than 5 cents in the 1990s, was settled at
close to six times that when it was restructured.
The prospect of harvesting these sort of returns is why some investors will consider
buying non-performing debt from the tiny island of Nauru in the South Pacific,
currently trading at 5 cents on the dollar, or debt issued by Sudan before civil war
split the country north to south.
Exotic frontier debt is in vogue right now. Debut sovereign bonds issued by
Rwanda and Kenya have attracted unexpected levels of interest from investors
keen for yield. That has caused concern in some quarters.
‘There is an increasing lack of awareness about the illiquidity and implicit risk
taken by investors as they move down the curve looking for yield in this zero
interest world,’ says Sam Vecht at BlackRock Frontiers investment trust.
But others say that long-term investment in defaulted sovereign debt is not neces-
sarily the one-sided risk it might sound. The prospect of low-cost funding has also
put pressure on countries such as Argentina to resolve outstanding debts if they
are to tap global capital markets.
‘There is a big difference between a country and a corporation defaulting because
the country won’t disappear,’ says Christopher Wyke, emerging market debt product
manager at Schroders.
One of the markets long considered ripe for turnaround is Cuba, which defaulted
on its debt in 1986. This year prices in the secondary market for the discounted debt
rose from 6 cents on the dollar to 9 cents. Experts say unpaid due interest could far
exceed the sums demanded by investors in Argentinian debt.
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‘Opportunities [in distressed debt] will usually arise from a credit event such as
the lifting of an embargo,’ says Julian Adams, chief executive of investment fund
Adelante. ‘But this market is shrinking as countries embrace capital markets and
must sort out their older debts.’
Sovereign foreign currency defaults
Country Selective default date Time in selective default
Russia Jan 27 1999 22 months

Pakistan Jan 29 1999 11 months
Indonesia, first default Mar 30 1999 One day
Indonesia, second default Apr 17 2000 Six months
Argentina Nov 6 2001 54 months
Indonesia, third default Apr 23 2002 Four months
Paraguay Feb 13 2003 18 months
Uruguay May 16 2003 One month
Grenada, first default Dec 30 2004 11 months
Venezuela Jan 18 2005 One month
Dominican Republic Feb 1 2005 Five months
Belize, first default Dec 7 2006 Three months
Seychelles* Aug 7 2008 –
Ecuador Dec 15 2008 Six months
Jamaica, first default Jan 14 2010 One month
Belize, second default Aug 21 2012 Seven months
Grenada, second default Oct 8 2012 One week
Greece, first default Feb 27 2012 Three months
Greece, second default Dec 5 2012 Two weeks
Jamaica, second default Feb 12 2013 22 days
Grenada, third default Mar 12 2013 –
Cyprus Jun 28 2013 Five days
* The rating on Seychelles was withdrawn while it was still in default

Source: Data from Thomson Reuters Datastream
Source: Moore, E. (2014) Argentina row triggers interest in defaulted debt, Financial Times,
2 July.
It is going to be much harder for holdouts to force governments to pay up in

future – see Article 3.7.
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Article 3.7
New framework for sovereign

defaults
By Elaine Moore

A group representing more than 400 of the world’s largest banks, investors and debt
issuers has agreed a plan for dealing with financially stricken countries and their
creditors, in a bid to prevent a repeat of the wrangling that has pushed Argentina
into default.
After months of talks convened by the US Treasury in the wake of Greece’s restruc-
turing, global debt experts will on Friday unveil a new framework that could
transform the relationship between critically indebted nations and lenders.
Lawsuits filed by creditors against defaulting governments have doubled over the
last decade and the changes come at a time when levels of sovereign debt have
risen to record highs around the world in the wake of the financial crisis.
The fallout from recent defaults reignited calls for an international bankruptcy
court, but market participants and Washington authorities favour a voluntary
response rather than new statutory mechanisms.
The International Capital Market Association, whose members include banks,
investors and debt issuers, has created fresh clauses for inclusion in sovereign
debt contracts that will give countries the option to bind all investors to decisions
agreed by the majority.
The new approach will make it difficult for small holdout investors to undermine
restructuring deals by giving countries the option to employ a single vote across all
bonds, with a 75% voting threshold, if they restructure their debt. This will hinder
the chances of so-called ‘vulture’ investors from buying up blocking stakes.
Alternatively governments can choose to take votes on each bond, or votes on
individual bonds and a second vote across all debt. The final option has become a
standard clause in eurozone government bonds since 2013 in the wake of the bloc’s
debt crisis.
When Greece restructured billions of euros of debt in 2012 private investors with
more than €6bn of Greek bonds would not accept the deal. Their actions put the
country’s financial future at risk, say analysts, and set a precedent that threatened
to discourage investors from agreeing to future restructuring deals.
A further change to be outlined on Friday is intended to make clear that the com-
mon ‘pari passu’ clause, which hedge fund investors have used to argue for full
repayment on Argentine debt, means equal treatments but not equal payments
for bond holders.
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Around half of all government debt defaults now trigger creditor lawsuits and
in countries such as Congo, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru and Poland, small numbers of
private investors have refused to take part in government plans to restructure
unaffordable debt, holding out for full repayment.
Additional reporting by Robin Harding.
Source: Moore, E. (2014) New framework for sovereign defaults, Financial Times,
28 August.
International bond investors tend to be focused on those issued in hard currency,

but it must be borne in mind that the vast majority of emerging economy
government borrowing is in the domestic market in the local currency, and
increasingly international investors are buying in those markets as inflation
and government spendthrift habits are tamed and high economic growth with
reasonably stable exchange rates is established – see Article 3.8.
Article 3.8
Markets: the road to redemption

By Robin Wigglesworth

Developing nations have largely tackled their poor exchange rates, high inflation,
crushing debt burdens, trade imbalances and budget deficits that helped sink them
in the 1980s and 1990s.
One of the most remarkable shifts is the rapid growth of their domestic bond
markets. Over the past decade they grew fivefold to about $10tn by late 2011, accord-
ing to the latest comprehensive data, which is estimated to equal almost one-sixth
of the world’s total bond stock.
This is a revolutionary development. Throughout modern economic history, most
countries that have needed long-term loans have been forced to borrow abroad in
one of the world’s major currencies, predominantly the US dollar. Although many
have had banking sectors or even local bond markets to tap, the domestic lending
capacity has often been limited, and the duration of the loans has been exceedingly
short.
More than a decade ago, the economists Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann
named the emerging markets’ inability to borrow abroad in their local currency as
‘original sin’. Professor Hausmann: ‘It seemed to be a huge, persistent problem that
all emerging markets were born with, and had remarkable problems getting rid of’.
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Original sin is pernicious. Borrowing in foreign currencies can both trigger and
exacerbate financial and economic crises. When a country’s debts are denominated
in foreign currencies, it forces policy makers to keep exchange rates pegged or
heavily managed. If the rate buckles, the authorities have to burn through valuable
reserves and raise interest rates to protect the value of the local currency – even in
the midst of a recession if necessary.
Almost inevitably, the peg breaks, the local currency tumbles, the foreign currency-
denominated debt burden becomes too great and a destructive government default
ensues.
Spurred by these crises, emerging market policy makers have spent the past decade
getting their finances in order. Crucially, they have nurtured and developed domestic
bond markets denominated in local currencies.
‘We saw with our own eyes how hard [the Asian financial crisis in 1998] hit our
neighbours, and how harshly the IMF treated them – far worse than it is treating
the eurozone,’ Cesar Purisima, the Philippine finance minister, told the Financial
Times. ‘We learnt lessons from that.’
The changes across emerging markets are eye-catching. The domestic Mexican peso
bond market, for example, exploded from about $28bn in US dollar terms in 1996 to
$445bn in late 2011. South Korea’s bond market surged fivefold to $1.1tn over the
same period, while Poland’s zloty market grew sevenfold to $203bn.
It has been a gradual process. Local institutional investor bases have often had
to be started from scratch through reforms that encourage domestic pension and
insurance industries to take root. Above all, inflation – the nemesis of bond investors
but a perennial problem in emerging markets – had to be tamed.
‘When I started trading, emerging markets were the wild west,’ recalls Sergio Trigo
Paz, head of emerging market debt at BlackRock. ‘Local markets were considered
no-man’s land, even domestically, due to hyperinflation.’
Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart have shown that the share of domestic debt
to total government debts in emerging markets declined gradually from a peak
of about 80% in the 1950s to a low of about 40% in the early 1990s. But by 2010 the
percentage had climbed sharply back to more than 60%. In fact, experts now say
domestic debt levels could return to those highs of the 1950s.
‘There were very large local bond markets before, but high inflation pretty much
wiped them out,’ says Mr Rogoff, an economics professor at Harvard. ‘Things are
changing. Developing countries have been very keen to rebalance their borrowing
away from foreign markets.’
The financial crisis reinforced this trend. Domestic bond sales now account for the
vast majority of government borrowing in the developing world, perhaps as much
as 90% of it in 2012.
International investors have become increasingly infatuated by the economic pro-
spects for the developing world and have piled into local bond markets in recent
years. From less than $150bn in March 2009, foreign holdings of local currency
emerging market bonds climbed to well over $500bn last year.
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The rating agencies have also cheered the rise of local bond markets and have
rewarded developing countries with better grades. ‘One of the key reasons for the
improvement in emerging market resilience and robustness – and the increase in
their ratings – is the changing make-up of their debt,’ says David Riley, head of
sovereign ratings at Fitch Ratings.
Although positive, more vibrant local bond markets do not completely inoculate
countries from crises. Deep local markets can even act as a temptation for govern-
ments to borrow excessively. Once they do, many countries have in the past found
it easier simply to inflate the debts away – throttling local bond markets in the
process. Some have simply defaulted. For example, Russia’s short-term debt market
allowed it to delay its inevitable default in 1998, but exacerbated the ensuing chaos.
Local bond markets are also of little help if a country has a current account deficit.
Countries that import more than they export need foreign currency inflows to
make up the difference, whether through borrowing or overseas investment. Even
governments with healthy budget surpluses can run into trouble if the current
account is negative.
It also remains tricky to sell longer-term bonds locally. While some have managed to
lengthen the ‘duration’ of their markets, even some of the more advanced emerging
economies struggle to sell bonds with a maturity longer than 10 years.
‘Original sin is receding for some countries, but mostly for the advanced ones,’ says
Marie Cavanaugh, managing director and member of the sovereign ratings com-
mittee at Standard & Poor’s. ‘Poorer, less developed emerging economies are often
still very dependent on foreign capital.’
Of the almost $10tn worth of locally denominated debts tallied by BofA, almost
two-thirds are in Brazil, China and South Korea. Many smaller countries have
found it harder to nurture local markets.
In fact, the IMF has started to become concerned that the current eagerness of
investors to lend to emerging economies could lead some of these smaller states to
forget the hard-learnt lessons of the past and borrow too much in dollars.
Countries such as Zambia and Mongolia have been identified as being at particular
risk of reviving the bane of original sin. Mongolia late last year sold a $1.5bn bond
– equal to a fifth of its annual economic output in a single offering.
Some fund managers also fret that emerging market companies could become
future sources of instability, after selling record amounts of dollar-denominated
corporate bonds in recent years.
Professors Hausmann and Eichengreen agree that original sin is a less pressing
problem than in the past, but argue that improvements are the result of a drastic
curtailment of dollar borrowing – not a rise in international investor participation
on local bond markets. Indeed, these days some countries have imposed barriers to
keep foreign investors out of their markets, rather than enticing them in. Capital
inflows can cause currencies to appreciate, making a country less competitive.
Foreign investors are often more fickle than local ones, and sharp outflows can
unsettle local markets.
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Nonetheless, the rise of domestic bond markets has proved a tremendously positive
development not just for emerging economies but also for the wider international
financial system. Rather than being sources of instability – as was often the case in
the past – many emerging markets are now self-funding carthorses for the global
economy.
The progress of the past decade is already striking. As long as policy makers do not
forget the lessons of past crises, local bond markets are likely to continue to gain in
size, vibrancy and importance, experts say.
Source: Wigglesworth, R. (2013) Markets: the road to redemption, Financial Times,

31 January.
Africa has underdeveloped local bond markets, but even here many of its
countries are now welcomed in the international dollar-denominated market
– see Article 3.9.
Article 3.9
Sub-Saharan bond rush spreads east

to Kenya and Tanzania
By Javier Blas in London and Katrina Manson
Financial Times September 3, 2013

Ever since Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country to issue a sovereign
bond in 2007, the trend to tap capital markets has been confined to the west and
south of the continent. Now, east Africa is joining.
Kenya and Tanzania are close to debuts in the US dollar-denominated sovereign bond
market, with notes worth up to $2.5bn – joining a string of other African countries
that have already raised a record $6.2bn in international debt this year, three times
as much as in 2011, according to data provider Dealogic.
Until now, only Rwanda has tapped the debt market from east Africa. But the arrival
of Kenya and Tanzania is set to put the region firmly on the radar of international
investors – barely a decade after the region benefited from billions of dollars in debt
relief.
‘East Africa is the second fastest growing region in the world, only behind develop-
ing Asia,’ says Ragnar Gudmundsson, head of the International Monetary Fund in
Kenya. ‘That is why investors are attracted to the region.’
David Cowan, Africa economist at Citigroup, adds that east African nations would
also benefit from investors’ interest in diversifying their exposure from countries
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such as Nigeria, Ghana and Gabon. ‘There is strong appetite to diversify from the
west African sovereign bond story, which is mostly linked to oil,’ he says.
The JPMorgan Nexgem Africa index, which tracks the bond market in the region,
is yielding 7.3%, up from a low-point in January of 5.3%. Still, interest rates for
sovereign issuers in sub-Saharan Africa remain well below the most recent peak of
14% set during the global financial crisis in 2008.
Zambia’s debut last year marked the top for the sub-Saharan market, raising $750m
at a yield of 5.6%. But since then other countries have paid higher yields: Ghana
paid an interest rate of 7.85% in June, and Nigeria paid 6.6%.
Mohammed Hanif, head of Insparo Asset Management, which manages a $160m

emerging markets fixed-income fund that holds Nigerian and Zambian sovereign
debt among others, says investor appetite for African debt is so strong the company
will launch an Africa-only fixed-income fund later this year.
‘There is a clear lack of tradeable African debt around,’ he says.
But he warns that many investors attracted by ‘a bit of euphoria in the market’
but who are not familiar with Africa are easily wrong footed. Insparo did not join
in the rush for Rwanda’s debut $400m bond, which launched earlier this year and
has already fallen significantly. He says Rwanda’s small, aid-dependent economy is
at too early a stage of development to warrant a bond. Still, Mr Hanif says Kenya
and Tanzania instead present ‘great stories’ with more mature economies that offer
‘sustainable growth’ and Insparo expects to participate in both bonds.
In Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital of Tanzania, William Mgimwa, finance

minister, put the example of a private placement the country launched earlier this
year as a sign of the interest that investors have in east Africa.
‘In March this year I was online requesting [offers] for investors. I was looking for
$500m but it was oversubscribed to $2.5bn,’ he says, adding: ‘We already have very
good investors who are actually waiting for [the bond] opportunity.’
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Source: Blas, J. and Manson, K. (2013) Sub-Saharan bond rush spreads east to Kenya and
Tanzania, Financial Times, 3 September.
Clearly, many emerging markets are for the bravest of investors, but it can pay
off if you buy at high yields and then the generality of investors become less
afraid, start buying, pushing up the bond price and lowering yields, as they did
with Irish and Belarusian debt following their crises. But there is brave and
there is foolhardy – see Article 3.10.
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Article 3.10
EM bonds: are you nuts? Investors

are buying bonds with ever less
discrimination
Lex column
On Tuesday a transnational group of terrorists seized Iraq’s second-largest city,

Mosul. The army did not resist. Abandoned equipment and millions of dollars left
in Mosul’s banks are now at the disposal of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
But never mind that. Would you like to take the government’s side for a yield of
6.7%? That is where risk is being priced in Iraq’s US dollar bond due in 2028. This
would be after the market had digested ill tidings from Mosul.
Not so sure of the risk-reward there? Investors may prefer to buy into the stability
of the regime of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, with Egyptian hard-currency bonds
that mature in a quarter of a century. These yield just below 7%. How about Belarus?
There is a 6.5% yield on bonds due in 2018. Trust that no revolution in Minsk disrupts
cash flows before then.
The point here is not simply that some dodgy sovereigns are being priced with low
yields. Risk assets are being bid up generally, even as US Treasury yields have fallen
so far in 2014. Foreign-currency EM bonds are still cheaper overall than high-yield
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developed-market credit. Even so, investors are beginning to buy these bonds with
ever less discrimination.
A brave investor may also argue that fundamentals favour the Iraqi bond. The
country sells lots of oil. But 6.7%? EM bond risks may not seem so high when risk
has become favoured everywhere. That is not the same as riskless.
Source: Lex column (2014) EM bonds: are you nuts?, Financial Times, 11 June.
Local authority/municipal/quasi-state/
agency bonds
Local authority, municipal, quasi-state and agency bonds are issued by
governments and organisations at a sub-national level, such as a county, city
or state. They pay a rate of interest and are repayable on a specific future date,
similar in fact to Treasury bonds. They are sometimes called semi-sovereigns
or sub-sovereigns. They are an important means of raising money to finance
developments, buildings or expansion by the local authority or agency. They
are riskier than government bonds (the issuers cannot print their own money
as governments might) as from time to time cities, counties, etc. do go bust and
fail to pay their debts. However, many issuers, particularly in Europe and the
US, obtain bond insurance from a private insurance group with a top credit
rating, guaranteeing that the bond will be serviced on time. This can boost an
issue’s credit rating, as its rating will then be based on the insurer’s credit
rating, which reduces the interest rate the sub- sovereigns pay.
In the UK, local authority bonds or quasi-state bonds are out of favour at
the moment, although Transport for London issued a 25-year bond in 2006,
and in 2012–2013 raised £1.6 billion with four bond issues with maturities
ranging from 5 to 33 years. There has been talk of issuing a ‘Brummie’ bond
(by Birmingham City Council), but this has yet to be finalised. In July 2013
the city of Leeds raised more than £100 million with an oversubscribed bond
issued to finance a social housing project.
US municipals
Municipal bonds (‘munis’, pronounced mew-knees) are issued by state and
local government departments and special districts. Much of the infrastructure
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Figure 3.9 State and local government debt in the US over time
Source: Data from Financial Accounts of the United States, June 2013
in the US has been and still is financed by municipal bonds, the first of which
was issued in 1812. These bonds have proved to be a valuable source of finance
for local communities.
The US muni market is enormous, with a total in outstanding bonds of over

$3 trillion in 2012 – see Figure 3.9. Special districts are independent govern-
ment bodies managed by a board and they provide some type of service to
a particular area, e.g. airports, ports, roads, bridges, public transport, parking
facilities, fire services, libraries, parks, cemeteries, hospitals, nursing homes,
conservation, sewerage, waste disposal, stadiums, water, electricity and gas.
They tend to be issued in minimal denominations of $5,000.
General-obligation bonds offer the bond holder a priority claim on the

general (usually tax) revenue of the issuer in the event of a default, whereas a
holder of a revenue bond receives interest and principal repayment from the
revenues of a particular project, e.g. the income from a toll bridge.
Some municipal bond issuers have made bad investment decisions and
have gone bust, notably those issued by Orange County, California, in 1994,
where the county treasurer lost more than $1.5 billion; by Jefferson County,
Alabama, in 2011, which went bankrupt owing $4.2 billion; and by the city
of Detroit, Michigan, the former hub of the US motor industry, which in
2013 went down owing $18 billion. Investors who bought bonds where
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the issuer has gone bankrupt face losing some or all of their investment.
Despite these few well-publicised defaults, overwhelmingly municipal bonds
provide a valuable service to their communities and their investors with very
few problems.
Investors in US municipal bonds issued by state and local governments are

usually exempt from federal income tax on the interest they receive. In many
states the income is exempt from state taxes. Because of these concessions
they usually trade at lower yields to maturity than US government bonds. The
investor groups dominating the municipal securities market are households
(some investing via mutual funds), commercial banks and some insurance
companies able to benefit the most from the tax concessions. Municipal bonds
are less liquid than federal government bonds in the secondary market, so
investors may have greater difficulty selling in some of the smaller issues and
the dealer spreads (bid-ask) can be wide.
Some municipals outside of America

In Japan, the Japan Finance Organization for Municipalities (JFM) established in
2008, issues long-term bonds. Most of these are domestic bonds but some are
international issues. The amount outstanding in 2014 was about ¥22 trillion
(US$220 billion), which provided loans to finance local projects.
The German Länder (federal states) are also large issuers, with more than
€350 billion of bonds outstanding in 2014, about the same as the Netherlands.
There are also quasi-state organisations issuing bonds in Europe. In France,
Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF, the state-owned French
railway operator), and in Germany, Deutsche Bahn (DB, the state-owned German
railway company), are just some of the institutions that have issued bonds.
Sweden and Finland both run schemes where local communities join together
to issue bonds to raise finance. By keeping the schemes local, the risk is reduced
so that the bonds receive higher credit ratings. Article 3.11 discusses some local
authority bonds.
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Article 3.11
Local authorities turn to capital

markets
By Elaine Moore

Public sector debt is piling ever higher, driven by the lure of low borrowing costs
and strong investor demand.
Borrowers ranging from supranational organisations like the World Bank to
individual towns and states are issuing record amounts of debt.
In theory, the sudden rise in debt issued by public sector organisations in the wake
of the financial crisis should fall back as the economy recovers. But so far, that has
not happened.
Last year, supranationals such as the World Bank, European Stability Mechanism
and others issued $267bn – a record level of debt. Local authorities are also borrow-
ing more than ever – issuing $7.2bn in bonds so far this year compared with $3.7bn
by the same point last year.
Collectively, quasi-government borrowers make an unwieldy group. At one end of
the scale are enormous organisations created by multiple governments in response
to political or economic crisis.
At the other end are sub-government authorities with the ability to borrow on
capital markets to fund local projects.
Between the two are government-sponsored banks such as Germany’s KfW and
AFD in France, which fund programmes with specific economic or social functions.
These agencies borrowed slightly less last year than in 2012, but still issued a sum
of debt that exceeded borrowing in 2010.
All tend to boast similar credit ratings to the governments that back them, and
offer a slight bump in yields to investors.
The Belgian sub-sovereign Flemish Community, for example, offers about 40 basis
points more than the equivalent Belgian five-year bond, according to Rabobank.
‘Traditionally you get at least a few basis points over sovereign debt yields,’ says
Matthew Cairns, strategist at Rabobank. However, he points out that the investor
base for public debt has broadened from conservative central banks to global banks
under the direction of new regulation. This, combined with the fall in governments,
afforded the highest, triple-A credit rating, and the drop in debt issued by US
agencies – such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – is pushing up order books.
‘The yield makes the sector attractive, but now there is more demand than
paper available and yields are falling. We don’t know how far that can go,’ says
Mr Cairns.
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Investor appetite for public sector debt has become intense, says George Richardson,
head of capital markets at the World Bank Treasury.
In the UK, local authorities are hoping to kick start a market in municipal bonds to
take advantage of low global borrowing rates by creating central agencies.
The UK’s Local Government Association has said that creating an agency able to
issue debt on behalf of councils could save them more than £1bn in borrowing
costs.
More than £4.5m has so far been raised to create the Local Capital Finance
Company, and the organisers say they hope to raise the first bond by March or
April 2015.
Bankers say the success of municipal bond agencies in Nordic countries, Switzerland,
Italy and now France, bodes well.
In Sweden, Kommuninvest raises sums that standalone councils would not be able
to do, something UK councils will be aware of. Launched in the late 1980s, by the
end of last year Kommuninvest’s total lending had reached $28bn.
And in the US, the vast municipal bond market, which reached $3.7tn by the end
of last year, is an established source of saving for households.
Source: Moore, E. (2014) Local authorities turn to capital markets, Financial Times,
30 September.
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Agencies
Agencies (government-sponsored enterprises, GSEs) are set up to fulfil a
public purpose and while the debt they issue is not always explicitly guaranteed
by the government, there is a strong implication or assumption that the state
will step in to make good any shortfall. In the US, a handful of organisations
(quasi-governmental) dominate the agency bond market, including the Federal
Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS), the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac),2
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Student Loan Marketing Association
(Sallie Mae).
2
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the US government in 2008 to save them
from failure after the mortgage crisis.
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CHAPTER 4
CORPORATE BONDS
Most companies at some time need to borrow large sums of money to finance
their operations, and it is vital that they try to do so to their best advantage, e.g.
at the lowest cost, with an optimum mix in terms of maturity dates and with
an acceptable pattern of cash outflows.
If a company finds that it needs extra debt capital to operate successfully, one
of the ways it can source the capital is by issuing corporate bonds. These bonds
are simply IOUs issued by the company and bought by investors who, in return
for lending the company their money, receive interest payments (usually) and
payment of the principal amount at a set time. In general, corporate bonds
offer a higher rate of return than reputable government bonds but as you
might expect, this comes with a greater degree of risk of failure to pay what was
agreed. Having said that, because many governments are less reputable than
some companies within the country, corporate borrowing can be at lower rates
of return than that of their governments. Corporate bonds are generally issued
with a coupon (usually taxable) paying a set amount annually or semi-annually,
and their yield is calculated in the same way as government bonds. Most
corporate bonds are medium to long dated and are rarely more than 20 years.
Corporate bonds can be a very useful way for companies to raise money with-
out issuing equity, which brings the possibility of losing a degree of control
over the company, or accepting the constraints imposed by bank lenders.
Issuance depends on investors and corporate managers having confidence
in the economy and in the prospects for the specific company as well as the
interest rate level. Investor appetite for corporate bonds ebbs and flows, as does
managerial confidence in the benefits of additional debt. Sometimes, as in
August 2013, there is great economic uncertainty and a considerable drop in
the amount being issued – see Article 4.1.
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Article 4.1
Global corporate bond issuance at

lowest level in five years
By Ralph Atkins

Global corporate bond issuance has this month fallen to the lowest level in five
years as market turmoil triggered by rising US Treasury yields persuades compa-
nies worldwide to shelve funding plans.
Just $61bn in investment grade corporate debt has been raised so far in August. In
August last year, more than $121bn in new corporate debt was issued.
The slowdown follows the US Federal Reserve’s announcement that it would slow
the pace of its asset purchases, or ‘quantitative easing‘, from as early as next
month.
Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman, first hinted at his QE ‘tapering’ plans on May 22.
Since then the yield on 10-year US Treasuries has risen to more than 2.9%, compared
with a low of 1.61% at the start of May. Higher bond yields, which move inversely
to prices, have left investors nursing losses on the value of their portfolios.
‘What has been worrying people has been the speed and abruptness of moves. It has
made people more nervous,’ said Bryan Pascoe, global head of debt capital markets
at HSBC.
In the first months of this year, corporate bond issuance was running at a rapid
pace as companies took advantage of historically low interest rates. A high water
mark was reached in April when Apple, the US maker of the iPhone, sold bonds
worth $17bn. But since May, weekly data show global corporate debt issuance
tumbling. The steepest decline has been in emerging markets, where bond and
equity markets have seen sharp price falls in recent weeks as investors have
withdrawn capital.
However, bankers pointed out that US corporate bond issuance had remained
relatively strong, with debt markets buoyed by investment flows returning
from emerging markets. They also attributed the slowdown in Europe to a return
to a more normal summer lull – after several years in which companies have felt
compelled to issue whenever conditions were relatively favourable. Companies
that have issued bonds this month have included Viacom, Royal Dutch Shell and
China’s Wuhan Iron & Steel Group.
Source: Atkins, R. (2013) Global corporate bond issuance at lowest level in five years,
Financial Times, 25 August.
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4 CORPORATE BONDS 105
Some ‘corporate bonds’ are in fact issued by business enterprises owned by a

government. Also, the biggest issuers are banks and other financials rather than
non-financial commercial corporations. An important sub-set of corporate
bonds are the utilities, including telecommunication companies, water, elec-
tricity and gas suppliers. Because these are often regulated by a government
agency they may have a different risk/return profile to bonds from standard
industrials (manufacturers and service companies).
Trading of bonds
While the government bond markets in developed economies are very liquid,
with single government bond issues raising billions and with thousands of
investors trading in the market, by contrast corporate bond market activity can
be very low. Companies may raise merely millions of pounds/dollars in an
issue, and most investors buy and hold to maturity rather than trade in and
out. Some companies issue bonds on a regular basis, every few months or years,
each with its own coupon and terms, thus there might be a dozen bonds
for one company and tens of thousands of different corporate issues in the
secondary market place. The wide range reduces the market depth for any one
issue. This means that an investor might not be able to buy or sell particular
bonds because there is none being traded – see Article 4.2.
Article 4.2
Battle is on to make bonds more

transparent
By Stephen Foley

A retail investor who gets her hands on an Apple bond can sleep pretty soundly.
Not only can she be pretty sure the iPhone maker will be good for the interest pay-
ments. If she decides, at some point in the future, to sell the bond, she can be pretty
sure there will be a ready buyer there to take it off her hands at the prevailing
market price.
Would that this could be said for all bonds.
The scale of Apple’s $17bn debt offering means there ought to always be lots of
bonds changing hands, and it will be easy to keep tabs on the price at which they
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are trading. They join an elite group of liquid corporate bonds. Most issues are not
so easy to buy and sell.
In fact, of the 30,000 investment-grade corporate bonds trading in the US alone, only
20 trade more than ten times a day, according to MarketAxess. The proportion of
the market that turns over in a year has slipped below 75%. The situation in muni-
cipal bonds, issued by state and local governments, is even worse.
And that means it is not so easy for a bond investor to be sure of the price she
will have to pay if she puts in an order, or end up receiving if she tells her broker
to sell.
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At an industry forum earlier this month, the independent financial adviser Ric
Edelman went as far as to claim investors were, in effect, being ‘lied to . . . We
understand why that happens, that no deceit is intended, but they are shocked to
discover what they thought was $105 was in fact $98 and don’t know that until they
have sold. We have huge education and disclosure problems within the industry.’
The issue is getting scrutinised by regulators in the US and Europe like never
before. Technological advances bring the tantalising prospect of more liquidity and
there is already more transparency on price, at least after bonds have traded.
But the US Securities and Exchange Commission for one is sceptical that the bene-
fits are flowing through to retail investors. They fear that the opacity of the market
allows big dealers to take advantage by taking big mark-ups on trades.
The agency is considering demanding more transparency in corporate and muni-
cipal bond trading, although it has to weigh concerns that new rules could be
detrimental to some big players in the market.
As for investors being able to see a price for their specific bond before they trade,
that is a harder problem to crack. Traditionally, there has been no substitute to
brokers calling round the trading desks of Wall Street to ask what a specific lot of
bonds will fetch.
Source: Foley, S. (2013) Battle is on to make bonds more transparent, Financial Times,
1 May.
Some corporate bonds are sufficiently liquid to trade on the London Stock
Exchange and other exchanges in Europe, Asia or the Americas and may also
be traded on electronic communication networks (ECNs), which facilitate
trading outside stock exchanges, but the vast majority of trading occurs in the
over-the-counter market directly between an investor and a bond dealer.
Bond dealers stand ready to quote bid and offer prices depending on whether
the investor wants to buy or sell. Fund managers, or brokers acting for inves-
tors, will have to contact a number of these dealers by telephone to get quote
prices. The bid–offer spreads are generally higher than for equities – even large
company bonds can have a spread of 15%, but most are less than this.
There have been attempts to shift a large volume of trading on to computer-

based systems – see Article 4.3. These electronic trading venues allow investors
to input their desired buy or sell offer prices and amounts. Such an offer may
be fulfilled by the computer matching up with other clients (or the bank) on
the other side of the trade (crossing trade). The competition, transparency and
efficiency brought by the electronic systems will, it is hoped, reduce transaction
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costs. Many such platforms are now operating but they still account for only
1% of trades. Investors are irritated by the splitting of such trades between
numerous venues, mostly run by an investment bank with its own agenda (single-
dealer systems) and would prefer to see one dominant platform (multi-dealer
platform) emerge, run in a way that would benefit them. Concern has been
expressed that platform providers are using data from the trading venue to
inform their own team of traders and market makers – this knowledge might
be used against investors. Market makers in the OTC market appear to be
somewhat reluctant to shift from one-to-one trades with high spreads allowing
them to pocket the difference between bid and offer prices to a computer system
doing cheaper automatic trades – turkeys not voting for Christmas, I guess.
Article 4.3
Electronic trading to muscle in on

corporate debt
By Michael Mackenzie, Dan McCrum and Tracy Alloway
Financial Times April 3, 2013

Computers rule on trading desks – except in the corporate bond market, one of the
last bastions of telephone based transactions between investors and Wall Street
dealers. But that may be about to change.
A recent surge in buying and selling of Dell’s corporate bonds, triggered by the
news of a leveraged buyout of the company, suggests electronic trading systems
are set to muscle into this corner of the bond market.
While advocates of electronic trading are highlighting the shift in behaviour, some
say the $9tn US corporate bond market is not designed for a seamless transition to
computerised interactions, the way equities and foreign exchange trade.
‘Human judgment is what we’re paid for in this business,’ says Bonnie Baha, global
credit portfolio manager for DoubleLine. With many small debt issues, prices on a
screen for thinly traded securities would quickly become stale, she adds.
But for all the attachment to long standing and cosy relationships between sales
staff at dealers and investors, changing conditions are leading the way to greater
adoption of electronic trading.
Since the financial crisis, higher capital costs and regulatory scrutiny have forced
Wall Street banks to sharply reduce their presence in the corporate bond market.
With banks holding a smaller ‘inventory’ of bonds, it is harder for so-called
‘buyside’ investors to buy and sell large amounts of debt.
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Coming forward to fill this gap are electronic trading platforms such as MarketAxess,
Bonds.com, BondDesk, and TradingScreen. While attracting growing volumes, for
the most part, trading on these platforms involves so-called ‘odd lots’ or small
trades of older bond issues.
At least, that was the case until trading activity in Dell bonds on several platforms
surged earlier this year. For one electronic platform, Bonds.com, the heightened
activity in Dell bonds that helped its daily market share jump fivefold to around
10% was a watershed and points to a future solution. ‘It shows the model works,
really well, or one like it could,’ says Thomas Thees, chief executive at Bonds.com.
He says the industry needs to reach a consensus around one trading venue. The
dilemma for the industry is that an already fragmented bond market, comprised of
thousands of individual bond issues, requires a common solution, not an ecosystem
of competing electronic trading platforms. As a host of venues and initiatives by
dealers are fighting for leadership, investors have yet to throw their weight behind
one of them.
But at some point the investor community needs to take the lead. ‘The buyside has
to be very engaged and involved with getting out in front of the liquidity issue,
rather than sitting back and waiting for a solution,’ says Chris Rice, global head of
trading at State Street Global Advisors. ‘We need to take control of our destiny and
start supporting emerging bond trading venues.’
Some dealers say efforts to build electronic corporate bond trading platforms have
had to start slowly. Electronic trading can help banks reduce costs in their
bond-trading businesses, by automating trades and eliminating expensive staff, but
the trade-off is greater price transparency and potentially smaller profits per trade.
Banks are reluctant to give up their profitable ‘high-touch’ dealing in the bonds
before they absolutely have to, some dealers say privately. Still, many banks have
been experimenting with their own platforms, including Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley and UBS.
For many large bond investors, the use of single dealer platforms is limited, given
that the dealer selects the bonds being transacted and can also gain an insight into
what investors are doing.
Source: Mackenzie, M., McCrum, D. and Alloway, T. (2013) Electronic trading to muscle in
on corporate debt, Financial Times, 3 April.
Because most corporate bond market trading is a private matter between the
dealer and its customer in the OTC market it is difficult to obtain prices of recent
trades; they are not shown in the Financial Times, for example. Some websites
provide prices and other details on a few dozen corporate bonds, for example
www.fixedincomeinvestor.co.uk, www.hl.co.uk, www.selftrade.co.uk, http://
finra-markets.morningstar.com/BondCenter/Default.jsp.
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Corporate bonds are generally the province of investing institutions, such as

pension and insurance funds, with private investors tending not to hold them,
mainly due to the large amounts of cash involved – the minimum denomina-
tion for bonds to be listed on a European stock market under EU Directives
without a prospectus is €100,000 (or its equivalent in another currency at time
of issue). The par value on one bond, at, say, £100,000, €100,000 or $100,000,
is said to have minimum lot or piece. By keeping the denomination above
these sizes, thus putting off retail investors, the issuer is exempt from the
requirement for high levels of disclosure and ongoing financial reporting
(e.g. exempt from yearly and half-yearly reports) because they are issuing to
professional investing organisations.
Having said that the main bond market is a wholesale one, I need to add that
there is another regulated market in London. In 2010 the London Stock
Exchange (LSE, www.londonstockexchange.com) launched the Order Book
for Retail Bonds (ORB), which offers retail investors the opportunity to trade
a number of gilts, corporate bonds and international bonds, where lots are
often £100 or £1,000, with a typical initial minimum investment of £2,000,
and the costs of trading are relatively low.
Corporates are able to issue bonds on ORB in sizes smaller (from only £25 mil-
lion) than on the wholesale markets, where issues are usually £250 million
plus. Issuers must apply and be accepted by both (1) the United Kingdom
Listing Authority (UKLA), part of the financial services industry regulator, the
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and (2) the LSE. Trading is facilitated by
competing market makers advertising bid and offer prices on the LSE system
during the trading day, 8am to 4.30pm. Retail investors can buy through a
stockbroker, wealth manager or other regulated intermediary. Since 2010, com-
panies on ORB have raised more than £4 billion with 42 new issues. Table 4.1
presents some of the issues, showing the amounts raised.
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Table 4.1 Some bonds available to retail investors on the London Stock Exchange’s
Order Book for Retail Bonds market
Issuer Market Date Listed Issue Size
Ladbrokes Group Finance plc ORB 17-Jun-14 £100m

Paragon Group of Companies plc ORB 30-Jan-14 £125m
Premier Oil plc ORB 11-Dec-13 £150m
A2D Funding plc ORB 21-Oct-13 £150m
Bruntwood Investments plc ORB 25-Jul-13 £50m
Helical Bar plc ORB 25-Jun-13 £80m
International Personal Finance plc ORB 08-May-13 £101.5m
Provident Financial plc ORB 27-Mar-13 £65m
Paragon Group of Companies plc ORB 05-Mar-13 £60m
EnQuest plc ORB 15-Feb-13 £155m
Alpha Plus Holdings plc ORB 19-Dec-12 £48.5m
Unite Group plc ORB 12-Dec-12 £90m
Tullett Prebon plc ORB 11-Dec-12 £80m
St. Modwen Properties plc ORB 08-Nov-12 £80m
London Stock Exchange Group plc ORB 05-Nov-12 £300m
Workspace Group plc ORB 10-Oct-12 £57.5m
Beazley plc ORB 25-Sep-12 £75m
Intermediate Capital Group ORB 20-Sep-12 £80m
CLS Holdings ORB 12-Sep-12 £65m
ICAP ORB 31-Jul-12 £125m
Primary Health Properties plc ORB 24-Jul-12 £75m
Severn Trent plc ORB 11-Jul-12 £75m
Tesco Personal Finance plc ORB 23-May-12 £200m
HSBC ORB 02-May-12 £196m
Provident Financial ORB 02-Apr-12 £120m
Places for People ORB 31-Jan-12 £40m
Intermediate Capital Group plc ORB 22-Dec-11 £35m
Tesco Personal Finance plc ORB 16-Dec-11 £60m
Royal Bank of Scotland ORB 07-Nov-11 £20m
National Grid ORB 06-Oct-11 £285.5m
Figures 4.1 to 4.5 show the secondary bond price movements for some well-
known companies.
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Figure 4.1 Secondary bond price movements: Aviva

Source: Data from www.fixedincomeinvestor.co.uk
Figure 4.2 Secondary bond price movements: BP

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Figure 4.3 Secondary bond price movements: Cable & Wireless

Figure 4.4 Secondary bond price movements: Co-operative Bank

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Figure 4.5 Secondary bond price movements: John Lewis

Case study
Tesco Bank (‘Personal Finance’) bond
We now look at a bond issue on ORB in more detail: Tesco Bank’s 8.5-year 5%
Sterling Fixed Rate Bond issued in May 2012 and due to be redeemed at £100
on 21 November 2020. However, it may be redeemed (at 100% of face value),
purchased or cancelled by Tesco Bank before then. This may happen if the tax
rules change to make Tesco Bank pay more, or in the case of default. Interest is
paid on 21 May and 21 November each year.
When first issued the minimum purchase was a mere £2,000 and the issue price
was 100% of the face value. Barclays Bank and Investec Bank both helped with
the sale of the bonds in the primary market. They were book-runners (organisers
of the issue) who received in fees 0.75% of the amount raised (0.75% of £200
million, i.e. £1.5 million), of which two-thirds was passed on to eight distributors,
stockbrokers who sold the bonds to investors. Barclays Bank and Investec Bank
subsequently acted as market makers in the secondary market. Many free financial
websites display information about the bond and the trading prices in the second-
ary market – an example is shown in Figure 4.6, taken from www.ADVFN.com.
Trades are settled after two business days (T+2).
Figure 4.7 shows the price movements of Tesco Bank’s bond during its first two
years.
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Figure 4.6 Trading details of Tesco Bank’s bond on ADVFN

Source: advfn.com
Figure 4.7 Price chart of Tesco Bank 5% sterling 2020 bond

Source: advfn.com
Not all the bonds issued in ORB are borrowing with the same level of safety
because they may not have the backup from the strongest part of a group of com-
panies under the same ownership – see Article 4.4.
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Article 4.4
Concerns mount over UK retail

bond issues
By Steve Johnson
By most measures, the London Stock Exchange’s order book for retail bonds has
been a runaway success.
Since its launch in 2010, the electronic hub has hosted 38 corporate bond issues and
raised £3.4bn from yield-hungry small investors, who have been able to snap up the
bulk of these issues in denominations of just £100. As yet, not one of these retail
bonds has defaulted and most are trading above par.
The development filled an embarrassing hole in the UK’s capital market landscape;
whereas countries such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain have long had flour-
ishing retail bond markets, UK companies’ historic unwillingness to issue paper in
denominations of less than £50,000 had long stymied a similar market in London.
‘In terms of the development of the market, it has been a very good thing,’ says
Kate Ball-Dodd at law firm Mayer Brown. ‘It has allowed access to a type of invest-
ment that was difficult for retail investors to access before because of the very high
denominations.’
However, some investment industry professionals are raising concerns about the
nature of some of these bond issues. One concern is that retail investors may be
unwittingly assuming more risk than traditional institutional bond buyers.
National Grid and Severn Trent have issued retail bonds backed by cash flows from
their holding companies, rather than the regulated operating companies that stand
behind many of their bonds aimed at institutions.
The key difference is that the regulated entities are barred by the regulator from
taking on too much debt, reducing the risk to lenders.
‘[A retail bond] might have a good name on the tin but the debt may be issued by
an overseas subsidiary,’ says Jason Hollands, managing director of Bestinvest.
‘You need to know where you sit in the capital structure of the overall business if
the company runs into trouble.’
Tesco Personal Finance, the banking subsidiary of the retailer, has issued three
retail bonds. [Have] all the buyers understood that the debt is issued by a subsidi-
ary, not the parent company?
Retail and institutional bonds have been issued by the same entity, but with the
retail version paying a lower coupon. For instance, Provident Financial, a subprime
lender, simultaneously issued a retail bond with a 7% coupon and an institutional
one paying 8% last year.
Source: Johnson, S. (2013) Concerns mount over UK retail bond issues, Financial Times,
18 August.
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Mini bonds
There is another class of bonds targeted at retail investors, but these do not
have a secondary market. They have been dubbed mini-bonds (mini-retail or
self-issued bonds) and are issued in very small amounts by small companies
– see Article 4.5 for some examples. With these bonds lenders are committed
for the full term (usually 3–5 years), to a small, usually non-stock market-
quoted firm, with less open accounting than quoted firms. The marketing and
information material has not been vetted by the FCA. The covenants placed
on the bond to reduce lender risk tend to be much lighter than those of
normal bonds. The interest rates offered on the bonds described in Article 4.5
are greater than those on ORB due to the additional liquidity and default
risk. They also suffer from not being eligible for inclusion in retail investors’
tax shelters such as self-invested personal pensions and not being covered
by the regulators’ Financial Services Compensation Scheme should something
go wrong.
Article 4.5
‘Crowdfunding ’ muscles in on the

bond market
By Thomas Hale

‘Crowdfunding’ is coming for the bond market. Two UK restaurant chains have
raised fixed-income debt in the past week through Crowdcube, a crowdfunding
platform with 75,000 registered users.
Chilango, a Mexican restaurant chain, is looking to raise up to £3m through its
crowdfunded retail bond – the ‘first in the world’ of its kind.
The 5-year bond, which yields 8%, also included a free weekly burrito for those
willing to invest over £10,000.
Just days later, River Cottage, a restaurant chain founded by Hugh Fearnley-
Whittingstall, the celebrity chef, also crowdfunded a £1m bond.
So-called ‘mini-bonds’, a type of retail security used by smaller, high-growth
companies, have grown in popularity in the past few years. Research by Capita
Registrars suggests that the market for mini-bonds could rise to £8bn by the end of
2017.
➨
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But this market is ‘archaic’ and ripe for disruption, said Luke Lang, one of
Crowdcube’s founders. Rather than paying fees, which it says usually total more
than £100,000, Crowdcube charges companies 5% of the total raised once the target
has been met.
‘We’re trying to cut out some of the fat from the City of London,’ said Mr Lang.
‘With mini-bonds, fees from financial advisers, lawyers, compliance and marketing
companies can rack up pretty quickly.’
While attracting high-yield investors, the bonds have also drawn scrutiny. Critics
point out that there is no secondary market, and the bonds are unsecured – meaning
that investors rank behind secured investors in the case of a default.
‘Some of the conventions of the institutional market have been thrown out the
window, but those conventions are there for a reason,’ said James Tomlins, a
high-yield bond portfolio manager at M&G.
He added that the products represent a ‘new area of capital’ and that the use of the
word bond may be inappropriate. ‘You’ve got linguistic arbitrage here,’ he said.
‘You’ve got equity-like downside with bond-like upside.’
Previously, companies such as Crowdcube have targeted equity investors looking
to benefit from the profit potential of small but fast-growing companies. In issuing
bonds, crowdfunding companies hope to diversify their investment offerings and
attract companies with the cash flow available to service fixed income debt.
While the average size of an equity issuance on Crowdcube is £200,000, retail bonds
are all expected to raise at least £1m. The company says it is currently in talks with
companies – including ‘household name brands’ – over future bond issuances, some
of which may reach a price of up to £15m.
Source: Hale, T. (2014) ‘Crowdfunding’ muscles in on the bond market, Financial Times,
24 June.
Infinite variation
Corporate bonds come in an infinite variety of forms in many different curren-
cies and maturities, with the most common currencies being the US dollar and
the euro.
Straight (plain vanilla or bullet) bonds

These are straightforward bonds and the most commonly issued, with regular
(usually semi-annual or annual) fixed coupons and a specified redemption
date. If the entire issue matures on a single date they are often called term
bonds.
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Floating-rate notes (FRNs)

A major market has developed over the past three decades called the floating-
rate note (FRN, also called variable-rate note (VRN)) market. Two factors
have led to the rapid growth in FRN usage. First, the oscillating and unpredict-
able inflation of the 1970s and 1980s caused many investors to make large
real-term losses on fixed-rate bonds as the interest rate fell below the rate of
inflation. Lenders became reluctant to lend at fixed rates on a long-term basis.
This reluctance led to FRNs being cheaper for the issuer because it did not need
to offer an interest premium to compensate the investor for being locked into
a fixed rate. Second, a number of corporations, especially financial institutions,
hold assets which give a return that varies with the short-term interest rate
level (for example, banks have loans assets) and so they had a preference for a
similar floating-rate liability.
FRNs pay an interest rate that is linked to a benchmark rate – such as the Libor.
The issuer will pay, say, 70 basis points (0.7 of a percentage point) over the
‘reference index’ of Libor. The coupon might be set for the first six months at
the time of issue, after which it is adjusted every six months, so if Libor was 3%,
the FRN would pay 3.7% for that particular six months. The most common
reference rates are three-month or six-month Libor. Interest rates may be
linked to a variety of other benchmark rates, such as the Fed Funds rate, muni-
cipal and mortgage interest rate indexes, a particular money market rate or the
rate of inflation. The interest rate may be fixed daily, weekly, monthly, etc.
In 2013 concern about rises in interest rates led to an upsurge in the number of
FRNs being issued – see Article 4.6.
Article 4.6
Floating rate bond issuance jumps in

Europe
By Christopher Thompson and Ralph Atkins

European companies have switched to issuing debt at variable interest rates as
investors fret about higher global borrowing costs.
➨
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The proportion of European corporate bonds issued in August as ‘floating rate

notes’ has more than doubled month-on-month to nearly a fifth of overall issuance.
Overall European companies have issued $25bn of floating rate bonds for the year
to date, the highest total since $42.4bn achieved in 2007 over the same period.
Global issuance has spiked to $96bn from $52bn last year.
The rise in US Treasury yields has led to a marked slowdown in overall corporate
bond issuance recently as companies ponder the implications of longer-term higher
costs.
The switch to floating rate notes is part of the same trend.
‘Companies are simply tapping into the market which is hottest with investors,
given the widespread worry about rising rates,’ said Matt King, at Citigroup.
‘If rates were to rise, it would be a negative for those companies concerned . . . but
bank loans they had previously would have been floating-rate, and many issuers
traditionally swap fixed-rate bond issuance back into floating, so the impact should
be no worse than it would have been anyway.’
Shrinking bank lending has pushed many companies to seek more funding from
the public bond markets as European companies move towards a more US-style
market based model of corporate finance.
European non-financial corporate issuance rose nearly 20% in the first half of this
year to $333bn as companies took advantage of historically low interest rates.
As longer term borrowing costs rise, Europe’s banks are also turning to bonds with
floating interest rates.
While their issuance dipped to $3.2bn in June it rose to $6.2bn in July and stands at
$6.7bn so far this month, according to Dealogic.
That followed comments by Ben Bernanke, chairman of the US Federal Reserve,
about the prospect of tapering the Fed’s asset purchasing programme known as
quantitative easing.
Global financial institutions’ floating rate bond issuance has risen to $182.4bn so far
this year from $127.4bn over the same period in 2012.
For banks, which lend at variable interest rates, the issuing of floating rate bonds
allows them to better match assets and liabilities.
Source: Thompson, C. and Atkins, R. (2013) Floating rate bond issuance jumps in Europe,
FRNs may come with additional features such as a floor, which means that the
coupon can fall but there is a minimum beyond which it cannot go, and caps,
which permit a rise in the coupon with the underlying benchmark only up to
a point, there is a maximum. If there is both a floor and a cap the bond is said
to be a collared FRN.
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FRNs will trade at par value on each of the coupon reset days. But if interest
rates rise between reset days they will trade slightly below par because investors
can now obtain the higher rates on alternative bonds and so are less willing to
hold the FRNs unless the price falls commensurately. If rates fall then FRNs will
trade at slightly above par until the next reset day.
Coupons linked to other variables

Bonds issued in the last few years have linked the interest rates or principal
payments to a wide variety of economic events, such as a rise in the price of
silver, exchange rate movements, stock market indices, the price of oil, gold,
copper – even to the occurrence of an earthquake. These bonds were generally
designed to let companies adjust their interest payments to manageable levels
in the event of the firm being adversely affected by the changing of some
economic variable. For example, a copper mining company, with its interest
payments linked to the price of copper, would pay lower interest on its finance
if the copper price were to fall. Sampdoria, the Italian football club, issued a
€3.5 million bond that paid a higher rate of return if the club won promotion
to the Serie A division. If it stayed in Serie B it paid 2.5%. If it moved to Serie A
the interest rate was 7%. If it found itself in the top four clubs the coupon
would rise to 14%.
Callable bonds
The issuer retains the right but not the obligation to redeem these bonds before
maturity at a set price which is usually a little more than the par price, say
$1,050 instead of $1,000 (the difference is the call premium). In return for
this privilege, the bond will pay a higher coupon. If interest rates fall, it would
be advantageous for the company to call in its bonds, redeem them and
issue new replacement bonds with a lower coupon, thus reducing their cost
of borrowing.
European-style callables have a single call date determined at issuance. If the

issuer does not call the bonds on that date they become non-callable bonds for
the remainder of their term. American-style callable bonds are continuously
callable, at any time after the first call date, until the redemption date.
Bermudan-style callables have multiple discrete call dates when the bond
can be redeemed in whole or in part. Call provisions generally allow for the
first five or ten years of the bond’s life to be excepted, when the call does not
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apply (deferred callable bonds), which gives some protection to investors.

This lockout period (up to the first call date) has been as short as three months.
Freely callable bonds, meanwhile, do not offer the investor any protection
against a call because the issuer can call them any time.
For investors the attraction of a higher coupon rate on callable bonds is some-
what offset by the risk that, should interest rates fall, the value of a callable
bond may also fall or at least fail to rise due to the threat of being called at a
low price relative to a similar non-callable bond, contrary to the behaviour of
normal bonds where value rises if interest rates fall. This is called price com-
pression risk. Callable bonds also suffer from reinvestment risk – see page 133.
Irredeemable (perpetual) bonds

These bonds have no fixed redemption date but ostensibly pay their coupon
indefinitely. Many of these bonds have been issued by banks, but non-financial
companies also issue perpetual bonds which serve as permanent capital, with
some characteristics similar to equity but with the added advantage that in
raising money this way there is no dilution of existing shareholders’ percent-
age share of the company votes – see Article 4.7.
Article 4.7
Trafigura raises $500m with

perpetual bond
By Javier Blas in London and Jack Farchy

Trafigura, one of the world’s largest commodities trading houses, has launched its
first perpetual bond, tapping the public capital market.
The trading house raised $500m with its bond, up from an initial target of $300m.
The note, which was five times subscribed, will yield a 7.65% coupon.
Trafigura is the world’s second-largest independent metals trader after Glencore,
and the third-largest oil trader behind Vitol and Glencore.
The bond issue is the latest sign that the traditionally employee-owned commodity
trading industry is opening up to new sources of capital, as European banks scale
back their lending activities in the sector just as traders need more credit.
➨
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Louis Dreyfus Commodities, one of the world’s top food commodities traders, last
September tapped the public capital markets for the first time in its 160-year his-
tory, raising $350m in a perpetual bond.
The perpetual bond, which international accounting rules count as equity, will
strengthen the balance sheet of Trafigura without diluting existing shareholders.
Claude Dauphin, chief executive and one of the founders of the group, owns less
than 20% while more than 500 senior employees control the rest.
‘We want to get the long-term liquidity while maintaining our credit standing,’
Pierre Lorinet, Trafigura chief financial officer, said in an interview. ‘[The per-
petual bond] provides us with long-term money [with an] equity treatment.’
The bond will be listed on the Singapore Exchange, forcing Trafigura to release
publicly semi-annual accounts for the first time. Until now the company has only
released financial information to a small group of investors and bankers.
The new sources of financing in the Swiss commodities industry are partly driven
by a change in the business model of the trading houses.
Companies have moved away from their traditional role as middleman – selling
and buying commodities in a business of large volumes but razor-thin margins –
increasingly to become vertically integrated groups, with interest spanning pro-
duction, logistics, trading and processing.
The new areas, such as investing in oil refineries, require long-term capital that the
trading houses in the past did not need. Some trading houses have not opened their
equity to outsiders, but are seeking bond investors.
Source: Blas, J. and Farchy, J. (2013) Trafigura raises $500m with perpetual bond,
Financial Times, 10 April.
Despite their name and the characteristic of irredeemability at the insistence

of the holders, they are often callable (usually after the first five years), thus
the issuer can redeem them. They therefore pay a higher rate of interest to
compensate investors for the extra risks: (a) that the amount invested will
never be repaid and (b) that if the bonds are called the investor may not be able
to reinvest at a similar rate of interest.
Puttable bonds
The holder has the right but not the obligation to demand early redemption of
the bonds on a set date or dates. The benefit to purchasers is that if interest
rates rise, they can cash in their bonds and reinvest in another investment
offering a higher rate of interest. The disadvantage is a slightly lower rate of
return in the first place.
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Deep discounted bonds

Bonds that are sold at well below the par value are called deep discounted
bonds, the most extreme form of which is the zero coupon bond. They are sold
at a large discount to the nominal value and the investor makes a capital gain
by holding the bond instead of receiving coupons. These bonds are particu-
larly useful for firms with low cash flows in the near term, for example firms
engaged in a major property development that will not mature for many years.
Bearer bond and registered bond

With bearer bonds the coupons are traditionally attached to the paper bond
held by the investor. When it is time for a coupon the investor presents to the
issuer the relevant coupon section – the coupon bond is clipped. Information
on the holder is not kept on a database – useful for avoiding the prying eyes of
governments. Bearer bond holders are vulnerable to theft, as possession of the
bond is all that is required to receive money from the issuer. Today many ‘bearer’
bonds exist only as electronic entries rather than paper (see Chapter 7), but
anonymity from government remains. With registered bonds, the holder’s
identity is recorded by the issuer and coupon payments are sent in the post or
electronically transferred to the bank account of the registered owner.
During its life, a registered bond is usually held in a dematerialised form,

that is ownership, trading and settlement are merely a computerised book-
entry. The largest organisations that run global electronic clearing systems
are Euroclear and Clearstream. Settlement (when the money for a trade is
transferred) for corporate bonds is generally either two or three days after the
deal is struck.
Debentures and loan stocks

In the UK and many other countries the most secure type of bond is called a
debenture (it is different for the US – see page 135). Debentures are usually
secured by either a fixed or a floating charge against the firm’s assets. A fixed
charge means that specific assets (e.g. buildings, machinery) are used as
security, which, in the event of default, can be sold at the insistence of the
debenture bond holders and the proceeds used to repay them. Debentures
secured on property may be referred to as mortgage debentures.
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Bonds secured through a fixed charge often have legal provisions in the debt
agreement that allow the issuer to dispose of a proportion of the property or
plant (such as a crane or fleet of cars) used as collateral, but when they do so
they must make provision for the redemption of a proportion of the fixed-
charge bonds. These are known as release of property clauses. The usual rule
is that these bonds are retired at par value, but some agreements allow a
redemption price other than par.
A floating charge means that the debt is secured by a general charge on all the
assets of the corporation, or a class of the firm’s assets such as inventory or
receivables (debtors). In this case the company has a high degree of freedom to
use its assets as it wishes, such as sell them or rent them out, until it commits a
default which ‘crystallises’ the floating charge, i.e. the floating charge is converted
to a fixed charge over the assets which it covers at that time. If this happens an
administrative receiver or administrator will be appointed with powers to
manage the business, to either pay the debt through income generation, or
dispose of the assets followed by distribution of the proceeds to creditors, or
sell the entire business as a going concern.
Even though floating-charge debenture holders can force a liquidation, fixed-

charge debenture holders rank above floating-charge debenture holders in the
payout after insolvency. Floating-charge holders rank behind preferential
creditors who are given priority by statue, such as the tax authorities and
employees owed wages.
Similar collateral charges to the floating charge are the floating lien in the US
and a few other places, and the commercial pledge in many European countries.
The terms bond, debenture and loan stock are often used loosely and inter-
changeably, and the dividing line between debentures and loan stock is a fuzzy
one. As a general rule debentures are secured with collateral and loan stock is
unsecured, but there are examples that do not fit this classification. If liquidation
occurs, the unsecured loan stock holders rank beneath the debenture holders.
However, in the US and some other countries the definitions are somewhat
different and this can be confusing. Here a debenture is a long-term unsecured
bond and so the holders become general creditors who can only claim assets
not otherwise pledged. In the US the secured form of bond is referred to as a
mortgage bond and unsecured shorter-dated issues (less than ten years) are
called notes. US subordinated debentures, as well as being unsecured, are
further back in the queue for a cash distribution in the event of the company
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failing to pay its debts than both mortgage bonds/debentures and regular
US-style debentures. They carry higher interest rates to compensate and are
often classified as junk bonds (see Chapters 5 and 6).
Trust deeds and covenants

Bond investors may be willing to accept a lower rate of interest if they can be
reassured that their money will not be exposed to a high risk. Reassurance is
conveyed by placing risk-reducing restrictions on the firm. A trust deed (or
bond indenture) sets out the terms of the contract between bond holders
and the company. A trustee (if one is appointed) ensures compliance with the
contract throughout the life of the bond and has the power to appoint an
administrative receiver to liquidate the firm’s assets if necessary. If a trustee
is not appointed the usual practice is to give each holder an independently
exercisable right to take legal action against a delinquent borrower.
The loan agreement will contain a number of affirmative covenants. These

usually include the requirements to supply regular financial statements and
make interest and principal payments. The deed may also state the fees due to
the lenders and details of what procedures should be followed in the event of
a technical default, for example non-payment of interest. The issuer may also
have the right to ‘call’ the bond and/or the lenders to insist on selling back to
the issuer. The trust deed also states what, if anything, is ‘backing’ the bond in
the form of collateral acting as security.
In addition to these basic covenants are the negative (restrictive) covenants.

These limit the actions and the rights of the borrower until the debt has been
repaid in full. Some examples are:
● Limits on further debt issuance. If lenders provide finance to a firm they do so

on certain assumptions concerning the riskiness of the capital structure.
They will want to ensure that the loan does not become more risky due to
the firm taking on a much greater debt burden relative to its equity base, so
they limit the amount and type of further debt issues – particularly debt that
has a higher (senior) ranking for interest payments or for a liquidation pay-
ment. Subordinated debt (junior debt) – with a low ranking on liquidation
– is more likely to be acceptable. A negative pledge is the term used to
describe a clause that prohibits the issue of more senior debt requiring the
pledge of assets, thus jeopardising the existing bonds.
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● Limits on the dividend level. Lenders are opposed to money brought into the
firm by borrowing at one end and then being taken away by shareholders in
dividend payments at the other. An excessive withdrawal of shareholders’
funds may unbalance the financial structure and weaken future cash flows
required to pay bond holders.
● Limits on the disposal of assets. The retention of certain assets, for example
property and land, may be essential to reduce the lenders’ risk. Disposal of
assets covenants often allows a cumulative total of up to, say, 30% of the
gross assets of the firms, but no more.
● Financial ratios. A typical covenant here concerns the interest cover, for
example: ‘The annual profit should remain four times as great as the overall
annual interest charge.’ Other restrictions might be placed on working cap-
ital ratio levels (the extent to which current assets exceed current liabilities)
and the debt to net assets ratio (a gearing ratio covenant) may require
that the total borrowing of the firm may not exceed a stated percentage of
net worth (share capital and reserves) of, say, 100%.
● Cross default covenant. The trustee has permission to put all loans into
default if the borrower defaults on a single loan.
While negative covenants cannot ensure completely risk-free lending they can
influence the behaviour of the managerial team so as to reduce the risk of
default. They can also provide the management team with an early warning
signal to take action. The lender’s risk can be further reduced by obtaining
guarantees from third parties (for example, guaranteed loan stock). The guar-
antor is typically the parent company of the issuer.
The trustee, responsible to bond holders, will inform them if the firm has failed
to fulfil its obligation under the trust deed and may initiate legal action against
the firm. If the firm has to go through a reorganisation of its finances, admin-
istration or liquidation, the trustee will continue to act on behalf of the bond
holders.
Other professional help

Once the bond is in issue, the issuer will need administrative support to carry
out key tasks throughout its life. A paying agent’s main function is to receive
money from the issuer to then pay coupons and redemption amounts. When
no trustee has been appointed, instead of a paying agent there will be a fiscal
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agent to undertake the paying agent’s role. The fiscal agent is appointed
by and is the representative of the issuer, in contrast to the trustee’s role as the
representative of the lenders. Nevertheless, the fiscal agent must not act in
a harmful way toward the bond holders. As well as payments it performs a
number of administrative tasks such as sending information on the bond/
issuer to the holders.
A registrar or transfer agent keeps a record of bond ownership and notes all
changes of ownership. A listing agent is required only if the bond is listed on
a stock exchange such as in London or Luxembourg. The listing agent keeps
the stock exchange informed and ensures required documents are delivered
to the exchange. In the UK the listing agent must be authorised to act in that
capacity by the FCA.
Repayments
The principal on most bonds is paid entirely at maturity. However, some
bonds, e.g. callable bonds, can be repaid before the final redemption date.
Another alternative is for the company to issue bonds with a range of dates for
redemption; so a bond dated 2024–2027 would allow a company the flexibility
to repay a part of the principal over the course of four years. This may help
prevent ‘a crisis at maturity’ by avoiding a large cash outflow at a singular
redemption. A range of dates is also useful if machinery subject to deprecia-
tion, e.g. a ship, is used as collateral because the amount owed declines as the
asset backing declines in value. When there are many maturity dates the bonds
are referred to as serial bonds.
Another way of redeeming bonds is for the issuing firm to buy outstanding
bonds by offering the holder a sum higher than or equal to the amount ori-
ginally paid. A firm is also able to purchase bonds on the open market.
Sinking fund
The most trusted corporates are able to sell bonds without the need to be
specific about how the debt will be repaid – the implication is that they will be
redeemed using general income flowing from operations or by the issue of
more bonds or bank borrowing. Borrowers with lower credit ratings may need
to state specific provisions for principal repayment to reduce investor anxiety
about the safety of their money.
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One way of paying for redemption is to set up a sinking fund, overseen by a

trustee, which receives regular sums from the firm that will be sufficient, with
added interest, to redeem the bonds at maturity or to periodically retire a pro-
portion, thus reducing its debt burden over time. Bonds may be purchased
in the market at market prices, at the issue price, at a stated call price in the
sinking fund provision or at face value, depending on the original agreement.
The indenture/trust deed may allow freedom for the issuer to arbitrarily retire
the bonds or to do so only on fixed dates.
Bonds might be selected randomly through a lottery for early redemption. The
alternative is the pro rata method with which all bond holders are treated
equally, thus they all might be required to retire 10% of their holdings if the
issuer decides to reduce the bonds outstanding by 10%.
Because a bond with a sinking fund provision is less risky for the investor, as
there is money being set aside, there is a push down on the rate of return
offered. However, offsetting this for the investor are the negative effects of not
knowing when or how many bonds will be retired.
Some risks for investors

Corporate bond investors are subject to many types of risk.
Default risk (credit risk)

This is the likelihood that the issuer cannot/will not pay one or more coupons
in a timely manner or pay the principal sum of the debt at maturity. Bonds are
usually higher ranked than equity for payments if a company is in difficulty,
but there is always the risk of failure to make agreed payments. This risk
depends on creditworthiness, which in turn depends on competitive strength,
competence and integrity of the managers, financial structure (e.g. debt levels)
and the bond’s ranking in the pecking order for repayment in the event of the
firm running into difficulty (seniority of the debt).
Event risk
Some adverse event may occur which devalues the bond, e.g. a natural disaster
wipes out company profits and damages the ability of the company to pay its
obligations. Or an issuer is merged with another firm and the debt burden
increases significantly, causing a credit downgrade and lower bond prices.
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Sometimes a poison put provision (change of control clause) in the trust

deed/indenture protects bond holders because this allows them to sell their
bonds back to the borrower when there is a merger/takeover – see Article 4.8.
LBO means leveraged buyout, when high levels of debt relative to the equity
in the company are used to purchase a business.
Article 4.8
LBOs and bonds: animal antidote

Change of control clauses may
offer only limited protection to
investors
Lex column

Leveraged buyouts that load up companies with new debt to pay existing share-
holders are bondholder poison. Investors are left with securities in a riskier com-
pany, falling prices and ratings downgrades. After being caught off guard during
the buyout boom of 2005 –07, investors demanded some protection. Some 22% of US
investment grade corporate bonds by market capitalisation, 25% by the number of
bonds, now include something called a change of control clause, reckons JPMorgan,
versus less than 4% in 2006.
Change of control clauses enable bondholders to put their bonds back to the com-
pany if there is a change of majority control and that results in the bonds being
downgraded to junk. Most, but not all of the bonds that do not have them are from
issuers not considered to be LBO targets – banks and companies with market caps
exceeding $20bn–$30bn.
Most of the change of control provisions would have the company buy the bonds
back at 101 cents on the dollar. But that is cold comfort for investors that bought
bonds at big premiums. Plunging interest rates in recent years have driven the
prices of many investment grade bonds sharply higher. The average dollar price for
the Barclays index tracking them is 112, for example. While change of control pro-
visions can mitigate bondholders’ LBO risk, the extreme market conditions of the
past few years mean they are no antidote for potential losses if the animals do get
restless again.
Source: Lex column (2013) LBOs and bonds: animal antidote, Financial Times, 26 February.
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Interest rate risk (market risk)

The prices of fixed-rate bonds tend to fluctuate according to the current rate of
interest. If interest rates rise, the price of the bonds will fall and selling them at
the new price could result in a loss. Put provisions may build in some protection
for fixed-rate bonds, by placing a floor on the price falls because the holder can
insist that the company pay a certain minimum. Of course, floating-rate bonds
have more protection against interest rate movements if their coupons are
linked to an interest benchmark. Interest rate risk was a hot topic of conversa-
tion in 2014. Even the UK regulator warned investors to consider the conse-
quences – see Article 4.9. Also note the hint at liquidity risk, discussed below.
Article 4.9
Watchdog sounds alarm over

corporate bond funds
By Emma Dunkley

Investors buying funds that hold corporate bonds risk losing a significant amount
of capital if interest rates rise and will find it hard to sell out if market sentiment
plunges, the City watchdog has warned.
The Financial Conduct Authority issued the alert as bond funds continue to attract
large sums from individual investors seeking a steady income.
Corporate bond funds invest at least 80% of assets in ‘investment grade’ com-
panies, which have a low risk of defaulting on interest and capital repayments.
However, current and prospective investors are being urged to consider other risks
if market conditions change or interest rates rise, which the Bank of England has
signalled could happen in the months ahead.
Analysts at Barclays said the confluence of positive economic developments was
‘bad news’ for bonds because it increased the likelihood of a rate rise. ‘Interest rate
increases will put downward pressure on the prices of fixed-income securities, lead-
ing to mark-to-market losses for bond portfolios,’ they said.
The FCA is now warning about the effect of a rate rise on bonds, which could leave
many investors nursing losses and spark a rush for the exit.
‘Interest rate movements have an impact on corporate bond and fund unit prices,’
the watchdog said. ‘So, for example, as interest rates rise, bond prices fall. This is
the key difference to deposit accounts, where the capital value is constant.’
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Although fund managers aim to ensure investors can buy or sell their fund hold-
ings on any day, there is concern they would be unable to sell enough bonds to meet
redemption requests in a tough market environment, leaving investors stranded.
Source: Dunkley, E. (2014) Watchdog sounds alarm over corporate bond funds, Financial
Times, 29 July.
Liquidity risk (marketability risk)

If there is no active secondary market in the bonds it might not be possible
to sell them prior to maturity. Other markets have some liquidity but do not
qualify for highly liquid status, that is, the bond cannot be sold at a predictable
price with low transaction costs. The no- or low-liquidity bonds are likely to
carry higher interest rates – a liquidity risk premium (LRP) – to compensate
for the difficulty of selling quickly without moving the price. Bonds of larger
companies issuing in hundreds of millions or billions are generally the most
liquid.
Inflation risk (purchasing power risk)

This is where the purchasing power of money invested in the bond is eroded
despite coupon and principal flows. This could leave a diminished positive real
return or produce a negative real return, resulting in lower purchasing power
than the investor had to start with. Inflation risk may also refer to the ensuing
difficulty of selling an investment devalued through inflation.
Many companies have issued inflation-linked corporate bonds/notes (inflation-

indexed or corporate inflation protected) paying coupons and principal which
rise with inflation in a similar fashion to inflation-linked Treasuries (see
Chapter 2). With some of these bonds the coupons are paid semi-annually.
Others may pay interest monthly. Of course, the interest rate is usually higher
than for government bonds due to the additional default risk. For example, in
2013 water company Severn Trent issued around £100 million worth of RPI-linked
bonds in a ten-year sterling bond, offering a 1.3% annual coupon and a repay-
ment of capital. Both the coupon and the principal will in line with the retail
prices index. Investors were allowed to subscribe for as little as £2,000. This
followed National Grid’s ten-year RPI-linked issue, which raised £282 million
from private investors, and Tesco Bank’s offer of £60 million of eight-year bonds.
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Reinvestment risk
This is the risk arising from the need to reinvest money received from a
bond investment. For example, some issuers retain the right to redeem
bonds at their insistence; bonds thus called may then leave investors
struggling to find a replacement investment offering a similar rate of interest.
Another example: coupons received are likely to be reinvested in other bonds,
but the rate of return then available may be lower than when the bond was
first issued.
Call risk
There are three downsides for the lender when a bond agreement allows
the issuer to buy them back from the holder before the normal redemption
date:
1 Uncertainty regarding the cash flow from the investment because it is not
known whether a call will be enacted.
2 Calls are likely to be exercised if interest rates fall, thus the investor faces
reinvestment risk, i.e. buying other bonds at a lower yield.
3 A call provision will limit the capital appreciation potential of the bond
because the price may not rise much above the price at which it could be
called.
Supply risk
A company may issue further bonds of the same type, which could result in an
over-supply in the market and the price falling.
Tax risk
A government might change its tax policy to the detriment of corporate bond
holders.
Sector risk
Investors become unwilling to buy bonds in a certain sector (e.g. those issued
by banks) regardless of the merits of an individual borrower, thus bond prices
fall even for sound issuers.
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Foreign exchange (currency) risk

Bonds denominated in a foreign currency have an uncertain value in the home
currency if exchange rates vary.
Political risk
Bond values may be adversely affected by civil unrest, nationalisation of assets,
inflation, government interference in markets, coups or dictatorships.
Company health risk

Corporate bond prices are often more closely linked to the health of the
issuer than movements of interest rates within the economy than is the case
for government bonds. Thus when general interest rates rise, a corporate
bond’s price may not go down as much as a reputable government bond of
similar maturity because of the company’s strong operating performance and/
or improving credit standing. Offsetting this benefit for a bond on a lower
credit rating is that its price movements will be even more influenced by the
company’s health in terms of cash generation, financial structure and economic
standing. Deterioration in health can cause price falls to add hundreds of basis
points to the rate of return on current bonds and those it might need to issue
in the future.
The issue process

Investment banks lie at the heart of the primary corporate bond market, with
the expertise, contacts and reputation to advise on corporate finance and to
organise the selling of bonds into the market. If the issue is relatively small a
single bank will handle it, but larger issues are more likely to be underwritten
by a syndicate of investment banks, especially if the bonds are sold in a num-
ber of countries. Each syndicate member bank will be allocated a proportion of
the issue to sell.
The process might begin with competing banks offering their services to the
corporate. They will indicate the price/yield at which they think the bonds
can be sold together with the size of their fees. The issuer will consider these
factors along with the bank’s reputation and standing. The bank that wins the
mandate for the issue will be termed the lead underwriter, lead manager or
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book-runner. The lead underwriter will then usually team up with a number
of other banks to simultaneously offer the bonds to the market. This syndicate
often comprises banks from many countries. A co-lead manager(s) might be
appointed to help sell the bonds in particular countries, where the lead man-
ager does not have large client bases.
The usual method is the fixed-price re-offer. The investment bank syndicate
agrees a fixed price and a fixed commission. It also agrees the quantity each
member is to take to offer to the market at the agreed price. In this way the lead
manager avoids the problem of some syndicate members selling the bonds at
a low price in the grey market just to shift the bonds (‘dumping’). The grey
market is the buying and selling of bonds before they have officially arrived on
the market – they are traded on investors’ anticipation of their allocation. The
obligation to stick to a fixed price means that the lead manager does not
have to step in to support the price by buying back the bonds. After the first
settlement date in the secondary market the restriction on syndicate members’
selling prices is lifted.
In a bought deal the issuer is offered a package: a fixed price for a fixed quan-
tity bought by the lead manager or managing group (not a syndicate). The
issuer then has a few hours to decide whether to accept. If accepted the lead
manager then either buys the whole issue to distribute to other investors or
sells portions to other banks for distribution to investors – placement of the
bonds. In anticipation of issuer acceptance many of the bonds will usually
have been pre-placed with institutional investors (pension funds, insurance
companies, etc.) before the bid was made. Obviously, bought deals are con-
ducted by lead managers with large capital bases and with high placement
ability; they might be left holding (‘wearing’) the bonds if they cannot find
buyers, thus tying up capital and damaging their reputation for accurately
assessing market demand, pricing and marketing bonds.
Most corporate bonds are underwritten by an investment bank(s) on a firm
commitment basis, meaning that the issuer is guaranteed a certain amount
from the sale. However, some are best-efforts offerings where the bank(s) does
not guarantee a firm price to the issuer, merely agreeing to act as a placing
or distribution agent. A fee will be paid for this service. The downside of
best-efforts issues is that investors are aware that the investment bank(s) has
not committed any of its own funds and so they are usually unwilling to pay a
price as high as they might with a firm fixed-price commitment from the lead
underwriter.
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The lead manager (often in cooperation with other syndicate members) will
help the issuer prepare the prospectus to be presented to potential investors,
detailing the issue and explaining the company and its finances. It will also
deal with the legal issues and other documentation, using either an in-house
legal team or an external one.
Fees as a percentage of funds raised for underwriting (agreeing to buy those not
sold to the public) and selling bonds tend to be greater for longer maturities
and for those lower down the credit rating scale, but smaller for large issues
given the economies of scale. Fees will rise if the issue is more exotic (unusual
and/or complex) rather than straight vanilla, but are typically in the range
0.25–0.75% of the par value. The issuer will also have to factor in their own
time and that of their accountants, legal advisers, etc.
When pricing a bond the lead manager often focuses on a benchmark bond
currently trading in the market with the same maturity as the new issue and
uses that as a reference. The new bond might be priced as so-many basis points
of spread over or under the benchmark.
Private placements
In private placements an investment bank(s) uses its contacts to find finan-
cial institutions willing to purchase the whole issue between them, usually
no more than ten in the group. This allows the issuing company to develop a
closer relationship with a tight-knit group of investors, first gaining under-
standing of the business and later communicating progress, perhaps opening
the possibility of raising more at a later date. Private placings also avoid the
cost of obtaining and maintaining a credit rating for publicly traded bonds and
the costs of additional disclosure.
In the US, where this market is very strong, privately placed bonds are un-
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, with minimal dis-
closure required, and so can be resold only to large, financially sophisticated
investors; they are therefore not available to retail investors. Most privately
placed bonds are 144a securities, meaning that they are exempt from SEC
registration under Section 144a of the 1990 Securities Law. Private placement
costs much less than a public offering because the issuer does not have to
comply with generally accepted accounting principles and because marketing
to only a handful of investing institutions is cheaper. A detailed prospectus
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does not need to be prepared; instead a much simpler private placement

memorandum is sent to prospective investors.
Privately placed bonds tend to be illiquid and so are generally bought by

institutions willing to buy and hold without going to the secondary market;
interest rates tend to be higher to compensate for the illiquidity and because
most of the issuers are less well known than for publicly placed bonds – the
bonds are generally not ‘investment grade’, i.e. with credit ratings under
BBB−. Europeans are trying to grow a strong local private placement market –
see Article 4.10.
Article 4.10
Thirst for funds lifts appeal of private

placements
By Andrew Bolger

Britvic is an official supplier to Wimbledon, where its Robinsons Squash has helped
quench the thirst of many tennis players since the invention of Lemon Barley
Water in 1935.
This quintessentially British company has found inventive ways of quenching its
funding needs, including in recent years £650m in private placements, a market
that was developed by US insurers as a way to make strong returns from long-term
investment in companies.
Insurers and pension funds – including some from Europe – achieve this by issuing
securities that are not sold through a public offering but instead directly to chosen
investors.
Now leading European investors and finance trade bodies that admire this US fund-
ing model are trying to develop a similar pan-European placement market.
‘The development of the market should stimulate further growth, enabling more
companies to access the capital markets in Europe and provide investors with a
new investment opportunity,’ says Calum Macphail, head of private placements at
M&G Investments, which has invested €5.6bn in private placements since 1997.
The private placement market for European issuers has grown in recent years,
especially in France and the UK, which had an estimated combined volume of €8bn
in 2013.
Private placements typically provide fixed-rate financing of between three and
15 years, most commonly for seven to 10 years. Mr Macphail says pension funds
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are attracted to the characteristics of private placements – strong, stable cash

flows and covenant protections similar to a loan.
‘In addition to diversification and stronger documentation compared to public
bonds, investors benefit from an illiquidity premium when investing in medium or
long-term assets which provide regular income, giving a pension fund more bang
for their buck,’ he says.
The International Capital Market Association is co-ordinating the work of the
pan-European Private Placement Working Group that aims to establish a guide to
best market practice, principles and standardised documentation. The working
group will build on a Charter for Euro Private Placements, a French initiative.
The European private placement market is smaller than its $50bn US equivalent,
which issued €12.4bn to European companies, and Germany’s Schuldschein mar-
ket, which issued €8.5bn to European companies last year.
The Schuldschein is a fixed- or floating-rate loan instrument, ranging in size from
€10m to €500m. The market is used primarily, but not exclusively, by invest-
ment-grade companies.
Source: Bolger, A. (2014) Thirst for funds lifts appeal of private placements, Financial
Times, 24 June.
Despite the progress made in Europe, even today European companies often
choose to issue privately placed bonds on the other side of the Atlantic where
there is a well-established clientele, infrastructure, regulation and procedures
Article 4.11
Midsized issuers welcome funding

scheme
By Andrew Bolger

An ambitious framework for a European private placement market has been pub-
lished that aims to widen access to finance by midsized companies.
For many years, lots of midsized European businesses have accessed the US private
placement market, which allows insurers to provide long-term finance to com-
panies that wish to avoid the expense and scrutiny of issuing publicly listed bonds.
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But a working group led by the International Capital Market Association has
launched a voluntary guide for common market standards and best practices
which it says are essential for the development of a pan-European market.
‘The guide will be a big help in communicating with and within midsized corpor-
ates about an alternative source of finance,’ says Colin Tyler, chief executive of
the Association of Corporate Treasurers. ‘For potential midsized issuers that have
not used private placements before, it will give confidence that there are clear
paths to issuing – it is not venturing into Wild West territory.’
Private placements are medium- to long-term senior debt obligations – in bond or
loan format – issued privately by companies to a small group of investors. The
private placement market typically provides fixed-rate financing of between three
and 15 years, most commonly for seven to 10 years.
With private placement deals providing longer maturities than many bank loans,
this helps to release companies from the burden of refinancing bank debt every
couple of years.
Calum Macphail, head of private placements at M&G Investments, one of the
largest European investors in private placements, says the guide provides com-
panies interested in exploring this market an understanding of the process, who
was involved and information potential investors would require.
‘As the financing landscape changes as banks de-lever, natural sources of longer-
term finance, namely pension funds and institutional investors, are filling this
gap,’ he says. ‘Pension funds are attracted to the characteristics of private place-
ments – strong, stable cash flows and covenant protections similar to a loan.’
In addition to diversification and stronger documentation compared with public
bonds, he says investors will also benefit from an illiquidity premium which could
provide an enhanced yield as well as regular income over the medium to long term.
The popularity of private placements has accelerated since the onset of the finan-
cial crisis, with markets in countries such as France and Germany providing bor-
rowers with a local solution.
ICMA, which represents institutions across the international capital markets, says
demand for private placements is set to increase as the EU’s approximately 200,000
midsized companies look to diversify their sources of funding away from the tradi-
tional bank loan market, and view private placements both as an alternative and
as an intermediate step towards the listed bond markets.
The guide builds on existing practices and documents used in the European bond
and loan markets, especially a charter developed by the Euro PP Working Group, a
French financial industry initiative. It is expected costs will be lowered by promot-
ing the use of recently standardised documentation.
Daniel Godfrey, chief executive of the Investment Association, says common mar-
ket standards for European private placement transactions will remove a signifi-
cant barrier to the development of the private placement market in the UK and
Europe.
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‘Our members are major investors in UK businesses and, having worked closely
with members and government on the proposed withholding tax exemption for
privately placed debt in the UK, in December 2014, we were able to announce that
five institutions intend to make investments of around £9bn in private placements
and other direct lending to UK companies,’ he said.
The French and German domestic private placement markets issued approximately
€15bn of debt in 2013 in addition to a further $15.3bn raised by European companies
in the $60bn US private placement market.
Standard & Poor’s estimates €2.7tn of debt will need to be refinanced by midsized
companies between now and 2018, at a time when banks continue to retreat from
long term lending markets.
As well as trade bodies, the pan-European private placement initiative has received
strong support from government officials in the UK and France, as it is closely
aligned with the European Commission’s goal of bringing about a capital markets
union, on which a green paper is expected this week.
Welcoming the guide, Fabio Panetta, deputy governor of the Bank of Italy, said: ‘It
is a useful tool for developing a European private placement market for corporate
debt and, consequently, for broadening and diversifying sources of funding to the
European economy.’
Source: Bolger, A. (2015) Midsized issuers welcome funding scheme, Financial Times,
16 February.
Timetable for an issue

The timetable for a bond issue can range from a few days to several months; it
is longer for more complex issues, those in numerous jurisdictions, when it is
the first bond for this issuer, and when the bonds are to be listed on a stock
exchange. Here are the basics of the process (except for a bought deal or private
placement):
● Pre-launch and launch. The lead manager appoints the trustee or fiscal agent,
the principal paying agent, the other members of the syndicate, and pre-
pares the prospectus and other documents. The lead manager or co-lead
managers will discuss with the issuer and potential investors the specifica-
tions, such as size of issue, coupon and price. As discussion progresses these
will be ‘firmed up’. A book-building public promotion period might span
two weeks (‘pre-selling the bonds’). Within that, a roadshow and a series of
conference calls might take four days with, say, 10 to 100 attendees per
meeting in different cities across the country.
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● Announcement day. It is only on the announcement day that the issue is for-
mally announced (a press notification is usual), including the decision on
the maturity and coupon rate or range of coupon rates. The lead manager
formally invites the prospective syndicate members to participate, telling
them the timetable and their obligations. On the pricing day, the price
of the bond relative to par (say £99.85 if the par is £100) is agreed by the
borrower and the syndicate group.
● Offering day/signing day. The bonds are formally offered the day after the
pricing day. The borrower and managing group sign the agreement on the
specifications. The size of the allotments to syndicate members is announced
by the lead manager. Signing usually occurs between two days and one week
before closing and can take place at a meeting or, more frequently these
days, by fax or email.
● Closing. The trust deed or fiscal agency agreement are signed, the bond is
created and investors pay for the bonds they have purchased.
● Listing.For listed bonds the relevant documentation must be delivered to
the listing authority (e.g. in Britain it is the UKLA, part of the FCA) and
the stock exchange.
Auction issue
In an auction issue the cost of management fees is bypassed because the issuer
goes to investors directly asking for price and quantity bids for prospective
bonds with specified maturity and coupon. The disadvantage is that the
expertise of the lead manager and others in the syndicate is forgone with
regard to market knowledge, contacts, reputation, etc. Thus auction issues are
for high-quality, well-known borrowers only.
United States of America

The US has the largest corporate bond market in the world. The Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) supervises all aspects of bond
trading and its participants. FINRA (www.finra.org) lists over 40,000 corporate
bonds, with details of each bond (coupon, maturity, etc.) and, if it has one, its
credit rating. To take an example: the Ford Motor Co has about 190 bonds
listed, with maturities ranging up to 2097 and coupon rates varying from
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0.571% to 12%. About two-thirds of Ford’s bonds have the same credit rating,
Baa3 from Moody’s and BBB− from Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, and recent
sales prices vary from $41 to $202.375.
Disney has 26 bonds listed, including its famous Sleeping Beauty bond, a
100-year bond issued in 1993 paying a coupon of 7.55% on par (the yield
to redemption was 4.071% at the time of writing). This bond is continuously
callable and of the initial offering of $300 million, $99 million has been
redeemed. It is rated single-A. According to Morningstar, the investment
research centre, the Ford Motor Co had $7.7 billion of outstanding bonds and
Walt Disney had $13.3 billion in 2014, illustrating how important the bond
markets are for funding their operations.
Publicly traded US corporate bonds usually carry a minimum denomination

of $1,000. Those paying coupons usually do so every six months. More than
7,000 corporate bonds are listed on the NYSE (more than on any other
exchange in the US), but the bulk of trading is in the off-exchange OTC mar-
ket. Data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA), a trade association for financial enterprises, shows the increase in
corporate debt from 1980 to the present, with a total outstanding in 2014 of
$9.8 trillion (see Figure 4.8) and daily trading in these bonds averaging over
$20 billion.
Figure 4.8 US corporate debt outstanding from 1980

Source: Data from www.sifma.org
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Many non-US companies issue US$ bonds in both the public debt market and
the private placement market because they are more attractive to investors
than bonds issued in a not-so-strong currency. Increasingly, with globalisation
corporate bonds are issued all over the world, so a UK company might issue
bonds in Japan denominated in yen or dollars because it is transacting business
there.
Asia
Bond issuance in China is booming as corporates tap the markets rather than
automatically source borrowed funds from banks. The big issuers are the state-
owned enterprises, ranging from the oil company Sinopec to China National
Nuclear. But there are many private companies tapping into markets offering
good interest rates. Alongside the greater issuance has been the growth in sec-
ondary market trading with institutions and retail investors enthusiastic about
adding fixed-income securities to their portfolios in what is now a reasonably
liquid market. China is beginning to realise the importance of overseas invest-
ment in its domestic markets, and has paved the way for renminbi-qualified
foreign institutional investors (RQFIIs) to invest their foreign-held renminbi in
Chinese corporate (and government) bonds.
Domestic pension funds and other institutions in many Asian countries are
keen to obtain assets denominated in their own currencies and so welcome
further growth of their corporate bond markets – see Article 4.12. Pension
funds are particularly interested in bonds of a longer maturity providing a
better match to their pension liabilities than short-maturity issues. From
the companies’ perspective, they benefit from the stability that comes with
locking in fixed-rate money for a decade or more.
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Article 4.12
Asian credit markets expand at a

record pace
By Chris Flood

Asian credit markets are expanding at a record pace, attracting growing numbers
of both international and local institutional investors. New corporate issuance is
expected to rise to near $150bn this year, from $120bn in 2013. Yields on offer appear
generous compared with other fixed income markets. Bond-buying programmes by
leading central banks have squeezed yields and spreads elsewhere to historically
low levels.
David Bessey at Pramerica Fixed Income says the large scale of Asian corporate
bond issuance has meant that the tightening in credit spreads has lagged behind
developed markets, providing relative value opportunities for managers running
global and multi-sector funds.
Raja Mukherji at Pimco, the world’s largest bond house, adds that many US and
global investors remain underinvested in Asia and want to add exposure.
‘Local investors, especially insurance companies, pension funds and sovereign
wealth funds, are increasingly participating in new issues,’ he says.
Rajeev De Mello at Schroders agrees. He has seen strong interest from US investors
in investment-grade credit across Asia, with clients showing a stronger appetite for
risk than in previous years.
Mr De Mello adds that Asian local-currency bonds provide a distinct yield advan-
tage over US Treasuries, pointing out there is better value in those markets where
interest rates have already increased, such as China, India and Indonesia.
But he cautions that some other Asian credit markets now look ‘frothy’. Indeed,
yields are described as low in export-orientated Asian countries such as Taiwan,
South Korea and Thailand, although there are selective pockets of value elsewhere
for tactical investors.
Robert Stewart at JPMorgan Asset Management says: ‘Indonesia is attracting a lot
of interest from global fixed income investors anticipating that Joko Widodo will
pursue a reform agenda after his recent election as president.’
In India, Mr Bessey says Pramerica hopes that the new Modi government will pur-
sue a more orthodox fiscal approach than its predecessors. The Modi government
has a ‘unique mandate’ after winning a large election majority, adds Mr De Mello.
He says India’s central bank has also appointed a ‘very credible’ governor,
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Raghuram Rajan, who is determined to bring inflation down to sustainable levels,

an important commitment for building confidence among bond investors.
However, Indonesia and India play less influential roles in Asian credit markets
than China. The Chinese corporate bond market is now the world’s largest. Non-
financial debt is expected to grow from around $14.2tn at the end of 2013 to $20tn
over the next four years, according to Aberdeen Asset Management.
But Aberdeen warns that a third of Chinese debt is sourced from the informal
shadow banking sector while signs of stress continue in the country’s property
markets.
But the sense is clients in Asia see China’s credit markets as ‘an exciting area’ as
Beijing gradually liberalises capital flows. Mr Stewart says: ‘We are also starting
to see interest from other (non-Asian) international investors in onshore
Chinese corporate bonds, which look relatively attractive in the current low-yield
environment.’
Source: Flood, C. (2014) Asian credit markets expand at record pace, Financial Times,
27 July.
Bond indices
A bond index provides information, such as price movements and returns over
a period for a particular category of bond, e.g. an average for 100 or so corpor-
ate bonds denominated in euros or a few dozen inflation-linked bonds across
the world. Among other uses they allow investors to compare their bond port-
folio performance against a benchmark. The main indices are managed by
Markit (the iBoxx indices) and FTSE. Leading investment banks supply bid and
ask (offer) prices through the trading day to these organisations, which then
compile the indices.
In Table 4.2, an example of the bond indices table from the Financial Times, the
first column shows whether the bonds are denominated in sterling, dollars or
euros, the second column shows the number of bonds included in the index.
The final column does not indicate the yield to maturity but the return to an
investor who bought one year ago, including capital gains and losses, if they
sold now. These index suppliers produce many more indices than those shown
in Table 4.2 – see www.markit.com and www.ftse.co.uk for the other indices
and much more analytical data, such as average yield and duration.
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146
Table 4.2 Bond indices in the Financial Times
BOND INDICES
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Index Day’s Month’s Year Return Return
change change change 1 month 1 year
Markit iBoxx Jul 8

Overall (£) 1093 260.40 0.48 0.13 3.94 0.22 4.22
PART 2 BOND MARKETS
Overall ($) 3262 218.50 0.14 –0.49 3.47 –0.49 3.47

Overall (€) 2276 208.90 0.09 0.15 6.21 0.63 7.78
Global Inflation-Lkd† 97 256.03 0.13 –0.60 6.14 0.85 10.43
Gilts (£) 33 258.11 0.51 0.15 3.62 0.25 2.94
Corporates (£) 703 274.03 0.40 0.07 4.80 0.09 7.94
Corporates ($)† 2111 246.21 0.20 –0.47 5.10 –0.47 5.10
Corporates (€) 1196 206.45 0.09 0.17 5.05 0.53 6.81
Treasuries ($)† 156 208.25 0.13 –0.54 2.75 –0.54 2.75
Eurozone Sov (€) 261 210.02 0.08 0.13 7.10 0.64 8.70
ABF Pan-Asia unhedged 541 179.44 0.08 0.31 4.92 0.93 4.69
FTSE Jul 8
Sterling Corporate (£) 66 108.63 0.45 –0.05 1.54 0.35 6.72
Euro Corporate (€) 304 109.28 0.12 0.39 3.08 0.64 6.59
Euro Emerging Mkts (€) 7 96.09 0.13 0.14 2.70 0.50 7.83
Eurozone Gov’t Bond 260 109.94 0.07 0.24 5.58 0.50 9.18
Source: Data from www.ft.com http://markets.ft.com/RESEARCH/markets/DataArchiveFetchReport?Category=BR&Type=BOND&Date=07/08/2014
7/7/15 8:47 AM
CHAPTER 5
CREDIT RATINGS
FOR BONDS
Time was when a country’s financial credibility was measured by the amount
of gold in its vaults. Modern life has overtaken precious metal’s capacity to
underpin the credit standing of countries, or that of companies or individuals.
Nowadays we often rely on some independent outside body to be an
‘impartial’ judge of each borrower’s standing, and so the credit rating industry
was established.
As we have already seen, the standing or creditworthiness of a country or

company is crucial as it affects the rate of interest that will be applied to its
securities. The assessment of its standing is made by credit rating agencies
(CRAs), which, after a thorough investigation, issue a rating that is generally
accepted worldwide as a reasonably accurate evaluation of the issuer’s relative
ability to avoid default, and the likely payout should default occur.
Borrowers pay to have their bonds rated by the CRAs. Standard & Poor’s,
Moody’s and Fitch Ratings are the three most important credit rating com-
panies, but there are also many less well-known CRAs in North America (e.g.
Kroll Bond Rating Agency, DBRS and Morningstar) and in other countries,
including Dagong from China.
Standard & Poor’s was founded in 1860 by Henry Varnum Poor to give infor-
mation about US railroad companies, but did not assign ratings to corporate
bonds until 1922. Moody’s was established in 1900 by John Moody to give
statistics on US bonds and shares, providing its first credit rating in 1909. Fitch
was founded in 1913 by John Knowles Fitch to provide financial statistics to
help the US investment industry and began rating in 1924. Dagong is a relative
newcomer, founded in 1994.
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The As, Bs and Cs

When investing in bonds, the larger banks, fund managers and corporates
often conduct their own credit analysis of individual bond issues, but the
majority of the huge volume of bond investments are made using CRA
ratings for guidance. The top part of Table 5.1 shows the ratings regarded
as investment grade (prime grade). This is important because many institu-
tional investors are permitted to invest only in investment-grade securities.
The difference in bond yield between the different grades can be as little as
30 basis points, but this can rise dramatically at times of financial trauma,
e.g. in early 2009.
The ratings that CRAs give to countries, sovereign ratings, can vary – see
Table 5.2. A notch is a one-stage move on the rating scale, e.g. moving from
A− to BBB+. The UK lost its AAA rating with some of the CRAs in 2013, due to
concern about future financial stability. S&P downgraded the US to AA+ in
2011 after the prolonged political wranglings over the US government debt
level, and the Chinese agency, Dagong, caused controversy by downgrading
the US rating by several notches, from AAA to A−, in 2013 when the US
government could not agree on its financial policy (again, arguments in
Congress over the debt ceiling) and came dangerously close to being unable
to meet the payments due on its bonds. The Chinese are concerned about
the US debt burden as they are the biggest holders of US Treasury securities, at
$1.3 trillion:
For a long time the U.S. government maintains its solvency by repaying
its old debts through raising new debts, which constantly aggravates the
vulnerability of the federal government’s solvency. Hence the government
is still approaching the verge of default crisis, a situation that cannot be
substantially alleviated in the foreseeable future.
Dagong Global (http://en.dagongcredit.com)
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5 CREDIT RATINGS FOR BONDS 149
Table 5.1 Credit rating systems for long-term debt (more than one year)
Moody’s S&P Fitch Dagong
Investment grade
Highest credit
Aaa AAA AAA Highest quality, minimal credit risk AAA
quality
Aa1 AA+ AA+

AA+
High grade, high quality, very low Very high credit
Aa2 AA AA AA
credit risk quality
AA−
Aa3 AA– AA−
A1 A+ A+
A+
High credit
A2 A A Upper medium grade, low credit risk A
quality
A−
A3 A− A−
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+

Lower medium grade, moderate BBB+
Medium credit
Baa2 BBB BBB credit risk, possessing certain BBB
quality
speculative characteristics BBB−
Baa3 BBB− BBB−
Non-investment grade (speculative grade)
Ba1 BB+ BB+

BB+
Speculative elements, subject to Low–medium
Ba2 BB BB BB
significant credit risk credit quality
BB−
Ba3 BB− BB−
B1 B+ B+
B+
Relatively low
B2 B B Speculative, high credit risk B
credit quality
B–
B3 B− B−
Low credit
Caa CCC+ Poor standing, very high credit risk CCC
quality
Highly speculative, likely, in the near

Very low credit
Ca CCC CCC future, to default with some prospect CC
quality
of principal and coupon recovery
Typically in default with little prospect Lowest credit

C CCC− C
for recovery of principal or interest quality
In default. These trade on the

D D assumed recovery rate following
default
Source: Data from Rating agencies
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Table 5.2 Sovereign ratings
Dagong S&P Moody’s Fitch
Australia AAA AAA Aaa AAA

Belgium A+ AA Aa3 AA
Brazil A− BBB+ Baa2 BBB
Canada AA+ AAA Aaa AAA
China AA+ AA− Aa3 A+
Egypt B− B− Caa1 B−
Finland AAA AAA Aaa AAA
France A+ AA Aa1 AA+
Germany AA+ AAA Aaa AAA
Greece CC B− Caa3 B
Hong Kong AAA AAA Aa1 AA+
India BBB BBB− Baa3 BBB−
Ireland BBB A− Baa1 BBB+
Italy BBB− BBB Baa2 BBB+
Japan A AA− Aa3 A+
Luxembourg AAA AAA Aaa AAA
Mexico BBB A A3 BBB+
Netherlands AA+ AA+ Aaa AAA
New Zealand AA+ AA+ Aaa AA
Norway AAA AAA Aaa AAA
Portugal BB BB Ba1 BB+
Russia A BBB Baa1 BBB
Singapore AAA AAA Aaa AAA
South Africa A− BBB+ Baa1 BBB
South Korea AA– AA− Aa3 AA−
Spain BBB+ BBB Baa3 BBB+
Sweden AAA AAA Aaa AAA
Switzerland AAA AAA Aaa AAA
UK A+ AAA Aa1 AA+
USA A− AA+ Aaa AAA
Source: Data from CRAs’ websites
When the rating agencies disagree we have a split rating – as you can see, this
occurs quite often. The rating and re-rating of bonds is followed with great
interest by borrowers and lenders and can give rise to some heated argument.
Italians were very upset in 2014 when S&P was accused of taking insufficient
account of the country’s qualities – see Article 5.1.
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Article 5.1
Italy accuses S&P of not getting

‘la dolce vita’
By Stephen Foley and Guy Dinmore

If financial analysts had spent more time admiring a Michelangelo fresco or
reading Dante instead of poring over spreadsheets, they might not have touched
off the inferno that engulfed the Italian sovereign debt market, Italy’s state auditor
is claiming.
Standard & Poor’s revealed on Tuesday it had been notified by Corte dei Conti
that credit rating agencies may have acted illegally and opened themselves up to
damages of €234bn, in part by failing to consider Italy’s rich cultural history when
downgrading the country.
The potentially gigantic claim, which S&P dismissed as ‘frivolous and without
merit’, relates to the string of downgrades the rating agency issued on Italian debt
when the eurozone crisis intensified in 2011.
Notifying S&P that it was considering legal action, the Corte dei Conti wrote:
‘S&P never in its ratings pointed out Italy’s history, art or landscape which, as
universally recognised, are the basis of its economic strength.’
An official in Italy confirmed the judicial inquiry into S&P and its smaller peers,
Moody’s and Fitch.
Previous reports have indicated the auditor is considering whether ‘reckless’
rating agency reports on Italy’s public debt contributed to a worsening of the
sovereign debt crisis, forcing the governments of Silvio Berlusconi and then Mario
Monti to take emergency measures.
While it remains uncertain that the claim will be brought, the auditor’s dramatic
threat – and the size of damages it has suggested – reflects anger in European
political circles at the role played by rating agencies in the market turmoil that
threatened the eurozone.
The prospect of sovereign downgrades caused waves of selling of government debt
from countries such as Italy and Spain, raising their borrowing costs and further
damaging their public finances.
A spokesman for Moody’s also said the allegations were without merit.
Fitch said it would co-operate with the probe. ‘As we understand the prosecutor’s
concerns, we believe Fitch at all times acted appropriately and in full compliance
with the law.’
Source: Foley, S. and Dinmore, G. (2014) Italy accuses S&P of not getting ‘la dolce vita’,
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The rating agencies are constantly reviewing countries to detect reasons for
thinking that default risk has improved or deteriorated. As Article 5.2 shows, in
the years following the financial crisis there were some dramatic changes, with
Europe declining and developing countries prospering.
Article 5.2
Turning point for European debt

ratings
By Ralph Atkins and Keith Fray
Financial Times March 31, 2014

The financial crises of the past seven years drove sweeping changes in the global
credit ratings map. The US and European governments were downgraded.
Emerging markets rose.
The story of the past 12 months has been more complex. The rating performance of
developing economies has been at best mixed. But signs are appearing that Europe
has reached a possible turning point.
‘What we have tried to emphasise is how much divergence there is in terms of
exposure to the turning tide in global capital,’ says Moritz Kraemer, chief sovereign
ratings officer at Standard & Poor’s. ‘It is really country-specific policy actions that
are likely to overshadow rating actions, rather than global factors.’
Credit ratings guide investors’ decision making by indicating the likelihood of
defaults.
Top performers compared with a year ago in terms of rating upgrades are Mexico
and the Philippines. Near the bottom, unsurprisingly, is Ukraine, which has come
close to financial collapse.
By weighting countries according to the size of their outstanding debt, the FT’s
analysis also shows the changing size of bond markets by credit rating category.
Downgrades in the past year have thrown the Netherlands out of the shrinking
club of economies rated triple A by all three agencies.
But, overall, average credit ratings in the developed world stabilised in the past
year, although with significant country-by-country variations.
With Europe still reeling from its debt crisis and recession, France and Italy were
downgraded. But Spain and Greece headed in the opposite direction, and there are
signs that the 18-country eurozone trend is no longer downwards. Rating ‘outlooks’
– which indicate possible future actions – have been switched from negative to stable
by at least one agency for six eurozone countries, including Germany and Portugal.
‘At the beginning of last year, we had two-thirds of the eurozone on negative
outlook. Now it’s just one-third,’ says James McCormack, at Fitch. ‘If you’d known
➨
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before the crisis that a third would be on negative outlook, you would have right-
fully thought that was pretty bad, but it has stabilised. Relative to where we were,
things have certainly improved.’
Any turnround in European credit ratings will be slow, however. Mr Kraemer at
S&P points out that when Sweden and Finland lost their triple A status in the early
1990s, it was a decade before it was regained.
Similarly, France and the UK are unlikely to see a quick return to triple A status,
warns Mr McCormack. ‘We have suggested that debt ratios need to come down in
a more meaningful way – there has to be a track record of fiscal adjustment.’
Ratings in emerging markets over the past year have improved in Asia, central and
eastern Europe and the Caribbean. But African, Middle East and Latin American
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countries have seen downgrades on average. Brazil was downgraded by S&P

last week.
As well as country-specific factors, the future performance of emerging markets
could depend on China’s prospects. ‘China has generated a lot of economic activity,
which has driven a lot of trade and improved the fiscal position of a lot of countries
in, say, Latin America,’ says Mr Oosterveld (head of sovereign ratings] at Moody’s.
‘Things look very different if you assume, in a downside scenario, China is going
to grow by 4% a year rather than 8%.’
But changes in the global ratings map do not necessarily reflect what happens
on the ground. Economists at UniCredit argued that the subjective part of rating
decisions often blurred their predictive powers. ‘History is littered with countries
being over- and underrated by the rating agencies, with – at times – dramatic
consequences,’ they wrote. ‘The biggest casualty was the eurozone periphery,
which was downgraded far too heavily during the 2009–11 sovereign debt crisis.’
Source: Atkins, R. and Fray, K. (2014) Turning point for European debt ratings, Financial
Times, 31 March.
While corporate borrowers’ credit ratings are generally of great concern to them,
because those with lower ratings tend to have higher costs, some companies
are fairly sanguine, particularly if they regard the CRAs as using unreasonable
methods and they can persuade finance providers of their point of view – see
Article 5.3 for the example of Rio Tinto.
Article 5.3
Rio Tinto’s Sam Walsh questions

credit rating groups’ relevance
By James Wilson and Neil Hume
Financial Times December 11, 2013

Rio Tinto’s chief executive has signalled that he is not afraid of a downgrade by
credit rating agencies, saying that he will not run the company according to their
demands, in spite of possible consequences for borrowing costs at the indebted miner.
Sam Walsh said that agencies including Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s were using
yardsticks that were of limited relevance to the miner and its shareholders.
His comments came as Rio told investors that it would make a priority next year
of paying down debt, which has soared after misguided acquisitions and heavy
investment.
➨
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Mr Walsh acknowledged that he no longer saw Rio’s single-A rating, given by

Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, as sacrosanct.
‘You have got to be very careful that you manage the business and that Standard
& Poor’s or Moody’s or what-have-you don’t end up running the business [by]
default,’ said Mr Walsh.
‘I believe we have done all the things we need to retain an A-rating. But I am not
about to be driven by a rating which takes into account things that we and our
shareholders don’t take into account.’
The Anglo-Australian miner expects to end the year with $19bn of net debt, down
from $22bn in midyear but the same level as at the start of 2013. Its gross debt stood
at $29.5bn at midyear.
Credit rating agencies’ judgments have been increasingly called into question
since the financial crisis, when they were viewed as having given overly reassuring
ratings to many of the complex debt instruments that were at the heart of the crisis.
Rio has long been focused on maintaining its single-A credit rating. S&P put the
rating on ‘negative’ outlook in February, citing risks that its debt, including costs
for pensions or for mines at the end of their lives, could rise.
He acknowledged Rio’s rating was ‘clearly an issue’ for its borrowing costs. ‘It is
not totally irrelevant but you cannot be driven by what others think you should be
doing,’ he said.
Source: Wilson, J. and Hume, N. (2013) Rio Tinto’s Sam Walsh questions credit rating
groups’ relevance, Financial Times, 11 December.
How rating judgements are formed

The rating given to securities depends on the likelihood of payments of inter-
est and/or capital not being paid (default) and in some cases on the extent to
which the lender is protected in the event of a default by the loan contract, the
recoverability of debt. Rating agencies say that they do not in the strictest
sense give an opinion on the likelihood of default, but merely evaluate relative
creditworthiness or relative likelihood of default, and because rating scales
are relative, default rates for a rating grade fluctuate over time. Thus, a group
of middle-rated bonds is expected to be consistent in having a lower rate of
default than a group of lower-rated bonds, but they will not, year-after year,
have a default rate of, say, 2.5% per year. With regard to the recovery rate (‘loss
given default’) element, much will depend on the extent of credit enhance-
ments such as collateral backing, strength of covenants and priority ranking
relative to other debt.
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The agencies consider a wide range of quantitative and qualitative factors in

determining the rating for a bond. The quantitative factors include the ratio of
company assets to liabilities, cash flow generation and the amount of debt
outstanding. Ratios such as the number of times profits exceed interest are
likely to be considered, together with the extent to which shareholder funds in
the business are greater than total debt. Also considered are funding diversity,
profitability and liquidity of assets.
The qualitative factors include competitive position, quality of management,

vulnerability to the economic cycle, dependence on one or a few products
or customers, and geographic diversity – see Article 5.4 for a qualitative dis-
cussion of Microsoft’s and Apple’s relative default risk.
Article 5.4
Microsoft beats Apple in the credit

ratings league
By Michael Mackenzie and Vivianne Rodrigues

It is a long standing rivalry and on one score, Microsoft still trumps Apple – when
it comes to the rating of their respective debt securities. While Apple effortlessly
sold a record $17bn in debt that attracted $52bn in demand from investors on
Tuesday, the paper comes with a Double A plus rating, one notch below the gold
standard of Triple A.
In contrast, Microsoft is rated Triple A by both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
Fitch, which has not yet rated Apple, assigns a Double A plus rating to Microsoft.
This comes in spite of Apple having an enormous gross cash pile of $145bn, and
enjoying solid sales for its very popular products. While that would suggest Apple
should qualify for a top rating, it has been awarded a slightly lower rating due to
its hefty reliance on sales to consumers. The rating agencies deem this market
to be more volatile than sales to corporate customers.
In turn, the Triple A club has a very select membership of just four US companies,
ADP, Johnson & Johnson, ExxonMobil and Microsoft. What links these companies,
say analysts, is their strong leadership in their respective sectors.
‘Generally, Microsoft has a recurring fee business, while Apple is more of a con-
sumer products company,’ says Jack Ablin at Harris Private Bank.
Gerald Granovsky at Moody’s says: ‘Microsoft’s ratings reflect our confidence in
the company’s revenue stream and also the fact their customers have very little
➨
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option but to buy Microsoft products. The consumer profile for the companies is
slightly different.’
He adds: ‘Apple’s credit profile is tied to the company’s ability to keep up with
innovations and maintain its unique corporate culture. The rapid rise and fall of
new products demonstrates these sectors are particularly prone to transforma-
tional changes that could lead to shifts in market leadership.’
Fitch said the company would likely fall in the high single ‘A’ rating category,
based on the inherent business risk of consumer-centric hardware companies.
‘Consumer product companies such as Sony, Nokia, and Motorola Mobility have
proven the risks related to ever-changing consumer tastes, low switching costs,
and a highly competitive environment,’ said James Rizzo at Fitch. ‘Each has his-
torically had a dominant market position and strong financial metrics, only to
falter over a relatively short period of time.’
‘Apple’s better diversification and the stickiness of its iTunes ecosystem clearly
make it a stronger credit that would likely be at the highest end of the ‘A’ category,’
said Mr Rizzo.
While there is a one notch difference in ratings between Apple and Microsoft,
investors appear less discerning based on the pricing of recent bond issues by both
companies. Apple’s blockbuster bond issue priced very close to where Microsoft’s
much smaller $1.95bn offering of five-, 10-, and 30-year debt was sold last week.
While Microsoft sold $1bn of 10-year debt at 70 basis points over Treasury yields,
Apple’s $5.5bn issue arrived at 75 bps over benchmark government debt. There was
a difference of 10 basis points in pricing between their 30-year bonds.
Source: Mackenzie, M. and Rodrigues, V. (2013) Microsoft beats Apple in the credit ratings
league, Financial Times, 1 May.
A checklist for a rating assessment might include:
● breakdown of sales by geography and product lines – degree of diversifica-

tion is of particular interest
● market position of main goods and services produced, pointing out competi-
tive advantages
● life-cycle position of main goods and services: are they old, tired or in
decline?
● costs
● sources of inputs: any competitive advantages or weaknesses there, e.g. reli-

ant on one supplier for a key input
● intellectual property ownership (trademark, copyright, advantage given by
government or regulatory concession/licence)
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● any restriction on price charged, e.g. under competition authority rules or

other regulators
● excessive dependence on one/few customers
● thought-through strategy or changed by whim at short notice
● vulnerability to technological change
● main drivers of profits and cash flow
● managers’ track record
● delivery on past plans
● risk management processes
● plans for further cash raising, equity or bonds; how receptive might the
markets be; will the changes unbalance the capital structure, creating risk?
● how sensible the dividend policy is
● any worries over the legal structure of the group, such as subsidiaries in
overseas companies borrowing, government controls on moving money
across borders
● contingent liabilities, e.g. pensions, legal liabilities, environmental
● strength of bank relationships
● derivative risk exposure.
The sovereign issuer might be asked for the following:
● national economic and financial data
● government budget forecasts
● independent reports on the country, e.g. from the International Monetary

Fund
● economic strategy, e.g. fiscal policy, monetary policy, planned privatisa-
tions, microeconomic reforms, exchange rate policy
● political trends and risks
● general government debt burden
● government debt owed to foreigners (external debt)
● taxation powers
● strength of political institutions and trends
● contingent liabilities
● private sector external debt (owing to foreigners) burden.
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As well as specific bond ratings the CRAs provide issuer ratings to firms and
other organisations, which are assessments of the creditworthiness of the
whole entity. The vast majority of ratings, however, apply to a particular
security issue by the firm. Ratings on some securities may have a higher rating
than the issuing company as a whole because the specific security is secured on
a very reliable asset.
Obtaining a rating can be expensive, of the order of 0.05% of the amount

raised with a minimum of $80,000, but for some companies the benefit of
being able to borrow at lower interest rates due to the rating can be worth ten
times as much as the fees paid for it. For other companies the equation does
not work out that way and they choose not to obtain one – see Article 5.5.
If a bond does not have a rating, it could simply mean that the borrower
has chosen not to pay for one, rather than implying anything untoward or
sinister. Indeed, some bonds are sold on a name recognition basis, that is, the
issuer has such a good reputation with lenders accepting that their financial
standing is such that there is a very low likelihood of default and they do not
require a formal credit rating. However, ‘unrated’ is often used to mean poorer
default risk.
Article 5.5
‘Dash for trash’ lifts unrated debt

sales
By Andrew Bolger and Robin Wigglesworth

Now it is the turn of the tiddlers. Even companies too small to be graded by the
leading rating agencies – or that choose not to – are benefiting from voracious
investor appetite for European corporate bonds.
Mahle, a German car parts maker, SEA, an Italian airport operator, and Bureau
Veritas, a France-based inspection and certifying company, are among those to
have recently issued unrated bonds.
These bring the total volume of unrated corporate bonds issued in Europe this
year to more than $20bn, and open up the prospect of yet another record year for
grade-less company debt. Last year there were $58bn worth of unrated corporate
bond sales.
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Other prominent unrated deals so far this year include Sodexo, the French caterer,
which borrowed $1.1bn in January, ProSiebenSat, the German broadcaster, which
borrowed $828m in April, and CGG, an Irish support services group, which raised
$750m in March.
However, unrated bond issues remain relatively rare, given many investors are
limited to buying certain grades, and most prefer the transparency that a rating
confers. They have accounted for about 10% of the European corporate bond
market in recent years.
Unrated bonds also tend to be smaller and less liquid than rated debt. Half such
bonds issued over the past three years were for less than $250m. The companies
therefore have to pay lenders a premium to the yields at which they would
normally expect to issue.
But Rupert Lewis, a debt syndicate banker at BNP Paribas, says that the extra
cost of issuing unrated debt has come down over the last couple of years from
approximately 100 basis points to 50bp – or potentially less, depending on the
company.
‘It’s a horses for courses market,’ he says. ‘They tend to be companies that don’t
issue that often and therefore don’t want to go through the workload and costs of
getting and maintaining a credit rating for infrequent borrowing. Without a rating
they don’t go in indices, so a large amount of investors cannot buy, but despite that
the cost has definitely come down.’
Jean-Marc Mercier, global head of debt syndicate at HSBC, says: ‘A lot of companies
don’t want to take on the cost, work and management time involved with obtaining
a rating – particularly family-controlled companies.’
However, unrated bonds have also been issued by large companies such as SAP, the
German software group, which has borrowed several billions of euros via such
bonds. Household names that have used the market and subsequently acquired
ratings include the Dutch brewer Heineken and Thomas Cook, the UK travel group.
The rating agency Fitch says some household names have been able to take
advantage of their higher profiles among retail investors to issue unrated bonds.
These include Skanska, the Swedish engineering group; Finnair in Finland; Air
France-KLM; and Sixt, the German-based car rental group.
Mike Dunning at Fitch says: ‘UK companies can also access the US private
placement market to raise funds on an unrated basis – which is easier than going
through the full bond rating process.’
The agency says that a sizeable proportion of the larger issues of unrated bonds
display credit profiles that could be classified as investment, or near-investment
grade. This is in spite of a significant level of opportunistic issuance by smaller,
non-eurozone domiciled corporates.
‘The European institutional bond market is generally receptive to the first, oppor-
tunistic, unrated bond from a new issuer, but increasingly looks for a rating if
repeat visits, particularly for smaller issuers, are contemplated,’ says Tom
Chruszcz, an analyst with Fitch.
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Source: Bolger, A. and Wigglesworth, R. (2014) ‘Dash for trash’ lifts unrated debt sales,
© The Financial times Limited 2014. All Rights Reserved.
A rating decision generally takes a few weeks and is made by a rating committee
assessing the evidence, rather than by an individual. The committee notifies
the issuer of the rating and the rationale behind it.
The agencies are also available to carry out credit analysis as a service to lenders.
They thus produce unsolicited company analysis and credit ratings without
necessarily gaining the cooperation of the issuing company (or country).
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Post-rating
There is generally a high degree of ongoing interaction between a corporate
and its CRA following bond issuance; the relationship is akin to that between
a company and its longstanding bank, with a high degree of transparency.
In addition to the agency gleaning information through dialogue with the
company it will continue to scan publicly available sources. Its monitoring
(ratings review) in the months and years following is focused on develop-
ments that could alter the original rating. Issues might arise that lead to
an upgrade or a downgrade. These are called rating actions. A press release
disseminates a change of rating.
The CRAs not only give countries/companies/bonds a credit rating, they also
give an outlook, an assessment of what the credit rating is likely to be in the
future over the intermediate to longer term: ‘positive’ indicates that the rating
might be raised, ‘stable’ means not likely to change, ‘negative’ means it may
be lowered, ‘developing’ means it may be raised or lowered. This can be
influenced by many things, such as political unrest (e.g. Egypt), natural
disasters (e.g. earthquake in Japan and New Zealand) or economic instability
(e.g. Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal in 2010–2012). But note, outlooks are
not necessarily a precursor to ratings changes, just possibilities.
If a company announces or is expected to announce a major corporate move

such as a proposed merger it might be placed on credit watch while events
unfold. Sometimes the CRA assesses the rating it would give under different
scenarios likely to stem from the event. This special surveillance can be
short-term or long-term focused, unlike an outlook which has a more distant
horizon.
Ranking
In the event of financial failure of a company (liquidation/bankruptcy), the
ranking (‘priority’) order for bonds is:
1 Senior secured debt holders will be paid first. An example of this would be a
mortgage loan secured on the mortgaged asset.
2 Senior unsecured debt is paid next, if any money is left. This is debt consist-
ing of loans which are not secured on an asset(s), but it is stated in the trust
deed that they will be near the front of the queue for payouts of annual
M05_ARNO1799_01_SE_C05.indd 162 7/7/15 8:48 AM

coupons and of proceeds from liquidation. After this group has been paid
the subordinated bond holders may receive nothing.
3 Senior subordinated debt – high-yield or junk bonds, secured or unsecured.
4 Subordinated debt is the last type of debt to be paid out after all other
creditors.
The situation becomes more complicated when group companies are forced
into liquidation. For example, it is possible for senior debt issued by the
holding company to be subordinated to debt issued by a subsidiary (senior or
junior) if the subsidiary’s lenders have legal access to assets of the subsidiary.
The variety of insolvency regimes across Europe, with different rules on bond
priorities following insolvency, is thought to have inhibited bond market
growth relative to that in the single system across the US – see Article 5.6.
Article 5.6
Europe looks for common default

process
By Andrew Bolger

European companies have been able to access a flood of high-yield loans and bonds
over the past few years – so far with remarkably few defaults, thanks partly to low
interest rates.
But rating agencies and lawyers warn that investors may not appreciate the com-
plexity of the different European insolvency procedures they may have to deal
with, when the market returns to more normal conditions.
Moody’s says the default rate among high-yield issuers was 2.2% in the second
quarter, down from 3.4% at the same stage last year. It expects the global high-yield
default rate to finish this year at 2% – well below the historical average of 4.7%
since 1983.
‘The benign default rate outlook is supported by robust liquidity which has con-
tinued for quite some time,’ says the rating agency. ‘Lowly rated companies have been
able to access the capital markets and refinance their debt with issuer friendly terms,
which will probably keep the default rates low into the first half of next year.’
However, no one expects the present benign conditions to last once interest rates
start to increase.
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Michael Dakin, a partner at the law firm Clifford Chance, likens the recent sell-off
of high-yield bonds to ‘blowing the froth off the cappuccino’. But he predicts a
‘flood’ of selling when the currently ‘ludicrously low’ level of company defaults
moves back closer to its historic average.
One potential problem is that US investors are used to dealing with corporate re-
organisations conducted under the Chapter 11 procedure, which applies in all
states, and is subject to the US bankruptcy code, providing for valuations of the
debtor’s assets and ranking of competing claims.
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‘In Europe, there is no common process, law or statutory timetable equivalent to

Chapter 11,’ says Philip Hertz, joint leader of the restructuring and insolvency
group at Clifford Chance.
‘While high-yield products may have originated in the US, a European high-yield
transaction, with a European issuer and a primarily European business, is a
European deal in restructuring terms. If that deal falters, its restructuring will be
largely driven by European considerations.’
But there are moves afoot to develop a more consistent regime across Europe.
Continental European companies such as the German building materials group
Monier, Italian directories publisher Seat Pagine Gialle and Spanish retailer Cortefiel,
shifted jurisdiction to the UK to access more creditor-friendly, court-sanctioned
schemes of arrangement, despite reforms in their own jurisdictions.
Many UK companies have used such schemes to restructure not only their liabilities
governed by English law, but also non-English law liabilities.
Source: Bolger, A. (2014) Europe looks for common default process, Financial Times,
11 August.
Bond ratings in the Financial Times

The Financial Times shows credit ratings daily in the tables titled ‘Bonds –
Global Investment Grade’ and ‘Bonds – High Yield & Emerging Market’,
together with yields to redemption (‘bid yield’ – based on the bid price offered
by market makers) and other details – see Tables 5.3 and 5.4. These give the
reader some idea of current market conditions and the redemption yield
demanded for bonds of different maturities, currencies and risk. The ratings
shown are for August 2014 and will not necessarily be applicable in future
weeks because the creditworthiness and the default risk of a specific debt issue
can change significantly in a short period. A key measure in the bond markets
is the ‘spread’, which is the number of basis points a bond is yielding above
a benchmark rate, usually the government bond yield to maturity for that
currency and period to redemption.
Bond credit ratings are available direct from rating agency websites,
www.standardandpoors.com, www.moodys.com, and www.fitchratings.com.
Note the higher variation in the price, yield and spread of the high-yield
bonds, compared with investment-grade bonds.
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Table 5.3 Global investment-grade bonds, 7 August 2014 166
Aug 7 Red date Coupon Ratings Bid price Bid yield Day’s chge Mth’s chge Spread vs
yield yield Govts
S* M* F*
US $
BNP Paribas 06/15 4.80 BBB+ Baa2 A 103.28 0.98 0.03 –1.13 0.89
M05_ARNO1799_01_SE_C05.indd 166
GE Capital 01/16 5.00 AA+ A1 0 106.09 0.64 –0.02 –0.08 0.55
Erste Euro Lux 02/16 5.00 A– 0 0 104.24 2.11 –0.03 –0.17 1.65
Credit Suisse USA 03/16 5.38 A A1 A 107.24 0.89 – –0.05 0.28
SPI E&G Aust 09/16 5.75 A– A3 A– 107.50 2.07 –0.04 –0.08 1.63
Abu Dhabi Nt En 10/17 6.17 A– A3 0 113.54 1.79 0.01 –0.05 0.73
Swire Pacific 04/18 6.25 A– A3 A– 114.04 2.26 –0.07 –0.06 1.38
PART 2 BOND MARKETS
ASNA 11/18 6.95 A– Baa2 A 119.10 2.19 –0.06 –0.18 0.58

Codelco 01/19 7.50 AA– A1 A+ 121.29 2.40 –0.16 –0.17 0.79
Bell South 10/31 6.88 A– WR A 123.05 4.88 –0.04 –0.17 2.45
GE Capital 01/39 6.88 AA+ A1 0 134.85 4.51 –0.02 –0.15 1.26
Goldman Sachs 02/33 6.13 A– Baa1 A 120.02 4.52 –0.04 –0.15 2.09
Euro
JPMorgan Chase 01/15 5.25 A A3 A+ 102.21 0.04 –0.52 –0.49 0.01
Hutchison Fin 06 09/16 4.63 A– A3 A– 108.16 0.71 –0.07 –0.12 0.71
Hypo Alpe Bk 10/16 4.25 0 Caa1 0 92.01 8.33 0.02 2.01 8.32
GE Cap Euro Fdg 01/18 5.38 AA+ A1 0 116.03 0.64 –0.04 –0.09 0.60
UniCredit 01/20 4.38 BBB Baa2 BBB+ 113.61 1.74 0.01 0.05 1.43
ENEL 05/24 5.25 BBB Baa2 BBB+ 126.60 2.19 –0.10 –0.13 1.27
Yen
Deutsche Bahn Fin 12/14 1.65 AA Aa1 AA 100.21 0.95 0.01 0.18 0.92
Nomura Sec S 3 03/18 2.28 0 0 0 104.49 1.00 –0.04 –0.05 0.92
£ Sterling
Slough Estates 09/15 6.25 NR 0 A– 104.82 1.90 –0.02 –0.07 1.11
ASIF III 12/18 5.00 A+ A2 A+ 110.20 2.48 0.00 –0.17 0.79
US $ denominated bonds NY close; all other London close. S* – Standard & Poor’s, M* – Moody’s, F* – Fitch.
7/7/15 8:48 AM
Table 5.4 High-yield and emerging market bonds, 7 August 2014
Aug 7 Red date Coupon Ratings Bid price Bid yield Day’s Mth’s Spread
chge yield chge yield vs US
S* M* F*
M05_ARNO1799_01_SE_C05.indd 167
High Yield US$
Bertin 10/16 10.25 BB Ba3 0 113.06 3.85 0.03 0.14 3.26
High Yield Euro

Kazkommerts Int 02/17 6.88 B Caa1 B 100.75 6.52 0.17 –0.38 6.52
Emerging US$
Bulgaria 01/15 8.25 BBB– Baa2 BBB– 102.75 1.72 0.68 0.39 1.68
Peru 02/15 9.88 BBB+ A3 BBB+ 104.31 0.92 0.00 –0.37 0.87
Brazil 03/15 7.88 BBB– Baa2 BBB 103.78 1.20 –0.03 –0.10 1.16
Mexico 09/16 11.38 BBB+ A3 BBB+ 121.25 1.12 – 0.27 0.66
Philippines 01/19 9.88 BBB Baa3 BBB– 131.48 2.34 –0.05 –0.04 0.72
Brazil 01/20 12.75 BBB– Baa2 BBB 148.20 3.05 0.17 0.12 1.41
Colombia 02/20 11.75 BBB Baa2 BBB 143.64 3.11 0.03 0.06 1.51
Russia 03/30 7.50 BBB– Baa1 BBB 111.50 4.98 0.25 0.72 3.35
Mexico 08/31 8.30 BBB+ A3 BBB+ 147.38 4.33 –0.03 –0.13 1.91
Indonesia 02/37 6.63 BB+ Baa3 BBB– 112.88 5.61 0.19 –0.15 2.37
Emerging Euro
Brazil 02/15 7.38 BBB– Baa2 BBB 103.05 0.95 –0.25 0.06 0.92
Poland 02/16 3.63 A– A2 A– 104.73 0.40 –0.01 0.11 0.40
Turkey 03/16 5.00 NR Baa3 BBB– 105.50 1.39 0.04 –0.11 1.38
Mexico 02/20 5.50 BBB+ A3 BBB+ 120.85 1.53 0.02 –0.04 1.14
5 CREDIT RATINGS FOR BONDS
US $ denominated bonds NY close; all other London close. S* – Standard & Poor’s, M* – Moody’s, F* – Fitch.
167
7/7/15 8:48 AM
Crisis of confidence
CRAs advance the argument that their ratings are mere opinions and are thus
protected under free speech laws. They have no contract with the investing
institutions, nor do they have a fiduciary duty to them, so say the agencies.
Thus they can publish an opinion without being liable for mistakes or mislead-
ing statements.
But a lot of weight is placed on bond ratings by financial institutions and

investors who rely on them for investment decisions. They can feel aggrieved
if a bond rating fails to live up to expectations. It has been suggested that
during the run-up to the financial crisis of 2008 the CRAs gave unduly high
ratings to bonds that were shaky. Many have called into question the CRAs’
judgement when it became apparent that many bonds rated ‘A’ and above
were, in fact, worthless. Just before Lehman Brothers went into bankruptcy, its
credit rating was A, and Bear Stearns was downgraded from AA to A shortly
before the company became insolvent. It would seem that the CRAs seriously
underestimated the risks undertaken by these and many other companies.
In particular, the CRAs have been criticised for not spotting the dangers in a
number of bonds which gained their income from thousands of US mortgages,
and several lawsuits were launched, with the CRAs being accused of causing
financial loss through their perceived as inaccurate ratings.
There have been some serious legal challenges to the CRAs’ claim that
an ‘opinion’ should not lead to claims of carelessness or negligence if their
judgement turns out to be wrong. Article 5.7 shows the state of the law in
Australia, which will probably have an impact on other jurisdictions: CRAs
have a duty of care to investors, not just their paymasters, the issuers.
Article 5.7
S&P loses Australia appeal over

misleading investors
By Jamie Smyth and Sam Fleming

Standard & Poor’s has lost its appeal against a landmark court ruling in Australia,
which found the credit rating agency misled investors by giving AAA ratings to
toxic financial products that lost almost all their value.
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The ruling by the Federal Court of Australia in a case that also involved ABN Amro,
which is now owned by Royal Bank of Scotland, paves the way for similar court actions
elsewhere from investors who lost billions of dollars during the financial crisis.
John Ahern, a partner at law firm Jones Day, said the judgment augured ill for
rating agencies. ‘The position that the court took is logically the conclusion that
courts in other jurisdictions could arrive at, given [there is] a good deal of similar-
ity in the principles of negligence – at least in common law jurisdictions.’
S&P originally lost the Australian case in November 2012, when the court issued a
scathing ruling that the rating agency was ‘misleading’ and ‘deceptive’ when it
awarded a AAA credit rating to a complex debt instrument.
The judgment was the first time a court found a credit-rating agency liable for
losses incurred by investors on financial products, which it had erroneously
awarded a gilt-edged credit rating. It also said that rating agencies have a duty of
care to investors.
The court found that the notes were sold to local councils in Australia on the basis
that the AAA rating was based on reasonable grounds, and as the result of an exer-
cise in reasonable care and skill, while neither was true.
‘S&P also knew them not to be true when they were made,’ concluded the original
ruling.
Local councils lost tens of millions of dollars on the collateralised debt instruments
when the financial crisis struck.
ABN AMRO, which created the toxic products, and Local Government Financial
Services, which sold them to councils, also engaged in misleading and deceptive
conduct, according to the original court judgment.
The dismissal of the appeal by Judge Peter Jacobson is a setback for S&P, which is
fighting multiple legal actions in the US and Europe related to claims it issued
misleading credit ratings before the 2008 financial crisis.
Source: Smyth, J. and Fleming, S. (2014) S&P loses Australia appeal over misleading
investors, Financial Times, 6 June.
Regulators around the world have tried to keep closer tabs on the CRAs in
recent years. The European Union set up a new regulator, the European
Securities and Markets Authority, in part to scrutinise the CRAs’ conduct.
The Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US
tightened regulation, e.g. by prohibiting the agencies from also advising the
issuers (for a fee) on how to structure a bond issue to obtain a favourable rating.
The fear was that the CRAs would lower standards in order to generate business
for their consultancy wing. In addition, the agency’s fee negotiator (for the
rating exercise) has to be someone who is not involved in the rating assess-
ment. Also, more disclosure on how ratings are determined, and disclosure of
historical ratings performance, are required. One of the tools regulators are
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employing is the encouragement of rival CRAs to criticise and give alternative

unsolicited opinions on ratings – see Article 5.8. Structured bonds, discussed in
the article, have special individualised features to attract particular investors,
usually with derivative features, e.g. an option to gain from a rise in the stock
market, or bonds whose value derives from a collection of loans or other bonds
(for more on securitisation see Chapters 15 and 16).
Article 5.8
Doubts raised over rating agency

reform
By Tracy Alloway and Christopher Thompson

On a Friday night in New York City, the block around the Westin Hotel near Times
Square heaves with activity. Throngs of tourists head for dinner at Sardi’s, or to the
St James Theatre for an evening showing of the musical ‘Bullets over Broadway’.
On Wall Street, bullets of a very different sort are flying. And, here too, the Westin
is in the thick of the action.
Fitch, one of three big rating agencies, this week criticised credit ratings given by its
competitors to a securitisation containing a loan secured by the Westin – the latest
instance of agencies sparring with each other over so-called structured finance deals.
Such deals bundle together a wide variety of loans into bonds that can be sold to
large fund managers who use the evaluations of credit rating agencies to help
inform their investment decisions.
Typically, these opinions are paid for by the financial firms that create the deals.
But, since the financial crisis, regulators have encouraged credit rating agencies to
give ‘unsolicited’ opinions on deals that they are not hired to evaluate, as part of an
effort to avoid the ‘ratings shopping’ that proliferated before 2008.
However, as the rating agencies trade public barbs amid a resurgence of certain
types of structured products, questions are being raised as to whether these
unsolicited opinions actually have much effect on investors’ thinking. And are the
banks that securitise loans simply taking their deals to the agencies likely to give
them the highest ratings?
‘You’re seeing them [the agencies] having to be vocal because there’s no other
visible ramification for their competitors being wrong,’ says Gene Phillips at PF2,
a structured finance consulting firm.
‘A preferable alternative is a system which says you can rate whatever you like
wherever you like but you will lose business as a result of being wrong.
Unfortunately that’s not happening. People aren’t choosing or aren’t able to choose
based on quality or ratings performance.’
➨
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In the aftermath of the crisis, when subprime mortgage securitisations turned out
to be anything but the pristine investments that their triple-A credit ratings
implied, regulators rushed to reform the agencies hired to evaluate such securities.
At the top of their list was encouraging the agencies to be more vocal about their
competitors’ ratings by publishing their own unsolicited opinions. To do so, they
created a special website for issuers to share deal data, so that competing agencies
could evaluate securitised products they were not formally hired to rate.
The idea was to help expose spurious ratings and encourage smaller agencies that
might help challenge the dominance of ‘the big three’ – Fitch Ratings, Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s.
Fitch’s criticism of Wells Fargo Commercial Mortgage Trust 2014-Tish, which
includes a $210m loan secured by the Westin Hotel, is the most recent example of
a rating agency publishing an unsolicited commentary. ‘Fitch believes a number
of recently issued large loan transactions have debt levels that are inconsistent
with the ratings assigned,’ the agency’s analysts wrote in the commentary.
Larger credit rating agencies, in particular Fitch, have been among the most
prolific when it comes to issuing unsolicited opinions. Smaller groups such as Kroll
and Morningstar have not published any unsolicited ratings or commentaries,
according to their respective spokespeople.
‘We believe that [publishing unsolicited commentaries] will enhance our credibility
with investors and they will encourage issuers to use Fitch more frequently,’ says
Kevin Duignan, global head of securitisation and covered bonds at Fitch. ‘We think
that’s healthy.’
But, while the competition between rating agencies to issue unsolicited opinions
has heated up, it appears to have had little impact on the behaviour of investors
or issuers, say market participants. ‘They [the rating agencies] have been sidelined
by US regulation so they could be just fighting each other in a shrinking market.
I would expect some laundry cleaning in public,’ said a securitisation banker.
Indeed, there are rumblings of a return of ratings shopping – the pre-crisis practice
where issuers would sound out rating agencies for their initial feedback on a deal,
and then hire the agency that offered the best possible designation.
When Moody’s criticised a residential mortgage-backed security in 2011, for
instance, the company that created the deal simply decided to use Fitch’s ratings
instead. ‘The sponsor disagreed with Moody’s preliminary assessment of the risks
attributable to the mortgage loans,’ the prospectus for the deal read.
Fitch says it was asked to provide initial feedback on the CMBS backed by the
Westin loan and determined that it would have rated the safest slice of the deal AA,
and would not have rated some of the riskier pieces of the deal at all. S&P and
Morningstar rated the top slice of the deal triple-A. Says Mr Duignan: ‘Unsolicited
commentaries may not be the best solution but they are a far better solution than
remaining silent.’
Source: Alloway, T. and Thompson, C. (2014) Doubts raised over rating agency reform,
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A major debate is whether the investing institutions rather than the borrowers
should pay for ratings. After all, they would be the beneficiaries of a more
robust examination of the likelihood of default without the, supposed, taint-
ing of the potential conflict of interest arising from the examinee paying – a
case of he who pays the piper calling the tune, it is alleged. The CRAs retort that
they live and die by their reputations; they cannot be seen to be anything less
than objective and impartial. Also, with lenders paying, they might decide
not to publicise the rating they pay for; lack of public information could result
in distortion of trading in the market or duplication of rating assessments.
Egan-Jones is an example of a CRA paid by bond investors, but remains a
minnow, with 95–97% of ratings conducted by S&P, Moody’s or Fitch. Despite
this dominance, new rating agencies are springing up to challenge the big
three – see Article 5.9.
Article 5.9
Scope Ratings aims to shake up

hegemony
By Patrick Jenkins

A new pan-European rating agency is expanding from modest German roots with
an ambition to challenge established names such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s.
Scope Ratings, a family-owned company based in Berlin, will on Tuesday open a
London office, with a focus on banks.
The London operation will be headed by Sam Theodore, formerly head of European
bank ratings at Moody’s and more recently a regulator first with the UK’s Financial
Services Authority and latterly with the European Banking Authority.
The move comes in the same week that another German ratings initiative, by
a non-profit arm of the Bertelsmann media group, got under way. On Monday,
the Financial Times reported that the Bertelsmann Foundation’s International
Non-profit Credit Rating Agency (Incra) had initiated its coverage of US govern-
ment debt with a AA+ rating.
The established Big Three of the ratings world have been widely criticised for
failing to spot the warning signs that led to the financial crisis and for being slow
in reforming their methodologies to reflect the post-crisis world.
Scope believes its fresh start in rating the banking industry will allow it to take
a less formulaic approach. Mr Theodore and his team will incorporate more
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qualitative analysis of business models and relations with regulators alongside

regulator-style stress-testing of loan portfolios and capital strength.
The agency has no plans to move into sovereign ratings and sees its pan-European
role as sharply focused on banks for the time being. It has ambitions to rate 50 to 60
mostly large European lenders over the next 18 months.
A third German ratings initiative – from the consultancy Roland Berger – remains
in the planning stage, though company insiders said the project was progressing.
Source: Jenkins, P. (2013) Scope Ratings aims to shake up hegemony, Financial Times,
15 April.
Bond default rates

Table 5.5 and Figure 5.1 show research from Fitch, detailing the proportion of
corporate finance bonds that have defaulted one, two, three, four, five and ten
years after issue over the period 1990–2013. Notice the large differences in
Table 5.5 Global corporate finance defaults 1990–2013
Rating 1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year 10-year
AAA 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA+ 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA 0 0 0.11 0.28 0.46 0.36
AA− 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.21
A+ 0 0.1 0.2 0.27 0.4 0.89
A 0.06 0.25 0.45 0.69 0.94 2.05
A− 0.17 0.31 0.46 0.57 0.74 2.53
BBB+ 0.13 0.28 0.51 0.82 1.16 2.39
BBB 0.09 0.64 1.29 1.97 2.58 4.79
BBB− 0.39 1.14 1.89 2.66 3.6 7.54
BB+ 0.92 2.62 4.17 5.71 7.13 10.15
BB 0.79 2.84 4.55 6.36 7.69 13.78
BB− 1.59 2.6 4.08 5.08 6.01 9.19
B+ 1.01 3.65 6.08 7.83 9.04 10.12
B 2.28 5.11 8.2 11.52 14.24 13.97
B− 2.63 4.92 6.16 7.42 9.19 10.19
CCC to C 23.51 31.48 34.96 37.01 39.58 39.54
Investment grade 0.11 0.35 0.61 0.88 1.17 2.27
Speculative grade 2.88 5.33 7.38 9.16 10.7 13.38
All corporate finance 0.73 1.43 2.04 2.59 3.07 4.07
Source: Data from Fitch – Credit Market Research Report
www.fitchratings.com/web_content/nrsro/nav/NRSRO_Exhibit-1.pdf
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Figure 5.1 Global corporate finance issuer default rates

Source: Data from Fitch – Credit Market Research Report www.fitchratings.com/web_content/nrsro/nav/
NRSRO_Exhibit-1.pdf
default rates between the ratings. After five years only 0.46% of AA bonds had
defaulted, whereas 14.24% of B bonds had defaulted.
When examining data on default rates it is important to appreciate that default

is a wide-ranging term and could refer to any number of events, from a missed
payment to liquidation. For some of these events all is lost from the investor’s
perspective. For other events a very high percentage, if not all, of the interest
and principal is recovered. Hickman (1958)1 observed that defaulted publicly
held and traded bonds tended to sell for about 40 cents on the dollar.
This average recovery rate rule of thumb seems to have held over time – in
approximate terms – with senior secured bank loans returning roughly 60%
and subordinated bonds less than 30%. But the average disguises a wide
variety, with many defaulted bonds offering nothing and others giving a
recovery of 80% or more.
1
Hickman, W.B. (1958) ‘Corporate bond quality and investor experience’, National Bureau
of Economic Research, 14, Princeton.
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CHAPTER 6
HIGH-YIELD AND HYBRID
BONDS
High-yield (junk) bonds

High-yield bonds are debt instruments offering a high return with a high risk.
Credit ratings of less than Baa3 or BBB− are non-investment and are often
labelled as ‘junk’. They may be either unsecured or secured but rank behind
senior loans and bonds. This type of debt generally offers interest rates 2–9
percentage points more than that on senior debt and frequently gives the
lenders some right to a share in equity values should the firm perform well.
This kind of finance ranks for payment below straight debt but above equity –
it is thus described alternatively as subordinated, intermediate or low grade.
With the prevalence of continued low interest rates investors have been seek-
ing securities that pay higher returns and this demand has fuelled the increase
in the issuance of junk bonds – see Article 6.1.
Article 6.1
Triple C bond sales hit record high

By Vivianne Rodrigues

Global borrowers with weaker credit quality are taking advantage of investors’
relentless search for higher yields to sell a record amount of bonds so far in 2013.
Intelsat, the world’s largest satellite-services company, the US casino owner
Caesars Entertainment and the luxury chain Neiman Marcus have been among the
low-rated borrowers to have sold a combined $38.1bn debt this year, according to
Dealogic. That amount surpassed the previous record of $37bn for the whole of 2012.
Bonds with the lowest possible credit ratings have soared in popularity with inves-
tors, who have been diverted from top tier government and corporate debt where
central banks are suppressing interest rates.
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Heavy buying has pushed down the average yield on triple C rated bonds to 7.75%
from 9.80% a year ago, significantly cutting the compensation that investors
receive for the higher risk of default.
Michael Collins, a senior investment officer for Prudential Fixed Income, said the
risk-return equation involving very low rated bonds is now ‘asymmetric’.
‘Investors are not being fully compensated for holding some of these bonds.’
The demand for yield has become the big driver of investor behaviour as they
downplay high valuations for junk bonds.
The gamble for investors is that as long as the Fed keeps on trying to suppress
interest rates, and as long as corporate default rates – currently 2.3% per year –
remain below historical norms, the prospect of losses is limited.
But the risks are twofold: a general rise in rates could cause investors to abandon
risky overpriced assets, while weaker economic growth or falling lending stand-
ards could cause a spike in defaults.
‘Easy money has pushed investors to take more and more risk,’ said Sabur Moini,
a high-yield bond portfolio manager at Payden & Rygel.
‘A severe downturn in the US economy and a freeze in the high-yield market is a
potential big risk. But investors can make the argument that, from a perspective
on margins and cash flow, the average company is healthier now than it was five
years ago.’
Total returns on this tier of the junk bond market have been higher than nearly all
fixed-income asset classes this year and now stand at 11.6%, according to Barclays
data.
That compares with returns of 5.9% on junk bonds as a whole and a negative return
of 2.2% on investment grade corporate debt.
While top tier corporate bonds are rated on the basis of an investor being repaid
their principle with interest, the assumption behind junk debt is that the company
could at some point default on its obligations.
Source: Rodrigues, V. (2013) Triple C bond sales hit record high, Financial Times,
15 November.
One of the major attractions of this form of finance for the investor is that it
often comes with equity warrants or share options attached, which can be
used to obtain shares in the firm – this is known as an equity kicker. These
may be triggered by an event taking place, such as the firm joining the stock
market. They give the right but not the obligation to buy shares at a fixed price
in the future. If this is at, say, £1 per share and the firm performs well, resulting
in the share rising to, say, £5, the warrant or option holders can make high
returns.
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6 HIGH-YIELD AND HYBRID BONDS 177
Bonds with high-risk and high-return characteristics may well have started as
apparently safe investments but have now become more risky (fallen angels)
– see Article 6.2 for an example – or they may be bonds issued specifically
to provide higher-risk financial instruments for investors who are looking
for a higher return and are willing to accept the accompanying higher risk
(original-issue high-yield bonds). This latter type began its rise to promin-
ence in the US in the 1980s and is now a market with more than $130 billion
issued per year. The rise of the US junk bond market meant that no business was
safe from the threat of takeover, however large – see Box 6.1 on Michael
Milken.
Article 6.2
Moody’s cuts Sony rating to junk

By Jennifer Thompson

Moody’s Investors Service has cut the credit rating of Sony to junk status saying
that the Japanese group’s profitability is likely to remain ‘weak and volatile’ until
the turnround of its television and personal computer businesses translates into
better earnings.
The credit rating agency on Monday downgraded Sony to Ba1, one level below
investment grade, from Baa3. Moody’s said the majority of the group’s consumer
electronics businesses, such as televisions, digital cameras and personal com-
puters, faced loss of technology leadership and increasing competition.
Fitch Ratings downgraded the credit rating of Sony to junk in 2012. Standard &
Poor’s rates Sony’s credit at BBB, or two notches above junk.
Like other Japanese electronics companies Sony is battling rivals Apple in the US
and South Korea’s Samsung, particularly in smartphone sales.
But unlike its peers Sharp and Panasonic, which lean more towards household
electronics, Sony faces a second dilemma: its focus on entertainment devices,
such as radios, digital cameras and televisions, mean that the success of one of its
divisions often comes at the expense of the other as smartphones become more
sophisticated.
‘The primary reason [for the downgrade] is intense competition and the shrinkage
in demand, the result in turn of cannibalisation caused by the rapid penetration of
smartphones,’ Moody’s said in a statement.
Source: Thompson. J. (2014) Moody’s cuts Sony rating to junk, Financial Times, 27 January.
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Box 6.1
The junk bond wizard: Michael Milken

While studying at Wharton Business School in the 1970s Michael Milken came to
the belief that the gap in interest rates between safe bonds and high-yield bonds
was excessive, given the relative risks. This created an opportunity for financial
institutions to make an acceptable return from junk bonds, given their risk level.
At the investment banking firm Drexel Burnham Lambert, Milken was able to
persuade a large body of institutional investors to supply finance to the junk bond
market as well as provide a service to corporations wishing to grow through the
use of junk bonds. Small firms were able to raise billions of dollars to take over large
US corporations. Many of these issuers of junk bonds had debt ratios of 90% and
above – for every $1 of share capital, $9 was borrowed. These gearing levels con-
cerned many in the financial markets. It was thought that companies were pushing
their luck too far and indeed many did collapse under the weight of their debt.
The market was dealt a particularly severe blow when Michael Milken was convicted,
sent to jail and ordered to pay $600 million in fines. Drexel was also convicted,
paid $650 million in fines and filed for bankruptcy in 1990.
The junk bond market was in a sorry state in the early 1990s, with high levels of
default and few new issues. However, it did not take long for the market to recover.
Issuers of high-yield bonds

High-yield bond finance is sometimes used when bank or senior bond borrow-
ing limits are reached and the firm cannot or will not issue more equity. Junk
bonds provide cheaper finance (in terms of required return) to the company
than would be available on the equity market and they allow the owners of a
business to raise large sums of money without sacrificing control because
bonds do not carry votes, whereas new equity usually assigns votes over key
company matters, so selling shares to outsiders would mean lower percentage
control over the company for existing shareholders.
Senior lenders to a firm (e.g. banks and bond holders) usually impose limits on
the senior debt to equity ratio. However, subordinated debt might be accept-
able to senior bond holders and equity holders alike. Thus, junk bonds are a
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form of finance that permits the firm to move beyond what is normally consid-
ered an acceptable debt:equity ratio (financial gearing, leverage levels). This
might be useful for rapid company expansion.
High-yield bonds have been employed by firms ‘gearing themselves up’ to

finance merger activity by raising cash to pay for the target’s shares. They are
also useful for leveraged recapitalisations. For instance, a firm might have
run into trouble, defaulted and its assets are now under the control of a group
of creditors, including bankers and bond holders. One way to allow the business
to continue would be to persuade the creditors to accept alternative financial
securities in place of their debt securities to bring the leverage to a reasonable
level. They might be prepared to accept a mixture of shares and high-yield bonds.
The bonds permit the holders to receive high interest rates in recognition of
the riskiness of the firm, and they open up the possibility of an exceptionally
high return from warrants or share options should the firm get back to a
growth path. The alternative for the lenders may be a return of only a few
pence in the pound from the immediate liquidation of the firm’s assets.
Junk bond borrowing usually leads to high debt levels, resulting in a high
fixed-cost imposition on the firm. This can be a dangerous way of financing
expansion and therefore the use of these types of finance has been criticised.
Yet some commentators have praised the way in which high gearing and large
annual interest payments have focused the minds of managers and engen-
dered extraordinary performance. Also, without this finance, many takeovers,
buyouts and financial restructurings could not take place.
Market price movements

Investment-grade bond prices and returns tend to move in line with govern-
ment bond interest rates, influenced mainly by perceptions of future inflation
rather than the risk of default. Junk bond prices (and their yields), meanwhile,
are much more related to the prospects for the company’s trading fundamen-
tals because the company needs to thrive if it is to cope with the high debt and
raised interest levels, and to cause the equity kicker to have some value. Thus
the factors that affect equity valuation also impact on junk bond valuations.1
1
For equity valuation you could consult Arnold, G. (2014) The Financial Times Guide to
Investing, 3rd edition, or, for more depth, the university textbook, Arnold, G. (2013)
Corporate Financial Management, 5th edition.
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As a result high-yield bonds are, in general, far more volatile than investment-
grade bonds, going up and down depending on expectations concerning the
company’s survival, strength and profitability. In 2009, for example, investors
were very risk averse, requiring yields of more than 20% for a typical euro
high-yield bond; in 2014 they lent ‘high-yield’ for less than a 5% return per
year, perceiving company business risk to be relatively low, lured by low recent
default rates and factoring in low inflation expectations.
Comparing US and European high-yield bond

markets
Historically, high-yield bonds have been much more popular in the US than in
Europe, but as the recovery from the financial crises takes hold, high-yield
bonds have grown in popularity in Europe (see Article 6.3) and now the
annual amounts raised are about the same, both more than €100 billion or
$130 billion. For Europe this is rapid growth for a market that started only in
1997 when the first high-yield bond denominated in a European currency was
issued: Geberit, a Swiss/UK manufacturer, raised DM157.5 million by selling
ten-year bonds offering an interest rate 423 basis points higher than on a ten-
year German government bond.
Article 6.3
European junk bonds hit a sweet

spot
By Andrew Bolger

Record issuance levels and a wall of money rushing into Europe’s high-yield bond
market suggests ‘junk’ is the place to be. Will it last?
More than $46bn of euro-denominated high-yield bonds – also labelled ‘sub invest-
ment grade’ or ‘junk’ – have already been issued this year. This is 50% more than
in the whole of 2012, and almost double the amount issued by the same stage last
year, according to Dealogic.
Christine Johnson, London-based head of fixed income at Old Mutual’s corporate
bond fund, says ‘Europe is in a sweet spot, growth is flat, or only gradually recovering,
➨
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so there is a “lower for longer” feeling about interest rates. Where is the place in
the world where you least expect interest rates to rise? It has got to be Europe.’
The high-yield market is also being driven by more fundamental shifts, such as
the need for European corporates to tap the bond markets for finance as capital-
constrained banks shrink their balance sheets by refusing to renew loans to
traditional customers.
Fraser Lundie, of Hermes Credit’s global high-yield bond fund, says 33% of
European high-yield bonds have come over the past year from companies that were
first-time issuers, whereas in the US the comparable figure was 5%.
‘It shows you where the US market is, and where the European market is going,’ he
says.
Mitch Reznick, at Hermes Credit, says that the size of the European high-yield
sector has trebled since 2008. The sector has also been boosted by ‘fallen angels’ –
companies that have slipped below investment grade – and a recent influx of small
companies.
Moody’s, the rating agency, says there has also been a flurry of small companies
issuing high-yield bonds for the first time, with six companies, each with core
annual earnings (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) of
less than $50m, raising a total of about $2bn.
Moody’s adds: ‘It is encouraging to see the success of these small companies in
issuing bonds at the bottom of the ratings spectrum. However, it remains to be seen
if this is a temporary consequence of investors’ search for yield, that will diminish
as interest rates rise.’
Increasingly, corporates are borrowing more, for longer and cheaper, which can
often mean poor value for the bond investor on the other side of that trade.
Paul Smith, corporate bond fund manager at Premier Asset Management, believes
that ‘For corporate issuers this can be an opportunity to lock in fixed-rate, long-
term capital before rates start to rise . . . which can often mean poor value for the
bond investor on the other side of that trade, although defaults will remain low for
the near-term.’
Ms Johnson sees potential dangers in bonds rated BB or Ba1 – the top end of the
high-yield market.
‘BB looks overbought, since it has been backed by investors who are not really high-
yield people, and could exit quickly. But single B and CCC bonds still offer 9% yields.
You’ve got to do your homework, but selectively there are still good opportunities.’
At Hermes, Mr Lundie argues that any shift in sentiment that spooks investors in
BB-rated bonds will also hit lower-rated issues. Part of his strategy is to focus on
bonds that have been issued in the past 12 months and now trade below face value.
He says: ‘High-yield bonds usually offer change-of-control put options that allow
investors to redeem at more than face value. This “optionality” further improves
the potential for returns from investing in bonds below face value.’
Source: Bolger, A. (2013) European bonds hit a sweet spot, Financial Times, 31 October.
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Covenant light and payment-in-kind notes

These are extreme forms of high-yield bonds. Covenant light (cov-lite,
covenant-lite) means that the covenants imposed on issuers are less onerous
than normal. Issuers can get away with eliminating the restrictiveness of many
of the usual covenants because investors are particularly keen to lend. This
may be because they are yield-hungry due to alternative investments offering
low yields relative to the covenant lights. Private equity houses often use such
bonds when they are taking over a company through a leveraged buyout, that
is, buying a company or part of a company using a large amount of debt and
little equity in the capital structure.
For bonds higher up the rating ladder the normal covenants are often put in
place to provide early warning signs of distress or threats to the collateral back-
ing, for example:
● the property assets of the issuer must remain greater than the debt
● the profits/cash flow must be a minimum multiple of the interest payments
● the piling on of more debt is prohibited
● no/low payouts to shareholders when debt is high.
If these are breached the lenders can request cash or a debt restructuring, where
they gain a powerful negotiating position. Covenant light legal structures
eliminate many of these safeguards. A further erosion of the lender’s position
is the shrinkage of the call protection: while there is typically a six-year non-
call period on standard bonds, this can be reduced to three years or less on
covenant light bonds. Critics point out that the absence of key covenants
makes them dangerous for the lenders – the lack of meaningful covenants
results in prudence going out of the window – see Article 6.4.
Companies have also increasingly been making use of payment in kind (PIK)
toggle notes where payments due to lenders can, at the option of the issuer, be
rolled over into a further debt; lenders can be paid with more debt (more PIK
toggle notes or other payments in kind such as equity) rather than cash. The
interest paid in additional notes is set at a higher rate than the cash interest
rate. During boom times for bonds when lenders are searching for higher yield,
which usually happens following a period of subdued default levels, these
instruments become a popular way for companies to finance leveraged buy-
outs. This exuberance was present in the run-up to the 2008 crisis and again in
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Article 6.4
Loan terms eased in search for yield

By Anne-Sylvaine Chassany

Ceva Santé Animale, a veterinary drug producer based in France’s Saint-Ěmilion
wine region, is tapping into increasingly generous credit markets.
A group of banks including Goldman Sachs and Nomura have agreed to lend nearly
€1bn to the private equity-backed company without requesting the typical creditor
protections attached to highly indebted borrowers. It is one of the largest ‘covenant
light’ financings arranged for a European company this year.
The loan package, which the banks are marketing on both sides of the Atlantic,
highlights the way that credit markets have become more accommodating of
European companies, as institutional investors snap up riskier debt securities and
abandon protective clauses in their hunt for yields.
European private equity-backed companies have mostly tapped US investors for

loans rather than their region’s investors, who have historically demonstrated a
greater resistance to ‘cov-lite’ loans.
But volumes are also picking up in the region. Nearly €8bn in euro-denominated
loans of this type were issued last year. Dollar-denominated covenant light loans to
US and European companies reached a record $260bn in 2013, or 57% of the total
volume, and 69% more than in 2007.
‘Covenants are being dropped, lenders’ arranging fees are going down, interest
margins are going down, the amount of debt you can borrow is going up – it’s a
great time to be a borrower,’ says William Allen, a partner at Marlborough,
London-based debt adviser. ‘There simply isn’t enough paper to satisfy investors’
demand and European investors wanting to invest in European loans are having to
accept increasingly loose terms.’
Ceva’s financing, which will comprise a euro tranche and a dollar tranche, has
features that became common at the peak of the credit bubble in 2007. The com-
pany, which has taken the unusual step of issuing a new financing before starting
a competitive process to sell a stake, will not have to comply with debt-to-earning
ratios every quarter during the entire seven-year maturity of the loan.
It will not have to pay down any principal amount before the very end, and will be
able to roll over interest payments into debt instead of paying them for about a
quarter of the package (in a so-called ‘payment in kind’ debt). ‘It’s a dream for
Ceva,’ a person close to the deal said.
It’s not a dream for the debt holders, however, according to Jon Moulton, the
British veteran private equity executive. ‘Cov-lites are pretty dangerous pieces of
paper for those who advance the loan.’
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Ceva’s creditors will not be able to request a debt restructuring or a cash injection
from the company’s shareholders in case its creditworthiness deteriorates. This is
despite the fact that Ceva’s total debt will equal up to 7.5 times its earnings before
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, a level reminiscent of the leveraged
buyout boom.
Buoyant credit markets are also translating into higher amounts of debt in LBOs,
which have increased in Europe and in the US to near the 2007 all time highs of six
times ebitda on average, according to S&P.
While the Bank of England and the European Central Bank have not yet raised the
alarm, they are starting to take an interest in the matter, in the wake of the US
regulators, including the Federal Reserve, being concerned about ‘deteriorating
underwriting practices’.
‘Private equity is its own worst enemy when it comes to leverage,’ said Neil
MacDougall, managing partner of Silverfleet, a London-based private equity group.
‘As an industry, we’ll just use it to maximise prices.’
Source: Chassany, A.-S. (2014) Loan terms eased in search for yield, Financial Times,
23 March.
2013–2014 when investment-grade debt gave very low interest rates. PIKs can
give yields in double figures, but that ‘yield’ may be in the form of more bonds
Article 6.5
Pre-crisis debt products make

comeback
By Vivianne Rodrigues and Tracy Alloway

Risky lending practices that were a hallmark of the boom years before the financial
crisis are staging a comeback in the US as companies take advantage of investor
hunger for higher returns.
The issuance of payment-in-kind toggle notes, which give a company the option to
pay lenders with more debt rather than cash in times of squeezed finances has
surged in recent months.
➨
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The esoteric debt structures last gained prominence during the leveraged buyout
boom that defined the 2006–2007 credit bubble, and their return has raised concerns
that markets could once again be overheating.
PIK note issuance has taken off in the past month, with deals from luxury retailer
Neiman Marcus, drive-through burger joint Checkers & Rally’s, and Ancestry.com,
pushing the amount sold so far this year to $9.2bn, according to S&P LCD
[Leveraged Commentary and Data]. That is the highest volume since 2008, when
$13.4bn worth of PIK notes were sold.
A wave of junk-rated borrowers, including Michaels Stores, the chain of arts and
crafts shops, and CommScope, a maker of communications cable equipment, have
also included PIK structures as part of new bond deals earlier this year.
PIK-toggles were widely criticised for fuelling the bubble in cheap credit before the
crisis. About 32% of the companies that issued PIK bonds during the bubble era
defaulted at some point from 2008 to mid-2013, according to Moody’s, although the
rating agency says the outlook for today’s issuers is less bleak.
‘PIK structures are back,’ said Lenny Ajzenman, senior vice-president at Moody’s.
‘It has become easier for companies to issue such notes given lower borrowing costs
and use the proceeds to fund dividend payments to shareholders. And with the low
yields in debt markets, investors are snapping up all these notes.’
Bankers say the intense demand for higher-yielding bonds and loans has made
selling such assets much easier in recent years.
Source: Rodrigues, V. and Alloway, T. (2013) Pre-crisis debt products make comeback,
Financial Times, 22 October.
PIKs relieve the company of making cash payments, but regularly add to the
amount of debt, which can then become excessive and cause problems, as it
did for the fashion company New Look – see Article 6.6.
Article 6.6
New Look launches £800m bond to

grasp debt nettle
By Duncan Robinson and Anne-Sylvaine Chassany

New Look has launched an £800m bond offering to repay part of a loan that rolls up
interest as extra debt and was blamed for scuppering the fashion retailer’s aborted
initial public offering in 2010.
➨
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The cash raised will be used to pay off half of the £746m in payment-in-kind notes
that accounted for the bulk of the private equity-owned retailer’s £1.1bn net debt.
The remaining PIK notes were due to mature in 2015, but will now not do so until
2018, giving vital breathing space to new chief executive Anders Kristiansen, who
took over the business late last year.
New Look, owned by private equity groups Apax and Permira, will pay a coupon of
12% on the new payment-in-kind notes, compared to 9% plus Libor the retailer had
paid previously.
‘People were expecting the keys to be handed over to the payment-in-kind holders
in 2015,’ said one person familiar with the situation. The £425m left over from the
bond will – along with some of the group’s cash – refinance the retailer’s remaining
senior debt.
The move comes three years after New Look scrapped a planned £650m IPO as
potential investors raised questions about the low-cost fashion retailer’s debt.
Annual interest costs on the debt, which came to slightly more than £100m in 2012,
have since hindered the group’s profitability.
New Look, founded in 1969, has more than 1,000 stores globally. In 2012, it had
revenues of £1.5bn and adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and
amortisation of £198m. Late last year, New Look was forced to beat off suggestions
that it was close to going into administration and wrote to suppliers to reassure
them of its financial strength.
Source: Robinson, D. and Chassany, A.-S. (2013) New Look launches £800m bond to grasp
debt nettle, Financial Times, 26 April.
Hybrid securities
Convertible bonds
Convertible bonds (or convertible loan stocks, or converts, or CBs), like
other hybrids, combine a debt security element and an equity element.
Convertible bonds carry a rate of interest in the same way as ordinary bonds,
but they also give the holder the right to exchange the bonds at some stage in
the future into ordinary shares according to some prearranged formula.2 The
owner of these bonds is not obliged to exercise this right of conversion and so
the bonds may continue until redemption as an interest-bearing instrument.
2
Alternatively they may be convertible into preference (preferred) shares.
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They are not particularly popular in the UK, but in the US and some other parts
of the world they form a significant percentage of securities, and issuance has
risen as investors seek the better returns that may come from the link to equity
Article 6.7
Rate rise fears spark boom in

convertible bonds
By Michael Stothard and Arash Massoudi

Demand for convertible bonds is expanding sharply as fears of rising rates have hit
prices in traditional debt markets, while at the same time equity markets are
bouncing to record highs.
The convertible bond acts as a powerful weapon for investors looking to get the
potential upside of the equity markets while staying within the more cautious
realm of fixed income.
A convertible bond is essentially a low yielding corporate debt issue with an
attached equity option. If the share price of the company rises past a fixed point,
the investor benefits. If it falls, the investor still has the yield from the debt.
These features – in a market where shares have been rising but bonds falling in
recent months – have bolstered demand, with a record-breaking net inflow into
convertible bond funds of $4.8bn in the past six months, according to EPFR.
This follows three-and-a-half years of outflows from the asset class, and the net
figure is 36 times larger than the previous record half-year inflow back in 2009. The
boom reflects investors’ bets that improving economic conditions will be good for
equities, while pushing interest rates up from near-zero levels and putting pressure
on the price of regular bonds.
Traditional hedge funds, which dominated the market with very leveraged bets
before the financial crisis, have been edging back into the game. BlueMountain
Capital Management, a $13bn hedge fund, launched a convertibles desk last year.
The big managers have been buying as well. ‘It has been a great year for the asset
class,’ says Leonard Vinville, manager of the M&G Global Convertibles Fund,
whose assets under management have grown 50% this year.
‘People want to have exposure to equities, but they also want a degree of protection
on the downside if equities fall or if the wider markets start to see a lot more
volatility.’
➨
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Those bets have paid off, at least compared with pure fixed-income investments.
Convertible bonds have returned 12.8% this year, compared with 3.2% for high
yield and a loss of 3% for investment grade debt.
The strong demand has prompted companies to take advantage of the instruments
as a source of cheap and flexible financing. Companies around the world raised
$48bn in the first half of the year.
And it is not just the traditional unrated companies in the technology or bio-
technology sector – which struggle to get normal bond market funding – that are
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borrowing. ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steelmaker, raised $2.2bn through a

convertible bond while Volkswagen raised $1.6bn.
Terms for many of these deals have been attractive for issuers. Online travel com-
pany Priceline.com was able to raise nearly $1bn in seven-year debt in May with a
coupon of just 35 basis points, alongside an option premium of 66%.
‘Given the ultra-low pricing issuers can get on convertible bonds right now, lots of
blue-chip companies are looking to tap the market as well as smaller ones,’ says
Klaus Hessberger of JPMorgan.
The greatest danger looming for investors in convertible bonds is really share
prices going down substantially. Many convertible bonds trade in close alignment
to equity, and so can be hit in a downturn more than regular fixed income.
‘The option element does mitigate the risk, but convertible bonds will typically
fall when equity markets fall,’ says Mark Wright, a fund manager at Miton Group.
‘That is our biggest worry.’
Source: Stothard, M. and Massoudi, A. (2013) Rate rise fears spark boom in convertible
bonds, Financial Times, 19 July.
The conversion price can vary from as little as 10% to over 65% greater than
the share price at the date of the bond issuance. So, if a £100 bond offered the
right to convert to 40 ordinary shares, the conversion price would be £2.50
(that is £100 ÷ 40), which, if the market price of the shares is £2.20, would be a
conversion premium of 30p divided by £2.20, which equals 13.6%. The right
to convert may be for a specific date or several specific dates over, say, a four-
year period, or any time between two dates. The company may have the option
to redeem the bonds before maturity.
Case study
Ford Motor Co
The Ford Motor Co issued 30-year convertible bonds in 2006, raising $4.5 billion.
The bonds were sold at a premium of 25% above the share price at the time of
$7.36. That is, the conversion price was at $9.20 per share. The bonds will mature
in 2036 if they have not been converted before this and were issued at a par value
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of $1,000. The coupon was set at 4.25%. They are non-callable for the first ten
years. From this information we can calculate the conversion ratio:
Nominal par value of bond $1,000

Conversion ratio = = = 108.6957 shares
Conversion price $9.20
Each bond carries the right to convert to 108.6957 shares, which is equivalent to
paying $9.20 for each share at the $1,000 par value of the bond.
In November 2010 Ford, desperate to reduce its corporate debt and try to regain
a better credit rating (move up to investment grade), after having had its commer-
cial paper downgraded in 2005, persuaded holders of $1.9 billion of convertibles
(this issue together with some other convertibles due for redemption in 2016) to
swap debt for shares in the company. Ford gave the holders of the 2036 convert-
ibles 108.6957 shares plus a cash payment equal to $190 for every $1,000 in
principal amount, along with accrued and unpaid interest.
Box 6.2
Technical terms for convertibles

Conversion ratio
This gives the number of ordinary shares into which a convertible bond may be
converted:
Nominal ( par ) value of bond

Conversion ratio =
Conversion price
Conversion price
This gives the price of each ordinary share obtainable by exchanging a convertible
bond:
Nominal ( par ) value of bond

Conversion price =
Number of shares int o which bond may be converted
Conversion premium
This gives the difference between the conversion price and the market share price,
expressed as a percentage:
Conversion price – Market share price

Conversion premium = × 100
Market share price
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The length of time to maturity affects the conversion premium: the longer it is, the
greater likelihood the share will rise above the conversion price and therefore the
more an investor will pay for the option to convert.
Conversion value
This is the value of a convertible bond if it were converted into ordinary shares at
the current share price:
Conversion value = Current share price × Conversion ratio
The value of a convertible bond (a type of equity-linked bond) could be

analysed as a ‘debt portion’, which depends on the discounted value of the
coupons and principal, and an ‘equity portion’, where the right to convert is
an equity option. Generally, the value is strongly influenced by the equity
option value, which rises or falls with the market value of ordinary shares, at a
lower percentage rate. They can therefore be quite volatile. But convertibles
with large conversion premiums trade much like ordinary bonds because the
option to convert is not a strong feature in their pricing. They are therefore less
volatile and offer higher yields.
A convertible bond has two values forming lower bounds through which it
should not fall: (1) it must sell for more than its conversion value, otherwise an
arbitrageur could buy bonds and immediately convert them to shares, selling
the shares, making a quick low-risk profit; (2) the value as a straight bond
(ignoring the conversion option) (see Chapter 13 for such valuations). When
the share price is low, the straight bond value is the effective lower bound, with
the conversion option having little impact. When the share price is high, the
bond’s price is overwhelming driven by the conversion value.
To illustrate convertible bond price movements consider the Ford bond selling
at $1,000, which can be converted to 108.6957 shares at $9.20 per share when
shares are currently trading at $7.36:
1 If you bought shares and then they double to $14.72 you would make 100%
return.
2 If, instead, you bought a convertible for $1,000 and shares double your
return will be 60% (the convertible rises to 108.6957 × $14.72 = $1,600). The
lower return than in (1) is due to you effectively paying $9.20 per share
rather than $7.36. In reality, the value of the convertible would be slightly
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higher than this because it will tend to trade at a slight premium to its con-
version value (it still has the safety feature of the straight debt, and a timing
option on the conversion).
3 Conversely, if the share price falls, say, to $5 and you made a pure share
investment, you will be down by 32%, that is $2.36/$7.36. The conversion
value on the bond falls from $800 to $5 × 108.6957 = $543.4785.
4 However, its price does not go down that low because the minimum price is
the greater of its conversion value or its value as straight debt. Assuming the
value of comparable straight debt is $750 given current yields to redemption
in the bond markets, the convertible will fall by a maximum of only 25%.
Again, it is very likely to trade at more than this, a premium to its straight
value, because the conversion right is still in place, even though conversion
has become a more distant prospect. Thus a convertible offers the benefit of
a reduced downside risk compared with equity, but also a reduced upside
potential because the premium per share is paid.
5 Of course, if the share price is constant but market-determined redemption
yields rise, then the value of the convertible will fall, as will its floor, being
determined by its value as straight debt.
6 If the credit rating of Ford deteriorates, then the convertible price will fall, as
will the straight-debt floor level.
If the share price rises above the conversion price, investors may choose to
exercise the option to convert if they anticipate that the share price will at least
be maintained and the dividend yield is higher than the convertible bond
yield. If the share price rise is seen to be temporary, the investor may wish to
hold on to the bond. If the share price remains below the conversion price, the
value of the convertible will be the same as a straight bond at maturity.
Advantages for investors of convertibles

1 Investors are able to wait and see how the share price moves before investing
in equity. They may take advantage of the upside.
2 In the near term there is greater security for their principal compared
with equity investment, and the annual coupon is usually higher than the
dividend yield.
3 For companies that do not pay dividends the investor can gain a regular
income stream through a convertible and then (possibly) make a capital
gain via conversion.
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Disadvantages for investors of convertibles

1 The yield on the bond will be less than on a comparable straight bond. If the
option value never materialises because the share does not appreciate, the
holder may regret choosing a convertible over a vanilla bond.
2 There is a greater risk of default than for ordinary bonds because they are
usually subordinated – down the pecking order upon administration and
liquidation than most other bonds, but above equity.
3 Interest rate risk (see Chapters 4 and 13) is greater because the fixed interest
rate offered is lower than for vanilla bonds; thus an increase in market inter-
est rates causes a greater decline in price in the convertible compared with
the non-convertible. This problem may be compounded if general market
interest rate rises are accompanied by declines in the equity market reducing
the chance of the share price rising above the conversion price and the bond
being converted.
4 The bonds might be called by the company to the detriment of the holder,
i.e. when the price has risen above the call rate.
5 Disadvantage for share owners: conversion of these bonds into shares may
have the effect of diluting the value of individual shares – there is an increase
in the number of shares as more are created, but not necessarily any increase
in the profits/value of the company.
Advantages to the issuing company of selling convertible bonds

1 Lower interest than on a similar debenture. The fact that a firm can ask investors
to accept a lower interest rate because the investor values the right to con-
version was a valuable feature for many dot.com companies when they were
starting out, e.g. Amazon and AOL could pay 5–6% on convertibles – less
than half the amount they would have had to pay on vanilla bonds. Great
Portland issued a convertible offering a coupon of only 1% – see Article 6.8.
2 The interest is tax deductible. Because convertible bonds are a form of debt,
the coupon payment can be regarded as a cost of the business and can there-
fore be used to reduce taxable profit.
3 Self-liquidating. When the share price reaches a level at which conversion
is worthwhile the bonds will (normally) be exchanged for shares so the
company does not have to find cash to pay off the loan principal – it simply
issues more shares. This has obvious cash flow benefits. However, the dis-
advantage is that the other equity holders may experience a reduction in
earnings per share and dilution of voting rights.
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Article 6.8
Great Portland strikes with

convertible bond
By Ed Hammond

Great Portland Estates has underscored the strength of demand for London prop-
erty by issuing one of the lowest-paying convertible bonds in UK history.
On Tuesday, the group, which specialises in developing and owning real estate
in London’s West End, announced the final terms of £150m-worth of five-year
unsecured convertible loan notes, and said the annual interest payment, or coupon,
for holders would be 1%. This compares with an average coupon of about 5% for
bonds issued by European property companies last year.
Great Portland set the initial conversion price – at which the bonds may be con-
verted into equities – at £7.145 per share, representing a premium of 35% to the
average market price of its shares during the bookbuilding.
Source: Hammond, E. (2013) Great Portland strikes with convertible bond, Financial Times,
3 September.
4 Fewer restrictive covenants. The directors have greater operating and financial
flexibility than they would with a secured debenture. Investors accept that
a convertible is a hybrid between debt and equity finance and do not tend
to ask for high-level security (they are usually unsecured and subordinated)
or strong restrictions on managerial action or insist on strict financial ratio
boundaries. Many Silicon Valley companies with little more than a web
portal and a brand have used convertibles because of the absence of a need
to provide collateral or stick to asset:borrowing ratios.
5 Underpriced shares. A company that wishes to raise equity finance over the
medium term, but judges that the stock market is temporarily underpricing
its shares, may turn to convertible bonds. If the firm does perform as the
managers expect and the share price rises, the convertible will be exchanged
for equity.
6 Cheap way to issue shares. Managers tend to favour convertibles as an inex-
pensive way to issue ‘delayed’ equity. Equity is raised at a later date without
the high costs of rights issues, etc.
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7 Available finance when straight debt and equity are not available. Some firms
locked out of the equity markets (e.g. because of poor recent performance)
and the straight debt markets (because of high levels of indebtedness) may
still be able to raise money in the convertible market. Rating agencies treat
them as part bond, part equity, usually half-and-half,3 thus their issue does
not impact leverage levels as much as vanilla debt for assessments such as
default ratings, making downgrades less likely.
Note that a bond’s conversion price will be adjusted for corporate actions such
as share splits (say doubling the number of shares by simply giving existing
shareholders one extra share for each one currently held), rights issues (share-
holders buying more shares from the firm) and stock dividends (shares issued
as an alternative to a cash dividend).
Some variations
A variation on the convertible idea is to have rising conversion prices, e.g. £3
in the first three years, £4 for the next five years, and so on. These are known as
step-up convertibles. Obviously, with these the bond converts to fewer shares
over time. Another variation is the zero coupon convertible bond, issued at a
discount to par value. Going further we can have the zero coupon convertible
bond, which is both issued and redeemed at par, i.e. there is no capital gain to
make up for the lack of coupons (a par-priced zero coupon convertible). Here
the investor is expecting the equity value to rise, but has an element of capital
protection through the issuer’s promise to repay at par. Yet another possibility
is a variable-coupon bond, which can be converted into a fixed-interest rate
bond – useful if you can judge when interest rates have reached a peak because
you can convert and lock in high interest rates.
The bonds sold may give the right to conversion into shares not of the issuers
but of another company held by the issuer. Note that the term exchangeable
bond is probably more appropriate in these cases.
Contingent convertible bonds (cocos)

Cocos are convertible bonds which give the investor the right to convert to
equity if a pre-specified ‘contingency’ occurs, such as the share price exceeding
3
But sub-investment-grade issuers often do not qualify for the 50% equity treatment.
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a specified value for a specified amount of time. The coco market really got
going in the mid-2000s when a number of, particularly US, companies issued
bonds which were convertible into shares only once the share price moved
beyond a threshold (set even higher than the strike price for the convertible).
This type is known as an upside contingent bond.
Also issued were downside contingent bonds which convert if a low thresh-
old is breached. This downside idea was extended following the financial crisis.
Banks needed to raise more reserve capital (the gap between what they owe
and what they own) as a buffer against running into difficulties. Banks tend
to run with tiny amounts of equity put into the business by the ultimate risk
takers, the shareholders. They might put up, say, 3% of the amount that the
bank owes to depositors and other creditors. If it loses more than 3% by, say,
making bad loans, then it will owe more than its assets, i.e. be insolvent.
The regulators insisted on a programme of gradual beefing-up of equity
buffers. Most banks have done this by selling more shares through, say, a rights
issue or by retaining more profit in the business rather than paying dividends.
However, some bankers thought they did not want to continue increasing the
amount of equity capital in the business and looked for alternatives. The main
instrument they adopted was the contingent convertible. Some banks opted
for the downside contingent bond, which forces the holder to convert to
shares automatically if the equity as a percentage of bank assets falls below a
pre-determined level (note: the holder has no choice). This boosts the buffer of
capital that will be subject to total loss if the bank has to be liquidated, thus
providing greater protection for depositors and other creditors to the bank.
In the jargon: it boosted the bank’s ‘Tier One capital’, reducing the odds of it
falling below the regulatory amount. (See Arnold, G. (2014) The Financial
Times Guide to Banking for more on bank solvency buffers.)
Some banks issued another type of bond to help cope with losses. The total
writedown bond (sudden death bond, total loss bond or wipeout coco) is
written off completely if the contingency occurs. Thus the bank eliminates a
portion of its debts and improves its leverage ratios. This is usually triggered by
the equity capital buffers falling below a trigger level approved by the country’s
financial regulator.
Because of the risks involved of losing the income from the original bond, or
losing the amount invested entirely, cocos pay a higher rate of return, up to 8%
at a time when interest rates in much of the world are less than 1%, and so hold
considerable attraction to investors – see Articles 6.9 and 6.10.
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Article 6.9
‘Sudden death’ bank bonds on the

increase
By Christopher Thompson and Tracy Alloway

Some call them ‘sudden death’ bonds; others talk about ‘wipeout’ bonds. Both refer
to the potential of some cocos, or contingent convertible bonds issued by banks, to
turn debt investors’ gold into lead. Either way, European banks are issuing them
in growing numbers despite mounting criticism that they discriminate against
investors.
As regulators encourage banks to hold more capital where investors would take
losses if a bank defaults, cocos are seen as a relatively quick fix when it comes to
bolstering tier one capital ratios.
Tier one capital, a key regulatory measure of financial health, is considered the
safest portion of a bank’s capital and traditionally comprises common equity and
retained earnings.
There have been two types of coco to date: those which convert into equity when a
bank’s capital ratio falls below a pre-agreed trigger and those which are written off
entirely.
It is the latter that are proving controversial – and increasingly popular.
‘The bank doesn’t have to default to trigger these cocos . . . the point is they can
push losses on to bondholders and provide capital while the bank is still a going
concern,’ says Jenna Barnard at Henderson.
Such criticism has not deterred the banks, particularly as demand has been buoyed
by wealthy Asians who can snap up cocos with borrowed money, bolstering their
returns.
Year to date global coco issuance stands at $8.5bn from eight deals, a record num-
ber, according to figures from Dealogic, all from European banks.
Keith Skeoch, chief executive of UK life company Standard Life, describes wipeout
cocos as ‘death-spiral bonds’. However, he says they have a role where ‘there is a
desperate need, particularly in the banking sector, for the provision of loss absorb-
ing capital’.
Barclays issued a $3bn death spiral coco last November and followed it up with
another $1bn issue in April. They yielded 7.6% and 7.7% respectively.
Earlier this month Credit Suisse issued its own $2.5bn wipeout coco, which yielded
6.5%, that followed a $1bn issue from Belgium’s KBC with an interest rate of
8%.
➨
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The Swiss bank said similar issues would follow, not least as it seeks to lock in
historically low interest rates and take advantage of investors’ hunger for rela-
tively high-yielding instruments.
It is why even coco critics, such as Ms Barnard, admit the asset class ‘will become
quite hard to ignore’.
Other banks are choosing to plot a middle path.
Société Générale is preparing what it refers to as a ‘write-down, write-up’ hybrid
bond in which investors would take losses if the bank’s tier one capital falls below
5.1%. However, if the bank recovers, bondholders would begin to get their money
back.
‘It’s not exactly a coco but it has a writedown mechanism . . . if the trigger is
reached only a proportion will be written down, depending on where the capital
ratio of the bank stands,’ says Stéphane Landon, Société Générale’s head of asset
and liability management. ‘If the bank gets better this amount can be reinstated
and so the bond can be reinstated.’
In the US, a more restrictive definition of regulatory capital effectively prevents US
banks from including cocos in their tier one buffers.
US regulators are said to have been scarred by their experience during the financial
crisis with other types of hybrid bank instruments combining equity and debt char-
acteristics. Many of these hybrid products failed to absorb bank losses during the
financial crisis.
Source: Thompson, C. and Alloway, T. (2013) ‘Sudden death’ bank bonds on the increase,
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Article 6.10
Coco sell-off unveils high-yield

bargains
By Christopher Thompson

Is that the sound of the coco bubble going pop? Yield-hungry investors have had their
appetites sorely tested over the past few weeks as high-risk, high-return contingent
convertible bonds, or cocos, recorded their worst monthly performance to date.
Cocos are hybrid bonds which count towards a bank’s capital. Banks can issue cocos
up to the value of 1.5% of their risk-weighted assets under incoming Basel III rules.
‘Regulatory headwinds and Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s ruling that cocos will
no longer be eligible for high yield or investment grade indices, has led to a strong
sell off in the sector,’ says Armin Peter at UBS.
The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority earlier this month announced a ban on
retail investors buying cocos, which now constitute a €45bn market according to
RBS, albeit one dominated by institutions and hedge funds.
➨
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Some see the sell-off as restoring a measure of sobriety to what had become an
increasingly frenzied market whose gyrations were exacerbated in part due to fast-
money investors selling-out at the first sign of trouble.
The sell-off comes on the back of frantic coco buying. In May average yields hit a
record low of 5.54%, while Deutsche Bank reported about €25bn of orders for its
maiden €1.5bn coco, underlining investor willingness to shoulder more risk in their
hunt for higher-yielding bank assets.
‘When I see cocos at 5.5% I personally don’t think I’m getting paid for the risks,’
says Jorge Martin Ceron, a portfolio manager at Lombard Odier.
The bond’s conversion mechanism – which can allow for coupon cancellations even
while the bank is a ‘going concern’ and potentially paying dividends to shareholders
– remains untested. Coco supporters point out that European banks’ continued
deleveraging and recent capital raising has made the prospect of outright conver-
sion, if not coupon cancellations, increasingly unlikely. But the wider market fall-
out highlights the asset’s exposure to ‘tail-risks’, or unforeseen events.
Regulatory incentives remain for banks to tap the coco market, not least because
they offer a cheaper way of raising capital than issuing equity. ‘For banks, using cocos
is still a very cost effective way to fill your capital bucket,’ says Mr Weinberger [head
of capital markets engineering at Société Générale].
Source: Thompson, C. (2014) Coco sell-off unveils high-yield bargains, Financial Times,
14 August.
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Catastrophe bonds
These are issued by insurance companies. If no major catastrophe, e.g. earth-
quake in California, occurs they pay coupons and a redemption amount at the
end of their lives, usually around three years. If the specified catastrophe does
occur before maturity the principal and further coupons are ‘forgiven’ by the
holders: they get no more money from the insurance company. Thus the
insurance company has passed on some of the risk – see Article 6.11.
Article 6.11
Cat bond investors show their limits

By Alistair Gray

The World Bank attracted attention last week when the development institution
issued its first ever catastrophe bond, the latest instance of yield-hungry investors
leaping into this hottest of asset classes.
Another $5.7bn worth have been issued so far this year, bringing the total outstand-
ing to $22bn. ‘There’s still lots of money coming in, but people are becoming a little
bit more sensitive about the yields,’ says James Vickers, of Willis Re International.
It is not hard to see the appeal of catastrophe bonds, which insurers, reinsurers and
other institutions issue to minimise losses arising from earthquakes and hurri-
canes. They are among the very few securities that appear to have genuinely little
correlation with broader financial markets.
The returns have also been strong. The bonds have produced annualised returns
of 8.4% since 2002. This, however, has pushed typical yields down about 30% over
the past 18 months or so, to little more than 5%.
Niklaus Hilti, head of insurance linked strategies at Credit Suisse, says a ‘historic’
shift has taken place as the catastrophe bond market, once largely the domain of
hedge funds and other specialists, has attracted more mainstream investors – from
endowment funds to wealthy individuals. Higher prices are an inevitable conse-
quence of a more mature market, he adds. About half of European and US pension
funds now have some exposure to the asset class. Although most allocate less than
1% of their total funds under management, even relatively small allocations can
have a big impact given the trillions of dollars at their disposal.
Insurance executives question whether such investors properly appreciate the risks
they are running in buying the bonds, which incur losses only when especially
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costly disasters – those expected to occur less frequently than once in 50 years –
strike.
Even Hurricane Sandy, which caused almost $70bn worth of damage when it struck
the US east coast in 2012, left the bondholders unscathed. Only about a dozen of the
bonds – equating to less than 2% of the sums at risk – have ever incurred any losses.
Source: Gray, A. (2014) Cat bond investors show their limits, Financial Times, 1 July.
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CHAPTER 7
INTERNATIONAL BONDS
This chapter focuses on ways of raising money by selling bonds outside of the
issuer’s home currency. This may be done by issuing bonds in another country
under the regulatory constraints of that country (foreign bonds) or may be
done outside of the jurisdiction of any country, with no interference from
national regulators or tax authorities (Eurobonds). It may also be done by
setting up an ongoing programme of issuance of a number of medium-term
bonds/notes through an arrangement with an investment bank(s) acting as a
manager helping the sale of bonds every few weeks in the amounts, currency
and type that suit the borrower at that time. Finally, the chapter discusses
the principles behind the rapidly growing market in Islamic bonds; still less
than 30 years old, this market is now worth well over $230 billion.
International bonds are government (sovereign) or corporate bonds issued

in a country or a currency foreign to the investor. The amount outstanding in
the international bond markets was over $20 trillion in 2014, in a variety of
currency denominations. International bonds fall into two main categories.
● Foreign bonds are issued in the domestic currency of the country where the
bond is issued by a non-resident, and are usually given a name that relates
to the country of the currency of issue, e.g. Samurai bonds are issued in
Japan in yen by a non-resident issuer.
● Eurobonds are bonds issued outside the jurisdiction of the currency of issue,
e.g. a Eurodollar bond is issued outside the US and so the US authorities have
no control over this market.
The different types of bonds are outlined in Table 7.1.
The term global bond is used where bonds are issued simultaneously in differ-
ent countries by large companies trading internationally or by sovereign entities.
These may be issued and traded in the foreign bond markets of one or more
countries, and/or the Eurobond market, and/or in the domestic market of the
issuer. Thus, they may be issued and trade in many different currencies.
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Table 7.1 The attributes of the different types of bonds
Type of bond Currency of issue Nationality of Place of Primary

issuer issue investors
Domestic bond Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic
Foreign bond Domestic Foreign Domestic Domestic

Bulldog, Yankee,
Panda, etc.
Eurobond Eurocurrency Any International International

Euroyen Eurodollars,
Eurosterling, etc.
The majority of international bonds are issued in US dollars or euros, with the
euro now having overtaken the dollar – of all the international bonds out-
standing 45% are denominated in euros and 36% in dollars. Note that most of
those denominated in euros are not under the jurisdiction of any eurozone
country (they are Eurobonds), with most of their trading taking place in finan-
cial centres outside of the continent, such as London. While only 9% of inter-
national bonds are issued in sterling, London is the major centre for secondary
trading, responsible for more than 70% of Eurobond trades.
Foreign bonds
Foreign bonds are given names relevant to the country where they are issued
and regulated, for example in Canada bonds issued by non-Canadian companies
denominated in Canadian dollars are known as Maple bonds and the interest
and capital payments are in CAD. Other foreign bonds from around the world
issued by non-domestic entities in the domestic market include:
Yankee bonds (US), dollar bonds issued in the US by a non-US issuer
Bulldog bonds (UK), sterling bonds issued in the UK by a non-UK issuer
Rembrandt bonds (the Netherlands)
Matador bonds (Spain)
Panda bonds (China)
Kangaroo or Matilda bonds (Australia)
Kiwi bonds (New Zealand).
Many deeply furrowed brows can be seen in financial circles when trying to
come up with nicknames for new types of foreign bonds – see Article 7.1.
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7 INTERNATIONAL BONDS 207
Article 7.1
The rise of the . . . Masala bond?

By James Crabtree

The World Bank’s move doubling to $2bn its offshore-rupee bond programme today
marks a significant moment in the international development of India’s currency.
But it leaves one big question unanswered: what should these new Indian instru-
ments be called?
Offshore debt naming is not difficult: just pick a food or animal commonly linked to
the country in question, and add extra points for alliteration.
China manages both of the above, with ‘dim-sum’ offshore renminbi bonds and
‘panda’ bonds for those from non-Chinese entities, such as the Rmb500m ($80m)
issuance brought out by Germany’s Daimler last month.
Almost every other country follows the same pattern, from tasty baklava bonds in
Turkish lira, to lively kangaroo bonds down under.
Yet even when the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank’s private
sector arm, launched its first $1bn rupee-linked programme last year, an Indian
equivalent failed to stick.
India hardly lacks for recognisable food and fauna, while a handful of local media
outlets did begin speculating last year. The ‘samosa bond’ might soon take hold,
one said; another floated the rather blander ‘tiger bond’ as an option.
But the IFC has so far distanced itself from any attempts to attach a cheery
moniker to its programmes. Those familiar with the group’s thinking say it is being
extra-cautious, for fear of riling one of India’s famously vocal and prickly lobby
groups with its endorsement.
Yet the IFC’s new $2bn programme will in time be followed by numerous other
offshore rupee issuances as the Indian economy grows in coming decades, leaving
the naming issue as something of a conundrum.
And what about [our] favoured option: the masala bond? Unquestionably Indian in
flavour, the title could just catch on, says Eswar Prasad, professor at Cornell
University and a particular expert on India’s gradual capital account liberalisation.
‘Masala bonds might well resonate,’ he says. ‘Certainly foreign investors seem to
like their taste so far, even if they are still a bit spicy and exotic, you might say.’
Source: Crabtree, J. (2014) The rise of the . . . Masala bond?, Financial Times, 10 April.
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For investors, foreign bonds carry the disadvantage of being subject to cur-
rency fluctuation. For example, a £100,000 foreign bond bought by a US
investor when the exchange rate was $1.60 to the £ would cost $62,500. Three
years later, the bond reaches maturity and the investor receives back the par
value of £100,000, but now the exchange rate is $1.85 to the £, so he receives
only $54,054 and makes a capital loss.
Another disadvantage for investors is that foreign bonds are traded on foreign
markets where investors do not have the same degree of protection as they
would in their own domestic market. Political unrest or disputes could cause
investors to lose control of their foreign investments as the foreign govern-
ment could ban all payments on externally raised finance. Not infrequently
investors in foreign bonds have found their coupon payments subjected to an
extra withholding tax imposed by the country where the bonds are issued.
Nevertheless, institutional investors taking foreign bonds into their portfolios

are able to achieve greater diversification and hedge against foreign currency
fluctuations. Not all foreign bonds are issued by companies – Article 7.2 dis-
cusses the foreign bond issued by the Bulgarian government.
Article 7.2
Bulgaria lines up €3.5bn bond issues

as crises ease
By Andrew MacDowall

After a difficult two years that saw five governments, ongoing street protests and a
banking crisis, Bulgaria’s politics and economy may be getting back to something
approaching normality in 2015.
Blessed with greater stability – but with a significant fiscal deficit and loans to
repay – the country plans to raise 6.9bn lev (€3.5bn) from bond issues this year. But
investors may still be wary of the risks of a slow-growing country with a recent
history of instability.
On January 8, Vladislav Goranov, finance minister, said the government planned
to raise the cash from foreign investors in two issues, one in the first half of the year
and one in the autumn. He implied that the first issue would be sooner rather than
later, pointing to market liquidity.
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‘We expect good results on yields, meaning Bulgaria gets cheap financing,’
Goranov said early this month.
The money raised will be used to help bridge a fiscal deficit that the government
expects to come in at 3% of GDP this year. It will also finance the rollover of a
€1.5bn loan it used to finance last year’s deficit, which was increased by the need to
guarantee deposits and recapitalise banks following the collapse of Corporate
Commercial Bank (KTB or Corpbank) and a run on another domestic lender.
The loan was syndicated by Citi, HSBC and the Bulgarian units of Société Générale
and UniCredit, which will also arrange the first foreign bond issue this year.
The 6.9bn lev bonds will increase Bulgaria’s public debt to 28.4% of GDP this year,
Reuters reported, from 18% in 2013.
While this is still one of the lowest levels in the European Union, observers have
mixed views on Bulgaria’s creditworthiness. GDP growth is expected to come in at
under 1% this year, according to a recent forecast by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, though the Economist Intelligence Unit expects
a respectable average of 3% between 2015 and 2019.
‘Bulgaria’s banking crisis and the chronic political instability which has been
plaguing the country of late have taken their toll on the country’s creditworthiness,’
says Nicholas Spiro of consultancy Spiro Sovereign Strategy. ‘Many of Bulgaria’s
underlying weaknesses have been exposed over the past several months even
though the country’s low level of public indebtedness sets it apart from some of its
more fiscally challenged CEE peers. Growth remains lacklustre and the budget
deficit has deteriorated significantly over the past year – albeit from a relatively
strong position.’
While quantitative easing from the European Central Bank will provide a liquidity
boost that somewhat offsets the US Federal Reserve’s monetary tightening, Spiro
does not expect this to boost demand for Bulgarian sovereign debt considerably.
‘A huge burst of monetary stimulus from one of the world’s leading central
banks is inevitably positive for emerging-market assets. But Bulgarian yields were
already at exceptionally low levels to start with, offering little carry for investors
– not least given the mounting risks in the country and the relatively illiquid
nature of the market.’
In December, Fitch affirmed Bulgaria’s foreign and local currency ratings at
investment-grade BBB − and BBB, respectively, with a stable outlook. The agency
noted the stabilisation of the banking sector and the government’s efforts to
reduce its deficit, as well as downside risks from the eurozone and the crisis in
Ukraine. However, the same month, Standard & Poor’s cut the country’s sovereign
credit rating to junk.
There are grounds for optimism. A snap election last October brought an unwieldy
four-party coalition to power, including two groupings that are themselves awkward
alliances of smaller parties. But a pro-reform government source told beyondbrics
the administration’s progress was a case of ‘so far, so good’.
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‘There are no major cracks in the government, and none in sight,’ the person said.
‘Some reforms are already under way in health, justice and education, without any
sign of social discontent.’
There were also tentatively positive signs on the chaotic and indebted energy
sector, with a ‘major focus’ on improving energy security, while in the banking
system, ECB supervision and a move towards the eurozone (the lev is already
pegged to the euro in a currency board arrangement) were part of the government’s
programme.
Still, there is much work to be done – and all with an economy that is both sluggish
and vulnerable.
‘The governing coalition, although composed of four rather different parties, has
already demonstrated that it can deliver,’ says Daniel Smilov, programme director
at the Centre for Liberal Strategies, a Sofia think-tank. ‘Bulgaria’s position on the
South Stream project and the start of judicial reforms are positive signs. Thus far,
the government has handled the banking situation well – what remains to be done
is a thorough investigation of responsibility for the Corpbank collapse. As for the
energy sector, concrete actions have not been taken yet, and the government has
still not announced a detailed plan for tackling the problems.’
Source: MacDowall, A. (2014) Bulgaria lines up 3.5bn bond issues as crises ease, Financial
Times, 29 January.
Because foreign bonds are regulated by the domestic authority of the country
where the bond is issued the rules can be demanding and an encumbrance to
companies seeking to act quickly and at low cost. Some regulatory authorities
have also been criticised for stifling innovation in the financial markets. The
growth of the less restricted Eurobond market, where the bonds are not under
the jurisdiction of the country of issue, has put the once dominant foreign
bond market in the shade.
Eurobonds
Let’s get one misunderstanding out of the way: Eurobonds are not connected
with the euro currency. They were in existence decades before Europe thought
of creating the euro – the first Eurobond issue was in 1963 on the Luxembourg
stock exchange, with the $15 million Eurodollar issue by Autostrade, the
Italian motorway company.
The term ‘euro’ in Eurodollar and Eurobond does not mean European. The name
‘Eurodollar’ came about when the former Soviet Union transferred dollars
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from New York to a French bank at the height of the cold war in 1957. The
cable address just happened to be EUROBANK and the money transferred
became Eurodollars – dollars beyond the reach of US tax and government
restrictions. Bonds issued outside of the US in Eurodollars were called
Eurodollar bonds, but they are often referred to simply as Eurobonds.
Eurobonds are issued all over the world – see Article 7.3 for examples.
Article 7.3
Sub-Saharan market: high yields fire

appetite for African Eurobonds
By Fiona Rintoul

Investors have flocked to Eurobonds as an attractive alternative to bonds issued in
local currencies such as Nigeria’s naira.
In October 2007, Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country outside
South Africa for 30 years to issue a dollar-denominated bond. Its $750m Eurobond,
which had an 8.5% coupon rate, was four times oversubscribed and signalled a
flurry of successful African Eurobond issues.
Countries such as Gabon, Ivory Coast, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Rwanda and
Zambia have all since issued sovereign bonds. Corporate issues have taken place
in Nigeria and Ghana, and there has been a government-backed agency issue in
Mozambique.
African Eurobonds offer high yields and a way into the African story for fixed-
income investors wary of the currency and liquidity risks associated with even
higher-yielding local currency bonds.
Antoon de Klerk, portfolio manager for emerging markets fixed income at Investec
Asset Management, cites the example of Rwanda, which issued a $400m Eurobond
in May with a 6.625% coupon that was nearly nine times oversubscribed.
‘Unless you believe Rwandan fundamentals have changed since then, it remains a
good investment opportunity,’ he says.
Of course, changes to US monetary policy affected the investment. But Mr de Klerk
believes the scenario is not as dire as it is sometimes depicted.
‘Something people miss a lot is the yield protection, which means you run
relatively low interest-rate risk,’ he says. ‘The yield movements in the US and
Rwanda were similar during the sell-off, but after the sell-off the US still only
yielded 2.8%, while Rwanda yielded 8.7%.’
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According to Vimal Parmar at Burbidge Capital, it is now likely to take place

this December or early next year. On the basis of other African Eurobond issues,
investors may ask for a higher yield than was expected when the issue was
planned. Ghana certainly paid a premium to investors on its second Eurobond
issue in July, but Zambia’s 15 times-oversubscribed issue in October shows
investor appetite for African Eurobonds is still keen.
There have been judders: the Seychelles and Ivory Coast have defaulted on
Eurobonds. On the other hand, Eurobonds attract new investors. ‘Anything that
diversifies funding sources from traditional concessional loans, which haven’t got
Africa that far, is definitely good,’ says Stephen Charangwa, fixed-income portfolio
manager at Silk Invest.
In the meantime, Angola, Cameroon, Tanzania and Uganda also plan debut
Eurobond issues, as does Ethiopia when it has secured a credit rating.
Source: Rintoul, F. (2013) Sub-Saharan market: high yields fire appetite for African
Eurobonds, Financial Times, 3 November.
© Andrew Macdowall.
Eurobonds are distinct from euro bonds – euro bonds are bonds denominated
in euros and issued in the eurozone countries. Of course, there have been
euro-denominated Eurobonds issued outside the jurisdiction of the authorities
in the euro area; these are euro-Eurobonds.
Eurobonds can be described as ‘external bonds’, but the more precise defini-
tion of ‘bonds sold outside the jurisdiction of the country of the currency in
which the bond is denominated’ is more descriptive. So, for example, the UK
financial regulators have little influence over Eurobonds issued in Luxembourg
and denominated in sterling (known as Eurosterling bonds), even though the
transactions (for example interest and capital payments) are in sterling.
Eurobonds are medium- to long-term instruments with standard maturities of

three, five, seven and ten years, but there are also long maturities of 15–30 years
driven by pension fund and insurance fund demand for long-dated assets.
Because they are issued outside the country of the currency of issue, they are not
subject to the rules and regulations imposed on foreign bonds. One such require-
ment for foreign bonds is to issue a detailed prospectus, which can be expensive.
More importantly Eurobonds are not subject to an interest-withholding tax.
In many countries the majority of domestic and foreign bonds are subject to a
withholding tax by which income tax is deducted before the investor receives
interest. The fact that Eurobond interest is paid gross without any tax deducted
has appeal for investors keen on delaying, avoiding or evading tax. The EU and
the US would like to introduce regulations and minimise tax evasion. But the
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UK, the world centre for Eurobonds, is sticking to its tax exemption, making it
difficult for other jurisdictions to tax this source of income – this stateless
money will flow to where it is most advantageous to lenders and borrowers,
thus any tax rules in one or a few countries only will be bypassed.
Eurobonds are also bearer bonds, so holders do not have to disclose their
identity. All that is required to receive interest and capital is for the holder to
have possession of the bond. Originally this meant physically held bonds, but
today many bearer bonds are held in a central depository so that trading and
post-trade settlement can take place electronically – a paperless system. The
clearing organisations (e.g. Euroclear or Clearstream) ‘present’ the bonds for
coupon payment on the appropriate dates. The anonymity from the govern-
ment authorities makes tax avoidance even easier. In contrast, domestic bonds
are usually registered, allowing companies and governments to identify the
owners and ensure that taxes are paid.
Despite the absence of official regulation, the International Capital Market

Association (ICMA), a self-regulatory body based in Zurich, imposes some
restrictions, rules and standardised procedures on Eurobond issue and trading.
Securities dealers from dozens of countries accept rules on issues such as stand-
ardised methods of calculating bond yields, procedures for settling secondary
market transactions and computerised mechanisms for reporting trades in the
market.
The development of the Eurobond market

In the 1960s many countries (e.g. the USSR), companies and individuals held
surplus dollars outside the US and were reluctant to hold these funds in
American banks where they would be subject to US jurisdiction. Also rigorous
US tax laws were offputting, as was the tough regulatory environment in the US
domestic financial markets, making it more expensive for foreign institutions
to borrow dollars in the US. These factors encouraged investors and borrowers
alike to undertake transactions in dollars outside the US. London’s strength as
a financial centre, the UK authorities’ more relaxed attitude to business and its
position in the global time zones made it a natural leader in the Euro markets.
The market grew modestly through the 1970s and then at a rapid rate in the
1980s. By then the Eurodollar bonds had been joined by bonds denominated
in a wide variety of currencies. The market was stimulated not only by the tax
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and anonymity benefits, which brought a lower cost of finance than for
domestic and foreign bonds, but also by the increasing demand from transna-
tional companies and governments needing large sums in alternative currencies
and with the potential for innovatory characteristics. The Eurobond market
was further boosted by the recycling of dollars from the oil-exporting coun-
tries, which generated vast amounts of dollars needing an investment home,
and by other countries not wanting to keep dollar assets in the US, e.g. Iran,
and by American companies choosing not to send profits to head office
because of the high tax rates if they did so. Apple, for example, had more than
$150 billion held outside of the US in 2014, while eBay said it faced a tax
charge of $3 billion on $9 billion of foreign earnings it was bringing back to the
US that it had been storing offshore.
In 1979 less than $20 billion worth of international bonds were issued in a
variety of currencies. By the end of 2013 the rate of new issuance had grown to
about $900 billion, with a total amount outstanding of about $23,500 billion
(these were mostly Eurobonds, but some were foreign bonds) – see Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 International bond and note (including foreign bonds) outstanding,
December 2013
Source: Data from BIS Quarterly Review, March 2014 www.bis.org
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Figure 7.2 Net international debt securities issuance
Non-financial corporations account for a relatively small proportion in most

years – see Figure 7.2. The biggest issuers are the banks and other financial
institutions. Issues by governments and state agencies in the public sector
account for a small fraction of issues. Other issuers are international organ-
isations such as the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development and the European Investment Bank (also referred to as
supranational organisations).
Even though the majority of Eurobond trading takes place through London,
sterling trades are not as important as USD and EUR trades, and what is
more, it tends to be large US and other foreign banks located in London that
dominate the market. While American issuers are the largest, they account for
less than one-seventh of all the issues because the issuing organisations are
dispersed all over the world – see Figure 7.3.
Since the financial crisis Eurobonds have become increasingly important for
financing European businesses, the growth in the market assisted by reduced
appetite in banks for business lending and the ability to sell across the eurozone
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Figure 7.3 Percentage share of international bonds (including foreign bonds)

outstanding at the end of 2013, by nationality of issuer
Source: Data from BIS Quarterly Review, March 2014 www.bis.org
Article 7.4
Eurobonds: a change of gear

By Ralph Atkins and Michael Stothard

The Autostrada del Sole, which joins Italy’s north and south and was completed in
1964, was as much part of the country’s postwar revitalisation as Fiat 500 cars and
film stars wearing Gucci loafers. Behind the company that built the toll road was a
deal that transformed global finance.
On July 1, 1963, Autostrade had issued the world’s first eurobond. Despite its name,
the bond was dollar-denominated and pitched at US currency investors operating
across national borders.
‘Capital at that time was not so accessible and the company wanted to reduce its
reliance on the Italian state,’ says Giovanni Castellucci, chief executive of Autostrade.
Exactly 50 years later, European corporate bond markets could be on the verge of
another significant shift. Today’s bond pioneers believe that weaknesses in the
continent’s banking system and historically low interest rates will encourage com-
panies to tap capital markets much more for finance and rely increasingly less on
bank loans.
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Traditional bank ties remain strong, especially in continental Europe. On some

measures, emerging economies have experienced a bigger shift towards capital
market funding of companies since 2008. But just as the launch of eurobonds
kick-started the globalisation of corporate finance, the crises of the past six years
could bring Europe’s markets closer to the depth and liquidity of those in the US.
‘In five to 10 years, I think the European market will look broadly similar to the US
market in terms of bank and bond percentages,’ says Michael Ridley at JPMorgan.
Eurobonds were created out of necessity – as well as changes in the 1960s in US
tax rules that encouraged investors to keep dollars outside the country. But their
pioneers consider Autostrade’s launch issue as part of a broader shift in capitalism
in the decades after the second world war.
The success of eurobonds cemented London’s position as Europe’s financial capital.
In 1999, came the launch of the euro, the continent’s boldest experiment yet in eco-
nomic integration. ‘Once the euro came into being, it accelerated hugely the growth
of the European corporate bond market,’ says Chris Whitman at Deutsche Bank.
The early years of this century saw a wave of issuance as European telecoms
companies raised funds to buy 3G licences. ‘That was really the first time European
markets had been aggressively peppered on a consistent basis by very large corpor-
ate deals,’ recalls Bryan Pascoe at HSBC.
Cross-border issuance of corporate bonds has become ubiquitous. ‘Eurobonds
largely replaced domestic markets in Europe – there was no point launching a bond
in just one country when you can tap an international investor base at no extra
cost,’ says Chris O’Malley, whose book Bonds without borders will be published
next year.
Mr Tuffey [head of investment-grade capital markets and syndicates] from Credit
Suisse says: ‘The move towards capital markets in Europe has been slower partly
due to uncertainty over regulation but also [because of] the huge players out there
defending parochialism. German and French banks, for example, have historically
lent to local corporates at generous rates.’
Meanwhile, many smaller European companies remain wary of the extra trans-
parency required under today’s more stringent rules. ‘It will be some time before
midsized European companies overcome their disquiet about the regular reporting
required by capital markets,’ says Paul Watters at Standard & Poor’s. ‘If you have a
relationship with a bank, the detailed information that you provide remains private.’
Data on corporate bond issuance show a move this year towards companies fund-
ing themselves more in debt markets and relying less on bank loans. Encouraging
the shift will be low interest rates and increased concerns about the stability of
banks – which have encouraged companies to pay much more attention to their
funding requirements – and it could quickly become firmly established if European
economies saw stirrings of a revival in growth.
With government finances under severe pressure and banks continuing to struggle,
European policy makers want to promote alternative forms of finance. The European
Commission has launched initiatives to encourage capital market development.
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Paving the possible way ahead has been the rapid development of corporate bond
markets in the world’s emerging economies. During the past quarter, emerging-
market companies obtained three times as much funding from the bond markets as
from bank syndicates, the biggest gap in at least a decade.
Additional reporting by Rachel Sanderson.
Source: Atkins, R. and Stothard, M. (2013) Eurobonds: a change of gear, Financial Times,
30 June.
Types of Eurobonds
The Eurobond market is innovative in producing bonds with all sorts of coupon
payment and capital repayment arrangements, for example the currency of
the coupon changes half way through the life of the bond, or the interest rate
switches from fixed to floating rate at some point. We cannot go into detail
here on the rich variety but merely categorise the bonds into broad types.
1 Straight fixed-rate bond
The coupon remains the same over the life of the bond. These are usually paid
annually, in contrast to domestic bond semi-annual coupons. The redemption
of these bonds is usually made with a ‘bullet’ repayment at maturity.
2 Equity related
These take two forms:
a Bonds with warrants attached
An equity warrant, for example, would give the right, but not the obliga-
tion, to purchase shares. There are also warrants for commodities such as
gold or oil, and for the right to buy additional bonds from the same issuer
at the same price and yield as the host bond. Warrants are detachable from
the host bond and are securities in their own right, unlike convertibles.
b Convertibles
The bondholder has the right (but not the obligation) to convert the
bond into ordinary shares at a pre-set price (see Chapter 6).
3 Floating-rate notes (FRNs)
These have variable coupons reset on a regular basis, usually every three
or six months, in relation to a reference rate, such as Libor. The size of the
spread over Libor reflects the perceived risk of the issuer. The typical term for
a Eurobond FRN is about 5–12 years, but some companies, particularly
banks, favour issuing perpetual, or undated, FRNs.
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4 Zero coupon bonds

These pay no interest but are sold at a discount to face value so that the
holder receives a gain in a lump sum at maturity – also called pure discount
bonds. This is of investor benefit in countries where income is taxed more
onerously than capital gains.
5 Dual-currency bonds
These bonds pay the coupon in one currency but are redeemed in a different
currency. The redemption currency is usually the US dollar and the coupon
payments are often made in a currency which offers the issuer the chance of
a lower rate of borrowing.
Within these broad categories all kinds of ‘bells and whistles’ (features) can be
attached to the bonds, for example reverse floaters – the coupon declines as
benchmark interest rate, say Libor, rises – and capped bonds – the interest rate
cannot rise above a certain level. Many bonds have call back features under
which the issuer has the right, but not the obligation, to buy the bond back
after a period of time has elapsed, say five years, at a price specified when the
bond was issued. This might be at the par value but is usually slightly higher.
Because there are real disadvantages for investors, bonds with call features offer
higher interest rates. Issuers like call features because a significant price rise for
the bond implies that current market interest rates are considerably less than
the coupon rate on the bond. They can buy back the original bonds and issue
new bonds at a lower yield. Also some bonds place tight covenant restrictions
on the firm so it is useful to be able to buy them back and issue less restrictive
bonds in their place. Finally, exercising the call may permit the corporate to
adjust its financial leverage by reducing its debt. A Eurobond may also have a
‘put’ feature (see Chapter 4).
Issuance
The majority of Eurobonds (more than 80%) are rated AAA or AA, although
some are issued rated below BBB−. Denominations are usually $1,000, $5,000,
$10,000, $50,000 or $100,000 (or similar large sums in the currency of issue –
known as 1,000, 5,000 or 50,000 lots or pieces). Details of some international
bonds are shown in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 taken from FT.com. The issue process
leading to this point is described in Chapter 4. Note the large volume of money
raised in this market in one week (selected at random).
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Table 7.2 New international bond issues, 7 August 2014
Borrower Amount Coupon Price Maturity Fees Spread Book-

m. % % bp runner
US Dollars
Ecobank 200 8.75 99.011 aug 2021 Undiscl Deutsche

Nigeria Bank/Standard
Chartered/Ned
Euros
Hamburg 300 1 100.747 jun 2021 Undiscl CMZ/HSH

Nord/
LBBW/WGZ/
IBB 75 FRN 100.000 aug 2020 6mE Undiscl IBB
Swiss Francs
Canton 100 0.625 101.055 maj 2022 Undiscl Credit Suisse/

Ticino BasleKB
Bond issue details are online at ft.com/bondissues. Final terms, non-callable unless stated.
Spreads relate to German govt bonds unless stated.
Eurobonds present significant advantages to their issuers relative to domestic

bonds – see Table 7.4, which also lists their drawbacks.
Secondary market
Eurobonds are traded on the secondary market through intermediaries acting
as market makers. Some bonds are listed on the London, Dublin, Luxembourg,
Channel Islands or other stock exchanges around the world. Listing enables
some institutions to invest that would otherwise be prohibited. Despite this,
the market is primarily an over-the-counter one. Most deals are conducted
using the telephone, computers, telex and fax, but there are a number of
electronic platforms. The extent to which electronic platforms will replace
telephone dealing is as yet unclear. It is not possible to go to a central source
for price information. Most issues rarely trade; those that do are generally pri-
vate transactions between investor and bond dealer and there is no obligation
to inform the public about the deal.
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 221 7/7/15 8:48 AM

Table 7.3 New international bond issues weekly summary, 15 August 2014
Borrower Amount Maturity Coupon Price Launch Moodys/S&P Ratings

m. % spread bp Book-runner
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 222
US Dollars
American Water Capital Corp 200 01-12-2042 4.3 99.589 BofA Merrill/RBC CM/RBS/TD Securities
American Water Capital Corp 300 01-03-2025 3.4 99.857 RBS/BofA Merrill Lynch/RBC CM/TD Securities
Burlington Northern 700 01-09-2024 3.4 99.771 Citi/BofA Merrill Lynch/Goldman Sachs
Burlington Northern 800 01-09-2044 4.55 99.446 Citi/BofA Merrill Lynch/Goldman Sachs
CBS Corp 550 15-08-2044 4.9 98.639 CS/Deutsche Bk/BofAML/RBS/UBS/BNPP/Mizuho/SMBC Nikko
China Constr Bark 750 20-08-2024 4.25 99.577 ANZ/BofAML/CCB International/Citi/DeutscheBank/HSBC/UBS
Consumers Energy 250 31-08-2064 4.35 99.137 Scotia Capital/Barclays/RBCCM/SuntrustRobinsonHumphrey/WFC
Consumers Energy 250 31-08-2024 3.125 99.898 Scotia Capital/Barclays/RBCCM/SuntrustRobinsonHumphrey/WFC
Gulfport Energy Corp 300 01-11-2020 7.75 106 Credit Suisse
Minerva Luxembourg 200 31-01-2023 7.75 100 *Banco BTG Pactual/HSBC/ItauBBA/BofA Merrill Lynch/Santander*
PRICOA Global Funding I 500 18-08-2017 1.35 99.93 *Citi/Credit Suisse/JP Morgan/Wells Fargo*
UBS AG Stamford 1250 14-08-2017 1.375 99.678 UBS Investment Bank
UBS AG Stamford 2500 14-08-2019 2.375 99.836 UBS Investment Bank
World Bank 100 28-08-2019 1.7 100.000 Morgan Stanley
Euros
Baden Wuerttemburg 300 18-07-2022 1 100.030 DZ/HSH Nord/HSBC/LBBW/Nord/LB/Nordea

BayemLB 100 13-08-2021 1.25 99.970 BLB
BP 300 15-03-2040 2.75 114.015 BAML/CMZ/LBBW/Nord/LB/RBS
HSH Nordbank 125 21-08-2017 FRN 99.927 3mE+59 bps HSH Nordbank
IBB 100 19-08-2022 FRN 100.000 3mE+12.5 bps IBB
IBB 50 21-08-2019 FRN 99.950 3mE+8 bps LBBW
Lower Saxony 500 18-08-2022 1 99.725 CMZ/Nord/LB/BLB/LBBW
7/7/15 8:48 AM
Sterling
EIB 200 01-02-2019 1.5 98.565 Deutsche Bank/HSBC
Swiss Francs
Canton de Vaud 250 --/--/2023 2 112.193 ZKB
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 223
Credit Suisse 370 18-08-2015 FRN 100.000 3mL+22bps Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse 155 19-08-2016 FRN 100.000 3mL+27bps Credit Suisse
Municipality Finance 150 17-09-2024 0.75 101.328 Credit Suisse
Total 800 29-08-2024 1 100.584 UBS
WellsFargo 250 30-09-2020 0.625 100.456 Credit Suisse/UBS
WellsFargo 250 03-09-2024 1.25 100.513 Credit Suisse/UBS
Australian Dollars
KBN 150 16-07-2025 4.25 100.213 TD/WBC

Province of Ontario 225 22-08-2024 4.25 99.096 TD Securities
Norwegian Krone
VWFS 500 22-08-2017 2 99.727 ANZ/Deutsche Bank
Swedish Krona
Hemso Fastighets AB 200 26-01-2016 FRN Undisclosed 3mS+40 bps Danske/Handelsbanken

Lansforsakringar Bank 200 21-08-2017 FRN 100.000 3mS+37 bps Swedbank
VWFS 500 22-08-2016 0.96 100.000 Handelsbanken
Bond issue details are online at ft.com/bondissues. Final terms, non-callable unless stated. Spreads relate to German govt bonds unless stated.
7/7/15 8:48 AM
Table 7.4 Advantages and drawbacks of Eurobonds as a source of finance for

corporations
Advantages Drawbacks
1 Large loans for long periods are available. 1 Only for the largest companies – minimum
realistic issue size is about £100m – and
only those with good ‘name recognition’
(widely regarded as creditworthy) or good
credit rating.
2 Often cheaper than domestic bonds. 2 Because interest and capital are often paid
The finance provider receives the interest in a foreign currency there is a risk that
without tax deduction and retains anonymity exchange rate movements mean more of
from the tax authorities and therefore the home currency is required to buy the
supplies cheaper finance. Economies foreign currency than was anticipated.
of scale also reduce costs. Also a wider
investor base can be tapped than in the
domestic market.
3 Ability to hedge interest rate and exchange 3 The secondary market can be illiquid.
rate risk. For example, a Canadian
corporation buying assets in Europe
(such as a company) may finance the
asset by taking on a Eurobond liability
in euros, thus reducing variability in net
value (in Canadian dollars) when the
C$/€ exchange rate moves.
4 The bonds are usually unsecured. The

limitations placed on management are less
than those for a secured bond.
5 The lower level of regulation allows greater

innovation and tailor-made financial
instruments.
6 Issuance procedures are relatively simple

and bonds can be issued with speed,
allowing borrowers to take advantage of
an opportunity (e.g. raising money for a
corporate purchase) in a timely way.
7 Being outside the control of governments

they cannot be frozen in an international
dispute.
8 Enhances the international profile of the

borrower.
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 224 7/7/15 8:48 AM

Euro medium-term notes and domestic

medium-term notes
By issuing a medium-term note (MTN) a company promises to pay the holders
a certain sum on the maturity date, and in many cases coupon interest in the
meantime. These instruments are typically unsecured and may carry floating
or fixed interest rates. Medium-term notes have been sold with a maturity of as
little as 9 months and as great as 30 years, so the term is a little deceiving, but
the period is usually 5–10 years. They can be denominated in the domestic
currency of the borrower (MTN) or in a foreign currency outside the control of
the authorities of the currency (Euro MTN). MTNs normally pay an interest
rate above Libor, usually varying between 0.2% and 3% over Libor.
An MTN programme stretching over many years can be established with one
set of legal documents. Then, numerous notes can be issued under the pro-
gramme in future years. Such a programme allows greater certainty that the
firm will be able to issue an MTN when it needs the finance and allows issuers
to bypass the costly and time-consuming documentation associated with each
stand-alone note/bond. The programme can allow for bonds of various qual-
ities, maturities, currencies or type of interest (fixed or floating). Over the years
the market can be tapped into at short notice in the most suitable form at that
time, e.g. US dollars rather than pounds, or redemption in three years rather
than in two. It is possible to sell in small amounts, e.g. $5 million, and on a
continuous basis, regularly dripping bonds into the market. The banks
organising the MTN programme charge a commitment fee on any available
funds authorised by the programme but not used. Management fees will also
be payable to the syndication of banks organising the MTN facility.
The success of an MTN programme depends on the efficiency of the lead

manager and the flexibility of the issuer to match market appetite for lending
in particular currencies or maturities with the issuer’s demands for funds. The
annual cost of running an MTN programme, excluding credit rating agency
fees, can be around £100,000. The cost of setting up an MTN programme is
high compared with the cost of a single bond issue (and more expensive than
most bank debt, except for the very best AAA, AA and some A-rated companies).
Many companies are prepared to pay this because they believe that the initial
expense is outweighed by the flexibility and cost savings that a programme can
provide over time.
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 225 7/7/15 8:48 AM

Vodafone’s MTN programme is one of the most varied I have come across. If
you download an annual report you will find a list of over two dozen MTNs
in issue, with a wide variety of currencies, maturities and coupon payment
intervals (see Vodafone’s Notes to the accounts). It has two MTN programmes:
a €30 billion medium-term note (EMTN) programme and what is called a
‘US shelf programme’. The US shelf programme (shelf registration or shelf
offering or shelf prospectus) is one where there is a single prospectus approved
by the Securities and Exchange Commission at the outset under which numerous
MTNs can be issued in subsequent years. For each issue the borrower must file
a short statement pointing out material changes in its business and finances
since the shelf prospectus was filed.
Here is a summary of three examples of Vodafone’s MTNs:
● Australian dollars (A$250 million) raised at an interest rate of 6.75% with a

semi-annual coupon. Minimum purchase for lenders of A$100,000.
● €1.25 billion raised as a floating-rate note. Interest is Euribor (variable rate
in euros – discussed in Chapter 8) plus 35 basis points. Interest is payable
quarterly. Minimum denomination of €50,000.
● £250 million raised with a coupon of 5.625% and due to mature in 2025.
Interest is paid annually and the minimum denomination is £50,000.
Islamic bonds (sukuk)

From its inception in 1975, when the Islamic Development Bank and the
Dubai Islamic Bank (the first commercial Islamic bank) were established to
operate in strict accordance with sharia (shari’ah) law, Islamic finance has
made significant progress worldwide. It is growing much faster than tradi-
tional banking and global Islamic investments now exceed $1 trillion. Most of
this is bank based, but some is bond market based (i.e. sukuk).
Sukuk (the plural form of the Arabic word sakk, meaning legal document or
certificate, from which the word cheque is derived) are bonds which conform
to sharia law, which forbids interest income, or riba. However, Islam does
encourage entrepreneurial activity and the sharing of risk through equity
shares.
There was always a question mark over the ability of modern finance to com-
ply with Islamic sharia law, which not only prohibits the charging or paying of
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 226 7/7/15 8:48 AM

interest but insists that real assets underlie all financial transactions. Money
alone should not create a profit and finance should serve the real economy, not
just the financial one. Ways have been found to participate in the financial
world while still keeping to sharia law, although certain Islamic scholars
oppose some of the instruments created.
Whereas conventional bonds are promises to pay interest and principal, sukuk
represent part ownership of tangible assets, businesses or investments, so the
returns are generated by some sort of share of the gain (or loss) made and the
risk is shared.
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions

(AAOIFI), which is based in Bahrain and sets standards for Islamic finance,
defines sukuk as:
certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in ownership of

tangible assets, usufructs and services or (in the ownership of) the assets
of particular projects or special investment activity.
Sukuk are administered through a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a company

set up as a separate organisation for a particular purpose, which issues sukuk
certificates. These certificates entitle the holder to a rental income or a profit
share from the certificate. Sukuk may be issued on existing assets as well as
specific assets that may become available at a future date.
Currently, there is some confusion over whether investors can always seize
the underlying assets in the event of default on sukuk or whether the assets
are merely placed in a sukuk structure to comply with sharia law. Lawyers
and bankers say that the latter is the case, with most sukuk being, in reality,
unsecured instruments. They differentiate between ‘asset-backed’ and ‘asset-
based’ sukuk:
● Asset-backed: there is a true sale between the originator and the SPV that
issues the sukuk, and sukuk holders own the underlying asset and do not
have recourse to the originator in the event of a payment shortfall. The
value of the assets owned by the SPV, and thence the sukuk holders, may
vary over time. The majority of sukuk issues are not asset backed.
● Asset-based: these are closer to conventional debt in that they hand inves-
tors ownership of the cash flows but not the assets themselves; the sukuk
holders have recourse to the originator if there is a payment shortfall.
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 227 7/7/15 8:48 AM

There is no overarching regulator for Islamic finance but the rulings of the
AAOIFI are most widely followed in the Gulf. In Malaysia and other parts of
Asia other guidelines are adopted.
At the beginning of 2013 3,875 sukuk had been issued, 223 international and
3,652 domestic, with a total issuance value of $473 billion. The most common
types of sukuk are:
● Bai’ Bithaman Ajil – the issuer sells an asset(s) to investors with the promise
that it will buy the asset back at a predetermined price which allows for a
profit to the finance provider(s). Payment is on a deferred or instalment
basis over a pre-agreed period. The assets generally comprise land, buildings,
vehicles and equipment.
● Ijarah – one of the most common sukuk types, this is a leasing contract, for
well-defined assets, in which the lessee can gain benefit from the use of
equipment or other asset in return for regular lease payments providing a
return to sukuk holders. Some types permit legal title to be passed to the user
after the end of the lease, others do not. The ijarah contract is a binding con-
tract which neither party may terminate or alter without the other’s consent.
● Istisna’a – this is the financing of manufacturing, assembly or construction
capacity by arranging money to be transferred from the finance providers
prior to production. Payment is made at an agreed price for something that
does not yet exist in a lump sum or in instalments. The finance providers
may sell the asset once created. It is not necessary that the seller itself is the
manufacturer, merely that it causes the manufacture to take place. The item
must be described in detail and construction must fit the specifications.
Istisna’a is invalid for an existing asset or for natural things such as corn or
animals.
● Mudarabah – this is for when a partnership between two parties is formed.
One party acts as capital provider(s), giving a specific amount of capital to
another person, a named entrepreneur, to make use of the capital given for
the benefit of the business. Profits are shared according to a pre-arranged
ratio. Losses are borne by the finance providers.
● Murabaha – this a fixed-income bond for the purchase of an asset such as
property or a vehicle, with a fixed rate of profit for the finance providers
determined by a fixed profit margin. The asset acts as collateral until the
contract is settled. It is similar to rent-to-own arrangements, with sukuk
holders as owners and creditors until all required payments are made.
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 228 7/7/15 8:48 AM

● Musharakah – these are for business venture partnerships between two or

more people/organisations where money comes from all the partners. A
profit and loss sharing contract is made and all partners have a right to share
in the management. Profit or losses would be divided according to their
contribution.
● Salam – this is a sale whereby the seller undertakes to supply some specific
goods to the buyer at a future date in exchange for an advanced price fully
paid at spot. Salam is used to finance agricultural goods.
● Wakalah – the organisation that wants to be financed (e.g. a financial
institution) acts as an agent for the finance providers to purchase the sharia-
compliant products. An example from the UK’s HM Revenue and Customs:
‘The investor receives only the agreed ratio against investment. Anything
made above that ratio is kept by the financial institution and not given to
the investor. Example: an investor agrees to invest a sum with the bank for
an agreed return (e.g. 5%). The bank pools the investor’s funds with the
funds of other investors and its own capital and invests in Sharia compliant
assets. At the end of a given period (e.g. a month) the bank returns the
invested sum to the investor along with the agreed 5%. Any additional
revenue that the bank makes on the customer’s money is kept by the bank
(e.g. if the bank makes 6% then 5% is given to the customer and the
additional 1% is kept by the bank). If the bank does not make the agreed
percentage return then the investor gets what has been made whilst the
bank gets nothing (e.g. if only 4% is achieved then the investor gets the
full 4%).’ (www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/vatfinmanual/vatfin8500.htm)
The first sukuk (a Bai Bithaman Ajil) was issued in 1990 in Malaysia by Shell
and denominated in the Malaysian currency, ringgit. International sukuk were
introduced in 2001 with the $100 million sovereign ijarah issue by the Central
Bank of Bahrain, and the market has grown rapidly since then, albeit with a
blip as a result of the 2008 global crisis – see Figures 7.4 and 7.5. It is estimated
by the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) that there is more than
$230 billion ($191 billion of domestic and $45 billion of international) sukuk
outstanding, and this figure is expected to increase rapidly.
Malaysia takes the lion’s share of the domestic market, with nearly 80% of the
world total, and has 12% of the international market. United Arab Emirates
dominates the international market with 44%, followed by Saudi Arabia with
13%, and then Malaysia. The UK and Luxembourg are important European
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 229 7/7/15 8:48 AM

Figure 7.4 International and domestic sukuk issuance, 2001–2013
Source: Data from Islamic International Financial Market, sukuk issuance database
Figure 7.5 Amount of sukuk issued each year from 2001 to 2012
Source: Data from IIFM, sukuk issuance database
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 230 7/7/15 8:48 AM

centres for Islamic finance. In the UK there are more than 20 banks providing
this service and numerous professionals skilled and experienced in its complex
details. To April 2015 more than US$38 billion had been raised through 53
issues of sukuk on the London Stock Exchange. See Article 7.5 for a discussion
on the competition between financial centres for Islamic finance.
Article 7.5
Islamic finance: by the book

By Robin Wigglesworth

London wants to be a global centre in the fast-growing industry despite fierce
competition.
This spring, a clutch of politicians, civil service mandarins, bankers and overseas
dignitaries gathered in the gilded halls of the UK Foreign Office’s Lancaster House
in west London. Unusually for such a gathering, there was not a glass of wine in sight.
For this was a reception designed to celebrate London’s credentials as an aspiring
hub for Islamic finance – a niche but fast-growing industry that meshes modern
capitalism with Muslim religious principles. The speeches were brief and toasted
with glasses of still water and mango juice rather than alcohol from the Foreign
Office’s cellars. The reception was interrupted briefly for evening prayers in an
adjoining room prepared for the occasion.
The UK government last year announced plans to become the first western country
to issue an Islamic bond, or sukuk – a security structured to adhere to the Muslim
prohibition on interest. For industry insiders, it was further confirmation that
Islamic finance had arrived.
‘The UK is one of the world’s biggest and most established economies, and it is
saying Islamic finance is good to go,’ says Afaq Khan, head of Saadiq, Standard
Chartered’s Islamic arm. ‘It’s a vote of confidence and sends the signal that the UK
is open to Islamic finance.’
Some sceptics may blanch at the government rolling the red carpet out for a little-
understood industry that adheres to sharia, or Islamic, law. Yet the attractions are
obvious. From humble beginnings just a few decades ago, the global Islamic
finance industry is expected to hit $2tn this year – extending to banks, mutual
funds, insurance, private equity and even some (contentious) hedge funds.
The gambit is part of a wider government strategy to ensure that the City of London
continues to enjoy its lucrative but sometimes contentious status as a freewheeling
➨
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 231 7/7/15 8:48 AM

entrepôt for global finance in the 21st century. Bolstering Islamic finance is an import-
ant aspect of this, especially if, as the government hopes, it triggers an accompanying
wave of investment from appreciative Muslim countries and financiers.
The UK is stepping into a crowded field, however. The biggest Islamic finance
markets are Malaysia, Iran and Saudi Arabia. But Iran is in effect cut off from the
rest of the industry by international sanctions and different sharia interpretations,
leaving the other two centres as the leading powerhouses.
Saudi Arabia and Malaysia have the size and depth to act as regional centres of
gravity for the Middle East and Asia, and aspirations to lead the global industry.
Then there are established offshore hubs, led by Bahrain – one of the industry’s
pioneers – but with ambitious Dubai increasingly asserting itself. Bahrain has a
head start, but Dubai has already stolen its crown as the Middle East’s financial
centre and hopes to become the capital of the emerging ‘Islamic economy’ as well.
London is the leading western centre but Luxembourg, Hong Kong and South
Africa are now competing with the UK to become the first non-Islamic country to
issue a sovereign sukuk to make themselves stand out.
➨
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 232 7/7/15 8:48 AM

Several factors came together to nurture an industry now courted by a host

of countries. Growth came quickly after devout Arab merchants established a
handful of Islamic banks in the 1970s and 1980s, with many Muslims attracted to
the promise of having access to financial services without breaking their religious
principles. Malaysia began promoting Islamic finance after setting up its sharia-
compliant financial institution in 1983.
Essentially, bankers, lawyers and clerics who are well versed in Islam’s financial
tenets work together to use one or a combination of permissible concepts in sharia
to get around bans on fixed interest rates and pure monetary speculation. They also
need to fulfil injunctions for real assets to back transactions and for profit-and-loss
sharing investments.
Still, the industry has its detractors. Some Muslim critics feel it is merely a means
to give conventional finance a veneer of sharia, following the letter of Islamic law
rather than its spirit.
Critics charge that the industry fails in the area that some proponents like to hold
up as its prime selling point: Islam’s injunction for profit-and-loss sharing equity
investments, rather than usurious debt. In practice, however, Islamic finance often
deviates little from its conventional counterpart.
Tarek El Diwany, a derivatives trader turned Islamic finance proselyte, is a par-

ticularly fierce critic of the modern industry. He argues it has simply copied the
institutional framework and products of conventional banking. ‘That’s not just
a failure of vision, it’s often completely counter to the objectives of Islamic law,’
he says.
Some proponents feel that Islamic finance has occasionally compromised its
principles in its efforts to grow. That has led to periodic pushback from the ‘sharia
scholars’, the specialist clerics who act as guardians of the industry’s religious
foundations.
In 2007 Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani, one of the most distinguished sharia
scholars, indicated that some prominent sukuk structures strayed too far from the
spirit of Islamic law. Briefly, ‘a cold sweat broke out across the industry’, recalls
Harris Irfan of EIIB-Rasmala, an Islamic investment bank, but standards were
quickly tightened and growth was revived.
Many Muslims are simply agnostic on Islamic finance. Despite high hopes,
Islamic retail banking has failed to take off in the UK, for example. Even in Egypt,
a populous bastion of the Muslim world, the industry has failed to establish firm
roots.
Western banks have also largely withdrawn after profitability disappointed.

Most damningly, HSBC, which helped spearhead the industry’s growth, decided
to cut back its sharia-compliant Amanah arm two years ago, ending its retail
services everywhere but Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. While it remains active in
Islamic investment banking, the diminution of Amanah was a blow to the wider
industry.
➨
M07_ARNO1799_01_SE_C07.indd 233 7/7/15 8:48 AM

Source: Wigglesworth, R. (2014) Islamic finance: by the book, Financial Times, 25 May.
© Financial Times Limited 2014. All Rights Reserved.
As well as Shell, Tesco and Toyota have both issued ringgit sukuk (both
musharakah) in Malaysia. In a further development in November 2009,
General Electric (GE) became the first large western corporation to expand its
investor base into this arena with the issuance of its $500 million ijarah sukuk.
The assets underlying this sukuk are GE’s interests in aircraft and rental pay-
ments from aircraft leasing. The London Shard building was partly financed
with sharia-compliant funds. As the importance of Islamic finance grows, it is
thought that more European and US companies will enter this market and tap
the vast investment resources available. The UK government raised £200 million
by issuing a sukuk in 2014, hoping that this would be a catalyst for corporates
to follow suit. Being the first western country to do so has helped to reinforce
London’s position as the dominant western hub for Islamic finance. As well as
Islamic banks it already has Islamic insurance, murabaha for commodities,
mortgages, car loans and a secondary market for sukuk. Many other countries
are expected to issue their first sukuk soon – see Article 7.6.
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Article 7.6
South Africa to issue maiden sukuk

By Javier Blas

South Africa aims to become the world’s second non-Muslim country to issue a
sukuk, announcing on Thursday plans for at least a $500m sharia compliant sover-
eign bond to be issued as early as next month.
Britain in June became the first western country to issue an Islamic bond, attract-
ing orders of more than £2bn from global investors for its sale of sharia-compliant
debt.
Luxembourg and Hong Kong have also announced plans for a sukuk and interna-
tional companies in western countries have issued them too.
The move represents a potentially significant boost for the profile of Islamic
finance in Africa. Until now, Gambia and Sudan have been the only countries on
the continent to issue a sukuk – and they were only for tiny sums. But African
countries are keen to issue sukuk in order to attract cash-rich Middle Eastern and
Asian investors to finance their large infrastructure programmes.
Africa is home to roughly 400m Muslims, about a quarter of the world’s total. But
until now a mix of financial, legal and political factors have deterred most coun-
tries in the continent from tapping the Islamic market.
West African country Senegal, where the majority of the population is Muslim,
earlier this year raised 100bn CFA francs ($208m) via its first sukuk.
The use of Islamic finance on the continent could grow further as several north and
sub-Saharan African countries – including Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia and Kenya –
are laying the legal groundwork to be able to issue sukuk.
Source: Blas, J. (2014) South Africa to issue maiden sukuk, Financial Times, 28 August.
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PART 3
MONEY MARKETS
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CHAPTER 8
INTERBANK AND
EUROCURRENCY
The interbank market

Originally, the interbank market was defined as the market where banks lend
to each other, in both the domestic and international markets. This is a rather
strict (old-fashioned) definition, and increasingly, as well as banks, this group
of lenders includes large industrial and commercial companies, other financial
institutions and international organisations. Thus, the interbank market exists
so that a bank or other large institution which has no immediate demand for
its surplus cash can place the money in the interbank market and earn interest
on it. In the opposite scenario, if a bank needs to supply a loan to a customer
but does not have the necessary deposit to hand, it can (usually) borrow on the
interbank market. A variety of interbank overnight lending rates is published
daily in the FT – see Table 8.1. We live in very strange times, with negative
interest rates in euros (the lender gets back less than it lent!)1 and zero interest
rates in Swiss francs.
There is no secondary trading in the interbank market; the loans are non-
negotiable – thus a lender for, say, three months cannot sell the right to
receive interest and capital from the borrower to another organisation after,
say, 15 days. The lender has to wait until the end of the agreed loan period to
recover the money. If a bank needs funds, it simply ceases to deposit money
with other banks or borrows in the market.
1
Apart from interest rates being very low due to central bank intervention, banks did
not want to encourage large deposits from other banks because this would increase the
amount they need to retain as equity reserves. See Chapter 16 for more on bank reserve
requirements.
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240 PART 3 MONEY MARKETS
Table 8.1 Interbank overnight interest rates, annualised, 4 September 2014
Interbank lender Latest Today’s change
Budapest: BUBOR 1.28% −0.09

Canadian: Libor 1.04% 0
Euro: Libor −0.03% >−0.01
GBP: Libor 0.47% >−0.01
Oslo: OIBOR 2.21% −0.01
Swiss: Libor 0.00% +0.01
US$: Libor 0.09% <0.01
Yen: Libor 0.06% <0.01
Source: Data from FT.com
The loans in this market are not secured with collateral. However, the rate of
interest is relatively low because those accepting deposits (borrowers) are respect-
able and safe banks. The interest rate charged to the safest banks creates the
benchmark (reference) interest rate, e.g. Libor – explained below. Banks with
lower respectability and safety will have to pay more than the benchmark rates
set by the safest institutions.
Interest rates
In the financial pages of serious newspapers you will find a bewildering variety
of interest rates quoted from all over the world. Following is an explanation of
some of the terms in common use.
Libor
Libor or LIBOR, the London InterBank Offered Rate, is the most commonly
used benchmark rate, in particular the three-month Libor rate, which is the
interest rate for one bank lending to another (very safe) bank for a fixed
three-month period. Obviously these lending deals are private arrangements
between the two banks concerned, but we can get a feel for the rates being
charged by surveying the leading banks involved in these markets. This is done
every trading day. Libor, and other such benchmark interest rates, are crucial
to an economy and its citizens, as benchmark rates are used to set rates for loans,
mortgages, savings accounts, etc. It is therefore imperative that confidence in
the validity of benchmark rates is maintained. A small change in a benchmark
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8 INTERBANK AND EUROCURRENCY 241
rate has the ability to affect millions of financial products, from one person’s
small hire purchase loan on a washing machine to a corporate’s billion dollar
loan for expansion. London’s historical and current preeminent position in
the financial world has seen Libor used as a benchmark interest rate not only
in the UK but also in many other countries, where an interest rate might be
quoted as Libor plus a few basis points, with universal comprehension of
what this means.
Until 2013 the official Libor rates were calculated by Thomson Reuters for
the British Banking Association (BBA) by asking a panel of 23 UK and inter-
national banks at what rates they could borrow money in unsecured loans of
various maturities. The size of the panel for a particular currency varied from 7
(e.g. New Zealand dollar) to 18 (e.g. US dollar). For sterling it was (and is) 16.
Contributor banks were (and still are) asked to base their Libor submissions on
the question:
At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for
and then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior
to 11 am?
The rates from the submitting banks were ranked in order from the highest
to the lowest and the average of only the middle two quartiles was taken,
i.e. with 16 submitting, the top four and bottom four quoted each day were
removed and then the middle eight rates were averaged to calculate Libor.
The Libor figures appeared on millions of computer screens around the world
each day at midday (now around 11.45am).
For over two decades the BBA produced Libor interest rates for borrowing
in ten currencies with a range of 15 maturities from overnight (borrowing for
24 hours) to 12 months quoted for each currency, producing 150 rates each
business day, even though many of them might be based on actual loans only
occasionally. The rates are expressed as an annual rate even though the loans
may be for only one day, a few days or weeks, e.g. if an overnight sterling rate
from a contributor bank is given as 2.00000%, this does not indicate that a
contributing bank would expect to pay 2% interest on the value of an over-
night loan. Instead, it means that it would expect to pay 2% divided by 365.
Following the Libor scandal (see below) it was decided that there was not
enough data to keep calculating 150 benchmarks and those rarely used were
open to manipulation; for some, such as 9-month sterling, a big bank may do
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Table 8.2 Libor rates on 16 April 2014
Libor EUR USD GBP JPY CHF
Overnight (1 day) 0.15143 0.09070 0.46375 0.05571 −0.01000

1 week 0.17786 0.12150 0.46656 0.07571 −0.00800
1 month 0.22071 0.15200 0.48531 0.10143 −0.00500
2 months 0.26000 0.19300 0.50531 0.12286 0.00700
3 months 0.29143 0.22635 0.52531 0.13500 0.01600
6 months 0.38771 0.32090 0.62381 0.19107 0.07540
12 months 0.55029 0.54650 0.91063 0.34500 0.19540
Source: Data from www.global-rates.com
50 borrowing deals per year, but nevertheless had to submit a new estimate
every day. The less frequently used currencies/maturities have been dropped,
resulting in a more manageable 35 rates per day, 7 maturities in 5 currencies.
The data shown in Table 8.2 is for those currencies and maturities that are
currently available.
Because the Libor rate is calculated in different currencies, its influence is spread
worldwide, and is particularly used in dollar lending outside the US. In all, Libor
is used to price around £200 trillion of financial products; for comparison, the
output of all UK citizens in one year (GDP) is around £1.5 trillion. Remarkably,
about 90% of US commercial and mortgage loans are thought to be linked to
the Libor rates, usually 2–3% over Libor.
Libor scandal
The fact that Libor was not necessarily based on actual transactions because
there were simply not enough lending transactions in each of the currencies/
maturities every day meant that a bank was asked to ‘estimate’ or to ‘predict
accurately’ the correct rate for currencies or maturities based on its knowledge
of its credit and liquidity risk profile. The inability to base many Libors on
recorded loans gave all the leeway needed for unscrupulous bankers to mani-
pulate the reported rate to further their own ends. This led to the now infamous
Libor scandal and fines imposed on the banks involved amounting to billions.
Up to 20 banks and a number of brokers are involved in investigations in
Europe, America and Asia.
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There were two main elements to the manipulative behaviour. First, the value
of billions of pounds/dollars’ worth of derivatives is determined by the level of
Libor. If derivative traders could persuade those in their bank (and in some
of the other banks) who had responsibility to submit daily Libor rates to
change the submission slightly, they could make a fortune on the movements
in derivatives. With the huge values involved in derivative trading, a differ-
ence of a few pips (one-hundredth of 1%) had the potential to make (or lose)
huge amounts of money. From 2005 on (and perhaps earlier) rate submitters
were regularly cajoled, bribed and leant on to do the derivative guys a favour
– and some senior bankers encouraged this. It was an international game,
with many interlocking personal relationships in the very small world of rate
submitters and derivatives traders located in the major financial centres.
Within this web, an alternative way of making money illegally using derivatives
was for traders to receive advanced word on which direction rates would move.
It wasn’t just banks; some interdealer brokers, who facilitate derivative trades
between banks, also came under investigation for coordinating manipulation.
Second, following the financial crisis of 2007–2008, banks did not want to
appear weak. A clear sign of weakness, and therefore seeming to be a higher
risk, is for a bank to admit that it has to borrow from other banks at high inter-
est rates. Thus, the rate submitters were leant on to ‘lowball’ their submissions
to make the banks appear healthier than they really were. Admittedly, there
was so little confidence in banks generally at that time that actual tangible
interbank lending became very thin, if not completely shut down, and so sub-
mitters frequently had to fall back on their judgement of what they might have
to pay to borrow ‘were you to do so’. They were caught out by email records
showing that, far from merely using good judgement about what rate the bank
might have to pay, they were deliberately underestimating borrowing rates to
fool outsiders – they falsified.
An insider’s view
In the tight-knit world of interest rate derivatives and Libor submissions, the
bankers know each other by first name, regularly phoning, texting, messaging
and emailing. They were ridiculed in the press as crass money-obsessed shallow
people. Their confidence and bonuses knew no bounds at a time when millions
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suffered in a recession created by greedy bankers, an image that was not helped
by the email correspondence made public, for example:
● ‘Dude, I owe you big time! Come over one day after work and I’m opening a
bottle of Bollinger.’ In response to a manipulation of USD Libor.
● ‘When I write a book about this business your name will be written in golden
letters.’
● ‘If you keep the 6s [the six-month yen Libor rate] unchanged today . . . I need
you to keep it as low as possible . . . if you do that . . . I’ll pay you . . . I’m a man
of my word.’
● ‘It’s just amazing how Libor-fixing can make you that much money or lose it if
opposite. It’s a cartel now in London.’
And from the submitters:
● ‘Always happy to help.’

● ‘Done . . . for you big boy.’
● ‘You know, scratch my back yeah an all.’
In response to a request to submit a lower Libor:
● ‘I am going for 90 altho 91 is what I should be posting’ [assumption: he is

referring to the annualised rate in basis points].
The response from bank leadership was interesting. Here is a quote from
The Economist:2
Risibly, Bob Diamond, [Barclays] chief executive, who resigned on July 3rd
as a result of the scandal, retorted in a memo to staff that ‘on the majority
of days, no requests were made at all’ to manipulate the rate. This was rather
like an adulterer saying that he was faithful on most days.’
The authorities went on the warpath – see Article 8.1.
2
‘Briefing: The LIBOR scandal.’ The Economist, 7 July 2012, 25–27.
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Article 8.1
Daily fix that spiralled out of control

By Brooke Masters, Caroline Binham and Kara Scannell
Financial Times December 19, 2012

UBS traders and managers on three continents used phone calls, electronic chat
rooms and emails to manipulate benchmark interest rates in five currencies on an
almost daily basis, according to documents filed by US, UK and Swiss authorities.
The web of activity spanned the globe, taking in traders in Japan and the US, brokers
in London and elsewhere and rate submitters based in London and Switzerland.
About 40 UBS employees, traders at five other banks and 11 employees at six inter-
dealer brokers were directly involved or aware of efforts to manipulate Interbank
lending rates in various currencies, according to the UK Financial Services
Authority final notice.
US authorities have charged two former UBS traders, Tom Hayes and Roger Darin,
with criminal conspiracy, and Mr Hayes also faces a criminal price-fixing charge in
connection with allegations he ‘colluded’ with another bank to manipulate the yen
Libor rate.
The charging and settlement documents include excerpts from myriad emails and
chat room messages focused on the daily fixing process for Libor, the collective
name for benchmark lending rates set in London for 10 currencies, and Euribor and
Tibor, similar rates set in Brussels and Tokyo.
All of the benchmarks rely on averaging daily estimates from panels of banks, so
they can in theory be moved if one or more banks deliberately aim high or low.
That was not a problem in Libor’s infancy in the mid-1980s when it was used
primarily to price corporate and other lending. But the Interbank lending rates
became a crucial benchmark for derivatives in the late 1990s, transforming the
importance of the daily fixings. A swing of only a few basis points changed from
being a rounding error on a loan rate to making the difference between a bonanza
trading day and devastating losses.
According to the regulators, that shift also drew the attention of UBS traders, who,
according to the Swiss regulator Finma, could triple or even sextuple their annual
salaries with bonuses for good results.
The FSA documented more than 2,000 requests to move rates, including more than
800 internal conversations at UBS between traders and rate submitters – nicknamed
the ‘cash boys’ – and more than 1,100 external contacts.
The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission said that it found rate requests
focused on yen Libor on 570 of the trading days between 2006 and 2009, or roughly
three-quarters of the time.
➨
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A US criminal complaint alleges that Mr Hayes, based in Tokyo, used an electronic

chat room to tell Mr Darin, who helped submit UBS’s Libor estimates, that he had
a big derivative riding on the six-month US dollar Libor rate. ‘Can we try to keep it
on the low side pls?’ he wrote in April 2008.
Mr Darin allegedly responded ‘I’ll submit something low . . . but if u can u should
square it up’, adding ‘the correct 6m is 1.08’. UBS then submitted a rate of 0.98, the
criminal complaint said.
The internal contacts were so pervasive that one submitter responded to a January
2007 rate request with ‘standing order, sir’, the FSA said.
UBS traders also reached out directly to their counterparts at other banks and they
sometimes worked in concert.
But the vast majority of external requests, particularly for yen Libor, went through
the interdealer brokers. The FSA said four UBS traders based in Tokyo used
11 employees at six brokerages as conduits, asking them to pass on requests for
specific rates to traders and more broadly influence the market.
Although brokers do not participate in the rate setting process directly, they were
frequently contacted for market information by submitters at some panel banks.
So UBS traders also asked the brokers to report false bids and offers – known as
‘spoofs’ – and asked them to manipulate the rates shown on their trading screens
to skew market perceptions, according to the FSA.
The brokers were repaid for their assistance in two ways. In one broker’s case,
UBS traders would place ‘wash trades’ – transactions that have no purpose other
than to generate fees – with the helpful party. In addition, UBS made corrupt
payments of £15,000 per quarter to brokers to reward them for their assistance over
a period of at least 18 months.
Source: Masters, B., Binham, C. and Scannell, K. (2012) Daily fix that spiralled out of control,
Financial Times, 19 December.
The new regime

In 2013 the BBA was stripped of its ‘sponsor’ role and a new administrator cre-
ated, ICE Benchmark Administration Limited (IBA), part of the US-based
Intercontinental Exchange Group. The benchmark administrator is overseen
by the Financial Conduct Authority, the financial regulator (formerly the
Financial Services Authority) – see Figure 8.1.
ICE began its role on 1 February 2014 and issued its first ICE Libor rates on
3 February – see Article 8.2. Note the determination to move away from rates
based on theoretical loans to actual lending agreements.
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Figure 8.1 The new Libor structure
Article 8.2
Intercontinental Exchange to take

over running Libor benchmark
By Philip Stafford

Intercontinental Exchange will take over the administration of the scandal-tainted
Libor benchmark from February 1 after receiving approval from UK regulators on
Friday.
➨
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The US derivatives exchange has also appointed André Villeneuve, a senior City
executive, as chairman of the ICE subsidiary that will collate and monitor the data
submitted by banks.
The handover of administration to ICE from the British Bankers’ Association
will mark the first steps to rehabilitate the benchmark, which has been tarnished
after allegations it has been manipulated by banks around the world. More than
€2bn has been collected in fines by regulators after a string of financial institutions,
including RBS, UBS and Barclays settled charges.
ICE has been in line to run the process since its purchase of NYSE Liffe, the London
derivatives exchange, in November. NYSE won the contract to replace the BBA
last year. It plans to move calculation of the benchmark away from the theoretical
price quotes submitted by banks to a fixing based on real transactions.
However, ICE said there would be no immediate change to the calculation of Libor.
The group is currently moving the technology platform from a NYSE-owned system
to one overseen by ICE.
Source: Stafford, P. (2014) Intercontinental Exchange to take over running Libor

benchmark, Financial Times, 17 January.
The IBA continues to administer Libor in much the same way as the BBA, with
a panel of banks submitting seven different maturity rates for five currencies:
the US dollar (USD), the British pound (GBP), the euro (EUR), the Swiss franc
(CHF) and the Japanese yen (JPY). The highest and lowest 25% of submissions
are removed and the remainder averaged to give each rate. This trimming of
the top and bottom quartiles allows for the exclusion of outliers (potentially
freakishly extreme numbers) from the final calculation.
The submitting banks for each currency are shown in Table 8.3. IBA asks the
panel banks to inform Thomson Reuters of the rates they might be asked for
if they were to borrow using the same question that the BBA employed. The
rates are published and distributed by the ICE Benchmark Administration.
The www.global-rates.com website, run for IBA, shows Libor rates updated
daily at around 6pm (CET) so that those of us without the expensive computer
systems showing the 11.45am postings can also see the rates.
The current system tries to place more emphasis on actual market transactions,
but frequently this is not possible due to lack of lending that day for that
particular maturity and currency, especially problematic in times of market
turmoil. Then the IBA allows the submitters to use ‘qualitative criteria’ and
‘expert judgement’ to estimate the rate they would be charged should they
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Table 8.3 ICE Libor panel banks
Bank USD GBP EUR CHF JPY
Bank of America N.A. (London branch) ✴
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
Barclays Bank plc ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
BNP Paribas SA (London branch) ✴ ✴
Citibank N.A. (London branch) ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
Credit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank ✴ ✴ ✴
Crèdit Suisse AG (London branch) ✴ ✴ ✴
Deutsche Bank AG (London branch) ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
HSBC Bank plc ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (London branch) ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
Lloyds TSB Bank plc ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
Mizuho Bank, Ltd ✴ ✴ ✴
Rabobank Intl CCRB (Cooperatieve Centrale ✴ ✴ ✴

Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank BA)
Royal Bank of Canada ✴ ✴ ✴
Santander UK plc ✴ ✴
Société Générale (London branch) ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Europe Limited ✴ ✴
The Norinchukin Bank ✴ ✴
The Royal Bank of Scotland plc ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
UBS AG ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴ ✴
Source: Data from www.theice.com/iba/libor
borrow. ICE would like to move to a system that also takes into account
interest rates in the commercial paper and certificates of deposits markets – see
Article 8.3. There are voices saying that the compromise of allowing estimates
alongside actual rates is not going far enough, that all submissions should be
on actual deals – see Article 8.4. Other prominent people such as regulators
ponder whether it is best to move towards two systems running in parallel, and
this is something which the new administrator, ICE Benchmarks Limited,
and the FCA will have to resolve.
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Article 8.3
Intercontinental Exchange unveils

plans for Libor reform
Philip Stafford

Intercontinental Exchange wants to rehabilitate Libor by proposing that submitting
banks include transactions they conduct with central banks as part of their daily
calculations.
To toughen the new rate-setting process, ICE proposes establishing a system in
which a wide range of data from around the world is used as a basis for submissions.
It also wants to force banks to flag up more clearly those submissions which have
been supplemented with human judgments.
It added that it wanted banks to anchor rates based on their unsecured wholesale
funding deposits, commercial paper and primary issuance certificates of deposit.
The approach follows guidelines recommended by the UK-backed Wheatley report
in 2012.
Source: Stafford, P. (2014) Intercontinental Exchange unveils plans for Libor reform,
Article 8.4
Regulators warn on Libor reform

By Daniel Schäfer

A powerful umbrella body for global regulators has criticised the administrators
of Libor and two other interbank lending rates for failing to show that they have
improved the reliability and accuracy of such benchmarks.
The administrators of Britain’s Libor and its European and Japanese equivalents
Euribor and Tibor have not provided the data and analysis to demonstrate whether
they are anchored in real transactions, the International Organisation of Securities
Commissions said in a review of its benchmark principles.
Iosco last year introduced those principles after the scandal over widespread mani-
pulation of Libor sparked an intense debate about radical reform of the way such
benchmarks are compiled.
➨
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Regulators are keen to ensure that benchmarks are rooted in real market trans-
actions rather than just bank submissions which, since the Libor scandal, are seen
as susceptible to manipulation.
‘None of the administrators has completed an analysis of methodologies to provide
a basis for deciding whether the submissions are anchored in that market,’ Iosco
said.
The group gave administrators until the end of the year to set out concrete steps to
address this issue.
Iosco’s report comes shortly after Intercontinental Exchange, which took over
the administration of Libor this year, began asking banks for internal transaction
data and also started testing a new system to collect and validate rates the banks
submit.
Major reference interest rates such as Libor, Euribor and Tibor should be ‘to the
greatest extent possible’ based on actual trade data, the Financial Stability Board
said in an additional report on Tuesday.
The FSB also called on market participants to investigate the feasibility of develop-
ing alternative, fully transaction-data based reference rates.
Source: Schäfer, D. (2014) Regulators warn on Libor reform, Financial Times, 22 July.
Now that Libor is no longer calculated for the Australian dollar (nor NZ or
Canadian dollars or Danish and Swedish krona) the Australians have decided
to obtain interbank rates from market transactions – see Article 8.5. Bank bills
are discussed in Chapter 11.
Article 8.5
Australia to use market prices

for Libor
By Neil Hume

Australia will use prices displayed electronically by brokers and trading venues to
set the price of the country’s benchmark Interbank borrowing rate.
The Australian Financial Markets Association, which represents 130 Australian
and international banks, brokers and fund managers, announced on Wednesday it
would disband the panel used to set the bank bill swap rate.
➨
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‘Building on the advantage of BBSW being based on a traded market, AFMA pro-
poses to bypass the panel requirement by adopting a process to extract these rates
directly from trading venues – brokers and electronic markets. This proposal has
the support of market participants,’ it said in a statement.
The BBSW is the Australian equivalent of the scandal-plagued London InterBank
Offered Rate (Libor) and is used to set interest payments on floating rate securities,
derivatives and Australian dollar-denominated loans.
The decision to take rates directly from the market, rather than from submissions,
comes after two more banks – Citigroup and HSBC – said they would no longer
contribute to the BBSW panel. JPMorgan and UBS withdrew earlier this year.
Banks are quitting rate-setting panels around the world because of tougher scrutiny
and a rise in compliance costs brought about by the Libor scandal.
Banks which contribute to the process in the UK will be required to corroborate their
submissions and appoint a specific person to take charge of compliance with the
new rules.
Australia’s BBSW rate differs from Libor in that panellists are asked for the actual
rates they observe in the market rather than an indicative quote.
Source: Hume, N. (2013) Australia to use market prices for Libor, Financial Times,
27 March.
Euribor and some other BORs

There are other rates similar to Libor in common use and many of these have
also been caught up in the interbank rate-fixing scandal.
Euribor (Euro InterBank Offered Rate)

Euribor or EURIBOR is the rate at which euro interbank term deposits are
offered by prime banks to other prime banks within the eurozone (not London)
for periods of one week to one year. Euribor came into existence in 1999
with the adoption of the euro currency. It does not cover overnight lending
– see Eonia below for that. Euribor is calculated as a weighted average of
unsecured lending transactions undertaken within the euro area by a panel
of 26 banks. They are mostly eurozone nationality banks, but there are some
non-eurozone/international banks. The highest and lowest 15% of quotes
received are eliminated and the remainder are averaged to three decimal places
and published daily around 11am CET. The panel banks are those with the
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highest volume of business in the eurozone money markets: they have a

first-class credit standing and high reputation.
There used to be nearer 40 banks contributing to the daily survey of rates,

but many found themselves embarrassed and exposed to severe fines and legal
action for manipulating Euribor and other rates, so they quit the panel to reduce
further risk. Others, even though they had behaved well in the past, feared the
risk of rogue employees bringing them down, even if it was a small risk – see
Article 8.6.
Article 8.6
UBS joins exodus from Euribor panel

By Daniel Schäfer

UBS is pulling out of the Euribor rate setting panel, thwarting efforts by European
authorities to keep intact the number of banks involved in the fixing process
following the global rate manipulation scandal.
The Swiss lender joins the exodus from the panel by banks including Dutch lender
Rabobank, Citigroup from the US and Bayerische Landesbank in Germany.
This week, Svenska Handelsbanken will become the latest bank to withdraw from
the rate-setting panel according to Euribor-EBF, the organisation that administers
the benchmark.
UBS said: ‘We have decided to withdraw from the Euribor panel and to focus on our
core funding markets Swiss franc and US dollar.’
The Swiss lender added that this was related to a strategy announced last October
to drastically cut back the investment bank by exiting most of its fixed income
businesses.
UBS is one of three global banks that have paid large fines to US and UK authorities
over involvement in the manipulation of Libor, another benchmark interest rate.
The Euribor panel currently consists of 39 banks. Authorities including the European
Central Bank have been calling on lenders to continue contributing to the fixings
to avoid further damage to the credibility of the benchmark.
Michel Barnier, EU commissioner responsible for the financial sector, said last
month he was considering forcing banks to contribute to the rate-setting process.
Source: Schäfer, D. (2013) UBS joins exodus from Euribor panel, Financial Times, 19 March.
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Figure 8.2 Eonia chart since its beginning

Source: European Central Bank www.ecb.europa.euhttp://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/
quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=198.EON.D.EONIA_TO.RATE
Eonia
Eonia or EONIA (Euro OverNight Index Average) is the effective overnight
rate for the euro, a ‘one-day Euribor’. It is computed as a weighted average of
all overnight unsecured lending transactions in the interbank market initiated
within the European Union and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) coun-
tries by the same 26 panel banks as for Euribor. It is calculated by the European
Central Bank. Figure 8.2 and Article 8.7 illustrate the dramatic effect of the
financial crisis and the long recession on Eonia, with policy makers pushing
down interest rates: before 2008 Eonia remained in the range of 2–6%, today it
hovers just above zero.
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Article 8.7
Eurozone borrowing costs hit

record low
By Christopher Thompson and Elaine Moore

Benchmark overnight borrowing costs in the eurozone have tumbled to a record
low of 0.01% amid worries that Europe’s fragile economic recovery is stagnating.
The move follows a package of measures the European Central Bank announced in
June to further flood the market with liquidity.
‘A low Eonia, along with expectations of further liquidity to come from the ECB,
keeps other money market rates low,’ said Giuseppe Maraffino at Barclays. The
ECB said it would begin charging banks for parking their funds.
But data released last week showed Italy has now slipped back into recession, while
manufacturing figures in Germany were below expectations, fuelling hopes among
some investors that the ECB will do even more to calm febrile markets.
‘Given the clear weakening of European economic activity in the past few weeks
there is hope that the ECB will have to do even more, such as buying asset-backed
securities or other purchases that would inject further liquidity into the system,’
said Vincent Chaigneau at Société Générale.
Yields for two-year German Bunds are now below zero, meaning investors in effect
are paying for the security they receive in short-term German government debt.
This decline has been matched by a fall in yields on Berlin’s benchmark 10-year
debt, which are fast approaching 1%.
‘There has been a flight to quality but it has not led to the typical rebalancing of
portfolios away from risky periphery debt,’ said Gianluca Salford, at JPMorgan.
‘That’s because this is about investors betting that the ECB will not be able to
increase interest rates for years to come.’
Source: Thompson, C. and Moore, E. (2014) Eurozone borrowing costs hit record low,
© The Financial Times 2014. All Rights Reserved.
Tibor, Sibor and Hibor

Many other countries have markets setting rates for lending between domestic
banks. Tibor (Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate) is the rate at which Japanese
banks lend to each other in Japan. In Singapore there is Sibor and in Hong
Kong there is Hibor.
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Federal funds rate and prime rate

In the US, the equivalent to very short-term Libor or Eonia is the Federal
funds rate (Fed funds). This is the daily effective rate at which depository
institutions lend balances to each other overnight, calculated by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York as a volume-weighted average of rates on brokered
trades. This is strongly influenced by the US central bank, the Federal Reserve,
which sets a target rate and then can influence the Fed funds rate by increasing
or lowering the level of cash or near cash reserves the banks have to hold.
Banks often need to borrow from other banks to maintain the required
minimum level of reserves at the Federal Reserve. The lending banks are happy
to lend because they receive a rate of interest and the money is released the
next day (usually). This borrowing is unsecured and so is available only to
the most creditworthy.
Fed funds interest rate – borrowing in the US – and the overnight US dollar
Libor rate – borrowing in the UK – are usually very close to each other because
they are near-perfect substitutes. If they were not close then a bank could make
a profit borrowing in one overnight market and depositing the money in
another. If the US dollar Libor rate is significantly higher, banks needing to
borrow will tend to do so in the Fed funds market and the increased demand
will push up interest rates here, while the absence of demand will encourage
lower rates in the US dollar Libor market. Having said that, they are not perfect
substitutes: the Fed funds rate tends to be slightly lower than US dollar Libor
because of the greater safety in the US with the Federal Reserve overseeing and
backing up the debt market, including deposit insurance. Thus the arbitrage
opportunity is really about the risk premium in London over the Fed funds
rate, but the risk premium is usually pretty small.
The Federal Reserve created vast amounts of new money by buying about
$3 trillion of bonds over the five years to 2014. It funded this by creating
bank reserves. Now that banks have plenty of reserves, interbank lending has
reduced dramatically. This has distorted the Fed funds rate and interrupted
the normal mechanism for adjusting interest rates through central bank inter-
vention (discussed further in Chapter 16). Article 8.8 considers the possibility
of using other measures of short-term dollar borrowing as benchmarks.
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Article 8.8
Fed explores overhaul of key rate

By Robin Harding

The US Federal Reserve is exploring an overhaul of the Federal funds rate – a
benchmark that underlies almost every financial transaction in the world – as it
prepares for an eventual rise in interest rates.
The Fed funds rate is the main measure of overnight US interest rates and is based
on the actual rates reported by brokers for overnight loans between US banks.
According to people familiar with the discussions, the Fed could redefine its main
target rate so that it takes into account a wider range of loans between banks,
making it more stable and reliable.
Concerns have grown about the reliability of the Fed funds rate since the Fed began
buying trillions of dollars of assets during three rounds of quantitative easing.
US banks now have huge amounts of cash and have stopped borrowing or lending
Fed funds, making the market highly illiquid.
With the Fed targeting rates close to zero, the reliability of Fed funds has been
less important but when the Fed starts raising rates – something markets expect
it to do in the middle of next year – it needs to be sure that it is targeting a real
benchmark.
In particular, the Fed is looking at redefining the funds rate to include eurodollar
transactions – dollar loans between banks outside the US markets – as well as tradi-
tional onshore loans between US banks.
Other closely related rates that it could include are those on transactions for bank
commercial paper and wholesale certificates of deposit between banks.
The Fed hinted at a change in the minutes of its June meeting. ‘Participants
examined possibilities for changing the calculation of the effective Federal funds
rate in order to obtain a more robust measure of overnight bank funding rates,’
the minutes said.
Ira Jersey, director of interest rate strategy at Credit Suisse in New York, said
eurodollars were a very close substitute for Fed funds. ‘In general, at nine in the
morning New York time, the only difference between a Fed funds transaction and
a eurodollar transaction is the back end coding,’ he said.
Mr Jersey said he thought including eurodollars would be unlikely to change the
Fed funds rate much right now but the effect when interest rates were higher was
hard to judge.
Source: Harding, R. (2014) Fed explores overhaul of key rate, Financial Times, 10 July.
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The US prime rate is the short-term interest rate US banks charge their
best corporate customers. An average is taken from the largest US banks – the
most well known is the prime rate calculated by The Wall Street Journal. In
approximate terms it is around 3% more than the Fed funds rate. It is used as
a benchmark for other loans, e.g. consumer credit loan interest rates are often
set at so-many basis points above the prime rate, as are credit cards, home
equity loans and lines of credit and auto loans. Many small business loans are
also indexed to the prime rate.
Sonia and Euronia
The Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association (WMBA) is a group of financial

companies which act as intermediaries (interdealer brokers) in arranging the
wholesale money market operations in London. From the transactions they
broker, they provide the details for calculating important benchmark interest
rates for the overnight sterling and euro markets, Sonia and Euronia, all
published daily at 5pm.
Sonia or SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average) was launched in 1997

and is a weighted average of the actual unsecured sterling overnight rates
in deals in London with a size in excess of £25 million brokered by WMBA
members. The weighting is by the principal amount of deposits which were
taken on that day (between midnight and 4.15pm).
Euronia or EURONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average) is the UK equivalent

of Eonia, a weighted average of euro interest rates on unsecured overnight
euro deposits arranged by WMBA members in London. There is no minimum
deal size for Euronia. The weighting is by the principal amount of deposits
which were taken on that day (between midnight and 4pm).
Eurocurrency
Eurocurrency has a large part to play in the interbank market as well as other
lending/borrowing markets. The terms Eurocurrency, Eurodollar, Euroyen,
Euroswissfrancs, etc. have nothing to do with the actual euro currency.
Their name simply means that the currency is deposited and lent outside the
jurisdiction of the country that issued the currency. For example, an Australian
company might make a deposit in yen in a German bank; this would be a
M08_ARNO1799_01_SE_C08.indd 258 7/7/15 8:48 AM

Euroyen deposit. An American corporation might pay a Swiss corporation in

dollars; these dollars are deposited in a Swiss bank and are Eurodollars.
Today, it is not unusual to find an individual/company holding a dollar

account at a UK bank which pays interest in dollars linked to general dollar
rates. This money can be lent to firms wishing to borrow in Eurodollars
prepared to pay interest and capital repayments in dollars. The point is that
both the Euroyen deposit and the Eurodollars are outside the control of their
country of origin – regulators have little influence on this market.3 The market
is a wholesale one with the minimum transaction typically $1m or equivalent
in other currencies.
Growth of the Eurocurrency markets

Eurocurrency markets came about after World War II during the 1950s and
1960s, when substantial amounts of US dollars were deposited in Europe
(mainly in London). Countries outside the US were wary about depositing
their dollars in US banks, where they would be subject to stringent US
regulations. Regulation Q of the US Banking Act of 1933 prohibited banks
from paying interest on commercial demand deposits. Additionally, ‘Iron
Curtain’ countries were worried that their dollars could be seized or frozen
for political reasons if they were placed where the rule of the US authorities
was in force. Countries earning dollars, especially oil producing countries,
looked for banks outside the US where they could deposit their US dollars
and earn market rates of interest. US corporations began to expand into
Europe, and wanted their funds outside the control of the US authorities.
Even after Regulation Q was finally phased out in the 1980s, US banks were
still subject to restrictions and controls, so the Eurocurrency market thrived,
where dollars could be deposited free from US regulations, although strictly
speaking, the term should be international market. Nowadays, there is daily
Eurosecurities business transacted in all of the major financial centres, but
the most significant is London. The Bahamas, Cayman Islands and Singapore
are also significant Eurocurrency centres.
3
Just to confuse everybody, traders in this market often refer to all types of Eurocurrency,
from Eurosterling to Euroyen, as Eurodollars, and do not reserve the term for US dollars.
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Eurocurrency and Eurocredit

To add a little precision: Eurocurrency is short-term (less than one year)
deposits and loans outside the jurisdiction of the country in whose currency
the deposit/loan is denominated. These are term (‘time’) deposits that may be
fixed for just one day (overnight) or for a longer period such as three months.
Deals for three-month lending, for example, are struck one day and then
two business days later the money is actually transferred – the spot delivery.
The funds are repaid with interest at maturity three months after the spot
value date (a bullet repayment structure).
Eurocredit is used for the market in medium- and long-term loans in the
Euromarkets, with lending rates usually linked to (a few basis points above)
the Libor rates. Loans greater than six months normally have interest rates
that are reset every three or six months depending on the Libor rate then pre-
vailing for, say, three-month lending. So a corporate borrower with a two-year
loan that starts off paying three-month Libor plus 150 basis points when
three-month Libor is 3% pays 4.5%. This is expressed as an annual rate – the
borrower will pay only one-quarter of this for three months. If, at the start of
the next three months, the three-month Libor rate has moved to 3.45%, the
corporate will pay 4.95% (annual rate) for three months. Interest on deposits
of more than one year is likely to be paid on an annual or six-monthly basis.
Benefits of the Eurosecurities markets

Companies large enough to use the Eurosecurities markets are able to put
themselves at a competitive advantage vis-à-vis smaller firms.
● The finance available in these markets can be at a lower cost in both trans-
action costs and rates of return offered. There are economies of scale due
to the wholesale nature of the market. The absence of withholding tax on
interest and anonymity encourage lenders to offer lower rates.
● There are fewer rules and regulations, such as needing to obtain official
authorisation to issue or needing to queue to issue, leading to speed,
innovation and lower costs.
● There may be the ability to hedge foreign currency movements. For example,
if a firm has assets denominated in a foreign currency it can be advantageous
to also have liabilities in that same currency to reduce the adverse impact of
exchange rate movements.
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● The borrowing needs of some firms are simply too large for their domestic
markets to supply. To avoid being hampered in expansion plans, large firms
can turn to the international market in finance.
The Eurocurrency market allows countries and corporations to lend and borrow
funds worldwide, picking the financial institution which is the most suitable
regardless of geographic position. While the world economy is thriving, this
works well. However, some spectacular problems were highlighted in 2008.
For example, Iceland’s financial institutions found themselves in trouble after
much of their borrowing in the international debt markets suddenly dried up.
The Eurodollar market has become so deep and broad that it now sets interest
rates back in the mother country of the dollar. A very large proportion of
US domestic commercial loans and commercial paper interest rates are set at
a certain number of basis points above US dollar Libor rates determined by
banks operating out of London.
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M08_ARNO1799_01_SE_C08.indd 262 7/7/15 8:48 AM
CHAPTER 9
TREASURY BILLS AND
COMMERCIAL PAPER
Treasury bills
Throughout the world, government agencies issue Treasury bills (T-bills or
Treasury notes).1 They do not pay a coupon; the return investors receive is the
difference between the purchase price and the selling/redemption price – they
trade at a discount to their face value, and the discount reflects the current rate
of interest on similar securities. They are negotiable securities, which means
that they can easily be traded in the secondary market and thus easily liqui-
dated to release cash. They can be one of the most risk-free forms of investing
(if you are lending to financially stable governments), but pay a lower return
for this reason. T-bills form by far the largest part of the money markets and are
generally issued at auction through a national government agency.
UK Treasury bills
In the UK Treasury bills were first issued by the Bank of England in the early
1700s, when the UK adopted the concept of money as an amount written
on a piece of paper, rather than a piece of metal with intrinsic value. They are
now issued at weekly tenders by the Debt Management Office (DMO) with a
face value or par value of £100 and are sold with a maturity date of one month
(approximately 28 days), three months (approximately 91 days), six months
(approximately 182 days) or twelve months (up to 364 days).2 At each tender,
the DMO publishes the type and amount of bills to be offered the following
week. Bills are initially sold by competitive tender to cash management
1
In Germany and Austria, a Treasury bill is called a Schatzwechsel; in Russia a Gosudarstvennoe
Kratkosrochnoe Obyazatelstvo (GKO); and in France and Canada a Bons du Trésor.
2
In theory 12-month bills can be issued, but to date none has yet been offered for sale.
M09_ARNO1799_01_SE_C09.indd 263 7/7/15 8:49 AM

counterparties (which must be regulated financial institutions) and 28 primary

participants who can bid on behalf of clients and can also in turn sell on the
bills to other investors. Most holders of Treasury bills are financial institutions.
Individuals may buy them, but the minimum purchase amount is £500,000;
above this bidding is in £50,000 increments. Bids are ranked according to the
yield bid, and bills are allotted to those purchasers who submit yields at or
below the yield the DMO thinks necessary to fulfil the amount tendered.
Table 9.1 shows the results from the four sales of Treasury bills which took
place weekly during March 2014, on the 7th, 14th, 21st and 28th. Note that
the issues occurred every few days as the government borrowed more money
or simply replaced maturing debt. Table 9.2 shows the Financial Times tender
results table for the three-month T-bills on 14 and 21 March 2014.
Tenders are held by the DMO on the last business day of each week (i.e. usually
on Fridays), for settlement (paid for) on the following business day, usually
Monday. The redemption date is the day when the face value of the bill (£100)
will be paid to the holder. The T-bills issued at tenders mature on the first busi-
ness day of the week. The nominal amount is the total amount of the face
value of the bills offered at the tender (not what was actually paid for them).
Table 9.1 DMO Treasury bill tender results, 1 March 2014 to 31 March 2014
Tender Issue Redemption Nominal Bid to Average Average

date date date amount cover yield price
(£m) ratio (%) (£)
1 month
07-Mar-14 10-Mar-14 07-Apr-14 2,000 2.21 0.393578 99.969817
14-Mar-14 17-Mar-14 14-Apr-14 2,000 3.30 0.364505 99.972046
21-Mar-14 24-Mar-14 22-Apr-14 2,000 1.85 0.381211 99.969721
28-Mar-14 31-Mar-14 28-Apr-14 2,000 1.62 0.407344 99.968761
3 months
07-Mar-14 10-Mar-14 09-Jun-14 1,500 2.64 0.363186 99.909534
14-Mar-14 17-Mar-14 16-Jun-14 2,000 3.09 0.379104 99.905573
21-Mar-14 24-Mar-14 23-Jun-14 2,000 1.95 0.390464 99.902746
28-Mar-14 31-Mar-14 30-Jun-14 2,000 1.51 0.421457 99.895035
6 months
07-Mar-14 10-Mar-14 08-Sep-14 1,500 2.87 0.409168 99.796392
14-Mar-14 17-Mar-14 15-Sep-14 1,500 3.23 0.394030 99.803910
21-Mar-14 24-Mar-14 22-Sep-14 1,500 2.17 0.400866 99.800515
28-Mar-14 31-Mar-14 29-Sep-14 1,500 1.70 0.422876 99.789585
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9 TREASURY BILLS AND COMMERCIAL PAPER 265
Table 9.2 UK three-month Treasury bill tender results in the Financial Times
Mar 21 Mar 14 Mar 21 Mar 14
Bills in offer £2000m £2000m Lowest accepted yield 0.3300% 0.3400%
Total of application £3894m £6170m Avg. Rate of discount 0.3901% 0.3787%
Total allocated £2000m £2000m Average yield 0.3905% 0.3791%
Highest acpt yield 0.4180% 0.3850% Offer at next tender £2000m £2000m
About allocated 88.10% 75.95% Highest acpt yield 28 days 0.4170% 0.3650%
Information shown relates to the three month tender.

Source: DMO including details of the month tender, see www.dmo.gov.uk
The bid to cover ratio is the ratio of the amount that was actually bid to the
amount of T-bills offered; if the number is greater than 1 it shows that there
were more bids than the amount on offer. Although extremely rare it is not
unknown for an offer to be undersubscribed3 – it is a sign of lack of confidence
in the government’s financial situation and/or indigestion in a market faced
with an exceptionally high volume of government borrowing.
Treasury bills in March 2014 yielded a rate as low as 0.364505% for one month
T-bills, 0.363186% for 3M T-bills and 0.394030% for 6M T-bills (Table 9.1). The
average price is the average of the price handed over by bidders for bills which
will pay the holders of the bills £100 in one month, three months or six
months.
Those participants that wish to purchase compete in the weekly tender

by placing bids based on the yield they will accept. The bids are gathered
and different yield prices accepted. The DMO determines what is the highest
accepted yield (and therefore the lowest purchase price) needed to sell the
requisite amount of bills and allocates bills to purchasers bidding below
this yield. For the three-month 21 March tender some bidders achieved
a yield of 0.418% whereas others offered and received merely 0.33%.
Purchasers bidding at the accepted yield may not receive the amount for
which they bid.
3
This has happened only twice for UK Treasury bills, both times in 2008, with a six-month
bill offered for sale in October and a three-month bill offered for sale in May.
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An important consideration to take note of when undertaking any calculations

associated with T-bills around the world (and other money market securities)
is the day count convention. For ease of calculation, some countries/markets
use a 30-day month and 360-day year, rather than the actual variable days in a
month and a 365-day year, or 366 in a leap year. This can get complicated
when the repayment date falls on the 31st of a month, and there are various
methods for dealing with this. Other markets use the actual number of days
until redemption of the instrument and the actual number of days in a year.
Great care must always be taken to check which day count convention is being
used and to understand terminology, e.g. actual/360, 360/360, actual/actual,
actual/365 and so on – it is imperative that an investor knows which conven-
tion is being used and how it works. The UK still uses the 365-day year for
Treasury securities.
The DMO published results for the tender on the 21 March for the 23 June
bill are shown in Table 9.3. From this it can be noted that the bill was over-
tendered by a factor of 1.95, i.e. the amount on offer was £2 billion (at face
value), there were actual bids offered totalling nearly £4 billion and about 88%
of the bidders achieved the highest yield of 0.418%.
During the life of the bill, its value fluctuates daily as it is traded between inves-
tors – see Table 9.4, which gives the daily March and April 2014 figures for this
particular bill. The yield shown is the (annual) return that a purchaser in the
secondary market will achieve between purchase date and maturity date. Note:
Table 9.3 Results of tender on three-month T-bill ISIN code: GB00B7P4VP73
Lowest accepted yield 0.330000
Average yield 0.390464
Highest accepted yield 0.418000 (About 88.10% allotted)
Average rate of discount (%) 0.390084
Average price per £100 nominal (£) 99.902746
Amount tendered for (£) 3,894,400,000.00
Amount on offer (£) 2,000,000,000.00
Bid to cover ratio 1.95
Amount allocated (£) 2,000,000,000.00
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Table 9.4 Daily trading prices for Treasury bill GB00B7P4VP73, 21 March to 16 April
2014
ISIN code Redemption Close of Price Yield

date business date (£) (%)
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 21-Mar-14 99.903464 0.388
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 24-Mar-14 99.905141 0.385
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 25-Mar-14 99.906352 0.384
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 26-Mar-14 99.907558 0.384
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 27-Mar-14 99.908762 0.383
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 28-Mar-14 99.911712 0.384
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 31-Mar-14 99.913389 0.381
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 01-Apr-14 99.914615 0.380
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 02-Apr-14 99.915802 0.380
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 03-Apr-14 99.916987 0.379
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 04-Apr-14 99.919921 0.380
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 07-Apr-14 99.921688 0.376
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 08-Apr-14 99.922855 0.376
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 09-Apr-14 99.924018 0.375
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 10-Apr-14 99.925176 0.374
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 11-Apr-14 99.926169 0.385
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 14-Apr-14 99.929775 0.372
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 15-Apr-14 99.930889 0.371
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 16-Apr-14 99.932055 0.370
the price gravitates towards par value as the day of maturity draws nearer
because on redemption day, 23 June 2014, the holder will receive the face
value of £100.
Emerging market Treasury bills

Many emerging market4 economies are now able to issue Treasury bills in their
own currencies, while some others concentrate issuance in one of the major
4
Not yet fully developed economies.
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currencies of the world, especially the US dollar. By borrowing in the US dollar

or another international currency the lenders can borrow at lower interest
rates because international lenders are less fearful of a decline in the local cur-
rency, but the downside is that when the country has to redeem the T-bills, it
faces the risk that the dollar has risen against the local currency and so more
local currency than initially thought needs to be paid out to lenders. This prob-
lem has caused financial crises in a number of countries over the years, e.g.
Mexico in 1995, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1999.
US Treasury bills
US Treasury bills are sold by Treasury Direct (www.treasurydirect.gov), which
is part of the US Department of the Treasury. They range in maturity from a
few days to 52 weeks, with 4-week (28 days), 13-week (91 days) and 26-week
(182 days) bills being the most common. They are sold at a discount to par
value by auction every week, except for the 52-week bills which are auctioned
every 4 weeks. The buyers include securities’ houses, banks, institutional
investors and private investors. The bidders can bid for the bills in two ways
(they have to choose one route or the other at the outset):
● Competitive. This is where potential buyers specify the minimum discount

rate or yield they are willing to accept. No single bidder may bid for more
than 35% of the total on offer. These bids may be:
a Accepted in the full amount the bidder wanted if the discount rate they
specified is less than the discount rate set by the auction. This threshold
rate is determined by the Treasury, which, when all the bids are gathered
in, sets the level of discount that will shift the bill quantity required.
Competitive bids are accepted in ascending order until the quantity
reaches the amount offered.
b Accepted only partially (the bidder does not receive the full amount of
bills bid for) if their bid is the same as the cut-off level that sells the
amount of bills the government is trying to sell in that auction.
c Rejected if the bidder stated a level of discount that is higher than that set
at the auction.
● Non-competitive. The buyer agrees to accept the rate or yield which is set at
the auction, in other words, the price set by other investors. The offer to
buy can be submitted via the internet. With a non-competitive bid buyers
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Table 9.5 US Treasury bills auctioned March 2014
CUSIP Security Auction Issue Maturity Price Average/ Bid to

term date date date per $100 median cover
discount ratio
rate
912796DE6 13-week 03/31/14 04/03/14 07/03/14 99.988625 0.04% 4.83
912796DX4 26-week 03/31/14 04/03/15 10/02/14 99.967139 0.06% 5.18
912796CJ6 4-week 03/25/14 03/27/14 04/24/14 99.996500 0.04% 4.65
912796BP3 13-week 03/24/14 03/27/14 06/26/14 99.987361 0.04% 4.61
912796DW6 26-week 03/24/14 03/27/14 09/25/14 99.962083 0.07% 5.05
912796CH0 4-week 03/18/14 03/20/14 04/17/14 99.995333 0.06% 4.27
912796DD8 13-week 03/17/14 03/20/14 06/19/14 99.987361 0.05% 4.42
912796CB3 26-week 03/17/14 03/20/14 09/18/14 99.959556 0.08% 4.86
912796CG2 4-week 03/11/14 03/13/14 04/10/14 99.995722 0.05% 4.11
912796DC0 13-week 03/10/14 03/13/14 06/12/14 99.987361 0.05% 4.76
912796DV8 26-week 03/10/14 03/13/14 09/11/14 99.959556 0.08% 4.97
912796BA6 4-week 03/04/14 03/06/14 04/03/14 99.996500 0.04% 3.93
912796DP1 52-week 03/04/14 03/06/14 03/05/15 99.878667 0.12% 4.85
912796DA4 13-week 03/03/14 03/06/14 06/05/14 99.987361 0.04% 5.02
912796DS5 26-week 03/03/14 03/06/14 09/04/14 99.959556 0.08% 4.46
Source: www.treasurydirect.gov
are guaranteed to receive the full amount of bills they wanted up to a

maximum of $5 million. This is a good method for individual investors
who are not expert security traders and therefore can avoid calculating bill
discount rates.
All bidders, competitive and non-competitive, receive the same discount rate,
and therefore the same yield, as the highest accepted bid and so pay the same
amount for their bills (contrasting with UK bills, where bidders pay the
amount at which they tendered).
Individuals may bid and the minimum purchase is a lowly $100, unlike in the
UK where the minimum bid is £500,000 and individuals may not bid them-
selves but hold UK Treasury bills only through one of the approved bidders.
Table 9.5 gives the results of US T-bill auctions held during March 2014. US
T-bill interest is calculated on an actual/360 annual basis.
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Commercial paper
Commercial paper (CP) is an unsecured short-term instrument of debt, issued
primarily by corporations, banks and other financial institutions to help meet
the financing requirements of their accounts receivable (debtors), inventories
(stock) and other short-term cash needs, but can also be issued by municipali-
ties. The issue and purchase of commercial paper is one means by which the
largest commercial organisations can avoid paying a bank intermediary a mid-
dleman fee for linking borrower and lender, e.g. corporations can avoid taking
out loans from a bank and go direct to the financial market lenders.
Called ‘paper’ because originally the promissory note was written on a piece of
paper, CP is now more usually dealt with electronically, but is still a promise to
pay the holder the designated sum on the designated date. Buyers include
money market funds, investment firms, mutual funds, insurance companies,
pension funds, governments and banks. Also corporations with temporary
surpluses of cash are able to put that money to use by lending it directly to
other commercial firms at a higher effective rate of interest than they might
have received by depositing the funds in a bank. Investors in CP often buy it
from dealers, which are usually banks. Settlement (actual transfer) is normally
the same day as the deal is struck (known as T+0).
One of the advantages of CP is its flexibility in terms of maturity. While it has

an average maturity of about 40 days, with the normal range being from 30 to
90 days, it can be 270 days in the US and up to a year in some other countries.
Normally CP is issued at a discount rather than the borrower being required
to pay interest – thus the face value (amount paid on redemption) will be
higher than the amount paid for the paper at issuance.5 The discount, and
the yield gained by the lender, tends to be higher than that for T-bills
because there is a greater risk of default and because there is less liquidity in the
secondary market.
This source of finance is in general available only to the most respected

corporations with the highest credit ratings given the absence (usually) of
assets pledged to be used to pay the obligation should the borrower fail to
do so by other means. Most commercial paper is issued and traded among
institutions in denominations of $100,000 or more, but some is issued in
smaller denominations.
5
A small amount of commercial paper is issued with interest payments, but this is rare.
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Large and frequent borrowers may pay issuance costs of merely one or two
basis points. Some companies, such as General Electric, are such frequent issuers
of CP that they employ in-house teams to do the selling – direct placement.
Other issuers ask dealers (usually employed by investment banks) to either buy
the issue with the expectation of selling it on (firm commitment underwrit-
ing) or use ‘their best endeavours’ to find lenders. These two methods are
dealer-directed offers.
Short-term debt credit ratings

The main buyers, such as money market funds, are often restricted to having
the bulk of their portfolios invested in those issues regarded as carrying a low
risk of short-term vulnerability to default. Commercial paper is often rated by
the credit rating agencies, which focus on the possibility of the issuer running
out of cash over the life of the paper, say 30 days, rather than the solvency of
the business in the long run. Moody’s has a very simple scale, with P-1, P-2
and P-3 all being investment grade and anything else being Not Prime – see
Table 9.6.
With Standard & Poor’s, A-3 is on the cusp of investment to non-investment

grade – see Table 9.7. Fitch has F1+, F1, F2 and F3 as investment grade and B, C
and D for speculative grade.
Demand is very limited for lower-rated issues. Even moving from Prime-1 to
Prime-2 means much greater difficulty in finding lenders – see Article 9.1.
Table 9.6 Moody’s short-term debt credit ratings
Global Short-Term Rating Scale
P-1 Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-1 have a superior ability to repay
short-term debt obligations.
P-2 Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-2 have a strong ability to repay short-
term debt obligations.
P-3 Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Prime-3 have an acceptable ability to repay
short-term obligations.
NP Issuers (or supporting institutions) rated Not Prime do not fall within any of the Prime
rating categories.
Source: www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004
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Table 9.7 Standard & Poor’s short-term debt credit ratings
Short-Term Issue Credit Ratings
Category Definition
A-1 A short-term obligation rated ‘A-1’ is rated in the highest category by

Standard & Poor’s. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment
on the obligation is strong. Within this category, certain obligations are
designated with a plus sign (+). This indicates that the obligor’s capacity to
meet its financial commitment on these obligations is extremely strong.
A-2 A short-term obligation rated ‘A-2’ is somewhat more susceptible to the

adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than
obligations in higher rating categories. However, the obligor’s capacity to meet
its financial commitment on the obligation is satisfactory.
A-3 A short-term obligation rated ‘A-3’ exhibits adequate protection parameters.

However, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more
likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial
commitment on the obligation.
B A short-term obligation rated ‘B’ is regarded as vulnerable and has significant

speculative characteristics. The obligor currently has the capacity to meet its
financial commitments; however, it faces major ongoing uncertainties which
could lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity to meet its financial
commitments.
C A short-term obligation rated ‘C’ is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is

dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for
the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.
D A short-term obligation rated ‘D’ is in payment default. The ‘D’ rating category
is used when payments on an obligation are not made on the date due,
unless Standard & Poor’s believes that such payments will be made within
any stated grace period. However, any stated grace period longer than five
business days will be treated as five business days. The ‘D’ rating also will be
used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action if
payments on an obligation are jeopardized.
Source: www.standardandpoors.com/spf/general/
RatingsDirect_Commentary_979212_06_22_2012_12_42_54.pdf
In some countries using credit rating agencies to rate CP is rare, with investors
buying paper on the basis of the strength of the name of the organisation
issuing it – only the largest, most well known and trusted can issue in these
places.
The secondary market in CP is weak or non-existent – while dealers might be

found who will buy CP from a lender, it is not easy to complete such deals and
can be costly. One way of investing in it while retaining liquidity is to invest
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Article 9.1
ADP: commercial success

The Lex team

Credit ratings matter. But not always the ones that get the most attention.
Fortunately ADP, the payroll processing mainstay, knows the difference. In early
April, after it announced a spin-off of its Dealer Services business – a unit that pro-
vides software to motor sellers – ADP lost its rarefied AAA rating. Perhaps that
stung. But the spin-off still looks like a canny move for shareholders. And just as
important, ADP managed to keep its top-tier commercial paper rating that is cen-
tral to its business model.
Since ADP is an intermediary that makes payroll for employees and withholds
taxes for the government on behalf of its client companies, it happens to maintain
a large cash portfolio or ‘float’. That float totalled $28bn at the end of the last
quarter. It chooses to invest that money in medium-term bonds that generate
interest income that flows straight to earnings. But with the cash tied up in these
investments, it relies on commercial paper – short-term debt that matures in less
than a year and these days costs about 0.2% – to fund working capital.
Commercial paper is typically available to companies of investment grade quality.
However, during the credit crisis of 2008 even borrowers who had the A-2/P-2 rating,
the second-highest CP ranking, were locked out of that market.
The ADP Dealer Services business constitutes only about 15% of ADP’s current
revenue and has been estimated to be worth $5bn (ADP’s current market cap is
$37bn). With its debt capacity, the motor business will send back $700m in cash
to ADP that will be used to buy back shares. And so ADP will remain a massive
business, but only focused on payroll and other human resource functions such as
benefits and recruiting management. With its formidable size, its CP rating of
A-1/P-1 went untouched. The perfect outcome, if you happened to notice.
Source: Lex column (2014) ADP: commercial success, Financial Times, 21 April.
via a money market fund: the fund buys a range of CP issues (and other instru-
ments) and so, while it is committed to hold each CP to maturity, because it is
well diversified, with many securities maturing every day, it is able to pay out
to money market fund investors when they demand it. The Federal Reserve
Board posts the current rates being paid on US commercial paper by non-
financial and financial firms on its website – see Table 9.8.
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Table 9.8 US Federal Reserve Federal funds rate and examples of commercial paper
rates in August 2014, per cent annualised
Instruments 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 Week ending 2014

Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug Aug
Aug Aug
25 26 27 28 29
29 22
Federal funds (effective) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09
Commercial paper
Non-financial
1-month 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.08
2-month 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09
3-month 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Financial
1-month 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09
2-month 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
3-month 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Source: Data from www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/current/
Note issuance facility (NIF)

Note issuance facilities (variously known as revolving underwriting facilities,
RUFs, note purchase facilities, commercial paper programmes and Euronote
facilities) were developed as services to large corporations wanting to borrow
by selling commercial paper or medium-term notes into the financial markets.
The largest corporations often expect to be selling a series of different CPs or
MTNs issues over 5–7 years. Instead of handling each individual issue them-
selves as the need arises they can go to an arranging bank(s) at the outset,
which will, at various points over the, say, five years, approach a panel of other
banks to ask them to purchase the debt as it becomes needed. The loan obliga-
tion can be in a currency that suits the borrower at the time. The borrower can
also select the length of life of the paper (say, 14 days or 105 days) and whether
it pays fixed or floating interest rates.
If there is a time when it is difficult to sell the paper to the banks then the
borrower can turn to those banks that have signed up to be underwriters of the
facility to buy the issue, or, depending on the deal, borrow from the bank or
banks in the syndicate. Underwriters take a fee for these guarantees. Most of
M09_ARNO1799_01_SE_C09.indd 274 7/7/15 8:49 AM

the time they do not have to do anything, but occasionally, often when the
market is troubled, they have to step in.
Some people draw a distinction between an NIF and an RUF: with an RUF the
underwriting banks agree to provide loans should the CP/MTN issue fail, but
under an NIF they could either lend or purchase the outstanding CP or notes.
However, these definitions do not seem to be rigidly applied.
By allowing borrowers the choice at each point of borrowing of either drawing
a loan from the bank(s) at an agreed spread over Libor or selling CP/MTN
through banks, the borrower gets the best of both worlds: a bank loan (com-
mitted bank facility) fallback, or access to the financial markets in corporate
debt instruments. Which is chosen depends on interest rates at the time. One-
off fees are payable for arrangement and annual fees for bank participation
(actual lending) and commitment (standing ready to lend).
An insider’s view
Opus plc agrees a £300 million NIF with a bank for six years. This lead bank asks other
banks to join the syndicate. Opus obtains a credit rating for commercial paper that
it might issue. Opus can repay funds drawn down under the NIF at will, without penalty.
Opus decides it would like to borrow £150 million starting in eight days for a six-month
period. It tells the lead bank that it would like either to take a six-month loan at the
rate stated in the NIF loan agreement, which is Libor + 95bp, or to issue CP to a
predetermined syndicate of banks and dealers at the rate currently being offered
by that dealer group. Currently, six-month Libor is 1.4%, thus the loan will cost 2.35%
(annual rate) for six months. The lead bank comes back with the CP interest rate
of 2.56%, so Opus decides to exercise its right under the NIF to borrow the £150
million from the banks. For the remaining five and a half years Opus will have the
right to repay and then take out fresh loans or issue fresh CPs as the need arises.
Really well-known creditworthy issuers can opt to avoid the cost of maintain-
ing the backstop option of access to these loans (arrangement and participa-
tion fees) and simply rely on their ability to periodically attract lenders in the
CP market under the NIF framework, but they still pay for swinglines and
backup. That is, to obtain a credit rating CP issuers must have unused credit
lines from banks to provide liquidity in the event of an interruption to the CP
market preventing rolling over (the issue of new CP as old ones mature).
Swinglines are bank commitments to provide same-day credit facilities to
cover a few days of the CP maturities. Backup lines, sometimes uncommitted,
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are available for the longer maturities. There is a variety of liquidity backups
that can be acceptable for this purpose, including cash and securities, but most
CP issuers rely on credit lines from banks.
US commercial paper (USCP)

The largest commercial paper market in the world, by far, is the US, distantly
followed by Japan, Canada, France, the UK and other developed economies.
According to US law, because its maturity is less than 270 days, commercial paper
does not have to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
main US financial regulator, and therefore is not subject to the time-consuming
and costly process required by US federal regulations. Figure 9.1 gives data for
USCP from 1992. The amount of CP outstanding peaked in 2006 at nearly $2
trillion, of which half was asset-backed CP, before succumbing to the world-
wide recession and loss of confidence and falling to around $1 trillion.
Now about one-third is asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), i.e. com-

mercial paper secured on the collateral of assets – for example, the issuer has
the right to receive monthly interest from mortgage payers, credit card holders,
vehicle loans or some other regular income and uses the cash flow from these
assets to pay the commercial paper when it becomes due and to provide collateral.
The issuers of ABCP are usually special entities/companies set up by a bank.
These, special purpose vehicles (SPVs) or structured investment vehicles
(SIVs) or conduits, buy the assets (rights to mortgage interest, etc.) after rais-
ing money from issuing commercial paper. Thus they are ‘bankruptcy remote’
from the parent company that supplied the assets – if they go bust the parent
bank can still survive. Also they are perceived as less risky for the investors
because of the security of the assigned assets, so if the parent goes bust the
lenders still have the collateral (right to mortgage income, etc.) in the conduit.
At least that was the theory, but many conduits and their parent banks disap-
peared or nearly blew up in 2008 when they could not roll over the ABCP as
they were accustomed to doing. When the financial crisis occurred many of these
cash flows dried up, causing major problems for both issuers and holders of CP.
Rolling over CP became difficult, confidence in this market plummeted and com-
panies found it nearly impossible to obtain the CP funding on which they relied.
The commercial paper market can be very influential in corporate life. For
example, in 2005, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the commercial paper
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Figure 9.1 US commercial paper outstanding, 1992–2013

Source: Data from www.federalreserve.gov
of Ford and General Motors, making their commercial paper unattractive to

investors, leading to an increase in the cost of financing to these companies
and reducing the global confidence in both the companies and their products.
This contributed to their financial crisis in 2009, when General Motors was
forced into bankruptcy.
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Eurocommercial paper
Eurocommercial paper (Euro-CP) is paper that is issued and placed outside
the jurisdiction of the country in whose currency it is denominated. So an
American corporation might issue commercial paper denominated in Japanese
yen outside of the control of the Japanese authorities and this is classified as
Eurocommercial paper. The most common denominations are the euro, US
dollar and GB pound, and the main place of issue is London.
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CHAPTER 10
REPURCHASE
AGREEMENTS AND
CERTIFICATES OF
DEPOSIT
Repurchase agreements (repos)

A repo is a way of borrowing large amounts of money for a short time using a
sale and repurchase agreement in which securities are sold for cash at an agreed
price with a promise to buy them back, or identical ones, at a specified (higher)
price at a future date. The interest on the agreement is the difference between
the initial sale price and the agreed buy-back.
One, or a few days, later:
Because the agreements provide collateral backup for the lender, most often in
the form of government-backed securities such as Treasury bills, the interest rate
is lower than on a typical unsecured loan from a bank. If the borrower defaults
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on its obligations to buy back on maturity the lender can hold on to or sell the
securities they bought in the first leg of the repo. In the absence of such a
default if a coupon is payable on bonds during the term of the repo the original
owner receives it, maintaining the same economic exposure to the security as
though the economic ownership had not been sold. Thus, despite legal title to
the securities being transferred, economic benefits and market risk are retained,
so if the price of the security falls in the market it is the original owner who
suffers the capital loss.
Repos have the advantage that they can be tailor-made to suit circumstances
– the maturity can be any number of days and the amount fully variable,
whereas many other forms of lending via financial securities tend to be for
specific amounts and periods of time.
Repos are used very regularly by banks and other financial institutions to
borrow large amounts of money from each other. Secured lending, such as
repo lending, increased in volume following the financial crisis as more banks,
etc. became reluctant to participate in unsecured lending, deeming it too risky.
Companies do use the repo markets, but much less frequently than the banks
do. This market is also manipulated by central banks to manage their mone-
tary policy and maintain stability in their economy (see Chapter 16).
The term for repos is usually between 1 and 14 days, but can be up to a year,
and occasionally there is no end date, an open repo. Overnight repos are the
most common type, where the repurchase takes place the next day. Repos are
useful for institutions holding large quantities of money market securities
such as T-bills. They can gain access to liquidity through the repo for a few
days while maintaining a high level of inventory in short-term securities.
Example 10.1
Repurchase agreement
A high street bank has the need to borrow £26 million for 14 days. It agrees to sell
a portfolio of its financial assets, in this case government bonds, to a lender for £26
million. An agreement is drawn up (a repo) by which the bank agrees to repurchase
the portfolio 14 days later for £26,005,285.48. The extra amount of £5,285.48
represents the repo rate of interest (an annual rate of 0.53%) on £26 million over
14 days.1 The sterling market day count basis is actual/365.
1
The formula for this calculation can be found in Chapter 14.
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10 REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT 281
A reverse repo (RRP) is the lender’s side of the transaction, an agreement in

which securities are purchased with a promise to sell them back at an agreed
price at a future date. Traders may do this to gain interest. Alternatively, it
could be to cover another market transaction. For example, a trading house
may need to obtain some Treasury bills or bonds temporarily because it has
shorted them – sold them before buying – and needs to find a supply to meet
its obligations, so it places a reverse repo order to get an inflow of the securities
now. In a transaction, the terms repo and reverse repo are used according to
which party initiated the transaction, i.e. if a seller initiates the transaction, it
is a repo; if the transaction is initiated by a buyer, it is a reverse repo.
Example 10.2
Reverse repo
A bank has £45 million of spare cash for one day. A reverse repo agreement is
drawn up, by which the bank agrees to buy £45 million of government securities
from a borrower and sell them back the next day for £45,000,517.81. The extra
amount of £517.81 represents overnight interest on £45 million at an annual rate
of 0.42%.2
Repo deals are usually individually negotiated between the two parties
(bilateral repos) and are therefore designed to suit the length of time of
borrowing and the amount for each of them, thus there is usually little need
for redemption before the agreed date. However, if circumstances change
and the lender needs the money quickly it might be possible to arrange an
off-setting reverse repo transaction.
Traditionally banks formed the largest group of borrowers in the repo markets,
but now, as Article 10.1 makes clear, hedge funds, property funds and mutual
funds have overtaken them.
2
The formula for this calculation can be found in Chapter 14.
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Article 10.1
Big investors replace banks in $4.2tn

repo market
By Tracy Alloway

Big investors, including hedge funds, mutual funds and real estate trusts, are
replacing banks as the biggest users of the overnight funding market that played a
key role in the financial crisis.
The repo market, in which borrowers pledge securities as collateral against very
short-term loans, was once a popular method for banks to source cheap financing.
But the strategy proved destabilising in 2008, when lenders in the repo market lost
confidence in mortgage-backed collateral and pulled back on funding.
Since 2008, the repo market has been shrinking as banks have shifted to longer-
term financing in response to new regulatory capital rules and other post-crisis
pressures. What remains of the $4.2tn market is increasingly being taken up by
non-bank entities such as real estate investment trusts (Reits), mutual funds and
hedge funds, turning to repo to boost returns during an era of low rates. By using
more borrowed money, or leverage, they can take larger positions, but they are also
taking a bet that markets will remain stable.
The growing use of repo has been particularly marked among Reits, which have
overtaken banks and broker-dealers as the largest borrowers in the market. To
purchase long-term mortgage assets, Reits have increased their repo borrowings to
$281bn, up from $90.4bn in 2009.
Closed-end funds, which invest in assets ranging from corporate bonds to muni-
cipal debt, also have increased their borrowing in the repo market, from $2.74bn at
the end of 2007 to almost $8bn now, according to Fitch Ratings data.
Industry participants say there is ample anecdotal evidence that other types of big
investors are lending out more of their assets to generate greater returns.
‘It’s becoming more of a popular strategy,’ said one repo specialist at a large bank.
‘It’s an opportunity to enhance yield and hit the return hurdles that investors are
looking for.’
Closed-end funds have historically used leverage to help increase their returns. ‘In
the low interest rate environment, repo is very attractive,’ said Yuriy Layvand,
who analyses closed-end funds at Fitch. ‘They’re taking that money and investing
it further out in the yield curve in fixed income assets.’
Additional reporting by Michael Mackenzie.
Source: Alloway, T. (2014) Big investors replace banks in $4.2tn repo market, Financial Times,
29 May.
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Generals, specifics and specials

Repos may be backed by general collateral (GC repos) where the securities are
fungible and acceptable to the cash lender; the lender of funds is willing to
accept any of a variety of Treasury and other related securities as collateral, as
long as it is of the required credit quality. An alternative is specific repos,
where the collateral is a specified security.
Special collateral repos, ‘specials’, are used extensively in the financial mar-
kets. Here the lender designates a particular security as the only acceptable
collateral. Dealers and others lend money on special collateral repos in order to
borrow specific securities needed to deliver against short sales. Superficially,
this sounds the same as a specific repo. The key difference is that a special has
a repo interest rate that is lower than the GC repo rate. Also there is exceptional
specific demand in the cash market for those particular bonds trading ‘on spe-
cial’. Clearly, not all repo rates with a precisely defined agreed security are
below the GC repo rate. Such issues could be called ‘specifics’ but should not be
called ‘specials’.
To be clear: specials are often used to cover short sales where a dealer sells secur-
ities it does not own but still needs to deliver. It then must obtain the desig-
nated securities through a repo – a stock-driven transaction. It might be so
keen to obtain the securities that it will hand over cash for them, expecting
little extra cash on the second leg in the repo. The interest rate on a special
collateral RP is commonly called a specials rate.
From the perspective of the institution that happens to be holding the desig-
nated securities, it can gain from temporarily selling them through a repo. This
may make sense even if it has no need to borrow money at that time. For exam-
ple, if the specials rate is 1% per annum, money could be borrowed at this rate
using the securities as collateral. This money can then be lent out in the GC
repo market. If the interest rate here is 1.4% then a profit can be achieved on
the interest rate difference.
There are times when the supply of particular securities is limited. Then the
specials rate for the security may be significantly below the general collateral
rate. When interest rates are very low, as in 2014 in the eurozone, the repo
interest can be negative: the cash transferred in the second leg is less than that
in the first.
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Benchmarks
In the UK a benchmark for interest charged on repos with a maturity one day
later is arrived at daily by the WMBA by consulting a group of interdealer
brokers on the rates being charged in the market place with lenders and
borrowers who use brokers to transact. The rate is called RONIA or Ronia,
the Repurchase Overnight Index Average. This overnight funding rate is the
weighted average rate to four decimal places of all secured sterling overnight
cash transactions brokered in London by contributing WMBA member firms
between midnight and 4.15pm with all counterparties regardless of deal size.
The weighting is according to the principal amount of deposits which were
taken on that day. The gilts bought and repurchased for these deals are deliv-
ered via the settlement system called CREST. The borrowing member has gilts
on its account to the required value delivered automatically to the CREST
account of the money lender. Some advocates believe that Ronia has the poten-
tial to take over from the interbank rate in providing the ‘risk-free’ interest
benchmark – after all, it has collateral backup whereas Libor does not, and
it is based on actual transactions.
For euro-denominated repos in the eurozone we have benchmarks calculated

daily by the interdealer broker ICAP BrokerTec and fixed-income electronic
trading platform MTS. Together they produce the RepoFunds Rate indices
based on trades executed through their electronic platforms. These are for one-
day repos using government bonds. The main benchmark combines the repos
issued in all the eurozone countries, but there are also repo benchmarks for
individual German, French and Italian repos using their government bonds
and bills as collateral. RepoFunds Rate indices are reported on an actual/360 day
count convention and are published at 18:35 UK/19:35 CET via Bloomberg
and Reuters. They can also be seen at www.repofundsrate.com – see Table 10.1,
Table 10.1 Euro overnight repo rates, 8 September 2014
Value (%) Index Vol (€m) Initial Vol (€m)
RFR Euro –0.028 167789 219635

RFR France –0.045 27942 38162
RFR Germany –0.059 48231 67208
RFR Italy 0.01 58149 70637
Source: www.repofundsrate.com/overview.htm#
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showing average repo rates combining general collateral and specific collateral
trades. Note that average interest rates are below zero for three indices. In other
words, for a proportion of these deals market participants are willing to pay
interest on money they lend. The market makers and other dealers are using
the repo market to borrow bonds that are in strong demand in the cash market
(and therefore sometimes scarce) in order to fulfil delivery commitments on
sales of those bonds in the cash market.
The STOXX® GC Pooling index is a benchmark for secured euro lending trans-
actions and binding quotations that take place on the Eurex Repo GC Pooling
Market. These range from overnight to 12-month terms. Eurex Repo also
organises a Swiss Franc Repo Market for financial institutions to borrow and
lend in the interbank repo market. A wide range of high-quality fixed-income
securities apart from government bonds and bills is accepted by the market
participants with terms from intraday up to 12 months.
In America, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation DTCC GCF Repo
Indices track the average daily interest rate paid for the most-traded repo con-
tracts for the sale and repurchase of (1) US Treasury bills, (2) federal agency
securities and (3) mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. Table 10.2 shows the extraordinarily low rates on 9 September
2014 – less than 0.1% per annum. Figure 10.1 tracks how US repo rates changed
over a year – the lowest line is for the strongest collateral, Treasury bonds and
bills, the middle line is for federal agency securities and the highest line is for
mortgage-backed securities. Figure 10.2 displays the amount borrowed: bil-
lions every day. The interest on dollar repos is based on actual number of days
of the deal divided into a 360-day year.
In the US, the Federal Reserve of New York section known as The Desk uses
repos and reverse repos for monetary policy, adding or draining reserves of
Table 10.2 US repo rates as reported by the Depository Trust and Clearing
Corporation for 9 September 2014
Security Latest 1-week 52-week Par value

(billions USD)
High Low
Agency 0.076 0.094 0.261 0.020 15.780

MBS 0.082 0.104 0.286 0.019 68.796
Treasury 0.067 0.099 0.255 0.010 89.796
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Figure 10.1 US repo rates of interest, September 2013 to 9 September 2014 as

measured by the DTCC GCF Repo Index®
Source: www.dtcc.com/charts/dtcc-gcf-repo-index.aspx
Figure 10.2 US repo volume of transactions September 2013 to 9 September 2014.

The first column is agency securities, the second is mortgage-backed securities and
the third Treasury
Source: www.dtcc.com/charts/dtcc-gcf-repo-index.aspx
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cash to and from the banking system. Repos and reverse repos are arranged by
auction among the 21 primary dealers and the 49 reverse repo counterparties
approved by the Fed, all of them respected banking/broking institutions. Both
primary dealers and reverse repo counterparties must have substantial assets.
In 2014 the Fed embarked on greater intervention in the repo market so that it
could influence short-term interest rates as the economic recovery took hold
Article 10.2
New York Federal Reserve takes on

key role in repo market
By Tracy Alloway and Michael Mackenzie

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has emerged as the single largest player in
an important segment of the short-term lending market that was at the epicentre
of the financial crisis.
The Fed’s decision to quadruple its trading with government money market funds
in the repurchase or ‘repo market’ is a sign that the central bank is now engaging
more directly with the shadow banking system at the expense of large Wall Street
banks.
Historically, the repo market was where big banks pawned out their securities such
as Treasury bonds to lenders including money market funds, insurers and mutual
funds, in exchange for short-term financing. Now the Fed is stepping in to trade as
well as it prepares to end its current near-zero interest rate policy.
Armed with a balance sheet of $4.3tn of bonds purchased during quantitative
easing, the Fed is using what it calls its reverse repo programme, or RRP, to trade
with money funds at a time when tough new regulatory standards have made
such borrowing less attractive for the banks.
Rather than lending to the banks, money market funds have sharply boosted their
dealings with the US central bank.
Between September 2013 and the end of May, government money market funds
increased their use of repo trades with the New York Fed by $65bn to a total of
$87bn, while decreasing their repo holdings with dealer-banks by $38bn, according
to a study by Fitch Ratings.
The growing presence of the Fed in repo is a signal that it is testing new ways to
control short-term interest rates once it starts tightening monetary policy.
➨
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When official short-term rates are eventually pushed higher, the Fed plans to use
the RRP to drain cash from the financial system via short-term loans of Treasuries
from its huge balance sheet.
Robert Grossman, managing director at Fitch, said the change in the Fed’s pre-
sence in the repo market had been dramatic and that the central bank could use
RRP to significantly escalate its role.
Source: Alloway, T. and Mackenzie, M. (2014) New York Federal Reserve takes on key role in
repo market, Financial Times, 19 June.
Haircuts
Although the securities bought and sold are considered relatively safe collat-
eral for the lender of the cash, there is always the danger that the price of the
bills, etc. might fluctuate during the period of the agreement to the detriment
of the buyer who is committed to a pre-agreed selling price. The buyer might
also be exposed to illiquidity risk and counterparty risk related to the securities
bought. Therefore it is common practice to impose a haircut on the collateral,
where the seller receives the amount of cash secured on the collateral less a
margin (over-collateralisation). If the haircut were 2%, the seller of a £200 mil-
lion repo would receive £196,000,000 cash in return for £200 million worth of
securities. The repo interest is only applied to the lesser amount.
Another way of looking at this is that if a bank wanted to own £200 million of
gilts it would only be necessary to find £4 million of cash. The other £196 mil-
lion could be borrowed in the repo market by using the £200 million of gilts as
security.
Haircuts on Treasuries are relatively low; if the collateral used is mortgage-

backed bonds or corporate bonds, the haircut will be a larger percentage.
Haircuts rose even for Treasuries in many countries during the financial crisis
as doubt crept in about government default risk. Haircuts are lower for
high-quality counterparties, e.g. a central bank supplying collateral in a repo.
They are also lower for overnight repos than longer-term ones due to the lower
securities price fluctuation risk, and for securities trading in highly liquid mar-
kets. Longer-term bonds are more volatile than short-term bonds or bills and
so if they are used as collateral a large haircut will be required, as it will if a
non-standard legal agreement is used for the repo.
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Article 10.3 discusses some new rules on minimum haircuts. If the market
value of the collateral drops by a larger amount or percentage than an agreed
threshold during the term, the lender might be entitled to variation margin.
This is a call for extra cash or collateral to be handed over.
Article 10.3
Terms laid down for taming shadow

bank risk
Sam Fleming and Tracy Alloway

Global regulators have taken a landmark step towards taming risk in a key seg-
ment of the shadow banking system, outlining tougher rules on collateral for short-
term lending which will affect both banks and non-bank players.
Shadow banks have emerged as a key regulatory concern as risk migrates out of the
traditional banking sector into more thinly policed reaches of the financial markets.
Shadow banks can include a broad array of institutions engaged in bank-like activ-
ities, among them hedge funds, private equity groups and money market funds.
The Financial Stability Board, an umbrella group of regulators, on Monday night
published a framework imposing minimum requirements on the collateral needed
when such firms borrow money from banks through short-term loans secured by
stocks or bonds.
The global standards are intended to stop excessive lending, and so avoid a repeat
of the reckless behaviour that helped precipitate the financial crisis of 2008. They
also take aim at a key segment of the shadow banking world, known as the repur-
chase, or ‘repo’, market.
This emerged as a prime area of weakness during the crisis and regulators are said
to be concerned about the potential impact that a ‘fire sale’ of assets used as collat-
eral for loans could have on the wider financial system.
Crucially, the FSB’s minimum floors for repo transactions are higher than initial
proposals made in August last year, following calls for tough standards from US
regulators.
In a significant step, the FSB said it would also consult on applying the standards
to deals struck between non-banks, rather than simply limiting them to repo trans-
actions undertaken between banks and non-banks.
However, the FSB rules would still fail to capture transactions that use govern-
ment bonds as collateral, focusing instead on private debt and stocks, amid anxiety
from some governments about the potential impact on sovereign debt markets.
➨
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The FSB now wants a minimum 1.5% ‘haircut’ for corporate bonds with a maturity
of between one and five years, up from 1% before, and a 6% haircut for equities,
instead of 4% previously. The latter would mean that a borrower would have to
post $106 of equity collateral for a $100 loan.
The FSB also set out non-numerical standards aimed at tackling the risk that hair-
cuts get whittled away in benign market conditions. Mark Carney, chairman of the
FSB and Bank of England governor, said the rules marked a ‘big step forward’ in
the global shadow banking agenda.
Daniel Tarullo, chairman of the FSB Standing Committee on Supervisory and
Regulatory Co-operation, added: ‘Securities financing transactions such as repos
are important funding tools for a wide range of market participants, including non-
bank financial firms.
‘The implementation of the numerical haircut floors on securities financing trans-
actions will reduce the build-up of excessive leverage and liquidity risk by non-
banks during peaks in the credit and economic cycle.’
The FSB stressed that market participants should continue to set higher haircuts
than the official requirements where prudent. The FSB said firms had expected
only a ‘minimal’ impact on market volume from its proposals.
The FSB added that the haircut floors could in future be raised and lowered as part
of efforts to lean against fluctuations in the financial cycle, but that this would
require further work.
The repo market has already been under pressure from new rules that make it
more expensive for banks to broker the transactions or undertake their own repo
borrowing. While many in the market concede that runs in the repo market were a
prime cause of Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008, they also warn that limiting the
repo market could affect liquidity in a long list of financial assets.
Source: Fleming, S. and Alloway, T. (2014) Terms laid down for taming shadow bank risk,
Tri-party repo
Many repo markets are based on bilateral deals between borrower and lender.
But a common form in the US is the tri-party repo (TPR), where an interme-
diary, a custodian, acts for both seller and purchaser and undertakes all admin-
istrative tasks. There are two custodian banks, Bank of New York Mellon and
JPMorgan, which help to administer a repo agreement between two parties.
Lenders place money with the custodian bank, which in turn lends it through
a repo to another institution. Such a model functions well when liquid assets
such as Treasuries are being used, as this type of collateral can easily be sold.
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During the credit boom, which peaked in the first half of 2007, the type of
collateral being pledged for cash in repo transactions steadily migrated away
from Treasuries and towards other assets such as private label mortgages, cor-
porate bonds and equities. This reflected the drive by investors to boost their
returns, gaining higher interest when lending against poorer quality collateral.
Tri-party was very popular with investment banks as it allowed them to finance
their balance sheets with short-term funding. However, as soon as market sen-
timent turned negative on lower-quality or more complex assets, investors
that had funded these repo agreements began to pull their money out. That
sparked a run on the investment banks. The vulnerabilities of this system were
highlighted with the near-failure of Bear Stearns six months before Lehman’s
demise. Article 10.4 illustrates the concerns of US authorities about the TPR
market.
Article 10.4
Repo ‘fire sale’ risk worries

regulators
By Michael Mackenzie and Tracy Alloway

The prospect of financial assets being dumped in a ‘fire sale’ has re-emerged as a
substantial risk in a crucial $2tn funding market used by US banks, despite
changes since the financial crisis to reduce risk.
The tri-party repo market, where banks loan out their securities in exchange for
short-term loans from investors, has been one of the key areas of financial reform
after playing a major role in the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Banks use the market to pledge their assets as security, or collateral, in exchange
for short-term loans from lenders that include money market funds, insurers and
mutual funds. In 2008, much of that financing was suddenly pulled away after the
value of mortgage-related collateral underpinning the loans was called into doubt.
Fire sales, where assets are sold in a manner that can sharply depress prices and
thereby pressure other investors into selling their assets, were a hallmark of the
financial crisis.
While much of the market has been strengthened, regulators including Bill Dudley,
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, say that a run on repo collat-
eral remains a risk. The issue is likely to dominate a New York Fed conference on
Friday.
➨
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‘This is a process that’s providing credit from one part of the market to another,’
said Martin Hansen, senior director at Fitch Ratings. ‘But the issue is that at one
end of this chain of credit you have risk averse, short-term lenders. If they have
concerns, then that can create ripple effects along the rest of the chain and beyond.’
Fitch estimates that the use of interest rate-sensitive securities such as US
Treasuries and other US government-backed securities as collateral in the tri-party
repo market fell $187bn between May and July, after the Fed began talking about
winding down its emergency economic support. That suggests sell-offs in the repo
market remain an issue more than five years after the crisis.
‘The risk is that once a dealer [bank] goes under, money funds have to liquidate the
securities they hold and a money fund may not have the expertise to liquidate large
amounts of securities,’ said Scott Skyrm, a former repo broker.
The New York Fed has overseen reform of the tri-party repo market in recent years,
with a heavy focus on the role played by the two custodian banks that incur daily
counterparty risk, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon.
While dependence on so-called ‘intraday credit’ from the two banks, along with
poor liquidity and credit risk management practices by the banks, has largely been
addressed, the spectre of fire sales remains an issue for regulators.
Regulators also point to a lack of data concerning the bilateral repo market, which
operates in a similar way but without custodians. Estimates of the market’s size
vary from about $3tn to $5tn, and a report from the Office of Financial Research this
week warned of ‘data gaps’ in securities lending and repo markets.
Friday’s meeting organised by the New York Fed will bring together academics,
market participants and other regulators. Speakers are expected to discuss ways of
setting up ‘a process for orderly liquidation’ of repo collateral.
Source: Mackenzie, M. and Alloway, T. (2013) Repo ‘fire sale’ risk worries regulators,
Whereas in the UK, US and many other developed countries repo rates are
currently low, typically between 0% and 1%, in other parts of the world the
rate can be considerably higher. The rates reflect the risk element, anticipated
current and future degree of inflation, and the credit rating in each country –
see Figure 10.3.
The sell/buy-back
Some countries, such as Italy, never developed, or were slow to develop, the
legal frameworks, IT systems and settlement systems for repo transactions. The
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Figure 10.3 Overnight repo rates, per cent (annualised), 2013/2014

Source: Data from national banks and other sources
sell/buy-back was created instead, which is very similar to a repo but involves
an outright cash sale of bonds, and a separate agreement to buy back the bonds
at a forward date. Coupon payments during the term are paid first to the buyer
and only given to the original owner on termination.
Certificates of deposit (CDs)

Certificates of deposit are issued by banks when funds are deposited with
them by other banks, corporations, individuals or investment companies. The
certificates state that a deposit has been made (a time deposit) and that at the
maturity date the bank will pay a sum higher than that originally deposited,
i.e. they are issued at face value and at maturity the holder receives the
face amount plus interest. The maturities can be any length of time, with a
minimum of one week, and are typically between one to four months. But they
can be issued with a maturity date of five years or longer. For those lasting less
than one year the interest is generally payable on maturity. However, some
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short-term CDs also occasionally pay variable interest rates, e.g. the interest on
a 6-month CD changes every 30 days depending on interbank interest rates.
Those dated for over one year have interest paid annually, or sometimes semi-
annually; they may also pay a variable rate of interest, with the rate altered,
say, each year, based on the rates on a benchmark rate, e.g. Libor.
Negotiable and non-negotiable

CDs can be negotiable, that is, permitted to be traded in a secondary market to
another investor before the maturity date, although many negotiable CDs are
not all that liquid, with few potential buyers interested in trading. CDs can also
be designated non-negotiable, meaning they have to be held to maturity by
the original investor – there is a penalty on withdrawal of cash from the bank
before the maturity date. The advantage of negotiable CDs is that although
they cannot be redeemed before maturity at the issuing bank without a pen-
alty, the original depositor can achieve liquidity while the bank issuing the
certificate has a deposit held with it until the maturity date. The rate of interest
paid on negotiable CDs is lower than a fixed deposit because of the attraction
of liquidity. A company with surplus funds can put it into a CD knowing that
if its situation changes and it needs extra cash, it can sell the negotiable CD.
The tradable value of the CD rises as the remaining length of its maturity
reduces.
United Kingdom and United States of America

At the centre of the secondary market is a network of brokers and dealers in
CDs, striking deals over the telephone or on the internet. CDs are normally
issued in lots ranging from £100,000 to £500,000 in the UK. Most sterling
CDs are held by other banks operating in the UK, building societies and
other money market players. Individual/personal holdings are negligible. For
sterling CDs the interest is calculated on an actual/365 days basis.
Lot sizes are generally $100,000 to $1,000,000 in the US for the main wholesale
market, with similar sized lots in the eurozone, Japan and other countries. In
the US, however, CDs are frequently bought by retail investors in denomina-
tions that can go as low as $100. Individuals generally buy non-negotiable
CDs because the minimum denomination for a negotiable CD is $100,000
(also termed a jumbo CD). Most retail-focused CDs are guaranteed by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for up to $250,000 per depositor,
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meaning that if the issuing bank does not redeem them this government-
sponsored agency will. For US CDs the interest is calculated on an actual/360
basis, with the interest generally paid at maturity.
Quotations
CDs are quoted in the trading markets on a yield to maturity basis. So, if a
deposit of £100,000 is made and a CD is handed over which states that after
one-quarter of the year the holder will receive £100,500, the yield to maturity
is £500 divided by £100,000 multiplied by 4 to annualise it. Thus the annual
rate of interest is 2%. (See Chapter 14 for more on CD calculations.)
Many CDs issued today lack a paper certificate, which, given that ‘certificate’
is in the title, seems a little oxymoronic. These ‘dematerialised’ CDs are held
as electronic book entries only. Euroclear operates a book entry system in
London. Here CDs are issued and transferred using Delivery Versus Payment
(DVP), meaning that the electronic transfer of ownership in the secondary
market is at the same time as payment.
Eurocurrency CDs
As well as domestic currency CDs there are Eurocurrency certificates of
deposit, Euro-CDs, outside the jurisdiction of the authorities of the currency
of denomination. Standard Eurocurrency deposits (not CDs) have fixed
maturities – say seven days – and you cannot get at that money until the seven
days have passed. By issuing Eurodollar CDs banks are able to offer an advan-
tage if those CDs are negotiable, by allowing depositors to sell the CDs to other
investors before maturity. Those issued by a bank with a high credit standing
are likely to have greater liquidity. Eurodollar CDs tend to offer higher yields
than CDs issued in dollars in the US because the American-based CDs have the
backing of the Federal Reserve regulatory environment for banks, making
them safer for investors.
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M10_ARNO1799_01_SE_C10.indd 296 7/7/15 8:49 AM
CHAPTER 11
BILLS OF EXCHANGE
AND BANKER’S
ACCEPTANCES
Bills of exchange and banker’s acceptances are instruments that are particu-
larly useful in helping to oil the wheels of international commerce. They enable
corporations to obtain credit from suppliers or raise money, and also to trade
with foreign corporations at low risk of financial inconvenience or loss. An
illustration of the risk problem is provided in the following example.
Example 11.1
The international trade problem
Tractors UK has found a firm in South Africa that wishes to buy £12 million worth
of its tractors. Tractors UK cannot simply send its tractors to South Africa in the
hope that the payment will be sent, nor can the South African firm send £12 million
in the hope that the tractors will be sent. The two companies do not know each
other well enough to trust that the transaction will be carried out correctly on
each side. The solution is to use a bill of exchange or a banker’s acceptance, which
will provide a legally enforceable promise of payment of £12 million to Tractors UK,
which can send the tractors off to South Africa, knowing with a high degree of
certainty that payment will be made.
Bills of exchange
Bills of exchange have been used to smooth the progress of overseas trade for
a long time. Known to have been used by the Babylonians, Egyptians, Greeks
and Romans, the bill of exchange appeared in its present form during the
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13th century among the Lombards of northern Italy who engaged in wide-
spread foreign trading. These instruments became particularly useful in the
burgeoning international trade of the 19th and 20th centuries.
The seller of goods to be exported to a buyer in another country frequently

grants the customer a number of months in which to pay. The seller will draw
up a bill of exchange (also called a trade bill). This is a legal document showing
the indebtedness of the buyer. The exporter also obtains a bill of lading
from the carrier to show that the goods have been appropriately despatched.
The airline, shipping firm or other carrier signs the bill of lading and sends it
to the exporter or its bank, confirming that the goods have been received by
the carrier, that the carrier accepts responsibility to deliver the goods to the
importer, and showing evidence of ownership of the goods, insurance certificates
and commercial invoices. Then the relevant documents are sent to the importer
or its bank.
At this point the bill of exchange may be forwarded to and accepted by the
customer, which means that the customer signs a promise to pay the stated
amount and currency on the due date (a time draft). The due date is usually
90 days later, but 30-, 60- or 180-day bills of exchange are not uncommon.
However, note that some bills of exchange are sight drafts (‘documents
against payment’ drafts), payable on demand immediately.
More usual is for the bill first to be sent to the exporter’s bank, which, in turn,
sends the draft and the documents to a bank in the importer’s country with
which the exporter’s bank has an ongoing relationship. This correspondent
bank will be instructed to get the draft signed, that is, accepted, by the
importer, or to receive payment in the case of a sight draft. Then the corres-
pondent bank will hand over the bill of lading documents permitting the
importer to claim the goods. With payment on a sight draft the correspondent
bank will transfer the funds received from the importer to the exporter’s bank,
which will credit the exporter’s account. Fees will be charged for facilitating
these transactions. With time bills the exporter will receive a promise to pay in,
say, 90 days.
The banks have reduced the risk for the exporter by ensuring that the goods
are not released to the importer until money or a promise is in place. Also, for
the time draft, there is a legal acknowledgement that a debt exists, facilitating
easier access to the legal systems in the event of non-payment.
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11 BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND BANKER’S ACCEPTANCES 299
As well as the benefit of a potential credit period before paying on a time draft,
risk for the importer is reduced because payment will be made only if the goods
are present and correct with all the documentation.
Trading time drafts

With a time draft the bill is returned to the exporter who can either hold it
until maturity or sell it at a discount. Many bills of exchange are traded in
an active secondary market. The purchaser (discounter) in this market pays
a lower amount than the sum to be received at maturity from the customer.
The difference represents the discounter’s interest payment. For example, the
customer might have signed the bill promising to pay £300,000 in 90 days.
The bill is sold immediately by the exporter to a discount house or bank
for £297,000. After 90 days the discounter will realise a profit of £3,000 on a
£297,000 asset. Through this arrangement the customer has the goods on
90 days credit terms, and the supplier has made a sale and immediately receives
cash from the discount house amounting to 99% of the total due. The dis-
counter, if it can borrow at less than 1% over 90 days, turns a healthy profit.
The sequence of events is shown in Figure 11.1.
Figure 11.1 Bill of exchange sequence
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Despite the simplification of Figure 11.1, many bills of exchange do not remain
in the hands of the discounter until maturity but are traded a number of times
before then.
Bills of exchange are normally used only for large transactions (> £100,000).
The effective interest rate charged by the discounter is usually a competitive
150–400 basis points over interbank lending rates (e.g. Libor). The holder of
the bill usually has recourse to both of the commercial companies: if the
customer does not pay then the seller will be called upon to make good the debt.
This overhanging credit risk for the exporter can sometimes be transferred (to,
say, a bank) by buying credit insurance. If the bill is guaranteed by another
bank or the importer has a very high credit standing it may not carry recourse
rights for the holder to force the exporter to pay.
Banker’s acceptances
A banker’s acceptance, also known as an acceptance credit, is a time draft,
which is a document stating the signatory will pay an amount at a future
date, say in 90 days. Say, for example, that an importer buys goods from an
exporter with an agreement to pay in three months. Instead of sending the
bill to the importer, the exporter is instructed to send the document, which
states that the signatory will pay a sum of money, at a set date in the future,
to the importer’s bank. This is ‘accepted’ by the importer’s bank rather than
by a customer. Simultaneously the importer makes a commitment to pay the
accepting bank the relevant sum at the maturity date of the bill.
The exporter does not have to wait three months to receive cash despite the
importer’s bank not paying out for 90 days. This is because it is possible to sell
this right to investors in the discount market long before the three months are
up. This bank commitment to pay the holder of the banker’s acceptance allows
it to be sold with more credibility in the money markets to, say, another bank
(a discounter) by the exporter after receiving it from an importing company’s
bank. So, say, the acceptance states that €1 million will be paid to the holder
on 1 August. It could be sold to an investor (perhaps another bank) in the
discount market for €980,000 on 15 June. The importer is obliged to reimburse
the bank €1 million (and pay fees) on 1 August; on that date the purchaser
of the acceptance credit collects €1 million from the bank that signed the
acceptance, making a €20,000 return over six weeks.
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While banker’s acceptances are similar to bills of exchange between a seller

and a buyer, they have the advantage that the organisation promising to pay is
a reputable bank representing a lower credit risk to any subsequent discounter,
thus they normally attract finer discount rates than bills of exchange. The
holder of the instrument has two guarantors: the importer and the bank. It also
has the collateral of the goods underlying the trade.
Not all banker’s acceptances relate to overseas trade. Many are simply a way of
raising money for a firm. The company in need of finance may ask its bank
to create a banker’s acceptance and hand it over. Then the company can sell
it in the discount market at a time when it needs to raise some cash. They are
very useful for companies expanding into new markets where their name is not
known and therefore their creditworthiness is also unknown; they can take
advantage of the superior creditworthiness of the bank issuing the acceptance,
which guarantees that payment will be made.
There are three costs involved:
1 The bank charges acceptance commission for adding its name to the
acceptance.
2 The difference between the face value of the acceptance and the discount
price, which is the effective interest rate.
3 Dealers take a small cut as they connect firms that want to sell with com-
panies that wish to invest in banker’s acceptances.
These costs are relatively low compared with overdraft costs. However, this
facility is available only in hundreds of thousands of pounds, euros, etc. and
then only to the most creditworthy of companies. Figure 11.2 summarises the
acceptance credit sequence for an export deal.
1 Banker’s acceptance drafted and sent by an exporting company (or its bank)
demanding payment for goods sent to an importer’s bank. Importer makes
arrangements with its bank to help it. Acceptance commission paid to the
bank by importer.
2 The bank accepts the promise to pay a sum at a stated future date.
3 The banker’s acceptance may be sold by the exporter at a discount.
4 The discounter pays cash for the banker’s acceptance.
5 The bank pays the final holder of the banker’s acceptance the due sum.
6 The importer pays to the bank the banker’s acceptance due sum.
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Figure 11.2 Banker’s acceptance sequence – for an export deal
Example 11.2
The use of a banker’s acceptance
A Dutch company buys €3.5 million of goods from a firm in Japan; it promises to
pay for the goods in 60 days’ time. The Dutch company asks its bank to accept the
banker’s acceptance. Once the bank has stamped ‘accepted’ on the document,
it becomes a negotiable (sellable) instrument. The exporter receives the banker’s
acceptance. After 15 days, the Japanese company decides it needs some extra
short-term finance and sells the acceptance at a discount of 0.60%, receiving
€3,479,000. The exporter has been paid by banker’s acceptance immediately the
goods have been despatched. It can also shield itself from the risk of exchange
rates shifting over the next 60 days by discounting the acceptance immediately,
receiving euros and then converting these to yen. And, of course, the exporter is
not exposed to the credit risk of the importer because it has the guarantee from
the importer’s bank.
Case study
HSBC Canada’s banker’s acceptance service
HSBC Canada advertises banker’s acceptances (BAs) as a good way of raising
money for businesses. Here is a page from its website:
➨
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Banker’s acceptances (BAs)

Available in Canadian and US dollars, banker’s acceptances (BAs) are an excellent
alternative to traditional short-term borrowing or commercial paper.
BAs may provide your business with a lower cost borrowing alternative
● A BA is an unconditional non-interest bearing note that is issued by a borrowing

company
● On acceptance of the BA, HSBC assumes an irrevocable liability for the borrower’s
debt
● BAs are typically more negotiable and reduce your borrowing costs
BAs are typically issued:
● At a discount to face value

● In bearer form
● With flexible maturity dates to a maximum of 1 year
● From 30 to 90 days
Source: HSBC Canada website www.hsbc.ca/1/2/business/business-banking/finance/bankers-acceptance
Money market interest rates in the

Financial Times
The Financial Times publishes a table each day showing many of the money
market interest rates – see Table 11.1 for the 12 September 2014 rates. The FT
shows a lot more information at http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Bonds.
The UK three-month Treasury bill rate of interest is not shown in this table, but
it is shown at the bottom of the front page of the FT every day. It was 0.56%
(annualised rate) for 12 September 2014.
Most of the rates shown have already been described, but the ‘SDR int rate’
needs some explanation. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are a composite
currency created in 1969 by the IMF to act as an international reserve currency
to supplement IMF member countries’ official reserves. Weak IMF members can
sell SDRs to financially strong members, effectively borrowing money from
them via the IMF. The SDR rate of interest is decided weekly and is a weighted
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Table 11.1 Market interest rates for 12 September 2014, all annualised rates
Sep 12 Over Change Change Change One Three Six One

night Day Week Month month month month year
US$ Libor* 0.09060 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.15360 0.23410 0.33090 0.58220
Euro Libor* –0.05929 –0.042 –0.033 –0.054 0.00071 0.05000 0.14000 0.29929
£ Libor* 0.47500 – 0.003 0.004 0.50438 0.56025 0.69875 1.04744
Swiss Fr Libor* –0.00600 –0.002 – –0.009 –0.00400 0.00500 0.05140 0.15500
Yen Libor* 0.04571 –0.001 –0.009 –0.009 0.08357 0.11786 0.17071 0.32071
Canada Libor* – – – – – – – –
Euro Euribor – – – – 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.35
Sterling CDs – – – – 0.55 0.77 0.75 1.10
US$ CDs – – – – 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.42
Euro CDs – – – – –0.10 –0.05 0.06 0.23
US o'night repo 0.08 0.010 –0.060 –0.020
Fed Funds eff 0.09 – – –
US 3m Bills 0.02 –0.005 –0.010 –0.015
SDR int rate 0.05 – –0.020 –0.030
EONIA –0.024 –0.036 –0.018 –0.043
EURONIA –0.0362 0.046 0.002 0.005
RONIA 0.4904 –0.013 0.027 0.036
SONIA 0.4316 0.003 0.002 0.006
LA7 Day Notice 0.35%–0.30%
Over night One One Three Six One
Week month months months year
Interbank £ We are no longer able to provide these figures.
* Libor rates come from ICE (see www.theice.com) and are fixed at 11am UK time. Other data sources:
US$, Euro & CDs: dealers; SDR int rate: IMF; EONIA: ECB; EURONIA, RONIA & SONIA: WMBA. LA7 days
notice: Tradition (UK).
Source: Data from Financial Times http://markets.ft.com/RESEARCH/markets/DataArchiveFetchReport?Category=BR&Type=
MNY&Date=09/12/2014
average of the rate charged on money market securities in the currencies that
make up the SDR basket. This currency basket is currently based on four key
international currencies: the euro, the Japanese yen, pound sterling and the
US dollar. There are 188 members of the IMF and on joining each member
is allocated a quota of SDRs according to its relative position in the global
economy.
The FT also publishes in the ‘Companies and Markets’ section a table showing
US, eurozone, UK, Japanese and Swiss official interest rates – see Table 11.2.
These are the rates strongly influenced by central bank policy makers, such
as the US Federal Reserve trying to manage monetary conditions (more on this
in Chapter 16).
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Table 11.2 Official interest rates
Sep 12 Rate Current Since Last Mth ago Year ago
US Fed Funds 0.00–0.25 16-12-2008 1.00 0.00–0.25 0.00–0.25

US Prime 3.25 16-12-2008 4.00 3.25 3.25
US Discount 0.75 18-02-2010 0.50 0.75 0.75
Euro Repo 0.05 04-09-2014 0.15 0.25 0.75
UK Repo 0.50 05-03-2009 1.00 0.50 0.50
Japan O’night Call 0.00–0.10 05-10-2010 0.10 0.00–0.10 0.00–0.10
Switzerland Libor target 0.00–0.25 03-08-2011 0.00–0.75 0.00–0.25 0.00–0.25
Comparing interest rates

Despite money market instruments having maturities of less than one year
(mostly), it can be seen from the FT table in Table 11.1 that they can have
remarkably different interest rates depending on the length of time to
maturity. For example, on 12 September 2014 a sterling interbank loan for one
month cost 0.50438% (annualised) whereas a loan of similar default risk, but
lasting for one year, cost more than double that, at 1.04744% for the year.
From Table 11.2 we can also see that repo rates can change significantly over
time, for example the European Central Bank targeted overnight repo rates
at 0.75% in early 2013, which was reduced to 0.5% in May 2013 and fell to
a tenth of that level (0.05%) in September 2014.
Figures 11.3 and 11.4 show comparative interest rates from the UK and the US
over a 30-year period. A number of observations can be made about the
interest rate on different money market instruments:
● Generally, investors require extra return for longer lending periods because
of the extra risk involved, so overnight rates will normally be less than rates
on longer-term instruments (although this is not always the case). Notice
in Figure 11.4 US six-month T-bill rates are slightly higher than those for
three-month T-bill lending.
● The creditworthiness of the borrowing institution has a strong influence
on the rate of interest charged. The rate offered by reputable national
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Figure 11.3 UK average interest rates 1983–2013, % annualised rate

Source: Data from www.bankofengland.co.uk
governments will usually be lower than the rate offered by a corporation

wishing to raise cash by issuing commercial paper, or by a bank issuing
certificates of deposit (see the higher rates on three-month CDs than on
three-month Treasuries in both Figures 11.3 and 11.4). However, there
are some governments that are required by the financial markets to pay
higher interest rates than many corporates – e.g. Greece, Portugal and
Ireland in 2011 paid more than many banks in the years following the
financial crisis.
● When expectations about future inflation rise, interest rates rise accordingly,
which leads to a decrease in the market price of money market instruments.
Conversely, when inflation expectations are lowered, interest rates fall and
the market price of the instruments rises. Thus we see that interest rates
across the board tend to rise and fall together over time. The high rates of
interest offered in the 1980s largely reflect the high inflation of the time.
● Supply and demand – for example, if banks need to borrow large sums of
money quickly, they will sell more shorter-term instruments. This will have
the effect of increasing market supply of these instruments and therefore
pushing down their price, which in turn will increase the rate of interest, the
yield to maturity.
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Figure 11.4 US average interest rates 1983–2013, % annualised rate

Source: Data from www.federalreserve.gov
● Money market interest rates with similar terms to maturity stay close
together and move up or down with quite a high degree of correlation over
time. These rates are all low risk and all short term, thus there is a reasonable
amount of substitutability between them for potential lenders. So if interest
rates in, say, the CD market fell abnormally below that in, say, the com-
mercial paper market, those banks needing to attract deposits might have
difficulty doing so because potential lenders will put more money in the
CP market. The banks will have to raise CD interest rates to attract deposits
while the commercial paper borrowers will find they can lower rates – thus
some degree of convergence takes place.
● Short-term interest rates can be lowered by central banks intervening in the
markets when they judge that the economy is in need of a boost. You can see
this sort of action in the figures in the years after the shock of the dot.com
bust at the turn of the millennium and following the financial crisis of
2007–2008.
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PART 4
VALUING BONDS
AND MONEY
MARKET
INSTRUMENTS
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CHAPTER 12
FINANCIAL CONCEPTS
AND MATHEMATICS
The time value of money

When people undertake to set aside money for investment something has
to be given up now. For instance, if someone buys bonds in a firm or lends
via commercial paper there is a sacrifice of present consumption. One of the
incentives to save is the possibility of gaining a higher level of future consump-
tion. Therefore, it is apparent that compensation is required to induce people
to make a consumption sacrifice. Compensation will be required for at least
three things:
● Impatience to consume. Individuals generally prefer to have £1 today than
£1 in five years’ time. To put this formally: the utility of £1 now is greater
than £1 received five years hence. Individuals are predisposed towards
impatience to consume, thus they need an appropriate reward to begin the
saving process. The rate of exchange between certain future consumption
and certain current consumption is the pure rate of interest – this occurs
even in a world of no inflation and no risk. If you lived in such a world you
might be willing to sacrifice £100 of consumption now if you were compen-
sated with £102 to be received in one year. This would mean a pure rate of
interest of 2%.
● Inflation. The price of time (or the interest rate needed to compensate
for impatience to consume) exists even when there is no inflation, simply
because people generally prefer consumption now to consumption later. If
there is inflation then the providers of finance will have to be compensated
for that loss in purchasing power as well as for time.
● Risk. The promise of the receipt of a sum of money some years hence gen-
erally carries with it an element of risk; the payout may not take place or
the amount may be less than expected. Risk simply means that the future
return has a variety of possible values.
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312 PART 4 VALUING BONDS AND MONEY MARKET INSTRUMENTS
Thus, the issuer of a security, whether it be a share, a bond or a certificate

of deposit, must be prepared to compensate the investor for impatience
to consume, inflation and risk involved, otherwise no one will be willing to
buy the security. A further factor (which, to a large extent, could be seen as a
form of risk) is that once the lender has committed the funds to a borrower
for a set period of time they have to face the problem that at some point they
may need the funds. With some investments there are ways of releasing the
money – converting the instrument to cash – quickly, at low transaction
cost and with certainty over the amount that would be released – either by
insisting that the borrower repays on request or from selling the right to
receive interest, etc. to another investor in a market – high liquidity and there-
fore low liquidity risk. If lenders/investors do not have access to easy and quick
liquidity (high liquidity risk) then they are likely to demand an additional
return in compensation.
If Mrs Ann Investor is considering a €1,000 one-year investment she will

require compensation for three elements of time value. First, a return of
2% is required for the pure time value of money. Second, inflation is anti-
cipated to be 3% over the year. At time zero (t0) €1,000 buys one basket of
goods and services. To buy the same basket of goods and services at time t1 (one
year later) €1,030 is needed. To compensate the investor for impatience to
consume and inflation the investment needs to generate a return of 5.06%,
that is:
(1 + 0.02)(1 + 0.03) − 1 = 0.0506 = 5.06%
The figure of 5.06% may be regarded here as the risk-free return (RFR), the
interest rate that is sufficient to induce investment assuming no uncertainty
about cash flows. Investors tend to view lending to highly reputable govern-
ments through the purchase of bills as the nearest they are going to get to risk-
free investing because these institutions have an almost unlimited ability to
raise income from taxes or to create money with minimal likelihood of default.
This applies only if the country has a reputation for good financial manage-
ment – Greece had a troublesome 2011–15; between 2011 and 2014 bonds
from Spain, Portugal and Ireland were also thought to be risky investments.
When investors doubt the soundness of government finances, this has the
effect of pushing up the interest rates governments have to pay to allow for the
risk of default (non-payment) way beyond the normal RFR accorded a reputa-
ble eurozone government, such as Germany.
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12 FINANCIAL CONCEPTS AND MATHEMATICS 313
The RFR forms the bedrock for time value of money calculations as the pure
time value and the expected inflation rate affect all investments equally.
Whether the investment is in property, bonds, shares or a factory, if expected
inflation rises from 3% to 5% then the investor’s required return on all invest-
ments will increase by 2%.
However, different investment categories carry different degrees of uncertainty

about the outcome of the investment. For instance, an investment on the
Russian stock market, with its high volatility, may be regarded as more risky
than the purchase of a bond in Unilever, with its steady growth prospects.
Investors require different risk premiums on top of the RFR to reflect the
perceived level of extra risk. Thus:
Required return (Time value of money) = RFR + risk premium
In the case of Mrs Ann Investor, the risk premium pushes up the total return
required to, say, 10%, thus giving full compensation for all three elements of
the time value of money.
The interest rates quoted in the financial markets are (theoretically) sufficiently
high to compensate for all three elements – whether investors sometimes
over- or under-price bonds, etc. and thus yields are pushed irrationally low or
high is a different matter.
Leaving the idea of irrationality to one side, a ten-year loan to a reputable

government (such as the purchase of a bond) currently paying 5% will be offer-
ing some of this as compensation for time preference and a little for risk, but
the majority of that interest is likely to be compensation for future inflation.
The same elements apply to the cost of capital for a business; when it issues
financial securities, the returns offered include a large element of inflation and
risk compensation.
The nominal rate of interest is the rate quoted by lenders and includes the
inflation element. The real rate of interest removes inflation.
Real rate of interest = Nominal rate of interest − Inflation
Mathematical tools for finance

The purpose of this section is to explain essential mathematical skills that will
enhance understanding of finance. The author has no love of mathematics for
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its own sake and so only those techniques of direct relevance to the subject
matter of this book are covered.
When there are time delays between receipts and payments of financial sums
we need to make use of the concepts of simple and compound interest.
Simple interest
Interest is paid only on the original principal. No interest is paid on the

accumulated interest payments.
Example 12.1
Suppose that a sum of £10 is deposited in a bank account that pays 12% per
annum. At the end of year 1 the investor has £11.20 in the account. That is:
F = P(1 + i )
11.20 = 10(1 + 0.12)
where F = Future value (or terminal value), P = Present value, i = Interest rate.
The initial sum, called the principal, is multiplied by the interest rate to give
the annual return. At the end of five years:
F = P(1 + in)
where n = number of years. Thus,
F = 10(1 + (0.12 × 5)) = 16
Note from the example that the 12% return is a constant amount each
year. Interest is not earned on the interest already accumulated from previous
years.
Compound interest
The more usual situation in the real world is for interest to be paid on the sum
that accumulates – whether or not that sum comes from the principal or from
the interest received in previous periods.
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Example 12.2
An investment of £10 is made at an interest rate of 12% with the interest being
compounded. In one year the capital will grow by 12% to £11.20. In the second year
the capital will grow by 12%, but this time the growth will be on the accumulated
value of £11.20 and thus will amount to an extra £1.34. At the end of two years:
F = P(1 + i )(1 + i )
F = 11.20(1 + i )
F = 11.20(1 + 0.12)
F = 12.544
Alternatively,
F = P(1 + i )2
F = 10(1 + 0.12)2
F = 12.544
Over five years the result is:
F = P(1 + i )n = £10(1 + 0.12)5 = £17.62
While these calculations are not overly difficult, they can become cumbersome
and time consuming, requiring the use of a calculator and accurate pressing of
buttons. It is common practice to use tables for the solution. Table 12.1 shows
an extract from Appendix I to this chapter, which gives the future value of
£1 invested at a number of different interest rates and for alternative numbers
of years.
This gives the results we have worked out above. From the second row of the
table in Table 12.1 we can read that £1 invested for two years at 12% amounts
to £1.2544. Thus, the investment of £10 provides a future capital sum 1.2544 times
the original amount:
£10 × 1.2544 = £12.544
and from the fifth row, the investment of £10 after five years provides a future
capital sum 1.7623 times the original amount:
£10 × 1.7623 = £17.623
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Table 12.1 The future value of £1
Interest rate (per cent per annum)
Year 1 2 5 12 15
1 1.0100 1.0200 1.0500 1.1200 1.1500

2 1.0201 1.0404 1.1025 1.2544 1.3225
3 1.0303 1.0612 1.1576 1.4049 1.5209
4 1.0406 1.0824 1.2155 1.5735 1.7490
5 1.0510 1.1041 1.2763 1.7623 2.0114
The interest on the accumulated interest over five years is therefore the differ-
ence between the total arising from simple interest and that from compound
interest:
£17.62 − £16.00 = £1.62
Present values
There are many occasions when you are given the future sums and need to find
out what those future sums are worth in present-value terms today. For exam-
ple, you wish to know how much you would have to put aside today that will
accumulate, with compounded interest, to a defined sum in the future; or you
are given the choice between receiving £200 in five years or £100 now and wish
to know which is the better option, given anticipated interest rates; or a bond
gives a return of £1 million in three years for an outlay of £800,000 now and
you need to establish whether this is the best use of the £800,000. By means of
a discount calculation, a sum of money to be received in the future is given a
monetary value today.
Example 12.3
If we anticipate the receipt of £17.62 in five years’ time we can determine its
present value. Rearrangement of the compound interest formula, and assuming a
discount (interest) rate of 12%, gives:
F 1
P= or P = F ×
(1 + i ) n (1 + i ) n
£17.62
P= = £10
(1 + 0.12)5
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Table 12.2 The present value of £1
Interest/discount rate (per cent per annum)
1 5 10 12 15 17
Periods 1 0.9901 0.9524 0.9091 0.8929 0.8696 0.8547

2 0.9803 0.9070 0.8264 0.7972 0.7561 0.7305
3 0.9706 0.8638 0.7513 0.7118 0.6575 0.6244
4 0.9610 0.8227 0.6830 0.6355 0.5718 0.5337
5 0.9515 0.7835 0.6209 0.5674 0.4972 0.4561
20 0.8195 0.3769 0.1486 0.1037 0.0611 0.0433
Alternatively, as before, we can use discount tables – see Appendix II, which gives
the present value of £1, an extract from which is shown in Table 12.2. The factor
needed to discount £1 receivable in five years when the discount rate is 12% is
1 1
0.5674. This is the element, = 0.5674.
(1 + i ) n (1 + 0.12)5
Therefore the present value of £17.62 is:
0.5674 × £17.62 = £10
Examining the present value of £1 in Table 12.2 you can see that as the
discount rate increases, the present value goes down. Also, the further into the
future the money is to be received, the less valuable it is in today’s terms.
Distant cash flows discounted at a high rate have a small present value; for
instance, £1,000 receivable in 20 years when the discount rate is 17% has
a present value of £43.30 (£1,000 × 0.0433). Viewed from another angle, if
you invested £43.30 for 20 years it would accumulate to £1,000 if interest
compounds at 17%.
Determining the rate of interest

Sometimes you wish to calculate the rate of return that a project is earning. For
instance, a bond may offer to pay you £10,000 in five years if you deposit
£8,000 now, when interest rates on similar bonds are offering 6% per annum.
In order to make a comparison you need to know the annual rate being offered.
Thus, we need to find i in the discounting equation.
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To be able to calculate i it is necessary to rearrange the compounding formula.
Since:
F = P(1 + i )n
first divide both sides by P:
F
= (1 + i ) n
P
(The Ps on the right side cancel out.)
Second, take the root to the power n of both sides and subtract 1 from each
side:
1/ n
n
F ⎛F⎞
i= − 1 or i = ⎜ ⎟ −1
P ⎝ P⎠
Example 12.4
In the case of a five-year investment requiring an outlay of £10 and having a future
value of £17.62 the rate of return is:
1/ 5
5
17.62 ⎛ 17.62 ⎞
i= − 1 = 0.12, or 12% or i = ⎜ − 1 = 0.12, or 12%
10 ⎝ 10 ⎟⎠
The rate of interest being offered by the bond mentioned above is:
5 £10, 000
i= − 1 = 0.04564, or 4.564%
£8, 000
so this deal is not competitive with the 6% being offered elsewhere.
A more straightforward alternative is to use the future value table (Appendix I),
an extract of which is shown in Table 12.1. In our example, if the return on £10
is £17.62, then the return on £1 worth of investment over five years is:
17.62
= 1.762
10
In the body of the future value table look at the year 5 row for a future value
of 1.762.
Read off the interest rate of 12%.
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Annuities
In financial calculations, quite often there is not just one payment at the end
of a certain number of years, there can be a series of identical payments made
over a period of years. For instance:
● bonds usually pay a regular rate of interest
● individuals can buy, from savings plan companies, the right to receive a
number of identical payments over a number of years
● a business might invest in a project which, it is estimated, will give regular
cash inflows over a period of years
● a typical house mortgage is an annuity.
An annuity is a series of payments or receipts of equal amounts. We are able to

calculate the present value of this set of payments.
Example 12.5
For a regular payment of £10 per year for five years, when the interest rate is 12%,
we can calculate the present value of the annuity (P) by three methods.
Method 1
A A A A A
P= + + + +
(1 + i ) (1 + i )2 (1 + i )3 (1 + i )4 (1 + i )5
where A = the periodic receipt.
10 10 10 10 10
P= + + + + = £36.048
(1 + 0.12) (1 + 0.12)2 (1 + 0.12)3 (1 + 0.12)4 (1 + 0.12)5
Method 2
Using the derived formula:
⎡ 1 ⎤
1− ⎢ n ⎥
P= ⎣ (1 + i ) ⎦ × A
i
⎡ 1 ⎤
1− ⎢ 5 ⎥
P= ⎣ (1 + 0.12) ⎦ × 10 = 3.6048 × £10 = £36.048
0.12
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 319 7/7/15 8:49 AM

Table 12.3 The present value of an annuity of £1 per annum
Interest rate (per cent per annum)
Year 1 5 10 12 15
1 0.9901 0.9524 0.9091 0.8929 0.8696

2 1.9704 1.8594 1.7355 1.6901 1.6257
3 2.9410 2.7232 2.4869 2.4018 2.2832
4 3.9020 3.5460 3.1699 3.0373 2.8550
5 4.8534 4.3295 3.7908 3.6048 3.3522
Method 3
It is useful to understand Methods 1 and 2, but the calculations can be prolonged.
Method 3 is recommended, where the relevant figures are looked up using the
‘present value of an annuity’ table. Table 12.3 is an extract from the more complete
annuity table in Appendix III. Here we simply look along the year 5 row and 12% column
to find the figure of 3.6048. This is the present value of five future annual receipts
of £1. Therefore we multiply by £10:
3.6048 × £10 = £36.048
Perpetuities
Some contracts run indefinitely and there is no end to a series of identical
payments. Certain government securities do not have an end date; that is, the
amount paid when the bond was purchased by the lender will never be repaid,
only interest payments are made. For example, the UK government issued
consolidated stocks many years ago which may never be redeemed.
Perpetuities are annuities that continue indefinitely. The value of a perpetuity

is simply the annual amount received divided by the interest rate when the
latter is expressed as a decimal.
A
P=
i
If £10 is to be received as an indefinite annual payment then the present value,

at a discount rate of 12%, is:
10
P= = £83.33
0.12
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 320 7/7/15 8:49 AM

It is very important to note that in order to use this formula we are assuming
that the first payment arises 365 days after the time at which we are standing
(the present time or time zero).
Discounting semi-annually, monthly and daily

Sometimes financial transactions take place on the basis that interest will be
calculated more frequently than once a year. For instance, if a bond paid
12% nominal return per year but credited 6% after half a year, in the second
half of the year interest could be earned on the interest credited after the first
six months. This will mean that the true annual rate of interest will be greater
than 12%. The greater the frequency with which interest is earned, the higher
the future value of the investment.
Example 12.6
If you put £10 in a bank account earning 12% per annum then your return after one
year is:
10(1 + 0.12) = £11.20
If the interest is compounded semi-annually (at a nominal annual rate of 12%):

10(1 + [0.12/2])(1 + [0.12/2]) = 10(1 + [0.12/2])2 = £11.236
In Example 12.6 the difference between annual compounding and semi-annual

compounding is an extra 3.6p. After six months the bank credits the account with
60p in interest so that in the following six months the investor earns 6% on £10.60.
If the interest is compounded quarterly:

10(1 + [0.12/4])4 = £11.255
Daily compounding:
10(1 + [0.12/365])365 = £11.2747
Example 12.7
If £10 is deposited in a bank account that compounds interest quarterly and the
nominal return per year is 12%, how much will be in the account after eight years?
10(1 + [0.12/4])4×8 = £25.75
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 321 7/7/15 8:49 AM

Continuous compounding
If the compounding frequency is taken to the limit we say that there is
continuous compounding. When the number of compounding periods
approaches infinity the future value is found by F = Pein where e is the value
of the exponential function. This is set as 2.71828 (to five decimal places, as
shown on a scientific calculator).1
So, the future value of £10 deposited in a bank paying 12% nominal compounded
continuously after eight years is:
10 × 2.718280.12×8 = £26.12
Converting monthly and daily rates to annual rates

Sometimes you are presented with a monthly or daily rate of interest and wish
to know what is its equivalent in terms of annual compound rate (or effective
annual rate (EAR)).
If m is the monthly interest or discount rate and i is the annual compound rate,
then over 12 months:
(1 + m)12 = 1 + i
So
i = (1 + m)12 − 1
If d is the daily rate:
(1 + d )365 = 1 + i
So
i = (1 + d )365 − 1
Thus, if a credit card company charges 1.5% per month, the annual compound
rate, i, is:
i = [(1 + 0.015)12 − 1] × 100 = 19.56%
1
The number ‘e’ is a special number discovered by mathematicians, a mathematical constant.
It is the ‘natural’ exponential because it arises naturally in science and maths, similar to the
way pi arises naturally in geometry. It is on most calculators.
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 322 7/7/15 8:49 AM

If you want to find the monthly rate when you are given the annual com-
pound rate:
m = (1 + i )1/12 − 1 or m = 12 ( 1 + i ) − 1
m = (1 + 0.1956)1/12 − 1 = 0.015 = 1.5%
If you want to find the daily rate when you are given the annual compound
rate:
d = (1 + i)1/365 − 1
Or
d= 365
(1 + i ) − 1
d = (1 + 0.1956)1/ 365 − 1 = 0.000489567,or 0.04896%
Bond equivalent yield

To compare interest rates, yields are generally converted to annual rates, even
for those instruments which mature in only a few days. Money market security
yields are converted to an annualised rate called the bond equivalent yield.
If you receive £37.92 in interest on a three-month bank deposit (91 days) of

£50,000 and want to know what annual rate (the bond equivalent yield, bey)
this equates to:
amount received in interest days in year

bey = × × 100
amount deposited days to maturity
£37.92 365
bey = × × 100 = 0.304193%
£50, 000 91
The bond equivalent yield we have calculated, 0.304193%, is simple annualised

rate of return. It is not compounded, it is just (roughly) four lots of interest
added up (one for each quarter of the year).
An alternative outcome might be that every three months you take your money
(principal plus interest) and reinvest in the same deal at the same rate. Thus
you can get interest on the accumulated interest as well as on the principal. If
you reinvested the principal and accumulated interest every three months at
this quarterly rate of return for a year you would receive:
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 323 7/7/15 8:49 AM

4
⎛ 0.00304193 ⎞
£50, 000 × ⎜ 1 + ⎟⎠ = £50,152.27
⎝ 4
This compound annualised rate of return is calculated by imagining that

after the first 91 days the initial investment and the accrued interest, £50,037.92
are invested for a further 91 days, and so on each quarter.
The compound rate of return is slightly more than the simple annualised rate
of return of 0.304193%:
4
⎛ 0.00304193 ⎞
⎜⎝ 1 + 4 ⎟⎠ − 1 = 0.003045402 or 0.3045402%
Note that this is not entirely accurate because there are more than 4 × 91 days
in a year, so if you want to be really precise, a further small adjustment is
necessary:
In a 365-day year the number of compounding periods is 365 ÷ 91 = 4.010989,

thus to be really accurate the compound annualised rate of return is:
4.010989
⎛ 0.00304193 ⎞
⎜⎝ 1 + 4.010989 ⎟⎠ − 1 = 0.003045405 or 0.3045405%
Thus, to my mind, there are two bond equivalent yields:
1 Simple annualised bey. This is the one most practitioners and books refer to
and it is fine for comparing the rate offered on one money market security
with another of the same time to maturity.
2 (What I’ll call) compound annualised bey, but many people only use (1).
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 324 7/7/15 8:49 AM

Appendix I
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 325
Future value of £1 at compound interest
F = P(1 + i ) n
Interest rate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Periods (n) 1 1.0100 1.0200 1.0300 1.0400 1.0500 1.0600 1.0700 1.0800 1.0900 1.1000 1.1100 1.1200 1.1300 1.1400 1.1500 1
2 1.0201 1.0404 1.0609 1.0816 1.1025 1.1236 1.1449 1.1664 1.1881 1.2100 1.2321 1.2544 1.2769 1.2996 1.3225 2
3 1.0303 1.0612 1.0927 1.1249 1.1576 1.1910 1.2250 1.2597 1.2950 1.3310 1.3676 1.4049 1.4429 1.4815 1.5209 3
4 1.0406 1.0824 1.1255 1.1699 1.2155 1.2625 1.3108 1.3605 1.4116 1.4641 1.5181 1.5735 1.6305 1.6890 1.7490 4
5 1.0510 1.1041 1.1593 1.2167 1.2763 1.3382 1.4026 1.4693 1.5386 1.6105 1.6851 1.7623 1.8424 1.9254 2.0114 5
6 1.0615 1.1262 1.1941 1.2653 1.3401 1.4185 1.5007 1.5869 1.6771 1.7716 1.8704 1.9738 2.0820 2.1950 2.3131 6
7 1.0721 1.1487 1.2299 1.3159 1.4071 1.5036 1.6058 1.7138 1.8280 1.9487 2.0762 2.2107 2.3526 2.5023 2.6600 7
8 1.0829 1.1717 1.2668 1.3686 1.4775 1.5938 1.7182 1.8509 1.9926 2.1436 2.3045 2.4760 2.6584 2.8526 3.0590 8
9 1.0937 1.1951 1.3048 1.4233 1.5513 1.6895 1.8385 1.9990 2.1719 2.3579 2.5580 2.7731 3.0040 3.2519 3.5179 9
10 1.1046 1.2190 1.3439 1.4802 1.6289 1.7908 1.9672 2.1589 2.3674 2.5937 2.8394 3.1058 3.3946 3.7072 4.0456 10
11 1.1157 1.2434 1.3842 1.5395 1.7103 1.8983 2.1049 2.3316 2.5804 2.8531 3.1518 3.4785 3.8359 4.2262 4.6524 11
12 1.1268 1.2682 1.4258 1.6010 1.7959 2.0122 2.2522 2.5182 2.8127 3.1384 3.4985 3.8960 4.3345 4.8179 5.3503 12
13 1.1381 1.2936 1.4685 1.6651 1.8856 2.1329 2.4098 2.7196 3.0658 3.4523 3.8833 4.3635 4.8980 5.4924 6.1528 13
14 1.1495 1.3195 1.5126 1.7317 1.9799 2.2609 2.5785 2.9372 3.3417 3.7975 4.3104 4.8871 5.5348 6.2613 7.0757 14
15 1.1610 1.3459 1.5580 1.8009 2.0789 2.3966 2.7590 3.1722 3.6425 4.1772 4.7846 5.4736 6.2543 7.1379 8.1371 15
16 1.1726 1.3728 1.6047 1.8730 2.1829 2.5404 2.9522 3.4259 3.9703 4.5950 5.3109 6.1304 7.0673 8.1372 9.3576 16
17 1.1843 1.4002 1.6528 1.9479 2.2920 2.6928 3.1588 3.7000 4.3276 5.0545 5.8951 6.8660 7.9861 9.2765 10.7613 17
18 1.1961 1.4282 1.7024 2.0258 2.4066 2.8543 3.3799 3.9960 4.7171 5.5599 6.5436 7.6900 9.0243 10.5752 12.3755 18
19 1.2081 1.4568 1.7535 2.1068 2.5270 3.0256 3.6165 4.3157 5.1417 6.1159 7.2633 8.6128 10.1974 12.0557 14.2318 19
20 1.2202 1.4859 1.8061 2.1911 2.6533 3.2071 3.8697 4.6610 5.6044 6.7275 8.0623 9.6463 11.5231 13.7435 16.3665 20
12 FINANCIAL CONCEPTS AND MATHEMATICS
25 1.2824 1.6406 2.0938 2.6658 3.3864 4.2919 5.4274 6.8485 8.6231 10.8347 13.5855 17.0001 21.2305 26.4619 32.9190 25
325
7/7/15 8:49 AM
326
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 326
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Periods (n) 1 1.1600 1.1700 1.1800 1.1900 1.2000 1.2100 1.2200 1.2300 1.2400 1.2500 1.2600 1.2700 1.2800 1.2900 1.3000 1
2 1.3456 1.3689 1.3924 1.4161 1.4400 1.4641 1.4884 1.5129 1.5376 1.5625 1.5876 1.6129 1.6384 1.6641 1.6900 2
3 1.5609 1.6016 1.6430 1.6852 1.7280 1.7716 1.8158 1.8609 1.9066 1.9531 2.0004 2.0484 2.0972 2.1467 2.1970 3
4 1.8106 1.8739 1.9388 2.0053 2.0736 2.1436 2.2153 2.2889 2.3642 2.4414 2.5205 2.6014 2.6844 2.7692 2.8561 4
5 2.1003 2.1924 2.2878 2.3864 2.4883 2.5937 2.7027 2.8153 2.9316 3.0518 3.1758 3.3038 3.4360 3.5723 3.7129 5
6 2.4364 2.5652 2.6996 2.8398 2.9860 3.1384 3.2973 3.4628 3.6352 3.8147 4.0015 4.1959 4.3980 4.6083 4.8268 6
7 2.8262 3.0012 3.1855 3.3793 3.5832 3.7975 4.0227 4.2593 4.5077 4.7684 5.0419 5.3288 5.6295 5.9447 6.2749 7
8 3.2784 3.5115 3.7589 4.0214 4.2998 4.5950 4.9077 5.2389 5.5895 5.9605 6.3528 6.7675 7.2058 7.6686 8.1573 8
9 3.8030 4.1084 4.4355 4.7854 5.1598 5.5599 5.9874 6.4439 6.9310 7.4506 8.0045 8.5948 9.2234 9.8925 10.6045 9
10 4.4114 4.8068 5.2338 5.6947 6.1917 6.7275 7.3046 7.9259 8.5944 9.3132 10.0857 10.9153 11.8059 12.7614 13.7858 10
11 5.1173 5.6240 6.1759 6.7767 7.4301 8.1403 8.9117 9.7489 10.6571 11.6415 12.7080 13.8625 15.1116 16.4622 17.9216 11
12 5.9360 6.5801 7.2876 8.0642 8.9161 9.8497 10.8722 11.9912 13.2148 14.5519 16.0120 17.6053 19.3428 21.2362 23.2981 12
13 6.8858 7.6987 8.5994 9.5964 10.6993 11.9182 13.2641 14.7491 16.3863 18.1899 20.1752 22.3588 24.7588 27.3947 30.2875 13
14 7.9875 9.0075 10.1472 11.4198 12.8392 14.4210 16.1822 18.1414 20.3191 22.7374 25.4207 28.3957 31.6913 35.3391 39.3738 14
15 9.2655 10.5387 11.9737 13.5895 15.4070 17.4494 19.7423 22.3140 25.1956 28.4217 32.0301 36.0625 40.5648 45.5875 51.1859 15
16 10.7480 12.3303 14.1290 16.1715 18.4884 21.1138 24.0856 27.4462 31.2426 35.5271 40.3579 45.7994 51.9230 58.8079 66.5417 16
17 12.4677 14.4265 16.6722 19.2441 22.1861 25.5477 29.3844 33.7588 38.7408 44.4089 50.8510 58.1652 66.4614 75.8621 86.5042 17
18 14.4625 16.8790 19.6733 22.9005 26.6233 30.9127 35.8490 41.5233 48.0386 55.5112 64.0722 73.8698 85.0706 97.8622 112.4554 18
19 16.7765 19.7484 23.2144 27.2516 31.9480 37.4043 43.7358 51.0737 59.5679 69.3889 80.7310 93.8147 108.8904 126.2422 146.1920 19
20 19.4608 23.1056 27.3930 32.4294 38.3376 45.2593 53.3576 62.8206 73.8641 86.7362 101.7211 119.1446 139.3797 162.8524 190.0496 20
25 40.8742 50.6578 62.6686 77.3881 95.3962 117.3909 144.2101 176.8593 216.5420 264.6978 323.0454 393.6344 478.9049 581.7585 705.6410 25
PART 4 VALUING BONDS AND MONEY MARKET INSTRUMENTS
7/7/15 8:49 AM
Appendix II
Present value of £1 at compound interest
1
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 327
(1 + i ) n
Interest rate (i )
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Periods (n) 1 0.9901 0.9804 0.9709 0.9615 0.9524 0.9434 0.9346 0.9259 0.9174 0.9091 0.9009 0.8929 0.8850 0.8772 0.8696 1
2 0.9803 0.9612 0.9426 0.9246 0.9070 0.8900 0.8734 0.8573 0.8417 0.8264 0.8116 0.7972 0.7831 0.7695 0.7561 2
3 0.9706 0.9423 0.9151 0.8890 0.8638 0.8396 0.8163 0.7938 0.7722 0.7513 0.7312 0.7118 0.6931 0.6750 0.6575 3
4 0.9610 0.9238 0.8885 0.8548 0.8227 0.7921 0.7629 0.7350 0.7084 0.6830 0.6587 0.6355 0.6133 0.5921 0.5718 4
5 0.9515 0.9057 0.8626 0.8219 0.7835 0.7473 0.7130 0.6806 0.6499 0.6209 0.5935 0.5674 0.5428 0.5194 0.4972 5
6 0.9420 0.8880 0.8375 0.7903 0.7462 0.7050 0.6663 0.6302 0.5963 0.5645 0.5346 0.5066 0.4803 0.4556 0.4323 6
7 0.9327 0.8706 0.8131 0.7599 0.7107 0.6651 0.6227 0.5835 0.5470 0.5132 0.4817 0.4523 0.4251 0.3996 0.3759 7
8 0.9235 0.8535 0.7894 0.7307 0.6768 0.6274 0.5820 0.5403 0.5019 0.4665 0.4339 0.4039 0.3762 0.3506 0.3269 8
9 0.9143 0.8368 0.7664 0.7026 0.6446 0.5919 0.5439 0.5002 0.4604 0.4241 0.3909 0.3606 0.3329 0.3075 0.2843 9
10 0.9053 0.8203 0.7441 0.6756 0.6139 0.5584 0.5083 0.4632 0.4224 0.3855 0.3522 0.3220 0.2946 0.2697 0.2472 10
11 0.8963 0.8043 0.7224 0.6496 0.5847 0.5268 0.4751 0.4289 0.3875 0.3505 0.3173 0.2875 0.2607 0.2366 0.2149 11
12 0.8874 0.7885 0.7014 0.6246 0.5568 0.4970 0.4440 0.3971 0.3555 0.3186 0.2858 0.2567 0.2307 0.2076 0.1869 12
13 0.8787 0.7730 0.6810 0.6006 0.5303 0.4688 0.4150 0.3677 0.3262 0.2897 0.2575 0.2292 0.2042 0.1821 0.1625 13
14 0.8700 0.7579 0.6611 0.5775 0.5051 0.4423 0.3878 0.3405 0.2992 0.2633 0.2320 0.2046 0.1807 0.1597 0.1413 14
15 0.8613 0.7430 0.6419 0.5553 0.4810 0.4173 0.3624 0.3152 0.2745 0.2394 0.2090 0.1827 0.1599 0.1401 0.1229 15
16 0.8528 0.7284 0.6232 0.5339 0.4581 0.3936 0.3387 0.2919 0.2519 0.2176 0.1883 0.1631 0.1415 0.1229 0.1069 16
17 0.8444 0.7142 0.6050 0.5134 0.4363 0.3714 0.3166 0.2703 0.2311 0.1978 0.1696 0.1456 0.1252 0.1078 0.0929 17
18 0.8360 0.7002 0.5874 0.4936 0.4155 0.3503 0.2959 0.2502 0.2120 0.1799 0.1528 0.1300 0.1108 0.0946 0.0808 18
19 0.8277 0.6864 0.5703 0.4746 0.3957 0.3305 0.2765 0.2317 0.1945 0.1635 0.1377 0.1161 0.0981 0.0829 0.0703 19
20 0.8195 0.6730 0.5537 0.4564 0.3769 0.3118 0.2584 0.2145 0.1784 0.1486 0.1240 0.1037 0.0868 0.0728 0.0611 20
25 0.7795 0.6095 0.4776 0.3751 0.2953 0.2330 0.1842 0.1460 0.1160 0.0923 0.0736 0.0588 0.0471 0.0378 0.0304 25
30 0.7419 0.5521 0.4120 0.3083 0.2314 0.1741 0.1314 0.0994 0.0754 0.0573 0.0437 0.0334 0.0256 0.0196 0.0151 30
35 0.7059 0.5000 0.3554 0.2534 0.1813 0.1301 0.0937 0.0676 0.0490 0.0356 0.0259 0.0189 0.0139 0.0102 0.0075 35
40 0.6717 0.4529 0.3066 0.2083 0.1420 0.0972 0.0668 0.0460 0.0318 0.0221 0.0154 0.0107 0.0075 0.0053 0.0037 40
45 0.6391 0.4102 0.2644 0.1712 0.1113 0.0727 0.0476 0.0313 0.0207 0.0137 0.0091 0.0061 0.0041 0.0027 0.0019 45
50 0.6080 0.3715 0.2281 0.1407 0.0872 0.0543 0.0339 0.0213 0.0134 0.0085 0.0054 0.0035 0.0022 0.0014 0.0009 50
327
7/7/15 8:49 AM
328
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Periods (n) 1 0.8621 0.8547 0.8475 0.8403 0.8333 0.8264 0.8197 0.8130 0.8065 0.8000 0.7937 0.7874 0.7812 0.7752 0.7692 1
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 328
2 0.7432 0.7305 0.7182 0.7062 0.6944 0.6830 0.6719 0.6610 0.6504 0.6400 0.6299 0.6200 0.6104 0.6009 0.5917 2
3 0.6407 0.6244 0.6086 0.5934 0.5787 0.5645 0.5507 0.5374 0.5245 0.5120 0.4999 0.4882 0.4768 0.4658 0.4552 3
4 0.5523 0.5337 0.5158 0.4987 0.4823 0.4665 0.4514 0.4369 0.4230 0.4096 0.3968 0.3844 0.3725 0.3611 0.3501 4
5 0.4761 0.4561 0.4371 0.4190 0.4019 0.3855 0.3700 0.3552 0.3411 0.3277 0.3149 0.3027 0.2910 0.2799 0.2693 5
6 0.4104 0.3898 0.3704 0.3521 0.3349 0.3186 0.3033 0.2888 0.2751 0.2621 0.2499 0.2383 0.2274 0.2170 0.2072 6
7 0.3538 0.3332 0.3139 0.2959 0.2791 0.2633 0.2486 0.2348 0.2218 0.2097 0.1983 0.1877 0.1776 0.1682 0.1594 7
8 0.3050 0.2848 0.2660 0.2487 0.2326 0.2176 0.2038 0.1909 0.1789 0.1678 0.1574 0.1478 0.1388 0.1304 0.1226 8
9 0.2630 0.2434 0.2255 0.2090 0.1938 0.1799 0.1670 0.1552 0.1443 0.1342 0.1249 0.1164 0.1084 0.1011 0.0943 9
10 0.2267 0.2080 0.1911 0.1756 0.1615 0.1486 0.1369 0.1262 0.1164 0.1074 0.0992 0.0916 0.0847 0.0784 0.0725 10
11 0.1954 0.1778 0.1619 0.1476 0.1346 0.1228 0.1122 0.1026 0.0938 0.0859 0.0787 0.0721 0.0662 0.0607 0.0558 11
12 0.1685 0.1520 0.1372 0.1240 0.1122 0.1015 0.0920 0.0834 0.0757 0.0687 0.0625 0.0568 0.0517 0.0471 0.0429 12
13 0.1452 0.1299 0.1163 0.1042 0.0935 0.0839 0.0754 0.0678 0.0610 0.0550 0.0496 0.0447 0.0404 0.0365 0.0330 13
14 0.1252 0.1110 0.0985 0.0876 0.0779 0.0693 0.0618 0.0551 0.0492 0.0440 0.0393 0.0352 0.0316 0.0283 0.0254 14
15 0.1079 0.0949 0.0835 0.0736 0.0649 0.0573 0.0507 0.0448 0.0397 0.0352 0.0312 0.0277 0.0247 0.0219 0.0195 15
16 0.0930 0.0811 0.0708 0.0618 0.0541 0.0474 0.0415 0.0364 0.0320 0.0281 0.0248 0.0218 0.0193 0.0170 0.0150 16
17 0.0802 0.0693 0.0600 0.0520 0.0451 0.0391 0.0340 0.0296 0.0258 0.0225 0.0197 0.0172 0.0150 0.0132 0.0116 17
18 0.0691 0.0592 0.0508 0.0437 0.0376 0.0323 0.0279 0.0241 0.0208 0.0180 0.0156 0.0135 0.0118 0.0102 0.0089 18
19 0.0596 0.0506 0.0431 0.0367 0.0313 0.0267 0.0229 0.0196 0.0168 0.0144 0.0124 0.0107 0.0092 0.0079 0.0068 19
20 0.0514 0.0433 0.0365 0.0308 0.0261 0.0221 0.0187 0.0159 0.0135 0.0115 0.0098 0.0084 0.0072 0.0061 0.0053 20
25 0.0245 0.0197 0.0160 0.0129 0.0105 0.0085 0.0069 0.0057 0.0046 0.0038 0.0031 0.0025 0.0021 0.0017 0.0014 25
30 0.0116 0.0090 0.0070 0.0054 0.0042 0.0033 0.0026 0.0020 0.0016 0.0012 0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 30
35 0.0055 0.0041 0.0030 0.0023 0.0017 0.0013 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 35
40 0.0026 0.0019 0.0013 0.0010 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 40
45 0.0013 0.0009 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 45
50 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 50
7/7/15 8:49 AM
Appendix III
Present value of an annuity of £1 at compound interest
⎡ 1 ⎤
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 329
1− ⎢ n ⎥
P= ⎣ (1 + i ) ⎦ × A
i
Interest rate (i )
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Periods (n) 1 0.9901 0.9804 0.9709 0.9615 0.9524 0.9434 0.9346 0.9259 0.9174 0.9091 0.9009 0.8929 0.8850 0.8772 0.8696 1
2 1.9704 1.9416 1.9135 1.8861 1.8594 1.8334 1.8080 1.7833 1.7591 1.7355 1.7125 1.6901 1.6681 1.6467 1.6257 2
3 2.9410 2.8839 2.8286 2.7751 2.7232 2.6730 2.6243 2.5771 2.5313 2.4869 2.4437 2.4018 2.3612 2.3216 2.2832 3
4 3.9020 3.8077 3.7171 3.6299 3.5460 3.4651 3.3872 3.3121 3.2397 3.1699 3.1024 3.0373 2.9745 2.9137 2.8550 4
5 4.8534 4.7135 4.5797 4.4518 4.3295 4.2124 4.1002 3.9927 3.8897 3.7908 3.6959 3.6048 3.5172 3.4331 3.3522 5
6 5.7955 5.6014 5.4172 5.2421 5.0757 4.9173 4.7665 4.6229 4.4859 4.3553 4.2305 4.1114 3.9975 3.8887 3.7845 6
7 6.7282 6.4720 6.2303 6.0021 5.7864 5.5824 5.3893 5.2064 5.0330 4.8684 4.7122 4.5638 4.4226 4.2883 4.1604 7
8 7.6517 7.3255 7.0197 6.7327 6.4632 6.2098 5.9713 5.7466 5.5348 5.3349 5.1461 4.9676 4.7988 4.6389 4.4873 8
9 8.5660 8.1622 7.7861 7.4353 7.1078 6.8017 6.5152 6.2469 5.9952 5.7590 5.5370 5.3282 5.1317 4.9464 4.7716 9
10 9.4713 8.9826 8.5302 8.1109 7.7217 7.3601 7.0236 6.7101 6.4177 6.1446 5.8892 5.6502 5.4262 5.2161 5.0188 10
11 10.3676 9.7868 9.2526 8.7605 8.3064 7.8869 7.4987 7.1390 6.8052 6.4951 6.2065 5.9377 5.6869 5.4527 5.2337 11
12 11.2551 10.5753 9.9540 9.3851 8.8633 8.3838 7.9427 7.5361 7.1607 6.8137 6.4924 6.1944 5.9176 5.6603 5.4206 12
13 12.1337 11.3484 10.6350 9.9856 9.3936 8.8527 8.3577 7.9038 7.4869 7.1034 6.7499 6.4235 6.1218 5.8424 5.5831 13
14 13.0037 12.1062 11.2961 10.5631 9.8986 9.2950 8.7455 8.2442 7.7862 7.3667 6.9819 6.6282 6.3025 6.0021 5.7245 14
15 13.8651 12.8493 11.9379 11.1184 10.3797 9.7122 9.1079 8.5595 8.0607 7.6061 7.1909 6.8109 6.4624 6.1422 5.8474 15
16 14.7179 13.5777 12.5611 11.6523 10.8378 10.1059 9.4466 8.8514 8.3126 7.8237 7.3792 6.9740 6.6039 6.2651 5.9542 16
17 15.5623 14.2919 13.1661 12.1657 11.2741 10.4773 9.7632 9.1216 8.5436 8.0216 7.5488 7.1196 6.7291 6.3729 6.0472 17
18 16.3983 14.9920 13.7535 12.6593 11.6896 10.8276 10.0591 9.3719 8.7556 8.2014 7.7016 7.2497 6.8399 6.4674 6.1280 18
19 17.2260 15.6785 14.3238 13.1339 12.0853 11.1581 10.3356 9.6036 8.9501 8.3649 7.8393 7.3658 6.9380 6.5504 6.1982 19
20 18.0456 16.3514 14.8775 13.5903 12.4622 11.4699 10.5940 9.8181 9.1285 8.5136 7.9633 7.4694 7.0248 6.6231 6.2593 20
25 22.0232 19.5235 17.4131 15.6221 14.0939 12.7834 11.6536 10.6748 9.8226 9.0770 8.4217 7.8431 7.3300 6.8729 6.4641 25
30 25.8077 22.3965 19.6004 17.2920 15.3725 13.7648 12.4090 11.2578 10.2737 9.4269 8.6938 8.0552 7.4957 7.0027 6.5660 30
35 29.4086 24.9986 21.4872 18.6646 16.3742 14.4982 12.9477 11.6546 10.5668 9.6442 8.8552 8.1755 7.5856 7.0700 6.6166 35
40 32.8347 27.3555 23.1148 19.7928 17.1591 15.0463 13.3317 11.9246 10.7574 9.7791 8.9511 8.2438 7.6344 7.1050 6.6418 40
45 36.0945 29.4902 24.5187 20.7200 17.7741 15.4558 13.6055 12.1084 10.8812 9.8628 9.0079 8.2825 7.6609 7.1232 6.6543 45
50 39.1961 31.4236 25.7298 21.4822 18.2559 15.7619 13.8007 12.2335 10.9617 9.9148 9.0417 8.3045 7.6752 7.1327 6.6605 50
329
7/7/15 8:49 AM
330
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 330
Periods (n) 1 0.8621 0.8547 0.8475 0.8403 0.8333 0.8264 0.8197 0.8130 0.8065 0.8000 0.7937 0.7874 0.7812 0.7752 0.7692 1
2 1.6052 1.5852 1.5656 1.5465 1.5278 1.5095 1.4915 1.4740 1.4568 1.4400 1.4235 1.4074 1.3916 1.3761 1.3609 2
3 2.2459 2.2096 2.1743 2.1399 2.1065 2.0739 2.0422 2.0114 1.9813 1.9520 1.9234 1.8956 1.8684 1.8420 1.8161 3
4 2.7982 2.7432 2.6901 2.6386 2.5887 2.5404 2.4936 2.4483 2.4043 2.3616 2.3202 2.2800 2.2410 2.2031 2.1662 4
5 3.2743 3.1993 3.1272 3.0576 2.9906 2.9260 2.8636 2.8035 2.7454 2.6893 2.6351 2.5827 2.5320 2.4830 2.4356 5
6 3.6847 3.5892 3.4976 3.4098 3.3255 3.2446 3.1669 3.0923 3.0205 2.9514 2.8850 2.8210 2.7594 2.7000 2.6427 6
7 4.0386 3.9224 3.8115 3.7057 3.6046 3.5079 3.4155 3.3270 3.2423 3.1611 3.0833 3.0087 2.9370 2.8682 2.8021 7
8 4.3436 4.2072 4.0776 3.9544 3.8372 3.7256 3.6193 3.5179 3.4212 3.3289 3.2407 3.1564 3.0758 2.9986 2.9247 8
9 4.6065 4.4506 4.3030 4.1633 4.0310 3.9054 3.7863 3.6731 3.5655 3.4631 3.3657 3.2728 3.1842 3.0997 3.0190 9
10 4.8332 4.6586 4.4941 4.3389 4.1925 4.0541 3.9232 3.7993 3.6819 3.5705 3.4648 3.3644 3.2689 3.1781 3.0915 10
11 5.0286 4.8364 4.6560 4.4865 4.3271 4.1769 4.0354 3.9018 3.7757 3.6564 3.5435 3.4365 3.3351 3.2388 3.1473 11
12 5.1971 4.9884 4.7932 4.6105 4.4392 4.2784 4.1274 3.9852 3.8514 3.7251 3.6059 3.4933 3.3868 3.2859 3.1903 12
13 5.3423 5.1183 4.9095 4.7147 4.5327 4.3624 4.2028 4.0530 3.9124 3.7801 3.6555 3.5381 3.4272 3.3224 3.2233 13
14 5.4675 5.2293 5.0081 4.8023 4.6106 4.4317 4.2646 4.1082 3.9616 3.8241 3.6949 3.5733 3.4587 3.3507 3.2487 14
15 5.5755 5.3242 5.0916 4.8759 4.6755 4.4890 4.3152 4.1530 4.0013 3.8593 3.7261 3.6010 3.4834 3.3726 3.2682 15
16 5.6685 5.4053 5.1624 4.9377 4.7296 4.5364 4.3567 4.1894 4.0333 3.8874 3.7509 3.6228 3.5026 3.3896 3.2832 16
17 5.7487 5.4746 5.2223 4.9897 4.7746 4.5755 4.3908 4.2190 4.0591 3.9099 3.7705 3.6400 3.5177 3.4028 3.2948 17
18 5.8178 5.5339 5.2732 5.0333 4.8122 4.6079 4.4187 4.2431 4.0799 3.9279 3.7861 3.6536 3.5294 3.4130 3.3037 18
19 5.8775 5.5845 5.3162 5.0700 4.8435 4.6346 4.4415 4.2627 4.0967 3.9424 3.7985 3.6642 3.5386 3.4210 3.3105 19
20 5.9288 5.6278 5.3527 5.1009 4.8696 4.6567 4.4603 4.2786 4.1103 3.9539 3.8083 3.6726 3.5458 3.4271 3.3158 20
25 6.0971 5.7662 5.4669 5.1951 4.9476 4.7213 4.5139 4.3232 4.1474 3.9849 3.8342 3.6943 3.5640 3.4423 3.3286 25
30 6.1772 5.8294 5.5168 5.2347 4.9789 4.7463 4.5338 4.3391 4.1601 3.9950 3.8424 3.7009 3.5693 3.4466 3.3321 30
35 6.2153 5.8582 5.5386 5.2512 4.9915 4.7559 4.5411 4.3447 4.1644 3.9984 3.8450 3.7028 3.5708 3.4478 3.3330 35
40 6.2335 5.8713 5.5482 5.2582 4.9966 4.7596 4.5439 4.3467 4.1659 3.9995 3.8458 3.7034 3.5712 3.4481 3.3332 40
45 6.2421 5.8773 5.5523 5.2611 4.9986 4.7610 4.5449 4.3474 4.1664 3.9998 3.8460 3.7036 3.5714 3.4482 3.3333 45
50 6.2463 5.8801 5.5541 5.2623 4.9995 4.7616 4.5452 4.3477 4.1666 3.9999 3.8461 3.7037 3.5714 3.4483 3.3333 50
7/7/15 8:49 AM
Appendix IV
M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 331
Future value of an annuity of £1 at compound interest
Interest rate (i )
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 14 16 18 20 25 30 35
Periods (n) 1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2 2.0100 2.0200 2.0300 2.0400 2.0500 2.0600 2.0700 2.0800 2.0900 2.1000 2.1200 2.1400 2.1600 2.1800 2.2000 2.2500 2.3000 2.3500
3 3.0301 3.0604 3.0909 3.1216 3.1525 3.1836 3.2149 3.2464 3.2781 3.3100 3.3744 3.4396 3.5056 3.5724 3.6400 3.8125 3.9900 4.1725
4 4.0604 4.1216 4.1836 4.2465 4.3101 4.3746 4.4399 4.5061 4.5731 4.6410 4.7793 4.9211 5.0665 5.2154 5.3680 5.7656 6.1870 6.6329
5 5.1010 5.2040 5.3091 5.4163 5.5256 5.6371 5.7507 5.8666 5.9847 6.1051 6.3528 6.6101 6.8771 7.1542 7.4416 8.2070 9.0431 9.9544
6 6.1520 6.3081 6.4684 6.6330 6.8019 6.9753 7.1533 7.3359 7.5233 7.7156 8.1152 8.5355 8.9775 9.4420 9.9299 11.2588 12.7560 14.4834
7 7.2135 7.4343 7.6625 7.8983 8.1420 8.3938 8.6540 8.9228 9.2004 9.4872 10.0890 10.7305 11.4139 12.1415 12.9159 15.0735 17.5828 20.4919
8 8.2857 8.5830 8.8923 9.2142 9.5491 9.8975 10.2598 10.6366 11.0285 11.4359 12.2997 13.2328 14.2401 15.3270 16.4991 19.8419 23.8577 28.6640
9 9.3685 9.7546 10.1591 10.5828 11.0266 11.4913 11.9780 12.4876 13.0210 13.5795 14.7757 16.0853 17.5185 19.0859 20.7989 25.8023 32.0150 39.6964
10 10.4622 10.9497 11.4639 12.0061 12.5779 13.1808 13.8164 14.4866 15.1929 15.9374 17.5487 19.3373 21.3215 23.5213 25.9587 33.2529 42.6195 54.5902
11 11.5668 12.1687 12.8078 13.4864 14.2068 14.9716 15.7836 16.6455 17.5603 18.5312 20.6546 23.0445 25.7329 28.7551 32.1504 42.5661 56.4053 74.6967
12 12.6825 13.4121 14.1920 15.0258 15.9171 16.8699 17.8885 18.9771 20.1407 21.3843 24.1331 27.2707 30.8502 34.9311 39.5805 54.2077 74.3270 101.841
13 13.8093 14.6803 15.6178 16.6268 17.7130 18.8821 20.1406 21.4953 22.9534 24.5227 28.0291 32.0887 36.7862 42.2187 48.4966 68.7596 97.6250 138.485
14 14.9474 15.9739 17.0863 18.2919 19.5986 21.0151 22.5505 24.2149 26.0192 27.9750 32.3926 37.5811 43.6720 50.8180 59.1959 86.9495 127.913 187.954
15 16.0969 17.2934 18.5989 20.0236 21.5786 23.2760 25.1290 27.1521 29.3609 31.7725 37.2797 43.8424 51.6595 60.9653 72.0351 109.687 167.286 254.738
16 17.2579 18.6393 20.1569 21.8245 23.6575 25.6725 27.8881 30.3243 33.0034 35.9497 42.7533 50.9804 60.9250 72.9390 87.4421 138.109 218.472 344.897
17 18.4304 20.0121 21.7616 23.6975 25.8404 28.2129 30.8402 33.7502 36.9737 40.5447 48.8837 59.1176 71.6730 87.0680 105.931 173.636 285.014 466.611
18 19.6147 21.4123 23.4144 25.6454 28.1324 30.9057 33.9990 37.4502 41.3013 45.5992 55.7497 68.3941 84.1407 103.740 128.117 218.045 371.518 630.925
19 20.8109 22.8406 25.1169 27.6712 30.5390 33.7600 37.3790 41.4463 46.0185 51.1591 63.4397 78.9692 98.6032 123.414 154.740 273.556 483.973 852.748
20 22.0190 24.2974 26.8704 29.7781 33.0660 36.7856 40.9955 45.7620 51.1601 57.2750 72.0524 91.0249 115.380 146.628 186.688 342.945 630.165 1152.21
25 28.2432 32.0303 36.4593 41.6459 47.7271 54.8645 63.2490 73.1059 84.7009 98.3471 133.334 181.871 249.214 342.603 471.981 1054.79 2348.80 5176.50
30 34.7849 40.5681 47.5754 56.0849 66.4388 79.0582 94.4608 113.283 136.308 164.494 241.333 356.787 530.312 790.948 1181.88 3227.17 8729.99 23221.6
331
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M12_ARNO1799_01_SE_C12.indd 332 7/7/15 8:49 AM
CHAPTER 13
BOND VALUATION
Bonds, particularly those that are traded in liquid secondary markets, are
priced according to supply and demand, and their prices can be volatile. The
main influence is the general level of interest rates for securities of a similar risk
level and length of time to maturity. As a bond approaches its maturity date,
its market value grows closer to its nominal value, the amount that will be paid
at maturity. This is known as the pull to par, pull to maturity or pull to
redemption.
Irredeemable bonds
Take the case of a €1,000 irredeemable bond with an annual coupon of 8%.
This financial asset offers to any potential purchaser a regular and fixed €80 per
year in perpetuity (i.e. 8% of the par value of €1,000), but the actual price of
the bond will fluctuate in response to the prevailing rate of interest. When the
bond was issued, general interest rates for this risk class may well have been 8%
and so the bond may have been sold at €1,000. However, interest rates change
over time and the €80 coupon may not remain sufficient to maintain the bond
price at €1,000.
Suppose that the current rate of interest is now 10%. Investors will no longer
be willing to pay €1,000 for an instrument that yields only €80 per year. The
current market value of the bond will fall to €800 – the current value of the
irredeemable bond is given by dividing the coupon rate by the current rate of
interest, €80/0.10. This is the maximum amount needed to pay for similar
bonds given the current interest rate of 10%. We say that the bond is trading at
a ‘discount’ to its nominal value because it is trading below €1,000.
If the coupon rate is more than the current market interest rate, the bond price
will be greater than the nominal (par) value. Thus, if market rates are 6%,
the irredeemable bond will be priced at €1,333.33 (€80/0.06). We say that it is
trading at a ‘premium’ to its nominal value, i.e. at more than €1,000.
M13_ARNO1799_01_SE_C13.indd 333 7/7/15 8:50 AM

The formula relating the price of an irredeemable bond, the coupon and the
market rate of interest is:
C
PD =
kD
where PD = price of bond, D stands for debt
C = nominal annual income (the coupon rate × nominal (par) value of the
bond)
kD = market discount rate, the annual return required on bonds of similar risk
and characteristics.
Also:
I
VD =
kD
where VD = total market value of all of the bonds of this type
I = total annual nominal interest of all the bonds of this type.
We may wish to establish the market rate of interest represented by the market
price of the bond. For example, if an irredeemable bond offers an annual coupon
of 9.5% and is currently trading at £87.50, with the next coupon due in one
year, the rate of return is:
C £9.5
kD = = × 100 = 10.86%
PD £87.5
Note this formula can be used only if the next coupon is payable one year
from the time of valuation. If there are coupons before then they need to be
discounted separately, adding to the overall value.
Redeemable bonds
A purchaser of a redeemable bond buys two types of income promise: first
the coupon, second the redemption payment. The amount that an investor
will pay depends on the amount these income flows are presently worth when
discounted at the current rate of return required on that risk class of debt. The
relationships are expressed in the following formulae:
C1 C2 C3 C4 Cn Rn
PD = + + + + ... + +
1 + k D (1 + k D )2 (1 + k D )3 (1 + k D )4 1 + k D ) n (1 + k D ) n
(1
M13_ARNO1799_01_SE_C13.indd 334 7/7/15 8:50 AM

13 BOND VALUATION 335
and:
I1 I2 I3 I4 In Rn*
VD = + + + + ... + +
1 + k D (1 + k D ) 2
(1 + k D ) 3
(1 + k D ) 4
1 + kD )
(1 n
(1 + k D ) n
where C1, C2, C3 and C4 = nominal interest per bond in years 1, 2, 3 and 4 up to
n years
I1, I2, I3 and I4 = total nominal interest in years 1, 2, 3 and 4 up to n years
Rn and R*n = redemption value of a single bond, and total redemption value of
all bonds in issue in year n, the redemption date or maturity date.
The following examples illustrate the valuation of a bond when the market
redemption yield is given.
Example 13.1
Blackaby plc issued a bond with a par value of £100 in September 2014, redeem-
able in September 2020 at par. The coupon is 8% payable annually in September.
Therefore:
● the bond has a par value of £100 but this may not be what investors will pay for it
● the annual cash payment will be £8 (8% of par)
● in September 2020, £100 will be handed over to the bond holder (in the
absence of default by the issuer).
The price investors will pay for this bond at the time of issue if the current market
rate of interest for a security in this risk class is 7% can be worked out as follows
(computers and financial calculators will perform the task quicker, but by doing it
the old-fashioned way you gain a greater understanding of what is going on inside
the ‘black box’ of the machine):
The present value of an £8 annuity for 6 years when 4.7665 × £8 = £38.13

discounted at 7%:
First obtain the present value of six lots of £1 paid at annual
intervals. This is given in the annuity table. Look along the ‘6’
period row and down the ‘7’ interest rate column to obtain
4.7665. This bond pays £8 per year, not £1, so we need to
multiply this annuity factor by 8.
This bond also gives the holder £100 in six years from now. 100
= £66.63
We need to add the present value of this £100 to the (1 + 0.07)6
present value of all the coupons
PD = £104.77
M13_ARNO1799_01_SE_C13.indd 335 7/7/15 8:50 AM

Example 13.2
It is now three years later. What is the value of Blackaby’s bond in the secondary
market in September 2017 if market interest rates rise by 200 basis points (i.e.
for this risk class they rise to 9%)? (Assume the next coupon payment is in one
year.)
£8 annuity for 3 years @ 9% = 2.5313 × £8 = £20.25
100
+ = £77.22
(1 + 0.09)3
PD = £97.47
If we need to calculate the rate of return demanded by investors from a particular

bond when we know the market price they are paying and coupon amounts,
we can compute the internal rate of return (IRR)1 – see Example 13.3.
Example 13.3
Bluebird plc issued a bond many years ago that is due for redemption at £100 par
in three years. The annual coupon is 6% (next one payable in one year) and the
market price is £91. The rate of return now offered in the market by this bond is
found by solving for kD:
C1 C2 C3 R3
PD = + + +
1 + k D (1 + k D )2 (1 + k D )3 (1 + k D )3
6 6 6 100
91 = + + +
1 + k D (1 + k D ) 2
(1 + k D ) 3
(1 + k D )3
We’ll solve this problem through iteration, i.e. trial and error, by trying one interest
rate after another on paper. First we will try 9%, as this seems roughly right given
the capital gain of around 3% per year over the three years (i.e. £9 overall) plus the
6% coupon.
1
If you would like a refresher on IRR and other discounted cash flow calculations consult
Chapter 2 of Arnold, G. (2012) Corporate Financial Management.
M13_ARNO1799_01_SE_C13.indd 336 7/7/15 8:50 AM

At an interest rate (kD) of 9%, the right side of the equation amounts to £92.41:
100
+ = £77.22
(1 + 0.09)3
PD = £92.41
This is more than the £91 on the left side of the equation, so we conclude that we
are not discounting the cash flows on the right side of the equation by a sufficiently
high rate of return. At an interest rate of 10% the right-hand side of the equation
amounts to £90.05:
100
+ = £75.13
(1 + 0.10)3
PD = £90.05
This is less than the £91 we are aiming at, so the internal rate of return lies some-
where between 9% and 10%. We can be more precise using linear interpolation:
Interest rate 9% kD 10%
Value of discounted cash flows £92.41 91 £90.05

a b c
We are trying to find the value of kD, where the cash flows are discounted at just
the right rate to equal the amount paid for the bond (£91). kD is 9% plus the fraction
formed by the difference between points ‘a’ and ‘b’, that is 92.41 − 91, divided by
the difference between points ‘a’ and ‘c’, that is 92.41 − 90.05, multiplied by the
number of percentage points between a and c, that is 10 − 9, one percentage
point:
92.41 − 91
k D = 9% + × (10 − 9) = 9.59%
92.41 − 90.05
Thus the cash flows offered on this bond represent an average annual rate of
return of 9.59% on a £91 investment if the bond is held to maturity and the coupon
payments are reinvested at 9.59% before then. This is the yield to maturity or YTM
discussed in the next section.
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Excel offers formulae, IRR and NPV, for these calculations – see below:
A B C D E F G
1 Calculating rate of return offered by the Bluebird bond
3 Year zero 1 2 3
4 Current bond price −91
5 Coupon payments 6 6 6
6 Redemption value in year 3 100
8 −91 6 6 106
10 The rate of return (IRR) offered by the bond is 9.59%
11
12
13 Sensitivity of bond prices to changes in rate of return
14
15 Rate of return 5.0% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
16
17 Current bond price (NPV) 102.72 100.00 97.38 94.85 92.41 90.05
Using the above figures, format a cell (in this case E10) in Excel as a percentage
and type in
=IRR(B8:E8)
and 9.59% will appear in cell E10.
To understand the sensitivity of bond prices to changes in the rate of return, type
into a cell (in this case B17)
=NPV(B15,$C8:$E8)
and 102.72 will appear in cell B17, which is the market price if the rate of return is
5%. (NPV is the net present value of all the cash inflows, ignoring the initial outflow
to buy the bond.) The figures for 6%, 7%, 8%, 9% and 10% can be worked out in
the same fashion, or by copying B17 and pasting in C17, D17, E17, F17 and G17.
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The two types of yield

The current yield2 is the gross (before tax) interest amount divided by the
current market price of the bond expressed as a percentage:
Gross interest ( coupon)

× 100
Market price
Thus, for a holder of Bluebird’s bonds in Example 13.3 the current yield is:
£6
× 100 = 6.59%
£91
This is a gross yield. The after-tax yield will be influenced by the investor’s tax
position.
Net interest yield = Gross yield (1 − T )
where T = the tax rate applicable to the bond holder.
At a time when interest rates are higher than 6.59% for that risk class it is obvi-
ous that any potential purchaser of Bluebird bonds will be looking for a return
other than from the coupon. That additional return comes in the form of a
capital gain over three years of £100 – £91 = £9. A rough estimate of this annual
gain is (9/91) ÷ 3 = 3.3% per year. When this is added to the current yield we
have an approximation to the second type of yield, the yield to maturity (the
redemption yield).
The yield to maturity of a bond is the discount rate such that the present value
of all the cash inflows from the bond (interest plus principal) is equal to the
bond’s current market price. The rough estimate of 9.89% (6.59% + 3.3%) has
not taken into account the precise timing of the investor’s income flows.
When this is adjusted for, the yield to maturity is 9.59% – the internal rate of
return calculated in Example 13.3.
Return on selling before maturity

It is important to note that many investors sell their bonds before the redemp-
tion date. The price received depends on market conditions. If general interest
2
Also known as the interest yield, flat yield, income yield, simple yield, annual yield and
running yield.
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rates have risen over the holding period, the bond could well be worth less
than if market interest rates remained constant or declined. This will have a
depressing effect on the rate of return received even though coupons have
been paid during the time the bonds were owned – see Example 13.4.
Example 13.4
If an investor bought Bluebird’s three-year bonds at £91 and sells them one year
later when the rate of return on two-year bonds of this risk level in the market has
risen to 10%, instead of receiving the original 9.59% yield to maturity he/she will
achieve a rate of return of only 8.86% over the year of holding, as explained below:
After one year of holding there are only two cash inflows left owing to a buyer:
£6 to be received in one year and £106 to be received in two years (£6 coupon
plus £100 nominal value):
6 106
Market value of bond after 1 year = + = 93.06
1 + 0.1 (1 + 0.1)2
Thus the return (r) to our investor is:
C + ( Pt +1 − Pt )
r= × 100
Pt
where C = coupon received
Pt+1 = price of bond after one year
Pt = price of bond at the start.
There is an interest element (C/Pt) plus a capital gain or loss ((Pt+1 – Pt)/Pt) element
to the rate of return:
6 + (93.06 − 91)
r= × 100 = 8.86%
91
Semi-annual interest
The example of Bluebird is based on the assumption of annual interest payments.
This makes initial understanding easier and reflects the reality for many types
of bond, particularly internationally traded bonds. However, many companies
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and governments around the world issue domestic bonds with semi-annual
interest payments. The rate of return calculation on these bonds is slightly
more complicated.
Example 13.5
Redwing has an 11% bond outstanding that pays interest semi-annually. It will be
redeemed in two years at €100 and has a current market price of €96, with
the next interest payment due in six months. The yield to maturity on this bond is
calculated as follows:
Cash flows
Point in time (years) 0.5 1 1.5 2.0
Cash flow €5.50 €5.50 €5.50 €5.50 + €100
Taking the capital gain (€100 − €96 over two years) as about 2% per year, the
IRR/2 would be roughly 5.5% plus 1%, 6.5% for six months. To obtain a more
accurate yield to maturity figure we need to solve for kD allowing for the semi-
annual compounding of interest received:
5.50 5.50 5.50 105.50
96 = + 2
+ 3
+ 4
kD ⎛ kD ⎞ ⎛ kD ⎞ ⎛ kD ⎞
1+ 1 + 1 + 1 +
2 ⎜⎝ 2 ⎟⎠ ⎜⎝ 2 ⎟⎠ ⎜⎝ 2 ⎟⎠
More precisely, at a rate of 7% for kD /2, PD equals €94.920:
€5.50 × 4-period annuity @ 7% = 3.3872 × €5.50 = €18.63
100
+ = €76.29
(1 + 0.07)4
PD = €94.92
At a rate of 6% for kD/2, PD equals €98.267:
€5.50 × 4-period annuity @ 6% = 3.4651 × €5.50 = €19.058
100
+ = €79.209
(1 + 0.06)4
PD = €98.267
The IRR of the cash flow equals:

98.267 − 96
6% + × (7 − 6) = 6.6773%
98.267 − 94.92
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The IRR needs to be converted from a half-yearly cash flow basis to an annual
basis (an effective annual yield).
The relationship between semi-annual interest and annual interest is:
(1 + s)2 = (1 + i )
where s is the semi-annual rate and i is the annual rate, i.e. interest received at the
half year is compounded.
Thus:
(1 + s)2 – 1 = i
In the case of Redwing:

i = (1 + 0.066773)2 – 1 = 0.138 or 13.80%
Yield to maturity versus rate of return

It is important to understand the difference between yield to maturity and rate
of return.
The yield to maturity is the return that would be received given the current
rate of coupon and market price, and assuming the bond is held until
maturity.
The rate of return is the rate that an investor actually receives between the
purchase and when their bond is sold before maturity, or on reaching
maturity.
Yield to maturity and rate of return are only the same if the time to maturity
is the same as the holding period.
We can illustrate this as follows.
Example 13.6
Assume that Tom has just bought four bonds. The maturity dates are 1 year from
now, 5 years from now, 10 years from now and 20 years from now. For the sake
of simplicity assume that all the bonds are trading in the secondary market at
€1,000, which is also their par values to be paid at maturity, and that they each
offer a yield to maturity of 6% (annual coupons are €60).
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Tom is planning to sell all of the bonds in a year from now. The question is, what
rate of return will he receive if between now and then the yield to maturity that
investors demand in the secondary market on these bonds rises from 6% to 10%,
or falls to 2%? (Again, assume for the sake of simplicity that the yield to maturity of
10% or 2% is the same regardless of whether the bond has a short or a long time
until maturity – there is a ‘flat yield curve’ as discussed later.)
We’ll concentrate on the 10% interest rate level first.
One-year bond
In the case of the one-year bond Tom does not have to sell in the secondary
market; the issuer redeems the bond at its par value of €1,000. Tom also receives
the coupon of €60, so the rate of return he gains is 6% (60/1000). This is the same
as the yield to maturity when he bought the bond.
Five-year bond
C + ( Pt +1 − Pt )
Rate of return over the one-year holding periood r = × 100
Pt
where C = coupon rate
Pt+1 = price of bond after one year
Pt = price of bond at the start.
To calculate Pt+1:
Pt+1 = four annual coupons discounted to time t + 1 (€60 × annuity factor for four
years at 10%) plus the redemption amount discounted back to t + 1:
€60 annuity for 4 years @ 10% = 3.1699 × €60 = €190.19
+ 1000 = €683.01
(1 + 0.10)4
Pt+1 = €873.20
60 + (873.20 − 1000)
Rate of return over one year r = × 100 = −6.7%
1000
So, while the yield to maturity at time t was 6%, the rate of return over the one-year
holding period was −6.7% because of the large capital loss on the bond.
It is even worse for the 10-year and 20-year bonds. If yields to maturity rise from
6% to 10% over the holding year then these bonds can be sold for only €769.64
and €665.40 at time t + 1:
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Ten-year bond
C + ( Pt +1 − Pt )
Rate of return r = × 100
Pt
Pt+1 with nine annual coupons, 10% discount rate:
+
1000 = €424.10
(1 + 0.10)9
Pt+1 = €769.64
60 + (769.64 − 1000)
Rate of return over one year r = × 100 = −17%
1000
Twenty-year bond
C + ( Pt +1 − Pt )
Rate of return r = × 100
Pt
Pt+1 with 19 annual coupons, 10% discount rate:
1000
+ = €163.51
(1 + 0.10)19
Pt+1 = €665.40
60 + (665.40 − 1000)
Rate of return over one year r = × 100 = −27.5%
1000
So far, poor Tom. Because interest rates have risen, the value of all his bonds
(except the one-year bond) has fallen and he ends up with a considerable capital
loss, €691.76 in total.
If, however, interest rates fall by 4% points to 2%, then Tom is in luck. Each of his
bonds (except the one-year bond) is worth far more, giving him a gain of €1105.93
on top of his coupon at the end of one year. The individual bond returns are shown
in Table 13.1, for both a rise in interest rates to 10% or a fall to 2%. An interest rate
change of 4% is quite dramatic; typically interest rates change by far smaller
amounts, but this example demonstrates the different volatility of bond prices and
how important it is to understand bond pricing.
Of course, if each of the bonds is held until maturity Tom will receive a 6% rate of
return on all of them, because they will then be redeemed at their par value.
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Table 13.1 Rates of return on Tom’s bonds given market interest rate changes
and sale after one year
Years to Initial Current Price at Price Capital Rate of

maturity yield to rate of time t at time gain/loss return
when maturity interest t+1
+ − %+ %−
first (coupon
bought on bond)
1 6% 10% € 1,000 € 1,000.00 6.0

1 6% 2% € 1,000 € 1,000.00 6.0
5 6% 10% € 1,000 € 873.20 −€ 126.80 −6.7
5 6% 2% € 1,000 € 1,152.31 € 152.31 21.2
10 6% 10% € 1,000 € 769.64 −€ 230.36 −17.0
10 6% 2% € 1,000 € 1,326.49 € 326.49 38.6
20 6% 10% € 1,000 € 665.40 −€ 334.60 −27.5
20 6% 2% € 1,000 € 1,627.14 € 627.14 68.7
Again, we have an illustration of the inverse relationship between the price of

a bond and the yield to maturity. We also have the (when first encountered)
counter-intuitive result that a rise in interest rates results in a poor bond investment
– Tom will not be happy with the return on his bonds if interest rates rise, but if
they fall he will benefit.
Volatility of bond returns

The Tom example also demonstrates how volatility changes with time to
maturity. The most volatile bond is the one stretching for 20 years – its price
is very sensitive to market interest rates, there is a large amount of interest
rate risk. The degree of price change is much smaller for the five-year bond
and non-existent for the one-year bond (although there would be some
impact from market interest rate changes if the one-year bond was sold in a
few months rather than after the whole year is out).
In general, rates of returns and prices for long-term bonds are more volatile
than they are for short-term bonds.
This means that if the investor has a time horizon of only a year or two,
long-term bonds may be seen as risky investments – even if they have very low
default risk, they have high interest rate risk. It is not uncommon for bonds to
lose or gain a significant percentage of their value in a year, even if they are
reputable government bonds. This is illustrated in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.3) by the
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returns on UK gilts for every year going back to 1900. On many occasions an
investor who purchased bonds at the beginning of the year and sold at the end
lost more than 10%, despite receiving coupons.
Duration
To gain a measure of interest rate risk and volatility for a bond relative to
others, bond market participants often use duration. The duration3 metric is
a summary measure of how far into the future is the average date of the
cash flows to be received, when the cash flows are weighted by their size after
they have been discounted.
In other words,
the duration of a bond is the weighted average maturity time of all pay-
ments (coupons and principal) to be received from owning a bond, where
the weights are the discounted present values of the payments.
So, for zero coupon bonds the effective duration is the same as its actual term to
maturity – the ‘average’ maturity time is the same as the final payout, the only
cash flow received. A three-year zero coupon bond has a duration of three years.
For coupon-paying bonds the duration is shorter than the stated term to
maturity because as the years go by the investor receives income from the bond
which pushes the weighted average timing of income flows more towards the
start date than is the case on a zero coupon bond.
A three-year coupon-paying bond offering £7 per year (with the first in one
year from now) and £100 on maturity can be seen as having cash flows equal
to the following three zero coupon bonds:
A one-year zero coupon bond paying £7 in one year’s time
A two-year zero coupon bond paying £7 in two years’ time
A three-year zero coupon bond paying £107 in three years’ time
If the present yields to maturity for bonds of this risk class are also 7% then the
duration can be calculated – see Table 13.2 – where the present value
Ct
PV =
(1 + k D )t
3
Often referred to as Macaulay’s duration after Frederick Macaulay who formulated it in the
1930s.
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Table 13.2 Calculating duration on a three-year 7% coupon bond
Coupon PV (7% Weights Weighted maturity value

Period
and discount (PV ÷ total PV as a percentage) (period × weights ÷ 100)

principal rate, the in years
current
market
YTM)
1 £7 £6.542 (£6.542 ÷ £100) × 100 = 6.542% 1 × 6.542 ÷ 100 = 0.0654
2 £7 £6.114 (£6.114 ÷ £100) × 100 = 6.114% 2 × 6.114 ÷ 100 = 0.1223
3 £107 £87.344 (£87.344 ÷ £100) × 100 = 87.344% 3 × 87.344 ÷ 100 = 2.6203
Total PV £100.00 100.00% Duration = 2.808 years
As we might expect, the duration of 2.808 years is almost as much as the time
to maturity but it is lowered from the full three years because some of the income
is received before the end of three years. This three-year 7% coupon bond has
the same duration as a 2.808-year zero coupon bond also yielding 7%.
Duration if the term to maturity is lengthened

If we now look at a four-year bond offering £7 per year when the yield to matu-
rity is 7% we expect to find its duration greater than that on the three-year
bond – see Table 13.3.
This illustrates a general rule:
Holding other factors constant, the longer the term to maturity of a bond,
the longer its duration.
Table 13.3 Calculating duration on a four-year 7% coupon bond

Period

current
market
YTM)
1 £7 £6.542 (£6.542 ÷ £100) × 100 = 6.542% 1 × 6.54 ÷ 100 = 0.0654
2 £7 £6.114 (£6.114 ÷ £100) × 100 = 6.114% 2 × 6.11 ÷ 100 = 0.1223
3 £7 £5.714 (£5.714 ÷ £100) × 100 = 5.714% 3 × 5.714 ÷ 100 = 0.1714
4 £107 £81.630 (£81.63 ÷ £100) × 100 = 81.630% 4 × 81.63 ÷ 100 = 3.2652
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Article 13.1 illustrates the importance of length to maturity in creating

increased interest rate risk related to duration – sometimes investors are very
concerned about it, other times they are more sanguine.
Article 13.1
Investors lap up ultra-long corporate

bonds
By Vivianne Rodrigues

Global sales of corporate bonds maturing in 50 years have jumped to record levels
this year as investors are flocking to the securities, lured by the higher yields
offered by the debt.
Total issuance of ultra-long corporate debt jumped to $56.5bn in 2013, a rise of 84%
from 2012.
Strong demand has boosted total returns on the debt, with investors for now leav-
ing aside concerns about duration exposure – a measure of the sensitivity of bond
prices to changes in interest rates – in their bond portfolios.
Longer-dated bonds are more sensitive to duration risks.
In spite of rising expectations of higher US bond yields, which may hurt long-dated
corporate debt, there has been no shortage of buyers for 50-year dollar bonds sold
in 2014 by companies such as Caterpillar, South Carolina Electric & Gas, Volkswagen
and EDF.
‘For people who are comfortable with some duration exposure, these bonds offer a
good opportunity to capture 20 or sometimes even 30 basis points in additional
yield,’ said Adrian Miller, at GMP Securities.
‘For high-grade companies, this is a great chance to raise very long-term funding at
low costs.’
On Tuesday, building-supply maker Johnson Controls sold $450m in 50-year bonds
as part of a $1.7bn offering. Demand for the 50-year tranche surpassed the $3bn
mark, according to people familiar with the sale. The 50-year bonds offered yields
30 basis points higher than those offered by the company’s 30-year debt.
However, a turn higher in rates still stands to hurt those investors chasing the higher
yields on longer-dated debt . . . the clock is ticking for long-term interest rates.
Source: Rodrigues, V. (2014) Investors lap up ultra-long corporate bonds, Financial Times,
11 June.
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Duration and changes in yield to maturity

The time to maturity of a bond is not enough on its own to tell you what its
volatility level is. Thus all four-year bonds do not have the same duration (say,
3.6243 years). This can be illustrated using the four-year bond example again,
keeping everything the same except that the yield to maturity is now 10%.
Thus, we discount the future cash flows at the higher discount rate of 10%, not
7% – see Table 13.4.
Table 13.4 Calculating duration on a four-year 7% coupon bond when the yield to
maturity is 10%
Period

current
market
YTM)
1 £7 £6.36 (£6.36 ÷ £90.49) × 100 = 7.03% 1 × 7.03 ÷ 100 = 0.0703
2 £7 £5.79 (£5.79 ÷ £90.49) × 100 = 6.40% 2 × 6.40 ÷ 100 = 0.1280
3 £7 £5.26 (£5.26 ÷ £90.49) × 100 = 5.81% 3 × 5.81 ÷ 100 = 0.1743
4 £107 £73.08 (£73.08 ÷ £90.49) × 100 = 80.76% 4 × 80.76 ÷ 100 = 3.2304
With the interest rate at 10%, duration has fallen from 3.6243 years to 3.603
years. This is because at the higher interest rate the more distant cash flows are
discounted more heavily and thus comprise a lower overall proportion of the
overall discounted cash flows – the nearer-term cash flows gain relative weight
as the duration reduces.
This illustrates another rule:
If interest rates rise, the duration falls (keeping everything else constant).
Article 13.2 discusses how the difference in yield between investment-grade

and junk bonds causes significantly greater interest rate risk for investment-
grade securities.
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Article 13.2
Investors bet on junk bonds to

outperform
By Vivianne Rodrigues and Michael Mackenzie

The average junk yield, which moves inversely to prices, has dipped below 6% this
month, a big turnround in sentiment when the 10-year Treasury yield of 2.60%
remains just shy of its June peak.
The total return for an index of US junk bonds in July stands at 2%, according to
Barclays. Year-to-date, high yield has returned 3.4%. While investment-grade bonds
have rallied 1% in July, the sector has posted a negative 2.4% total return for the year.
The contrast in performance between junk and investment grade reflects a stark
difference in the sensitivity of bonds in an environment of rising interest rates.
Investment-grade bonds tend to carry lower coupons over longer maturities, which
in turn helps increase the bonds’ so-called duration – a measure of how sensitive
bond prices are to changes in interest rates.
For example the average duration for junk debt stands at 4.2 years, below the aver-
age of 6.9 years for investment-grade bonds for the respective Barclays bond indices
that are followed by money managers.
The lower a bond’s duration, the less its price reacts to change in underlying
interest rates.
Source: Rodrigues, V. and Mackenzie, M. (2013) Investors bet on junk bonds to outperform,
Financial Times, 30 July.
Duration if coupons increase

If we take two bonds with the same yield to maturity, but one has higher
coupons, then duration will be lower on that bond, resulting in a bond with
less volatility or interest rate risk. To illustrate we can go back to the example
of the four-year bond above with a yield to maturity of 7% (Table 13.3). We
can compare its duration with that for another bond with the same yield to
maturity but with the following pattern of cash flows:
Current market price = £144.03
Four annual coupons of £20
Par (nominal) value to be redeemed in four years = £100
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Table 13.5 Calculating duration on a four-year 20% coupon bond when the yield to
maturity remains at 7%
Period

current
market
YTM)
1 £20 £18.69 (£18.69 ÷ £144.03) × 100 = 12.98% 1 × 12.98 ÷ 100 = 0.1298
2 £20 £17.47 (£17.47 ÷ £144.03) × 100 = 12.13% 2 × 12.13 ÷ 100 = 0.2426
3 £20 £16.32 (£16.32 ÷ £144.03) × 100 = 11.33% 3 × 11.33 ÷ 100 = 0.3399
4 £120 £91.55 (£91.55 ÷ £144.03) × 100 = 63.56% 4 × 63.56 ÷ 100 = 2.5424
The bond with £20 coupons has a shorter duration, at 3.2547 years, than the
bond with the £7 coupon, at 3.6243 years, despite the yield to maturity and
time to maturity remaining the same. Thus we come to another rule:
The higher the coupon rate on the bond, the shorter the bond’s duration.
Using duration as a guide to interest rate risk

As duration increases, the percentage change in the market value of a bond
increases for a given change in interest rates, i.e. interest rate risk rises with
duration. Thus we can use duration as a measure of interest rate risk. It is not a
perfect measure, but it does provide a good approximation, when interest rate
changes are small, of the extent to which the price of a bond will change if
yields to maturity rise or fall – as expressed in the following formula:
Percentage change in bond change in YTM

≈ −Duration × × 100
price from one period to the next 1 + YTM
The negative sign in front of Duration is due to the inverse relationship

between bond prices and interest rates.
For example, if an investor is holding the four-year bond yielding 7% at time t

in Table 10.3 with a duration of 3.6243 years, you could ask: how much would
the price of the bond change if interest rates (YTM) rose by 1%?
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Answer:
Change in interest rate = 0.01
Current YTM = 0.07
0.01
Change in bond price ≈ −3.6243 × × 100 = −3.3
39%
1 + 0.07
Thus, for a 1 percentage point change in market interest rates this bond’s price
moves by roughly 3.39%. (Note that this formula can only be used for small
changes in yield to maturity of one percentage point or less, and even then it
is only an approximation. It slightly overestimates price declines and underes-
timates price increases – see convexity discussion later.) We can compare this
degree of sensitivity to interest rate changes with other bonds. Let us take the
four-year bond in Table 13.5 offering 20% coupons with YTM of 7%. It has a
duration of 3.2547 years.
0.01
Change in bond price ≈ −3.2547 × × 100 = −3.0
04%
1 + 0.07
Clearly, this bond carries less interest rate risk than the 7% coupon bond, as
its price changes by only 3.04% when yields change by 1 percentage point.
The lower duration and therefore lower interest rate risk, but same yield to
maturity, on the 20% coupon bond may induce an investor to switch invest-
ment funds from the more risky bond (7% coupon) to this less risky one.
Convexity
In the section discussing the effect of duration on interest rate risk we noted
that the formula, while roughly correct, produces errors for the influence of
interest rate changes on bond pricing. This is because it assumes a linear rela-
tionship between interest rate changes and bond price changes – this is shown
by the straight diagonal line in Figure 13.1. The exact valuation relationship
is curved, and the curvature around some interest rate level is measured by
convexity. The true relationship line is tangential to the straight line assump-
tion only at a zero interest rate change, i.e. it has the same slope, therefore
for very small interest rate changes the duration approach gives the true
answer. However, if we test large interest movements the true bond price
changes are different to that determined by the duration-based calculation
we used earlier.
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Figure 13.1 The linear assumption for the relationship between bond price and YTM
This can be illustrated using the same example above, where we calculated a
change in bond price of −3.39% for a 1% increase in yield to maturity. We can
now calculate the actual change for an increase in 1%. At the interest rate of
7% the four-year bond was priced at £100. If interest rates rise to 8% then the
price changes to £96.6877:
Four-year annuity@ 8% for £7 per year = 3.3121 × £7 = £23.1847

£100
Present value of the principal payment = £73.5030
(1 + 0.08)4
£23.1847 + £73.5030 = £96.6877
This is a −3.3123% change ((100 – 96.6877) ÷ 100), a true percentage change

resulting from the rise in YTM. Compare this with the approximation provided
by using a duration of −3.39%. When interest rates rise, the true decline in
price is less than the fall implied using duration.
Bond market participants often want to use duration to estimate sensitivity of

price to YTM changes. This can be done more accurately if they allow for the
extent of convexity. More precisely, they need to measure the curve at that
particular interest rate because slopes alter with the starting point for YTM
changes. This involves formidable calculations which are beyond the scope of
this book. Bond traders do not always need to carry out these calculations to
make decisions because they develop an ability to gain a ‘good enough’ idea of
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Figure 13.2 High convexity versus low convexity
bond price changes given the maturity and coupon rate to form a view of the
ball-park movements in various scenarios. Besides, modern computer systems
calculate duration and convexity automatically and display them on trading
screens.
For bond investors, high convexity is usually a desirable quality and so they
pay premiums to hold such bonds. This can be understood by examining
Figure 13.2. Two bonds are shown, each with the same duration at point ‘0’ (no
change in interest rate), but one has greater convexity. If interest rates increase,
the one with the greater convexity will experience a lower percentage decrease
in price than the bond with lower convexity. However, if rates decline, the high
convexity bond will have a greater uplift in value than the low convexity bond.
The term structure of interest rates

It is not safe to assume that the yield to maturity on a bond will remain the
same regardless of the length of time of the loan (holding all else constant). So,
if the interest rate on a three-year bond is 7% per year, it may or may not be 7%
on a five-year bond of the same risk class and liquidity class. Lenders in the
financial markets demand different interest rates on loans of differing lengths
of time to maturity – that is, there is a term structure of the interest rates.
Four of these relationships are shown in Figure 13.3 for lending to the UK, US,
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Figure 13.3 Yield curves for the UK, US, eurozone and Japanese government bills
and bonds ( The ‘Latest’ shows the current rates for different maturities. Also shown is
the range of rates as calculated one week before and one month before)
Source: The Financial Times
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eurozone and Japanese governments.4 Note that default (and liquidity) risk
remains constant along one of the lines; the reason for the different rates is the
time to maturity of the bonds. Thus, a two-year US government bond has to
offer 0.57% whereas a ten-year bond offered by the same borrower gives 2.62%.
Note that the yield curve for the eurozone is only for the most creditworthy
governments who have adopted the euro (e.g. Germany). Less safe govern-
ments had to pay a lot more in 2014 as investors worried whether they would
default.
Upward-sloping yield curves occur in most years, but 2014 demonstrated

extreme upward slopes because governments and central banks around the
world forced down short-term interest rates. Occasionally we have a situation
where short-term interest rates (lending for, say, one year) exceed those of
long-term interest rates (say, a 20-year bond). A downward-sloping term struc-
ture (yield curve inversion), a flat yield curve and the usual upward-sloping
yield curves are shown in Figure 13.4.
Figure 13.4 Upward-sloping, downward-sloping and flat yield curves
4
Using the benchmark yield curves as examples of the term structure of interest rates may
offend theoretical purity (because we should be using zero coupon, e.g. STRIPS, rather than
those with coupons that have to be reinvested before the redemption date – we do not
know the reinvestment rate), but they are handy approximate measures and help illustrate
this section.
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Three main hypotheses have been advanced to explain the shape of the yield
curve (these are not mutually exclusive – all three can operate at the same time
to influence the curve):
a The expectations hypothesis.

b The liquidity-preference hypothesis.
c The market-segmentation hypothesis.
The expectations hypothesis

The expectations hypothesis focuses on the changes in interest rates over
time. To understand the expectations hypothesis you need to know what is
meant by a spot rate of interest. The spot rate is an interest rate fixed today
on a loan that is made today. So a corporation, Hype plc, might issue one-year
bonds at a spot rate of, say, 8%, two-year bonds at a spot rate of 8.995% and
three-year bonds at a spot rate of 9.5%. This yield curve for Hype is shown in
Figure 13.5. The interest rates payable by Hype are bound to be greater than for
the UK government across the yield curve because of the additional default risk
on these corporate bonds compared with safe government bonds.
Spot rates change over time. The market may have allowed Hype to issue
one-year bonds yielding 8% at a point in time in 2014 but a year later (time
2015) the one-year spot rate may have changed to become 10%. If investors
expect that one-year spot rates will become 10% at time 2015 they will have a
theoretical limit on the yield that they require from a two-year bond when
Figure 13.5 The term structure of interest rates for Hype plc at time 2014
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viewed from time 2014. Imagine that an investor (lender) wishes to lend
£1,000 for a two-year period and is contemplating two alternative approaches:
1 Buy a one-year bond at a spot rate of 8%; after one year has passed the bond
will come to maturity. The released funds can then be invested in another
one-year bond at a spot rate of 10%, expected to be the going rate for bonds
of this risk class at time 2015.5
2 Buy a two-year bond at the spot rate at time 2014.
Under the first option the lender will have a sum of £1,188 at the end of two
years:
Year 1 £1,000.00 × (1 + 0.08) = £1,080.00
Year 2 £1,080.00 × (1 + 0.10) = £1,188.00
Given the anticipated change in one-year spot rates to 10% the investor will
buy the two-year bond only if it gives the same average annual yield over two
years as a series of one-year bonds (the first option). The annual interest
required will be:
£1,000 (1 + kD)2 = £1,188
k D = (1188
, / 1,000) − 1 = 0.08995, or 8.995%
which is the spot rate quoted for a two-year bond in 2014 in the second option.
Thus, it is the expectation of spot interest rates changing that determines the
shape of the yield curve according to the expectations hypothesis.
Now consider a downward-sloping yield curve where the spot rate on a one-
year instrument is 11% and the expectation is that one year from now spot
rates will fall to 8% for the one-year bonds. An investor considering a two-year
investment will obtain an annual yield (k) of 9.49% by investing in a series of
one-year bonds, viz:
Year 1 £1,000.00 × (1+0.11) = £1,110.00
Year 2 £1,110.00 × (1+0.08) = £1,198.80
5
I have simplified this to spot rates only. In reality investors in bonds can agree to buy a
bond one year (or more years) from now, a forward. The price of the forward purchase is
agreed now, thus traders can lock in the interest rate from that point on. This implied
forward rate can be interpreted as the market’s consensus of the spot rates in one year from
now.
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or £1,000 (1.11) (1.08) = £1198.80

k D = (1198.8 /1000 ) − 1 = 0.0949, or 9.49% per year
or (1.08)(1.11) − 1 = 0.0949
With this expectation for movements in one-year spot rates, lenders will demand
an annual rate of return of 9.49% from two-year bonds of the same risk class.
Thus in circumstances where short-term spot interest rates are expected to fall,
the yield curve will be downward sloping.
Example 13.7
Spot rates
If the present spot rate for a one-year bond is 5% and for a two-year bond is 6.5%,
what is the expected one-year spot rate in a year’s time?
Answer
If the two-year rate is set to equal the rate on a series of one-year spot rates then:
(1 + 0.065)2
x= − 1 = 0.0802 or 8.02%
1 + 0.05
The liquidity-preference hypothesis

The expectations hypothesis does not adequately explain why the most com-
mon shape of the yield curve is upward sloping. The liquidity-preference
hypothesis (liquidity premium theory) helps explain the upward slope by
pointing out that investors require an extra return for lending on a long-term
basis. Lenders demand a premium return on long-term bonds compared with
short-term instruments because of greater interest rate risk and the risk of
misjudging future interest rates. Putting your money into a ten-year bond on
the anticipation of particular levels of interest rates exposes you to the possibil-
ity that rates will rise above the rate offered on the bond at some point in its
long life. Thus, if five years later interest rates double, say because of a rise in
inflation expectations, the market price of the bond will fall substantially,
leaving the holder with a large capital loss if they sell. By investing in a series
of one-year bonds, however, the investor can take advantage of rising interest
M13_ARNO1799_01_SE_C13.indd 359 7/7/15 8:50 AM

rates as they occur. The ten-year bond locks in a fixed rate for the full ten years
if held to maturity. Investors prefer short-term bonds so that they can benefit
from rising rates and so will accept a lower return on short-dated instruments.
The liquidity-preference theory focuses on a different type of risk attaching to

long-dated debt instruments other than default risk – a risk related to uncer-
tainty over future interest rates. A suggested reinforcing factor to the upward
slope is that borrowers usually prefer long-term debt because of the fear of
having to repay short-term debt at inopportune moments. Thus borrowers
increase the supply of long-term debt instruments, adding to the tendency for
long-term rates to be higher than short-term rates.
A further factor is that in many bond markets there is a greater volume of trad-
ing for short-dated instruments than longer-dated ones, i.e. there is greater
liquidity, an increased speed and ease of the sale of an asset. In bond markets
where there is high liquidity for both short- and long-term bonds, the title
‘liquidity-preference theory’ seems incorrectly used because there is no prob-
lem of illiquidity for long-term bonds. For example, for government bonds,
sale in the secondary market is often as quick and easy as for short-term bonds.
In the bond markets where liquidity is fairly constant along the yield curve,
the premium for long-term bonds is generally compensation for the extra risk
of capital loss; ‘term premium’ might be a better title for the hypothesis.
The market-segmentation hypothesis

The market-segmentation hypothesis argues that the debt market is not one
homogeneous whole but that there are, in fact, a number of sub-markets
defined by maturity range. The yield curve is therefore created (or at least influ-
enced) by the supply and demand conditions in each of these sub-markets. For
example, banks tend to be active in the short-term end of the market and pen-
sion funds to be buyers in the long-dated segment.
If banks need to borrow large quantities quickly they will sell some of their
short-term instruments, increasing the supply on the market, so pushing
down the price and raising the yield. Meanwhile, pension funds may be flush
with cash and may buy large quantities of 20-year bonds, helping to temporar-
ily move yields downward at the long end of the market. At other times banks,
pension funds and the buying and selling pressures of a multitude of other
financial institutions will influence the supply and demand position in the
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opposite direction. The point is that the players in the different parts of the
yield curve tend to be different. This hypothesis helps to explain the often
lumpy or humped yield curve.
A final thought on the term structure of

interest rates
It is sometimes believed that in circumstances of a steeply rising yield curve it
would be advantageous to borrow short term rather than long term. However,
this can be a dangerous strategy because long-term debt may be trading at a
higher rate of interest because of the expected rise in spot short-term rates and
so when the borrower comes to refinance in, say, a year’s time, the short-term
interest rate is much higher than the long-term rate and this high rate has to
be paid out of the second year’s cash flows, which may not be convenient.
Additional reading
Bodie, Z., Kane, A. and Marcus, A.J. (2014) Investments. McGraw-Hill.
Chisholm, A.M. (2009) An Introduction to International Capital Markets. 2nd
edition. John Wiley & Sons.
Choudry, M. (2010) An Introduction to Bond Markets. 4th edition. John Wiley &
Sons.
Fabozzi, F.J. (2012) Bond Markets, Analysis and Strategies. 8th edition. Prentice
Hall.
Veronesi, P. (2010) Fixed Income Securities. John Wiley & Sons.
M13_ARNO1799_01_SE_C13.indd 361 7/7/15 8:50 AM

M13_ARNO1799_01_SE_C13.indd 362 7/7/15 8:50 AM
CHAPTER 14
MONEY MARKET
SECURITIES VALUATION
Vast amounts of money in a wide variety of currencies are traded on the money
markets daily. Most of this huge volume of short-term instruments is traded
on a discount basis; there is no regular coupon payment, the instruments
are bought at a discount to their face value; any return for investors comes
from the difference between the price at which they were purchased and the
payout received when they reach maturity or are sold in the secondary market
before then.
There are two important considerations to take note of when undertaking any
calculations associated with money market securities:
● day count convention
● the difference between bond equivalent yield and discount yield.
Day count convention

For supposed ease of calculation or simply because of long-established
habit, some countries/markets use a 30-day month and 360-day year, rather
than the actual variable days in a month and a 365-day year, or 366 in a leap
year. This can get complicated when the repayment date falls on the 31st of a
month, and there are various methods for dealing with this. Other markets use
the precise number of days until redemption of the instrument and the real
number of days in a year. Great care must always be taken to check which day
count convention is being used and to understand terminology, e.g. actual/360,
360/360, actual/actual, actual/365 and so on; it is imperative that an investor/
issuer knows which convention is being used and how it works.
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Converting from a 365-day basis to a 360-day basis

To compare interest rates calculated with different day count conventions
we need to convert all rates to a common basis. This can be done using the
following formula:
Interest rate on comparison basis
⎛ number of days in comparison ⎞

= interest rate on quoted basis ⎜
mber of days in quoted year ⎟⎠
⎝ num
If you wanted to compare a 5.5% interest quoted on a 365-day year basis with
another instrument calculated on the basis of a 360-day year, the calculation
would be:
⎛ 360 ⎞
Comparison interest rate = 5.5 × ⎜ = 5.4246
657%
⎝ 365 ⎟⎠
When the rate offered on a 360-day convention is 5.424657%, then the

effective annual rate of interest for the year is 5.5%. This difference may seem
small, but when trading is done in millions it can be a significant amount. For
example, on an investment of £100 million, the difference in interest rates is
worth £75,343:
£100 million × 5.5% = £5,500,000
£100 million × 5.424657% = £5,424,657
Difference £75,343
A dealer thinking 5.424657% represented an actual annual rate of interest and

investing £100 million at this rate, would end up £75,343 out of pocket.
If the rate quoted is presented for a 360-day year then to compare with other
effective annual yield rates we need to adjust upwards. This time the comparison
rate is based on 365-days.
Interest rate on comparison basis
⎛ number of days in comparison ⎞

= interest rate on quoted basis ⎜
mber of days in quoted year ⎟⎠
⎝ num
Let us assume the 360-day rate is 10%. To compare with other rates on a
365-day basis:
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14 MONEY MARKET SECURITIES VALUATION 365
⎛ 365 ⎞
Comparison interest rate = 10.0 × ⎜ = 10.13
38889%
⎝ 360 ⎟⎠
Bond equivalent yield (bey) and discount (d)

yield compared
Any investor/issuer needs to be able to compare returns with other investments
and so it is important that they understand the figures and the basis on which
they are calculated, and that they are able to work out the bond equivalent
yield (bey).
The bond equivalent yield (also known as equivalent bond yield) is the yield
that is usually quoted in newspapers and it allows a comparison between
fixed-income securities whose payments are not annual and securities that
have annual yields. So a wide variety of debt instrument yields is expressed in
the same annual terms, whether they mature in a matter of days, have interest
paid every three months or have one yearly interest payment. The bey uses the
actual number of days in a year (365 or 366).
Example 14.1
Bond equivalent rate
Imagine a 12-month £100 UK Treasury bill was sold at a discount of 2%, i.e. at
£98, the purchase price or market price. We recognise that the investment made
is £98 and we gain £2 when it is redeemed in one year. Thus we know that the
true rate of return is slightly over 2%.
To be more accurate we calculate the bey:
Discount ( Face value – Purchase price) Days in year

× × 100
Purchase price Days to maturity
Given that there is a full year to maturity we know this is going to be the annual
rate:
100 − 98 365
bey = × × 100 = 2.04%
98 365
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So although the bill was discounted at 2%, the actual return is more than this
because the investor did not pay the face value.
The discount yiel (bank-discount basis or discount rate) is the yield when using
the face value as the base rather than the actual amount invested by the buyer.
Discount yields are often calculated using a 360-day year count convention (e.g. in
US, German, Dutch, French and Italian T-bills), but the UK uses a 365-day year in
its calculations.
To calculate the discount yield:
Discount ( Face value – Purchase price) Days in year

×
Face value Days to maturity
Example 14.2
Discount yield
For a UK T-bill issued at £98 when the face value is £100 and the time to maturity
is one year, when there are 365-days in the year:
( Face value – Purchase price) Days in year

d= × × 100
(100 − 98) 365

d= × × 100 = 2%
100 5
365
Treasury bills
We shall use examples from the UK and US Treasury bills to explain how these
instruments are valued and how the returns on them are calculated.
Table 14.1 shows the results from the four sales of UK Treasury bills which took
place weekly during March 2014, on the 7th, 14th, 21st and 28th. As different
bidders pay different prices, a bill’s tender results are averaged. Each bidder
therefore must work out their own results to give them accurate information
about their investment.
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Table 14.1 DMO Treasury bill tender results 1 March 2014 to 31 March 2014
Tender Issue Redemption Nominal Bid to Average Average

date date date amount cover yield price
(£m) ratio (%) (£)
1 month
07-Mar-14 10-Mar-14 07-Apr-14 2,000 2.21 0.393578% 99.969817
14-Mar-14 17-Mar-14 14-Apr-14 2,000 3.30 0.364505% 99.972046
21-Mar-14 24-Mar-14 22-Apr-14 2,000 1.85 0.381211% 99.969721
28-Mar-14 31-Mar-14 28-Apr-14 2,000 1.62 0.407344% 99.968761
3 months
07-Mar-14 10-Mar-14 09-Jun-14 1,500 2.64 0.363186% 99.909534
14-Mar-14 17-Mar-14 16-Jun-14 2,000 3.09 0.379104% 99.905573
21-Mar-14 24-Mar-14 23-Jun-14 2,000 1.95 0.390464% 99.902746
28-Mar-14 31-Mar-14 30-Jun-14 2,000 1.51 0.421457% 99.895035
6 months
07-Mar-14 10-Mar-14 08-Sep-14 1,500 2.87 0.409168% 99.796392
14-Mar-14 17-Mar-14 15-Sep-14 1,500 3.23 0.394030% 99.803910
21-Mar-14 24-Mar-14 22-Sep-14 1,500 2.17 0.400866% 99.800515
28-Mar-14 31-Mar-14 29-Sep-14 1,500 1.70 0.422876% 99.789585
Example 14.3
UK three-month Treasury bill
If we take the three-month Treasury bill sold at tender on 24 March at a discount
price of £99.902746, we can work out the discount yield (d), yield (bey) and
purchase price. Note that the time difference between the date of purchase and
redemption is only 91 days in this case and we must express these interest rates
in annual terms, so we multiply by 365/91.
Discount yield
d= × × 100 = annual rate
(100 − 99.902746) 365
d= × × 100 = 0.390085% per annum
100 91
Yield (bey) (on the purchase price)

( Face value – Purchase price) 365
bey = × × 100
Purchase price 91
100 − 99.902746 Days in year
bey = × × 100 = 0.390464% per annum
99.902746 Days to maturity
This is the ‘average yield’ shown in Table 14.1.
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Effective annual rate

To be really precise we need to note that this is not the effective annual rate (EAR)
because we have failed to allow for the fact that after one-quarter of a year we
receive £100 (after investing £99.902746) and this can be reinvested for a second,
third and fourth three-month period within the year. Interest can be earned
accumulatively on each subsequent three-month period and added to the original
capital invested. In other words, the original investment is compounded more than
once in the year. To calculate the EAR (if we can assume that in the next three
quarterly periods the interest rate is the same as in the first three months):
365 / 91
⎡ 0.00390464 ⎤
⎢1 + ⎥ − 1 × 100 = 0.391037%
⎣ 365/91 ⎦
Another example
You invest for three months and receive a ‘simple’ annual yield of 3%. This is an
annual rate that does not take into account compounding over the year – i.e.
interest received on interest, added after each quarter. With compounding the
effective annual rate is:
4 /1
⎡ 0.03 ⎤
⎢1 + ⎥ − 1 × 100 = 3.0339%
⎣ 4 / 1⎦
Thus, over a period of one year you receive an extra 0.0339% because after the
first three-month period you reinvest the maturity amount, including interest from
the first investment, in an identical investment for the next three of the remaining
nine months. And do the same after six months and nine months. Thus you
receive interest on interest received of 0.0339%. This is, of course, assuming
identical investments every three months. While this is unrealistic, at least the EAR
provides a gauge of the ‘true’ annual rate offered on short-term securities.
Purchase price
To calculate the price to be paid if the discount yield is 0.390085% we need to
start with the face value and take away the discount that applies when the term
is only one-quarter of the year or, more strictly, for 91/365th of the year.
The annualised rate of discount of 0.390085 is decreased by multiplying by

91/365.
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The purchase price is the face value of 100 multiplied by 1 minus the discount
for this portion of the year:
⎡ ⎛ Discount × Days to maturity ⎞ ⎤

Purchase price = Face value × ⎢1 − ⎜ ⎟⎠ ⎥
⎢⎣ ⎝ Days in Year ⎥⎦
⎡ ⎛ 0.00390085 × 91⎞ ⎤
Purchase price = 100 × ⎢1 − ⎜ ⎟⎠ ⎥ = £99.902746
⎢⎣ ⎝ 365 ⎥⎦
Note that the purchase price is often called the settlement amount. This is
because the bill is paid for on the settlement day rather than the transaction or
bargain day, which is usually one day earlier in the secondary market.
The results for the tender of this 24 March bill are in Table 14.2. The actual bids
from buyers varied from a yield (bey) of 0.33% to a high of 0.418% with an
average yield of 0.390464%.
A bidder tendering the lowest accepted yield, 0.33%, would have paid
£99.9177936 for their bills:
If:
( Face value – Purchase price) 365

bey = × × 100
Purchase price 91
Then:
Face value
Purchase price =
⎛ bey 91 ⎞
1+ ⎜ × ⎟⎠
⎝ 100 365
Table 14.2 Results of tender on three-month T-bill
3 months Treasury bill maturing on 23-Jun-2014, ISIN CODE: GB00B7P4VP73
Lowest accepted yield 0.330000

Average yield 0.390464
Highest accepted yield 0.418000 (about 88.10% allotted)
Average rate of discount (%) 0.390085
Average price per £100 nominal (£) 99.902746
Amount tendered for (£) 3,894,400,000.00
Amount on offer (£) 2,000,000,000.00
Bid to cover ratio 1.95
Amount allocated (£) 2,000,000,000.00
M14_ARNO1799_01_SE_C14.indd 369 7/7/15 8:50 AM

For this example:
100
Purchase price = = £99.9177
7936
⎛ 0.33 91 ⎞
1+ ⎜ ×
⎝ 100 365 ⎟⎠
And a bidder tendering the highest yield, 0.418%, would have paid
£99.89589479:
Face value
Purchase price =
⎛ bey 91 ⎞
1+ ⎜ ×
⎝ 100 365 ⎟⎠
100
Purchase price = = £99.895
589479
⎛ 0.418 91 ⎞
1+ ⎜ ×
⎝ 100 365 ⎟⎠
During the life of a bill, its value fluctuates daily as it is traded between
investors – see Table 14.3, which gives the daily March and April 2014 figures
for this particular bill.
Table 14.3 Data for Treasury bill GB00B7P4VP73, 21 March to 16 April 2014
ISIN code Redemption Close of Price Yield

date business date (£) (%)
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 21-Mar-14 99.903464 0.388

GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 24-Mar-14 99.905141 0.385
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 25-Mar-14 99.906352 0.384
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 26-Mar-14 99.907558 0.384
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 27-Mar-14 99.908762 0.383
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 28-Mar-14 99.911712 0.384
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 31-Mar-14 99.913389 0.381
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 01-Apr-14 99.914615 0.380
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 02-Apr-14 99.915802 0.380
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 03-Apr-14 99.916987 0.379
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 04-Apr-14 99.919921 0.380
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 07-Apr-14 99.921688 0.376
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 08-Apr-14 99.922855 0.376
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 09-Apr-14 99.924018 0.375
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 10-Apr-14 99.925176 0.374
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 11-Apr-14 99.926169 0.385
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 14-Apr-14 99.929775 0.372
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 15-Apr-14 99.930889 0.371
GB00B7P4VP73 23-Jun-14 16-Apr-14 99.932055 0.370
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The price increases as the days to maturity decrease (all else remaining the
same) and on redemption day, in this case 23 June 2014, the holder will receive
the face value of £100. The yield in Table 14.3 is the (annual) return (bey) that
a purchaser in the secondary market will achieve between purchase date (the
settlement date is one day after the close of business transaction date) and
maturity date. We can check these figures, using 8 April as the purchase date:
100 − 99.922855 365

bey = × × 100 = 0.376%
99.922855 75
US Treasury bills
While in many countries bills are bought in the primary market (from the
government) at the bidding price, in the US all bidders, competitive and
non-competitive, receive the same discount rate, and therefore the same yield,
as the highest accepted bid and so pay the same purchase price for their bills.
Table 14.4 gives the results of US T-bill auctions held during March 2014.
If we take the 26-week T-bill that was auctioned on 17 March 2014 below its
par value at $99.959556, we can work out the figures in Example 14.4.
Table 14.4 US Treasury bills auctioned March 2014
CUSIP Security Auction Issue Maturity Price Average/ Bid to

term date date date per $100 median cover
discount ratio
rate
912796DE6 13-week 03/31/14 04/03/14 07/03/14 99.988625 0.04% 4.83

912796DX4 26-week 03/31/14 04/03/14 10/02/14 99.967139 0.06% 5.18
912796CJ6 4-week 03/25/14 03/27/14 04/24/14 99.996500 0.04% 4.65
912796BP3 13-week 03/24/14 03/27/14 06/26/14 99.987361 0.04% 4.61
912796DW6 26-week 03/24/14 03/27/14 09/25/14 99.962083 0.07% 5.05
912796CH0 4-week 03/18/14 03/20/14 04/17/14 99.995333 0.06% 4.27
912796DD8 13-week 03/17/14 03/20/14 06/19/14 99.987361 0.05% 4.42
912796CB3 26-week 03/17/14 03/20/14 09/18/14 99.959556 0.08% 4.86
912796CG2 4-week 03/11/14 03/13/14 04/10/14 99.995722 0.05% 4.11
912796DC0 13-week 03/10/14 03/13/14 06/12/14 99.987361 0.05% 4.76
912796DV8 26-week 03/10/14 03/13/14 09/11/14 99.959556 0.08% 4.97
912796BA6 4-week 03/04/14 03/06/14 03/04/14 99.996500 0.04% 3.93
912796DP1 52-week 03/04/14 03/06/14 03/05/15 99.878667 0.12% 4.85
912796DA4 13-week 03/03/14 03/06/14 06/05/14 99.987361 0.04% 5.02
912796DS5 26-week 03/03/14 03/06/14 09/04/14 99.959556 0.08% 4.46
Source: www.treasurydirect.gov
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Example 14.4
US Treasury bill
For US short-term investments (less than one year) the day count is actual/360.
To calculate the discount yield, d, on the 26-week (182 days) US T-bill sold on
20 March 2014 at a discount price of $99.959556:
( Face value – Purchase price ) Days in year

d= × × 100
(100 − 99.959556) 360

d= × × 100 = 0.08%
100 182
To calculate the purchase price of the same bill:
⎡ ⎛ Discount × Days to maturity ⎞ ⎤

Purchase price = Face value × ⎢1 − ⎜ ⎟⎠ ⎥
⎢⎣ ⎝ Days in year ⎥⎦
⎡ ⎛ 0.0008 × 182 ⎞ ⎤
Purchase price = 100 × ⎢1 − ⎜ ⎟⎠ ⎥ = £99
9.959556
⎢⎣ ⎝ 360 ⎥⎦
To calculate the bey from this bill, a 365-day (366 in a leap year) year is used
(because a 360-day year would underestimate the return):
Face value – Purchase price Days in year

bey = × × 100
100 − 99.959556 365

bey = × × 100 = 0.081143% per annum
99.959556 182
The effective annual rate (over a 12-month investment period) assuming compound-
ing after reinvesting at day 182 with the same bey on this T-bill is:
365 /182
⎛ 0.00081143 ⎞
EAR = ⎜ 1 + − 1 = 0.08116%
⎝ 365/182 ⎟⎠
Commercial paper
After T-bills, commercial paper is the most common money market instrument.
It is a very popular way of raising money for large, well-regarded companies.
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Example 14.5
Commercial paper
A dealer buys $2,000,000 worth of Eurodollar commercial paper from a company
requiring liquidity, with a 60-day maturity, at a discounted price of $1,994,874.
For Eurodollar (and most other Eurocurrency) deals interest is calculated using an
actual/360-day count convention (the same as in the US).
The discount yield (using an actual/360-day count) is:

d= × × 100
(2,000,000 − 1,994, 87
74) 360
= × × 100 = 1.5378% per annum
2,000,000 60
The bey using an actual/365-day count is:

bey = × × 100
0 − 1,994,874) 365
(2, 000, 000
bey = × × 100 = 1.5632% per ann
num
1,994, 874 60
The effective annual rate is:

365 / 60
⎛ 0.015632 ⎞
EAR = ⎜ 1 + − 1 = 1.57345%
⎝ 365/ 60 ⎟⎠
For UK commercial paper the day count convention is actual/365 days.
Repurchase agreements
Repurchase agreements (repos) and reverse repos are collateralised agreements
used mainly by banks to borrow from or lend to each other with cash that is
available for a short time (usually overnight or for a few days). Repo rates are
calculated for a variety of maturities.
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Example 14.6
Repurchase agreement
A high street bank has the need to borrow £6 million for 14 days. It agrees to sell
a portfolio of its financial assets, in this case government bonds, to a lender for
£6 million. An agreement is drawn up (a repo) by which the bank agrees to repurchase
the portfolio (or an equivalent portfolio) 14 days later for £6,001,219.73. The extra
amount of £1,219.73 represents the interest on £6 million over 14 days at an
annual rate of 0.53%. Using an actual/365-day count convention, the calculation is:
Days to maturity
Interest = Selling price × Interest rate ×
Days in year
0.53 4
14
Interest = 6, 000, 000 × × = £1,219.73
100 365
Note that the agreement is to ‘sell’ securities and thereby borrow on a particular
date. The value date is when the transaction acquires value. This is not always
the same as the settlement date – when the amounts are actually transferred,
i.e. ‘settled’ or ‘cleared’ – because the value date may fall on a non-business day
such as a weekend.
Example 14.7
Repo bond equivalent yield
A financial institution borrows £26 million through a repo for 14 days. The difference
between the amounts in the first and second legs is £5,285.48, therefore the annual
rate of interest (bey) is:
Repurchase amount minus selling amount Days in year

bey = × × 100
Amount of cash received in first leg Days to maturity
5, 285.48 365
bey = × × 100 = 0.53%
26, 000, 000 14
In some markets, e.g. the US, the repo yield or repo rate of interest is calculated
based on a 360-day year:
Repurchase amount minus selling amount 360

Repo yield = × × 100
Amount of cash received in first leg Days to maturity
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Of course, this is not the bond equivalent yield, but merely the convention
used in some places to work out yields and prices of repurchases, strangely
enough. The repo rate is the one that will be most quoted in these markets,
so you need to remember that this is not even close to the true annualised
interest rate.
Example 14.8
Repo interest paid
A bank lends £45 million overnight at an annual bey rate of 0.42%. The actual
amount of interest is:
interest rate ( annualised, bey ) Days to maturity

Amount of interest = Amount lent × ×
100 Days in year
0.42 1
Amount of interest = 45, 000, 000 × × = £517.81
100 365
Example 14.9
A repo buy-back amount
A company owning £20 million worth of Treasury bills wishes to raise cash on
28 February and enters into an agreement to sell the bills and buy them back
in one week’s time. The agreed buy-back price would be £20 million plus the
accrued interest. The bond equivalent yield on 28 February for a one-week repo
is 0.52167%:
⎛ Days to maturity ⎞
Buy-back price = Selling price + ⎜ Selling price × Interest rate ×
⎝ Days in year ⎟⎠
⎛ 0.52167 7 ⎞
Buy-back price = 20, 000, 000 + ⎜ 20, 000, 000 × × = £20, 002, 000.93
⎝ 100 365 ⎟⎠
This is not quite what happens in the markets because they impose ‘haircuts’.
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Haircuts
Haircuts counteract the possibility of loss due to a drop in value of the securities
involved in a repo (and illiquidity and counterparty risk) by reducing the cash
received by the seller for a given quantity of collateral. The lender makes sure
that there is more collateral than the amount actually lent, also called margin
or over-collateralisation.
Example 14.10
A repo with a haircut
If a company has ownership of £20 million of gilts and wishes to raise money for
7 days through the repo market it can do so, but not all of the £20 million can be
borrowed. If a 0.95% haircut is imposed on £20 million, given a bond equivalent
yield of 0.52167%, the seller receives £19,810,000 in return for £20 million worth
of securities being sold in the first leg to the lender. Note that the repo interest is
only applied to the lesser amount.
The buyer (lender) pays out £19,810,000, but has securities worth £20 million, and
receives interest on the amount of cash actually lent. The buy-back price of a repo
with a haircut can then be calculated:
Buy-back price
⎡ Days to maturity ⎤
= Selling price + ⎢ ( Selling price − Haircut ) × Interest rate × ⎥
⎣ Days in year ⎦
Buy-back price = 20,000,000 +
⎡⎛ ⎧ 0.95 ⎪⎫⎞ 0.52167 7 ⎤

⎢ ⎜ 20, 000, 000 − ⎨ 20, 000, 00
00 × ⎬⎟ × × ⎥ = £20, 001,981.92
⎢⎣ ⎝ ⎩⎪ 100 ⎭⎠ 100 365
⎦⎥
Certificates of deposit (CDs)

In some places CDs are issued at face value and interest is charged on them, so
that at maturity the holder will receive the face value plus interest. In other
places the value at maturity is called the face value.
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Example 14.11
Certificate of deposit
A £75,000 CD is issued on 15 March for two months at 1.04% (expressed as
an annual rate, even though the money is deposited for a mere two months, often
called the coupon rate). Using an actual/365-day count, this means that the holder
will receive the following at maturity, including accumulated interest:
⎛ Interest Days to maturity ⎞

Value at maturity = Face value + ⎜ Face value × ×
⎝ 100 Days in year ⎟⎠
⎛ 1.04 61 ⎞
Value at maturity = 75, 000 + ⎜ 75, 000 × × = £75,130.36
⎝ 100 365 ⎟⎠
If the CD is sold to another investor with 16 days left to maturity, its present value
(at the time of sale) if annual rates of interest on 16-day CDs are 1.04% is:
Value at maturity
Present value =
1+ ⎜ ×
⎝ 100 Days in year ⎟⎠
75,130.36
Present value = = £75, 096.12
⎛ 1.04 16 ⎞
1+ ⎜ ×
⎝ 100 365 ⎟⎠
Thus, the second holder of the CD will pay £75,096.12 now and receive
£75,130.36 from the holder if they keep it for another 16 days.
The annualised yield to maturity of this CD held for 16 days is:
Value at maturity – Present value Days in year

Yield to maturity = × × 100
Present value Days to maturity
75,130.36 − 75, 096.12 365

Yield to maturity = × × 100 = 1.04% per annum
75, 096.12 16
For Eurocurrency CDs a 360-day year convention is used, thus the future value at
maturity is given by the following formula:

Value at maturity = Face value + ⎜ Face value × × ⎟⎠
⎝ 100 360
It is important to remember that the interest (coupon rate) quoted in these markets
is based on the 360-day convention and is not the same as the yield to maturity
based on a 365-day year.
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Example 14.12
Eurocurrency CD
If the quoted rate based on a 360-day year is 3% for a CD with a present value of
$10 million with 92 days to maturity, the value at maturity is:
⎛ 3 92 ⎞
Value at maturity = $10m + ⎜ $10m × × = $10
0.076667m
⎝ 100 360 ⎟⎠
Bill of exchange
Bills of exchange are used by companies to facilitate trading by granting a
credit period to a customer. The customer signs a bill (accepts it) promising to
pay a sum of money to the seller at a set date.
Example 14.13
Bill of exchange
A customer has accepted a bill of exchange which commits it to pay £400,000 in
180 days. The supplier needs to raise cash immediately and so sells the bill to a discount
house or bank for £390,000. The discounter will, after 180 days, realise a profit of
£10,000 on a £390,000 asset. To calculate the effective rate of interest over 180 days:
Discount
Interest = × 100
Discounted price
10
0, 000
Interest = × 100 = 2.5641%
390, 000
To calculate the annual rate of interest, the bond equivalent yield, this equates to:
Discount Days in year
bey = × 100 ×
Discounted price Days to maturity
10, 000 365

bey = × 100 × = 5.19
994%
390, 000 180
Through this arrangement the customer has the benefit of the goods on 180 days’
credit, the supplier has made a sale and immediately receives cash from the
discount house amounting to 97.4359% of the total due. The discounter, if it can
borrow its funds at less than 2.5641% over 180 days, turns in a healthy profit.
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Banker’s acceptance
With banker’s acceptances it is a bank that takes on the liability to pay a sum
of money on a fixed date.
Example 14.14
The use of a banker’s acceptance
A German company purchases €8.5 million of goods from a Swiss company. It
draws up a document promising to pay for the goods in 90 days’ time, which its
bank accepts, that is, it is obliged to pay €8.5 million when it is due.
By stamping ‘accepted’ on the document, the document becomes more valuable
than if the promise to pay was given by the buying company only. Also it is a
negotiable (sellable) instrument.
Twenty days after the Swiss exporter receives the banker’s acceptance (BA) it
decides to sell it in the money market to raise some extra short-term finance. It is
sold at a discount of 0.95%. To calculate how much (the selling price) it receives:
Selling price = Face value − (Face value × Discount percentage)
⎛ 0.95 ⎞
Selling price = 8, 500, 000 − ⎜ 8, 500, 000 ×
⎝ 100 ⎟⎠
= €8, 419, 250, a discount of €80, 750
To calculate the annual rate of interest, the bond equivalent yield, which this is
costing them:
Discount amount Days in year
bey = × 100 ×
Discounted price Days to maturity
80, 750 36
65
bey = × 100 × = 5.0011%
8, 419, 250 70
The exporter can shield itself from the risk of exchange rates shifting over the
remaining 70 days until the BA pays out by discounting the acceptance, receiving
euros and then converting these to Swiss francs. And, of course, the exporter is
not exposed to the credit risk of the importer because it has the guarantee from
the importer’s bank.
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The 360-day convention

A point of potential confusion: bear in mind that in the US and many other
money markets the rate of discount is quoted as an annualised rate based on a
360-day year.
Example 14.15
A US banker’s acceptance
If an institution sells a BA with a face value of $10 million when the rate of discount
is quoted at 3.05% based on a 360-day convention and the length of time to
maturity is 60 days, the amount to be received is:
⎛ Days to maturity ⎞
Selling price = Face value − ⎜ Face value × Discount percentage × ⎟⎠
⎝ 360
⎛ 3.05 60 ⎞
Selling price = 10, 000, 000 − ⎜ 10, 000, 000 × × = $9, 949,166.67
⎝ 100 360 ⎟⎠
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PART 5
SOME VARIATIONS
ON A BOND THEME
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CHAPTER 15
SECURITISATION
In the strange world of modern finance you sometimes need to ask yourself
who ends up with your money when you pay your monthly mortgage, or your
credit card bill or the instalment payment on your car. In the old days you
would have found that it was the organisation from which you originally
borrowed and whose name is at the top of the monthly statement. Today
you cannot be so sure because there is now a thriving market in repackaged
debt – debt that is tied up in the bond markets.
Asset-backed securities
In this market a mortgage lender, for example, collects together a few
thousand of its mortgage ‘claims’ (the right of the lender to receive regular
interest and capital from the borrowers); it then sells those claims in a
collective package as bonds to other institutions, or participants in the market
generally. This permits the replacement of long-term illiquid assets with
immediate cash (improving liquidity and financial gearing), which can then
be used to generate more mortgages. It may also allow a profit on the difference
between the interest on the mortgages and the interest on the bonds. The
mortgages might be generating 6% interest, but the bonds secured on the cash
flow from the mortgages might pay a coupon of only 5%. The 5% is known as
the pass-through rate, the rate that is passed through to investors once fees
and commission have been deducted.
The borrower is usually unaware that the mortgage is no longer owned by

the original lender and everything appears as it did before, with the mortgage
company acting as a collecting agent for the buyer of the mortgages. The
mortgage company is usually said to be a seller of asset-backed securities
(ABS) to other institutions (the ‘assets’ are the claim on the mortgage interest
and capital) and so this form of finance is often called asset securitisation.
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384 PART 5 SOME VARIATIONS ON A BOND THEME
Rather than selling bonds in the mortgage company itself, a new company is
established, called a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or special purpose entity
(SPE). This new entity is then given the right to collect the cash flows from the
mortgages. It has to pay the mortgage company for this. To make this payment
it sells bonds secured against the assets of the SPV (e.g. mortgage claims). By
creating an SPV there is a separation of the creditworthiness of the assets
involved from the general creditworthiness of the parent company.
Asset-backed securitisation involves the pooling and repackaging of rela-

tively small, homogeneous and illiquid financial assets into liquid securities.
The sale of the financial claims can be either ‘non-recourse’, in which case
the buyer of the securitised bonds (the lender to the SPV) bears the risk of
non-payment by the mortgage holders, or ‘with recourse’ to the mortgage
lender should the mortgage payment fall short (with recourse the bonds might
be said to have ‘credit enhancement’).
Example 15.1
Car loan securitisation
GM Financial, the subsidiary of General Motors responsible for administering car loans,
which regularly securitises its loans, explains securitisation on its website. Notice
the recourse to GM if some customers do not pay – it suffers any ‘credit losses’:
The securitization named 2007-D-F has an average customer interest rate

of 16.9 percent, but we are only required to pay the investors approxi-
mately 5.5 percent. Therefore, GM Financial will earn a 11.4 percent net
interest margin (16.9 percent minus 5.5 percent) on these loans before
covering credit losses, operating expenses and any fees associated with
the securitization. Utilizing a securitization locks in the net interest margin
for the company for the entire life of the securitization, removing exposure
to changes in interest rates for these specific loans.
As net interest margin is generated, cash is available to the company to
cover operating costs, credit losses and taxes. Anything left over is GM
Financial’s profit. This can be reinvested in new loans. Then, we start the
cycle again – originating new loans, funding our dealers and transferring
loans to warehouse lines or securitization trusts.
Source: www.gmfinancial.com
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15 SECURITISATION 385
A wide variety of securitised bonds

The assets used in securitisations vary enormously. Securitisation has even
reached the world of rock. Iron Maiden issued a long-dated $30 million
asset-backed bond securitised on future earnings from royalties. It followed
David Bowie’s $55 million bond securitised on the income from his earlier
albums. Tussauds has securitised ticket and merchandise sales, Keele University
has securitised the rental income from student accommodation, and Arsenal
Football Club has securitised £260 million future ticket sales at the Emirates
Stadium. Loans to Hong Kong taxi drivers have been securitised, as have
the cash flows from UK funeral fees. In the US, the Student Loan Marketing
Association (Sallie Mae) is a publicly traded company which both provides
student loans and buys them from other providers, then sells bonds collateralised
(secured) on these loans.
The securitisation desks of investment banks are nothing if not innovative.

Recent ideas include securitising the cash flows from solar panel output and
from rents on houses – see Article 15.1.
Article 15.1
Sunshine-backed bond to go on sale

By Tracy Alloway

The world’s first sunshine-backed bond could be sold in the coming weeks after
securing a coveted credit rating that should make it palatable to large investors.
SolarCity said on Monday it would sell a $54.4m bond backed by cashflows from
the rooftop solar panels leased to US home owners, who can then claim certain tax
breaks from the government. Credit Suisse is bookrunner for the securitisation,
which will only be eligible to be sold to big, qualified investors.
According to people familiar with the proposed deal, the bonds have secured a
credit rating from Standard & Poor’s and pre-marketing of the private placement
began on Friday.
Bankers have been experimenting with new assets that can be bundled and sold to
investors, as they take advantage of resurgent demand for higher-yielding, sliced-
and-diced securitisations. For instance, this week bankers also began selling
another type of securitisation backed by foreclosed houses that have been turned
into rental homes.
➨
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Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse and JPMorgan are marketing the ‘Reo-to-rental’ after
securing a surprise triple-A rating from Moody’s, Morningstar and Kroll for the
bonds, which are backed by single-family rental properties owned by Blackstone.
Bankers involved in the solar panel deal had a tougher time convincing rating
agencies to evaluate the bonds, according to people familiar with the transaction,
after struggling to put together a deal for many months.
As talks with rating agencies about the potential deal deepened this year they hit
repeated structural snags. Rating agencies usually rely on historical data to judge
the risks of bonds defaulting. In the case of solar panel installations, such data is
lacking, making it difficult for the agencies to assess the probability of solar panel
lessors missing out on their payments.
Some bankers said that despite the risks of investing in a new asset class, the solar
bonds could attract interest from investors keen to place money into environmen-
tally friendly assets that can also generate decent returns.
‘There is a pool of capital that wants to invest in these types of assets,’ said one
banker at a large US investment bank. ‘People love to talk about clean technology
and renewables, because at some level most institutional investors want to invest
in things they can put in their annual report with glossy pictures.’
Solar panel companies will also be hoping that a successful sale of the bonds will
provide them with an additional source of capital to finance solar panel installations.
To date they have mostly relied on financing from big investment banks to help
fund their growth.
With additional reporting by Arash Massoudi.
Source: Alloway, T. (2013) Sunshine-backed bond to go on sale, Financial Times,

4 November.
Why securitise?
Securitisation permits banks, etc. to focus on the aspects of the lending process
where they have a competitive edge. Some, for example, are better at originat-
ing loans than funding them, so they sell the loans they have created, raising
cash to originate more loans. Other motives include the need to change the
risk profile of the bank’s assets (e.g. reduce its exposure to the housing market)
or to reduce the need for reserve capital: if the loans are removed from the asset
side of the bank’s balance sheet it does not need to retain the same quantity of
reserves – the released reserve capital can then be used in more productive ways
(There is more on capital reserves in Chapter 16.)
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A further motive is to adjust the extent of a bank’s maturity mismatch. Banking

is a business with large amounts of maturity mismatching, that is, they gener-
ally borrow short-term money, e.g. deposits from you and me or interbank
loans, which might have to be repaid in hours or days, and lend long term,
e.g. for 5 or 25 years. Sometimes a bank reduces the risks inherent in such
a mismatch by placing a group of its long-term loans, say mortgages, in an SPV
and then receiving cash from the sale of securitised bonds.
The process of securitisation

In the most common type of securitisation the originator, the bank or other
firm that supplies the assets to be securitised, places them in an issuer, usually
an SPV, a company set up for the securitisation – see Figure 15.1. Thus the
assets are not vulnerable to the insolvency of the originator, they are
bankruptcy-remote.
Credit enhancement is usually sought, which is often a guarantee from a

highly rated organisation, e.g. an insurance company, that timely payments
on bonds will be made. The credit enhancement when combined with the
positive effect of the ring-fencing of assets from the originator frequently
allows the securitised bonds to be issued with a triple-A rating. This rating is
usually a higher rating than for the originator itself.
The SPV must be a separate entity to be bankruptcy-remote from the originator,

even in those cases where the originator has some degree of ownership of the
SPV. To make sure, the regulators insist on features such as:
1 The SPV is in existence for securitisation only.

2 It has a board of directors separate from the originator, with independent
directors having special powers over when the SPV may place itself in
liquidation.
3 The SPV maintains separate assets, bank accounts and record keeping.
4 The SPV pays its own expenses.
5 The originator publicly acknowledges that the SPV’s assets are separate and
not available to its creditors.
6 There are no inter-company guarantees between originator and the SPV.
7 All business between originator and SPV is conducted on an arm’s length basis.
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Figure 15.1 The securitisation process
There are different ways of paying bond investors:
● Amortising (pass-through) structure. As the interest and principal on the

underlying assets are received the SPV passes these on in regular payments
to the bond holders. Thus, as say mortgagees pay off their mortgages, i.e. the
principal is repaid, the size of the asset pool gets smaller – there are fewer
outstanding mortgages left in the SPV. This structure is commonly used for
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home, car and student loan assets. There may be a pre-payment risk with
these because the bond holders do not know the proportion of borrowers
who will repay their loans earlier than expected. By repaying earlier than
expected the overall length of time to maturity of the pool of assets is
curtailed.
● Revolving structures. The asset pool is topped up with new assets as principal
is paid on older ones. In other words, when borrowers pay off their
debt principal, the SPV then has cash which can be used to buy, say,
more car loans, credit card debt, etc., but only if they fulfil key criteria
in terms of quality of the financial asset. Interest payments made by the
borrowers is regularly passed on to the SPV bond holders. The replacement
of maturing loans carries on in the revolving period, but when the
time comes for the amortisation period principal payments are paid to
bond holders either periodically or in a single lump sum (bullet or
slug methods).
● Master trust. Many batches of securitised bonds can be issued from the same
SPV. A large number of mortgages, say, are sold to the SPV, which act as the
collateral for a number of securitisations. ABS sold with this collateral back-
ing in a single trust have a variety of different maturities and redemptions.
The originator can replenish the asset pool by transferring new mortgages
of a comparable credit quality that meet certain pre-defined minimum
standards to the trust. Then additional series of ABS, identified by specific
dates, can be issued. Thus a recurring process is created with numerous
rounds of ABS (often called certificates) issues all backed by a single pool
of assets. This is particularly useful where the assets are receivables with
a short life, such as credit card receivables that may be paid off in a matter of
days or months by the credit card borrowers. New cardholder receivables
can take over from the old ones in providing cash flow and security for the
ABS. Some of the ABS issued under the master trust may be of lower credit
quality (offering high yields) than others.
In the UK, most mortgage-based securitised bonds, RMBS (residential

mortgage-backed securities), are from master trusts – see Article 15.2 – with
periodic issuing of new bonds and top-ups with new mortgages. In other
countries a specific bundle of ring-fenced mortgages is created, against which
bonds can be issued.
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Article 15.2
Recent deals signal market’s

reopening in the same old style
By Jennifer Hughes

When Northern Rock decided to wind down its Granite master trust – now to be
placed in the lender’s ‘bad bank’ rump – industry insiders predicted the death of
a structure that had helped the UK dominate the European mortgage-backed
market.
The Granite decision, in November 2008, put all bondholders in a queue for repay-
ments that could take years, regardless of the maturity date of the paper they
held.
Investors warned that they would demand far simpler structures before venturing
near the sector again.
Less than a year later, however, two master-trust-backed deals in the last month
have signalled the reopening of the market in the same old style.
They have reignited a debate about how best to structure an instrument considered
crucial for boosting economic growth but which represents the very complexity
that triggered the crisis.
Policymakers in Europe and the US have called for simpler, more transparent
structures. The industry has responded with guidelines and templates for providing
more data that many big issuers have agreed to follow.
But the UK, responsible for about half the total European market before the crisis,
is a particular challenge because its biggest lenders use a different structure from
the rest of the world.
Most mortgage-backed securitisations are based around stand-alone, ring-fenced
bundles of loans.
Bonds are backed by the loans in deals known as ‘pass-throughs’ because the
mortgage repayments are passed to the bondholders almost as they happen.
This leaves investors with the risk of pre-payment – where the loans are repaid
earlier than expected, meaning investors end up with extra cash they must reinvest
– or of extension risk, where the bonds mature more slowly than expected.
In the UK, bankers have instead created master trusts – vast pools of mortgages
which the lender would periodically top up with new loans and from which it would
issue different bonds at different times.
The advantage was that this constant pool allowed the trust to issue the exact
bonds investors wanted, such as ones with set maturity dates.
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Investors were thereby freed from prepayment and extension risk and left only
with credit risk, and the impact of any bad loans would be cushioned by the size of
the whole giant mortgage pool.
Master trusts enabled the UK market to expand rapidly. Swathes of the bonds were
sold overseas because it was far easier to arrange currency swaps on paper with set
maturity dates than it would have been on a pass-through deal with its uncertain
quarterly payments.
Investors liked the apparent relative simplicity of the deals. By buying bonds
backed by a pool of known quality, they saved on the effort of analysing each deal
in great depth.
But the upshot of the simple front was the complexity that lurked behind the
master trust. ‘They have got many strong positives but one big negative, and that’s
the complexity,’ said one expert, summing up the industry’s dilemma.
‘Either we have a complex security or a simple-looking security backed by a
complex structure.’
Some investors favour the former. ‘Master trusts create concentration problems,’
says Chris Ames, head of asset-backed securities at Schroders. ‘If I own a 2005
bond and a 2006 bond from the same master trust, then I’ve simply doubled up my
exposure to the exact same pool of mortgages.
‘Furthermore, you lose a lot of information in a master trust pool. Because new
loans are added to the existing collateral pool when new bonds are issued, the
performance statistics of the older loans are diluted by the new loans.’
Steve Swallow, head of European asset-backed securities at CQS, the hedge fund,
believes investors are prepared – or should be – to do the extra work required to
analyse stand-alone deals.
‘Providing the investor community with a proposition that requires more diligence
and more consideration of risk can only be a good thing, and in the long term, the
transparency will encourage more investors into the market,’ he said.
Investors are unhappy at the way the structure leaves them at the mercy of the
lender’s treasury team, which can decide, under certain circumstances, not to
repay the bonds until their legal maturity date.
This is further into the future than the set maturity date and reflects the long-term
nature of mortgages.
In effect, this happened with Granite, where Northern Rock decided to no longer
support the trust with new mortgages and where it will instead simply pay out on
the existing bonds when the underlying mortgages are repaid.
‘Before the crisis, people took complexity for granted since what would get them
into trouble was so far-fetched, but now that’s actually happened with Granite,’
said one investor. ‘Everyone is comfortable with credit risk, but it’s really also
extension risk they’ve taken. It’s not always at the issuer’s discretion. They might
have to extend if certain things happen.’
Investor unhappiness does not appear to have yet held back the market.
➨
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Last month’s £4bn ($6.5bn) deal from Lloyds was snapped up by investors who
returned this week to take £3.5bn of paper offered by Nationwide, a deal even more
notable because its Silverstone master trust was new to investors.
Bankers expect more deals to follow.
‘We’ve talked to the core investor base and most of them said we want “master
trusts”,’ said one banker on the Nationwide transaction.
David Basra, head of debt financing at Citigroup, argues that the UK structure is
safer for investors. He helped structure the first master trust for Bank of Scotland.
‘I’d argue that stand-alone pass-through transactions may expose investors to
greater credit risk, depending of course on which mortgages back their underlying
bonds,’ he said.
‘I think investors may find that they lose more over the cycle on some stand-alone
deals because there is a greater chance they’ll end up exposed to poorly under-
written risk.’
Source: Hughes, J. (2009) Recent deals signal market’s reopening in the same old style,
Article 15.3 describes the securitisation of Dunkin’ Donuts’ royalties received

from its hundreds of franchises around the world – a steady source of income.
Article 15.3
Securitisation: it’s all a question of

packaging
By Richard Beales

In a corporate securitisation, assets and related cash flows are carved out from a
business into special purpose entities (SPEs) and repackaged. Debt is then raised
against the SPEs alone.
‘Securitisation isolates a cash flow and insulates it from extraneous events,’ says
Ted Yarbrough, head of global securitised products at Citigroup.
Depending on the credit quality and the quantum of borrowing, part or all the debt
may be highly rated, and there is sometimes a low-rated or unrated subordinated
slice of debt as well.
A financing structured this way can achieve higher credit ratings than the business
on its own. This partly reflects the structural aspects – for example, the fact that
➨
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the SPEs can survive a bankruptcy of the umbrella group – and partly the fact
that the securities issued are often ‘wrapped’, or guaranteed, by highly-rated bond
insurers such as Ambac, FGIC or MBIA in return for a fee.
This is a complex and costly exercise, but can result in much cheaper debt. Once
established, a securitisation can be tapped again later if a business grows.
Sometimes securitisation is best suited to part of a business rather than the whole.
When applied to an entire business, as with Dunkin’ Brands or Domino’s, the new
financing typically replaces all traditional debt.
Rob Krugel, head of the esoteric asset-backed securities business at Lehman
Brothers, says: ‘Generally, the constituencies – rating agencies and bond insurers
– require that all pre-existing debt is refinanced. There is flexibility on a go-forward
basis to issue debt outside the securitisation as well as additional securitisation
debt. We generally find that securitisation is so efficient there’s no reason to issue
debt outside the structure.’
While a securitisation does involve financial constraints, they can be fewer and less
onerous than with traditional bank and bond debt. Managers would, for example,
have greater flexibility to pay dividends or buy back stock.
This reflects the fact that financiers in a securitisation look only to the specific
assets and cash flows held within the SPEs. But Eric Hedman, analyst at Standard
& Poor’s in New York, notes there can be a trade-off in terms of operational
flexibility. ‘Prior to the securitisation, Dunkin’ was an owner operator. Now, the
company is no longer the franchisor, there’s an SPE. Any new store agreement is
for the benefit of the securitisation.’ The company’s management also does not
have sole discretion over advertising spending, for example.
And the Dunkin’ Donuts brand is no longer owned by the company. ‘The sign on
the wall says “Copyright DD IP Holder LLC”. That’s a bankruptcy-remote SPE set
up for the benefit of noteholders [in the securitisation],’ Mr Hedman says.
This kind of shift might not suit all managers. But for some executives – particularly
those focused on maximising cash returns to shareholders – such considerations
can be outweighed by the financial benefits.
Private equity owners also like the fact that securitisations are ‘portable’ – they can
stay in place through a change of ownership. ‘That’s a big hook from the point of
view of sponsors,’ says John Miller, US head of financial sponsors at Lehman.
But Mr Yarbrough concedes that the structural demands of securitising their
entire business may not suit even the majority of companies. ‘I don’t know how
many businesses are really going to completely fit that model,’ he says. ‘But what
you will see is securitisation increasingly becoming a part of a financing solution.’
With the help of bond insurers, corporate securitisations can achieve triple-A or at
least investment grade ratings, even if the company concerned could not have done so.
This attracts the broadest possible range of investors, including pension funds and
fund managers at the most highly-rated end, and hedge funds lower down the cap-
ital structure.
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Mr Krugel says the magic is in the legal separation of the assets and the creation of
a tailored package for securitised investors. ‘You’re not fundamentally changing
the operational risk of the business, but you’re putting in place a lot of protections
in downside cases.’
He says it is also crucial that the SPEs are bankruptcy-remote. He points to the test
case of US car rental group Alamo National.
A securitised financing put in place before the group went bankrupt in 2001 sur-
vived the bankruptcy process, and was used for acquisition finance when the com-
pany was acquired by private equity firm Cerberus in 2003.
Source: Beales, R. (2007) Secularisation: it’s all a question of packaging, Financial Times,
25 July.
The giants in the US market

The really big players in the securitisation market are the US quasi-government
bodies of Fannie Mae, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), and
Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), both
‘government sponsored enterprises’ (GSEs). They were privately (shareholder)
owned companies acting in accordance with US government mandates to
provide funding for the housing market. Even then there was an implicit
subsidy from the government because everyone knew that bond holders
would be bailed out by the government if anything went wrong, thus they
could borrow cheaply, being regarded as virtually risk free. Sure enough, in
2008 the government had to bail them out with a $187.5 billion injection
of US taxpayers’ money. The value of the old shares was wiped out and Fannie
and Freddie went into conservatorship, meaning they are owned by the
government and profits go to the government.
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Fannie and Freddie buy collections of mortgages from mortgage providers and
issue bonds backed by the security of these mortgages (mortgage bonds or
mortgage-backed securities (MBS)), thereby creating a secondary mortgage
market. They guarantee that the interest and principal on the MBS are paid,
thus the ultimate lenders have recourse to the GSE.
Ginnie Mae, the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), also

guarantees the timely payment of principal and interest payments on residential
MBS backed by federally insured or guaranteed loans sold to institutional
investors. These are mainly loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) or guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Other
guarantors or issuers of loans eligible as collateral for Ginnie Mae MBS include
the Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development (RD). Unlike Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae neither originates nor purchases mortgage loans.
US mortgage bonds guaranteed by government-owned or sponsored enter-

prises are known as agency MBS. They make up by far the largest section of
the US MBS market – they underwrite more than 80% of new US mortgages.
Non-agency MBS are issued by banks or financial institutions, and rely on the
quality of the collateral for their credit rating.
The sub-prime crisis

In the old days the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac would not take just any old mortgage. They usually insisted that the house
owner owed no more than 80% of the value of the house (loan-to-value ratio
(LTV)) and the maximum size of mortgage was $417,000. They also investigated
the borrower’s income, state of employment, history of bad debts (if any) and
amounts of other assets. In other words, this system was pretty safe because
only the most creditworthy entered it. It was for prime mortgages only.
Now for some innovation: in the early 1990s new lenders emerged who were
willing to lend to people who did not qualify as prime borrowers. They would
often employ independent firms of mortgage brokers to persuade families to
take out a mortgage. The brokers received a commission for each one sold. The
number of sub-prime lenders grew significantly over the 12 years to 2005 and
the proportion of mortgages that were sub-prime rose to over 20%. The rise of
this market attracted the interest of the big names on Wall Street (e.g. Goldman
Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Morgan Stanley),
which bought up sub-prime lenders. These borrowers could be charged higher
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interest rates than prime borrowers. They could also be charged large fees for
setting up the loan. The sub-prime market boomed. By 2005 the largest US
mortgage provider was the sub-prime lender Countrywide Financial, which
had grown fast from 1980s’ obscurity.
A key characteristic of the new lenders was that they lent at different interest rates
to different groups of mortgagees classified on the basis of statistical models
of likelihood of default. These relied heavily on the borrower’s credit score.
This score was calculated by examining a number of borrower characteristics,
the most important of which became the absence (or low incidence) of missed
or delayed payments on previous debts. The statisticians had discovered a high
correlation between credit scores and defaults on mortgages in the 1990s and
so it made sense to them to carry on with them in the 2000s. The problem
was that the statisticians had not fully taken on board the extent to which
mortgages in the 2000s were different to mortgages in the 1990s, particularly
at the sub-prime end of the market.
Many of the 2000s mortgages required much less documentation than in the
1990s. People were often not even required to prove their level of income; they
could just state their income. Nor was it necessary to pay for an independent
valuation of the house; borrowers could just state the value of the house.
Stated income loans were convenient for those without regular work, but
anyone with common sense can see the potential temptation to overstating
income to speculate on rising prices (they quickly became known as liar loans
on the street – a clue that the mathematicians could have picked up on if they
had taken time to glance up from the algebra).
Another change was the help given with the deposit on the house. Whereas
traditionally households would have to find 10–20% of the house value as
a down payment, in the new era brokers could offer a second mortgage (called
a piggyback) which could be used as the deposit, so 100% of the value of the
house could be borrowed. Taking things a stage further, the UK’s Northern
Rock offered mortgages that were 125% of the value of the house.
A further change was the increasing use of mortgages that had very low
interest rates for the first two years (teaser rates), but after that they carried
rates significantly higher than normal – 600 basis points above Libor was
merely the average, many paid much more, i.e. well into double figures.
The more rational players in this market allowed for the qualitative changes
that had taken place in the housing markets in the noughties, rather than sim-
plistically using a mathematical model developed in the 1990s for estimating
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default likelihood. Those wedded to quantified data in the statistical series had
difficulties adjusting to the new reality.
Originate-and-hold to originate-and-distribute
Traditionally, if a bank grants a mortgage it keeps it on its books until it is
repaid. This is called the originate-and-hold model. In this way banks have
every incentive to ensure that the mortgagee can repay and can help those
few who have temporary problems along the way. Fewer and fewer banks
kept mortgages on the books in the 2000s. They preferred the originate-
and-distribute model, selling them to other investors, usually through
securitisations. Alongside this development was the movement of investment
banks to use their own money to invest in securities rather than only provide
(lower-risk) advice and other fee-based activities.
In the 1990s only around one-quarter of sub-prime mortgages were packaged

up into securitisation vehicles and sold to bond investors. By the mid-2000s
three-quarters were. In the good old days Freddie and Fannie dominated this
market; in the boom of the mid-2000s the private firms overtook the GSEs and
issued vast quantities of mortgage-based securities – over $1,000 billion per year,
cumulating to $11,000 billion by 2007. The leaders of this pack included the
Wall Street investment banks as well as Countrywide and Washington Mutual.
Pressure was applied to the mortgage brokers to generate more mortgages

which could then be repackaged so that the investment banks could generate
fees and other profits from the transaction. The mortgage brokers were only
too happy to oblige, so they ran after people to sign up for mortgages to receive
commission. No job, no deposit, on welfare benefits? Don’t worry, we have
just the mortgage for you!
Despite losing their lead the GSEs still participated. Apart from holding
hundreds of billions of dollars worth of MBS they had created, they also
bought more than $1,000 billion of MBS issued by the private firms. They felt
safe because they had put in place ‘safeguards’. First, if the loans were at more
than 80% of LTV they insisted on insurance being purchased from private
insurance firms that paid out in the event of default. Second, the credit rating
agencies had checked out the default likelihood on the private MBS they
bought and had concluded that they should be granted AAA status. What
could go wrong? Well, much of the insurance proved to be worthless as insur-
ance companies went bust, overwhelmed by the sub-prime losses, and credit
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Figure 15.2 Securitisation issuance, 2013, €bn

Source: Data from European Securitisation Forum Securitisation Data Report
rating agencies looked foolish in granting high credit scores. Even they got
caught up in the rose-tinted vision of the time. (Or did they, as some people
suggest, have an incentive to rate excessively high? The debate rumbles on.)
The volume of mortgage payment defaults was too much for Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac and they had to be taken under government supervision in 2008
(they were too big to be allowed to fail) and government guarantees were put
in place to try to restore public confidence. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, along
with Ginnie Mae, still have an enormous slice of the ABS market – see Figure 15.2.
Thus, in the land of the free (markets) most mortgage bonds are guaranteed by
the government, squeezing out the private securitisation market and produc-
ing large profits. The flows of interest and principal payments for commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) shown in Figure 15.2 come from companies
paying off mortgages on commercial property (offices, factories, etc.).
European securitisation
The European asset-backed securities market is less than a quarter of the size of
the US market. It has always been smaller, but it faltered particularly badly
after the 2008 debacle. Also banks are currently not interested in increasing
volumes of lending and so do not need to securitise, especially when they can
borrow cheap money from the European Central Bank or the Bank of England
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Article 15.4
Banks shun packaged UK mortgage

deals
By Christopher Thompson

A former landfill site 10 minutes’ drive from Nottingham’s town centre is an unlikely
symbol for the fortunes of the UK’s struggling mortgage-backed securities market.
In the centre of the Showcase Cinema leisure park, amid knee-high weeds and
broken bottles, stands a barn-sized building which used to house the city’s biggest
nightclub, called Isis. In 2009, amid a deepening recession, police ordered its closure
after an R&B music night when a clubber was stabbed. It was not long before the
club’s owner, James Eftekhari, fell behind on his mortgage repayments.
The Isis mortgage was one of 27 ‘sliced and diced’ commercial property mortgages
that had been rolled up into London & Regional Debt Securitization No 2, a £256m
MBS that subsequently defaulted. Five years later, in an echo of the wider sluggish-
ness in the UK MBS market, the nightclub still stands vacant.
Volumes of UK MBS, whereby banks package together commercial and residential
mortgages for sale to fixed-income investors, have traditionally been among the
biggest in Europe. But volumes of $5.1bn for the year to date are poised to plumb
the lowest annual total since the crisis in 2009.
‘Issuance has gone off a cliff since 2011,’ says Ganesh Rajendra at Royal Bank of
Scotland.
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The primary reason for the fall is simple: banks do not need the funding. After
volumes rose in the wake of the crisis – 2010 saw a nearly tenfold increase in ABS
issuance year-on-year to $30bn – they declined sharply in 2012 after the Bank of
England’s ‘funding for lending’ scheme (FLS), which offered banks cheaper fund-
ing than selling ABS on the open market.
‘Banks’ need for securitisation funding has been diminished,’ says Neal Shah at
Moody’s. ‘Banks have been deleveraging their balance sheets over the past few
years, and at the same time have had access to various forms of relatively cheap
liquidity, including FLS.’
Even as volumes shrank investor demand remained robust. The result is that
spreads – the amount of interest paid over the London Interbank Offered Rate –
have declined markedly.
‘Expectations of new issuance collapsed,’ says Dipesh Mehta, a research analyst at
Barclays. ‘Before FLS a senior tranche of a residential mortgage-backed security
priced at 150 basis points over Libor – now the same senior RMBS tranche is trading
at between 30–50 basis points over Libor.’
As the big high street banks cut back volumes, challenger banks such as Virgin
Money and Aldermore picked up some of the slack, albeit with smaller issues.
In 2010 smaller banks and building societies accounted for 5% of MBS issuance.
This year they account for two-thirds, according to research by RBS.
Source: Thompson, C. (2014) Banks shun packaged UK mortgage deals, Financial Times,
9 October.
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You can see in Article 15.5 that the US market has remained extremely strong,
with a blip in 2008. Investor confidence grew as it became clear in 2009–2010
that most pre-crisis securitised bonds, e.g. prime mortgage, car loan, credit card
securitisations and student loans, were performing as they were supposed to
through a recession. This led to high demand from insurance companies,
banks, hedge funds and pension funds.
Article 15.5
Sliced and diced debt deals make

roaring comeback
By Tracy Alloway

In early June 2009, the world’s securitisation bankers congregated at a London
hotel on Edgware Road, not far from the prison cells at Paddington Green police
station.
It was a location symbolic of the state of the securitisation industry in the
aftermath of the financial crisis, when the bankers who had sliced and diced loans
into bonds were in the collective doghouse. ‘Regroup and rebuild’ was the humble
slogan for that year’s ‘Global ABS’, or asset-backed securities, conference.
Five years later and bankers are heading to the sunnier climes of Barcelona for
the annual ABS gathering. The location is, once again, suggestive of the wider state
of securitisation markets – one that features a much brighter outlook.
Certain securitisation deals have roared back in the US. The European market
could soon come back to life after a prolonged hibernation.
In the US, the resurgence has been swift. While the kind of subprime mortgage-
backed securities that played a prominent role in the build-up to the financial crisis
remain dormant, other securitisation deals have rebounded thanks to investors’
hunger for yield and low corporate default rates.
Issuance of commercial mortgage-backed securities totalled $102bn in 2013, accord-
ing to Dealogic data, the highest since the $231bn sold just before the crisis.
In the US investors, such as insurers and pension funds, have long been buyers of
ABS. By contrast, much of the pre-crisis demand in Europe for such securities came
from local banks and related structured investment vehicles which disappeared in
the crisis.
‘[In the US] there was continuous demand for fixed-rate product, whereas in the
European market demand was much more dependent on the sale of floating-rate
paper,’ says Doug Tiesi, chief executive of Silverpeak.
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Nevertheless, there are critics who warn that the industry has yet to learn the
lessons of the crisis. Adam Ashcraft, head of credit risk management at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, warned at a conference last year: ‘We haven’t done
anything meaningful to prevent the securitisation market from doing what it
just did.’
Bankers are conscious the industry still needs to rebuild its reputation following
the excesses of the past.
Source: Alloway, T. (2014) Sliced and diced debt deals make roaring comeback, Financial
Times, 4 June.
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It is hoped that the European securitisation market can grow strongly, not least
because the European Central Bank and the Bank of England are helping to
promote a ‘high-quality’ packaged debt market – see Article 15.6.
Article 15.6
Asset-backed securities: back from

disgrace
By Christopher Thompson and Claire Jones

When Ian Bell visited the European Commission in the dark days after the global
financial crisis to lobby for ‘high-quality’ asset-backed securities, the veteran
financial analyst was given short shrift. The packages of loans that were sliced
and diced and sold off to investors had become one of the symbols of the type of
financial engineering that brought on the worst economic crisis since the Great
Depression.
‘They would listen politely and say, “thanks for coming – don’t call us, we’ll call
you”,’ says Mr Bell, the head of the Prime Collateralised Securities secretariat,
a body set up in London to monitor the quality of ABS after the crisis.
By late 2013, however, the policy makers were inviting him back to Brussels. ‘When
I arrived they were sitting in a room with pads and pens saying, “high-quality
securitisation – how can we make it work?” ’ The reason for the volte-face is simple
enough: two years on from the promise by Mario Draghi, president of the European
Central Bank, to do ‘whatever it takes’ to save the euro.
Mr Draghi gave the eurozone a much-needed respite, pushing euro borrowing costs
for banks and governments to record lows. But as concerns have grown in recent
months about deflation, Mr Draghi has realised that more radical intervention is
needed. He says a reinvigorated ABS market will allow banks to start lending again
to struggling small- and medium-sized businesses.
The ECB is expected to announce details on Thursday in Naples of an ambitious
plan to buy hundreds of billions of euros of repackaged debt in order to kick-start
bank lending.
‘Assets only recently branded as toxic are being heralded as potential saviours,’
says Andrew Jackson at Cairn Capital.
Supporters say a revival in the eurozone’s moribund ABS market would allow
banks to trim their bloated balance sheets and free up capital for lending. This
would allow smaller companies to borrow money to invest in their businesses.
But it would also entail unprecedented levels of credit exposure for the ECB.
Mortgage-backed securities account for about two-thirds of the ABS market.
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‘The ECB is taking a bet on the credit market, and by opening to mortgage-backed
purchases, especially the housing market, which has potentially powerful fiscal
implications for the eurozone area,’ says Carlo Altomonte, a professor at Bocconi
University.
The plan has powerful critics. Last week, Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance
minister, voiced his unease. ‘I am not particularly happy about the debate started
by the ECB about the purchase of securitisation products.’
The ECB and Bank of England consider a revival of the market as a way of trans-
forming European finance from a system based on bank loans to a US-style system
weighted more in favour of capital markets.
Europe’s bank dependence is stark: banks account for nearly 80% of corporate
loans compared with about 50% in the US. With a greater variety of non-bank
sources of finance, businesses’ access to credit is not solely tied to the fortunes of
their high street bank. Proponents of the plan point to the US programme of asset
purchases as evidence that it can work in Europe.
The US Federal Reserve has $1.7tn in mortgage-backed securities on its balance
sheet as a result of its buying programme since 2009, leading to a sharp rebound in
US ABS volumes. The ability to sell historic debts has given banks more lending
capacity. Commercial and industrial loans, for example, have risen by 45% to
$1.74tn since late 2010.
‘The key takeaway [from the US] is “build it and they will come”,’ says Jim Caron
at Morgan Stanley. ‘There were many questions about who would invest and would
it work. But once the government started to buy [MBS] it kick-started other forms
of lending and moved collateral away from banks to non-banks.’
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There is also evidence that Europe’s inventory of ABS is in better condition than
that of the US, where default rates were much worse. Of more than 9,000 European
ABS notes issued during the past decade, only 2% have defaulted or are likely to
realise future losses, according to Moody’s Investors Service, compared with about
a fifth of US ABS.
Mr Draghi said the ECB would only buy products that were ‘simple, transparent
and real’.
The ECB could start with ABS backed by SME, consumer and car loans, of which
there is €300bn outstanding. Most existing ABS are held by banks as collateral
in exchange for ECB loans. If the ECB included all banks’ outstanding loans and
mortgages that could be feasibly packaged, the potential ABS could be €3tn.
Source: Thompson, C. and Jones, C. (2014) Asset-backed securities: back from disgrace,
Financial Times, 30 September.
Even sub-prime is making a come-back in the US, with bonds securitised on

sub-prime car loans selling particularly well – see Article 15.7. Quantitative
easing is discussed in Chapter 16.
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Article 15.7
Rebound in sales of risky assets

raises fears over quantitative
easing’s legacy
By Tracy Alloway

‘Bankruptcy? Repossession? Charge-offs? Buy the car YOU deserve,’ says the
banner at the top of the Washington Auto Credit website. A stock photo of a woman
with a beaming smile is overlaid with the promise of ‘100% guaranteed credit
approval’.
On Wall Street they are smiling too, salivating over the prospect of borrowers
taking Washington Auto Credit up on its enticing offer of auto financing. Every car
loan advanced to a high-risk, subprime borrower can be bundled into bonds that
are then sold on to yield-hungry investors.
These subprime auto ‘asset-backed securities’ have, like a host of other risky
assets, been beneficiaries of six years of quantitative easing.
When the Fed began asset purchases in late 2008 the premise was simple: unleash
a tidal wave of liquidity to force nervous investors to move out of safe investments
and into riskier assets.
It is hard to argue that the tactic did not work; half a decade of low interest rates
and QE appears to have sparked an intense scrum for riskier securities as investors
struggle to make their return targets. Wall Street’s securitisation machine has
kicked back into gear to churn out bonds that package together corporate loans,
commercial mortgages and, of course, subprime auto loans.
The question now is whether the rebound in sales of risky assets will prove to be a
toxic legacy of QE in a similar way that the popularity of subprime mortgage-backed
securities was partly spurred by years of low interest rates before the financial crisis.
‘QE has flooded the system with cash and you’re really competing with an entity
with an unlimited balance sheet,’ says Manish Kapoor of West Wheelock Capital.
‘This has enhanced the search for yield and caused risk appetites to increase.’
The subprime auto loan market is a case in point. Lured by the higher returns on
offer from investing in subprime auto ABS, investors have flocked to buy the securities.
Washington Auto Credit, just one of many similar companies in a burgeoning

industry, helps would-be car owners find financing for their vehicle purchases
by connecting them with a growing crop of subprime car lenders. On its website,
it lists Flagship Credit Acceptance, a relatively new auto lender backed by the
private equity firm Perella Weinberg, as one of its partners.
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Like other subprime auto lenders, Flagship has been able to grow its business by
tapping strong investor demand for subprime auto ABS. So strong is that demand
that Flagship has been marketing ABS with a ‘prefunding’ feature – in effect selling
securitised bundles of auto loans before the loans have even been made.
Such prefunding features were a hallmark of securitisation markets before the
crisis, when demand for residential mortgage-backed securities was so high that it
outstripped supply of new loans. Now a similar dynamic appears in play, prompting
concerns that investors’ relentless search for yield will once again end poorly.
There remains a lingering unease that investors are being herded into asset classes
that may not be adequately compensating them for the risks involved. Some are
already leveraging their portfolio and using derivatives to help amplify their
returns during a period of unprecedented low interest rates.
Source: Alloway, T. (2014) Rebound in sales of risky assets raises fears over quantitative
easing’s legacy, Financial Times, 27 October.
Covered bonds
Covered bonds are similar to the securitised asset-based bonds described
above, in that a specific group of assets, e.g. mortgage receivables, is used to
back up the claims of the bond holders. But covered bonds give investors
extra layers of protection compared with other types of ABS. First, only banks
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are permitted to issue them and investors have full recourse to the bank’s
resources. This applies even for those issued through a special purpose vehicle
which on-lends the proceeds to the originating bank (either through a loan or
by buying its bonds). Thus if the covered bonds do not pay on time investors
can obtain payment from the bank that issued them, albeit indirectly, through
the SPV.
Furthermore, if the issuer goes bust, covered bond holders have priority claims
on the assets (mortgages, etc.) held in the cover asset pool. This is always a
segregated collection of financial assets, separate from the assets of the bank.
Covered bond holders rank above unsecured creditors of the bank in being
able to claim the assets in the pool. Thus covered bond holders are protected
from the failure of the bank because they have a group of ring-fenced assets
they can turn to, while, at the same time, if the bank is fine but the pool of
assets turns out to be a dud, investors can turn to the assets of the bank held
outside of the cover asset pool. In most jurisdictions the value of the assets in
the cover pool is required at all times to exceed the value of the covered bonds
by a prescribed amount: over-collateralisation – see Figure 15.3.
There is also the protection offered of dynamic cover pool maintenance,

meaning that the bank has an ongoing obligation to maintain sufficient
high-quality assets in the cover pool as collateral to satisfy the claims of
Figure 15.3 Legal minimum over-collateralisation levels for covered bonds in Europe
Source: European Covered Bond Council http://ecbc.hypo.org European Covered Bond Fact Book 2014,
European Covered Bond Council http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/default.asp?PageID=501
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covered bond holders at all times. Under this the bank is required to add
further assets to the cover pool to compensate for matured or defaulted assets
(e.g. house owner not paying his mortgage). This contrasts with most securitisa-
tions, where the sponsoring institution is not obliged to replace defaulted
assets, so the losses are borne by the bond investors.
On top of that protection, covered bonds can be issued only in strict legal and
supervisory settings. Supervision typically includes:
● a special cover pool monitor
● periodic audits of the cover pool by the cover pool monitor
● arrangements for ongoing management and maintenance of the cover

pool should the bank become insolvent to ensure continued payments to
covered bond holders.
In most of the 29 countries with covered bond markets the monitor is a public
authority, e.g. the banking supervisory authority. In other countries the
issuing organisation (e.g. bank, SPV) appoints an external auditor (outside
its control) to regularly audit the cover pool, as well as an external trustee to
safeguard bond holders’ interests.
The financial assets held within the cover pool include loans and bonds. There
might also be derivatives designed to hedge interest rate and currency risk, but
equities, property and commodities cannot be included. The most common
pool asset is mortgage loans secured on residential or commercial property, but
in many countries there is a large market in covered bonds where the under-
lying assets are loans to public entities such as regional or local authorities.
Ship loans comes in a distant third.
Figure 15.4 shows the growth of this market, which in 2013 had more than
€2.5 trillion outstanding, with an increasing shift towards mortgage-backed
covered bonds and a decrease in the importance of public sector CBs.
We can see clearly from Figure 15.5 that the covered bond market is more
significant in some European countries than others. Germany takes nearly
20% of the outstanding covered bond market (its covered bonds are called
Pfandbriefe). Spain, Denmark and France all have around €350 billion out-
standing. The UK accounts for 5% (nearly €137 billion), while the US, with less
than 0.3% of the market, is only just getting going.
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Figure 15.4 Total outstanding covered bonds outstanding bonds, 2003–2013

Source: Data from European Covered Bond Council http://ecbc.hypo.org European Covered Bond Fact Book
2014, European Covered Bond Council http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/default.asp?PageID=501
Figure 15.5 Outstanding covered bonds by country as well as change versus 2012 in
billions of euros
European Covered Bond Council http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/default.asp?PageID501
About three-quarters of covered bonds are denominated in euros, with US

dollar and UK pound issues accounting for only a small fraction of the total.
More than 97% in a typical year are issued with fixed-rate coupons, rather than
floating rates.
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Figure 15.6 Covered bond and senior unsecured euro new issues by maturity, billions
of euros
Some are short bonds, but most are medium-term bonds – see Figure 15.6.
Because of their high level of backing, covered bonds are usually given high
credit ratings (AAA) and are therefore a relatively low-cost way for financial
institutions to raise money. Having said that, the AAA rating is far from
automatic – see Article 15.8.
Article 15.8
Moody’s risk alert sparks covered

bond dispute
By Tracy Alloway

An unlikely dispute has blown up over one of the finance world’s oldest and safest
assets, drawing in Danish banks, rating agencies and even a George Soros venture.
Rarely do Danish covered bonds, which have their roots in the reconstruction
following the 1795 fire that devastated Copenhagen, generate controversy.
But Moody’s unsettled the 200-year-old market last month by warning that the
bonds were carrying a higher refinancing risk.
The rating agency demanded that Danish issuers top up the debt with billions of
extra funds to maintain the top ratings.
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‘Denmark is one of the biggest, most liquid, most transparent bond markets around
and Moody’s are picking on them,’ says Alan Boyce, chief executive of the Absalon
Project.
At the heart of the rating agency’s stance is its assertion that Danish covered bonds
– which pool together mortgages – are changing.
Where once the bonds were almost entirely composed of fixed-rate loans, now more
than half of outstanding Danish covered bonds – some DKr1,217bn ($231bn) worth
– are for financing adjustable-rate mortgage (Arm) loans, says Denmark’s central
bank.
But Danish banks have to reissue the bonds before the underlying loans expire,
creating a refinancing risk, according to Moody’s.
The interest rate that borrowers pay on their loan also changes every time the bond
is refinanced, meaning they may have to pay a higher rate if the rollover comes at
a time of financial stress for the issuing bank.
‘Typically, Arm loans mature after 20 to 30 years while the covered bonds mature
every one to three years,’ Moody’s says. ‘Hence there is refinancing risk and the
issuers’ dependence on regular market access to issue covered bonds has increased
with the growing volume of Arm loans.’
Covered bond issuers counter by arguing that unique features of the Danish
mortgage market mitigate risk. Mortgages are capped at 80% loan-to-value and
the bonds stay on bank balance sheets, aligning the interests of borrowers and the
issuing banks, says renowned financier Mr Soros.
Issuers say the debt has never defaulted – not even during Denmark’s early 19th
century bankruptcy – and also survived the 2008 financial crisis relatively well.
Denmark now has over DKr2,300bn in outstanding mortgage bonds, more than four
times the country’s government bond market.
But Moody’s says the refinancing risk for Danish covered bonds may still be up due
to the so-called ‘bail-in’ rules introduced for failed banks last year by Denmark’s
government.
The new rules allow banks to fail and impose losses on creditors and have raised
Danish banks’ funding costs in recent months.
Danske Bank, which issues covered bonds through its Realkredit Danmark business,
says it dropped Moody’s after the agency estimated it would have to surrender an
additional DKr32.5bn of collateral to maintain the triple A rating on its debt.
Smaller issuers say they will turn to other rating agencies such as Standard &
Poor’s or Fitch, according to Jan Knøsgaard, deputy director-general of the
Association of Danish Mortgage Banks. ‘The issuers can’t understand Moody’s
decision; they find it very mechanical and very different to the position of other
rating agencies,’ he adds.
Danish banks have started spreading their refinancing dates throughout the year
to limit the risk of big pressure points.
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Nykredit Realkredit, Denmark’s largest mortgage lender, says it will hive off its
funding for adjustable rate mortgages into a separate unit to protect the ratings on
its fixed-rate covered bonds. ‘The mortgage bonds have already traded back up
since the Moody’s announcement, and this is in an environment where everything
else in Europe has widened out,’ says Mr Boyce.
‘If Moody’s want to play hardball, they should look at some other European covered
bonds, things like German Public Pfandbriefe, which are stuffed with exposure to
eurozone peripherals but still retain their triple A ratings.’
Source: Alloway, T. (2011) Moody’s risk alert sparks covered bond dispute, Financial Times,
20 July.
The main investors in covered bonds are banks and investment funds, but
there are many others – see Figure 15.7.
Figure 15.7 Allocation of euro-denominated covered bond benchmark issuance by

investor type
Covered bonds originated in 18th-century Prussia, and Europe remains the

strongest market for these bonds, where they are well understood by both
investors and issuers, see Article 15.9.
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Article 15.9
‘Periphery’ bank bonds are

the comeback assets
By Christopher Thompson, Rachel Sanderson and Miles Johnson

Banco Popolare was one of three mid-tier Italian banks which together sold €2.75bn
of covered bonds last week.
Weakened mid-tier banks in the eurozone ‘periphery’ economies are widely seen as
holding back the continent’s broader economic and financial market recovery.
Yet in spite of limited capital, depressed profitability and bulky books of non-
performing loans, some are returning to favour among investors.
Analysts say Italy’s midsized banks are ratcheting up their bond issuances having
seen an opening in the market amid indications that Italy’s crippling two-year
recession is coming to an end.
Last week UBI Banca, Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna and Mediobanca –
three mid-tier Italian banks – issued covered bonds, collectively raising €2.75bn.
It was the largest weekly issue ever from Italian non-national champion banks.
With one eye on the European Banking Authority’s stress tests next year, other
peripheral banks are expected to follow suit.
‘It’s about boosting market credibility,’ said Ralf Grossmann, head of covered
bonds at Société Générale. ‘There is the best potential [for debt issuance] in the
periphery because they have been absent from the market for some time and they
want to show investors that “we can do this”.’
Much of the capital raising has been done using covered bonds – those backed by
specific, high-quality assets held by the issuing bank – which are seen as a low-risk
form of lending.
Banks in peripheral countries account for more than a third – or $31.7bn – of
eurozone banks’ covered bond issuance so far this year, the highest proportion
since 2006, according to Dealogic, the data provider.
By contrast, senior unsecured debt issuance, viewed as a bank’s bread and butter
funding, has fallen in the periphery year-on-year since 2009.
Since the intervention of Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank,
Spanish banks have been able to once again issue debt – a process started by BBVA,
the country’s second-largest lender by assets, which issued a five-year covered
bond back in November last year.
Little wonder they are eager to flaunt their capital raising prowess.
It’s not all plain sailing. Banco Popular [the Spanish bank] struggled to attract
significant demand for a €750m bond it issued at the start of September, a sale not
helped by uncertainty over US monetary policy at the time.
➨
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Moreover, non-performing loans as a proportion of total bank lending continue to

rise in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, according to research by Royal
Bank of Scotland. Mid-tier banks bear the most exposure to bad loans and also to
wider sovereign interest rate spreads.
Nevertheless, Oliver Burrows, a credit research analyst at Rabobank, believes the
recent deals show the market is increasingly willing to take a punt on the periphery.
‘The fact they’re issuing shows there is a thawing in the market,’ he said. ‘It’s not
just covered bonds now; we’ve seen a flood of issuance across the capital and credit
quality spectrum.’
Source: Thompson, C., Sanderson, R. and Johnson, M. (2013) ‘Periphery’ bank bonds are
the comeback assets, Financial Times, 17 October.
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In the US, covered bonds make up a very small part of the bond universe
because the market has been hampered by a lack of legal framework for them
Article 15.10
Sales of ultra-safe US covered

bonds stall
By Tracy Alloway and Vivianne Rodrigues

Legend has it that Frederick the Great, the 18th century King of Prussia, sent
a sword to George Washington inscribed with the words: ‘From the oldest general
in the world to the greatest.’
More than two centuries later, efforts to export to the US one of Frederick’s oldest
and greatest inventions – covered bonds – have completely stalled.
It is a far cry from the situation in July 2008, when then-US Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson recommended the specially-structured mortgage bonds as a way of
offsetting the sputtering of Wall Street’s loan securitisation machine.
Six years after the US government first raised the possibility of writing new rules
that would help US banks sell the special debt, that legal framework is no closer.
When bankers and investors gather in New York this week for a conference about
covered bonds in ‘the Americas’ there is likely to be little excitement about the
prospect of Washington – still in gridlock – creating new legislation for the debt.
Covered bonds have been a feature of the wider European debt market since
Frederick crafted them in 1769 as a way of easing a credit shortage following the
devastating Seven Years’ War. Early iterations of the bonds allowed creditors to
acquire direct claims over Prussian estates, as well as a claim on the debtor.
Giving investors the right to a specific pool of assets differentiated the bonds from
so-called ‘unsecured’ debt which is not backed by any specific collateral.
This extra recourse remains one of the defining features of modern covered bonds.
Even more important is the specially-designed law that accompanies covered bonds
in many countries, and which gives investors in the debt added legal protections in
the event that the issuing bank goes bust.
While those added protections have made the bonds popular with ultra-conservative
investors, they have also impeded the debt’s march into the US market. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is still said to be concerned about the bonds’
potential to hoover up assets from a failed or failing bank – making the government
agency a key sticking point to new legislation.
The lack of a covered bond framework has not stopped the mortgage bonds from
being sold in the US. For years, non-US banks, especially Canadian lenders, have
been distributing ‘yankee’ covered bonds denominated in dollars.
➨
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But sales in the US of such bonds have slumped to $17bn so far this year. That is
down from $45bn in 2012 and $40bn in 2011, according to data from Dealogic.
The slower-than-expected march of covered bonds into the US is a disappointment
for the debt’s proponents, who still view the bonds as an elegant solution to the
problem of encouraging private investors into a mortgage market which is still
largely propped up by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).
Some in the market are now looking at alternative ways to make covered bonds
work in the US and give banks an opportunity to tap an alternative source of
financing, even without new legislation.
Source: Alloway, T. and Rodrigues, V. (2013) Sales of ultra-safe US covered bonds stall,
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CHAPTER 16
CENTRAL BANKING
INFLUENCE ON
INTEREST RATES
To appreciate the influence of central banks on interest rates we need to first

look at how money is created. It may surprise you to learn that, for the most
part, money is not created by the actions of the central bank, it is mostly cre-
ated by the commercial banks lending to people and business.
We then need to tackle the constraints on that money creation, which come
largely from prudential self-restraint, with a helping hand from the central
banking authorities. Because a commercial bank knows it is sensible to keep a
proportion of the assets it owns in a highly liquid form, but at the same time
knows that it is tempting to lend long term to gain higher interest, there is
a tension within a bank on the quantity of money to hold in reserve. The
central bank can influence interest rates through its supply of cash reserves,
its interest rate on money borrowed from it, the level of interest it pays on
money deposited with it, and its purchases and sales of money market and
bond securities.
Following the 2008 financial crisis central banks significantly changed the way
in which they influence interest rates in the wider economy, not least through
quantitative easing. Thus we need to discuss both the ‘normal’ monetary
policy approaches and the more recent interventions.
The start of modern banking

Imagine you are a wealthy Londoner in the 17th century. You have a problem:
much of your wealth is in metal coins and you need somewhere safe to keep
these. You have heard of a group of merchants known as goldsmiths who
have long experience, strong vaults, high reputation and the latest technology
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to keep valuables safe. They’ve been dealing in gold for decades. You could
strike up a deal with them whereby they looked after your gold and silver for a
small fee.
The goldsmith gives you a written receipt. This piece of paper states the value
of the coins deposited. If you wanted to buy something in a shop you could
take your piece of paper to your goldsmith to receive coins to spend. But what
happened next led to the development of goldsmiths as banks. The shop keeper,
as likely as not, would deposit your coins with a goldsmith for safekeeping,
receiving a receipt in return. It did not take long for shopkeepers to realise that
a receipt from a reputable goldsmith was worth taking from a customer rather
than insisting on the usual merry-go-round of collecting coin and depositing
it again. The shopkeeper could simply accept the receipt and collect the coins
at a later date (or get them transferred to their account at the goldsmith). The
paper receipts increasingly became accepted as a form of money.
These private depositories of coin got a real boost when the rival depository,
the Royal Mint, on Tower Hill, was raided by Charles I at the start of the civil
war. He decided to ‘borrow’ the huge sum of £200,000. He later repaid, but the
damage was done, trust was gone. The goldsmiths not only had higher reputa-
tions but paid interest.
Fractional-reserve banking
Goldsmiths noticed that most of the deposited coins were never taken out. On
a typical day, or even a typical month, only a very small proportion of deposi-
tors turned up to demand their coins. So, reasoned the bankers, if for every
£100 deposited only around £20 would need to be kept in the vault to satisfy
those who turned up at the bank, why not lend out the other £80 and gain
some interest? Hence only a fraction of the money deposited is held in reserve:
fractional-reserve banking.
Money creation
Now we can move to another stage, we can actually create money. The borrowers
of the money from goldsmiths were usually content to take a piece of paper –
call it a bank note – instead of taking coins out of the bank. They could then
use that as currency to buy things. The goldsmith could just create these pieces
of paper off their own bat. Thus, a goldsmith-bank might have a total of, say,
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16 CENTRAL BANKING INFLUENCE ON INTEREST RATES 421
£1,000 deposited, but hand out £500 of the coin as loans and issue another
£5,000 or £6,000 of new paper money to borrowers.
You can see the obvious danger here: depositors might all come at the same
time to demand their money – they want £1,000 back when there is only
£500 in the vault. Illiquidity! But what are the chances of a high proportion
of depositors wanting cash back at the same time? Minuscule, thought the
bankers, and so they carried on lending beyond their deposit base – and this
is what bankers do today. They create money out of thin air (just so long as
there is a deposit base on which to build) – see Figure 16.1. Initially there is
only £100, after seven actions there is £100 + £80 + £64 + £51.20 = £295.20 in
the economy.
Figure 16.1 Money creation by bankers
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This new money is actually debt. And it works only if people are willing to accept
bankers’ promissory notes. They do this because these notes are perceived as
being ‘payable on demand’. If you turned up at a bank you would have been
able to swap your notes for coins. Today UK notes still state ‘I promise to pay
the bearer on demand the sum of twenty pounds’. However, unlike in the 17th
century, if you went to collect from the Bank of England today you would only
get another note in exchange – we have moved right over to pure fiat money.
Paper money is called fiat money – it is money simply because it is declared
as such by a government to be legal tender. It is money without intrinsic
value other than the potential for others to trust it and accept it as money. To
be useful the notes issued then and now have to carry a legally enforceable
unconditional right to payment. Also, they should be negotiable – that is,
transferable – between people.
Of course, there is another danger: if you are working off a deposit base of
£1,000 and you lend £4,000, and then 30% of your borrowers are unable
to pay, you are bankrupt. This thought should limit the amount you lend
given your deposit base (a capital reserve is kept), but bankers occasionally
misjudge this.
Many of the goldsmith-bankers developed into famous banking firms of today,

such as Coutts & Company.
The cheque is invented

If a depositor wanted to make a payment he could write a letter to his
goldsmith-bank asking that the person named in the letter be allowed to
receive in cash the sum stated in the letter. Alternatively, the letter could
authorise the transfer from one deposit account at the goldsmith to another.
The earliest handwritten cheques appeared after the English civil war. The
early 1700s saw the first fully printed cheques, and the first personalised
printed cheques were produced in 1810.
A clearing house
But what if the payee banks with another goldsmith-bank? Then there had to
be a way of communicating between the two. At first this process would have
been laborious, as clerks from each bank would visit all the other banks to
exchange cheques and then settle between them, but in 1770 the London
bankers got together in one place (a tavern) to handle the cheques from many
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banks. This eventually became the Bankers’ Clearing House in the early 19th
century. When the railways linked up the rest of the country in the 1840s the
cheque system really took off, linking up more than 150 banks.
More on fiat money

The first modern fiat paper money issued by a government was by Massachusetts
in 1690. To pay off soldiers who had contributed to the latest round of plun-
dering expeditions in Quebec, £7,000 was printed. The pieces of paper handed
out were to be redeemed in gold or silver out of tax receipts in a ‘few years’ (in
fact, they had to wait 40 years). Massachusetts’ politicians loved this way of
paying for things and so kept issuing paper – by 1748 there was £2.5 million in
circulation. By the late 1750s all the other colonies had followed suit. It was
only natural that the Continental Congress chose the tool of fiat paper money
to finance the Revolutionary War (1775).
Paper money in the UK

Britain was somewhat slower in gaining government control over the issue
of paper money. In 1694 the Bank of England (BoE) was founded but at this
stage its job was to act as the government’s banker (managing its account)
and to raise money for it. It immediately raised £1.2 million for the govern-
ment by getting people to subscribe to a share issue to set up the new bank (the
government needed to pay for a war with France). The subscribers became
the Governor and the Company of the Bank of England. While other banks
were restricted in size by being limited to six partners (if they were to issue
currency), the BoE, being a joint-stock company with shareholder limited
liability, could issue shares to investors around the country to raise capital.
Also, being so big and strong it attracted plenty of deposits. Its strength meant
that by the 1780s it was acting as banker to other banks.
During the Napoleonic wars the government was borrowing so much paper
money from the BoE that it ran out of gold to back the notes. The government
thus declared that the notes need no longer be convertible to gold. The result
of all this spending and the creation of so much fiat money was high inflation.
The lesson was learned: you need to limit the quantity of paper money.
There continued to be many small banks issuing bank notes. Many were
unsound, irresponsibly creating notes. In 1844 the BoE was emphasised as the
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main issuer of notes. From then on, there were to be no new issuers of notes
and those whose issues lapsed, or that were taken over, forfeited their right
to issue. Other issuers gradually died out. The notes issued by the BoE were
mostly backed by its holdings of gold or silver bullion, but another £14 million
was permitted (equal to the BoE capital raised from shareholders). The backing
of gold (the gold standard) created a long period of price stability. However,
today in most countries currency notes are not backed by anything other than
a promise to pay – pure fiat systems.
In addition to the issue of notes and being banker to the government the BoE
took on roles such as being lender of last resort to the banking system and was
called on to stabilise the banking system in crises, which happened pretty
often.
The key elements of banking

Bankers must avoid lending out via long-term loans a very high proportion
of the money they attract without regard for the potential of depositors and
other creditors to suddenly demand their money back. That is, banks must
prudentially retain reserves of cash (and other liquid assets) to satisfy creditors
as the need arises. Yet holding too much cash leads to the loss of opportunities
to lend that money (acquire assets) to earn higher interest. This liquidity
management involves a delicate balance.
Second, banks must protect themselves against the possibility of their assets
falling below liabilities (what the bank owes depositors and other creditors of
the bank). Such an eventuality would make a bank insolvent and unable to
carry on. This might happen, for instance, if, say, 10% of the loans it has made
to businesses go sour and are never repaid (as happened with HBOS following
the financial crisis). If a bank was to play it ultra-safe it would always hold
assets worth at least 20% more than its liabilities. This level of safety is being
called for by some experts in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, but very few
banks come anywhere near that level; more typical levels are 3–5%.
This capital management is a much debated topic. The fundamentals are that
a bank starts out with some money put in by its owners to pay for buildings,
equipment, etc. Shareholders’ funds, obtained by the selling of shares in the
bank, have the advantage that the shareholders do not have the right to with-
draw their money from the company – it is permanent capital (although they
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might sell their shares to other investors). As well as paying for the initial
set-up, shareholders’ capital provides a buffer acting as a safety margin against
the event of a significant number of the loans granted to borrowers going
wrong. The buffer is referred to as capital and loans made are assets of the
bank. Deposits (and other loans to the bank) are liabilities:
Total assets = Total liabilities + Capital
In addition to capital being raised at the foundation of the business it can be

augmented over the years through the bank making profits and deciding to
keep those profits within the business rather than distributing them as divi-
dends to shareholders – retained earnings. It can also be increased by selling
more shares. Capital is also called net worth or equity capital.
A closer look at liquidity risk

A bank keeps a proportion of the money it raises in the form of cash (and near
cash) rather than lending it all to lower liquidity risk, running out of liquid
assets. Let us assume for now that a bank, BarcSan, is required by the central
bank (its regulator) to hold 8% of the value of its deposits in reserves. These
are the regulatory required reserves. However, the bank may judge that 8% is
not enough and decide to add another 4% of the value of its current account
liabilities as excess reserves. Reserves consist of both the cash that the bank is
required to hold in its account with the central bank and cash that it has on
its own premises, referred to as vault cash. Note that we are referring here to
cash reserves and not the capital reserves (the difference between assets and
liabilities). Cash reserves are there to avoid running out of cash, a short-term
phenomenon, whereas capital reserves are there to avoid running out of net
assets (assets minus liabilities).
Cash reserves of 12% are unusually high, but useful for illustration. A more
normal figure is 1–3% of overall liabilities (not just deposit liabilities) held
in cash, but another 10% or so might be held in assets that can quickly be
converted to cash, such as very short-term loans to other banks, certificates of
deposit for money placed with other banks in tradable form and government
Treasury bills – these are termed near cash. The term for reserves that includes
near cash is liquid reserves.
To understand the working of a bank we will start with a very simple example
of a change in the cash held by a bank. Imagine that Mrs Rich deposits £1,000
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of cash into her current account at the BarcSan Bank. This has affected the
bank’s balance sheet. It has an increase of cash, and therefore reserves, of
£1,000. This is an asset of the bank. At the same time it has increased its liabil-
ities because the bank owes Mrs Rich £1,000, which she can withdraw any
time. We can illustrate the changes by looking at that part of the balance sheet
that deals with this transaction. In the T-account below, the asset (cash) is
shown on the left and the increased liability is shown on the right.
BarcSan partial balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Vault cash (part of reserves) £1,000 Current account £1,000
This increase in reserves could also have come about through Mrs Rich
paying in a £1,000 cheque drawn on an account at, say, HSBC. When BarcSan
receives the cheque it deposits it at the central bank, which then collects
£1,000 from HSBC’s account with the central bank and transfers it to BarcSan’s
account at the central bank, increasing its reserves. Remember: cash reserves
include both those held at the central bank and those in the bank vault, tills,
ATMs, etc.
Given that BarcSan has required reserves at 8% of current account deposits,

following the receipt of £1,000 it has increased assets of £80 in required
reserves and £920 in excess reserves.
Assets Liabilities
Required reserves £80 Current account £1,000

Excess reserves £920
These reserves are not paying a high interest to BarcSan.1 What is even more
troubling is that the bank is providing an expensive service to Mrs Rich with
bank branch convenience, cheque books, statements, etc. This money has to
be put to use – at least as much of it as is prudent. One way of making a profit
1
Many central banks now do pay interest on those reserves deposited with them, but it can
be quite low. In May 2014 the US Federal Reserve paid 0.25% (annual rate), for example.
The BoE paid 0.5%.
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is to lend most of the money. It does this by lending to a business for five years.
Thus the bank borrows on a short-term basis (instant access for Mrs Rich) and
lends long (five-year term loan). The bank decides to lend £880 because this
would allow it to maintain its required reserve ratio of 8% and its target excess
reserve of 4%.
Assets Liabilities
Required reserves £80 Current account £1,000

Excess reserves £40
Loan £880
Liquidity management and reserves

There may be times when a large volume of cash is withdrawn by depositors
and the bank has to be ready for that. Let us look at the (simplified) balance
sheet for BarcSan as a whole, all its assets and all its liabilities. We will assume
that it keeps 8% of deposits as required reserves and aims to have a further 4%
as excess reserves (either at the central bank or as vault cash). As well as £10
billion in deposits the bank has £900 million in capital accumulated mostly
through retaining past profits. It has lent £5.7 billion and bought £3.1 billion
of marketable securities such as government bonds and bills.
BarcSan’s balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Required reserves £800m Deposits £10,000m

Excess reserves £1,300m Bank capital £900m
Loans £5,700m
Securities £3,100m
To satisfy its own rule of 12% of current account deposits held as reserves it
needs only £1.2 billion but it currently has £2.1 billion (£800m + £1,300m). It
has a ‘spare’ £900 million. If there is a sudden rise in withdrawals from bank
accounts as people worry about the bank system collapsing and not being
able to repay its deposit liabilities (as with Northern Rock in 2007, or Cypriot
banks in 2013), this will have an impact on BarcSan. If £900 million of cash is
withdrawn from BarcSan, its balance changes to:
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BarcSan’s balance sheet after a sudden withdrawal of £900 million
Assets Liabilities

Excess reserves £472m Bank capital £900m
Loans £5,700m
Securities £3,100m
The bank still has cash reserves above its target because 12% of £9,100 million
is £1,092 million (this apportioned as required reserves, 8% of £9,100m =
£728m, and excess reserves, 4% of £9,100m = £364m), but the bank has £1,200
million (required reserves of £728 million plus excess reserves of £472 million).
Because it started with plentiful reserves the public panic to withdraw funds
has not affected the other elements in BarcSan’s balance sheet.
Now take a different case, where BarcSan has already lent out any reserves
above its prudential level of 12% of deposits.
BarcSan’s balance sheet if actual reserves equal target reserves
Assets Liabilities

Loans £6,600m
Securities £3,100m
Now imagine a financial panic: many depositors rush to the bank’s branches to
take out their money. In one day £900 million is withdrawn. At the end of the
day the balance sheet is looking far from healthy.
BarcSan’s balance sheet after £900 million is withdrawn (after the bank just met its
reserve target)
Assets Liabilities

Loans £6,600m
Securities £3,100m
Another day like that and it might be wiped out. It is required to hold 8% of
£9,100 million as reserves, £728 million, but now has only £300 million.
Where is it going to get the shortfall from? There are four possibilities.
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1 Borrow from other banks and other organisations. The active markets in inter-
bank loans, repos, commercial paper or certificates of deposit could be use-
ful to raise the £428 million.
BarcSan’s balance sheet if it borrows £428 million from the markets
Assets Liabilities

Excess reserves £0m Borrowed from banks and firms £428m
Loans £6,600m Bank capital £900m
Securities £3,100m
However, given the cause of the crisis was a system-wide loss of confidence,
BarcSan may have difficulty raising money in these markets at this time.
This was a problem that beset many banks around the world in 2008, and
then many eurozone banks in Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain in 2011–
2013. They had grown used to quickly obtaining cash to cover shortfalls
from other banks. But in the calamitous loss of confidence following the
sub-prime debacle and the eurozone crisis, banks simply stopped lending –
those that were caught with insufficient reserves failed or were bailed out by
governments.
2 Securities could be sold. Of the securities bought by a bank, most are traded in
very active markets where it is possible to sell a large quantity without mov-
ing the price. Let us assume that the bank sells £428 million of government
Treasury bills and bonds to move its reserves back to 8% of deposits.
BarcSan’s balance sheet if it sells £428 million of securities
Assets Liabilities

Loans £6,600m
Securities £2,672m
The short-term securities issued by respectable (safe) governments held by

banks are classified as secondary reserves because they tend to be very easy
to sell quickly, at low transaction cost and without moving the market price,
even if sold in fairly high volume. Other securities held by the bank will
have higher transaction costs of sale and are less easy to sell and so are not
classed as secondary reserves.
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3 Borrowing from the central bank. One of the major duties of a central bank is
to act as lender of last resort. It stands ready to lend to banks that lack cash
reserves. However, it will do this at a high price only (high interest rate) to
deter banks from calling on it in trivial circumstances.2 If BarcSan borrows
the £428 million shortfall from the central bank to take it back to the regu-
lator’s minimum of 8%, its balance sheet now looks like this:
BarcSan’s balance sheet if it borrows £428 million from the central bank
Assets Liabilities

Excess reserves £0m Borrowings from central bank £428m
Loans £6,600m Bank capital £900m
Securities £3,100m
4 Reducing lending. Banks receive principal repayments on loans every day as

the periods of various loan agreements come to an end, or as portions of
loans are repaid during the term of the loan. To raise some money the bank
could simply refuse any more loans for a period. I was on the sharp end of
this in February 2007 when trying to complete a business property deal.
Suddenly Halifax Bank of Scotland refused to lend on what was a pretty
safe deal for them. I was nonplussed. What were they playing at? Didn’t
they know they would lose my company as a customer? Of course, with
hindsight we all know that this was the start of the crisis when HBOS
was desperately short of cash (it avoided complete annihilation only by
allowing itself to be bought by Lloyds). Another possibility is to sell off some
of the loan book to another bank – but the purchasers are unlikely to pay
full value, especially in uncertain times. An even more drastic solution is to
insist that borrowers repay their loans immediately. This is possible with
some types of loans such as overdrafts, but it results in much resentment
and damage to long-term relationships. If BarcSan raised £428 million in
one of these ways its balance sheet would look like this:
2
Interest charged by central banks is normally at penalty rates, but in 2014 many central
banks were charging very low rates to assist banks and encourage lending.
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BarcSan balance sheet after reducing loans by £428 million
Assets Liabilities

Loans £6,172m
Securities £3,100m
Of course, there are a few more moves that need to be made if the bank wants
to reach its target of 12% reserves, rather than simply get to 8%, but after such
a crisis in the financial markets this may take a few years to achieve.
A difficult balance
A bank has a trade-off to manage. If it ties up a very high proportion of its
money in reserves it loses the opportunity to lend that money to gain a decent
return, but the managers can feel very safe, as they are unlikely to run out of
cash. Yet if it goes for maximum interest by lending the vast majority of the
money deposited long term, it could run out of cash. Thus it has to have
enough reserves to avoid one or more of the following costly actions to quickly
raise money: (a) borrowing from other banks; (b) selling securities; (c) borrow-
ing from the central bank; or (d) reducing its loans. Required and excess
reserves provide insurance against incurring liquidity problems due to deposit
outflows, but like all insurance it comes at a high price.
Capital adequacy management

How much capital should the bank hold? In deciding this managers need to
trade off the risk of bank failure by not being able to satisfy its creditors (depos-
itors, wholesale market lenders, etc.) against the attraction of increasing the
return to the bank’s owners by having as little capital as possible relative to the
asset base. The fear here is of insolvency – an inability to repay obligations
over the longer course of events – rather than illiquidity, which is insufficient
liquid assets to repay obligations falling due if there is a sudden outflow of cash
(e.g. large depositor withdrawals on a particular day, unexpectedly drawing
down on lines of credit, or large payments under derivative deals). To under-
stand the difficulty with this trade-off we can compare BarcSan’s situation with
a less well-capitalised bank, Mercurial.
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BarcSan’s opening balance sheet
Assets Liabilities

Loans £5,700m
Securities £3,100m
BarcSan’s capital to assets ratio is £900m/£10,900 = 8.3%. Mercurial has

exactly the same assets as BarcSan, but it has only £400 million in capital. It
has an extra £500 million in deposits. Its ratio of capital to assets is 3.7%
(£400m/£10,900m).
Mercurial’s opening balance sheet
Assets Liabilities

Loans £5,700m
Securities £3,100m
Now consider what happens if we assume a situation similar to that in

southern Europe in 2013. Both banks invested £500 million in bonds issued by
Cypriot financial institutions. These now become worthless as the borrowers
stop paying.3 BarcSan can withstand the loss in assets because it maintained a
conservative stance on its capital ratio.
BarcSan’s balance sheet after £500 million losses on Cypriot bonds
Assets Liabilities

Loans £5,700m
Securities £2,600m
3
This case illustrates a domino effect. The Cypriot banks ended up in trouble and unable to
pay their debts because a few years earlier they had bought a lot of bonds issued by Greek
banks. Then the eurozone ‘bailout’ of Greece was agreed, which resulted in default on the
Greek bank bonds – they lost 70% of their value. This wiped out a tremendous proportion
of assets from the Cypriot banks’ balance sheets.
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Its capital to assets ratio has fallen to a less conservative 3.8% (£400m/
£10,400m), but this is a level that still affords some sense of safety for its pro-
viders of funds. (Some writers refer to the capital to assets ratio as the leverage
ratio, others take its inverse as the leverage ratio.)
Mercurial is insolvent. Its assets of £10,400 are less than the amount owed to
depositors.
Mercurial’s balance sheet after £500 million losses on Cypriot bonds
Assets Liabilities

Excess reserves £1,300m Bank capital − £100m
Loans £5,700m
Securities £2,600m
A course of action is to write to depositors to tell them that it cannot repay the
full amount that was deposited with the bank. They might panic, rush to the
branch to obtain what they are owed in full. More likely is for the regulator to
step in to close or rescue the bank. Occasionally the central bank organises a
rescue by a group of other banks – they, too, have an interest in maintaining
confidence in the banking system. In 2009 Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds
Banking Group, following the sudden destruction of balance sheet reserves
when the value of their loans and many securities turned out to be much less
than what was shown on the balance sheet, were rescued by the UK govern-
ment, which injected money into them by buying billions of new shares. This
was enough new capital to save them from destruction, but the banks are still
clawing their way back to health and still trying to rebuild capital reserves.
Why might banks sail close to the wind in aiming at a

very low capital to assets ratio?
The motivation to lower the capital to assets ratio is to boost the returns to
shareholders. To illustrate: imagine both BarcSan and Mercurial make profits
after deduction of tax of £150 million per year and we can ignore extraordinary
losses such as the sub-prime fiasco. A key measure of profitability is return on
assets (ROA).
Net profit after tax

ROA =
Total assets
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Given that both firms (in normal conditions) have the same profits and the
same assets, we have a ROA of £150m/£10,900m = 1.376%.4 This is a useful
measure of bank efficiency in terms of how much profit is generated per pound
of assets.
However, what shareholders are really interested in is the return for each
pound that they place in the business. Assuming that the capital figures in the
balance sheet are all provided by ordinary shareholders then the return on
equity (ROE) is:
Net profit after tax

ROE =
Equity capital
£150m
For BarcSan: ROE = = 16.7%
£900m
£150m
For Mercurial: ROE = = 37.5%
£400m
Mercurial appears to be super-profitable, simply because it obtained such a small

proportion of its funds from shareholders. Many conservatively run banks
were quizzed by their shareholders in the mid-2000s on why their returns to
equity were low compared with those of other banks, and ‘couldn’t they just push
up returns with a little less caution on the capital ratio?’ Many were tempted to
follow the crowd in the good times only to suffer very badly when bank capital
levels were exposed as far too daring. You can understand the temptation, and
that is why regulation is needed to insist on minimum levels of capital.
Monetary policy
If the interest rates in an economy are held at a level that is too low then
inflation will start to take off. This can be disruptive to businesses in addition
to destroying people’s savings. It is especially problematic if inflation is high
and fluctuating. The resulting uncertainty about future price levels is likely
to inhibit economic growth, or, at the very least, penalise those who are not
protected against inflation. Unpredictability makes planning very difficult.
Yet if interest rates are set at an excessively high level this will inhibit business
activity, cause people to put off buying houses and reduce spending in the
4
This is at the top end of the usual range of ROAs for commercial banks.
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shops, leading to a recession with massive job losses. Clearly a society needs
an organisation whose task it is to select the appropriate short-term interest
rate for the economic conditions it faces: neither too high nor too low. That
organisation is the central bank.5
Controlling reserve amounts

When the amount of money spent rises faster than the quantity of goods and
services produced in the economy, the result is likely to be raised inflation. To
understand how a central bank controls money supply and interest rates you
need to focus on the fact that it acts as banker to the banks (including other
depository institutions, e.g. building societies), holding commercial bank reserves
in its accounts, which banks are either formally obliged to hold or feel informally
obliged to hold because of the need to settle accounts between depository insti-
tutions when cheques and electronic payments are cleared at the central bank
and for liquidity-safety reasons. A central bank might insist that, say, 2% or
10% of the amount deposited by customers be held as the required reserve ratio.6
Thus, one way to control money supply and interest rates is to use its special
powers to insist that each bank leaves a certain proportion of the amount it has
received as deposits from its customers (households, small businesses, etc.) at
the central bank. If a bank’s reserves at the central bank fall below the minimum
required then it has to top this up.
Many central banks, e.g. the Bank of England, some time ago moved from a
fixed daily level of reserves to target balances of reserves held at the central
bank on average over ‘maintenance periods’. In the case of the BoE the main-
tenance period ran from one meeting of the committee that sets interest rates
(the Monetary Policy Committee) to the next, usually one month. Smaller
banks may be exempt from the system.
A couple of years before the financial crisis the BoE removed its formal insist-
ence for banks to achieve targeted levels of reserves to be held with it. It had
a ‘voluntary’ system. However, when motivated by self-imposed prudential
liquidity levels and the need to settle payments with other commercial banks,
bankers want to hold reserves at the BoE.
5
Occasionally called a reserve bank or national bank or monetary authority.
6
Also called the cash reserve ratio.
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Currently, even this voluntary reserves averaging system in the UK is described

as ‘suspended’ (since March 2009). Because there may be a return to this
system, and because it is used elsewhere in the world, we need to understand
the system first. While there are no formal reserve requirements in the UK,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada, elsewhere, such as the eurozone,
Switzerland, the US and China have reserve requirements in proportion to the
bank’s holdings of deposits. After describing monetary policy under a reserves
targeting system we’ll look at how monetary policy changed over the last few
years of crisis.
Banks and other depository institutions (henceforth ‘banks’) like to maintain

an additional buffer beyond the required reserves at the central bank, excess
reserves, to feel comfortable about the prospect of a sudden outflow of cash.
The target amount of the excess reserves may, in fact, be largely dictated by the
banking regulator (which is usually the central bank) and may be strongly
influenced by international agreements on the appropriate amounts.
Monetary base
The central bank has a liability – it accepted deposits from banks. Another liab-
ility of a central bank is what you see written on notes (or coins) that you have
in your wallet or purse; the central bank ‘promises to pay the bearer on demand
the sum of . . .’. As well as reserves at the central bank a typical commercial
bank will hold some of its assets in the form of vault cash in hand. Finally, the
economy has currency in circulation, that is, outside of banks. The combina-
tion of reserves and currency in circulation is the monetary base:
Monetary base = currency in circulation + reserves
Reserves = required reserves + vault cash (excess reserves)
It is important to note that the sole supplier of reserves – notes and coins, and
balances at the central bank as liabilities of the central bank – is the central
bank.
It is changes in these accounts that can have an influence on the size of a

nation’s money supply. The relationship between the amount of money in
banks or the wider economy and changes in the monetary base or reserves
is very far from a mechanical mathematical relationship – the downturn
in 2008–2013 rammed that home – but nevertheless there is, holding all else
M16_ARNO1799_01_SE_C16.indd 436 7/7/15 8:51 AM

constant, a relationship. If there is an increase in either the currency in

circulation or reserves there is likely (but not always) to be an increase in the
money supply. Normally, an increase in reserves, either cash deposited by a
bank at the central bank or vault cash, leads to an increase in the level of loans
and deposits and thus contributes to the money supply.
Central banks can conduct monetary policy by changing the country’s mone-
tary base.
The monetary base described above is sometimes referred to as M0, which is a

very extreme form of narrow money, i.e. defining what money is in a very
narrow way. Banks can use this base to create broad money, which is a multi-
ple of the monetary base. The definitions of broad money vary from country to
country, but generally include money that is held in the form of a current
(checking) account or deposit account, and some money market instruments
such as certificates of deposit. These broad money aggregates often have names
such as M3 or M4. You can see why it is difficult to define money because banks
can ‘create money’ – see the Example 16.1 below.
Example 16.1
Money creation – the deposit multiplier
Assume that all banks in a monetary system are required to keep 20% of deposits
as reserves. Bank A has $100 million of deposits from customers. Because it is
sticking to the reserve requirement, both required by the central bank and its own
prudential reserves policy, it lends out only $80 million and keeps $20 million as
cash or in its account with the central bank (assume no vault cash for simplicity).
Bank A’s opening balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Reserves $20m Deposits $100m

Loans $80m
Now, if deposits in Bank A are increased by $5 million, the position changes (we’ll
look at where it got $5 million from in a minute – this is crucial). Deposits rise to
$105 million and reserves rise to $25 million as the additional $5 million is initially
held as reserves at the central bank.
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Bank A: an increase in deposits – intermediate period
Assets Liabilities

Loans $80m
This means that the reserve ratio has risen to $25m ÷ $105m = 23.8%. The bank
earns no or little interest from reserves, so it will wish to reduce it back to 20% by
lending out the extra. The next balance sheet shows the amount of lending that
leaves a 20% reserve ratio, $84 million.
Bank A: lending out just enough to attain minimum reserve ratio
Assets Liabilities

Loans $84m
Now let us bring in more banks. In lending an additional $4 million Bank A will have
an impact on the rest of the banking system. If the $4 million is lent to a company
and, initially at least, that company deposits the money in Bank B, then at the
central bank, Bank A’s account will be debited (reserves go down) and Bank B’s
account will be credited (reserves increase). Bank B will lend out 80% of the
amount, or $3.2 million, keeping $800,000 in reserves to maintain its 20% ratio of
reserves to deposits. The $3.2 million lent finds its way to Bank C, which, again,
holds 20% as reserves and lends the rest . . . and so on. At each stage 80% of the
deposit is lent out, increasing the deposits of other banks, encouraging them to lend.
The effect on the banking system of an injection of $5 million of money, under a

reserve ratio of 20%
Change in Change in Change in

deposits, $m loans, $m reserves, $m
Bank A 5.00 4.00 1.00

Bank B 4.00 3.20 0.80
Bank C 3.20 2.56 0.64
Bank D 2.56 2.05 0.51
Bank E 2.05 1.64 0.41
Bank F ... ... ...
Bank G ... ... ...
Bank . . .
Total of all banks 25 20 5
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The deposit multiplier is a reciprocal of the reserve ratio, which in this case =
1 ÷ 0.20 = 5. Following an injection of $5 million into the financial system,
the whole process ends when an additional $25 million of deposits have
been created; equilibrium has been reached again. Broad money grows by
$25 million.
Reality check: please note that the model is a simplification for illustrative
purposes. In reality, there might be leakages from the system due to money
flowing abroad, or people increasing currency holdings,7 or buying govern-
ment bonds rather than placing it in bank deposits. People and companies
might be so shocked by an economic downturn that instead of borrowing
more they repay old debt, thus working against the multiplier. Banks might
also be in such turmoil that they would rather reduce their loan book than
expand lending despite huge injections of deposits (they increase excess
reserves). But for now we’ll go along with the logic of the deposit or money
multiplier in ‘normal’ times, with an assumed mathematically pure relation-
ship between narrow and broad money.
The key point to remember is: the creator of the monetary base is the central
bank because it has a monopoly on the issuance of currency. If it has control
over this then it can influence the broader money supply (including deposits
at banks) through the reserves requirements. So, once the system has settled
down from the injection of a new deposit, it will be fairly stable – little money
creation or removal.
Here is the crucial bit about the source of the additional deposits of $5 million:
if it came from a customer who withdrew it from another bank then the
example is null and void because while Bank A benefits from the $5 million
deposit, the other bank, Bank X, sees a reduction in its reserves at the central
bank by an equal amount. It can now lend less than it could before because it
has to rebuild its reserves. Thus the stimulus effect of Bank A’s deposit is exactly
offset by the removal of money from the system by Bank X. If, however, the
7
If none of the extra reserves finds its way into currency then the example, assuming all else
equal, would be describing the money multiplier. However, the money multiplier is usu-
ally a much smaller number than the deposit multiplier because a significant proportion of
the new reserves finds its way into currency and this does not lead to multiple deposit
expansion.
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$5 million came from the central bank purchasing Treasury bills from an
investor who then put the newly created cash received into his account with
Bank A, then we have new money coming into the system and we can expect
something like the multiplier effect shown above. The central bank is the only
player here that can create money out of thin air and pump it into the system
if the system is at equilibrium.
Thus, despite commercial banks’ ability to create money on the way to equilib-
rium, there is a limit to the amount that the system as a whole can go up to
because for every dollar, pound, euro, etc. created there has to be a fraction
held as a cash reserve. It is the central bank that controls the total volume of
monetary base (reserves at the central bank plus cash in circulation and at
deposit-taking institutions) and so the broader aggregates of money have an
upper limit. Small changes in the monetary base can have a large impact on the
amount of broad money in the system and so we often refer to the monetary
base as high-powered money.
Central banks have three major tools they use to increase or decrease the
money supply and interest rates:
● open market operations
● standing lending facilities/discount rate
● reserve requirement ratio changes.
Open market operations

This is the most important tool of monetary policy in most countries today.
Open market operations means the buying and selling of government secur-
ities (Treasury bills and bonds) in the normal trading markets on a day-to-day
basis. In purchasing government securities the central bank creates money to
hand it over to those selling. It issues currency notes (as in your wallet/purse)
or it writes a cheque in the name of the owner. When the cheque is drawn on,
the central bank just creates an amount of credit for itself to satisfy the buyer
– money from thin air. When the central bank sells some of its stock of previ-
ously market-bought government securities, the purchasers draw on their
money in the banking system, which leads to a lowering of reserves.
To illustrate the creation of money by a central bank we can take Bank A’s bal-
ance sheet from the example above. The starting position is:
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Bank A: lending out just enough to attain minimum reserve ratio
Assets Liabilities

Loans $84m
The central bank wants to inject money into the financial system and lower
interest rates. It offers to buy billions of dollars of government securities. One
of the customers of Bank A sells $6 million of securities to the central bank. The
central bank sends money to the customer of Bank A who deposits the newly
created money (an electronic record rather than cash) in Bank A.8 Bank A adds
this $6 million to its reserve account at the central bank. Now Bank A’s balance
sheet looks like this:
Bank A balance sheet after an injection of $6 million
Assets Liabilities

Loans $84m
Bank A has a very high reserve level relative to its deposits, $27m ÷ $111m =
24.3%. The managers will want to employ the surplus money above that
needed to maintain the target reserve ratio (20%) to earn higher interest by
lending it. If banks are more willing to lend to businesses and individuals
because of the central bank intervention then interest rates are likely to fall,
along with new money flows into the financial system. If the central bank
wanted to raise interest rates by draining money from the system through
open market operations it would sell government securities to investors, which
reduces the amount held by banks in their reserve accounts at the central bank
or reduces vault cash. This would curb lending and raise interest rates.
Central banks tend to use Treasury securities to conduct open market opera-
tions because the secondary market in these securities is very liquid, there is a
8
In many financial systems there is a select group of security dealers (often a wing of the
major commercial and investment banks) with which the central bank buys and sells
government securities. It is these security dealers’ deposit accounts that are credited and
debited.
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large volume of these securities held by dealers and investors, meaning that
the market can absorb a large number of buy and sell transactions. The main
method used is a repurchase agreement. The BoE generally uses repos with
an average maturity of one or two weeks, but will also target long-term
repos (3–12 months). The assets eligible for repo are gilts and sterling Treasury
bills, UK-government foreign currency debt, eligible bank and local authority
bills, and certain sterling bonds issued by supranational organisations and by
governments in the European Economic Area. Turkey uses the repo market –
see Article 16.1.
Article 16.1
Turkey’s central bank cuts rates

despite mounting inflation
By Daniel Dombey

Turkey’s central bank has cut its benchmark interest rate by 50 basis points despite
mounting inflation, a move likely to rekindle the debate about the bank’s independ-
ence. But in a decision that took some economists by surprise, the central bank –
which is formally independent – announced on Thursday that it was enacting a
‘measured decrease’ in the benchmark one week repo rate from 10% to 9.5%. The
broader range of rates at which the central bank lends money to the banking sector
remained unchanged.
Last January, the central bank defied [president of Turkey] Mr Erdoğan’s calls for
lower borrowing costs and increased the repo rate to 10%, during a midnight meet-
ing. The move sparked rallies in both the lira and Turkish equity markets, after
weeks in which the currency had slid against the dollar.
While the currency has recovered, Turkey’s inflation has continued to rise, reach-
ing a two year high of 9.4% in April. Economists expect prices will rise even faster
this month.
In its statement on Thursday, the bank argued that a ‘recent decline in uncertain-
ties and improvement in the risk premium indicators’ had led to a fall across the
board in market interest rates. It insisted that ‘the monetary policy stance will
continue to be tight’ despite the latest cut.
Source: Dombey, D. (2014) Turkey’s central bank cuts rates despite mounting inflation,
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An alternative, used in many countries, is to lend or borrow in the interbank

market to add or subtract reserves and influence rates of interest charged. In
the US, for example, the Fed funds rate is targeted.
Repos and reverse repos are, by their nature, temporary interventions because
the opposite transaction takes place on maturity, a few days after the first buy
or sell. There are times when the central bank wants to effect a more perman-
ent change in the money supply. Then it can go for an outright transaction, a
purchase or a sale (of government bills and bonds), that is not destined to be
reversed in a few days.
(An alternative way to increase the monetary base is for the central bank to
lend money to a commercial bank. The central bank simply credits the
commercial bank’s account with electronically created reserves. The amount
of monetary base is less controllable through this method than through
open market operations because the banks may or may not borrow, even if the
central bank offers enticing interest rates.)
The supply and demand of reserves
Banks trade surplus reserves with each other. They always have an incentive
to lend – even if only for 24 hours – if they find themselves with too many
reserves. Each day there will be dozens of other banks that find themselves
temporarily below the reserve level they need and so they willingly borrow
in the market. The main target for central banks is usually the overnight
interest rate on loans of reserves from one bank to another. In the US this is
the Federal funds rate, in the eurozone it is the overnight repo rate in euros,
and in the UK it is the overnight sterling repo rate. Switzerland opts for the
Swiss franc Libor target rate. Soon after the official rate changes (typically the
same day) banks adjust their standard lending rates (‘base rate’ in the UK),
usually by the exact amount of the policy changes. This is transmitted through
money market rate changes, repos, interbank lending, etc. The impact on
longer-term interest rates can go either way when the short-term rates are
changed, depending on what the market perceives the future will bring in
terms of inflation and additional rises or falls in the overnight interest rate.
(A rise in the official rate could, for example, generate expectations of lower
future interest rates, in which case long rates might fall in response to a rise in
short-term rates.)
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If we take the banking system as a whole, the demand for reserves falls as interest
rates rise. That is, the quantity of reserves demanded by banks (holding all else
constant) reduces if banks have a higher opportunity cost of keeping money in
the form of reserves; they would rather lend it out to clients to achieve higher
interest rates. This becomes more and more of a lost opportunity as rates in the
short-term interest rate markets rise. Bankers increasingly start to think that
they can economise on the excess reserves buffer if interest rates are high.
Thus, the demand curve for reserves, D, slopes downwards in Figure 16.2.
The central bank usually has a continuous programme of lending into the
general repo market and so there is a large quantity of money borrowed by
banks from the central bank at any one time. It is through the adjustment to
the amount of reserves outstanding that the central bank controls interest
rates. The supply curve for reserves, S, is the amount of reserves from the
central bank supplied through its open market operations (in more normal
times, at least). Equilibrium occurs where the demand for reserves equals the
quantity supplied. This occurs at an interest rate of A, providing the short-term
interest rate in the market.
Figure 16.2 The demand and supply of reserves
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Now imagine that the central bank wishes to lower interest rates. It does
this by increasing its purchases of government securities in the repo market,
providing a greater quantity of reserves. This pushes the supply curve in
Figure 16.3 from S1 to S2, and moves the equilibrium interest rate from A to B.
Obviously, if the central bank reduced its reserves outstanding to the banking
system by selling additional securities, the supply curve would move to the left
and the interest rate would rise.
So far we have discussed dynamic open market operations. That is, where
the central bank takes the initiative to change the level of reserves and the
monetary base within a reasonably static banking environment. However,
many times the environment is not static because there are a number of factors
changing demand for borrowed reserves, e.g. greater or lesser banker confid-
ence in the economy and thus the potential for low-risk lending. Thus, it
intervenes – a defensive open market operation – to offset the other factors
influencing reserves.
Figure 16.3 An open market increase in the supply of reserves
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When the central bank wants to change short-term interest rates it can often
do so merely by announcing its new target rate and threatening to undertake
open market operations to achieve it rather than actually intervening. The
money market participants know that if they do not immediately move to the
new rate they will encounter difficulties. For example, if the central bank shifts
to target an interest rate lower than previously (i.e. it will lend on the repo
market at a new lower rate), then any bank wanting to borrow will be foolish
to borrow at a higher rate. Conversely, if the central bank announces a new
higher target rate, any bank wanting to lend will be foolish to accept a lower
rate than the central bank’s target because it stands ready to trade at its stated
rate. India targets the repo rate – see Article 16.2.
Article 16.2
India cuts interest rate to revive

growth
By Amy Kazmin

India’s central bank has lowered a key interest rate by 0.25% as it seeks to revive
an economy that has slowed to the same pace as during the global financial
crisis.
The Reserve Bank of India cut its key repo rate to 7.5%, as concerns about India’s
faltering economy outweigh worries about persistently high inflation.
But in its outlook, the central bank warned that the ‘headroom for further easing
remains quite limited’, with inflation expected to remain stuck at levels that are
‘not conducive for sustained economic growth’.
The RBI also left the cash reserve ratio unchanged, disappointing many who had
expected a slight reduction.
India’s economy grew just 4.5% from October to December, the slowest pace in
15 quarters – sharply down from the near double-digit growth rates recorded
earlier in the decade.
Indian businesses have been complaining that high interest rates, coupled with
policy gridlock on such issues as land acquisition policies, are constraining eco-
nomic expansion.
Source: Kazmin, A. (2013) India cuts interest rate to revive growth, Financial Times,
19 March.
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Lending facility/discount rate changes

There is an option for banks to borrow additional reserves from the central
bank, the standing lending facility. In some countries it is called discount
window borrowing. The European Central Bank offers loans at the marginal
lending rate in its marginal lending facility. In May 2014 when the main
refinancing rate was 0.25%, if banks were forced to borrow under the mar-
ginal lending rate they paid 0.75%. In the US, the Federal Reserve offers (a) a
primary credit discount rate for very short-term (usually overnight) lending
to banks in sound condition, set in May 2014 at a level of 0.75% (at a time
when the Fed Funds target was 0–0.25%); (b) a secondary credit discount rate
for banks not in sound financial condition, where the interest rate is even
higher at 1.25%; and (c) a seasonal discount rate for special situations. In the
UK, with the target Bank Rate at 0.5% in May 2014, the BoE would lend to
banks under the operational standing lending facility at 0.75%. In more
normal times the standing lending facility/primary credit discount rates are
usually 100 basis points above the target Bank Rate.
The BoE’s operational standing lending facility is designed to allow banks a

way of managing unexpected day-to-day shortages of reserves, which may arise
due to technical problems in the commercial bank’s own systems or in market-
wide payments and settlement infrastructure. These funds are available in
unlimited size. Standing lending facility borrowing is used by generally sound
banks in normal market conditions on a short-term basis, typically overnight,
at a rate above the normal open market target rate. But given the higher inter-
est rate it is used sparingly.
For banks in severe shock there is usually another facility, which is even more
expensive to borrow under. The BoE also has a discount window facility, which
is aimed at banks experiencing firm-specific or market-wide shock. Rather than
cash being borrowed from the BoE, the more usual form of borrowing is UK
government bonds, gilts, which are lent for up to 30 days (or 364 days for an
additional fee). The BoE hands over the gilts and receives in return less liquid
collateral in a repo-type deal. These less liquid securities are much more risky
than sovereign bonds, e.g. the collateral put up could be securitised bonds or a
portfolio of corporate bonds. Once it is in receipt of the gilts the borrowing
bank then obtains cash by lending them in the market – another repo. The
discount window facility borrowing is designed only to address short-term
liquidity shocks and the fees are set to ram home the extraordinary nature
of this type of help with reserves. The BoE states that ‘the fees are set to be
M16_ARNO1799_01_SE_C16.indd 447 7/7/15 8:51 AM

unattractive in “normal” market conditions so that participants use the facility

as back up rather than a regular source of liquidity’.
In normal conditions banks will be most interested in using the standing

lending facility. This type of borrowing can allow an increase in reserves
in the financial system and therefore an increase in the money supply. When
the standing lending facility loans are repaid the total amount of reserves,
the monetary base and the money supply will fall.
If the interest premium (above Bank Rate, Fed funds rate, etc.) charged in the
standing lending facility falls then an increasing number of banks will be
tempted to cut things fine on excess reserve levels, leading potentially to more
borrowing at the lending facility rate. If the premium rises then few banks will
borrow this way. Thus banks rein in their lending to customers for fear of
having to borrow themselves at punitive interest rates. The standing lending
facility rate acts as a back-stop for the open market target interest rate. The
money market rate will not rise above the standing lending facility rate so long
as the central bank remains willing to supply unlimited funds at the facility rate.
If we introduce the possibility of large volumes of supply of money (reserves)

from the central bank at a high interest rate then we have the upside-down
L-shaped supply curve shown in Figure 16.4. If the demand curve D1 is the
Figure 16.4 Standing lending facility availability changes the supply curve
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relevant demand schedule for aggregate bank reserves then the horizontal
portion of the curve – bank borrowing from the central bank at the standing
lending facility rate – does not come into play. Banks will continue to borrow
and lend in the money markets but not from the central bank,9 and the
equilibrium interest rate remains at A. This is the case most of the time:
changes in the standing lending facility rate have no direct effect on the
market interest rate.
Now, consider the case where there has been a shock to the system and banks
increase their demand for reserves all the way along the curve – the demand
curve has shifted to the right, from D1 to D2 in Figure 16.5. Indeed, it has
shifted so much that banks now borrow from the central bank at the standing
lending facility rate to top up their reserves – see demand curve D2 intersecting
the supply curve at the standing lending facility rate at point M. Now, if the
central bank moves the lending facility rate up or down the point of intersec-
tion with the demand curve shifts and thus the market interest rates change. If
the central bank wanted to lower interest rates it could move the lending facil-
ity rate from, say, F to G, leading to increased borrowing from the central bank
and an increased money supply.
Figure 16.5 Standing lending facility rate lending
9
Unless, of course, it too happens to be one of the buyers or sellers in the normal market.
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A few decades ago adjusting the standard lending facility/discount rate was
the main way in which many central banks effected monetary policy, but the
problem with this approach became increasingly apparent. It is difficult to
predict the quantity of lending facility/discount rate borrowing that will occur
if the lending facility/discount rate is raised or lowered, and so it is difficult
to accurately change the money supply. Today changes in this rate are used
to signal to the market that the central bank would like to see higher or lower
interest rates: a raising indicates that tighter monetary conditions are required
with higher interest rates throughout; lowering it indicates that looser, more
expansionary, monetary conditions are seen as necessary.
Reserve requirement ratio changes

The power to change the reserve requirement ratio is a further tool used by
central banks to control a nation’s money supply. A decrease in the reserve
requirement ratio means that banks do not need to hold as much money at
the central bank (the demand curve for reserves shifts to the left) and so they
are able to lend out a greater percentage of their deposits, thus increasing the
supply of money. The new loans result in consumption or investment in the
economy, which raises inflows into other banks in the financial system and
the deposit or money multiplier effect takes hold, as shown in the Example’
Money creation – the deposit multiplier’ above. The process of borrowing
and depositing in the banking system continues until deposits have grown
sufficiently such that the new reserve amounts permit just the right amount
of deposits – the target reserve ratio is reached. At least that is the economic
theory, but the recent financial crisis taught us that it is not quite as simple as
that if individuals, corporations and banks lack confidence to borrow
and lend.
The main drawback to using changes in the reserve ratio, even in ‘normal
times’, is that it is difficult to make many frequent small adjustments because
to do so would be disruptive to the banking system (e.g. a sudden rise can cause
liquidity problems for banks with low excess reserves). Open market opera-
tions, however, can be used every day to cope with fluctuations in aggregate
monetary conditions. Article 16.3 discusses the lowering of reserves in China
to stimulate the economy.
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Article 16.3
Chinese shares fall despite bank

reserve ratio cut
By Gabriel Wildau and Patrick McGee

Chinese equities fell despite early gains on Thursday after the People’s Bank of
China loosened policy earlier than anticipated during London trading hours on
Wednesday.
China’s central bank cut the required reserve ratio for its banks as it stepped up
efforts to counter the impact of capital outflows and encourage banks to boost lend-
ing amid fresh data showing a weakening economy.
The Shanghai Composite lost 1.2%, having jumped 2.3% at the open on Thursday.
A survey published on Sunday revealed that China’s manufacturing sector – a key
growth driver – contracted in January for the first time in more than two years.
This followed news last month that China experienced its weakest GDP growth in
24 years last year.
In addition, China suffered its largest capital outflow on record in the fourth quar-
ter last year, according to balance of payments data released on Tuesday. The
deficit of $91bn on the capital and financial accounts was the worst since quarterly
data were first compiled in 1998. China’s foreign exchange reserves also fell as
investors sold renminbi and bought foreign currency.
‘The most important reason for the cut is liquidity demand in the banking system,’
said Haibin Zhu, chief China economist at JPMorgan in Hong Kong . . .
The required reserve ratio, known as the RRR, specifies the portion of a commercial
bank’s deposits that must be held on reserve at China’s central bank, where it is
unavailable for loans and other investments.
For most of the past decade, ‘twin surpluses’ on both the current and capital
accounts swelled China’s foreign exchange reserves and its domestic money sup-
ply. In response, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) raised the RRR steadily as a
way to sterilise these inflows and prevent inflation. The RRR for China’s biggest
banks rose from 8% in 2005 to a high of 20.5% in late 2012.
Wednesday’s cut of 0.5% brings that rate down to 19.5% – although this is still
much higher than any other major economy. With inflows now reversing, eco-
nomists expect at least one more RRR cut this year.
➨
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In depth
The central bank has tried to tread a fine line over the past year by providing a
targeted stimulus to support the slowing economy, without exacerbating financial
risks by unleashing a new credit binge like the one deployed in response to the 2008
financial crisis.
The central bank’s latest easing move followed a cut in benchmark interest rates in
November and a series of targeted easing measures last year, which included direct
loans worth more than $80bn to specific banks, and RRR cuts for small lenders.
In addition to Wednesday’s broad-based cut, the PBOC announced further targeted
cuts for so-called city commercial banks, whose loan books tilt towards small busi-
ness and the agricultural sector – two areas that have long complained of difficulty
obtaining credit.
In addition to responding to domestic conditions, economists say the PBOC’s move
is also a reaction to moves by central banks in other countries, including the recent
decision by the European Central Bank to pursue an ambitious programme of
quantitative easing.
‘Various countries are raising the stakes when it comes to monetary policy easing,’
said Cao Yang, an analyst at Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. ‘China’s RRR
cut is a move to keep pace.’
Source: Wildau, G. and McGee, P. (2015) Chinese shares fall despite bank reserve ratio cut,
Choosing between targeting the quantity of

reserves and targeting an interest rate level
Which is more likely to lead to stable monetary conditions: (a) targeting a fixed
aggregate supply of money, or (b) targeting a particular overnight interest rate?
Or consider an alternative question leading to a similar conclusion: is it pos-
sible to target both the quantity of reserves and the interest rate simultaneously?
To provide answers, examine the situation in Figure 16.6. The central bank
expects the aggregate demand curve to be as described by the solid demand
line, D2. However, the reality is that the authorities have only a vague idea of
where the demand schedule is. It might fluctuate up to the higher dashed line
or down to the lower one as, say, unexpected changes in deposit levels increase
or decrease commercial banks’ desire to hold excess reserves. Thus, if the cen-
tral bank rigidly maintains the supply schedule, S, the result could be that from
one day to the next overnight interest rates could be quite volatile, fluctuating
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Figure 16.6 Targeting reserve levels
from, say, i1 to i3, as the demand curve moves left and right. Such a rapidly
shifting overnight rate can be disruptive.
The alternative approach is to target the overnight interest rate and to there-
fore fine-tune the supply of reserves to achieve the desired interest rate stability
– see Figure 16.7. Here the reserves demand curve fluctuations can be accom-
modated by the central bank response of quickly implementing open market
operations to pump in or drain reserves. If the D1 curve comes into play with
higher reserves demanded at each interest rate then the central bank can
increase supply to S3 by buying securities, achieving equilibrium at interest
rate, i. If demand for reserves is low, D3, then the central bank can move to
supply only S1, leaving equilibrium at i. It can do this by selling securities or
simply not supplying fresh reserves as repo positions come to an end. Thus, the
supply of reserves is determined by the commercial banks’ aggregate demand
for reserves, which is accommodated by the central bank through open market
operations in targeting the price of credit.
Interest rate targeting is generally preferred because the central bank can
quickly observe changes in the rate, whereas measuring aggregate quantities of
reserves involves a time lag. It can also intervene quickly to control the interest
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Figure 16.7 Targeting the interest rate
rate, whereas reserves are not completely controllable. Also, central banks have
generally concluded that there is a closer link between interest rates and the
goal of the inflation level in the economy than that between monetary aggre-
gates and inflation. For these reasons central banks generally target short-term
interest rates.
Following the logic of targeting the overnight interest rate, some monetary
economists emphasise that it is the price of credit that determines the quantity
of broad money created by banks. So, rather than targeting a deposit multiplier
through altering the quantity of the monetary base in an assumed stable ratio
of broad money to narrow money, central banks set overnight interbank inter-
est rates, which affect other interest rates. The level of interest rates throughout
the economy (mortgages, deposit interest, etc.) creates the demand for broad
money – banks may become more or less willing to lend, borrowers become
more or less willing to borrow, pay down debt or spend, depending on the
interest rates. The impact on broad money then has an impact on the quantity
of base money demanded. Thus the demand for reserves is a consequence rather
than a cause of banks making loans and creating broad money. Commercial
bank decisions on the amount they make available for loans depends on
the perceived profitability of lending, which in turn depends on a number of
M16_ARNO1799_01_SE_C16.indd 454 7/7/15 8:51 AM

factors, including degree of confidence in a growing economy and the cost of

funds that banks face, which is influenced strongly by the interest rate paid on
reserves at the central bank.
A central bank decision to lower overnight interest rates is likely to increase

the amount of broad money, as long-term loan rates fall and the volume of
loans rises. The larger volume of spending and broad money in the economy is
likely to cause banks and customers to demand more reserves and currency.
Thus the deposit or money multiplier is seen as working in a reverse way to
that described earlier. However, bear in mind that whichever direction the
causation goes, broad money has to backed up with reserves. Thus the reserves
level can limit changes in the amount of broad money. Interest rates, reserves
and long-term bank lending are intimately linked, and controllable, to some
extent, by the central bank.
Quantitative easing
In extreme circumstances a central bank may find that interest rates have been
reduced to the lowest level they could go and yet still economic activity does
not pick up. People are so shocked by the crisis – increased chance of unem-
ployment, lower house prices, lower business profits – that they cut down their
consumption and investment regardless of being able to borrow at very low
interest rates. This happened in 2009–2014. Annualised short-term interest
rates in eurozone countries were less than 0.1%, in the UK they were 0.5% and
in the US they were between 0% and 0.25%. Clearly, low short-term interest
rates were not enough to get the economy moving, even with the additional
boost of government deficit spending to the extent that up to one-eighth of all
spending was from government borrowing.
In response, another policy tool was devised: quantitative easing. This

involves the central bank electronically creating money (‘printing money’, but
without any more bank notes) which is then used to buy assets from non-bank
investors in the market. Thus pension funds, insurance companies and other
non-financial firms can sell assets, mostly long-term government bonds (but
can include mortgage-backed securities and corporate bonds), and their bank
accounts are credited with newly created money (broad money increases). This
raises bank reserves. More significantly, the increased demand for government
bonds raises their prices and lowers interest rates along the yield curve – so the
main influence is on interest rates for medium- and long-term bonds. Also, it
M16_ARNO1799_01_SE_C16.indd 455 7/7/15 8:51 AM

is hoped that the new cash will be used to invest in other assets such as shares
pushing up equity issuance, prices and lowering required returns on these
assets, thus stimulating investment in companies.
In the UK the BoE bought so many bonds in 2009–2013 that it now owns
about one-third of all gilts, pushing ten-year yields at times to only 1.5%.
Between 2008 and 2014 the Fed bought more than $3.5 trillion bonds (mostly
mortgage-backed and government). However, central banks are increasingly
anxious about the consequences of ceasing quantitative easing – interest
rates might rebound dramatically and devastatingly. Some economists are
also worried that inflation might take off at some point given all the extra cash
floating about (optimists argue that the central bank can just sell the bonds
or wait until redemption to suck cash out of the system, others are not so
sure). Japan launched the most audacious quantitative easing plan in 2013:
$1.4 trillion in less than one year – see Article 16.4. Many suspect that bubbles
are being created in bond and other asset markets.
Article 16.4
Bank of Japan opens floodgates

This week, Haruhiko Kuroda, the new governor of the Bank of Japan, launched
perhaps the boldest ever experiment by the central bank of an important country.
It is not a revolution in monetary policy, since the BoJ is following the intellectual
lead of Ben Bernanke’s Federal Reserve. But it is a revolution in Japanese thinking
and in the magnitude of the planned action. The Bank of Japan risks doing too
much. But Japan already knows well the costs of doing too little. That lesson is one
the European Central Bank may yet learn.
The BoJ has promised to turn Japan’s slow-motion deflation into inflation of 2%
within two years. To achieve this transformation it has now promised to raise pur-
chases of government bonds from a monthly rate of Y2tn ($21bn) to one of Y7tn, to
double the average maturity of new bond purchases to seven years and to double
the monetary base to Y270tn by the end of 2014.
This is still monetary policy, since the BoJ intends to reverse the purchases. The
aim is to force holders of government liabilities to move into riskier assets. The
result, it is hoped, will be higher prices for riskier assets, including equities; a weak
yen, a stronger economy and so higher inflation.
Source: Financial Times, 5 April 2013.

© The Financial Times 2013. All Rights Reserved.
M16_ARNO1799_01_SE_C16.indd 456 7/7/15 8:51 AM

The floor system

Over the decades central banks have tried all sorts of levers to control inflation,
money supply and interest rates. Currently, a popular approach is the floor
system. This has been prompted by the pressures caused by the enormous
amounts of money pumped in to counteract depressed appetite to invest,
borrow and lend.
With quantitative easing the central bank is creating large quantities of reserves
far beyond that needed to achieve its target interest rate. Not only this, but
the quantity of money goes up in large increments, so the supply curve is all
over the place – view the supply curve in Figure 16.8 as moving frequently left
to right and back again.
This could lead to uncertainty. To put a floor under the fluctuations the central
bank introduces a policy of paying its target Bank Rate of interest (0.5% in the
UK) to all reserves lodged by banks with it (even excess reserves). Because
commercial banks will not lend their surplus reserves to each other at rates
lower than can be obtained by depositing them at the central bank, this has the
effect of flattening the demand curve for reserves after the point where there
Figure 16.8 First change: extraordinary circumstances calls for quantitative easing
M16_ARNO1799_01_SE_C16.indd 457 7/7/15 8:51 AM

Figure 16.9 Second change: a floor system, where all bank reserves held at the
central bank are remunerated at Bank Rate (Fed Funds rate, etc.)
are sufficient reserves in the system for banks to manage their day-to-day
liquidity needs – see Figure 16.9.
This allows the central bank to supply unlimited amounts of reserves without
affecting the overnight interest rate – the supply curve can move but the over-
night interest rate stays at, say, 0.5%. The central bank establishes a bench-
mark short-term risk-free interest rate. This will influence the rates that
commercial banks are willing to charge or pay on short-term loans or borrow-
ings in the market.
We could, for completeness, also add the standing lending facility rate (0.75%
at the time of writing) to the diagram, which would create an upper boundary
for interest rates – see Figure 16.10. Commercial banks can borrow as much as
they want at this rate and so market interest rates for overnight money will not
go above this. Commercial banks will typically be unwilling to borrow in the
repo market on worse terms than those available from the central bank. Thus
short-term interest rates in the markets are collared within the range bounded
by the Bank Rate and the standing lending facility rate regardless of the extent
of high-powered money creation. In the UK the short-term interest rate is
M16_ARNO1799_01_SE_C16.indd 458 7/7/15 8:51 AM

Figure 16.10 A floor system combined with a standing lending facility
unlikely to be lifted higher than the Bank Rate given the sheer quantity of
reserves sloshing about the banking system, where there are plenty of banks
willing to lend overnight to other banks at 0.5%. Collectively, banks would
need to come under severe strain for the upper limit of the corridor (0.75%) to
be tested.
M16_ARNO1799_01_SE_C16.indd 459 7/7/15 8:51 AM

INDEX
Page numbers in italic indicate figures and tables.
4% Consolidated Loan 36 ‘at best’ 50

32nds 70 auctions
144a securities 136 corporate bonds 141
government bonds
ABCP see asset-backed commercial paper France 71
(ABCP) Germany 75
ABS see asset-backed securities (ABS) Japan 78
acceptance commission 301 United Kingdom 37 – 41, 40
acceptance credit see banker’s Treasury bills
acceptances United Kingdom 263 – 6, 264 – 6
Accounting and Auditing Organization United States 67, 268 – 9, 269
for Islamic Financial Institutions Australia 168 – 9, 251 – 2
(AAOIFI) 227, 228 Aviva 112
administrative receivers 125
affirmative covenants 126 backup lines 275 – 6
Africa 93 – 5, 211 – 12, 235 balloon interest 17
agency bonds 97, 102 bank-discount basis see discount yield
agency MBS 395 bank loans 8
American-style callables 121 Bank of England 43, 43, 263, 423 – 4,
amortisation period 389 435, 442, 447 – 8, 456
amortising structures 388 – 9 Bank of Japan 456
announcement day 141 Bank of New York Mellon 290, 292
annual yield 15 – 16, 339 banker’s acceptances 21, 297, 300 – 3,
annuities 319 – 20, 320, 329 – 31 302, 379 – 80
Apple 105 – 6, 156 – 7, 214 Bankers’ Clearing House 422 – 3
Approved Group of Investors banker’s promissory notes 422
40, 50 banking
Argentina 85, 86 capital management 424 – 5, 431 – 4
arranging banks 274 history of 419 – 24
Asia 143 – 5 liquidity management 424, 425 – 31
see also China; Japan; Malaysia money creation 420 – 2, 421,
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 437 – 40
276, 277 see also banks
asset-backed securities (ABS) 383 – 6 bankruptcy see insolvency
see also Islamic bonds bankruptcy-remote securities 387
Z01_ARNO1799_01_SE_IDX.indd 460 7/7/15 8:51 AM

INDEX 461
banks 18, 20, 105, 215 United Kingdom gilts 38 – 9, 50 – 1

arranging 274 US government bonds 70 – 1, 71
correspondent 298 size of 10 – 14, 10
investment 134 – 6 volatility 11 – 13, 11, 12
shadow 289 – 90 bond valuation 8 – 10, 333 – 61
see also banking; central banks convertible bonds 191 – 2
Barclays Bank 114 convexity 352 – 4, 353, 354
basis points (bps) 19 duration 346 – 52, 347, 349, 351
BBA see British Banking Association expectations hypothesis 357 – 9
(BBA) government bonds
bearer bonds 124, 213 United Kingdom gilts 38, 45 – 6
benchmark interest rates 8, 15, 75, 119, United States 70 – 1, 71
240 – 1, 284 – 8, 458 high-yield bonds 179 – 80
see also bond indices; interbank interest rate risk 351 – 2
interest rates irredeemable bonds 333 – 4
benchmark securities 63, 64, 72, 136 liquidity-preference hypothesis 359 – 60
Bermudan-style callables 121 market-segmentation hypothesis
best-efforts basis 14, 135, 271 360 – 1
bey (bond equivalent yield) 323 – 4, redeemable bonds 334 – 8
365 – 6, 367, 373 selling before maturity 339 – 40
bid prices 38 semi-annual interest 340 – 2
bid to cover ratio 39, 40, 264, 265 term structure of interest rates 354 – 61,
bilateral repos 281 355 – 7
bills of exchange 21, 297 – 300, 299, 378 volatility of bond returns 345 – 6
bills of lading 298 yield 339
Birmingham City Council 97 yield to maturity versus rate of return
Bobls 75 342 – 5
bond default rates 173 – 4, 173, 174 bonds 5 – 17
bond equivalent yield 323 – 4, 365 – 6, 367, bearer bonds 124, 213
373 call options 16 – 17, 121 – 2, 128, 133,
bond funds 17, 51 220
bond indentures 126 catastrophe bonds 201 – 3
bond indices 59 – 60, 59, 145, 146 contingent convertible bonds (cocos)
bond insurance 97 195 – 200
bond markets convertible bonds 17, 186 – 95, 219
primary 6 coupon rates 8, 17, 45 – 6, 121, 350 – 1
corporate bonds 134 – 6 covenants 15, 126 – 7, 182, 194
United Kingdom gilts 37 – 41, 40, covered bonds 15, 407 – 18, 408, 410,
50 411, 413
US government bonds 67 credit ratings 14, 147 – 74
secondary 6, 8 – 10, 11 – 13 bond default rates 173 – 4, 173, 174
corporate bonds 105 – 10, 111 – 15, corporate bonds 137, 142, 159
114 – 16 crises of confidence 168 – 73
Eurobonds 206, 221 outlooks 162

462 INDEX
bonds (continued ) Bureau of the Fiscal Service, USA 65

post-rating 162 buyouts, leveraged 130, 178, 179, 182
ranking of bonds 162 – 3
rating decisions 155 – 61 Cable & Wireless 113
rating systems 148 – 55, 149, 150 call premium 121
ratings tables 165, 166, 167 call risk 133
sovereign credit ratings 61, 62, 84, callable bonds 16 – 17, 121 – 2, 128, 133,
148 – 54, 150 220
unsolicited 161 Canada 206
high-yield bonds 126, 175 – 86, 350 capital 424 – 5
Islamic bonds 57 – 8, 226 – 35, 230 capital gains 45 – 6, 51
issuance 14 capital management 424 – 5, 431 – 4
legal rights 7 capital to assets ratio 432, 433 – 4
local authority bonds 97 – 101, 98 capped bonds 220
maturity 6 – 7 caps 120
perpetual bonds 35, 36, 122 – 3, 333 – 4 cash equivalents 22 – 3
principal 6, 8, 17 cash management counterparties 263 – 4
put options 16, 123, 220 cash reserves 425, 436, 437
securitised 15 catastrophe bonds 201 – 3
yield 15 – 16, 45 – 6, 339 CBs see convertible bonds
zero coupon bonds 6, 17, 56, 124, 346 CDs see certificates of deposit (CDs)
convertible 195 central banks 419, 430
Eurobonds 220 Bank of England 43, 43, 263, 423 – 4,
see also corporate bonds; government 435, 442, 447 – 8, 456
bonds; international bonds European Central Bank 403 – 5, 447
bons du Trésor 71 – 2 see also monetary policy
book-building 41, 140 central clearing houses 22
book-runners 114 certificates of deposit (CDs) 18 – 19, 21,
see also lead managers 293 – 5, 376 – 8
bought deals 135 change of control clauses 130
BP 112 cheques 422
break even inflation 54 – 5, 55 China 81 – 3, 83, 143, 451 – 2
‘breaking of the buck’ 24 clean prices 42, 52 – 3, 57
British Banking Association (BBA) 241, clearing houses 22, 422 – 3
246 Clearstream 124
broad money 437 – 40 closing of bond issue 141
BTANs 72 CMBS see commercial mortgage-based
BTFs 71 securities (CMBS)
Bubills 75 CNAV see constant net asset value
Bulgaria 208 – 10 (CNAV) money market funds
Bulldog bonds 206 co-lead managers 41, 135, 140
bullet bonds 118 Co-operative Bank 113
bullet structure 17 cocos 195 – 200
Bunds 75 collared FRNs 120

INDEX 463
commercial mortgage-based securities perpetual 122 – 3

(CMBS) 398 plain vanilla bonds 118
commercial paper (CP) 20, 270 – 8, 271, private placements 136 – 40
272, 274, 277, 372 – 3 professional support 127 – 8
commercial pledge 125 puttable bonds 123
company health risk 134 registered bonds 124
compound annualised rate of return repayments 128 – 9
323 – 4 retail investors 110, 111, 114 – 16, 115
compound interest 314 – 16, 316, 325 – 6 mini-bonds 117 – 18
continuous compounding 322 risks for investors 129 – 34
converting rates 322 – 3 secondary trading 105 – 10, 111 – 15,
discounting 321 114 – 16
Computershare 50 sinking funds 128 – 9
conduits 276 timetables for issues 140 – 1
constant net asset value (CNAV) money trust deeds 126 – 7
market funds 24 – 6 United States 141 – 3, 142
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 67 unrated 159 – 61
contingent convertible bonds (cocos) utilities 105
195 – 200 correspondent banks 298
continuous compounding 322 counterparty risk 22
conventional bonds 6 coupon 6
conversion premium 189, 190 – 1 coupon rates 8, 17, 45 – 6, 121, 350 – 1
conversion prices 189, 190, 195 see also zero coupon bonds
conversion ratio 190 covenant light high-yield bonds 182 – 4
conversion value 191 – 2 covenants 15, 126 – 7, 182, 194
convertible bonds 17, 186 – 95, 219 cover asset pools 408
see also contingent convertible bonds cover pool monitor 409
(cocos) covered bonds 15, 407 – 18, 408, 410, 411,
convexity 352 – 4, 353, 354 413
corporate bonds 7, 14 – 15, 103 – 46 CP see commercial paper (CP)
Asia 143 – 5 credit enhancements 155, 387
bearer bonds 124 credit rating agencies (CRAs) 61, 147, 172
bond indices 145, 146 see also Dagong; Fitch; Moody’s;
callable bonds 121 – 2, 128, 133 Standard & Poor’s
China 81 credit ratings
covenants 126 – 7 bonds 14, 147 – 74
debentures 124 – 6 bond default rates 173 – 4, 173, 174
deep discounted bonds 124 corporate bonds 137, 142, 159
default rates 173 – 4, 173, 174 covered bonds 411 – 13
electronic trading 107 – 9 crises of confidence 168 – 73
floating-rate notes (FRNs) 119 – 21, 131 outlooks 162
index-linked bonds 132 post-rating 162
issue process 134 – 6, 140 – 1 ranking of bonds 162 – 3
mini-bonds 117 – 18 rating decisions 155 – 61

464 INDEX
credit ratings (continued ) discount pricing 18, 19

rating systems 148 – 55, 149, 150 commercial paper 270
ratings tables 165, 166, 167 discount rate changes see standing
sovereign credit ratings 61, 62, 84, lending facility
148 – 54, 150 discount window facility 447 – 8
unsolicited 161 discount yield 365 – 6, 367, 373
commercial paper 271 – 3, 271, 272, Disney 142
276 – 7 disposal of assets covenants 127
credit risk 13, 85 – 9, 87, 129 distributors 114
credit scores 396 dividend see coupon rates
credit watch 162 DMO see Debt Management Office
CREST system 50, 284 (DMO)
cross default covenants 127 ‘documents against payment’ drafts
crossing trade 107 298
crowdfunding 117 – 18 domestic bond markets 11
currency in circulation 436 emerging markets 89 – 93
currency risk 134 domestic currency bonds 29
current maturity 19 domestic money markets 21
current yield 15 – 16, 339 downside contingent bonds 196
Drexel Burnham Lambert 178
Dagong 147, 148, 149, 150 DTCC GCF Repo Indices 285, 285, 286
daily compounding 321 dual-currency bonds 220
day count convention 266, 363 – 5, 373, duration of bonds 346 – 52, 347, 349,
380 351
dealer-directed offers 271 DVP see Delivery Versus Payment (DVP)
dealer’s spread 38 dynamic cover pool maintenance 408
debentures 124 – 6 dynamic open market operations 445
Debt Management Office (DMO) 33,
43 – 5, 263, 264 eBay 214
debt to net assets ratio 127 effective annual rate (EAR) 368
deep discounted bonds 124 Egan-Jones 172
default rates, corporate bonds 173 – 4, electronic clearing systems 124
173, 174 electronic communication networks
default risk 13, 85 – 9, 87, 129 (ECNs) 107 – 9
defensive open market operations 445 emerging markets
deferred callable bonds 121 – 2 domestic bond markets 89 – 93
deficit spending 29 government bonds 84 – 5, 84, 89 – 97
Delivery Versus Payment (DVP) 295 Treasury bills 267 – 8
dematerialised form 124 Eonia (Euro OverNight Index Average)
Denmark 409, 410, 411 – 13 254 – 5, 254
deposit multiplier 437 – 40, 450 equity 7
Diageo 3, 4 return on equity (ROE) 434
direct placement 271 volatility 11, 13, 13
dirty prices 53, 57 equity capital 424 – 5

INDEX 465
equity kickers 176 face value 6, 8, 17, 110

equity-linked bonds fallen angels 177
convertible bonds 17, 186 – 95, 219 Fannie Mae 394 – 5, 397 – 8
Eurobonds 219 FCA see Financial Conduct Authority
equity warrants 176, 219 (FCA)
equivalent bond yield 323 – 4, 365 – 6 Federal funds rate 256 – 7, 443
Eurex Repo GC Pooling Market 285 Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Euribor (Euro InterBank Offered Rate) Corporation (FHLMC) 394 – 5,
252 – 3 397 – 8
Eurobonds 11, 205, 206, 210 – 26 Federal National Mortgage Association
advantages and drawbacks 224 (FNMA) 394 – 5, 397 – 8
issuance 220 – 1, 221, 222 – 3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York 169,
market development 213 – 19, 214 – 16 285 – 8, 291 – 2, 447, 456
medium-term notes (MTNs) 225 – 6 fees, underwriting 136
types 219 – 20 fiat money 422, 423 – 4
Euroclear 50, 124, 295 financial bonds, China 81
Euroclear France 71 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 110,
Eurocommercial paper 278 117, 128, 131
Eurocredit 260 financial crisis 24, 76 – 8
Eurocurrency certificates of deposit 295, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
377, 378 (FINRA) 141
Eurocurrency deposits 295 Financial Services Compensation Scheme
Eurocurrency market 21, 258 – 61 117
Eurodollar market 261 Financial Stability Board 289 – 90
Euronia (Euro Overnight Index Average) Finland 99
258 firm commitment basis 135, 271
Europe fiscal agents 127 – 8
covered bonds 409, 410, 411 – 15 Fitch 147, 149, 172
high-yield bond market 180 – 1 corporate bonds 142
insolvency 163 – 5 government bonds 84
private placements 137 – 40 sovereign credit ratings 61, 150,
securitisation 398 – 400, 403 – 5 151
see also France; Germany; United fixed charge 124 – 5
Kingdom fixed-interest securities 8
European Central Bank 403 – 5, 447 see also bonds
European Securities and Markets fixed-price re-offers 135
Authority 169 fixed-value money market funds see
European-style callables 121 constant net asset value
Eurosecurities 259, 260 – 1 (CNAV) money market
event risk 129 – 30 funds
exchange traded funds 51 flat prices 42, 52 – 3, 57
exchange trading 6 flat yield 15 – 16, 339
exchangeable bonds 195 floating charge 125
expectations hypothesis 357 – 9 floating lien 125

466 INDEX
floating-rate notes (FRNs) 17 local authority issues 21

collared 120 private placements 140
corporate 119 – 21, 131 Gilt-edged Market Makers (GEMMs)
Eurobonds 219 37 – 9, 39, 50
US Treasury 68 – 9 gilt-edged securities 32
floor system 457 – 9, 458, 459 see also United Kingdom gilts
floors 120, 131 Gilt Purchase and Sales Service 50
Ford Motor Co 141 – 2, 189 – 90, 277 Ginnie Mae 395
foreign bonds 11, 205, 206 – 10, 206 global bonds 205
foreign currency reserves 29, 30 gold standard 424
foreign exchange risk 134 government bonds 13 – 14, 29 – 30,
foreign investors 61 – 102
China 81, 82 – 3, 83 Africa 93 – 5
Japan 79 benchmark securities 63, 64, 72, 136
United Kingdom 43 – 5, 43 Bulgaria 208 – 10
United States 65 – 6 China 81 – 3, 83
fractional-reserve banking 420 credit ratings 61, 62, 84, 148 – 54, 150
France default risk 85 – 9, 87
covered bonds 409, 410 emerging markets 84 – 5, 84, 89 – 97
government bonds 56, 71 – 3, 72, 73 during financial crisis 76 – 8
local authority bonds 99, 100 France 56, 71 – 3, 72, 73
local authority issues 20 – 1 Germany 56, 74 – 5, 74, 76
private placements 140 Japan 78 – 81, 79, 80
public debt 71, 74 open market operations 440 – 6
Freddie Mac 394 – 5, 397 – 8 spreads 64, 64
freely callable bonds 122 United States 11, 65 – 71, 66, 71
FRNs see floating-rate notes (FRNs) see also local authority bonds; United
FTSE bond indices 59 – 60, 59, 145, 146 Kingdom gilts
full accrual prices 53, 57 Government National Mortgage
FX reserves 29, 30 Association (GNMA) 395
government-sponsored enterprises
GC repos 283 (GSEs) 394 – 5
gearing ratio covenants 127 see also agency bonds
Geberit 180 Great Portland Estates 194
GEMMs (Gilt-edged Market Makers) Greece 85, 88
37 – 9, 39, 50 grey market 135
general collateral repos 283 gross issuance 31, 33
General Electric 271 gross redemption yield 16
General Motors 277, 384 GSEs see government-sponsored
general-obligation bonds 98 enterprises (GSEs)
Germany guaranteed loan stock 127
covered bonds 409, 410
government bonds 56, 74 – 5, 74, 76 haircuts 288 – 90, 376
local authority bonds 99, 100 handle 70

INDEX 467
hard currencies 29 Euronia 258

Hibor (Hong Kong Interbank Offered Federal funds rate 256 – 7, 443
Rate) 255 Hibor 255
high-powered money 440 Libor 119, 240 – 52, 242, 247, 249, 260
high-yield bonds 126, 175 – 86, 350 prime rate 258
HSBC Canada 302 – 3 Sibor 255
hybrid bonds Sonia 258
catastrophe bonds 201 – 3 Tibor 255
contingent convertible bonds (cocos) interbank market 239 – 40, 443
195 – 200 interdealer brokers (IDBs) 38 – 9, 39
convertible bonds 17, 186 – 95, 219 interest calculations
annuities 319 – 20, 320, 329 – 31
ICAP BrokerTec 284 bond equivalent yield 323 – 4
ICE Benchmark Administration Limited compound annualised rate of return
(IBA) 246 – 51, 247, 249 323 – 4
ICMA see International Capital Market compound interest 314 – 16, 316,
Association (ICMA) 325 – 6
IDBs see interdealer brokers (IDBs) continuous compounding 322
IMF 303 – 4 converting rates 322 – 3
impatience to consume 311 discounting 321
income yield 15 – 16, 339 converting rates 322 – 3
index-linked bonds perpetuities 320 – 1
corporate 132 present values 316 – 17, 317, 327 – 8
government rates of interest 317 – 18
Europe 55 – 6 simple annualised rate of return 323
France 56, 72, 72 simple interest 314
United Kingdom 33 – 7, 34, 35, 38, interest rate risk 131 – 2, 193, 351 – 2
39, 53 – 5, 55 interest rates
United States 66, 67 – 8 coupon rates 8, 17, 45 – 6, 121, 350 – 1
India 446 money markets 18, 19, 303 – 8, 304 – 7
industrials 105 nominal 313
see also corporate bonds pure 311
inflation 53 – 5, 311 real 313
break even 54 – 5, 55 repo rates 284 – 8, 284 – 6, 293, 305, 443,
inflation risk 132 446
insolvency 162 – 5 spot rates 357 – 9
bankruptcy-remote securities 387 term structure of 354 – 61, 355 – 7
banks 424, 431 see also benchmark interest rates;
and debentures 125 interbank interest rates; monetary
and junk bonds 178 policy
interbank deposits 18 – 19 interest-withholding tax 212
interbank interest rates 240 – 58, 240 interest yield 15 – 16, 339
Eonia 254 – 5, 254 intermediate bonds see high-yield bonds;
Euribor 252 – 3 medium-dated bonds

468 INDEX
international bonds 11, 205 – 35 Libor (London InterBank Offered Rate)

Eurobonds 11, 205, 206, 210 – 26 119, 240 – 52, 242, 247, 249, 260
advantages and drawbacks 224 liquid reserves 425
issuance 220 – 1, 221, 222 – 3 liquidations 125, 162 – 5
market development 213 – 19, see also insolvency
214 – 16 liquidity management 424, 425 – 31
medium-term notes (MTNs) 225 – 6 liquidity of markets 6
types 219 – 20 liquidity-preference hypothesis 359 – 60
foreign bonds 11, 205, 206 – 10, 206 liquidity risk 132, 425
Islamic bonds 57 – 8, 226 – 35, 230 liquidity risk premium (LRP) 132
International Capital Market Association listing 141
(ICMA) 213 listing agents 128
International Securities Identification loan stock 125
Number (ISIN) 33, 34 guaranteed 127
Investec Bank 114 local authority bonds 97 – 101, 98
investment banks 134 – 6 local authority issues 20 – 1
investment grade ratings 148, 149 lockout periods, callable bonds 122
invoice prices 53, 57 London InterBank Offered Rate (Libor)
irredeemable bonds 35, 36, 122 – 3, 333 – 4 119, 240 – 52, 242, 247, 249, 260
ISIN (International Securities London Stock Exchange 51, 107, 110,
Identification Number) 33, 34 111, 114 – 16
Islamic bonds 57 – 8, 226 – 35, 230 longs 6, 34, 35, 38
issuer ratings 159 lots 8, 110
Italy 21, 151 low-grade bonds see high-yield bonds
LRP see liquidity risk premium (LRP)
Japan 78 – 81, 79, 80, 99, 456
Japan Finance Organization for main refinancing rate 447
Municipalities (JFM) 99 Malaysia 228, 229, 232 – 4
John Lewis 114 Maple bonds 206
JPMorgan 290, 292 marginal lending facility 447
junior debt see subordinated debt market makers 22, 108, 114
junk bonds 126, 175 – 86, 350 Gilt-edged Market Makers (GEMMs)
37 – 9, 39, 50
launch of bond issue 140 market-segmentation hypothesis 360 – 1
lead managers 41, 114, 134 – 6, 140 – 1 marketability risk 132
lead underwriters see lead managers Markit bond indices 145, 146
Leeds City Council 97 master trusts 389 – 92
Lehman Brothers 24, 168 maturity 3
lender of last resort 424 bonds 6 – 7
leverage 16 corporate bonds 128
leverage ratio 433 covered bonds 411, 411
leveraged buyouts 130, 178, 179, 182 United Kingdom gilts 33 – 4, 37, 37,
leveraged recapitalisations 179 38
liar loans 396 and duration 347 – 8

INDEX 469
maturity (continued ) money market securities valuation

money market instruments 19 363 – 80
certificates of deposit 293 banker’s acceptances 379 – 80
commercial paper 270 bills of exchange 378
pull to 333 bond equivalent yield versus discount
yield to 16, 45 – 6, 339, 342 – 5, 349 – 50, yield 365 – 6, 367, 373
349 certificates of deposit 376 – 8
maturity value 6, 8, 17 commercial paper 372 – 3
MBS see mortgage-based securities (MBS) day count convention 266, 363 – 5, 373
medium-dated bonds 6, 34, 35, 38 repurchase agreements (repos) 373 – 6
medium-term notes (MTNs) 225 – 6 Treasury bills 366 – 72
Microsoft 156 – 7 money markets 18 – 23
Milken, Michael 178 discount pricing 18, 19
mini-bonds 117 – 18 Eurocurrency market 21, 258 – 61
mini-tenders 41 interbank market 239 – 40, 443
monetary base 436 – 40 interest rates 18, 19, 303 – 8, 304 – 7
monetary policy 434 – 59 secondary trading 19
controlling reserves 435 – 6, 450 – 5, bills of exchange 299 – 300, 299
453 commercial paper 272 – 3, 274
floor system 457 – 9, 458, 459 Treasury bills 266 – 7, 267
monetary base 436 – 40 see also interbank interest rates
open market operations 440 – 6 money multiplier 437 – 40, 450
overnight interest rate control 443 – 6, Moody’s 147, 149, 172
444, 445, 452 – 5, 454 corporate bonds 142, 177
quantitative easing 43, 455 – 6, 457, 457 covered bonds 411 – 13
required reserve ratio changes 450 – 2 government bonds 84
standing lending facility 447 – 50, 448, short-term debt 271, 271
449, 458 – 9, 459 sovereign credit ratings 61, 150, 151
money creation 420 – 2, 421, 437 – 40 mortgage-based securities (MBS) 389,
see also quantitative easing 395, 399 – 400
money market funds 24 – 6 sub-prime crisis 395 – 8
money market securities mortgage bonds 125 – 6, 395
banker’s acceptances 21, 297, 300 – 3, mortgage debentures 124
302, 379 – 80 MTNs see medium-term notes (MTNs)
bills of exchange 21, 297 – 300, 299, MTS electronic trading platform 284
378 multi-dealer electronic trading systems
certificates of deposit 18 – 19, 21, 108
293 – 5, 376 – 8 multiple price auctions 37
commercial paper (CP) 20, 270 – 8, 271, municipal bonds 97 – 101, 98
272, 274, 277, 372 – 3
local authority issues 20 – 1 name recognition 159
yield 18, 19 narrow money 437
see also repurchase agreements (repos); National Grid 132
Treasury bills National Savings and Investments, UK 32

470 INDEX
near-cash 22 – 3 pass-through structures 388 – 9

negative covenants 126 – 7 paying agents 127
negative pledge 126 payment-in-kind (PIK) notes 182,
negotiable certificates of deposit 294 184 – 6
negotiable securities 7 permanent capital 424
net worth 424 – 5 perpetual bonds 35, 36, 122 – 3, 333 – 4
Netherlands 99 perpetuities 320 – 1
New Look 185 – 6 piggyback mortgages 396
NIFs see note issuance facilities (NIFs) PIK (payment-in-kind) notes 182, 184 – 6
nominal rates see coupon rates placements of bonds 135
nominal rates of interest 313 plain vanilla bonds 6, 118
nominal value 6, 8, 17, 110 poison put provision 130
non-agency MBS 395 policy bank bonds, China 81
non-negotiable certificates of deposit 294 political risk 134
non-negotiable loans 239 post-auctions option facility (PAOF) 38
note issuance facilities (NIFs) 274 – 6 post-rating 162
notes 125 pre-launch of bond issue 140
pre-payment risk 389
OATs (Obligations Assimilables du preferential creditors 125
Trésor) 72 present values 316 – 17, 317, 327 – 8
offer prices 38 price compression risk 122
offering day 141 prices
open market operations 440 – 6 clean 42, 52 – 3, 57
open repos 280 dirty 53, 57
operational standing lending facility 447 high-yield bonds 179 – 80
opportunity costs 19 United Kingdom gilts 38, 45 – 6
Opus plc 275 US government bonds 70 – 1, 71
Order book for Retail Bonds (ORB) 51, see also bond valuation; money market
110, 111, 114 – 16 securities valuation
original-issue high-yield bonds 177 pricing day 141
original maturity 19 primary bond markets 6
originate-and-distribute model 397 corporate bonds 134 – 6
originate-and-hold model 397 United Kingdom gilts 37 – 41, 40, 50
over the counter (OTC) trading 6, 107 US government bonds 67
overdrafts 7 primary credit discount rate 447
overnight repos 280 primary participants 264
prime grade ratings see investment grade
PAOF see post-auctions option facility ratings
(PAOF) prime mortgages 395
paper money 422, 423 – 4 prime rate 258
par-priced zero coupon convertible principal 6, 8, 17
bonds 195 private placement memorandum 137
par value 6, 8, 17, 110 private placements 14, 136 – 40
pass-through rate 383 prospectuses 136

INDEX 471
public debt 29 – 30, 31, 36 tri-party repos (TPRs) 290 – 2

France 71, 74 valuation 373 – 6
United States 66, 66 required reserve ratio 435, 450 – 2
see also government bonds required reserves 425, 435 – 6, 450 – 2
pull to par 333 Reserve Primary Fund 24
purchasing power risk 132 reserves, bank 424, 425 – 31
pure rate of interest 311 central bank control of 435 – 6, 450 – 5,
puttable bonds 16, 123, 220 453
required 425, 435 – 6, 450 – 2
qualified foreign institutional investors secondary 429
(QFIIs), China 81, 82, 143 supply and demand of 443 – 6, 444, 445
quantitative easing 43, 455 – 6, 457, 457 vault cash 425, 436, 437
quasi-money 22 – 3 reserves, foreign currency 29, 30
quasi-state bonds 97 – 101, 98 reset days 120
restrictive covenants 126 – 7
rate of return retail investors 25
compound annualised 323 – 4 bond funds 17, 51
simple annualised 323 corporate bonds 110, 111, 114 – 16, 115
versus yield to maturity 342 – 5 mini-bonds 117 – 18
real rate of interest 313 government bonds
recapitalisations, leveraged 179 Japan 78, 79
reconstitution of STRIPS 70 United Kingdom 40 – 1, 50 – 1
recoverability of debt 155 United States 70
redemption, pull to 333 retained earnings 425
redemption value 6, 8, 17 return on assets (ROA) 433 – 4
redemption yield 16 return on equity (ROE) 434
register of holdings, United Kingdom reverse floaters 220
gilts 50 reverse repos (RRPs) 281, 287
registered bonds 124 revolving period 389
registrars 128 revolving structures 389
reinvestment risk 133 revolving underwriting facilities (RUFs)
release of property clauses 125 274, 275
renminbi-qualified foreign institutional RFR see risk-free return (RFR)
investors (RQFIIs), China 82, 143 riba 226
reopenings 68 Rio Tinto 154 – 5
RepoFunds Rate indices 284 – 5, 284 risk 311
repurchase agreements (repos) 20, risk-free return (RFR) 311 – 12
279 – 93 risk premiums 313
generals, specifics and specials 283 risks, corporate bonds 129 – 34
haircuts 288 – 90, 376 RMBS (residential mortgage-backed
open market operations 442 – 5 securities) 389
repo rates 284 – 8, 284 – 6, 293, 305, 443, ROA (return on assets) 433 – 4
446 ROE (return on equity) 434
sell/buy-back 292 – 3 rolling over debts 7

472 INDEX
Ronia (Repurchase Overnight Index United States 394 – 8, 398, 401 – 2,

Average) 284 405 – 7
RRPs see reverse repos (RRPs) securitised bonds 15
RUFs see revolving underwriting facilities self-issued bonds 117 – 18
(RUFs) sell/buy-back 292 – 3
running yield 15 – 16, 339 semi-annual compounding 321
semi-sovereign bonds 97 – 101, 98
sale and repurchase agreements see senior debt 126, 162 – 3, 178
repurchase agreements (repos) Separate Trading of Registered Interest
Sallie Mae 385 and Principal Securities see STRIPS
Sampdoria football club 121 serial bonds 128
Saudi Arabia 229, 232 – 4 settlement day 50
Schaetze 75 Severn Trent 132
Scope Ratings 172 – 3 shadow banks 289 – 90
SDRs see Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) share options 176
seasonal discount rate 447 shares see equity
SEC see Securities and Exchange sharia law 57 – 8, 226
Commission (SEC), USA shelf MTN programme 226
secondary bond markets 6, 8 – 10, 11 – 13 shorts 6, 34, 35, 38
corporate bonds 105 – 10, 111 – 15, Sibor (Singapore Interbank Offered Rate)
114 – 16 255
Eurobonds 206, 221 sight drafts 298
United Kingdom gilts 38 – 9, 50 – 1 signing day 141
US government bonds 70 – 1, 71 simple annualised rate of return 323
secondary credit discount rate 447 simple interest 314
secondary money markets 19 simple yield 15 – 16, 339
bills of exchange 299 – 300, 299 single-dealer electronic trading systems
commercial paper 272 – 3, 274 108
Treasury bills 266 – 7, 267 sinking funds 128 – 9
secondary reserves 429 SIVs see structured investment vehicles
sector risk 133 (SIVs)
Securities and Exchange Commission Sleeping Beauty bond 142
(SEC), USA 25, 26, 107, 136, 169, Sonia (Sterling Overnight Index Average)
226, 276 258
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Sony 177
Association (SIFMA) 142 South Africa 235
securitisation 15, 383 – 417 sovereign bonds see government bonds
asset-backed 383 – 6 sovereign credit ratings 61, 62, 84,
covered bonds 15, 407 – 18, 408, 410, 148 – 54, 150
411, 413 Spain 56, 409, 410
Europe 398 – 400, 403 – 5 special collateral repos 283
master trusts 389 – 92 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) 303 – 4
process of 387 – 94, 388 special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 227, 276,
sub-prime crisis 395 – 8 384, 387, 388 – 9

INDEX 473
specials rate 283 T-bills see Treasury bills

specific repos 283 takeovers see leveraged buyouts
split credit ratings 150 tax risk 133
spot rates of interest 357 – 9 taxation
spreads 64, 64 Eurobonds 212 – 13
SPVs see special purpose vehicles (SPVs) interest-withholding tax 212
Standard & Poor’s 147, 149, 168 – 9, 172 United Kingdom gilts 51, 52
corporate bonds 140, 142 teaser rates 396
government bonds 84 tenor see maturity
short-term debt 271, 272, 276 – 7 term see maturity
sovereign credit ratings 61, 62, 150, 151 term bonds 118
standing lending facility 447 – 50, 448, term loans 8
449, 458 – 9, 459 term securities 21
stated income loans 396 term structure of interest rates 354 – 61,
step-up convertible bonds 195 355 – 7
STIR (short-term interest rate) products Tesco Bank 114, 115, 116, 132
22 Tibor (Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate) 255
stock-driven transactions 283 time deposits 21, 293
stock exchanges 6 time drafts 298 – 9
corporate bond trading 107, 128 time value of money 311 – 13
London Stock Exchange 51, 107, 110, TIPS see Treasury inflation-protected
111, 114 – 16 securities (TIPS)
STOXX GC Pooling index 285 total writedown bonds 196 – 8
STRIPS TPRs see tri-party repos (TPRs)
United Kingdom gilts 56 – 7, 57 trade bills see bills of exchange
US Treasury 69 – 70 Trafigura 122 – 3
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) 276 transfer agents 128
Student Loan Marketing Association Transport for London 97
(Sallie Mae) 385 Treasury bills 20, 263 – 9
sub-prime car loans 405 – 7 emerging markets 267 – 8
sub-prime crisis 395 – 8 United Kingdom 263 – 7, 264 – 7,
sub-sovereign bonds 97 – 101, 98 367 – 71
subordinated debentures 125 – 6 United States 66, 67, 268 – 9, 269,
subordinated debt 126, 163 371 – 2
see also high-yield bonds valuation 366 – 72
sudden death bonds 196 – 8 Treasury bonds
sukuk 57 – 8, 226 – 35, 230 China 81
supply risk 133 United States 66, 67
supranational organisations 215 Treasury coupon securities 67
Sweden 99, 101 Treasury floating-rate notes (FRNs) 68 – 9
sweep facility 24 Treasury inflation-protected securities
swinglines 275 (TIPS) 66, 67 – 8
Swiss Franc Repo Market 285 Treasury notes 66, 67
syndication 41, 135 – 6, 141 Treasury STRIPS 69 – 70

474 INDEX
TreasuryDirect 65, 67, 268 quotes 46 – 50, 47, 48, 49

tri-party repos (TPRs) 290 – 2 register of holdings 50
triple A ratings 14, 61, 62 retail investors 40 – 1, 50 – 1
trust deeds 126 – 7 secondary trading 38 – 9, 50 – 1
trustees 126, 127, 129 STRIPS 56 – 7, 57
Turkey 442 supplementary issues 41 – 2, 42
syndication 41
UKLA see United Kingdom Listing taxation 51, 52
Authority (UKLA) yields 45 – 6
ultra-longs 34, 35 United Kingdom Listing Authority
ultra-shorts 6, 34, 35, 38 (UKLA) 110, 141
underwriting 14 United States
commercial paper 274 – 6 agency bonds 102
corporate bonds 134 – 6 certificates of deposit 294 – 5
uniform price auctions 37 commercial paper (CP) 276, 277
unit trusts 51 corporate bonds 141 – 3, 142
United Arab Emirates 229 covered bonds 409, 410, 416 – 17
United Kingdom debentures 125 – 6
certificates of deposit 294 government bonds 11, 65 – 71, 66, 71
covered bonds 409, 410 high-yield bond market 177, 178,
Eurobond trading 206, 212 – 13, 215 180
Islamic bond market 57 – 8, 229 – 34 interbank interest rates 256 – 8
local authority bonds 97, 101 municipal bonds 97 – 9, 98, 101
mortgage-based securities (MBS) 389, paper money 423
399 – 400 private placements 136 – 7
paper money 423 – 4 public debt 66, 66
public sector borrowing 31 – 2, 32 repurchase agreements (repos) 285 – 8,
Treasury bills 263 – 7, 264 – 7, 367 – 71 285, 286, 290 – 2
United Kingdom gilts 12, 31 – 60, 33 securitisation 394 – 8, 398, 401 – 2,
bond indices 59 – 60, 59 405 – 7
cum-dividend 52 – 3 shelf MTN programme 226
ex-dividend 53 sovereign credit rating 148, 150
Gilt-edged Market Makers (GEMMs) Treasury bills 66, 67, 268 – 9, 269,
37 – 9, 39, 50 371 – 2
index-linked 33 – 7, 34, 35, 38, 39, unrated bonds 159 – 61
53 – 5, 55 unregistered bonds 136
interdealer brokers (IDBs) 38 – 9, 39 unsolicited credit ratings 161
Islamic bonds 57 – 8 upside contingent bonds 196
maturity 33 – 4, 37, 37, 38 utilities 105
mini-tenders 41
perpetual 35, 36 valuation see bond valuation; money
prices 38, 45 – 6 market securities valuation
primary markets 37 – 41, 40, 50 variable net asset value (VNAV) money
purchasers of 43 – 5, 43 market funds 24 – 6

INDEX 475
variable-rate notes see floating-rate notes bond equivalent yield 323 – 4,

(FRNs) 365 – 6, 367, 373
variation margin 289 bonds 15 – 16, 45 – 6, 339
vault cash 425, 436, 437 discount yield 365 – 6, 367, 373
VNAV see variable net asset value (VNAV) money market instruments 18, 19
money market funds yield curve inversion 356, 356
Vodafone 22 – 3, 23, 226 yield-hungry investors 182
yield to maturity 16, 45 – 6, 339,
Wholesale Markets Brokers’ Association 342 – 5, 349 – 50, 349
(WMBA) 258, 284
wipeout cocos 196 – 8 zero coupon bonds 6, 17, 56, 124,
working capital ratio 127 346
convertible 195
Yankee bonds 206 Eurobonds 220
yield see also Treasury bills

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR Do you want to develop a good working knowledge of FT FT Guides

Glen Arnold, PhD has held positions of

BOND AND MONEY MARKETS

Front cover image Visit our website at

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First edition published 2015 (print and electronic)

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About the author vii

1 Introduction to bond and money markets 3

3 Government bonds around the world 61

4 Corporate bonds 103

5 Credit ratings for bonds 147

6 High-yield and hybrid bonds 175

7 International bonds 205

8 Interbank and Eurocurrency 239

9 Treasury bills and commercial paper 263

10 Repurchase agreements and certificates of deposit 279

11 Bills of exchange and banker’s acceptances 297

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12 Financial concepts and mathematics 311

13 Bond valuation 333

14 Money market securities valuation 363

16 Central banking influence on interest rates 419

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Everybody’s life is touched by ﬁnancial markets. This was painfully brought

● the jargon used in the debt markets

● the wide variety of bond markets, from sovereign bonds to junk

Who might find the book useful?

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I hope you enjoy the book.

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Susan Henton, my personal assistant, helped tremendously with this book.

I would also like to thank Christopher Cudmore, my editor at Pearson

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Repayment Currency Year end 2013 2012

Bank overdrafts On demand Various Various 111 38

Borrowings due within one 1,858 1,230

Guaranteed bonds 2013 2013 Euro 5.5 – 926

Borrowings due after one 8,233 7,399

Total borrowings before 10,091 8,629

Fair value of foreign currency – – – (205) (210)

Total borrowings after 9,886 8,416

Source: Diageo plc, Annual Report 2013, Note 17

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Structure of the book

Finally, we consider the importance of central banks to the workings of these

A bond is a long-term contract in which the bond holder lends money to

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the issuer promises to make predetermined payments in the future which

Primary and secondary markets

Shorts, mediums and longs

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Bonds, equity, bank loans and overdrafts compared

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