2 COL - Personal Law Notes

Conflict of Laws
Professor: Atty. Jefferson Secillano

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IV. Personal Law

A. Definition and Importance
The law which attaches to a person wherever he may go. It is the law that generally governs the
following:
1. Family rights and duties
2. Status
3. Condition
4. Legal capacity
B. Status v. Capacity
STATUS
-Place of an individual in society
-Consists of personal qualities and relationships, more or less permanent, with which
the state and the community are concerned.
-Includes the civil status, paternity and filiation, minority, capacity to enter into transactions,
name, sex, and his profession in certain cases
CAPACITY
-It is only part of one’s status.
-It is the sum total of his rights and obligations.
1. Beginning and End of Civil Personality

A. Arts. 40-42, Civil Code of the Phil.
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than
seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete
delivery from the maternal womb.
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will
B. Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. 16439, July 20, 1961
Facts:
In 1950, before Nita Villanueva and Oscar Lazo were married, Villanueva became pregnant. To
conceal her pregnancy from her parents and upon her aunt’s advice, she had an abortion by
Antonio Geluz, a physician. After Villanueva and Lazo got married, she became pregnant for
the second time. As she was an employee of the Commission on Elections and found it
inconvenient, she had her second abortion by Geluz in October 1953. In less than two years, she
again became pregnant. On 21 February 1955, Villanueva went to the clinic of Geluz in Manila
accompanied by her sister and her niece.
Unknown to Lazo and without his consent, his wife had an abortion for the third time, an
abortion of a two-month old fetus. Villanueva paid Geluz fifty pesos. At that time, Lazo was in
Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz,
ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs of the
suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority
vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
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P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account ofpersonal injury
or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages
could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death
ISSUE: Did the unborn child acquire civil personality?
HELD:
No, the unborn child did not acquire civil personality.
Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits the provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: “provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article.” In this case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury of death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf
of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death since no transmission to
anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased child, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the
parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would
normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the
spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss,
and the disappointment of their parental expectations as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or
heirs of an unborn child.
In this case, however, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis
for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee’s indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Even after learning of the
third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and
criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.
that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was
likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to
have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of
the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not
seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney’s fees, an indemnity
claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated
Hence, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Let a copy
of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners
for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as
the facts may warrant.
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The consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or
illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record,
have no factual or legal basis.
2. Absence
a. Arts. 381-386, 390-392, Civil Code of the Phil.
Article 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an
agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a
person to represent him in all that may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has
expired. (181a)
Article 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made, the judge shall take the
necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify the powers, obligations
and remuneration of his representative, regulating them, according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning
guardians. (182)
Article 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there is no legal
separation.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be appointed by the
court. (183a)
CHAPTER 2
Declaration of Absence
Article 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news,
and five years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence
may be declared. (184)
Article 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his
death. (185)
Article 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. (186a)
Administration of the Property of the Absentee
ARTICLE 387. An administrator of the absentee’s property shall be appointed in accordance with article 383.
(187a)
ARTICLE 388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the husband’s property cannot alienate or
encumber the husband’s property; or that of the conjugal partnership, without judicial authority. (188a)
ARTICLE 389. The administration shall cease in any of the following cases:
(1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an agent;
(2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate or intestate heirs appear;
(3) When a third person appears, showing by a proper document that he has acquired the absentee’s property by
purchase or other title.
In these cases, the administrator shall cease in the performance of his office, and the property shall be at the disposal
of those who may have a right thereto. (190)
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Presumption of Death
ARTICLE 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. (n)
ARTICLE 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years. (n)
ARTICLE 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall recover his
property in the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have been
alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194)
b. Art. 40, Family Code of the Phil.

Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.
3. Age of Majority
a. R.A. No. 6809
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of
the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the
exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in
the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
4. Names
a. Arts. 364-380, Civil Code of the Phil.
Article 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Article 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
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Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If
recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.
Article 367. Natural children by legal fiction shall principally employ the surname of the father.
Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.
Article 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of
the father.
Article 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Article 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name
and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Article 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation.
Article 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with
article 370.
Article 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional
name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Article 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word "Junior" can
be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
Article 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
Article 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other relief.
Article 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter.
Article 379. The employment of pen names or stage names is permitted, provided it is done in good faith and there is
no injury to third persons. Pen names and stage names cannot be usurped.
Article 380. Except as provided in the preceding article, no person shall use different names and surnames.
b. Arts. 165 and 176, Family Code of the Phil.
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain
in force
An illegitimate child is one conceived and born outside a valid marriage(Art. 165, Family Code).
Thus, an illegitimate child shall be under the parental authority of the mother.
c. R.A. No. 9255
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AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER,

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"
5. Titles of Nobility
C. Theories of Personal Law
1. Nationality Theory – or Personal theory
a. Definition of the Theory
b. Definition of Nationality
c. Merits and Demerits of Nationality as Personal Law
d. Relation to Conflict of Laws
e. Modes of Acquisition of Nationality
1.By birth - Natural born

2.Naturalization - Citizenship
- Sec. 1 and 2, Art. IV of the 1987 Phil. Const.
- Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been restored.
He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he cannot be elected
to high offices which the Constitution has reserved only for natural-born Filipino citizens.
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Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
(1) by naturalization,
(2) by repatriation, and
(3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino; As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces;
(2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
(5) political and economic necessity
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Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be
considered natural born: (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one does
not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one’s Philippine citizenship
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born:
(1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers
who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship.
Repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1, of RA 2630, a person
who ha[s] lost his citizenship may reacquire it by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines
- Poe-LLamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-221700, (Page 145 of Pe Benito)
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As presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final

judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified is guilty of or found
by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering
from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution, neither can the certificate of
candidacy (CoC) be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not
qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. Domestic laws on
adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. Foundlings are likewise
citizens under international law. It is a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling
is found.
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only
if the adoptee is a Filipino.
The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and
ensure that no child is stateless.
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That a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a ninety-
nine percent chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:

1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
2. an intention to remain there; and
3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur: (a) physical presence in the new
place, (b) an intention to remain there (animus manendi),and (c) an intention to abandon the
former domicile (animus non revertendi). Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence
of these requirements, the domicile of origin continues.
Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005.
Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED
Repatriation (recovery)
Mar. 8, 2016
- Djumantan v. Domingo, G.R. No. 99358, Jan. 30 1995 (Page 150 (85) in Pe Benito)
Facts:
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.
He embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in
accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979. On January 13,
1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, (Marina and Nikulas) arrived in Manila as
the “guests”of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitality extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia.
Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,”for his “guests.” Petitioner Djumatan
and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section
9(a)of the Immigration Act of 1940. In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true
relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”with the
Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner Djumatan was changed from
temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law.
On April 14,1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the
Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID (Commission on Immigration
and Deportation). On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention
cell. She was later released pending the deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90–400) after
posting a cash bond (Rollo, pp. 15–16), Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that she be
allowed to depart voluntarily from the Philippines and asked for time to purchase her airline
ticket (Rollo, p. 10). However, she had
a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she
was validly married to a Filipino citizen.
Issue: WON the petitioner’s admission into the country and the change of her status from
temporary visitor to permanent resident are legal –NO
HELD:
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There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the
country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to
permanent resident. All such privileges were obtained through misrepresentation. Never was
the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her
applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency. The civil status of
an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence
the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration
authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered
into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to another woman.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could
influence the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens
are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission
and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit
them to stay. The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue
to reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it.
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be

admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines. The fact of
marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the
immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien
woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not
excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended
stay here as an alien. Decision.
The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the
issuance of the permanent resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January
29, 1991 are REVERSED
- C.A. No. 473 "Revised Naturalization Law."
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with
the community in which he is living.
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
languages; and
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period
of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen
- R.A. No. 9139 "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000."
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f. Multiple Nationality
- Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999 (page 155 (87) Pe Benito)
Facts:
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not
a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 in San Francisco USAof a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother.
He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California and acquired US citizenship by
operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship (as both parents are
Filipinos) , as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance
to the United States. Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual
citizenship.
COMELEC: He registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he
no longer had U.S. citizenship. Commission enbanc decided Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to
be QUALIFIED.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority
ISSUE: The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy, Vice mayor of Makati. - YES
HELD:
YES.
Private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist,
and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss
of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
COE disqualified Manzano. Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), „disqualified from
running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is
incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: .
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO
CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW
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Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control
- 1930 Hague Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws
Naturalization Kinds
Direct
Derivative Naturalization is conferend as an incident in a particular act. Example is marriage to
a national.
g. Expatriation
- C.A. No. 63
- Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Callano, G.R. No. 24530, Oct. 31, 1968
The children born in the Philippines of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father who. however,
was not married to their mother, are citizens of the Philippines, having acquired their
Philippine citizenship by birth and their blood relationship with their mother.
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by

(1) naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country;
(4) rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country;
(5) cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in
time of war;
(7) in the case of a woman, by marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality. (Amended by Contitution, retain their citizenship
unless by their act she renounces her Philippine citizenship.)
Recognition of illegitimate children by their alien father is not among the grounds for losing
Philippine citizenship under the law.
Renunciation of Philippine citizenship to be recognized as a ground for loss of citizenship

should be express and must be made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication; a renunciation, manifested by direct and appropriate language as distinguished
from that which is inferred from conduct.
h. Repatriation
- R.A. No. 8171
SECTION 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children,
on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
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- R.A. No. 9225 – Catch all provision.

“account of political or economic necessity,” – was removed
Now they are qualified
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases
1st. group ; before the effectivity of the law. -deemed to reacquire

2nd group after the effectivity of the law – deemed to retained as if they never lost the same
- Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, Nov. 27, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the
US. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the
administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine
Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued an Order of
Approval of petitionerÊs request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo.
Identification Certificate recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. Six months after,
on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of
the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.
COMELEC Division disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he
failed to make a personal renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and his
oath in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective renunciation of his US
citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an „Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local
elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship?
HELD: Yes he is disqualified.

This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003
(precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon.
Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath
of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who
are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. One must
explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the
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Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one
citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained
their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to
administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels naturalborn Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1)
to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar
to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and
sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize
that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as
candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an
additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special
circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term „dual citizenship‰ vis-à-vis the
concept of „dual allegiance.‰ At the time this Court decided the cases of Valles and Mercado
on 26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000, respectively, the more explicitly worded requirements of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by our legislature
Note: This RA 9225 took effect on September 2003.
- Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, Aug. 10, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
In 2005, she filed an application to reacquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.
It was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of
Vice Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning
candidate.
Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility were filed
before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an o ath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
RTC disqualifies SObejana-Condon.

COMELEC: It dismissed the appeal.
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Petitioner argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement.
She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they
failed to do so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections
Issue: Is petitioner qualified to hold her elective post? - NO
Held: NO
The fact that petitioner won the elections cannot cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the
most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.
We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation
must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized
to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all
foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and reacquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant the herewith, subject to
certain conditions imposed in Section 5. Under the provisions of the aforementioned law,
the petitioner has validly reacquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she
held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
Before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia, which was not under oath, contrary to the exact
mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
When the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or
interpretation; there is only room for application. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such
instance.
Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we declared its categorical
and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of
the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit
duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in
clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring
or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their
foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines.
The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
Remedy of a person who fails to file the petition to disqualify a certain candidate within the
twenty-five (25)- day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is to file a
petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from proclamation of the results of the election.
- Maquiliing v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, Apr. 16, 2013
Facts:
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Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen, but lost his citizenship upon naturalization as
citizen of United States of America. Sometime on 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted
and he subsequently executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship.
On November 2009, Arnando filed for a certificate of candidacy and won the said election. But
prior from his declaration as winner, a pending action for disqualification was filed by Balua,
one of the contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando was not a citizen of the
Philippines, with a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Arnando’s nationality
is USA-American and a certified true copy of computer-generated travel record that he has been
using his American passport even after renunciation of American citizenship.
A division of the COMELEC ruled against Arnando but this decision was reversed by the
COMELEC en Banc stating that continued use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds
provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. Meanwhile, Maquiling petition that he should be declared winner as he
gained the second highest number of votes.
Issue: Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
Held: Yes.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify
one to run for an elective position which makes him dual citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of
convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship.
By representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to

his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a
foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public
office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed
not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.This does
not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in
fact did. It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d)
of the Local Government Code of 1991
- Arnando v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, Aug. 18, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA).
Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines,
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 92255 (RA 9225) before the Consul
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
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of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the
May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US
citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines
after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation. While Balua’s petition remained pending,
the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes for
the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning candidate.
October 5, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado’s
continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply with the requirements of
RA 9225.
COMELEC En Banc: REVERSED the ruling of the COMELEC First Division. It held that
Arnado’s use of his US passport did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship. The
COMELEC En Banc found merit in Arnado’s explanation that he continued to use his US
passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine passport at the time
of the relevant foreign trips. The COMELEC En Banc further noted that, after receiving his
Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.
While G.R. No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local elective officials
for the May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC6 for
the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it annulled and
set aside the COMELEC En Banc’s February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from
running for elective position, and declared Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling, Arnado executed
an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado’s Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009.
May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado’s lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a Petition seeking to
disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC
based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. The resolution of said petition was, however,
overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado won the election and proclaimed the
winning candidate.
COMELEC Second Division: Arando failed to comply
ISSUE: Did Arnado complied with the requirement of personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of his certificate of candidacy?
HELD: NO, he was not complaint.

In the case at bench, the COMELEC Second Division, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc,
ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5(2) of RA 9225
because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,47 his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said
affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May
13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The COMELEC
also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly
executed.
The COMELEC En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding
the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running for public
office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado’s disqualification to run for public office
during the 2010 elections being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on
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October 1, 2012. The COMELEC En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in
Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office during the
May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. Arnado’s use
of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification
to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his
CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling,
therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle
things which are established.48 Under the doctrine, „[w]hen the court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply
it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same. It enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue.
In short, the argument that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in
his CoC since Maquiling was promulgated after the lapse of the period for filing a CoC for the
2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit. Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling,
Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his inaction since he could have remedied it
at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 or even before that. There is no law prohibiting
him from executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible
questions about his Qualifications.
- David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, Mar. 18, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.

Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along
the beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the
portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR.
In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification
of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9225.
The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.
An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of
arrest was issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was
alleged and admitted to have been committed before he had reacquired his Philippine
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen.
Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.
ISSUE: Is he libale for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application (MLA?
RULING: YES he is liable for falsification.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law
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allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance.
In the case of those who became foreign citizens after Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided
they took the oath of allegiance under the new law
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is
not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that
considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,
should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy
governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a
Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a
Canadian citizen.
Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses
his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did
not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172,
paragraph.
i. Assisted Reproductive Technology Children and Citizenship

- American Bar Association Model Act of 2019
- Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, 2019 WL 911799, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 30525
Facts:
Andrew and Elad Dvash-Banks are a married same-sex couple who had twins through
surrogacy in Canada, where they live. Each of them is the genetic father of one of the twins, but
both fathers are legally-recognized as parents of the twins. Elad is an Israeli citizen and
Andrew is a U.S. and Canadian dual citizen. The U.S. Consulate refused to recognize both
twins as U.S. citizens because one child is not genetically tied to Andrew.
The U.S. Government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which upheld the decision on October 9,
2020. NCLR and GLAD, along with WilmerHale, filed an amicus brief in support of the Dvash
Banks.
On January 22, 2018, a father and his minor son filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the
Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of State (DOS) for not
granting U.S. citizenship to the child plaintiff, because he was born outside of the U.S. to a
same-sex dual-nationality couple. Represented by the nonprofit organization Immigration
Equality and the private law firm Sullivan & Cromwell (who also represented the plaintiffs in a
similar lawsuit filed the same day), the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief
granting birthright U.S. citizenship to the child.
The adult plaintiff, a natural-born U.S. citizen, married his Israeli-citizen husband in 2010 in
Canada. The couple continued living in Canada because the U.S. citizen held joint Canadian
citizenship and could sponsor his husband for legal residence there, which he could not do in
the United States at the time. Some years later, each man contributed his sperm to conceive two
children, born through a surrogate in Canada in 2016. The children's birth certificates listed
only the names of the two fathers as parents.
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However, when the fathers applied for U.S. citizenship for the children, DOS only recognized
the citizenship of the son born of the sperm of the U.S. citizen, under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) § 301(g) (8 U.S.C. § 1401(g)) (governing derivation of U.S. citizenship for
a child born abroad to a U.S. citizen). DOS did not recognize U.S. citizenship of the child
plaintiff, born of the sperm of the Israeli citizen, because he lacked a biological or adoptive
relationship to the U.S. citizen adult plaintiff. According to plaintiffs, DOS erroneously
considered this child born "out of wedlock" and not entitled to U.S. citizenship at birth under
INA § 309 (8 U.S.C. § 1409). Thus the child plaintiff could only travel to the U.S. with the rest of
his family on a temporary tourist visa.
The plaintiffs asserted that DOS had a policy of discrimination against the children of same-sex
couples. Any child born to a U.S. citizen woman married to a man was born "in wedlock." But
a child of a U.S. citizen who was not the biological or adoptive parent, but instead conceived
through reproductive technology, could be considered born "out of wedlock." The plaintiffs
argued that this policy, which largely burdened same-sex couples, was unsupported by the
INA's text and intent to keep families together, as well as case law supporting the rights of
same-sex married couples.
The plaintiffs alleged that DOS's policy and its application to the plaintiffs violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well
as the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the INA.
On January 24, 2018, the case was assigned to Judge John F. Walter.
Status reports filed in May and July 2018 stated that the parties were continuing to try to resolve
the matter without resorting to litigation. On August 21, 2018, Judge Walter referred the parties
to private mediation.
On November 27, 2018, Judge Walter issued an order for plaintiffs to show cause as to why the
case should not be dismissed with respect to the child plaintiff, as a guardian ad litem had not
yet been appointed as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c). The order called for
the plaintiffs to file an ex parte application to appoint a guardian ad litem by December 3, 2018,
which they did. On December 4, 2018, Judge Walter issued an order granting the application.
In early January, the parties engaged in a flurry of motions and amended complaints. On
January 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion amending their complaint to remove
the Equal Protection claim. They retained the other three causes of action. Three days later, they
filed a partial motion for summary judgment on the Due Process claim and the 8 U.S.C. § 1503
claim for a declaration that the child plaintiff is a U.S. citizen. The same day, DOS also moved
for summary judgment on the Due Process and the APA claims. A week later, on January 14,
2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
On February 21, 2019, Judge Walter granted each party partial summary judgment. 2019 WL
911799. He held that DOS was entitled to summary judgment on the APA claim, finding that
the plaintiffs had an adequate alternative remedy to the APA claim in their § 1503 claim. Judge
Walter ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the § 1503 claim, finding
that there was no dispute over the material facts and that Ninth Circuit authority did not
condition citizenship under § 301 of the INA upon a biological connection to both of the child’s
married parents. Because the plaintiffs prevailed on the § 1503 claim, the parties agreed, and
Judge Walter ruled, that the plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory judgment on the Due Process claim
was moot.
On March 7, 2019, Judge Walter ruled that the child plaintiff was a citizen of the United States
who acquired his citizenship at birth under § 301 of the INA; ordered DOS to issue the child
plaintiff a U.S. passport within 45 days of the judgment; ordered DOS to issue the child plaintiff
a Consular Report of Birth Abroad if the parents decided to apply for one; prohibiting DOS
from charging the family any additional fines (since their first applications were improperly
denied); entering judgment for DOS on the APA claim; and dismissing the plaintiffs' Due
Process claim as moot. Judge Walter retained jurisdiction to adjudicate on applications for
attorneys' fees and costs.
On March 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”) for an award of attorneys' fees. Because the defendants planned to
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appeal the district court's decision, the parties agreed to defer the proceedings related to the
motion until a final judgment was reached.
On May 6, 2019, the defendant appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
docket number 19−55517. The parties issued a joint status report stating they had agreed upon
an amount to be paid in attorney fees on May 9, 2019, but the court ordered deferment in light
of the appeal on May 13, 2019.
In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court on October 9, 2020. 2020 WL 5991163. The Court noted that the district court correctly
ruled that the child-plaintiff was a citizen of the United States under Ninth Circuit precedent.
The Ninth Circuit issued its mandate and its judgment took effect on January 25, 2021. The
parties filed a joint status report on February 2, 2021.
The case remains ongoing.
j. Statelessness
Since the person in question is stateless and, therefore, has no national law, we cannot apply the
nationality theory (Art. 16, sec. par., New Civil Code) to him. ln this case, again the domiciliary
theory comes to the rescue, and the court shall apply the law of his domicile or if he has none,
the law of the country of his temporary domicile.
- 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
- Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General
ISSUES:
(1) appellee-petitioner’s declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen was valid
and sufficient basis for his petition for naturalization - YES
(2) appellee-petitioner sufficiently established legal residence in the Philippines and could speak
and write any of the principal Philippine languages - YES
(3) appellee-petitioner was stateless refugee. - YES
HELD:
(1) Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law applies and provides that “[n]o Declaration
shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been established and a Certificate
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showing the date, place and manner of his arrival has been issued.” While appellee-
petitioner’s declaration was reconstituted, the attached certificate referred to in the
declaration was not reconstituted. The SC ruled that the law does not state that the certificate is
essential to the validity of the declaration as the only requirement is for the said certificate to be
issued. There is the uncontroverted fact of appellee-petitioner’s peaceful and continuous
residence in the Philippines for 25 years and statement in his declaration that a certificate had
been attached to the said declaration. Hence, appellee-
petitioner’s declaration was valid under law in view of other competent evidence showing
the facts sought to be established under the certificate that was not reconstituted.
(2) Appellee-petitioner has sufficiently shown legal residence in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than 10 years as required by Section 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. In addition, appellee-petitioner had good command of both English and
Bicol. While there may be many standards out there, none was set in the law on the
required ability to speak and write any of the principal Philippine languages. Appellee-
petitioner got along well with his comrades during his hazardous days in the guerrilla
movement thus showing that he satisfied the requirement of the law. There was also
circumstantial evidence that appellee-petitioner also ought to know how to write Bicol,
which uses the same alphabet used in English and so widely used in the Philippines.
Given his good command of English as shown in his testimony, appellee-petitioner could
easily make use of the same alphabet in the place where he had been residing for 25
years.
(3) Appellant SolGen asserted that appellee-petitioner failed to show that he lost his
citizenship under the laws of Russia and that Russia granted to Filipinos the same right to
be naturalized citizens. However, the SC still found that lower court did not err in finding
appellee-petitioner as a stateless refugee. Appellee-petitioner’s testimony that he is not a
Russian citizen and that he has no citizenship is uncontroverted. There is also the well-
known ruthlessness of modern dictatorships giving rise to a great number of stateless
refugees or displaced persons, without country or flag. The tyrannical intolerance of
dictatorships to opposition translates into beastly oppression, concentration camps and
bloody purges, such that it is only natural that those who flee to other countries to escape
such a situation, such as appellee-petitioner, lose all bonds of attachments to their former
fatherlands.
Attachment of the certificate of arrival is not essential to the validity of a declaration of intention
to become a Filipino citizen, because section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 merely uses the
Words has been issued.
The Court may take judicial notice of the arrival of Russian refugees in March, 1923, aboard a
fleet under the command of Admiral S, who were allowed to land and remain in the Philippines
or proceed to other countries, except about 800 who were allowed to go to the United
States and given free transportation on the naval transport Merritt.
2. Domiciliary Theory
a. Definition of the Theory
b. Definition of Domicile
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Elements:
Physical presence
Intention to return
c. Domicile v. Residence (Page 30 Sempio)
d. Domicile v. Citizenship
e. Kinds of Domicile
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Constructive/Domicile by operation of law is the domicile attributed or assigned by law to a

person. Ex. Husband and wife, parents to children.
Note: Civil Code

RA 829
RA 816
- Schill v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 141 Ohio St. 3d 382 (2014) – Page 113 of Pe Benito
Facts:
Dr. Miles Cobrun was driving his bicycle struck by a vehicle driven by Robert Schill (Ohio).
Peggy Spaeth, Cobrun’s wife, filed a wrongful-death action against Robert and his insurer.
Robert sought additional coverage under the liability policy of his parents (personal umbrella
liability) issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC). CIC denied coverage.
Robert – Ohio
James (father) – Florida
Under the terms of the policy, an insured includes a resident relative for any occurrence
involving an automobile they own, lease, rent or use. By definition, a resident relative is a
person related to the insured by blood, marriage or adoption that is the resident of your
household and whose legal residence of domicile is the same as yours.
Spaeth contends that Robert was a definitional insured under the policy as a “resident relative”
who shares the same domicile with James. She further argued that James could be “domiciled”
in Florida for some purposes and “domiciled” in Ohio “for insurance coverage purposes.” On
the other hand, CIC submits James’ admission that he has considered his home to be the house
in Florida since 1993 and the steps he has taken to give the impression his home is in Florida,
should be enough to prove his domicile is in Florida, not Ohio.
Robert then filed this declaratory-judgment action seeking a declaration that CIC owed him a
duty of indemnification in the wrongful-death case.
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ISSUE: Did Schill share the same “legal residence of domicile” with his father JAMES at the
time of the accident?
HELD:
NO.
The trial court found that Robert did not meet the definition of “resident relative” since he did
not have the same domicile as either of his parents, the names insured, which was required
under the CIC policy.
In order to change one’s domicile, there must be actual abandonment of the first domicile,
intention not to return to the first domicile, and acquisition of a new domicile in another place
with the intention of making the new domicile a permanent home. The acts of the person must
correspond with the purpose of changing one’s domicile.
Because James sold his home, moved all of his belonging from Ohio to Florida, let his Ohio
driver’s license expire, found new doctors, changed his voter registration, manages his finances
through Florida bank accounts, and is careful not to stay in Ohio long enough to trigger
tax consequences, his intent to be domiciled in Florida is clear.
- Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No 119976, Sept. 18, 1995 (page 117 in Pe Benito)
DOCTRINE:
If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes of the residence requirement, the 1
year period is irrelevant because wherever he is, he is a resident of his domicile of origin.
Second, if a person reestablishes a previously abandoned domicile, the 1 year requirement
must be satisfied. (Bernas book)
FACTS:
Imelda Marcos established her domicile in Tacloban City, which was her father’s
hometown, in 1938 when she was 8 years old. She pursued her studies (GS,HS, College) in the
aforementioned city and subsequently taught in the Leyte Chinese School. In 1952 , she went
to Manila to work in the House of Representatives. Two years after, she married Pres.
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman in Ilocos Norte and registered
there as a voter. In 1959, her husband was elected a Senator and they lived in San Juan,
Rizal where she again registered as a voter. And in 1965, she lived in the Malacanang Palace
when her husband became the President. This time, she registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila. After their exile in Hawaii, she ran for President in 1992 and indicated in her
CoC that she was a resident and register voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Marcos filed her CoC for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte.
The incumbent Representative, Montejo, filed for her Disqualification alleging that
she did not meet the 1 year constitutional requirement for residency.
Apparently, she wrote down in her CoC in item no.8, which asked for the number of years
of residency, that she had been a resident for 7 months.
Marcos filed an amended CoC changing “7 months” to “since childhood”, claiming that it was
an honest misinterpretation that she thought she was being asked for her actual and physical
presence in Tolosa, and not her domicile.
COMELEC:
Found the petition for her disqualification meritorious and cancelled her amended CoC.
For them, it was clear that Marcos has not complied with the 1 year residency
requirement and the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of
the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy (7months)
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In election cases, the term residence has always been considered synonymous with
domicile. This is the intention to reside in the place coupled with the personal
presence.
When she returned after her exile, she did not choose to go back to Tacloban. Thus,
her animus revertendi (intention to return) #JudgePrincess points to Manila.
Pure intention to reside in Tacloban is not sufficient, there must be conduct indicative of such
intention.
The COMELEC denied her motion for reconsideration but issued a resolution allowing for
her proclamation should she obtain the highest number of votes. On the same day,
however, the COMELEC reversed itself and directed the suspension of her proclamation.
Marcos found out that she was won by a landslide in the said elections and prayed for
her proclamation. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year.
Stated differently, Whether Leyte is domicile of Emelda Marcos? -YES
HELD:
The case at hand reveals that there is confusion as to the application of ‘Domicile’ and
‘Residence’ in election law.
Originally, the essential distinction between residence and domicile lies in the fact that
residence is the PHYSICAL presence of a person in a given area and domicile is where a
person intends to remain or his permanent residence, when absent one has the intention of
returning.
A person can only have a single domicile. It was ascertained from the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that residence for election purposes is synonymous
with domicile. It cannot be contested that the petitioner held various residences in her lifetime.
The Courts reiterate that an individual does not lose his domicile even if she has
maintained different residences for different purposes. None of these purposes pointed to
her intention of abandoning her domicile of origin.
The Courts ruled in favor of Marcos because of the ff reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin
by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term
“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a
new home and not domicilium necessarium.
*Civil Code kasi sa Art 110: The husband shall fix the residence of the
family. Sobrang distinguished yung residence at domicile sa Civil law.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile
of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
DISPOSITION:
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COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim

petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
- Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, Apr. 24, 2012

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973.
He migrated to Australia in 1981 and there acquired Australian citizenship. On
November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his
brother, Romeo in brgy Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship,
executing a sworn renunciation of the same. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a
residential property in the same village. He applied for registration as a voter in the
Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the Barangay Captain of
Veterans Village opposed the same. Acting on the application, the Election
registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections
voters list.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of
Zambonag Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to
deny due course of to cancel Jalosjos COC on the ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of
R.A 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code.
After hearing, the Second Division of the Comelec ruled that, while Jalosjos had
regained Philippine citizenship by complying with the requirements of R.A 9225, he failed to
prove the residency requirement for gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample proof
of a Bona Fide intention to establish domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for
reconsideration, the Comelec en banc affirmed the Second division decision.
Acting on Jalosjos prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order, the Court
resolved on May 7, 2010 to issue a status quo ante order, enjoining the Comelec from enforcing
its February 11, 2010 decision pending further orders. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the election and
was proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race.
Issue:
Is the Comelec correct in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay
Rulings: COMELEC is wrong.

The requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not
only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal in such place
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the
following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b)
where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can
have but one domicile at a time.
The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos failed to prove that he successfully
changed his domicile to Zambonga Sibugay. When he came to the Philippines in November
2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to
change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship and
renounced his allegiance to that country.
In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the
house of a friend or relative. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual
physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. The evidence Jalosjos
presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay as his domicile. The COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise. Jalosjos won and was proclaimed
winner in the 20130 gubernatorial race. The court will respect the decision of the people of that
province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favour to breathe life to their
life to their manifest will.
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A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or

domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented
house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where
he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile.
- Caballero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, Sept. 22, 2015 (Pe Benito Page 120)
Facts: See in Pe Benito Page 120
HELD:
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was
able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding
the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by
virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he
reestablished his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence
thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. However, the period
from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required by
law.
RA No. 9225 does not touch on a person’s residence; does not mention it; and does not even
require residence in the Philippines prior to or at the time he or she takes the oath to reacquire
Philippine citizenship. In fact, RA No. 9225 allows former natural-born citizens to reacquire
their Philippine citizenship while still residing in the country that granted them naturalized
citizenship status.
Residency in the Philippines becomes material only when the natural-born Filipino availing of
RA No. 9225, decides to run for public office. As provided under Section 5 of this law, those
who seek elective public office shall, in addition to taking the oath of allegiance, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship and meet the
qualifications for holding such public office that the Constitution and existing laws require.
View that Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 does not even require Filipinos with reacquired
citizenship to establish or maintain any Philippine residence, although they can, as Filipinos,
come and go as they please into the country without any precondition other than those
applicable to all Filipino citizens. By implication, RA No. 9225 (a dual citizenship law) allows
residency anywhere, within or outside the Philippines, before or after reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship under its terms. Reacquisition of citizenship, however, does not by
itself imply nor establish the fact of Philippine residency. In these senses, RA No. 9225 and
the LGC are complementary to, yet are independent of, one another.
View that another legal reality that must be kept in mind in appreciating Republic Act (RA) No.
9225 and residency is that entitlement to the civil and political rights that come with the
reacquired citizenship comes only when the requirements have been completed and Filipino
citizenship has been reacquired.
Under our election laws, the term “residence” is synonymous with domicile and refers to the
Individual’s permanent home or the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure,
one intends to return.
Jurisprudence provides the following requirements to effect a change of domicile or to acquire a

domicile by choice:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) a bonafide intention to remain there; and
(3) a bona fide intention to abandon the old domicile.
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These are the animus manendi and the animus non revertendi that jurisprudence requires to be
satisfied. Under these requirements, no specific unbending rule exists in the appreciation of
compliance because of the element of intent · an abstract and subjective proposition that can
only be determined from the surrounding circumstances.
Even the Philippines, through our laws on naturalization, recognizes these requirements prior
to the grant of Philippine citizenship. Our existing laws require continued residency in the
Philippines for a given period before any foreign national who wishes to become a Philippine
citizen is conferred this status.
- Caasi v. CA, G.R. No. 88831, Nov. 8, 1990
Facts:
Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate of Merito Miguel filed a petition to disqualify the latter from
being a candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Pangasinan on the ground that Miguel
is a green card holder.
On his defense: Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US
Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He
allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United
States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections.
COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that the possession of a green card by the
respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has
sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by
his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent
meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective
local officials.
Petitioner then appealed to CA and prays for a review of the decision, "Merito C. Miguel,
petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the RTC
which denied. The Court of Appeals ordered the RTC to dismiss and desist from further
proceeding in the quo warranto case. It is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case
questioning the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC
has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and residence for
candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the
candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo
warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC
ISSUES:
Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States
- YES
Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to
the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988 – NO
HELD:
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he
acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public
office, not during his tenure as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
As to the second issue:

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate
who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in
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the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver,
he was "disqualified to run for any elective office". Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he
holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United
States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such
before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore,
hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
- Coquilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002
Facts: (page 120 Pe Benito)

Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar.
He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.
From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy.
Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United
States. On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence
certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which
took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued
Certificate of Repatriation on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration on November 13,
2000
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two (2) years.
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who
was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided
therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen
of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001.
Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. He subsequently took his
oath of office.
COMELEC granted private respondent’s petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy. – that espondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay
in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a
waiver of his status as a permanent resident.
ISSUE: Did the respondent met the 1 yr requirement of residency? _NO
HELD:
Petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the
U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our
immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien
Naturalization in a foreign country results in an abandonment of domicile in thePhilippines.
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Petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in
January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus Election
Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray, however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing
of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of residency.
The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one
acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same
time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may
obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Im-
migrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other
hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A.
No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his
status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien. Petitioner can only be held to
have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon
taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite
residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern Samar
- Poe-LLamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-221700, Mar. 8, 2016
Pe Benito Page 122 - 125
f. Absentee Voting and Overseas Voting vis-à-vis Domicile

- R.A. No. 9189
- Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her
registration, the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship
in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return
shall be cause for the removal of their names from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed the expected
problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to
return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under Section 9, should a registered
overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive national elections, his name may be
ordered removed from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters
- Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759
Facts: Page 129 in Pe Benito
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as “duals” or
dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be
allowed to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting
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Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be
ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189
HELD:
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law· R.A. 9225·requiring ”duals” to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise the
right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely
non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an
absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements
exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote
Note: Removal of Affidavit Requirement –
- R.A. No. 10590 'The Overseas Voting Act of 2013′
g. Estate Proceedings vis-à-vis Domicile

Venue is the abode of the testator / deceased - last resided before they died
- Jao v. CA, G.R. No. 128314, May 29, 2002
- San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 134029, Feb. 6, 2007
Facts:
Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages during his lifetime.
His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit. The couple had 6 children: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel.
Virginia died and five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin and had Tobias. Merry
Lee, an American citizen, therafter obtained a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce against
Felicisimo from the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America.
Consequently, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. After 18 years, Felicisimo died. Felicidad San Luis then sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
Felicidad San Luis filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death;;
Felicisimo being then the Laguna Governor. He further claimed that respondent Felicidad San
Luis has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo
since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Felicidad San Luis submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
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Conflict of Laws
jvtutanes@gmail.com
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. They asserted that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256 of the Family Code considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
ISSUES:
1. Whether venue was properly laid - YES
2. Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry
under the Civil Code -YES
3. Whether San Luis has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration - YES
HELD:
1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” It is incorrect for petitioners
to argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say,
there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws and
“residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence”
and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence
to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in
one place and domicile in another.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa.
2. YES. In resolving this issue, the Court need not retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing them to rule in the affirmative.
Art. 26 of Civil Code provides:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The
Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse.
3. YES. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, the Court found that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
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Conflict of Laws
jvtutanes@gmail.com
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of

Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during
their cohabitation.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has
filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property
relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
Therefore, Felicidad’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co--
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
3. Situs or Eclectic Theory (Page 32 of Sempio)
Under the situs or eclectic theory', the capacity, condition, status or capacity of a person is
governed not necessarily by the law of his nationality or the law of his domicile but rather the
law of the place where an important element of the problem occurs or is situated.
36

2 COL - Personal Law Notes

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Conflict of Laws

Professor: Atty. Jefferson Secillano

IV. Personal Law

1. Beginning and End of Civil Personality

B. Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. 16439, July 20, 1961

ISSUE: Did the unborn child acquire civil personality?

a. Arts. 381-386, 390-392, Civil Code of the Phil.

(1) The spouse present;

(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;

Administration of the Property of the Absentee

(1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an agent;

b. Art. 40, Family Code of the Phil.

Article 370. A married woman may use:

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

b. Arts. 165 and 176, Family Code of the Phil.

c. R.A. No. 9255

AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER,

c. Merits and Demerits of Nationality as Personal Law

d. Relation to Conflict of Laws

e. Modes of Acquisition of Nationality

1.By birth - Natural born

- Sec. 1 and 2, Art. IV of the 1987 Phil. Const.

- Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

- Poe-LLamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697-221700, (Page 145 of Pe Benito)

As presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final

There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be

- C.A. No. 473 "Revised Naturalization Law."

- R.A. No. 9139 "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000."

- 1930 Hague Convention on the Conflict of Nationality Laws

A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by

Renunciation of Philippine citizenship to be recognized as a ground for loss of citizenship

- R.A. No. 9225 – Catch all provision.

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases

1st. group ; before the effectivity of the law. -deemed to reacquire

- Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, Nov. 27, 2008

HELD: Yes he is disqualified.

Note: This RA 9225 took effect on September 2003.

- Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, Aug. 10, 2012

RTC disqualifies SObejana-Condon.

Issue: Is petitioner qualified to hold her elective post? - NO

- Maquiliing v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, Apr. 16, 2013

By representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to

- Arnando v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, Aug. 18, 2015

COMELEC Second Division: Arando failed to comply

HELD: NO, he was not complaint.

- David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, Mar. 18, 2015

Petitioner David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.

RULING: YES he is liable for falsification.

i. Assisted Reproductive Technology Children and Citizenship

- Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, 2019 WL 911799, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 30525

The case remains ongoing.

- 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness

- Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General