8 - CAMBRIDGE Hermeneutical Injustice
8 - CAMBRIDGE Hermeneutical Injustice
8 - CAMBRIDGE Hermeneutical Injustice
doi:10.1017/hyp.2022.4
ARTICLE
Abstract
This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice.
According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical
gap: one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, impor-
tant social experiences, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social
methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incom-
plete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn’t
result from a lack of hermeneutical resources, but from the overabundance of distorting
and oppressive concepts which function to crowd-out, defeat, or pre-empt the application
of a more accurate hermeneutical resource. I propose a broader analysis that better
respects the dynamic relationship between hermeneutical resources and the social and
political contexts in which they are implemented.
I. Introduction
Scholarship on epistemic injustice has highlighted the importance of hermeneutical
resources in facilitating the intelligibility of socially significant experiences.1 Notably,
Miranda Fricker has defended a species of epistemic harm that she calls hermeneutical
injustice. On her analysis, hermeneutical injustice arises when one attempts to make a
socially significant experience intelligible, but can’t because one lacks the required her-
meneutical tools (Fricker 2007, 1). There is a gap in the inventory of hermeneutical
resources that are used to render important social experiences intelligible, where this
gap is the result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine
hermeneutical resources (Fricker 2006; 2007; 2016; 2017).
Despite various points of disagreement and further developments concerning
Fricker’s analysis, one key assumption appears to have gained widespread acceptance
in the literature. This is that hermeneutical injustice requires a lacuna in the stock of
hermeneutical resources used to interpret socially significant experiences.2 The lacuna
requirement imposes a necessary condition on the occurrence of a hermeneutical
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Hypatia, a Nonprofit Corporation. This is
an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
[T]he faithful, obedient domestic servant. Created to justify the economic exploi-
tation of house slaves and sustained to explain Black women’s long-standing
restriction to domestic service, the mammy image represents the normative yard-
stick used to evaluate all Black women’s behavior. By loving, nurturing, and caring
for her White “family” better than her own, the mammy symbolized the dominant
group’s perceptions of the ideal Black female relationship to elite White male
power. Even though she may be well loved and may wield considerable authority
in her White “family,” the mammy still knows her “place” as an obedient servant.
(Collins 1990, 72-73, italics added)
The controlling image of the mammy functions to limit Black women’s participation
in the hermeneutical practices of influential meaning-making by relegating them to
domestic household roles.8 The mammy controlling image supports the construction
and normalization of Black women as complacent domestic workers, and functions
to place them into submissive roles with expected behaviors. Crucially, Collins argues
that controlling images function as “normative yardsticks”—they help to set the
terms for what counts as an appropriate allocation of praise or blame. Accordingly,
Black women who transgress and seek work outside of the domestic roles associated
with the mammy image are prone to be interpreted as violating the prescriptions
and roles imposed upon them via this social categorization.
The productive potential of hermeneutical resources is also salient in Lynne Tirrell’s
work on epithets. Tirrell examines the use of “inyenzi” (cockroach) and “inzoka”
(snake) by Hutu soldiers to describe Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide. She describes
these epithets as exhibiting the following key features: they mark insider/outsider rela-
tions, they attribute negative properties to their target (which are presumed to be essen-
tial to them), they are embedded in social networks of subordination and oppression,
they set boundaries for what constitutes permissible behavior toward the target, and
they are action-engendering insofar as they facilitate and purport to justify nonlinguistic
behaviors. The widespread use of these epithets, Tirrell argues, contributed greatly
to the dehumanization of Tutsis and the legitimization of horrific acts of violence
against them (Tirrell 2012, 192–93).9
Additionally, Katharine Jenkins has recently developed an analysis of ontic injustice,
a kind of injustice that concerns a wrong done to one in virtue of being constructed as a
member of a particular social kind. Jenkins defines ontic injustice: “An individual suf-
fers ontic injustice if and only if they are socially constructed as a member of a certain
social kind where that construction consists, at least in part, of their being subjected to a
set of social constraints and enablements that is wrongful to them” (Jenkins 2020, 191,
italics added). The notion of ontic injustice helps to shed further light upon the
productive function and power that conceptual resources can have. Jenkins considers
the example of being socially constructed as belonging to the category wife in
England before 1991, prior to the emergence of marital rape laws. As such, under
the law, wives in England were denied full control over who had sexual access to
their bodies. Jenkins argues that those who were socially constructed as belonging to
the category wife during this time were morally wronged, given the constraints and
enablements that this social categorization imposed upon them—they faced a kind of
ontic injustice.
Prevailing analyses of hermeneutical injustice have understood the function and
value of hermeneutical resources as primarily interpretive—hermeneutical resources
help to facilitate the intelligibility of socially significant experiences. However, herme-
neutical resources can do so much more than render social experiences intelligible.
They often serve crucial productive functions as well: they organize members of society
and cast them into certain roles and relations with expected behaviors. Collins’s discus-
sion of controlling images, Tirrell’s work on epithets, and Jenkins’s discussion of ontic
injustice help to reveal an overly narrow focus across much of the literature on herme-
neutical injustice by highlighting the productive dimensions of conceptual resources.
In addition to intelligibility, we ought to also recognize the productive function of
hermeneutical resources, namely, the significant value and potential they have in help-
ing to support the equitable coordination and organization of members of society
(cf. Haslanger 2020a, 14–15). Thus, an analysis of hermeneutical injustice must
acknowledge that some concepts have serious productive power—that they can serve
to sustain, normalize, and justify oppressive social practices and unjust social arrange-
ments. Once the productive function of hermeneutical resources is salient, this opens
the door to theorizing about hermeneutical injustice in a more comprehensive and
more deeply social way; it draws our attention to the complex relationship between her-
meneutical resources and the broader social and political environments in which they
are embedded and implemented.
A lacuna-centered approach toward hermeneutical injustice fails to appreciate the
potential for hermeneutical injustice to manifest not just from a dearth in conceptual
resources, but also from the way in which concepts interact with one another given per-
vasive cultural assumptions and social conventions. In other words, it is not just that we
need to fill in hermeneutical gaps, but we also need to consider how newly introduced
concepts are operationalized and how they cohere (or fail to cohere) with other extant
concepts when situated within a social milieu. Hermeneutical resources are not intro-
duced to collective understanding in a vacuum, but against the backdrop of longstand-
ing and often deeply rooted conceptual schemes—schemes that too often include
distorting concepts and oppressive controlling images. Zooming out and taking a
broader perspective on hermeneutical injustice, namely, a perspective that acknowl-
edges the interpretive as well as the productive value of hermeneutical resources, is
vital not only to understand the myriad ways in which hermeneutical injustice can
manifest, but also to gain a deeper understanding of what hermeneutical justice
demands.
Similarly:
The stories about Brock running from police with a backpack full of Coors, rub-
bing up on girls, smoking weed, tripping on acid, photographing tits, were all
absent from the image his loved ones and the media projected. The Washington
Post called him squeaky clean and baby-faced, a rosy-cheeked cherub. The letter
writers insisted he was misconstrued as a criminal. They called him an innocent
man, fighting for his freedom. . . . Gracious, caring, talented. Humble, responsible,
trustworthy. Wouldn’t hurt a fly. Even after the conviction, they believed he
remained entitled to impunity. Their support was unwavering, they refused to
call it assault, only called it the horrible mess, this unfortunate situation. (Miller
2019, 463)13
The hermeneutical clash between the concept rapist and the concept golden boy is
also salient in the seemingly paradoxical statements in a letter from Leslie
Rasmussen, Turner’s friend:
[R]ape on campuses isn’t always because people are rapists. . . . This is completely
different from a woman getting kidnapped and raped as she is walking to her car
in a parking lot. That is a rapist. These are not rapists. These are idiot boys and
girls having too much to drink and not being aware of their surroundings and hav-
ing clouded judgment. (Paiella 2016, italics added)
When privileged men (typically, cis, white, heterosexual, upper-class, and so on)
commit acts of violence against women, there is a persistent tendency to explain
away their behavior as an aberration or deviation from one’s “normal” or “true” char-
acter—Turner might have done this, but he isn’t a rapist.14
Reflecting upon these cases helps to uncover an important, yet underexplored, spe-
cies of hermeneutical injustice. The case of Carmita Wood is strikingly different from
the case of Chanel Miller. In the former case, the concept sexual harassment was wholly
absent from the collective hermeneutical repertoire—it wasn’t available for use within
social, political, or legal settings in general. In the latter case, the concept rapist was
widely available and, importantly, was present within legal settings. However, there is
a crucial difference between a concept being sufficiently acquired and broadly
If we say that red and green are opposite colors in a traffic light, we are not saying
that they logically contradict each other. Rather, they are opposed with respect to
the meanings these colors are given in traffic signals. The context of conventions
concerning traffic signals makes them opposites. In another context, they may be
seen as similar to each other. For example, red and green are both colors of the
natural spectrum, or colors associated with Christmas, while lavender and
brown are not. Thus red and green are seen as different in some contexts, and
are seen as having similar properties in others. (Balkin 1990, 6–7)
and social practices, along with other overlapping systems of oppression, are prevalent,
the golden boy concept is prone to be interpreted as clashing or as in opposition to the
bad boy, or the scoundrel. Furthermore, in such social settings rapists are readily char-
acterized as creepy strangers, reclusive outsiders, deviant monsters, or savage animals.
Accordingly, those who fit the profile of golden boy are commonly taken to be the
kind of people who could do no wrong, for the very meaning—what it is to be a golden
boy in this social context—precludes this. It’s creepy strangers and deviant monsters
who rape women; golden boys are “good guys”; they’re Eagle Scouts and are awarded
swimming scholarships. These two concepts—golden boy and rapist—when embedded
into certain social environments, are susceptible to being construed as opposites or as
clashing.
—is not enough to overcome hermeneutical injustice. Conceptual competence does not
ensure the accurate application of a concept, especially in high-stakes social contexts
where privileged groups stand to gain from conceptual distortion and oppressive ideo-
logical practices. The application of the needed concept may be defeated or preempted
when pernicious background ideologies and social practices dictate that some other
opposing and distorting concept is more applicable. Hence, even if the concept is avail-
able and widely used across social groups and communities, this is not enough to secure
its accurate application, and importantly, not enough to reap the productive value of the
concept in important social contexts.
Let’s take stock. So far, I have outlined the productive function and power of herme-
neutical resources—how they serve to organize members of society and how some dis-
torting concepts or controlling images purport to justify and normalize unjust social
arrangements. This drew our attention to an important, yet often overlooked, value
of hermeneutical resources, namely, their productive value and potential to support
social and political change. Thus, the value of hermeneutical resources is at least two-
fold: they have productive as well as interpretive value. Recognizing this, in turn, helped
to uncover a species of hermeneutical injustice that does not result from a hermeneu-
tical lack. Reflecting upon concrete examples of hermeneutical injustice without lacunae
made highlighted a critical need to consider how concepts are operationalized within a
given social milieu—how they combine with other extant concepts and how they are
integrated into preexisting hermeneutical frameworks. The need for this is especially
pressing when extant hermeneutical frameworks contain negative controlling images
and oppressive distorting concepts. Such concepts have the potential to crowd out,
defeat, or preempt the application of an available and more accurate hermeneutical
resource.
In the next section, I begin to develop a more expansive and more socially situated
framework for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. This approach aims to accom-
modate cases of hermeneutical injustice both with and without hermeneutical gaps.
hallmarks of a golden boy. So, though others could render intelligible the fact that
Miller and her defense team were accusing Turner of rape, they failed to apply the con-
cept rapist to Turner because of the presence of distorting and oppressive concepts.
Let’s return to the three conditions needed to establish a hermeneutical injustice on
Fricker’s lacuna-centered analysis. Given that the concept rapist was intelligible to
Miller and those in the relevant social context, and moreover, given that the concept
rapist was broadly available in the hermeneutical repertoire at large (there was no
lacuna), this case does not satisfy any of the three conditions. So, according to the
lacuna-centered framework, it follows that Miller isn’t a victim of hermeneutical injus-
tice. Is this the right result? I think it would be a serious mistake to draw this conclu-
sion. Instead, cases like these highlight a need to revise and expand upon the analysis of
hermeneutical injustice and the range of harms that it may give rise to.
Defenders of a lacuna-centered framework are right to note that across a range of
cases, the primary harm of hermeneutical injustice concerns an inability to make an
important social experience intelligible (either to oneself or to others). However, this
is not the sole way in which hermeneutical injustice can manifest. The hermeneutical
injustice that Miller faced didn’t involve a lack of intelligibility, but instead resulted
from a failure of conceptual application or conceptual aptness. Others were reluctant
to apply the concept rapist to Turner because they didn’t view this concept as fitting
or appropriate for a man like him. Furthermore, this failure of application doesn’t
trace back to any hermeneutical gap. It’s the very opposite: it was the positive presence
of distorting and oppressive concepts that served to prop up Turner’s innocence and to
prevent the concept rapist from applying to him. Taken in this way, we can
explain Miller as having suffered a kind of hermeneutical injustice, not because of a
lack of intelligibility, but because others in her social context were unable to accurately
apply the concept rapist to Turner owing to the presence of oppressive concepts.
This, in turn, resulted in the denial of Miller’s credibility and thus diminished her status
as a knower—specifically as a contributor of important and socially significant
knowledge—in the given social context.
Reflecting upon these features of Miller’s situation suggests a more expansive frame-
work for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. This framework encompasses the
explanatory successes of the lacuna-centered analysis, while also capturing an important
species of hermeneutical injustice that doesn’t result from lacunae. According to this
broader approach, hermeneutical injustice can manifest in at least two distinct ways,
what we might call positive hermeneutical injustice and negative hermeneutical injus-
tice. Negative hermeneutical injustice is the more familiar kind of injustice that is cap-
tured by the lacuna-centered account. It’s negative because at its core it results from a
lack of hermeneutical resources. A paradigm example is the much-discussed case of
Carmita Wood and the absence of the concept sexual harassment. In cases of negative
hermeneutical injustice, the primary harm consists in an inability to render important
social experiences intelligible (either to oneself or to others).18
On the other hand, positive hermeneutical injustice results from the presence of
oppressive and distorting concepts that crowd out, defeat, or preempt the application
of an available and more accurate concept. Positive hermeneutical injustice is the
kind of injustice exhibited in Miller’s case and the failure to apply the concept rapist
to Turner, given that he fits the profile of a golden boy. Because of the hermeneutical
marginalization of certain groups—specifically, the unequal authority and power con-
cerning not just the initial creation and dissemination of conceptual resources, but
also their revision, reinforcement, and overall influence and applicability in high-stakes
change in helping to reform our social and political landscapes for the better. The sheer
existence of a concept, even if it has been disseminated both intra and intercommunally,
though vitally important, is not enough to ensure this.
Theorizing about hermeneutical injustice using this more expansive framework
helps us to reveal significant limits of a lacuna-centered model by illustrating how her-
meneutical injustice may persist well after lacunae are filled. Additionally, an expansive
framework supports a characterization of hermeneutical injustice as an appropriately
social phenomenon by highlighting the overarching social environments in which her-
meneutical resources are embedded and implemented. A more expansive framework—
one that recognizes both positive and negative forms of hermeneutical injustice—is
more complete and possesses more explanatory depth to the extent that it acknowledges
the aptness or applicability of socially significant concepts within specific social con-
texts, and relative to their operationalization within a given social milieu.
This expansive framework also has important connections to Pohlhaus’s analysis of
willful hermeneutical ignorance, as well as Dotson’s account of contributory injustice.
Recall that willful hermeneutical ignorance occurs when dominantly situated knowers
refuse to acquire the hermeneutical tools of those from marginalized groups, and, as
a result, sustain hermeneutical lacunae at the level of the dominant (or intercommunal)
hermeneutical repertoire. On a more expansive approach, we can begin to describe a
phenomenon adjacent to willful hermeneutical ignorance. Even after a concept is col-
lectively available, that is, even after the dominantly situated have acquired the concepts
needed to make the experiences of marginalized members of society intelligible, they
may still willfully refuse to adopt the proper application conditions for such concepts.
This will directly affect the overall productive function and value of such concepts
within one’s social milieu. In such cases, those in dominant positions may acknowledge,
acquire, and even widely utilize a concept—yet they may refuse to apply it in particular
situations because of their continued use of controlling images and oppressive distorting
concepts.
In a related vein, recall Dotson’s notion of contributory injustice that occurs when,
because of willful hermeneutical ignorance, the dominantly situated refuse to adopt
the hermeneutical resources of those from marginalized groups and instead use
other, often prejudiced, resources instead. When this happens, the epistemic agency
of marginalized individuals is frustrated and undermined; they are unable to positively
contribute to the dominant hermeneutical repertoire. In light of the more expansive
framework, we can begin to explain a related way in which the epistemic agency of mar-
ginalized groups may be compromised. This happens when the dominantly situated fail
to properly apply and utilize a socially significant concept accurately and for its
intended productive purposes. Systematic failures of conceptual application, particularly
when this is the result of endorsing and maintaining the use of oppressive concepts or
controlling images, can serve to undermine the epistemic agency of marginalized indi-
viduals insofar as it limits their capacity to influence how hermeneutical resources are
implemented and utilized within a social milieu. When this happens, marginalized indi-
viduals are unjustly undermined in their ability to contribute hermeneutical resources
with robust productive value and influence, that is, resources that are able to effectively
support social and political change.
Oftentimes, when disadvantaged communities develop hermeneutical resources,
they do so not only because they are valuable interpretive tools needed to understand
and communicate their experiences, but also because they are vital productive resources
that are needed to help improve their material circumstances. The hope is that these
resources will be accurately and effectively deployed in society to improve the lives of
individuals within these communities (for example, to help survivors of sexual vio-
lence). However, if members of society continue to engage in oppressive social practices,
specifically, those that make use of and reinforce the influence of oppressive controlling
images and distorting concepts, then these hermeneutical contributions will be signifi-
cantly diminished.
So, where does this leave us? In closing, I want to emphasize what I take to be the
best way forward in theorizing about hermeneutical injustice and epistemic injustice
more broadly. The main thrust is this: we need to broaden our horizons and engage
in a more socially embedded way.21 Contrasting cases of positive and negative herme-
neutical injustice serves to illustrate how concepts don’t exist and operate independently
from each other, but are deeply interconnected. The productive value of hermeneutical
tools is both constrained and enabled by their place alongside other concepts within an
overarching social milieu. Moreover, the sheer fact that many concepts were and still are
needed to make sense of the socially significant experiences of marginalized communi-
ties should be extremely suggestive of the current state of collective hermeneutical
frameworks and the strong influence of unjust social practices and oppressive concepts
and controlling images therein.
It is thus imperative that we pay close attention to how concepts can function to
sustain and promote pernicious background ideologies and unjust social arrangements,
and how this in turn can restrict the productive function and power of liberatory
concepts, both old and new. The intelligibility gained from the introduction and
widespread dissemination of a hermeneutical resource is undeniably important.
However, this is just one dimension of hermeneutical progress that ought not distract
us from others. We must also recognize the productive function and value of
hermeneutical resources and how they come to be deemed applicable and utilized, or
more important, not applicable and not utilized, across diverse social environments.
Successfully overcoming hermeneutical injustice likely requires full-fledged social
movements—it requires organization, mobilization, and activism. It requires challeng-
ing and disrupting the status quo narrative and dislodging ingrained assumptions
and ideologies that normalize and purport to justify oppressive social arrangements.
Introducing into the collective hermeneutical repertoire a hermeneutical resource that
is needed to understand the experiences of disadvantaged groups is clearly a move in
the right direction—it is progress toward hermeneutical justice. However, if prevailing
social conditions aren’t conducive to the concept’s gaining a meaningful grip on the
world—that is, to its being broadly applied in important social contexts where it accu-
rately describes social reality and where it stands to do productive work to help improve
the material conditions of those in marginalized communities—the concept’s potential
to combat hermeneutical injustice will be undermined. Contrary to what a lacuna-
centered analysis suggests, filling in hermeneutical gaps is not enough to ensure herme-
neutical justice; it is just one part of a much broader, comprehensive, and socially
embedded process.
Acknowledgments. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Summer Immersion Program in
Philosophy at Brown University (2019), the Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy at the University of
Cincinnati (2019), the Pacific Division of the APA (2021), and the Words Workshop (2021). I’m grateful to
audience members for their feedback. I would also like to thank Zach Barnett, Endre Begby, Thomas
Brandt, David Christensen, Corbin Covington, Sally Haslanger, Jonathan Ichikawa, and Elizabeth Miller,
as well as two anonymous referees.
Notes
1 Hermeneutical resources include interpretive tools such as tropes, narratives, stories, scripts, and con-
cepts. For simplicity, and following much of the literature, I will talk mostly in terms of conceptual
resources.
8 Note: as was mentioned previously, this does not necessarily mean that Black women are unable to
develop and use hermeneutic resources intracommunally.
9 We can also compare similar influential rhetoric during World War II that described Jewish people as
“vermin.” For example, this language is prevalent in The Eternal Jew, a 1940 Nazi propaganda film. For
further discussions on the productive function of pernicious social concepts see, for example, Young
1990, chapter 2, on cultural imperialism, Kukla 2018 on the relationship between slurs and ideology,
and Neufeld 2019 on slurs and essentialization.
10 It is also important to note that “monstrosity” and “animality” are also deeply racialized notions in a
United States context, associated primarily with Black people and people of color. Consider, for example,
the rhetoric surrounding the 1989 “Central Park Five” case where five Black teenagers were wrongfully
accused of raping a white woman who was jogging in Central Park. These boys were described as a
“wolf pack,” “animals,” “bloodthirsty,” “savages,” and “wilding” (Hinton 2019).
11 At the time of the trial, the victim’s name was kept anonymous and listed under “Emily Doe.” However,
Chanel Miller has recently shared her story with the broader public in a memoir: Know My Name (Miller
2019).
12 Manne’s discussion of the Brock Turner case engages primarily with Fricker’s account of testimonial
injustice, a kind of epistemic injustice wherein a testifier’s report fails to gain uptake owing to an identity
prejudice that the testimonial recipient has against the testifier. It’s noteworthy that Fricker focuses primar-
ily upon credibility deficits when developing her analysis of testimonial injustice (that is, giving too little
For example, we may have the same concept of cat—the informational content of the concept cat is
the same for each of us—but our possession of it occurs in somewhat different ways so that certain
inferences are more direct for me than they are for you, or that I am more ready to apply the concept
than you. Or it may be that because you know more about cats, you have a sensitivity to different
kinds of cat, so your partition of logical space is more fine-grained. (Haslanger 2020b, 240)
This analysis helps to capture the idea that merely possessing or being competent with a concept is not, and
usually isn’t, an indication that the individual can accurately apply the concept across all cases (that is, that
they have a perfect ability to sort the X’s from the non-X’s).
16 Cf. Endre Begby’s analysis of evidential preemption in the context of testimonial exchange, especially
what he calls “epistemic grooming” (Begby 2020).
17 Ishani Maitra outlines different ways in which concepts might be distorting using the concepts statutory
rape and sexual harassment as case studies (Maitra 2018). I hope to remain neutral on the ways in which
concepts might be distorting; I believe that the phenomena in question are diverse and complex. Offering a
taxonomy of the various ways in which concepts distort social reality is beyond the scope of this article;
however, Maitra’s work is helpful in outlining two potential ways this happens: through eliciting inappro-
priate inferences or eliciting inappropriate analogies. Also see Jenkins 2017 for a related and illuminating
discussion of the relationship between rape myths and hermeneutical injustice. Jenkins considers cases
where a victim of rape is unable to understand her experience as rape owning to operative and distorting
rape myths.
18 It is important to note that in some cases of negative hermeneutical injustice, the presence of negative
controlling images might very well serve to sustain and reinforce hermeneutical lacunae. In classifying this
species of hermeneutical injustice as negative, I don’t want to in any way to rule out this possibility. Cf.
Dotson’s related discussion of contributory injustice (Dotson’s 2012). These two categories—negative and
positive—are somewhat idealized, and in practice the lines between them might be fuzzy and imprecise.
Moreover, once we consider the broader relationship and interaction among hermeneutical resources within
a social context, we might find cases that involve combinations of both positive and negative forms of her-
meneutical injustice. I don’t mean to rule out this potential either. Teasing apart the details here is an impor-
tant project that merits further careful investigation, but that is beyond the scope of this article.
19 Fricker acknowledges the important role of social movements and political change in challenging the con-
ditions that give rise to hermeneutical injustice, namely, in challenging hermeneutical marginalization, but she
doesn’t wholly embrace this as a necessary component of combating hermeneutical injustice itself. She says:
However, once the productive function of hermeneutical resources is brought to the fore, I hope we can
begin to marshal persuasive reasons that individual-level interventions focusing on intelligibility are
unlikely to be “justice enough” when it comes to combating hermeneutical injustice.
20 A few major beauty brands have slowly begun to take notice and have shown some signs of change for
the better, but there is without question a long way to go. See, for example, Dove’s Self-Esteem Project:
https://www.dove.com/us/en/dove-self-esteem-project/our-mission.html.
21 Elizabeth Anderson, Kristie Dotson, Sally Haslanger, and Nadya Vasilyeva and Saray Ayala-López,
among others, have also emphasized the importance of thinking about whole social systems and
institutional-level phenomena when theorizing about epistemic injustice (Anderson 2012; Dotson 2012;
2014; Haslanger 2016; Vasilyeva and Ayala-López 2019; Haslanger 2020a; 2020b).
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Arianna Falbo is a doctoral student in philosophy at Brown University, where she is also obtaining a doc-
toral certificate in gender and sexuality studies. Her research is primarily at the intersection of epistemology,
feminist philosophy, and social philosophy.
Cite this article: Falbo A (2022). Hermeneutical Injustice: Distortion and Conceptual Aptness. Hypatia 37,
343–363. https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.4