1.

Democracy: contested concept with

a common core
Svend-Erik Skaaning

It is well known that democracy means rule by the people. Although this understanding goes
all the way back to Ancient Greece (Cartledge, 2018; Dunn, 2005; Held, 2006), democracy has
also been construed as a contested concept par excellence (Collier, Hidalgo and Maciuceanu,
2006; Gallie, 1956, p. 169). This special status as an essentially contested concept, which
increases temptations to manipulate and abuse the concept, was captured well by George
Orwell (1962, p. 149), when in 1946 he made the following statement:

In the case of a word like democracy, not only is there no agreed definition, but the attempt to make
one is resisted from all sides. It is almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic we
are praising it: Consequently the defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and
fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one meaning. Words of
this kind are often used in a consciously dishonest way. That is, the person who uses them has his own
private definition, but allows his hearer to think he means something quite different.

Systematic accounts of the concept in political theory are to a larger degree constrained by
academic standard requirements about consistency and justification. They generally regard
freedom and equality as the primary values associated with democracy1 (Hansen, 1989;
Kelsen, 1920; Munck, 2016), but these concepts are themselves debated. When it comes to
democracy, the ways in which citizens should be equal, what freedoms are required – and to
which extent equality and freedom need to be fulfilled – are not self-evident.
At a lower level of abstraction, a wide variety of attributes have been associated with the
concept of democracy. These include, for example, free and fair elections, freedom of expres-
sion, checks and balances, rule of law, civil society engagement, public deliberation, political
consensus, majority rule, and economic equality. Whereas some of these features tend to go
hand in hand, theoretically and/or empirically, others do not and may even stand in contrast
to each other. Consequently, it matters a great deal for our understanding of the relationship
between democracy and, say, development, elements that are seen as constitutive of democ-
racy, and that are conceived as potential causes and consequences of democracy.
A clear understanding of what is meant by democracy is warranted for several reasons. It is
important to have a clear understanding of key concepts when developing and evaluating the-
oretical arguments and to justify why and how the chosen definition fits the particular research
agenda. Moreover, any attempt to operationalize democracy for the purpose of empirical
investigation depends upon a particular understanding of the concept. Since there are mul-
tiple conceptions of democracy (see Cunningham, 2002; Held, 2006; Naess, Christophersen
and Kvalo, 1956), most of which resonate in some fashion with the core meaning of rule by
the people (Coppedge et al., 2011; Møller and Skaaning, 2011, 2013), the need for making
a motivated, explicit choice is all the more obvious. This choice might not satisfy everyone,
but transparency will at least enable systematic use and scrutiny.

27
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28 Research handbook on democracy and development

Table 1.1 Values and criteria linked to different conceptions of democracy

Principal Value Features

Electoral democracy Popular sovereignty achieved through Free and frequent elections
contested elections filling legislative and Government responsible to the electorate (universal
(directly or indirectly) executive offices adult suffrage, freedom of expression, freedom of
association)
Liberal democracy Guaranteed individual liberty understood Civil rights and liberties, checks and balances, rule of
as freedom from state repression law
Egalitarian democracy Equal political empowerment Equal distribution of resources, no discrimination, equal
access to agenda setting and decision making
Participatory democracy Direct, active participation of all in every Civil society engagement, high turnout, strong local
stage and level of political decision democracy, opportunities of political involvement,
making including direct decision making
Deliberative democracy Political agenda setting and decision Public and respectful deliberations and consultative
making based on well-informed and bodies, focus on facts and the broader societal
reasoned justification implications of policies in deliberations and decision
making
Majoritarian democracy Efficient decision making reflecting the Power-concentrating institutions
will of the majority
Consensual democracy Inclusive decision making involving and Power-dispersing institutions
pleasing a broad range of opinions

In this chapter, I first present some predominant conceptions of democracy. Although the
number of particular meanings associated with the concept of democracy is legion (see Collier
and Levitsky, 1996), my reading of the voluminous literature on the subject suggests the
existence of seven main traditions, that is, electoral democracy, liberal democracy, egalitarian
democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, majoritarian democracy and
consensual democracy. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the respective values and distin-
guishable features associated with them, which are described in the above table.
Taken together, these conceptions offer a relatively comprehensive account of how democ-
racy has been used in academic debates in recent decades (Coppedge et al., 2011). Different
understandings emphasize distinct values and institutions. Yet, they also tend to share
a common core in the form of free elections, as is clear from the presentation of the different
principles of democracy in the first part of the chapter.2
In the second part of this chapter, I briefly present two different approaches to systema-
tize the relationship between some of these ideal typical constructions. The first attempts to
separate as much as possible the defining aspects, which go beyond the electoral core (see
Coppedge et al., 2020). The second suggests a cumulative ordering of these features, moving
from a relatively undisputed core (a thin conception) to increasingly comprehensive defini-
tions (thicker conceptions) by the stepwise addition of – increasingly disputed – features (see
Møller and Skaaning, 2011). Both these approaches are put to work in the third part of the
chapter, in which I provide some empirical overviews where various measures of democracy
are used to categorize contemporary polities.

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 Democracy: contested concept with a common core 29

ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY3

The Schumpeterian Version – Minimalist Democracy

The electoral principle of democracy focuses on the role of contested elections as the principal
means to winning political power. Joseph A. Schumpeter ([1942] 1974) famously presented
a minimalist, procedural understanding of democracy. In opposition to idealist and compre-
hensive conceptions of democracy, he emphasizes that a definition of democracy should
preferably be narrow and realistic and that the democratic principle only implies that govern-
ment power should rest with the group who wins a larger popular backing than their political
opponents (ibid., p. 272).
Democracy thus merely concerns elections, that is, it is a matter of the selection of political
leadership, and the primary role of the electorate is to take part in the elections that appoint
the members of the legislature and – directly or indirectly – the executive. Accordingly,
Schumpeter (ibid., p. 269) defines democracy in the following way: ‘The democratic method
is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.’ This means
that in a democratic regime, leaders are selected by a broad electorate through contested
elections held periodically. These are the principal tools to achieve the overall goal of popular
sovereignty. The political competition empowers popular rule by fulfilling three criteria: those
winning the elections take government power; the government is not removed by undemo-
cratic means and core democratic institutions, first and foremost the parliament, operate con-
tinuously; and elections are held on a relatively frequent basis (see also Przeworski et al., 2000,
Ch. 1). It deserves explicit mentioning that Schumpeter’s understanding of democracy does
not require universal suffrage or respect for civil liberties such as the freedoms of expression,
assembly, and association.

The Dahlian Version – Polyarchy

Together with Schumpeter’s minimalist definition of democracy, Robert A. Dahl’s (1971,

1989, 1998) concept of polyarchy has established itself as a standard reference in debates
within political science about the meaning of democracy (Collier and Levitsky, 1997, p. 431).
The Schumpeterian and Dahlian conceptions have been especially influential in studies with
broad empirical ambitions.
Dahl (1989, pp. 108–14) reserved the term democracy for political processes fulfilling
a much more demanding set of criteria, which will probably never be realized by any polity:
effective participation, voting equality when decisions are made, enlightened understanding,4
control of the agenda, and inclusive citizenship. Yet, he also introduced the supplementary
concept of polyarchy, which can be understood as a definition of electoral democracy some-
what more demanding than Schumpeter’s.
The concept of polyarchy thus also highlights free elections as essential for democracy and
focuses on procedures and institutions. However, in contrast to Schumpeter, Dahl includes
universal suffrage and freedom of expression and association among the defining attributes.
Universal adult suffrage is key to him because of equal recognition of citizens as capable of
pursuing their own interest in connection with collective decision making (Dahl, 1989, p. 105).

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30 Research handbook on democracy and development

Moreover, respect for a number of civil liberties is needed to enable the exchange of ideas
and collective mobilization. On the one hand, these rights support electoral contestation. On
the other hand, they enable the population to control elected officials between the elections.
Hence, democracy requires not only free, fair, and contested elections, but also the liberties
such as freedom of expression and freedom of association that make them meaningful (see
Diamond, 2002, p. 21).
The result of Dahl’s reflections on the topic is a list of six5 institutional guarantees, which
together defines polyarchies (Dahl, 1998, pp. 85–6):

1. Elected officials: control over government decisions is constitutionally vested in officials

elected by citizens, which means that the government is representative.
2. Free, fair, and frequent elections: elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly con-
ducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3. Freedom of expression: citizens have the right to express themselves on political matters
without facing the danger of severe punishment.
4. Alternative information: citizens have the right to seek alternative and independent sources
of information, which are legally protected and not under political control.
5. Associational autonomy: citizens have the right to form relatively independent associa-
tions or organizations in order to exercise their rights.
6. Inclusive citizenship: no adult who permanently resides in the state and is subject to its
laws can be denied the rights that are available to others and necessary to the other political
institutions.

Contested Elections as a Prerequisite of Democracy

The attributes associated with electoral democracy arguably have a special status compared to
those added by other conceptions of democracy. In short, the minimal conditions constitute the
sine qua non of democracy (Collier and Adcock, 1999, p. 599; Coppedge et al., 2011; Merkel,
2004, pp. 36–8). This means that we should not call a political regime democratic if contested
elections do not determine access to political power (unless the polity is characterized by direct
democracy).
Accordingly, it was conceptual stretching (see Sartori, 1970) when Trujillo spoke of the
Dominican Republic under his dictatorial rule as a neo-democracy; when German Nazis envis-
aged a Führerdemokratie; when Franco termed his semi-fascist, military regime an organic
democracy; when communist leaders in the Eastern Bloc referred to their political regimes as
people’s democracies; or when President Xi Jinping recently called China a whole-process
democracy. In the absence of free elections, a political regime is undemocratic, full stop!
Note, furthermore, that this conclusion also applies to the many regimes, which only formally
fulfill the criteria for electoral democracy. In this context, multi-party autocracies, which allow
opposition parties to run for elections, but where they have no chance of winning in practice
due to different sorts of overt and covert manipulation, cannot be called democracies (see, e.g.,
Levitsky and Way, 2010; Morse, 2012; Schedler, 2013; Seeberg, 2018).
There is broad agreement about disqualifying such regimes from the set of democracies.
Some argue, however, that the electoral criteria are insufficient to capture the meaning of
democracy. This critique has given rise to additional principles of democracy, each of which is
designed to remedy one or more limitations of electoral democracy. The more comprehensive

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 Democracy: contested concept with a common core 31

conceptions thus complement electoral properties through additional attributes supposed to

reflect or support particular values.

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

The concept of liberal democracy is one prominent example of a principle of democracy that
goes beyond the electoral core. It stresses the intrinsic value of individual liberty understood
as protection of individual rights against state repression and unrestricted majoritarian rule.
This principle is rooted in the classical liberal tradition that evolved in Europe during the Age
of Enlightenment as a reaction to absolutist rule, aristocratic privileges, and clerical dogmas.
Liberal ideals include reason, tolerance, pluralism, secularism (or at least freedom of religion),
and freedom of choice (Held, 2006, p. 59).
On this basis, the liberal tradition sees the state as a double-edged sword. One the one
hand, political institutions are necessary to safeguard individual freedoms. On the other hand,
they also pose a direct threat to those freedoms (Holmes, 1995, p. 270).6 Accordingly, the
power of rulers should be limited. Government authority must be derived from, and limited
by, law (Holmes, 1995; O’Donnell, 2007; Ross, 1952; Sartori, 1987, p. 374; Vile, 1998).
Constitutional rules should emphasize the protection of civil liberties, constraints on the exec-
utive and legislature, and protection of minority rights (Gordon, 1999).
One of the distinguishing features of the liberal principle is the idea of checks and bal-
ances among legislative, executive, and judicial powers. This idea was originally conceived
by Montesquieu ([1748] 1989) and later adapted by James Madison in connection with the
framing of the US Constitution (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, [1787/1788] 1992). Since the
executive is the branch of government most prone to abuse, we regard the judicial and legis-
lative branches as providing checks against executive authority. Independent courts also serve
the function of adjudicating among citizens and between citizens and public authorities.
Another key feature of liberal democracy is a catalog of individual rights (Beetham, 2004).
In addition to the political liberties, already included among Dahl’s polyarchy criteria, the
liberal principle embraces associated rights such as personal integrity and security, freedom of
movement, freedom of religion, and property rights. All these rights may be grouped together
under the rubric of civil liberties.
The final feature emphasized by the liberal tradition is the rule of law (O’Donnell, 2004).
This requirement implies that there is equality before the law and that the rules need to be
general, prospective, clear, certain, and impartially and regularly applied by public authorities
(Fuller, 1969; Raz, 1979; see also Møller and Skaaning, 2014). Taken together, civil liberties,
checks and balances, and the rule of law may be said to fulfill the liberal ideal insofar as all
three impose constraints on state repression and help to secure fundamental rights for citizens.
Note that the liberal model generally takes a negative view of political power. This is the
background for the historical suspicion about popular sovereignty among liberals. They basi-
cally feared that inclusive elections would undermine individual rights, including property
rights (see Held, 2006, Ch. 3; Macpherson, 1977). Gradually, liberal rights fused with the prin-
ciple of popular rule, however, and created the modern understanding of liberal democracy.
This happened in the theoretical works of political thinkers such as Thomas Paine ([1791]
1996), Jeremy Bentham ([1776] 1988), and John Stuart Mill ([1861] 1993). More importantly,
it also happened in practice with the emergence of political regimes characterized by free,

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inclusive elections as well as general respect for liberal rights. These empirical developments
have tended to disprove the original fears of a trade-off between popular sovereignty and
liberal features. Instead, they lend support to the position that the electoral and liberal elements
of democracy are better conceived as mutually constitutive (Habermas, [1992] 1996; Merkel,
2004).

EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY

The principle of egalitarian democracy is based on the idea that elections (and liberal rights)
are insufficient to realize political equality (Beitz, 1990; Lindblom, 1977). To a large extent,
the egalitarian perspective on democracy grows out of a leftist critique of electoral and liberal
democracy. Some writers in the Marxist tradition merely view free elections as a democratic
facade with the hidden purpose to ensure class rule (of the bourgeoisie) rather than political
and social equality (e.g., Lenin, [1917] 2004, pp. 73–7; Luxembourg, [1899] 2006; Marx,
[1848] 1988). Others hope to integrate electoral democracy with socialist policies to combine
the best of both worlds (Bernstein, [1899] 1961); Heller, 1930). To some extent, this tradi-
tion resonates with Dahl’s (1982, 1985, 1989) understanding of a fully democratic process
mentioned above, as it would require substantial redistribution of politically relevant power
resources to reach the goal of political equality.
To be fully democratic, all citizens should de facto possess equal resources that can be
marshalled to make self-government real. What is specific about the egalitarian tradition is the
emphasis on equal protection of rights across genders and social groups, equal access to posi-
tions of political power, and equal distribution of key resources (Ake, 2000). Material as well
as immaterial inequalities can fundamentally undermine the exercise of rights and liberties and
thus compromise the extent to which rule by the people is realized.
The egalitarian ideal mandates political equality across social groups – as defined by
income, wealth, education, ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, region, gender, sexual
identity, or other ascriptive characteristics. Ideally, all groups should enjoy similar capabilities
to participate in politics, that is, to vote, to serve in leadership positions, to place issues on the
agenda, and to influence policy making in other ways.
A key assumption embedded in this tradition of thought is that political power is associated
with social power. If an individual or group is disadvantaged in society, this will likely reflect
in the political sphere. Material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual use of formal
political (electoral) rights and liberties. Hence, for the egalitarian democratic ideal to be
achieved, citizens must have equality in power resources within society. In other words, rule
by the people requires equality among the people, meaning that people must be substantially
equal in wealth, education, and health, and group relationships should be unhindered by social
prejudice (Ake, 2000; Meyer, 2007; see also Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).
At a minimum, the distribution of resources must be sufficient to ensure that citizens’ basic
needs are met in a way that enables their meaningful participation in politics (Beetham, 1999;
Saward, 1998). To a large extent, this view aligns with the capability tradition, which under-
stands full development of human capability as both an aim in itself and important for the true
realization of democracy (see Nussbaum, 2011; Sen, 2001).
Egalitarian democracy thus requires electoral democracy and liberal rights to be undergirded
by equal respect for all social groups and individuals and an equal distribution of resources

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 Democracy: contested concept with a common core 33

across social groups and individuals – or at least the fulfilment of minimum standards that
enable everybody to participate effectively in political processes.

PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

The key value of participatory democracy is active political participation and direct rule by cit-
izens. It is rooted in the tradition of direct democracy as practiced in Ancient Greece and later
envisaged by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Hansen, 1991; Ober, 1989; Rousseau, [1762] 1984).
This model of democracy received renewed attention from scholars in the 1970s and 1980s
(e.g., Macpherson, 1977; Mansbridge, 1983; Pateman, 1976), and, recently, activists in many
countries have followed by criticizing the functioning of electoral and liberal democracy and
making calls for political reforms, which echo some of the principles underlying this tradition.
This ideal is based on the assumption that mere representation by elected politicians is
inherently flawed from a democratic perspective. Representation is said to alienate human
beings from each other rather than bringing them together, and the basis of electoral and
liberal democracy in the form of autonomous citizens casting ballots on election day does not
facilitate a strong democracy (see Barber, 1984). Joel Wolfe (1986, p. 10) summarizes this
perspective as follows: ‘strong [participatory] democracy should be a form of government in
which all people participate in decision-making and implementation…participation by all is
imperative because it creates shared interests, a common will, and community action, all of
which inevitably give legitimacy to politics.’ The benefits of active participation are multifold.
It is expected to develop public awareness and the capacities of citizens, improving their
sense of membership in the community. This may be especially important for groups facing
discrimination in society. Moreover, participation will inform the formation of preferences,
and citizens gain a sense of ownership over the political process, which increases legitimacy.
Moderate versions of participatory democracy do not reject political representation alto-
gether. However, the institutions associated with electoral democracy need to be undergirded
by alternative tools of political engagement and influence to achieve the participatory ideal.
Rather than looking solely at the right to elect representatives, the actual turnout at elections is
relevant. More importantly, in addition to voting, the polity should provide other mechanisms
of citizen participation such as direct democracy (initiatives and referenda), party primaries,
a strong and engaged civil society (including demonstrations, protests, and strikes), and sig-
nificant policy-making power at all levels through participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies/
councils/panels, and so forth. Arguably, these forms of engagement also enhance the quality
of representation by reducing the autonomy of politicians from citizens as well the autonomy
among citizens.

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Deliberative democracy embraces the core value that political decisions in pursuit of the
public good should be informed by respectful and reason-based dialogue rather than by
emotional appeals, solidary attachments, self-interests, or coercion. This conception was first
conceived and developed into an independent perspective in the early 1980s (see Bessette,
1980; Habermas, [1981] 1987). To a large degree, this was a response to dissatisfaction with

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some unwanted characteristics of political discussion and decision making such as the person-
alization of politics, disrespect for alternative views, pork-barrel politics, affective appeal to
base interests, and narrow-minded pursuit of irrational preferences.
The deliberative principle says that a legitimate political order is one that is justifiable to
all members of society. A key objective is to transform political preferences through a process
of deliberation. The outcome should be political positions that can withstand public scrutiny
(Held, 2006, p. 237). To achieve this aim, more focus has to be directed to the pre-voting
communicative processes of opinion formation (Bohman, 1998; Elster, 1998; Gutmann and
Thompson, 1996; Habermas, [1992] 1996). Deliberative democracy thus requires more than
an aggregation of existing preferences. The process by which decisions are reached is also
crucial.
A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good moti-
vates political decisions. Deliberation can basically be understood as ‘debate and discussion
aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to
revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow par-
ticipants’ (Chambers, 2003, p. 309). It also requires respectful dialogue at all levels – from
preference formation to final decision – among informed and competent participants who are
open to persuasion (Dryzek, 2010, p. 1). Rational political deliberation more generally has to
be ‘“fact-regarding” (as opposed to ignorant or doctrinaire), “future-regarding” (as opposed to
myopic) and “other-regarding” (as opposed to selfish)’ (Offe and Preuss 1991, p. 157).
Even though proponents of deliberative democracy vary in their views about the institutions
of electoral democracy, many of them think the deliberative features should supplement rather
than replace representative democracy (e.g., Chambers, 2003, p. 308; Fishkin, 1991). What is
distinct to deliberative democracy is that political decision making must fulfil the criteria of
public deliberation and consultation, respectful debate, and reasoned justification with exclu-
sive emphasis on the public good.

MAJORITARIAN VS CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY

The idea that the will of the majority of the people should decide policies affecting society is
the key value underlying the majoritarian democracy perspective. Democracy is boosted when
political institutions ensure that the voice of the many prevail over the few. To facilitate this,
political institutions should centralize and concentrate power within the context of electoral
democracy, generating an efficient method of decision making and implementation.
Consensual democracy is basically the mirror image of majoritarian democracy, apart
from the fact that they share the core of electoral democracy. Accordingly, in order to realize
popular rule, the consensual principle prescribes political power to be widely dispersed and
political institutions to encourage the inclusion of as many political perspectives as possible in
the decision-making process. Decision making should involve and take into account as broad
a range of opinions as possible, meaning that all affected groups are to be heard and have an
impact on the result. Inclusionary measures should preserve interests even when opposed by
the government.
The origin of these contrasting types of democracy may be assigned to Walter Bagehot
([1867] 1963, pp. 219–22), who in the mid-nineteenth century contrasted the British political
model with the US political model: ‘The English Constitution…is framed on the principle of

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 Democracy: contested concept with a common core 35

choosing a single sovereign, and making it good; the American, upon the principle of having
many sovereign authorities, and hoping that their multitude may atone for their inferiority.’
Some decades later, Arendt Lijphart (1999) reinvigorated the debate, and his distinction
between consensus and majoritarian democracy has been pointed out as ‘the single most influ-
ential typology of modern democracies’ (Mainwaring, 2001, p. 171).7
Broadly speaking, the majoritarian ideal is fulfilled when political institutions are power
concentrating, that is, they centralize political power in the hands of a single party and the
number of veto points/players are very limited. A veto point may be understood as a constitu-
tional body such as a legislature or a political body such as a political party or interest organi-
zation. Such institutional set-up is supposed to strengthen the government and ensure effective
decision making, which is advantageous when dealing with complex societal challenges and
trying to overcome the resistance of special interests (Freeden, 1978).
While both majoritarian democracy and consensual democracy share a commitment to
electoral democracy, the institutions that fulfill the two ideals are directly contrary. According
to the consensual principle, political power should be dispersed with the help of many veto
points. Considerable power should be delegated to independent bodies at national and subna-
tional levels. Power-sharing is key, so decision making at various levels should be character-
ized by super-majorities, and executive powers be vested with oversized coalitions.

HOW THE DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS RELATE TO EACH OTHER

Orthogonal Components with a Common Core

One way to view the relationship between different conceptions of democracy is to inter-
pret them as being as distinct as possible apart from the common electoral core. This is the
perspective embraced by the Varieties of Democracy project (see Coppedge et al., 2020).
This approach distinguishes between a reduced and a comprehensive version for each of the
conceptions of democracy, which supplement the electoral basis with additional criteria. The
comprehensive versions cover all defining features, while the reduced versions, referred to as
components, only include the most unique attributes of that conception compared to the other
conceptions. Accordingly, substantial overlaps are avoided between the liberal, egalitarian,
deliberative, participatory, majoritarian, and consensual components. In other words, these are
designed to be conceptually distinct (even though they may co-vary empirically).
Figure 1.1 presents the different conceptions of democracy and illustrates how distinct prin-
ciples of democracy, on the one hand, share an electoral core, and, on other hand, can function
as separate extensions of the electoral understanding.
This procedure works well when the reduced components are clearly distinct from each
other, as in the case of the participatory and liberal principles, including when they stand in
contrast to each other, as in the case of the majoritarian and consensual principles. It is more
problematic, however, when there are substantial overlaps between the reduced components
as they should preferably be mutually exclusive to fit the approach.

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36 Research handbook on democracy and development

Figure 1.1 Conceptions of democracy

Cumulative Ordering of Components

One procedure to handle a situation where there is partial overlap between different under-
standings of democracy is to use the logic of cumulative ordering. However, if one is able to
order multiple definitions of democracy in a stepwise fashion, ranging from less demanding,
thin versions to more demanding, thick versions, it is possible to construct a hierarchical
typology (taxonomy) of conceptions of democracy (see Gerring, Pemstein and Skaaning,
2018; Skaaning, Gerring and Bartusevičius, 2015). This is done by enlisting a sequence of
necessary conditions, which at each level are jointly sufficient for a particular understanding
of democracy.
This approach cannot be applied to contrasting perspectives or to perspectives that cannot
be systematically ordered. This means that some of the principles do not lend themselves to
this exercise. However, as shown in Table 1.2, it is possible to do so with the two versions
of electoral democracy (i.e., minimalist democracy and polyarchy), liberal democracy, and
egalitarian (aka social) democracy (see Møller and Skaaning, 2011, 2013).
The table illustrates the stepwise extension of the definition, where contested elections
are necessary for all conceptions but only sufficient for the thinnest type, that is, minimalist

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 Democracy: contested concept with a common core 37

Table 1.2 Taxonomy of conceptions of democracy

Contested Universal Suffrage and Political Liberal Rights Social Rights

Elections Freedoms
Minimalist democracy +
Polyarchy + +
Liberal democracy + + +
Egalitarian democracy + + + +

democracy. At the next level, the definitional requirements of polyarchy are captured by
adding universal suffrage and political freedoms (free speech and the rights of organization
and assembly) to contested elections. Liberal democracy then shares these features but also
requires respect for liberal rights in the form of civil liberties and the rule of law, while egali-
tarian democracy at the highest level combines all the previously listed conditions with respect
for social rights.
The logic of this approach entails that the thicker definitions also include the constitutive
elements of the thinner definitions. This means that the procedure can handle partial overlaps
between the principles; it is even a requirement. The procedure also implies, however, that it is
not suitable for principles standing in direct contrast to each other. It also falls short when it is
hard to justify why democratic attributes should be arranged in a particular order.

ILLUSTRATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS OF POLITIES

After the conceptual spadework, it is interesting to see how countries map on to the different
categories. This exercise has a two-fold purpose. First, it identifies the closest we get to
real-world examples of the types. Second, it gives a raw impression of the empirical variation
and distribution. Table 1.3 lists the ten best-performing countries in 2018 according to the
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) indices constructed to capture exactly the conceptions of
democracy described above (see Coppedge et al., 2020).8 However, V-Dem does not provide
indices for majoritarian democracy and consensus democracy. I therefore employ Lijphart’s
(1999) classical executives-parties measure to identify the polities, which were most majori-
tarian and consensual, respectively. His measure covers 1971 to 1996 and offers a single score
for each of the 36 electoral democracies included in his study.
The V-Dem indices have been constructed based on the logic of a common overview that
shows that it is to a large extent the same countries that do well across the first five concep-
tions of democracy. This pattern is not self-evident since the construction of these indices has
followed the logic of orthogonal components with a common core of electoral democracy
described above. This circumstance means that much more variation in the rankings is theoret-
ically possible, especially if there are some trade-offs between the achievement of the various
components. However, this does not seem to be the case, as illustrated by the Scandinavian
countries, which do well across the board. Electoral integrity, liberal rights, basic equality,
political engagement, and public and respectful political debate tend to go hand in hand in
these polities. Also, other countries, such as Estonia, Switzerland, and Costa Rica, figure
prominently in the rankings. Unsurprisingly, Switzerland and Uruguay, with their frequent

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38 Research handbook on democracy and development

Table 1.3 Top performers regarding different conceptions of democracy

Electoral Liberal Egalitarian Participatory Deliberative Majoritarian Consensus

Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy
1 Norway Norway Norway Switzerland Norway Jamaica Switzerland
2 Sweden Sweden Denmark Uruguay Sweden Bahamas Finland
3 Estonia Denmark Estonia Denmark Denmark Trinidad & Tobago Denmark
4 Costa Rica Estonia Luxembourg New Zealand Switzerland Barbados Belgium
5 Denmark Switzerland Sweden Taiwan Estonia UK Israel
6 Uruguay Costa Rica Switzerland Norway Luxembourg Botswana Netherlands
7 Switzerland Australia Portugal UK Uruguay New Zealand Italy
8 UK Portugal Belgium Costa Rica Costa Rica Canada Papua New Guinea
9 Portugal Netherlands New Zealand Slovenia Portugal France Sweden
10 Luxembourg New Zealand Finland Estonia Netherlands Malta Norway

Notes: The first five rankings refer to 2018 and are based on the V-Dem indices for electoral democracy, liberal
democracy, egalitarian democracy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy. The last two ranking refer
to 1971–96 and are based on Lijphart’s (1999, p. 312) measure of the so-called executives-parties dimension.

use of referenda and strong traditions of subnational democracy and vibrant civil societies, do
extraordinarily well regarding participatory democracy.
The top-ten performers in the majoritarian democracy column are quite different. It is
mainly populated by the UK and a number of its former colonies that have largely adopted
a similar set of political institutions. Accordingly, the UK is often pointed to as a prime
example of a majoritarian democracy. Two parties dominate the political arena, the executive
dominates the legislature (where the lower house is much stronger than the upper house), the
national government dominates local government, and the power to govern is mostly concen-
trated in a single party. Moreover, the unwritten constitution is flexible, and there is no judicial
review of primary legislation. Taken together, there are only few and weak veto players, so it
is unlikely that the majority is obstructed from carrying out its preferred policies.
In contrast to the British system, the institutional set-up in Switzerland is often presented
as prime example of a consensus democracy. The political arena is characterized by multi-
ple parties (none of them dominant), the relationship between the executive and legislature
(divided into two equally strong chambers) is balanced, regions in the federative structure have
strong autonomy, and government power is shared by all important parties in a broad coalition,
where different (linguistic) groups are represented in proportion to their size. This rather pure
version of a consensus democracy is extraordinary. The political institutions of the other states
topping the ranking for consensus democracy, including the Scandinavian countries, are less
consistent with regard to promoting inclusion and decentralization. On the one hand, corporat-
ism, multi-party coalition governments, and oversize legislative majorities, are more the rule
than the exception. On the other hand, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are unitary states with
unicameral legislatures and do not have strong traditions of judicial review.
But how does the distribution of contemporary democracies look if we employ a cumu-
lative ordering of democratic attributes? To answer this question, I first use the competitive
elections indicator from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED) (Skaaning et al.,
2015) to distinguish autocracies from minimalist democracies. In the next step, minimalist
democracies with a score of at least 0.72 on V-Dem’s electoral democracy (polyarchy) index
are placed in the group of polyarchies. A score of 0.86 on the V-Dem liberal component index
then separates out the liberal democracies, while a subsequent criterion of a minimum score of

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 Democracy: contested concept with a common core 39

Table 1.4 Taxonomic classification of democracies, 2018

Minimalist Democracy Polyarchy Liberal Democracy Egalitarian Democracy

Albania Guinea-Bissau Mongolia Argentina Australia Austria
Armenia Guyana Montenegro Brazil Barbados Belgium
Bahamas Haiti Namibia Burkina Faso Belgium Canada
Benin Honduras Nepal Czech Republic Cape Verde Denmark
Bhutan Hungary Nigeria Greece Chile Estonia
Bolivia India Papua New Guinea Malta Costa Rica Finland
Botswana Indonesia Paraguay Panama Cyprus France
Bulgaria Iraq Philippines Peru Italy Germany
Burkina Faso Israel Poland Senegal Jamaica Iceland
Colombia Kenya Romania Slovakia Lithuania Ireland
Comoros Kosovo São Tomé & Príncipe Suriname Mauritius Japan
Côte d’Ivoire Lebanon Serbia Bosnia Timor-Leste Spain Latvia
Croatia Lesotho Seychelles Trinidad & Tobago Luxembourg
Dominican Republic Liberia Sierra Leone Tunisia Netherlands
Ecuador Macedonia Solomon Islands UK New Zealand
Ecuador Madagascar South Africa US Norway
Fiji Malawi Sri Lanka Uruguay Portugal
Gambia Malaysia Tunisia Vanuatu Slovenia
Georgia Mali Turkey South Korea
Ghana Mexico Ukraine Sweden
Guatemala Moldova Switzerland
Taiwan

Notes: The country distribution refers to 2018 and comprises all independent countries covered by V-Dem (v9).
The distinctions are based on the competitive elections indicator from LIED and the electoral democracy index, the
liberal component index, and the egalitarian component index from V-Dem.

0.89 on the V-Dem egalitarian component index identifies the egalitarian democracies.9 Table
1.4 shows the distribution of polities in 2018 on the four types of democracy, where members
of higher-order categories are by definition also members of all less demanding categories.
For example, all liberal democracies, such as Australia and Chile, also belong to the set of
minimalist democracies.
The overview reveals that relatively few polities are classified as egalitarian democracies
and that most of them are rich, Western European countries with long traditions of electoral
contestation. In contrast, most third wave countries are only minimalist democracies or pol-
yarchies. There are positive exceptions, though, such as the Baltic countries and some of the
Asian Tigers. The country distribution indicates that there is a strong covariation between
socio-economic development and type of democracy, but it does not say anything about the
existence and direction of a causal relationship.

CONCLUSION
Dahl (1989, p. 2) once noted that ‘a term that means anything means nothing. And so it has
become with “democracy”, which nowadays is not so much a term of restricted and specific
meaning as a vague endorsement of a popular idea.’ However, this situation did not make
Dahl abstain from continuing to discuss and précis his own understanding of democracy – or

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40 Research handbook on democracy and development

to identify and account for real existing democracies for that matter. Although fundamental
disagreements still exist about the correct definition of democracy, and even though some
conceptions of democracy build on conflicting values, this chapter has shown that it is pos-
sible to order many particular understandings into more general clusters. Moreover, I have
suggested approaches that can be helpful when trying to systematize the relationship between
different conceptions, and I have argued that there is a set of minimum conditions that need to
be included in any meaningful definition of democracy.
Related to the last point, it has been argued that researchers should avoid the inclusion
of potential causes and consequences of democracy (such as rule of law, social equality, or
a lively civil society) into the concept of democracy. The argument goes that this choice would
solve interesting factual questions by definitional fiat. If, for instance, one is interested in the
empirical association between economic equality and democracy, it would not be suitable to
consider economic equality as a defining feature of democracy as this would generate a tau-
tological relationship (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, p. 73; Przeworski et al., 2000,
p. 33). Even though there are some limits to what features can meaningfully be constitutive of
democracy, many of the arguments in favor of including attributes that go beyond contested
elections are plausible considering the baseline values of political freedom and equality. When
trying to disentangle theoretical and empirical relationships between democracy and some
other variable, it can be valuable to carefully distinguish these phenomena. However, research-
ers also have the choice of focusing on the relationship between more particular elements of
overarching concepts to avoid disturbing overlaps.
I make no claim to have offered the authoritative conceptualization of the seven traditions
introduced in this chapter. My aim is a modest one of identifying some the most important
and distinctive attributes associated with the most influential conceptions of democracy and
thereby to provide some guidance for researchers and students interested in this issue. Others
might suggest different ways to make sense of the complexity characterizing the field of
democratic theory. If these attempts are transparent, coherent, and well justified, they are more
than welcome.
Moreover, the conceptions of democracy presented here are not exhaustive. Some extant
traditions have been neglected and new ones will probably be suggested in the future. The
conceptualization of democracy will continue to be debated. Societal developments, intellec-
tual innovations, and novel research questions sometimes call for a rethinking of our concepts.
They are, after all, merely tools used for the higher purposes of precise communication and
scientific progress, that is, the achievement of valid theoretical and empirical insights.

NOTES
1. Some scholars add control as a third dimension (e.g., Bühlmann et al., 2012; Lauth, 2004) but since
control is merely considered as a means to safeguard equality and freedom, it should not have the
same constitutive status.
2. This could be marked in the table by also adding the criteria mentioned in connection to electoral
democracy to the list of criteria linked to all the other conceptions. However, I prefer not to do so
here to avoid blurring the overview and to emphasize the distinct features. The overlap is obvious
from the following discussions.
3. The description of the different conceptions of democracy is heavily inspired by – and partly over-
lapping with – some of my previous works on the topic, especially Coppedge et al. (2020, Ch. 2; see
also Møller and Skaaning, 2011, 2013).

1 7 6 : 1 44 : 9
 Democracy: contested concept with a common core 41

4. That is, adequate and equal opportunities to discover and validate relevant information.
5. Dahl (1971, p. 3) originally conceived eight requirements. Later, he reduced them to seven (Dahl,
1989, p. 221) and eventually to six.
6. Held (2006) identifies both a protective and a developmental version of liberalism. Here we focus
on the former, because it represents what most scholars have in mind when referring to liberal
democracy (see, e.g., Diamond, 1999; Fukuyama, 2014; Møller and Skaaning, 2011; O’Donnell,
2001; Zakaria, 2003).
7. Other works have also distinguished between different institutional configurations of democracies
and their expected impact on inclusion and effectiveness (e.g., Gerring and Thacker, 2008; Powell,
1982; Tsebelis, 2002), but they have generally been less influential than Lijphart’s work.
8. Note that since the ranking is mainly used for illustrative purposes, I do not utilize the confidence
bounds associated with the V-Dem point estimates. Doing so would reveal that many of the differ-
ences are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
9. The cumulative ordering requires crisp distinctions on each level. This means that some valuable
information is lost. In addition, although the thresholds are inspired by country distributions iden-
tified in previous studies (see Møller and Skaaning 2011, 2013), they are necessarily somewhat
arbitrary since the V-Dem indices are continuous.

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