Changing Dimension of Capital Punishment and

Judicial Pronouncement in India

By:

Dr. Kalpana V. Jawale Dr. Vivek V. Jawale

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

Abstract:

The history of capital punishment in India shows, during the midlevel period inflection of
death penalty was commonly practiced for the elimination of criminals. In 19th century, however
the public opinion disfavored the use of capital punishment for offences other than the heinous
crimes. The irrevocable and irreversible nature of death penalty gave rise to a number of
complications which invited public attention towards the need for abolition of this sentence.
Many Asian counties removed capital punishment but in 21st century capital punishment plays an
important role in India and it is awarded in rarest of rare cases only.

___________________________________________________________________________

The aims of punishment are now considered to be retribution, justice, deterrence,

information and protection and modern sentencing policy reflects a combination of several or all
these aims. The retributive element is intended to show public revulsion to the offence and to
punish the offender for his wrong conduct. In the concept of justice as an aim of punishment
growing emphasis is laid upon it by much modern legislation but judicial opinion towards this
particular aim is varied an rehabilitation will not usually be accorded precedence over deterrence
means both that the punishment should fit the offence and also that like offences should receive
similar punishment.

Under Indian penal code death sentence may be awarded on the offenders in the following
cases only:-

· Waging war against the government of India.1

· Abetting mutiny actually committed.2

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 · Giving or fabricating false evidence upon which an innocent person suffers death.3
· Murder.4
· Murder by a life convict.5
· Abetment of suicide of a minor or insane or intoxicated person.6
· Attempt to murder by a person under sentence of imprisonment for life if hurt is caused.7
· Kidnapping for ransom, etc.8
· Dacoit accompanied with murder. 9
Death sentence can also be awarded under special statute like POTA, Narcotics, Drugs, and
Psychotropic Substance Act.

India stands poised between the global trend to end the death penalty and those nations
that continue to execute. Like many of the diminishing number of nations that still apply the
death penalty, over the last two decades, India has reduced the number of executions carried out.
The Indian judiciary has ruled that the death penalty for murder must be restricted to the "rarest of
rare" cases, but this instruction has been contradicted by the legislature increasing the number of
offences punishable by death. The death penalty is mandatory under two of the relevant laws,
including for drug-related offences. Death sentences have been imposed on people who may have
been children at the time of the crime, and on people suffering from mental illness. There are
grave concerns about arbitrariness and discrimination in the processes that lead to people being
sentenced to death. Such factors would render India's use of the death penalty to be in violation of
international laws and standards.

Amnesty International is urging the Government of India to declare an immediate

moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty. As an emerging global and
regional power and a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
international human rights treaties, India has an opportunity to exercise regional leadership and to
strong signal of its determination to fully uphold human rights by abolishing the death penalty.

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 In the past three decades, great strides have been made towards a world free from
executions. In 1980 only 25 countries had abolished the death penalty for all crimes. That figure
now stands at 91, with a further 11 countries having abolished the death penalty for 'ordinary'
crimes but retained it for offences such as treason or under military law. Thirty-three countries are
considered by Amnesty International to be 'abolitionist in practice' in that they retain the death
penalty for ordinary crimes such as murder but have not executed anyone during the past 10 years
and are believed to have a policy or established practice of not carrying out executions, meaning
that a total of 135 of the world's nations have turned their back on capital punishment in law or
practice.

At the end of 2007, some 14 countries in Asia Pacific still retained the death penalty,
including China, where executions outnumber those in the rest of the world combined. However,
there is movement towards abolition in the region. In 2006 and 2007 respectively, the Philippines
and the Cook Islands abolished the death penalty joining those 17 other Asia Pacific countries
that have abolished the death penalty for all crimes. Twenty seven countries have now abolished
the death penalty in law or in practice in the Asia Pacific region. In South Korea and Mongolia
there have been legislative initiatives to abolish the death penalty. There have also been increased
levels of regional activism against the death penalty by individuals and civil society groups.3

At independence in 1947, India retained the 1861 Penal Code which provided for the
death penalty for murder, requiring judges to state the reasons if a death sentence was not
imposed. During the drafting of the Indian Constitution between 1947 and 1949, several members
of the Constituent Assembly expressed the ideal of abolishing the death penalty, but no such
provision was incorporated in the Constitution. Private members' bills to abolish the death penalty
were introduced in both houses of parliament over the next two decades, but none of them was
adopted.

In 1973, the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty for
the first time in the case of Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.10. In the same year, a new Code of
Criminal Procedure was adopted. The new Code required judges to note 'special reasons' when
imposing death sentences and required a mandatory pre-sentencing hearing to be held in the trial
court. The requirement of such a hearing was obvious, as it would assist the judge in concluding
whether the facts indicated any 'special reasons' to impose the death penalty.

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 In 1980, the Supreme Court again upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in the
key case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab11 with other case, although the bench was not
unanimous. The judgment called for aggravating and mitigating circumstances with reference to
both the crime and the convicted prisoner to be considered in passing sentence and emphasized
that the death penalty should be used only in the 'rarest of rare' cases. In this case Minority
Judgment, published in 1982, in which he argued that the death penalty was unconstitutional,
Justice Bhagwati of the Supreme Court identified a number of problems within the criminal
justice system:

"Our convictions are based largely on oral evidence of witnesses. Often, witnesses perjure
themselves as they are motivated by caste, communal and factional considerations.
Sometimes they are even got up by the police to prove what the police believe to be a true
case. Sometimes there is also mistaken eyewitness identification and this evidence is
almost always difficult to shake in cross-examination. Then there is also the possibility of a
frame up of innocent men by their enemies. There are also cases where an overzealous
prosecutor may fail to disclose evidence of innocence known to him but not known to the
defence. The possibility of error in judgment cannot therefore be ruled out on any
theoretical considerations. It is indeed a very live possibility..."

Justice Bhagwati's concerns in 1982 reflected concerns raised 35 years earlier by members
of India's Constituent Assembly when they drew up its constitution. In this case the Supreme
Court also ruled that the death penalty should be used only in the "rarest of rare" cases. More than
a quarter of a century later, it is clear that through the failure of the courts and the State
authorities to apply consistently the procedures laid down by law and by that judgment, the
Court's strictures remain unfulfilled.

In 1991, a Supreme Court bench again upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in
Smt. Shashi Nayar v. Union of India and others12. The Court did not go into the merits of the
argument against constitutionality, arguing that the law and order situation in the country had
worsened and now was therefore not an opportune time to abolish the death penalty. An argument
which assumes executions address such situations.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has reversed two practices that had been observed for
several decades in capital cases. The first practice was not to impose a death sentence where the

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judges hearing the case had not reached unanimity on the question of sentence or of guilt. The
second was not to impose a death sentence on a person who had previously been acquitted by a
lower court. Since 1999 and 2003 respectively, the Supreme Court has imposed or upheld death
sentences in such cases.

In a 1994 Supreme Court judgment Rampal Pithwa Rahidas v. State of Maharashtra13,the

Court observed that 'the manner in which the investigating agency acted in this case causes
concern to us. In every civilised country the police force is invested with the powers of
investigation of the crime to secure punishment for the criminal and it is in the interest of society
that the investigating agency must act honestly and fairly and not resort to fabricating false
evidence or creating false clues only with a view to secure conviction because such acts shake the
confidence of the common man not only in the investigating agency but in the ultimate analysis in
the system of dispensation of criminal justice. In this case, the trial court had sentenced eight
people to death. The High Court upheld the sentences of five of them, but the Supreme Court
acquitted them all, noting that the main evidence against them was not trustworthy. The Court
noted sarcastically that the main witness's memory constantly improved his testimony at the trial
three years after the incident was observed to be far more detailed than his confessional statement
recorded a few days after the incident). The Court concluded that the witness was pressured by
the police to give evidence because "the investigation had drawn a blank and admittedly the
District Police of Chandrapur was under constant attack from the media and the public."

In a judgment in 2001 Sudama Pandey and others v. State of Bihar14 relating to a case in
which the trial court had sentenced five people to death for the attempted rape and murder of a
12-year-old child, the High Court had commuted the sentences, but the Supreme Court noted that
it was unfortunate that the High Court did not also properly review the evidence. Acquitting the
accused, the Supreme Court noted that both the trial court and the High Court had committed a
serious error by appreciating circumstantial evidence, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. In an
indictment of the lower judiciary, the Supreme Court remarked: "The learned Sessions Judge
found the appellants guilty on fanciful reasons based purely on conjectures and surmises -- It is
all the more painful to note that the learned Sessions Judge, on the basis of the scanty, discrepant
and fragile evidence, found the appellants guilty and had chosen to impose capital punishment on
the appellants."

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 In Krishna Mochi and others v. State of Bihar15 a three-judge bench disagreed over the
sentence imposed on one of the appellants, while agreeing on the conviction and upholding the
death sentence awarded to three other appellants. In a dissenting judgment, Justice Shah argued
that the shortcomings in the investigation and the evidence that only proved the presence of the
accused at the scene of the offence meant that this could not be a fit case for imposing the death
penalty. On the other hand, he observed, "this case illustrates how faulty, delayed, casual,
unscientific investigation and lapse of long period of trial affects the administration of justice
which in turn shakes the public confidence in the system."

Exemption to minor and mentally retired person:

The ICCPR prohibits the use of the death penalty against people who were under 18
years old at the time of the crime16, as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, another
international human rights treaty to which India acceded in 1992 17 . Indian law came into
conformity with this prohibition in 2000 with the passage of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act 2000. Before that, it was lawful for a boy of 16 to be sentenced to
death, but prior to 1986 there was no minimum age prohibition, contrary to India's obligations as
a party to the ICCPR.

While the current legal position must be welcomed, the practice has not been clear-cut
due to disputes over the age of offenders (birth registration in India is at about 50 per cent, but the
level varies considerably across states). In such cases, as shown by the present study, the Supreme
Court has not given individuals the benefit of the doubt and has upheld death sentences in cases
in which there was evidence that the individuals may have been under 18 at the time of the
offence. One such person - Amrutlal Someshwar Joshi - was executed in Pune Central Jail on 12
July 1995; the Supreme Court had dismissed the defence counsel's plea that a medical
examination be carried out to determine his age Amrutlal Someshwar Joshi v. State of
Maharashtra II18.

Safeguard 3 of the UN Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing

the Death Penalty states that "the death penalty shall not be carried out on persons who have
become insane." In resolution 2005/59, adopted on 20 April 2005, the UN Commission on
Human Rights urged all states that still maintain the death penalty 'not to impose the death

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penalty on a person suffering from any mental or intellectual disabilities or to execute any such
person'.

The study found that while the Supreme Court had looked at various facets of mental
health as a factor in adjudicating on sentencing, there was no consistent response to concerns
about mental health, and no established practice of seeking medical evidence in the face of such
concerns. In several cases the Court commuted sentences on grounds of questions over the mental
health or state of mind of the appellant, while in other cases such questions were ignored. Access
to mental health professionals by condemned prisoners or by the accused at trial stage is
extremely limited in India. There is no current research on the subject.

The study identified a number of concerns about legal representation in capital cases. The
concerns included lawyers ignoring key facts of mental incompetence, omitting to provide any
arguments on sentencing, or failing to dispute claims that the accused was under 18 years of age
at the time of the crime despite evidence to the contrary. These facts came to light only because
they were observed by the Supreme Court in their judgments. On other occasions the Supreme
Court may have disregarded evidence of the absence or ineffectiveness of counsel, leading the
authors of the study to conclude that the number of accused in capital trials who were been served
by inadequate counsel is probably high but remains unknown.

It should not be necessary to underline the importance of adequate legal representation

for those facing trial in capital cases, particularly at the earliest stages. For them it can literally be
a matter of life or death. Crucially, the higher judicial fora hearing appeals in India are
constrained by being able to consider only the evidence brought before the trial court. Although a
High Court has the powers to issue directions for fresh evidence to be introduced, these powers
are rarely used. Hence the quality of defence evidence at the trial stage is of utmost importance. It
is not just evidence relating to the innocence or culpability of the accused which can be vital, but
also evidence relevant to the court's consideration of mitigating factors when deliberating on
sentence -- social, personal, psychological or cultural information that shows the context of the
crime and the character of the accused. The absence of such evidence in the sentencing process
can seriously prejudice the way in which the case is treated through the remaining judicial
process.

With a large number of the accused in capital trials poor and illiterate reflecting the
general picture for the criminal justice system as a whole, even where individuals may be able to
afford legal representation, the quality, ability and experience of counsel in capital cases are

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unknown variables. This is particularly problematic as regards legal aid counsel. The study noted
the lack of legal aid and legal representations immediately after arrest and during remand and bail
proceedings. Legal representations at these stages can play a vital role in preventing torture and
ill-treatment, which can result in forced confessions. This is particularly problematic in cases
where detainees are detained under anti-terrorism legislation, where the law has allowed for long
periods in police detention and for confessions made to a police officer to be used as evidence.
Furthermore, the study noted that the need for legal aid and legal representation during
preparation of mercy petitions and in filing writ petitions in the Supreme Court or the High Court
after completion of the appeals stage has not been adequately addressed, either by the state which
has responsibility for ensuring provision of such services or by the Supreme Court in its
adjudication of individual cases.

Terrorist Activities and Capital Punishment:

The study highlighted cases of people sentenced to death under successive special anti-
terrorist laws. Major concerns include the broad definition of 'terrorist acts' for which the death
penalty can be imposed; insufficient safeguards on arrest; provisions allowing for confessions
made to police to be admissible as evidence, unlike the provisions under ordinary criminal
procedure; obstacles to confidential communication with counsel; insufficient independence of
special courts from executive power; insufficient safeguards for the principles of presumption of
innocence; provisions for discretionary in camera closed trial; provisions for secrecy of
witnesses' identity; and limits to appeal.

The cases examined in the study that have been tried under special anti-terror laws not
only reveal capital trials in which safeguards for fair trial have been inadequate; they also raise
concerns that the suspension of safeguards has been resorted to far too broadly, encompassing
cases that should not have been tried under special legislation at all, such as kidnapping and
communal violence. The fact that the death penalty is involved only serves to heighten the
concern.

Devender Pal Singh v. State, N.C.T. of Delhi and anr19 Devinder Pal Singh Bhullar was
sentenced to death by a designated court in 2001 under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act 1987 after being found guilty of involvement in the 1993 bombing of the Youth
Congress Office in Delhi, which led to the deaths of many persons. The prosecution's case was
that he had voluntarily confessed to his role in the bombing to the police. The prosecution relied

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almost solely on this alleged confession by the accused, which he subsequently retracted. The
Supreme Court, sitting as a court of first appeal under the TADA, confirmed the death sentence in
2002. In a dissenting judgment, Justice Shah of the Supreme Court recommended acquittal of the
accused, doubting the veracity and voluntary character of a confessional statement made to a
police officer. Justice Shah concluded that there was no evidence to convict Bhullar and that a
dubious confession could not be the basis for awarding the death sentence. But the majority
bench, upholding the sentence, merely suggested that such concerns could be taken into account
by the executive during their decision on clemency. Devinder Pal Singh Bhullar's mercy petition
remains pending before the President. He is currently on death row in Tihar Jail, Delhi.

Judicial Discretion and Capital Punishment:

While successive Supreme Court constitutional benches have favoured judicial discretion
rather than the setting out of detailed guidelines on sentencing, the study demonstrated that
judicial discretion has proved inadequate as a safeguard against arbitrariness. The judgments in
numerous cases demonstrate that the courts, including the Supreme Court, have not always
followed the existing law and jurisprudence on death penalty cases consistently. In the same
month, different benches of the Supreme Court have treated similar cases differently, often
apparently reflecting their own positions for or against the death penalty. While in one case the
defendant's youth could be a mitigating factor sufficient to commute the death sentence, in
another it could be dismissed as a mitigating factor. In one case the gruesome nature of the crime
could be sufficient for the Court to ignore mitigating factors and in another case a similar crime
was clearly not gruesome enough.

Dhananjoy Chatterjee alias Dhana v. State of West Bengal20, In August 2004, Dhananjoy
Chatterjee was executed for the 1990 rape and murder of a girl in the apartment building where
he worked as a guard. He was the first person to be hanged in India for over six years, ending a de
facto moratorium on executions.

Three days after the execution, a similar case of rape and murder of a child was heard on
appeal by the Supreme Court Rahul alias Raosaheb v. State of Maharashtra21 The victim in the
former case was 13 years old; in the latter she was four-and-a-half. Neither of the accused had a
previous criminal record, and in neither case was any report of misconduct while in prison. Yet
the Supreme Court deemed Dhanajoy Chatterjee a menace to society and not only was his

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sentence upheld by the Court but he was subsequently hanged. In Rahul's case, he was not
deemed a menace, and his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. It is ironic that even
while upholding Dhananjoy Chatterjee's death sentence in 1994, Justice Anand of the Supreme
Court accepted that there were huge disparities in sentencing. He noted: 'Some criminals get very
harsh sentences while many receive grossly different sentence for an essentially equivalent crime
and a shockingly large number even go unpunished thereby weakening the system's credibility.'
Two contradictory events over three days show that a decade later, the inconsistencies remain.

Dhananjoy Chatterjee had completed over 14 years in prison, most of them under
sentence of death and in solitary confinement, before he was executed in August 2004. No action
had been taken on his case for nine years because the West Bengal state officials had failed to
inform the High Court of the rejection of his mercy petition by the state governor. These facts
were not considered a ground for commutation by the Supreme Court, which refused to be drawn
on the issue of delay in dismissing appeals on his behalf in 2004.

In the case of Gurmeet Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh22 the Supreme Court similarly
refused to take into account a delay of a number of years, caused in this case by the negligence of
staff of the High Court of Allahabad. In March 1996 Gurmeet Singh had sought special leave
from the High Court to appeal to the Supreme Court after the High Court had confirmed his death
sentence. Despite several reminders sent by the jail authorities, there was no response from the
High Court. Finally, after a petition had been filed in the Supreme Court, an inquiry was ordered
which found that officials of the High Court had been negligent in failing to respond, and action
was initiated against the officers responsible. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court refused to
commute the sentence on the ground of delay, relying on the position that only delays in mercy
petitions would be material for consideration. Gurmeet Singh is currently on death row in Uttar
Pradesh.

In a judgment delivered in December 2006, a Supreme Court bench admitted the Court's
failure to evolve a sentencing policy in capital cases Aloke Nath Dutta and ors. v. State of West
Bengal23. The bench examined judgments over the past two decades in which the Supreme Court
adjudicated upon whether a case was one of the 'rarest of the rare' or not and concluded: "What
would constitute a rarest of rare case must be determined in the fact situation obtaining in each
case. We have also noticed hereinbefore that different criteria have been adopted by different

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benches of this Court, although the offences are similar in nature. Because the case involved
offences under the same provision, the same by itself may not be a ground to lay down any
uniform criteria for awarding a death penalty or a lesser penalty as several factors therefore are
required to be taken into consideration." The frustration of the Court was evident when it stated:
"No sentencing policy in clear cut terms has been evolved by the Supreme Court. What should we
do?'

In that particular ruling, the Court commuted the appellant's death sentence. On the same
day, however, another bench of the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence imposed on an
appellant who had convicted of murdering his wife and four children Bablu @ Mubarik Hussain
v. State of Rajasthan24 . After referring to the importance of reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders as among the foremost objectives of the administration of criminal justice in the
country, the judgment merely referred to the appellant's declaration of the murders as evidence of
his lack of remorse. There was no discussion of the specific situation of the appellant, the motive
for the killings or the possibility of reform in his case.

Mercy petition and Capital Punishment:

An appeal to a higher court during the judicial process is based on a challenge to the
evidence heard at trial that has a bearing on the guilt of the accused or on the sentence imposed.
The process focuses on the appreciation of evidence placed before the courts and is therefore
circumscribed both by the nature of the evidence and by the rules for assessment of the evidence.
In contrast, the commutation powers of the executive are not limited by the evidence that can be
considered by the courts. Mercy petitions to the executive are therefore often based on
background personal and social factors that explain the conduct of the convicted person, their
psychological and cultural background and other special features, including material that could
not be placed before the courts. In practice, the exercise of clemency has even more potential for
arbitrariness than the judicial process, especially since there is no requirement to give reasons for
either accepting or rejecting mercy petitions, and decisions are neither reported widely nor
published. The absence of transparency in the clemency process is a serious concern, especially
since the executive may be subject to pressures extraneous to the case.

In the case of Gurmeet Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh25 the Supreme Court similarly refused
to take into account a delay of a number of years, caused in this case by the negligence of staff of

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the High Court of Allahabad. In March 1996 Gurmeet Singh had sought special leave from the
High Court to appeal to the Supreme Court after the High Court had confirmed his death
sentence. Despite several reminders sent by the jail authorities, there was no response from the
High Court. Finally, after a petition had been filed in the Supreme Court, an inquiry was ordered
which found that officials of the High Court had been negligent in failing to respond, and action
was initiated against the officers responsible. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court refused to
commute the sentence on the ground of delay, relying on the position that only delays in mercy
petitions would be material for consideration. Gurmeet Singh is currently on death row in Uttar
Pradesh.

The Criminal Procedure Code 1973 also contains a provision of death sentence. Section
354 (3) of the code provides that while awarding the sentence of death, the court must record, “a
special reason” justify the sentence and state as to why and alternative sentence would not meet
the ends of justice in that particular. Commenting on this provision of the code Mr. Justice V.R
Krishna Iyer of the Supreme Court OF India observed that the special reasons with Section
354(3) speaks of provides reasonableness as envisaged in Article 19 as a relative connotation
dependent on a variety of variables, cultural, social, economical and otherwise26.

The rationale of the above procedural safeguards and the awful consequences of a death
sentence on the convict, his family and society were considered by the Supreme Court once again
in the case of Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar27 in this case the Apex Court held that when the
court is called upon to choose between the convict cry ‘I, want to live’ and the prosecutor’s
demands “he deserves to die “, it must show a high degree of concern and sensitiveness in the
choice of sentence.

The Supreme Court further observed that special reason clause contained in Section 354(3)
of Cr. P. C. implies that the court can imposed extreme penalty of death in fit cases. The
provision of section 235(2) of the code calls upon the court that the convicted accused must be
given an opportunity of being hurt on the question of sentence. This provides the accused an
opportunity to place his antecedents, social and economic background and mitigating and
extenuating circumstances before the court.

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 Besides the statutory provisions the Constitution of India also empowers the President and
the governor28 of the state to code of offenders in appropriate cases. These powers are, however
co-extensive with the legislative powers, the power to cut short a sentence by an act of executive
clemency is not subject to judicial control. It is exclusive domain of the executive in India and
elsewhere.

The magistracy has more offend than not use Section 354(3) of the code of Cr.P.C to
justify its stand either in support of or against capital punishment. The abolitionists see these
provisions of green signal for dilution of capital punishment while for the receptionists the special
reasons contemplated by Section 354(3) implicitly suggest that death sentence is legally and
constitutionally permissible.

Conclusion:

In India Capital Punishment plays an important role in the rarest of rare cases. If we find
out ratio of the capital punishment in India, very few cases in which this sentence is granted.
There are so many cases in which the Supreme Court converted capital punishment into life
imprisonment, these grounds may be as under-

· it constitutes a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment;

· secondly, it is irrevocable;
· thirdly, it is capable of being inflicted on the innocent;
· fourthly, it does not act as a deterrent to crime;
· Fifthly it is a violation of the right to life provisions of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and other international covenants.
Turning to the international situation, we find that the UN General Assembly has taken
the official position that it is desirable to abolish the death penalty in all countries, that it should
not be introduced for crimes to which it does not already apply, that the crimes to which it applies
should be progressively reduced and that it should be employed only for the gravest of crimes.
But a large number of UN member states including India have not respected this decision.

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References:
1. Section 121 Indian Penal Code.
2. Section 132 Indian Penal Code.
3. Section 194 Indian Penal Code.
4. Section 302 Indian Penal Code.
5. Section 303 Indian Penal Code.
6. Section 306 Indian Penal Code.
7. Section 307 Indian Penal Code.
8. Section 364 Indian Penal Code.
9. Section 364A Indian Penal Code.
10. AIR 1973 SC 947
11. AIR 1980 SC 898
12. AIR 1992 SC 395
13. (1994) Supreme Court Cases 478
14. AIR 2002 SC 293
15. 2002) 6 SCC 81
16. Article 6(5) of The ICCPR
17. Article 37(a) Convention of the Rights of the Child, 1992.
18. (1994) 6 SCC 200
19. (2002) 5 SCC 234
20. (1994) 2 SCC 220
21. (2005) 10 SCC 322.
22. AIR 2005 SC 3611
23. MANU/SC/8774/2006
24. AIR 2007 SC 697
25. AIR 2005 SC 3611
26. Rajendra Prasad v.State of UP, AIR 1979 SC 916 (931)
27. AIR 1989 SC 1456
28. Article 72 of the Constitution of India.

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