DURKHEIM AS A REVIEW CRITIC

Anthony Giddens

D uring the course of his academic career Durkheim wrote a very

large number of book reviews. Most of these review writings
have remained little known. They provide, however, a valuable
source of insight into the themes documented at length in his major
works. Durkheim often used reviews as a platform for the elucidation
of his own theories, and for rebuttal of the attacks of his critics. The
object of this article is to indicate some of the issues covered by Durk-
heim in the course of his activities as a reviewer. All of Durkheim's
reviews are written in the same direct, severe style which is charac-
teristic (tf his longer works: there is no humour, little rhetoric, and
only rare flashes of irony. But neither is there any surplus content:
many of the reviews are in fact wholly descriptive, and simply present
an outline of what the reviewer takes to be the most significant con-
tributions made by the author in question. It is not my intention,
however, to discuss Durkheim's skill as a critic, nor to comment
upon his literary style, but simply to describe a few of the ways in
which the reviews which he wrote d the works of others expand upon
and illuminate his own conception of sociology.
The bulk of Durkheim's reviews were written in two separate
periods. The first phase ran from the middle of the i88os up to the
publication ot The Division of Labour in Society in 1893. Durkheim's
earliest published writings, in faa, consist of reviews (which ap-
peared in 1885) of books by Schaffle and Gumplowicz.' During this
phase, Durkheim also published a compendious three-part review
artide concenwd with the works of these and other German sodal
thinkers. The second period spanned the time during which Durkheim
was involved with the Annee Sodologique. Throughout this latter
period—as the guiding spirit of the journal—Durkheim undertook
the arduous task of reviewing books and articles in several broad areas
of sociology.

Reviews published from 188$ to 1893

There are some sorts of sociological theory which, although as recent
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 Anthony Giddens
in formulation as others which are very familiar in present day soci-
ology, have rapidly become almost completely forgotten. One such
type of theory is organidsm, as represented in the latter part of the
nineteenth century by the writings of Fouill& and Worms in France,
and Schaffie and Lilienfeld in Germany. The notion that society forms
an integrated unity which is in some sense comparable to that charac-
teristic of living organisms is, d course, one which can be traced back
to Classical social philosophy. But the publication c^ Darwin's account
of biological evolution gave an entirely new stimulus to the elaboration
of organismic theories. It is difficult from the perspective of the modern
age to recapture the extraordinary impact which Darwin's writings had
upon social thought in the concluding decades of the nineteenth
century. The century as a whole witnessed many considerable advances
in biology: the properties of the cell were identified through micro-
scopic analysis, and the thesis that all organisms are composed of
cconbinatiom of similar cellular structures became a firmly established
principle. Darwin's work placed these notions within the context of an
empirically grounded, dynamic theory; and nothing was more guaran-
teed to fire the imagination of his contemporaries than this powerful
combination of positivism and a perspective of evolutionary progress.
The writings of SchSSle and the others thus differed considerably from
those of most d their many precursors who had employed organic
analogies, in that these later authors proceeded from the premise that
the established laws governing the functioning and evolution of animal
organisms formed a model upon which the framework of a natural
science d society may be based.
Durkheim's review of Sdiaffle's Bau und Leben des Sodalen
Korpers was his first publication. It is a long ami comprehensive dis-
cussion, and occupies nearly twenty closely printed pages (rf the journal
in ^riiich it appears. Durkheim begins by pointing out that, while the
name of SchSffle is not unfamiliar in France, the main substance of
his work is largely unknown. The appearance of this new edition of
Schaffle's book therefore, DurMieim states, forms an opportune
moment to present to a French public an outline of the ideas of the
German sociologist.
SchSffle's main contribution to sociology, according to Durkheiffl,
is to have outlined a useful morphological analysis of the main struc-
tural components of different forms d society. In doing so, Schiiffle
makes extensive use of organismic analogies, comparing the various
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 Durkheim as a Review Critic
parts of society to the organs and tissues in the body. These are,
however, Durkheim emphasises, only analogies; Schaffle does not
attempt in any direct sense to deduce the properties of social organisa-
tion from those of organic life. On the contrary, Schaffle insists that
the use of biological concepts form no more than a 'metaphor' which
can facilitate sociological analysis. In fact, Durkheim points out,
Schaffle stresses that there exists a radical and highly significant dis-
crepancy between the life of the organism and that of society: whereas
the life of the animal organism is governed 'mechanically', society is
bound together 'not by a material relation, but by the ties of ideas'.^
This consensus of ideas which is the foundation of social unity is not
primarily composed of 'instincts, habits, traditions and prejudices';
for Schaffle 'the conscience collective is mainly made up of definite
ideas (idees claires) . . . social consensus is a product of conscious
contrivance and adaptation." Thus, while sociology may Intimately
aspire to emulate the procedures and findings of biology, the laws of
the former discipline cannot merely be inferred from those of the
latter. Knowledge of organic phenomena can provide useful conceptual
and theoretical aids to the understanding of society, but sociology
must nonetheless reach its own independently verified conclusions.
The notion of 'society as the ideal', Durkheim stresses, occupies a
focal place in Schaffle's thought, and is entirely consistent with the
latter's premise that society has its own specific characteristics which
are separable from those of its individual members. For Schaffle,
'Society is not simply an aggregate of individuals, but is a being (etre)
which has existed prior to those who today compose it, and which will
survive ±em, which influences them more than they influence it, and
which has its own life, consciousness (conscience), its own interests
and destiny.'' Schiffle thus rejects the conception of the individual
and society given primacy by Rousseau, in which the hypothetical
'isolated individual' in a state of nature is freer and happier than when
bonded to society. Schaffle shows that all that makes human life above
the level of animal existence is derived from the accumulated cultural
and technological wealth <3i society. If this is removed from man, 'then
you will have removed at the same time all that makes us truly
human'.'' These ideals and sentiments which constitute the cultural
inheritance of the members of every society are 'impersonal'; that is,
they are socially evolved, and are neither the produa nor the property
of any specific individuals. This is easily shown by reference to the
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 Anthony Giddens
example of language: 'each of us speaks a language vi4uch he did not
create'.' Schaffle shows, Durkheim continues, that to treat the con-
science collective as having properties which are not the same as those
of the individual consciousness does not imply anything metaphysical.'
The conscience collective is simply 'a composite, the elements of
which are individual minds'.^
Gumplowicz' writings, Durkheim points out in his review of the
latter's Grundriss der Soziologie, provide further evidence of the
advances in sociology made by German thinkers. Durkheim is con-
siderably less impressed by Gumplowicz' work than by that of
Sdufne, but notes: 'Although we do not accept his principles, his
method, or the major part of his conclusions, we have no hesitation
in recognising the value and interest of his book'.' Gumplowicz' book
is indicative of the vital character of German sociology—a state of
affairs, according to Durkheim, which contrasts dramatically with the
retarded development of the discipline in France: 'Thus sociology,
which is French by origin, is becoming more and more a German
science'."
Durkheim criticises Gumplowicz for an inadequate representation
of the thought of other sociologists (including Schaffle, about whom,
Durkheim states, Gumplowicz makes the common mistake of pre-
suming that he seeks to directly infer the laws of sociology from those
of biology), Gumplowicz is nevertheless correct in holding that
sociology 'is an independent science, and sui generis'.^' But Durkheim
rejects both the mode in which Gumplowicz attempts to conceptualise
the autonomous character of sociology, and the substantive conclusions
he reaches through the application of it. According to Gumplowicz'
version of Social Darwinism, the evolution of human society can be
understood in terms of group conflict: every society stands in a con-
flict relation with all others, and attempts to exploit them in its own
interests, Conflia and subordination are thus, for Gumplowicz, the
great forces which are the motors of social change: 'the struggle for
domination, Der ewige Kampj um Herrschaft, is the fundamental faa
of all sodal life'."
Durkheim admits the force of these arguments; but Gumplowicz
pushes this line of reasoning much too far, and fails to account for the
unified and integrated diaracter which most societies manifest most
of the time. It is one of SchaSle's main contributions to have shown
the importance of this. To recognise the unitary character of society is
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 Durkheim as a Review Critic
not CO deny the significance of conflict, but it is to repudiate the
notion that conflict is the source of all social development. Moreover,
Gumplowicz fails to recognize the intimate and complex relation be-
tween the individual and society; the individual is not simply a passive
agent moulded by society, but is the active carrier of social life. In
criticism of Gumplowicz, Durkheim points out that: 'Since there is
nothing in society apart from individuals, it is they and they alone who
are the agents (facteurs) of social life . . . But, one might say, the
individual is an effect, not a cause; he is a drop of water in the ocean;
he does not act, he is acted upon, and it is the social environment
which directs him. But what is this social environment made up of,
if not of individuals? Thus we are at the same time aaors and acted
upon, and each of us contributes to forming this irresistible current
which sweeps him along.'"
In his long survey of 'positive moral science' in Germany, published
in 1887," Durkheim reiterates some of these points; but the main
concern of the review is to examine the contributions which leading
German authors have made towards founding a science of moral life."
In France, Durkheim asserts, only two broad forms of ethical theory
are known—Kantian idealism on the one hand, and utilitarianism on
the other. The recent works of the German social thinkers, however,
have begun to establish ethics on a scientific footing. These new views
have been developed primarily by economists and jurists, among whom
the most important are Wagner and SchmoUer.'* The views of Wagner
and SchmoUer are considerably different from those of orthodox
liberal economists. Orthodox economic theory is founded upon in-
dividualistic utilitarianism, and is a-historical: 'In other words, the
major laws of economics would be exactly the same even if neither
nations nor states had existed in the world; they suppose only the
presence of individuals who exchange their products.'" Wagner and
SchmoUer depart radically from this utiUtarian standpoint. For them
(as for Schaffle) society is a unity which has its own specific properties
not derivable from those of its individual members. It is false to
suppose that a whole is equal to the sum of its parts; insofar as these
parts are organised in a definite fashion, then this organisation of rela-
tionships has characteristics of its own." This principle has to he
applied also to the moral rules which men Uve by in society: morality
is a coUective property and must be studied as such. In utilitarian
theory, on the other hand, 'the collective interest is only a form of
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 Anthony Giddens
personal interest', and 'altruism is merely a concealed egoism'."
SchmoUer has shown, Durkheim states, that economic phenomena
cannot be adequately studied in the manner of orthodox economic
theory, as if separate from the moral norms and beliefs which govern
the life of individuals in society. There is no society (nor could there
conceivably be a society) where economic relationships are not subject
to customary and legal regulation. That is, as Durkheim was later to
put it in The Division of Labour, 'a contract is not sufficient unto it-
self';"' if it were, then 'incoherent chaos' would reign in the economic
world.-' The regulations which control economic life cannot be ex-
plained purely in economic terms. 'One can understand nothing of the
rules of morality which govern propeny, contract, work etc., if one
does not know the economic causes which underlie them; and, con-
versely, one would arrive at a completely false notion of economic
development if one neglected the moral causes which influenced it'."
It is the major achievement of the German thinkers to have shown
that moral rules and actions can and must be studied scientifically, as
properties of social organisation. Here Durkheim sets out a principle
which was to form a main connecting thread of his subsequent writ-
ings. Up to the present, philosophers have assumed that ethics can
be based upon logic: upon a deductive system of abstract principles.
But the work of the German authors has shown that it is fundamentally
mistaken to construct moral principles in the abstract and then to
seek to apply them to reality, as if human social life could be simply
organised according to imelleaual precepts. Rather we must begin
with the reality, which means the concrete forms of moral rules em-
bodied in specific societies. In this connection, Durkheim again quotes
Schaffle approvingly: it is precisely Schaffle's major achievement to
have shown that moral rules are shaped by society, under the pressure
of collective needs. Therefore there can be no question of assuming
that such rules, as they really operate in real life, can be reduced to a
few a priori principles of which all specific beliefs and actions are
merely an expression. Moral facts are actually 'of prodigious com-
plexity': the empirical study of different societies shows that there
exists a 'steadily increasing multitude of beliefs, customs, and legal
provisions'.'' Only the sociologist, through scientific observation and
description, can hope to classify and interpret this diversity.

Durkheim devoted a large part of his review article on the German

thinkers to analysing Wundt's Ethik, regarding this work as one of the
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 Durkheim as a Review Critic
most significant fruits of the perspectives outlined above. One of
Wundt's primary accomplishments is to have shown the significance of
religion in society. Wundt shows that primitive religions contain
two sets of interrelated beliefs: a set of 'metaphysical speculations on
the nature and order of things', and rules of conduct and moral dis-
cipline." Religion, Wundt demonstrates, is the original source of all
subsequently evolved systems of ideas which eventually become separ-
ated from religious beliefs. Moreover, through providing ideals to be
striven for, religion is a force making for social unity. These ideals
vary in different societies, 'but one can be confident that there have
never been men who have completely lacked an ideal, however humble
it may be; for this corresponds to a need which is deeply rooted in our
nature'.'"' In primitive societies, religion is a strong source of altruism:
religious beliefs and practices 'had the effect of restraining egoism,
of inclining man towards sacrifice and disinterestedness'. Religious
sentiments 'attach man to something other than himself, and make him
dependent upon superior powers which symbolise the ideal'." In-
dividualism, Wundt shows, is a product of social development: 'far
from individuality being the primitive fact, and society the derived
fact, the first only slowly emerges from the second'."
Durkheim criticises Wundt, however, for not fully perceiving the
dual character of the regulative effect of religious and other moral
rules. All moral behaviour, Durkheim stresses, has two sides to it: the
positive attraction—the attraction to an ideal or set of ideals—is one
side. But moral rules also have characteristics of obligation or con-
straint, since the pursuit of moral ends is not always pleasurable. Both
aspects of moral rules are crucial to their functioning: the one to
provide ideals, the other to maintain adherence to them. The preserva-
tion of ideals which go beyond the immediate sphere of the individual's
needs and interests is of decisive importance to the continuity of
social life: 'None of our ends has an absolute value, not even happi-
ness . . . if they attract us, it is because we believe them to relate to
something other than ourselves... If our efforts culminate in nothing
lasting, they are futile, and why should we labour in vain? Moreover,
individualism, because it detaches the individual from the rest of
things, because it confines him in himself and closes off his horizon,
leads straight to pessimism. Of what consequence are our individual
joys, which are so poor and short?"'
Other works which Durkheim reviewed prior to the publication of
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 Anthony Giddens
The Division of Labour included Guyau's Virreligicm de faoenir and
Tonnies' Gemeinschaft und GeseUschaft." Guyau's work is an analysis
of the decline of traditional religious beliefs and the consequences of
this for contemporary society. Modem societies, according to Guyau,
are characterised by a state of 'moral anomie'.'" Guyau does not use
this term to mean the absence of effective moral rules (Durkheim's later
usage), but employs it instead to refer to the loosely formulated ideals
of human dignity and freedom which have increasingly replaced the
dogmatism of previous ages. According to Guyau, these have now to a
large degree supplanted religion in contemporary societies, and there
can be no return to the classical form of religious belief. These ideals
are, however, historically an outgrowth of values contained in Christ-
ianity, and could not have developed without it. Durkheim accepts the
general substance of Guyau's analysis, but considers it overly 'rational-
istic'. Guyau tends to treat the changes in religious belief which he
isolates as a product of the reflective intelligence. But, Durkheim
stresses, it is utterly misleading to attempt to understand religion in
this way. Religion is bound up with the practical needs of life in
society, and if profound changes have taken place in the nature of
religious beliefs, this is because basic changes have occurred in the
structure of society."
Durkheim's review of Tonnies' book is of some significance in
virtue of the obvious parellels between the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschajt
typology and his own differentiation of mechanical and organic solid-
arity. Durkheim expresses general agreement with the main generalisa-
tions established by Tonnies: that two broad types of society can be
distinguished, and that Gemeinschaft is the original form out of which
Gesellschaft emerges. The main point of difference which Durkheim
singles out as separating his views from those of TSnnies concerns the
nature of Gesellschaft. Tonnies assumes, according to Durkheim, that
in the latter type of society all 'collective life resulting from internal
spontaneity' has been lost: insofar as this type of social order involves
'truly collective life', it does so in virtue of 'the completely external
influence of the state'." What this comes down to is in fact the satne
sort of conception of society advanced by the utilitarians: which is
inadequate for reasons akeady specified by Durkheim. In analysing the
structure of Gesellschaft societies, Durkheim concludes, we must
accept that they are characterised by certain phenomena, such as the
growth of 'individualism', which distinctively separate them from the
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 Durkheim as a Review Critic
Gemeinschaft type. But we must also recognise that the differentiated
{orm of social order has not ceased to be a society: that it preserves
a collective unity and identity and is not, any more than the first type
is, a mere aggregate of individuals, 'Outside of purely individual
actions (mouvements), there is in our contemporary societies a truly
collective activity which is quite as natural as that of the less extensive
societies of former times. It is assuredly different; it constitutes a
distinct type, but between these two species of a single genus, however
different they may be, there is not a difference in nature'." Society has
not, Durkheim emphasises, in contradistinction to Tonnies, moved
from being an organic unity to becoming a mechanical aggregate,^'
Before moving on to look at some of Durkheim's reviewing activities
subsequent to the publication of his doctoral thesis, it is perhaps
worthwhile to indicate briefly his position with regard to the useful-
ness of organic analogies in sociology. Durkheim made a fairly exten-
sive use of biological concepts in The Division of Labour; but in his
early reviews his attitude towards the significance of such analogies is
very guarded. While he was not wholly consistent in his remarks on the
issue, his basic standpoint on the matter is expressed in his review of
Schaffle: "We willingly recognise', Durkheim stated, 'that society is
a sort of organism; but we do not see how this aphorism can serve as
the basis of a science."' That is to say, while it may serve useful con-
ceptual purposes to employ biological concepts—especially in the early
stages of sociology—it is utterly illegitimate to attempt to derive the
laws of social life from those established in biology. The assumption
that the principles which govern social life are the same as those which
control the life of organisms is in fact a retarding factor hampering
the progress of sociology. For these reasons, Durkheim considers
Lilienfeld's Gedanken iiber die Sozialuiissertschaft der Zukunft to be of
little usefulness. For while some of the other so-called 'biological
sociologists' (e.g. Schaffle) see social phenomena as 'facts sui generis
which have to be studied in themselves', 'the sole aim of Lilienfeld is
to show analogies between societies and organisms'.''
The use of organic metaphors, however, can help to focus attention
upon the vital, changing character of society. Thus Durkheim re-
marks of Gumplowicz: 'It is true that our author repudiates any com-
parison between societies and organisms. But in order to avoid a lesser
evil he falls into a worse one . . .'; Gumplowicz' sociology is 'rigid',
and 'has none of the flexibility with which living organisms adapt
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 Anthony Giddens
themselves in response to new circumstances . . . ' "

Reviews published from 1895 (0 79/2

Durkheim published The Division of Labour in 1893, *"'' ^'•^
Rules of Sociological Method (in book form) two years later. Both
works, but particularly the latter, stimulated critical reaction. Durk-
heim dealt with some of these criticisms in a preface to the second
edition of The Rules." One focus of attack by Tarde and others, how-
ever, concerned not the issues Durkheim answered in his new preface
—mainly concerned with the nature of social phenomena and the
methodological assertion that they should be treated as 'things'—but
Durkheim's position with regard to 'normality' and 'pathology'."
Tarde challenged in particular Durkheim's radical conception that
crime is a 'normal' phenomenon in society. Since this is one part of
Durkheim's work which has been almost universally rejected by sub-
sequent sociologists, it is worthwhile to examine how Durkheim de-
fended himself in this respect.
Durkheim replies to Tarde's criticism in two respects: with regard
to the question of whether crime is functionally 'useful' in society; and
in relation to the issue of the relationship between the 'normal' and
the statistically 'average'. The question of the 'usefulness' of crime
can be partly separated, Durkheim considers, from whether or not
crime is 'normal'. Here he reiterates, in only a slightly different way,
the two principal rules governing normality set out in The Rules of
Sociological Method: namely, that crime is 'normal' because it is
present (in varying degrees and forms) in all societies—there is no
society where some individuals do not deviate from 'the collective
type'; and that crime is therefore 'bound to the fundamental conditions
of all social life'. Its 'usefulness' stems from this fact, but 'useful or
not crime is in any case normal'.*" Crime has two sorts of 'usefulness':
indirectly, in that it is a condition of the 'normal evolution' of society,
since if no-one questioned the conscience collective there could be
no (endogenous) social change; and directly in that 'sometimes, but
only sometimes, the criminal has been a precursor of the morality to
come'."
On the question of the 'normal' versus the 'average', Durkheim's
reply is directed not to what might seem the main weakness in his
position—^that is, his identification of what is 'normal' with what is
present in the average society of a given type*"—^but to the connection
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 Durkheim as a Review Critic
between individual pathology and social normality. Durkheim's main
point is in fact simply a generalisation of his basic position with regard
to the autonomy of social facts: it is that social pathology is sui generis
and is not simply an aggregate of individual abnormalities:
'In the theory which I have fonntilated, a people which comprised only
average individuals would be essentially abnormal. For there is no
society which does not contfiin multitudes of individual anomalies, and
a fact of such universality does not exist without a reason. It is therefore
socially normal that there should be in every society individuals who
are psychologically abnormal; and the normality of crime is only a par-
ticular case of this general proposition.'*'''

The conditions which govern social normality may thus even be

contrary to those which govern the health of individuals. This op-
position between 'social health' and individual health can be, Durkheim
states, 'directly proved'. It is a condition of social life that society
should periodically renew itself: in other words, that incumbent
generations cede place to younger ones. Therefore the former must
die: their dying, so to speak, is a condition of the birth of new in-
dividuals. It follows therefore, so Durkheim considers, that 'the normal
state of societies implies the illness of individuals'. Thus a certain rate
of mortality is a necessary factor in social normality."
The Division of Labour in Society, when it appeared in 1893, was
criticised for its alleged 'materialism'. Durkheim replied to this objec-
tion on several occasions. Insofar as the implication was that his views
were indistinguishable from those of Marxists, Durkheim was able to
reply to his critics while reviewing Labriola's work on the materialist
conception of history.*' Durkheim begins by admitting his agreement
with certain of the notions embodied in the Marxist view as presented
by Labriola. It is fruitful conception, Durkheim states, which regards
social life not merely from the point of view of the consciousness of
the individuals involved, but which examines the influence of factors
which escape consciousness, and indeed shape it. This is a valid and
important characteristic of Marxist social theory. Moreover, it is also
valid to hold that these factors must be sought in the organisation of
social groupings. 'For in order for collective represetitations to be
understandable, it is certainly necessary that they come from some-
thing and, since they cannot form a circle closed upon itself, the
source which they derive from must be located outside of themselves.""
It is therefore quite correct to analyse the source of ideas in relation to
the social substratum in which they are rooted; what, Durkheim
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 Anthony Giddens
asked rhetorically, can this substratum be composed of, if not of the
members of society organised into given social relationships?
There is no reason to suppose, however, that this perspective is in
some way inseparably bound up with socialism. One can study societies
in this way without accepting the rest of the principles upon which
Marxism is founded. Durkheim remarks that he arrived at this view
before having been acquainted vrith Marx's work; and that his con-
ception has been in no way influenced by Marx.*' This perspective is
simply the substance of sociological method, and is a necessary con-
dition of studying society in a scientific maimer. It is, however, quite
dubious to suppose that the substratum of social consciousness is
located solely in economic relationships. This hypothesis, although it
is the central principle of historical materialism, is not only not proven,
but is even 'contrary to facts which seem established'.** This can be
demonstrated specifically with reference to the rdle of religion in social
life. It has been established, Durkheim declares, that religion is the
original source out of which all subsequent systems of ideas have
become differentiated. But in the early forms of society, 'the economic
faaor is rudimentary, while religious life is, on the contrary, luxurious
and enveloping'.*' It is therefore likely that the economy is formed
much more under the influence of religion than the other way
around. We must not fall into the trap of treating ideas as mere
epiphenomena, however much it is true that they are causally in-
fluenced by basic characteristics of social organisation. Once ideas and
beliefs are established, 'they are, in virtue of this, realities sui generis,
autonomous, capable of being causes in their turn and of producing
new phenomena'." This must not be taken to imply, Durkheim
cautions, that economic factors are of no significance whatsoever to the
sociologist. But their influence is probably variable according to the
level of development of the society in question, and according to the
nature of their interrelationships with the rest of society.

If it is true that the materialistic conception of history gives undue

primacy to economic factors in the life of society, it follows that the
importance of economic classes is also exaggerated. The past develop-
ment of society cannot be understood primarily in terms of class con-
flict; and nor can the malaise of contemporary European societies be
traced to a conflict between classes. Class conflict is a symptom of a
disorder which has its origin elsewhere. 'From which it follows',
Durkeim concludes, 'that the economic transformations which have
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 Durkheim as a Review Critic
been produced during the course of this century, the change-over from
small to large scale industry, do not necessitate an upheaval and radical
reorganisation (renouvellentent integral) of the social order . . . ' "
On other occasions Durkheim amplifies these views, as for instance
in a review of Richard's Le sodalisme et la science sociale." Durk-
heim's primary objection to socialism insofar as it is considered to be
'scientific'—and the context here makes it clear that the reference is
mainly to Marxism—is that it is a complete system of thought which is
presented as a 'finished' theory of past, present, and future. But such a
system could not have been arrived at scientifically, since it presup-
poses an enormous fund of knowledge, far and above what is already
established at the present dme. A great deal of research would be
necessary to substantiate in scientific terms even some of the more
limited generalisations contained in Capital. '. . . of all the criticisms
which Richard has directed at Marx, the strongest appears to us to be
that which limits itself to setting in relief what a distance there is
between the fundamental proposition of the system and the observa-
tions upon which it rests.'" But if it cannot be regarded as an estab-
lished scientific theory, it is itself a social faa of great significance
which the sociologist must seek to understand. Socialism is itself
rooted in a definite state of society; but it does not necessarily express
accurately the conditions which give rise to it.'*
The thesis that sociology is only a beginning science, and that as yet
only a relatively limited number of reliable facts about different
societies have been firmly established, is one upon which Durkheim
insisted strongly. As he remarks in the preface to Suicide, sociologists
must avoid 'hasty intuitions' and 'brilliant generalisations' which are
not grounded in empirical knowledge. It is premature, Durkheim
remarks in another place, to formulate any sort of definite scheme of
developmental stages in the evolution of society into which existing
societies could be classified." This would demand considerably more
comparative knowledge than is yet available.
'All that it is possible to do is to sketch schematically the main outlines
of a possible classification: to trace the contours of a few general cat-
egories which only subsequent scientific discoveries will allow us to make
more precise and progiessively complete.'"*

In the Annee Sodologique of 1901-2, Durkheim reviewed three

articles on the nature of history, includitig ones by Croce and Sorel."
Many historians, Durkheim points out, like to consider themselves to
183
 Anthony Giddens
be scientists; but history can only be a science if it deals in generalisa-
tion. A science avoids the unique in the sense that its aim is to abstract
from the particular what is shared in common among a class of
phenomena. But if history were to aim at generalisation, it would then
'cease to be itself in order to become a branch of sociology'.'* History
can remain an independent discipline only if it limits itself to the
study of the particular development of a given nation over specific
periods of time in which it formed its individual charaaer. However,
in this case history becomes 'nothing more than a narration, the object
of which is primarily practical'."" The function of history in this sense
would be simply to make societies conscious of their past: to stimulate
the 'collective memory'.
Thus two apparently different conceptions of history can be dis-
tinguished. But in fact, Durkheim concludes, these are not absolutely
separate from one another, and are bound to come closer together in
the future. Each should lean on and make use of the other: 'Scientific
history or sociology cannot do without direct observation of concrete
facts, and, from another aspect, national history, (and) history as art,
cannot but gain through the penetration of the general principles which
the sociologist arrives a t . . ."" Sociology and history therefore do not
form two completely distinct disciplines; they approach social reality
from perspectives which are different but complementary. Neverthe-
less, Durkheim warns, the two should not for all that be confused.
Durkheim wrote well over a hundred reviews of substantial length
for the Annee Sociologique, plus numerous shorter critical notes."
These ranged over diverse topics, and covered works on general
sociology, morals and law, religion, kinship and the family, urbanis-
ation, and demography. It is obviously quite impossible to give any sort
of overall description of these here. The following, however, are among
the most interesting and important: a review of Simmel's Philosophie
des Geldes; a comparative review discussing L6vy-Bruhl's Les
fonctions mentales dans Us societe inferieures, in conjunction with the
reviewer's own Elementary Forms of the Religious Life; and a dis-
cussion of 'scientific ethics'.
Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes must surely rank as one of the
most neglected classics of modem sociology. Durkheim's review of it
is of particular interest, since the book forms part of a general theory
of social development which overlaps considerably with some of the
main themes embodied in The Division of Labour." As Durkheim
184
 Durkheim as a Review Critic
points out, the title of Simmel's work would make it appear that the
book is mainly concerned with economic theory; but in fact the author
covers a much wider range than this, and the main substance of the
book is sociological. Money is used as a basis for an analysis of many
diverse aspects of social life. Simmel begins from the premise that
goods have 'value' insofar as their equivalence can be assessed in
quantitative terms through exchange, so that one good is worth a
specifiable number of other goods." Value is thus not determined by
any one individual or group but constitutes an impersonal norm.
Money is the symbol of this: it concretises and makes possible an in-
creasingly extensive range of exchange transactions, whereby both men
and goods are 'bought' and 'sold' on the market. Money thus provides
a cotnmon standard in terms of which intrinsically heterogeneous
things are made comparable and brought into systematic and rational
relationship with one another. Money and the increasingly pervasive
rationalisation of modern life are therefore intitnately related."
Much of Simtnel's book consists of a long and detailed pursuit of
the ramifications of the extension of rationalisation and quantification
into different spheres of modern social life. As Durkheim notes, this
analysis is much too diverse to be summarised shortly. Durkheim
echoes the conclusions of most subsequent secondary interpreters of
Simmel when he states that the abundance of insights and origitial
ideas in Simmel's book are more striking than the basic thesis is con-
vincing. It is obviously true that money has an abstract and symbolic
character; but this does not show that it has the profound infiuence
upon social life which Simmel attributes to it. The way in which the
distribution of money is regulated socially is more important than the
nature of money as such; in a fully socialised economy, for example,
the infiuence of money would be very different from what it is in a free
market."' Durkheim reaches similar general conclusions in reviewing
other writings of Simmel, in which the latter developed his conception
of fortnal sociology: Simmel's vmtings are impressive in terms of their
ingenuity and cleverness, but they are imprecise, and display a general
lack of concern with the systetnatic application of empirical method."
Durkheim's comparative discussion of LSvy-Bruhl's book on prim-
itive mentality and his own work on religion, was published in the last
volume of the Annee Sodologique to appear under his auspices."
The two works, Durkheim admits, share a great deal in common.
The main object of LSvy-Bruhl's work is to demonstrate that hmnan
185
 Anthony Giddens
thought-processes do not possess the invariable character which many
anthropologists have believed, by showing in detail that the logical
structure of thought in primitive societies is decisively different in
certain respects from that characteristic of the more developed forms of
society. In general, Durkheim states, his own work is in accord with
this conclusion. Both authors agree that patterns of human thought
have changed profoundly over the course of the development of human
society: both emphasise that religious symbolism is the origin of all
differentiated systems of belief. But there is one major difference—
Levy-Bruhl's work seeks to draw a clearly demarcated division between
primitive and modern thought, and even makes the claim that the two
are in some ways fundamentally opposed. In Durkheim's view, how-
ever, this is a basic error; different as these modes of thought are, they
are not wholly exclusive, since the one is the sotirce of the other.
L6vy-Bruhl's notion that primitive thought does not recognise the
logical principle of contradiction is, moreover, mistaken: 'We have
shown by means of examples that, if the primitive mind is prone to
make confusions, it nonetheless recognises defined antitheses (opposi-
tions heurtees), and frequently applies the principle of contradiction
in an extreme way. Inversely, the law of participation is not specific
to primitive mentality: today as previously, our ideas partake of each
other. This is the very condition of all logical life. The difference is
primarily in the way in which these participations are established.""
In 1905, Durkheim returned to the question of the possibility of
establishing a 'scientific ethics', replying to critiques of his position
given in three different works." Rather ironically, in virtue of his
numerous explicit attacks upon certain of the views held by the utili-
tarians, one of the criticisms of Durkheim's own approach was that it
was 'utilitarian'. Durkheim replies to this in the following way. 'Mora!
institutions, precisely because they are social institutions', play a
functionally 'useful' role in the operation of society. This therefore
involves a kind of social utilitarianism; but that this perspective is
quite distinct from that of utilitarian individualism can be seen from
the fact that it also involves 'the contrary principle': the Kantian im-
perative. 'In fact, we have not ceased to repeat that, for us, the essential
characteristic of the moral rule is obligation, in the Kantian sense of
the word."" The basic position which Durkheim's sociology of
morality is founded upon is thus clear. It involves a unification, a
synthesis of the two competing schools of ethical thought which
186
 Durkheim as a Review Critic
Dtu-kheim distinguished in his early review articles: Kantiatiism and
utilitarianism. The 'constraint' exercised by moral rules in virtue of
their social character is the Durkheimian equivalent of Kant's moral
imperative: the functional role which moral rules play in the working
of society is the equivalent, again translated into sociological terms,
of the utilitarian conception of the means-ends relationship. The socio-
logical standpoint therefore, in Durkheim's view, reconciles these two
apparently divergent approaches, and in doitig so surpasses both.
The possibility of establishing in a scientific fashion what is 'normal'
and what is 'pathological' with regard to the moral rules existit^ in a
given society is, for Durkheim, simply an extension of this standpoint.
If the ethical 'obligation' which morality imposes is founded upon the
'useful' role which it plays in society, then it follows that, where a
certain set of moral rules is simply a 'survival' which is not adapted
to a changed form of society, these rules are lositig or have lost
their grounds for being recognised as tnaking legititnate demands on
behaviour. But only the sociologist, who studies the workings of society
in a scientific empirical manner, can be in a position to demonstrate
this: to show whether or not, in a given set of drcmnstances, a certain
set of moral rules are 'obsolete'. It is, furthermore, only by dint of
sociological analysis that one can answer the subsequent question:
what forms of moral rule are the emergent norms of the future?
'Certainly the explanation of a moral rule (maxime) is not ipso facto
a justification of it, but the explanation opens up ways to justification,
far from dispensitig with it or makitig it impossible."'
It could be objected to this, as Durkheim recognises, that the adop-
tion of this standpoint—that morality has its own reality grounded in
the organisation of specific forms of society—^renders all the more
'philosophical' attempts to create logically consistent ethics completely
futile. But, Durkheim adds, his standpoint is not as radical as this.
While it is true that 'morality did not wait for the theories of the
philosophers in order to be formed and to function', this does not mean
that, given empirical knowledge about the working of moral institu-
tions, philosophical reflection cannot play a part in producing changes
in existing moral rules.
In reviewitig the work of a particularly hostile Thomist critic in
the twelfth volume of the Annee Sodologique, Durkheim offers a
statement which exemplifies his position:
'There is not, according to our view, and there cannot be, any conflict
187
 Anthony Giddens
between ethics and sociology; we ask simply that ethical constructions
should be preceded by a science of morality which is more methodical
than the ordinary speculations of so-called theoretical ethics. Our thesis
can be summed up as a whole in this way: in order to be able to deter-
mine what morality should be, at a given moment in tiine, it is necessary
to know first of all what morality is, how to distinguish what is moral
from what is not, and one cannot answer this question if one has not,
to begin with, studied moral phenomena in and for themselves.'"

Conclusion: the structure and substance of Durkheim's sociology

Durkheim's review writings have an intrinsic interest of their own
as useful critical analyses of the writings of other prominent sociologists
and anthropologists. But they are also significant as a source of iUu-
tnination of the main themes and concerns of Durkheim's sociology as
a whole.
For some years past there has existed an orthodoxy in the interpreta-
tion of Durkheim's writings which has insisted upon the sigtiificance
of changes in theoretical outlook which are presumed to have taken
place over the course of his intellectual career. Talcott Parsons has
attributed a particular importance to this notion, and his discussion of
Durkheim's sociology, although written over thirty years ago, remains
a standard exposition of Durkheim's thought in English."
The thread of Parsons' brilliant but tortuous account of Durkheim's
ideas runs as follows.'* The main unifying theme running through
Durkheim's work is a concern with 'the problem of order'—Durkheim,
Parsons says, 'was almost wholly concerned with what Comte would
have called "social statics". The problem of order is Durkheim's central
problem from an early stage'.'" Durkheim's attempts to grapple with
the issues that this raised, however, gave rise to 'a fundamental change'
in his thinking, 'from one set of sharply formulated ideas to another'."
The analysis set out by Durkheim in The Division of Labour, accord-
ing to Parsons, was representative of a formative stage, in which
Durkheim sought to establish a positivistic critique of utilitarian
individualism. There is, so Parsons' account states, a basic ambiguity
in The Division of Labour, which has to do with the fate of the con-
science collective in societies having a complex division of labour."
Durkheim hesitated between the view (a) that the conscience collective
is progressively eradicated with the advance of organic solidarity, and
(b) that the increasing differentiation of the division of labour leads,
not so much to the disappearance of the conscience collective, but
rather to a change in its internal content. While (a) is the dominant
i88
 Durkheim as a Review Critic
theme in The Division of Labour, according to Parsons, (b) constitutes
'the authentic line of Ourkheim's own development'," and is
elaborated in the reasoning underlying Suicide. The distinction be-
tween egoism and anomie elaborated in Suicide makes manifest that
Durkheim no longer thought at this point in terms of a polarity he-
tween the presence versus the absence of the conscience collective.
Durkheim substituted for this crude polarity a distinction between two
types of conscience collective ('altruism' versus 'individualism'), and
distinguished both of these from its absence ('anomie'). In doing so,
Durkheim fostered a break, not only with the main direction of his
thought as developed in The Division of Labour, but also with the
methodological precepts set out in The Rules of Sociological Method.
In the latter work, 'social facts' were defined in terms of their 'external'
and constraining character. But, in Durkheim's newly developing posi-
tion, social facts were no longer regarded as wholly 'external' to in-
dividuals," Durkheim perceived that the values embodied in the
conscience collective form an essential element of the 'internal' com-
position of the individual personality. Thus the sigtiificance of 'con-
straint' or 'obligation' changed profoundly over the course of Durk-
heim's writings: in his publications subsequent to Suicide, he came to
understand that the 'desirable' or positive affiliation to social ideals is
as basic a dimension of social conformity as is that of sanctioned
obligation. The further pursuance of this line of thought Parsons con-
cludes, eventually resulted in the emergence of a strong current of
idealism in Durkheim's writings towards the end of his career."
That Durkheim did both change and elaborate certain of the key
themes in his thought over the course of his life cannot he disputed.
Durkheim himself specifically drew attention to this." Nor can it be
doubted that Parsons has successfully identified some of the main
theoretical and conceptual dilemmas in Durkheim's sociology. It is,
however, questionable how far Parsons' chronology of the stages in
the development of Durkheim's ideas is at all accurate; and, con-
sequently, whether the overall representation of Durkheim's ideas en-
tailed by this chronology yields a satisfactory interpretation of the
main concerns of the latter's work. Durkheim's review writings, to-
gether with other sources either not used or unavailable to Parsons,
are of some considerable significance in evaluating these problems.
The review writings reveal very clearly the continuity of Durkheim's
basic perspectives upon sociology, both in terms of the main problems
189
 Anthony Giddens
which occupied him in his life's work, and in terms of the direction in
which he sought the solution of those problems. It is mistaken to
suppose, as Parsons tends to, that the overall emphasis of Durkheim's
work was towards the construction of an overall 'system' of sociology of
the sort which Comte wished to establish. Certainly Durkheim con-
cerned himself with delimiting the basic rules of sociological method,
and with specifying the distinctive subject matter of sociology as a
whole. But he consistently stressed that sociologists must break with
the sort of grand theoretical fabrications of prior social thinkers; and
he explicitly affirmed that his own contributions lie principally within
one restricted field of the discipline—the sociological analysis of moral
norms and ideals.'^
The original reviews which Durkheim wrote of the works of the
German social thinkers are of basic significance in that they show how
early his key ideas were formed. It is difficult to assess how far Durk-
heim was directly influenced by their writings, and how far alterna-
tively these simply reinforced conclusions which he had already
derived from other sources;'^ but the important point is that the
specific mode in which Durkheim presented and analysed the content
of the works makes manifest the fact that he was conscious, at the out-
set of his career, of notions which Parsons and others have supposed
only appear much later. These include a stress upon the importance
of 'ideals' and moral unity in the continuity of society; the significance
of the individual as an active agent as well as a passive recipient of
social influences; the dual nature of the attachment of the individual
to society, as involving both positive commitment to ideals as well as
obligation; the conception that an organisation of units has properties
which cannot be directly inferred from the nature of those units them-
selves; the essential foundations of the conception of anomie;"* and
the elements of the later theory of religion."'
This suggests that the now conventional interpretation of the
theoretical sigtiificance and polemical drift of The Division oj Labour,
such as presented by Parsons, must be considerably revised. The work
should be seen, not as something of a passing stage in which Durk-
heim developed a transitory formulation of a general theory of social
order, but as a definitive perspective upon the emergence of the
modern form of society which Durkheim never abandoned and which
constitutes the lasting grounds of all his later writings. While utilitarian
individualism was otie of Durkheim's main polemical targets in the
190
 Durkheim as a Review Critic
book, it was not the only one; the other was the stream of thought
deriving from Comte and adopted by such authors as Schaffle, which
stressed above all the importance of strong moral consensus for the
perpetuation of social order." Durkheim accepted this as appropriate
to the analysis of traditional forms of society. But the main theme of
The Division of Labour is that modem complex society is not, in
spite of the declining significance of traditional moral beliefs, in-
evitably tending towards disintegration. Instead, the 'normal' state of
the diiferentiated division of labour is one of organic stability. This
does not mean, however, (as Durkheim considered Tonnies' analysis
to imply) that the integrating effect of the specialised division of
labour can be satisfactorily interpreted in the mode of utilitarianism,
as the result of multifarious individual contracts. On the contrary, the
existence of contract presupposes norms which are not themselves the
outcome of contractual ties, but which constitute general moral com-
mitments without which the formation of such ties could not proceed
in an orderly fashion. The 'cult of the individual', a notion which
Durkheim took over from Renouvier (the basic consensual beliefs
concerning the dignity and worth of the human individual, such as
formulated by the philosophes of the eighteenth century and inspiring
the American and French Revolutions) is the counterpart to the in-
dividualisation produced by the division of labour, and is the main
moral support upon which it rests."
The stress which Durkheim placed upon the 'external' and 'con-
straining' character of social facts was similarly directed not simply
against utilitarian individualism, but also against the view (attributed,
for example, to Wundt) which while recognising the importance of
moral ideals, obscured the Kantian element of obligation which is
always associated with them. Durkheim's own statement on the matter
of the 'constraining' character of social facts is worth quoting in this
respect: 'Since we have made constraint the outward sign by which
social facts can be the most easily recognised and distinguished from
the facts of individual psychology, it has been assumed that according
to our opinion, physical constraint is the essential thing for social life.
As a matter of fact, we have never considered it more than the material
and apparent expression of an interior and profound fact which is
wholly ideal: this is moral authority'."

University of Cambridge.
191
 Anthony Giddens
1 Review of Albert SchSffle: Bau und Leben des Sodalen Korpers (Second
Edn.) (The review covers only Vol. I of Schaffle's work), Revue Philosophique
iR.P.\ Vol. 19, 1885, pp. 84-101; review of Ludwig Gumplowicz: Gnindriss
der Sosiologie, R.P., VoL 20, 1885, pp. 627-634. The Revue Philosophique was
founded under the direction of Ribot, and was intended to be a non-partisan
journal which would open its doors to all schools of philosophy. From its in-
ception it carried nitmerous wrtides on psychology and sodolc^y. The journal
was devoted to ^any study which has as its object the theoretical understanding
of man' (Editor's introduction, Vol. I, 1876, p. 2); but it was made clear to
contributors that the Revue would not accept any 'metaphysical' contributions
which did not embody reference to the findings of the empirical sciences.
^ Review of SchafiFle, p. 85. All quotations are from Durkheim.
•* Ibid., p. 86.
* Ibid., p. 84.
= Ibid., p. 87.
« Ibid., p. 87.
^ Durkheim criticises Schaffle, however, for sometimes relapsing into
idealism. Ibid., pp. 99S.
^ Ibid., p. 92.
^ Review of Gumplowicz, p. 627.
"* Ibid., p. 627.
" Ibid,, p. 629.
'- Ibid.,p. 631.
'« Ibid., p. 632.
^* 'La science positive de la morale en Allemagne', R.P., Vol. 24, 1887,
PP- 33-58; 113-142; and 275-284. See also 'Les dtudes de science sociale', R.P.,
Vol. 22, 1886, pp. 61-80.
's Durkheim usually employs the term 'la morale', which is ambiguous
in English in that it can mean either 'morality' or 'ethics' (i.e., the study of
morality). I have rendered the term variably accordir^ to context.
'* This forms a point of direct connection between Durkheim's writings
and those of Max Weber. Adolf W^ner and Gustav Schmoller were amoi^
the founders of the Verein fiir SozialpoUtik, of which Weber became a
prominent member. But Weter never accepted that aspect of the views of
Wagner and Schmoller which appealed most Durkheim—their attempt to
found a 'science' of ethics.
'^ 'La science positive de la morale en Allemagne', Part I, p. 37.
^ * This principle was already well-known to Durkheim, through Renouvier.
As Durkheim remarks in a review published much later: '. . . it is from
Renouvier that we took the axiom that a whole is not equal to the sum of its
parts'. Review of Simon Deplore: Le conflit de la morale et de la sodologie,
Annee Sodologique (M.S.). Vol. 12, I9O9'-I2, p. 326. This work was a
scathing attack upon Durkheim's school, and particularly upon the notion of
'scientific ethics'. It has been translated into English as The Conflict Between
Ethics and Sociology, St. Louis, 1938, see esp. pp. 15-185.
192
 Durkheim as a Review Critic
'^ 'La science positive de la morale en AUemagne', Part I, p. 38.
2° The Division of Labour in Society, Allen and Unwin, London, 1964,
p. 215.
^' 'La science jMsitive de la morale en Allemagne', Part I, p. 40.
=- Ibid., p. 41.
2^ Ibid., Part 3, p. 276.
^'* 7brd., part 2, pp. 116-117.
^•' Ibid., p. 117.
-'^ Ibid., p. 120.
-'" Ibid., p. 129.
^•^ Ibid.y pp. 139-140. Kant, of course, frequently reiterated that inoral acts
cannot be at the same time acts which are carried out purely according to the
wishes of the individual.
^^ Review of M. Guyau: L'irreligion de I'avenir, R.P., Vol. 23, 1887, pp.
299-311; review of Tonnies: Gemeinschafi und Gesellschaft, R.P., Vol. 27,
1889, pp. 416-422.
^'' Guyau's book has since been translated into Ei^lish. M. Guyau: The
Non-Religion of the Future, New York, 1962. For Guyau's definition of
'anomie', see The Non-Religion of the Future, p. 374.
•'" Review of Guyau, p. 310.
^- Review of Tonnies, p. 421. Tonnies also considered his typology to be
quite different from Durkheim's; cf. his Soziologische Studien und Kritiken,
Jena, 1929, VoL 3, pp. 215-217. Here Tonnies qiioted Durkheim's review of
his work, and expressed his disagreement with Durkheim's interpretation.
^••' Review of Tonnies, p. 421.
•'* Durkheim's anxiety to stress this point as against Tonnies may partly
account for his choice of terminol<^y in the distinction he makes between
'mechanical' and 'organic solidarity' in The Division of Labour. However, it is
clear that tluse terms do refer to a substantive differeiu:e in Durkb^im's
typology, namely that the s»:»nd type is characterised by a differentiation and
specialisation of function similar to that of a developed (as opposed to a
protoplasmic) organism. See his remarks in his review of Tonnies, p. 421.
••'' Review of Schaffle, p. 98.
•'" 'La science positive de la morale en Allemagne', p. 49.
^^ Review of Gumplowicz, p. 634. For later remarks by Durkheim on the
usefulness of organic analogies, see his review of articles by Novicow and
Espinas, A.S., VoL 5, 1900-1901, pp. 127-129. On Durkheim's use of organic
metaphors, see Harry Alpert: Entile Durkheim and his Sociology, New York,
1939* pp. 34-35-
^^ The Rules of Sociological Method, London, 1964, pp. xii-Iviii.
"* Ibid., pp. 65ff. G. Tarde: 'Criminality et santd sodale', R.F., VoL 39,
1895, pp. 148-162; Durkheim's discussion of this is headed 'Crime et sant6
sociale'. Ibid., pp. 518-523.

193
 Anthony Giddens
^^ 'Crime et sant6 sociale', p. 520.
*^ In The Rules of Sociologies Method, Socrates is cited as an example
of a criniinal who, through his crime, 'served to prepare a new morality and
faith' (p. 71).
*^ Ibid., p. 64. Certainly this is the main point of Tarde's critique (and
that of virtually all subsequent critics).
*'•' 'Crime et sante sociale*, p. 523.
^^ Ibid., p. 523. It can hardly be maintained that Durkheim defends him-
self here with any great deal of success; the argument is circular.
*-^ Review of Antonio Labriola: Essais sur la conception materialiste de
I'histoire, R.P., Vol. 44, 1897, pp. 645-651.
** •* Review of Labriola, p. 648.
••^ Ibid., p. 649. Cf. Mauss' comments in the Introduction to the first
edition of Durkheim: Socialism and Saint-Simon, New York, 1962, pp.
34-35-
^'^ Review of Labriola, p. 650.
^« Ibid., p. 650.
•''* Ibid., p. 651. The similarities are worth noting between DurWieim's
remarks here and those expressed by Max Weber in his discussion of
Stammier. Weber: 'R. Stamnilers "Uberwindung" der materialistischen
Geschichtsauffassxmg', in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre,
Tubingen, 1962, pp. 291-359.
^1 Review of Labriola, p. 651.
^^ Review of Gaston Richard: Le sodalisme et la science sodale, R.P., Vol.
44, 1897, pp. 200-205.
^•' Ibid., p. 204.
•^^ Cf. Sodalism and Saint'Simon, pp. 40ff.
S" Review of P. Carini: 'Saggio di una classificazione della societa', Revista
italiana di sociologica. Vol. 9, 1904, in AS., Vol. 9, r9O4-5. PP- I43-I47.
••^« Ibid., p. 144.
•'' A.S., Vol. 6, 1901-2.
•'•'* Ibid. ,p. 124.
''^ Ibid., p. 124.
^'^ Ibid., p. 125.
*^ Some of the more important reviews written by Durkheim for the
A.S., have been collected tc^ether in Durkheim: Journal Sodologique,
Paris, 1969.
«=* Review of Geoi^ Simmel: Philosophie des Geldes, A.S., Vol. 5, 199O'
1901, pp. 140-145. See also Simmel: Vber sodale Differenzierung, Leipzig,
1890.
194
 Durkheim as a Review Critic
^^ Siminel's analysis here takes its point of departure from Marx (cf.
Marx's discussion of 'use value' versus 'exchai^e value' in Capital, VoL 1.) It
is interesting to note that the former's analysis leads him to reach similar con-
clusions to those arrived at in early writir^s of Marx which were u i ^ o w n to
Simmel; cf. T. B. Bottomore: Karl Marx, Early Writings, New York, 1964,
pp. 168-178 and 189-194.
"'* The connections between Simmel's position and that developed by
Weber are clear; Weber, however, thoi^ht that in Simmel's book 'money
economy and capitalism are too ck)se]y identified, to the detriment of his
concrete analysis'. M. Weber: The Frotestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism, New York, 1958, p. 185.
6^ Review of Simmel, pp. 144-145.
^'^ Durkheim reviewed two articles by Simmel (one dealing with 'social
space', and the other with the influence of numbers on social life) in A.S.,
Vol. 7, 1902-1903, pp. 646-649. See also Durkheim's discussion of Simmel's
formal sociology in 'Sociol(^ and its scientific field', in Kurt H. Wolff: Emile
Durkheim, 1858-1917, Columbus, i960.
^^ Review of Levy-Bruhl: Les fonctions mentales dans les societes in-
ferieures, and Durkheim: Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse, A.S.,
Vol. 12, 1909-1912, pp. 33-37.
^^ Review of Levy-Bnihl and Durkheim, p. 37. Levy-Bruhl defines the 'law
of participation' as referring to the fact that, in primitive t h o i ^ t , 'objeas,
beings, phenomena, can be simultaneously, in a way which is incomprehen-
sible to us, themselves and things other than themselves.' Les fonctions
mentales dans les societes inferieures, Paris, 1922, p. 77.
"^ The works in question were by Alfred Fouillee, Gustave Belot, and
Adolphe Landry. Reply in A.S., VoL 10, 1905-1906, pp. 352-358.
'" Ibid., p. 354.
•' Ibid., p. 355.
"^ Review of Deploige, p. 327.
^' Talcott Parsons: The Structure of Social Action, Giencoe, 1949, pp.
301-450.
'^ Ibid., especially pp. 304-307.
'••' Ibid., p. 307.
'*•• Ibid., p. 304.
"" This theme is reiterated by Nisbet; Robert A. Nisbet: Emile Durkheim,
Hnglewood Cliffs, 1965. Nisbet takes a position here which is more extreme
than that set out by Parsons, stating that, after The Division of Labour,
'Durkheim never went back, in later studies, to any utilisation of the distinc-
tion between the two types of solidarity, nor the division of labour as a form
of cohesion, much less to any rationalisation of conflict and anomie in society
as mere "pathol(«ical forms of division of labour". The kirids of society, wn-
straint, and solidarity dealt with in all his later works—either in theoretical
or practical terms—have nothing whatsoever to do with the attributes that
he had laid down for an organic and (presumably) irreversibly modem society
in The Division of Labour.' (p. 37) "Diis is an extraordinary judgement; it is
much closer to the truth to say exactly the opposite—that most of the theory
established in The Division of Labour remained fundamental to the whole of
Durkheim's later writings.

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 Anthony Giddens
^^ ParsMis: op. dt., p. 321.
''^ For Parsons' analysis of the various senses in which Durkheim em-
ployed the term 'individual', see Ibid., pp. 36off; see also Alpert: op. dt., pp.
135-137-
*" Parsons: op. dt., pp. 444ff.
^' 'The course of 1895', Durkheim said, 'marks a line of demarcation in
the development of my thoi^ht; so much so, that all my previous researches
had to be taken up again with renewed efforts in order to be placed in har-
mony with these new views . . .' Letter to the Director of the Revue Neo-
scolastique, Vol. 14, p. 613.
"^^ '(the) science of moral facts is, I am convinced, a sociological science,
but it is a very particular branch of sociolt^y'. 'On the determination of moral
facts', Sodology and Philosophy, London, 1953, pp. 71-72.
*^ When attacked by Deploige as having imported his ideas wholesale
from the German social thinkers^ Durkheim was at pains to deny the influence
of the latter upon his sociolt^y. Thus Durkheim stated: 'Comte's work had a
far more profound influence upon us than the rather indecisive and vapid
thoi^ht of Schmoller, and especially of W^ner'. Review of Deploige, p. 326.
But it should be remembered that this was written in the shadow of the
imminent World War.
** Cf, Durkheim's early article on suicide, where the point is made that
contrary to the thesis of the utilitarians, there is no direct and universal rela-
tionship between prosperity and the advance of human happiness. If the efFect
of wants is simply to stimukte further wants, then the disparity between
desires and their satisfaction may become actually broadened. 'Suicide et
natalite, etude de statistique morale', R.P., Vol. 26, 1888, pp. 446-447.
'*^ Durkheim's remarks (e.g. Review of Schaffle, pp. 99-100) in his first
reviews make it perfectly clear that at this early date he was determined to
steer a path between utilitarianism and idealism, and believed that an adequate
sociolc^ical perspective must combine and reintegrate elements from both.
"^ Gouldner has noted this point. Cf. Alvin W. Gouldner: Socialism, New
York, 1962, pp. 13-18.
*^ Durkheim spent the whole of his adult life as a professor and was never
more than marginally involved in politics. But miich of his writing has a
general political slants and was stimulated by the great social changes of his
day. This aspect of Durkheim's thought is given little prominence in The
Structure of Social Action (The same is true of Parsons' discussion of Weber).
Aldiough The Structure of Sodal Action is deseed to demonstrate, as one
of its main themes, that positivism ('the doctrine that positive science is man's
sole s^niiicant cognitive relation to external reality* (p. 421)) is inadequate as
a basis for sociological analysis, the book itself coiUd be criticised for the same
reason. Parsons assumes throughout the work that changes in theoretical direc-
tion and interest on the part of the social thinkers he examines are generated
only by internal 'scientific' discrepancies and problems which they faced as
their work progressed.
** The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, p. 239 (footnote).

196