Bar Feb 1999
Bar Feb 1999
Matthew asked Drake if he could buy a gun from him. Drake agreed to sell a gun to
Matthew at an agreed upon price. Later, Drake and his friend John decided they would only
pretend to sell Matthew the gun. Their intent was to "rip off" Matthew. They figured they
would point the gun at Matthew and scare him into letting them keep the money and the gun.
The next day, Matthew, Drake, and John met to complete the transaction. They got
into Matthew's car and drove to a nearby parking lot. Matthew gave Drake the money and
Drake gave the gun to Matthew. Drake then told Matthew that he wanted to show Matthew
an interesting feature, and asked Matthew to give the gun back to him. Matthew complied.
Drake then loaded the gun, and he and John got out of the car with the money and the gun.
Drake pointed the gun at Matthew's head and said 'You better not say anything about this to
anybody." At that moment the gun fired, killing Matthew.
QUESTION:
Discuss what common law felony crimes Drake could be charged with, and what
arguments he might make to counter those charges. Qhe jurisdxtion where the trial is to be
held follows the majority rule .)
QUESTION 2
Beginning on September 1, and continuing through October 31, the Daily News
published the following announcement each day in its newspaper:
On October 1, the Daily News received a word list from Alice Adams. Attached to the
word list was a note in which Adams wrote that she had included proper nouns and foreign
words because sometimes judges did not follow the rules and she wanted to have the longest
list.
On October 10, Barbara Burns delivered her word list to the Daily News. Her list
conformed to the published rules.
On October 20, Cathy Cook called the News and asked what would happen if two or
more contestants tied for the longest wordlist. The receptionist checked with the publisher and
then told Cook that, in that case, the winners would split the $2000. Cook then compiled her
list, which conformed to the rules, and delivered it to the Daily News.
On November 1, the Daily News announced that Burns and Cook had tied for first place
and that each would be awarded $1000. Adams read the announcement, reviewed the winning
lists, and discovered that, even without the improper words, her list had every word that
appeared on the winning lists plus ten additional words. When she called the newspaper to
complain, she was told that she had been disqualifiedfrom the contest because of her note and
the paper had not counted the words in her list.
QUESTION:
Your law firm represents the Daily News. Adams, Burns, and Cook each claim to be
entitled to $2000 under the rules of the contest. Please advise your client regarding each
claim.
QUESTION 3
In 1970, Amy built two homes on a piece of property she owned. She constructed a
driveway between the homes, just wide enough for a single car to use. The dnveway was, and
continues to be, the only way to reach the attached garages in the rear of each home. After
construction was completed, Amy moved into one of the homes. She allowed her brother,
Mark, to use the other home rent free. Both Amy and Mark used the common driveway to
access their garages.
In 1997, Amy &ed and her son Donald inherited all of her property. Donald allowed
Mark to continue living in the house for a month after Amy's death. Mark paid Donald $300
for the month's stay. Donald then told Mark to immediately vacate the house because he,
Donald, intended to sell it. Mark refused, but nevertheless, Donald had Mark evicted and sold
the house to Mary.
Shortly thereafter, Donald sold the home Amy lived in to Sally. Soon after moving in,
Sally decided to put an addition on her home that would extend to the center of the common
driveway. (She no longer uses the garage behind her home.)
The deeds for both homes were properly recorded and established the property line
down the center of the common hveway.
QUESTIONS:
1. Discuss the rights, if any, under which Donald required Mark to vacate the house
and whether Mark had any defenses.
2. Discuss whether Mary can block Sally from building the proposed addltion to her
house.
QUESTION 4
Officer Oliver was staking out a burnt out, boarded up building that was used as
a drop off point for drug transactions. A little after midnight, Officer saw Dave Defendant
go into the house. He had seen Defendant go in and out of the house on previous occasions.
Fifteen minutes later, Defendant came out carrying a small package and placed the
package in the trunk of h s car. After Defendant got in the car, but before he could drive
off, Officer stopped him. Officer then searched the car and found the package in the trunk.
It contained a kilo of heroin. Officer then arrested Defendant.
QUESTION:
ABC Corporation ("ABC"), a midsized corporation incorporated under the laws of the
State of Imagination, is a software company. The State of Imagination follows the Model
Business Corporations Act.
ABC has been in the news for the past year and a half because it is a star in launching
new software products. Recently, after about two months of steady publicity, ABC released
its newest product, Web Alert. Web Alert is designed to alert parents when their children have
contacted inappropriate Internet sites.
Peter Piper is an investor looking to "make it big" in the stock market. Peter saw the
publicity about Web Alert and invested a substantial sum of money in purchasing stock in ABC
prior to release of Web Alert, hoping to make a hefty return on his investment.
Unfortunately, on the day that Web Alert was released, ABC's largest competitor, XYZ
Corporation, released a similar product called Mommy Watch. All of the trade papers and
news media called Mommy Watch the most innovative product of the decade. The positive
press for Mommy Watch and XYZ Corporation sent its stock soaring and the stock of ABC, its
competitor, plunging.
Peter is disgusted. He thinks that the Board of Directors and the officers of ABC should
have seen this coming, and that they improperly failed to take action to prevent the stock from
plummeting. He wants to sue ABC because he has lost a substantial amount of money due to
the drop in value of the stock. He is certain that other investors in ABC lost money also.
QUESTION:
Discuss possible actions Peter may have against ABC, and what he must do in order
to file suit against the corporation.
QUESTION 6
Arlo and Bubba have been neighbors for years. Recently, Bubba decided to allow
persons to dump unwanted materials on his property for a fee. He has stated he will accept
anything h m old refrigerators to spent nuclear material. Bubba intends to start construction
of the dumping facility in about 30 days.
Arlo fears that Bubba's operation will contaminate adjacent properties, includmg his
own.
QUESTION:
Discuss what action Arlo might be able to take in Federal Court to obtain relief pending
the final resolution of a suit against Bubba. Assume that jurisdictional and venue
requirements are not a problem.
QUESTION 7
On a Saturday night a t approximately 11:30 p.m., nine year old Sally was skating a t
the Whoville ice skating rink. While skating, Sally's leg was slightly injured when a piece of
debris was playfully kicked in her direction by another skater, a twenty-five year old mentally
disabled person. Sally had previously injured the leg in the same place when she fell earlier
in the evening a t the rink. The fall was caused by Sally stumbling on debris that had
accumulated on the ice.
A Whoville city ordinance, enacted "to reduce juvenile violence, crime, and other
misconduct," forbade children under the age of fifteen to be at "movie theaters, bowling alleys,
or other places of public amusement" after 11 p.m. on weekends unless accompanied by an
adult. Sally's mother had left Sally a t the skating rink a t 6 p.m. on the night in question,
intending to pick her up a t 10 p.m. Sally's mother, however, failed to pick up Sally until 11:45
p.m. that evening.
The previously described injuries caused a latent condition to flare up in Sally's leg,
eventually resulting in loss of the limb.
QUESTION:
Identify and &scuss potential tort claims Sally may have against (1) the mentally
&sabled person, and (2) the skating rink. Also hscuss any possible defenses to these claims.
QUESTION 8
The City of Brotherly and Sisterly Love adopted an ordinance prohibiting "speech or
symbols that arouse anger in, deride or insult another on the basis of race." The City h a s
charged a member of the Segregation Forever Society under that ordinance for displaying an
emblem above the entrance to its headquarters. The City alleges that the emblem is racially
derisive andinsulting because the motto on the emblem proclaims that "Separate Is Inherently
Desirable."
QUESTION:
Discuss any constitutional grounds upon which the ordinance may be challenged.
QUESTION 9
Tyrone Testator properly executed his last will and testament in 1997. It provided as
follows:
Tyrone died in a fire which occurred at his home in July of 1998. The home was totally
destroyed in the fire and was not covered by insurance. At the time of his death, Tyrone's car,
which was undamaged in the fire, was worth $25,000. Tyrone also had 3,000 shares of IBM
stock and $50,000 in cash accumulated from IBM dividends. (The IBM stock had split giving
Tyrone an additional 1,000 shares.)
It was determined that Tyrone's nephew, Mack, started the fire in order to get back at
Tyrone for leaving him out of hls will. Mack was convicted of arson for his misdeed.
rUESTION:
IU Discuss what interests Bill, Mary and Marty have in Tyrone's estate. Assume that the
niform Probate Code is in effect in this jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 1
Drake could be charged with the following common law felonies: conspiracy to
commit robbery, robbery, felony murder, and murder. With respect to the murder charge,
Drake might more appropriately be convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
If convicted of all crimes charged, the murder or manslaughter and robbery convictions would
merge into the felony murder conviction. The conspiracy conviction would not merge into the
robbery or felony murder convictions.
Conspiracy
The elements of conspiracy are: (1) an agreement between two or more people,
(2) with the specific intent to enter an agreement, and (3) with the specific intent to commit
a crime. The majority rule is that the conspirators must also commit a n overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Wharton's Criminal Law (15th Edition), 55 6 78-684.
Here, Drake and John expressly agreed to sell Matthew a gun and then to retain both
the money and the gun. The day after they entered into their agreement, they acted on their
plan, thus committing overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Robberv
The elements of robbery are: a taking of the property of another person from his person
or in his presence by force or intimidation and without his consent with the intent to
permanently deprive the victim of the property. The threats must be of immediate death or
serious physical injury to the victim, and must be made either before or immediately after
taking the property. Wharton's Criminal Law (15th Edition), 88 454, 455, 457-63.
Here, after selling Matthew a gun and accepting his money, the gun became Matthew's
property. Drake took the gun back with the intent to permanently deprive Matthew of the gun
(contrary to his representation that he only wanted to show Matthew a feature of the gun,
Drake never intended to give the gun back to Matthew). And, although Matthew gave the gun
back to Drake when Drake said he wanted to show Matthew a feature of the gun, Matthew did
not consent to letting Drake keep the gun permanently. Drake took the gun from Matthew's
person, and pointed the gun a t his head while cautioning him not to say anything, thus
satisfying the requirement that the property be taken by force or threat.
Some examinees might argue that Drake is guilty of larceny rather than robbery. The
elements of larceny are: the taking and carrying away (asportation) of the property of another
without the victim's consent and with the intent to permanently deprive him of the property.
The primary ddference between larceny and robbery is that robbery involves the use of force
or threats, while larceny does not. Here, Drake clearly used threats to steal the gun, so is
guilty of robbery.
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 1
Page Two
Felonv Murder
Murder
If Drake were acquitted of the robbery charge, he could not be convicted of felony
murder. Thus, the prosecution should separately charge him with murder.
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Wharton's
Criminal Law (15th Edition), $5 114 and 139; Model Penal Code, $ 210.2.
Nevertheless, here, Drake did not specifically intend to kill Matthew, and probably did
not even intend to cause him serious bocldy harm. However, Drake probably acted recklessly.
Aperson acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial or unjustifiable risk that
a certain result will follow, and this disregard constitutes a gross deviation fiom the standard
of care that a reasonable person would use under similar circumstances. Wharton's Criminal
Law (15th Edition), $ 145. By pointing a loaded gun at Matthew's head, even if just to scare
him, Drake arguably knew of and consciously disregarded the risk that Matthew would be
shot.
The prosecution should charge Drake with murder, but the jury might find him guilty
of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is the criminally
negligent killing of another person. A person is criminal negligent when he fails to be aware
of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will follow, and such failure constitutes a
substantial deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 1
Page Three
would exercise under the circumstances. To determine whether a person acted negligently, an
objective standard is used. Here, a t the very least, by pointing a loaded gun a t Matthew's
head, Drake ignored the substantial risk that Matthew would be shot. 2 Wharton's Criminal
Law (15th Edition), 55 168, 169, 171.
Merger
Lesser included offenses merge into greater offenses. A lesser included offense is one
that consists entirely of some, but not all, elements of the greater crime.
Here, if Drake were convicted of all crimes charged (conspiracy to commit robbery,
robbery, felony murder, and murder or manslaughter), some of his convictions would merge.
S p e ~ ~ c a l lbecause
y, the robbery was the underlying felony for the felony murder conviction,
it is a lesser included offense of felony murder, and would merge into the felony murder
conviction. See Boulies v. P e o ~ l e770
, P.2d 1274 (Colo. 1989).
Conspiracy does not merge with the completed offense. Thus, conspiracy conviction
would not merge into either the felony murder or robbery convictions.
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 2
Under common law, the announcementpublishedin the Daily News constituted an offer
to contract. An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to
justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will
conclude it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 24. The announcement clearly specified
all terms necessary for a reader to understand that he or she was invited to create and deliver
to the Daily News the longest list of conforming words.
The offer created powers of acceptance in Adams, Burns, and Cook. An offer may create
a power of acceptance in anyone or everyone who renders a specifiedperformance. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, section 29(2); see Chang v. First Colonial Savings Bank, 4 10 S.E.2d 928.
931(Va. 1991). Because the offer was directed to any "Word Builders" and published in the
newspaper, it created a power of acceptance in the general public. See also Lefkowitz v. Great
Minneapolis Surplus Store, 86 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn. 1957).
Adams did not accept the offer because she dld not perform its specified terms. An
acceptance must comply with the requirements of the offer as to the performance to be
rendered. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 58. Although offers may be interpreted
in accordance with common understanding in order to permit inconsequential variations, an
intentional violation of the rules does not sufficiently comply with the terms of the offer. Id.
Comment A. See also Scott v. People's-Monthly Co., 228 N.W. 263, 266 (Iowa 1929) ("Other
contestants, who substantially complied with the rules, should not lose to one who
intentionally and deliberatelyviolated them."). By deliberatelyincludingnonconformingwords,
Adams failed to accept the offer.
If Adams' performance did not constitute acceptance, the Daily News was under no duty
to Adams. Although a defective performance may operate as a counter-offer, silence by the
original offeror does not operate as acceptance of the counter-offer except under exceptional
circumstances not present here. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sections 69 and 70. As
noted in section 70, comment a: "The exceptional cases where silence is acceptance fall into
two main classes: those where the offeree silently takes offered benefits, and those where one
party relies on the other party's manifestation of intention that silence may operate as
acceptance."
Conversely, by delivering conforming word lists to the Daily News before November 1,
Burns and Cook both accepted the offer and by their performances supplied consideration to
support contracts with the Daily News. Any performance which is bargained for can constitute
consideration unless it involves the performance of a legal duty or forbearance to assert an
invalid claim. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sections 70, 73, 74.
Although both Burns and Cook are entitled to enforce those contracts, there is an issue
as to the amount of prize money which must be awarded to each under the contract. The Daily
News asserts that they are to split the $2,000. Burns will argue that she is entitled to the
entire $2,000 because she found the most words, which was the term of the contract as it was
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 2
Page Two
announced by the offer. Where the interpretations ofboth parties are reasonable, a court will
normally interpret the term against the party who supplied it, in this case, the Daily News.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 60. Accordingly, the Daily News will prevail against
Bums only if a court finds that Burns' interpretation is unreasonable. Since both
interpretations are reasonable, Burns should recover the full $2,000 because she had fully
performed the contract under its terms.
Cook cannot make the same argument as Bums to claim the full $2000. The Daily
News clearly explained the terms of the contract to Cook prior to her performing under the
contract. An offer may be modified or withdrawn before it is accepted. See Lefiowitz, supra.
An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeror manifests a n intention not to
enter into the proposed contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 742. Because
Cook was told that in case of a tie, the winners would split the $2000 before she accepted by
compiling and delivering it to the Daily News receptionist, Cook accepted that modified term
as part of a new offer, and is entitled only to $1,000.
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 3
I. Part (a): Donald's Arguments that he can demand Mark vacate the house immediately
Amy as owner of the second home allowed her brother, Mark, to live there. However,
she did not convey in writing any interest in the house to Mark. Consequently, Mark cannot
have any real property interest in the house since the Statute of Frauds requires a real
property conveyance to be in writing. Additionally, after Amy died and Donald inherited the
houses, Donald didn't convey any property interest in the house to Mark.
Upon Amy's death, Donald inherited all of her property, including her interest as it
relates to Mark. Amy allowed Mark to live in the house so he is not a trespasser; he at least
has a license to be in the house. However, a license is typically terminable at will. Therefore,
if Mark is a licensee, Donald is free to require him to vacate immediately. Even if a new license
was created by Donald when he allowed Mark to continue living in the house, Donald still
would have the right to demand that Mark vacate. Alternatively, the fact that Mark has lived
in the house for a long time may establish a tenancy despite the Statute of Frauds. However,
since Mark has not paid rent, any resulting tenancy that can be implied would be at most a
tenancy at will. Like a license, a tenancy at will is terminable by the lessor at will without any
notice. (See Cunningham, Stoebuck & Whitman, The Law of Property (2nded. 1993) 5 6.18
& 6.19 at 269-71)
11. Part (b): Mary's arguments that Sally cannot build her addition to her house
The deed conveying the property from Donald to Mary did not contain any express
language with regard to an easement. Nevertheless, Mary can argue an implied easement
over the half of the driveway owned by Sally was created by the conveyance. Typically, an
implied easement based on prior use requires the following:
(a)Commonownership of the property prior to severance; @)Severanceof the property into two
or more separate parcels with ownership in one of the parcels being transferred to a third
party; (c)Continuation of the use right after severance is necessary for the uselenjoyment of
the dominant estate; and (d)Prior to the severance, part of the land was apparently used for
the benefit of another part of the land (called a "quasi-easement").
(See Cunningham, Stoebuck & Whitman, The Law of Property (2nded. 1993) 8 8.4 at 445-47)
Initially, Amy owned both houses. Subsequently, Donald inherited the houses from Amy
upon her death. He then severed the land into two parcels with the boundary line between
them running down the center of the common driveway. He first conveyed one parcel to Mary;
subsequently, he conveyed the other parcel to Sally. Therefore the first two requirements,
above, are satisfied.
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 3
Page Two
At the time of the initial severance - the sale of one house to Mary - it can be argued that
it was necessary for Mary to use the half of the common driveway located on the land Donald
retained. The driveway was only as wide as a single car; additionally, it was the only way to
reach the garage located a t the rear of Mary's house. Consequently, the third requirement,
above, is met since absent the right to use the entire common driveway Mary will be unable
to put her car in her garage.
Prior to Donald selling one house to Mary, the common driveway had been used for many
years to reach the garages behind each of the two homes. If the two homes hadbeen separately
owned during this time, the use of the common driveway by each owner would have involved
using the portion of the driveway located on their neighbor's property. Additionally, in such a
situation each home would be both a dominant and servient estate since half of the common
driveway wouldbe on each homeowner's land. Finally, the use of the common driveway would
be both obvious and apparent to any observer. Consequently, the final requirement above, the
"quasi-easement" requirement is satisfied.
If Mary can establish that an implied easement by prior use was created when Donald sold
the house to Mary, she can seek to enjoin Sally from buildlng her addition because the addltion
would block half of the common driveway thereby interfering with Mary's easement.
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 4
Under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, evidence derived from a warrantless
search must be suppressed unless it fits within one or more of the six exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Michigan v. Tvler. 436 U.S. 499 (1978). Here, because Officer Oliver did not
obtain a warrant to search Dave's car, the exceptions must be examined.
The first possible exception is for'a "search incident to a lawful arrest." Weeks v. U.S.,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). The question whether a search prior to the actual arrest fits with this
exception has been left open by the Supreme Court. Michigan v. L o n ~463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
Even if the exception covered such situations, it would not apply here because it only extends
to searches of the passenger compartment, and not to the trunk. New York v. Belton. 453 U.S.
454 (1981).
The second possible exception is the "stop and frisk" exception, which requires the
officer to have an articulable and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and is limited to a
protective frisk for weapons. Term v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). When the suspect is in an
automobile, the protective frisk extends to the passenger compartment of the car. Michigan v.
Long. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Here, Officer Oliver's previous observations of Dave going in and
out of the house and seeing Dave bring a small package out constituted an articulable and
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Ker v. California. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Nonetheless,
there is no indication he thought Dave was armed, and, in any event, his search went beyond
the passenger compartment.
The third possible exception is the "plain view" exception. Coolidge v. New Ham~shire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971). To fit within this exception 1) the police must legitimately be on the
premises, 2) inadvertently discover the fruits of the crime, and 3) see the evidence in plain
view. Id. Here Officer Oliver was legitimately on the premises and stopped Dave because he
had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was taking place. However,
he could not have inadvertently seen the heroin in plain view, as it was wrapped up in the
trunk.
The fourth exception is the "consent" exception, which requires that consent be
voluntarily given before a search commences. Z ~ v.
D U.S.. 328 U.S. 624 (1946). Here, no
consent was given.
The final possible exception is the "automobile" exception, which requires that the
officer have probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence or instrumentalities of a
crime before he searches it. Carroll v. US., 267 U.S. 132 (1925). It is not limited to the
passenger compartment, but extends to the trunk and packages w i t h it. U.S.V. Ross. 456
U.S. 798 (1982). Here, because Officer Oliver had probable cause prior to the search, see Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), and the heroin was found in the trunk, the automobile
exception is met and the heroin is admissible.
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 5
In this case, the initial determination to make is whether or not there is an actual basis
for a lawsuit, or whether Petm'slosses are simply the result of the vagaries of the marketplace.
If it is established that the drop in stock value here is actionable, then the most likely cause
of action would be a possible shareholder derivative action. Shareholder derivative actions are
those lawsuits brought by a shareholder of a corporation to obtain relief for alleged wrongs
committed against the corporation. Brooks v. Land drill in^ Co., 564 F. Supp. 1518 (D.C. Colo.
1983). Such actions can be used only where it is evident that the facts and circumstances
make it clear that a corporation will not take action to remedy a particular situation that is
injurious to itself. Id.The theory of shareholder derivative proceedings is that any harm done
in a situation such one which harms the value of the stock of the corporation, is done not to the
individual but to the corporation. Nicholson v. Ash, 800 P.2d 1352 (Colo. App. 1990). In other
words, a stockholder may only maintain a personal action against a corporation if the type of
injury complained of is unique to that shareholder, see id. This does not appear to be the
situation here. Rather, the drop in the value of the stock in this case appears to be harm done
to the corporation and not to the individual, and thus, may be proper for a shareholder
derivative action.
Beyond this threshold inquiry, certain preliminary steps be taken prior to filing suit.
First, a shareholder must make a written demand upon the corporation. Id.at section 7.42(1),
and either the claim must have been rejected by the corporation,or 90 days must have expired,
or "irreparable injury" to the corporation must be inevitable by waiting the 90 days. Id. So,
Peter must make a demand upon the Board of Directors of the corporation to right the alleged
wrong. This would provide an opportunity for the corporation to correct its actions in the
interest of the corporation. Once the demand is made, Peter would need to allow the
corporation 90 days to solve the problem, or meet one of the other elements of section 7.42.
Additionally, it is imperative that the shareholder bringing suit "fairly and adequately
representrs] the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation." Id.at
section. 7.41(2). This means that a shareholder should represent not just his own interests,
but those of all other shareholders. Peter, then, must be representing the interest of the
corporation in this special type of civil suit designed to be brought in the right of a corporation.
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 6
These facts raise the issue of potential injunctive relief under Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Since there is no question concerning jurisdictional and venue
requirements in the Federal Court, the discussion should proceed directly to the requirements
and considerations under Rule 65. The purpose of the Rule, and injunctive relief in general,
is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be decided. See, generallv, Rule
65(b); and Resolution Trust Con, v. C r u q 972 F.2d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir.1992). Either the
granting or denial of a preliminary injunction is immediately appealable as of right. $ee 28
U.S.C.A. §1292(a)(l).
A Temporary Restraining Order may also be a remedy in the event that there would
irreparable loss or damage prior to being able to have a hearing, and if notice is given or a
specific reason or certification is provided for failing to give the notice. See Rule 65(b); and
Hos~italResources Personnel. Inc.. v. United States, 860 F.Supp. 1554, 1556 (S.D.Ga.1994).
Generally, a decision to grant or deny a temporary restraining order is not appealable. See
Robinson v. Lehman, 771 F.2d 772, 782 (3d Cir.1985). The facts of this case, however, seem
to not demonstrate a need for a temporary restraining order. TRO's are only good for 10 days
and the threatened harm does not appear to be likely to occur before a hearing on an injunction
can be obtained. See generally Rule 65(b).
The type of notice which must be given an opposing party to obtain a preliminary
injunction (as opposed to a temporary restraining order) is not specifically set out in Rule 65.
Nonetheless, notice is required. Western Water Management. Inc. v. Brown, 40 F.3d 105,109
(5th Cir.1994). Usually, the courts will require that a t least a copy of the motion for
preliminary injunction be sewed, and notification given of the date of a preliminary hearing.
See Parker v. Rvan, 960 F.2d 543,544 (5th Cir.1992). The court must hold a hearing before
granting or denying a preliminary injunction, but the scope and timing of that hearing is up
to the discretion of the trial court. Rule 65(a)(2); and see Cam~bellSOUD Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d
467 (1st Cir.1995); and Gom~ertsv. Chase, 404 US. 1237, 92 S.C. 16, 30 L.Ed.2d 30 (1971).
The hearing on preliminary injunction can, in a proper circumstance, be consolidated with the
trial on the merits. Rule 65(a)(2).
See S & R Corn. v. JiffvLube International, Inc, 968 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.1992).
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 6
Page Two
If an order is entered granting a preliminary injunction, the order must be specific, set
forth in detail the acts to be restrained, and the reasons for the issuance of order. The order
is binding only upon the parties to the action, persons who act in concert with them, and those
who receive actual notice of the order. Rule 65(d).
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 7
The mentally disabled person may also be liable to Sally for battery -- the intentional
touching of another person with intent to harm or offend. Restatement (Second) of Torts $513,
18. The fact that the person was acting playfully will not bar recovery, as long as the act was
not lawful or privileged. Vosbur~v. Putnev, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891). The elements
of battery are (1) defendant's intent to make contact with another; (2) defendant's act resulted
in contact with another and (3) the contact was harmful or offensive. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts 813, 18 (1965)
A person normally takes the tort victim as he finds her. Vosburg v. Putnev. supra.
Therefore, the fact that Sally previously had been injured, and had a latent condtion, would
be no defense to her claim.
The rink may be guilty of negligence in allowing debris to accumulate on the ice, if it
had notice of and a reasonable opportunity to remove it before the accident. Mendoza v. Citv
of Comus Christi, 700 S.W.2d 652 vex. App. 1985). If found negligent, the rink can be liable
for the reasonably foreseeable injuries to Sally, including the later exacerbation of her injury
by the mentally disabledperson.McPeake v. Cannon, 381 Pa. Super. 227,553 A.2d439 (1989).
The rink also may be negligent for not removing the debris that caused the second
injury. Sally is an invitee of the rink rather than trespasser or licensee, and as such, can
recover if the rink failed to reasonably protect against damages of whch it knew or should
have known. Mile Hiah Fence v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971). As with the
mentally handicapped person, the rink takes its victim as it finds her.
The rink may contend Sally was contributorily negligent in not seeing or avoidmg the
debris, thus barring or reducing her recovery. In determining this issue, Sally will be held to
the standard of care of a minor of like age, intelligence, and experience. Restatement (Second)
of Torts 8283A.
The negligence of Sally's mother in not picking her up by 11:OO p.m. cannot be charged
to Sally as her child. Public Service Co. v. Pettv, 75 Colo. 454, 226 P. 297 (1924)
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 8
The city's ordinance must be measured against First Amendment principles which
prevent the gdvernment from abridging or impairing freedom of speech. see also Article 2,
Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution. A statute properly may criminalize speech which
constitutes "fighting words." Cha~linskvv. New Ham~shire,315 U.S. 568, 572,62 S.Ct. 766,
769,86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); Whimbush v. Peo~le,869 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Colo. 1994). "Fighting
words," however, must plainly tend to incite or animate an immediate breach of peace or
unlawful conduct, or to provoke immediate retaliatory action or violence. Cha~linskv,a t 572;
Whimbush, a t 1248; Goodme: v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,523 (1972). I t is debatable whether the
message on the building's headquarters, even if taken as arousing anger, derisive or insulting,
tends toward such imminent incitement.
The law in question may also be unconstitutionally overbroad. Given the preferred
status accorded to free speech by the federal and state constitutions, a statute which restricts
speech must be narrowly drawn to avoid crirninalizing an intolerable range of constitutionally
protectedconduct. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,112, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 1697,109 L.Ed.2d 98
(1990); P e o ~ l v.
e Batchelor, 800 P.2d 599,602 (Colo.1990); P e o ~ l v.
e Smith, 862 P.2d 939, 941
(Colo. 1993). If a statute substantially infringes upon constitutionally protected speech while
proscribing speech which is not constitutionally protected, it will be struck down as facially
overbroad. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2917, 37 L.Ed.2d 830
(1973); Batchelor, 800 P.2d a t 601; Smith, 862 P.2d a t 941. The regulation may be a basis not
only for prosecuting individuals whose opinions simply may be objectionable but also those that
represent a political perspective and do not necessarily provoke a violent response. Because
of the potential to regulate speech merely because it is "offensiveto some who hear" it, the law
probably sweeps too broadly. Gooding, 405 U.S. a t 527.
(While the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth are often interrelated, they are
conceptually distinct. Whereas an overbroad law substantially burdens protected speech, an
impermissibly vague law fails to provide fair notice of what conduct is prohibited and allows
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Board of Education v. wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 703
(Colo. 1998).)
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 8
Page Two
Finally, the regulation singles out racially significant speech and does not proscribe
expression that insults or offends other groups. Moreover, as a practical matter, the law
operates to silence only those who are bigoted in their views. "Fighting words" or abusive
speech that does not invoke the illegal subject of race would seemingly be useable freely by
those arguing in favor of racial tolerance and equality, but not by their opponents. The law
accordingly may be struck down too on grounds of illegal content or viewpoint discrimination.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,2547-48 (1992). Given its deficiencies, the ordinance
does not appear capable of surviving a First Amendment challenge.
DISCUSSION FOR QUESTION 9
BILL'S INTERESTS:
Bill is clearly entitled to 2,000 shares of the IBM stuck. A specific devisee has a right
to the specifically devised property in the testator's estate. Uniform Probate Code Sec. 2-
606(a). Tyrone's gift to Bill was a specific devise because it is a gift of a particular item of
property separate and distinct from any other property of the estate.
The second issue is whether Bill is entitled to the additional 1,000 shares due to the
stock split. Under the Uniform Probate Code Sec. 2-605(a), if a testator executes a will that
devises securities, and the testator then ownedsecuritiesthat meet the description as set forth
in the will, the devise includes any additional securities acquiredby the testator after the will's
execution as result of an action initiated by the organization that issued the securities,
including stock splits. Hence Bill would be entitled to distribution of the additional 1,000
shares of IBM stock if they were in the estate at the time of Tyrone's death.
Third, is Bill entitled to the accumulated dividends from the IBM stock? Under the
Uniform Probate Code Sec. 2-605(b), cash distributions made before death with respect to a
described security are not part of the devise. Therefore, the $50,000 in dividends from the
stock are not part of Tyrone's devise to Bill.
MARY'S INTERESTS:
Under the Uniform Probate Code Sec. 222-606(a)(3),a specific devisee is entitled to any
unpaid fire or casualty insurance proceeds or other recoverv for iniurv to ~ r o ~ e r t Tyrone
v. did
not have insurance on the house so there are no insurance proceeds. However, the Personal
Representative has the authority under the Uniform Probate Code Sec. 3715(22) to prosecute
claims of the estate. Therefore, the representative may resolve the matter prior to final
distribution. Mary would be entitled to any proceeds from a lawsuit against Mack if the
Personal Representative is successful in recovering the value of the house from Mack.
MARTY'S INTERESTS:
The clause that gives Marty the rest, residue and remainder of Tyrone's estate is called
the residuary devise. A residuary devise consists of the all property remaining in the estate
after satisfying all of the specific, general and demonstrative gifts. Marty is therefor entitled
to Tyrone's car and the accumulated cash, including the IBM dividends because that property
was not otherwise devised by Tyrone's estate.
Seat
Please use blue or black Den
and write numbers clearly
General
1. Identify elements of contract (offer, acceptance, consideration).
Adams
5. Because she deviated from the published rules, Adams did not
accept the offer.
-
Burns
6. By delivering conforming word lists to the Daily News by November 1,
Burns/Cook accepted the offer.
10. If the written offer is interpreted to mean that each winner is entitled
to $2000, then Burns had fully performed before Daily News
clarified the terms to her and thus can enforce the original
contract.
-
Cook
1 1. Because the offer to Cook was not accepted until she was notified
of the change, she accepted the changed term by compiling and
delivering her entry.
eFl
43953
Essay 3 Gradesheet
1.
2.
.
Like a license, a tenancy a t will is terminable a t will by the lessor or her death. 3.
Mark could argue that he had a month to month lease because of the $300
he paid to Donald. 4.
8. Automobile exception. 8.
In this case, the wrong done to the corporation - a drop in the value
of the stock -is not unique to Peter Piper and therefore, he must
bring suit through a shareholder derivative action.
Peter Piper may allege that the board of directors and officers breached
its Duty of Care to the corporation.
The board of directors and officers may defend against Peter's suit
on the basis of the "Business Judgment Rule."
Injunctive relief preserves the status quo until the case can
be decided.
7a. That he will suffer irreparable harm (no adequate remedy a t law).
7b. That the injunction would not cause excessive harm to Bubba.
1.
Essay 9 G r a d e s h e e t Seat
lb. Bill is not entitled to any of the dividends from stock. Cash
dstributions made by IBM before death relating to a
described security are not part of devise. lb.