CASE: I.R.

COELHO (DEAD) BY LRS VS STATE OF TAMIL NADU &

By Parul Thakur

DATE OF THE CASE: 11th January 2007

PETITIONER: I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs

RESPONDENT: State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.

BENCH/JUDGES: Y.K. Sabharwal CJI & Ashok Bhan & Arijit Pasayat & Bisheshwar P.
Singh & S.H. Kapadia & C.K. Thakker & P.K.I. Balasubramanyan & Altamas Kabir &
D.K. Jain

EQUIVALENT CITATION: AIR 2007 SUPREME COURT 861

IMPORTANT PROVISIONS: Article 31 B of the Indian Constitution states the validation of

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Gudalur Janmann Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act of 1969, about
the vesting of forest lands in Janman estates in Tamil Nadu, faced judicial annulment in the
Balmadies Plantations Ltd and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu case2. The court held that it did not
qualify as an agrarian reform safeguarded by Article 31-A of the Constitution. Similarly, the
Calcutta High Court invalidated Section 2(c) of the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act, 1979,

1
AIR 2007 SC 861
2
AIR 1972 SUPREME COURT 2240
 deeming it arbitrary and unconstitutional. The State of West Bengal's plea against this decision was
dismissed.

In response, the Constitution (34th Amendment) Act and the Constitution (66th Amendment)
Act were enacted to encompass the entire Janman Act and the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue
Act, 1979, within the Ninth Schedule. As per the Waman Rao v. Union of India3, amendments
to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973, incorporating various statutes and
regulations into the Ninth Schedule, are susceptible to legal challenge as the Basic Structure
Doctrine had a retrospective effect. Such challenge may be based on the argument that these
laws, individually or collectively, exceed the Constituent Power of Parliament, posing a threat
to the essential features or basic structure of the Constitution. However, subsequent decisions in
Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India 4 and Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of
India5 suggested a need for a larger Bench to reconsider the judgment in Waman Rao. The
subsequent rulings raised questions about whether any law, rule, or regulation included in the
Ninth Schedule that violates Articles 14, 19, and 31 can be incorporated, or if it is solely
constitutional amendments amending the Ninth Schedule that could be subject to being
invalidated for damaging or destroying the basic structure of the Constitution.

ISSUES RAISED:

The pivotal issues before the Apex Court revolved around the post-Keshvananda Bharati
judgment query:
1. Can laws housed in the Ninth Schedule evade judicial review by claiming exemption on the
basis of not violating the fundamental structure of the Constitution?
2. The crux of the matter lies in unraveling the precise extent to which the Ninth Schedule
bestows immunity upon laws, shielding them from thorough judicial scrutiny.

CONTENTIONS:

3
(1981)2SCC362
4
1980 AIR 1789
5
AIR 1985 SUPREME COURT 1650
 Arguments from Petitioner’s side:

The Supreme Court has consistently asserted that the principle of the separation of powers is an
indispensable and integral facet of the foundational architecture of the Constitution. the
principal contention advanced by the petitioners is that, after 1973, it is impermissible to grant
immunity to laws in the Ninth Schedule from judicial review by excluding them from the
purview of Part III. They argue that such a course of action is incongruent with the basic
structure doctrine. The crux of their argument centers on the assertion that the authority to
confer absolute immunity is at odds with the inherent limitations on the power of amendment
delineated in Article 368. As per the petitioners, the implications arising from the development
of basic structure principles dictate that laws in the Ninth Schedule cannot be endowed with
constitutional immunity akin to that established by Article 31B. Ultimately, they anchored their
argument on the viewpoint articulated by Justice Khanna in the Kesavananda Bharati case6,
contending that, in accordance with his stance, fundamental rights constitute an inseparable
component of the constitutional basic structure. Hence, they posited that laws within the Ninth
Schedule should be subject to examination through the prism of the Fundamental Rights
criterion.

Argument from Respondent’s side:

Conversely, the respondent reiterated their reliance on the Kesavananda Bharati case
judgment and asserted that the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution functions as a constitutional
mechanism to shield specific laws under its purview. They argued that while the judiciary
constitutes a crucial component of the constitution's basic structure, the authority of judicial
review vested in the judiciary is not unrestricted. According to their stance, only Article 31B
imposes constraints on the power of judicial review. Consequently, once a law is incorporated
into the Ninth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, it attains immunity from the provisions of
Part III of the Constitution. The argument presented on behalf of the respondents asserts that
the legitimacy of laws within the Ninth Schedule can only be assessed based on the basic
6
AIR 1973 SUPREME COURT 1461
structure doctrine, as established by the majority opinion in the Kesavananda Bharati case.
This majority opinion unconditionally upheld the Constitution 29th Amendment, making it
clear that there is no room for judicial review of such legislation on the grounds of violating the
chapter on fundamental rights. The argument posits that the protective cover afforded by
Article 31B excludes the fundamental rights chapter from scrutiny. Consequently, any
challenge can only be mounted based on the basic structure doctrine. Additionally, the
legislation can be subjected to examination for (i) inadequate legislative competence and (ii)
infringement of other constitutional provisions.

RATIONALE:

The court asserted that the legislature cannot evade examination under the basic structure
doctrine. This doctrine, intrinsic to the Indian Constitution, is considered fundamental, and any
act, rule, or regulation that contradicts its essence cannot be permitted. The ruling established
that any law contravening the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution should be
deemed to infringe upon the basic structure of the Constitution. This implies that Part III is an
integral component of the basic structure doctrine, and any amendment or mere inclusion of
laws in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution would be considered violative and subject to
nullification through judicial review.
Furthermore, the judgment stipulated that all laws enacted or amended after the Kesavananda
Bharati case, i.e., 24th April 1973, must adhere to constitutionality standards, grounded in
Articles 14, 19, 21, and other principles outlined in it, even if they are incorporated in the Ninth
Schedule of the constitution. The provisions of such laws can be challenged on these
constitutional grounds. Finally, the court introduced a crucial principle known as the
'fundamental rights test' or the ‘effect and impact test’.

DEFECTS OF LAW: Unbridled Powers to the Judiciary

Skeptics argue that the judiciary is ostensibly seeking to curtail the legislative branch's
authority in enacting laws and shaping public policies. The frequent introduction of novel
theories or doctrines not only impedes the legislative process but also contributes to the
 prevailing ambiguity and confusion surrounding the basic structure doctrine. Notably, the
judiciary has refrained from offering a precise definition of the basic structure or a
comprehensive enumeration detailing its constituents. Justice Mathew, in the Indira Gandhi
case7, expressed criticism, asserting that the concept of the basic structure, “the concept of
basic structure as a brooding omnipresence in the sky apart from specific provisions of the
Constitution is too vague and indefinite to provide a yardstick for the validity of an ordinary
law.”

INFERENCE:

The I.R. Coelho judgment strongly reaffirms the basic structure doctrine, going so far as to assert
that a constitutional amendment violating any fundamental rights deemed integral to the
Constitution's basic structure can be invalidated based on its impact and consequences.
Thanks to the basic structure doctrine, the judiciary retains the authority of judicial review,
preventing its deprivation, and upholds the principle of the rule of law. Similarly, this doctrine
safeguards federalism, preventing the subjugation of states to the central government. The
traumatic experiences of the emergency period have underscored the significance of judicial
review as a potent remedy against state arbitrariness and for the protection of fundamental rights.
In the Indian context, the substantial gains resulting from the basic structure doctrine serve as a
bulwark against further erosion of fundamental rights.
However, we must also acknowledge the fact that although the Doctrine of Basic Structure
seemed to have granted liberty to the Parliament to even amend the Fundamental Rights, it also
gave the Court immense power to decide whether any law is violative of Basic Structure or not,
deciding which is again dependent on the discretion of the Court as to what constitutes the
Basic Structure since the ambit of Fundamental Rights is always increasing.

7
AIR 1975 SUPREME COURT 2299