Anne Peters Corruption and Human Rights

MPIL RESEARCH PAPER SERIES | No.
2023-18
Human Rights and Corruption: Problems and

Potential of Individualising a Systemic Problem
Anne Peters
ISSN 2702-9360
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4553701

MPIL RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
No. 2023-18
HUMAN RIGHTS AND

CORRUPTION: PROBLEMS AND
POTENTIAL OF INDIVIDUALISING
A SYSTEMIC PROBLEM
AUTHORS
Anne Peters
EDITORIAL DIRECTORS
Armin von Bogdandy, Anne Peters
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Moritz Vinken
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Verena Schaller-Soltau
Angelika Schmidt
2
ISSN 2702-9360
All MPIL Research Papers are available on the MPIL website at https://www.mpil.
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Copyright remains with the author
Suggested citation
Peters, Anne, Human Rights and Corruption: Problems and Potential
of Individualising a Systemic Problem (August 28, 2023). Max Planck
Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL)
Research Paper No. 2023-18, forthcoming in the International Journal of
Constitutional Law 2024.
Available at SSRN:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4553701
3
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed.
3
ABSTRACT
This article examines the pitfalls and potentials of the recent deliberate legal-political strategy of individu-
alising the systemic problem of corruption. Correlations between the quantity and quality of corruption on
the one side and the level of enjoyment of human rights on the other side have been shown. In response
to these observations, the policy agendas of anti-corruption and human rights have been converging on
the international and regional levels. Nevertheless, it is not easy to conceptualise corruption as a human
rights violation that triggers international state responsibility. Moreover, risks and opportunities of the con-
vergence of the policy agendas need to be assessed. This leads to the conclusion that the human rights
approach does convey an added value that outweighs its drawbacks. The question remains whether
human rights are the proper normative framework to denounce and combat corruption. It is submitted
that, by opening up new options for monitoring and litigation, the human rights perspective can usefully
complement the criminal law approach. Therefore, the currently one-sided integration of corruption con-
cerns into the human rights machinery should be supplemented by a full attention to human rights in all
monitoring schemes in the various anti-corruption regimes. Then, the relevant policies will likely create
a positive feedback loop in which anti-corruption is instrumental to improving the human rights situation
while a range of human rights will work as enablers for fighting corruption.
KEY WORDS:
human rights, corruption, state responsibility, negative impact on enjoyment of human rights, systemic
integration, causation, attribution
MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2023-18

4
Accepted for publication in I CON 2024
Human Rights and Corruption: Problems and Potential of Individualising a

Systemic Problem*
Anne Peters**
Introduction
Corruption, the misuse of entrusted power for an undue advantage, stands in complex relationships to
human rights. Human rights first of all benefit individuals, in ‘recognition of the inherent dignity’ of
each single human being, to cite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In contrast, corruption is
a systemic harm, posing threats ‘to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions
and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the
rule of law’, as the preamble of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) puts it.
This article examines the pitfalls and potentials of the recent deliberate legal-political strategy of
‘individualising’ or ‘humanising’ such a systemic issue. Section 1 recalls evidence for correlations and
causalities between the quantity and quality of corruption on the one side and the level of enjoyment of
human rights on the other side; and it distinguishes four types of legal relationships between both
issues. Section 2 recounts how the policy agendas of anti-corruption and human rights have been
converging on the international and regional levels. Section 3 conceptualises corruption as a human
rights violation that triggers international state responsibility. Section 4 assesses risks and opportunities
of the convergence of the policy agendas and concludes that the human rights approach conveys an
added value that outweighs its drawbacks. Section 5 explains which concrete measures the human
rights-based approaches to corruption imply in practical terms. The contribution ends with a broader
reflection on whether human rights are the proper normative framework to denounce and combat
corruption (sec. 6).
1. Mapping complex interrelations

States perceived to be highly corrupt are at the same time those with a poor human rights record: the
states ranked lowest on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index of 2021 are South
Sudan, Syria, and Somalia, all of which have massive human rights problems.
Conceptually, the level of corruption and the prevalence of human rights violations in a country can be
seen as two sides of the same coin, because they seem to have common root causes related to the
legal culture and the weakness of state institutions. Corruption, the rule of money, is the negation of the
rule of law, and therefore antithetical to human rights protection.
More concretely, corruption corrodes the State’s capacity to guarantee human rights both in a material
and an ideational way: first, it diverts the public revenues and cripples the state budgets that should
provide services and thus reduces the availability, quality and accessibility of goods and services that
support the realisation of human rights.1 Second, corruption destroys public trust in the government,
the judiciary, and elections.2
* Accepted for publication in International Journal of Constitutional Law 2024.

** Prof. Dr Dr h.c. Anne Peters, LL.M. (Harvard), Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law in Heidelberg, Titular Professor at the University of Basel, Honorary Professor at the University of
Heidelberg and the Freie Universität Berlin and L. Bates Lea Global Law Professor at the Law School of the University
of Michigan.
1
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Comm. on Enforced Disappearances, Comm. on
Migrant Workers, Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Joint Statement
on “Corruption and Human Rights”, ¶ 6 (May 31, 2021)[hereinafter Joint Statement].
2
Off. High Comm’r Hum. Rts. (2018), United Nations Human Rights Management Plan 2018-2021, at 44, U.N. Doc.
HRC/NONE/2018/17/Rev. 1, [hereinafter OHCHR Management Plan]; Hum. Rts. Council Res. 45/9, U. N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/45/9, at 2 (Oct. 6, 2020).
ISSN 2702-9360 MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2023-18 1

Additionally, corruption appears to facilitate and aggravate human rights violations, especially against
vulnerable groups such as prison inmates, migrants, and children. Overall, corruption often runs in the
background and is an operative factor for arbitrary restrictions of rights and for discrimination in all
sectors of public services, ranging from the health and educational sector to the police and the
judiciary.
Beyond such general claims, empirical connections between both harms have been established. A
study on impact of corruption and human rights in Moldova found that ‘corruption significantly
depletes public resources, which in turn adversely impacts the enjoyment of all’ human rights. The
‘most frequently affected rights that share a causal relationship to corruption are the right to life, to
legal representation and a fair trial, as well as to education, health, property, and social protection.
Additionally, the most frequently identified victims are vulnerable and marginalized groups.’ The study
‘also identified that human rights violations may be driven by corruption on an individual basis, on a
systemic level or a combination of the two.’3 Another empirical study by Mexican sociologists found that
when corruption is reduced, there is a greater probability of a more widespread enjoyment of political
rights. The statistics were based on the usual indicators for corruption and for noncompliance with
international human rights norms, and controlling for other factors such as the political regime and the
GDP.4
Such findings call for an examination of the legal aspects of the links between corruption and human
rights. I leave aside the idea of a (new) human right to a corruption-free society, as propagated by
some authors.5 Such a right is neither acknowledged by legal practice nor is there a need for it.6
Instead, four types of legal relations between human rights and corruption can be distinguished.7 First,
some forms of corruption, notably petty corruption, directly violate (breach, infringe) human rights: a
bribed judge violates the due process or fair trial guarantees of a litigant or an accused; a corrupt
police officer who arrests someone who refuses to pay a bribe unlawfully restricts and thus violates that
persons’ liberty. Second, other forms of corruption, especially ‘grand corruption’, contribute to the
systemic conditions in which human rights violations thrive. Notably the diversion of money reduces
the states’ budget to deliver public services demanded by social rights such as housing and
healthcare. Third, several human rights, notably freedom of information, freedom of the media,
freedom of assembly and association, are instrumental in exposing and combatting corruption.8
Corrupt governments tend to disregard and unduly restrict these human rights exactly because of
these rights’ utility for the fight against corruption. Fourth, an aggressive anticorruption agenda may
produce a tension with human rights interests of suspects and accused, for example their property
rights, rights to privacy, due process rights, and the presumption of innocence.
3
Centre for Civ. and Pol. Rts., The impact of corruption on the fulfilment of human rights in Moldova: An analytical study
with policy recommendations (Geneva – Chișinău, May 2021) [https://www.undp.org/moldova/publications/impact-
corruption-fulfilment-human-rights-moldova-analytical-study-policy-
recommendations#:~:text=This%20study%20seeks%20to%20examine%20the%20impact%20of,then%20assessing
%20the%20resulting%20impact%20on%20human%20rights]. (last visited Jul. 11, 2023), quotes from the abstract
at 2.
4
Luz Angela Cardona/ Horatio Ortiz/Daniel Vázquez, Corruption and Human Rights: Possible Relations, 40 HUM. RTS Q.
317-41 (2018), (found that the connection between corruption and human rights is not constant. Corruption has
most impact where people enjoy political, social, and cultural rights at a medium to high level).
5
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official
Corruption to a Crime under International Law, 34 INT’L LAW. 149-78 (2000); Andrew B. Spalding, Anti-Corruption:
Recaptured and Reframed, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC,
517-530 (Andreas von Arnauld, Kerstin von der Decken and Mart Susi eds., 2020),.
6
U. N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Challenges Faced and best practices applied by States in integrating human rights into
their national strategies and policies to fight against corruption, including those addressing non-State actors, such as
the private sector, ¶ 20, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/44/27 (Apr. 21, 2020) [hereinafter UNHCHR Challenges Faced].
7
Matthew C. Stephenson, Corruption and Human Rights – Exploring the Relationship in: GRECO, 22ND GENERAL ACTIVITY
REPORT: ANTI-CORRUPTION TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND GOOD PRACTICES IN EUROPE & THE UNITED STATES OF A MERICA (2021),
19-21.
8
cf. United Nations Convention against Corruption, opened for signature Dec. 9, 2003, art. 13(1) lit. d), 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.
2 MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2023-18 ISSN 2702-9360

2. A lopsided convergence of the anti-corruption and human rights agendas

From an institutional perspective, the phenomenon of ‘corruption and human rights’ offers an example
of fragmentation and regime-integration in international law. None of the more than ten universal and
regional anti-corruption instruments that are currently in force explicitly pursue a human rights-based
approach. The two Council of Europe conventions of 1999 only mention in their preambles the ‘threat’
posed by corruption to human rights. In his Foreword to the UNCAC of 2003, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan stated that corruption ‘leads to violations of human rights’.
Only several years later, two NGOs elaborated on the ‘connection’ between corruption and human
rights.9 This connection was investigated in scholarship10 and picked up by the United Nations human
rights actors (see below).
In the American human rights system, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) took
the lead in integrating corruption into its work. It adopted a seminal resolution on ‘Corruption and
Human Rights’ in 2018.11 One year later, the Commission issued an almost 200-page report on ‘Inter-
American standards’ on corruption and human rights.12 In parallel, the Court compiled all its
corruption-related case-law in a document for the public.13
The African Union’s (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption of 2003 mentions
human rights, but the AU has so far not visibly integrated human rights into its anti-corruption work.
The Council of Europe’s (CoE) Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) has since 2008 been
reporting about its cooperation with human rights advocates in its monitoring of member states’
compliance with the CoE anti-corruption standards.
The EU institutions started to establish a link between corruption and breaches of human rights around
2013 in the legislative debate leading to the adoption of the EU Magnitsky Act on sanctions against
human rights violators. Currently, the EU Parliament is working towards a global anti-corruption
strategy of the EU. In this context, Parliament recommends to the other relevant EU institutions to
‘acknowledge the linkage between corruption and human rights and that corruption is an enormous
obstacle to the enjoyment of all human rights’. It also recommends to ‘adopt, therefore, a human
rights-based approach in the fight against corruption, with victims of corruption placed at its core’.14
In 2003, the former Human Rights Commission established the mandate of a special rapporteur on
corruption and its impact on the enjoyment of human rights. The special rapporteur produced three
reports that did not lead to further political action. Around 2007, the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human rights took up the issue. In 2013, the Office made the ‘Human Rights Case
9
Int’l. Council on Hum. Rts. Pol’y & Transparency Int’l., Corruption and Human Rights: Making the Connection,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551222 (last visited Jul. 11, 2023) [hereinafter Transparency International 2009]; Int’l
Council on Hum. Rts. Pol’y & Transparency Int’l, Integrating Human Rights into the Anti-Corruption Agenda:
Challenges, Possibilities and Opportunities, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1705396 (last visited Jul. 11, 2023).
10
Seminally Zoe Pearson, An international human rights approach to corruption, in CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, 30-
61 (Peter Larmour and Nick Wolanin (eds), 2001). See in more detail CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Martine Boersma and Hans Nelen eds., 2010); MARTINE BOERSMA, CORRUPTION: A
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND A CRIME UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW? (2012); KOLALE OLANIYAN, CORRUPTION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (2014).
11
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Res. 1/18 (Mar. 2,2018). A critic has called this resolution ‘a prime example of the confusion
and political babble’ (HURST HANNUM, RESCUING HUMAN RIGHTS: A RADICALLY MODERATE APPROACH, 51 (2019).
12
IACHR, Corruption and Human Rights in the Americas: Inter-American Standards (6 December 2019) [hereinafter
IACHR Corruption and Human Rights]. See for an analysis of this report: Claudio Nash Rojas, Nuevos desarrollos
sobre corrupción como violación de Derechos Humanos. El Informe “Derechos Humanos y Corrupción” de la
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 45 CUESTIONES CONSTITUCIONALES 205-35 (2021). See also Edyta
Lis, Corruption and Human Rights in the Case Law of Inter-American Human Rights Treaty Bodies, REVIEW OF
EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW 51 (2022), 149-180.
13
IACtHR, Cuardernillo de jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos No. 23: Corrupción y derechos
humanos (2019).
14
Corruption and human rights: European Parliament recommendation of 17 February 2022 to the Council and the Vice
President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning
corruption and human rights (2021/2066(INI)), ¶ 1(a), EUR. PARL. DOC. P9_TA(2022)0042 (2022) .

against Corruption’.15 Since then, the High Commissioner has developed ‘Best practices to counter the
negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of all human rights’16 and reported challenges for the
integration of human rights into the fight against corruption.17
In parallel, the Human Rights Council (HRC) had tasked its Advisory Committee with research on the
matter that culminated in a report of 2015.18 Since 2012, the HRC has adopted several resolutions
specifically devoted to the negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights.19 It has also
regularly insisted on the link between corruption and human rights in further resolutions on good
governance and on the repatriation of funds.20
The various UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies have begun to scrutinise states’ anti-corruption measures
and problematise them in their concluding observations on the periodic reports of member states to
the various treaties.21 By way of example, the Human Rights Committee raised concern and/or
recommended to upstep measures to prevent and eradicate corruption in Bolivia, Cambodia, Georgia,
and Ukraine in its concluding observations issued in 2022 under Art. 40 of the ICCPR. A Joint
Statement on ‘Corruption and Human Rights’, issued by seven UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies in
2021 summarised the practice of these bodies and cited concluding observations and general
comments that have pronounced themselves on the ‘pernicious impact of corruption on the enjoyment
of human rights’.22
The standard formula used by international actors is that corruption has (or may have) a negative
impact on the enjoyment of human rights.23 Other formulations are that corruption has an ‘adverse’,
‘detrimental’, or ‘strong negative’ human rights impact, that corruption ‘undermines’ and ‘impairs’ the
realisation and enjoyment of human rights, that it has a ‘grave and devastating effect’ in that regard,
and that corruption poses a significant obstacle to the enjoyment of human rights.24
The recent political pledge by all UN member states to jointly combat corruption again highlighted the
possible negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of all human rights, and ─ concomitantly ─
that the prevention and countering corruption can improve the human rights situation.25
To sum up, the relevance of corruption for the realisation of human rights has been acknowledged by
human rights actors in all regions of the world except Asia, soon after corruption had been addressed
in international policy and law. The UN Human Rights Council’s Advisory Committee of 2015 report26
and the Inter-American Commission’s development of standards of 201927 were key documents here.
Importantly, however, this move has been lopsided. The UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
which acts as a secretariat for UNCAC has to my best knowledge mentioned only in passing that
15
Navi Pillay (UN High Comm’r for Hum. Rts.), Opening Statement to the Panel on “the negative impact of corruption on
human rights, Mar. 13, 2013, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2013/03/opening-statement-navi-pillay-high-
commissioner-human-rights-panel-negative (last visited Jul. 11, 2023).
16
U. N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Best Practices to Counter the Negative Impact of Corruption on the Enjoyment of All
Human Rights, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/32/22 (Apr. 15, 2016).
17
UNHCHR Challenges faced, supra note 6.
18
U. N. Hum. Rts. Council, Final Report of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on the Issue of the Negative
Impact of Corruption on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/28/73 (Jan. 5, 2015) [hereinafter
UNHRC Negative Impact of Corruption].
19
See last: UN Hum. Rts. Council, The Negative Impact of Corruption on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, U. N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/47/7(Jul. 26, 2021).
20
See, e.g., UN Hum. Rts. Council, The negative impact of the non-repatriation of funds of illicit origin U. N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/46/11(Mar. 26, 2021) [hereinafter HRC Non-repatriation of funds].
21
See for a systematic overview: Làzarie Eeckeloo (Centre for Civ. and Pol. Rts.), Corruption and Human Rights – The
Approach of the United Nations Treaty Bodies, (Jul. 2019),
https://ccprcentre.org/files/media/Corruption_et_droits_lhomme_ENG.pdf (last visited Jul. 11, 2023).
22
Joint statement, supra note 1.
23
See only Ramírez Escobar v. Guatemala, Fondo, reparaciones y costas, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R., (ser. C) No. 351,
¶ 242; IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12.
24
See, e.g., Joint Statement, supra note 1.
25
UN General Assembly, Political Declaration: ‘Our common commitment to effectively addressing challenges and
implementing measures to prevent and combat corruption and strengthen international cooperation’, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/S-32/1, Annex (Jun 7, 2021) [hereinafter UNGA Common Commitment].
26
UNHRC Negative Impact of Corruption, supra note 18.
27
IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12.

corruption is bad for human rights.28 The Conference of the State Parties to UNCAC (COSP) has
mentioned human rights for the first time in 2015, explicitly in a dialogue with the UN HRC. Citing the
Council’s Resolution 29/11,29 the COSP mentioned ‘the negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment
of human rights’ in preambles and operative clauses of its resolutions.30 In contrast, the monitoring
body of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, has so far not mentioned human rights, neither in its annual reports nor in its anti-bribery
recommendations. The International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) which is the
network founded in 2006 to implement UNCAC (with meanwhile 140 participating anti-corruption
authorities) has so far not mentioned human rights in its declarations. This might be due to the fact
that the association is dominated by Asian states. But even the more Western-influenced International
Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC) that brings together specialist law enforcement officers
from multiple agencies around the world has not made any explicit commitment to human rights.
To conclude, while human rights actors have wholeheartedly embraced the issue of corruption, the
international and transnational anti-corruption actors have rarely mentioned human rights at all, and
have not explicitly espoused a human rights-based approach. Apparently, the human rights institutions
expect benefits from bringing corruption into their purview. In line with their mandate, they have
instrumentalised anti-corruption for the sake of improving the human rights situation in countries under
review. In contrast, the anti-corruption actors have not acknowledged that a focus on human rights
might support their core mission, nor have they expanded their mandate to understand themselves as
being also human rights defenders.
3. Corruption as a human rights violation triggering international state responsibility

The preceding sections have shown that acts of corruption are generally seen to undermine the ability
of States to live up to their human rights commitments. This section analyses the legal requirements for
conceptualising corruption as an actual violation (breach) of human rights that is apt to trigger the legal
responsibility of a corrupt state under international law.31
3.1. Case law

As yet, no international or regional court has qualified corruption per se as a violation or breach of
human rights. Rather, corruption has been treated as a contextual element, as part of the facts
constituting the human rights violation, frequently in provisional measures.32 A judgment of the IACtHR
on the scheme of illegal adoptions in Guatemala came closest to such a finding: the court explicitly
reiterated the state’s obligation to prevent, punish, and eradicate corruption (flowing from the state’s
ratification of UNCAC and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption). The court also
highlighted that the international adoptions took place ‘in a framework of corruption’, and that this
28
United Nations Off. on Drugs and Crime, Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention
against Corruption (UNODC, 2nd ed.,2012), iv.
29
U. N. Hum. Rts. Council, The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights,U. N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/29/11 (Jul. 2, 2015).
30
U. N. Convention against Corruption Conference of the State Parties, Follow-up to the Marrakech declaration on the
prevention of corruption, preamble, Res. 6/6 (2015); Prevention of corruption by promoting transparent, accountable
and efficient public service delivery through the application of best practices and technological innovations,
preamble, Res. 6/8 (2015); Education and training in the context of anti-corruption, preamble and ¶8 Res. 6/10
(2015).
31
I first examined this question in Anne Peters, Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights, 29 EUR. J. INT’L LAW
1251–87 (2018). Some passages in this section reproduce language of that paper.
32
See for the case law of the IACtHR: Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cuardernillo de jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos No. 23: Corrupción y derechos humanos (2019); Jimena Reyes, State Capture through
Corruption: Can Human Rights Help?, in: THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW 263-86, esp. at 281
(Régis Bismuth et al. eds.).

context ‘had strong negative impact on the enjoyment of the human rights of the children and their
biological parents.’33
In a case on corruption in the Nigerian education sector, the ECOWAS Court explicitly dwelled on
‘conclusive findings of corruption that per se will not amount to a violation of the right of education.’ It
admitted that embezzling, stealing and mismanagement of funds has a ‘negative impact on education
since it reduces the amount of money made available to provide education to the people. Yet it does
not amount to a denial of the right to education, without more.’ In the absence of ‘a clear linkage
between the acts of corruption and a denial of the right to education’, a human rights violation could
not be found.34
Extrapolating such case-law, this section analyses the legal elements needed for a judicial finding of a
human rights violation through corruption.
3.2. Breach of an obligation

The first element is the breach of an international obligation of a State.35 Corruption can affect all types
of obligations that flow from all international human rights.36 In practice, social rights are most
impinged, with the health sector probably having the largest share. Where bribes can expedite an
appointment with the doctor, the right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of health is
compromised (Art. 12 ICESCR); when a teacher asks for favours, the right to education (Art. 13
ICESCR) is at issue. But also civil and political rights may be undermined by corruption: when a
prisoner has to give the guard something in return for better food, then the prisoner’s basic right to
humane conditions of detention (Art. 10 ICCPR) is affected. When human trafficking is facilitated
primarily by corruption that induces police and border guards to look the other way, this affects the
human right to protection from slavery and servitude (Art. 8 ICCPR). Obviously, corruption in the
administration of justice endangers the basic rights to judicial protection, including the right to a fair
trial without undue delay (Art. 14 ICCPR). Or, the human right of association and the (labour) right to
organize (Art. 22 ICCPR and relevant ILO Conventions) may be affected by bribes offered by industry to
the officials of a ministry of labour. In other cases of grand corruption and foreign bribery, however, the
implications for human rights – such as the effect of nepotism on the right to equal access to public
offices (Art. 25(c) ICCPR) – are less clear.
Depending on the sector and the form of corruption, the human rights obligations to respect, protect
(prevent, investigate, redress), and fulfil (facilitate, provide, promote) are compromised by corruption.
First, state officials and judges must refrain from soliciting or taking bribes. Where they take bribes for
public services, they do not respect the relevant human rights. Here the question of attribution of their
behaviour to the state arises (see below sec. 3.3.).
Second, the obligation to protect requires States to take measures that prevent third parties from
interfering with the enjoyment of human rights. The failure of officials or of the state apparatus as a
whole to actively and effectively combat corruption may therefore lead to a violation of the obligation to
protect. The duty to protect human rights comprises duties to prevent, to investigate, to provide redress
(remedies) to victims, and in the extreme case also to punish perpetrators of crimes of corruption.37
When corruption is alleged, the duty to investigate, a procedural obligation, is especially pertinent.38
The failure to conduct a serious investigation of potential corruption may render the state internationally
33
Ramírez Escobar v. Guatemala, Fondo, reparaciones y costas, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 351, 242 (Mar.
9, 2018).
34
The Registered Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) v. Federal Republic of Nigeria
and Universal Basic Education Commission, Doc. ECW/CCJ/JUD/07/10, Law Report, Judgement, Community Court
of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 19 (emphasis added) , Doc. (30 November
2010).
35
cf. Art. 1 ARSIWA. These rules apply directly only to inter-state relations and not to breaches of human rights obligations
owed to humans. But the underlying principles are similar (cf. Art. 33(2) ARSIWA).
36
Joint statement, supra note 1,at. 7.
37
UNHCHR Challenges Faced, supra note 6, ¶ 20; Joint Statement, supra note 1, ¶ 14; UNHRC Negative Impact of
Corruption, supra note 19, preamble p. 2.
38
See e.g. Matter of the Penitentiary Complex of Curado, Provisional Measures regarding Brazil, Order of the court, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 20 (7 October 2015): order to investigate corruption in the penitentiary complex.

responsible for noncompliance with its human rights obligation to protect. Importantly, the duty to
investigate is triggered also against conduct by corrupt state officials, regardless of the agents who may
eventually be charged with committing the violation.39 The reason is that only an investigation can shed
light on the question whether the corrupt state official has exceeded his or her authority or contravened
instructions and thus acted ‘ultra vires’ (see below sec.3.3.).
Third, corruption undermines a states’ obligation to fulfil human rights, albeit indirectly. This positive
obligation arises for all human rights, but it is especially relevant for social and economic rights. Under
the ICESCR, every state party has the basic obligation to progressively realise the Covenant rights ‘to
the maximum of its available resources’ (Art. 2(1) ICSECR). Most forms of corruption lead to a
diversion, squandering, and dissipation of public money and thus reduce the maximum resources at
the disposal of the State.
Additionally, basically any act of bribery, cronyism, and influence peddling might be conceptualised as
constituting discrimination (Art. 2(2) ICESCR and Art. 2(1) ICCPR) or as a denial of equality before the
law (Art. 26 ICCPR), because access to the relevant public good is given in exchange for money and is
not determined by rational criteria.40 Besides such direct discrimination or inequality, corruption
frequently has a disproportionate negative impact on vulnerable groups, and may thus constitute an
indirect discrimination of group members, e.g. on the ground of ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation,
and the like.
3.3. Attribution
In order to constitute a human rights violation (an internationally wrongful act that triggers state
responsibility), a corrupt behaviour must be attributable to the state. State officials including judges are
state organs whose conduct is considered as acts of state.41
The ensuing question is whether imputation should cease because the corrupt officials act solely for
their personal enrichment and in their own interest, and not in the public interest, or not in ‘official
capacity’ in terms of Art. 7 ARSIWA. The human rights perspective demands that the question of ultra
vires action should be answered in light of the perception and interests of the victims. This suggests
that – as a rule – the conduct should be attributable to the state, notably when state officials use
exactly their formal status to execute or withhold acts that a private person cannot perform, and hence
act under cover of public authority.42 Alternatively, depending on the concrete constellation, corrupt
state officials can be seen as actors outside the state against whom the state’s human rights-based
duties to protect arise. The general anti-corruption policy of the state of course potentially implicates
the international responsibility of the state as a whole in its quality as an international legal person.
3.4. Causation
It is submitted here that state responsibility next requires that human rights violations by a state must
have been caused by corruption in legal contemplation. Full-fledged rules on causation (or causality)
exist neither in international law nor in human rights law.43 However, the more international law
expands and legalises complex relationships (such as the one between corruption and human rights
deficits) the more we need a legal tool that helps sorting out the mess of real life factors and
39
IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12), ¶ 246.
40
See in detail Peters, supra note 31, 1265-7.
41
Art. 4 ARSIWA.
42
cf. Estate of Jean-Baptiste Caire (France) v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A., 516, 530 (French-Mexican Claims
Commission 1929).
43
cf. Ilias Plakokefalos, Causation in the Law of State Responsibility and the Problem of Overdetermination: In Search of
Clarity, 26 Eur. J. Int’l L. 471-492, (2015); Alexander Orakelashvili, CAUSATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2022).

contribution and that establishes a threshold for legal responsibility.44 The legal concept of ‘attribution’
does not perform this work but rather concerns the special question of linking behaviour to actors.
Tort law in many countries distinguishes between a first causal link between conduct and the legal
breach (‘cause in fact’) and the next causal link between the breach and the damage (‘scope of
responsibility’). Art. 31 ARSIWA and several historical arbitral awards have only dealt with the latter part
of causality or causation (between breach and damage).
When it comes to human rights violations, the main damage is immaterial (pain, anxiety, feelings of
shame, etc.). Such immaterial damage flows directly from the breach, so that no special problems of
causation arise at this point. Rather, the problem is to establish corruption (or other behaviours) as a
‘cause in fact’ of a breach of the legal (human rights) obligation. This first causal link is especially
difficult to establish when the potential causes involve multiple actors and factors, and/or when the
aggrieved behaviour also comprises omissions. This is exactly the constellation of individual acts of
corruption that thrive in an overall context of state’s failure to effectively prevent and combat them.
Generally speaking and as a matter of standard legal reasoning prevalent in the domestic jurisdictions
of the world, causation (in the sense of a conditio sine qua non (the so-called ‘“but-for” test’) is
normally supplemented by an evaluative element that breaks chains of causation that are excessively
long. The standard requirement, also used by international tribunals (albeit only for the so-called
‘scope of responsibility’), is that there must be ‘proximity’. Proximity is determined on the basis of the
objective criterion of ‘natural and normal consequence’45 and of the subjective criterion of
‘foreseeability’.46
I submit that these criteria should be applied to the relation between a corrupt conduct and the human
rights violation. These terms convey the idea that corrupt acts (or omissions) cause human rights
violations in the legal sense only if the violations – such as of the right to food, housing or education –
are foreseeable and not too far removed from the corrupt public officials (or from the otherwise passive
apparatus of the state).
In some cases, these requirements are likely to be met. For instance, an arrangement for a court
official to receive a small sum of money to summon a witness is causally related to the violation of the
right to a fair trial. Similarly, bribes paid to the employee of an environmental supervisory authority,
intended to induce the employee to ‘overlook’ the creation of an illegal toxic waste dump, must −
according to these principles − be qualiﬁed as a cause of the subsequent adverse health effects of the
local residents. In such cases, the approval of the toxic waste dump and the damage to health were
foreseeable for the public official and were in the usual course of things. The corrupt toleration of the
toxic waste dump is thus in the eyes of the law a cause of the violation of the human rights of the local
residents in terms of respect for their private life and physical integrity.47
Conversely, a legal causal link should not be affirmed where any subsequent human rights violation is
not in the usual course of things and is not foreseeable. As an example, assume that election bribery
leads to riots after the announcement of the election results – protests that in turn are struck down by
excessive force by the police. The violation of the freedom of assembly and bodily integrity of the
demonstrators has then – in legal terms – not been caused by the electoral corruption.
In addition to the frequent situation that the ‘distance’ between the cause and the human rights
violation is too great, special problems of causation arise. Typically, the dysfunctionality of a given
governmental sector (health, education, and the like) that involves human rights violations has multiple
causes, only one of them being corruption. Such multiplicity has so far hardly been addressed in
international law. The ARSIWA do not say anything on multiple causes (or contributions) by one and
44
But see León Castellanos-Jankiewicz, Causation and International State Responsibility (April 13, 2012),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2039268 (last visited Jul. 25, 2023): causation in international law is only needed for
assessing the damage.
45
See mutatis mutandis Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company and Others (United States) v. Germany (Life Insurance
Claims), 7 R.I.A.A., 91, 113 (Arb. Trib. 1924), (for the scope of responsibility).
46
See mutatis mutandis Decision Number 7 of 27 July 2007, 26 R. I.A.A. 10, ¶ 13 (Eritrea−Ethiopia Claims Comm’n
(EECC), 2007 (for the scope of responsibility).
47
Transparency International 2009, supranote 9, at 27, refers to this constellation as an ‘indirect link’ between corruption
and human rights violations.

the same state, but only deal with a plurality of states.48 Also, the Amsterdam Guiding Principles on
Shared Responsibility in International Law deal (only) with ‘shared responsibility’, i.e. the ‘commission
by multiple international persons of one or more internationally wrongful acts that contribute to an
indivisible injury’.49 The two sets of principles thus offer only marginal guidance for the causality
problems with regard corruption. Here, problems partly stem from multiple actors (such as states and
transnational corporations) but mostly from the multiplicity of factors and contributions that occur
within the sphere of one and the same state. When corruption is involved, it can often not be
determined whether the factors were cumulative (both factors needed to produce the injury) or
concurrent (‘dual’, ‘competing’ or ‘alternative’ causes – that is, each sufficient on its own).50 In the case
of concurrent factors, some of them might ‘override’ the acts of corruption or vice versa (which is called
‘overtaking’ or ‘pre-emptive’ causation in tort law). In conclusion, on the premise that causality
(causation) is indeed – besides breach and attribution – a legal requirement for establishing a violation
of human rights that triggers state responsibility, this legal requirement is apt to cut off state
responsibility in many instances of corruption.
3.5. Violations by omission

The state’s obligations to prevent, protect and fulfil human rights demand positive action and are
potentially violated by state passivity. In the eyes of the law, such failure to tackle a systemic or
structural problem becomes a legally relevant omission only if three conditions are met, as developed
by the IACtHR: state organs must be aware of a situation of real and imminent danger for human rights
(foreseeable risk); the danger must threaten a specific individual or groups of individuals (victims), and
the state must have the reasonable possibility of preventing and avoiding the danger (ability).51 Along a
similar line, emerging human rights case law on state passivity towards climate change is developing
legal requirements that can mutatis mutandis be applied to state passivity towards corruption, too.52
Another point is that the states’ positive and human rights-based obligation to actively combat
corruption is an obligation of conduct. States need not reach a specific result such as a ‘corruption-
free’ society. States must act with due diligence and must adopt ‘all appropriate means’ (Art. 2(1)
ICESCR), with ‘reasonableness’ (see Art. 8(4) OP ICESCR). These legal terms define the bottom-line of
positive state action (which, in German constitutional rights doctrine, is called ‘Untermaßverbot’). State
measures are not allowed to fall short of a minimum level in order to be considered ‘appropriate’ or
‘reasonable’. In the case of empirically demonstrated corruption in a state, the human rights-based
prohibitions of insufficient action require the state not only to ratify the international anti-corruption
instruments but to actually and actively combat corruption. Especially the ICESCR-based duty to make
the maximum use of their resources so as to realise the economic, social and cultural rights generates
this obligation to act. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, suppress and provide redress
for such corruption-related abuses.53 The concepts of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘reasonableness’ thus play
48
Art. 16 and 47 ARSIWA.
49
Principle 1(1) of the Guiding Principles. See André Nollkaemper et al., Guiding Principles on Shared Responsibility in
International Law, 31 EUR. J. INT.L L., 15-72 (2020) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
50
See on concurrent and cumulative contributions to one indivisible injury the principle 2(2) of the Amsterdam Guiding
Principles on Shared Responsibility in International Law (Guiding Principles, supra note 49, commentary at 25-27).
These principles prefer the concept of ‘contribution’ in the absence of acknowledged principles of causality in
international law.
51
cf. Gonzales v. Mexico, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser C) No. 205, ¶ 280, (Nov. 16,
2006) (on the State’s failure to combat rampant femicides).
52
Hum. R. Comm. , U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/135/D/3624/2019 Torres Strait Islanders v. Australia (Sep.22, 2022), ¶¶ 8.3., 8.6.,
8.12., 8.14., denying a violation of the right to life but affirming violation of the right to private and family life by the
State’s failure to protect the islanders from the consequences of climate change; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural
Rts, Statement Climate change and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ¶ 5U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2018/1 (Oct. 31, 2018).
53
UNHCHR Challenges Faced, supra note 6, at ¶ 71. Already Boersma, supra note 10, at 233.

a dual role; they serve not only as the cap but also as the floor.54 States must take ‘appropriate’
measures – not more but not less either.
The question is at what point a state fails to meet that minimum level and which institution is
empowered to make an authoritative determination thereof. Under the ICECSR, the states’ parties have
a substantial ‘margin of appreciation’ in this regard.55 The Optional Protocol expressly provides that a
state party ‘may adopt a range of possible measures for the implementation of the rights set forth in the
Covenant’ (Art. 8(4) of the Optional Protocol). In the final instance, however, the Social Rights
Committee reserves for itself the right to review the ‘appropriateness’ of the means, and, thus, of the
financial resources, in an authoritative way – albeit without the power to enforce this determination.56
Given these shortcomings, a formal anti-corruption protocol to one or several human rights covenants
that would explicitly recognise corruption as a violation of the protected rights has been proposed in
academia.57 However, such a protocol would not in itself resolve the thorny questions of causation and
seems therefore unnecessary.
3.6. Interim conclusions on rights violations

To conclude, the legal requirements for establishing that an incidence of corruption in itself violates a
concrete human right of a concrete victim are quite high. It is therefore unsurprising that so far, no
single judgment has made such a finding.
In the realm of social rights – which are in practice most affected by corruption – an additional difficulty
is that the concept and contours of ‘violation’ are as yet ill-defined. The situation of corruption is only
one modality of impinging notably on ESC-rights. It raises the larger and basically unresolved question
of how to exactly determine at which point a concrete ESC-right of a concrete person is violated. This
problem is often described as a lack of justiciability. But it is not only a procedural matter but relates to
the material structure of the ESC-rights. The conceptual juridical work towards defining violations (as
opposed to vague statements of noncompliance) is only in its infancy. Because social rights violations
very often result from systemic governance deficiencies, based on political budgetary decisions, affect
large groups of people, and pose threshold questions, the question of ‘translating’ systemic deficits into
a finding of an individual rights violation looms large.58 Deeper legal analysis of the negative impact of
corruption on the enjoyment of social rights can contribute to developing the concept of violation, too.
A finding of violation may trigger state responsibility and lead to the state’s obligation to adopt
measures of reparation as foreseen by the relevant human rights treaties.59 The analysis of corruption
as an actual rights violation therefore goes one step further than merely diagnosing a negative impact.
54
cf. Secretariat of the Human Rights Council, The Use of the ‘Reasonableness’ Test in Assessing Compliance with
International Human Rights Obligations, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/WG.4/CRP.1(Feb. 1, 2008).
55
Comm. On Econ., Soc. And Cultural Rts, Statement An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the ‘Maximum of
Available Resources’ under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant, ¶¶ 11–12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2007/1 (May 10,
2007) [hereinafter CESCR Available Resources].
56
See Comm. On Econ., Soc. And Cultural Rts.,Rep. on the 5th session, 26 November-14 December 1990, 83, at ¶ 4, U.N.
Doc. E/1991/23, General comment No. 3; CESCR Available Resources, supra note 55, ¶¶ 8, 12.
57
Kolawole Olaniyan, The Implications of Corruption for Social Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS, 355, 373 (Christina Binder et al. eds., (2020).
58
Anne Peters, The Risk and Opportunity of the Humanisation of International Anti-Corruption Law: A Rejoinder to Kevin E.
Davis and Franco Peirone, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-risk-and-opportunity-of-the-
humanisation-of-international-anti-corruption-law-a-rejoinder-to-kevin-e-davis-and-franco-peirone/ (last visited Jul.
11, 2023). See critically Ranieri L. Resende, Corrupção e violação de direitos humanos: Uma correlação necessária?
Apontamentos críticos ao debate Peters – Davis, 175 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CIÊNCIAS CRIMINAIS 69-89 (2021).
59
American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” art. 63(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U. N. T. S. 143
[hereinafter ACHR]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 41, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U. N. T. S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; Protocol to the African Charter on Human And People’s Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 27(1), adopted Jun. 10, 1998, entered into
force Jan. 25, 2004, https://www.african-court.org/wpafc/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/2-PROTOCOL-TO-THE-
AFRICAN-CHARTER-ON-HUMAN-AND-PEOPLES-RIGHTS-ON-THE-ESTABLISHMENT-OF-AN-AFRICAN-COURT-
ON-HUMAN-AND-PEOPLES-RIGHTS.pdf (last visited Jul. 11, 2023). See also G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, annex (16 December 2005).

It reaches a clear verdict of illegality that is welcome for identifying and calling out the injustice of
corruption.
4. Risks and opportunities of the convergence of agendas

The overlap of the issues of human rights and corruption has led human rights practitioners and
bodies to assert that corruption and human rights violations ‘should not be separated in policy or
analysis in global and national efforts to improve the lives of the poor who suffer the most from systems
plagued by widespread corruption and violence. For human rights research and practice, it is
important to make corruption a central issue’.60 It is assumed that both strategies tied together have the
potential ‘to more effectively address the phenomenon of corruption … and guarantee the enjoyment
and exercise of human rights. Effectively, while the fight against corruption can have a positive effect
on the enjoyment and exercise of human rights, the promotion of human rights reduces the chances of
corruption.’61 ‘Anti-corruption efforts and efforts to promote and protect human rights complement and
reinforce each other. They should be pursued in a mutually reinforcing manner that leverages their
comparative strengths and minimizes their respective limitations.’62 With this reasoning, human rights
institutions have actively sought a ‘convergence’ of both agendas.63 This section examines the risks and
opportunities of such convergence.
4.1. Risks
The loading of anti-corruption with human rights bears risks. Notably Hurst Hannum has warned of the
‘danger of conflating corruption with human rights’.64 The ‘conflation’ of the agendas meets
institutional, conceptual, and policy objections.
Institutionally, human rights actors might be overburdened by looking at corruption. They risk to
overstep the boundaries of their expertise and their formal competencies.65 Moreover, it is not the
primary task of regional and national human rights courts to resolve structural, societal problems (such
as corruption) but rather to deliver justice to specifically harmed individuals. The typical admissibility
conditions such as the individualisable ‘victimhood’ and further thresholds such as the causality
requirements all manifest this individualistic rationale and role of courts. The scope of application of
human rights instruments is limited to the state parties’ jurisdiction. States are not held accountable for
human rights problems beyond their jurisdiction (which roughly demands effective control over a
person or a territory). This jurisdictional link requirement effectively limits the reach of the human rights
tool to tackle transnational corruption.
Conceptually, the human rights-based approach to corruption is still fuzzy. Not all forms of corruption
affect, let alone violate human rights, while inversely many human rights problems exist outside of and
independent from corruption. Because of this lack of full congruence, the ‘translation’ of corruption
into a human rights issue is to some extent artificial and might miss the point. We have seen that a
rigorous legal analysis of corruption as an outright human rights violation (sec. 3) encounters several
doctrinal hurdles. And even if ‘hard’ state responsibility for human rights violations could be
established, the legal outcomes would not unambiguously be welcome. Some observers find that the
ensuing obligation to compensate victims on a large scale would unduly burden innocent tax-payers.66
Such unease about burdening the general public with reparation for human rights violations manifests
60
Morten Koch Andersen, Why Corruption Matters in Human Rights, 10 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC., 179-190, abstract (2018).
61
IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12, ¶86 (emphasis added); see along this line also UNGA Common
Commitment, supra note 25, at 3.
62
UNHCHR Challenges Faced, supra note 6, ¶ 75; see, amongst others, OHCHR Management Plan, supra note 2, at 44.
63
IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12, chapter 1 and passim.
64
HANNUM, supra note 11, 51-52 (quote at 51).
65
Cecily Rose, The Limitations of a Human Rights Approach to Corruption, 65 INT’L COMPAR. L. Q., 405-438 (2016); also
Kevin E. Davis, Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights: A Reply to Anne Peters, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. ,
1289, 1294 (2018).
66
Davis, supra note 65, at 1293.

a desire to keep apart the production of justice for individuals on the one hand, and systemic decisions
about laws and politics on the other hand.
This leads to the first profound objection against the infusion of anti-corruption with human rights
concerns. It is rooted in an attitude of distrust towards rule-of-law-based (neo-)liberal state and the
institution of rights. Skeptical observers perceive the human rights language as an embellishment of
the crusade against corruption, as an attempt to upgrade it and to gain legitimacy. Such a sham, from
that perspective, only veils the ultimately global capitalist purpose of anti-corruption.67
Another deep criticism is that the individualistic nature of human rights law is unsuitable for collective
action problems such as transnational corruption. 68 This is not only a practical but also a conceptual
concern that pertains to presumed rationales of outlawing corruption. The critical objection is that,
while the human rights are, to use the image by Franco Peirone, like visible ‘trees’, anti-corruption
seeks not to protect the trees but rather the ‘forest’ of the rule of law. When one focusses too much on
the trees, one risks not to see the forest. And a burning forest, to stay in the picture, cannot be rescued
by watering individual trees one by one.69 Peirone therefore opines that instead of human rights,
administrative law is better suited to address the issue, because this body of law is conceived to give
consideration to third parties’ expectations, interests, and rights, and in itself balances these against
the public interest.70
Related objections are that a human rights-based approach to corruption is built on a binary and
bilateral relationship between the state as the only duty bearer and a victim as a rights holder.
Potentially co-responsible other duty bearers — such as private corporations and the individual itself,
participating in a corruption transaction — do not fit into the human rights framework.71 Assuming that
human rights law ‘is not designed as a form of collective power or as a vehicle of popular governance,
but only creates individual shields against the exercise of abusive power’, critics might wonder which
benefits — except for the rights-holder in question — human rights law offers to combat corruption.72
Finally, a simply strategic disadvantage of the fusion of both debates might be to fuel cheap talk by
many states because such (con-)fusion shrouds the concrete problems and is prone to covering up
insufficient state action in combatting both harms.73
With these drawbacks in mind, we need to turn to potential benefits of bringing human rights into the
international and transnational law against corruption.
4.2. Conceptual Opportunities

The human rights-based approach to corruption has conceptual benefits, besides the practical
advantages that will be discussed in section 5.2. The human rights lens brings into purview the
systemic responsibility of the state. It means ‘getting to the bottom’ of corrupt structures that made the
violations possible in the first place, as opposed to sticking with corrupt individuals.74
Even short of findings of human rights violation, a range of conceptual (doctrinal) consequences must
be drawn from the acknowledgment of a legally relevant link between corruption and human rights.
Therefore, the application of human rights law opens the gate for employing more elaborate
67
David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 455-65 (1999).
68
See mutatis mutandis for climate change: Marie-Catherine Petersmann, Is Climate Change a Human Rights Violation?:
No, in CONTEMPORARY CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATES: A STUDENT PRIMER 160, 165 (Mike Hulme ed., 2019); Lea Raible,
Expanding Human Rights Obligations to Facilitate Climate Justice?, A Note on Shortcomings and Risks, EJIL: TALK!
(15 November 2021), https://www.ejiltalk.org/expanding-human-rights-obligations-to-facilitate-climate-justice-a-note-
on-shortcomings-and-risks/ (last visited Jul. 11, 2023).
69
Franco Peirone, Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights: A Reply to Anne Peters, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1297,
at 1298, 1302(2018).
70
Peirone, supra note 69, at 1300.
71
Peirone, supra note 69, at 1299; Davis, supra note 65, at 1293. See mutatis mutandis for climate change Petersmann,
supra note 68, at 165.
72
cf. (on climate change) Petersmann, supra note 68, at 167.
73
HANNUM, supra note 11, at 52.
74
IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12, ¶at 266.

parameters and criteria on a range of legal questions, notably on the trigger and contours of the duty to
prevent.75
First, the overarching general obligation set out in all human rights treaties which is to ‘ensure’,
‘secure’, ‘give effect’, or ‘realise’ the human rights laid out in the respective instruments76 generates a
concrete obligation to effectively combat corruption.77 Section 3.2. has broken down the general
obligation into all its components (obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil). These human rights-based
obligations fortify, bolster, and specify the more vague and general state obligations as laid out in the
anti-corruption treaties. The result is an ‘enhanced obligation’ or ‘special obligation’ to combat
corruption in all areas that affect the enjoyment of human rights.78
Second, the content and scope of applicable human rights norms must be defined in the light of the
anti-corruption standards and vice versa.79 This interpretative technique of systemic integration (Art.
31(3) lit. c) VCLT) then leads to a mutual reinforcement of the relevant state obligations. Especially the
duties to prevent corruption (e.g. under Art. 5 UNCAC), to conduct a risk assessment, and to exercise
due diligence that derive from both sets of international instruments are strengthened and enhanced
when seen to flow from a dual source.80 Moreover, the general obligation of UNCAC that ‘each State
Party member shall take the necessary measures’ to implement the convention (Art. 65 UNCAC)
should in the light of international and domestic human rights be interpreted as setting a floor:
measures need to be sufficiently effective for securing human rights.
Given that international human rights are in most states domesticated by incorporation into national law
or by other forms of references to the relevant human rights treaties, a human rights-oriented
interpretation of suitable UNCAC provisions fits well to the reference to the UNCAC parties’ domestic
law in Art. 65(1) UNCAC. It is also in line with the convention’s allowance given to state parties to take
stricter measures against corruption than prescribed in special provisions of the convention (Art. 65(2)
UNCAC).
Next, the human rights approach affects the requirements of proof. Unlike individual criminal
suspects, the state enjoys no presumption of innocence. Although victims of a corruption-induced
human rights violation must prove their case, the threshold is lower than for the criminal conviction of
an individual.81 More even, a prima facie showing suffices in many human rights constellations, in
which the state must then exonerate itself.
Also, the human rights lens facilitates the establishment of extraterritorial obligations. Under human
rights law, states are obliged to regulate and supervise transnational and global business actors that
possess their nationality to prevent those businesses’ involvement in corruption such as offering bribes
even if the acts are committed abroad.82 To conclude, the human rights analysis projected onto the law
against corruption creates a much-refined legal toolbox. This allows for more consistent and more
robust legal responses to corruption.
5. Practical implications of the human rights-based approach to corruption

A human rights approach to anti-corruption has procedural and institutional implications. Importantly,
human rights work not only as reinforcers (sec. 5.2.) but also as limits to excessive crusades against
corruption (sec. 5.1.).
75
IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12, ¶ at 143.
76
see only ACHR, supra note 59, art. 1; ECHR, supra note 59, art. 1; African Charter on Human and People’s Rights art. 1,
concluded Jun. 27, 1981, 1520 U. N. T. S. 217; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U. N. T. S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
art. 2(1), opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U. N. T. S. 3.
77
cf. Reyes, supra note 32, at 282 on the ACHR.
78
Olaniyan, supranote 57, at 371; Reyes, supra note 32, at 282.
79
IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12 at ¶ 86; Reyes, supra note 32, at 284.
80
See on the human rights sources above section 3.2.
81
cf. Reyes, supra note 32, at 284.
82
Khulekani Moyo, Corruption, Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS 312-324 (Mark Gibney et al.eds., 2022).

5.1. Human rights limiting anti-corruption
A human rights-based approach to corruption demands that special attention is paid to avoiding
violating human rights in the fight against corruption.83 At least three sets of rights are at stake here: the
rights of individuals fighting against corruption, the rights of potential perpetrators; and rights of victim
populations when it comes to the repatriation of stolen assets.
First of all, journalists and whistle-blowers who investigate, report, and denounce corruption exercise
their human right to acquire and disseminate information and their media freedoms. States owe special
protection to these persons and to judges investigating corruption cases, against intimidation and
attacks on their physical integrity.84
When state officials criticise the deficiency of anti-corruption legislation, the great public interest of the
matter calls for a high degree of protection for their freedom of expression and for a strict scrutiny of
any interference, with a narrow margin of appreciation afforded to the authorities of the respondent
State. Fair trial guarantees are applied strictly to shield such critics against irregular removal from their
office.85 Given that the rights to information and public participation in the administration of public
financial management are important additional safeguards against corruption, the enhanced human
rights protection of all anti-corruption activists at the same time contributes to combatting corruption.
The recognition of this correlation has provided and should continue to provide a motivation for further
strengthening rights-based transparency schemes as a tool to control corruption more effectively.86
Second, an advantage of supplementing the (criminal law-based) repression by (human rights-based)
prevention is that it makes it harder to use anti-corruption as a mere pretext for eliminating political
opponents. Where human rights are not respected, anti-corruption is one of the classic alibis for the
elimination of political opponents, as it happened during the Chinese ‘campaign’ against corruption
from 2012-2017 by which current leader Xi Jinping consolidated his power. In order to minimise such
abuses, it is crucial to respect due process and fair trial rights such as access to evidence of those
accused and indicted for corruption.87
Asset freezing and confiscations need to respect the property rights of putative offenders. The
establishment of illegal enrichment (Art. 20 UNCAC) as a criminal offence jeopardises the presumption
of innocence. The rights to privacy and private life, including reputation, need to be respected in
surveillance and disclosure activities. Harsh judgments including the death penalty for offenders pose
additional human rights risks. UNCAC does not prohibit the death penalty, but a cautious UN policy
seeks to contain and ultimately eradicate this form of punishment.
Third, all States involved in asset recovery need to pay attention to the human rights of the populations
whose money had been stolen and transferred abroad by corrupt officials.88 States that are requested
to repatriate funds of illicit origin must take care to diminish negative human rights effects, steering
between the risk of the dissipation of the money in the country of origin and prohibitive requirements
that prevent returning money. The States requesting the repatriation of funds of illicit origin must
themselves allocate repatriated funds to the realization of economic, social and cultural rights in a
83
UNGA Common Commitment, supra note 25, at 2.
84
cf. Miguel Angel Galvez and family regarding Guatemala, Precautionary Measure 351-16 and 366-16, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Resolution 45/2016 , (Aug. 21, 2016); Gloria Patricia Porras Escobar and family regarding Guatemala, ,
Precautionary Measure 431/17, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Resolution 34/2017(Aug. 29, 2017).
85
Kövesi v. Romania, App. no. 3594/19, ¶¶ 204- 207 (May 5, 2020), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-202415 (last
visited Jul. 11, 2023).
86
cf. Joint Statement, supra note 1, at ¶ 16; UN Hum. Rts. Council, The negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of
human rights,, preamble, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/9 (Jul. 11, 2019., 11 July 2019 [hereinafter HRC Negative
impact 2019].
87
See explicitly African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption art. 14, adopted Jul 1, 2003, entered
into force Aug 5, 2006, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36382-treaty-0028_-
_african_union_convention_on_preventing_and_combating_corruption_e.pdf (last visited Jul. 11, 2023); López
Mendoza v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 233, ¶ 25 and fn.
208 (Sep. 1, 2011); Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C)
No. 330, ¶¶ 159, 178 (Dec.1, 2016).
88
Simeon A. Igbinedion, Human Rights as a Basis for Recovering the Proceeds of Grand Corruption, 26 AFR. J. INT’L AND
COMPAR. L. 483-506, especially at 494 (2018).

transparent and participatory fashion and must create the conditions for avoiding new human rights
violations.89 To conclude, the integration of human rights considerations into the transnational fight
against corruption has served and should continue to serve as an important moderating force against
excess and abuse in the course of these campaigns.
5.2. Human rights reinforcing anti-corruption

This section highlights the practical and strategic advantages of bringing human rights into the
transnational effort against corruption, based on existing practice and showing paths towards
intensification of the policy integration.
First, the entire gamut of national and international human rights institutions including the regional
human rights courts can be harnessed to tackle corruption. Fighting corruption is added to these
institutions’ ‘repertoire of competencies’, and they cannot be reproached of acting ultra vires.90 With the
reframing, the human rights become empowered to address corruption directly and generally, rather
than only when corrupt acts are explicitly linked to more traditional human rights violations.91
Importantly, the entire human rights regime (including all the commissions, tribunals, special
rapporteurs, national human rights agencies, and non-governmental organisations) is very good at fact-
finding. The additional credible information that these actors can produce is valuable for fighting
corruption.92
The IACHR has taken the lead with specific measures to incorporate anti-corruption into its work,
ranging from awareness-raising to its follow-up mechanisms. It has developed detailed ‘public policy
standards in the fight against corruption’.93 Through its monitoring sections and thematic and special
rapporteurships, the IACHR track acts of corruption that may impair enjoyment of human rights in the
states. The Commission has qualified corruption as a matter of specific human rights relevance which
then enters in the Commission’s mandate to request governments to supply additional information on
that point (Art. 41 lit. d) ACHR). In its precautionary measures mechanism, the IACHR has announced
to accord priority to requests for protection measures for all anti-corruption actors whose life and bodily
integrity are at risk. In its individual petitions and cases system, the IACHR pays special attention to
corruption as a possible context of alleged human rights violation. Qualifying large-scale corruption as a
‘serious structural situation’ that has impact in the enjoyment of human rights, the IACHR may
expedite the evaluation of relevant petitions.94
On the universal level, the human rights treaty bodies have issued their ‘Joint Statement on ‘Corruption
and Human Rights’, in 2021 which amounts to a functional equivalent to a General Comment that
applies to all treaties. An empirical study of all concluding observations issued by the UN treaty bodies
(TBs) in the decade (2007-2017) has revealed inconsistencies in the treaty bodies’ approach to
corruption: ‘[N]one of the TBs approach corruption in a systematic manner. The Committees often
raise certain concerns during their reviews of particular countries, but not others, even though the
problems mentioned also exist in those state parties. In addition, the wording of recommendations by
all TBs is inconsistent. As such, when the same issue is raised in recommendations made to different
States, the wording is often completely different.’95 Often, the mentionings of corruption do not translate
into an accompanying recommendation, without discernible reason for such omission.96
Continuing on this trajectory, the corruption-sensitive approach in the UN Treaty Bodies and other
institutions could be strengthened and improved as follows: the simplified reporting procedure, as
89
HRC Non-repatriation of funds, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 21-22.
90
cf. IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12, at ¶ 143.
91
Stephenson, supra note 7, at ¶ 20.
92
Davis, supra note 65, at 1294-95.
93
IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12.
94
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights art. 29(2) lit. d) i), adopted Nov. 28, 2009,
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/reglamento/nov_2009_ing.pdf (last visited Jul. 11, 2023).
95
Eeckeloo, supra note 21, at 28.
96
Eeckeloo, supra note 21, at 6 (on the HR committee).

introduced for most universal human rights treaties, should include corruption in the list of issues prior
to reporting. The committees’ focused reports could then consider the states’ replies on this issue, by
issuing recommendations in a consistent fashion, by establishing standards formulas, and by using
more detailed and concrete language.
Mandates of human rights special rapporteurs could include an analysis of the impact of corruption on
the human rights question that is examined, as part of the regular analysis. The Human Rights Council
could and should draw institutional and procedural consequences relating to corruption for the
Universal Periodic Review. It should consider giving a voice to specialised anti-corruption NGOs in the
review process. An anti-corruption mandate could also be included in the international standards for
the National Human Rights Institutions.97 All policies that require a human rights due diligence, for
example in the context of business and human rights, should comprise anti-corruption compliance
procedures, given that such compliance is likely to improve the realisation of human rights.98 The
recognition of the link between corruption and human rights abuse could encourage new civil society
alliances where collaboration in advocacy and litigation promises to be more successful than isolated
action.99
The synergy between anti-corruption and pro human rights arises not only from a mutual
instrumentalisation of the policies but also because the same principles – that fall under the broad
umbrella of ‘good governance’ – are essential both for developing successful anti-corruption strategies
and for promoting the enjoyment of human rights. These are notably transparency, participation,
inclusion, accountability, integrity, and the rule of law.100
Ultimately, the moral pedigree of human rights upgrades the fight against corruption and infuses an
ethical value that underscores the policies’ urgency and importance.101 The moral assessments implicit
in the human rights analysis not only mobilises many dedicated and skilled people to work against
corruption but also allows to set plausible priorities in the anti-corruption policies by suggesting that
some forms of corruption, such as in health care or in the criminal justice system, ought to be targeted
with higher priority.102 It seems fair to conclude that the opportunities of a human-rights-based
approach to corruption outweigh its risks. The approach conveys a net benefit.
6. Concluding Thoughts
Corruption has many adverse legal, economic, social, and political effects that go beyond human
rights. Concomitantly, many human rights problems are unrelated to corruption. Put differently, human
rights are only one segment of the problem of corruption, and corruption is only one segment of human
rights: both are overlapping but not congruent issues. Therefore, the invocation of human rights is not
necessary for depicting corruption as a harm. It is entirely possible to discuss the threat that corruption
poses to the law, to security, fairness, freedom, and welfare without using the language of human rights
at all.
The non-identity of the problem translates into a non-identity of possible remedies: ‘Ensuring good
governance is not the same as ensuring human rights, and the latter will never be sufficient to protect
us fully from corrupt or ignorant government officials.’103
Given the lack of congruence, the fusion of both issues has been a deliberate policy choice made by
the universal and regional human rights actors, and much more cautiously by some anti-corruption
97
cf. HRC Negative impact 2019, supra note 86, preamble, at 3.
98
UNHCHR Challenges Faced, supra note 6, at ¶ 41.
99
Olaniyan, supra note 57, at 371.
100
UNHCHR Challenges Faced, supra note 6, ¶¶22, 32, and 75; HRC Non-repatriation of funds, supranote 20, ¶ 22.
Especially the IHCR has committed to applying these principles, which it conceives as specific human rights
principles, to the states’ anti-corruption action (IACHR Corruption and Human Rights, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 489-505).
The IACHR adds equality and non-discrimination, access to justice, access to information, and priority protection for
groups that historically have been discriminated against and refers to Inter-Am, Comm’n H.R., Public Policy with a
Human Rights Approach, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 191, (Sep. 15, 2018).
101
Stephenson, supra note 7, at 20; Moyo, supra note 82, at 320: ‘The added value of elevating an issue to the level of
human rights is that it establishes a universal norm that becomes more difficult to disregard.’
102
Davis, supra note 65, at 1295-96.
103
HANNUM, supra note 64, at 51.

actors. This policy choice can and should be problematised. A certain unease with it flows from the
intuition that human rights are not suited to tackle systemic problems such as corruption. There is a
great spatial and temporal distance between the institutions facilitating corruption on the one hand and
the effects of such structural weakness on the enjoyment of human rights of individual victims on the
on the hand. Moreover, these effects are indeterminate and very difficult to measure. One doctrinal
expression of that distance and indeterminacy is exactly the struggle to establish causality between
corrupt behaviour and the violation of a human right.
Pressing the systemic problem into a human rights mould is inevitably reductive, because this leads to
a concentration on purely ‘binary’ relations between specific individuals and the state, leaving aside the
complex social and political context. Such breaking down, such ‘individualisation’ of a structural issue,
has its price. It risks to push out of sight the big picture and may even deviate attention from root
causes of corruption.
However, in our transnational legal order as it stands, the extant human rights machineries are
relatively strong compared to anti-corruption institutions. Against this background, on a superficial
level, the turn to human rights is mainly strategic. The full recognition that corruption undermines the
enjoyment of human rights allows the universal, non-adversarial human rights monitoring bodies to
legitimately address corruption in detail without overstepping their mandate. Whether corruption can in
itself constitute a human rights violation that can be successfully invoked in an individual complaint
procedure is a different question. It is difficult but not impossible in terms of both legal argument and
proof. In any case, regional human rights courts and other human rights bodies can implement at least
some forms of legal accountability and responsibility for the harms of corruption and can thus alleviate
the glaring implementation gap in anti-corruption. Most importantly, domestic courts, applying human
rights, can force legislators and the executive branch to adopt more robust measures, as the wave of
climate litigation has shown.
On a deeper level, the reframing of corruption as a human rights issue has readjusted and broadened
the objectives of the transnational battle against corruption. The ultimate purpose of anti-corruption is –
from this perspective – to secure the well-being of humans whose rights have taken centre stage. The
turn towards the victims and their rights does not constitute a radical departure from the historic policy
objectives of the transnationalisation of the efforts against corruption which addressed both the
economy and the public order. Anti-corruption was professedly designed to safeguard the functioning
of markets and to promote development. But this was never fully confined to the purely economic
sphere. Rather, protection of the market order and of the social order went hand in hand.
Bringing the human being as a victim of corruption on the stage is in line with the liberal vision that
global markets are the best structure to secure human liberty and welfare. It matches the human
rights-based approaches to development and fits into the good governance agenda. In these policies,
the alliance between global capitalism and international human rights remains fully intact. Parts of the
suspicion against the human rights-based approach to anti-corruption stems from a deep critique
against that alliance.
So, the novelty is less the shift of the emphasis from the economic to the societal sphere. Rather, the
novelty lies in the break with the historic perception that corruption is a victimless crime. Traditionally,
corruption has been conceptualised as an offence (only) against public order, because corruption
replaces ‘the proper governance of public affairs and the correct assignment of public goods (…) by
favour and arbitrariness (…) at the expense of the common good.’104 In the public order-paradigm,
victims have no place and no standing. The readjustment lies in turning attention from society at large,
from ‘the’ public to its individual members. Corruption, like other offenses such as sexual crimes or
animal cruelty, is no longer seen as an offense only against public order or public morality but as
attacks against the dignity of the victims with a name. We are witnessing an ‘individualisation’ or
‘rightsification’ of the law in many fields, with anti-corruption being only one example. Actually, such
104
Glencore International and C.I. Prodeco v. Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/6, Award, ¶ 663 (Aug. 27,
2019).

‘employment’ of human rights for a greater good are engrained in the philosophy of human rights.
Recognition ‘of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world’, says the preamble of the UDHR.
It is submitted here that the rights-framework is indeed able to contribute to structural conversion
because rights transform victims into citizens, and citizens build institutions that work. By contributing
to a change of the frame of reference and by opening up new options for monitoring and litigation, the
human rights perspective can usefully complement the criminal law approach. Human rights may be
‘not enough’, but they have proven to be indispensable in the fight against corruption.
It is therefore recommended that both concerns be mutually streamlined through all forms of
cooperation between actors in both fields, ranging from exchange of information and sharing of best
practices to the development of joint plans for action. The currently one-sided integration of corruption
concerns into the human rights machinery should be supplemented by a full attention to human rights
in all monitoring schemes in the various anti-corruption regimes. Then, the relevant policies will likely
create a positive feedback loop in which anti-corruption is instrumental to improving the human rights
situation while a range of human rights will work as ‘enablers’ for the prevention of and fight against
corruption.

Cover: Imbalanced World, 1996, Veronika Dell‘Olio (photo: Miriam Aziz)
“Essential to our concept was the establishment of a connection to the work and objectives of
the institute. In view of the diversity of the research tasks concerned, we have attempted to high-
light an overarching idea that can be understood as the institute’s mission. We see this as the
ideal of peaceful relations between peoples on the basis of an internationally validated notion of
justice…. The depicted sculpture…[symbolizes] an imbalanced world in which some peoples
are oppressed while others lay claim to dominance and power. The honeycomb form of the circu-
lar disks denotes the [international] state structure. Glass parts … [represent] the individual sta-
tes .… [The division] of the figure … into two parts [can] be interpreted as the separation of the
earth into two unequal worlds. The scissors-shaped base, on the one hand, makes the gap bet-
ween them clear, on the other hand, a converging movement of the disks is conceivable…. The
sculpture [aims] at what is imagined – the possibility of the rapprochement of the two worlds.”
[transl. by S. Less]
Art in architecture, MPIL, Heidelberg
Im Neuenheimer Feld 535

D-69120 Heidelberg
Tel.: +49 (0)6221 482 - 1
Fax: +49 (0)6221 482 - 288
www.mpil.de
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MPIL RESEARCH PAPER SERIES | No.

Human Rights and Corruption: Problems and

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND

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MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2023-18

Human Rights and Corruption: Problems and Potential of Individualising a

1. Mapping complex interrelations

* Accepted for publication in International Journal of Constitutional Law 2024.

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2. A lopsided convergence of the anti-corruption and human rights agendas

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3. Corruption as a human rights violation triggering international state responsibility

3.1. Case law

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3.2. Breach of an obligation

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3.5. Violations by omission

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3.6. Interim conclusions on rights violations

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4. Risks and opportunities of the convergence of agendas

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4.2. Conceptual Opportunities

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5. Practical implications of the human rights-based approach to corruption

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5.2. Human rights reinforcing anti-corruption

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18 MPIL Research Paper Series No. 2023-18 ISSN 2702-9360

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Art in architecture, MPIL, Heidelberg

Im Neuenheimer Feld 535

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