Villareal Vs Ramirez, GR No. 144214, July 14, 2003
Villareal Vs Ramirez, GR No. 144214, July 14, 2003
Villareal Vs Ramirez, GR No. 144214, July 14, 2003
999
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 144214. July 14, 2003 ]
LUZVIMINDA J. VILLAREAL, DIOGENES VILLAREAL AND
CARMELITO JOSE, PETITIONERS, VS. DONALDO EFREN C.
RAMIREZ AND SPOUSES CESAR G. RAMIREZ JR. AND CARMELITA
C. RAMIREZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A share in a partnership can be returned only after the completion of the latter's
dissolution, liquidation and winding up of the business.
The Case
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before us challenges the March 23, 2000
Decision[1] and the July 26, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 41026. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
The Facts
On July 25, 1984, Luzviminda J. Villareal, Carmelito Jose and Jesus Jose formed a
partnership with a capital of P750,000 for the operation of a restaurant and
catering business under the name "Aquarius Food House and Catering Services."
[5]
Villareal was appointed general manager and Carmelito Jose, operations
manager.
On March 1, 1987, respondent spouses wrote petitioners, saying that they were
no longer interested in continuing their partnership or in reopening the
restaurant, and that they were accepting the latter's offer to return their capital
contribution.[9]
Before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 59, respondents
subsequently filed a Complaint[11] dated November 10, 1987, for the collection of
a sum of money from petitioners.
In their Reply, respondents alleged that they did not know of any loan
encumbrance on the restaurant. According to them, if such allegation were true,
then the loans incurred by petitioners should be regarded as purely personal
and, as such, not chargeable to the partnership. The former further averred that
they had not received any regular report or accounting from the latter, who had
solely managed the business. Respondents also alleged that they expected the
equipment and the furniture stored in their house to be removed by petitioners
as soon as the latter found a better location for the restaurant.[13]
The CA Ruling
The CA held that, although respondents had no right to demand the return of
their capital contribution, the partnership was nonetheless dissolved when
petitioners lost interest in continuing the restaurant business with them. Because
petitioners never gave a proper accounting of the partnership accounts for
liquidation purposes, and because no sufficient evidence was presented to show
financial losses, the CA computed their liability as follows:
Issues
On closer scrutiny, the issues are as follows: (1) whether petitioners are liable to
respondents for the latter's share in the partnership; (2) whether the CA's
computation of P253,114 as respondents' share is correct; and (3) whether the CA
was likewise correct in not assessing costs.
First Issue:
Share in Partnership
Both the trial and the appellate courts found that a partnership had indeed
existed, and that it was dissolved on March 1, 1987. They found that the
dissolution took place when respondents informed petitioners of the intention to
discontinue it because of the former's dissatisfaction with, and loss of trust in,
the latter's management of the partnership affairs. These findings were amply
supported by the evidence on record. Respondents consequently demanded from
petitioners the return of their one-third equity in the partnership.
We hold that respondents have no right to demand from petitioners the return of
their equity share. Except as managers of the partnership, petitioners did not
personally hold its equity or assets. "The partnership has a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of each of the partners."[23] Since the capital was
contributed to the partnership, not to petitioners, it is the partnership that must
refund the equity of the retiring partners.[24]
Second Issue:
What Must Be Returned?
Since it is the partnership, as a separate and distinct entity, that must refund the
shares of the partners, the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its
total resources. In other words, it can only pay out what it has in its coffers,
which consists of all its assets. However, before the partners can be paid their
shares, the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated.[25] After all
the creditors have been paid, whatever is left of the partnership assets becomes
available for the payment of the partners' shares.
Evidently, in the present case, the exact amount of refund equivalent to
respondents' one-third share in the partnership cannot be determined until all
the partnership assets will have been liquidated -- in other words, sold and
converted to cash -- and all partnership creditors, if any, paid. The CA's
computation of the amount to be refunded to respondents as their share was
thus erroneous.
First, it seems that the appellate court was under the misapprehension that the
total capital contribution was equivalent to the gross assets to be distributed to
the partners at the time of the dissolution of the partnership. We cannot sustain
the underlying idea that the capital contribution at the beginning of the
partnership remains intact, unimpaired and available for distribution or return
to the partners. Such idea is speculative, conjectural and totally without factual
or legal support.
Second, the CA's finding that the partnership had an outstanding obligation in the
amount of P240,658 was not supported by evidence. We sustain the contrary
finding of the RTC, which had rejected the contention that the obligation
belonged to the partnership for the following reason:
"x x x [E]vidence on record failed to show the exact loan owed by the
partnership to its creditors. The balance sheet (Exh. `4') does not reveal
the total loan. The Agreement (Exh. `A') par. 6 shows an outstanding
obligation of P240,055.00 which the partnership owes to different
creditors, while the Certification issued by Mercator Finance (Exh. `8')
shows that it was Sps. Diogenes P. Villareal and Luzviminda J. Villareal,
the former being the nominal party defendant in the instant case, who
obtained a loan of P355,000.00 on Oct. 1983, when the original
partnership was not yet formed."
Third, the CA failed to reduce the capitalization by P250,000, which was the
amount paid by the partnership to Jesus Jose when he withdrew from the
partnership.
Because of the above-mentioned transactions, the partnership capital was
actually reduced. When petitioners and respondents ventured into business
together, they should have prepared for the fact that their investment would
either grow or shrink. In the present case, the investment of respondents
substantially dwindled. The original amount of P250,000 which they had
invested could no longer be returned to them, because one third of the
partnership properties at the time of dissolution did not amount to that much.
It is a long established doctrine that the law does not relieve parties from the
effects of unwise, foolish or disastrous contracts they have entered into with all
the required formalities and with full awareness of what they were doing. Courts
have no power to relieve them from obligations they have voluntarily assumed,
simply because their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise
investments.[29]
Third Issue:
Costs
Although, as a rule, costs are adjudged against the losing party, courts have
discretion, "for special reasons," to decree otherwise. When a lower court is
reversed, the higher court normally does not award costs, because the losing
party relied on the lower court's judgment which is presumed to have been
issued in good faith, even if found later on to be erroneous. Unless shown to be
patently capricious, the award shall not be disturbed by a reviewing tribunal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution
SET ASIDE. This disposition is without prejudice to proper proceedings for the
accounting, the liquidation and the distribution of the remaining partnership
assets, if any. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[17] Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 148, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
[20] The case was deemed submitted for decision upon this Court's receipt of
petitioners' Memorandum on July 18, 2001.
[21]
Petitioners' Memorandum was signed by Atty. Teodoro L. Regala Jr., while the
Memorandum for respondents was signed by Atty. Jose M. Ricafrente.
"Article 1839. In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution, the
following rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary:
(b) Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits,
(3) The assets shall applied in the order of their declaration in No.1 of
this article to the satisfaction of the liabilities.
(4) The partners shall contribute, as provided by article 1797, the
amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities.
(6) Any partner or his legal representative shall have the right to
enforce the contributions specified in No. 4, to the extent of the amount
which he has paid in excess of his share of the liability.
(7) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for the
contributions specified in No. 4.
(9) Where a partner has become insolvent or his estate is insolvent, the
claims against his separate property shall rank in the following order:
[27]
As an accepted business practice, furniture and equipment are depreciated
over five years to recognize the decrease in their value due to wear and tear.
[29]
Esguerra v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 58, 69, February 3, 1997; Sanchez v.
Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155, 190-191, September 29, 1997.