Psda Moot 2
Psda Moot 2
Psda Moot 2
VS.
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………........ 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………….... 6
ISSUE RAISED…………………………………………………………………………….9
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED……………………………………………………...…….12-18
PRAYER………………………………………………………………………………… 19
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
ed. Editor
Hon’ble Honorable
LJ Law Journal
No. Number
Ors. Others
p. Page
para Paragraph
Pt. Point
SC Supreme court
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case laws:
Harvey V. Facey
State bank of Patiala V. Ramesh Chander Kanoji,
Household fire & accident insurance Co. V. Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 (CA)
Henthorn V. Fraser
.
Food Corporation of India & Ors. V. Ramesh Kumar
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Raghuvir Singh Narang & Anr.
Binod Kumar Khetan V. The Hindustan Copper Ltd.
Ram Das Chakrabarti V. Cotton Ginning Co. Ltd.
Parvati V. Mannar, I.L.R (1885) 8 Mad. 175,180
Venkata Surya Rao V. Nandipati Muthayya, A.L.R. 1964 A.P. 382,386
Mc. Pherson V. Daniels, (1929) 10 B. and C.
Websites:
www.supremecourtcases.com
www.indiankanoon.com
www.livelaw.com
www.scconline.com
Statues:
The counsel for the plaintiff/ petitioner hereby humbly submit before this Hon’ble High
Court of Allahabad that Section 63 of the Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation & Resettlement Act, 2013 provides a bar upon the
jurisdiction of the civil courts to try a case of the aforesaid act and the jurisdiction to try the
same has been vested with the concerned Hon’ble High Courts and Hon’ble Supreme Court
under article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
63. Jurisdiction of civil courts barred.–No civil court (other than High Court under article
226 or article 227 of the Constitution or the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction to
entertain any dispute relating to land acquisition in respect of which the Collector or the
Authority is empowered by or under this Act, and no injunction shall be granted by any court
in respect of any such matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of Brevity and convenience of the Hon’ble Court, the facts of case are as
follows:
1. That the XYZ National Highway Authority Agency, through an official gazette dated
September 24, 2023, announced plans to acquire a substantial portion of agricultural land for
the construction of a new six-lane highway connecting two major cities. Additionally, the
agency intended to purchase approximately 1000 acres directly from farmers along the
Greater Noida Expressway for the development of new industrial sectors.
2. That the notification specified that the Ram Nagar district administration would be the
nodal executing authority collaborating with XYZ under The Land Acquisition Act of 2013
to acquire the agricultural land for the project.
3. That the acquisition process commenced in December 2013, but faced a significant hurdle
as farmers and landowners protested against the authority's compensation offer of ₹3,324 per
square meter, which they deemed lower than the market value of the land.
4. That despite the protests, the acquisition notices were issued, but some farmers and
landowners refused to comply, asserting that the compensation was inadequate, and the
Social Impact Assessment process was flawed.
5. That Notably, a group of farmers, who had cultivated the land for generations, argued that
the acquisition not only jeopardized their livelihoods but also violated their constitutional
rights.
6. That according to the project's authority, out of the 950 acres required, 650 acres had
already been acquired, with 630 acres earmarked for sectors 14, 15, 16, and 20 between the
Yamuna and the Noida-Greater Noida Expressway.
7. That an additional 300 acres or more of the proposed land was necessary to complete
essential infrastructure works such as roads, parks, and drainage systems.
8. That the challenge arose as the farmers and landowners, affected by both the acquired and
proposed land, contested the acquisition notification under The Land Acquisition Act of
2013, as announced by the XYZ National Highway Authority Agency in its official gazette
dated September 24, 2023.
Whether the Act is in line with the constitutional provisions protecting the fundamental rights
of citizens, including the right to property and the right to livelihood.
.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court by the present council for the petition that
as per Article 21 of the Indian constitution, no person shall be deprived of his right to life and
livelihood and therefore the act of acquisition of the agricultural land of the farmers is
amounting to infringement of their right guaranteed under Article 21 as the agricultural land
is their main and only source of income of the landowners and deprivation of the same leads
to infringement. As also provided under section 16 (1) (b) of RFCTLARR ACT, 2013 that
the Administrator for Rehabilitation and Resettlement shall conduct a survey and undertake a
census of the affected families, which shall include “livelihoods lost in respect of land
losers and landless whose livelihoods are primarily dependent on the lands being
acquired”. It is pertinent to mention that Article 300A of the Indian constitution provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law, it implies that this
right is not absolute in nature and it is subject to a legislation made in this behalf by the
Legislature and hence RFCTLARR ACT ,2013 was legislated in this regard which provides a
procedure of the acquisition keeping in mind the principles of equity which includes right to
fair compensation and other reliefs and it has also signified great importance to the concept of
consent as no such acquisition can be made without the consent of the land owner or owners
as the case may be. It is in fact in consonance with the constitutional provisions as was held
in number of judgements by the apex court.
2. The conflict between the public interest in promoting development and
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court by the present council for the Petitioners
that whenever a dispute arises between public interest and private interest it is the duty upon
the authority to draw a balance between them and the same cannot be exercised arbitrarily or
without adhering to the principles of natural justice. It has been observed in In Radhey Shyam
vs state of UP Justice Singhvi also remarked that ‘in recent years, the country has witnessed
new phenomena. Large tracts of land have been acquired in rural parts of the country in the
name of development and transferred to private entrepreneurs, who have utilized the same for
construction of multi-storied complexes, commercial centers and for setting up industrial
units. But in the given factual matrix it can be seen that no such balance can be seen to be
drawn as the interest of the farmers was neglected to an extent leading to infringements of
various rights and the voice of the farmers was not given the adequate consideration.
reflects the true value of their land and the potential losses they may incur.
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court by the present council for the petitioner that
compensation offered to the farmers is inadequate and doesn’t reflect the true value of their
land and the potential losses they incurred as provided under section 26 of the RFCTLARR
ACT ,2013 which provides for determination of market value of land by collector in
accordance with the First and Second Schedules of the said Act. As further provided under
section 27 of the aforesaid act the Collector having determined the market value of the land to
be acquired shall calculate the total amount of compensation to be paid to the land owner by
including all assets attached to the land. The procedure given under section 28 of the said act
which provides for the parameters to be considered by the collector in determination of the
award of compensation was not adhered to while calculating the amount of compensation for
the land owners. The award of solatium was also neglected while executing the proceedings
under the said act which is the mandate of section 30 of the aforementioned act.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
A valid contract exists between the Appellant and the respondent in the eyes of law. A valid
agreement was formed the moment the application came to the respondent’s notice.
According to Section 2(e) of the Indian contract act an agreement is “every promise and
every set of promises forming the consideration for each other.” Moreover, as stated in
section 10 of Indian Contract act, an agreement is a contract if made by the free consent of
parties which stands true in case of appellant as he was free to apply for the early retirement
scheme in the required manner. The parties were competent to contract as they were of the
age of majority according to the law to which they are subject, and were of sound mind and
not disqualified from contracting by any law to which they are subject. There exists a valid
consideration i.e., the offeree has promised to pay the benefits an applicant is entitled to get.
And has a lawful object that was to provide to the employees the benefits of the ‘voluntary
retirement scheme’. The Respondents publication of the ‘Ottoman Bank Employees
Voluntary Retirement Scheme’ (OBEVRS) which stipulated the process, the benefits, and the
terms and conditions was an invitation to offer1 floated and when pursuant to or in furtherance
of such a voluntary retirement scheme an employee opts therefore, he makes an offer which
upon acceptance by the employer gives rise to a concluded contract between the employer
and the employee 2.
1.
Harvey V. Facey
2.
State bank of Patiala V. Ramesh Chander Kanoji, (2004) 2 SCC 651
Thus, the application submitted by the appellant under the scheme was in the nature of an
offer and in the light of Para 10 of the Ottoman Bank Employees Voluntary Retirement
Scheme which provides for that the respondent had the authority to have absolute discretion
either to accept or reject the request of an employee seeking voluntary retirement under the
Scheme depending upon the requirement of the Bank.
The respondent made a valid acceptance and communicated their assent of the offer made by
the appellant by sending a letter of notice as to the calculation of his benefits and his last day
of work before the appellant made a revocation of offer as by withdrawing his application.
Thus, it is hence humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that by virtue of the current factual
matrix it can be concluded that there exists a valid contract between the appellant and
respondent as there was a proposal or offer, its acceptance and consideration which forms a
lawful agreement and is enforceable by law.
It is humbly submitted that the said argument is said to be completed upon the
communication of acceptance of the appellant’s application (Mr. Jai Singh) by the
respondents (Ottoman Bank). When on 16-01-2001, the application was submitted by the
appellant and reached and came into the knowledge of respondents on 16-01-2001 itself.
Thus, the communication of proposal was complete on 16-01-2001 as it came to the
knowledge of the defendants i.e., to whom it was made. An offer becomes accepted only
when it is brought to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made according to Section 4
of the Indian Contract Act,1872.
When the parties are at a distance and are contracting through post, a complete contract arises
on the date when the letter of acceptance is posted on due course.3
As soon as the letter of acceptance is delivered through post, the contract is made as complete
and final and absolutely binding. The Indian Contract Act, in section 4 adopts that when the
letter of acceptance is posted and is out of power of the acceptor, the proposer (Jai Singh).
The application of the appellant was accepted by the respondents on or before 18-0-2001 i.e.,
before the withdrawal of application or revocation of offer by the appellant. Therefore, the
communication of acceptance of the appellant’s application was also made or put into
transmission before the revocation of offer made by the appellant. The offeror (Mr. Jai Singh)
becomes bound as soon as a properly addressed and adequately stamped letter of acceptance
was posted by the respondents. 4
Thus, it is hence humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that by virtue of the current factual
matrix it can be concluded that a valid contract between the appellant and respondent is
concluded upon the communication of acceptance of appellant’s application by the defendant.
3
Household fire & accident insurance Co. V. Grant (1879) LR 4 Ex D 216 (CA)
4
Ram Das Chakrabarti V. Cotton Ginning Co. Ltd.
14 Memorial on behalf of respondents
6TH ARGUENDO MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
1. The Section 5 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 clearly states that “a proposal may be
revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the
proposer, but not afterwards”. And the communication of acceptance is complete as against
the proposer, when it is put into transmission to him, so as to be out of the power of acceptor.
Thus, For the communication of revocation to be effective it must reach the offeree before he
mails his acceptance and makes it out of his power. A revocation is effective only when it is
brought to the mind of the person to whom the offer is made. 5
The appellant made a revocation of the offer after the acceptance of communication was put
into transmission by the respondent as against the proposer (appellant) 4 i.e., on 18-01-2001.
The respondent has completed their acceptance by posting a letter of notice as to the
calculation of his benefits and his last day of work before appellant made a revocation of his
application (offer). Thus, the respondents made their acceptance by conduct.
.
The appellant’s appeal that he withdrew his offer before any acceptance regarding the same
was communicated to him and now he is not required to undergo early retirement is not
consistent as communication of acceptance as against him was complete as soon as the
respondents posted the letter i.e., on 16-01-2001 and not when the appellant would receive it.
The respondent’s argument on this part of the case is that the communication of
the revocation of the offer was not complete before the communication of the acceptance, and
consequently, the revocation of the offer became ineffective
5
Henthorn V. Fraser
6
Binod Kumar Khetan V. The Hindustan Copper Ltd. (2006)
2. The SC has ruled that an employee who has opted for a voluntary retirement scheme
(VRS) can revoke his decision before the management considers his offer unless the scheme
itself forbade such a revocation.1. Moreover, according to para 10 of Ottoman Bank
Employees Voluntary Retirement Scheme which reads as follows:
10.2.” It will not be open for an employee to withdraw the request made for voluntary
retirement. under the Scheme after having exercised such an option.”
An employee who made an application under the scheme, cannot revoke his offer or
application and such application is bound to form a contract unless a communication of
rejection and the reasons for rejection of a request of an employee seeking voluntary
retirement be recorded in writing by the competent authority.
Thus, it is clearly stated in the terms and conditions of the above scheme and a prudent
employee applying for the scheme is expected to have read all the necessary clauses of the
said scheme prior to applying for the scheme in required manner.
In so far as the scheme of Ottoman Bank is concerned, the terms and condition of service of
its employees were governed by statutory Rules and the scheme was also statutory in nature;
and consequently, the scheme would be binding.
The general principles of contracting were held to be not applicable where the voluntary
retirement was under a statutory scheme which categorically barred the employee from
withdrawing the option once exercised. The terms and conditions of a statutory scheme
would prevail over the general contractual principles. 3
Thus, it is hence humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that by virtue of the current factual
matrix it can be concluded that the revocation made by the appellant is not valid.
7
Food Corporation of India & Ors. V. Ramesh Kumar (2007)
8.
State bank of Patiala V. Ramesh Chander Kanoji, (2004) 2 SCC 651
9
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Raghuvir Singh Narang, (2010) 5 SCC 335.
1. The alleged tort of defamation committed by the respondent does not fulfil the
requirement of ‘publication’. Publication means making the defamatory known to some
person other than the person defamed, and unless that is done, no civil action for defamation
lies.
Whether the statement is defamatory or not depends upon how the right thinking members of
the society are likely to take it. Mere hasty expression spoken in anger, or vulgar abuse to
which no hearer would attribute any set purpose to injure the character would not be
actionable. 8 Words which merely injure the feelings or cause annoyance but which in no way
reflect on character or reputation or tend to cause one to be shunned or avoided are not
rebellious. Mere vulgar abuse and vituperative epithets if intended as a mere abuse and so
understood by those who hear those words only hurt a man’s pride. Such words are not
considered defamatory as they do not disparage the reputation. No action for damages can lie
for mere insult.9
The respondent merely called him a liability to the organisation who was threatened by the
computers as he himself was of no use. The entire episode was witnessed by several
employees, many of whom were acquainted with Mr. Jai Singh. Thus, his Character was not
injured merely because of the fact that respondent’s legal official just lashed out at the
appellant in the heat of the moment.
10
Parvati V. Mannar, I.L.R (1885) 8 Mad. 175,180
11
Venkata Surya Rao V. Nandipati Muthayya, A.L.R. 1964 A.P. 382,386
The imputation must have been made with the intention of harming or with the knowledge or
having the reason to believe it will harm the reputation of a person concerning whom it is
made. So, any imputation not made with an intention described above, would not complete
the conditions of publication to complete the offence of defamation.
2. Moreover, in civil action for defamation, truth of the defamatory matter is complete
defence. The reason for the defence is that “the law will not permit a man to recover damages
in respect of an injury to a character which he neither does not or ought not to possess.” 10
The respondent merely called the appellant ‘a liability’ who was threatened by the computers.
Calling the appellant, a liability itself falls under the defence of truth. The appellant has
become a liability for the respondents after introduction of computer machines to help the
bank to budget their human resources.
Thus, it is hence humbly submitted to this Hon’ble Court that by virtue of the current factual
matrix it can be concluded that there the respondents did not fulfil the requirement of
‘publication’.
12
Mc. Pherson V. Daniels, (1929) 10 B. and C.
1. The petition is maintainable under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
2. That adequate compensation be given to the petitioner in accordance with the market
value of the land at par.
3. That direction be given to Respondents to ensure the resettlement & rehabilitation of
the Petitioners.
Sd/-
(Counsel for Petitioner)