POCSO
POCSO
History
Sexual abuse and sex trafficking have always been serious problems in India. However, the problem of
child sexual abuse needs to be addressed through less ambiguous and more stringent punishment. The
Bill was introduced and enacted with a view to protect children from sexual offences. The Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 was passed by both the houses of Parliament,
assented by the President on 19 June 2012. This Act came into force on 14 November 2012 as Act
number 32 of the year 2012.
Subjective Theory
Sexual behaviour is simply a biological phenomenon. The bio-physical changes with the growth of
human body automatically prepares the males and females for sexual behaviour and thus it needs no
specific training. But due to the present moral degradation and vanishing effects of religious sanctions,
there has been an unprecedented increase in sex delinquency.
Sex crimes have now-a-days become so common that not only adults, but the tender aged children
also are becoming the victims of various sexual offences. Considering the alarming situation, the
Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan versus Om Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 2235, held that “in such cases,
responsibility on the shoulders of the courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to
these children. Children always need special care and protection. Their physical and mental immobility
call for such protection. It has always been stated that children are the natural resources of our
country. They are country’s future. In this country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position and one
of the modes of her exploitation is rape besides other modes of sexual abuse. These factors point
towards a different approach required to be adopted.”
To strengthen the legal provisions for the protections
Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia, of children from sexual abuse and exploitation,
confers upon the State powers to make a special law has been passed which intends to
special legislation for children. Further, address the issue of sexual offences against children.
Article 39, inter alia, provides that the Therefore, the POCSO, 2012 was enacted on 19 June
state shall in particular direct its policy 2012 and came into force from 14 November 2012
towards securing that the tender age with a view to protect the children from offences of
of children are not abused and their sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography
childhood and youth are protected and provides for the establishment of Special Courts
against exploitation. for trial of such offences and for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto.
Section 22 of the POCSO Act, 2012: Punishment for False Complaint or False Information
According to Section 22 of the POCSO Act, 2012, if any person makes a false complaint or provides
information that is not true related to any offence mentioned under Sections 3, 5, 7 or 9 with an
intention to defame, threaten, or humiliate such person, then he/she has committed a crime under
Section 22. Such a person is liable for imprisonment, which may extend to six months or with fine or
with both.
However, if a person provides false information about a crime against a child and knows that the
information is incorrect but victimise the child by providing such information, in this case, the POCSO
Act Punishment is an imprisonment for maximum of one year or with fine or with both.
Attorney General for India versus Satish, 2021 SCC Online Sc 1076
The Bombay High Court’s Nagpur Bench had ruled in the case of Satish Ragde versus State of
Maharashtra (2021) that grabbing a child’s breasts without making “skin-to-skin contact” constituted
molestation under the POCSO Act, 2012. The comment was given by a single bench led by Justice
Pushpa Ganediwala. The Attorney General of India, the National Commission for Women, and the State
of Maharashtra filed appeals against the High Court’s controversial decision, which were heard by a
bench consisting of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, S Ravindra Bhat, and Bela M Trivedi, in the present case
of Attorney General for India versus Satish and Another, 2021 SCC Online Sc 1076.
The issue at hand was how should Section 7 of the POCSO Act, 2012 be interpreted so as to provide a
fair and reasonable solution to the cases falling under its ambit. The present judgement observed that
Section 7 covers both direct and indirect touch thereby highlighting that the logic in the High Court’s
opinion quite insensitively trivialises indeed legitimises a whole spectrum of undesirable behaviour
which undermines a child’s dignity and autonomy, through unwelcome intrusions.
Setting aside the Bombay High Court’s judgement, the Apex Court observed that the matter at hand
would be an appropriate situation for using the “mischief rule” of statutory interpretation. It emphasises
that courts must constantly interpret the law in order to prevent harm and promote the remedy. In
this view, the top court’s judgement observed that the High Court’s interpretation not only restricts the
implementation of the legislation but also seeks to pervert its objective.
1. Reporting of Offences
As per Section 19 of the said Act,
“a. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, any person (including
the child), who has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has
knowledge that such an offence has been committed, he shall provide such information to the
Special Juvenile Police Unit, or the local police.
b. Every report given under sub-section (1) shall be ascribed an entry number and recorded in writing;
be read over to the informant shall be entered in a book to be kept by the Police Unit.
c. Where the report under sub-section (1) is given by a child, the same shall be recorded under sub-
section (2) in a simple language so that the child understands the contents being recorded.
d. In case contents are being recorded in the language not understood by the child or wherever it
is deemed necessary, a translator or an interpreter, having such qualifications, experience and on
payment of such fees as may be prescribed, shall be provided to the child if he fails to understand
the same.
With satisfactory explanation to the delay, the prosecution’s case cannot be discarded or disbelieved
merely on the grounds of delay in FIR. “Delay in filing of FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula
to doubt the authenticity of the prosecution evidence”.
In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh versus Gian Chand, (2001) 6 SCC 71, the Supreme Court has
rightly held that delay in filing of FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to doubt the authenticity
of the prosecution evidence. When an explanation for the delay is offered it is the duty of the courts to
analyse if the same is satisfactory or not. In the event the prosecution fails to establish the reason for
the delay in lodging of the FIR, it should be checked whether there is a possibility of embellishment or
exaggeration in the version of the prosecution.
2. Ordering of Summons/Appearance
The summons for appearance of the child victim should not be as a formal summons as sent to the
other witnesses. The docket order should read as to the following and summons for examining the
child victim need to:
a. Specify the exact time of recording of the statement.
b. Specify that the child victim to be accompanied by any one of the parents/persons who is in trust
and confidence with child.
c. If the court finds that the interpreter/expert/translator is necessary for examination of child victim
necessary summons need to be ordered on requisition of the Investigating Officer. Police officer
not to be employed to interpret the evidence of witnesses in cases prosecuted by the police.
Can approach the Judicial Magistrate/Presiding Need to approach the CJM/CMM with an
Officer of Special Court with an application to application for necessary nomination of Judicial
record the statement of a witness/victim under Magistrate to record the statement of an
164 CrPC accused under 164 CrPC
Oath needs to be administered for child witness Oath need not be administered
after testing the competency
Special Courts
For the purpose of providing a speedy trial, the State Government shall in consultation with the Chief
Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, designate each district, a Court of
Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under the POCSO Act, 2012, provided that, if a Court
of Session is notified as Children’s Court under the Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005
or a Special Court designated for similar purposes under any other law for the time being in force, then,
such Court shall be deemed to be a Special Court under Section 28 of the Act of 2012.
Section 31 of the POCSO Act provides for application of the provisions of the code to proceedings
before the designated Special Court under the POCSO Act and for the purposes of the said provisions,
the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions. Section 31 which makes the provision
of the code applicable to proceedings under the POCSO Act, however, begins with “save as otherwise
provided in this Act”, which would imply that the provisions of the code would be applicable to
proceedings before the designated Special Court under the POCSO Act, unless otherwise provided
under the said Act.
A conjoint reading of the afore stated provisions The designated Special Court, upon receipt
under Sections 31 and 42A would indicate that of the police report, transmitted through
unless a different procedure is provided under the the Magistrate, was fully empowered to
POCSO Act, the provisions under the Code would be take cognizance of the offence, without the
applicable; however, in case of any inconsistency, requirement of the accused being committed to
the provisions of the POCSO Act would have an it for trial, in view of the procedure prescribed
overriding effect. under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the Act.
The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Ravi versus State of Uttar Pradesh, application bearing
number 5009 of 2021 preferred under section 482 of the code, decided on 16 December 2021, held that
“The POCSO Act being a special enactment the procedure prescribed therein would be required to be
followed. The applicability of the provisions of the Code as per the deeming clause under Section 31 of
the Act is only to the extent provided therein and in view of Section 42A the provisions of the Act shall
have an overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of inconsistency. This leads to
an inference that unless a different procedure is provided under the POCSO Act, the provisions under
the Code would be applicable; however, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of the POCSO Act
would have an overriding effect.
Section 33(1) of the Act which empowers the Special Court to take cognizance of any offence, without
the accused being committed to it for trial, marks a departure from the general procedure under the
Code and in particular Section 193 thereof which stipulates that the Court of Session cannot take
cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it
by the Magistrate under the Code.
Sub-section (1) of Section 33 would therefore have the effect of waiving the otherwise mandatory
requirement of Section 193 of the Code and in a way, it lifts the embargo under Section 193. The procedure
provided under Section 33(1) with regard to the power of the Special Court to take cognizance, without
any committal of the accused, to the extent of any inconsistency, would override the general provisions
under the Code, by virtue of the provisions under Section 42A read with Section 31 of the POCSO Act.”
Section 29 of the POCSO Act creates a ‘presumption of guilt’ on the part of the accused if he/she is
prosecuted for committing, abetting or attempting certain offences. Section 30 therefore stipulates
that in a prosecution under the POCSO Act, where the offence requires the existence of a culpable
mental state, the court is to presume the existence of such culpable mental state on the part of the
accused, while of course giving to the accused the right to rebut it beyond reasonable doubt. Again
therefore, there is a presumption of culpability coupled with the right of the accused to rebut such
presumption.
The Delhi High Court on 11 January 2023 issued certain guidelines in the interest of the victim considering
the facts that she is not traumatised again and again by re-living the said incident by being present in
Court proceedings (Criminal Appeal No. 198/2020 titled Babu versus State). The Bench directed that
during bail hearings of a POCSO case, the following guidelines shall be adhered to:
y The Investigating Officer shall ensure that timely service of notice of bail application is made on the
victim/prosecutrix, so that he/she gets reasonable amount of time to enter appearance and make
her submissions.
y The Investigating Officer while serving notice/summons of the bail application to the victim/
prosecutrix shall make relevant inquiries about the victim and his/her circumstances and shall
document the same in order to assist the Court in the hearing of the bail application and to facilitate
effective representation and participation on behalf of the victim.
y The Investigating Officer should ensure that while making such enquiries the victim is not made to
feel uncomfortable or questioned like an accomplice to a crime.
y If the victim gives it in writing that his/her counsel/parent/guardian/support person shall appear
on his/her behalf and make submissions on the bail application, insistence on physical or virtual
presence of the prosecutrix should not be made. A written authorisation of the victim authorising
another to make submissions on her behalf (after victim is duly identified by the Investigating Officer)
and said authorisation is forwarded by the Station House Officer, should suffice.
y If the victim has appeared in Court on one date of hearing of a bail application, his/her presence
on subsequent dates can be dispensed with and either his/her counsel or parent representing the
victim in court can be permitted to make submissions on behalf of the victim. On the day of the first
appearance of the victim/prosecutrix, his/her submissions qua the bail application can be recorded
by the Court and the same maybe used for the purpose of adjudicating on the bail application.
y Further, after the bail application is disposed-off, the copy of the order should be mandatorily sent
to the victim.
In Navin Dhaniram Baraiye versus The State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC Online Bom 1281, the Bombay
High Court has held as under:
“18. A perusal of the above quoted provision does show that it is for the accused to prove the contrary
and if he fails to do so, the presumption would operate against him leading to his conviction under
the provisions of the POCSO Act. It cannot be disputed that no presumption is absolute, and every
presumption is rebuttable. It cannot be countenanced that the presumption under Section 29 of
the POCSO Act is absolute. It would come into operation only when the prosecution is first able to
establish facts that would form the foundation for the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act
Section 34: Procedure in Case of Commission of Offence by Child and Determination of Age
by Special Court
(1) Where any offence under this Act is committed by a child, such child shall be dealt with under the
provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000).
(2) If any question arises in any proceeding before the Special Court whether a person is a child or
not, such question shall be determined by the Special Court after satisfying itself about the age of
such person and it shall record in writing its reasons for such determination.
(3) No order made by the Special Court shall be deemed to be invalid merely by any subsequent proof
that the age of a person as determined by it under sub-section (2) was not the correct age of that
person.
In Jarnail Singh versus State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, it was held that the process of age
determination as per Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (JJ Act, 2000) is
applicable to victims of crime as much as children in conflict with the law.
In K Muthu Mariappan versus The State Represented by the Inspector of Police, 2015 (3) MLJ (Crl) 429,
the Madras High Court held that in the absence of the prosecutrix’s birth certificate, an age inquiry can
be conducted by relying on other documents/certificates that prove her date of birth. In the present
case, the Court held that the certificates submitted by the prosecution, i.e., school matriculation
certificates (in the absence of the birth certificate), which contain the date of birth of the prosecutrix,
are public documents and will not lose their value at least as a corroborative piece of evidence for
want to examination of the person who gave the information regarding date of birth. The said document
would duly corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix to prove her date of birth.
In Manoj Vishwakarma versus State of Chhattisgarh, Cr. Rev. No. 138/2017, the accused filed a revision
petition in the Chhattisgarh High Court as he was aggrieved by the order passed by the Special Judge
under the POCSO Act, which held that the applicant was not a juvenile on the alleged date of commission
of the offence. The accused challenged this order and argued for his juvenility under Section 102 of
the JJ Act, 2015. The Chhattisgarh High Court allowed the petition and held that in the present case,
the Special Judge had not determined the age of applicant in accordance with Section 94(2) of the JJ
Act, 2015. The Court held that the Special Judge had erred by relying on the “kotwari register”, which
was not a statutory document prescribed under Section 94 of the JJ Act 2015 for the purpose of
determining the age of the accused. The Court further held that, in the absence of a birth certificate or
a matriculation certificate, the Special Judge should have determined the age of the accused through
a bone ossification test or the latest medical age determination test.
(2) The Special Court shall complete the trial, as far as possible, within a period of one year from the
date of taking cognizance of the offence.
In the case of Alakh Alok Srivastava versus Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 291, the Supreme Court of India
laid down guidelines to be followed by the Special Courts while trying a case under the POCSO Act,
2012 so that the trial is completed within a period of one year from the date of taking cognizance of
the offence, as provided under Section 35 Act. The guidelines are provided as under:The High Courts
are responsible for ensuring that cases filed under the POCSO Act are heard and decided by Special
Courts and that the presiding officials of such Courts are trained in child protection and psychological
reaction.
1. If not previously done, the Special Courts should be constituted and given the role of dealing with
matters brought under the POCSO Act.
2. The Special Courts should be given instructions to expedite cases by not granting superfluous
adjournments and following the procedure outlined in the POCSO Act, allowing the trial to be
completed in a time-bound manner or within a certain time period set forth in the Act.
3. The Chief Justices of the High Courts have been asked to form a three-judge committee to control
and supervise the progress of the POCSO Act cases. In the event that three judges are not available,
the Chief Justices of the respective courts will form a Judge Committee.
4. A Special Task Force will be formed by the Director-General of Police or a state authority of
comparable rank to guarantee that the investigation is properly handled, and witnesses are
presented on the dates set before the Trial Courts.
5. The High Courts must make appropriate efforts to create a child-friendly environment in the
Special Courts, keeping in mind the requirements of the POCSO Act, to ensure that the spirit of
the Act is upheld.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the Special Court may record the statement of a child through
video conferencing or by utilising single visibility mirrors or curtains or any other device.
Landmark Judgements
Child Prostitution
Vishal Jeet versus Union of India
AIR 1990 SC 1412: 1990 Cri LJ 1469: 1990 (3) SCC 318: 1990 (2) SCR 861
Decided on: 02-05-1990
Bench: S Ratnavel Pandian and K Jayachandra Reddy, Supreme Court of India
Facts: PIL at the instance of Advocate as Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of Constitution of India
seeking issuance of certain directions, directing the Central Bureau of Investigation (1) to institute an
enquiry against those police officers under whose jurisdiction Red Light Areas (pg. no. 165).
Issue: Child prostitution – Directions.
FIR
Youth Bar Association of India versus Union of India
AIR 2016 SC 4136: 2016 (8) SCALE 611: 2016 (9) SCC 473: 2017 Cri LJ 1093
Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 68 of 2016
Decided on: 07-09-2016
Bench: Dipak Misra and C Nagappan
Directions to be issued:
1. An accused is entitled to get a copy of the First Information Report at an earlier stage than as
prescribed under Section 207 of the CrPC.
2. An accused who has reasons to suspect that he has been roped in a criminal case and his
name may be finding place in a First Information Report can submit an application through his
representative/agent/parokar for grant of a certified copy before the concerned police officer or to
the Superintendent of Police on payment of such fee which is payable for obtaining such a copy
from the Court. On such an application being made, the copy shall be supplied within 24 hours.
3. Once the First Information Report is forwarded by the police station to the concerned Magistrate
or any Special Judge, on an application being filed for certified copy on behalf of the accused, the
same shall be given by the Court concerned within two working days. The aforesaid direction has
nothing to do with the statutory mandate inhered under Section 207 of the CrPC.
4. The copies of the FIRs, unless the offence is sensitive in nature, like sexual offences, offences
pertaining to insurgency, terrorism and of that category, offences under the POCSO Act and such
other offences, should be uploaded on the police website, and if there is no such website, on the
official website of the State Government, within 24 hours of the registration of the FIR so that
the accused or any person connected with the same can download the FIR and file appropriate
application before the Court as per law for redressal of his grievances. It may be clarified here that in
case there is connectivity problem due to geographical location or there is some other unavoidable
difficulty, the time can be extended up to 48 hours. The said 48 hours can be extended maximum
up to 72 hours and it is only relatable to connectivity problems due to geographical location.
5. The decision not to upload the copy of the FIR on the website shall not be taken by an officer
below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or any person holding equivalent post. In case,
the states where District Magistrate has a role, he may also assume the said authority. A decision
taken by the concerned police officer, or the District Magistrate shall be duly communicated to the
concerned jurisdictional Magistrate.
6. The word ‘sensitive’ apart from the other aspects which may be thought of being sensitive by
the competent authority as stated hereinbefore would also include concept of privacy regard
Solved Question
Q. What is the definition of ‘sexual harassment’, under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012?
Ans.
Sexual Harassment
Under section 2(j) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, it is said that ‘sexual
harassment’ has the same meaning as assigned to it in Section 11. Section 11 covers six situations
which constitute an offence of sexual harassment.
Section 11 of the POCSO Act declares the acts to be held as the sexual harassment. Section 11 of the
POCSO Act catalogues the following acts: a person is said to commit sexual harassment upon a child
when such person with sexual intent:
1. utters any word or makes any sound, or makes any gesture or exhibits any object or part of body
with the intention that such word or sound shall be heard, or such gesture or object or part of body
shall be seen by the child; or
2. makes a child exhibit his/her body or any part of his body so as it is seen by such person or any
other person; or
3. shows any object to a child in any form or media for pornographic purposes; or
4. repeatedly or constantly follows or watches or contacts a child either directly or through electronic,
digital or any other means; or
5. threatens to use, in any form of media, a real or fabricated depiction through electronic, film or
digital or any other mode, of any part of the body of the child or the involvement of the child in a
sexual act; or
6. entices a child for pornographic purposes or gives gratification therefor.
Explanation to Section 11 states that, any question which involves “sexual intent” shall be a question
of fact.