SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC.

& MARLOWE
NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19,
1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of
US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver on their
promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second
Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19,
1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had
served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired
portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the
NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC
on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple
Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal
dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.

Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries
for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the
subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate;
however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8042, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas

employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,
the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
 Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum
salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three
months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in

addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire
nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate
of US$2,590.00

Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the
entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for
a period of three months?
2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that
have been stipulated into his contract?

Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 is declared unconstitutional.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term
employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation
of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one
year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their
money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on
local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect

classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term
employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none
on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The
subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage.
 The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to
substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits,
without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being
unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior
to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave
pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides
a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic
wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is
compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday
pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.

By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion
of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless
there is evidence that he performed work during those periods.
PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC., petitioner, vs. ARMANDO A.
VINUYA, et al, respondents. G.R. No. 197528. September 5, 2012.

BRION, J
FACTS: On March 5, 2008, respondent Vinuya et al. filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the petitioner Pert/CPM and its President with labor arbiter
alleging among others that the agency deployed them to work as aluminium
fabricator/installer for the agency’s principal, Modern Metal in Dubai, United Arab
Emirates for a two-year employment whose contracts were approved by the
POEA providing for nine-hours working day, salary of 1,350 AED with overtime
pay, food allowance, free and suitable housing (four to a room), free
transportation, free laundry and free medical and dental services. However, on
April 2, 2007, Modern Metal gave respondents, except Era, appointment letters
different from that of originally signed, increasing their employment terms and
reducing their salaries and allowances and removing certain benefits. Further,
the working conditions were not as promised and they repeatedly complained
with their agency about their predicament but to no avail. Respondents resigned
from their job citing personal/family problems for their resignation except for Era
who mentioned the real reason which is due to the company policy. After several
weeks, petitioner repatriated the respondent to the Philippines who shouldered
their own airfare except for Ordovez and Enjambre. The agency countered that
the respondents were not illegally dismissed alleging that the respondents
voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a better paying job. The
agency furthered alleged that the respondents even voluntarily signed affidavits
of quitclaim and release. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint finding that the
respondent voluntarily resigned from their job. Respondent appealed to the
NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and found that the
respondents were illegally dismissed. NLRC also pointed out that the signing of a
different employment contract in Dubai is illegal. Consequently NLRC ordered
the agency and the principal to pay, jointly and severally the respondents salary,
placement fee, and exemplary damages. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC but modified their judgment
adjusting the awards particularly the payment of their salaries in the light of the
Court’s ruling in Serrano striking down the clause in Section 10, paragraph 5 of
the RA 8042 which limits the entitlement of illegally dismissed OFW. The agency
again moved for reconsideration reiterating its earlier argument and questioned
the applicability of the Serrano ruling because it is not yet final and effective but
was denied by the NLRC. Petitioner appealed with CA which upheld the decision
of the NLRC finding the resignation letter as dubious.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Serrano ruling which declared the subject Section 10
of RA 8042 unconstitutional can be given retroactive application in the present
case Whether or not RA 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010 restoring
the subject clause in Section 10 of RA 8042 being amendatory in nature can be
applied retroactively
RULING: The SC held that the Serrano ruling can be given retroactive
application as resolved in Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship’s Management in the interest
of equity and that the Serrano ruling is an exemption to the doctrine of operative
fact. Moreover, the SC held that the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022
cannot be given retroactive effect not only because there is no express
declaration of retroactivity of the law, but because the retroactive application will
result in an impairment of right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of
the Serrano Ruling. The SC reiterated that all statutes are to be construed as
having only a prospective application, unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them retrospective effect are expressly declared or are
necessarily implied from the language used.

HELD: The petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution were
AFFIRMED.
CREWLINK v. TERINGTERING
Respondent Editha Teringtering, spouse of the deceased Jacinto Teringtering,
and in behalf of her minor child filed a complaint against Crewlink for the
payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child, burial assistance, damages
and attorney’s fees.
Editha alleged that her husband entered into an overseas employment contract
with Crewlink – he took a medical exam and was declared fit to work. On April 9,
2001 Jacinto died due to drowning. Editha claimed for compensation but was
denied by Crewlink. She claimed that in order for her to get compensation it is
enough that Jacinto died during the term of his contract and while still on board.
She asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or mood
disorder bipolar type. She further alleged that the death was not deliberate and of
his own will but as a result of a mental disorder.
Crewlink alleged that Jacinto jumped off the ship twice. He was saved the first
time and someone was assigned to watch over him. He jumped off a second time
and was no longer saved. Crewlink asserted that Editha was not entitled to the
benefits because Jacinto committed suicide.

ISSUE: WON Jacinto was insane.

In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death
was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the sea.
Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare allegation that her husband was
suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical report was
given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does not even show
when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or family
problems may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to
mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a
condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man
would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing
the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be insane, or
who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the
witness’ own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to support respondent's claim.
People of the Philippines (petitioner) v Jamilosa (repondent)
GR No. 169076 January 23, 2007
Callejo, Sr.,:

FACTS:
Sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, representing to have
the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or transport
workers for overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally recruit, contract and promise to deploy, for a fee the herein
complainants, namely, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E.
Singh, for work or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing
Home and Care Center.
Prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Imelda Bamba, Geraldine
Lagman and Alma Singh.
According to Bamba, she met the appellant on a bus. She was on her way
to SM North Edsa where she was a company nurse. Appellant introduced
himself as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad. Appellant told her he
could help her get employed as nurse. Appellant gave his pager number and
instructed her to contact him is she’s interested. Sometime in January 1996,
appellant fetched her at her office, went to her house and gave him the
necessary documents and handed to appellant the amount of US$300.00 and
the latter showed her a photocopy of her supposed US visa. However, the
appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money. Thereafter, appellant told her
to resign from her work because she was booked with Northwest Airlines and to
leave for USA on Feb, 1996. On the scheduled departure, appellant failed to
show up. Instead, called and informed her that he failed to give the passport and
US visa because she had to go to province because his wife died. Trying to
contact him to the supposed residence and hotel where he temporarily resided,
but to no avail.
Winess Lagman testified that she is a registered nurse. In January 1996,
she went to SM North Edsa to visit her cousin Bamba. At that time Bamba
informed her that she was going to meet to appellant. Bamba invited Lagman to
go with her. The appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad. On
their next meeting, Lagman handed to the latter the necessary documents and
an amount of US$300.00 and 2 bottles of black label without any receipt issued
by the appellant. Four days after their meeting, a telephone company called her
because her number was appearing in appellants cell phone documents. The
caller is trying to locate him as he was a swindler. She became suspicious and
told Bamba about the matter. One week before her scheduled flight, appellant
told her he could not meet them because his mother passed away.
Lastly, Alma Singh, who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first
met the appellant at SM North Edsa when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to
her. Appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of FBI and he could fix her
US visa. On their next meeting, she gave all the pertinent documents. Thereafter,
she gave P10,000 to the appellant covering half price of her plane ticket. They
paged the appellant through his beeper to set up another appointment but the
appellant avoided them as he had many things to do.
The accused Jamilosa testified on direct examination that he never told
Bamba that he could get her a job in USA, the truth being that she wanted to
leave SM as company nurse because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba
called him several times, seeking advices from him. He started courting Bamba
and went out dating until latter became his girlfriend. He met Lagman and Singh
thru Bamba. As complainants seeking advice on how to apply for jobs abroad,
lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Bamba, Lagman and Singh sign
separate certifications, all to effect that he never recruited them and no money
was involved. Bamba filed an illegal recruitment case against him because they
quarreled and separated.
RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment in large scale.

ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale

HELD:
“Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or
not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. Provided,
That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
so engaged.
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to
prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a
recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34
of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused
committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group. As
gleaned from the collective testimonies of the complaining witnesses which the
trial court and the appellate court found to be credible and deserving of full
probative weight, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to
prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
Indeed, the findings of the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are
conclusive on this Court absent evidence that the tribunals ignored,
misunderstood, or misapplied substantial fact or other circumstance.
 The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document
signed by appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and liquor
does not free him from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money or other
valuables given as consideration for the "services" of appellant, the latter is
considered as being engaged in recruitment activities.
It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that the
act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused
promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal
recruitment.
SANTOSA B. DATUMAN, petitioner,
vs.
FIRST COSMOPOLITAN MANPOWER AND PROMOTION SERVICES,
INC., respondent.

November 14, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in 1989, respondent First Cosmopolitan Manpower & Promotion

Services, Inc. recruited petitioner Santosa B. Datuman to work in Bahrain as
Saleslady for 1 year for $370.

On April 17, 1989, petitioner was deployed to Bahrain after paying the required
placement fee. However, her employer Mohammed Hussain took her passport
when she arrived there; and instead of working as a saleslady, she was forced to
work as a domestic helper with a salary of Forty Bahrain Dinar (BD40.00),
equivalent only to One Hundred US Dollars (US$100.00). This was contrary to
the agreed salary of US$370.00 indicated in her Contract of Employment signed
in the Philippines and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).3

On September 1, 1989, her employer compelled her to sign another contract,

transferring her to another employer as housemaid with a salary of BD40.00 for
the duration of two (2) years.4 She pleaded with him to give her a release paper
and to return her passport but her pleas were unheeded. Left with no choice, she
continued working against her will. Worse, she even worked without
compensation from September 1991 to April 1993 because of her employer's
continued failure and refusal to pay her salary despite demand. In May 1993, she
was able to finally return to the Philippines through the help of the Bahrain
Passport and Immigration Department.5

In May 1995, petitioner filed a complaint before the POEA Adjudication Office
against respondent for underpayment and nonpayment of salary, vacation leave
pay and refund of her plane fare, docketed as Case No. POEA ADJ. (L) 95-05-
1586.6 While the case was pending, she filed the instant case before the NLRC
for underpayment of salary for a period of one year and six months, nonpayment
of vacation pay and reimbursement of return airfare.

In its Position Paper,7 respondent countered that petitioner actually agreed to

work in Bahrain as a housemaid for one (1) year because it was the only position
available then. However, since such position was not yet allowed by the POEA at
that time, they mutually agreed to submit the contract to the POEA indicating
petitioner's position as saleslady. Respondent added that it was actually
petitioner herself who violated the terms of their contract when she allegedly
transferred to another employer without respondent's knowledge and approval.
Lastly, respondent raised the defense of prescription of cause of action since the
claim was filed beyond the three (3)-year period from the time the right accrued,
reckoned from either 1990 or 1991.8

On April 29, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision
finding respondent liable for violating the terms of the Employment Contract and
ordering it to pay petitioner: (a) the amount of US$4,050.00, or its equivalent rate
prevailing at the time of payment, representing her salary differentials for fifteen
(15) months; and, (b) the amount of BD 180.00 or its equivalent rate prevailing at
the time of payment, representing the refund of plane ticket, thus:

On appeal, the NLRC, Second Division, issued a Decision10 affirming with

modification the Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr., by reducing the award of
salary differentials from US$4,050.00 to US$2,970.00 ratiocinating as follows:

Accordingly, we find that the claims for salary differentials accruing earlier
than April of 1993 had indeed prescribed. This is so as complainant had
filed her complaint on May 31, 1995 when she arrived from the jobsite in
April 1993. Since the cause of action for salary differential accrues at the
time when it falls due, it is clear that only the claims for the months of May
1993 to April 1994 have not yet prescribed. With an approved salary rate
of US$370.00 vis-à-vis the amount of salary received which was $100.00,
complainant is entitled to the salary differential for the said period in the
amount of $2,970.00.

On August 7, 2002, the CA issued the assailed Decision15 granting the petition
and reversing the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, thus:

Under Section 1 (f), Rule II, Book II of the 1991 POEA Rules and
Regulations, the local agency shall assume joint and solidary liability with
the employer for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection
with the implementation of the contract, including but not limited to
payment of wages, health and disability compensation and repatriation.

Respondent Commission was correct in declaring that claims of private

respondent "for salary differentials accruing earlier than April of 1993 had
indeed prescribed." It must be noted that petitioner company is privy only
to the first contract. Granting arguendo that its liability extends to the acts
of its foreign principal, the Towering Recruiting Services, which appears to
have a hand in the execution of the second contract, it is Our considered
opinion that the same would, at the most, extend only up to the expiration
of the second contract or until 01 September 1991. Clearly, the money
claims subject of the complaint filed in 1995 had prescribed.
ISSUES: WON respondent agency is liable to principal contract only NO WON
cause of action of petitioner already prescribed NO

RATIO:

On whether respondent is solidarily liable for petitioner's monetary claims

Section 1 of Rule II of the POEA Rules and Regulations states that: Section 1.
Requirements for Issuance of License. -

(3) Shall assume joint and solidary liability with the employer for all
claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the
implementation of the contract; including but not limited to payment of
wages, death and disability compensation and repatriation. (emphasis
supplied)

The above provisions are clear that the private employment agency shall assume
joint and solidary liability with the employer.

In the assailed Decision, the CA disregarded the aforecited provision of the law
and the policy of the state when it reversed the findings of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter. As the agency which recruited petitioner, respondent is jointly and
solidarily liable with the latter's principal employer abroad for her (petitioner's)
money claims. Respondent cannot, therefore, exempt itself from all the claims
and liabilities arising from the implementation of their POEA-approved Contract
of Employment.

We cannot agree with the view of the CA that the solidary liability of respondent
extends only to the first contract (i.e. the original, POEA-approved contract which
had a term of until April 1990). The signing of the "substitute" contracts with the
foreign employer/principal before the expiration of the POEA-approved contract
and any continuation of petitioner's employment beyond the original one-year
term, against the will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-
approved contract. To accept the CA's reasoning will open the floodgates to even
more abuse of our overseas workers at the hands of their foreign employers and
local recruiters.

Respondent's contention that it was petitioner herself who violated their Contract
of Employment when she signed another contract in Bahrain deserves scant
consideration. It is the finding of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC - which,
significantly, the CA did not disturb - that petitioner was forced to work long after
the term of her original POEA-approved contract, through the illegal acts of the
foreign employer.

We look upon with great disfavor the unsubstantiated actuations of innocence or

ignorance on the part of local recruitment agencies of acts of their foreign
principals, as if the agencies' responsibility ends with the deployment of the
worker. In the light of the recruitment agency's legally mandated joint and several
liability with the foreign employer for all claims in connection with
the implementation of the contract, it is the recruitment agency's responsibility
to ensure that the terms and conditions of the employment contract, as approved
by the POEA, are faithfully complied with and implemented properly by its foreign
client/principal. Indeed, it is in its best interest to do so to avoid being haled to the
courts or labor tribunals and defend itself from suits for acts of its foreign
principal.

On whether petitioner's claims for underpaid salaries have prescribed

It should be recalled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly found that
petitioner is entitled to underpaid salaries, albeit they differed in the number of
months for which salary differentials should be paid. The CA, on the other hand,
held that all of petitioner's monetary claims have prescribed pursuant to Article
291 of the Labor Code which provides that:

Art. 291. Money Claims. - All money claims arising from employer-
employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be
filed within three years from the time that cause of action accrued;
otherwise, they shall be forever barred. (emphasis supplied)

We do not agree with the CA when it held that the cause of action of petitioner
had already prescribed as the three-year prescriptive period should be reckoned
from September 1, 1989 when petitioner was forced to sign another contract
against her will. As stated in the complaint, one of petitioner's causes of action
was for underpayment of salaries. The NLRC correctly ruled the right to claim
unpaid salaries (or in this case, unpaid salary differentials) accrue as they fall
due.24 Thus, petitioner's cause of action to claim salary differential for October
1989 only accrued after she had rendered service for that month (or at the end of
October 1989). Her right to claim salary differential for November 1989 only
accrued at the end of November 1989, and so on and so forth.

Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioner was forced to work
until April 1993. Interestingly, the CA did not disturb this finding but held only that
the extent of respondent's liability was limited to the term under the original
contract or, at most, to the term of the subsequent contract entered into with the
participation of respondent's foreign principal, i.e. 1991. We have discussed
previously the reasons why (a) the CA's theory of limited liability on the part of
respondent is untenable and (b) the petitioner has a right to be compensated for
all months she, in fact, was forced to work. To determine for which months
petitioner's right to claim salary differentials has not prescribed, we must count
three years prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31, 1995. Thus, only claims
accruing prior to May 31, 1992 have prescribed when the complaint was filed on
May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary differentials for the
period May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11) months.25
Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion v Sps. Simplicio and Mila
Cuaresma (in behalf of daughter Jasmin), White Falcon Services, and
Jaime Ortiz (Pres. Of White Falcon)
Sps. Cuaresma (in behalf of Jasmin) v White Falcon and Becmen
Facts:
Jan 1997 – Jasmin was deployed by Becmen to serve as assistant nurse in Al-
Birk Hospital in Saudi under a 3 year contract, for $247/mo.
June 1998 - she died. Jessie Fajardo, co-worker, found her dead inside her
dormitory room with mouth foaming and smelling of poison. Medical report of Al-
Birk Hosp stated that the cause of death was poisoning – halt in blood circulation,
respiratory system and brain damage due to poisoning from unknown substance.
Sep 1998 – her body was repatriated to Manila. The City Health Officer of
Cabanatuan found that Jasmin died under violent circumstances not poisoning –
abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left
and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows;
abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at
the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia
minora.
Mar 1999 – Jasmin’s body was exhumed by NBI. Toxicology report tested
negative ffor non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.
Sps. Cuaresmas received from OWWA the following: 50k death benefits, 50k
loss of life; 20k funeral expenses; 10k medical reimbursement.
Nov 1999 – Sps. Filed complaint against Becmen and Rajab & Silsilah Co
(principal in Saudi) claiming death and insurance benefits. Sps. Claim that
Jasmin’s death was work-related having occurred at the employer’s premises;
their entitled to iqama insurance; compensatory damages amounting to $103k
which is the sum of her monthly salary 35 years (she was 25 yo when she died,
assuming she would survive until 60 yo).
Becmen and Rajab claim that Jasmin committed suicide and relied on the
medical report of Al Birk. They deny liability since the Sps. Had already received
their benefits from OWWA. Later, Becmen manifested that Rajab had terminated
their agency, and impleaded White Falcon as the new agency of Rajab.
Summary of Rulings
 LArb – dismissed for lack of merit, giving credence to Al Birk medical
report
 NLRC – reversed, found Jasmin a victim of compensable work-connected
criminal aggression; both agencies are solidarily liable to pay $113; later
reduced to $80k
 CA – affirmed; later reduced the award to $8k (monthly salary x remaining
contract period)

Issues
 WON entitled to insurance – NO
 WON death is compensable – NO
 WON death was by suicide – NO
  WON Becmen and Falcon are liable – YES, solidary liability

Ratio
1. NOT entitled to insurance.

The terms and conditions of Jasmin’s 1996 Employment Agreement which

she and her employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between
them. As a rule, stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to
statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law
between the contracting parties. An examination of said employment
agreement shows that it provides for no other monetary or other
benefits/privileges than the following:

1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;

2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the
Philippines at the end thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end
of each twenty four-month service;
3. Transportation to and from work;
4. Free living accommodations;
5. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations,
plastic surgery charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained
outside of KSA;
6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her
employer, but the exit/re-entry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance,
renewal, replacement, passport renewal, sponsorship transfer and
other liabilities shall be borne by her;
7. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila
after twenty four-months of continuous service;
8. Eight days public holidays per year;
9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service
will be calculated as per labor laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for
accident, death or other benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and
which the labor tribunals and appellate court granted variably in the guise
of compensatory damages.
Absence for provisions on social security and other benefits does not
make the contract infirm under PH laws since under Saudi law, foreign
employer is not obliged to provide her these benefits.

2. Death NOT WORK RELATED, therefore not compensable (i.e., not liable
for lost earnings)

At time of death, Jasmin was not on duty but at her dormitory room on
personal time. Court stated that the foreign employer cannot be expected
 to ensure her safety even while she is not on duty. What an employee
does on free time is beyond the employer’s sphere of inquiry.

The dormitory room also cannot be considered as “employer’s premises”.

3. Jasmin DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDE

Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while
halfway into her employment contract. This is beyond human
comprehension for a 25 yo Filipina especially since suicide is contrary to
Christian belief. Court cited Filipina’s resilience despite abuse and
maltreatment. Based on past OFW experiences, Filipina’s do not simply
commit suicide but rather endure.

Court also found that Saudi police and autopsy reports are patently
inconclusive. Their report is contradicted by the City Health Officer and by
NBI. Even the toxicology report tested negative for poisonous substances.

All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to
death.

4. Rajab, Becmen, White Falcon solidarily liable for moral and exemplary
damages

Court admonished Becmen and Falcon for simply dismissing Jasmin’s

case as one of suicide instead of fighting for her rights. The Agencies
prioritized their corporate interest over that of Jasmin.

RA 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act provides that the
State shall at all times uphold the dignity of its citizens, whether in the
country or overseas. The rights and interest of distressed overseas
Filipinos are adequately protected and safeguarded.

Becmen and Falcon, both licensed recruitment agencies, miserably failed

to abide by RA 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend
assistance to deployed OFWs, be the first to come the rescue of our
distressed OFWs; and have the primary obligation to protect the rights and
ensure the welfare of our OFWs. It should have been them who sought
justice for Jasmin. Instead, it was the parents who requested an autopsy
in the Ph to confirm the Saudi report. Court stated that the parents have
done all that was within their power to investigate Jasmin’s case on their
own.

Art 19 CC – every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art 21 CC – any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the later for the damage.
Art 24 CC – in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the
courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Rajab, Becmen and Falcon’s acts and omissions are against public policy
because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of
our OFWs.

Whether employed locally or overseas, all Fil workers enjoy the protective
mantel of PH labor and social laws, contract stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. This is in keeping with the Consti provision for the State
to afford protection to labor, promote full employement, ensure equal work
opportunities.

All labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of
the safety and decent living for the laborer.

As a result of their misconduct, Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages

for which Becmen and Falcon are solidarily liable. Grant of moral
damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the
employer is sanctioned by Art 2219 (10) CC.

Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the
foreign-basd employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or
contract of employement. This is meanth to assure the aggrieved worker
of immediate and sufficient payment. If the agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners are also solidarily liable.

Falcon’s assumption of Becmen’s liability does not absolve Becmen.

CA decision set aside. Awarded P2.5M as moral damages, P250k as
exemplary damages.