The Effect of Good Corporate Governance (GCG),

Temporary Syirkah Funds, and Profitability on the

Performance of the Maqasid of Sharia Commercial Banks in
Indonesia
Iftikar Arif Yuri1, Annisaa Rahman2, Amy Fontanela3, dan Syamsurizal4
1
Mahasiswa Fakultas Ekonomi, Jurusan Akuntansi Universitas Andalas
2
Fakultas Ekonomi, Jurusan Akuntansi Universitas Andalas
3
Jurusan Akuntansi Politeknik Negeri Padang
4
Fakultas Syariah dan Hukum, UIN Sultan Syarif Kasim Riau

E-mail: arifyuri@gmail.com1 , annisaa.rahman@gmail.com2, amyfontanella@pnp.ac.id3,

syamsurizal@uin-suska.ac.id4

Abstract This study aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance, temporary syirkah
funds and profitability to the performance of maqasid sharia that occurs in Islamic banks
registered as sharia commercial banks within a period of five years with purposive
sampling method. Maqasid shari'a is everything that Allah and His Prophet has set for
the benefit as a whole, that is to preserve existence, to bear both the quality and the
quantity, both material and spiritual. The general purpose of enforcing the Sharia is to
prosper life on earth, maintain order in it, always maintain the stability of the natural
welfare with the responsibility of human beings create a healthy environment, fair and
actions that can benefit the entire layer of the earth's inhabitants. Statistical analysis used
in this research is descriptive statistical analysis and by using multiple linear regression
model. The results showed that temporary syirkah funds had an effect on the
performance of maqasid sharia. While Good Corporate Governance (independent board
of commissioners, syariah supervisory board, DPS positions, audit committee), and
profitability do not affect the performance of maqasid sharia.

Keywords Good Corporate Governance, independent board of commissioner, syariah supervisory

board, DPS positions, audit committee, temporary syirkah fund, profitability, maqasid
sharia.

INTRODUCTION
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 The development (performance) of Islamic banks, which is only assessed by the growth of
assets and market share, makes it no different from conventional banks as profit-oriented
organizations (Reni, Muklis and Cholisni 2014). According to Mohammed, Razak and Taib (2008),
the purpose of Islamic banks would be appropriate if they were derived from maqasid Sharia (sharia
objectives). Performance assessment of Islamic banks is assessed by profitability and compliance
with Islamic Sharia (Reni, Muklis and Cholisni 2014). The operation of Islamic banks must be under
Islamic Sharia, where Islamic Sharia has sharia objectives (maqasid syariah) so that the purposes of
Islamic banks will be proper if it is derived from maqasid Sharia, therefore performance measurement
to determine its achievement towards goals will be appropriate if the measurement is based on
maqasid Sharia.
So far, in research on the performance of a sharia bank, most of them use the same measuring
instruments as conventional banks. This study using a performance measurement tool for Islamic
maqasid. Maqasid Sharia is understood as the ultimate goal of Sharia that leads to the values of
welfare and benefits and eliminates suffering (Widdy, 2015). Measurement of the performance of the
Islamic Maqasid is a model for measuring the performance of Islamic banking according to the
objectives and characteristics of Islamic banking. This is developed into three main factors. Namely,
education, the creation of justice and the achievement of prosperity, where these three factors are
universal.
Temporary syirkah funds are an input for the operations of a sharia bank which the sharia bank
must then manage as a party given the mandate following Islamic sharia principles. According to the
theory of stewardship, a bank is a servant who will carry out the customer's mandate, so that the
operation of temporary syirkah funds will be following Islamic sharia principles and the provisions
that have been made with the customer. Mutiara's research (2016) found that temporary syirkah funds
significantly negatively affect financing risk. Meanwhile, the Uswatun Khasanah research (2012)
found that temporary syirkah funds significantly positively affect profitability. Moreover, Muamar's
research (2014) found that temporary syirkah funds positively affect sharia maqasid.
Profitability is the company's ability to generate profits or the company's capabilities from the
various resources used in operational activities. Meanwhile, according to Mamduh Hanafi and Halim
(2008), the ratio profitability measures the company's ability to generate profits (profitability) at the
level of sales, specific assets, and share capital. Several studies related to profitability, such as
research by Bayu (2013), found that profitability harmed company leverage. Then in Nico's research
(2012) found that profitability positively affects corporate social responsibility.
According to agency theory, the explanation of the mudharabah and musyarakah contracts
above shows a separation between the fund owner and the fund manager (Bank). In other words, the
owner of the funds entrusts their funds to an Islamic bank for management of these funds. The
separation of fund owners and management (banks) in accounting is often referred to as agency
theory. This separation results in more access to Islamic banks to manage funds belonging to
customers themselves. Islamic banks know more about the management of these funds than
customers. This is what is often referred to as asymmetric information. The existence of this
asymmetric information allows agency problems to arise. The possibility of agency problems raises
the need for good corporate governance.
In connection with the possibility of agency problems where the Bank does not carry out its
business operations that are not under Islamic Sharia, mechanism was formed corporate governance
with the formation of the Sharia Supervisory Board (DPS). The sharia supervisory board is tasked
with encouraging banks to always comply with Islamic Sharia and ensure that no bank operations
violate Islamic Sharia.

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 Several studies related to corporate governance related to bank performance can be found in
several previous studies. Research by Syam and Najda (2012) examined the quality of good corporate
governance in Islamic Commercial Banks as measured by indicators set by Indonesian Islamic banks,
found that the quality of good corporate governance did not affect the performance of Islamic banks
measured by ROA. Research by Muttakin and Ullah (2012) and Hoque, Islam and Ahmed (2012)
found that the number of directors and the number of audit committee meetings positively affect ROA.
Al-Baidhani's (2013) study, which measures bank performance using ROE, ROA and profit margin
in conventional banks and Islamic Islamic banks in Yemen, found that the number of audit committee
members has a significant positive effect on ROE. However, the number of audit committee meetings
does not affect ROE.
Some of the previous studies that have been described above, both Islamic banks and
conventional banks, mostly use performance measures in the form of ROA, ROE, profit margin or
Tobin's-Q, which means that previous researchers did not differentiate performance measures
between Islamic banks and conventional banks. This study will focus on measuring the performance
of Islamic commercial banks, which measures performance not only by a measure of profitability but
also by the performance of the maqasid of Islamic banks developed by Mohammed, Razak and Taib
(2008).

LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Agency Theory
According to Imanta (2011), agency theory assumes that every individual in the company only
acts based on their respective interests. Shareholders as principal are assumed to be only interested
in the maximum possible return on their investment, one of which is reflected in the increase in the
dividend portion of each share owned. Meanwhile, agents are assumed to be motivated to increase
incentives or compensation obtained from each ability that has been issued.
Agency theory requires a separation between principal and agent; this triggers asymmetric
information where agents have better information about the organization than the principal. This is
due to differences in the information held between managers and shareholders. The existence of
asymmetric information can lead to agency problems in moral hazard and adverse selection.
According to Smith (2011) in Fatmawati (2013), there are two types of conflicts of interest,
namely:
1. Moral hazard.
Actions of agents that are not ethical and selfish are usually not known by the principal. In
addition, the agency contract is based on imperfections. Namely, the principal does not know
the details of the company information relating to the agent's actions.
2. Adverse selection
Agents have complete information when the contract with the principal has not been made (pre-
contracting private information). Complete information is only disclosed after the contract is
executed before a decision is made (superior post contracting but pre-decision private
information). The principal cannot control whether the agent acts in the interests of the principal
or the interests of the agent itself.

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B. Stewardship Theory
According to Rashidpour and Mazaheri (2013) states that in contrast to agency theory which
views managers as motivated by personal goals, especially those related to economic factors,
stewardship theory views managers, in carrying out their duties and functions, motivated to serve
organizational needs and devote himself for the achievement of the organization's goals. Although
no one can determine which theory is better between the two, there is one thing that is important to
note regarding these two approaches, namely that managers and workers must be seen from the right
direction, whether they are motivated for the achievement of personal goals or are they motivated. to
serve the goals of the organization.

C. Good Corporate Governance (GCG)

According to Eviannisa (2014), Good Corporate Governance is a set of regulations governing

the relationship between shareholders, company managers, creditors, government, employees, and
other internal and external stakeholders relating to their rights and obligations. Corporate governance
is a process and structure that is implemented in running a company, with the primary objective of
increasing shareholder value in the long term while still paying attention to the interests of other
stakeholders.

● Independent Board of Commissioners

According to Sari (2012), Independent Commissioners are commissioners who have no
affiliation with other commissioners, board of directors, and controlling shareholders. The
number of independent commissioners is proportional to the number of shares owned by non-
controlling shareholders. The stipulation is that the number of independent commissioners
must be at least 30% of all commissioners. An independent commissioner can also double as
chairman of the audit committee.
● Sharia Supervisory Board
Totok(2015: 212) states that, in general, the Sharia Supervisory Board is a board tasked with
providing advice and advice to the board of directors and supervising bank activities to
comply with sharia principles. A further definition is that DPS is a board that is independent,
formed by the National Sharia Board and placed in a bank that conducts business activities
based on sharia principles, with duties regulated by the National Sharia Board
● Audit Committee
in Article 1 number 1 of the Financial Services Authority Regulation Number 55 / POJK.04
/ 2015 of 2015 concerning the Establishment and Guidelines for the Work Implementation of
the Audit Committee ("OJK Regulation 55/2015"), the Audit Committee is a committee
formed and responsible to the Board of Commissioners in helping carry out the duties and
functions of the Board of Commissioners. The Audit Committee consists of at least 3 (three)
members from Independent Commissioners and Parties from outside the Issuer or Public
Company. An Independent Commissioner chairs the Audit Committee. The Audit Committee
acts independently in carrying out its duties and responsibilities.

D. Temporary Syirkah Funds Temporary

Page | 21
 syirkah funds are funds received as investments for a certain period from individuals and other
parties where the Bank has the right to manage and invest these funds by sharing the investment
returns based on an agreement (Martani, 2015).
An example of a temporary syirkah fund is the receipt of funds from an investment of
mudharabah muthlaqah, mudharabah muqayyadah, musyarakah, and other similar accounts. The
relationship between the Bank and the fund owner is a partnership relationship based on the
mudharabah muthlaqah, mudharabah muqayyadah or musyarakah agreement. The Bank has the right
to manage and invest funds received with or without restrictions such as the place, method, or object
of investment.

E. Profitability

Profitability is used to measure management effectiveness based on the profits from the use of
company finances (Agustin, 2014). This ratio is preferred by shareholders and company management
as an investment decision tool, whether this business investment will be developed, maintained and
so on. The measurement of a company's profitability shows the level of management effectiveness
as a whole and indirectly. Long-term investors will be very interested in this analysis.

F. Maqasid Sharia
Maqashid Sharia is defined as the purpose of Islamic law's existence for the good and welfare
(maslahah) of humanity in the world and the hereafter (Nurhayati et al., 2013). According to Mingka
(2014), Maqashid Sharia means the objectives of Sharia which are used to realize the benefit of
humanity in the world and the hereafter.
The development of Islamic Maqasid developed by Mohammed, Razak and Taib (2008),
namely:
Table 2.1
Operationalization of Islamic Maqasid
Concept Weight Dimension Element Performance Ratio Score
(objective) ed (Element) Weight
Value
1. Individual 30 D1. Increase E1. R1. Education Grants / Total 24
Education Knowledge Education Costs
Grants

E2. Research R2. Research Cost / Total Cost 27

D2. Added and E3.training R3. Training Costs / Total Costs 26

upgraded new
abilities

D3. Creating E4. Publicity R4. Publicity Costs / Total Costs 23

Public
Awareness of
the Existence of
Islamic Banks

Page | 22
 Total 100
2. Achieving 41 D4. Fair E5. Fair R5. Profit Equalization Reserve 30
Justice Contract Return (PER) / Total Income

D5. Affordable E6. R6. Mudharabah + Musharaka 32

Products & Functional Financing / Total Financing
Services Distribution

D6. Elimination E7. Non- R7. Non Interest Income / Total 38

of Injustice Interest Bank Income
Products

Total 100
3. Public 29 D7. E8. Profit R8. Net income / total assets 33
Interest Profitability Ratio
D8. E9. R9. Zakat / net profit 30
Distribution of Individual
Income and Income
Welfare
D9. E10. R10. Total real sector 37
Investments in Investment investment / total investment.
the Real ratio in the
Sector real sector
100 Total 100
Source: Mohammed & Taib (2008)

Stages of Measuring the Performance of Maqasid Syariah in banking, namely:

a) Determining the performance ratio to be used based on data availability. This study uses ten
financial ratios, namely:
1) Education Grants / Total Costs (R1)
2) Research Costs / Total Costs (R2)
3) Training Costs / Total Costs (R3)
4) Publicity Costs / Total Costs (R4)
5) Profit Equalization Reserve (PER) / Total Income (R5)
6) Mudharabah Financing + Musharaka / Total Financing (R6)
7) Non Interest Income / Total Income (R7)
8) Net Profit / total assets (R8)
9) Zakat / net profit (R9)
10) Total real sector investment / total investment (R10)

b) The next stage is to perform the multiplication operation between the dimensions and the
performance ratio with each weight. Mathematically it can be explained in the following model:

1) First Maqasid (Educating Individuals):

PI (O1) = W11(E11 x R11 + E21 x R21 + E31 x R31 + E41 x R41)
Where:
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 PI (O1): Performance indicator for the Maqasid, first namely educating individuals
W11: Weight O1 (First Maqasid)
E11: weight of the first element O1
E21: weight of the second element O1
E31: weight of the third element O1
E41: weight of the fourth element O1
R11: ratio of the first element O1
R21: ratio of the second element O1
R31: the ratio of the third element O1
R41: the ratio of the fourth element O1

2) Second Maqasid (Creating Justice)

PI (O2) = W22(E12 x R12 + E22 x R22 + E32 x R32)
Where :
PI (O2): Performance indicator for the Maqasid second, namely realizing justice
W22: Weight O2 (Second Maqasid)
E12: weight of the first element O2
E22: weight of the second element O2
E32: weight of the third element O2
R12: ratio of the first element O2
R22: ratio of the second element O2
R32: ratio of element Third O2

3) Third Maqasid (Public Interest)

PI (O3) = W33(E13 x R13 + E23 x R23 + E33 x R33)
Where:
PI (O3): Performance indicator for the Maqasid second, namely Public interest
W33: Weight O3 (Third Maqasid)
E13: weight of the first element O3
E23: weight of the second element O3
E33: weight of the third element O3
R13: ratio of the first element O3
R23: ratio of the second element O3
R33: ratio of element third O3

c) Determining the index Sharia Maqasid (IMS)

TheIndex Sharia Maqasid for each Islamic Bank is the total of all the performance indicators
of the three objectives of the Islamic maqasid which can be formulated as follows:
IMS = PI (O1) + PI (O2) + PI (O3 )
In other words, the Islamic maqasid index for each Islamic Bank is the number of indicators
of Islamic maqasid objective 1, objective 2, and objective 3.

G. Research Hypothesis

H1: It is suspected that the number of members of the Independent board of commissioners
positively affects Islamic Maqasid.
H2: Suspected total membership of sharia supervisory board has a positive effect on the
Page | 24
 performance of Maqasid Sharia Islamic banks
H3: Suspected number of audit committee members have a positive influence on the performance
of Maqasid Sharia Islamic banks
H4: Suspected double post sharia supervisory board negatively affect the performance of
Maqasid Sharia Islamic banks
H5: Suspected the level of funding temporary syirkah positive effect on the performance of
maqasid Sharia Islamic banks
H6: Suspected profitability positive effect on performance maqasid Sharia Islamic Bank

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. Design and Research Methodology

This research type is quantitative research to get the data and information that the authors
obtained from several Islamic Commercial Banks listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2012-
2016. The data analysis methodology of this study uses multiple regression tests by testing hypotheses
to find and identify the influence between multiple variables or between the independent variable and
the dependent variable. This study tests the classical assumptions (Normality, Multicollinearity,
Autocorrelation and Heterosadasticity) and features simultaneous testing and adjusted determinant
coefficients.
. To predict the effect of the six variables independent of the dependent variable it can be used
multiple linear regression equation as follows:
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6

Description:
Y = Performance of Islamic Maqasid
X1 = Independent Commissioner
X2 = Sharia Supervisory Board
X3 = Audit Committee
X4 = Concurrent position of the Sharia Supervisory Board
X5 = Temporary Syirkah funds
X6 = Profitability
a = Constant
b = Regression Coefficient of

B. Research Object This

type of research is secondary research, so the sample in this study is the sampling technique in
this study using purposive sampling, namely selecting samples using specific considerations or
criteria. The criteria used to determine the sample in this study are as follows:
1. Sharia banking is registered as a Sharia Commercial Bank
2. Publish annual reports and financial reports between 2012 - 2016
3. Publish good corporate governance reports between 2012 - 2016.

Table 1. List of Sharia Commercial Banks for 2012-2016

No Bank Syariah
1 Bank BRI Syariah
2 Bank BNI Syariah

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 3 Bank Syariah Mandiri
4 Bank Muamalat Indonesia
5 Bank BCA Syariah
6 Bank Panin Syariah
7 Bank Mega Syariah
8 Bank Victoria Syariah
9 Bank Syariah Bukopin
10 Maybank Syariah Indonesia
11 Bank Jabar Banten Syariah
Source: Financial Services Authority, 2016

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. Descriptive Statistics Processing Results in Descriptive statistics

used in this study indicate the minimum, maximum, average, and standard deviation values.
The variables used in this study include the dependent variable (Y), namely the maqasid syariah and
the independent variable (X), namely the independent board of commissioners, the sharia supervisory
board, concurrent positions of the sharia supervisory board, the audit committee, temporary syirkah
funds and profitability. The results of the descriptive testing of these variables are as shown in table
2 below:

Table 4.1 above shows that the number of observations (N) is 55. From all observations made
on the existing sample, the smallest value of the Independent Board of Commissioners is 0.50. , the
most significant value is as much as 1.00, with an average value of 0.6955 and a standard deviation
of 0.13753. For the Sharia Supervisory Board variable, the smallest value was 2.00, the most
significant value was 3.00 with an average value of 2.2727, and a standard deviation of 0.44947. For
the audit committee variable, the smallest value was 2.00, the most significant value was 9.00, with
an average value of 3.6128 and a standard deviation of 1.23964.

B. Classical Assumption Test Results

After testing the classical assumptions, the data that has been collected has fulfilled the classical
assumption test. Starting from the normality test, multicollinearity test, autocorrelation test, to
heteroscedasticity test. One example is the normality test in the following figures and tables:

Figure 1
Normality Test Results using a Histogram Graph

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 Figure 2
Data Normality Test Results Using the Normalchart P-Plot

Based on Figure 1 above, it can be seen that the histogram graph forms a bell and is not skewed
right or left. Thus, it can be concluded that the normality test with histogram graphs usually is
distributed, and the regression model has met the normality assumption.
Furthermore, Figure 2 above shows that the data spread around the diagonal line and follows
the direction of the line. So it can be concluded that the data has been normally distributed, and the
regression model has met the assumption of normality.
To provide more convincing data normality test results, the normality test was also carried out
by Kolmogorov-Smirnov. The following shows the results of the data normality test using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.

Table 3

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 Results of Normality Test with Kolmogorov-Smirnov
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test

Unstandardized Residual
N 55
Mean .0000000
Normal
Std. 278.30124534
Parameters, b
Deviation
Absolute .086
Most Extreme
Positive .068
Differences
Negative -.086
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .640
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .807
a. Test distribution is Normal.
Source: (Processed data, 2018)

C. Hypothesis Test Results

Table 4
Partial Hypothesis Results Test

Coefficients
Model Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
-594,500 1542,346 -, 385 .70
(Constant)
2
Independent -81,904 366,389 -, 036 -, 224 .82
Commissioner Board 4
-250,273 148,707 -.359 - .09
Sharia Supervisory
1,68 9
Board
1 3
-39,415 45,602 -.156 - .86
Audit Committee
.392 4
-130 673 189 891 -.109 - .49
positions
.688 5
143 641 56 519 .623 2,54 .01
Temporary Syirkah Fund
1 4

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 4828 12 323 .055 .392 .69
Profitability
7
a. Dependent Variable: Sharia Maqasid
Source: (Data Processing, 2018)

After To test the hypothesis, the following results were obtained:

a. The results of the first hypothesis testing showed a statistical value for the Independent
Commissioner (Sig. 0.0824> 0.05), which means that the independent board of commissioners
variable did not have a significant effect on the Maqasid Syariah variable. Based on these
results, it can be concluded that the first hypothesis is rejected. The possibility of this
happened because the company chose the position of an independent commissioner to someone
not based on competence and professionalism. According to Wantoro (2015), the election of
the board of commissioners in Indonesia does not consider the integrity and competence of the
person, so that the monitoring function of the board of directors' policies does not work well.
b. The result of testing the second hypothesis shows that the statistical value of the sharia
supervisory board is (Sig. 0.099> 0.05), which means that the sharia supervisory board variable
does not have a significant effect on the variable of Islamic Maqasid. Based on these results, it
can be concluded that the second hypothesis is rejected. Based on research by Bank Indonesia
in collaboration with Ernst and Young (2008), it is concluded that the role of SSB is not yet
optimal. The breach of sharia compliance due to weak supervision by SSB has an impact on
risk management and reputation risk, which in turn impacts liquidity risk and other risks.
c. Testing the third hypothesis shows that the audit committee's statistical value is (Sig. 0.392>
0.05), which means that the audit committee variable does not significantly affect the Islamic
Maqasid variable. Based on these results, it can be concluded that the third hypothesis is
rejected. This is because the existence of the audit committee is only limited to compliance
with regulations, but not accompanied by effective performance, which causes the audit
committee responsible for overseeing financial reports, supervising external audits and
observing that the internal control system is not running optimally (Wantoro, 2015).
d. Testing the fourth hypothesis shows the statistical value of the dual position of the sharia
supervisory board (Sig. 0.495> 0.05), which means that the dual position of the sharia
supervisory board does not significantly affect the Islamic Maqasid variable. Based on these
results, it can be concluded that the fourth hypothesis is rejected. In other words, the quality
of supervision of the sharia supervisory board that performs multiple positions and those who
do not have multiple positions has the same quality level of supervision. The sharia supervisory
board, which has concurrently held positions, shows its expertise in conducting sharia
supervision, but its expertise must be divided into several banks.
e. Testing the fifth hypothesis shows that the statistical value of temporary syirkah funds is (Sig.
0.014 <0.05), which means that the temporary syirkah funds variable significantly affects the
Maqasid Syariah variable. Based on these results, it can be concluded that the fifth hypothesis
is accepted. This shows that the higher the temporary syirkah funds, the higher the Islamic
banking maqasid from Islamic banks. Based on the stewardship theory, when there are many
temporary syirkah funds entrusted, there will be more funds that the manager can manage, and
the manager will manage the funds entirely for the common interest by the mandate of the fund
owner.
f. The results of testing the sixth hypothesis show a statistical value of profitability (Sig. 0.695>
0.05), which means that the profitability variable does not have a significant effect on the
Page | 29
 Islamic Maqasid variable. Based on these results, it can be concluded that the sixth hypothesis
is rejected. This means that profitability does not affect the performance of maqasid Sharia.
Which for Islamic banks based on stewardship theory, Islamic banks do not only act in the
interests of the owner of the funds and are not motivated by individual goals. Which
profit/profit does not make the company's primary goal in carrying out its activities.

CONCLUSION

This research aims to provide empirical evidence regarding the Independent Commissioner,
Sharia Supervisory Board, Audit Committee, concurrent positions of the Sharia Supervisory Board,
Temporary Syirkah Funds, and Profitability. This study uses a sample of Islamic Commercial Banks
for five consecutive years from 2012 to 2016.
Based on the results of partial statistical testing of the above variables on the performance of
Islamic Maqasid in Islamic Commercial Banks tested using multiple regression analysis, the
following conclusions can be drawn :
1. The Independent Commissioner Board factor does not affect the performance of Maqasid
Syariah in Islamic Commercial Banks in 2012-2016.
2. The Sharia Supervisory Board factor did not affect Islamic Maqasid in Islamic Commercial
Banks in 2012-2016.
3. Audit Committee factors did not affect Islamic Maqasid in Islamic Commercial Banks in
2012-2016.
4. Multiple Factors of Sharia Supervisory Board Position do not affect the performance of
Maqasid Sharia in Islamic Commercial Banks in 2012-2016.
5. The Temporary Syirkah Fund factor affects the performance of Maqasid Syariah in Islamic
Commercial Banks in 2012-2016.
6. The profitability factor did not affect Islamic Maqasid in Islamic Commercial Banks in 2012-
2016.

The suggestions that the author can give based on the results of the tests that the author has
done include:
1. Further research should use the measurement of corporate governance to a more
comprehensive.
2. Future research should be able to develop this research using other measurement
measurements such as NIM, BOPO, ROE, and so on.

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