This is the Third Edition of the Sustainment Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper, written by

the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 (JS J7), and published by the JS J7.

Third Edition: May 2016

Second Edition: December 2013
First Edition: June 2011

Scope: This paper focuses on defining sustainment and the roles and responsibilities of key
players in the planning and execution of sustainment functions at the theater-strategic and
operational levels. This includes developing a concept of support at the operational level to set
the foundation for integration of the various sustainment functions. This paper also introduces
the sustainment sub-functions and offers insights and best practices for achieving sustainment
goals.

Terminology and Acronyms: Numerous military acronyms and organizational names are used
freely in the paper. They are defined in the glossary, but not throughout the body of the paper to
improve readability based on the high level of experience and knowledge of the intended
audience.
Table of Contents
1.0 Executive Summary ....................................................................................................1
2.0 Sustainment Defined ...................................................................................................2
3.0 Roles and Relationships ..............................................................................................2
4.0 Developing the Concept of Support ............................................................................3
5.0 Logistics ......................................................................................................................4
6.0 Engineering .................................................................................................................6
7.0 Health Services ...........................................................................................................8
8.0 Personnel Support .....................................................................................................10
9.0 Supporting the Commander’s Decision Making Process .........................................13
GLOSSARY: Abbreviations and Acronyms .......................................................... GL

POC: Mr. Mike Findlay - Email: js.dsc.j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.mil

Deployable Training Division, Deputy Director Joint Staff J7, Joint Training
116 Lake View Parkway
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

Accessibility: This and other insights and best practice papers can be accessed through use of a
search engine on the open internet. Also available on the following websites:
Joint Electronic Library (Public website):
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/fp/focus_papers.htm
Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) (CAC enabled):
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=124&catindex=58

Releasability: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Disclaimer: The views in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense (DOD), or the United States Government
(USG).
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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. This focus paper shares emerging joint sustainment insights
and best practices across the range of military operations. This includes warfighting, support to
foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)
missions in the continental United States (CONUS). The paper addresses joint HQ activities at
the theater-strategic (i.e., CCMD) and operational (e.g., JTF and other joint force commander
(JFC)) levels in the areas of logistics, engineering, health services (HS), and personnel support.
Sustainment is one of six warfighting functions common to joint operations and includes the
provision of logistics and personnel services to maintain and prolong operations through mission
accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Sustainment encompasses all of the core
logistics capabilities (including supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, HS, logistics
services, engineering, and operational contract support [OCS]) along with personnel support
services that include human resources, financial management, and religious ministry.

This paper is based on observed insights and best practices, and is consistent with the 2015
National Military Strategy (NMS) as it pertains to the concepts of global agility and globally
integrated operations. Future joint forces are unlikely to operate within an established theater
with mature support networks. Joint force entry and sustainment may likely be contested in an
anti-access, aerial denial (A2AD) environment. Access to global chokepoints, en route
infrastructure, force protection, and cyber vulnerabilities are all concerns. Reduced forward
presence will necessitate flexible positioning of forces, prioritized prepositioned stocks, and
rapid expeditionary capability. Joint Force 2020 is envisioned to be more rapidly deployable and
employable, pervasively interoperable, and sustained via globally synchronized operations.

Key Challenges:
 Anticipating requirements in an uncertain, complex and rapidly changing operating
environment.
 Leveraging Global Providers that are part of the Joint Logistic Enterprise (JLEnt) to ensure
rapid and precise response for the JFC.
 Integrate sustainment capabilities to support joint force requirements.

Key Insights:
 The involvement of the commander and the staff’s ability to anticipate requirements and
leverage available capabilities are crucial to both setting theater conditions and for successful
long-term force sustainment.
 Availability of limited global resources and time-distance requirements can become factors
early in a conflict or crisis. Coordination for and prioritization of critical resources are key
methods by which the higher headquarters (HHQ) can help set conditions for success.
 Sustainment actions (to include medical “soft power,” and health diplomacy) should be
included in the theater campaign plan (TCP) objectives and the commander’s communication
synchronization narrative.
 Force accountability supports the commander’s concept of operation and is essential to make
informed decisions concerning force allocation and capabilities.

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2.0 SUSTAINMENT DEFINED. Sustainment is more than logistics. It encompasses all of the
core logistics capabilities (including
supply, maintenance, deployment and
distribution, HS, engineering, logistics
services, and OCS) and also includes
personnel support services (including
human resources, financial management,
and religious ministry). The joint logistics
capabilities on the left side of the diagram
along with the personnel support
capabilities on the right side of the
diagram are an integral part of
sustainment and vital for supporting
TCPs.

The responsibility for these capabilities is usually spread across multiple directorates (e.g., J1, J4,
J7, J8, surgeon, and chaplain), making the integration of capabilities more challenging. The joint
HQ surgeon and engineer staffs may be organized under the J4 (Logistics Directorate) or each
may be autonomous as a special staff directorate. Responsibility for personnel support is
typically spread across the staff to include the J1, J8, and chaplain. Each functional area provides
a unique view of supporting operations; success entails effective synchronization of these
capabilities to support the mission.

3.0 ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

3.1 National Strategic Providers. Our Nation’s ability to project military power depends on our
ability to sustain a joint force through the sharing of Department of Defense (DOD), interagency,
and other national resources. Just as it is important to understand the linkage between national
strategy and defense strategy, it is equally important to understand force structure and
resourcing, and translate those linkages from the theater-strategic to the operational level.

Within the DOD, resource responsibility begins with the Title 10, United States Code (USC)
authority of the Services and includes Combat Support Agencies like the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA), U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and commercial industrial
partners. These global providers manage end-to-end processes that provide capabilities and
support to the JFC.

The essence of joint sustainment is the ability to integrate all of these strategic capabilities and
resources at the operational level to satisfy tactical-level requirements in order to achieve
national objectives. This means setting conditions for subordinate success and setting priorities at
the operational level.

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3.2 The Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt). Globally integrated operations require
coordination and partnering across multiple global logistics providers, both military and civilian.
The sustainment and logistics demands in
complex emergencies require an
“enterprise” approach as they often
transcend the ability of a single nation,
government, or organization to address
alone.1

There are multiple stakeholders, both

military and civilian, that comprise the
JLEnt, a multi-tiered matrix of key global
logistics providers working cooperatively
to achieve a common purpose without
jeopardizing their own mission and goals.

Understanding the players and their authorities, goals and limitations as well as their willingness
to help in an operation are imperative to establishing effective situational awareness. This
situational awareness can enable sustainment planners to identify potential support opportunities
as well as potential resource conflicts. In FHA or DSCA missions, interagency and multinational
partners may play key or lead roles. When participating in a supporting role, communicating the
capabilities the Joint Force can deliver will be a key challenge for the JFC.

Insights:
 Understand the authorities, goals, and limitations (such as national caveats) of JLEnt partners
early in the planning process. This may expand capabilities or restrict them.
 Capitalize on and leverage other stakeholders’ capabilities and resources.
 Other organizations may play a key role in providing logistics support during both Phase 0
(Shaping) and FHA missions as well as in relief and reconstruction operations. Be prepared
to provide support to other U.S. Government (USG) agencies, intergovernmental
organizations [IGOs], nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], and private volunteer
organizations (PVO).
 Establish relationships and build trust among JLEnt partners before a crisis. Once a crisis
occurs, involve JLEnt partners early in the planning process.

4.0 DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF SUPPORT. Setting conditions at the operational

level begins by integrating all of the sustainment capabilities into a synchronized concept of
support. The concept of support is a planning product developed to support the concept of
operations (CONOPS) for each operations plan (OPLAN).

1
For more information on the Joint Logistics Enterprise Concept, see Operation of the Logistics Enterprise in Complex Emergencies, July 2012.

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Each CCDR has a theater support concept that contains existing provisions to help set conditions
in the theater for subordinate
organizations’ success. The overarching
theater support concept should include
factors based on the formal Logistics
Supportability Analyses and
Transportation Feasibility Analyses
developed for each concept plan
(CONPLAN). Subordinate commanders
should nest their concepts of support
within the CCDR’s theater support
concept. Components and subordinates
should work with the CCMD staff early to
leverage and capitalize on existing theater
resources and capabilities. Joint forces
strive to gain efficiencies and minimize the organic footprint by leveraging host and partner
nation support and other National Support Element (NSE) capabilities. Where possible, staffs
should leverage Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) for the limited exchange
of goods and services between forces, maximize OCS integration, and consider area support or
sea basing options. As always, strategies such as these are not implemented at the expense of
effective support to the force or detriment to the long-term objectives of the theater security
cooperation (TSC) plan.

Insights:
 Nest the subordinate concept of support with the CCDR’s theater support concept.
 Integrate and synchronize JLEnt capabilities in support of joint force requirements. Use OCS
to minimize the joint force’s organic footprint and, where feasible, supplement/replace
military support capabilities. Capitalize on the knowledge and experience of the Joint
Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) planners resident on the CCMD staff as
well as DLA’s deployable JCASO team.

5.0 LOGISTICS

5.1 Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL). CCDRs can exercise directive authority for
logistics, or DAFL, as part of Combatant Command (COCOM) authority. DAFL provides a
CCDR with the authority to organize logistics resources within the theater according to
operational needs. DAFL includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders,
including peacetime measures necessary to ensure: effective execution of OPLANs;
effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary
duplication of facilities and functions overlapping among Service component commands.
However, DAFL does not alleviate Service responsibility for logistics support, discourage
coordination by consultation and agreement, disrupt effective procedures, or prevent efficient use
of facilities or organizations. Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, the Military Departments
and Services continue to have responsibility for logistics support of their forces assigned or
attached to joint commands.

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The CCDR may delegate DAFL for common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as
required to accomplish the assigned mission. However, when delegated to a subordinate
commander, the CCDR formally delineates this delegated authority by function and scope to the
subordinate JFC.

5.2 Global Considerations. There are a variety of important global logistics considerations that
often require cross-CCMD coordination
and JS action. Availability of limited
resources, combined with the associated
time-distance requirements, is a common
challenge. Prioritization and coordination
of critical resources and focus on gaining
access are two key methods by which the
HHQ helps set the conditions for the joint
force.

Four critical consideration areas include:

 Strategic lift and tanker support
 Global critical munitions (e.g.,
integrated air defense, ballistic missile
defense, and global strike)
 Access, basing, and overflight
 War Reserve Materiel (WRM) and prepositioned stocks

Insights:
 Access requirements for basing and overflight (transit and en route infrastructure) may
extend beyond a given area of responsibility (AOR) and involve coordination with other
CCMDs and the JS, and appropriate engagement with interagency, multinational and
coalition partners.
 Understand the implications of simultaneous execution of OPLANs and how competing
requirements will impact the mission and the associated risks.

Best Practices:
 Articulate critical resources required to support OPLAN(s) along with the impacts, risk
assessment, and mitigation strategies based on anticipated global logistical sustainment
constraints.
 Engage in cross-CCMD and JS coordination early (pre-crisis) to request adjudication of
limited resources. The JS can convene a Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board
(JMPAB) to adjudicate competing requirements between CCMDs.2
 Engage JS J4 and USTRANSCOM early should events require a joint transportation board
(JTB) to prioritize and allocate strategic lift or tanker support.

5.3 Theater Logistics Considerations. At the theater level, coordination across components and
with subordinates is crucial to set the theater and to ensure long-term sustainment of the force.

2
For policy and procedure guidance on the JMPAB process, see CJCSI 4110.01E, Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation.

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Subordinates and components work with the CCMD staff to assess capabilities, limitations, and
resources early in the planning process.

Insights:
 During operations, assess and tailor the logistics posture to support the broader mission.
 Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) planning is critical to balancing and
prioritizing combat forces and combat service support forces.
 Scale sustainment capabilities across the phases of an operation.

Best Practices:
 Recognize and tailor logistics posture activities to send coherent messages (and not
unknowingly send an escalatory message through an aggressive logistics posture).
 Sequence critical enablers such as theater opening and force protection capabilities
appropriately in the force flow.
 Utilize the joint logistics coordination board (JLCB) to provide theater logistics guidance,
and coordinate and set logistics priorities. Include other internal and external staff as well as
the JLEnt partners in planning.

6.0 ENGINEERING. Engineers facilitate the freedom of action necessary for the JFC to meet
mission objectives. This is accomplished by: enhancing strategic and operational maneuver,
providing infrastructure for force projection, and enhancing quality of life. Engineers also
provide support to sustainment operations, develop operational intelligence, construct protective
fortifications, and help set conditions for an operation to transition to civil authorities. Engineer
functions include combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering.
Integration of the engineer functions and directing their efforts through a logical organizational
structure and coherent command and control (C2) relationships are keys to achieving unity of
effort.

Responsibilities for engineer functions may be spread across the staff to include the J3, J4, or
special staff. When deciding where to place the Engineer or engineering staff function oversight
in the joint force staff, there are four general options to consider based on the focus of engineer
efforts.
 When focused on maneuver support, the engineering staff function may be placed under
the J3. This is observed in most U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps commands.
 When directed towards facilities and basing, the best choice may be to place the
engineering staff function under the J4. This is the organizational construct observed in
most CCMD staffs.
 When the engineer effort cuts across several staff sections, the best option may be to
designate the engineering staff function as a separate staff section, normally the J7 or
simply the Joint Engineer (JENG) as seen in coalition HQs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
 When the engineer effort is a significant focus or a key element of the joint operation,
and there are a significant number of theater engineer requirements which can only be
accomplished with high-demand engineer assets, consider establishing a separate
engineer command known as a Joint Force Engineer Command (JFEC) that reports
directly to the JFC and whose commander may be dual-hatted as the joint force’s staff
engineer. This option provides maximum flexibility in synchronizing diverse engineer

6
 operations but will require geographic CCMD (GCC) approval based on the command
relationship the JFC has with the other Service forces.

Insights:
 The omission of engineer considerations in any phase of an operation may adversely impact
the entire plan.
 In stability operations and TSC activities, engineers are a valuable capability the JFC can use
to achieve civil-military objectives.

Best Practices:
 Use a joint civil-military engineer board (JCMEB) to facilitate unity of effort among JLEnt
partners in the joint operations area (JOA).
 Integrate the JCMEB into campaign assessments and nonlethal integration processes to
allocate resources to achieve operational objectives.
 Leverage engineering efforts (e.g., humanitarian construction projects) to support TSC
efforts and effectively deliver themes and messages that support the commander’s
communication strategy.

6.1 Basing and Infrastructure. The joint HQ Engineer and staff play a critical role in
sustainment operations through development, closure, and transition of basing and infrastructure.
In base support operations, the joint HQ Engineer establishes policy for base development,
construction standards, real estate actions, operation and maintenance, and closure of facilities.
The Engineer recommends to the commander the overall facility utilization policy for the AOR
and reconciles discrepancies with the military Service components or CCMD staff.
Environmental planning and policy formulation are important to consider early in the operational
planning process. Key tasks include developing policy in accordance with U.S. and host nation
(HN) laws and agreements, providing advice on applicable laws and regulations, mitigating
actions for mishaps, and coordinating for completion of all environmental baseline surveys
(EBSs). Neglecting early environmental planning can result in impacts to force protection issues
(health and safety) and the disposal of real estate or the closure of operating bases. These
functions normally require specialized skill sets not usually available on the engineer staff. Some
Service military engineers may have the experience required, but civilians who reside in the U.S.
Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, U.S. Army Environmental
Command, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC), and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) may be called on
to support environmental requirements of the engineer staff.

Insight:
 Consider infrastructure and basing requirements in the early stages of campaign
development, particularly for new construction or extensive renovations.

Best Practices:
 Incorporate basing and infrastructure considerations in the JFC’s concept of support.
 Incorporate environmental planning factors in the planning phase to reduce later challenges
in disposal of real estate or the closure of operating bases.

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 Understand and apply the appropriate basing standards to achieve the mission. Contingency
basing using predesigned modules (Force Provider and Harvest Falcon) maximizes
operational flexibility and support efficiency. Contingency construction and MILCON
provide more enduring solutions but require long lead time for planning, funding, and
construction.

7.0 HEALTH SERVICES. HS supports the operational mission by fostering, protecting,

sustaining, and restoring the health of the joint force. Responsibility for HS is under the staff
purview of the Joint Force Surgeon. Inclusion of HS requirements into operational planning is
vitally important to support operations. A clear picture of the medical footprint (to include all
medical capabilities, equipment, airlift/medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) support, personnel and
specialties available in the operational area as well as availability of multinational and HN
facilities and services) enhances operational planning efforts and ensures responsive support to
the JFC. The Joint Forces Surgeon and staff develop the HS plan based on mission requirements,
the medical capabilities of the joint force, and the operational situation. The HS plan should
account for DOD, interagency, state and local agency, NGO, and partner or HN medical
capabilities.

7.1 Patient Movement / Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC). Timely patient movement through
CASEVAC, MEDEVAC, and Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) is a critical capability in military
operations. CASEVAC is the movement of casualties using opportune lift capabilities.
MEDEVAC is patient movement using pre-designated aircraft, and watercraft temporarily
equipped and staffed with medical attendants for en route care. The U.S. Army is the only
Service that has dedicated air MEDEVAC assets. AE is the Air Force system providing time-
sensitive en route care to regulated patients to and between medical treatment facilities.

Per JP 4-02, the Joint Force Surgeon will either establish a joint patient movement requirements
center (JPMRC) or direct liaison with the
theater patient movement requirements
center (TPMRC) and Service patient
movement components. The JPMRC
coordinates closely with the TPMRC for
patient movement to theater-controlled
beds outside the JOA. The JFC can also
establish a patient evacuation coordination
center (PECC) to perform integrated
patient movement into and out of the JOA
and to control MEDEVAC within the
JOA. The primary difference between the
PECC and the JPMRC is that the PECC
controls JTF commander OPCON
MEDEVAC assets for urgent MEDEVAC, intra-theater evacuation, and coordinates with the
TPMRC for inter-theater evacuation.
 Effective PECCs have the following:
‐ The communications systems to quickly and reliably receive 9-Line MEDEVAC
requests.

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 ‐ Direct communications and liaison with Task Force Aviation or the unit to which
MEDEVAC aircraft are assigned. This allows the PECC to coordinate launch authority.
‐ Direct communications and liaison with Task Force Medical or the elements that provide
Role II/III HS to the JTF. This allows the PECC to direct casualties to the correct medical
treatment facility.
‐ Communications with the TPMRC via transportation command regulating and command
and control evacuation system (TRAC2ES) to submit patient movement requests for
inter-theater evacuation.
 The multiple roles of the PECC suggest the following staffing considerations:
‐ Staff for 24-hour operations and locate on the joint operations center (JOC) floor.
‐ Designate a PECC OIC and NCOIC.
‐ TF Aviation Liaison Officer (LNO)/NCO to coordinate for launch authority of urgent
MEDEVAC and intra-theater evacuation.
‐ Patient Administration Officer/NCO to request inter-theater evacuation with TPMRC.
‐ TF Medical Liaison Officer/NCO to coordinate the exact medical treatment facility that
will receive urgent MEDEVAC requests and intra-theater evacuations.
‐ A medical provider to ensure that all MEDEVAC requests are medically sound.

7.2 Health Diplomacy and ‘Soft Power.’ HS can be leveraged especially during Phase 0
shaping operations in support of broader TSC efforts. Coined “health diplomacy,” this ‘soft
power’ connotes medical capabilities that can be used in humanitarian and civic assistance
(HCA) efforts to help shape the future
environment, build partner nation
capacity, promote stability in key regions,
and assist in preventing future conflict or
violence. Health diplomacy can also be
leveraged to mitigate future A2AD
challenges by improving access to HNs
through HCA efforts. These efforts should
also be coordinated with interagency and
multinational partners as part of a broader
strategy to achieve national and strategic
objectives. JFC’s must avoid creating a
non-sustainable change in HN health care
that creates dependency on our shaping
efforts to deliver essential health care.

During an FHA operation, medical support may become the priority of effort for the JFC. Other
governmental and nongovernmental medical providers may support the relief operations, often
competing with the JFC for access and resources. JFC’s medical efforts expand the operational
reach within the JOA. They also incorporate the appropriate strategic messages and themes
during the initial phases of the operation to prepare the local population and other providers for
the eventual departure of military forces.

Insights:
 Health diplomacy is most effective when coordinated with other mission partners.

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 Recognize the potential impact providing medical care may have upon local and/or national
medical infrastructure.
 HS may be a line of operation or effort (LOO/LOE) during an FHA or DSCA mission.

Best Practices:
 Establish a medical synchronization board, with representation from key JLEnt partners, to
ensure vertical and horizontal communications across staffs and provide a venue to allow for
deconfliction of efforts and dissemination of information.
 Clearly define medical rules of engagement (MRoE) and HS transition criteria; leveraging
international and nongovernmental organizations’ expertise for medical transitions.
 Leverage health diplomacy efforts to support TSC efforts and effectively deliver themes and
messages that support the commander’s communication strategy.
 Incorporate HS into the campaign assessment and nonlethal integration process to better
direct resources to achieve operational objectives.

8.0 PERSONNEL SUPPORT. Human resources, financial management, and religious affairs
are functional areas within joint personnel support. These functions are executed, respectively,
by the J1 and J8 directorates, and HQ chaplain as a staff agency lead. The focus of this section is
narrow in scope and covers three critical activities executed under the purview of the J1: joint
manning document (JMD), personnel accountability, and casualty reporting.

8.1 Joint Manning Document. Once a mission is delineated via a SecDef order, the unit tasked
to form the core of the JTF HQ must identify its personnel requirements. One of the keys to
effectively transition a Service component organization from its routine Title 10-related missions
to that of a JTF HQ is the creation of a JMD that defines the JTF HQ’s overall manpower
requirements needed to complete its mission. These requirements are captured in a JMD to
ensure adequate manning levels and the proper mix of skilled military and civilian personnel.
The JMD is the tool to identify core staff, and to request joint individual augmentation (JIA) if
necessary. The JMD billets can be filled using multiple sourcing options to include existing staff
personnel, Service units, and other DOD entities. With proper coordination, it is possible to
leverage coalition, other government agencies, and contractors to fill capability gaps. A
formalized, structured JMD working group (JMDWG), within the boards, bureaus, centers, cells,
and working groups (B2C2WGs) construct, is the prescribed venue for JMD development. It is
used to confirm/validate JMD positions by skill, grade, and component. The draft JMD is
submitted to the establishing commander (usually the CCDR) for validation and approval. The
CCMD J1 will attempt to fill any remaining vacancies in JMD billets from within the CCMD
prior to requesting JS J1 for JIA support. The JMD is not a static document. Once approved and
sourced, the JMD can be utilized as a tool to track by-name arrivals and departures for each
position; determine/refine current and future manning requirements; and submit requests to HHQ
for changes based on approved additions, deletions, and modifications identified by the
JMDWG.

Insights:
 JMD development and management is an iterative process that warrants constant
command attention.

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  JMDs should be capabilities-based to allow the staff to effectively meet operational
requirements.
 JMD constructs must accurately reflect the actual needs of the commander; inflated
requirements call into question the veracity of the entire document.
 An evolving mission mandates an adaptive manning construct.
 LNO/interagency partners, internal and external to the organization, are a critical
component of a staff. Provide the most qualified personnel as liaisons to external
organizations.

Best Practices:
 The JMDWG is most effective when chaired by the chief of staff (COS). Identify the J1
and J3 as JMDWG co-chairs.
 Engage the staff to identify required capabilities during JMD development to establish a
credible/supportable document.
 Engage the Service components early and frequently during the JMD validation process
to improve fill rates.
 Include theater Service component manpower representatives in the JMDWG.
 Establish an iterative process through the JMDWG, ensuring the staff remains tailored
and capable to adapt to evolving mission phases, branches and sequels.

8.2 Personnel Accountability. The J1 has primary staff responsibility for personnel
accountability (and strength reporting). Accountability begins with arrival in the theater.
Accurate accountability enables leaders at all echelons to support the commander’s overall
concept of operations. Timely reporting allows the commander to make optimal force allocation
and employment decisions.

Joint strength reporting for the JFC is accomplished by combining daily Service component
strength reports into the joint personnel status and casualty report (JPERSTAT). JPERSTAT is
the prescribed method used to satisfy the commander’s information needs and to authenticate the
number of Total Force personnel physically present in a geographic CCDR’s AOR. The
JPERSTAT is divided into three sections: Personnel Strength, Casualty, and the Narrative. The
personnel strength number includes all U.S. forces physically present within a CCDR’s AOR;
the Casualty Section is a report of all
categories of personnel identified in the
Personnel Strength Section who have
become casualties since the last
JPERSTAT report; and, the Narrative
section is used to amplify data, raise
personnel issues, and explain changes or
discrepancies. The completed
JPERSTAT will be classified consistent
with the classification of the operation or
as directed by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or the authoritative
CCDR.

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As mentioned previously, accountability begins immediately upon arrival in theater. A
mechanism to account for personnel arrivals (to include civilians and U.S. contractors) is through
establishment of a joint personnel reception center (JPRC) which is a key component of joint
reception, staging, onward movement and integration (JRSOI) activities. One of the primary uses
of the JPRC is as a central entry point for in-processing. It should be established as early as
possible in an operation. In addition to accountability, the JPRC is an excellent venue to provide
mass briefings regarding rules of engagement, cultural concerns, and General Orders, and
information regarding billeting, training, and onward movement. Additionally, the JPRC is used
to out-process personnel upon their departure from the theater or the operational area.
As the number of contractors on the battlefield increases, accurately accounting for these
contractors (both U.S. and foreign national) presents a significant challenge. Processing these
personnel in and out of the AOR through the JPRC, or other personnel center designated by the
CCDR, can alleviate this issue. The synchronized predeployment and operational tracker (SPOT)
is the sole federal government database for tracking and accountability of contractor personnel;
its use is mandatory. SPOT delivers a standardized and collaborative method for the
management, tracking, and visibility of contractor personnel.

Insights:
 Personnel accountability (to include JRSOI) should be included in a JFC’s concept of
operations.
 Forces tasked with personnel accountability must be identified early and properly
sequenced in the force flow to allow immediate reception activities.
 Accurate accountability of contractors can impact planning and sustainment of the force.
Best Practices:
 Establish reporting instructions that identify mandatory entry points (ideally at a JPRC)
as well as theater-specific personnel requirements (medical records, orders, etc.).
 Identify staff responsibility for the oversight and monitoring of SPOT (JP 4-10 states that
the J1 is responsible for contractor accountability); know the SPOT use requirements and
system functionality.
8.3 Casualty Reporting. Per JP 1-0, “Casualty reporting requirements are based on CCDR
guidance to make the chain of command aware of status of forces and events under their
purview. Casualty operations are a Title 10, USC responsibility of the respective Services
(components). “Service casualty procedures remain relatively consistent across the range of
military operations.” The system for casualty reporting by the DOD is the defense casualty
information processing system (DCIPS). The lowest level unit with DCIPS capability will create
the casualty report. Timely and accurate reporting is critical since reporting facilitates time-
sensitive family notification. Typically, the Services perform the next of kin notification and the
J1 maintains accountability.
Insight:
 Properly maintaining accurate personnel accountability facilitates timely casualty reporting.
 Plan for redundant casualty reporting capabilities.
Best Practices:
 Link casualty reporting to significant events for commander update briefs.

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 Ensure the most current casualty information is presented at all commander update forums
(regardless of established reporting criteria).
 Reconcile casualty numbers between the J1, J3, and the Joint Force Surgeon’s office to
eliminate confusion.

9.0 SUPPORTING THE COMMANDER’S DECISION MAKING PROCESS.

9.1 The Sustainment Team Concept. Fostering a Sustainment team mindset on the staff
promotes planning and coordination
across the staff sections responsible for
Sustainment (e.g., J1, J4, J8, Surgeon, and
Chaplain).

Organization of sustainment functions at

the CCMD level varies. Although the
Engineer and Surgeon staff may be
consolidated in the J4, they are frequently
organized as a special staff section or in a
different J-code.

The Sustainment team concept is

employed through deliberate internal staff
synchronization meetings between the various directorates. Whether formal or informal, there
are clear benefits in a Sustainment team approach. Benefits include:
 Better synchronization and coordination of overlapping Sustainment functions.
 Provides consistent cross-functional inputs supporting operational planning and
execution.
 Facilitates information sharing while minimizing stovepiped efforts.
 Development of a comprehensive picture of Sustainment issues.

The Sustainment team concept is more a philosophy than a hard and fast set of business rules.
Sustainment team organization should be tailored to best support each mission. The key take
away is that staff sections routinely coordinate (sometimes virtually), at both the senior leader
and action officer level, to address Sustainment issues to support the mission.

Insights:
 Operating as a Sustainment team can promote comprehensive planning and concept of
support development.
 During a contingency, a Sustainment team approach can help synchronize cross-
functional/directorate requirements such as personnel rotation, JRSOI, resourcing, mortuary
affairs, casualty tracking and patient evacuation, transportation and lift, and key leader
engagement (KLE) requirements.

Best Practices:
 Include representatives from the J1, J8, Engineer and Surgeon’s staff in the Joint Logistics
Operations Center (JLOC) to facilitate daily coordination of sustainment efforts.

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 Include the J1, J8, Engineer, Surgeon, and Chaplain in the JLCB and leverage this decision
board to facilitate senior-level synchronization of sustainment efforts.
 Provide effective visualization of the Sustainment picture through the use of a dedicated
portal, electronic dashboard, or an integrated Common Operational Picture (COP) that can be
used for situational awareness.

9.2 Visualizing the Sustainment Picture. A critical aspect of informing the commander’s
decision cycle is the ability to help the commander and the staff visualize the sustainment picture
through the use of electronic visualization tools. Visualization can be provided via a variety of
information technology tools such as SharePoint portals, electronic dashboards, or a more
sophisticated portal or web-based COP. A Logistics COP (LOGCOP) can contain integrated
mapping and overlay features as well as an electronic library and can be used for both the staff’s
situational awareness as well as to brief the commander.

Insights:
 Emphasis should be on achieving a fully collaborative information sharing (vertically and
horizontally) environment.
 JLEnt partners will not always be able to share information since they often communicate on
different systems (e.g., a non-DOD network).
 Global Combat Support System – Joint (GCSS-J) is the current joint system of record for
LOGCOP. GCSS-J provides a global picture for logistics operations allowing for better
cross-CCMD synchronization of logistics.

Best Practices:
 When possible, avoid creating separate functional COPs in the same command. Integrate the
Sustainment picture with the operational COP.
 When possible, incorporate information feeds from the system(s) of record.
 Create backup plans in the event of cyber degradation.

9.3 Informing the Commander’s Decision Cycle. Synchronizing and integrating Sustainment
staff efforts are not only important to
ensure unity of effort and economy of
staff, but ultimately, to better inform the
commander’s decision cycle. The
Sustainment team must provide advice and
recommendations to the commander
concerning prioritization and allocation of
support in the theater. This demands that
the Sustainment team have a clear
understanding of the commander’s intent
and CONOPS and is able to anticipate the
basic mobilization, deployment,
employment, and sustainment
requirements of the plan. The Sustainment
team best supports the commander’s decision making process through integration in the
command’s battle rhythm across all three event horizons—current operations (CUOPs), future

14
operations (FUOPs), and future plans (FUPLANs). The Sustainment team must be able to
synchronize the joint logistics integrating tasks (i.e., Plan, Execute, Control, and Assess) with the
commander’s decision cycle activities (i.e., Design and Plan, Direct, Monitor, and Assess).
Sustainment planners and functional subject matter experts (SMEs) must stay engaged as plans
and planning products are developed and refined.

As plans transition to orders, the JLOC and joint deployment and distribution operations center
(JDDOC) are the fusion centers for logistics execution efforts on the staff and must stay closely
connected to the JOC and other external operations centers such as a TPMRC. The sustainment
staff sections will establish functional B2C2WGs and represent sustainment equities in other
command B2C2WGs. The primary logistics board for overall theater logistics synchronization is
the JLCB. Other supporting boards include the theater-joint transportation board (T-JTB) for
theater lift prioritization and allocation, the JCMEB for civil-military construction projects and
resources, and the joint requirements review board (JRRB) or combatant commander logistics
procurement support board (CLPSB) for theater contract support coordination. The Sustainment
staff should also have a presence in the JOC and participate in other command B2C2WGs—
providing staff estimates and supportability analyses throughout the planning process. At a
minimum, the Sustainment staff should actively participate in the following B2C2WGs:
targeting, interagency, assessments, KLE, as well as OPTs or joint planning groups (JPGs).

As campaign and operational assessment informs future design and planning, the Sustainment
team must be integrated into the command’s assessment process. In order to monitor the progress
or effectiveness of plans in execution, sustainment planners and functional SMEs must identify
expected outcomes from the concept of support that will be used to assess progress.

Insights:
 Synchronize sustainment staff efforts across all three event horizons (CUOPs, FUOPs, and
FUPLANs) to inform the commander’s decision cycle.
 Sustainment support, particularly when operating in remote or austere locations, often
requires significant lead time. Including the Sustainment team up front and early in the
design and planning phase enables them to anticipate requirements and help set conditions
for mission success.

Best Practices:
 Include a J3 representative in the T-JTB and the JLCB to ensure operational priorities are
communicated and understood by the Sustainment team.
 Include the correct sustainment SME(s) in appropriate command B2C2WGs (e.g., Joint
Targeting Working Group/Board, Interagency Working Group, KLE Working Group, Joint
Effects or Assessments Working Group/Board, etc.) to ensure staff products and analysis
incorporate sustainment considerations from the beginning.
 Establish Directorate Critical Information Requirements (DCIRs) to prioritize staff efforts
supporting sustainment decision making.
 Develop measures of effectiveness (MOEs) in coordination with the J3/5, components, and
subordinates and participate in the assessment process to ensure support adaptation based on
assessment of LOOs/LOEs.

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 Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms

A2AD – Anti-access, area denial FUOPS – Future Operations

ACSA – Acquisition and Cross-Servicing FUPLANS – Future Plans
Agreement GCC – Geographic combatant commander
AFCAP – Air Force Contract Augmentation GPMRC – Global Patient Movement
Program Requirements Center
AFCEE – Air Force Center for Engineering HCA – Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
and the Environment HHQ – Higher headquarters
AOR – Area of Responsibility HS – Health Service
B2C2WGs – Boards, Bureaus, Centers, IFAK – Improvised First Aid Kit
Cells and Working Groups IGO – Intergovernmental Organization
CASEVAC – Casualty evacuation ISAF – International Security Assistance
CCDR – Combatant Commander Force
CCJO – Capstone Concept for Joint ISSA – Inter-Service Support Agreement
Operations J1 – Manpower and Personnel Directorate of
CCMD – Combatant Command a Joint Staff
CJCS – Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff J3 – Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff
CLPSB – Combatant Commander Logistics J4 – Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff
Procurement Support Board J8 – Force Structure, Resource, and
COCOM – Combatant Command Authority Assessment Directorate of a Joint Staff
CONOPs – Concept of Operations JCASO – Joint Contingency Acquisition
CONPLAN – Concept Plan Support Office
COP – Common Operational Picture JCMEB – Joint Civil-Military Engineer
COS – Chief of Staff Board
CUOPS – Current Operations JDDOC – Joint Deployment and
CREST - Contingency Real Estate Teams Distribution Operations Center
DAFL – Directive Authority for Logistics JDEIS – Joint Doctrine, Education, and
DCG-S – Deputy Commanding General for Training Electronic Information System
Support JECC – Joint Enabling Capabilities
DCIPS – Defense Casualty Information Command
Processing System JENG – Joint Engineer
DCIR – Director’s Critical Information JFC – Joint Force Commander
Requirement JFEC - Joint Force Engineer Command
DCMA – Defense Contract Management JFS – Joint Force Surgeon
Agency JFUB – Joint Facilities Utilization Board
DLA – Defense Logistics Agency JIA – Joint Individual Augmentee
DOD – Department of Defense JLCB – Joint Logistics Coordination Board
DOS – Department of State JLEnt – Joint Logistics Enterprise
DSCA – Defense Support to Civil JLLIS – Joint Lessons Learned Information
Authorities System
DTD – Deployable Training Division JLOC – Joint Logistics Operations Center
EA – Executive Agency JMD – Joint Manning Document
EBS – Environmental Baseline Survey JMPAB – Joint Materiel Priorities and
e-JMAPS – Electronic Joint Manpower and Allocation Board
Personnel System JOA – Joint Operations Area
FHA – Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

GL-1
 Glossary
Abbreviations and Acronyms
JPERSTAT – Joint Personnel Status and TPMRC – Theater Patient Movement
Casualty Report Requirements Center
JPMRC – Joint Patient Movement TRAC2ES – Transportation command
Requirements Center regulating and command and control
JRC – Joint Reception Center evacuation system
JRSOI – Joint Reception, Staging, Onward TSC – Theater Security Cooperation
movement and Integration ULN – Unit Line Number
JTF – Joint Task Force USACE – U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
KLE – Key Leader Engagement USAID – U.S. Agency for International
LNO – Liaison Officer Development
LOE – Line of Effort USSTRATCOM – U.S. Strategic Command
LOGCAP – Army Logistic Civil USTRANSCOM – U.S. Transportation
Augmentation Program Command
LOGCOP – Logistics Common Operational WRM – War Reserve Materiel
Picture
LOO – Line of Operation
MEDEVAC – Medical evacuation
MILCON – Military Construction
MOE – Measure of Effectiveness
NAVFAC – Naval Facilities Engineer
Command
NGO – Nongovernmental Organization
NMCB – Naval Mobile Construction
Battalion
OCS – Operational Contract Support
OFDA – Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance
OPCON – Operational Control
OPLAN – Operations Plan
PECC – Patient Evacuation Coordination
Center
PRIMEBEEF – U.S. Air Force Prime Base
Engineer Emergency Force
PVO – Private Volunteer Organization
R-A-T-E – Refine, Adapt, Terminate,
Execute
SecDef – Secretary of Defense
SG – Surgeon
SITREP – Situation report
SME – Subject Matter Expert
SPOT – Synchronized Pre-Deployment
Operational Tracker
TFPDD – Time-Phased Force and
Deployment Data
T-JTB – Theater-Joint Transportation Board

GL-2