Advaita Siddhi of Madhusudana Sarasvati - Pariccheda 1

चिद्घनगणेशाय नम: |
श्री गुरुभ्यो नम: |
सदाशिव समारम्भाम् शङ्कराचार्य मध्यमाम् |
अस्मदाचार्य पर्यन्ताम् वन्दे गुरु परम्पराम् ||

This is a humble attempt at presenting the subject matter of

the Advaita Siddhi, a text by SrI madhusUdana
sarasvati svAminah, one of the greatest AchAryas within the
advaita tradition. The text was written in response to a
brilliant work titled nyAyAmrita, by SrI vyAsa tIrtha, an equally
renowned and influential AchArya within the dvaita tradition.
The terms siddhikAra and nyAyAmritakAra in this refer to
these two AchAryas respectively.

At the outset, I would like to state for the record that I do not
feel particularly qualified to write about a text like the advaita
siddhi. That I have even attempted such a foolhardy exercise
as trying to present this complex text in English, is motivated
by two reasons. As far as I am aware, there is no complete
English translation of the text available today. Secondly, this is
a text which demands deep engagement from the student. This
becomes especially difficult for students of advaita not
particularly comfortable in sanskrit. Therefore, this has been
created with the aim of making the text more accessible.

Philosophy in general, and moksha siddhAnta in particular,

ought to live not in unopened books in libraries, but in the
hearts and minds of its adherents. I hope this will help bridge
this gap.

I will try to translate most of the sanskrit words of the text,

but in some places where the meaning is more comprehensible
in sanskrit, I may decide to use the original sanksrit terms - I
have often found the fully translated versions of texts more
inscrutable than the sanskrit ones. The text is divided into four
paricChedas or chapters. I will follow the order in the text and
there will be a page in this corresponding to each chapter.
Clearly, any errors in presentation or understanding are my
own and should not be attributed to the three stalwarts.

For people interested in such matters, the Sanskrit text

follows the 2nd edition of the Advaita Siddhi as edited by
mahAmahopAdhyAya vedAntaviSArada Anantakrishna
sAstrigal, published by Pandurang Jawaji of the Nirnaya Sagar
Press, Bombay (1937).

My deep-felt thanks to my gurus and many others who have

helped in this regard.
nyAya basics - an aide memoire
pancha avayava vAkya
anumAna, or inference, is of two kinds - svArthAnumAna and
parArthAnumAna. The former is a situation where a person
makes an inference themselves, and the latter is a situation
where a person conveys information that allows another
person to draw an inference. The naiyyAyika (logician)
believes there are five components that are required for
parArthAnumAna. Let us consider the classic inference
example: The mountain is on fire, as smoke is seen. Like the
smoky kitchen fire. parvato vahnimAn, dhUmatvAt;
mahAnasavat.

1) pratijnA - a hypothesis that needs to be proved. In our

example, parvato vahnimAn - the mountain is on fire. This is
the statement that needs to be proved. The pratijnA consists
of two elements - the sAdhya (the idea to be proved) and the
paksha (the locus where it should be proved).
2) hetu - reason. dhUmatvAt - on account of the smoke.
3) driShTAnta - example. yo ya: dhUmavAn sa: vahnimAn.
mahAnasavat. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire - like the
invariable concomitance observed in instances like the
kitchen fire (we are talking of old-school wood-fired kitchens.)
4) upanaya: - application. ayam dhUmavAn - there is smoke on
this mountain.
5) nigamanam - conclusion. tasmAt vahnimAn - therefore this
mountain must be on fire.

The term vyApti, or invariable concomitance, refers to the

conclusion drawn by the seer that wherever the hetu is
present, the sAdhya will also be present. This vyApti jnAna is
made by the seer when he observes the fire being present
along with the smoke in the kitchen. When the same person
sees the smoke in the mountain later, he recalls the vyApti and
infers the presence of fire, based on his prior knowledge.

According to the naiyyAyika, if a parArthAnumAna consists of

these five parts (pancha avayava), it is certain to generate
anumiti, inferential understanding, in the hearer.
The mImAmsaka, on the other hand, says that it is sufficient if
any three are present (1-3 or 3-5), for anumiti to be generated.

Types of hetvAbhAsa (fallacious reasons)

The naiyyAyika outlines the basis errors in reasoning that are
possible in the inferential process. He categorises them into
five groups. Whether the defect is present in the hetu, sAdhya,
paksha or drishTAnta, the naiyyAyika chooses to call it a
hetvAbhAsa, an error in the hetu.

1) vyabhichAra - where the hetu, the reason, is present in the

paksha, but the sAdhya, the thing to be proved is absent from
the paksha. For example, wherever there is smoke, there is
fire. However, the reverse is not true. Where there is fire, there
is no necessity for smoke. So if someone wanted to argue that
there is smoke in the mountain, because of perceived fire - in
this reverse of the classic anumAna, fire is the hetu and smoke
is sAdhya. There are several instances where fire (the hetu) is
present, but smoke (the sAdhya) is absent. This would be a
case of vyabhichAra.
2) asiddhi - the hetu is not present in the paksha. in the
parvato vahnimAn dhUmatvAt, if there is no dhUma (smoke),
no inference can be drawn. This is an instance of
svarUpAsiddhi. There are two other kinds of asiddhis outlined.
AshrayAsiddhi, where the paksha itself is absent (the sky lotus
is fragrant, like a lotus, is an oft-cited example).
vyApyatvAsiddhi, where the hetu is dependent on some
extraneous factors. In the inference, the mountain is smoky,
because of fire - the hetu, fire, is dependent on wet fuel for
smoke to be present. This factor, upon which the hetu is
dependent to indicate the sAdhya, is termed (quite confusingly
from an advaitin's perspective) as upAdhi. That conditionality
is an instance of vyApyatvAsiddhi. If the paksha is not well-
known (aprasiddha paksha), that is another instance of
vyApyatvAsiddhi.
3) bAdham - if the sAdhya is not present in paksha. For
example, if someone tries to argue that fire is cold, that is an
instance where coldness (sAdhya) can never be present in the
paksha (fire). This is usually established by some other
contradicting means of knowledge, like perception etc.
4) viruddham - if the sAdhya and hetu are in contradiction. If
the hetu proves the opposite of the sAdhya it is a case of
viruddham. For example, if the anumAna is parvato vahnimAn,
jalatvAt (the mountain is on fire, because of water being
present there), that would be an instance of viruddha.
5) satpratipaksha - if the opponents in a debate give two hetus
- one to prove a sAdhya and the other to prove its opposite. If
both the hetus are equally strong, then it is an instance of
satpratipaksha doSha. One of the two hetus could even be
correct, but unless the hearer knows which, no anumiti is
generated.
upAdhi, upalakshaNa, visheShaNa
Throughout the veda, Brahman has been described both in
association with attributes (for example, in 8.1.5 of the
ChAndogya upaniShad as सत् य का मः सत्यसङ्कल्प:, etc.), and as
attribute-less (e.g., in 3.8.8 of the BrihadAraNyaka as
अ स् थूल म न णु, etc.). The challenge to advaita has been to justify its
position that Brahman unconditioned by attributes is the
ultimate reality propounded by the upaniShads, because the
automatic response to this proposition is a counter-question -
is the lack of attributes itself an attribute? That is, is
nirguNatva an attribute of brahman?

Before this challenge can be addressed, we need to take a

grammatical detour.

The long tradition of vedAnta has developed the concepts of

visheShaNa, upAdhi and upalakshaNa, which serve as useful
tools in this endeavour. How can a language uniquely refer to
an object amongst a collection of many? Typically, this is by
means of adjectives, distinguishing characteristics. This
concept has been developed quite extensively in sanskrit into
broadly three categories:

1) विशेषणम् - In the vedAnta paribhASha of dharmarAja

adhvarIndra, visheShaNas are defined as विशेषणञ्च कार्यान्वयि वर्तमानं
व्यावर्तकम् (visheShananca kAryAnvayi vartamAnam vyAvartakam).
That is, a qualifying attribute (visheShaNa) is a distinguishing
characteristic of an object that is present and is associated
with the object in respect to the predicate. There are two
aspects to this definition - kArya anvaya and vartamAnam.

To explain, let us consider the sentence - "I saw the man with
the blue shirt". In this sentence, the qualifier is 'blue-shirted'
and the qualified is the man. Here the qualifer is a visheShaNa
because a) it serves to clarify that it is the man with the blue
shirt that is seen, and not a man wearing some other colour
shirt (vyAvartakam) b) the blue-shirt is present along with the
man (vartamAnam) and c) when the man is seen, it is both the
man and his blue shirt that is seen, that is, the qualifier, 'blue-
shirted', is associated with the qualified (man), in respect to
the activity of seeing (kArya anvayi). Thus the visheShaNa not
only present with the visheShya, the subject, it also is
associated with the vidheya, the predicate.

2) उपा धि : - However, all distinguishing features need not

necessarily be visheShaNas. The paribhASha defines upAdhi
as उपाधिच श्चकार्यानन्वयी व्यावर्तको वर्तमानश्च (upAdhishca kAryAnanvayI
vyAvartako vartamAnashca) - That is, a limiting adjunct
(upAdhi) is a distinguishing characteristic of an object that is
present and is not associated with the object in respect to the
predicate. Thus the upAdhi is not associated with the vidheya,
but is present along with the visheShya.

For example, let us consider the sentence "The man with the
blue shirt spoke". In this sentence too, the qualifier is 'blue-
shirted' and the qualified is the man. Here, the same qualifier
'blue-shirted' is an upAdhi because, while it identifies the
speaker uniquely from other people (vyAvartakam), and is
present along with the speaker (vartamAnam), it is not
associated with the action of speaking (kArya ananvayitvam) -
that is, when the man spoke, it is only he that spoke, not his
blue shirt.

3) उपलक्षणम् - The idea of upAdhi has been further refined in

vedAnta to cover the case of upalakshaNa. The vedAnta
paribhASha does not directly define an upalakshaNa, but the
identifier vartamAna present in both the definitions of
visheShaNa and upAdhi allows us to define upalakshaNa as
उपलक्षणञ्च कार्यानन्वयी अवर्तमानं व्यावर्तकम्. That is, the upalakshaNa is
a circumstantial identifier that is not present at the time of
identification and not associated with the object in respect to
the predicate. Thus the upalakshaNa is not associated with
the vidheya, and is not present along with the visheShya.

For example, let us consider the sentence "The house which

had the crows on it is Devadatta's". Here, a house is spotted
with some crows on its rooftop. Later, the speaker uses this is
a basis to identify that house as Devadatta's house. Thus the
crows serve as a unique identifier (vyAvartakam) for the
house, they are only accidentally in association with the
house's existence (kArya ananvayitvam), nor are they
necessarily present at the time of identification
(avartamAnam).

This three-fold classification has applications across advaita

vedAnta. For example, in postulating the ultimate reality of the
attributeless brahman. This idea was hinted by Sri Mani Dravid
Sastrigal at a vAkyArtha sadas held last year: http://lists.advaita-
vedanta.org/archives/advaita-l/2017-August/046520.html

The same idea is invoked in several places in the advaita

siddhi - e.g. the nyAyAmritakAra says that the akhaNDAkAra
vritti, which reveals only the svarUpa of Brahman, and no other
attributes in association with it, cannot sublate the world. His
rationale is that any sublating cognition must reveal a
previously unknown attribute in the object. For example, when
a person mistakes shell for silver, he does not know that the
object in front is a shell. The sublating cognition to this
erroneous notion is "this is a shell". That is, the previously
unknown shell-ness is revealed in the sublating cognition,
leading to the sublation of silver.

The advaitin argues that the world is sublated on the cognition

of Brahman, through the akhaNDAkAra vritti. This knowledge,
by definition, reveals only the svarUpa of Brahman, and no
attribute of Brahman, including brahmatva - brahman-hood.
Thus, the cognition contains no unknown attribute of Brahman
either. That being so, how can it sublate the world? If the
world continues to be unsublated even with brahmajnAna, to
argue that the world is mithyA is incorrect - this in summary, is
an argument that he makes.

The siddhikAra, in reply, says that it is not necessary for a

sublating cognition to reveal a hitherto unknown attribute of
the mistaken object. For example, if a cognition reveals the
price of shell in the marketplace which the seer did not know
until then, that is not going to help sublate the silver. All that
is required is that the sublating cognition reveal that the
object in front is shell.
Therefore, one must refine the requirement for sublating
cognition to say - if a cognition reveals a thing, the ignorance
of which led to the erroneous cognition, then it is sufficient to
sublate the error. The ignorance of Brahman led to the
cognition of the world. akhaNDAkAra vritti reveals the svarUpa
of Brahman, and not Brahman endowed with attribute-lessness
(that is, the akhaNDAkAra vritti does not reveal that Brahma is
attributeless, it reveals Brahman, that's all). Thus vedic
sentences such as 'neti, neti' which negate any duality in
Brahman, use the absence of duality as an upalakshaNa to
point to Brahman, without revealing that Brahman is endowed
with attribute-lessness - exactly like the sentence "the house
which had the crows is Devadatta's" uses the presence of
crows to identify the house, without indicating that the house
is endowed with the presence of crows. Therefore, knowing
that it is Brahman that is present everywhere, is both
necessary and sufficient to sublate the world.

This idea was hinted at in the vAkyArtha sadas.

 1st paricCheda
mangalAcharaNam
srI gurubhyo namah

The text of the advaita siddhi is divided into four

paricChedas or sections. Each section consists of multiple
chapters.
Here we commence the first paricCheda, which starts with
four invocatory verses, the first of which is presented below.
मायाकल्पितमातृतामुखमृशाद्वैतप्रपञ्चाश्रय: सत् य ज्ञा न सुखा त् म क:श्रुतिशिखोत्थाखण्डधीगोचर: |
मिथ्याबन्धविधूननेन परमानन्दैकतानात्मकं मोक्षं प्राप्त इव स्वयं विजयते विष्णुर्विकल्पोज्झित: ||

Every work in shAstra starts with a benedictory verse, a

mangalAcharaNam - as a mark of auspiciousness. In this
mangalAcharaNam, the siddhikAra says:
विष्णु: मोक्षं प्राप्त इव स्वयं विजयते viShNu appears as if he has attained
moksha. This appears bizarre at first instance. How can
viShNu, the ever liberated ISvara, appear "as if" he has
attained moksha, liberation? Who is this viShNu referred to
here?
By the word viShNu, the siddhikAra is referring here to the
jIva.
That which is all-pervading, vyApakam, is viShNu. A question
may arise - Isn't the jIva located in a particular body, and if
so how can he be the all-pervading viShNu?
By using the term viShNu to refer to the jIva, the siddhikAra
at the very outset itself gets straight to the ultimate import
of advaita vedAnta - that the all pervading consciousness is
the only object that is present. The terms Ishvara, or God,
and jIva, or the individual soul, are merely two terms to
describe the one all pervading consciousness - the
underlying object is the one consciousness.
Thus the meaning of विष्णु: मोक्षं प्राप्त इव स्वयं विजयते is - the one all
pervading consciousness appears as though to have
attained liberation. Why "as though"?
Because that is his very nature. However, this fact is
obscured due to ignorance. When that ignorance is
destroyed, he attains liberation, as it were. In reality, he is
ever free.
What kind of a jIva is he? मायाकल्पित (प्र)मातृतामुख he who has the
differences of pramAtrita / pramAna / prameya (knower /
knowledge / known) attributed in him due to mAya
मृशाद्वैत प्रपञ्चाश्रयः he who is the locus of the false dvaita
prapancha, the false duality that is the world
सत्यज्ञानसुखात्मक: however whose actual true nature is of
existence, consciousness, bliss
श्रुतिशिखोत्थाखण्डधीगोचर: who is attained by a mind endowed with
the akhaNda dhi, the impartite knowledge of the self
generated from shruti shikhA, the upaniShad mahAvAkyas -
upaniShad sentences that talk of the oneness of the jIva and
Ishvara. The exact definition of akhaNDArtham will be dealt
in the second paricCheda, but for the moment, we can
understand this as a thought, jnAna, about the Atma,
wherein no relations or samsargas are present.
मिथ्याबन्धविधूननेन by the complete wiping off of false bondage
विकल्पोज्झित: cast-off the divisions of false duality
परमानन्दैकतानात्मकं मोक्षं and attained moksha, which is of the nature
of a continuous flow of (ekatAna) parama Ananda, supreme
bliss
प्राप्त इव - the jIva is as though endowed with such a moksha.
The jIva who has moksha as his nature, forgets it, and
recollects it - so he attains moksha as it were.
In summary, the all-pervading one in whom are falsely
superimposed the triad of the knower, knowing and the
known, who is the locus of the false duality called the
world, whose true nature is of existence, consciousness and
bliss, which knowledge is attained by a mind endowed with
the impartite knowledge of the self generated from the
upaniShadic sentences that speak of the identity of the jIva
and the ISvara - such a one, by the complete wiping of false
notions of bondage, casts away the notions of duality, and
appears as though he has attained liberation, of the nature
of a never-ending flow of supreme bliss, when such a
liberation happens to be his very nature.

The second benedictory verse:

श्रीरामविश्वेश्वरमाधवानामैक्येन साक्षात्कृतमाधवानाम् ।
 न निर्धूततमोरजोभ्यः पादोत्थितेभ्योऽस्तु नमो रजोभ्यः ॥
स्पर् नर्शे
श्रीरामविश्वेश्वरमाधवानाम् (I pay obeisance to my) paramaguru srirAma ,
(my guru) vishveshvara (who gave me sanyAsa dIksha), and
mAdhava (who taught me advaita)
ऐक्येन साक्षात्कृतमाधवानाम् who by virtue of realising the oneness
of jIva and brahma, became sAkshAt mahAviShNu himself
नमो अ स् तु I worship
पादोत्थितेभ्यः the dust which arose from their feet
न निर्धूततमोरजोभ्यः by whose contact my ajnAna is
स्पर् नर्शे removed
I pay obeisance to my teachers - srIrAma, vishveshvara and
mAdhava, who by virtue of realising the oneness of the
individual self with the all encompassing self, became the
Lord mahAviShNu himself. I worship the dust rising from
their feet, which in itself has the capacity to remove my
ignorance.

The third benedictory verse:

ब हुभि र्वि हि ता बुधैः परार्थे विजयन्तेऽमितविस्तृता निबन्धाः।

मम तु श्रम ए व नूनमात्मभिरतां भावयितुं भविष्यतीह॥
बहुभिर्विहिता बुधैः a lot of wise ones
अमितविस्तृता निबन्धाः विजयन्ते have written a lot of books
परार्थे for the sake of others
मम तु श्रम एव नूनम् but I have written this book for myself
आ त् म भ रि तां भावयितुं भविष्यतीह to consolidate the works of others
into one place
There are several wise ones that have written extensively
for the sake of others. However, I have written this work for
myself, consolidating the works of others in one place.

The fourth benedictory verse:

श्रद्धाघनेन मुनिना मधुसूदनेन संगृह्य शास्त्र निचयं रचितातियत्नात् ।

बोधाय वादिविजयाय च सत्वरणामद्वैतसिद्धिरियमस्तु मुदे बुधानाम् ॥

संगृह्य शास्त्र निचयं रचितातियत्नात् this is a collection of various
shAstra's views created with great effort
श्रद्धाघनेन मुनिना मधुसूदनेन and with great faith by Madhusudana
बोधाय for the purpose of teaching वादिविजयाय and correcting the
views of others
सत्वरणामद्वैतसिद्धिरियमस्तु मुदे बुधानाम् this advaita siddhi has
been created to give joy to the wise
This is a collection of the views of several shAstras, one
gathered with great effort and faith by the sanyAsi
madhusUdana. This advaita siddhi has been created for the
wise ones' enjoyment, to teach others, and win over critical
opponents.
With this, we have completed the four mangalAcharaNams
or benedictory verses with which the siddhikAra
commences his magnum opus, advaita siddhi.
harih om
vipratipattivAkyasya
vicArAngatva nirUpaNam
The advaita siddhi begins by identifying the central bone of
contention under debate between the dvaitin and the advaitin.
The advaitin wishes to prove that the only entity that is real is
Brahman. It is that one Brahman that appears as the individual
soul - jIva, is worshipped as God - Ishvara, and is transacted
with as the world - prapancha. However, before advaitam or
non-duality is established, it is necessary to prove that duality
is unreal, mithyA.

What is mithya? This question will be elaborately dealt with in

the subsequent chapters, but as a provisional translation, we
can call it unreal. It is not quite that, and we will refine this
translation - but for the moment, this will do.

तत्राद्वैतसिद्धेर्द्वैतमिथ्यात्वसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वात् द्वैतमिथ्यात्वमेव
प्रथममुपपादनीयम् | उपपादनं च स्वपक्षसाधनपरपक्षनिराकरणानाभ्याम् भ व ती ति
तदुभयं वादजल्पवितण्डानामन्यतमां कथमाश्रित्य सम्पादनीयम् |

तत्राद्वैतसिद्धे: द्वैतमिथ्यात्वसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वात् Now, because duality needs to

established as mithyA, unreal, before the establishment of
advaita,
द्वैतमिथ्यात्वमेव प्रथममुपपादनीयम् | it becomes essential to prove that
the world of duality is mithyA first.
उपपादनं च स्वपक्षसाधनपरपक्षनिराकरणानाभ्याम् भवति इति Proof means
substantiating one's own position and disproving the
opponent's position
तदुभयं वादजल्पवितण्डानामन्यतमां कथमाश्रित्य सम्पादनीयम् Both these (ie proving
one's own position and disproving the opponent's) can be
achieved by employing any of the three methods of debate -
vAda, jalpa, vitaNDa.

The nyAya system outlines the three ways a debate may

proceed.
vAda, defined as तत्त्वनिर्णयफलं कथा विशेषं. This type of argument is
employed by ego-less seekers of truth, and the main purpose
of this argument is to arrive at the truth of a matter,
irrespective of whether that is the position held by the
speaker, or his opponent. This is the best of the arguments.
Lord Krishna in the Bhagavad gIta says वादः प्रवदतामहम् -
amongst the arguments, I am the vAda.
jalpa, defined as परपक्षनिराकरणपूर्वक स्वपक्षस्थापनवती विजिगीषु कथा - the
proving of one's position along with the refutation of the
opponent's viewpoint. The bhAShya literature is typically jalpa.
vitaNDa, defined as परपक्षनिराकरण मात्रवती स्वपक्षस्थापनरहिता विजिगीषु कथा
- disproving of one's position without seeking to establish
one's position.

The advaitin holds that the world is mithyA, and the dvaitin
says that the world is satyam. Before the debate proper
commences, it is customary for the moderator, the
madhyastha to state the topic of the discussion.

Is the world mithyA or not? This statement, which encapsulates the

central discussion in the debate is called the vipratipatti
vAkya.

Before we begin the debate itself, the first objection arises.

The nyAyAmritakAra's view is that the vipratipatti vAkya need
not be said, as it serves no purpose.

A sentence spoken in a debate cannot be considered as

shabda pramANa, verbal testimony. Its acceptability (or
otherwise) is not on the basis of it being shabda pramANA, but
whether it meets the test for anumAna pramANa, inference.
The classic example of anumAna in shAstra is the inference
drawn that the mountain is on fire, not on the basis of visual
perception of fire there, but on the basis of the smoke seen in
the mountain.

Now, if a person already knows that fire exists in the

mountain, there is no need to infer fire. Inference is only
needed when direct perception of the thing has not already
happened. Therefore the absence of this knowledge, in other
words, the presence of doubt is necessary for inference to
occur. The prima facie view is that vipratipatti vAkya helps
generate a doubt.

Coming to our debate, if there is certainty amongst everyone

that the world is real, or alternatively if everyone agrees that
the world is mithyA, there is no need to enquire into this
question. Therefore enquiry presupposes a doubt, and
vipratipatti vAkya serves as a means to generate this doubt.
This reason is examined and rejected by the nyAyAmritakAra.

He does so for three reasons.

1) The upaniShad says Atma drashTavyah - the Atma must be
known. For this, it proposes 3 means, sAdhanas - shrotavyah,
mantavyah, nidhidhyAsitavyah - listen to scriptures,
contemplate upon them, meditate upon their meaning. By
mantavyah, contemplation aided by anumAna, logical
inference, is meant. Therefore, the upaniShad enjoins the use
of anumAna after shravaNam has occurred. If shravaNam has
occurred correctly, there should be certainty about the Atma.
If there is doubt, then shravaNam has not happened correctly,
and has to be repeated. Shruti cannot prescribe a second
sAdhana if the first sAdhana has not been performed
adequately. Therefore, doubt about the Atma should trigger
further shravaNam, not anumAna (manana). Therefore the rule
that one must have doubts before one proceeds to anumAna is
incorrect.

2) A person hears thunder and infers the presence of clouds in

the sky, even when he has not seen the clouds. One does not
start off with a doubt whether there are clouds in the sky - he
hears the thunder and automatically infers clouds. Thus, doubt
is not a requirement for the operation of inference. However,
if the person already had seen clouds in the sky, inference will
not produce a new knowledge of the clouds, therefore it
ceases to be a pramANa in that instance. In the
nyAyAmritakAra's view, inference does not require doubt, it
requires a lack of knowledge of the object of inference.

3) However, even if a person has certainty about the object of

inference, anumAna can arise. The nyAyAmritakAra argues
that in some cases, even if one has certainty about something,
one may wish to use logic to prove it. The desire to prove
something by logical inference, sisAdhayiShA (sAdhayitum
icChA) could be a factor for the operation of anumAna.
Therefore when there is certainty about the thing to be proven
(sAdhya niSchaya) and no desire to prove it via logical
inference (sisAdhayiSha rahitatva), anumAna will not arise.
Thus, what prevents anumAna is the certainty about the
object, coupled with the absence of sisAdhiySha. In the case
of mananam, even though there is certainty about the Atma
after shravaNam, because there is also a desire to prove the
Atma by inference, mananam is enjoined by scriptures.

However, this is not applicable in the case of vipratipatti

vAkya in question - is the world mithyA or not.

With this as a background, the advaita siddhi offers a

provisional reason for the use of the vipratipatti vAkya.

नीया| The
तत्र च विप्रतिपत्तिजन्यसंशयस्य विचाराङ्गत्वात् मध्यस्थेन आ दौ विप्रतिपत्ति: प्रदर्नीयार्श
doubt born out of the vipratipatti vAkya serves as a useful
auxiliary to the enquiry and therefore there is a need for it to
be stated by the moderator in the beginning, as a nyAya
shAstra vidhi, a rule of the debate.

The siddhikAra first outlines the nyAyAmritakAra's position:

यद्यपि विप्रतिपत्तिजन्यसंशयस्य न पक्षतासंपादकतया उपयोगः,
सिसाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसाधकमानाभावरूपायाःतस्याः संशयाघटितत्वात्; अन्यथा
श्रुत्यात्मनिश्चयवतःऽनुमित्स्या तदनुमानं न स्यात्, वाद्यादीनां निश्चयवत्वेन
संशयाभावादाहार्यसंशयस्यातिप्रसञ्जकत्वाच्च; नापि विप्रतिप्रत्ते: स्वरूपत ए व
पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहफलकतयोपयोग:, 'त्वयेदं साधनीयं', 'अनेनेदं दूषणीय'
मित्यादिमध्यस्थवाक्यादेव तल्लाभेन विप्रतिपत्तिवैयर्थ्यात्;

यद्यपि विप्रतिपत्तिजन्यसंशयस्य न पक्षतासंपादकतया उपयोगः While the doubt born

out of the vipratipatti vAkya does not serve as a basis for each
debater to pick his position,
सिसाधयिषाविरहसहकृतसाधकमानाभावरूपायाः तस्याः संशयाघटितत्वात् the
desire to prove the sAdhya is present and a doubt about the
sAdhya is absent (i.e. there is a desire to examine the issue
using anumAna and there is no doubt about the sAdhya for
both parties.) Therefore, there being no obstacle to commence
the enquiry, one need not postulate that a vipratipatti vAkya is
necessarily spoken to justify an enquiry.
अन्यथा श्रुत्यात्मनिश्चयवतःऽनुमित्स्या तदनुमानं न स्यात् if doubt was a
requirement for anumAna, there would be no need for
mananam after certainty about the Atma is had shravaNam
वाद्यादीनां निश्चयवत्वेन संशयाभावात् further, as both debaters are certain
about their respective positions, the vipratipatti vAkya will not
create a doubt for them.
jnAna is generated in two ways - AhArya and anAhArya. AhArya
is where one knows his position is wrong but still argues for it,
and anAhArya is the opposite.
आहार्यसंशयस्य अतिप्रसञ्जकत्वाच्च Now one may assume assume
that one has a doubt and use that as a basis to start enquiry.
This is called AhArya samshaya. The nyAyAmritakAra says
that if the doubt is AhArya, the knowledge resulting from the
enquiry that follows such a doubt will be AhArya, and the
enquiry will serve no purpose.
नापि विप्रतिप्रत्ते: स्वरूपत एव पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहफलकतयोपयोग: 'त्वयेदं
साधनीयं', 'अनेनेदं दूषणीय' मित्यादिमध्यस्थवाक्यादेव तल्लाभेन विप्रतिपत्तिवैयर्थ्यात्
even though the debater may not believe his position, he may
choose to argue for it, and the vipratti vAkya may be used to
clarify that one argues for one position, and the other argues
for the other position. The nyAyAmritakAra says this is also
not right because the moderator follows this with another
sentence where he tells each debater "you need to prove this"
"he needs to disprove this etc." and thus the usefulness of
vipratipatti is denied.

Until now we had the arguments of the nyAyAmritakAra who

set out to prove the futility of vipratipatti vAkya. Now we
commence the arguments of the advaita siddhikAra:

तथापि विप्रतिपत्तिजन्यसंशयस्यानुमित्यनङ्गत्वेऽपि व्युदसनीयतया विचाराङ्गत्वमस्त्येव | तादृशसंशयं

प्रति विप्रतिपत्ते: क्वचिन्निश्चयादिप्रतिबन्धादजनकत्वेऽपि स्वरूपयोग्यत्वात् | वाद्यादीनाम् च
निश्चयवत्वे नियमाभावात् "निश्चितौ हि वादं कु रुत" इत्याभिमानिकनिचयाभिप्रायं
या भि प्रा ,
यंश्च
परपक्षमालंब्याप्यहम्कारिणो विपरीतनिश्चयवत: ज ल् पा दौ प्रवृत्तिदर्नात्र्श ना त् | तस्मात्
समयबन्धादिवत्स्वकर्तव्यनिर्वाहाय मध्यस्थेन विप्रतिपत्ति: प्रदर्नीयैवर्श नी यैव |

तथापि विप्रतिपत्तिजन्यसंशयस्यानुमित्यनङ्गत्वे अपि व्युदसनीयतया विचाराङ्गत्वं अस्ति एव - even

though doubt born of the vipratipatti vAkya is not a necessary
component for the commencement of an enquiry, the sentence
serves a useful purpose in articulating the doubt that will be
removed by the anumAna.
तादृशसंशयं प्रति विप्रतिपत्ते: क्वचिन्निश्चयादिप्रतिबन्धादजनकत्वे अपि स्वरूपयोग्यत्वात्
वाद्यादीनाम् च निश्चयवत्वे नियमाभावात्
Now, while some may have certainty on their positions, and for
them the vipratipatti vAkya will not generate a doubt, there
may be others (the people witnessing the debate may have
doubts, for example) who are not certain and therefore this
sentence serves to articulate their doubt.

"निश्चितौ हि वादं कु रुत" इत्याभिमानिकनिचयाभिप्रायं

याभि प्रा ,
यंश्च
ना
त्
परपक्षमालंब्याप्यहम्कारिणो विपरीतनिश्चयवत: जल्पादौ प्रवृत्तिदर्नात्र्श तस्मात्
नीयैव
समयबन्धादिवत्स्वकर्तव्यनिर्वाहाय मध्यस्थेन विप्रतिपत्ति: प्रदर्नीयैवर्श

Even if a debater may think he has certainty on his position, he

may have doubts too (which he is unaware of). So even for
such a speaker, the vipratipatti vAkya may be useful in
revealing their doubt. For example, even a person of certain
positions is sometimes forced to argue the opposite position in
a jalpa katha, and thereby gains certainty of an opposite
position. Thus a doubt is always possible, even if there is
certainty in the present.
Alternatively, in jalpa katha where there is no doubt,
sometimes the participants may debate several matters in
connection with the main content of a debate. A person may
win an argument in a secondary issue, but not the main issue.
Therefore, the purpose of vipratipatti vAkya is to state the
main issue of the discussion, which serves as a basis for the
moderator to fulfil his role in determining the winner and loser
of the debate, based on the winner or loser of that central
issue.

In summary, the vipratipatti vAkya serves 3 purposes:

1) it is to ensure that a doubt about the issue to be proven, the
sAdhya is generated, so that a discussion can take place to
answer the doubt.
2) even if the speakers have certainty in their positions, the
audience may not have a certainty on the question, and the
vipratipatti vAkya creates the doubt for the audience so that
the discussion can serve the purpose of addressing their
doubt.
3) even if everyone has certainty in the matter, vipratipatti
vAkya helps by identifying the main topic of discussion so that
the moderator can determine the winner and loser of the
debate.
pakshatAvacChedaka vichAra:
(part 1)
An enquiry into the paksha

We previously considered why a vipratipatti vAkya is

necessary before the commencement of a debate.
1) Sometimes vipratipatti vAkya is useful in generating a doubt
about a subject, thereby justifying an enquiry, a vichAra.
2) Sometimes in the context of a debate, it identifies the
primary subject matter under discussion, allowing the
moderator to determine the winner and loser based on success
or failure in proving the central hypothesis.
3) Sometimes even when there is no doubt, it helps to remind
one of a possible doubt, and thereby justify the
commencement of a discussion on it.

The organisation of the initial sections of the advaita siddhi is

in line with the standard structure of the anumAna - paksha
sAdhya hetu e.g dvaitam mithyA drishyatvAt. First, an enquiry
into the paksha will be conducted. The next few sections will
first discuss the nature of the sAdhya, mithyAtva. Five
definitions of mithyAtva will be studied. Following this, an
enquiry into the hetu, the establishing reason, will be
undertaken. Three hetus will be considered for mithyAtva -
drishyatvam (knowability), jaDatvam (inertness) and
paricChinnatvam (limitation).

This chapter is an enquiry into the nature of the paksha. What

is the object that we wish to examine for mithyAtvam? The
siddhikAra considers this question through a refinement of the
vipratipatti vAkya.

We had previously said that the vipratipatti vAkya can be द्वैतं

मिथ्या न वा - is the world of duality real or not? However, there is a
problem with this provisional statement. A second thing other
than Atma is duality, therefore this vipratipatti vAkya equates
to the question - Is anything other than Atma, mithyA or not?
Reality within advaita is classified into four categories - asat,
prAtibhAsika, vyAvahArika, Atma. asat is absolutely non-
existent in all three periods of time, thus it is not mithyA. Atma
is also not mithyA. If Atma and asat were included in the
paksha, it would lead to a bAdhi doSha, as the sAdhya of
mithyAtva does not exist in the paksha (the Atma and asat).

prAtibhAsika, objects such as the shell silver, is already well-

known as mithyA. Thus, if prAtibhAsika is included within the
paksha, it would lead to a siddha sAdhana doSha - it will lead
to proving that which is well established. An enquiry
commenced to prove something already proven is a waste of
time, and thus this is a defect.

Therefore, our vipratipatti vAkya needs to be refined to

exclude asat, Atma and prAtibhAsika This is the essence of
the next sentence from the advaita siddhi.

तत्र मिथ्यात्वे विप्रतिपत्ति: ब्र ह्म प्र मा ति रि क् ता बा ध् य त् वे सति सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हं

चिद्भिन्नं प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि न वा,
पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेणोक्तनिषेध प्रतियोगि न वेति |

तत्र मिथ्यात्वे विप्रतिपत्ति: There the vipratipatti vAkya for mithyAtva

should be
ब्रह्मप्रमातिरिक्ताबाध्यत्वे सति is that which is unsublatable by any
other knowledge other than the right knowledge of brahman,
सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हं that which is capable of appearing as
existing, and
चिद्भिन्नं that which is different from the Atma
प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि न वा the counterpositive of
the negation in all three periods of time in the locus of its
appearance?
पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेणोक्तनिषेध प्रतियोगि न वेति or is it the
counterpositive of the negation of absolute reality?

In summary, the vipratipatti vAkya is refined to be - Is that

which is unsublatable by any other knowledge other than the
right knowledge of brahman, that which is capable of
appearing as existing, and that which is different from the
Atma, the counterpositive of the negation in all three periods
of time in the locus of its appearance? Or is it the
counterpositive of the negation of absolute reality?

This is the direct translation of the text, but we need some

context to understand this. Let us take the case of the rope
that is mistaken for a snake. The view of the advaitin is that
when the snake appears, it exists - it exists at the time of
perception. It is prAtibhAsika. The view of the naiyyAyika is
that a snake that exists elsewhere is seen at the time of its
perception in the rope. The view of the dvaitin is that the
snake does not exist at all, it is asat.

The rope snake is sublatable, it is bAdhyam. Because we want

to exclude prAtibhAsika from the vipratipatti vAkya (and the
paksha), can we say say that which is abAdhyam,
unsublatable, is mithyA? This is a problem for the advaitin
because he says jagat is mithyA, which is bAdhya, sublatable.
Therefore, if we define mithyA as abAdhyam, then prapancham
cannot be mithyA. That's the end of the debate. Therefore, we
add a further qualifier - brahma pramA atirikta abAdhyam - that
is, it is that which is unsublatable due to any other knowledge
apart from the right knowledge of brahman. Whereas the snake
is sublated due to the knowledge of the rope, the world is
sublated only due to the knowledge of brahman, and nothing
else. Therefore to exclude prAtibhAsika objects such as the
rope snake, we add the qualifier, brahma pramA atirikta abAdhyam,
unsublatable due to any knowledge apart from the right
knowledge of brahma.

asat does not exist anywhere, therefore to exclude asat from

the vipratipatti vAkya, we add the qualifier sattvena pratItyarham,
meaning that which is capable of appearing as existing.

There is no doubt whatsoever that Atma is satya, therefore to

exclude Atma from the vipratipatti vAkya, we add the
qualifier chidbhinnam, that which is different from chit, the
Atma.

Therefore the paksha, now refined, becomes

ब्रह्मप्रमातिरिक्ताबाध्यत्वे सति सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हं चिद्भिन्नं - having
excluded asat, prAtibhAsika, brahman, the paksha is reduced
to vyAvahArika objects. Now we move over to the sAdhya,
mithyAtva.

What is mithyA? According to the advaitin:

sat is that which exists and does not change at all in all three
periods of time.
asat is that which does not exist nor appears to exist in any
period of time.
mithyA is that which is neither sat nor asat.

If this is the extent of the definition, no opponent will object.

The dispute arises when the advaitin insists that the mithyA
object is sublated when the satya vastu is seen. This text will
consider five different definitions of mithyA, which will be
elaborately considered. In the context of the vipratipatti
vAkya, the siddhikAra is giving the second definition of
mithyAtvam for the sAdhya.

Two alternative sAdhya's are considered. प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ

त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि न वा, पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेणोक्तनिषेध प्रतियोगि न
वेति

In the first, that sAdhya, mithyA is defined as प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ

त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि, using the second definition of
mithyAtva. Translated, this means that which is negated in all
three periods of time in the locus of its appearance.

Therefore, the vipratipatti vAkya being ब्रह्मप्रमातिरिक्ताबाध्यत्वे

सति सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हं चिद्भिन्नं प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि न
वा - is simply "Is the vyAvahArika vastu mithyA or not?".

One of the implications of the said definition of mithyA is that

the advaitin is saying that the object does not exist even when
it appears, which is something the dvaitin cannot accept.
Therefore, as a concession to the dvaitin, an alternative
suggestion for the sAdhya is provided.

पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेणोक्तनिषेध प्रतियोगि न वा Does the object not

have ultimate reality?
This is different from the first alternative (प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ
). The nature of the negation is different in the
त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि
two alternatives. The existence of the object in all three
periods of time is negated in the first, in the second, the
ultimate existence of the object is negated.
pakshatAvacChedaka vichAra:
(part 2)
There are two kinds of anumiti -
1) pakshatA avacChedakam sAmAnadhikaraNyeNa anumiti -
Here, the hypothesis is covering only a specific instance of the
paksha and in that instance, the sAdhya is claimed to be
present. When we say the mountain is on fire, we are not
interested in proving that every mountain is on fire, only one
specific mountain.
2) pakshatA avacchedakA avacchedena anumiti - Here, the
hypothesis is covering every instance of the paksha, and in
every instance, the sAdhya is claimed to be existing. So for
example, if the claim is all men are mortal, our intention is to
say that every man is mortal, not just one specific individual.

Should sAmAnAdhikaraNyena anumiti be used or should

avacchedakA avacchedana anumiti be used in the vipratipatti
vAkya here? To prove advaita siddhAnta, avacchedakA
avacchedana anumiti is needed. Every instance of the paksha
should be proved as mithyA. However, in a vAda, if the
opponent is saying that nothing in the paksha is mithyA, to
disprove such an opponent, it is sufficient for the advaitin to
prove just one item in the paksha is mithyA (and vice versa). In
such a scenario, sAmAnyAdhikaryeNa anumiti is sufficient.

1) In the case of avacchedakA avacchedena anumiti, siddha

sAdhana is not a problem. That is, when the advaitin wants to
prove that everything apart from Brahman and asat is mithyA,
then calling prAtibhAsika as mithyA is not a problem. So the
vipratipatti vAkya can just have two qualifiers - सत्त्वेन
प्रतीत्यर्हं चिद्भिन्नं मिथ्या न वा.
2) In the case of sAmAnAdhikaraNyena anumiti, bAdham is not
a problem, but siddha sAdhana is a problem. That is, when the
advaitin wants to prove only certain things are mithyA, and if
the pUrvapakshi happens to know that particular thing is
mithyA already, that ends the enquiry. Therefore, in that
scenario, because the pUrvapakshi already knows that
prAtibhAsika is mithyA, the advaitin will only say
ब्रह्मप्रमातिरिक्ताबाध्यत्वे सति मिथ्या न वा.
3) However, some logicians hold that all the three visheshaNas,
qualifiers, need to be added to the vipratipatti vAkya-
ब्रह्मप्रमातिरिक्ताबाध्यत्वे सति सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हं चिद्भिन्नं मिथ्या न वा.

The siddhikAra continues:

अत्र च पक्षतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्येन साद्ध्यसिद्धेरुद्देयत्वात् त्
वात्
श्य
पक्षैकदे शासाद्ध्यसिद्धावापि सिद्धसाधनतेति मते शुक्तिरूप्ये सिद्धसाधनवारणाय
षणम् । When pakshatA
ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाद्ध्यत्वं पक्षवि षणम्शे
avacChedaka sAmAnAdhikaraNya anumiti is used, ie when the
aim of the debate is to prove that a specific species within the
paksha contains the sAdhya, the charge of siddha sAdhana
accrues from the prior knowledge of some instance of that
species containing the sAdhya. To remedy this, we exclude all
species within the paksha which already contain the sAdhya.
Therefore, as we want to prove the mithyAtva of the world, we
exclude instances such as the shell-silver whose mithyAtva is
already known. We do this by adding the qualifier brahma
pramA atirikta abAdhyatvam.

; तदैकदे शा
यदि पुनः पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेनैव साद्ध्यसिद्धेरुद्देयाःश्याः
साद्ध्यसिद्धावापि सिद्धसाधनाभावात् तद्वारकं विशेषणं अनुपादेयम् । however,
where avacchedakA avacchedena anumiti is used, then in that
paksha, siddha sAdhana is not a defect, as every instance of
the paksha has to be demonstrated to contain the sAdhya.
Thus no qualifier needs to be added to remove siddha sAdhana.

वयंतु तुच्छे ब्रह्मणि च बाधवारणायादरणीयमेव । the other

षणद्
इतरवि षणद्वयंशे
two qualifiers must be added to remove bAdha in the case of
asat (tucCha) and brahman.

प्रत्येकं वा विप्रतिपत्तिः वियन्मिथ्या न वा, पृथिवी मिथ्या न वा इति । Now (in some
debates) we may wish to restrict the debate to prove some
particular objects as mithyA, such as the sky is mithyA, earth
is mithyA etc. A vipratipatti vAkya covering those specific
pakshas can be used in such instances. This is
called pratyeka vipratipatti, specific introductory sentences.

However, where pratyeka vipratipatti is used, it leads to

another defect called sandigdha anaikAntikatA or sandigdha
vyabhichAra. What is this?

To explain, let us say for example, we want to prove that a

specific object, such as a pot is mithyA, using the hetu of
drishyatvam (knowability). The opponent may argue that
knowability exists not just for the pot, but also for other
objects, like a piece of cloth. However, as this debate is just
about a pot, it has not been determined whether the cloth is
mithyA or not. Therefore, as far as the cloth is concerned, the
hetu, knowability is present, but the sAdhya, mithyAtva is
doubtful. This could potentially be a vyabhichAra (where the
hetu is present, but the sAdhya is not). There is a doubt
whether vyabhichAra is present or not. A similar doubt exists
for the subject of the debate, the pot. This doubtful
vyabhichAra is a defect called sandigdha vyabhichAra or
sandigdha anaikAntikatA. anaikAntikatA is a synonym for
vyabhichAra. This doubt is a defect as it hinders the generation
of certain knowledge.

To summarise, sandigdha vyabhichAra occurs if there is a

doubt regarding either (or both) a) the hetu being present, or b)
sAdhya being absent.

The advaitin wants to prove space is mithyA. He says AkAsha:

mithyA, drishyatvAt, shukti rUpyavat. The opponent shows that
hetu of drishyatvam is present in other objects, and because
we are not debating the mithyAtva of those objects, it is
unclear whether those objects are mithyA or not. Therefore,
the sAdhya is doubtful, but the hetu is present. Hence there is
the sandigdha anaikAntikatA defect.
To this, the siddhikAra says:
एवं वियदादेः प्रत्येकंपक्षत्वे अपि न घटादौ संदिग्धानैकान्तिकता । Not so.
This defect called sandigdhAnaikAntikatA (or sandigdha
vyabhichAra), a doubtful vyabhichAra in the case of pots etc is
not present when the argument is specifically restricted to the
space being mithyA. Why?

पक्षसमत्वात् घटादेः because all other objects such as the pot etc
belong to the same class as the paksha of this debate.

The siddhikAra by using just these two words is making quite a

powerful argument. If sandigdha vyabhichAra is necessarily
present whenever the sAdhya is in doubt, then it can be argued
to be present in all inference. For example, in the inference of
fire in the mountain, when the smoke is seen, the presence of
the hetu is established, but before the inference arises, there
is a doubt whether the mountain is on fire or not. If it is already
known that the sAdhya is present in the paksha, then there is
no requirement for inference at all. Therefore, a doubt
regarding the presence of the sAdhya is true for all inference,
as a consequence, every inference can be said to be afflicted
with the sandigdha vyabhichAra defect.

To remedy this, the tattvachintAmaNikAra, GangeSa

upAdhyAya, had said न हि पक्षे पक्षसमे वा व्यभिचारः. One cannot
argue that there is vyabhichAra in a paksha due to
vyabhichAra being present in another instance similar to the
paksha.

Taking this as his basis, the siddhikAra says that if space is

the paksha, a sandigdha vyabhichAra defect will not arise if
the opponent proves that it exists in another instance like a
pot, because the pot and space are similar pakshas.

तथाहि पक्षे साध्यसंदेहस्यानुगुणत्वात् further, the nature of the

paksha is such that a doubt whether the sAdhya is present or
not will always be present (before the anumAna dispels the
doubt).

Ok, when can this sandigdha vyabhichAra defect arise then?

पक्षभिन्न एव तस्य दूषणत्वं वाच्यं । only if this vyabhichAra is proven in a

completely different paksha, can this defect arise

अतएवोक्तं 'साध्याभावनिचयवति
यवतिश्चहेतुसंदेहे एव संदिग्धानैकान्तिकता' इति
Therefore it has been said by Gangesha upAdhyAya, "When
there is certainty about sAdhya's absence, but doubt over the
hetu, only then can sandighdha vyabhichAra defect arise".

The implication of this statement by the chintAmaNikAra is

that when the reverse holds, that is, when there is doubt about
the sAdhya's absence but certainty about the hetu's presence,
the defect of sandigdha vyabhichAra will not arise.

Earlier we had said that the sandigdha vyabhichAra can arise if

either a) there is doubt about the hetu being present, but
certainty about the sAdhya being absent or b) there is doubt
the sAdhya being absent, but certainty about the hetu being
present. Now, we are refining it to say that this can only arise
in the case of the former, and not the latter.

Another question arises. The opponent asks "You said that

space is the paksha, and pot is paksha samam, a similar
class to the paksha. Why is the pot paksha samam, and not
paksha itself? The definition of paksha is sandgidha sAdhyavAn
paksha: - that in which the presence of sAdhya is doubtful is
called paksha. A pot meets this definition".

To this the siddhikAra says: In this instance, I am interested in

proving sAdhya in the space only, not the pot. That is why
space was termed paksha, and pot as paksha samam.
However, there is no problem in calling the pot paksha too.
पक्षत्वं तु साध्यसंदेहत्वं साध्यगोचरसाधकमानाभाववत्वं वा - paksha can
be defined in two ways - one as sAdhya sandehatvam and the
other as sAdhya gochara siddhi abhAva (sAdhakamAna =
siddhi). In the former definition, we define paksha as where the
presence of sAdhya is in doubt and in the second definition we
define paksha as where certainty about the sAdhya's
presence is absent.

एतच्च घदादिसाधारणम् । This is present in pots etc too. अत एव तत्रापि

संदिग्धानैकान्तिकत्वं न दोषः। Thus there also the defect of
doubtful vyabhichAra is not present.

पक्षसमत्वोक्तिस्तु प्रतिज्ञाविषयत्वाभावमात्रेण । Even though the pot

is also paksha, we are calling it pakshasamam and not paksha
because the object of the pratijnA, the hypothesis in this
inference is space, and not the pot.

नच तर्हि प्रतिज्ञाविषयत्वमेव पक्षत्वं; स्वार्थानुमाने तदाभावात् । We

cannot define the paksha as the object of a hypothesis in an
inference, because a hypothesis is absent in a svArthAnumAna
- where one infers something for oneself. We had previously
seen the difference between svArthAnumAna and
parArthAnumAna here. There is no need for verbal expression
for svArthAnumAnam. For parArthAnumAnam, we need to
employ the pancha avayava vAkya (the sentence of the five
parts, as outlined in the link) to cause inference to occur in
another person. In the case of svArthAnumAna also, we need a
paksha. However there is no pratijnA or hypothesis. If we
define paksha as object of a hypothesis, it will not cover the
case of svArthAnumAna. Thus a definition of paksha would not
cover all cases where the paksha is required.

एवं विप्रतिपत्तौ प्राचां प्रयोगाः | The ancient advaita writers

(AnandabodhAchArya is being referred to here) have thus used
three kinds of anumAna to prove the mithyAtva of vyAvahArika
objects.
विमतं मिथ्या दृश्यत्वात् , जडत्वात् , परिच्छिन्नत्वात् , शुक्तिरूप्यवदिति | Thus the
anumAna that is used is "vimatam is mithyA" and three
reasons are given for this - because of knowability, inertness
and finitude, like the illusive silver seen instead of a shell.
What is vimatam?

The group of objects that constitute the paksha, the subject of

the vipratipatti vAkya, or alternatively, the words used in the
vipratipatti vAkya are referred to in shorthand as vimatam.

नावयवेष्वाग्रहः There is a variation amongst different philosophers in

the number of avayava vAkyas (pratijnA, hetu etc.) required for
inference. naiyyAyikas say five avayava vAkyas are required,
mImAmsakas require 3 avayava vAkyas. The siddhikAra says
that he is not too concerned over the exact number needed.
However many are required for the other person to understand,
we will use that many avayavas.

Now two alternatives will be proposed for the pakshatA

avacChedakam (ie the visheShaNas or the factors required to
be present in the paksha).

अत्र स्वनियामकनियतया विप्रतिपत्तया लघुभूतया पक्षतावच्छेदो न विरुद्ध: Here, the

doubt generated by the vipratipatti vAkya -
ब्रह्मप्रमातिरिक्ताबाध्यत्वे सति सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हं चिद्भिन्नं मिथ्या न वा which
can be described in shorthand as विमतं मिथ्या न वा, is the pakshatA
avacChedakam. Thus the first suggestion is that sandeha
viShayatvam is pakshatA avacChedakam.

If the doubt is the pakshatAvacChedakam, this raises a

question. A doubt is ultimately a thought. A thought, by its
nature is very brief. The naiyyAyika says that thoughts last for
two kshaNas, moments. Therefore, if the doubt lasts only for
two moments, and that is the pakshatA avacChedakam, how
can enquiry occur after those two moments?

समयबन्धादीना व्यवधानात् तस्य अनुमानकाल असत्त्वे अपि उपलक्षणतया

पक्षतावच्छेदकत्वं Even though doubt is time bound, and despite
the fact that it has ceased to exist at the time of anumAna, it
can serve as the pakshatAvacChedakam as an upalakshaNa.

In shAstra, three mechanisms are posited to uniquely identify

an object from a group.
1) visheShaNa - as an adjective that cannot be separated by
from the object. When we want someone to fetch a particular
pot from a group of pots, we say "bring the black pot". The
blackness is a unique adjective that separates the pot that we
want from the rest. That blackness and the pot cannot be
separated, so when the pot that we want is brought, its
blackness comes along with it. Such an identifier is called
visheShaNa.

2) upAdhi - as an adjective that does not belong to the object,

but there is an association with the object which allows the
adjective to identify the object uniquely. When we want
someone to bring a particular person from the next room, we
say "bring the person who is seated on the chair". When the
person is brought, the chair does not come along with him,
however, it serves as a basis to uniquely identify a person from
a group. Such an identifier is called upAdhi.

3) upalakshaNa - as an adjective that used to be associated

with the object, but is no longer so. When we want to identify a
friend's house to another friend, we sometimes say "do you
remember the house that we went past that had the crow
sitting on it? That is X's house". Now, when the identification
happens, the crow has probably flown away, but that
association of the crow with that house was noted in the past,
and serves as a useful identifier. Such an identifier is called
upalakshaNa.

The siddhikAra says that the doubt, which has ceased to exist
after the two moments, similarly serves as a
pakshatAvacChedakam as an upalakshaNa.
यद्वा विप्रतिपत्तिविषयता अवच्छेदकमेव पक्षतावच्छेदकं | Alternatively, the
three qualifiers ब्रह्मप्रमातिरिक्ताबाध्यत्वे सति सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हं
चिद्भिन्नं, the subject of the vipratipatti vAkya, can be the pakshatA
avacChedakam.

प्राचाम् प्रयोगेष्वपि विमतमिति पदं विप्रतिपत्तिविषयतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नाभिप्रायेणेत्यदोष: |

Thus the ancient advaitins essentially used the word vimatam
as a shorthand for all the three visheshaNas that were
mentioned earlier.
prathama mithyAtva vichAra:
(part 1)
In the previous section, we examined the paksha in the
mithyAtva anumAna. Now we will take up an enquiry into the
sAdhya, mithyAtva. What does mithyA mean? Various thinkers
in the advaita tradition have defined mithyA in different terms,
covering various aspects of the concept. The nyAyAmritakAra
takes up five definitions of mithyAtva and argues that there
are several logical inconsistencies within them. The
siddhikAra refutes these arguments.

The first definition of mithyAtva is sadasat vilakshaNatvam,

that which is different from sat and asat, as posited by
PadmapAda, the author of the panchapAdikA. In the adhyAsa
bhAShya of Adi Shankara BhagavatpAda, the term mithyA is
used in two different senses. In the beginning of the adhyAsa
bhAShya, there is a usage "अध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्" and
immediately thereafter, "मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः". There is a difference in
the meaning of the word mithyA in these two places. In अध्यासो
मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्, the word mithyA means that which is not
existent. That adhyAsa is not possible at all is the prima facie
view of the pUrvapakshi, and it is in this sense that the word
mithyA is first used. In reply, ShankarAchArya says despite
adhyAsa appearing to be an impossibility, मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः as a
result of mithyA jnAna, that such an adhyAsa is the natural
state of world affairs is self evident. Explaining the word
mithyA here, the panchapAdikAkAra says मिथ्याशब्दो
अनिर्वचनीयतावचन: - the word mithyA (here) means
anirvachanIyam. anirvachanIyam is सदसत्विलक्षणं - it is neither
sat, nor asat. It is different from both.

The nyAyAmritakAra takes this definition of mithyAtva up for

refutation. He asks:
ननु - किमिदं मिथ्यात्वं साध्यते, न तावत् 'मिथ्याशब्दो अनिर्वचनीयतावचन' इति
पञ्चापादिकावचनात् सदसदत्वानधिकरणत्वरूपमनिर्वाच्यत्वं. As long as
mithyAtva is defined, in the words of the panchapAdika, as
"mithyA is that which is anirvachanIyam", and
anirvachanIyatva as not being the locus of sat or asat - how is
such a mithyAtva possible?

Why is mithyAtva as being different from sat and asat

untenable?
ष्
टसत् त्
वाभा
तद्धि किं असत्त्ववि ष्टसत्त्वाभाव : उत
वशि
सत्त्वात्यन्ताभावासत्त्वात्यन्ताभावरूपम् धर्मद्वयं, आहोस्वित्
सत्त्वात्यन्ताभाववत्त्वे सति असत्त्वात्यन्ताभावरूपं विशिष्टं?
Does sadasat vilakshaNatva mean
1) The absence of : sat endowed with asat, or
2) The two properties being the absence of sat and the
absence of asat, or
3) While the absolute absence of sat is present, the absolute
absence of asat also is present.

Let us look at an example to understand how these are

different. When we say daNDi puruSha:, we are referring to a
person with a stick. This could mean
1) A person with a stick
2) A person and a stick.
While these two appear to be the same, there is a subtle
difference between the two which can be understood when we
look at the absence, or abhAva of daNDi puruSha. When we say
daNDI puruSha: nAsti, we could either mean
1) the person is there, but the stick is not there.
2) the stick is there, but the person is not there.
3) both the person and the stick are not there.
The pratiyogi of the daNDi puruSha abhAva is the puruSha only
(not daNDa), whereas the pratiyogi of daNDa and puruSha
abhAva is daNda and puruSha. Thus the expression "man with
stick" is different from the expression "man and stick".

Similarly, the nyAyAmritakAra wants to know whether the

mithyAtva of the world means that the world
1) has the absence of sat endowed with asat.
2) has the absence of sat and absence of asat.
3) has satvAbhAva present along with asatvAbhAva

According to him, there are problems in each of these

alternatives.
 ष्
टसत् त्
वानभ् यु
पगमा
नाद्य:, सत्त्वमात्राधारे जगत्यसत्त्ववि ष्टसत्त्वानभ्युपगमात् , विशिष्टाभावसाधने
त्
शि
सिद्धसाधनात् | The first alternative is untenable, as the dvaitin
holds the world is
endowed with reality. He is not claiming that the world is sat
endowed with asat. Therefore, in proving that the world is
mithyA, ie it is not sat endowed with asat, the advaitin is
proving something that the dvaitin already accepts. Thus it is a
case of siddha sAdhAna. He might as well save his breath.

A second objection possible is that a thing such as sat mixed

with asat is impossible, therefore denying it is impossible too.
However, while the dvaitin does not make such a claim, it is
possible for the naiyyAyika to do so. The reason is because
dvaita and nyAyA treat asat differently.

In nyAya, if there is absence, abhAvam, it must have a counter-

positive, pratiyogi. A pot must be present somewhere for it to
be absent. A thing never present anywhere cannot be said to
be absent. The dvaitin does not require that abhAva, as a rule,
must have a pratiyogi.

According to dvaita, asat can be the object of verbal

expression, ie it can said to be non existent. In nyAya, asat
cannot even be spoken as non-existent, as it is not available
for any verbal expression, including as "nAsti", non-existence.

The naiyyAyika differentiates atyantAbhAvam from asat - that

which is present in one thing, but completely absent in all
three periods of time in other things is atyantAbhAvam for him.
In wind, vAyu, rUpa or form has atyantAbhAvam, because rUpa
is present elsewhere. If form was not present anywhere, it
cannot be said to be absent either.

So, if something is said to be non-existent, that non-existence

can only refer to atyantAbhAvam, not asat. asat cannot even
be said to not exist.

Therefore, while the dvaitin can point out the logical fallacies
in the absence of sat endowed with asat, the naiyyAyika can
add another objection that such a thing as sat mixed with asat
itself is an impossibility, and thus to deny it is also an
impossibility.

न द्वितीयः, सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरेकाभावे अपरसत्त्वायकत्वेन कत् वेनश्य

व्याघातात्,
निर्धर्मकब्रह्मवत्सत्त्वासत्त्वराहित्ये अपि सद्रूपत्वेन अमिथ्यात्वोपपत्त्या अर्थान्तराच्च,
शुक्तिरूप्ये अबाध्यत्वरूपसत्त्वव्यतिरेकस्य सत्त्वेन बाध्यत्वरूप असत्त्वस्य
व्यतिरेक असिद्ध्या साद्धयवैकल्याच्च।

The second option is "where satyatva and asatyatva both are

not present" is mithyA. The nyAyAmritakAra objects to this for
three reasons -
कत्वेनश्य
सत्त्वासत्त्वयोरेकाभावे अपरसत्त्वायकत्वेन व्याघातात्,
a) If sattva (existence) is not present in a substratum, asattva
(non-existence) must automatically be present, and vice versa.
Thus to say that both are not present in a place is an
impossibility.

निर्धर्मकब्रह्मवत्सत्त्वासत्त्वराहित्ये अपि सद्रूपत्वेन अमिथ्यात्वोपपत्त्या अर्थान्तराच्च

b) The advaitin says that Brahman is nirdharmakam, it has no
attributes. Thus Brahman too is free from the attributes of
existence and non existence. Hence, Brahman too is a
substratum where the attributes of sattva and asattva are
absent. Brahman too is sadasat vilakshaNam, but brahman is
not mithyA. Therefore the world, which according to the
advaitin is sadasat vilakshaNam, is just like Brahman, which is
sat. The world ends up being sat, not mithyA. Therefore, this
sAdhya leads to the defect of arthAntara, or proving something
other than what is desired.
arthAntara is of two kinds - अभिमतार्थ असिद्धिः अनभिमतार्थ
सिद्धि: - not proving what one wants to prove, or proving
something other than what you want to prove. This is a case of
the latter.

c) शुक्तिरूप्ये अबाध्यत्वरूपसत्त्वव्यतिरेकस्य सत्त्वेन बाध्यत्वरूप असत्त्वस्य

व्यतिरेक असिद्ध्या साद्धयवैकल्याच्च। The third defect is related to the
example given for mithyA, the illusion of the shell-silver. The
illusion of silver seen in the shell is sublated when the shell is
seen. Thus sat, which is of the nature of unsublatability, is
absent in shell-silver. The absence of asat, of the nature of
sublatability, is also not proven, as shell-silver is sublated.
Thus while sat is absent, asat is not. Therefore,
sadasatvilakshaNatva, the sAdhya, does not exist in shell
silver.

It is necessary for the sAdhya and hetu to be present in the

drishTAnta, as this allows the perceiver to conclude a vyApti,
or invariable concomitance between the hetu and sAdhya
based on their co-presence in the example. That is, if he
cannot conclude that wherever the hetu is present, the sAdhya
must be necessarily present, he cannot use this rule to infer
the presence of the sAdhya in the paksha, by perceiving the
presence of the hetu in the paksha.

The absence of sAdhya from the drishTAnta is a defect called

sAdhyavaikalya.

अत एव न तृतीय:, पूर्ववत्व्याघात्, अर्थान्तरात्साध्यवैकल्याच्च thus the

third option - where sattva abhAva is present together with
asattva abhAva - is not possible. Like the option before, it
suffers from a) vyAghAta - the issue of impossibility, b)
arthAntaram - the flaw of proving the reality of the world and c)
sAdhya vaikalya - the defect of the example not having the
sAdhya of mithyAtva.

Until now, we have looked at the arguments of the

nyAyAmritakAra. How will the siddhikAra respond? We will
consider this in the next lesson.
prathama mithyAtva vichAra:
(part 2)
We had previously seen the nyAyAmritakAra's refutations of
the first definition of mithyAtva, sadasat vilakshaNatvam. He
had proposed three alternative meanings for this definintion,
namely
1) the absence of existence that is endowed with non-
existence, or
2) The two properties of the absence of existence and the
absence of non-existence, or
3) The absence of existence and the absence of non-existence
being simultaneously present.

He had suggested that there were errors with each of these

alternatives, which invalidate sadasat vilakshaNatvam as a
definition for mithyAtva.

We now look at the siddhikAra's response.

The siddhikAra replies:

इति चेत्, मैवम् | If this is the argument of the pUrvapakshi, not so.

The siddhikAra does not choose to defend the accusations

leveled against the first option as he does not consider that to
be the intended meaning of mithyAtva. In relation to the
second alternative, he says:

सत्त्वात्यन्ताभावासत्त्वात्यन्ताभावरूपधर्मद्वयविवक्षायां दोषाभावात् |
There are no faults in taking the meaning of sadasat
vilakshaNatva as the second alternative - the two properties
being the absolute absence of existence and the absolute
absence of non-existence.

Coming to the second alternative, the nyAyAmritakAra had

cited three problems with this.
1) Contradiction / Impossibility - if sat is absent, asat must
automatically be present, and vice versa.
2) Proving something other than what is intended - The
attributeless Brahman cannot have sat (existence) as its
attribute - that would be a contradiction in terms. (Thus, it
cannot have asat as its attribute too). Despite lacking the
attributes of sat and asat, Brahman is sat. The advaitin wants
to say that the world lacks the attributes of sat and asat. If
Brahman can be sat without having sat and asat as its
attributes, so can the world. This leads to the world being sat,
not mithyA. This definition of mithyAtva ends up with
arthAntara, proving something other than that which is
intended.
3) Failure to establish mithyAtva in the example: The shell-
silver is sublated, thus it is asat (according to the dvaitin).
Therefore it is not sadasatvilakshaNa or mithyA. If the example
used in the mithyAtva anumAna itself is not mithyA, how can
the world be mithyA?

vyAghAta - Contradiction / Impossibility

The first of these, contradiction, is taken up for analysis by the
siddhikAra. He says:

नच व्याहति: | There is no contradiction either.

The siddhikAra suggests that for sat and asat to be mutually
exclusive, one of the following three reasons must hold true:

सा हि सत्त्वासत्त्वयो: परस्परविरहरूपतया वा, परस्परविरहव्यापकतया वा,

परस्परविरहव्याप्यतया वा
1) they are paraspara abhAva - each is the absence of the
other. The absence of sat is asat. The absence of asat is sat.
Here sat and asat are not two things.
2) they are paraspara viraha vyApakam - the absence of sat
implies the presence of asat. The absence of asat implies the
presence of sat.
3) they are paraspara viraha vyApya - the presence of sat
implies the absence of asat. The presence of asat implies the
absence of sat.

तत्र नाद्य:, तदनङ्गीकारात् | The first of these possibilities is not

acceptable to us.
तथाह्यत्र त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्त्वव्यतिरेको नासत्त्वं, किन्तु क्वचिदप्योपाधौ
सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वानधिकरणत्वं - asat is not the absence of a sat
which is unsublated in any of the three periods of time. Rather,
(according to us) asat is that which does not appear in any
locus. The unsublatability of sat and the lack of appearance of
asat are not the mutual absence of each other.
तद्व्यतिरेकच श्चसाध्यत्वेन विवक्षित: | The absence of such an asat and
sat is what is meant by the sAdhya of mithyA.
तथाच त्रिकालाबाध्यविलक्षणत्वे सति क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वरूपम्
साध्यं पर्यवसितम् | The meaning of the sAdhya (mithyAtva) that
emerges is that which is different from the eternally
unsublatable and that which is capable of appearing as
existing in some locus.

sAdhyavaikalyam - mithyAtva not proven in the example

एवञ्च सति न शुक्तिरूप्ये साध्यवैकल्यमपि That being so, the sAdhya is
not absent from the example of shell-silver (there is no sAdhya
vaikalya).The shell-silver is sublated when the shell is seen (so
it is not the unsublatable sat), and at the same time, it is seen
(thus not asat). Therefore it is neither sat, nor asat.
According to the dvaitin, asat is that which is sublatable. That
is not the intended meaning of asat in sadasatvilakshaNatvam.
बाध्यत्वरूपासत्त्वव्यतिरेकस्य साध्याप्रवे त्त् The absence of an asat
शा
that is sublatable is not intended in the sAdhya. Put simply, by
asat vilakshaNam, we do not mean the negation of
sublatability, but the negation of non-appearance.
नापि व्याघात:, परस्परविरहरूपत्वाभावात् there is no contradiction too, as
the nature of sat and asat is not one of mutual absence.

vyAghAta - Contradiction / Impossibility (continued)

The second possibility for mutual exclusion is if the absence of
one implies the presence of the other. The siddhikAra says this
is also ruled out.
अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि, सत्त्वाभाववति शुक्तिरूप्ये विवक्षितासत्त्वव्यतिरेकस्य विद्यमानत्वेन
व्यभिचारात्, The second option is also not possible. In the case of
shell-silver, the absence of sat does not imply the presence of
asat, as the shell-silver is available for appearance. The rule of
the nyAyAmritakAra was that if sat was absent, asat must be
present. In the shell-silver, the hetu of this rule is present, but
the sAdhya of this rule is not. Thus this rule has a vyabhichAra,
exception, in the case of the shell-silver. It is not universally
true.

नापि तृतीय:, तस्य व्याघाताप्रयोजकत्वात्, गोत्वाश्वत्वयो: परस्परविरहव्याप्यत्वे अपि

तदभावयोरुष्ट्रादावेकत्र सहोपलम्भात् |
The third reason for mutual exclusion that may be offered is
that the presence of one implies the absence of the other.
However, upon examination, this does not result in
contradiction either. For example, a cow cannot be a horse, and
vice-versa. Therefore, where there is "cow-ness" there can be
no "horse-ness". However, despite the presence of cowness
implying the absence of horseness (and vice-versa), this in
itself does not mean that the absence of cowness and the
absence of horseness cannot co-exist in another entity. Both
are simultaneously absent in a camel. So, even if the presence
of sat implies the absence of asat (and vice versa), their co-
absence (mithyAtva) is not an impossibility.

The defects of vyAghAta and sAdhyavaikalya cited by the

nyAyAmritakAra cited have been addressed.

arthAntara - Proving something other than what is intended

The defect of arthAntara will be taken up next.
यच्च निर्धर्मकस्य ब्रह्मण: सत्त्वराहित्येऽपि सद्रूपवत्प्रपञ्चस्य
सद्रूपत्वेनामिथ्यात्वोपपत्त्या अर्थान्तरम् - उक्तं. it was said (by the
nyAyAmritakAra) - as the attributeless Brahman is considered
sat despite the absence of sat attribute (and absence of asat
attribute), the world can be considered sat (despite having the
absence of sat and asat attributes), leading to arthAntara.
The siddhikAra replies:
तन्न This is not correct.
The siddhikAra gives two reasons for disproving this. There is
no sAdhaka pramANa (positive proof) to prove that the objects
of the world are sat like Brahman. Further, there is a bAdhaka
pramANa (negative proof) that proves that the objects of the
world are not sat like Brahman.

एकेनैव सर्वानुगतेन सर्वत्र सत्प्रतीत्युपपत्तौ ब्रह्मवत् प्रपञ्चस्य

प्रत्येकं सत्स्वभावताकल्पने मानाभावात्, अनुगतव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गाच्च |

एकेनैव सर्वानुगतेन सर्वत्र सत्प्रतीत्युपपत्तौ - It is the one existence

that inheres in every object, leading to the appearance of the
object as existing. Why?

ब्रह्मवत् प्रपञ्चस्य प्रत्येकं सत्स्वभावताकल्पने मानाभावात् because there

is no pramANa (or valid proof) to conclude that each of the
objects that constitute this world has a sat like Brahman. The
objects of the world are all different. If each different object
was uniquely sat, there would be multiple existences. That is,
there would be an infinite set of realities corresponding to the
infiniteness of creation. Not only would existences be
manifold, it would also mean that each object would appear to
have a different sat. However, there is no pramANa to conclude
such a thing.

अनुगतव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गाच्च on the other hand, this contradicts

everyday experience, where every object in the world appears
to have the same existence inherent in it. The objects may
have differences between them, when we say they exist, it
means the same thing, irrespective of which object we refer to.
If the existence was different between objects, why do we use
the same word, "is", to describe the existence of a pot and the
existence of a table?

It can be argued that a common word does not necessarily

denote a common attribute. That is true, but not applicable
here. Words are sometimes used based on the nature of
objects (shabda pravritti nimittam is based on some quality in
the object denoted by the word). For example, different
animals of the same species are called "cow" on the basis of
the anugata dharma, common attribute of cowness (gotva). If
one knows what a cow looks like, the next time one sees an
animal of the species, one is able to identify it as a cow.

However, the word may not be based on an inherent quality of

the denoted object. For example, two people may share the
same name, Devadatta, but there is no inherent
"devadattatvam" between them. In this case, just because I
know one Devadatta, the next time another person with the
same name appears, I am unable to identify that individual as
Devadatta on the basis of an inherent Devadattatvam.

If existence was not an anugata dharma, a common attribute

in all existent things, then if I see an object for the first time,
like in the case of the second Devadatta, I would be unable to
know of its existence. However, everyday experience is not
that - irrespective of whether I know an object beforehand or
not, if I see it, I automatically assume its existence.

Thus saying that every object of the world was sat like
Brahman would mean that each sat is different. There is no
pramANa for that. It also means that I cannot use the same
word to describe all their existence.
prathama mithyAtva vichAra:
(part 3)
In the previous lesson, the first and second options for the
meaning of sadasatvilakshaNatva were considered. Now the
third option suggested by the nyAyAmritakAra is taken up for
discussion. However, instead of considering the third option as
"sattvAbhAvam and asattvAbhAvam present together in one
substratum" (because the arguments and the
counterarguments would be quite similar to the second
option), the siddhikAra takes this option as "that which is
different from sat and asat", that is, satbheda and asatbheda
pratiyogi.

To understand the difference between the two, we need to

consider the difference between atyantAbhAva and bheda
(anyonyAbhAva). The logician holds that there is a difference
between the two. According to him, abhAva and its pratiyogi
(i.e. absence and the thing absent) can be present in the same
substratum, whereas bheda and its pratiyogi (a substance, and
that which it is different from) cannot.

The former, where absence and its counter-positive are

present in the same location, is a special case which in nyAya
is called avyApyavritti. Take the example of a monkey sitting
on a tree. The naiyyAyika says that there is a type of a
relationship between the monkey and the tree called samyoga,
where the monkey is in physical contact with the tree. The
monkey is sitting at the top of the tree, not the bottom. Thus
samyoga sambandha between the monkey and the tree exists
at the top of the tree, but is absent at the bottom of the tree.
Thus both samyoga and its abhAva exists in the same
adhikaraNa.

However, a pot and that which is different from a pot, cannot

exist in the same place.
Thus absence and difference are different.

Extending this to mithyA, the siddhikAra says

सत्प्रतियोगिकासत्प्रतियोगिकभेदद्वयं वा साध्यं - Alternatively, the
sAdhya can be that which is different from sat and that which
is different from asat.
तथाचोभयात्मकत्वे अन्यतरात्मकत्वे
वा, तादृग्भेदासंभवेन ताभ्यामर्थान्तरनवाकाश: | There is no possibility
of arthAntara (i.e. proving something other than what is meant)
because this definition of difference is not possible in the case
of that which is both sat and asat or that is only one of the two
(ie sat only or asat only).

Further, this sAdhya will not be siddha sAdhana (proving what

is already known) for any of these three groups of people -
those who hold the world to be sat, those who hold it to be
asat, those who hold it to be sadasat.

न च - असत्त्वव्यतिरेकांशस्यासद्भेदस्य च प्रपञ्चे सिद्धत्वेनांशत:

सिद्धसाधनमिति वाच्यं - do not argue thus - "as the world being
different from asat is already known, it leads to a part of the
sAdhya already being known, leading to partial siddha
sAdhana".

The opponent already accepts that the world is different from

asat, thus a part of what needs to be proved - that it is
different from sat and asat - is already known. This leads to
amshatah siddha sAdhana, or partial redundancy. The
siddhikAra rejects this line of argument, because the nature of
what we are trying to prove falls outside the scope of
amshatah siddha sAdhanam.

To prove why, he cites an example which is accepted by

everyone as not having amshatah siddhasAdhanam. Comparing
this to the case at hand, he argues that calling mithyA as
different from sat and asat is also not a case of amshatah
siddhasAdhanam.

We take a slight detour to consider an argument between the

bhedAbheda vAdi and the tArkika. The bhedAbheda vAdi says
that wherever there is sAmAnAdhikaraNyam (sharing a
common locus), there is bhedAbheda (difference and lack of
difference). When we say "this pot is black", black is guNa
(attribute), pot is dravyam / guNi (the substance). This is an
instance of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam, where both blackness and
potness are found in the same locus. The argument of the
bhedAbheda vAdi is that an attribute and its substratum are
both similar and different.

The statement "this pot is a cloth" - is not a case of

sAmAnAdhikaraNyam. Because it is not possible for pot-ness
and cloth-ness to exist within the same locus. Therefore, we
can draw the conclusion that where two things are absolutely
different (bheda), sAmAnAdhikaraNya is not possible. On the
other hand, the statement "this pitcher is a jug" is not a case
of sAmAnAdhikaraNya, because the words 'pitcher' and 'jug'
are synonyms, referring to the same object. It is not a case of
two things sharing one locus, both words refer to only one
object. Thus where there is identity, abheda,
sAmAnAdhikaraNya is not possible there also. Therefore, the
bhedAbheda vAdi draws the conclusion that
sAmAnAdhikaraNya and bhedAbheda share a invariable
concomitance ie wherever sAmAnAdhikaraNya is present,
bhedAbheda is present as well. He uses this vyApti to draw the
conclusion that the relationship between an attribute and its
substratum is a case of bhedAbheda.

The bhedAbheda vAdi uses this vyApti to make the inference

"As sAmAnAdhikaraNya is present between the attribute and
the substratum, they must have bhedAbheda between them."
The naiyyAyika holds that the attribute and substratum have
bheda, are different. Thus he seeks to disprove the anumAna
made by the bhedAbheda vAdi.
However, in refuting the bhedAbheda vAdi's argument, the
naiyyAyika does not take recourse to amshatah
siddhasAdhanam. He does not say, I already know that they
have bheda, why are you trying to prove bhedAbheda to me? He
does not do so because he realises that the aspect of the
sAdhya that he does not accept, abheda, is not sufficient for a
vyApti with sAmAnAdhikaraNya.
As there can be no sAmAnAdhikaraNya with only one element,
the bhedAbhedavAdi has to say that the sAdhya is
bhedAbheda.

The naiyyAyika refutes this anumAna in a different way, but

that is outside the scope of the present context. The important
thing to the topic at hand is that he concedes that this
anumAna does not have amshatah siddhasAdhanam.

The siddhikAra says, if the naiyyAyika does not cite amshatah

siddhasAdhanam against the bhedAbheda vAdi, why are you
citing amshatah siddhasAdhanam against me under similar
circumstances?

'गुणादिकं गुण्यादिना भिन्नाभिन्नं समानाधिकृतत्वादिति' भेदाभेदवादिप्रयोगे

प्
रतीत्
यसिद्
धेर्
तार्किकाद्यङ्गीकृतस्य भिन्नस्य सिद्धावपि उद्देयप्रतीत्यसिद्धेर्यथायथा श्य
न
सिद्धसाधनं | "the attribute and substance are different-and-not-
different, on account of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam", in this piece of
inference by the bhedAbheda vAdi, the logician who holds that
they are different, does not cite the doSha of siddha sAdhanam
- because it is not sufficient to say that there is abheda for
sAmAnAdhikaraNya to be present.

The power of the hetu to prove the presence of the sAdhya lies
in the hetu always being present with the sAdhya. If the hetu is
present even without the sAdhya, it cannot establish the
sAdhya in the paksha. There can be no smoke without fire.
Similarly, the bhedAbhedavAdin argues that both bheda and
abheda have to be present for sAmAnAdhikaraNya to be
present. The siddhikAra extends this to say that difference
from both sat and asat have to be present together for
drishyatvam to be present.

If that is the case, when can amshatah siddhasAdhanam

occur? It can occur when the sAdhya (pakshatA
avacChedakam) is multiple. To explain - if I want to prove that
all men are mortal and intelligent, the sAdhya is two-fold. We
are seeking to establish both mortality and intelligence in men.
If my opponent already knows that all men are mortal, then I
would be committing amshatah siddhasAdhanam. It would be
sufficient if I prove intelligence alone. By doing that, I would
have achieved my objective of proving mortality (already
accepted) and intelligence (proved now) in men.

तथा प्रकृते अपि मिलितप्रतीतेरुद्देश्यत्वान्न सिद्धसाधनं in our context (sadasat

vilakshaNa), its only when the sAdhya consists of both
elements (sat bhedam asat bhedam) together, can the desired
objective be achieved.

The pUrvapakshi may argue, in the case of bhedAbhedam, one

needs to have both bheda and abheda for the hetu of
sAmAnAdhikaraNya to be present. The hetu for the advaitin is
drishyatvam (knowability). For drishyatvam, you do not
need both sad bhedam and asat bhedam, it is sufficient if you
have asat bhedam. Why are you seeking both?

To this, the siddhikAra says - the case of bhedAbheda is not

different from sadasatvilakshaNam.
यथा तत्त्वाभेदे घट: कु म्भ इति सामानिधिकरण्यप्रतीते: अदर्नेनर्शनेन मिलित्सिद्धेरुद्देश्या,
तथा प्रकृते अपि सत्त्वरहिते तुच्छे दृश्यत्वादर्शनेन मिलितस्य तत्प्रयोजकतया
मिलितसिद्धेरुद्देश्ये इति समानं just like sAmAnAdhikaraNya cannot be
seen by abheda alone (the pitcher and a jar, do not have
sAmAnAdhikaraNya as they are one and the same), in the
present conext too, drishyatva is not necessarily present if you
have only asatbhinnam (Brahman is asatbhinnam, but it is not
drishyam) or satbhinnam (a hare's horn is satbhinnam, but it is
not drishyam). drishyatva can necessarily be present only
when satbhedam and asatbhedam are simultaneously present.
The two cases are similar.

अतएव सत्त्वात्यन्ताभावे अपि सत्यसत्त्वात्यन्ताभावरूपं साध्यं विशिष्टं

साध्यमित्यपि साधु । therefore, the third option of the
nyAyAmritakAra, the absence of sat and the absence of asat
present in conjunction can also be accepted as the sAdhya. In
this section, he had started off by proving the simultaneous
presence of difference from sat and difference from asat as an
acceptable sAdhya. He extends this to the simultaneous
absence of sat and absence of asat.

न च - मिलितस्य विशिष्टस्य वा साध्यत्वे तस्य कु त्राप्रसिद्ध्या अप्रसिद्धवि षणत्वंशे

षणत्वं,
प्रत्येकं सिद्ध्या मिलितस्य विशिष्टस्य वा साधने, शशशृङ्गयोः प्रत्येकं प्रसिद्ध्या
शशीयशृङ्गंसाधनमपि स्यादिति - वाच्यम्;
The opponent argues: The absence of sat present
simultaneously with asat is not seen anywhere. If you, the
advaitin argue that, as each is individually seen in separate
places, one can join those two elements to get to the sAdhya,
we would say that by that logic, we can prove that a hare's
horn is also capable of being seen. We see a hare in one place,
we see a horn elsewhere. Can we join these two to say that a
hare's horn can be seen? Therefore, your sAdhya of
sadasatvilakshaNam is aprasiddham, not observed anywhere.
The siddhikAra says, if this your argument, that is incorrect
because:

तथाविधप्रसिद्धेः शुक्तिरूप्ये एवोक्तत्वात् | I have already proved how

sadasatvilakshaNatva is possible in the case of the shell silver.

The sAdhya of mithyA can also be said to be the lakshaNa,

definition of mithyA. The pUrvapakshi wants to say that such a
definition of mithyA would lead to ativyApti (ie the definition
applies to an entity that is not mithyA).

न च निर्धर्मकत्वात् ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वासत्त्वरूपधर्मद्वय)न्न्

यत्वेनशूतत्र अतिव्याप्तिः
यत्वेन
The opponent says that this lakshaNa has ativyApti doSha
because Brahman, being without attributes, has neither sat,
nor asat as its attributes. This is the same as the lakshaNa,
and therefore Brahman would be covered by this definition of
mithyA, therefore this is ativyApti. The siddhikAra says, no.

What does ativyApti mean? It means that the definition

(lakshaNa) covers something that is not meant to be covered
by it (alakshya). If Brahman is without attributes, how can it
have the attributes of sat atyantAbhAvam and asat
atyantAbhAvam? Therefore, by nirdharmakam, perhaps what is
meant by the pUrvapakshi is that Brahman does not have
bhAva rUpa dharma, but it does have abhAvarUpa dharma.

Sattvam itself can be abhAva rUpam. How? Because sattvam is

that which is abAdhyam - that which is not sublatable. That is
the absence of sublatability is sat.

सद्रूपत्वेन ब्रह्मणः तदत्यन्त्याभावानधिकरणत्वात् As Brahman is sat

(ie it is bAdhyatva abhAva), it cannot have sat atyantAbhAva.
Thus the lakshaNa of mithyA cannot apply to Brahman.

निर्धर्मकत्वेनैवाभावरूपधर्मानधिकरणत्वाच्चेति दिक् If Brahman means that it is

nirdharmakam (ie it has neither bhAva rUpa or abhAva rUpa
dharmas), it cannot have the attributes of sat atyantAbhAva or
asat atyantAbhAva either. Thus the lakshaNam cannot apply
there.

The nyAyAmritakAra had made several objections to this

definition of mithyA - if we apply the principles outlined in this
chapter, all of them can be addressed. This brings us to the
end of the chapter titled prathama mithyAtva vichAra:.
dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
1)
The second and third definitions of mithyAtva were proposed
by Sri PrakAshAtma yati, in the panchapAdika vivaraNam, or
vivaraNam in short, which is a commentary on PadmapAda's
panchapAdika.

The nyAyAmritakAra takes up the second definition of

mithyAtva for refutation.
प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं वा मिथ्यात्वं । The counter-
positive (pratiyogi) of the absence in three periods of time in
the locus of its appearance is mithyA. In other words, the
absence of an object in all three periods of time in the very
location in which it appears is mithyA. We need to pay
attention to three things in the definition
1) pratiyogi - the object that is mithyA
2) pratipanna upAdhi - the substratum in which it appears
3) traikAlika niShedha - the absolute absence - in all three
periods of time

The objections of the nyAyAmritakAra - the ontological

status of the absence

The refutation of this definition by the nyAyAmritakAra is

around the sattA, the degree of reality, of the absence. In the
case of the shuktirUpya, the shell-silver, the silver that appears
is prAtibhAsika. The shell is vyAvahArika. What is the degree of
reality of the silver's absence in the shell?

He asks:
ननु प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधस्य तात्त्विकस्य अद्वैतहानिः,
प्रातिभासिकसत्त्वे सिद्धसाधनं, व्यवहारिकत्वेऽपि तस्य बाध्यत्वेन
तेरतत् त्
वा वेदकत्
तात्त्विकसत्त्वाविरोधतया अर्थान्तरं, अद्वैतरुतेरतत्त्वावेदकत्वं वंश्रुच
तत्प्रतियोगिनः अप्रातिभासिकस्य प्रपञ्चस्य पारमार्थिकत्वं च स्यात् ।
ननु प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधस्य तात्त्विकस्य अद्वैतहानिः If the
absence of the object in all three periods of time is
pAramArthika, has ultimate reality, then it contradicts advaita
because there would be two objects that have pAramArthika
sat, ultimate reality - Brahman, and the absence referred to
here.

प्रातिभासिकसत्त्वे सिद्धसाधनं if the absence is prAtibhAsikam,

then it is proving that the world is real, which is my position.
That is siddha sAdhana. Take the example of an object, say a
pot, which is actually present, but due to some error in
perception, it is not seen. In such cases, the absence of the
pot is prAtibhAsikam, but the pot itself has existence.
Therefore, by calling its absence as prAtibhAsikam, it ends up
proving the pratiyogi's reality.

व्यवहारिकत्वेऽपि तस्य बाध्यत्वेन तात्त्विकसत्त्वाविरोधतया अर्थान्तरं if the

absence is vyAvahArika, then by definition, it will be sublated.
If the negation itself is sublatable, it may not be able to
disprove the ultimate reality of the counterpositive. Thus the
sublatability of the absence may end up proving the reality of
the thing which was considered absent. This is a case of
arthAntara, proving something other than what was intended.
It ends up proving the ultimate reality of the world.

To explain, if the absence is vyAvahArika, the pratiyogi cannot

be vyAvahArika - it is not possible for a thing and its absence
to have the same degree of reality and for the two to co-exist
simultaneously in one place, as that would be a contradiction,
viruddham. The advaitin does not accept the naiyyAyika
concept of avyApya vritti (discussed in the previous lesson).

However, it is possible for absence to be of a different degree

of reality than its pratiyogi. For example, the absence of the
shell-silver in the shell is vyAvahArika, but the shell silver is
prAtibhAsika. The shell-silver is absent when it appears.
Similarly, as we saw in the previous example, when the
absence was taken as prAtibhAsikam, the pot was vyAvahArika
and its absence was prAtibhAsika. The pot is not seen despite
being present.

Therefore, the nyAyAmritakAra argues that if the absence of

the world is vyAvahArika, it is possible for the pratiyogi to have
pAramArthika sattA, as such an abhAva would not be
contradictory to the pAramArthika sattvam of its pratiyogi, the
world. If the world is pAramArthika, it ends up proving
something other than what the advaitin wants, leading to
arthAntara.

तेरतत्त्
वावेदकत्वं
अद्वैतरुतेरतत्त्वावेदकत्वं श्रुच Further, it leads to advaita shruti
teaching unreal things. The advaitin claims that the mithyAtva
of the world is on the basis of shruti statements such as neha
nAnAsti kinchana (there is no multiplicity here). If the
mithyAtva (the absence of the world) is really vyAvahArika,
then it is ultimately sublatable, ie such an absence is mithyA.
advaita shruti, which teaches this mithyA absence, is teaching
an unreal thing. The prAmANya of veda, the validity of what it
is teaching is itself called into question.

तत्प्रतियोगिनः अप्रातिभासिकस्य प्रपञ्चस्य पारमार्थिकत्वं च स्यात् - the

pratiyogi of the absence, which is the non-prAtibhAsika world,
will end up being pAramArthika. If the abhAva of the world is
vyAvhAhArika, what is the nature of the world? It cannot be
prAtibhAsika, because the advaitin himself agrees it is not
prAtibhAsika. If it is vyAvahArika, then both abhAva and
pratiyogi will be of the same order of reality, and that will be a
contradiction. Therefore it cannot be vyAvahArika. Therefore
the only option is pAramArthika.

The reply of the siddhikAra - if the absence was

pAramArthika
इति चेत् न The siddhikAra says, if this is your argument, no.

He does not refute the option of abhAva having prAtibhAsika

sattA because that is not advaita siddhAnta. He takes up the
first option, abhAva being pAramArthikam.

प्रपञ्चनिषेधाधिकारिणीभूतब्रह्माभिन्नत्वान्निषेधस्य तात्त्विकत्वेऽपि
नाद्वैतहानिकरत्वं What is the abhAva that is being talked about? The
nature of the absence of the world is the substratum, Brahman
itself. If such an abhAva is tAttvika, ie pAramArthika, that does
not harm non-duality. When shruti says neha nAnAsti kinchana,
the "iha"- 'here', referred to is brahman. Thus the negation is
adhikaraNAtmakam. It is Brahman itself.

नच तात्त्विकाभावप्रतियोगिन: प्रपञ्चस्य तात्त्विकत्वापत्ति: Further, there

is no requirement that an abhAva that is pAramArthika needs
to have a pratiyogi that is pAramArthika. Thus, this does not
lead to the world have pAramArthika sattA. Why not?

तात्त्विकाभाविनि शुक्तिरजतादौ कल्पिते व्यभिचारात् because while the absence

of the shell silver is tAttvika (meaning vyAvahArika here), the
shell silver itself is prAtibhAsika. Thus, it is not necessary that
the reality of the absence implies the reality of the object.

Now, even though the siddhikAra has justified that abhAva can
be pAramArthika by arguing that abhAva is really the the
substratum, ultimately his view is that abhAva is
vyAvahArika. The reason for this is that every abhAva needs a
pratiyogi. If the nature of abhAva is Brahma svarUpa then what
pratiyogi can there be? As Brahman is completely free of
relations of any kind, there can be no anuyogi-pratiyogi relation
with anything.

It is possible to address this objection by saying that it is

possible for the same vastu to have two different aspects - one
with relations and one without. Take Dasharatha for example.
He is well known as Rama's father. Therefore, the one and the
same Dasharatha has dasharathatvam ("being Dasharatha" and
pitrtvam ("being a father"). One cannot talk about pitrtvam
without a relationship with the son, therefore the attribute of
pitrtvam has a relation inherent in it, whereas Dasharathatvam
does not presuppose any relations.

Similarly, when Brahman is talked of as the absence of the

world, there is an anuyogi-pratiyogi relationship between
Brahman and the world. However, as shuddha Brahman, it has
no relations with anything. The purpose of attributing the
characteristic of the world's absence to Brahman is only for
the purpose of denying reality to the plurality that is the world.
Having served its purpose, the attribute is withdrawn.

Brahman endowed with atyantAbhAva, the absolute absence of

the world, is not pAramArthika because there is an expectation
of a pratiyogi for such an entity. Therefore, the siddhikAra's
motive is not in establishing abhAva as pAramArthika, it is only
in meeting the pUrvapakshi's objection.
dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
2)
we looked at the objections made by the nyAyAmritakAra to
the second definition of mithyAtva proposed by the
vivaraNakAra - प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं मिथ्यात्वं - the
absence in all three periods of time of an object in the locus of
its appearance.

He had asked, what is the sattA, the degree of reality, of the

absence of the world?
1) If prAtibhAsika, the absence is only illusory. In other words,
the world is not really absent, thus it is real. This has already
been accepted by the nyAyAmritakAra, thus the advaitin's
argument is siddha sAdhanam.
2) If pAramArthikam, then there are two ultimate realities -
Brahman and the world's absence. Thus the doctrine of non-
duality, which holds that nothing other Brahman is real, is
disproven.
3) If vyAvahArikam, then the absence itself must be sublatable.
As the absence and its counter-positive (the world) cannot co-
exist in one location if they have the same order of reality, the
world must have a different order of reality than its absence.
Thus the world cannot have vyAvahArika satya. The advaitin
already agrees that the world does not have prAtibhAsika
satya. Therefore the only option left is that the world has
pAramArthika satya. Thus there is arthAntara. The advaitin had
wanted to prove the world was mithyA, but ended up proving it
is pAramArthika satya.

The siddhikAra had not refuted the first option as that is not
the position of the advaitin. He had refuted the second option
by holding that pAramArthika abhAva, was Brahman itself. That
is, abhAva is adhikaraNa svarUpam. Therefore, there is no harm
to the doctrine of non-duality. However, the siddhikAra does not
hold the status of the absence as pAramArthika to be the
siddhAnta. His true intention is to establish that both the
object and its absence are vyAvahArika. Thus he says:

abhAva is vyAvahArika
अतात्त्विक एव वा निषेधोऽयम् | in fact, the absence is not pAramArthika
. The use of "एव" by the siddhikAra emphasises that his view is
that abhAva is not pAramArthika (although the arguments of
the nyAyAmritakAra were refuted even assuming abhAva was
pAramArthika).
अतात्त्विकत्वेऽपि न प्रातिभासिक:, किन्तु, व्यावहारिक: | While not being
pAramArthika, it is not prAtibhAsika, but vyAvahArika.
नच - तर्हि निषेधस्य बाध्यत्वेन तात्त्विकसत्त्वाविरोधित्वादर्थान्तरमिति - वाच्यं ;
Do not argue thus - "then, if the absence is vyAvahArika, it
must be sublatable, and therefore this leads to arthAntara as
such a sublatable absence cannot refute the world's
pAramArthikatvam."

Why?

The sublatability of absence does not imply the unsublatability

of its pratiyogi. Let us consider the example of a person who
sees an elephant in a dream. Later, in the dream itself he
realises that the elephant was only an illusion. He had
mistaken some other object, say a rock, as the elephant. Thus
both the dream elephant and its absence are prAtibhAsika, as
they both are dreamt. Therefore, while the dream elephant's
absence is sublatable (as it prAtibhAsika), that does not
necessarily imply that the abhAva pratiyogi, the dream
elephant must be unsublatable.

नात्
स्वाप्नार्थस्य स्वाप्ननिषेधेन बाधदर्नात्र्शThe object seen in a dream
and its absence are both sublatable.
निषेधस्य बाध्यत्वं पारमार्थिकसत्त्वाविरोधित्वे न तन्त्रं There is no rule
that the sublatability of absence means that it will be non-
contradictory to the unsublatability of the counter-positive.

The wording is a little tricky here, so we will dwell on it for a

bit. The siddhikAra wants to establish an important principle
here. He says that in order for us to use the degree of reality of
the absence to refute the reality of the object, this condition
must be met - the absence needs to be either of the same
order of reality as the object, or a higher order of reality than
the object.

Let us consider these three examples to see the principle in

effect:
1) A person sees an elephant in a dream, and within the dream
realises that what he saw was a rock. Thus the absence of the
elephant proves the mithyAtva of the elephant within the
dream itself. Both the elephant and its absence are
prAtibhAsika. Thus even if abhAva and its pratiyogi share the
same state of reality, the abhAva can prove the mithyAtva of
the pratiyogi.
2) A person sees an illusion of silver in the shell, and later
realises that the silver was never present there. Here, the
absence of shell-silver (vyAvahArika) is of a higher order of
reality than the shell silver (prAtibhAsika). Here too the
absence is able to prove the mithyAtva of the pratiyogi.
3) A person sees real silver. He later erroneously thinks that it
was not silver (ie silver was absent). This illusion is later
corrected. In this case, the silver is vyAvahArika, but the
silver's absence is prAtibhAsika. In this case, the abhAva is
incapable of establishing the pratiyogi's mithyAtva.

Therefore, avirodhitvam, ie the inability of the abhAva to

establish the sublatability of the pratiyogi, is not based on the
sublatability of the abhAva itself, but is based on whether the
abhAva is of a lower order of reality than the pratiyogi or not.

निषेधस्य बाध्यत्वं पारमार्थिकसत्त्वाविरोधित्वे न तन्त्रं किन्तु निषेध्यापेक्षया

न्यूनसत्ताकत्वम् The sublatability of the absence does not confer
unsublatability on the pratiyogi; on the other hand, the
unsublatability of the pratiyogi is as a result of the lower order
of reality of its absence.
प्रकृते च तुल्यसत्ताकत्वात् कथं न विरोधित्वं in the current context, as
both the world and its absence are of an equal order of reality
the absence of the world is sufficient to prove its mithyAtva
too.

This raises an issue. The negative of a negative is positive

and the absence of the absence of a thing is the object's
presence. Upon brahma jnAna, absence being vyAvahArika, is
sublated. That is, the absence is absent. Will the world's
presence not be established upon brahma jnAna? This is the
next objection raised by the nyAyAmritakAra.

The denial of a denial is not affirming the original

नच - निषेधस्य निषेधे प्रतियोगिसत्त्वापत्तिरीति - वाच्यं; The siddhikAra says:
Do not argue thus - "the negation of a negation leads to the
counter-positive's reality."

Why? The denial of a denial leads to the affirmation of the

original only under certain circumstances. If only the pratiyogi
is being negated, then the subsequent negation of the negation
will establish the reality of the pratiyogi. However, if both
absence and its counter-positive are negated, then the
sublation of the absence, does not establish the reality of the
counter-positive.

It sounds good, but is there an example where both absence

and its counter-positive are simultaneously negated? In nyAya,
there is. The naiyyAyika mentions that there are four kinds of
absence:

1) prAg abhAva - the absence of an object before it is created.

2) dhvamsa abhAva - the absence of an object after it is
destroyed.
3) atyantAbhAva - the total absence of the object.
4) anyonyAbhAva - the absence of another object in this object.
According to nyAya, prAgabhAva (prior absence) and dhvamsa
abhAva (posterior absence) are said to exist in the pratiyogi's
upAdAna kAraNa (the material cause). However, atyantAbhAva
(absolute absence) does not exist in the upAdAna kAraNa. For
example, the pot's prior absence and posterior absence are
present in clay, but absolute absence is absent. Meaning, a
lump of clay may be converted into a pot in the future, thus the
pot's prAgabhAva can be said to be present in clay. Similarly,
after the pot is destroyed, it gets destroyed into pot shards,
which are nothing but clay. Thus, dhvamsAbhAva is also
present in clay. However, one cannot say that a pot was not
ever present in this clay or it will not ever be present in this
clay. Thus atyantAbhAva of the pot cannot be said to be
existing in the clay. Further, when it is just a lump of clay, the
pot itself is not present in it, in the current moment. Thus while
the upAdAna kAraNa of an object contains the prAgabhAva and
dhvamsAbhAva, it does not contain the atyantAbhAva and the
pratiyogi, according to the naiyyAyika.

This is the example used by the siddhikAra. In the instance of

clay, both pratiyogi and atyantAbhAva are absent. In this case,
when we negate the pot's atyantAbhAva in the clay, it does not
necessarily mean its pratiyogi, the pot is present in the clay
right now. Thus the denial of a denial need not necessarily
imply the satyatva of the pratiyogi.

Similarly, in the shruti sentence, neha nAnAsti

kinchana, both the world and its absence are being negated
in Brahman, therefore, the reality of the world is not
established on brahma jnAna when the negation is sublated.
dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
3)
In the previous lesson, we had outlined the siddhikAra's
response to two objections made by the nyAyAmritakAra,
namely:
1) if the absence of the world implied in the second definition
of mithyAtva was vyAvahArika, it would lead to the reality of
the world.
2) the sublation of the absence would be a case of negating
the negation of the world's reality, thus proving the world's
reality - very much like in mathematics where the negative of a
negative is positive.

The siddhikAra says:

तत्र हि निषेधस्य निषेधे प्रतियोगिसत्त्वामायाति, यत्र निषेधस्य निषेधबुद्ध्या
प्रतियोगिसत्त्वं व्यवस्थाप्यते, निषेधमात्रं निषिध्यते -
where only the negation is negated, there the negation of the
negation will lead to the establishment of the counter-positive.
In any negation, there are two aspects - the object which is
absent, and the absence itself. The absence of absence will
lead to presence, where the absence is only of the absence.
However, sometimes, both the absence and the object are
simultaneously absent. In such instances, the absence of
absence does not imply the presence of the object.

यथा रजते नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानानन्तरमिदं नारजतमिति ज्ञानेन रजतं व्यवस्थाप्यते For
example, a person looks at real silver and mistakenly thinks
"this is not silver". After sometime, if the right knowledge later
arises "I was wrong before, this is silver indeed", such a
knowledge will establish the reality of silver.

What is being subsequently negated is only the negation, not

the pratiyogi, the silver.

यत्र तु प्रतियोगिनिषेधयोरुभयमपि निषेधस्तत्र न प्रतियोगिसत्त्वं However,

where both the pratiyogi and the negation are negated, the
negation of negation does not re-establish the reality of the
pratiyogi.

यथा ध्वंस समये प्रागभाव प्रतियोगिनोरुभयोर्निषेधे For example, in the

case of the destruction of an object, both the atyantAbhAva
and its pratiyogi are simultaneously negated.

In the previous article, we had looked at a special case in

nyAya, where both atyantAbhAva and its pratiyogi are absent at
the location of the dissolution of the object. When a pot breaks,
dhvamsAbhAva is said to be present in the broken pot-shards.
Where dhvamsAbhAva is present, the pot itself cannot be
present. Similarly, according to one school of nyAya, where
dhvamsAbhAva is present, atyantAbhAva is also not present.
Thus when a pot breaks, we can say that both atyantAbhAva
and pratiyogi are simultaneously absent in the pot-shards.
Such a negation of atyantAbhAva does not establish its
pratiyogi, the ghaTa.

Interestingly, the text of the siddhi only says prAgabhAva and

its pratiyogi are simultaneously negated. Why do we interpret
this as atyantAbhAva instead? According to the pUrvapakshi, it
is the negation of atyantAbhAva that establishes the reality of
the pratiyogi. Therefore, if all we are saying is that both
prAgabhAva and pratiyogi are being negated at the time of
destruction, that is not sufficient to disprove the pUrva
pakshi's argument.

Therefore, brahmAnanda, in his commentary to the advaita

siddhi, says that prAgabhAva must be interpreted as prAk
jnAtayo: abhAva: - that is, prior to knowing whether the pot and
its atyantAbhAva are present (prAk jnAtayo:), abhAva
(atyantAbhAva) and its pratiyogi are together negated.

A second way of interpreting prAgabhAva is as prAk ajnAtayo:

abhAva:. that is, prior to not knowing whether the pot and its
atyantAbhAva are present (prAk ajnAtayo:), abhAva
(atyantAbhAva) and its pratiyogi are together negated.

In both cases, the negation of both the pratiyogi and its

atyantAbhAva occurs simultaneously.

The siddhikAra continues:

एवंच प्रकृतेऽपि निषेधबाधके न प्रतियोगिन: प्रपञ्चस्य निषेधस्य च बाधनात् न निषेधस्य
बाध्यत्वेऽपि प्रपञ्चस्य तात्त्विकत्वम् । Therefore, in our context (the
negation of the world), as the world, which is the pratiyogi of
the negation (in the mithyAtva definition, traikAlika niShedha
pratiyogi), is also negated in the subsequent negation (by
shruti sentences such as neha nAnAsti kinchana), the
sublatability of the negation does not result in the reality of the
world.

उभयोरपि निषेध्यतावच्छेदकस्य दृश्यत्वादेस्तुल्यत्वात् because the hetu of

drishyatvam (knowability) in the mithyAtva anumAna is the
basis for the negation of both the world and its absence. The
world is knowable by pratyaksha. Its absence is knowable by
shruti. Thus both the world and its absence are knowable,
drishyam, and therefore both their negation is on the basis of a
common hetu.

We will discuss this further in the chapter on mithyAtva

mithyAtvam and drishyatva hetu upapattih.

Is veda atattvAvedakatvam?
The nyAyAmritakAra had argued that if the absence of the
world was vyAvahArika, then it would be sublatable. If it was
sublatable, then a shruti that teaches the absence of the world
would be teaching something which ultimately has to be
sublated - thus the prAmANya, or the veracity of the veda
would be called into question. The siddhikAra responds to this
charge:

नचातात्त्विकनिषेधबोधकत्वे श्रुतेरप्रामाण्यापत्ति: the shruti does not lose its

prAmANya in teaching about the sublatable absence of a
world.
ब्रह्मभिन्नं प्रपन्चनिषेधादिकं अतात्त्विकमित्यतात्त्विकत्वेन बोधयन्त्या:
श्रुतेरप्रामाण्यासंभवात् in teaching that the world, which is different
from brahman, is sublatable (ie it is absent even when it
appears), the veda is teaching that a mithyA object is not
ultimately real. There is no loss of prAmANya as a result. If
shruti had taught an unreal thing as real, or a real thing as
unreal, it would lose its prAmANya. However shruti is teaching
an unreal thing is unreal. Where is the loss of prAmANya here?

Is the world absolutely absent, or does it lack pAramArthika

sat?
The nyAyAmritakAra now considers whether we are denying
the absolute reality of the world, or whether we are denying
the world absolutely.

In the former, all we are saying is that world does not have
ultimate reality (ie, it has some provisional existence instead),
whereas in the latter, we are saying the world has no existence
whatsoever. He asks:

What is the nature of the negation? ननु - एतन्निषेधप्रतियोगित्वं किं

स्वरूपेण, उतासद्विलक्षणस्वरूपानुपमर्देन पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण वा | Is the
negation, absolute, or is the negation (only) the denial of an
absolute character, by means of its difference from asat and
sat?

नाद्य:,श्रुत्यादिसिद्धोत्पत्तिकस्य अर्थक्रियासमर्थस्य अविद्योपादानकस्य

तत्त्वज्ञाननायस्य स् यश्य
च वियदादे: रुप्यादेश्च असद्विलक्षणस्वरूपेण
त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगात् |
It cannot be the first, the absolute denial of existence in the
world. Because श्रुत्यादिसिद्धोत्पत्तिकस्य - shruti and anumAna say that
the world has been born from Brahman. How can you say it
does not exist at all? अर्थक्रियासमर्थस्य the world has utility and
it is the ground for vyavahAra, activity. It is not like the
absolutely non-existent rope-snake, which is incapable of
biting the seer - the results of activity in the world are real.
अविद्योपादानकस्य the advaitins themselves admit that ignorance
is the varying material cause of the universe. If the world did
not exist at all, why postulate a material cause?
तत्त्वज्ञाननायस्य स् the advaitins also say that the world is
यश्य
sublated by jnAna - a thing which absolutely does not exist
cannot be destroyed by knowledge either.
वियदादे: रुप्यादेश्च धीकालविद्यमानेन असद्विलक्षणस्वरूपेण
त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगात् the four yuktis provided here are
simultaneously present in both the world (space, etc) and
shell-silver, both of which exist at the time of perception and
are admitted by the advaitins as different from asat. How can
the negation be an absolute negation in all three periods of
time?

The nyAyAmritakAra is offering four reasons why the world

cannot be said to be absolutely absent -
1) It is admitted by shruti as being created.
2) It has utility and the rules of cause-effect are observed here.
3) It is admitted by the advaitins as having avidyA as its
material cause.
4) It is admitted by the advatins as being destroyed by
knowledge.

नापि द्वितीय:, अबाध्यत्वरूपपारमार्थिकत्वस्य बाध्यत्वरूपमिथ्यात्वनिरूपयत्वेन

अन्योन्यारयात् यात्, पारमार्थिकत्वस्यापि स्वरूपेण निषेधे प्रथमपक्षोक्तदोषापत्ति:,
श्र
अतस्तस्यापि पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण निषेधे अनवस्था स्यात्;
You cannot say that the world does not have ultimate reality
(absence of pAramArthikatvam) - it has some other reality
instead - either. Why not?

अबाध्यत्वरूपपारमार्थिकत्वस्य बाध्यत्वरूपमिथ्यात्वनिरूपयत्वेन
या
अन्योन्यारयात् , the absence of sublatability is
त्
श्र
pAramArthikatvam. According to you, mithyA is that which is
sublatable, ie it is the absence of pAramArthikatvam. Thus, the
absence of pAramArthikam is mithyA and the absence of
mithyA is pAramArthikam. There is mutual dependency in the
two concepts.

पारमार्थिकत्वस्यापि स्वरूपेण निषेधे प्रथमपक्षोक्तदोषापत्ति: if you say that

world is not present as pAramArthikam, it means the world
does not have pAramArthikatvam. This again begs the
question, is the absence of pAramArthikatvam its absolute
absence (svarUpa niShedha), or is it the absence of an
absolute pAramArthikatvam? If the former, then this is just like
the svarUpa niShedha that we covered perviously.

अतस्तस्यापि पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण निषेधे अनवस्था स्यात् If the latter, it

leads to infinite regress. If the nature of the absence of
absoluteness is the absence of absoluteness, then that will
just lead to infinite recursion.

Thus, says the nyAyAmritakAra, whichever you answer you

provide, you are trapped.
dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
4)
In the previous lesson on the topic, we had taken a look at an
objection raised by the nyAyAmritakAra to the second
definition of mithyAtvam - pratipanna upAdhau traikAlika
niShedha pratiyogitvam. The absence of an object in all three
periods of time in the locus of its appearance is mithyAtva.

The negation of the world is absolute

The nyAyAmritakAra had asked - is the negation of the world,
an absolute absence? Or is the negation an absence of
absoluteness? If the former, this contradicts shruti which says
that the world was created. A non-existent thing cannot be
created.

If the latter, negation is the absence of absoluteness

(pAramArthikatvam) - you had defined pAramArthika sat as
that which is abAdhyam (ie not mithyA), and now you have
defined mithyA as that which is not pAramArthikam. Thus the
absence of sat is mithyA and the absence of mithyA is sat.
There is anyonya Ashraya, or mutual dependency between the
definitions of sat and mithyA, leading to neither one being
proven. Secondly, if mithyA is the absence of pAramArthikam,
a mithyA object does not have pAramArthikatvam. Is the
absence of pAramArthikatvam in that object an absolute
absence or an absence of absoluteness? If the first, then all
the defects of an absolute absence are reiterated and if the
latter, is the absence of absoluteness an absolute absence or
an absence of absoluteness. This leads to infinite regress.

We now look at the siddhikAra's response to these arguments.

He says:
इति चेन्मैवं if this is the argument, not so.
स्वरूपेणैव त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वस्य प्रपञ्चे शुक्तिरूप्ये चाङ्गीकारात् we
hold that the negation of the pratiyogi in all three periods of
time is an absolute negation - that is, neither the world nor the
shell-silver are existent in any of the three periods of time.
How?
तथाहि - शुक्तौ रजतभ्रमानान्तरं अधिष्ठानतत्वसाक्षात्कारे रूप्यं नास्ति नासीन्नभविष्यतीति
स्वरूपेणैव, 'नेह नाने'ति श्रुत्या च प्रपञ्चस्य स्वरूपेणैव निषेधप्रतीते: - after the
illusion of silver seen in a shell is removed by the direct
knowledge of the shell, the substratum, the negation of silver
is absolute - it does not exist now, did not at any time in the
past, nor will it at any time in the future. In a similar fashion,
the shruti which says "there is no multiplicity here" negates
the existence of the world absolutely.

Now a subsidiary enquiry is taken up. The siddhikAra says:

नच - तत्र लौकिकपरमार्थरजतमेव स्वरूपेण निषेधप्रतियोगीति - वाच्यं Do not argue
thus - the silver that is being negated absolutely (in the shell)
is a silver that has worldly reality (vyAvahArika).
भ्रमबाधयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्ते: अप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधापत्तेच श्चbecause if
that was the case, the silver that is negated would be
vyAvahArika, and the silver that is seen, prAtibhAsika. The
illlusion and its negation would be referring to different
entities. If I see a pot and negate a cloth, then the negation
cannot sublate the pot. Similarly if the illusion and sublating
knowledge do not have the same object, sublation will not
happen. Secondly, only that which appears can be denied. One
cannot deny that which has no relevance. Therefore, if what
appears is prAtibhAsika silver, one cannot deny some other
silver - that is a case of denial of something that was never
even suggested / did not appear.

नच तर्ह्युत्पत्त्याद्यसंभव: However, the absolute denial of the world

does not mean that its creation is an impossibility. The
nyAyAmritakAra had said that if the world was absolutely
denied - ie it does not exist even when it is seen, then how can
its creation, etc be talked about? No one theorises about the
creation of a hare's horn. To this, the siddhikAra says:

नह्यनिषिद्धस्वरूपत्वमुत्पत्त्यादिमत्त्वे तन्त्रं, परैरनिषेध्यरूपत्वेनाङ्गीकृतस्य

वियदादेरुत्पत्त्याद्यनङ्गीकारात् it is not necessary that the non absence of
objects is a requirement for their creation. For example, some
(ie naiyyAyikas) say space does not have absolute absence.
They however hold that space is eternal and thus not created.
Thus the absolute absence (or not) and creation (or not) are
two independent factors.

किन्तु वस्तुस्वभावादिकमन्यदेव किञ्चित् प्रयोजकं वक्तव्यं | therefore it must be

said that the creation of an object is dependent on some other
factor intrinsic to the object. Now, the pUrvapakshi may argue
that if the object itself is not there, how can one say it has an
intrinsic factor that determines whether it is created or not? To
this, the siddhikAra says:

तस्य मयापि कल्पितस्य स्वीकारात् | If the object itself is non-existent, it

cannot have an existent attribute either, however it can have
an attribute that is imagined. To explain, I am not denying
that a pot has pot-ness. I am denying that the pot has
existence. Similarly, I am not denying that the shell-silver seen
has silver-ness, I am denying that the shell silver exists.

Holding the negation as absolute does not contradict

vivaraNa
The nyAyAmritakAra quotes a sentence from the vivaraNa
which seems to indicate that the vivaraNakAra's opinion is
that the negation of the shell-silver is not an absolute negation,
but the negation of absolute-ness. That is, the pUrvapakshi
claims that the vivaraNakAra himself is saying that the view of
advaita is not that shell-silver is absolutely absent, but that
what is seen is not the real silver seen in a shop. The
implication is far-reaching. This means that the world too does
not have absolute non-existence, it only lacks ultimate
existence. That being the case, the niShedha in traikAlika
niShedha is not absolute, but only a denial of absoluteness.

The siddhikAra says:

नच - त्रैकालिकनिषेधं प्रति स्वरूपेणापणस्थं रूप्यं पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण
प्रातिभासिकम् वा प्रतियोगीति मतहानि: स्यादिति - वाच्यं;
Do not argue thus - Holding the prAtibhAsika shell-silver as the
counter-positive of the negation contradicts the words of the
vivaraNAchArya - "the counter-positive of the negation of the
shell silver in any of the three periods of time is the real silver
that appears in the shop. The prAtibhAsika silver becomes the
pratiyogi as the vyAvahArika silver." Thus what was said by
you, the siddhikAra, is wrong.

The siddhikAra says - the vivaraNAchArya is a teacher in the

advaita tradition. Therefore, the correct interpretation of his
words should be based on what an advaitin says - you cannot
superimpose any meaning that takes your fancy on his words.

अस्याचार्यवचस: पारमार्थिकलौकिकरजततादात्म्येन प्रतीतम् प्रातिभासिकमेव

रजतं प्रतियोगीत्यर्थ: | These words of the AchArya mean that the
pratiyogi of the negation of silver in the sublating knowledge is
the prAtibhAsika silver, which appears to have a
similarity (tAdAtmyam) to the vyAvahArika silver - and not that
the pratiyogi is the vyAvahArika silver itself.

आपणस्थं रूप्यम् प्रातिभासिकम् स्वरूपेण पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण वा

त्रैकालिकनिषेधं प्रति प्रतियोगि - the prAtibhAsika shell-silver that
appears to us as real as the one in the shop is the counter-
positive of the absolute negation in all three times. As a
concession (tuShyatu durjana nyAya), we can say that the
negation is of the absolute silver.

तच्च स्वरूपेण पारमार्थिकत्वेन वेत्यनास्थायां वा शब्द: | the usage of "vA"

after the word "pAramArthikatvena" indicates that he does not
have a desire towards the absolute-ness of the silver. Here the
vA is not used as an alternative, it is used as a concession.

The vivaraNakAra could have said this directly, why did he

make a reference to the ApaNastha rajata (the silver seen in
the shop)? This will be discussed in the next lesson.
dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
5)
In the the previous lesson, the nyAyAmritakAra had objected to
the absolute negation in the second definition of mithyAtva. To
substantiate his argument, he had cited a sentence from the
panchapAdikA vivaraNa, a highly respected work within the
advaita tradition - "त्रैकालिकनिषेधं प्रति स्वरूपेणापणस्थं रूप्यं
पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण प्रातिभासिकम् वा प्रतियोगि", which appears to say
that the object of negation in the shell-silver illusion is the
absolutely real silver. If the object of negation is the real
silver, the nature of negation is the negation of its absolute
reality. Thus this is a case of pAramArthikatvena niShedha, as
opposed to svarUpeNa niShedha, which was the position of the
siddhikAra. In essence, the nyAyAmritakAra's argument was
that the siddhikAra's position was contradictory to the
vivaraNakAra's.

The siddhikAra had objected to this interpretation of the

vivaraNakAra's words. According to him, the vivaraNakAra
meant that the silver appears to be real, but is in fact
prAtibhAsika. What is negated to remove the illusion is that
prAtibhAsika silver, not the real silver. If illusory silver had
appeared, and real silver was negated, the illusion and
negation would not have the same object, and the negation
would not be able to sublate the illusion. The meaning of the
vivaraNakAra's words therefore is - the illusory silver that is
seen in the shell, which appears to us as real as the silver in
the shop (ApaNastha rajatam), is the counterpositive of the
absolute negation in all three periods of time. Alternatively, as
a concession to those not satisfied by the previous
explanation(tuShyatu durjana:), the negation is of the silver's
reality. However, the vivaraNAchArya's primary intent was to
say that the object of negation was the prAtibhAsika silver.
Thus it is a case of svarUpeNa niShedha. However
pAramArthikatvena niShedha is offered as a concession to
those unable to accept svarUpeNa niShedha.

If the shell in the shop (ApaNastha silver) was not being

negated by the vivaraNakAra, why did he make a reference to
it? The siddhikAra says:

एतावदुक्तिच श्चपुरोवर्तितादात्म्येनैव रजतं प्रतीयत इति मतनिरासार्थं

लौकिकपारमार्थरजततादात्म्येनापि प्रतीयत इति प्रतिपादयितुं च | It (the reference
to the real silver seen in a shop) is to refute the view that the
only requirement for the superimposition of silver on shell is a
similarity with the object in front (the shell). The vivaraNakAra
wants to establish that in addition to this, similarity is also
required with the real silver. A person has to believe that it is
real silver on the ground, otherwise there would be neither the
desire nor the action to pick it. If something shone like silver,
but the person did not think it to be real silver, there would be
no pravritti towards it.

The interpretation of the vivaraNakAra's words by the siddhikAra

is echoed by chitsukhAchArya

The siddhikAra wants to say that this interpretation of the

vivaraNakAra is not his own. chitsukhAchArya, in the
tattvadIpika has also interpreted this sentence in a similar
fashion.

तदुक्तं तत्त्वदीपिकायां - 'तस्माल्लौकिकपरमार्थरजतमेव नेदं रजतमिति

निषेधप्रतियोगीति पूर्वाचार्याणां वाचोयुक्तिरपि पुरोवर्तिनि रजतार्थिन: प्रवृत्ति दर्शनात्
लौकिकपारमार्थरजतत्वेनापरोक्षतयाप्रतीतस्य कालत्रये अपि लौकिकपरमार्थरजतमिदम् न भवतीति
निषेधप्रतियोगितामङ्गीकृ त्य नेतव्ये ' ति |

As has been said in the tattvadIpika -

तस्माल्लौकिकपरमार्थरजतमेव नेदं रजतमिति निषेधप्रतियोगीति पूर्वाचार्याणां
वाचोयुक्तिरपि - therefore, even though the prior AchArya's sentence
seems to indicate that the counter-positive of the negation is
the real silver,
पुरोवर्तिनि रजतार्थिन: प्रवृत्ति दर्शनात् लौकिकपारमार्थरजतत्वेनापरोक्षतया प्रतीतस्य (it
has been said ) keeping in view the pravritti, or action of the
one desirous of silver, in picking up the object in front of him,
having directly perceived that object to be the real silver
कालत्रये अपि लौकिकपरमार्थरजतमिदम् न भवतीति however in fact, that this is
not real silver in all three periods of time,
निषेधप्रतियोगितामङ्गीकृ त्य नेतव्या must be accepted as the counter-positive
of the negation. That is, that the silver is vyAvahArika is
denied.

Seizing on this, the pUrvapakshi raises another objection. He

claims that this sentence proves his point - chitsukhAchArya
also says that the object of negation is the vyAvahArika silver,
not the prAtibhAsika silver. The vivaraNakAra, when talking
about mithyAtvam of the shell-silver, is referring to its absence
in all three periods of time. That is, he is saying the shell silver
is mithyA because there is the atyantAbhAvam, absolute
absence of silver in the shell. However, chitsukhAchArya is
talking about anyonyAbhAvam - The shell-silver that is seen is
different from the real silver. We are back to the svarUpeNa
niShedha vs. pAramArthikatvena niShedha debate.

The difference between anyonyAbhAvam and atyantAbhAvam

In order to understand whether there is an internal
contradiction between the two AchAryas, we need to
understand the differences between atyantAbhAvam and
anyonyAbhAvam.
1) atyantAbhAvam refers to the absolute absence of an object
in a place. anyonyAbhAvam refers to the difference of one
object from the other. For example, when a pot is absent, the
naiyyAyika refers to it as pot's atyantAbhAvam being present.
In the same way, a pot is different from a piece of cloth, which
the naiyyAyika describes as the pot having anyonyAbhAvam
with the cloth.
A question may arise, in a negation, when there is a reference
to abhAva, does it refer to atyantAbhAva or anyonyAbhAva?
There has to be some rule / identifying mark that allows us to
determine which one of the two is being talked about.
2) When speaking of difference, e.g. "a pot is not a cloth", that
is, "घट: पट: न", the pratiyogi of the difference is the cloth. The
subject, the anuyogi, is the pot. Here both the pratiyogi and
anuyogi are in prathamA vibhakti, nominative case.
3) When speaking of absence, e.g. "the pot is not on the
ground", that is, "भूतले घट: नास्ति", the anuyogi is the ground, and
the pratiyogi is the pot. Here the anuyogi is in saptami vibhakti
(locative case) whereas the pratiyogi is in prathamA vibhakti
(nominative case).
4) Thus, we can infer a general rule - if negation is conveyed in
a sentence, and the anuyogi-pratiyogi pair have the same case-
ending, the negation is anyonyAbhAva and if they have different
case-endings, the negation is atyantAbhAva.

Coming to our context,

1) When the silver was first seen in the shell, the seer thinks
"idam rajatam", "this is silver".
2) Then he realises that he was wrong before and thinks "na
idam rajatam". Here both idam (this) and rajatam (silver) are in
the same vibhakti, thus this negation is a case of
anyonyAbhAva.
3) What is being referred to by the word "idam"? Is it the shell,
or is it the silver that was seen previously? Both are correct. In
the former, the speaker is saying "this (shell) is not silver", and
in the latter he is saying "this (shell-silver) is not (real) silver".
4) If the seer means the previously seen silver by the word
"idam", ie if he thinks that this is not real silver, the counter-
positive of the negation is the vyAvahArika silver that he
initially had in mind when he said "idam rajatam". This is the
same silver that the vivaraNAchArya referred to as "ApaNastha
rajatam", the silver in the shop.
5) If this is the case, what is the status of the silver that was
actually seen? If the silver that was seen was not the real
silver (vyAvahArika), it must have been an unreal one
(prAtibhAsika). This is mithyAtvam by arthApatti (implication),
or arthAt mithyAtvam.
The siddhikAra says
- अयमाशय: - एकविभक्त्यन्तपदोपस्थापिते धर्मिणि प्रतियोगिनि च नञो
अन्योन्याभावबोधकत्वनियमस्य व्युत्पत्तिबलसिद्धत्वात् 'घट: पटो न भवती 'ति वाक्यव'दिदं
रजतं न भवती'ति वाक्यस्य अन्योन्याभावबोधकत्वे स्थिते
अभिलापजन्यप्रतीतितुल्यत्वादभिलप्यमानप्रतीते: ' नेदं रजत 'मिति
वाक्याभिलप्यप्रतीतेरन्योन्याभावविषयत्वमेव|

- अयमाशय: - एकविभक्त्यन्तपदोपस्थापिते धर्मिणि प्रतियोगिनि च नञो

अन्योन्याभावबोधकत्वनियमस्य व्युत्पत्तिबलसिद्धत्वात् - the intended meaning is
this - if the pratiyogi (counter-positive) and the dharmi
(anuyogi, substratum/subject) happen to have the same
vibhakti anta-pada (case-endings), the naN (negation) conveys
anyonyAbhAva (difference), as proven by everyday usage
(vyutpatti balam = loka vyavahAra)
'घट: पटो न भवती 'ति वाक्यव'दिदं रजतं न भवती'ति वाक्यस्य अन्योन्याभावबोधकत्वे
स्थिते like the sentence "the pot is not the cloth", the sentence
"this is not silver" indicates anyonyAbhAva.
अभिलापजन्यप्रतीतितुल्यत्वादभिलप्यमानप्रतीते: Because usage in the
two sentences is similar, the meaning conveyed by them ought
to be similar too
'नेदं रजत'मिति वाक्याभिलप्यप्रतीतेरन्योन्याभावविषयत्वमेव Therefore, the meaning
conveyed by the words in the sentence "this is not silver" is
one of anyonyAbhAva only.

तथाचेदंशब्दनिर्दिष्टे पुरोवर्तिप्रातीतिकरजते
रजतशब्दनिर्दिष्टव्यावहारिकरजतान्योन्याभावप्रतितेरार्थिकं मिथ्यात्वम्, ' नात्र रजत ' मिति वाक्याभिलप्या
तु प्रतीतिरत्यन्ताभावविषया ; भिन्नविभक्त्यन्तपदोपस्थापितयोरेव
धर्मिप्रतियोगिनोर्नञ: संसर्गाभावबोधकत्वनियमात् |

तथाचेदंशब्दनिर्दिष्टे पुरोवर्तिप्रातीतिकरजते
रजतशब्दनिर्दिष्टव्यावहारिकरजतान्योन्याभावप्रतितेरार्थिकं मिथ्यात्वम्, arthAt mithyAtvam, or
mithyAtvam by implication, is established by the meaning of
the sentence 'nedam rajatam'. The word idam in the sentence
denotes the object in front, the silver that was seen first. The
word rajatam in that sentence denotes vyAvahArika silver. The
negation conveys the difference between the seen silver and
the real silver. Therefore, if the seen silver was not real, it must
be unreal. This is mithyAtvam by implication.
' नात्र रजत ' मिति वाक्याभिलप्या तु प्रतीतिरत्यन्ताभावविषया On the other hand,
the meaning conveyed by the sentence "there is no silver here"
is the atyantAbhAva (absolute absence) of silver
भिन्नविभक्त्यन्तपदोपस्थापितयोरेव धर्मिप्रतियोगिनोर्नञ:
संसर्गाभावबोधकत्वनियमात् | because of the rule - if words denoting
the substratum and counter-positive of the negation have
different case-endings, the negation denotes samsargAbhAva
(meaning atyantAbhAva here)
सा च पुरोवर्तिप्रतीतिरजतस्यैव व्यावहारिकमत्यन्ताभावम् विषयीकरोतीति कण्ठोक्तमेव
मिथ्यात्वम् | that (the sentence "there is no silver here") conveys
the real absence of silver in the object in front, therefore its
mithyAtva is conveyed directly (as opposed to mithyAtva by
implication)

अतो नापसिद्धान्तो नान्यथाख्यात्यापत्तिर्न वा ग्रन्थविरोध इत्यनवद्यम् | Therefore, there is

no contradiction (apasiddhAnta) - the vivaraNAchArya is not
referring to atyantAbhAva in one place, and anyonyAbhAva
elsewhere. Neither does this imply anyathAkhyAti. The
pUrvapakshi cannot argue that the silver that was seen at the
place of illusion was in fact the real silver seen elsewhere in
the shop. The use of ApaNastha rajatam by the vivaraNAchArya
is not to imply that a real silver located elsewhere is seen at
the place of illusion (by alaukika sannikarSha as the
naiyyAyika would argue - more on that later). It is to imply that
the seer mistakenly attributes reality to the illusory silver.
Neither is the interpretation of the siddhikAra contradicting
prior advaita AchAryas.
dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
6)
We are discussing the second definition of mithyAtvam, as
postulated by vivaraNakAra, प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ
त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं - the counter-positive of the negation
in all three periods of time of an object in the locus of its
appearance. He had argued that the appearance of a mithyA
object was a case of anirvachanIya khyAti - that is, an
anirvachanIya object appears. The nyAyAmritakAra suggested
that an already existing object that is present elsewhere
appears at the location of an illusion, ie the illusion was a case
of anyathA khyAti. The siddhikAra had argued against this.

The nyAyAmritakAra makes this argument. According to the

second definition of mithyAtva, a mithyA object is not present
in any of the three periods of time in the locus of its
appearance. Further, if the appearance is not a case of
anyathAkhyAti, the object is not present anywhere else either.
Thus the object is not present anywhere, anytime. Is this not
asat?
He says:
ननु - एवमत्यन्तासत्त्वापात: प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं
ह्यन्यत्रासत्त्वेन संप्रतिपन्नस्य घटादे: सर्वत्र त्रैकालिक निषेधप्रतियोगित्वं पर्यवसितम्
; is this not an instance of asat? The object is absent in all
three periods of time in the locus of its appearance. It is not
present elsewhere too. Thus objects that appear like pot, are
not present in any place at any time.

अन्यथा तेषाम् सत्त्वापातात् , नहि तेषामन्यत्र सत्ता सम्भवतीति

; तथा कथमसद्वैलक्षण्यम्, नहि शशशृङ्गादेरितो अन्यदसत्त्वम् |
त्वदुक्तेच श्च
अन्यथा तेषाम् सत्त्वापातात् If they exist otherwise (i.e somewhere
else)
नहि तेषामन्यत्र सत्ता सम्भवतीति त्वदुक्तेच श्चit contradicts your own
statement that they cannot exist somewhere else. (the
siddhikAra had said that anyathAkhyAti was not a possibility, it
was a case of anirvachanIya khyAti)
तथा कथमसद्वैलक्षण्यम् thus, how is mithyAtvam different from asat?
नहि शशशृङ्गादेरितो अन्यदसत्त्वम् | if you say it is different from asat like
a hare's horn, ie there is another definition of asat, then that is
not possible.

The definition of asat

न च निरूपाख्यत्वमेव तदसत्त्वम्; निरूपाख्यत्वपदेनैव व्याख्यायमानत्वात् | If
nirUpAkhyatvam, ie not being the object of any word, is the
definition of asat, then, because the very fact that one is able
to use the word "nirupAkhya" to describe such things, means
that such a definition of asat results in a contradiction.

नाप्यप्रतीयमानत्वमसत्त्वम् ; असतोऽप्रतीतौ असद्वैलक्षण्यज्ञानस्यासत्प्रतीतिनिरा

सस्यासत्पदप्रयोगस्य चायोगात् | Nor is asat the absence of
knowability. If asat itself cannot be known, how can asat
vailakshaNyatvam, difference from asat, be known? Moreover,
when a person uses the word asat, he must know what it
denotes (whether it is correct or not is another matter),
because without knowing the object referred to by the word
asat, its usage itself will be invalid.

नचापरोक्षतया अप्रतीयमानत्वम् तत् ; नित्यातिन्द्रियेष्वतिव्याप्ते: | Nor is it the

absence of knowability by direct perception because there are
things which happen to be beyond our senses, but are still not
asat.

Thus, it appears that your mithyAtva is really not different from

asat.

The siddhikAra's reply

The siddhikAra replies:
- इति चेन्मैवम् not so;
सर्वत्र त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं यद्यपि तुच्छानिर्वचनीया साधारणम् ;
while the absolute absence of an object in all time and space
is common to both asat and mithyA
तथापि क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् अत्यन्तासत्त्वम् , asat is
something that is incapable of being perceived as existing in
any locus
तच्च शुक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे च बाधात् पूर्वं नास्त्येवेति न तुच्छत्वापत्ति: |
whereas that is not the case with regard to shell-silver and the
world before their sublation, thus their being asat is not true
नच बाधात् पूर्वं शुक्तिरूप्यम् प्रपञ्चो वा सत्त्वेन न प्रतीयते | as before their
sublation, shell-silver and the world do appear to exist.

The pUrvapakshi says this is a new definition of asat according

to the advaita siddhi. The faults that he had pointed to exist in
the definition of mithyAtva offered by the previous teachers of
advaita. The siddhikAra's position is that this definition is not
his independent opinion, it has been indicated by the prior
teachers too. This argument has been anticipated in the
vivaraNam itself, which is why the vivaraNAchArya uses the
word upAdhi in his definition.

Until now, we have been translation upAdhi as locus, but its

interpretation goes beyond just that. upAdhi = upa (samIpe) +
AdhIyate svadharma: yena. That which causes the attributes
that belong to itself to be perceived as belonging to a
proximate object is upAdhi.

Brahman is the upAdhi with respect to the world, because the

sat that is brahman appears as the sattA of the world.
Therefore by the usage of upAdhi in the mithyAtva definition,
vivaraNAchArya has indicated that asat cannot have sat
pratIti.

एतदेव सदर्थकेनोपाधिपदेन सूचितम् | This has been indicated by the

word upAdhi. The argument that this definition of asat is only
the siddhikAra's and the faults pointed lie in pUrvAchArya's
definition is refuted.

Though the world is asat, it happens to be the object of

bhrama, wrong cognition - this is the shUnyavAdin's position.
He does not recognise that asat vastu cannot be perceived,
and therefore says that which is asat is also mithyA. What is
the difference between the shUnyavAdin and the advaitin? It is
the word upAdhi, which indicates a real substratum. We hold
that illusion requires a real substratum, whereas the
shUnyavAdin does not require a real substratum for an
illusion.

शून्यवादिभि: सदधिष्ठानभ्रमानङ्गीकारेण the shUnyavAdins do not

acknowledge that an illusion must have a real substratum

कवचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वरूपासद्वैलक्षणस्य (क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन

प्रतीत्यर्हत्वरूपस्य) शुक्तिरूप्ये प्रपञ्चे चानङ्गीकारात् | therefore they do
not acknowledge a difference between asat which is incapable
of appearing as existing in any upAdhi, and the shell-silver / the
world, which are capable of appearing as existing in some
upAdhi.
dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
7)
We have been looking at the second definition of mithyAtvam,
प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं. In the previous lesson,
the objection that this definition of mithyAtva was in effect a
definition of asat was raised and refuted. Now the naiyyAyika
pUrvapakshi raises a few objections to this definition (this is
not raised by the nyAyAmritakAra). In classical nyAya tradition,
each word in the definition is analysed, faults identified and
refinements proposed to the definition.

नन्वेवं सति यावत्सदधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् पर्यवसितम् | That being so, the

result is that the definition of mithyAtva is equivalent to the
absolute absence of a thing in any real substratum.

Space according to the naiyyAyika has no substratum, AdhAra,

ie it does not have AdhAra Adheya (locus-object) relationship
with anything. It does not however mean that space is a non-
existent entity in nyAya. As defined, the definition of mithyAtva
(the absence of an object in a real substratum) would also
apply to space (as the absolute absence of space is present in
all substrata, according to the naiyyAyika). However, the
naiyyAyika would be unwilling to accept that space a mithyA
object. If not mithyA, what kind of an object is space in nyAya?

The absence of AdhAra Adheya sambandha for an object is

technically called avritti in nyAya. Thus, according to the
logician, space is avritti, not mithyA.

A syllogism where the sAdhya is present universally is called

kevala anvayi. As the absence of space in a locus is universal,
the naiyyAyika calls the atyantAbhAva of AkAsha as
kevalAnvayi.

तथाच के वलान्वय्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिषु अवृत्तिषु गगनादिषु तार्किकाणाम् सिद्धसाधनम् ;

that being so, this definition suffers from siddhasAdhanam.
The absolute absence of space in every substratum, which
happens to be kevala anvayi, is classified as avritti according
to the logicians, and already known. One need not postulate a
new category of mithyA to describe avritti.

यदधिकरणं यत्सत् तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तस्य मिथ्यात्वमिति विवक्षायां,

therefore, to avoid this defect, the following refinement is
made: if in the particular substratum of an object, the absolute
absence of the object is present, the object is to be understood
as mithyA.

The naiyyAyika says there is a further defect even after this

refinement. If an object is in a substratum, then the
substratum and the object have a relationship, a sambandha,
based on which, the object is present in that locus. The object
is not present in that substratum with any other sambandha.

One sambandha is called samyoga, when the object and the

substratum are in physical contact. Another sambandha is
called samavAya, where the object-substratum pair have a
part-whole, cause-effect, or attribute-substance relationship.
When a pot is on the ground, it has samyoga sambandha with
the ground. On the other hand, the relationship between the
pot and clay is samavAya sambandha. When considering clay
as the substratum of the pot, the pot is "present" in the clay
with samavAya sambandha, but not with samyoga sambandha.
Therefore, according to the naiyyAyika, it is well established
that between every object and its locus, there exists a
sambandha, along with which, the object is present in a
substratum, and another sambandha along with which, the
object is not present in the same substratum.

Thus, if the definition of mithyA is that a specific object is not

present in a specific substratum in all three periods of time,
that is already well known to the naiyyAyika - he already
knows that every object is not present in its substratum with a
particular sambandha.

अधिकरणपदेनावृत्तिनिराकरणेऽपि संयोगसंबन्धेन समवायसंबन्धेन वा यत्

घटाधिकरणम् समवायसंबन्धेन संयोगसंबन्धेन वा घटस्य
तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितया सर्वेषु वृत्तिमत्सु दुरुद्धरं सिद्धसाधनम् ।

अधिकरणपदेनावृत्तिनिराकरणेऽपि Even though the avritti of the word

substratum in the definition was remedied, संयोगसंबन्धेन
समवायसंबन्धेन वा यत् घटाधिकरणम् because a pot and its locus can
either have samyoga sambandha or samavAya sambandha
respectively
समवायसंबन्धेन संयोगसंबन्धेन वा घटस्य तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितया it
establishes the absence of the pot in that locus along with the
samavAyA or samyoga sambandha respectively. That is, if the
pot is present with samyoga sambandha is present, it is absent
with samavAya sambandha and vice versa.
सर्वेषु वृत्तिमत्सु दुरुद्धरं सिद्धसाधनम् this condition will be met for every
object and its locus. Therefore even this refined definition will
suffer from siddhasAdhanam.

येन संबन्धेन यद्यस्याधिकरणं तेन संबन्धेन तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमिति

विवक्षायां, Suppose this definition is further refined such that if an
object having a specific relationship with a specific locus is
absolutely absent in that locus with that relationship, then that
object is mithyA -

अव्याप्यवृत्तिषु संयोगदिषु सिद्धसाधनम् this too suffers from the defect

of siddha sAdhanam, in the case of the samyoga sambandha
being both present and absent, like in the case of avyApvya
vritti.

To explain, let us consider the example of a monkey on a tree.

The monkey and the tree have samyoga sambandha. A
particular monkey is sitting on a particular tree. Therefore, it is
already accepted that this specific monkey-tree samyonga
sambandha has an abhAva everywhere else apart from this
tree. Within this tree also, the samyoga sambandha is present
only on the top of the tree, and not in the bottom. Thus the
monkey with samyoga sambandha is present in the top of the
tree and absent in the bottom. When an object is both present
and absent in the same location, it is termed avyApya vritti in
nyAya. This is already known, thus defining mithyA in this
manner leads to siddha sAdhanam due to avyApya vritti.

The siddhikAra says:

इति चेन्न if this is the argument, no.

येन रूपेण यदधिकरणतया यत् प्रतिपन्नं तेन रूपेण

तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य प्रतिपन्नपदेन सूचितत्वात् | If a
particular object that appears in a particular locus is not
present in that locus, then that object is said to be mithyA.
This is indicated by the word pratipannam in the definition of
mithyA.

There is a flaw in the naiyyayika's argument. It must be noted

that the contact of the monkey with the tree is in the top part
of the tree, not the bottom. The substratum should be taken as
the top of the tree, not the tree in general. It will be avyApya
vritti only if the monkey is both in contact and not in contact
with the same part of the tree.

ष: अवच्छेदकवि षच
तच्च रूपम् संबन्धवि षशे षश्
श्च चशे| The locus is qualified in
two ways - by sambandha and by localisation (avacChedaka)

षमन्तरेण भूतले घटाधिकरणता प्रतीयते | The ground

नहि संबन्धवि षमन्तरेणशे
appears as the substratum for the pot only with a particular
sambandha, and not without.

षमन्तरेण वा वृक्षे कपिसम्योगाधिकरणता | The locus of the

अवच्छेदकवि षमन्तरेणशे
contact of the monkey with the tree is limited to a specific
location.

षेण येन चावच्छ्चेदकविशेषेण यदधिकरणताप्रतीतिर्यत्र भवितुमर्हति,

तथाच येन सम्बन्धवि षेणशे
षेण तेनैव चावच्छ्चेदकविशेषेण
तेनैव सम्बन्धवि षेणशे
तदधिकरणकात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तस्य मिथ्यात्वमिति पर्यवसते क्व
सिद्धसाधनम् | Therefore as the object which appears in a
particular spot, with a particular sambandha in a particular
locus, is absolutely absent in that spot, with that sambandha
in that locus, resulting in its mithyAtvam, where is the
siddhasAdhanam that you speak of?

No need to refine the definition

Until now, the siddhikAra had refined the definition of
mithyAtva in response to the naiyyAyika's objection. Now, his
argument shifts to dropping the assumptions inherently made
thus far. Therefore, the existing definition of mithyAtvam can
be accepted as is, without any refinement.

1) The adhikaraNa qualifier is not required in the definition.

The naiyyAyika had said, AkAsha is avritti, it has no
substratum. Hence he had argued that its absence was in
every substratum.

यदि पुन: ध्वंसप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वमिवात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमाकाशादौ न स्यात् However, If

instead we say - when space's destruction or creation is not
accepted by the naiyyAyika, its absence also must not be
accepted.

साधकमानाभावस्य तुल्यत्वात् Because, just like in the case of

destruction or creation, there is no proof for the absolute
absence of space either. The naiyyAyika can say there is
pramANa for atyantAbhAvam using the four pramANas at his
disposal - pratyaksha, anumAna, upamAna, shabda. There is no
scope for upamAna or shabda here, leaving only pratyaksha
and anumAna.

इहाका' शानास्तीति प्रत्यक्षप्रतीत्यसम्भवात् One cannot use pratyaksha

pramANa to say that "there is no space here". Because to
prove the absence of something, the pratiyogi must have the
yogyatA of pratIti. That is, the pratiyogi must be visible to
begin with, so that its absence can also be perceived. There
has to be yogyAnupalabdhi. According to nyAya, space cannot
be seen. How can its absence be perceived? There is no
pratyaksha basis for concluding that space has absence.

अनुमाने चानुकू लतर्काभावात्, There is no anukUla tarka, or supportive

logic that can be used to argue for the absence of space. What
harm ensues if space's absence is denied?

According to the founder of nyAya shAstra, Gautama, anukUla

tarka can be of three kinds. Proving the cause through its
effect (sheShavat), proving the effect through the cause
(pUrvavat) and proving one through an unrelated other
(sAmAnyato driShTa). The last of three, sAmAnyato driShTa, is
quite difficult to prove.

सामान्यतो दृष्टमात्रेण ध्वंसप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वस्यापि सिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् if sAmAnyato

driShTa anukUla tarka was used to prove atyantAbhAva, the
same can be used to prove the dhvamsa and prAgabhAva of
space too.

तद्व्यतिरेकेण कस्यचित् कार्यस्यानुपपत्तेरभावाच्च By holding that space is

never absent anywhere, no harm ensures anywhere.

Thus there is no reason to hold that space is universally

absent, therefore we need not qualify the specific nature of the
locus in mithyAtva's definition to exclude space.

2) The sambandha qualifier is not needed in the definition

एवं संयोगसंबन्धेन घटवति भूतले समवायसम्बन्धेन घटाभावसत्त्वे मानाभावात्
There is no basis to claim that the pot is not present in the
ground with a samavAya sambandha when the pot is present
on the ground with a samyoga sambandha. If a pot is present
on the ground, the pot cannot be absent at the same time in
the same place. If you argue that the pot is not present with a
samavAya sambandha, that is not true because the absence is
of the samavAya sambandha, not the pot.
लाघवेन घटात्यन्ताभावत्वेनैव घटसामानाधिकरण्यविरोधित्वकल्पनात्
Applying the principle of parsimony, if an object is absent, it
cannot be held to be present in the same place at the same
time.

Therefore, if there is valid perception of a pot in any place at a

particular time, one cannot have an equally valid perception of
its absence in that place at that time. If the objects of
knowledge are mutually contradictory, then their knowledge
also will be contradictory.

There is no water in fire. This is known. When one sees fire,

no one gets a doubt if there is water in the fire. If the
opponent's view is taken, then this rule will face harm.

षप्रवेशे
सम्बन्धवि षप्रवे
शे शेच गौरवात् घटसमवायमात्रविषयतया प्रतीतेरुपपत्तेः If the
naiyyAyika insists on introducing an adjective of sambandha in
the negation "there is no pot here with samavAya sambandha",
all that does is to establish that samavAya sambandha is
absent, not that the pot is absent.

The naiyyAyika had said that space is avritti, and the absence
of it is present in all substrata. If the advaitin wants to argue
that mithyAtva is the absence of an object in (all) substrata,
then what is established is avritti, not mithyAtva. To this
charge, the siddhikAra replies:

आधाराधेयभावस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वेन घटस्यावृत्तित्वशङ्कानुदयात् when the

object-locus relationship between a pot and the ground on
which it is located, is clearly knowable by direct perception,
there is no possibility of a doubt arising whether the pot is
avritti, ie has no substratum at all. The defect of arthAntara is
possible only if the possibility of arthAntara is not
contradictory to all other pramANa.

उक्तयुक्तेच श्चन घटादेरत्यन्ताभावसामानाधिकरण्यम्; By the means of the yukti

provided, it is not possible to establish that a pot and its
absence are simultaneously present in one location.

3) The avacchedaka qualifier is not needed in the definition

The naiyyAyika had tried to establish using the monkey-
samyoga example that it was possible for samyoga to exist in
one part of the substratum, but be absent in another part of
the substratum. The siddhikAra had suggested an
avacChedaka (locative) qualifier to remedy this. Now he denies
the need for an avacChedaka qualifier.

एवं संयोगतदभावयोर्नैकाधिकरण्यम् ; samyoga and its absence

cannot be in one substratum. Why not?

'अग्रे वृक्ष: कपिसम्योगी मूले ने' ति प्रतीतेरग्रमूलयोरेव

संयोगतदभाववत्तयोपपत्ते:, because when you say "the monkey is
on the top of the tree, not at the bottom", only the tree-top is
the substratum - the bottom is not. The agra vishiShTa vriksha
- the top of the tree - is different from mUla vishishta vriksa -
the bottom of the tree. Therefore, it is not possible to accept
that in the same substratum there is both samyoga and
samyoga abhAva.

If someone asks, "Is there a monkey on this tree?", one can

only reply "yes". The reply is not "there is both a monkey and
its absence". However, if someone asks, "Is there a monkey
sitting at the root of the tree?", one can reply "no" without any
hesitation. In this case, the question identifies the substratum
as "the root of the tree". Thus what is explicit in one question
is implicit in the other - the tree qualified by 'top-ness' and
'bottom-ness' are two different substrata.

तदा सन्मात्रनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमेव मिथ्यात्वं मन्तव्यं | therefore,

mithyAtvam should be understood as that which is the abhAva
pratiyogi and which has sat (Brahman) as its substratum. No
further refinement is required.
dvitIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
8)
In the previous lesson, we looked at the naiyyAyika's
objections to the second definition of mithyAtvam and the
siddhikAra's response to them. In conclusion, the siddhikAra
had said:

तदा सन्मात्रनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमेव मिथ्यात्वं मन्तव्यं | therefore,

mithyAtvam should be understood as the counterpositiveness
of the absence of an object having only sat (Brahman) as its
substratum.

On hearing this, the nyAyAmritakAra raises an objection. If a

mithyA object is not present in its own upAdhi, there must be
no difference between bhAva, presence and abhAva, absence.
If absence and presence are not mutually exclusive, then the
knowledge of an object's presence is not contradictory to
knowledge of its absence. How can right knowledge disprove
wrong knowledge then?

नचैवं सति - भावाभावयोरविरोधात्तज्ज्ञानयोर्बाध्यबाधकभावो न स्यादिति वाच्यं ; -

As (according to you) presence and absence are not mutually
exclusive, the knowledge that reveals presence and the
knowledge that reveals absence of that object in that place at
that time must not be mutually exclusive either. Only one of
the two must be right, the other must be wrong. Therefore
what this ultimately means is that the ability of right
knowledge to sublate wrong knowledge itself is rendered
impossible.

भिन्न्नसत्ताकयोरविरोधे अपि समसत्ताकयोर्विरोधात् | Not so, says the

siddhikAra. If presence and absence have the same degree of
reality, then they will be mutually contradictory, however, if
presence and absence have different degrees of reality, then
they can both mutually co-exist simultaneously.
यत्र भूतले यस्य घटस्यात्यान्ताभावो व्यावहारिक: तत्र स घटो न व्यावहारिक इति नियमात् |
where it is established from a pramANa that there is no pot in
the ground, its absence is confirmed as vyAvahArika, therefore
the pot must not be vyAvahArika, but prAtibhAsika.

Hearing this, the pUrva pakshi retorts - the rule "if presence
and absence are of different orders of reality, they will be not
be mutually contradictory", results in a problem. When a silver
is seen in shell, the silver, according to the advaitin, is
prAtibhAsika. Its absence is more real than the silver, thus it
must be vyAvahArika. According to this rule, these two will not
be contradictory. Therefore, even after knowing "this is not
silver", a seer should continue to see silver.

नचैवं सति - 'शुक्तिरियं न रजत' मिति ज्ञानविषयीभूताभावस्य व्यावाहारिकत्वेन

पुरोवर्तिप्रतीतिरजतस्य व्यावहारिकत्वापहारेऽपि प्रातीतिकसत्त्वानपहारात्
बाधोत्तरकालेऽपि 'इदं रजत' मिति प्रतीति: स्यादिति - वाच्यं

The siddhikAra says. Do not argue thus - As a result of the

vyAvahArikatvam of the object of the knowledge "this is not
silver, but shell" being the silver's absence, silver's reality is
established as not vyAvahArika. However the vyAvahArikatva
of the absence does not affect the silver's prAtibhAsikatva.
Therefore, (according to your rule) even after the sublating
knowledge (this is not silver) has arisen, the silver must
continue to be seen and the knowledge "this is silver" must
coexist with the "this is not silver" knowledge. If the two jnAna
viShayas can coexist, the two jnAnas must coexist too.

What the nyAyAmritakAra says is true. In some cases, even

after knowing that something is really absent, the object
continues to appear to exist. However in other cases like shell-
silver, it no longer appears to exist. What determines the
difference? To understand this, we have to consider the cause
for the appearance of the prAtibhAsika shell-silver. It is
ignorance of the true nature of the object in front. The seer did
not know that the object in the front was a shell, which led him
to believe that it was silver. Thus the cause of the appearance
of the silver, is shell-ignorance, shukti ajnAna. When the object
is later known as the shell, i.e its ignorance is removed, shukti
ajnAna nivritti takes place. When the cause is destroyed, its
effects are also destroyed. Therefore, in that case, the shell-
silver also undergoes nivritti. It is no longer seen.

The siddhikAra says

तत्र 'इयं शुक्ति'रित्यपरोक्षप्रमया प्रातीतिकरजतोपादानाज्ञाननिवृत्तौ
प्रातीतिकसत्त्वस्याप्यपहारात्, there (in the shell-silver example) the
direct perception of the shell destroys ignorance, which is the
material cause for the appearance of the prAtibhAsika shell
silver, which leads to the appearance of the silver to go away
too.

शुक्त्यज्ञानस्य प्रातीतिकरजतोपादानत्वेन तदसत्त्वे

प्रातीतिकरजतासत्त्वस्यावयकत्वात्कत्
वा त् | as shell ignorance is the
श्य
material cause of prAtibhAsika silver, when it (the cause) is
not there, (its effect) the shell silver, will necessarily not be
there too.

अत एव यत्र परोक्षयाधिष्ठानप्रमया न भ्रमोपादानाज्ञाननिवृत्ति:, तत्र

व्यावहारिकत्वापहारेऽपि प्रातीतिकत्वानपहारात् 'तिक्तो गुड' इत्यादिप्रतीतिरनुवर्तत एव
| When the direct perception of the (illusion's) substratum
does not result in the destruction of the material cause of the
illusion, even if the reality of the illusion is disproven, its
appearance / experience persists. For example, when someone
is ill, even a sweet object like jaggery tastes bitter. A person
may have absolute conviction that jaggery is sweet, but as
long as the cause of the illusion (his underlying illness) is
unresolved, the experience (pratIti) of bitterness will continue.

एवमखण्डब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारात्पूर्वं परोक्षबोधेन प्रपञ्चस्य व्यावहारिकत्वापहारे

अपि प्रतीतिरनुवर्तत एव, अधिष्ठानाज्ञाननिवृत्तौ तु नानुवर्तिष्यते | Similarly,
prior to the direct impartite realisation of Brahman, while the
indirect knowledge (of advaita) will lead to the falsification of
the world's reality (vyAvahArikatva), the world will continue to
be seen. However, when the ignorance of the substratum is
destroyed, the experience and perception of the world will no
longer occur.

एतेन - उपाधिशब्देनाधिकरणमात्रविवक्षायामर्थान्तरम्,
वाय्वधिकरणकात्यान्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वे अपि रूपस्यामिथ्यात्वात्, अधिष्ठानविवक्षायां तु
भ्रमोपादानाज्ञानविषयस्याधिष्ठानत्वेनान्योन्यारयत्वं यत्वं, ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वे
श्र
विषयस्य मिथ्यात्वं, विषयस्य मिथ्यात्वे च ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वमिति - परास्तम् ;

The nyAyAmritakAra had said -

'उपाधिशब्देनाधिकरणमात्रविवक्षायामर्थान्तरम्, वाय्वधिकरणकात्यान्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वे
अपि रूपस्यामिथ्यात्वात्
if the meaning of the word 'upAdhi' is understood as the locus,
it leads to the defect of arthAntara (ie instead of proving
mithyAtva, it proves avritti). Moreover, the absence of form in
wind does not result in form being classified as mithyA -
similarly, the absence of the world in brahman, does not imply
that the world is mithyA. The meaning of the shruti neha
nAnAsti kinchana does not establish the mithyAtva of the
world, only the absence of the world in Brahman.

अधिष्ठानविवक्षायां तु
यत्वं
भ्रमोपादानाज्ञानविषयस्याधिष्ठानत्वेनान्योन्यारयत्वं श्रif the meaning of
upAdhi is adhiShThAna, ie the substratum of an illusion, then
the substratum is the object of the ignorance which happens
to be the material cause of the illusion. However, such a
meaning of upAdhi results in the mutual dependence between
the meanings of adhiShThAna and mithyA.

adhiShThAna is the substratum of an illusion. In other words, if

object A is the substratum of an illusion, B, then A's
adhiShThAnatva presupposes the mithyAtva of object B, which
is superimposed on A.

mithyAtva, according to this definition by the advaitin, is the

absence of an object in its adhiShThAna. In other words, the
mithyAtva of an object B presupposes the absence of B in its
adhishThAna A. Thus the mithyAtva of B presupposes the
adhiShThAnatva of A and the adhiShThAnatva of A
presupposes the mithyAtva of B. This is mutually dependent
and a logical fallacy.
Further,

ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वे विषयस्य मिथ्यात्वं - to prove that an object is mithyA,

one says that its jnAna is an illusion

विषयस्य मिथ्यात्वे च ज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वम्' इति - and to prove that a jnAna is

an illusion, one says that its object is mithyA.

एतेन परास्तम् This was the argument of the nyAyAmritakAra -

the siddhikAra says that this has been refuted. How?

उक्तरीत्या अधिकरणविवक्षायां दोषाभावात् | Because upAdhi has been

defined as "That which causes the attributes that belong to
itself to be perceived as belonging to a proximate object."
Thus, the defect of mutual dependence does not exist.

The next argument made by the nyAyAmritakAra is that such a

definition of mithyAtva applies to Brahman also. In the
ChAndogya upaniShad mantra 7.25.1, "स एवाधस्तात्स उपरिष्टात्स
पचात्सत् पुरस्तात्स दक्षिणतः स उत्तरतः". Therefore, Brahman is in
सश्चा
every direction - in other words, Brahman has the directions as
its upAdhi, locus.

This mantra talks about Brahman. In the same upaniShad in

reply to the question, "What does Brahman rest upon?", स
भगवः कस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठित इति, the shruti replies, स्वे महिम्नि यदि वा न महिम्नीति - he
is dependent on himself, or not. Putting these together, the
nyAyAmritakAra argues that Brahman appears in all directions,
but at the same time, Brahman is not present in the directions.
Therefore, the second definition of mithyAtvam applies to
Brahman also. Hence, this is a case over-extension or
ativyApti.
The siddhikAra continues:
नच - 'स एवाधस्ता'दिति श्रुत्या प्रतिपन्ने देशकालाद्युपाधौ परमार्थतो ब्रह्मण: अभावात्
तत्र अतिव्याप्तिरीति- वाच्यं if you argue using the vedic sentence "he
is below"etc, that as Brahman is absent in the very locus of
time and space in which it appears, it would be mithyA too and
therefore this definition would suffer from the defect of over-
extension - that is not correct.

The siddhikAra could have simply said that the same shruti
ends with स एवेदं सर्वं - he is everything. Therefore, the veda
does not say that the directions are the substrata
of Brahman, it in fact says that the directions are Brahman
itself. It also goes on to say अहमेवेदं सर्वं and आत्मैवेदं सर्वं
to reinforce that point. However, he takes the objection at face
value and refutes it.

He says - The nyAyAmritakAra's argument was that shuddha

brahman, which is attribute-less, would be included within
such a definition of mithyAtva. However, if shuddha brahman is
really without attributes, it cannot be defined either - what can
be said of something which has no attributes?

निर्धर्मके तस्मिन्नभावप्रतियोगित्वरूपधर्माभावात् | A thing which is

attribute-less cannot have the attribute of abhAva
pratiyogitvam - counter-positiveness of its absence.

The standard question when this is said is to invoke the

"satyam jnAnam anantam brahma" shruti from Taittiriya
upaniShad and ask:

नचैवं सत्यत्वमपि तत्र न स्यात्, then how can Brahman have satyatva
dharma?

तथाच 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्त'मित्यादिश्रुतिव्याकोप इति - वाच्यं; for this will

invalidate the veda which says "satyam jnAnam anantam
brahma" - Brahman is existence, consciousness, bliss.
The siddhikAra says, do not argue thus, because:
अधिकरणातिरिक्ताभावानभ्युपगमेनोक्तमिथ्यात्वाभावरूपसत्यत्वस्य
ब्रह्मस्वरूपाविरोधात् | There is no absence other than the
substratum. As a result, existence, which is the absence of
mithyAtva as defined is not contradictory to Brahman's nature.

Shruti says Brahman is satyam, jnAnam, anantam. Here

existence in reality is of the nature of absence. When we say
there is a pot on the ground, the ground is the substratum for
the pot. When we say the pot is not there on the ground, the
naiyyAyika would argue that the ground is the substratum for
the atyantAbhAva of the pot. However, this is not acceptable to
us, because there is no need to posit an absence other than
the ground itself.

Similarly, we do not say that existence is in Brahman - just like

the absence of pot and the ground are not two different things,
existence and Brahman are not two different things,
existence is Brahman. It is in this sense that we hold
Brahman to be without attributes.

When stated in these terms, the nyAyAmritakAra asks - what

about svaprakAshatvam (being self evident), nityatvam (being
eternal), etc.? How can they be said to be abhAva rUpa
dharma? The siddhikAra says,

एतेन - स्वप्रकाशत्वाद्यपि - व्याख्यातम्; परप्रकायत्वाभावो

त्वाभावो हि स्वप्रकशत्वम्, the
श्य
same can be used to explain svaprAkAshatvam etc also. The
svaprakAshatvam of Brahman is merely the absence of
requiring anything else to illuminate it.

कालपरिच्छेदाभावो नित्यत्वं nityatva (being eternal) is simply the absence

of limitation by time.

देशपरिच्छेदाभावो विभुत्वम् vibhutva (being all pervading) is simply the

absence of limitation by space.
वस्तुपरिच्छेदाभाव: पूर्णत्वमित्यादि pUrNatvam (infiniteness) is simply the
absence of limitation by objects.

यत्
तथा च भावभूतधर्मानारयत्वेऽपि वेऽपि श्रब्रह्मण: सर्वधर्माभावरूपतया ना
काप्यनुपपत्तिरिति सर्वमवदातम् | therefore, even though attributes are not
located in Brahman, as the nature of Brahman is the absence
of all attributes, no defects are applicable to the second
definition of mithya.

This concludes the eight part series on the second definition

of mithyAtva, a far-reaching concept within advaita vedAnta.
tritIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
1)
We had previously considered two definitions of mithyAtva by
the panchapAdikAkAra and vivaraNakAra. Now we look at the
third definition of mithyAtva, also proposed by the
vivaraNakAra. - jnAna nivartyatvam. That is, mithyAtva is the
sublation of an object by knowledge.

ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं वा मिथ्यात्वं | mithyAtvam alternatively is the

sublatability of an object by knowledge.

We will first consider the nyAyAmritakAra's objections to this

definition:

*****problems with the third definition of mithyAtva*****

ननु - उत्तरज्ञाननिवर्त्ये पूर्वज्ञाने अतिव्याप्ति:, This definition would
lead to over-extension in the case of the sublation of one
thought by a successive thought.

When an object is seen, a thought objectifying that object

arises in the mind. When another object is then seen, the
thought objectifying the first object is destroyed, therefore the
object is not seen. So the subsequent thought is the cause of
destruction of the previous thought. This is true for all objects,
even if they are not mithyA. Thus there is ativyApti doSha, or
over-extension of the definition here.

मुद्गरपातादिनिवर्त्ये च घटादाव्याप्ति: - the objects of the world such as pots

are destroyed not be knowledge, but by things such as the
blows of a hammer. The advaitin holds all the objects of the
world to be mithyA, but none of them are in fact destroyed by
knowledge. Thus this definition does not apply to any tangible
object in the world.

ज्ञानत्वेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वविवक्षायामप्ययं दोष:,

Even if the definition is limited to the instance of the sublation
of an object by jnAna as jnAna (ie it is only a cognition that
sublates), this defect exists. According to nyAya, jnAna
(cognition), rAga, dveSha, sukha, dukha etc are all properties
of the Atma. The replacement of a previous thought by a
successive thought is not limited to cognition alone - any Atma
guNa can be a cause for the sublation of the previous
cognition. Therefore, jnAnatvena jnAna nivartyatvam is too
narrow, it ought to be AtmaguNa vishesheNa jnAna
nivartyatvam.

अधिष्ठानसाक्षात्कारत्वेन निवर्त्ये शुक्तिरजतादौ च ज्ञानत्वेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यभावात्

साध्यविकलता, if the sublatability of a mithyA object is due to
knowledge, then in the case of the shell-silver, mere knowledge
of the shell is not sufficient for the sublation of silver. Only the
direct perception of the shell sublates the silver. For example,
if a person hears from someone else that the shell-silver they
are seeing is not real, that shabda jnAna, knowledge generated
by verbal testimony, in itself is not enough to sublate shell-
silver. Its only when the seer directly perceives the shell that
the sublation occurs. Therefore the definition of mithyAtva as
jnAna nivartyatvam is not applicable in the case of shell-silver.
If the example of mithyAtva does not have mithyAtva, then the
jagat mithyAtva anumAna based on the example will be flawed
- leading to the defect of sAdhya vaikalyam.

Therefore to accommodate this, the advaitin can refine the

definition such that the word jnAna means the direct
perception of the substratum, adhiShThAna sAkshAtkAra.
sAkshAtkAratvam (vyApya) is a specialised form of jnAna
(vyApakam). Therefore the advaitin can refine the word jnAna
in the definition of mithyA to refer to sAkshAtkAram by the use
of the term jnAnatva vyApya dharmam instead.

ज्ञानत्वव्याप्यधर्मेण ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वविवक्षायां if jnAna in jnAna

nivartyatvam refers to jnAnatva vyApya (i.e. refers to
sAkshAtkAra) ज्ञानत्वव्याप्येन स्मृतित्वेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्ये संस्कारे
अतिव्याप्ति: as memory also is a specialised form of jnAna, it
leads to the over-extension of mithyAtva to refer to samskAra,
latent impressions.

When we experience something, that experience creates latent

impressions. When the latent impressions are activated at a
later time, they create a recollection of the experience. There
are some schools within nyAya that argue that when the
recollection occurs, the latent impression is destroyed. The
recollection creates newer, stronger latent impressions which
become the basis for future recollections of the same
experience. Thus each recollection destroys its cause and
creates a seed for future recollection. Not everyone within
nyAya accepts this, but the nyAyamritakAra uses this paksha
to argue that as recollection is a special form of jnAna, it has a
jnAnatva vyApya dharma, and therefore as samskAra is
jnAnatva vyApya dharmeNa nivartyam, it leads to the
classification of samskAra as mithyA. However, samskAra is
not mithyA because no one considers memory to be unreal.
Therefore, this is a case of over-extension.

*****siddhikAra's reply - what is jnAna nivartyatvam?*****

Now the siddhikAra commences his reply

- इति चेन्न ; If this is the objection, then, not so.

An object has two forms - svarUpa, an essential nature, and

kAraNa, a causal form. A pot exists as clay before it is created.
This is termed satkAryavAda. A naiyyAyika does not agree with
this, because he holds that the pot does not exist before it is
created.

satkAryavAdins, like the advaitins, cite the ChAndogya mantra

'sadeva somya idamagra AsIt' as a basis to hold that "all this"
was existing in a causal form in the beginning, ie before its
creation.
Therefore, according to advaita, a pot exists in its kAraNa
rUpa, causal form, before it comes into being. Once a pot is
created, it exists both causally and physically. After
destruction, it exists only in its causal state. Broadly speaking,
there are two kinds of destruction - niranvaya vinAsha (when
an object is completely destroyed, leaving no traces behind)
and sAnvaya vinAsha (when there are some remaining traces
left behind after destruction). The advaitins believe in sAnvaya
vinAsha.

When a pot is broken by the blow of a hammer, it's physical

form is destroyed, but its causal form is not. Only when
brahmajnAna occurs will it cease to exist both in its causal
and physical state. This is termed as avasthiti sAmAnya viraha
by the siddhikAra - the basic absence of an object in all states.

ज्ञानप्रयुक्तावस्थितिसामान्यविरहप्रतियोगित्वं हि ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं | this

definition, jnAna nivartyatvam, means the absence of every
aspect of the object, ie avasthiti sAmAnya viraha
pratiyogitvam, the counterpositiveness of the absence of the
object in all its aspects.

अवस्थितिच श्चद्वेधा, स्वरूपेण कारणात्मना च; There are two kinds of

avasthiti, physical and causal सत्कार्यवादाभ्युपगमात् Because we
hold on to satkAryavAda, the creation of a pre-existing thing.

तथाच मुद्गरपातेन घटस्य स्वरूपेणावस्थितिविरहेऽपि कारणात्मनावस्थितिविरहाभावात् In

the case of destruction of a pot due to a hammer blow, even
though the pot physically breaks, it continues to exist in its
causal form. ब्रह्मज्ञानप्रयुक्त एव स इति नातीतघटादावव्याप्ति: its (causal
state's) sublation is by knowledge of Brahman alone.
Therefore, even pots that have already been destroyed are
included within the definition of mithyAtva, and thus the
charge of avyApti (under extension) is not applicable.

There can be a doubt here. In the case of a pot that is broken,

it has already lost its physical form. When brahma jnAna
arises, only its causal form gets destroyed. Therefore, the
siddhikAra's definition of jnAna nivartyatvam as jnAna prayukta
avasthiti sAmAnya viraha pratiyogitvam, will not apply in such
cases, because jnAna is not a cause of both kAraNa avasthA
and svarUpa avasthA. It is the cause of nivritti of only the
kAraNa avasthA. Thus objects whose form has been destroyed
would not be mithyA.

This is not true because the third definition of mithyAtva does

not require that every form has to be destroyed by knowledge.
All that is required is that no form of the object exists after
jnAna arises.

By sAmAnya viraha, the siddhikAra means sAmAnyA abhAva,

the absence of any object that belongs to that object's class.
To explain, when we say that there is no blue pot on the
ground, it is a vishesha abhAva, it is the absence of a specific
blue pot. However, when we say there is no pot on the ground,
it is sAmAnya abhAva, no object endowed with potness
(ghaTatvam) is present. To postulate sAmAnya abhAva of an
object, there is no requirement that the seer should have prior
knowledge of all objects belong to the same class. To say that
a pot is not present, one does not require the prior knowledge
of all pots everywhere, at all time. All he needs to verify is that
there is an absence of ghaTa sAmAnya dharma in that place.

Therefore there is no requirement that jnAna has to sublate

every form of the object for us to claim its sAmAnya abhAva, all
that is required is that neither the physical nor the causal
form of the object is in existence after knowledge arises.

अत एवोत्तरज्ञाननिवर्तये पूर्वज्ञाने न सिद्धसाधनं therefore, while

the subsequent cognition destroys the physical form of the
previous cognition, the charge of ativyApti levelled by the
nyAyAmritakAra is not present here. The term ativyApti is used
in the context of defects in lakshaNas, when it is described in
terms of sAdhya, the equivalent defect is siddhasAdhana.
 त्वेऽपि
नवा वियदादौ ब्रह्मज्ञाननायत्वेऽपि तद्वदेव मिथ्यात्वासिद्ध्यार्थान्तरम् ; The
श्य
nyAyAmritakAra could argue that arthAntara is present - that
is, instead of proving mithyAtvam, all that is proven is the
destruction of the object. Even though the world consisting of
space, etc., is destroyed due to brahmajnAna, why does this
imply the world's mithyAtvam? Just like how the mithyAtva of
the previous cognition is not proven by its destruction by a
subsequent cognition, the world does not become mithyA
because it gets sublated by brahma jnAna.

The siddhikAra says, while the former is true, the latter is not
- the two cases are different. In the case of the previous
cognition's destruction by subsequent cognition, its causal
state is not destroyed, whereas when brahma jnAna arises, the
world's physical and its causal state are non-existent. It must
be noted that this does not establish the reality of cognitions
as a result - all that is said is that the destruction of cognition
by another thought is not sufficient to prove its mithyAtva. In
order to establish the mithyAtva of an object, after jnAna
arises, no trace of it should be left. This condition is met for
the world, but not met for the pUrva jnAna's nivritti due
to uttara jnAna.

उत्तरज्ञाने लीनस्य पूर्वज्ञानस्य

स्वकारणात्मनावस्थानादवस्थितिसामान्यविरहानुपपत्ते: | because while
the subsequent cognition will only destroy the physical form of
the previous cognition, it continues to exist in its causal state
(as samskAra). Therefore its jnAna prayukta sAmAnya viraha
pratiyogitvam is not established. This is not a case of mithyA,
whereas no aspect of the world remains after brahmajnAna.

A question may occur - why is there a requirement for the

words "jnAna prayukta" in the definition, "because of jnAna"?
It is to differentiate mithyA from asat.

शशविषाणादाववस्थितिसामान्यविरहेऽपि तस्य ज्ञानप्रयुक्तत्वाभावान्नतिव्याप्ति: | asat

is also absolutely absent in any form, however its absence is
not a result of jnAna. Therefore, by adding the qualification
"because of jnAna", asat is excluded from the definition. The
total absence of an object (avasthiti sAmAnya viraha) has to
be established because of jnAna (but as we saw earlier, there
is no requirement that the absence of each state
is established by jnAna).

Only then it can be called mithyA. Therefore, the definition

does not suffer from ativyApti due to asat.

The nyAyAmritakAra had argued that the shell-silver, the

driShTAnta for mithyAtva, itself is not included in such a
definition because the destruction of shell-silver is not by
jnAna as jnAna (ज्ञानत्वेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं), but by a specialised
direct cognition of the substratum of the illusion. The
siddhikAra replies:

शुक्तिरजतादेश्चापरोक्षप्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रतिभासकाले अवस्थित्यङ्गीकारान्न

बाधकज्ञानं विना तद्विरह इति न साध्यविकलता | The direct perception of
shell silver is not possible without accepting that it exists at
the time of its appearance. It is not some other silver that is
seen here. It is also only present at the time of its appearance,
not always. Therefore, as the absolute absence of such a
silver is not possible without a sublating knowledge, the
definition of mithyAtva does apply to shell-silver and the
charge of sAdhya vaikalyam (the sAdhya of mithyAtva not being
present in the driShTAnta) is not applicable.
tritIya mithyAtva vichAra: (part
2)
In the previous lesson, we had looked at the third definition of
mithyAtva proposed by the vivaraNakAra - jnAna nivartyatvam.
The nyAyAmritakAra had cited certain exceptions to this
definition, which in his opinion, rendered it unfit to describe
mithyAtvam completely (avyApti) or accurately (ativyApti). The
siddhikAra in each case had addressed the defects identified
by the nyAyAmritakAra.

In doing so, the true meaning of jnAna nivartyatvam was

brought out as jnAna prayukta avasthiti sAmAnya viraha
pratiyogitvam - the general absence of all the states of an
object brought about by knowledge. The nyAyAmritakAra may
think that this is a refinement that the siddhikAra has
independently provided to the original definition. To refute such
a potential allegation, the siddhikAra now sets out to prove
that this is the intention of the vivaraNAchArya as well. He
says:

अतेवोक्तं विवरणाचार्यै: - "अज्ञानस्य स्वकार्येण प्रविलीनेन वर्तमानेन वा सह

ज्ञानेन निवृत्तिर्बाध " इति | The same was said by the vivaraNAchArya
- sublation is the cessation of ignorance along with its
products in their physical state (वर्तमानेन = current, i.e. tangible
state) and in their causal state (प्रविलीनेन).

The words 'jnAnena nivritti' of the vivaraNakAra are equivalent

to the siddhikAra's 'jnAna prayukta', and the words 'pravilInena
vartamAnena vA nivritti' are equivalent to 'avasthiti sAmAnya
viraha pratiyogitvam' of the siddhikAra.

Not only the vivaraNakAra, the same has been said by

sureshvarAchArya too.

वार्तिककृ द्भिश्चोक्तं - "तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थसम्बन्धधीजन्ममात्रत: | अविद्या सह

कार्येण नासीदस्ति भविष्यति ||" इति | The vartikakAra also has said this -
by the mere rise (janma mAtra) of the jnAna (sAkshAtkAra)
that is born out of the mahAvAkya "That thou art", avidyA and
its products cease to exist in any of the three periods of time -
past, present and future.
सह कार्येण नासीदिति लीनेन कार्येण सह निवृत्त्यभिप्रायं | by the words "(avidyA) with
its products were not in existence", the sublation of the
object along with its samskAra (latent impression) is implied.

How? To answer, let us consider, when do we talk of an object

in the past tense? When we are reminded of an occasion in the
past in relation to the object. Therefore when we say "there
was a pot", we can infer that a samskAra of the pot exists now,
which triggered the memory of its past existence. Therefore by
saying nAsIt (it was not in existence), the vArtikakAra is
implying samskAra nivritti (लीनेन कार्येण सह). By the use of nAsti (it
is not in existence), the vArtikakAra is referring to the
negation of its physical state in the present.

"सह कार्येण न भविष्यति" इति तु भाविकार्यनिवृत्त्यभिप्रायमितन्यदेतत् | by

saying avidyA and its products will not come into existence (na
bhaviShyati), it means that the effect cannot be born if the
cause, ignorance, no longer exists. By anyadetat, siddhikAra is
saying that this - that an effect cannot come into existence
without its cause - is an aspect not relevant to our discussion
now.

Now we take a little diversion to consider whether avidyA is

one or many. If avidya is one, ie there is only one ignorance,
then the destruction of ignorance, will lead to the rise of
brahma jnAna. That is, if shell ignorance is removed by
knowledge of the shell, knowledge of brahman should also
arise, as in destroying shell-ignorance, the only ignorance is
destroyed. However, this is an absurd proposition - many
disappointed silver seekers would end up as brahma jnAnis!

To avoid this, if one were to say that the knowledge of the shell
does not remove the ignorance of the shell, then that is
equivalent to saying knowledge cannot remove ignorance. Thus
brahma jnAna will also not remove brahma ajnAna. There is no
drishTAnta, example, with which to argue that with brahma
jnAna, brahma ajnAna nivritti is possible. Thus there are some
logical problems when using the shell-silver example, in the
case where avidyA is one. They can be surmounted, but for this
discussion, the siddhikAra takes the case of avidyA being
many.

रूप्योपादानमज्ञानम् स्वकार्येण वर्तमानेन लीनेन वा सहाधिष्ठानसाक्षात्कारान्निवर्तते |

तत्तद्रूप्योपादानानामज्ञानानाम् भेदाभ्युपगमादिति न दृष्टान्ते साध्यवैकल्यम् ;
The sublation of the illusory shell silver and its material cause,
shell ignorance, happens when the shell is directly perceived.
This silver can be present at the time of perception or only as
a latent impression. Each form having a different material
cause, a different ajnAna (ie nAnA ajnAna paksha), there is no
sAdhya vaikalyam, ie the charge that mithyAtva (jnAna
nivartyatvam) does not exist in the example, is refuted. With
each jnAna, the cessation of both the illusion and its material
cause, which is a unique ignorance, happens. Thus in the nAna
ajnAna paksha, there is no sAdhya vaikalyam.

मुद्गरपातानन्तरं घटो नास्तीति प्रतीतिवदधिष्ठानज्ञानानन्तरं शुक्त्यज्ञानं तद्गतरुप्यं च

नास्तीति प्रतीते: सर्वसंमतत्वात् | After a hammer breaks a pot, its
clearly known that there is no pot in existence. Similarly,
after the knowledge of the substratum, the knowledge that
neither shell ignorance nor its product, shell-silver, is in
existence is clearly acceptable by everyone.

The nyAyAmritakAra had said that jnAna nivartyatvam is not an

acceptable definition, it has to be refined to jnAnatva vyApya
dharmeNa jnAna nivartyatvam (the sublation by a special case
of jnAna). jnAnatvam is present in all cognitions in general,
whereas sAkshAtkAratvam (of the nature of direct perception),
anubhavatvam (of the nature of experience), smrititvam (of the
nature of memory) etc are jnAnatvavyApya, special cases of
jnAna. He had argued that the sublation by knowledge is not by
all cognitions (ie with jnAnatva sAmAnya dharma), but it is a
special kind of jnAna that sublates (jnAnatvavyApya dharmeNa
jnAna nivartyatvam). He had gone on to argue that even this
definition was incorrect because there is an overextension,
ativyApti, in the case of samskAra. He had also said that there
is ativyApti in the case of the sublation of one cognition by
another cognition that immediately follows it.

The siddhikAra now refutes both these defects.

ज्ञानत्वव्याप्यधर्मेण ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वमित्यपि साधु | It is correct to say

that the sublatability by knowledge is in fact the sublatability
by a special kind of knowledge.
उत्तरज्ञानस्य पुर्वज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वं च न ज्ञानत्वव्याप्यधर्मेण,
किन्त्विच्छादिसाधारणे नोदीच्यात्मविशेषगुणत्वेन उदीच्यत्वेन वेति न सिद्धसाधनादि | The
destruction of one knowledge by the subsequent knowledge, is
not because the subsequent knowledge has a special attribute
- any knowledge in general that arises subsequently, including
icChA (desire) etc, which according to the naiyyAyika is a
special attribute of the Atma, is capable of superceding the
previous knowledge. Therefore, it is udIcyatvam of the jnAna,
ie its immediate occurrence after the prior knowledge, which
gives it the ability to remove the previous knowledge. We had
already seen that such a subsequent jnAna cannot remove the
samskAra of the previous jnAna, so this 'destruction' is not a
case of jnAna nivartyatvam.

नापीच्छाद्यनिवर्तये स्मृतित्वे न ज्ञाननिवर्त्ये संस्कारे अतिव्याप्ति: Latent

impressions, are not destroyed by desire, but memory, leading
to the overextension of this definition of mithyAtva to
samskAra - this was the view of the nyAyAmritakAra.
According to him, the memory of an object / experience can
remove the samskAra of that object / experience. Thus he had
argued that memory, a jnAnatva vyApya dharma, is capable of
removing samskAra, making it mithyA. The siddhikAra refutes
this view (that memory can remove samskAra).
There are three views within nyAya in this regard:

1) raghunAtha shiromaNi (dIdhiti) - there is destruction of

latent impressions due to memory. That recollection creates a
new latent impression which is stronger. If that is again
recollected, it will destroy the newer impression and create
another stronger impression, and so on.
2) vishvanAtha bhaTTAcArya (nyAya siddhAnta muktAvali) -
latent impressions are not created by memory, only by
experience. Similarly, impressions are not destroyed by
memory. With each recollection, the impression is activated
(samskAra udbodha), which keeps the impression from
deactivating, making it stronger.
3) the ancients (prAchina) - Both experience and memory
create latent impressions. Memory does not destroy
impressions. With each recollection, new impressions are
created. The multitude of impressions about the same object
make it strong.

स्मृतित्वेन स्मृते: संस्कारनिवर्तकत्वे मानाभावात् | There is no pramANa,

basis, to claim that memory can destroy latent impressions.

स्मृतौ हि जातायां संस्कारो दृढो भवतीत्यनुभवसिद्धम् | In fact, experience

tell us that our latent impressions become stronger with each
recollection.

तेषां दृढतरत्वं च समानविषयकसंस्कारानेकत्वादित्य दोष: | When the same

experience is recollected, newer samskAras created, causing
the recollection to become stronger. As a result, the claim that
memory destroys latent impressions is not true and therefore
there is no defect here.

वस्तुतस्तु, साक्षात्कारत्वेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वम् विवक्षितम् ; अतो न पूर्वोक्तदोष: | In

any case, what is meant is that it is the direct perception of
the substratum that leads to the sublation. Therefore, the
previous defects cited do not apply.
नापि निश्चयत्वेन ज्ञानत्वव्याप्यधर्मेण ज्ञाननिवर्त्ये संशये अतिव्याप्तिरीति
सर्वमवदातम् || When we have certainty, any doubts that we may
have are cleared. nishchayatvam (certitude) which is a special
property of jnAna, is also jnAnatva vyApya dharma. The
pUrvapakshi may argue that as doubt is removed due to jnAna
endowed with certainty, it leads to ativyApti in the case of
doubt. However, since the intention of the jnAnatva vyApya
dharma was to refer to sAkshAtkAratvam, such a charge is
uncalled for.

With this, the chapter covering the third definition of mithyAtva

in the advaita siddhi has been completed.
caturtha mithyAtva vichAra: (part
1)
Until now, we have considered three (out of five) definitions of
mithyAtva. Now we will take up the fourth definition of
mithyAtva, proposed by chitsukhAchArya, for discussion.

यनि ष्
ठा त्
यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि त्
वं
स्वारयनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं श्रवा मिथ्यात्वं | Alternatively,
mithyAtva is the appearance of an object in the location of its
absence.

This appears similar to the second definition of the mithyAtva.

The entity being described being the same, the siddhikAra
seeks to differentiate the two definitions. A cup of water can
be described either as a cup containing water, or water
contained in a cup. The difference between the two definitions
of mithyAtva is similar.

There are two components to mithyAtva - appearance

(pratIyamAnatvam) and absence (abhAvatvam). The second
definition is the absence of the object in the location of its
appearance and the fourth definition is the appearance of the
object in the location of its absence. Essentially, the
visheShya (qualified entity) and the visheShaNa (qualifier) are
reversed in the two definitions.

तच्च स्वात्यन्ताभावाधिकरण एव प्रतीयमानत्वम् | this means in the

location of the absence of the object, its appearance is also
present.

अत: पूर्ववैलक्षण्यम् | thus it is different from the previous

(second) definition.

The nyAyAmritakAra says that the fourth definition of

mithyAtva is the same as second definition, and therefore,
the defects cited for the second definition also apply here. In
reply, the siddhikAra says:
दूषणपरिहार: पूर्ववत् | The defects cited to this definition can be
remedied as described previously.

The pUrva pakshi argues:

नच - संयोगिनि समवायिनी वा देशे तदत्यन्ताभावासंभव:, if an object is
present in a location with samyoga sambandha (i.e. it is
physically located somewhere, e.g. a pot on the ground), then
it cannot be absent in the same place with samyoga
sambandha itself. Similarly, if it is present in a location with
samavAya sambandha (i.e. it is present in its material cause,
e.g. pot being present in clay), it cannot be absent in the
same place with samavAya sambandha.

There is an issue with this objection because if a pot is

present in a place and it is later moved, both the
counterpositive and its absence can be said to be present in
the same place. Similarly, before a piece of cloth is weaved,
only the thread is present. Later the cloth comes into being.
Here too, before the cloth is created, the absence of cloth is in
the thread, and later the cloth is present. Therefore, the
objection, on the face of it, appears invalid. Sri
GauDabrahmAnanda in his laghuchandrika, finds a way to
validate the objection first and then goes on to prove why that
objection is refuted.

BrahmAnanda says that the usage of the suffix - "in" (in

samyog-ini and samavAy-ini) implies a sense of nitya yoga,
permanent relationship - that is, the nyAyAmritakAra means
that it is impossible for the absence of an object in the locus
where it is permanently present with samyoga sambandha, or
samavAya sambandha.

संभवे तूपादानत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिरिति - वाच्यं - even if it is assumed that the

absence is somehow co-present with its counter-positive, this
would invalidate upAdAnatva, material causation.

If something can be created from something else, even a

completely unrelated entity, then any anything can be created
from anything. A Pot can be weaved from threads! Thus, the
idea of upAdAna kAraNa, material cause, is invalidated if a
thing is both present and absent in a location (with samavAya
sambandha). Similarly, everyday reality is that a pot is present
where it is seen (samyoga sambandha). Its absence in the very
location of its presence is never experienced. Thus not only
does the advaitin's conception of mithyAtva invalidate
causation, it also invalidates experience. This is implied by the
term 'Adi' in the sentence.

The siddhikAra responds to this line of argument by saying -

Not so.
- काले सहसम्भववद्दे शाअपि सहसम्भवाविरोधात्, It is possible for a
pratiyogi and its abhAva to be present at the same time. For
example, in the same instant, a pot is present here and absent
elsewhere. Therefore, just like it is possible for presence and
absence to be colocated in the same time, it is possible for
presence and absence to be colocated in the same space too.
For example, a pot is present here now, but absent in the same
place later. Therefore, just like an object's absence and
presence are simultaneously present in time, its absence and
presence can be simultaneously present in space.

In response to the argument that this view invalidates

upAdAna kAraNatvam, material causation, the siddhikAra
says:
प्रागभावसत्त्वेनोपादानत्वाविरोधाच्च | if prior-absence is possible, so
is material causation. The pUrvapakshi accepts that the clay
has the pot's prAgabhAva, prior absence. He also accepts that
the cloth does not have the pot's prAgabhAva. Therefore we
can argue that the presence of prAgabhAva in one and the
absence of prAgabhAva in the other means that the material
causation is possible only in one, and not in the other.

To this, the pUrva pakshi argues that the advaitin's definition

refers to the atyantAbhAva of an object in a place, not its
prAgabhAva. While it is acceptable that prAgabhAva and
upAdAna kAraNatvam are simultaneously present, it is not
possible for atyantAbhAva to be also present there, at that
time. According to the ancient school within nyAyA (prAchina
nyAya), atyantAbhAva and prAgabhAva cannot be
simultaneously present in a place.
The siddhikAra says - Do not argue thus:
नच - अत्यन्ताभावाधिकरणे प्रागभावस्याप्यनुपपत्तिरीति - वाच्यम्; "It is not
possible for atyantAbhAva and prAgabhAva to be present in
the same locus." If prAgabhAva is present somewhere,
atyantAbhAva cannot be present there and vice versa. The
advaitin's definition claims that atyantAbhAva and its pratiyogi
are present in a place. Therefore if an object is mithyA, its
atyantAbhAva is present, and thus its prAgabhAva cannot be
present there. If prAgabhAva is not present, material causation
is not present there. Therefore, the idea of material causation
is invalidated by this definition of mithyAtva.

The siddhikAra says - that is not true. prAgabhAva and

atyantAbhAva can be located in the same place.

काले व्यभिचारात् | according to naiyyAyikas, everything is located in

time (kAla adhIna), nothing can exist outside time. Therefore,
prAgabhAva is present in time, and so is atyantAbhAva.
atyantAbhAva being eternal, there is no time when it is not
present. Therefore the rule that atyantAbhAva and prAgabhAva
cannot be located in the same locus breaks down when the
locus is kAla, time.

If the locus can be time, why not extend it to space?

To this, the nyAyAmritakAra says:

नच - काले प्रागभावात्यन्ताभावयो: सामानाधिकरण्यमिदानीं घटात्यन्ताभाव इदानीम्
घटप्रागभाव इति प्रतीतिबलादङ्गीकृतं, देशे तु तदुभयसामानाधिकरण्ये न किञ्चिदपि
प्रामाणमिति - वाच्यम् |
We accept the prAgabhAva and atyantAbhAva are colocated in
time, because of the experience - "the pot's atyantAbhAva is
present now", "the pot's prAgabhAva is present now", etc.
However, there is no experience (or pramANa) to conclude
that prAgabhAva and its atyantAbhAva are present together
in space.

The siddhikAra says: not so.

navya nyAya, which refutes the prAchina school in holding that

atyantAbhAva and prAgabhAva can be simultaneously present,
gives a worldly example for this (from the dIdhiti of raghunAtha
shiromaNi).

Let us consider a pot, black in colour. Later, when it is burnt in

a kiln, it becomes red hot. When it turns red hot, the blackness
is destroyed, as it were. There is the dhvamsa of the blackness
present. If someone is asked, is the pot black, they will reply
"no". This negation refers to the atyantAbhAva of the
blackness, as the person who answered has no inkling that it
was black previously. As the blackness has been destroyed, its
dhvamsa also is present. Thus both blackness' dhvamsa and
atyantAbhAva are present in the pot. If dhvamsa and
atyantAbhAva can be co-present, it is possible for prAgabhAva
and atyantAbhAva to be co-present as well.

To refute this, if it is argued that the negation in the speaker's

reply "it is not black" refers only to the dhvamsAbhAva and not
atyantAbhAva, another example is given. An object called
pancharangi is considered, which changes colour between red
and black continuously. If we consider a set of 5 transitions -
BRBRB (B=black, R=red) - and within that, if we consider the
time when the object is in stage 3 (ie the middle of the 5
transition sequence), the object contains blackness, the
dhvamsAbhAva of the previous blackness and the prAgabhAva
of the subsequent blackness.

At that point, if someone asks - "is the object black?", the

reply cannot be "No." - because the object happens to be black
in colour then. If it was possible for the negation to refer to
either the prAgabhAva or the dhvamsAbhAva, the answer to
the question "is the object black", would have been "No.",
because black prAgabhAva and black dhvamsa are both
present then. However, the answer is not "No.", it is "Yes, it is
black". In order for the speaker to say "No", it would
necessarily have to refer to the atyantAbhAva of the
blackness. Therefore, the object of negation is not the
prAgabhAva or dhvamsAbhAva, but atyantAbhAva.

Extending this to the previous example, when the pot changed

colour from black to red and a person was asked "Is the pot
black?", the reply was "No". As we just proved, the object of
the negation is not dhvamsa of blackness, but its
atyantAbhAva. Therefore, to a seer, atyantAbhAva exists, in
addition to which dhvamsa exists too. Hence it is possible for
dhvamsa and atyantAbhava to coexist, and similarly, so can
atyantAbhAva and prAgabhAva.

However, instead of going through this explanation, the

siddhikAra simply replies, it is possible for prAgabhAva and
atyantAbhAva to be colocated on the basis of shruti pramANa
and mithyAtva anumAna.

मिथ्यात्वानुमिते: श्रुत्यादेश्च प्रमाणत्वात् | because their colocation

is proven by both shruti and mithyAtva anumAna.

How can contradictory attributes be present in the same

location?

विषमसत्ताकभावाभावयोरविरोध: पूर्वमुपपादित: | It is possible because

existence and non-existence can co-exist if they have different
orders of reality. The absence of silver in shell is vyAvahArika,
the presence of silver is prAtibhAsika, both can co-exist
simultaneously. Similarly in the paksha where the absence of
the world is taken as adhikaraNAtmakam - ie the absence of
the object is the locus itself, then the absence of the world,
which is nothing but the adhikaraNa, Brahman, is
pAramArthika, whereas the world is vyAvahArika. This has
already been said in the chapter on the second definition of
mithyAtva.

नच असत्यतिव्याप्ति:, स्वात्यन्ताभावाधिकरण एव सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वस्य

विवक्षितत्वात् |
There is no ativyApti, overextension of this definition to
include asat, because what is covered by this definition of
mithyAtva is the appearance of the object's existence in the
very locus of its absence.

This is quite obvious, on the face of it. However, the

pUrvapakshi is arguing that asat is the object of sentences
like "asat is not existent". Thus, if asat being the object of
sentences such as these is taken to be "pratIti", appearance,
then - they appear, but do not really exist. Thus, his argument
is that asat would thus be covered under the definition.

In reply, the siddhikAra says that pratIti is not merely

appearance, but appearance as existing (sattvena pratIti). A hare's
horn never appears to exist anywhere, thus there is no
sattvena pratIti for it.

नच - "तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसी" दिति श्रुत्या असत:

सत्त्वप्रतीतेस्तत्रातिव्याप्ति: दुष्परिहरेति - वाच्यम् ;
In reply, the pUrva pakshi says asat can have the sattvena
pratIti, for the veda itself says "Some say - asat was in
existence before this", as a result of which, the defect of
ativyApti is not so easily removed. The pUrva pakshi is arguing
that asat is the object of the vedic sentence which talks of its
existence in the past, and that itself confers sattvena pratIti to
asat.

The siddhikAra replies - Not so, because:

"सदेवेदमग्र आसी" दित्यस्यार्थस्याभाव एव नञा प्रतिपाद्यते, न त्वसत: सत्त्वम् ;

The अ in the sentence, which serves as a means of negation
(अमानोनाः प्रतिषेधवाचका:) is used to negate the entire sentence
"Sat was in existence", and not to indicate that asat was in
existence. That is, the right interpretation should be "Some
say - Sat was in existence - No" and not "Some say - asat was
in existence". First the veda says that "sat was in existence"
and then presents the view held by contrarians who negate the
previous view, saying "sat was in existence - No". (Which, in
turn, is later refuted in the next mantra). It does not mean asat
existed in the beginning. In the chAndogya bhAshya by
ShankarAchArya, the same interpretation is given.

Why is the pUrvapakshi's interpretation untenable?

विरोधात् | it would be contradictory to say that asat, non-
existence, was in existence.

The author of the nyAyAmrita tarangiNi writes in response to

the siddhikAra's reply. According to the siddhikAra's
interpretation, a wrong view held by some is presented in the
veda. They hold that "sat was not in existence in the
beginning". Brahman (sat) being eternal, its absence is asat,
absolutely absent. Thus the sentence "sat was not in
existence in the beginning" is conferring the pratIti
(appearance) of existence to brahma abhAva, an asat entity.
Therefore, the sentence's subsequent denial notwithstanding,
the defect of ativyApti still exists as an asat object has
sattvena pratIti.

There is a defect with this argument of the tarangiNikAra. The

interpretation by siddhikAra is interpreting अ as a negation of
the previous sentence. It is saying - "सदेवेदमग्र आसीत् - न." It is
not saying "सदेवेदमग्र न आसीत्" which is what the tarangiNikAra
understood it to be.

What is the difference between the two?

Take the sentences - "the pot previously existed as a clay"

and "the curd previously existed as milk". Let us also examine
two sentences where a negative is used, "the pot was not clay
before" and "the pot was milk before - No". While the first
sentence, by objectifying the pot's existence, can be said to
have sattvena pratIti, the second sentence is simply a
negation of the previous sentence and does not objectify the
pot's existence. Similarly, "असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्" or "सदेवेदमग्र
आसीत् - न " does not objectify Brahman's absence (asat) -
therefore sattvena pratIti is not conferred to asat in the
siddhikAra's explanation.

अतो नातिव्याप्ति: | Therefore there is no ativyApti.

सर्वे चान्यत् पूर्वोक्त्मेवानुसंबन्धेयमित्युपरम्यते || All the other

defects in this definition have been answered in the chapter on
the second definition of mithyAtvam.

This concludes the chapter on the fourth definition of

mithyAtvam - स्वारयनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं
यनि ष्
ठा त्
यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि त्
वं.
श्र
panchama mithyAtva vichAra:
The fifth definition of mithyAtva was proposed by
AnandabodhAchArya, a great AchArya of advaita from the 11th
century. Four works are attributed to him, nyAyamakaranda,
pramANamAla, nyAyadIpAvali and nyAyadIpika. The siddhikAra
takes up the fifth definition of mithyAtva for analysis.

सद्विविक्तत्वं वा मिथ्यात्वम् | That which is different from sat is

mithyA.

Prima facie, this may lead to the charge of ativyApti,

overextension of the definition to cover asat. asat is different
from sat, but not mithyA, hence ativyApti.

To understand why this charge does not hold, we have to

examine the intent of AnandabodhAchArya. What is sat? The
nyAyAmritakAra considers several meanings and finds flaws in
each of them:

1) sat can mean brahman. Using this definition of sat, mithyA

is different from brahman. If this is all that mithyA means, the
dvaitin would have no problem with it. Thus, such a definition
would lead to proving something already known, or the defect
of siddhasAdhanam.
2) sat can mean that which is real - ie satyam. Thus this
definition means that which is not real. That the world is not
real needs to be proved, therefore, the defect of
siddhasAdhana is not present. However, the meaning of sat is
equatable to abAdhyam, unsublatable. In other words, mithyA
is sublatable. However, such a definition of mithyA is nothing
new, it would be the same as previous ones.
3) The naiyyAyikas say there is a jAti (universal) called sattA
(existence), and objects that have sattA jAti are sat. If the
world is that which is not endowed with existence, then such a
definition is not desirable to advaitin - that would be contrary
to everyday experience.

To these objections, the siddhikAra replies:

सत्त्वं च प्रमाणसिद्धम् | that which is known through a valid
means of knowledge is sat.
If this definition had to apply to the world, then the implication
would be that the world is not known through a pramANa.
However, the world is directly perceived - it is the object of
pratyaksha. Therefore is pratyaksha not a pramANa?

The siddhikAra continues:

प्रमाणत्वं च दोषासहकृ तज्ञानकरणत्वम् | pramANa, a valid means of

knowledge, is that which generates knowledge without
defects.
However, the defects themselves may not be apparent when
knowledge arises. It is only when the object of knowledge is
subsequently sublated, that the presence of the defect
inferred. Every knowledge in vyavahAra is open for sublation,
upon the knowledge of identity with Brahman. Therefore in this
view, only mahAvAkyas (sentences that postulate the identity
of the individual self with Brahman) are pramANas in reality,
because they can never be sublated. Every other pramANa is
imbued with some defect or the other - avidyA or primal
nescience is the common defect afflicting all pramANas.

The pUrvapakshi may argue that even the mahAvAkya is

associated with avidyA, because it generates vritti jnAna, a
thought carrying the meaning of the mahAvAkya. vritti jnAnam
can be generated only in the mind, which is one of the effects
of primal nescience. That being the case, mahAvAkya requires
avidyA to remove avidyA. There is avidyA apeksha, or has
avidyA as a pre-requisite.

The reply given by brahmAnanda is that mahAvAkya requires

avidyA to generate valid knowledge, however the requirement
of avidyA is not as a defect. For example, a person suffering
from pitta doSha is traditionally held to see things yellow. If
he/she sees a white object like a conch, the person afflicted by
this ailment will see that conch as yellow. Let us assume that
this patient visits a doctor, who diagnoses the ailment
correctly. In this instance, the doctor's diagnosis (which is a
jnAna) has an expectation for the presence of the ailment (it is
the object of the doctor's jnAna), but that expectation is not as
a defect. However, when avidyA in association with the eyes
makes the world visible, there it acts as doSha. Whereas, for
jnAna born out of mahAvAkya, there is an expectation for the
presence of the mind, which is an effect of avidyA, but
avidyA's requirement is not as a defect.

This is the full import of the sentence प्रमाणत्वं च

दोषासहकृ तज्ञानकरणत्वम्.

तेन स्वप्नादिवत्प्रमाणसिद्धभिन्नत्वेन मिथ्यात्वं सिद्ध्यति | Therefore, just

like in the perception of dream objects, generated due to nidrA
doSha, perception is not considered as a valid means of
knowledge, (the world) is considered mithyA too as it is not
revealed by a valid means of knowledge.

The nyAyAmritakAra had previously said that if sattva meant

unsublatability, then mithyAtva as difference from sat, would
mean sublatability. Even if mithyA is held to be the difference
from a thing known through a pramANa, it would ultimately
imply sublatability. In other words, nothing new is revealed
with this definition and is the same as the previous definitions
of mithyAtva.

In reply, the siddhikAra makes a subtle but important

distinction. That which is pramANa siddha bhinnam is
bAdhyam, however, pramANa siddha bhinnatvam and
bAdhyatva are different. That is, pramAnA siddha bhinnatvam
implies bAdhyatvam, but is not the same as the bAdhyatvam,
just like where there is fire there is smoke, but that does not
make fire and smoke the same. Therefore, this definition
reveals something other than that which was revealed by
previous definitions of mithyAtva.

प्रमाणसिद्धत्वं चाबाध्यत्वव्याप्यमित्यन्यत् | pramANa siddhatvam is vyApya

for abAdhyatvam - that is, wherever there is pramANa siddha
bhinnatvam, there is bAdhyatvam. However the two are
different (and thus the charge of repetition does not apply).

अत्राप्यसति निर्धर्मके ब्रह्मणि चातिव्याप्तिवारणाय सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वं विशेषणं देयम्

;
If it is argued that this definition extends to asat and
attributeless Brahman, then the qualifier "that which appears
as existing" must be added.

asat are objects of a kind of vritti called vikalpa. Five kinds of

thoughts or vrittis are enumerated in yoga shAstra - pramANa,
viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrA and smriti. Of these, vikalpa vritti
objectifies asat. However, even vikalpa vritti is born out of
avidyA doSha or ignorance, according to advaita. Thus, even
according to this revision by AnandabodhAchArya, the fifth
definition of mithyA will extend to asat.

Secondly, this definition extends (incorrectly) to the

attributeless Brahman too. According to the BhAmati school,
shuddha Brahman cannot be the object of any vritti. Thus, as
shuddha Brahman is not knowable by any pramANa, this
definition of mithyAtva would incorrectly extend to shuddha
Brahman too.

The siddhikAra says - to remedy this, the qualifier "sattvena

pratIyamAnatva", "capable of appearing as existing" needs to
be appended to the definition.

तयो: सत्त्वप्रकारकप्रतीतिविषयत्वाभावात् | Both shuddha Brahman and

asat are not the objects of a cognition that has existence as
its qualifier (ie they are not capable of appearing as existing),
thus this addition will remedy the defects cited.

अतएव - " सिद्विविक्तत्व " मित्यत्र सत्त्वं सत्ताजात्यधिकरणत्वं वा,

अबाध्यत्वं वा, ब्रह्मरूपत्वं वा | आद्ये घटादावाविद्यकजातेस्त्वयाभ्युपगमेनासम्भव:, द्वितीये
बाध्यत्वरूपमिथ्यात्वपर्यवसानम् ; तृतीये सिद्धसाधनमिति - निरस्तम्

अतएव निरस्तम् - Therefore the following statements of the

nyAyamritakAra are refuted:

"सिद्विविक्तत्व" मित्यत्र सत्त्वं सत्ताजात्यधिकरणत्वं वा, अबाध्यत्वं वा,

ब्रह्मरूपत्वं वा | by the definition "sat viviktatvam", sat could
mean 1) that which is the substratum of the jAti (universal) of
existence, or 2) that which is unsublatable, or 3) that which is
Brahman.
In each of the three alternatives, there is a problem:
आद्ये घटादावाविद्यकजातेस्त्वयाभ्युपगमेनासम्भव: if the first, objects of the world
like pot, which the advaitin admits as having existence, would
render this definition of mithyAtva to not apply to any object at
all - ie it would suffer from the defect of asambhava,
inapplicability.
द्वितीये बाध्यत्वरूपमिथ्यात्वपर्यवसानम् ; if the second, then this
definition results in sublatability, which is the same as the
previous definition.
तृतीये सिद्धसाधनमिति in the third, mithyA is that which is different
from Brahman, which is already accepted. Thus there is siddha
sAdhanam.

Why are these refuted?

अनभ्युगमादेव | Because, none of these three alternatives is the
intended meaning of sat.
सदसद्विलक्षणत्वपक्षोक्तयुक्तयचात्रानुसन्धेया त्
रानु
सन्
धेया: | Other defects cited
श्चा
by the nyAyAmritakAra are answered in the chapter on
sadasat vilakshaNatvam.
ष्
टं
अव ष्टं च दृष्टान्तसिद्धौ वक्ष्याम : || Any remaining defects will be dealt
शि
with in the anirvachanIya khyAti section
mithyAtva mithyAtva nirUpaNam
After having discussed the five definitions of mithyAtva, the
next topic to be taken up is whether mithyAtva itself is mithyA
or satya. The nyAyAmritakAra argues that there is a problem
with either alternative.

He says:
ननु उक्तमिथ्यात्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वापत्तिः, If mithyAtva as
described is mithyA, then the world's reality is established.
How so?

एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि प्रसक्तयोः विरुद्धधर्मयोः एकमिथ्यात्वे अपरसत्यत्वनियमात् , If

any object appears to have two contradictory attributes, then,
as a rule, one of them must be real, and the other, unreal.
If there is an object in front, and one person claims that it is
silver, and the other that it is not silver, only one of them can
be true, the other must automatically be false. Similarly, the
world - the dharmi, the substratum - is said to contain two
contradictory attributes. The world is said to be unreal
(mithyA) according to the advaitin's inference (anumAna), and
is real (satya), according to direct perception (pratyaksha). It
cannot be both real and unreal, therefore if any one is present,
the other must not be present. pratyaksha cannot be wrong,
therefore the world's reality must be true. If satyatva is
present in the world, mithyAtva must necessarily be absent.

Let us consider two possibilities - mithyAtva itself is real and

mithyAtva itself is mithyA.

मिथ्यात्वसत्यत्वे च तद्वदेव प्रपञ्चस्यसत्यत्वापत्तेः, If mithyAtva is real,

then this implies the world's reality. Why? The hetu, or the
cause used in the inference to prove the world's reality is
drishyatvam, or knowability. The world is knowable, and
therefore is mithyA according to the advaitin. This inference of
mithyAtva itself is known, and thus is driShya itself. This
raises a conundrum.

Whatever is driShya is mithyA. mithyAtva anumAna is drishya.

However, we are now assuming that mithyAtva anumAna is
real. Therefore even though it is drishya, mithyAtva anumAna
is not mithyA, but satya. Thus the vyApti, or invariable
concomitance, between drishyatvam and mithyAtvam is
broken.

If the vyApti is broken, then jagat mithyAtva anumAna (the

inference of the world's unreality) which is based on the vyApti
of drishyatvam and mithyAtvam, is broken. Thus the world is
real as a result.

If, on the other hand, if mithyAtvam is mithyA itself, then the

unreality of the world is unreal. Therefore the world must be
real, after all (like the negative of a negative being a positive).

उभयथाप्यद्वैत व्याघात - in either case, the philosophy of advaita

stands refuted.

To this, the siddhikAra replies:

इति चेन्न; if this is the contention, no.

मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वेऽपि प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वानुपपत्ते: | there is no rule that if

mithyAtva is mithyA, the world's reality is established.

Let us consider the example of a person who looks at an

object and calls it a horse, and another looks at the same
object and calls it a cow. Cow-ness and horse-ness are
contradictory attributes. Where there is horse-ness, there is no
cow-ness. Where there is cow-ness, there is no horse-ness.
However, the absence of cow-ness does not automatically
imply the presence of horse-ness, nor does the absence of
horse-ness invariably imply the presence of cow-ness. The
object simply could be some other animal, like an elephant,
which is neither a horse, nor a cow. Here, even though both
options (it is a horse, it is a cow) are wrong - the wrongness of
one option does not imply the rightness of the other. Therefore
the rule should be refined to say - where two contradictory
attributes can be simultaneously negated, the negation of one
attribute does not imply the presence of the other attribute.
pratyaksha is proving the reality of the world. anumAna is
proving mithyAtva of the world. "mithyAtva and satyatva are
contradictory. If one of the two is wrong, then the other
becomes true" - these were the pUrvapakshi's contentions.
Both these views will be disproved later. Firstly, the presence
of mithyAtva does not rule out a satyatva known by
pratyaksha, and vice versa. Secondly, it is possible to negate
both simultaneously. advaita holds that the reality of the world
that is experienced (drishya) through pratyaksha and world's
mithyAtva that is known (driShya) through anumAna
are both mithyA.

तत्र हि विरुद्धयोर्धर्मयोरेकमिथ्यात्वे अपरसत्वं, यत्र मिथ्यात्वावच्छेदकमुभयवृत्ति न भवेत्, The

mithyAtva of one of two contradictory attributes implies the
reality of the other attribute only when mithyAtva is not the
attribute limitor (avacChedaka dharma) of both attributes - ie
both attributes can be mithyA.

यथा परस्परविरहरूपयो रजतत्वतदभावयो: शुक्तौ, for example, where the

presence of each attribute is of the nature of the absence of
the other, like between the presence or absence of silver-ness
in the shell. Where silver is present, its absence cannot be
simultaneously present, and vice versa.

यथा वा परस्परविरहव्यापकयो रजतभिन्नत्वरजतत्वयो: तत्रैव; alternatively,

where the absence of one implies the presence of the other,
like between silver and non-silver. The absence of silver
implies the presence of non-silver, and the absence of non-
silver, implies the presence of silver.

तत्र निषेध्यतावच्छेदकभेदनियमात्, There (in each of the two alternatives

above) the niShedhyatA avacChedaka dharma (the basis of
negation) of the two contradictory attributes is different.
Therefore, they are not negated simultaneously by one
negation.

प्रकृते तु निषेध्यतावच्छेदकमेकमेव दृश्यत्वादि, however, in the current context

(ie the world and its mithyAtva) the negation of the world and
its mithyAtva is on the common basis of drishyatvam,
knowability. The world is mithyA because it is drishya.
mithyAtva is mithyA because it too is drishya - it is known by
the mithyAtva anumAna. As both are simultaneously negated
by the one negation of everything drishya, the mithyAtvam of
the world's mithyAtva does not result in the reality of the
world.

यथा गोत्वाश्वत्वयोरेकस्मिन् गजे निषेधे गजत्वात्यन्ताभावव्याप्यत्वं निषेध्यतावच्छेदकमुभयोस्तुल्यमिति

नैकतरनिषेधे अन्यत्रसत्त्वं तद्वत् | In the case of an elephant, both
cow-ness and horse-ness are simultaneously negated on the
common basis of gajatva atyantAbhAva vyApyatva - they imply
the absolute absence of elephant-ness. If gajatva
atyantAbhAva is absent, then all attributes that imply it are
automatically absent. gajatva atyantAbhAva is absent in an
elephant (an elephant will not have the absence of elephant-
ness), thus all the impliers of the absence of elephant-ness are
rendered absent.

To explain - where cow-ness is present, the absolute absence

of elephant-ness would be present. Similarly, where horse-ness
is present, the absolute absence of elephant-ness would also
be present. Both cow-ness and horse-ness individually imply
the absence of elephant-ness, i.e. they have gajatva
atyantAbhAva vyApyatva. In logic, if A implies B (A->B), then
not B implies not A (B!->A!).

Therefore, by saying that the 'absolute absence of elephant-

ness' is absent in the elephant, every attribute that implied
that absolute absence, is automatically negated. Therefore,
cow-ness, horse-ness, etc, are automatically negated once the
absolute absence of elephant-ness is absent.

Therefore, the contention that the absence of one

contradictory attribute necessarily implies the presence of the
other contradictory attribute, is not true.

To this, the pUrva pakshi's contention is that the example

given by the siddhikAra is not appropriate because cow-ness
and horse-ness are both attributes of existence (bhAva rUpa
dharma), as opposed to satyatva and mithyAtva. Here, the
former (satyatva) is bhAva rUpa and the latter (mithyAtva) is
an attribute of non-existence (abhAva rUpa dharma).

To this, the siddhikAra says that satyatva and mithyAtva are

not pratiyogi and abhAva.

यथाच सत्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोर्न परस्परविरहरूपत्वम्, नवा परस्परविरहव्यापकत्वम्,

तथोपपादितमधस्तात् | satya and mithyA are not the mutual absence
of each other, nor does the absence of one imply the presence
of the other. This was said in the first definition of mithyAtvam.
There, it was argued that sat and asat are not pratiyogi and
abhAva. Similarly, sat and mithyA are not pratiyogi and
abhAva.

Later, in the advaita siddhi, it will be proven that reality of the

world seen through pratyaksha and mithyAtva of the world
proven by anumAna, are not mutually contradictory attributes
at all. Therefore the basic contention that the mithyAtva
anumAna is contradicted by pratyaksha will be challenged.

Even if, for the sake of argument, they are assumed to be

mutually contradictory, because both are negated
simultaneously, by negating one, the other is not proved.

In addition, the class of argument offered by the

nyAyAmritakAra is disallowed in nyAya shAstra. What he has in
effect done is called a nitya samA jAti, a category of
argumentation deemed futile in nyAya shAstra. A futile
argument, or jAti, is one where the refutation is merely
sophistical. To give an example, let us take the classic
anumAna - parvato vahnimAn, dhUmatvAt, mahAnasavat. The
mountain is on fire, because of smoke, like in the case of a
kitchen. Let us assume that the opponent objects to this
anumAna by splitting up the sAdhya (fire) into two categories -
mountainous fire (parvatIya vahni) and non-mountainous fire
(parvata-bhinna agni).

If the fire is parvatIya vahni, there is no vyApti (invariable

concomitance), because the mountainous fire cannot be
present in the kitchen. Thus the vyApti between smoke and
mountain-fire is not present in the example itself.
If parvata-bhinna agni, it would be illogical to try and prove
that the mountain contains non-mountain fire. Thus, whichever
position one takes, there is a logical fallacy.

To disallow such frivolous arguments, nyAya shAstra forbids

such class of arguments, termed nitya samA jAti. The
opponent is dividing the sAdhya into two vikalpas or options,
and each vikalpa is proved to be an impossibility. The way to
refute such an opponent is to say that the objective of the
anumAna is neither to prove that the mountain has parvatIya
vahni nor aparvatIya vahni, but that it has sAmAnya vahni - a
generic fire, not a fire specific to a particular locus at all.
There is a sloka in nyAya which defines nityasamA jAti: धर्मस्य
ष्
टत्वभङ्गो
तदसद्रूपविकल्पान् उपपत्तित: धर्मिण: तद्वि ष्टत्वभङ्गो नित्यसमो भवेत् |
शि

The nyAyAmritakAra's approach in this chapter is also a case

of nitya samA jAti. The anumAna of mithyAtva was taken and it
was split into vikalpas and argued that irrespective of whether
mithyAtvam is satya or mithyA, the world is proven to be real.

In reply to the charge of nitya samA jAti, various dvaitins argue

that the arguments offered by teachers within the advaita
tradition suffer from the same defect as well.For example, in
the khanDanakhanDakhAdya, Sri Harsha asks - is difference
different from the object, or identical with it? If it is different
from the object, then it leads to infinite regress (is that second
difference different from the first difference?, and so on). If
difference is identical with the object, then it would be
contradictory (how can an object be different from itself?). The
nyAyAmritakAra argues that this is also an example of nitya
samA jAti.

The advaita siddhikAra does not reply to this charge, but his
commentator, brahmAnanda, does so. His argument is that the
khanDanakAra intended for the khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya to be
a vitaNDa work - that is, he does not seek to prove anything,
he only wishes to disprove his opponent. The reason the
nityasamA jAti argument cannot be used in a debate is
because it can just as easily be turned around against the
arguer. This is not a problem for the khaNDanakAra because
he does not seek to prove or establish anything. Neither
difference nor identity is desirable, because he wants to refute
all vikalpas simultaneously. The opponent can use the
khaNDanakAra's arguments against him, but it does him no
harm, because all the opponent is refuting is a prakriyA, a
teaching methodology. The khaNDanakAra's ultimate refuge is
Brahman, which is irrefutable.

Coming back to the theme of the chapter, it was earlier argued

by the nyAyAmritakAra that when there are two contradictory
attributes ( e.g. abhAva and bhAva) in the same locus, the
attribute which is false must have a lower sattA, order of
reality than the attribute which is true.

brahmAnanda argues that this rule should refined by adding

that while one of the two must have a lower sattA, it is not
necessary for the false attribute to have a lower sattA than the
true attribute. In the case of shell-silver, the silver is
prAtibhAsika, whereas its absence is vyAvahArika. Now, when
the absence of silver is also later known to be mithyA by
anumAna or shruti, the pratiyogi of the abhAva, the silver, does
not become pAramArthika as a result. Therefore, it is not
necessary for a mithyA attribute to have a lower order than its
contradictory attribute. All that is required is that the two
attributes have different orders of reality.

However, even this refined rule is only applicable when one of

the two attributes are being negated, not when both are being
negated together. The siddhAnta is that both the world and its
mithyAtva are mithyA.

Our contention is that satyatva of the world and its mithyAtva

are not mutually exclusive.
परस्पररुपत्वेऽपि विषमसत्ताकयोरविरोधात् however, even if we were to
accept, for the sake of argument, that they were mutually
exclusive, both can be non-contradictory (ie co-exist) if they
have different orders of reality.

व्यावहारिकमिथ्यात्वेन व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वापहारेऽपि काल्पिनकसत्यत्वानपहारात्, If mithyAtva is

taken as vyAvahArika, while a vyAvahArika realty for the world
would not be possible (if satyatva and mithyAtva were
mutually exclusive), a prAtibhAsika reality would be possible.
Here, kAlpanika means prAtibhAsika.

तार्किकमतसम्योगतदभाववत् सत्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयो: समुच्चयाभ्युपगमाच्च | In

any case, it is possible for a pratiyogi and its abhAva to exist
within in the same locus - the naiyyAyikas accept that
samyoga and its abhAva can exist in the same locus (the
monkey's contact with one part of the tree but the absence of
such contact in another part, which was discussed in an
earlier lesson). Similarly, satyatva and mithyAtva are possible
in the same place.

What does the contradiction of satyatva and mithyAtva mean?

Not that it is impossible for both to coexist in one place, but
that when one is seen, the other is not. Therefore the
contradiction is not of existence, but in its comprehension. It
is jnAnata: virodha.

Now the siddhikAra presents some general rules for when two
contradictory attributes can have the same orders of reality,
and when they can have different orders of reality. He says:

एकस्य साधकेन अपरस्य बाध्यत्वं विषमसत्ताकत्वे प्रयोजकम् , यथा

शुक्तिरूप्यतदभावयो: |
When the same pramANa can prove one object's existence
while sublating the other, the two contradictory objects will
have different orders of reality. For example, pratyaksha
sublates the rajata, silver, while proving rajatAbhAva, the
absence of silver.

एकबाधकबाध्यत्वं च समसत्ताकत्वे प्रयोजकम्, यथा शुक्तिरूप्यशुक्तिभिन्नत्वयो: |

When the same pramANa sublates both contradicting objects,
the two objects must have the same order of reality. The
knowledge of the shell sublates both shell-silver and the
illusion that the object is different from shell. Here both
shuktirUpya (shell-silver) and shukti bhinnatvam (difference
from shell) have equal orders of reality.
अस्ति च प्रपञ्चतन्मिथ्यात्वयोरेकब्रह्मज्ञानबाध्यत्वम् |
In the same way, the world and its mithyAtva are sublated by
the one brahma jnAna.

अत: समसत्ताकत्वान्मिथ्यात्वबाधकेन प्रपञ्चस्यापि बाधान्नाद्वैतक्षतिरीति

कृ तमधिके न | Therefore, as this implies an equal order of reality
for the world and its mithyAtva, the sublation of mithyAtva
with brahmajnAna does not result in the establishment of
pluralism. Enough has been said on this topic, says the
siddhikAra.

With that, we conclude the chapter on the mithyAtva of

mithyAtva itself.
drishyatva hetu upapattih (part 1)
Until now, we have been analysing the sAdhya (mithyAtva) in
the anumAna (inference) to prove the world's mithyAtva. That
is, until now, we have been looking at the "what" in the
question "What is the ontological status of the world?".

Starting from this chapter onwards, we will consider three

primary hetu's (reasons) - drishyatvam, jaDatvam and
paricChinnatvam that are used to prove the world's
mithyAtva. That is, now we will commence a detailed look at
the "why" in the question, "Why do we say that the world is
mithyA?".

In any anumAna, the hetu serves to prove the sAdhya. This is

done through the concept of vyApti, or invariable
concomitance - that is, where the hetu is present, the sAdhya
will invariably be present. Therefore, in order to prove that the
sAdhya is present in the paksha, it is sufficient to prove that
the hetu is present in the paksha. The first hetu to be
considered is drishyatvam.

What is drishyatvam?

advaita vedAnta has a two fold classification of reality - drik,

the seer and drishya, the seen.

According to advaita, drik is one, drishya are many. Everything

in the world has drishyatvam (everything is knowable, or
everything has knowability). Therefore, the advaitin claims
that wherever drishyatvam is present, mithyA is also invariably
present.

The nyAyAmritakAra objects to this. He asks:

ननु - मिथ्यात्वे साध्ये हेतूकृ तं यद्दृश्यत्वं तदप्युपपादनीयम् | Knowability as a
basis for establishing mithyAtvam needs to be examined.

तथाहि - किमिदं दृश्यत्वं? Thus, what is this drishyatvam?

1) वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वं वा? Is it vritti vyApyatvam - being revealed by a vritti
(thought)?
2) फल व् या प् य त् वं वा? Is it phala vyApyatvam - being revealed by
consciousness reflected / delimited by a vritti?
3) साधारणं वा ? Is it that which is common to both?
4) कदाचित् कथंचिद्चिद्विषयत्वम् वा ? Is it being the object of consciousness
in some way at some time?
5) स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्त संविदन्तरापेक्षानियतिर्वा ? is it the
requirement, as a rule, of another conscious entity for its own
vyavahAra?
6) अस्वप्रका शा(वा ? Is it not being self-evident?

The nyAyAmritakAra wishes to prove that every alternative for

the meaning of knowability is flawed. If the hetu is proved to
be defective, the anumAna is rendered useless.

नाद्य:, आत्मनो वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिव्याप्यत्वेन तत्र व्यभिचारात् | It cannot be the first

alternative (revealed by a thought), because Brahman is
revealed by a thought born from the study of vedAnta. If such
is the definition of knowability, Brahman is knowable.
However, Brahman is not mithyA. Thus the hetu of knowability
does not invariably imply the presence of mithyAtva - in other
words, there is vyabhichAra.

अत एव न तृतीयोऽपि | For the same reason, the third alternative

(that which is common to both vritti vyApya and phala vyApya)
is also not true. Simply put, if A is false then (A and B) must be
false too.

नापि द्वितीय:, नित्यातीन्द्रिये शुक्तिरूप्यादौ च तदभावेन भागासिद्धिसाधनवैकल्ययो:

प्रसङ्गात् | It cannot be the second alternative too (ie being
revealed by the phala, reflection of consciousness in a
thought) - because there are several objects that are beyond
the reach of sensory perception (e.g. gurutvam (weight),
dharma/ adharma etc). These are not revealed by the reflection
of consciousness in a thought, thus there is the defect of
bhAgAsiddhi - that is, the hetu is not present in many things
considered mithyA by the advaitin. Again, the invariable
concomitance between the hetu and sAdhya is disproven.
Further, according to the advaitin, shell-silver is revealed by
the sAkshi (inner witness), and not phala, the reflection of
consciousness in thought. Therefore in addition to
bhAgAsiddhi, there is also the defect of sAdhana vaikalya - the
hetu is not present in the driShTAnta itself.

नापि चतुर्थ:, ब्रह्म पूर्वम् न ज्ञातमिदानीम् वेदन्तेन ज्ञातमित्यनुभवेन आत्मनि

व्यभिचारात् | It cannot be the fourth alternative too (being the
object of consciousness in some way at some time) - because,
Brahman, which was not known first, becomes known after
studying vedAnta. Thus, Brahman becomes the object of a
conscious entity at some time in some fashion. However,
Brahman is not mithyA. As the hetu is present, but the sAdhya
is not, this leads to the defect of vyabhichAra.

ष्टव्यवहा
नापि पञ्चम:, ब्रह्मण्यप्यद्वितियत्वादिवि ष्टव्यवहारे रेशि
नेन व्यभिचारात् | It cannot be the fifth
संविदन्तरापेक्षानियतिदर्नेनर्श
alternative too (the requirement of another consciousness for
its vyavahAra) - because activities such as claiming Brahman
to be endowed with non-duality, etc., requires another
consciousness as a rule. If this was the definition of
knowability, then Brahman is endowed with it. However, it is
not mithyA. Therefore there is vyabhichAra of this hetu with
respect to Brahman.

नापि षष्ठ:, स हि अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावरूप: | It is not the

sixth (not being self evident). svaprakAshatvam (being self
luminous) is the capability of being perceived directly, while
being unobjectifiable. The absence of such a capacity is
asvaprakAshatvam, or not being self evident. Why does this
rule out such a meaning for drishyatvam?

तथाच शुक्तिरूप्यादेरपि अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वेन साधनवैकल्यात् Because

shell silver, while being suitable for direct perception, is not
objectified by consciousness (it is revealed by the sAkshi, the
witness, but is not phala vyApya). Thus, it too is arguably self
luminous. Therefore, the hetu of knowability (meaning a-
svaprakAshatvam) is not present in the shell silver, leading to
sAdhanavaikalyam - the hetu is not present in the example
itself.

The siddhikAra replies to these charges:

इति चेन्मैवं- फलव्याप्यत्वव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्यापि पक्षस्य क्षोदक्षमत्वात् | If these
are the objections, No - apart from the phala vyApti option, all
others are acceptable definitions of knowability, albeit with
some refinements.

********Option 1 - Knowability as vritti vyApyatvam**********

नच - वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वपक्षे ब्रह्मणि व्यभिचार:, अन्यथा ब्रह्मपराणां वेदान्तानां वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्गादिति -
वाच्यं ; Do not argue thus - "With regards to the option of vritti
vyApyatvam, as Brahman is revealed by a thought, such a
definition of knowability would make Brahman knowable and
thus mithyA, leading to vyabhichAra. If on the other hand,
Brahman is not revealed by a thought, no knowledge of
Brahman is possible, rendering useless all scriptures of
vedAnta that talk of Brahman".

There are several reasons why such an argument is untenable.

In this case, the siddhikAra uses an argument of vAcaspati
miSra, the author of the bhAmati, a commentary on
SankarAchArya's brahma sUtra bhAShya. The bhAmatikAra's
position is that Brahman can be classified into two - pure
Brahman and conditioned Brahman. Pure Brahman is not
knowable, and is real. Conditioned Brahman is known via
vedAnta, thus saving scripture's utility. However, as it is
knowable, it is mithyA. This is being said now:

शुद्धं हि ब्रह्म न दृश्यम्; Pure Brahman is not revealed by any vritti.

Why?

"यत्तदद्रेश्य"मिति श्रुते: किन्तूपहितमेव, तच्च मिथ्यैव; नहि वृत्तिदशायां अनुपहितं तद्भवति | On

the basis of the muNDaka shruti, which defines Brahman as
"That which is not knowable". The object of the vritti
generated by vedAnta is conditioned Brahman, which happens
to be mithyA. As long as Brahman remains an object of such a
vritti, it cannot be unconditioned (ie. pure).

The purpose of scripture is the revelation of conditioned

Brahman through a special kind of thought called the
akhaNDAkAra vritti. This vritti has the unique property of
removing ignorance and its effects. As all thoughts, including
this vritti itself, are effects of ignorance, the akhaNDAkAra
vritti destroys not only ignorance but also its products,
including itself. What remains afterwards is pure Brahman.

This may lead to a few objections because some teachers of

vedAnta talk of Brahman as the object of thought. The
siddhikAra replies to this:

नच - "सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्येऽस्मिन् ब्रह्मरूपे व्यवस्थिते" इति स्ववचनविरोध इति -

वाच्यं तस्याप्युपहितपरत्वात् | Do not argue that such a view suffers
from internal contradiction with the author of the Brahma
Siddhi, who says, "This Brahman is that which is known
through every thought" - because, the brahmasiddhikAra
(maNDana miSra) is referring to conditioned Brahman only.

There is a further objection - if pure brahman cannot be the

object of any thought, how can it ever be known? If it is never
known, how can its knowledge lead to moksha? To such a
charge, the siddhikAra replies:

नच - एवं सति शुद्धसिद्धिर्न स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus - "This

being the case, pure brahman can never be known (obtained)".
Why?

स्वतएव तस्य प्रकाशत्वेन सिद्धत्वात् | Because, as pure Brahman is

self revealing, no other vritti is needed to know it.

ननु - अज्ञाते धर्मिणि कस्यचित् धर्मस्य विधातुं निषेद्धुं वा अशक्यत्वेन शुद्धेन दृश्यत्वं निषेधता
स्वीकरणीयम्, To this, the pUrva pakshi says - as
शुद्धस्य ज्ञेयत्वमवयंश्यं
it is impossible to posit the presence or absence of any
property in a fundamentally unknown entity, one has to
necessarily accept the knowability of Brahman to even deny
its knowability. This obviously is self-defeating and an
impossibility.

न च - स्वप्रकाशत्वेन स्वत: सिद्धे शुद्धे श्रुत्या दृश्यत्वनिषेधा इति - वाच्यम् ; Further,

if the advaitin argues that pure Brahman being self-evident, is
available, whereas its unknowability is established through
shruti, that is unacceptable because:

शुद्धं स्वप्रकाशमिति शब्दजन्यविशिष्टवृत्तौ शुद्धाप्रकाशे तस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वासिद्धे: - the

words "pure Brahman is self evident" must necessarily
generate a thought which reveals the meaning that "pure
Brahman is self evident". If the thought does not reveal that
meaning, pure Brahman is not self-evident. If the thought does
generate that meaning, pure Brahman is revealed by it. Either
option results in a problem for the advaitin.

To this, the siddhikAra says:

- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument, no.

वृत्तिकाले वृत्तिरुपेण धर्मेण शुद्धत्वासंभवात् शुद्धस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वं न संभवति, Because if

Brahman's self revealing nature is known through the thought,
then it cannot be pure brahman that is revealed.

अत: "शुद्धं स्वप्रकाश"मिति वाक्यस्य लक्षणया

द्
धत् वमस् वप्रकाशत्वव्या पकमि
अद्धत्वमस्वप्रकात्वव्यापकमित्यर्थ
श त्यर्थ:शु| Therefore, by implication, all
that the sentence "pure Brahman is self luminous" means is
that "that which is not self luminous, cannot be pure
Brahman". To clarify, the statement A->B is equivalent to !B -> !
A (not B implies not A). As pure Brahman cannot be the object
of any statement, let alone the statement "pure Brahman is
self luminous", that particular sentence must be interpreted to
mean that all things not self-luminous are not pure Brahman.

द्धत्वव्
या वृत्त्
या
तथा च अद्धत्वव्यावृत्त्या शुशुद्धे स्वप्रकाशता पर्यवस्यति, यथा भेदनिषेधेन
अभिन्नत्वम् | Therefore, the meaning that remains is that "as
pure brahman cannot contain impurity, it must be self-evident
too". For example, by denying difference, similarity is
established - similarly, by denying the absence of self-
luminosity (implied by the absence of impurity), self luminosity
is established.

The opponent raises an objection - if a thing can never be

referred to by words, any word used to denote such an entity,
serves no purpose.

न च - शुद्धपदेन अभिधया लक्षणया वा शुद्धाप्रकाशे तत्प्रयोगवैयर्थ्यमिति - वाच्यम् ;

The siddhikAra says - Do not say thus - "if the word - pure
Brahman - cannot be refer to pure Brahman either directly, or
by implication, it serves no purpose."
पर्यवसितार्थमादाय सार्थकत्वोपपत्ते: | Because - when all other
alternatives for the meaning have been ruled out, whatever
remains, the paryavasita artham, imbues the word with
meaning.

एवं च "शुद्धं न दृश्यं न मिथ्ये" तस्याप्यद्धत्वं

द्
धत्
वंशुदृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोर्व्यापकमित्येतत्परत्वेन शुद्धे
दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोर्व्यतिरेक: पर्यवस्यति |
Therefore, when it is said that "pure Brahman is neither
knowable nor mithyA", what is meant is that whichever entity
is knowable or mithyA is impure, ie not pure Brahman. The
meaning of purity is whatever remains after negating
mithyAtva and knowability.

एतेन - स्फुरणमात्रमेव मिथ्यात्वे प्रयोजकं तन्त्रम् लाघवात् ; Applying the

principle of parsimony, the rule can be refined to - anything
which is the object of thought (sphuraNam) is mithyA.

अत: "स्वत:स्फुरदपि ब्रह्म मिथ्यैवे'ति - शून्यवादिमतपास्तम् ; स्वत:स्फुरणरूपताया:

शुक्तिरूप्यादावभावात्, स्फुरणविषयत्वस्य ब्रह्मण्यसिद्धे: | Therefore, this also
refutes shUnyavAda buddhism, which claims that Brahman,
despite being self-evident, is mithyA - because knowledge
necessarily requires thought, whereas Brahman's self
luminosity is not as an object of thought. In contrast, shell-
silver which is mithyA is not self-luminous, and it is not
possible for Brahman to be the object of consciousness.

The pUrvapakshi takes a different tack - Any object that is

known, is known as being endowed with attributes. Here the
object is visheShya, the attribute is the visheShaNa, and the
qualified object is vishiShTa. The knowledge of the object is
vishiShTa jnAnam - that is, it is of an object endowed
(vishiShTa) with some characteristics. When such an attribute-
endowed-object is known, the object is also known. When
someone perceives a blue pot, not only is the blueness
perceived, the pot is also perceived. Similarly, when the
conditioned Brahman is perceived, pure Brahman should also
necessarily be perceived. He argues:

ननु - विशिष्टज्ञाने विशेष्यस्यापि भाने श्रुत्या विशिष्टस्य दृश्यत्वेनैव विशेष्यस्यापि दृश्यत्वाद्व्यभिचार:,

In any knowledge of an object endowed with attributes, the
object, the visheShya, is also necessarily known. Therefore, as
the shruti is said to reveal the conditioned (vishiShTa)
Brahman, pure Brahman (the visheShya) should also come
under the purview of knowability - leading to the mithyAtva of
pure Brahman or the defect of vyabhichAra.

न च - "विष्णवे शिपिविष्टाये"त्यादौ विशिष्टस्य देवतात्ववत् विशिष्टस्य विषयत्वम्,

अग्नीषोमयोर्मिलितयोर्देवतात्ववद्वा मिलितस्य विषयत्वम्, अतो न विशेष्ये विषयत्वमिति -
वाच्यम् ;
Sensing a counter to his argument, the opponent continues -
Do not argue thus: " The deity referred to in the mantra
"viShNave shipiviShTAya" is viShNu endowed with the
attribute of shipiviShTatvam (pervaded by rays) not just
vishNu. Similarly when an offering is made to AgniShoma, the
offering is made to agni and soma together, and not any one.
Therefore, there is no reason to say that the visheShya is also
objectified."

तद्वदेव विशेषणस्याप्यविषयत्वे भागासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् - because by extending

the same argument, it can be argued that the qualifier
endowed entity (vishiShTa) and qualifier (visheShaNa) are
different. While the vishiShTa is known, the visheShaNa is not,
and therefore the attribute of knowability will not be present in
the visheShaNa. However, the visheShaNa is mithyA too
according to the advaitin. That being so, a part of the paksha
does not have the sAdhya, leading to bhAgAsiddhi.

To this, siddhikAra says

इति चेन्न; If this is the argument - not so.

विशेष्यतापन्नस्य विषयत्वेऽपि क्षत्यभावात्, तस्य मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात् | There is no harm to

us if the qualified entity (visheShyatApanna = vishiShTa) is
knowable, as that is mithyA according to us.

अतएव - उपहितविषयत्वेऽप्युपधेयविषयत्वमक्षतमेव इति - अपास्तम्

उपहितात्मना तस्यापि मिथ्यात्वाभ्युपगमात्, ज्ञानन्तरविषयत्वेन विशेषणे
| Therefore the view that - "the knowability of
भागासिद्ध्यभावाच्च
conditioned Brahman implies the knowability of pure Brahman"
- stands refuted. The mithyAtva of the conditioned brahman
has been accepted by us already. Further, mithyAtva of the
visheShaNa is possible by it being the object of some other
vritti, therefore the charge of bhAgAsiddhi does not apply.
drishyatva hetu upapattih (part 2)
We are currently examining drishyatva (knowability) as a hetu
for mithyAtva. Six alternative meanings were offered for the
meaning of knowability. The nyAyAmritakAra dismissed each
meaning as unacceptable due to various reasons. In the last
lesson, the siddhikAra had taken up the defence of the first of
six meanings (vritti vyApyatva, being revealed by thought).

Now another objection is raised with the first meaning for

drishyatva - vritti vyApyatva . The pUrvapakshi asks:

ननु - वेदान्तजन्याखण्डवृत्तेरुपहितविषयत्वे तदानीमुपाध्यन्तराभावेन तस्या

एवोपधायकत्वात् स्वविषयत्वापत्ति:, नचेष्टापत्ति:, शाब्दबोधे शब्दानुपस्थिताभाननियमेन वृत्ते:
शब्दानुपस्थिताया भानानुपपत्ते:,
The akhandAkAra vritti that is generated through vedAnta,
objectifies the conditioned Brahman and is itself the upAdhi for
Brahman, as no other upAdhi can be present then. It must be
admitted that the vritti objectifies itself. However, this is
undesirable, for it is accepted that the meaning arising in a
knowledge generated by words is limited to what the words
reveal. That which is not mentioned by the words cannot be
revealed by them.

The opponent makes the argument that vedic scripture

generates the akhaNDAkAra vritti. This vritti destroys
ignorance and its products, therefore when it arises, no other
upAdhi can exist, apart from itself. If ignorance or any of its
products exist, the akhaNDAkAra vritti will remove them. That
being so, no other upAdhi can exist once the akhaNDAkAra
vritti has performed its function. How is the vritti itself known?
There being no other upAdhi to reveal it, it must be assumed
that the vritti reveals itself. This is undesirable because it
violates a basic principle of Indian epistemology - the
knowledge generated by words is limited to what the words
themselves reveal. It cannot exceed the meaning conveyed by
the words. When I see a cow, I automatically know its colour.
However, when I speak the words "here is a cow", the
sentence does not reveal anything more than the presence of a
cow here. It does not reveal any aspect of the cow (like its
colour, etc.) other than that which is explicitly revealed. The
mahAvAkya "aham brahmAsmi" makes no reference to the
akhaNDAkAra vritti itself, it refers to the object denoted by the
akhaNDAkAra vritti. However the akhaNDAkAra vritti is itself
known. How?

यथाकथन्चिदुपपत्तौ वा न ततोऽज्ञानतत्कार्ययोर्निवृत्ति: स्यात् ; If it is said that

the vritti is somehow revealed, then such a vritti will not be
able to remove ignorance and its products. Why?

अज्ञानतत्कार्याविषयकज्ञानस्यैव तदुभयनिवर्तकत्वात्, For, knowledge

that can remove ignorance and its products will necessarily
not objectify ignorance or its products.

अन्यथा "अहमज्ञ: अयं घट" इत्यादिज्ञानानामप्युपहितविषयकत्वेन

अज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वप्रसङ्ग: - Otherwise, even knowledge that
objectifies ignorance or its products, such as "I am ignorant",
or "This is a pot", which ultimately objectifies brahman
conditioned by upAdhi, would be capable of removing
ignorance and its products. That is an impossibility, therefore,
the revelation of akhaNDAkAra vritti is an impossibility too.

To this, the siddhikAra says

इति चेन्न ; if this is the argument, no.

वृत्ते: शाब्दवृत्तावानवभासमानाया एवोपधायकत्वाभ्युपगमात् | There is an exception

to the vritti for the rule in relation to knowledge generated by
words. Even if the words does not explicitly refer to knowledge
generated by them, the presence of the vritti is known.

तदुक्तं कल्पतरुकृ द्भि: - "शुद्धं ब्रह्मेति विषयीकु र्वाणा वृत्ति:

स्वस्वेतरोपाधिनिवृत्तिहेतुरुदयते, स्वस्या अप्युपाधित्वावि षात्शे षा
त्|
As it has been said by Sri amalAnanda in the kalpataru - the
vritti that refers to shuddha Brahman (akhandAkAra vritti),
even as it arises, it does so destroying itself and other
upAdhis, because it too is an upAdhi.

एवंच नानुपहितस्य विषयता; वृत्त्युपरागोऽत्र सत्तयोपयुज्यते, न भास्यतया

विषयकोटिप्रवेशेने"ति | Therefore, the unconditioned Brahman remains
unobjectified. Until the upAdhi was there, Brahman was
conditioned, after the vritti destroyed itself, what remains is
unconditioned brahman. The usefulness of the vritti is in its
existence, not by it being revealed as part of the objectified.

अयमभिप्राय: - यथा अज्ञानोपहितस्य साक्षित्वेऽपि नाज्ञानं साक्षिकोटौ प्रविशति;

जडत्वात्, किन्तु साक्ष्यकोटावेव, एवं वृत्त्युपहितस्य विषयत्वेऽपि न वृत्तिर्विषयकोटौ
प्रविशति; This is the implied meaning - Similar to ignorance,
which conditions the sAkshi, the witness, but ignorance itself
is not part of the witness. Ignorance being inert, can only be
part of the witnessed, not part of the witness. In the same
way, even though the vritti conditions / objectifies Brahman,
the vritti itself is not part of that which is objectified.

स्वस्या: स्वविषयत्वानुपपत्ते: किन्तु स्वयमविषयोऽपी चैतन्यस्य विषयतां

सम्पादयतीति न काप्यनुपपत्ति: | Because if it was objectified, it would
lead to the charge of self-objectification. Therefore, even while
it does not objectify itself, the vritti is able to objectify
consciousness. Therefore, there is no inconsistency.

एतेन ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरेकविषयत्वं व्याख्यातम् | This proves that

knowledge and ignorance have the same object
(consciousness). How?

या
मेवशा
अज्ञानमपि हि स्वोपधानद यामेव यां
ब्रह्म विषयीकरोति स्वानुपधानद यां शा
स्वस्यैवाभावात् | Ignorance objectifies Brahman only so long as it
is an upAdhi of Brahman. When it is no longer an upAdhi, it
does not exist itself.

तथाच ज्ञानाज्ञानयोरुभयोरप्युपाध्यविषयकत्वे सत्युपहितविषयकत्वात्

समानविषयकत्वमस्त्यैव | Therefore, both ignorance and the
knowledge that dispels it, objectify the upahita (conditioned
Brahman), while not objectifying the upAdhis (avidyA). Thus
both have the same object - as a result, knowledge is able to
dispel ignorance.

The development of the argument thus far has been as follows:

akhaNDAkAra vritti objectifies Brahman. However, it does not
objectify itself. That is, it has Brahman has its object, but does
not have the upAdhi as the object. Similarly, ignorance has
Brahman as its object, but it does not have itself as an object.
Again, Brahman is the object, upAdhi is not the object.
Therefore such a knowledge is capable of dispelling ignorance.
The examples given by the pUrvapakshi "I am ignorant", "This
is a pot", etc. do not meet this criterion.

एतेनोपाधिविषयज्ञानानामज्ञानानिवर्तकत्वं व्याख्यातम् |
अज्ञानस्योपाध्यविषयत्वेन समानविषयत्वाभावात् | समानविषयत्वेनैव
तयोर्निवर्त्यनिवर्तकभावात् | By this, the inability of certain types of
knowledge to remove ignorance is proven. In the examples
given by the opponent, both ignorance ("I am ignorant") or its
products ("This is a pot"), collectively, the upAdhis are
objectified, in addition to Brahman (the upahita). However,
primal ignorance objectifies Brahman (upahita) but not itself
(upAdhi). As the objects of these kinds of knowledge
(upahita+upAdhi) and ignorance (upahita only) are different,
these kinds of knowledge are unable to remove ignorance.
Only if ignorance and knowledge have the same object can
there be a dispelled-dispeller relationship between the two.

Until now, we have looked at knowability from the point of

view of the BhAmati. Now, we will look at knowability from the
point of the other sub-school within advaita, the panchapAdika
vivaraNam.

********Option 1a - Knowability as revelation by a thought

other than one generated by words ********
वस्तुतस्तु - शब्दाजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वमेव दृश्यत्वम् | Actually, knowability is
objectification by a vritti generated by anything except words.
Therefore, even though the veda refers to Brahman, such a
Brahman is not considered mithyA in this view, but absolutely
real.

अन्यथा "शशविषाणम् तुच्छं" इत्यादिशब्दजन्यवृत्तिविषये तुच्छे व्यभिचारस्य

दुरुद्धरत्वात् | If this is not given as the definition, a sentence such
as "the hare's horn is absolutely non-existent", which happens
to have the hare's horn as its object will end up conferring
knowability to the hare's horn. However the hare's horn is not
mithyA, but asat. Without this clarification, it would lead to the
defect of vyabhichAra.
 द्
धयो
एवंच सति शुद्धस्य वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वेऽपि न व्यभिचार:, तुच्छद्धयो :
शु
शब्दाजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वानभ्युपगमात् | Further, even in this view, although pure
Brahman is the object of a vritti that is born from the study of
vedAnta, there is no vyabhichAra. Both pure Brahman and asat
do not have the characteristic of being objectified by a vritti
generated by anything except words.

********Option 1b - Knowability as revelation by attributive

thought ********
यद्वा सप्रकारवृत्तिविषयत्वमेव दृश्यत्वम् | alternatively, knowability is the
object of a vritti which contains the attributes of the object.
When a person sees an object, say a pot, three aspects are
revealed - the pot (visheShya), its attributes (colour,
visheShaNa) and the relation (samsarga) between the pot and
its colour. The knowledge of the pot containing information of
its colour is an example of saprakAraka jnAna. Therefore
knowability as an indicator of mithyAtva is on the basis of the
knowledge containing the attributes of the object. Brahman,
being attributeless is not knowable, according to this
definition. Neither is asat knowable - thus no knowledge of an
asat object can contain the attributes of a non-existent entity.

प्रकारच श्चसोपाख्य: कश्चिद्धर्म: | prakAra here must be taken as a

property that is upAkhyA (later defined as that which appears
to exist in the object).

तेन निष्प्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूते शुद्धे निरुपाख्यधर्मप्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूते तु तुच्छे न व्यभिचार: |

There is no vyabhichAra in the case of pure brahman as it is
the object of non-attributive knowledge, and asat, as it is the
object of knowledge that cannot assign any existent attributes
in the asat object.

अभावत्वस्यापि सोपाख्यत्वादभावत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूते अभावे न

भागासिद्धि: | Absence or abhAva is mithyA according to the
advaitins. naiyyAyikas hold that absence is a property that can
be said to exist in a place (where the advaitins would say "The
pot is absent", the naiyyAyikas would say "The pot's absence
is present"). The pUrvapakshi may claim that absence is not
the object of knowledge, thus it is not mithyA and use that to
impute a defect of bhAgAsiddhi - ie a part of the paksha which
should be mithyA would end up as not. Such a charge would be
untenable, because even under the naiyyAyika's conception of
absence, the knowledge of the pot's absence would contain
the attribute of absence and therefore fall under the definition
of knowability.

| upAkhya is that which appears to

उपाख्या चास्तीति प्रतीतिविषयत्वादीत्यन्यत्
be exist.

Thus ends the defence of knowability as defined as vritti

vyApyatvam, or being revealed by a vritti.
drishyatva hetu upapattih (part 3)
We are examining the hetu of drishyatva (knowability) in the
mithyAtva anumAna. The nyAyAmritakAra had looked at six
possible meanings of knowability and in each case had
identified certain defects in them. The six alternatives were:
1) वृत्तिव्याप्यत्वं - being revealed by a vritti (thought), or
2) फलव्याप्यत्वं वा - being revealed by consciousness reflected /
delimited by a vritti, or
3) साधारणं वा - that which is common to both, or
4) कदाचित् कथंचिच्चिविषयत्वम् वा - being the object of consciousness in
some way at some time, or
5) स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्त संविदन्तरापेक्षानियतिर्वा - the requirement,
as a rule, of another conscious entity for its own vyavahAra, or
6) अस्वप्रका शा(वा - not being self-evident.

Of these, apart from option 2 (revealed by phala), all other

options were acceptable definitions for knowability according
to the siddhikAra. We had looked at the defence of vritti
vyApyatva as an acceptable definition - both from the
standpoint of bhAmati, and the vivaraNa. A few other
variations within vritti vyApyatvam were also looked at. Now
we will take a look at options 3 to 6.

****** Option 3 - Knowability as the object of either a vritti or

phala******
एतेन वृत्तिव्याप्यफलव्याप्ययो: साधारणं व्यवहारप्रयोजकविषयत्वरूपं दृश्यत्वमपि हेतु:, ब्रह्मणि
तुच्छे च व्यभिचारपरिहारोपायस्य उक्तत्वात् | Therefore (as vritti vyApyatva
has been proved to be an acceptable definition of drishyatva),
knowability as the objectification of a thing that leads to
worldly activity common to both revelation by vritti or by phala
is also acceptable. The means for the removal of vyabhichAra
in brahman and asat have been described already.

******** Option 4 - Knowability as some form of objectification

by consciousness********
यद्वा दृश्यत्वं चिद्विषयत्वम् | Alternatively, knowability is some form of
objectification by consciousness (via a vritti). The connection
between consciousness and its object can be in a few ways
(this will be studied elaborately in the pratikarma vyavasthA
chapter). Some are outlined here:
1) What a pot is seen, the connection between consciousness
is through the reflection of consciousness in a vritti that takes
the AkAra of the pot.
2) When the memory of the pot is recollected, the connection
between the pot and consciousness is by means of paroksha
vritti, non-perceptual knowledge
3) With regards to objects beyond sensory perception, such as
dharma / adharma, the connection is by means of an inferential
(non-perceptual) connection.
4) With regards to objects of the mind such as happiness,
sadness etc (ie those that are known to the sAkshi), it is a
direct connection.

तच्च यथाकिञ्चित् चित्संबंधित्वरूपम् हेतु: | That objectification is some form

of connection with consciousness.

तच्च न चैतन्ये, अभेदे भेदनान्तरीयकस्य सम्बन्धस्य अभावात् | Such a

connection cannot exist with consciousness itself because
consciousness cannot be connected to itself. As the
connection of anything is (always) with something else,
connection with oneself is not possible.

अतो न व्यभिचार: | Therefore there is no vyabhichAra with regard to

Brahman.

तुच्छे च व्यभिचार: परिहरणीय: | The defect of vyabhichAra for asat has

to be remedied by pointing out that any connection with
consciousness can exist only with things that exist.

**** Option 5 - Knowability as the requirement of another

consciousness for the object's activities****
यद्वा स्वव्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदपेक्षानियतिरूपं दृश्यत्वं हेतु: |
Alternatively, knowability as the hetu can be the requirement,
as a rule, of a conscious entity apart from itself for its own
vyavahAra.

vyavahAra is classified into four categories by the

vivaraNAchArya:
a) abhijnA - to know something
b) abhivadanam - to talk about it
c) arthakriya - to get some benefit from it
d) upAdAnAm - to obtain it

Each of these activities involving the object presupposes the

requirement of a consciousness different from itself.

संविच्छब्देन विषयाभिव्यक्तं वा वृत्त्यभिव्यक्तं वा शुद्धं वा चैतन्यमात्रमभिप्रेतम् | By the word

'consciousenss', the following are meant - either
consciousness that reveals the object, or consciousness that
illumines the thought, or pure consciousness.

Consciousness that illumines vritti - To know a pot, there is a

requirement for a consciousness illuminating the vritti that has
the AkAra of the pot.
Consciousness that reveals the object - To remove the veil of
ignorance (avdiyA AvaraNa) from an object, there is the
requirement for a consciousness that is manifest in the form of
the object
Pure consciousness - to know one's own mental states such as
happiness, sadness etc., there is the expectation of the
witness, the sAkshi.

तथाच घटादौ नित्यातीन्द्रिये साक्षिभास्ये च सर्वोऽपि व्यवहारात्

स्वातिरिक्तसंवित्सापेक्ष इति नासिद्धि: | In (the case of the perception
of) a pot, or for objects that are forever beyond sensory
perception, or for objects directly illumined by consciousness,
that is, the occurrence of any activity with respect to such
objects requires a consciousness apart from those objects
themselves. Therefore, no vyavahAra is left out, and asiddhi, or
the inapplicability of mithyAtva to any aspect of the paksha is
ruled out.

व्यवहारश्च स्फुरणाभिवदनादिसाधारण: | vyavahAra refers to the knowledge

of something as existing, talking about it to others, etc. The
four kinds of vyavahAra were spoken of earlier.

तत्र ब्रह्मण: स्फुरणरूपे व्यवहारे नित्यसिद्धे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदपेक्षा नास्तीति

नियतिपदेन व्यभिचारवारणम् | As the knowledge of the existence of
Brahman is eternally known, there is no requirement for
another consciousness to know it - Thus by the use of the
word 'niyati' = rule, there is no vyabhichAra.

स्वगोचरयावद्व्यवहारे स्वातिरिक्तसंविदपेक्षायां पर्यवसानात् | Therefore,

for all vyavahAras involving a thing other than itself, there is
the requirement for a consciousness apart from it.

***********Option 6 - Knowability as not being self-evident

*********

अत एवास्वप्रकाशत्वरूपं दृश्यत्वमपि हेतु: | Therefore, knowability as the

hetu can mean not being self-evident
स्वप्रकाशत्वं हि स्वापरोक्षत्वे स्वातिरिक्तानपेक्षत्वम् | where being
self-evident means not requiring anything else to directly know
it.
'यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म' इति श्रुते: | There is no vyabhichAra with respect to
Brahman as the shruti says: "Brahman, which is directly known
(by itself)".
तथाचान्यानधीनापरोक्षत्वं पर्यवस्यति | Here, the meaning of
aparokshatvam, or being directly known, is not being
dependent on anything else for knowing it.
तन्निरूपितभेदवत्त्वं हेतु: | Difference from such an aparokshatvam
is the hetu of knowability.
तच्च नित्यपरोक्षे अन्याधीनापरोक्षे च घटादावस्तीति नासिद्धि: | Therefore, as such
a knowability exists for objects such as pots, etc - ie they are
ever mediate (ie different from oneself) and require another
consciousness for their perception - the inapplicability of the
sAdhya to any element of the paksha, or asiddhi, is absent.

The pUrvapakshi may argue that even if a real difference does

not exist within Brahman, an imagined difference may exist.
Such a difference is mithyA, but requires Brahman for its
cognisance (ie it is not self-luminous). As such an imagined
difference is part of Brahman, there is vyabhichAra within
Brahman. To this the siddhikAra says:

न च ब्रह्मणोऽपि ब्रह्मप्रतियोगिककाल्पनिकभेदवत्त्वात्तत्र व्यभिचार:,

अकल्पितभेदस्य क्वाप्यसिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus: "There could
be an imagined difference which has Brahman as its
counterpositive. This leads to vyabhichAra. For unless
imagined, there can be no difference in Brahman." The
pUrvapakshi is arguing that the jIva knows Brahman through
the akhaNDAkAra vritti, therefore Brahman is not self-
luminous. Such an argument is untenable because:

तद्भेदस्यान्यानधीनापरोक्षत्वरूपधर्मानिरूपितत्वात् |
रत्वादिरू
पस्या न्
यधर्मस्
जीवत्वेवरत्वादिरूपस्यान्यधर्मस्ययश्वतन्निरूपकत्वात् | Such differences
are not due to the presence or absence of self-evidence, but
because of other attributes. Attributes such as jIvatva,
Ishvaratva etc are the causes of the imagined differences
within Brahman - which are themselves imagined.

एवंचावेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावरूपं दृश्यत्वमपि हेतु: | In the

same way, knowability can also be defined as the absence of
self-luminosity, where self-luminosity is the characteristic of
being not knowable as an object, but which happens to be
suitable for direct perception.

ष्
टं
न च फलव्याप्यत्वाभाववि ष्टं शि
यदपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् तस्य
ब्रह्मणीवाविद्यान्तःकरणादौ शुक्तिरूप्यादौ च सत्त्वेन असिद्धिसाधनवैकल्ये इति
वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue thus - "Brahman is not revealed by phala
(consciousness reflected in thought), but is capable of being
directly perceived. Similarly, ignorance (avidyA), the mind
(antahkaraNam), shell-silver (shuktirUpyam) etc. also are not
revealed by phala, but are capable of being directly perceived.
Therefore there is asiddhi and sAdhana vaikalya. "

The pUrvapakshi is arguing that the definition of self

luminosity is the absence of revelation by phala, while being
suitable for direct perception. avidyA is not known by phala,
but by the sAkshi. It is directly perceived. Similarly the mind
and shell-silver. Therefore, the definition of self-luminosity
applies to all of them. The absence of self-luminosity is
mithyA. Therefore these are not mithyA. There are two
problems with this - First, something that ought to be mithyA is
not, and therefore asiddhi is present. Second, the very
example for mithyAtva, shell-silver, is not mithyA. Thus there
is sAdhana vaikalya.
Such an argument is not correct, because that is not the
definition of self-luminosity. The term अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं
needs to be understood correctly.
अज्ञाननिवर्तकवृत्तिविषयत्वयोग्यत्वस्य अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वपदेन
विवक्षितत्वात् | The intended meaning of the term "being suitable for
direct perception", is the capability of something to be an
object of a vritti that removes ignorance.

To explain: The shell-silver was created at the time of its

perception, therefore it is not the object of a vritti that
removes shell-ignorance. The vritti that removes shell-
ignorance is the knowledge of the shell. The object of such a
vritti is shell, not shell-ignorance. Similarly the vritti that
removes avidyA and antahkaraNam is the akhaNDAkAra vritti,
which we earlier said had only Brahman as the object, not
avidyA (उपाध्यविषयकत्वे सत्युपहितविषयकत्वात्).

तस्य चाविद्यादौ शुक्तिरूप्यादौ चासत्त्वान्नासिद्धिसाधनवैकल्ये | As ignorance, the mind

and shell-silver are all not suitable for direct perception (ie
they are not objects of a vritti that removes ignorance),
sAdhana vaikalyam and asiddhi are not present.

यथाच घटादे: फलव्यायत्वं तथाग्रे वक्ष्याम: | The manner in which the

objects of the world such as pots, etc. are revealed by the
phala will be discussed at a later stage (in the pratikarma
vyavasthA chapter).

Next, the siddhikAra considers the ontology of avidyA nivritti

as postulated by AnandabodhAchArya. According to him,
avidyA nivritti is not sat, because if it was, then it would be
indestructible. If it is asat, it would not be known. It cannot be
sadasat as that would be a logical impossibility. It cannot be
sadasat vilakshaNa, because avidyA is sadasat vilakshaNa. So
how can avidyA nivritti be sadasat vilakshaNa? Therefore,
Anandabodha proposes that avidyA nivritti be classified into a
special fifth category.

The siddhikAra considers this possibility.

अविद्यानिवृत्ते पञ्चमप्रकारत्वाभ्युपगमपक्षे तत्र व्यभिचारवारणायाज्ञानकालवृत्तित्वं

हेतुविशेषणं देयम् | If avidyA nivritti is taken as the fifth category,
there would be vyabhichAra. The hetu of non self-luminosity
would be present, but the sAdhya of mithyAtva would not (as
avidyA nivritti is in a category different from mithyA). To
remove this, the qualifier, "existing contemporaneously with
ignorance" should be added to the definition.

तेनैव तुच्छेऽपि न व्यभिचार: | By doing so, asat also is automatically

excluded, because asat does not exist at any time, let alone
contemporaneously with ignorance.

एवमेव सर्वेषु हेतुषु व्यभिचारपरिहाराय यतनीयम् | The remedy of any

vyabhichAra for any other hetu should be done in a similar
manner.

सद्विविक्तत्वमात्रे तु साध्ये तुच्छे पञ्चमप्रकाराविद्यानिवृत्तौ च न

|| Therefore, when taking the sAdhya to
व्यभिचारगन्धोऽपीति सर्वमवदातम्
be that which is different from the real, there is no trace of
vyabhichAra in either the case of asat and avidyA nivritti as a
fifth category.

This concludes the discussion on drishyatvam, or knowability.

jaDatva hetUpapattih (part 1)
We discussed drishyatvam as a hetu for mithyAtva. Next, we
will consider jaDatvam, intertness as another possible hetu.

जडत्वमपि हेतु: | Inertness can also be considered as the hetu.

The nyAyAmritakAra introduces his objections to this. He asks:
ननु - किमिदं जडत्वम् ? What does inertness mean?
अज्ञातृत्वं वा, अज्ञानत्वं वा, अनात्मत्वं वा | - Is it 1) being other than
the knower 2) is it being other than knowledge 3) is it being
other than the Atma?

Each of these alternatives is problematic.

नाद्य:, त्वन्मते पक्षनिक्षिप्तस्यैवाहमर्थस्य ज्ञातृत्वात्तत्रासिद्धे:,
शुद्धात्मनोऽज्ञातृत्वेन व्यभिचाराच्च | It cannot be the first, because according
to you (the advaitin), the knower is the entity behind the "I"
thought. However, that is also considered mithyA, and thus
included within the paksha. If inertness as an indicator of
mithyAtva means being other than the knower, then the object
of the "I" thought would not contain the hetu of inertness. This
would be asiddhi - the hetu is not present in the paksha.
On the other hand, pure consciousness cannot be the knower
too. Advaita claims that pure consciousness needs the mind in
order to know, and without the mind, pure consciousness is
not accepted as the knower. Thus the hetu of inertness (taken
to mean being other than the knower) is present in pure
consciousness. The hetu (jaDatva) is present, but the
sAdhya(mithyAtva) is absent. Thus there is vyabhichAra in
Brahman.

नापि द्वितीय:, वृत्त्युपरक्तचैतन्यस्यैव ज्ञानत्वेन के वलाया वृत्ते: के वलस्य चैतन्यस्य चाज्ञानत्वेन

वृत्तावसिद्धिपरिहारेऽपि चैतन्ये व्यभिचारतादवस्थ्यात् |
It is not the second option either because the combination of
thought and consciousness alone is knowledge. Neither
thought on its own, nor consciousness on its own can be said
to be knowledge. This definition would remedy asiddhi with
respect to thought (thought is part of the paksha, it is not
knowledge, thus jaDatva and mithyAtva are both present).
However, as discussed, consciousness too cannot be called
knowledge, so the hetu of jaDatva is present. Consciousness is
not mithyA. Thus there is vyabhichAra in Brahman.

नापि तृतीय: ; आत्मत्वस्यैव निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात् | Neither is it the third

alternative (ie being not Atma), because the concept of Atma
itself cannot be proven.

ष:, त्वयात्मन एकत्वाभ्युपगमात्, विशिष्टात्मनां भेदेऽपि तेषां

तद्धि न जातिवि षशे
पक्षकुक्षिनिक्षिप्तत्वात् |
Atma cannot be described as an instance of a species,
because according to you, Atma is one. There can be no
species consisting of only one member. Even if it is said that
jIvas are many (jIvas, being Atma along with the mind body
complex, can be many due to the multiplicity of mind body
complexes), and Atma is taken as the species to which jIvas
belong, because the jIvas are part of the paksha, they are
mithyA too.

नाप्यानन्द रूपत्वम्, वैषयिकानन्दे तद्व्यतिरेकस्य हेतोरसिद्धे:, तस्याप्यात्मत्वे

अज्ञानपक्षोक्तदोष: प्रसञ्जनीय: Atma cannot be described as the
nature of bliss, because one encounters bliss in everyday
objects too. Thus the hetu of not having the nature of bliss
would be absent in objects, which are part of the paksha. This
would lead to asiddhi. If on the other hand, it is argued that the
bliss of objects is also Atma, then it would lead to the same
defects as the second option (not knowledge). Experiential
bliss is a combination of thought and consciousness, which is
the second option.

Thus in any of the three alternatives, there are issues. The

siddhikAra replies:
- इति चेत् - मैवम् ; If this is the argument, not so.

द्वितीयतृतियपक्षयो: दोषाभावात् | The second and third paksha are not

defective. (The first one also can be addressed, but is not dealt
with here).

तथाहि - "अज्ञानत्वं जडत्व" मिति पक्षे नात्मनि व्यभिचार:, In the alternative

"inertness is that which is other than knowledge", there is no
vyabhichAra in Atma as suggested. The nature of Brahman is
jnAna, thus to argue that Brahman has the absence of jnAna is
futile. The argument that jnAna is necessarily consciousness
in association with a thought, is only a secondary definition.

अर्थोपलक्षितप्रकाशस्यैव ज्ञानत्वेन मोक्षदशायामपि तदनपायात् | Thus,

jnAnatva (of the nature of knowledge) in fact means
consciousness that has been incidentally denoted
(upalakshita) by objects. Such a jnAna exists without
obstruction at all times, including moksha.

We had previously looked at three ways by which an object can

be uniquely identified - visheShaNa (included adjective),
upAdhi (excluded adjective), upalakshaNa (incidental
adjective). The siddhikAra says that jnAna is not associated
with objects or thoughts always - they serve as incidental
identifiers of consciousness, and such a object/thought
identified consciousness is the real meaning of the word
jnAna.

The crow seated on top of Devadatta's house in the past is

used to identify the house now. The relationship between the
crow and the house is purely circumstantial. It is neither an
inseparable part of the house, nor is it necessarily present
when the house is later known as belonging to Devadatta. In a
similar way, the relationship between jnAna and thought /
objects is merely AdhyAsika, superimposed. jnAna can exist
even in the absence of objects.

Brahman, taken in this sense, is jnAna, and therefore the

charge of vyabhichAra based on Brahman not being jnAna has
been addressed.

The siddhikAra makes a very subtle point - that knowledge can

exist independently of objects. This will be challenged by the
pUrvapakshi, which we will look at in the next few lessons.
jaDatva hetUpapattih (part 2)
In the previous lesson, we had looked at the primary
objections made by the opponent to the suitability of jaDatva
as a hetu for mithyAtva. The meaning of jaDatva as jnAna
bhinnatva - difference from jnAna was under discussion. jnAna
was interpreted as artha upalakshita prakAsha - that is, in this
context, jnAna is taken to mean pure illumination in the
absence of objects.

This raises a question - is it possible for jnAna to exist

independent of objects? Every form of knowledge that one
typically encounters is "of something". Can there be knowing,
without the known?

नच - अभावे सप्रतियोगित्ववदिच्छाज्ञानादिष्वपि सवषियकस्य

स्वाभाविकत्वादिच्छायामिव ज्ञानेऽपि तस्य समानसत्ताकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The purvapakshi says - Absence is always in association
with its counter-positive. Like absence, desires, etc. are
naturally associated with objects. One always desires some
thing. jnAna, like desire, must also therefore be necessarily
associated with objects. If there is no object, there can be no
jnAna too - thus they must necessarily have the same degree
of reality.

The siddhikAra says - no. He says:

ज्ञानस्य हि सविषयत्वं विषयसंबन्ध:, स च न तात्त्विक:, किन्त्वाध्यासिक: ; वक्ष्यमाणरीत्या

तात्त्विकसंबन्धस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्, The saviShayatvam of jnAna is
its association with the viShaya, the object. That is not a real
association, but an adhyAsa, a superimposition. We will go on
to say that it is impossible to establish that any real
association can exist between jnAna and viShaya (in the drik
drishya nirUpaNa chapter).

अतो न तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वम् ; नहि शुक्तौ रूप्यं स्वाभाविकम् | Therefore, this

association between jnAna and viShaya is not an intrinsic one.
The relationship of the silver with the shell is not intrinsic to
the shell. It is born out of error.
एवंच ज्ञानोपाधिकस्यैव सविषयत्वस्य इच्छादिष्वभ्युपगमात् नतरां तत्र तस्य
स्वाभाविकत्वम् | The association of desires with objects is not
intrinsic to desires, but born out of jnAna's upAdhi (the mind).

The pUrvapakshi responds - if association with objects is not

intrinsic to jnAna, then desire too can exist even without
objects, but that is never observed.

नचैवं - ज्ञानवत् विषयसंबन्धं विनापि कदाचिदिच्छाया: सत्त्वापत्तिरिति- वाच्यम् ;

If jnAna is not necessarily associated with objects, then desire
too, like jnAna, can exist without having an association with
objects.

The siddhikAra says - no.

There is a difference between jnAna and desire. Desire's

association with objects is as a result of the mind, which is
mutually interdependent with the world. Thus desires can
never be separate from objects, being of the same order of
reality as the mind which causes that association. The mutual
interdependency of the mind and objects was previously
highlighted by GaudapAda in the mANDUkya kArikas (3.31 and
3.32):

मनोदृश्यमिदं द्वैतं यत्किञ्चित्सचराचरम् ।

मनसो ह्यमनीभावे द्वैतं नैवोपलभ्यते ॥ ३१ ॥
आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन न सङ्कल्पयते यदा ।
अमनस्तां तदा याति ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहम् ॥ ३२ ॥

The duality perceived in the world is only seen through the

mind. In the absence of the world, the mind too ceases to be.
However, this is not true for jnAna, consciousness.

Unlike desire, which is dependent on the mind, consciousness

exists independently of the mind. It is of a higher order of
reality compared to both the mind and objects. Thus even in
their absence, jnAna continues to exist, but desire does not.
The siddhikAra says:

सविषयत्वप्रयोजकोपाध्यपेक्षया अधिकसत्ताकत्वस्य तत्र प्रयोजकत्वात्, It is

the higher order of reality of jnAna compared to the mind -
saviShayatva prayojaka upAdhi, the upAdhi causing the
association with objects - that allows jnAna to exist
independently of objects;
इच्छायाच श्चतत्समानसत्ताकत्वात् | however, as desires are of the
same order of reality as the mind, they are always associated
with objects.

The opponent makes another objection. He says:

नच - त्वया मोक्षावस्थायामात्मनो निर्विषयत्वाङ्गीकारात् आनन्दाप्रका शातदपुमर्थत्वं स्यादिति
- वाच्यम् ;
If liberation in your view is the Atma unassociated with
anything, there can be no experience of bliss in liberation. If
so, such a liberation can be of no interest to humanity. Why
would anyone desire such a liberation?
The siddhikAra says - do not argue thus. In our view,
तदा ह्यानन्द एव प्रका' शानत्वानन्दस्य, प्रकाशत्वम् अर्थोपलक्षितप्रकाशत्वं वा
तदास्त्येवेति न ज्ञानत्वहानिरित्युक्तम् |
Then, the illumination itself is bliss, it is not the illumination of
bliss. In any case, whether as illumination, or objectless-
experience, the existence of consciousness then cannot be
denied. There is no destruction of jnAna and as such there can
be no ajnAna in brahman. Thus jaDatva cannot exist in
brahman, and the charge of vyabhichAra is unfounded.

Until now, the opponent had been arguing that jnAna cannot
exist independently of objects. The next leg of the argument is
that jnAna cannot exist independently of the knower, jnAtA.
He says:
ननु - तथापि ज्ञातुरभावात् तदा तन्न ज्ञानम् ; Even so, as there is no
knower then (during moksha), it cannot be called jnAna.
नहि भोक्तृहीना भुजिक्रिया भवति, In the absence of the eater, there
can be no action of eating.
नच अनादित्वेन क्रियारूपत्वाभावात् अनपेक्षत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue that
as jnAna is beginningless, it is not a type of action requiring an
actor (a knower).

The opponent argues that anAditvam or the beginningless of

jnAna is no basis for ruling out the requirement for a knower.
He takes some examples of beginningless entities and says
that all of them require another associated entity.

अनादे: प्रागभावास्य प्रतियोगिनि, जातेर्व्यक्तौ जीवब्रह्मविभागस्य

धर्मप्रतियोगिनो: अज्ञानस्य चाश्रयविषययो: ब्रह्मसत्तायाच श्चकर्तर्यपेक्षादर्शनात्, अन्यथा
'अस्ति ब्रह्मे'त्यादौ कर्तरि लकारो न स्यात् |
1) अनादे: प्रागभावास्य प्रतियोगिनि, The prior absence of an object,
prAgabhAva, has no beginning according to the nyAya school.
However such a beginning-less prior-absence does have the
requirement for a counterpositive, a pratiyogi (the object of the
prAgabhAva).
2) जातेर्व्यक्तौ jAti, or species, is also beginningless. However,
the species comprises of individuals within it. jAti is indicated
by the vyakti, the individual. Therefore jAti requires the vyakti.
3) जीवब्रह्मविभागस्य धर्मप्रतियोगिनो: the difference between jIva and
Ishvara, which is admitted as beginning-less by the advaitin,
requires both the elements that are different.
4) अज्ञानस्य चाश्रयविषययो: Similarly, ajnAna or nescience is also
admitted as beginning-less, but it too requires a locus and
object
5) ब्रह्मसत्तायाच श्चकर्तर्यपेक्षादर्शनात्, अन्यथा 'अस्ति ब्रह्मे'त्यादौ कर्तरि लकारो न
स्यात् | Brahman is beginningless, however it too requires a
kartA, an agent. Otherwise, the usage of "अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेत्वेद"
("Brahman exists" - He who knows thus) in the veda, which
employs the present tense to indicate agency, would not be
possible.
This is a grammatical observation by the opponent. The word
'अस्ति' is a form of the root भू with the suffix तिप् in लट् लकार,
present tense. The usage of लकार (tense) is governed by the
sUtra ल: कर्मणि च भावे च अकर्मकेभ्य: which by implication says
that presence of लकार in a सकर्मक धातु indicates kartA or karma.
The opponent's argument is that the usage of लकार in 'अस्ति
ब्रह्म' implies the presence of an agent.

Thus, in the opponent's view, it is evident that the presence of

an agent, a knower is required even for beginning-less entities.
Thus anAditva cannot be cited as a reason to avoid the
requirement of a knower for the jnAna.

It may be argued that Ishvara's knowledge does not have

expectation of things in current existence.
एवंचातीतादिज्ञानस्य ईश्वरज्ञानस्य च उत्पत्त्यर्थमर्थानपेक्षत्वेऽपि
नेन ज्ञानस्य ज्ञातृज्ञेयनिरूप्यत्वं स्वभाव:, Moreover,
तन्निरूप्यत्वदर्नेनर्श
even though the knowledge of things in the past etc., or
Ishvara's knowledge does not expect things to be present
currently, the existence of knowledge can only be established
with a knower and the known.

In Indian epistemology, unlike pratyaksha (direct perception),

knowledge of things in the past or the future, or Ishvara's
knowledge of things is not born from the contact of the
sensory organs with objects. However, even with such
knowledge, there is an expectation that the knowledge is "of
something" and known "by someone".

If such a concomitance did not exist,

अन्यथा 'इदमहं जानामी'त्यनुभवो न स्यात्, Experiences such as "I know
this" would not be possible.

The vivaraNakAra also agrees with this.

'ज्ञातुरर्थप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानत्वा'दिति विवरणविरोधश्च स्यात् In defining

jnAnatva, knowing, the vivaraNa AchArya has said the
illumination of the object for the knower is knowledge.

Thus to argue that jnAna requires no knower is contradictory

to experience and your own AchArya. This is a pretty powerful
argument by the opponent.

The siddhikAra says in reply:

- इति चेन्न ; if this is the argument, no.

jaDatva hetUpapattih (part 3)
We are discussing the topic of jaDatvam, or inertness. The
advaitin wishes to use this as a hetu to prove mithyAtva in the
world. The world is inert, thus mithyA. This raised the question
- what is inertness? Some options were considered and
ajnAnatvam, or the difference from jnAna was postulated as
the meaning of inertness. The word jnAna was further refined
to mean object-less consciousness.

In the previous lesson, the pUrvapakshi had argued that it was

impossible for consciousness to exist independently of
objects. This was refuted by the siddhAntin. This led the
pUrvapakshi to argue that consciousness cannot exist
independently of the knower. To this, the siddhikAra replied:

- इति चेन्न ; if this is the argument, no.

The pUrvapakshi had argued using examples of beginning-less
entities which always occurred in conjunction with a
corresponding counterpositive - e.g, the universal (jAti) is
always identified on the basis of the individual (vyakti). The
siddhikAra argues that this is not necessarily true.

जातेर्व्यक्तिनिरुप्यत्वेऽपि कदाचित्तदसंबन्धवदुपपत्ते:,
While in most cases, jAti is known only when the vyakti is
seen, it is possible for the jAti to be known without having a
real vyakti relating to it. For example, a person may look at a
horse and mistake it for a cow. Thus it is possible to identify
the cowness jAti without a cow vyakti.
संबन्धप्रयोजकोपाध्यपेक्षया अधिकसत्ताकत्वात् | the jAti in such cases
has a higher degree of reality than the individual which leads
to the identification.

अतएव ज्ञानस्य सज्ञेयत्वं सज्ञातृत्वं च न स्वाभाविकम् | Therefore it is

not necessary that jnAna is intrinsically associated with
objects (sajneyatvam), or the knower (sajnAtritvam).Why?

तथाहि - सज्ञेयत्वं तावत् ज्ञेयजन्यत्वं वा ज्ञेयव्याप्यत्वं वा | The

association with objects can be either because a) the jnAna is
born as a result of objects, or b) because of the concomitance
with objects - that is, wherever jnAna is present, jneya are also
present.

रज्ञानेश्वचाभावात् | It cannot be the first,

नाद्य:, परोक्षज्ञाने इवरज्ञाने
because indirect knowledge does not require the objects to be
simultaneously present. Moreover, God's knowledge does not
require the presence of objects - He has knowledge of
everything in all three periods of time, and therefore at any
point in time, His knowledge of an object does not require its
presence.

नापि द्वितीय:, 'यदा ज्ञानं तदा अर्थ' इति कालिकव्याप्तौ पूर्ववत् व्यभिचारात्, दैशिकव्याप्तिस्तु
दूर निरस्तैव | Therefore, for the same reason, it cannot be the
second either. A temporal concomitance, ie "when there is
jnAna, there is an object too", cannot be true (as mentioned
previously, such a concomitance does not exist for indirect
knowledge and God's knowledge). The possibility of spatial
concomitance (where there is knowledge, objects are present)
is a distant prospect (ie impossible), because jnAna arises in
the mind, where there are no objects present.

The pUrvapakshi responds by restricting the concomitance of

objects to direct knowledge (and not knowledge in general).
He says:
नच - यदा 'अपरोक्षज्ञानं तदार्थ' इति कालिकव्याप्तौ नास्ति व्यभिचार:, आत्मा च 'यत्
साक्षात् अपरोक्षात् ब्रह्मे'ति श्रुतेरपरोक्षज्ञानरूप इति सोऽप्यर्थव्याप्त इति - वाच्यम् ;
Whenever there is direct knowledge, objects must be present -
In this temporal concomitance, there is no vyabhichAra. The
Atma has been spoken of as "That which is directly perceived
is Brahman" in the shruti. Through such sentences, it is
evident that the Self is the known object in the direct
knowledge of the Self.

The siddhikAra responds: do not argue thus, because

ईश्वरज्ञाने योगिज्ञाने च व्यभिचारात् | In God's knowledge and in the
knowledge of sages, there is no requirement that objects are
simultaneously present with knowledge.

'यदैन्द्रियकं ज्ञानं तदार्थ' इति तु व्याप्ति: सर्वसंमता | However, we do agree

that wherever there is knowledge born from the sense organs,
there has to be a corresponding object.

नचात्मरूपे ज्ञाने ऐन्द्रियकत्वमस्तीति न तया विरोध: | Knowledge of the Self is

not sensory perception, therefore this concomitance will not
apply to it, and will not contradict our position.

ननु - 'यदा अपरोक्षं ज्ञानं तदार्थ' इति व्याप्त्यनभ्युपगमे 'इदं

रजत'मित्यपरोक्षज्ञानान्यथानुपपत्त्या अनिर्वचनीयरजतसिद्धिर्न स्यात्, अर्थे
विनाप्यपरोक्षत्वोपपत्ते: -
The opponent asks - If the concomitance "when there is direct
perception, the object must also exist" is not accepted, it
would be possible for direct perception to exist even in the
absence of objects. As a result, the direct perception, "this is
silver", is not the perception of an anirvachanIya silver seen in
the shell.

The pUrvapakshi is arguing that anirvachanIya khyAti, the

theory of error based on the creation of an indeterminate
object in the locus of error, would be disproved if it is held that
the concomitance between direct perception and object is not
true. As far as the deluded person is concerned, he is directly
seeing silver in a shell. Citing this, the advaitin argues that an
anirvachanIya silver is created in that locus, which leads the
seer to conclude - "there is silver, here". If direct perception did
not necessarily require the object, then there must be no
anirvachanIya silver in the shell.

The siddhikAra responds:

इति चेन्न, 'इदं रजतमहं जानामी'त्यनुसन्धीयमानं यत् ज्ञानविषयत्वं

यान्
तरा नु
पपत्
तस्यारयान्तरानुपपत्त्या त्
याश्रअनिर्वचनीयरजतसिद्धेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् | That is
not true. We will explain this further, but in the cognition "I see
silver here", the object of knowledge must be understood as
the anirvachanIya silver, because no other locus is possible.
Further, our argument is that the rule "all direct cognitions
must be associated with objects" is not universal. That does
not mean that in this particular cognition, there is no
corresponding object. The denial of the universality of a rule
does not rule out its specific applicability.
अतएव परोक्षभ्रमेऽपि अनिर्वचनीयार्थसिद्धि: | As a result, we hold
that even indirect delusions (ie where the object of delusion is
not in front of the observer) can have an object which is
anirvachanIya.

जन्यापरोक्षत्वेन वा अर्थव्याप्यता आर्षज्ञानस्यापरोक्षत्वानभ्युपगमात् |

Alternatively, if we consider the concomitance to be "direct
perceptions that is generated must be associated with
objects" - that is also not necessarily true. The knowledge that
sages gain through their meditation is not considered as
generated direct perception.

तथाच नानिर्वचनीयरजतसिद्ध्यनुपपत्ति: | Thus, it is not true to say that the

anirvachanIya silver is disproved by holding on to this view.

Now the siddhikAra moves to the charge that jnAna cannot

exist independently of the knower.
एवं सज्ञातृकत्वमपि किं ज्ञातृजन्यत्वं, ज्ञातृव्याप्यत्वं, ज्ञातृसमवेतत्वं वा |
Similarly, what does association with the knower mean? Is
that a) knowledge is born from the knower, or b) where
knowledge is present, the knower is present too, or c)
knowledge is inherently present in the knower (ie it is a
samavAya sambandha between knowledge and the knower)?

आद्ये ईश्वरज्ञाने व्यभिचार: ज्ञाननित्यत्वस्य साधयिष्यमाणत्वाच्च | The first is

not true because that rule fails for God's knowledge, which will
be later proved by us as eternal. If God's knowledge is eternal,
how can it be born?

द्वितीयेऽपि अप्रयोजकता | The second option also is not true, because

there is no purpose served by holding such a concomitance to
be true. What is the harm if there is no knower when
knowledge is present? If no harm is done in the absence of the
rule, then the rule is not valid.

न तृतीय:, the third option is also wrong.

ज्ञानजन्यत्ववत् ज्ञानसमवेतत्वस्यापि असंभवात्, Similar to the

arguments against the position "knowledge is born from the
knower", the position "knowledge is inherent in the knower" is
also not true. Knowledge is not an attribute of the knower, and
thus it cannot have an inherence relationship with the knower.

ज्ञानस्य गुणत्वक्रियात्वयोरनभ्युपगमेन द्रव्याश्रयत्वानुमानायोगात्, Knowledge being

either an attribute or an activity is not acceptable to us. Thus
without it being an attribute or activity, it cannot be accepted
as located in a substance. Without being located in a
substance, knowledge cannot be accepted as being inherent in
any substance. Thus it cannot be inherent in the knower.

The pUrvapakshi had argued that the advaitin's position -

"jnAna is independent of the knower and known" - is
contradicting the vivaraNAchArya. The siddhikAra responds to
that charge:

कदाचित् ज्ञातृज्ञेयसंबन्धेनैव अनुभवस्य विवरणवाक्यस्य च उपपत्ते: | The

relationship between the knower and knowledge is
experienced at some time (ie in vyavahAra) - it is in that
context that the vivaraNAchArya's statement is made. It does
not mean that as a rule knowledge, knower and known are
related.

The pUrvapakshi had also argued that the statement -

"Brahman exists" अस्ति ब्रह्म - grammatically implies that
there is an agent, a kartA. This is being refuted next.

'अस्ति ब्रह्मे'ति च लकारो न ब्रह्मसत्तां प्रति ब्रह्मण: कर्तृत्वमाह; The use of

lakAra (tense) in the sentence "Brahman exists", does not
imply agency on Brahman's part in the action of existing.
Really speaking, what is meant to be said is that "ब्रह्म अस्" or
Brahman is existence (ie without the use of lakAra). The
statement "Brahman asti" is only said because of the
conventions of pANiNian grammar, that one should not use a
root without an appropriate suffix. Therefore, it is not meant
that Brahman is existing, but that Brahman is existence.

नित्यत्वेन तदसंभवात्, किन्तु साधुत्वार्थ द्रष्टव्यम् | As Brahman can never have

agency, the sentence is only keeping in line with grammatical
construction.
Thus the siddhikAra has systematically established that
knowledge need not necessarily exist in association with the
knower or the known.

In the next lesson, the siddhikAra will consider whether the

term jnAna can be used without the associated classification
of validity or invalidity (pramA / bhrama).
jaDatva hetUpapattih (part 4)
In the previous lesson, we had looked at the siddhikAra's
justification for jnAna to exist in the absence of a knower and
the known. Therefore, the quality of being different from
objectless consciousness was postulated as the definition of
the term jaDatva, or inertness.

The pUrvapakshi now asks:

ननु - प्रमाभ्रमभिन्नं न ज्ञानं, Cognition cannot be that which is
different from pramA, right knowledge or bhrama, wrong
knowledge. It has to belong to one of the two categories.
न चात्मस्वरूपं ज्ञानं प्रमा; तद्विषयस्याविद्यादेस्तात्त्विकत्वापातात्; The
knowledge of the nature of the self cannot be valid knowledge,
because the object of such a knowledge cannot be sublated.
The object of the knowledge of self is nescience, avidyA. If self
knowledge was valid knowledge, then its object, nescience,
cannot be sublated. The destruction of nescience would be
rendered impossible.
नच अप्रमा दोषजन्यत्वापातात् | It cannot be wrong knowledge either,
because it would imply that such a knowledge is born from a
defective source. However, it is the knowledge of the vedic
mahAvAkyas that generates this self-knowledge, and the
vedas can never be defective. Thus it cannot be wrong
knowledge either.

The siddhikAra replies

- इति चेन्न; if this is your argument, no. The position that all
knowledge must either be right or wrong is not true always.

रज्ञानवत्
तार्किकसिद्धेवरज्ञानवत् श्वघटादिनिर्विकल्पकवच्च स्वभावत
उभयवैलक्षण्येनानुपपत्ते:; It is possible for knowledge to be
intrinsically different from either category, like God's
knowledge in nyAya, or the indeterminate knowledge of
objects such as pots.

According to the logician, God's knowledge is permanent. The

logician defines valid knowledge as guNa janyam, ie that
which is born from a non-defective source, and wrong
knowledge as doSha janyam, ie that which is born from a
defective source. Since God's knowledge is permanent, it is
not born - thus according to him, God's knowledge is neither
pramA nor bhrama.

Similarly, the indeterminate cognition of objects like a pot (ie I

know some object is present, but I am not sure what it is
exactly), cannot fit into either category - right or wrong
knowledge.

तत्रापि ईश्वरज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वे गुणजन्यत्वस्य भ्रमत्वे दोषजन्यत्वस्य चापत्ते:, Because

even in that case if God's knowledge is right, then it would be
born from a non-defective source, and if it was wrong, it would
be born from a defective source. Either possibility would be
unacceptable to the naiyyAyika, as according to him, God's
knowledge is not born, it always exists.

निष्प्रकारके च निर्विकल्पके तद्वति तत्प्रकारत्वस्य तदभाववति तत्प्रकारत्वस्य

चानुपपत्ते: Neither niShprakAraka (non-relational cognition) nor
nirvikalpaka jnAna (indeterminate cognition) can be classified
as either as right knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the object
contains the feature that is present in the object (tadvati
tatprakArakatva) or as wrong knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of
the object contains a feature that is not present in the object
(tadabhAvavati tatprakArakatva).

जन्यसविकल्पकत्वेन भ्रमप्रमान्यतरत्वनियमे चास्माकं क्षत्यभावात्, If the rule

of classification as either right or wrong is applicable for
generated determinate cogintion, that does our view no harm.
विलक्षणवृत्तिद्वयोपरागेण च स्वभावतो भ्रमप्रमाविलक्षणस्याप्यात्मज्ञानस्य
तदुभयरूपेण व्यवहारोपपत्ते: | Because the knowledge of the self is
intrinsically neither right or wrong, being unclassifiable into
either category (tadvati tatprakAraka or tadabhAvavati
tatprakAraka). However for the sake of vyavahAra, one may
take it as either right or wrong.

The pUrvapakshi says:

नच - ज्ञानपदवाच्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायां उपाधेरपि
ज्ञानपदवाच्यत्वात्तत्रासिद्धि:, ज्ञानपदलक्ष्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायां तु घटादेरपि
ज्ञानपदलक्ष्यत्वात्तत्राप्यसिद्धिरिति - वाच्यम्;
"If you desire to define (jaDatvam) as that which is different
from the direct meaning of the word 'cognition', then as the
adjunct (thought) is the direct meaning of the word 'cognition',
this will lead to bhAgAsiddhi." Thought is mithyA, but if
jaDatva is defined as that which is different from the primary
meaning of the word 'cognition', it would result in the meaning
of jaDatva as not thought. This will result in thought being
excluded from the set of all mithyA objects, which would result
in bhAgAsiddhi.

"If instead you say that (jaDatvam) is that which is different

from the implied meaning of the word 'cognition', then
everyday objects such as pots (as cognitions objectify objects
such as pots, the word 'cognition' would imply those objects)
will be excluded from the set of of mithyA objects. Again
bhAgAsiddhi.
The siddhikAra says - Do not argue thus.

ष्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायामुक्तदोषाभावात् | Because if
ज्ञानपदजन्यप्रतीतिवि ष्यभिन्नत्वविवक्षायामुक्तदोषाभावात्शे
(jaDatva) is defined as that which is different from the
visheShya, the qualificand, in the meaning generated by the
word 'cognition', such defects would be absent. To explain, the
meaning of the word jnAna or cognition is 'vritti vishiShTa
chaitanyam', or consciousness qualified by thought. Thus if
jaDatva is defined as everything other than consciousness in
the meaning of cognition, then the said defects will be
absent.

एवमानन्दभिन्नत्वरूपमनात्मत्वमुपपाद्यम् | Similarly, if the meaning of

non-self (the third alternative for jaDatva proposed by the
nyAyAmritakAra) is taken as that which is different from bliss,
that would be appropriate.

The happiness derived from objects is also the bliss of the self
in reality - we falsely assume that objects cause the happiness
- but the real source of happiness is the self.

वैषयिकानन्दस्यापि ब्रह्मरूपत्वात्, तदुपाधिमात्रस्यैवोत्पत्तिविनाशप्रतियोगित्वात् |

The nature of objective happiness is as Brahman only, because
it is only the upAdhi of that happiness (ie the thought) that is
generated and destroyed. The thought that generates the
experience of happiness may come and go, but the real source
of happiness eternally shines.

The pUrvapakshi objects to this:

नच - ज्ञानभिन्नत्वस्यानन्दभिन्नत्वस्य च काल्पनिकस्य ब्रह्मणि सत्त्वात् तत्र
व्यभिचार इति - वाच्यम्; If that is the case, then because a difference
from consciousness and a difference from bliss are both
imagined in Brahman, such qualities exist in Brahman too -
Thus there is vyabhichAra.
The siddhikAra says - do not argue thus.

धर्मिसमानसत्ताकतद्भेदस्य हेतुत्वात् | Because we can remedy the defect by

adding "a difference that is not of the same order of reality as
its locus" to the definition of the hetu. An imaginary difference
will be of a lower order of reality than Brahman.

अनौपाधिकत्वेन वा भेदो विशेषणीय:, तुच्छे पञ्चमप्रकाराविद्यानिवृत्तौ च

व्यभिचारपरिहार: पूर्ववत् | Alternatively, one can add the
qualifier "non-relationally" to the difference in the definition.
i.e. jaDatva means that which is non-relationally different from
the qualifand in the meaning of the word 'cognition'. The
vyabhichAra in absolutely non-existent objects, and the
destruction of nescience, which is considered as belonging to
a fifth order of reality can be remedied by adding the same
qualifier as previously discussed in the drishyatva chapter.
There, the vyabhichAra with asat and avidyAnivritti was
remedied by adding the qualifier - अज्ञानकालवृत्तित्वं, ie
"existing contemporaneously with ignorance" - to the
definition.

एवं अस्वप्रकाशत्वम् वा जडत्वम्, तच्च पूर्वमेवोपपादितमिति शिवम् ||

Similarly, the definition of jaDatva as the absence of self-
luminosity is also acceptable, as has been said previously. In
the drishyatva chapter, the absence of self-luminosity was
defined as अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वाभावं - the absence
of a characteristic of being unobjectifiable, while being
directly known.

That completes the chapter on the suitability of jaDatvam as a

hetu for the mithyAtva anumAna.
paricChinnatva hetUpapattih
(part 1)
अथ परिच्छिन्नहेतूपपत्ति: |
Thus far, we have looked at the five definitions of the
sAdhya, and two alternatives for the hetu in the mithyAtva
anumAna. Now we will consider the third hetu,
paricChinnatvam - limitation. As discussed by
ShankarAchArya in the taittirIya bhAShya for the word
anantam, Brahman is free from any limitations, broadly
classified into three categories - desha paricChinnatvam
(spatial limitation), kAla paricChinnatvam (temporal
limitation) or vastu paricChinnatvam (limitation by objects).
The siddhikAra will argue in this chapter that
paricChinnatvam is a suitable hetu for the mithyAtva
anumAna.
परिच्छिन्नत्वमपि हेतु: | paricChinnatvam, or limitation, can also be
considered as a hetu.
तच्च देशत: कालतो वस्तुतश्चेति त्रिविधम् | It can be of three kinds -
limitation by space, time and objects.
तत्र देशत: परिच्छिन्नत्वं अत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् | Spatial limitation is
the absence at any location - ie it being the counterpositive
to the absolute absence of an object at a location.
कालत: परिच्छिन्नत्वं ध् वं सप्र ति यो गि त् व म् | Temporal limitation is the
absence caused by the object's destruction, ie it being the
counterpositive to the absence caused by destruction.
वस्तुत: परिच्छिन्नत्वं अन्योन्याभावप्रतियोगित्वम् | Limitation by objects is
the ability of other objects to limit the object in question.
For this, if there exist other objects different from this one,
this object can be considered to be limited by others. In
other words, limitation by objects is being the
counterpositive to mutual absence (i.e difference).
The nyAyAmritakAra raises some objections to this
definition:
ननु - समवायसम्बन्धेनात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् आत्मनि व्यभिचारि ; The
Atma has no cause of its own, it being accepted as the
primary cause. According to nyAya, the effect is present in
the cause with samavAya sambandha, or inherence
relationship. As the Atma has no cause, it is absent
everywhere with a samavAya sambandha. If spatial
limitation meant the counterpositive of absolute absence, it
can lead to vyabhichAra with Atma, which is absent
everywhere with an inherence relation.
तस्याप्याकाशादिवत् क्वाप्यसमवेतत्वात्, Atma, like space, has no inherence
relation with anything.
दावसिद्धम्
संयोगसंबन्धेनात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमाका दावसिद्धम् ; To remedy
शा
this, if you define spatial limitation as the absence in a
location with samyoga sambandha, it will lead to space
being rendered as not mithyA, or bhAgAsiddhi.
तस्य यावन्मूर्तसंयोगित्वनियमात्, Following the nyAya rule that all all-
pervading (vibhu) objects will have samyoga sambandha
(that is, be in contact) with all tangible objects, space will
be in contact with all tangible objects. Thus, space will not
have the absence with samyoga sambandha, which is the
hetu for mithyAtva, rendering space as not mithyA.
अमूर्तनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाभिप्राये तु आत्मनि व्यभिचारस्तदवस्थ:,
However all-pervading objects will not be in physical
contact with intangible objects. If spatial limitation is
defined as the absence of contact with intangible objects,
space will be included within the scope of the definition, but
so will Atma (Atma is considered all-pervading by the
naiyyAyika, so it too will have no contact with intangibles),
leading to vyabhichAra.
येशूपरमात्मनि व्यभिचार:, If you
सर्वसंबन्धित्वाभावविवक्षायामपि सर्वसंबन्ध)न्न्
ये
say limitation is the absence of all relations, then Atma,
which has no relations with anything, will be included within
the definition of paricChinna, causing vyabhichAra.
, On the other hand, nescience is
अज्ञाने सर्वसंबन्धिसिद्धिच श्च
related to everything, leading to nescience not being
mithyA.
Until now, the defects related to spatial limitation were
mentioned. Temporal limitation and limitation by objects will
be mentioned next.
वसिद् , तेषां परैर्नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्, The absence
धंशा
ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वमपि आका वसिद्धं
caused by the destruction of the object is not present for
space, because space has been accepted by others
(naiyyAyikas) as permanent. Thus there is asiddhi for these
objects.
अन्योन्याभावप्रतियोगित्वं चात्मनि व्यभिचार:, (The definition of
limitation by objects as) the counterpositive of difference
will lead to vyabhichAra in Atma.
तस्य जडनिष्ठान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगित्वात्, अन्यथा जडत्वापत्ते: - Because Atma is
different from inert objects. If you say that the Atma is not-
different from the inert, then Atma will be inert too.
Thus all three definitions of limitation have problems,
rendering limitation as an unfit hetu for the mithyAtva
anumAna.
To this, the siddhikAra says:
- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument, no.

षणेन आत्मनि
अत्यन्ताभावे अन्योन्याभावे च धर्मिसमसत्ताकत्ववि षणेनशे
व्यभिचारपरिहारात्, The defect of vyabhichAra in the Atma with
limitation defined as "being the counterpositive of absolute
absence or mutual absence" can be remedied by adding the
adjective "of an equal order of reality as the substratum" to
the absence.
Brahman can never be absent, nor can any object be said to
be different from Brahman, because Brahman is the content
of every object. Thus, Brahman's absence and any difference
from Brahman must necessarily be of a lower order of reality
than Brahman itself. Therefore, by adding the words "of an
equal order of reality as the substratum" in the definitions of
the nature of absence / difference, all mithyA objects are
covered, but Brahman itself is excluded. Thus, all the
defects cited by the nyAyAmritakAra can be addressed quite
easily.
This is further explained.

अज्ञानाका दौदौ
शा
च स्वसमसत्ताकात्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगित्वसत्वेन
असिद्ध्यभावात् | Nescience and space, etc. are of the same
order of reality as their absence / difference, therefore one
cannot argue that mithyAtva is not present in them as a
result of this definition of paricChinnatva. There is no
asiddhi.
What if the absence of an object is treated as
pAramArthika? This was one of the positions taken in the
second definition of mithyAtva. There it was argued that the
absence of an object could be treated as pAramArthika, ie it
is of the nature of Brahman itself.
देर् व्
यावहारिकस्
अविद्याका देर्व्यावहारिकस्य पारमार्थिकाभावपक्षे 'स्वान्यूनसत्ताके'ति विशेषणम्
यशा
देयम् ; When absence is treated as pAramArthika, and avidyA,
space, etc. are vyAvahArika, the qualifier should be changed
to "being not of a lower order of reality than" - that is, the
absence of an object is not of a lower order of reality than
the item in question. By doing this, the vyAvahArika world,
whose absence is pAramArthika (in this position it is
assumed that absence is of the nature of the ultimate
substratum, Brahman), will be rendered as mithyA, but
Brahman whose absence is necessarily of a lower order of
reality than itself will be excluded from all things mithyA.
अतएव प्रातिभासिकशुक्तिरूप्यादेर्व्यावहारिकाभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि न साधनवैकल्यम् | As a
result, prAtibhAsika shell-silver having a vyAvahArika
absence will also fall under this definition of mithyA, and
sAdhana vaikalya (or the defect of the hetu not being
present in the example) will not apply.
A question may be asked here - the second definition of
mithyA defined mithyA as that which is absent in all three
periods of time in its locus. That is, mithyAtva is
atyantAbhAva pratiyogitva. Now, the meaning of
paricChinnatvam is as ayantAbhAva pratiyogitva. Is this not
a circular argument? Essentially, the hetu and the sAdhya
are the same. The world is mithyA, because it is paricChinna
- this is the anumAna. That is, the world is atyantAbhAva
pratiyogi (2nd definition of mithyAtva, the sAdhya). Why?
Because it is atyantAbhAva pratiyogi (because it
paricChinna, the hetu). This is clearly untenable.
To this, the siddhikAra replies:
ष्
टता
निरुक्तमिथ्यात्वप्रकाराणामेवंरूपत्वाभावात् न साध्यावि ष्टता | There are other
शि
definitions of mithyAtva which are not equivalent to the
hetu, so one can use those definitions as the meaning of the
term mithyA when using paricChinnatva as the hetu. For
example, the first definition (sadasat vilakshaNatva) or third
definition (jnAna nivartyatva) can be used here.
The nyAyAmritakAra had said that as space is permanent, it
cannot be destroyed. Thus it is not temporally limited. The
siddhikAra replies:
ध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वं चाकाशादौ नासिद्धम् | Space is destroyed, and as a
result, it too is mithyA. Thus there is no asiddhi there.
'तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाश: सम्भूत:' इति श्रुतिसिद्धजन्यत्वेनानुमितत्वात्, As the
taittirIya shruti says "From the Atma, AkAsha was born".
Anything that is born, will die. Therefore, space, which is
created from the Atma, will also be destroyed at some point.
'आका वत्सर्वगतच
वत्
श्च सर्
वगतश्
चशा
नित्य' इत्यत्र चात्मनिदर्शनत्वं स्वसमानकालीनसर्वगतत्वेन
आभूतसंप्लवावस्थायित्वेन चेति द्रष्टव्यम् | "Atma is all pervading like
space, and permanent" says the shruti (note: this does not
mean that Atma is permanent like space, the comparison
with space is limited to its all pervading nature). Further,
space's existence and all pervasion is for as long as the
elements are in existence - that is, until everything is
destroyed, during the dissolution of pralaya.
'अतोऽन्यदार्त'मिति श्रुत्या अनात्ममात्रस्यैव विनाशित्वप्रतिपादनात्, अतएव |
Moreover, the shruti says that everything apart from
Brahman is ultimately destroyed. "Apart from that
(Brahman), everything else is destructible" says the shruti.
Thus everything other than Atma has temporal limitation and
that can be used as a suitable hetu for mithyAtva.
With this, the defects cited by the nyAyAmritakAra with
paricChinnatva have been addressed. The siddhikAra next
takes up an ancilliary discussion, which will be considered
in the next lesson.
paricChinnatva hetUpapattih
(part 2)
In the last lesson, we looked at paricChinnatva hetu as a basis
to establish jagat mithyAtva. ParicChinnatva or limitation, is
three dimensional - limitation by space, by time and by objects.
Thus any object which is limited by any one of these
dimensions is mithyA.

The siddhikAra now uses this concept to defend the criticisms

levelled by the nyAyAmritakAra on the work of an earlier
preceptor within the advaita tradition - Sri
AnandabodhAchArya, a 11th/12th century teacher of advaita.
In Sri Anandabodha's work pramANamAla, he makes the
following statement:

'घटादय: स्वानुगतप्रतिभासे वस्तुनि कल्पिता:, विभक्तत्वात्, यथा सर्पमालादिकं,

स्वानुगतप्रतिभासे रज्ज्वा इदमं शाविभज्यते, 'एवं ब्रह्मण्यनुगच्छति घटादिकं विभज्यते,
सन् घट: सन् पट' ' इति -

The AchArya uses the hetu vibhaktatvAt (because of

difference) as a basis to argue that the world is a
superimposition on Brahman - in other words, mithyA.

He says: Objects such as pots, etc. are superimposed on the

consciousness that is inherent (anugatam) in them, because
they are in reality distinct from it (vibhaktam). For example,
people superimpose a snake, garland etc. onto a rope, which
are in reality distinct (vibhaktam) from the rope, which is
inherent (anugatam) in each of the superimpositions. In the
sentence "this is a snake", there are two elements "this" and
"a snake". The real object is that which is denoted by "this",
the unreal one is the "snake". Thus in the one inherent "this",
people superimpose various erroneous notions such as "a
snake", "a garland" etc. Similarly, in the one inherent Brahman,
elements such as pots, clothes etc are superimposed.

Prima facie, the word vibhaktam, as it is in juxtaposition with

anugatam (inherent), leads one to conclude that vibhaktam
means ananugatam (not inherent). The nyAyAmritakAra takes
this meaning of vibhaktam to cite various examples where
different objects may share a common, inherent feature, but
one cannot conclude that the objects themselves are mithyA,
just on this basis.

He cites a few examples:

1) "ghaTa: calati", "paTa: calati" - We make statements such
as "the pot moves", "the cloth moves" etc. Do we claim that
pots, clothes, etc are superimposed on the inherent movement
and hence mithyA?
2) "ghaTa: rUpi", "paTa: rUpi" - The pot has an appearance, the
cloth too has an appearance. Are pots, clothes etc.
superimposed on the inherent appearance?
3) "ghaTa: dravyam", "paTa: dravyam" - The pot is a substance,
the cloth too is a substance. Are pots, clothes etc.
superimposed on the inherent substance?
4) "ghaTa: dhvastha:", "paTa: dhvastha:" - The pot is
destroyed, the cloth is destroyed. Are pots, clothes etc.
superimposed on the inherent destruction?
5) "ghaTa: anAtma", "paTa: anAtma" - pots, clothes, etc. are
anAtma. Are pots and clothes superimposed on the inherent
anAtma?
6) "khapuShpa asat", "vandhyAputrah asat" - Objects such as a
flower growing out of the sky, or the fictitious son of a woman
who is unable to conceive are absolutely non-existent, asat.
Can we say that the objects themselves are superimposed on
non-existence?

Clearly, the answer in all of these situations is - no. Therefore

vibhaktam (non-inherence) as a hetu for mithyAtva is
untenable. This was the argument of the nyAyAmritakAra.

The siddhikAra quotes the AnandabodhAchArya and says that

his statement is quite correct.
'घटादय: स्वानुगतप्रतिभासे वस्तुनि कल्पिता:, विभक्तत्वात्, यथा सर्पमालादिकं,
स्वानुगतप्रतिभासे रज्ज्वा इदमं शाविभज्यते, 'एवं ब्रह्मण्यनुगच्छति घटादिकं विभज्यते,
सन् घट: सन् पट' इति - आनन्दबोधोक्तमपि साधु |
The nyAyAmritakAra's criticism is quite valid if the meaning of
vibhaktatvam was taken as ananugatatvam (non-inherence).
However, that is not the meaning. The siddhikAra continues:

विभक्तशब्देन स्वसमानसत्ताकभेदप्रतियोगित्वरूपवस्तु परिच्छेदस्य विवक्षितत्वात् न

:| By the word vibhaktam, limitation by objects is
ब्रह्मतुच्छयोर्व्यभिचार
meant. That is, vibhaktatvam is being the counterpositive of
a difference, which is of the same order of reality as the
substratum. This addresses the various examples cited by
the pUrvapakshi and establishes that no vyabhichAra is
present either in Brahman or in absolutely absent objects
such as a hare's horn.
To explain, everyday objects are mithyA because they are
vibhaktam, ie really different from other objects, unlike
Brahman which is avibhaktam - it is not limited by any of
them on account of a real difference with them.
The pUrvapakshi interjects with some objections to this
interpretation. He says:
नच - 'खण्डो गौर्मुण्डो गौ'रित्येवमादिस्वानुगतप्रतिभासे गोत्वादौ व्यक्तीनामकल्पितत्वात् व्यभिचार इति
- वाच्यम् ; This interpretation would lead to the result that the
individuals of any species would end up as not mithyA,
leading to vyabhichAra. If the meaning of vibhaktatvam was
non-inherence, as previously assumed, the advaitin could
have argued that individual cows (such as one with a broken
horn, one with no horns etc) are only superimpositions on
the universal class of cows. However with this new
interpretation, such an argument is not possible. How will
they be mithyA then?
The siddhikAra says - do not argue thus. Advaita does not
accept the naiyyAyika concept of jAti or universals.
सत्सामान्यातिरिक्तगोत्वादिसामान्यानभ्युपगमात्, Apart from
existence, which pervades all objects, we do not accept a
universal such as cowness that pervades all individuals.
गोत्वाद्यभ्युपगमेऽपि गोत्वादिव्यञ्जकतावच्छेदकसामान्यानभ्युपगमात् Even those that
accept the universal of cowness, such a universal is
possible only due to a specificity of individual cows. There is
no universal feature that is the basis to indicate a
universal.
This naturally leads to the question - how is it possible to
accept the existence of an attribute called cowness
inherent in all cows, without knowledge of every cow in the
past, present and future? Now, if a universal species or jAti
of "Cows" is accepted, it is possible to circumvent this
problem - however the advaitin is unwilling to accept the
existence of any universal apart from sat, existence.

व्यक्तिविशेषाणामेवाननुगतानां सास्नादिमत्त्वाद्युपाध्यनुगतानां वा तद्व्यञ्जकत्ववत्

व्यक्तिविशेषविशिष्टत्वेन सत्सामान्यस्येव तत्तत्व्यवहारजनकत्वोपपत्ते: | The advaitins
accept the idea of 'cowness' which excludes features
unique to specific cows (such as colour etc), but which
includes features common to them such as dewlap, etc.
Such a cowness is immediately known by seeing individuals
of any species. One does not need to postulate a universal
set called jAti to know this inherent attribute.
अतएव - 'घ टा दि कं , सद्रूपे कल्पितम् प्रत्येकं तदनुविद्धत्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्, प्रत्येकं
चन्द्रानुविद्धजलतरङ्गचन्द्रवत्' - इति ब्रह्मसिद्धिकारोक्त्मपि साधु | Similarly, the
following statement of the brahmasiddhikAra (maNDana
miSra) is also true - 'Objects such as pots etc. are
superimposed on Existence (Brahman), because every
object appears endowed with existence, similar to the
multiple reflections of the moon on waves being
superimpositions, reflections of the one moon.'
The pUrvapakshi raises a crucial objection. If every object in
the world appears as existing, and that existence is really
Brahman, on what basis does the advaitin argue that
Brahman is aprameya, unknowable? Therefore the existence
that appears in every object is not Brahman, but the object's
very own existence.
He asks:
ननु - सदर्थस्य ब्रह्मण: रूपादिहीनस्यासंसारमज्ञानावृतस्य शब्दैकगम्यस्य कथं घट:
सन्नित्यादिबुद्धिविषयता स्यात् ?
Brahman, which is Existence, is without form. Further, as
long as one is in samsAra, Brahman is enveloped by
ignorance (ie it is not known). Further, it is knowable only
through shruti. That being the case, how can it be known as
the existence that appears in the vision "the pot exists"?
A truly fantastic question. He continues:
तथाच 'घटोऽनित्य' इत्यनेन घटगतानित्यतेव 'घट: स'न्नित्यनेनापि घटगतमेव
सत्त्वं गृह्यते | Further, in the knowledge "the pot is
impermanent", we gather that the impermanence is an
attribute of the pot, and not some other object. Why should
one assume that existence in the knowledge "the pot
exists" refers not to the pot, but to another object,
Brahman?
नच - स्वरूपेणाप्रत्यक्षस्य राहोश्चन्द्रावच्छेदेनेव ब्रह्मणोऽपि घटाद्यवच्छेदेनैव
प्रत्यक्षतेति - वाच्यम् ;
Now the advaitin may argue - Brahman by itself is not
perceivable, but like rAhu, whose presence is known only
when the moon is covered (during an eclipse), Brahman is
also known only when it is associated with / enclosed by a
pot. This is not an acceptable argument.
शब्दाद्यवच्छिन्नस्यापि गगनादे: श्रावणत्वाद्यापातात्, If that were true, by a similar
argument we could say that space becomes perceptible (ie
it is accessible to hearing) only in association with sound.
However, no one says that space is heard.
राहोऽस्तु दूरदोषेणाज्ञातस्य नीलस्य योग्यस्य शुक्लभास्वरचन्द्रसंबन्धाच्चाक्षुषता युक्ता - rAhu is
normally not known because he happens to be dark and is
physically located at a great distance from earth. He
becomes fit for perception in conjunction with the white,
bright moon. However Brahman is not perceptible under any
circumstances - thus one cannot compare Brahman with
rAhu.
To this, the siddhikAra replies - इति चेन्न; If this is your
argument, no.
यत: सदात्मना न ब्रह्मणो मूलाज्ञानेनावृतत्वम् ; किन्तु
घटाद्यवच्छिन्नशक्त्यज्ञानेनैव; Because Brahman's nature as
existence is not completely covered by primal nescience
(mUlAjnAna) - it is covered only by ignorance in association
with objects, secondary nescience (tUlAjnAna). tUlAjnAna is
ignorance of everyday objects which gets destroyed when
they are seen / known.
Similarly, it is possible to discern Brahman's nature as
existence in the perception of objects, and its nature as
consciousness by examining one's own cognitive processes.
Primal nescience does not completely obstruct existence
and consciousness. However, it does cover Brahman's
nature as absolute bliss.
तथाच चक्षुरादिजन्यवृत्त्या तदावरणभङ्गे सति 'सन्घट' इत्यत्र ब्रह्मण: स्फुरणे
बाधकाभावात् | When cognition, through the medium of eyes,
etc. removes the obstruction (of tUlAjnAna), it generates the
knowledge "the pot exists". However, there is no
contradiction in recognising that the existence which is
known is that of Brahman. With this, one of the three
objects of the pUrvapakshi (as long as one is in samsAra,
Brahman is enveloped by ignorance) has been met.
नच - रूपादिहीनतया चाक्षुषत्वाद्यनुपपत्ति: बाधिकेति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus -
Brahman, being without form, cannot be seen with eyes and
thus there is a contradiction.
प्रतिनियतेन्द्रियग्राह्येष्वेव रूपाद्यपेक्षानियमात्, सर्वेन्द्रियग्राह्यम् तु सद्रूपं ब्रह्म, नातो
रुपादिहीनत्वेऽपि चाक्षुषत्वाद्यनुपपत्ति: Every sense organ is capable of
revealing only that which it is designed for (for example,
eyes can only reveal form, not sound). Whereas Brahman is
capable of being known by all sense organs. Thus even
though Brahman has no form it is capable of being known.
How can Brahman be aprameya (unknowable) on the one
hand, and sarva indriya grAhyam (knowable by all sense
organs) on the other? Because shuddha Brahman is the one
that is not capable of being known, whereas upahita
Brahman is known through every sense faculty.
That all pramANas reveal existence has been accepted by
others.
सत्ताया: परैरपि सर्वेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च तदुक्तं वार्तिककृ द्भि: - That
existence is knowable by all faculties has been accepted by
others (mImAmsakas and naiyyAyikas) too. Similarly, the
vArtikakArA (SureshvarAchArya) says in the brihadAraNyaka
vArtikam:
'अतोऽनुभुव एवैको विषयोऽज्ञातलक्षण: | अक्षादीनां स्वतः सिद्धो यत्र तेषां प्रमाणाता ||
' इति | Therefore, anubhava (Atma, as existence) is the one
that is the object and locus of ignorance. It is in this Atma
where all means of knowledge such as sight have self-
evident validity.
The dvaitin may not accept the vArtikakAra's statement. So
the siddhikAra says -
कालस्य च रूपादिहीनस्य मीमांसकादिभि: सर्वेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् | Time,
which has no form has been accepted by the mImAmsakAs
as knowable by all sense faculties. If that is acceptable,
why not existence?
With this, the second (of three) objection of the pUrvapakshi
(how can a formless entity by seen?) has been met. The
third objection (how can Brahman which is known only
through the shruti be revealed in cognitions such as "the
pot exists"?) will be considered next.
नच - शब्दावच्छिन्नस्याकाशस्यापि श्रावणत्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ; You had argued that
space would be perceptible only in association with sound.
That is not correct.
स्वभावतो योग्यस्य हि के नाचिन्निमित्तेन प्रतिरुद्धयोग्यताकस्यावच्छेदकादिना योग्यता संपाद्यते,
If the obstruction covering an object that is otherwise
perceptible by nature is removed, then its natural
perceptability becomes manifest in association with that
which removes the obstruction.
यथा दूरदोषेण प्रतिरुद्धयोग्यताकस्य राहोश्चान्द्रसंबन्धेन | Like rAhu in your example,
which was obstructed due to the defect of distance
becomes perceptible again due to its association with the
moon which allows its perceptibility to become manifest.
एवंचावरेण प्रतिरुद्धयोग्यताकं ब्रह्म घटाद्यवच्छेदेन योग्यं भवति, Similarly
Brahman which is naturally knowable but whose knowledge
is obstructed, becomes known in association with the pot
when the secondary nescience is removed.
नभस्तु स्वभावयोग्यमेव; न प्रतिरुद्धयोग्यताकम्, येन शब्दावच्छेदेन योग्यं भवेत् |
However, space is intrinsically not amenable to perception -
if its lack of perceptibility was due to an obstruction, one
could have argued that it could be perceptible again when
the obstruction is removed in association with sound.
However, space is not perceptible by its very nature, and the
intrinsic nature of a thing cannot vary.
यद्वा - द्रव्यग्रहे चक्षुषो रूपापेक्षा नत्वन्यग्रहे, ब्रह्म तु न द्रव्यं; Alternatively, we can
say that the expectation of form as a necessary condition
for perception is only true for seeing dravya, substances.
Brahman cannot be called a substance. Why?
'अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घ'मिति श्रुत्या चतुर्विधपरिमाणनिषेधेन द्रव्यत्वप्रतिषेधात्, अतो
नानुपपत्ति: | Because shruti says Atma is not gross, it is not
subtle, it is not small, nor big. The the four kinds of measure
accepted within nyAya shAstra for substances are said to be
absent in Brahman. Thus it cannot be a substance.
अस्तु वा द्रव्यम् ; तथाप्यध्यस्तद्रव्यत्ववति गुणादौ रूपानपेक्षचाक्षुषत्वदर्शनेन
धर्म्यन्यूनसत्ताकद्रव्यत्ववत्येव चक्षूरूपमपेक्षते | If one insists on
Brahman being a substance, so be it. However that
substance-hood can only be an imagined attribute in
Brahman, because Brahman is intrinsically without
attributes. There can be no expectation of form in the
perception of objects whose substance-hood is unreal. From
this, one can conclude a general rule - the expectation of
form for the visual perception of an object is contingent on a
real substance-hood of the object. Put in other words, the
requirement of form for perception is only when the
substance-hood is not of of a lower order of reality than the
object itself.
Where the substance-hood is unreal, the object may be
perceptible even if it is formless.
ब्रह्मणि च द्रव्यत्वं धर्म्यपेक्षया न्यूनसत्ताकमेवेति न तद्ग्रहे रूपाद्यपेक्षा | In the case
of Brahman, because it is attribute-less, the attribute of
substance-hood must necessarily be of an order of reality
lower than Brahman itself. Thus there is no expectation that
the perception of Brahman requires it to have a form.
कल्पितत्वं च स्वाभाववति प्रतीयमानत्वं वा, स्वरूपज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं वेत्यन्यदेतत् |
Thus the substance-hood of Brahman must be kalpitam.
What is kalpitam? Where it is really absent, it appears, or
which is sublated when the nature of the object it is
supposedly present in, is correctly understood. These two
correspond to the second and third definitions of mithyAtva.
तस्मात् परिच्छिन्नत्वमपि भवति हेतुरिति सिद्धम् | Therefore, limitation too
can be a hetu for mithyAtva.
This concludes the chapter on paricChinnatvam - a three-fold
limitation present in all objects in the world.
amshitva hetUpapattih
त्
वहेतूपपत्ति
अथ अं त्वहेतूपपत्ति :|
शि

The ancient teachers of advaita have typically offered three

reasons for the mithyAtva of the world - drishyatva, jaDatva,
paricChinnatva - knowability, inertness, limitation. However, in
the early part of the 13th century, chitsukhAchArya offered a
special syllogism, which offered another reason - amshitva or
being a composite whole. He argued that any object, being an
aggregate of many parts, was itself absent. That is, a
composite is an unreal construct. Instead of using a sAmAnya
anumAna, a generic inference about the mithyAtva of the
world, he used a visheSha anumAna to prove the mithyAtva of
a particular object. He argued that a piece of cloth is absent in
the very threads that it is weaved from. Having proven the
absence of the composite whole in this special case, he
extended this to the entire world and argued that the world
was also nothing but an aggregate of several parts and
similarly, was absent in the very parts that composed it.

चित्सुखाचार्यैस्तु - 'अयं पट:, एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगी, अं त्वात्

त्
वा ,
त्
शि
इतरां वत्वत् '-
शि इत्युक्तम् |
However (in contrast to the generic inference on the world's
unreality presented thus far), chitsukhAchArya says - "This
cloth (paksha), is absent in the very threads (sAdhya), because
it is a composite whole (hetu), like other composites
(driShTAnta).

तत्र तन्तुपदमुपादानपरम्, एतेन

स्वोपादाननिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वलक्षणमिथ्यात्वसिद्धि: | By the
thread, the material cause is meant - thereby the mithyAtva of
an object is proven if the absence of that object in its own
material cause is established.

The pUrvapakshi argues that this is already known. He quotes

the ArambhaNAdhikaraNa of the brahma sUtra to argue his
point.
नच - कार्यस्य कारणाभेदेन तदनारितत्वात्
तत्वा त् सिद्धसाधनम्, The effect is non-
श्रि
different from the cause. Thus, to say that the effect cannot be
located in its cause, is stating the obvious. As the cause and
effect are non-different, to say that the effect is absent in the
cause is as good as saying the effect is absent in itself - which
is obvious, because a thing cannot be located in itself.

श्रि तत्
वेनान्
याश्
रितत्
अनारितत्वेनान्यारितत्वेन वा उपपत्त्या अर्थान्तरं च इति - वाच्यम् ;
वेनश्रि
Alternately, if by this, it is meant that the effect has no locus,
or that it is located in some other thing instead, then that is a
case of arthAntara - ie it does not prove the effect's unreality,
but something else. All that is proven is that the effect is not
located anywhere, not that it is unreal. In the second case, all
this proves is that the cloth is not located in the thread, but on
something else, say, a table.

Before we consider the siddhikAra's reply, we need to clarify a

few ideas. In advaita, a distinction is drawn between
similarity, equality and identity. A is like B is similarity. A = B
is equality and A=A is identity. Equality and similarity involve
two objects, whereas identity involves only one object. Thus,
equality is not the same as identity. Similarly, when we say
that the effect is non-different from the cause, we are not
saying that the cause and effect are identical, all we are
denying is their difference. As the bhAmatikAra argues in his
commentary to the bhAShya of the ArambhaNAdhikaraNa, न
खल् व न न् य त् व मि त् य भे दं ब्रूमः, किन्तु भेदं व्यासेधामः |

The siddhikAra responds to the original argument:

भ्युपेयत्वात्
अभेदे कार्यकारणभावव्याहत्या कथंचिदपि भेदस्यावयाभ्युपेयत्वात् | To talk of
श्या
cause and effect in the case of identity would be a
contradiction (because identity means that there is only one
object and not two), therefore we must accept some
distinction between the two - The absence of difference
(ananyatva) is not identity (abheda).

नच 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्य' इत्यधिकरणविरोध: ;
उपादानव्यतिरेकेनोपदेयं नास्तीत्यस्यैव तदर्थत्वात् | This is not contrary
to the non-difference of the cause and the effect argued by
VedavyAsa in the brahma sUtra. All that the sUtra means is
that the effect has no existence independent of the material
cause.
 तत्
वेनश्रि
बाधात्तन्मात्रारितत्वेन षणाद्वानार्थान्तरम् | We are not arguing
पक्षवि षणाद्वाशे
that the cloth is present elsewhere (ie somewhere other than
the thread), for that would be contradictory. We are saying that
the cloth is absent in the very thread in which it is located.
Thus it is mithyAtva that is proven by this, not the absence of
any basis whatsoever. The charge of arthAntara is not
admissable.
Secondly, by adding the adjective of 'being in association with
the paksha (ie the cloth)' to the thread, we are implying that
the absence of the paksha is located in the very locus of the
paksha, the thread. The absence of an object in its very locus
implies its mithyAtva, and not something else.

The pUrvapakshi argues that this is contrary to direct

perception. No one observes a cloth being absent in the
thread, in fact the cloth is very much perceived. How can it be
absent?

नच प्रकृतेऽपि बाध:, तस्योद्धरिष्यमाणत्वात् | One cannot argue that

this is unacceptable because it would be contradictory to
perception. We will prove why being contrary to perception is
not a fundamental defect. In a chapter titled pratyaksha
bAdhoddhAra:, it will be later proven that perception is often
illusory and therefore if an inference contradicts an erroneous
perception, that is not a problem.

Thus far, we have looked at three defects cited - siddha

sAdhanam (establishing the established), arthAntaram (proving
something else), bAdham (contradicting other valid means of
knowledge). Now we will consider the fourth defect,
prAmANikatvam (is the absence real or unreal?).

The argument is similar to the chapter on the second definition

of mithyAtva.

नचात्यान्ताभावस्य प्रामाणिकत्वाप्रामाणिकत्वविकल्पावकाश:, तस्य प्रागेव निरस्तत्वात्

| There is no room to query the ontological status of the
absence of the cloth - this has been refuted previously.
नच - कस्यचित् पटस्य संयोगवृत्त्यैतत्तन्तुषु सत्त्वेन तत्र व्यभिचार इति - वाच्यम् ;
It would be futile to argue thus - if another cloth is kept on top
of this one, there would be contact between the two, thus the
other cloth is present in contact with the threads of this one.

तत्समवेतस्य तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वमङ्गीकुर्वत:
तत्संयोगिनस्तन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाङ्गीकारेण पक्षसमत्वात् | To
us, who argue that a cloth made from this thread is absent in
the thread itself, to say that the contact of some other cloth
(ie not made from this thread) is not present here is not too
difficult. The two pakshas are similar. We are willing to say
that the an object is absent in the locus with which it has
samavAya sambandha, which is a permanent relationship. So it
is not difficult for us to say that an object is absent in the
locus with which it has samyoga sambandha, a temporary
relationship, as well.

नचाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वेनार्थान्तरम् ; We also do not argue that the object is both

present and absent in the locus. If we did it would have been
avyApva vritti and thus your charge of proving something else
(arthAntara) would have been valid. But we argue that it is
mithyA, not avyApya vritti.

Advaitins argue that it is impossible for an object to be both

present and absent in the same locus at the same time.

पटतदभावयोरेकाधिकरणवृत्तौ विरोधस्य जगति दत्तजलाञ्जलित्वप्रसङ्गात् , The

presence and absence of a cloth in the same locus would be a
contradiction and if possible, is as good as washing one's
hands off the world's affairs - ie we would be unfit for any
vyavahAra.

संयोगतदभावयोरप्येकाधिकरणवृत्तित्वानभ्युपगमात् | Therefore, neither

do we accept that the presence and absence of contact
(samyoga) in a locus is a possibility. Previously we had denied
the existence and non-existence of an object in a locus, now
we are denying the simultaneous existence and non-existence
of samyoga sambandha with that object.

अभ्युपगमे वा एतत्तन्तुत्वावच्छिन्नवृत्तित्वमत्यन्ताभावस्य विशेषणं देयम् ; If

you insist that such a thing is possible, then by qualifying the
cloth's absence as the absence which is colocated with
threadness, one rules out the simultaneous presence of both
the existence and the non-existence of the cloth in the thread
(by doing so, in the thread, wherever 'this threadness' is
present, we say that the 'cloth's absence' is also present -
there is no part of the thread without threadness, thus there is
no part of the thread without the cloth's absence). In other
words, the absence of the cloth fully pervades the thread - it is
not avyApya vritti.

एवमेतत्कालीनत्वमपि | तेन कालान्तरीयाभावमादाय नार्थान्तरम् । Similarly, by

qualifying this anumAna as "the cloth that is seen now in this
thread is absent", the charge that the hetu only proves that the
object is absent at some other time (and thus it is not
mithyAtva, but only anityatva that is proven) is remedied.

नचेह तन्तुषु पट इति प्रत्यक्षबाधः ; One cannot argue that absence of

the cloth here in these threads is contrary to direct
perception.

तस्य भ्रमसाधारणतया चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षवदप्रामाण्यशङ्कास्कन्दितत्वेनाबाधकत्वात् -

Because perception can either be correct or an illusion. Thus,
like the moon appears small enough to fit between the gap
between the thumb and the forefinger (prAdeshika), a
perception whose validity is doubtful cannot contradict an
inference which has the support of shruti. This will be
discussed in detail in the pratyaksha bAdhoddhAra chapter.

नच - अन्यासमवेतस्यां त्वमेतत्तन्तुसमवेतत्वं
त्
वमेतत्तन् तु
समवेतत्वं विना न युक्तमिति विरुद्धो हेतुरिति -
शि
वाच्यम् ;
The pUrvapakshi retorts - This cloth cannot be made from any
other object other than this thread. The advaitin says that
because the the cloth is a composite whole, it does not exist
in the thread. Therefore, one cannot say that the cloth is a
composite whole consisting of these threads unless one
agrees that this cloth is made from these threads. However,
the advaitin claims that the cloth does not even exist in the
thread, then how can it be made from the thread? If it is not
made from the thread, how can it be a composite of the
thread? Thus we start off with the cloth being a composite of
the thread, and end up disproving that it is a composite. The
hetu is contradictory.

The siddhikAra disagrees:

एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽप्येतत्तन्तुसमवेतत्वस्य
त्
वस्
सत्त्वेनां त्वस्य साध्येनाविरोधात् | Even if the cloth is absent in
यशि
the thread, it is possible for the cloth to be a creation of the
thread. Thus the hetu of being a composite is not contradictory
to the sAdhya of mithyAtva.

amshitvam is not dependent on existence of the cloth in the

thread but the existence of samavAya sambandha between
cloth and thread.

एतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभाव अप्रतियोगित्वं हि एतत्समवेतत्वे प्रयोजकं न भवति ;

The presence of the cloth in the thread does not imply that
cloth will have a samavAya sambandha with the thread.

परमते के वलान्वयिधर्ममात्रस्य एतत्समवेत्वापत्ते: According to others

(naiyyAyika), things which are universally present (kevala
anvayi dharmas) do not have samavAya sambandha with
anything. However, if presence implies samavAya sambandha,
then kevala anvayi attributes will end up having samavAya
sambandha. This would be contradictory to nyAya.

किन्त्वेतन्निष्ठप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वादिकम् ; Therefore it is not the existence or

non-existence of the object that implies its samavAya
sambandha with its locus, but the prior absence of that object
in that locus that implies the samavAya sambandha between
the two.

तच्चैतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि न विरुद्धमित्युपपादितमधस्तात् | That

(prior absence) can co-exist with absolute absence (as was
seen in the chapter on the fourth definition of mithyAtva), thus
there is no contradiction.

However, this does not imply that the advaitin accepts the
concept of samavAya sambandha wholesale, for that has been
disproven by the sUtrakAra.

एतत्समवेतत्वं चैतदुपादानकत्वम् , नतु नित्यसम्बन्धशालित्वम् ; तस्यानभ्युपगमात् | We

have accepted samavAya only as material causation. However,
we do not accept that the samavAya is a permanent / eternal
relation, as held by the logician. The only eternal entity is
Brahman, in advaita's view.

The next charge of hetvAbhAsa is sapratipaksham. The

opponent suggests an alternative syllogism of his own. He
says:

ननु - अयं पट एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगी न , एतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वात्,

व्यतिरेके ण पटान्तरवदिति प्रतिरोध:,
The cloth's absence in the thread is absent (that is, the cloth
is present in the thread), because it was created from this
thread. Like any other cloth, which is existent in its cause.

नचाप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वम् ; The pUrvapakshi anticipates an objection to

this anumAna - that it suffers from a qualifier which is not well-
known. How?

In the phrase nIlo ghaTa: (black pot), unless one knows nIlatva
(blackness), one cannot know a black pot. Similarly, unless
one knows the cloth's absence in its threads, the absence of
that absence (ie its presence, which the pUrvapakshi wishes
to establish) cannot be known. If the pUrvapakshi admits that
cloth's absence in its threads is well-known, then that would
go on to prove the siddhAntin. If he admits that the cloth's
absence is not known, then the absence of its absence is also
not knowable - or the adjective is not known at all.

He gets round this problem by providing a syllogism which

reveals the absence of the cloth without conceding that the
cloth is absent.

एतन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम्, किञ्चिन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि,
संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्वव्याप्यत्वात्, प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्ववदिति | The
absence of this cloth in this thread, is the object of some
absence located somewhere, because it implies samsarga
abhAva (which includes prAgabhAva, dhvamsa and
atyantAbhAva), just like the prior absence.
सामान्यतस्तत्प्रसिद्धे: Therefore the absence of the cloth is well
known. Thus the defect of an unknown adjective is not
present.

He continues. Do not argue that there is an error in the

anumAna thus:

नच - आका त्यन्ताभावस्य
त्
यन्ताभावस्यशा
घटादौ संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्वव्याप्यत्वग्रहात्
Where a pot is present, space cannot exist. Therefore, space is
absent in a pot. By the inference provided, space's samsarga
abhAva must also be present.

तस्य च के वलान्वयित्वेन किञ्चिन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाभावात् तत्र व्यभिचार इति - वाच्यम् ;

However, as the absence of space is universally present
(according to nyAya, AkAsha atyantAbhAva is kevala anvayi)
one cannot say that space is absent in some place. Thus this
syllogism fails there. This is the argument of the siddhAntin, as
imagined by the pUrvapakshi.

This is not correct, according to the pUrvapakshi. The absence

of an object implying samsarga abhAva is true for things like
pots, but it cannot be true for universally present objects. He
says:

संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्वानधिकरणे के वलान्वयिनि धर्मे

त्
यन्ताभा
वस्
सत्त्वेनाका त्यन्ताभावस्य यशा
संसर्गाभावप्रतियोगित्व अव्याप्यत्वेन
व्यभिचाराभावात् universally present attributes such as the absence of
space, cannot be the counterpositives of samsarga abhAva,
therefore the syllogism is not meant to cover universally
present objects. Therefore the charge that the syllogism
breaks down there is not applicable.

However, the siddhikAra's attack on the contradictory

anumAna is not on this basis. Instead, he says:

- इति चेन्न ; No

The syllogism itself is defective. According to the pUrvapakshi,

wherever a cloth is created from a thread, the cloth must
necessarily exist in the thread. Turning this around, this is
equivalent to saying if a cloth does not exist in a thread, then
it must not be made from that thread.

यत्रैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं , तत्रैतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभाव इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ

एतन्निष्ठप्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्योपाधित्वेन प्रतिरोधस्य हीनबलत्वात्, In the
reversed syllogism of the pUrvapakshi - viz., where a cloth is
absent in a thread, it must not be a creation of the thread, a
defect called the upAdhi is present.

This is not the upAdhi that students of vedAnta are familiar

with, so this ought to be explained. upAdhi, according to nyAya
is a conditionality which if present, weakens the syllogism.
This is defined in the tarka sangraha as साध्य व्यापकत्वे सति
साधन अव्यापकत्वं उपाधि:.

That is, a syllogism which is defective due to an upAdhi will

contain a feature which is present in the sAdhya always but is
not always present in the hetu. The popular syllogism - the
mountain is on fire, because of smoke - is valid. Let us take the
reverse - the mountain is on smoke, because of fire. This is
defective because even though smoke always implies fire, fire
does not always imply smoke. It is possible to have smokeless
fire.

Fire will be present along with smoke only if the fuel is wet.
Here the wet fuel is the upAdhi. Thus where the hetu is flawed
due to an upAdhi , it is not independently able to prove the the
sAdhya. It needs the upAdhi to be present alongside it. When
the upAdhi is absent, the sAdhya will also be absent. Thus
without wet fuel, fire will not cause smoke. Wet fuel is present
in every instance where smoke is present (sAdhya vyApakatve
sati) but is not present wherever fire is present (sAdhana
avyApakatvam).

Coming back to the original statement of the siddhikAra:

यत्रैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं , तत्रैतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभाव इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ
एतन्निष्ठप्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्योपाधित्वेन प्रतिरोधस्य हीनबलत्वात्, The
syllogism of the pUrvapakshi is weakened by the presence of
an upAdhi. What is it? Not being the counterpositive of prior
absence.

The pUrvapakshi had said - wherever a cloth is made by the

thread, the cloth must be existent too. The reverse of the
syllogism is - wherever the cloth is not existent in the thread,
it must not be made by the thread. The siddhikAra takes this
for analysis. The sAdhya of this reversed syllogism
is एतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभाव - it is not made from the thread. If an
item is not made from the thread, the prior absence of that
object cannot exist in the thread. Thus an object not made
from thread cannot be the counterpositive of its prior absence
in the thread. Or - prAgabhAva apratiyogitva pervades etat
tantu Arabdhatva abhAva.

The hetu of the reversed syllogism of the pUrvapakshi

is एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं - the absolute absence of
the object is located in these threads. As we discussed in the
chapter on the fourth definition of mithyAtva, it is possible for
the prior absence and absolute absence to be located in the
same place. If prAgabhAva pratiyogitva can be co-present with
atyantAbhAva pratiyogitva (the hetu), it is the same as
prAgabhAva apratiyogitva can be absent if the hetu is
present.

Therefore, prAgabhAva apratiyogitva is always present when

the sAdhya of the pUrvapakshi's anumAna is present, but is
not always present when the hetu of the pUrvapakshi's
anumAna is present. Thus, prAgabhAva apratiyogitva is an
upAdhi for the pUrvapakshi's anumAna.

एतत्तन्त्वारब्धत्वाभावव्यापकस्यैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठप्रागभावाप्रतियोगित्वस्य
पक्षावृत्ते: Wherever an object is not created from this thread,
its prior absence cannot be located in the thread. Therefore,
not being the counterpositive of prior absence pervades the
sAdhya of the pUrvapakshi's anumAna - being created from the
thread, which does not apply for the paksha, the cloth
(because we both agree that the cloth is created from the
thread).
पक्षवृत्तितया संदिह्यमानैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाव्यपकत्वात् ;
Whereas not being the counterpositive of prior absence does
not pervade the hetu of the anumAna, being the
counterpositive of absolute absence of the cloth in the thread,
whose validity is currently in doubt.

दृश्यत्वाद्यनुपपत्तिप्रतिकू लतर्कपराहतेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्च | Moreover, in the chapter about

the absence of any contradictory logic to disprove the hetu of
knowability, this will be further explained.

Can the opponent prove that our syllogism also has upAdhi?
We had said, यत्र अं त्वं
त्
वंशि
तत्र एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं.

अतएव एतत्तन्त्वनारब्धत्वमपि नोपाधि: ; Therefore, not being created

from the thread is also not an upAdhi to our syllogism.

उपाधिव्यतिरेकेण साध्यव्यतिरेके साध्यमाने सोपाधिकत्वस्योक्तत्वात्

Because it can be an upAdhi only if you can prove the absence
of my sAdhya (the existence of the cloth) by proving the
absence of your upAdhi (being created from the thread). Your
syllogism tried to prove that wherever the cloth was not
created from the thread, the cloth would be absent in the
thread. However, that syllogism was disproved by us.
Therefore, even if the cloth is created from the thread, the
cloth's absence is not disproved.

अव्याप्यवृत्तिसंयोगाभ्युपगमे तत्र व्यभिचाराच्च | If avyApya vritti was

accepted, then the cloth is both in contact and not in contact
with the thread. Thus taking the portion where it is not in
contact (ie where it is the atyantAbhAva pratiyogi), it would
imply that the cloth is not made from the thread. However, the
cloth is made from the the thread and therefore there is
vyabhichAra in the pUrvapakshi's anumAna in the case of
avyApya vritti of the cloth and thread.

अतएव यत्रैतत्तन्तुनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वं तत्रैतत्तन्त्वनारब्धमिति न

साध्यव्यापकताग्रहोऽपि तत्रैव व्यभिचारादिति सर्वमनवद्यम् | Therefore the
syllogism, wherever the cloth is not present in the thread, the
cloth is not made from the thread, is an incorrect one.
एवंच 'विमतं, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणासत्, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणानुपलभ्यमानत्वात् ,
स्वप्नादिवदि'ति - विद्यासागरोक्तमपि
साधु ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणासत्त्वमुक्तमिथ्यात्वान्यतमत्वं साध्यम् |

AnandapUrNa vidyAsagara, in a work called nyAya chandrika,

wrote that the world is non-existent, apart from
consciousness, because outside of consciousness, it is not
available for perception. Just like objects seen in a dream are
not seen independent of the perceiving consciousness. The
siddhikAra argues that this is also appropriate because
classifying anything other than consciousness as non-existent
is very much included in the five definitions of mithyA.

ज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणानुपलभ्यमानत्वं चिदाभासे सत्येवोपलभ्यमानत्वं हेतुरिति न

किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् | The non perception of things outside
consciousness (equivalent to non-self-luminosity) means that
objects are perceivable only when the chidAbhAsa is
present. Thus, AnandapUrNa-vidyAsAgara's comments are not
defective.

एवमन्येषामपि प्रयोगा यथायोगमुपपादननीया इति शिवम् | All other arguments

proposed by the various teachers of advaita have to be
understood in a similar manner.

त्
वहेतूपपत्ति
इत्यं त्वहेतूपपत्ति :|
शि This concludes the chapter on amshitva.
sopAdhikatva nirAsah (part 1)
After having discussed the paksha, sAdhya and hetu in the
mithyAtva anumAna, we will now proceed to refute the various
defects cited by the nyAyAmritakAra against this anumAna
proposed by the advaitin.

The first of these is sopAdhikatva - that is, the mithyAtva

anumAna of the advaitin is flawed because it is afflicted by
upAdhi, a disturbing condition. The anumAna uses the hetu to
prove the presence of the sAdhya in the paksha - critical to
this is the vyApti, or invariable concomitance, between the
hetu and the sAdhya. When the anumAna is sopAdhikam
(afflicted by upAdhi), it affects the anumAna in two ways:
1) It weakens the vyApti between the hetu and the sAdhya. If
the inference has an upAdhi, then the hetu does not invariably
prove the sAdhya. Even if the hetu is sometimes present, the
sAdhya may be absent. For instance, the inference of smoke
from the presence of fire (the reversal of the time-tested
inference of fire from the presence of smoke) is affected by
upAdhi of wet fuel. If fire is present, but the fuel is not wet,
then no smoke will occur. Thus it is possible that fire (hetu) is
present, but smoke (sAdhya) is absent, hence vyabhichAra.
upAdhi introduces vyabhichAra to the inference.
2) The absence of the upAdhi in the paksha, leads to the
absence of the sAdhya. Where wet fuel is absent, smoke is
absent. Thus, once the pUrvapakshi proves that the anumAna
has an upAdhi, all he needs to disprove the sAdhya is to prove
the absence of the upAdhi.

ननु - दृश्यत्वादिहेतव: सोपाधिका: The nyAyAmritakAra alleges that the

mithyAtva anumAna proved by the various hetus such as
knowability are sopAdhika, with upAdhi.

He will argue that various upAdhis are present in the anumAna.

As a reminder, upAdhi is that which is necessarily present with
the sAdhya, but is not necessarily present with the hetu. The
methodology that we can adopt to detect upAdhis is to look at
the drShTAnta, the example, and the paksha, the case under
question. Both the pUrvapakshi and the siddhAntin agree that
the hetu (knowability) and sAdhya (mithyAtva) are present in
the drShTAnta (shell-silver). They also agree that the hetu
(knowability) is present in the paksha (the world). The item
under debate is whether the sAdhya (mithyAtva) is present
there or not.

To prove that something is an upAdhi, we will need to examine

whether it is present in the drShTAnta (which contains the
sAdhya), but is absent in the paksha (which contains the hetu).

तथाहि - स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं, स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति

निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं वा विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तं समव्याप्तम्, अतएव व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमदुपाधि: -

स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं - an object that appears due to

defects that are not sublated by the cognition that is
considered to sublate the object.

drShTAnta: The shell appears like silver, because it is shiny

like silver. When light reflects on the shell, it appears to
glisten like silver, leading the viewer to think that silver is
present. Thus, the defect that causes the shell-silver (स्वं) to
appear (दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं) is the shininess off the shell. The cognition
that sublates shell-silver (स्वबाधकं) is said to be (अभिमतं) the
knowledge "this is a shell". However, that cognition does not
sublate the shininess of the shell (स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषं), which
leads to the appearance of shell-silver. Thus
स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं is present in the drShTAnta,
along with the sAdhya of mithyAtva.

paksha: The world (स्वं) appears, according to the advaitin,

because of the ignorance of Brahman (दोषप्रयुक्तभानं). The cognition
that sublates the world is said to be the knowledge "I am
Brahman" (स्वबाधकाभिमतं). When this cognition arises, it not only
sublates the world, but also the ignorance of Brahman
(स्वबाधकाभिमतबाध्यदोषं), because of which the world appears. No
defects remain after the rise of brahma jnAna. In other words,
स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं is absent in the paksha, where
the hetu of drShyatva is present.
Therefore where the sAdhya is present (drShTAnta), the
upAdhi is present, but it is not always present where the hetu
is present (paksha). This meets the criterion for upAdhi.

Let us take the next candidate - स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन

विषयत्वं - being the object of negation in the sublating cognition
which cognition is itself unsublated by the sublating cognition
of the object.

drShTAnta: The sublating cognition of shell-silver (स्वं) is the

cognition "this is not shell-silver" (स्वबाधकं). A cognition that is
not sublated by the sublating cognition of shell-silver is "there
is no shell-silver here" (स्वबाधकाबाध्यं). This is also the sublating
cognition of shell-silver (स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं). The object of
negation conveyed in such a cognition is the shell-silver
(स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं). Thus, the drShTAnta is
endowed with स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं.

paksha: The sublating cognition of the world (स्वं) is brahma

jnAna (स्वबाधकं). There is no cognition that is unsublated by
brahma jnAna. Thus there is nothing which is स्वबाधकाबाध्यं,
because the akhaNDAkAra vritti (impartite knowledge of
brahman) not only sublates the world and its cause, ignorance,
it sublates all effects of ignorance, including itself. Therefore,
we can conclude that the paksha is not endowed
with स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं.

Therefore, this too meets the test of an upAdhi.

विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तं समव्याप्तम्, अतएव व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिमदुपाधि: - The two upAdhis are

absent in that which is not the paksha (Brahman and asat) and
therefore these are not merely exclusions the paksha.
Therefore these upAdhis are samavyAptam - ie they are co-
extensive with the sAdhya, equally pervade with the sAdhya.
The upAdhi will always be present where the sAdhya is
present, and where the upAdhi is absent, the sAdhya also will
be absent.

According to udayanAchArya, only that which is a samavyApta

can be an upAdhi. For example, any inference (even a valid
one) can be said to have 'being other than the paksha'
(पक्षेतरं) as upAdhi. This merely excludes the paksha, and will
necessarily be present in everything, except the paksha. The
drShTAnta will not be the paksha, so 'being other than the
paksha' will be present there, whereas the paksha itself
cannot be 'other than the paksha'. If this is not remedied, no
inference would be valid. Hence, according to udayanAchArya,
only that which is samavyApta (co-extensive with the sAdhya),
i.e, not merely a negation of the paksha, is fit to be an upAdhi.
These two upAdhis are samavyApta. Where the sAdhya is
present, they are present. Therefore, the absence of the
upAdhi, will necessarily imply the absence of the sAdhya,
which is the vyatireka vyApti (reversal of the syllogism, where
the sAdhya is present, the upAdhi is present).

The siddhikAra's responses to these arguments will be taken

up in the next lesson.
sopAdhikatva nirAsah (part 2)
The pUrvapakshi had argued previously that the inference
establishing the unreality of the world is afflicted by the
problem of upAdhi, or disturbing conditions. Two upAdhis were
suggested:

1) स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं - an object that appears due

to defects that are not sublated by the cognition that is
considered to sublate the object.
2) स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं - being the object of
negation in the sublating cognition which cognition is itself
unsublated by the sublating cognition of the object.

The siddhikAra, in reply, says : - इति चेन्न; If this is the argument,

no.

ब्रह्मज्ञानमात्रबाध्ये देहात्मैक्ये मिथ्याभूते साध्याव्यापकत्वात्, The above two

cannot be upAdhis because they do not pervade the sAdhya
fully. For something to be an upAdhi, every instance of the
sAdhya must contain the upAdhi. The notion that the body is
the same as the Atma is accepted as mithyA, erroneous by
both us and the dvaitin. Thus it is part of the sAdhya. However,
both स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं and स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं
प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं do not apply in the case of taking the body to
be the Atma. Why? Because it is sublated only due to brahma
jnAna.

Let us see whether the first candidate for upAdhi,

स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं, is applicable to the notion of
body as Atma.
स्व= the notion that the body is the Atma
बाधकाभिमत = that which is considered to sublate it = ie brahma
jnAna
अबाध्य = that which is unsublated by brahma jnAna. However,
nothing is unsublated by brahma jnAna.
Thus स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं is not applicable to the
erroneous notion of the body as Atma and therefore, cannot be
upAdhi at all.

Let us consider the second candidate for upAdhi,

स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं,

स्व = the notion that the body is the Atma

बाधक = that which sublates it = ie brahma jnAna
अबाध्य = but is unsublated by it = However, nothing is
unsublated by brahma jnAna.
Therefore स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रति निषेध्यत्वेन विषयत्वं does not apply to
the erroneous notion of the body as Atma and therefore,
cannot be upAdhi too.

Both definitions do not have sAdhya vyApyatvam, and therefore

are not upAdhis.

षणत्वेन
पर्वतावयववृत्त्यन्यत्वादिवत् साधनवत्पक्षमात्रव्यावर्तकवि षणत्वेनशे
पक्षेतरत्वतुल्यत्वाच्च | "Being located anywhere except in a part
of the mountain" cannot be cited as an upAdhi for the
inference of fire, because all it does is exclude the instance of
the paksha which contains the sAdhya. By definition, such an
item will technically fall under the scope of upAdhi, but that is
not taken as an upAdhi because no valid inference is possible
then. This is dismissed on the same grounds as pakshetara, or
"being other than the paksha". Similarly, the two upAdhis
suggested by the pUrvapakshi exclude only the paksha
containing the sAdhya, and nothing else, and thus cannot be
taken as the upAdhi.

The pUrva pakshi says when a defect is already present in the

inference, this rule does not apply.
He says:
नच बाधोन्नीतत्वात् सोऽप्युपाधि:, Do not argue thus - As the inference
is already contradicted (by direct perception), these can serve
as upAdhis.
बाधस्याग्रे निरसिष्यमाणत्वात् | Because, that the inference is not
contradicted by perception will be proven shortly.

अपिच यद्व्यतिरेकस्य साध्यव्यतिरेकसाधकत्वं तस्यैव साध्यव्यापकत्वम् ; इतरां शा

अनुकूलतर्काप्रसरात् | Moreover, only those qualifiers necessary to
be present in order to prove the absence of the sAdhya through
the absence of the upAdhi can serve as the upAdhi. The
remaining qualifiers cited do not have supporting logic which
justifies their presence.

To explain, it is sufficient to say that दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्व is the upAdhi

(ie that which appears due to a defect) - the other qualifiers
are redundant.

udayanAchArya in nyAya kusumAnjali cites an inference to

prove the existence of God. He says that the world must have a
Creator, because it happens to be created. क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकम्,
कार्यत्वात्, घटवत्.

In response, the buddhist argues that the world is not created

by anyone with a body (unlike a pot, which is created by a
potter, who has a body). Thus he cites an upAdhi in udayana's
inference - शरीरजन्यत्वं. This pot was created by a person with a
body.

The naiyyAyika argues that the qualifier 'by a body' is

redundant. He could simply say that the world is not created,
and therefore cannot have a Creator - क्षित्यादिकं नकर्तृजन्यम्,
अजन्यत्वात्. Why was a redundant qualifier "by someone with a
body" added?

The siddhikAra argues that the upAdhi suggested by the

nyAyAmritakAra suffers from the same defect.

तथाच 'क्षित्यादिकं , न कर्तृजन्यम्, शरीराजन्यत्वा'दित्यत्र यथा शरीरविशेषणवैयर्थ्यान्न शरीरजन्यत्वम्

कर्तृजन्यत्वव्यापकम्,
Just like in the case of the inference "The world is not a
product of a Creator because it is not created by someone with
a body", the qualifier "with a body" is redundant; Therefore,
being a product of a Creator does not imply that the Creator
has a body.

एवं 'वियदादिकं , न मिथ्या,

स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वरहित्वा'दिति साध्यव्यतिरेकसाधने स्व
बाधकाभिमताबाध्यभागस्य वैयर्थ्यात् स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वं न
मिथ्यात्वव्यापकम् |
Similarly in the pUrvapakshi's inference "the world is not
unreal because the defects that cause it to appear are not
unsublated by the cognition that is considered to sublate the
world", there are redundant qualifiers. To prove the absence
of unreality (the sAdhya), the portion "unsublated by the
cognition that sublates it" is not necessary. It would have been
sufficient to say that "world is not unreal because it does not
appear due to any defects". Therefore, we can conclude that
being unreal does not imply that "the object appears due to
defects unsublated by a cognition considered to sublate it".

However, we cannot simply say "appearance due to defects" is

an upAdhi because,
दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वम् तु भवति साध्यव्यापकम्, तच्च साधनव्यापकमपीति नोपाधि: |
While "appearance due to defects" pervades every instance of
mithyA, it pervades every instance of the hetu, knowability,
also. Therefore it cannot be an upAdhi.

Either you will have svarUpa asiddhi or you will not have
upAdhi.

दृश्यत्वादिनैव मिथ्यात्ववत्तस्यापि साधनात् | Like drishyatva itself is unreal,

"appearing due to defects" is also knowable, and thus is unreal
itself.

एवं द्वितीयोपाधावपि 'स्वबाधकाबाध्यबाधकं प्रती'ति विशेषणं व्यतिरेकसाधने व्यर्थम् |

Similarly, in the second (candidate for the) upAdhi, the qualifier
"for the sublating cognition which is itself unsublated by the
sublating cognition of the object" is a redundant qualifier. It
would have been sufficient to merely say "being the object of
negation".

विशेष्यभागस्तु साध्यसाधनयोर्व्यापक इति नोपाधि: | However, (similarly) if the

qualified part alone is used (ie if only "being the object of
negation" is the upAdhi), then both the sAdhya (unreality) and
sAdhana (knowability) are pervaded by it, which means that it
ends up as not an upAdhi.

The pUrvapakshi argues for another upAdhi

अतएवाधिष्ठानत्वाभिमतसमसत्ताकदोषवद्धेतुजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वमुपाधि: | For
the same reason, being the object of a cognition that is caused
by something containing a defect which is of the same order of
reality as the substratum can be an upAdhi.

The substratum of the shell silver is the shell, which is

vyAvahArika. The defect that causes the shell-silver to appear
is the shininess of silver, which is also vyAvahArika. Sense
organs which perceive the shininess of the shell cause one to
perceive shell-silver.

However, the world is created by Ishvara, God. He can have no

defects. The world cannot be said to be created by a defective
God. Therefore the world is not created by a God (Brahman)
which contains a defect which is of the same order of reality
as the world's substratum, Brahman.

अत्र च ब्रह्मणोऽपि बौद्धकल्पितदोषवद्धेतुजन्यक्षणिकत्वादिज्ञानविषयत्वात्

समव्याप्तिसिद्ध्यर्थमधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकेति विशेषणम्,
Here, the buddhist postulates an imaginary defect
(momentariness) in Brahman and says that such a defect
causes the world. That defect is not of the same order of
reality as Brahman. Therefore, this upAdhi cannot be said to
exist in the world. To ensure that the paksha is fully pervaded
by the hetu, we added the qualifier "being of the same order of
reality as the substratum". Thus it is not a redundant qualifier
here.
नतु पक्षमात्रव्यावृत्त्यर्थं, And not merely to exclude the paksha
with a view of proving that this is an upAdhi and thus
disproving the advaitin.
अतो न पक्षेतरतुल्यतेत्यपास्तम् | Thus to claim that such an
adjective is equivalent to the qualifier "being other than the
paksha" is not true.

The siddhikAra in reply argues:

ब्रह्मणीव ब्रह्मणि कल्पिते क्षणिकत्वादावपि मिथ्याभूते धर्मे
अधिष्ठानसमसत्ताकदोषवद्धेतुजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वमुपाधे: साध्याव्याप्ते:,
The attribute of momentariness is imagined in Brahman. That
is, it is unreal. The cognition that perceives such an attribute
in Brahman is not generated by a cause that is of the same
order of reality as the substratum, Brahman. It is an erroneous
cognition. Thus the attribute of momentariness which is
accepted as unreal (ie the sAdhya is present), does not contain
the upAdhi. Therefore this does not pervade every instance of
the sAdhya and hence cannot be termed an upAdhi.

व्यतिरेकसाधने व्यर्थविशेषणत्वस्योक्तत्वाच्च | Further, as argued previously, it is

sufficient to say that the world is not the object of a cognition
that is born from a defective source, the rest of the adjectives
are redundant.

The pUrvapakshi suggests other upAdhis:

नापि श्रुतितात्पर्याविषयत्वमुपाधि:, श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वस्य ब्रह्ममात्रनिष्ठतया तदाभावस्य
साधनव्यापकत्वात् | "Not being the object of a shruti sentence with
ultimate import" cannot be an upAdhi too. The pUrvapakshi
argues that shell-silver is not the ultimate import of the shruti,
but the world is so, at least according to groups like the
pUrvamImAmsakas. Thus this can be an upAdhi.

The siddhikAra says no. The ultimate import of scripture is to

only reveal Brahman - thus everything knowable is not the
object of shruti. Hence, every aspect of the hetu is pervaded by
this and therefore cannot be the upAdhi.
नापि प्रातिभासिकत्वमुपाधि: Being a prAtibhAsika object also cannot
be the upAdhi.

तद्धि ब्रह्ममज्ञानेतरबाध्यत्वम्, तस्य च देहात्मैक्ये मिथ्याभुतेऽप्यसत्त्वेन

साध्याव्याप्ते:, Because being prAtibhAsika implies that it is
sublated by something other than brahmajnAna. This is not
present in every instance of the sAdhya - the notion of taking
the body to be the Atma is not prAtibhAsika, but is accepted as
mithyA. Therefore prAtibhAsikatva does not pervade every
instance of the sAdhya and cannot be an upAdhi.

व्यतिरेके व्यर्थविशेषणत्वाच्च | If you want to use "being sublated by

anything other than brahmajnAna" as an upAdhi, it would be
sufficient to merely say "being sublated", the rest is
redundant.

नापि प्रातिभासमात्रशरीरत्वमुपाधि:, Existence merely at the time of

cognition is not an upAdhi either.
दृष्टिसृष्टिपक्षे साधनव्यापकत्वात् In the view that creation is perception,
it pervades the hetu.
परेषामसिद्धेचेतिति श्चे| In the dvaita school on the other hand, the
concept of prAtibhAsika itself does not exist as according to
them the shell-silver is aLika / asat - ie non-existent. Thus
arguing that such a thing is an upAdhi would be impossible, as
it is non-existent itself.

This concludes the chapter on upAdhi.

AbhAsasAmya bhaNga:
This (brief) chapter is an attempt by the pUrvapakshi to argue
that the inference of the world's unreality is similar to other
flawed inferences and therefore must be dismissed.

ननु - विमतं, प्रातिभासिकम्, दृश्यत्वात्, ब्रह्म, मिथ्या, व्यवहारविषयत्वात्,

असद्विलक्षणत्वाद्वा शुक्तिरूप्यवदित्याद्याभाससाम्यम्
The inference of the world's unreality is flawed, similar to
other flawed inferences such as
a)The world is prAtibhAsika, because it is known
b) Brahman is mithyA because one can transact with it (one
speaks of Brahman, studies it in vedAnta, etc) or alternatively
c) Brahman is mithyA because it is not an absolutely non-
existent thing.
The illustration for all three inferences - like the unreal silver
seen in the shell (which is known, object of a transaction, and
not absolutely non-existent).

इति चेन्न; The siddhikAra in response says - No.

जगतोव्यावहारिकसत्त्वबाधे व्यवहारानुपपत्ति:, ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वे शून्यवादापात्तिश्चेति

प्रतिकूलतर्कपराघातेन तयोरसाधकत्वात्, The allegation that there is a
similarity with such flawed inferences is incorrect because:
a) If the transactional (vyAvahArika) reality of the world was
untrue, then no transactions would be possible. If the world
was not vyAvahArika, then the existence of uncognised
objects would be denied. If things did not exist prior to
cognition, then, the operation of pramANas, or the means of
knowledge, would be denied, for the instruments of knowledge
presuppose the existence of objects prior to their cognition.
Thus, if the world was not vyAvahArika, the operation of the
means of knowledge would be rendered moot, and any
transactions would be rendered impossible.
b) If Brahman was mithyA, then as there would be no real
substratum whatsoever, it would lead to nihilism, or
shUnyavAda.
There are several unfavourable arguments (pratikUla tarka)
which would disprove such inferences.
प्रकृते च प्रतिकूलतर्कस्य निरसिष्यमाणत्वात् | Whereas the unfavourable
arguments against the inference of the world's unreality will
be refuted (in a later chapter).

Defects in the first inference:

The pUrvapakshi's claim that the advaitin's inference of the
world's mithyAtva is similar to the inference of the world's
prAtibhAsikatva. prAtibhAsikatva can be defined in one of two
ways.
किञ्च प्रातिभासिकत्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानेतरबाध्यत्वं, प्रतिभासमात्रशरीरत्वं वा |
prAtibhAsikatva can either mean a) being sublatable by
another cognition other than right cognition of Brahman, or b)
existence only at the time of perception.

आद्ये साध्ये देहात्मैक्ये व्यभिचार:, अप्रयोजकत्वं च |

If the world's prAtibhAsikatva was of the former type, there
would be vyabhichAra in the case of the illusion of the body
taken to be the Atma. The opponent accepts that this is known
(the hetu is present) and that this (erroneous) notion
disappears only upon brahma jnAna (but the sAdhya is absent).
Hence the defect of vyabhichAra is present.
Further, even if something is knowable, how will that
necessarily imply sublatability by any knowledge? Thus the
hetu of drishyatva does not prove the sAdhya of
prAtibhAsikatva, i.e., it is sAdhya aprayojaka.

द्वितीये दृष्टिसृष्टिमतेन सिद्धसाधनम् | In the latter case, (the world is

prAtibhAsika meaning it exists only at the time of cognition),
this is already established to be the case in the case of
dRShTi-sRShTi vAda. Thus, if this was the meaning of
prAtibhAsikatva, this inference suffers from the defect of
siddhasAdhana, proving something that is already accepted.

Defects in the second and third inferences:

The second and third inferences quoted by the opponent set

out to prove that brahman was mithyA.
एवं ब्रह्मणि मिथ्यात्वे साध्ये सोपाधिके सिद्धसाधनम् | If the brahman
referred to here was conditioned by adjuncts, then its
mithyAtva is accepted by us, and therefore the defect of
siddha sAdhanam is present.
निरुपाधिके व्यवहारविषयत्वरूपो हेतुरसिद्ध: | On the other hand, if this was
brahman unconditioned by adjuncts, it cannot be the object of
transactions, and as the hetu is not present in the paksha, the
defect of asiddha is present.

वेदान्तजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वाभ्युपमेऽप्यप्रयोजक: | If, in accordance with the

vivaraNakAra, unconditioned brahman is accepted to be the
object of cognition that arises upon the contemplation of the
texts of vedAnta (and thus an object of "transactions"), such a
hetu does not prove the mithyAtva of brahman.

एवमसद्विलक्षणत्वमपि ब्रह्मण्यसिद्धमेव | Similarly, as the hetu of

'different from non-existence' is not present in Brahman, the
third inference is also flawed. Brahman is existence, which is
different from non-existence. Why is this hetu not present in
Brahman? Because:

क्वचिदप्युपाधौ सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यनर्हत्वम् ह्यसत्त्वम्, तद्विलक्षणत्वम् च क्वचिदप्युपाधौ

सत्त्वेन प्रतीत्यर्हत्वरूपम् तच्च शुद्धे ब्रह्मणि नास्त्येव | When advaitins
refer to asat, or non-existence, they are referring to that which
is not capable of appearing as existing in any locus. Being
different from such a non-existence means that which is
capable of appearing as existing in some locus. However,
Brahman does not appear to exist in any locus, and therefore
such a hetu is not present in Brahman.

This defect is on the basis of the meaning of asat as defined by

the advaitin. However, there is a problem even if the meaning
is as per the opponent. The opponent takes the meaning of
asat to be that which is sublatable. Thus asat vilakshaNam
means that which is unsublatable. This (asat vilakshaNatva)
he uses as a hetu in his inference for Brahman's mithyAtva. His
inference was ब्रह्म मिथ्या असद्विलक्षणत्वात्. That is, he uses the
presence of unsublatability to prove the sublatability of
Brahman. This is clearly contradictory.

अबाध्यत्वेन बाध्यत्वलक्षणमिथ्यात्वसाधने विरोधात् It is contradictory to

prove Brahman's mithyAtva, which essentially is of the nature
of sublatability, using a hetu that means unsublatability.
शुक्तिरूप्यदृष्टान्तस्य साधनविकलत्वाच्च, शून्यवादस्याग्रे निराकरिष्यमाणत्वाच्च | Further,
the illustration of the shell silver is not unsublatable either.
Thus the hetu is not present even in the illustration. How can
concomitance be established?

As said previously, this view leads to nihilism or shUnyavAda,

which will be further refuted later.

| Therefore, it is incorrect to say

तस्मान्न दृश्यत्वादीनामाभाससाम्यमिति सिद्धम्
that the inference of the world, as established by hetu's such
as knowability bear any similarity to such flawed inferences.
pratyaksha bAdhoddhAre sattva
nirvachanam (part 1)
The next chapter in the Advaita Siddhi is an examination of the
nature of reality. Is the inference of mithyAtva in contradiction
with the reality of the world perceived by the senses? This is
the central question raised in this chapter by the opponent. In
reply, the siddhikAra holds that the reality of the world
perceived by the senses does not contradict the mithyAtva
proved by inference. The reality of the world that can
contradict mithyAtva is beyond sensory perception. Therefore,
the charge of pratyaksha bAdha, contradiction by perception,
does not apply.

ननु 'सन् घट' इत्याद्यध्यक्षबाधितविषया दृश्यत्वादय - इति चेत् If this is the

argument (of the opponent) - The world's unreality established
by reasons such as knowability, etc. is contradicted by direct
perception of the kind "The pot exists".

न ; चक्षुराद्यध्यक्षयोग्यमिथ्यात्वविरोधिसत्त्वानिरुक्ते: |
No. The existence that is capable of being known through
direct perception is not contradictory to mithyAtva. (The
corollary - The existence that is contradictory to mithyAtva, is
not perceptible.)

तथाहि न तावत् प्रमाविषयत्वम्, तद्योग्यत्वं, भ्रमाविषयत्वं वा तादृक्सत्त्वं ;

Such an existence is by no means
1) the object of valid knowledge,
2) the capacity to be an object of valid knowledge, or
3) other than that which is revealed by invalid knowledge.

चक्षुराद्यगम्यभ्रमप्रमाघटितत्वेन चक्षुराद्ययोग्यत्वात्, वक्ष्यमाणदूषणगणग्रासाच्च |

The validity or invalidity of cognition is not perceptible, being
incapable of it. Moreover, there are other defects with these
definitions which will be explained further.

तथाहि - नाद्य:, असति प्रमाणाप्रवृत्ते: प्रमाविषयत्वात्प्राक् सत्त्वस्य वक्तव्यत्वेन

तस्य तदन्यत्वात्,
Therefore - It is not the first; As the instruments of knowledge
cannot be applied to the absolutely non-existent, before one
conceives something that is the object of valid cognition, one
has to presuppose existence. Therefore, existence cannot be
dependent on the validity of the cognition that perceives it.

सत्त्वनिरूपणम् विना सदर्थविषयत्वरूपप्रमात्वस्य निरूपणे चान्योन्याश्रयात्, If,

without establishing the definition of existence, one talks of
the validity of cognitions being of the nature of revealing
existing objects, then it leads to mutual dependence. If we do
not prove what existence is, but say that valid cognitions are
those that reveal existing objects, then the nature of validity is
dependent on the nature of existence, and the nature of
existence would, without any other means of establishing it,
depend on the validity of cognition.

मिथ्याभूतस्य शुक्तिरजतसंसर्गस्य व्यवसायद्वारा साक्षाच्च निषेध्यत्वादिना

प्रमाविषयत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च |
Existence defined as being the object of valid cognitions is
flawed due to another reason. A meta cognition of a person
who takes the unreal shell silver to be real is valid, but its
object, the shell-silver is not real. Similarly, when the reality of
shell silver is denied in a negation, that negation is valid, but it
too has the unreal shell-silver as its object. Thus existence
cannot be defined as being the object of valid cognitions.

To explain, when a person sees silver where shell is present,

that perception ("This is silver") is an erroneous one. However,
the cognition that objectifies such a cognition, the meta-
cognition ("I think that this is silver"), is a valid one. The
person does think so. The object of the (valid) meta-cognition
is the unreal shell silver. Further, the negation of the shell-
silver ("this is not silver"), is a valid cognition, but it too has
the unreal shell silver as its object.

If someone argues that an unreal existence is being revealed

by such cognitions, then such an unreal existence does not
contradict mithyAtva either.

नापि द्वितीय:, योग्यताया अनिरूपणात् | Neither is it the second (existence

defined as that which is capable of being the object of a valid
cognition), because the nature of capability has not been
defined yet. Moreover, such a capability is not itself
perceptible.

न तृतीय:, असिद्धे:, सर्वस्यैव क्षणिकत्वादिना भ्रमविषयत्वाभ्युपगमात् | Nor is it

the third, because of asiddhi - the hetu (not being the object of
invalid knowledge) is not present in any object in the paksha
(the world). The vijnAnavAdi buddhist holds that every object
in the world is momentary, merely the object of erroneous
cognition.

अतएव नासत्त्वाप्रकारकभ्रमाविषयत्वमपि ; अन्योन्यारयाच्च

या चश्र| Therefore,
च्
existence is not the absence of non-existence. Non-existence
is the object of an illusion where non-existence is not
revealed. If the cognition of a non-existent object does not
reveal its non-existence (asattva aprakAraka), then it is an
illusion. Not being the object of such an illusion is existence.
However, this is problematic, because the definition of
existence is being not non-existence, and non-existence is
being not existence. Thus there is mutual dependency in the
concepts of existence and non-existence, and such a definition
of existence is not helpful.

या
नापि सत्त्वप्रकारकप्रमाविषयत्वम्; आत्मारयात् श्र| Nor is existence being
त्
the object of a valid cognition which reveals existence,
because that is self-referential. The definition of existence
refers to existence itself (as a qualifier in a cognition).

या
नाप्यसत्त्वाप्रकारकप्रमाविषयत्वम् सत्त्वं, अन्योन्यारयात् श्र| Nor is existence the
त्
object of a valid cognition which does not reveal non-
existence. If a valid cognition reveals non-existence, then its
object must be non-existent. Similarly, if a valid cognition does
not reveal non-existence, then its object must be existent.
This too, is problematic, because like the previous definition,
there is a mutual dependence between the concepts of
existence and non-existence, and neither one can be proven
independently, only in relation to one other.

या
नापि प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकसत्त्वनिषेधविरह:, आत्मारयात् श्र| Nor is
त्
existence that which is not non-existent in all three periods of
time in the locus of its appearance. As this definition of
existence is dependent on the absence of non-existence, it is
self referential.

नापि सत्ता जातिरर्थक्रियाकारित्वमसद्वैलक्षण्यं वा ; Nor is existence a

universal (jAti), or that which has some utility, or that which is
different from the absolutely non-existent.

एतेषां मिथ्यात्वाविरोधित्वेन तत्प्रत्यक्षेण मिथ्यात्वानुमाने बाधाभावात् | Even if

these were acceptable definitions of existence, their
perception would not contradict the inference of mithyAtva.

नापि वेदान्त्यभिमतमिथ्यात्वाभाव: सत्त्वम्; तुच्छेऽतिव्याप्ते: | Nor is existence

that which is not mithyA, as defined by advaitins, because
absolutely non-existent objects (such as a hare's horn) are
also not mithyA, but they cannot be called existent by any
stretch of the imagination.

नाप्यसद्विलक्षणत्वे सत्यनारोपितत्वम् ; अनारोपितत्वं हि आरोपाविषयत्वम्,

तच्चासंभवि | सर्वस्यापि क्षणिकत्वादिना आरोपविषयत्वात् | Nor is existence
that which is not superimposed while being different from the
absolutely non-existent; Not being superimposed means that
the thing is not the object of superimposition. Such a definition
would not apply anywhere, as everything in the world is
considered as an object of superimposition by the momentary
consciousness school of Buddhism and others.

नाप्यस्तित्वप्रकारप्रमांप्रति कदाचित् साक्षाद्विषयत्वं, कालसंबन्धित्वं वा सत्त्वम्, अस्तित्वं

च वर्तमानत्वम्, नतु सत्त्वमतो नात्माश्रय:, अतीतादिरपि कदाचिद्वर्तत एवेति नाव्याप्ति:,
आरोपितं च कालत्रयासंबन्धित्वेन बाधेन बोधितमिति न द्वितीयलक्षणेऽतिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम्

Do not argue thus -

नाप्यस्तित्वप्रकारप्रमांप्रति कदाचित् साक्षाद्विषयत्वं, Existence is that which is
sometimes the object of a valid cognition that reveals that an
"object is present"
कालसंबन्धित्वं वा सत्त्वम्, Alternatively, a relation with time can be
defined as existence
अस्तित्वं च वर्तमानत्वम्, नतु सत्त्वमतो नात्माश्रय:, अतीतादिरपि कदाचिद्वर्तत एवेति
नाव्याप्ति:, In the first definition of existence, astitva is used not in
the sense of existence, but in the sense of being present, thus
the definition is not self referential. Objects in the past etc,
must have been present at some time, thus the definition does
not suffer from under-extension.
आरोपितं च कालत्रयासंबन्धित्वेन बाधेन बोधितमिति न द्वितीयलक्षणेऽतिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् Nor
does the second definition of existence extend to the
superimposed (which are accepted as non-existent), because
when they are sublated, they are revealed as not having
existed in any period of time. Thus as the superimposed are
revealed to not have any relation with time, the definition of
existence does not apply to them.

The first definition of existence (of the two mentioned now) is

dependent on the validity of cognition.
प्रमात्वस्य सत्त्वघटितत्वेन चक्षुराद्ययोग्यत्वेन च पूर्वोक्तदोषात्, As the
definition of valid cognition is dependent on existence, and
because valid cognitions are not perceptible by sight, etc., all
the defects cited previously apply to it.

वर्तमानत्वप्रकारकप्रमाविषयत्वेऽपि मिथ्यात्वाविरोधाच्च | Even if valid cognition

revealing an object to be present is the definition of existence,
it would not be contradictory to mithyAtva.

द्वितीयमपि न मिथ्यात्वविरोधि शुक्तिरूप्यस्यापि प्रतिभासकालसंबन्धित्वात्, बाधेन

तात्विककालत्रयसंबन्धनिषेधेऽप्यतात्त्विककालसंबन्धस्यानिषेधात् | The
second definition (relation with time) is also not contradictory
to mithyAtva. The shell-silver too has a relationship with time
when it appears. Even though a real relationship with time is
negated when it is sublated, an unreal relationship with time is
not negated.

नापि तात्त्विककालसंबन्धित्वं तत्, तात्त्विकस्याद्याप्यनिरूपणात्, निरूपणे वा

शेषवैयर्थ्यात् | One cannot therefore argue that a real relationship
with time is existence, because what is real has not yet been
proven. If it is proven, one does not need the rest of the
definition (relationship with time). It would be sufficient to say
existence is that which is real.

Until now, the siddhikAra had refuted the common definitions

of existence made historically. Now he presents the view of
the nyAyAmritakAra.

The nyAyAmritakAra says:

ननु - भवन्मते यत् सत्त्वं ब्रह्मणि, तदेवेह मम | That which is

Brahman's existence in your view, is my existence here (for
the world).

उक्तंहि - 'यादृशं ब्रह्मण: सत्त्वं तादृ शा(स्याज्जगत्यपि | तत्र स्यात्तदनिर्वाच्यं

चेदिहापि तथास्तु न: || ' इति |
This is encapsulated in a sloka - "Whatever is the existence of
Brahman, that is the same existence of the world. If you say
that such an existence cannot be articulated, let that apply
here too."

He continues:
नच - तत्रापरिच्छिन्नत्वं सत्त्वम्, तच्च न जगतीति - वाच्यम् ,
तुच्छस्यापरिच्छिन्नत्वेऽपि सत्त्वानभ्युपगमान्नापरिच्छिन्नत्वं सत्त्वम्, किं
त्वन्यदेव ;
Do not argue - Brahman's existence is unlimited (by space,
time and objects), whereas that is not true for the world.
Because, even though non-existence is not limited by space,
time and objects, one does not call non-existent objects as
existing. Therefore existence must be something other than
freedom from limitations.

How is an absolutely non-existent entity unlimited? As it has

no temporal or spatial relationship, not being located
anywhere, at any time, it cannot be said to be limited by time
and space. Only an object can be different from other objects,
and such a difference is called a limitation by objects.
Something absolutely non-existent is not an object, and thus
the nyAyAmritakAra argues that it is not limited by objects too.

तच्च ब्रह्मणीव भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वाच्छुक्तिकादेरपि भविष्यतीति - चेत्,

That (existence), is like Brahman's, because it happens to be
the substratum of illusions, can exist in objects like shell too.

The siddhikAra responds - Such an argument is self-defeating.

He says:
नूनं विवाहसमये कन्याया: पित्रा निजगोत्रं पृष्ठस्य यदेव भवतां गोत्रं तदेव ममापि गोत्रमिति
वदतो वरस्य भ्राता भवान्, At the time of the wedding, a groom was
questioned by the bride's father "What is your gotra", to which
he replied "Whatever is your gotra, that is my gotra too". You
are like his brother.

रयो
रेकगो त्रत्
यतो जामातृवरयोरेकगोत्रत्वे वेश्वविवाहानुपपत्तिवज्जगद्ब्रह्मणोरेकसत्त्वे
शु जगतोऽसत्त्वमेव
स्यात् | The wedding where the father-in-law's gotra is the same
as the son-in-law's cannot take place. Similarly, if you say that
whatever is the existence of Brahman is the existence of the
world, then the world has no existence of its own, it is non-
existent only.

तथाहि - स्वप्रका द्वितीयचैतन्यरूपत्वमेव

द्
वितीयचैतन्यरूपत् ब्रह्मण: सत्त्वम् ; Because
वमेवशा
Brahman's existence is only of the nature of self-effulgent
consciousness.

तदेव चेज्जडस्यापि जगतस्तदा रजतत्वविरोधिशुक्तिसत्तया रजतस्येव

जडत्वविरोधिस्वप्रकाशसत्तया जगत: स्वरूपतो मिथ्यात्वोपपत्ते: | This is akin to
the situation where saying the existence of the shell-silver is
the same as the existence of shell is essentially proving the
unreality of the shell-silver - on account of the existence of the
shell being mutually exclusive to the existence of shell-silver.
If the former exists, the latter cannot. Similarly, if the nature of
the world is inertness and the nature of the world's existence
is consciousness (because that is the nature of Brahman's
existence), then as the world's existence is contradictory to
its own nature, the world must intrinsically be a logical
impossibility - mithyA in other words.

The nyAyAmritakAra had said that objects in the world can be

the substrata of illusions. That is being refuted next.
चैतन्यस्यैवावच्छिन्नानवच्छिन्नाज्ञानविषयत्वेन सर्वभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वाभ्युपगमान्न
भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वेन शुक्त्यादे: सत्त्वसिद्धि : | It is consciousness alone that is
the substratum of all illusions generated due to ignorance
located in delimited and non-delimited consciousness. Thus,
objects such as shell are really not the substrata of illusions,
and the only existence that can be termed as being the
substratum of illusions is Brahman's, not the world.
In the case of prAtibhAsika objects such as shell silver, it is
ignorance located in consciousness delimited by the shell that
leads to the illusion of shell silver. In the case of vyAvahArika
objects such as this world, it is ignorance located in
consciousness (non-delimited) that leads to the illusion of the
world.

Until now, we have looked at various definitions of existence

offered - but none of them are defect free, apply to the world or
reveal an existence that is perceptible. Thus far, the charge
that the world's unreality established by inference is
contradicted by the perception of the world has not been
proven. In the next set of lessons, we will consider two kinds
of perception (laukika, everyday perception that we are
familiar with and alaukika, a special kind of perception
postulated by the nyAya school) and their capacity to reveal
existence.
pratyaksha bAdhoddhAre sattva
nirvachanam (part 2)
The pUrvapakshi continues:
यत्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि त्
वमसत् त्
नन्वेवमपि सर्वदे*यत्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वमसत्त्वंवंशी
तुच्छानिर्वचनीयसाधारणम्, तदभाव: सत्त्वम्, तच्च ब्रह्मणीव जगत्यपीति ब्रूम: |
Being absent in all periods of time and space is common to
both the absolutely absent (asat) and the indescribable
(mithyA). The absence of such a feature can be the definition
of existence. We say that both the world and Brahman have
this.

नच संयोगेऽव्याप्ति:, तस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वानभ्युपगमात् |
One cannot argue that this definition does not apply to
samyoga, contact. Samyoga always exists in the specific
substratum where the object rests. It is absent in all other
substrata. However, the special case of avyApya vritti allows
for samyoga to be both present and absent in the same
substratum (the monkey is present in the top of the tree, but
not its bottom). Thus in the case of samyoga avyApya vritti, not
only is samyoga absent in different substrata, it can be absent
in its own substratum too, leading to samyoga also being
included within the definition of non-existent objects. The
pUrvapakshi says such an argument is not acceptable because
avyApya vritti is an impossibility - it is not possible for an
object to be both present and absent in the same locus.

तदभ्युपगमे च व्याप्यवृत्तित्वेनाभावो विशेषणीय: | Even if avyApya vritti was

accepted, one can address this defect by qualifying the
absence in the definition of non-existence as being the
counter-positive of an absence that fully pervades its locus. As
samyoga not fully pervading the locus is the basis for its
avyApya vritti, its absence does not fully pervade the locus
either, and therefore the definition of non-existence does not
apply to samyoga. The absence of such a non-existence exists
in samyoga, and thus it is an existent entity.
As space is not located in any particular locus, one could
argue that space's absence is present in every locus, and
therefore space ends up as non-existent. The pUrvapakshi
anticipates such an objection and says

नापि वियत्यव्याप्ति:, तदत्यन्ताभावस्य के वलान्वयित्वनङ्गीकारेण लक्षणस्य विद्यमानत्वादेव | One

cannot say that the definition (of existence) does not apply to
space, because we do not agree that the absence of space is
kevalAnvayi, omnipresent. As a result, the definition applies to
space too.

नहि कस्मिन्श्चिद्देशे काले वा तस्याभाव:, नित्यविभुत्वभङ्गप्रसङ्गात् | It (space) is not

absent in any space or at any time, because if it was thus
absent, it would contradict space's permanence and all
pervading nature.

त्यन्
ताभावस्
आका त्यन्ताभावस्य के वलान्वयित्वाभ्युपगमे च वृत्तिमत्प्रतियोगिकत्वेनाभावो विशेषणीय: If one
यशा
wishes to devise a definition that is acceptable to even those
that hold that the absence of space is universally present, one
can do so by defining non-existence as being the counter-
positive of an absence, whose counter-positive is located in a
particular locus. As space cannot be said to have any
particular location as its locus, it does not fall under the scope
of this definition of non-existence.

Thus the pUrvapakshi carefully constructs a definition of non-

existence and says that the absence of such a non-existence is
present in both the world and Brahman.

- इति चेन्न ; The siddhikAra, in reply, says no.

चक्षुराद्ययोग्यानेकपदार्थघटितत्वेनैतादृशसत्त्वस्य ग्रहणे चक्षुरादेरसामर्थ्यात् | Such an

existence is not capable of being perceived because it is
composed of several elements that are not perceivable by the
eyes etc. That is, even if this is accepted as a definition of
existence, it cannot be perceived. If it cannot be perceived,
one cannot say that the perception of such an existence can
overrule the inference of the world's unreality (pratyaksha
bAdha).

नहि
यत्रैकालिकवृ त्
ति मत् प्रतियो गिकव् या प्
सर्वदे*यत्रैकालिकवृत्तिमत्प्रतियोगिकव्याप्यवृत्यवृ
त्
शी
तिनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं कस्यापि प्रत्यक्षम्, येन तदभाव: प्रत्यक्षो भवेत् | There
is no way that anyone perceives the counter-positiveness of an
absence in all three periods of time, in every point in space,
which fully pervades its locus, and whose counter-positive is
capable of being located in a substratum. If one were able to
perceive such an absence, then one can say that the absence
of such an absence could be perceivable.

वृत्तिमत्प्रतियोगिकत्वव्याप्यवृत्तिपरित्यागेऽपि
यत्वत् रैकालिकत्
सर्वदे*यत्वत्रैकालिकत्वयोरयोग्यत्वात् वयो रयोग्
यत्
वात्| Even if one were to discard
शी
the qualifiers of "fully pervading the locus" and "being capable
of being located in some locus", an absence that is present in
all three periods of time, or present everywhere is not
something that one can see.

In response to this argument, another definition of existence is

proposed by the opponent:
ननु - स्वदेशकालवृत्तिनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वाभावे गृह्यमाणे कालत्रयमध्ये वर्तमानकालस्य
सर्वेदेशमध्ये प्रकृतदेशस्यापि प्रवे नशे न तत्र निषेधप्रतियोगित्वाभावस्य
यनिषेधप्रतियो गि त्
गृहीतत्वात्तत्संवलितं कालत्रयवृत्ति सर्वदे*यनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वरूपंवरूपं शीमिथ्यात्वं नानुमानेन गृहीतुं
शक्यते - इति चेन्न; As the absence of negation (ie the presence) in its
location at a particular time is perceived, and as the present
time is included within the scope of all time, and the particular
location is included within the scope of all space, the absence
of absence in that place and time is proven. Thus inference will
not be able to establish an absence of the object in all time
and space.

In reply to this, the siddhikAra says - No. When you say that the
absence of the absence of an object is perceived in a
particular place at a particular time, what does that mean? Is
it the absence of all absences in that particular space and
time, or is it the absence of some absence?

स्वदेशकालवृत्तिसकलनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वस्य चक्षुराद्ययोग्यत्वेन तदभावस्य सुतरां

तदयोग्यत्वात्,
If the absence of absence refers to the absence of all
absences in that place and time, then that would never be
perceivable by the senses.

Only if one is able to know the counter-positive of every

absence possible, can one say that all those counter-positives
are absent here and now. There are many things beyond the
senses, so how can one know everything, and thus be able to
see their absence? If one is not able to see all their absences,
how can one see the absence of all their absences?

स्वदेशकालवृत्तियत्किञ्चिन्निषेधप्रतियोगित्वस्य मिथ्यात्वाविरोधात्, On the

other hand, if one were to say that the absence of some
absence is seen in that place and time and that is sufficient to
prove an object's existence there and then, such a perception
cannot overrule mithyAtva. For example, the absence of a pot
is absent in the pot shards (kapAla), therefore can we say that
the pot is not different from the cloth (that is, can we say that
paTa anyonyAbhAva is absent in a pot)? We cannot. Similarly,
the absence of some absence does not rule out the absence of
an object in that location for all time.

To remedy this, an alternative way of describing this is

proposed - The absence of an object is seen everywhere
except in the locus of the object. Thus let existence be defined
as that which is not colocated with an absence which has the
object as its counter-positive. Such an existence does not
require the absence of every absence to perceive presence. If
an object is seen somewhere, it cannot be absent in that locus.
Such an existence is perceivable.

स्वप्रतियोगिकात्यन्ताभावासामानाधिकरण्यस्य च (Existence defined as)

that which is not colocated in the locus of the absence which
has the object as its counter-positive (also suffers from the
following defects).

स्वप्रतियोगिकात्यन्ताभावाप्रसिद्ध्या के वलान्वियिनि, The absence of

omnipresent objects is not at all known, thus rendering this
definition inapplicable for such objects. Omnipresent objects
are present everywhere, so their absence in a particular place
is not known, so one cannot talk of their existence not being
colocated with their absence.

संबन्धभेदेन घटादौ चासिद्धे: Such an existence also does not apply to

objects such as pots, because it is possible to say that a pot is
present in a locus with one relationship (samyoga), but is
absent in the same locus with some other relationship
(samavAya). Thus, an object can be co-located with its own
absence with some other relationship, and as a result such a
definition of existence would not apply to everyday objects
such as pots, etc. in that scenario.

स्वात्यन्ताभावयावदधिकरणावृत्तित्वं वा,
स्वात्यन्ताभावयत्किञ्चिदधिकरणावृत्तित्वं वेति विकल्पेन पूर्वोक्तदोषाच्च | On
the other hand, if existence means the absence of co-
locatedness in any locus of absence, or if it means the
absence of co-locatedness in some locus of absence, then the
previous defects cited would apply. The former existence
would not be perceivable (there are several loci that are
beyond the senses, so how can one see the object's absence in
such loci?), the latter existence would not overrule mithyAtva
(the pot being absent in the thread does not prove the pot is
not mithyA).

तस्मात्तत्प्रकारान्तरस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वान्मिथ्यात्वाविरोधित्वाच्च
स्वसामानाधिकरणयावदत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाभावरूपमेव सत्त्वमुपेयम् | तच्च
न चक्षुरादियोग्यमित्युक्तम् | As a consequence, as in all these instances,
either it is impossible to prove existence, or where existence is
proven, such an existence is not contradictory to mithyAtva,
one has to conclude that existence is of the nature of the
absence of every kind of absence counter-positiveness in its
locus. However, such an existence is not perceivable.

In order to make the absence of every absence counter-

positiveness perceivable, the opponent makes use of the
naiyyAyika concept of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
According to nyAya shAstra, whenever an object is perceived,
its jAti, or genus is also perceived. At that instant, every single
individual of that species is automatically perceived as it were
- this process is caused sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti (the
analogy of common attributes).

When one sees a cow, one does not see only that individual, in
that instant, every cow that ever existed, exists now, will exist
in the future, is directly perceived. This (bizarre) theory is used
to argue that by seeing the absence of anything in a particular
place and time, every single absence in that location and time
is directly seen. Similarly the absence of every counter-
positive to those absences is seen, and extending this further,
the absence of all the counter-positives of absences in that
location and time is seen.

The nyAyAmritakAra says:

ननु - यस्मिन्कस्मिन्श्चित् स्वदेशकालवृत्तिनिषेधे
तत् कालवृ त्तिनि
एतद्दे"तत्कालवृत्तिनिषेधत्वंशै षेधत्
वंज्ञात्वा तेन प्रत्यासत्तिभूतेनोपस्थापितानां
स्वदेशकालवृत्तिसकलनिषेधानां प्रतियोगित्वस्याभावो घटे ग्राह्य: तत:
यनिषेधप्रति
सार्वदिक्कसर्वदे*यनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वस्य योगित्
वस् ग्रहणं घटे दुर्घटमिति चेन्न | By
यशी
observing that a thing is absent in a particular place and time,
one is aware of the absence of the thing in that place and time
(ie one becomes aware of the species of absence) and by
analogy, one sees every negation possible in that particular
place and time. By extending this, one can know the absence
of all negations in that particular place and time where a pot is
seen. Therefore, such a perception of existence of an object is
sufficient to argue that the inference of that object's mithyAtva
stands disproved.
The siddhikAra replies - if this is your argument, no.

एवं सामान्यलक्षणया सर्वनिषेधेषूपस्थितेष्वपि तत्प्रतियोगित्वाभावस्य

चक्षुरादिना ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् योग्यप्रतियोगिक एव हि संसर्गाभावो योग्य: | Even if by the
analogy of common attributes, all the negations possible are
directly brought forward for perception, it is not possible for
their counter-positives and their absences to be perceptible by
the eyes, etc - because, only the absence of that object which
is itself capable of being perceived, can be perceived.

नचाशेषनिषेधानां प्रतियोगित्वमतीन्द्रियसाधारणं चक्षुरादियोग्यम् | The entire

universe of absences and their counter-positives, include those
which are beyond sensory perception, and thus they cannot be
seen by the eyes.

वस्तुतस्तु - सामान्यं नेन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्ति: मानाभावात् | However, fundamentally,

there is no basis to claim that it is possible to see the entire
universe of individuals, by seeing the class that the individual
is part of.

The naiyyAyika bristles at this statement by the siddhikAra and

offers seven arguments in support of sAmAnya lakshaNA
pratyAsatti. These arguments and their subsequent refutation
by the siddhikAra will be next taken up.
pratyaksha bAdhoddhAre sattva
nirvachanam (part 3)
In the previous two lessons, we examined various definitions
of sat, existence, and concluded that none of these apply to
the world. The siddhikAra had concluded this section by
stating that the logician's theory of sAmAnya lakshaNA
pratyAsatti (the perception of all individuals belonging to a
class through the perception of the class) was untenable.

The opponent, the logician in this case, steps forward to

postulate seven reasons in support of the perception of the
universe of individuals.

The first reason

नच - महानसीयधूमेन्द्रिय संयोगेन तत्रैव व्याप्तिग्रहे पर्वतीयधूमादनुमितिर्न स्यात्,
सामान्यस्य च धूमत्वादे: प्रत्यासत्तित्वे तस्यापि प्रत्यासन्नत्वात्तत्र व्याप्तिग्रहे
ततोऽनुमितिरिति - वाच्यम् ;
When smoke is seen in the kitchen, by merely noting the
concomitance between kitchen smoke and fire, it would not be
possible to infer the presence of mountain fire by the presence
of mountain smoke (unless the mountain smoke itself was
seen directly in the kitchen in concomitance with fire).
However, such an inference of fire in the mountain through the
perception of smoke in the mountain does occur. Therefore,
one must concede that mountain smoke itself is observed in
the kitchen when the kitchen smoke is seen because of
sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti (that is, if through the
perception of the universal - smokeness - in the kitchen, every
single instance of smoke is directly seen, including mountain
smoke). As a result of the direct perception of the mountain
smoke in concomitance with fire (in the kitchen), it is possible
to infer the presence of fire later when the mountain smoke is
seen.

The siddhikAra says: not so.

He gives the example of the "visual perception" of fragrant

sandalwood. Fragrance is not an attribute that can be seen, it
can only be smelt. However, when a piece of sandalwood is
seen in close proximity, its fragrance is smelt directly too.
Later, when another piece of sandalwood is seen, it is natural
to say that a fragrant piece of sandalwood 'is seen', even
though its fragrance is not smelt then. How is this statement
tenable?

It is tenable because all the enabling factors for such a

vishiShTa jnAna, cognition qualified by an attribute, are
present. The enabling factors are:

1) This sandalwood (visheShya) is directly seen.

2) This triggers the memory of concomitance between the
sandalwood and fragrance observed previously. Thus the
cognition of the visheShya is endowed with the memory of
concomitance (the concomitance is the visheShaNa).
3) There is nothing to say that this piece of sandalwood cannot
be fragrant - no such contrarian factors are present.

As a result, the seer has the qualified cognition, "I see a

fragrant piece of sandalwood", even though he may not be
physically close enough to the sandalwood in this instance to
smell its fragrance.

Similarly, when the mountain smoke is perceived, the memory

of concomitance between smoke and fire is recollected. The
comprehension of mountain smoke is endowed with the
memory of concomitance between smoke and fire and there is
no contrarian factor that would inhibit the presence of fire in
the mountain. As a result, the inference of fire is possible even
without resorting to a theory postulating that the mountain
smoke is seen in the kitchen.

This is pithily said by the siddhikAra:

पर्वतीयधूमेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षद यां यांशा
धूमत्वेन प्रकारेण गृहीतस्मृतव्याप्तेस्तत्र
वैशिष्ट्यग्रहसंभवात्, 'सुरभिचन्दन'मितिवत् विशेष्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्षविशेषणज्ञानासंसर्गाग्रहरूपाया:
विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्र्या: पूर्णत्वात् | When someone sees a piece of
sandalwood, the group of factors that enable the cognition of
fragrant sandalwood are present - namely, direct perception of
the visheShya (sandalwood), the cognition of visheShaNa (the
concomitance of sandalwood with fragrance), and the absence
of factors that overrule the presence of fragrance in this piece
of sandalwood. Similarly, the cognition of mountain smoke
concomitant with fire is possible, because the enabling factors
for such a cognition are present - the mountain smoke is seen,
the memory of concomitance between smoke (and not a
particular smoke) with fire is present, and there are no
contrarian factors that rule out the presence of fire in the
mountain.

Earlier we had said that the mountain smoke endowed with the
memory of concomitance serves as the cause for the inference
to arise. Even that much is not necessary. One can simply say
the following:

व्याप्तिस्मृतिप्रकारेण वा पक्षधर्मताज्ञानस्य हेतुता; Or alternatively, if the

attribute present in the memory of concomitance (smoke-
ness), is also seen to be present in the paksha (the mountain),
then that commonality itself can serve as the cause for the
inference to arise.

When smoke and fire are seen to be concomitant in the

kitchen, the concomitance that is seen is between smoke, in
general, with fire, in general - not a particular smoke with
particular fire. Thus the memory of concomitance is between
smoke-ness and fire-ness. If smoke-ness is later seen in the
locus of inference (the paksha), the mountain, the memory of
the concomitance of smoke-ness with fire-ness, is sufficient to
trigger the inference of fire-ness in the mountain. In other
words, the mountain is inferred to be on fire.

This is explained.
महानासीय एव धूम धूमत्वेन व्याप्तिस्मृतिविषयो भवति, तच्च सामान्यलक्षणाम् विनैव
तावतैवनुमितिसिद्धे: धूमत्वेन पर्वतीयधूमज्ञानं चापि जातम् | The individual
kitchen smoke, as smoke-ness, becomes the object of the
memory of concomitance. Thus without sAmAnya lakshaNA
itself, the fact that the perception of smoke in the mountain is
also endowed with the same smoke-ness, the inference of fire
is possible
There is no need to postulate an extra sensory perception of
all the smoke in the world for the inference of fire to be
tenable.

The second reason

The siddhikAra refutes the second argument for sAmAnya
lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
नच - सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिं विना धूमो वह्निव्यभिचारी न वेति अनुभूयमानसंशयो न स्यात्
प्रसिद्धधूमे वह्निसंबन्धावगमात् अप्रसिद्धस्य चाज्ञानादिति - वाच्यम्;
Do not argue thus - Without accepting the perception of all
individuals belonging to a class, the doubt that one
experiences - "Can smoke be present without fire, or not?"
would not be possible. For, one only observes the
concomitance between the known smoke (in the kitchen) and
fire, whereas the unknown smoke's concomitance with fire is
unknown.

Because:
प्रसिद्धधूम एव तत्तद्धूमत्वादिना व्याप्तिनिश्चयेऽपि धूमत्वेन तत्संशयोपपत्ते: | In the
known smoke itself, while there can be certainty that a
particular smoke has concomitance with fire, whether that
concomitance extends to smoke in general can still be under
doubt. Such a doubt is possible even without the perception of
every individual instance of smoke.

The author of tattvachintAmaNi himself has admitted such a

possibility.
तथा च मणिकृ ता - 'घटत्वेनेतरभेदनिश्चयेऽपि पृथिवीत्वादिना तत्र संशयसिषाधयिषे भवत
एवेति | He says - even though one can be certain that a pot is
different, as a pot, from other things, whether it is different, as
earth, from other things or not, can still be doubtful. As such a
doubt is possible, the desire to prove by means of inference
that the element earth is different from other elements is a
worthwhile endeavour.

As a general rule, while there may be certainty with regards to

the object when viewed as being endowed with one attribute,
when viewed as being endowed with another attribute, a doubt
about the same object, in the same context, is possible.
Now an alternative explanation for the possibility of doubt is
given.
निश्चितेऽप्यर्थे प्रामाण्यसंशयाहितसंशयवत् धूमत्वं वह्निव्यभिचारिवृत्ति न वेत्ति संशयादपि
तादृशसंशयोपपत्तेच श्च| Like in the instance where one clearly
knows that an object is present, it is still possible to have a
doubt "whether such knowledge is valid or not", "whether
smokeness is concomitant with fire or not" can be in doubt,
which can lead to the doubt whether smoke is concomitant
with fire.
That is, while being certain the smoke is concomitant with fire
in the kitchen, one can still doubt whether smokeness in
general is concomitant with fire or not. If such a doubt is
possible, then whether smoke is concomitant with fire or not,
in general, is also necessarily possible.
एतेन वायू रूपवान्न वेति संशयोऽपि वयाख्यात: | By this, the doubt "whether
wind has a visible form or not" is also explained.
This relates to a situation when one is certain that of the five
elements, earth, water, and fire have a visible form. However,
when a person does not know that only those elements can
have form, by merely knowing that earth, water and fire have
form, one can still be doubtful whether wind has form or not.
Therefore, even if one is certain about one aspect of a thing, a
doubt is possible in regard to it, provided that one does not
have the certainty that all other possibilities are ruled out.

The third reason

ननु - सिद्धे नेच्छा, किन्तु असिद्धे, सा च स्वसमानविषयकज्ञानजन्या, तच्च
ज्ञानं न सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिं विना |
The logician presents his third reason for the perception of
universals - One does not desire a thing which one already
possesses, rather desire is possible only for that which one
does not have. Thus desire is for an object because it will lead
to the experience of happiness when one possesses it in the
future. The experience of future happiness is only possible if
one cognises that future happiness in the present. This is not
possible without the perception of universals.

नच - सिद्धगोचरसुखत्वप्रकारकज्ञानादेवाज्ञाते सुखे भवतीच्छा,

समानप्रकारकत्वमात्रस्य नियामकत्वादिति - वाच्यम्;
The pUrvapakshi anticipates a possible response from the
siddhAntin and counters it. He says: "Do not say that it is the
experience of happiness encountered with an obtained object
that leads to the desire for an unobtained object - therefore,
the cause of desire for an unobtained object is the common
presence of happiness in both the cognition of an obtained
object and the experience of an obtained object."

रजतत्वेन प्रकारेण रजते अनुभूयमाने घटादौ रजतत्वप्रकारके च्छाप्रसङ्गात् | The

pUrvapakshi argues why such an explanation is incorrect - If
desire is generated on the basis of a common qualifier
between the cognition of the obtained and the cognition of the
unobtained, upon the cognition of silver as endowed with
silver-ness, one can have a desire of silver-ness in a pot, etc.

The pUrvapakshi takes the siddhAntin's words literally and

argues - you did not say that the current object and future
object need to share a common attribute. Rather, you said that
the experience of the current object and experience of future
object need to share a common attribute. If that is the case,
the cognition of silverness in silver can lead to the desire of
silverness in a completely different object such as a pot.

He anticipates another response from the siddhAntin and says:

नच - प्रकारारयत्वमपियत् वमपि श्रनियामकम् ; Do not say that the attribute must
reside in the unobtained substance also (in addition to the
attribute being shared in the two cognitions).
Why?
रजतभ्रमाच्छुक्ताविच्छान्नुदयप्रसङ्गात् | If the requirement for desire was that
the common attribute should also reside in the unobtained
object, it would not lead to the desire to pick up a shell
mistaken for silver - because silver-ness does not actually
exist in the shell, and because you say that the attribute must
exist in the object in order to desire it, one should not desire to
pick up the shell mistaken for silver. However, such desire is
observed in common experience.
तथा च समानप्रकारकत्वे सति समानविषयकत्वं तन्त्रम् | As a result, not
only is there a requirement for a common attribute in the
cognitions, there is also the requirement for the objects to be
similar too.
अत एवाख्यातिपक्षे रजतस्मरणस्यैव शुक्तौ प्रवर्तकत्वमित्यपास्तम् Therefore,
the stand of the akhyAti vAdin who postulates that the memory
of silver leads to the motivation towards picking up the shell
stands disproved. akhyAti vAda is the theory of error which
holds that an illusion of silver is not really an illusion - Rather,
the memory of silver triggered upon perceiving a shell leads
one to pick up the shell. This is the view advocated by the
prAbhAkara school of mImAmsa.

Until now, the pUrvapakshi anticipated possible responses

from the siddhAntin and countered it. The siddhikAra now
presents the view of the siddhAnta:
इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
यतो रजतभ्रमाच्छुक्ताविच्छा नास्त्येव, किं त्वनिर्वचनीये रजत इत्यनिर्वनीयख्यातौ वक्ष्यते | We
do not say that one desires for shell in the illusion of the shell-
silver, rather, one desires for silver, which happens to be
anirvachanIya, (indescribable as existing or non-existing), in
other words, a silver which is mithyA, according to the first
definition of mithyAtva. The description of the advaitin theory
of error will be explained further in the section dealing with
anirvachanIya khyAti - the theory of error postulating the
creation of the indescribable.
प्रकारारयत्वंयत्वं श्रनियामकं वदन्नख्यातिवादी परमेवं विभीषणीय: | If the akhyAti
vAdin says that the memory of silver leads to the desire of
shell having silverness as its attribute, then your argument
would apply to him.
तथा च प्रकारारयत्वस्य यत्वस् यश्रनियामकत्वादन्यथाख्यातिपक्षोऽपि निरस्त एव | However by
such an argument, the anyathAkhyAti vAdin (the pUrvapakshi)
too stands refuted as he stipulates the presence of the
attribute in the desired object.
The argument the siddhikAra makes is that one cannot say
that an attribute present in some other substance (silver) is
present in the shell, as the anyathA khyAti vAdin argues. The
logician argues that when one sees the shell, the silver which
is present somewhere else, appears directly in front of him by
the process of alaukika sannikarSha, extra sensory perception.
The siddhikAra argues that such a theory is absurd, because
any object can only have attributes that belong to it - it cannot
have attributes belonging to some other object. If such is the
requirement for desire, then no desire is possible.

The counter question that the opponent asks is - how is error /

illusion possible then? If, according to the anirvachanIya
khyAti of the advaitin, silver-ness is present in silver itself
(albeit indescribable silver), how is this an illusion? If a foreign
attribute is not mistakenly seen in the object, then such a
cognition is not an illusion.
नच - तर्हि भ्रमत्वं न स्यात् इदं रजतमिति भ्रमत्वाभिमतज्ञानस्य
व्यधिकरणप्रकारत्वानभ्युपगमादिति - वाच्यम् | Do not argue thus - "By that
account, no illusions are possible. If the silver in the erroneous
cognition "This is silver", does not contain a vyadhikaraNa
dharma, an attribute that does not belong to it, then the
cognition is not an illusion at all."
Why? Because:
बाधितविषयत्वेन हि भ्रमत्वं न तु व्यधिकरणप्रकारत्वेन तस्यापि विषयबाधप्रयोज्यत्वादिति हि
वक्ष्यते | The cognition of an object is termed an illusion by us
because of the subsequent sublation of the object, not
because it contains an attribute that does not belong to it.
Containing a foreign attribute is also indicative of illusion only
because of the ultimate sublation of the object. If the object
was not sublated, how would one determine that an attribute
that was seen previously, is foreign?

Thus far, we have seen three reasons postulated by the

opponent for sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti. In the next
lesson of this chapter, we will consider a few other reasons.
pratyaksha bAdhoddhAre sattva
nirvachanam (part 4)
In this lesson, we shall consider other refutations of sAmAnya
lakshaNA pratyAsatti (the perception of the universe of things
through the perception of the individual) made by the
siddhikAra.

The fourth argument for sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti

ननु - अभावज्ञानस्य
प्रतियोगिज्ञानजन्यत्वात् प्रौढप्रकाशयावत्तेजोविरहरूपस्य तमस: प्रत्यक्षता
न स्यात्, इति - चेन्न; The knowledge of absence requires the (prior)
knowledge of the counterpositive. Therefore, unless one
accepts the perception of the universe of things belonging to a
class by the perception of an individual of that class, it would
not be possible to perceive profound darkness, of the nature of
the absence of any kind of light.
The opponent argues that the nature of absolute darkness is
the absence of every form of light. It is accepted that darkness
is seen. How is this possible? Seeing darkness, one must have
seen the absence of all light. For this one must have seen all
light somewhere. Therefore one must accept that this is
possible because of sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
The siddhikAra says - this is not correct.
अस्मन्मते तमसो भावान्तरभावात् | According to advaita, darkness is
not the absence of light, but the presence of some substance
whose nature is contradictory to light. It is a bhAva padArtha,
not abhAva padArtha.
There are gradations to darkness, which would not be possible
if darkness was simply the absence of light, for absence
cannot have gradation.
नच - तथापि तद्व्यञ्जकत्वात्तदपेक्षेति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus -
"Even if darkness is some other existent entity, such a
darkness can only exist in the absence of light. Thus the
absence of light is a necessary requirement (an indicator) for
the presence of darkness. Once that is accepted, one again is
led to the requirement for the prior knowledge of all light (in
order to perceive the absence of all light), which requires the
perception of the universe of lights."
Such an argument is untenable because:
स्वरूपसत एव तादृक्तेजोविरहस्य तमोव्यञ्जकत्वम् न तु ज्ञातस्य
मानाभावादित्यभ्युपगमात् | The absence of lights is intrinsically
sufficient to indicate the presence of darkness, there is no
requirement that one knows the absence of light, for there is no
basis to postulate thus.
The presence of a thing can sometimes sufficient to lead to an
outcome in certain cases (svarUpasata: kAraNa) - one need
not be aware of its presence for it to lead to that outcome. In
other cases, one necessarily needs to be aware of the
presence of the cause for that to lead to the outcome
(jnAtasya kAraNa). When a medicine is prescribed, the patient
does need to know how it works, or even that it is medicine, or
that it is being given to him, for the medicine to work.
अन्येषां
मते तादृक्तेजोविरहज्ञानस्यापेक्षितत्वेऽपि प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्
ञानादेव तत्संभवेन तदर्थे सकलप्रतियोगिज्ञानजनिकाया:
सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तेरनुपयोगात् | Others may require the awareness
of the absence of light for the perception of darkness, but even
they admit that the awareness of the absence of all light is
possible so long as that cognition contains the attribute of the
counter-positive delimiter (pratiyogitAvacChedaka = tejatva).
To explain, a cognition that has lightness as its attribute is
sufficient to know the absence of such light, and that
knowledge can lead to the cognition of darkness. Therefore,
there is no need to accept the doctrine of sAmAnya lakshaNA
pratyAsatti leading to the perception of all the
counterpositives.

The fifth argument for pratyAsatti

The siddhikAra had said that it was possible to know the
absence of all light if one has had a cognition that contains the
light-ness as a qualifier. One does not need to have seen all
light first in order to see the absence of all light. In general,
the knowledge of the absence of a thing is a result of the
knowledge of the absence which contains that thing-ness
(pratiyogitAvacChedakam) as its qualifier.
In response, the opponent tries another tack.
नच - गोत्वाभावज्ञानं गोत्वत्वप्रकारकज्ञानजन्यम् तच्च गवेतरावृत्तित्वे सति सकलगोवृत्तिरूपं
सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिमन्तरेण न शक्यमवगन्तुमिति - साम्प्रतम्;
गोत्वाभावज्ञानं गोत्वत्वप्रकारकज्ञानजन्यम् - (By your logic) The cognition of the
absence of cow-ness is born from the cognition of cowness-
ness
तच्च गवेतरावृत्तित्वे सति सकलगोवृत्तिरूपं That (cowness-ness) is that
which is present in all cows, but which is not present in
animals other than cows.
सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिमन्तरेण न शक्यमवगन्तुमिति However that cannot be
known without sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
How can an attribute present in all cows, unless one has
knowledge of all cows first? Only through sAmAnya lakshaNA
pratyAsatti.
The siddhikAra dismisses this view and says:
यत्किन्चिद्गोव्यक्तेरेव गोत्वत्वरूपत्वात् | Cowness-ness is nothing but some
individual cow.
Advaita does not recognise the idea of jAti or universals that is
accepted by dvaita and nyAya. The only universal that is
accepted is sat, or existence that pervades everything. Thus
the class of cowness, is nothing but existence which pervades
every individual. The corollary is that every individual inheres
in that universal existence.
Thus cow-ness pervades all cows, and cowness-ness which
inheres in cows, is nothing but the cow itself.
Put in another way, a pot on the ground can be described as 1)
a pot, which is on the ground, or 2) the ground which contains
a pot. Thus the pot and ground act as mutual qualifiers of each
other. The same argument can be applied to cows and
cowness.

एतेन प्रागभावप्रतीतिरपि व्याख्याता | By this, the cognisance of prior

absence is also explained.
किं चानागतज्ञानस्यापेक्षितत्वे अनुमानादेव तद्भविष्यति; For the perception of
prior absence would presuppose the cognition of something to
come in the future. However that (a future cognition) is
possible by inference alone.
The opponent wishes to argue that prior absence is unlike
absolute absence. The absolute absence of something is
knowable by the knowledge of any particular instance of the
counterpositive. If I know some pot, I can know that there is
no pot on the ground. However, to know the prior absence of a
particular pot, I need to have known that particular pot first.
However, that pot has not been created yet. How can one
know the prior absence of something which is going to be
created in the future? The opponent argues that it is by
sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti.
The siddhikAra refutes this by saying that one can postulate
prior absence only by means of inference, and not an extra
sensory perception as argued by the logician. As argued in the
nyAyAkusumAnjali by udayanAchArya:
तथा च न्यायकु सुमाञ्जलौ - "शङ्का चेदनुमास्त्येव न चेच्छङ्का ततस्तराम् | व्याघातावधिराशङ्का तर्क:
शङ्कावधिर्मत: ||" Where there is doubt (about a concomitance in the
future or the past), that can be remedied by inference alone.
Where no such doubt exists, then it is even more so true (that
is, one does not need to postulate something extraordinary).
Doubt exists until it is remedied by inference, and the limit of
inference is till the doubt is resolved.
इत्यत्र शङ्कोपपादकमनागतज्ञानमनुमानादेवेत्युक्तम्, अनुमानं
च वर्तमानपाक: पाकपूर्वकालीन: पाकत्वादतीतपाकवदित्यादि | From the
passage quoted above, it is by inference alone that a doubt
regarding the occurrence of a future event is removed. For
example, the following inference serves to establish a future
event - The cooking in the present precedes a cooking that is
going to occur, because it is cooking, just like the past
cooking preceded this one.
नच चरमपाके व्यभिचार:, साध्यसिद्ध्युपजीवकस्य व्यभिचारज्ञानस्यादोषत्वात्, अन्यथा
सिद्ध्यसिद्धिव्याघातात् | There is no inferential defect in the case of
the final cooking (as it would precede no further cooking).
Once the goal has been attained, that is once we can
postulate there is some such thing as a final cooking, to claim
that there is a further inferential flaw is not a problem, and
without using the very same inference, one cannot postulate a
series of cookings leading to the final one.

किञ्च शब्दादपि सकलधूमपाकादिगोचरज्ञानसंभव: | Moreover, by verbal

testimony too one can postulate the cognition of all smoke, all
cooking, (ie all instances in a class) etc. Therefore one need
not postulate the perception of the entire universe of
individuals belonging to the same class.
नच - शङ्कापूर्वे शब्दस्योपस्थितिनियमाभाव इति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue that it is not
necessary as a rule that verbal testimony is necessarily
present prior to the existence of a doubt (which is remedied by
inference).
कदाचिदेव शब्दादनुभूतस्य तदानीं प्रमृष्टतत्ताकस्मृतिसंभवात् | The knowledge
gained through verbal testimony at some other time is
recollected then (at the time of inference), and thus even
though he may not recollect the concomitance as arising out
of verbal testimony, he recollects the concomitance which is
sufficient for the inference to occur.

The sixth argument for pratyAsatti

The inference of the mountain on fire is a vishiShTa jnAna, a
cognition of an object endowed with a qualifier. The opponent
postulates that the knowledge of the qualifier is the cause for
the knowledge of the substance endowed with that qualifier. In
the inference of the fire in the mountain, the qualifier is the
mountainous fire. However, prior to the inference of the
mountain being on fire, one has not cognised mountainous fire.
Therefore, the seer must have seen such a mountainous fire
somewhere previously - let it be by sAmAnya lakshaNA
pratyAsatti, in the kitchen itself.
ननु - अनुमितेर्वि षणज्ञानजन्यत्वेनशे
षणज् ञानजन् यत्वेन सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिसिद्धि:, न
चानुमानान्तराद्विशेषणज्ञानमनवस्थानात् - इति चेन्न ;
The inference of the mountain on fire is a result of the
cognition of the qualifier, and that is the proof for sAmAnya
lakshaNA pratyAsatti. One cannot argue that the qualifier was
known through some other inference as that would lead to
infinite regress.
The siddhikAra says, not so.
षणकपक्
विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानादेव साध्यवि षणकपक्षवि
शे षविशे
ष्यकानुमितिसंभवा त्
ष्यकानुमितिसंभवात्शे | The
cognition of (fire) as being endowed with
visheShaNatAvacChedaka, the characteristic that allows it to
be the qualifier (fire-ness) in the inferential cognition, is
sufficient to lead to the inference having the sAdhya as the
qualifier and the paksha as the qualified.
Put simply, one does not need to know the prior knowledge of
a mountainous fire to infer the presence of fire in the
mountain, it is sufficient to know what fire is in general.

एतेन - "सुरभि चन्दन"मित्यादिविशिष्टज्ञानाय कल्पिता ज्ञानलक्षणा प्रत्यासत्तिरपि -

निरस्ता; By this reason, the postulation of jnAna lakshaNA
pratyAsatti to justify the occurrence of the visual compound
cognition (vishiShTa jnAna) "the sandalwood is fragrant", also
stands refuted.
There is no need to say that the eyes must have had prior
contact with fragrance through jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti for
the compound visual cognition to arise. Why ?
चन्दनत्वेन सुरभित्वानुमानोपपत्ते:, Because such a cognition is
possible by inferring the presence of fragrance in the presence
of sandalwood.
अन्यथा
ष्
टपक् षप्रत्
यक्षोपपत्तेरनु
मानमात्
रोच्
छेदप्रसङ्गा
साध्यवि ष्टपक्षप्रत्यक्षोपपत्तेरनुमानमात्रोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्त्| Otherwise,
शि
if it is insisted that one must have had the direct perception of
the object (which happens to be the paksha in the inference)
being endowed with the qualifier (which happens to be the
sAdhya in the inference), and this happens through jnAna
lakshaNA pratyAsatti, then inference would be rendered
impossible.
If one can directly perceive the mountain on fire by jnAna
lakshaNA pratyAsatti, what purpose would an inference of fire
in the mountain serve? More directly, how would the inference
of an object even arise if perception has already shown it?

The pUrvapakshi tries to argue that inference would be

possible where the factors enabling the inference are stronger
than the factors enabling direct perception.
नच - अभावसाध्यक के वलव्यतिरेकिणि साध्यप्रसिद्धेरनङ्गत्वात्तत्र क्लृप्ताया
अनुमितिसामग्र्या: प्रत्यक्षसामग्रीतो बलवत्वमिति वाच्यम् ; In the case
where the sAdhya is not known, like in the case of the kevala
vyatireka inference where the absence of something is being
proven, as the factors enabling direct perception are weaker
than the factors enabling inference, inference is still possible.
To explain - the logician wants to prove that earth needs to be
classified as a separate element. To do this, he argues that
earth is different from the other four elements because it
contains a quality - the characteristic of smell - that is not
present in any of the other four. Thus it deserves to be a
separate category of its own.

However, there is no example he can give to prove this,

because other than the paksha (earth), the only elements are
the four elements themselves and the quality of difference
from the four elements is absent in them (sAdhya is
aprasiddha). Thus he uses a vyatireka logic (argument of
discordance / difference) for this. He says: where one of the
other four elements are present (or the difference from the four
elements is absent), fragrance (and thus earthness) is absent.
By corollary, where earthness is present, difference from the
other elements is present. This is a case of kevala vyatireka
logic, which is resorted to when anvaya logic is not possible
because the sAdhya is not known anywhere.

In the case where the sAdhya is not known anywhere, jnAna

lakshaNA pratyAsatti would not be possible (if no individual of
a class has been seen before, the perception of all the
members of the class would not be possible), and in such
instances, the factors enabling inference are stronger than the
factors enabling perception. Thus inference can arise. The
siddhAntin's argument that the inference would be rendered
impossible has been disproven.

The pUrvapakshi however adds a qualifier and says that

inference is possible where an argument of discordance
(kevala vyatireka) proves the absence of something (abhAva
sAdhyaka kevala vyatireka). This is so because where kevala
vyatireka proves the presence of something, such a thing must
be first be possible for the argument to be valid. If someone
argues that a field has been tilled by a hare's horn on the
grounds that it is a field, and that which is not tilled by a hare's
horn is not a field (and therefore the reverse must also be
true), such a kevala vyatireka anumAna is not acceptable,
because the sAdhya must be an entity which is within the
realms of possibility. A hare's horn is absolutely non-existent.
Therefore, where the kevala vyatireka anumAna proves the
existence of something, that thing must not be an impossibility
(ie sAdhya prasiddhi is expected), but where the kevala
vyatireka anumAna proves the absence of something, sAdhya
prasiddhi is not expected.

As jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti is not possible in the case of

kevala vyatireka anumAna proving the absence of something,
one must conclude that inference is possible, and therefore
the siddhAntin's argument that jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti
renders inference as an impossibility stands refuted. This is
the opponent's argument.

The siddhikAra says नच वाच्यम् - One cannot say that because:

अर्थापत्तिवादिभिरस्माभिस्तदनभ्युपगमात् | we (advaitins) hold that
knowledge is gained in such instances through arthApatti,
circumstantial inference, instead.
The logician had tried to cite an example where inference is
possible but jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti is impossible. The
siddhikAra says, inference would still be impossible, because
we hold that it is not inference that arises there, but
arthApatti, which is a different pramANa from anumAna
(inference).

There is an alternative refutation possible. The opponent had

argued that the knowledge of the sAdhya needs to precede the
knowledge of the paksha endowed with the sAdhya, and the
knowledge of the sAdhya is only possible because of jnAna
lakshaNA pratyAsatti. This according to him, was because the
sAdhya is the qualifier and the paksha is the qualified entity in
the inference. However, it is possible to simply restate the
inference such that the paksha is the qualifier and the sAdhya
is the qualified. That is the subject-object relationship in the
inference can be reversed. If instead of saying the mountain is
on fire, if it is said fire is in the mountain, then fire is the
subject(visheShya) and mountain is the object (visheShaNa).
The visheShaNa is directly seen, so one need not postulate
jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti to see it. If the visheShaNa is
known, the inference of the visheShya endowed with the
visheShaNa is possible.
"पर्वतवृत्तिधूमो वह्निव्याप्य" इति परामर् त्र्शा
त्
ष्यकपक्
साध्यवि ष्यकपक्षवि
शे षवि शेषणकानु मित्यभ्युपगमे तु नैव काप्यनुपपत्ति: | If the
षणकानुमित्यभ्युपगमेशे
consideration (paramArsha) in the inference is that the smoke
located in the mountain implies fire, it is possible for it to lead
to the inference where the sAdhya is the visheShya and the
paksha is the visheShaNa. There is no fallacy therefore.
ष् यत् वनि
अनुमिते: पक्षवि ष्यत्वनियमेशे यमे मानाभावात् | Moreover, there is no rule
that the paksha has to be the visheShya in the inferential
cognition.
pratyaksha bAdhoddhAre sattva
nirvachanam (part 5)
To recap, this chapter is a refutation of the argument that the
inference of the world's unreality is contradicted by the
perception of the world's reality. The dvaitin argues - As
perception is a stronger proof in comparison to inference,
when the two are in contradiction, perception will overrule
inference. The perception of the world as real will overrule the
advaitin's inference of the world as unreal.

In response, the siddhikAra raises two questions - what is real,

and can it be perceived?

Having considered various definitions of

existence here and here, the siddhikAra concludes that a
reality that can overrule unreality is not perceptible; and that
which is perceptible cannot overrule unreality.

The discussion led to a conclusion that only a reality, where

every kind of absence associated with an object at a particular
place and time are absent, can overrule unreality. The absence
of every form of pot absence in a place proves the real
existence of the pot there, and such a real existence can
overrule an inference of the pot's unreality. The challenge for
the dvaitin is that it is impossible to perceive every kind of the
absence of anything anywhere. If the universe of absence is
not perceptible, the absence of all absence (ie reality) would
not be perceptible either.

To address this, the nyAyAmritakAra invokes the logician's

doctrine of extrasensory perception, sAmAnya lakshaNA
pratyAsatti or alaukika sannikarSha, to establish the
perceptibility of the absence of all absence at a place. The
basic theory is that when any absence of an object is known,
one directly perceives all kinds of absence. Once such a
universal absence is seen, the absence of universal absence is
knowable as well.
It is a far-fetched theory, but the siddhikAra offers an
elaborate rebuttal to the basic doctrine of sAmAnya lakshaNA
pratyAsatti which serves as the foundation for the
nyAyAmritakAra's argument.
This led to a lengthy discussion on the validity of the theory of
jnAna lakshaNA pratyAsatti here and here. Six justifications
were offered, and each of those were refuted by the
siddhikAra.

Now another justification is being proposed.

The seventh argument refuting sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti

किञ्च धूमत्वादिसामान्यं न स्वरुपत: प्रत्यासत्ति:, धूलिपटले धूमभ्रमानन्तरं धूमत्वेन
सकलधूमनिष्ठवह्निव्याप्तिग्रहानुदयप्रसङ्गात्, तत्र स्वरूपतो धूमत्वाभावात्, न
चेष्टापत्ति: तदुत्तरकालमनुमित्यनुदयापत्ते:, तथा च धूमत्वज्ञानं प्रयासत्तिरिति वाच्यम्,
तच्च धूमेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षदशायां धूमज्ञानात्प्राक् नास्त्येव |
किञ्च धूमत्वादिसामान्यं न स्वरुपत: प्रत्यासत्ति:, Moreover, the generic class
of substances does not have any intrinsic connection to all
individual instances of that class. For example, the generic
class of smokeness does not have any intrinsic connection to
all instances of smoke. Why?
धूलिपटले धूमभ्रमानन्तरं धूमत्वेन सकलधूमनिष्ठवह्निव्याप्तिग्रहानुदयप्रसङ्गात्,
Because it is possible to mistake a dust cloud for smoke,
following which, a smokeness led cognition of the
concomitance between all smoke and fire would not arise.
तत्र स्वरूपतो धूमत्वाभावात्, न चेष्टापत्ति: तदुत्तरकालमनुमित्यनुदयापत्ते:, For
smokeness is absent there. However, this is not desirable, for
it will imply that an inference (of fire) will not subsequently
occur.

To explain - the opponent wants to argue that any inference is

possible only because of his theory of extraordinary
perception. He says that the inference of fire in a mountain is
possible because one has previously perceived the
concomitance between mountain fire and mountain smoke, in
the kitchen itself. The 'smokeness' of the kitchen smoke leads
to the perception of all smoke, including mountain smoke
(similarly, the 'fireness' of the kitchen fire leads to the
perception of mountain fire as well). Thus in the kitchen, the
seer draws a conclusion regarding the invariable
concomitance of mountain smoke with mountain fire.

Later, when the same seer sees mountain smoke in the

mountain, he remembers that invariable concomitance
between mountain fire and mountain smoke he saw previously
in the kitchen and infers that mountain fire also must be
present now. The opponent uses this inference as a proof for
the existence of extrasensory perception.

The siddhikAra rebuts this by alleging that smokeness cannot

intrinsically lead to the perception of all smoke because there
is no direct connection between smokeness and every
instance of smoke. He cites an example of an illusion where a
person sees a dust cloud and mistakes it for smoke. Let us
assume that coincidentally, fire also happens to be present
there. Thus a person sees what he thinks is smoke copresent
with fire and draws a conclusion that where smoke is present,
fire must be present. Wrong data, but right conclusion.

If the opponent is right in holding that inference occurs

because of extrasensory perception, as smokeness is not
present in the dust cloud, the extrasensory perception of all
smoke should not occur. He therefore should not be able to
infer mountain fire when he sees mountain smoke later.
However, in practice, that inference does occur in the
mountain based on the prior perception of concomitance
between fire and illusory smoke.

Thus even where smokeness is absent, an illusion of smoke

can sometimes lead to the right conclusion of concomitance
and the subsequent inference of fire. This means that even
without extrasensory perception, inference is possible. As a
consequence, the occurrence of inference is no proof for
extrasensory perception.

तथा च धूमत्वज्ञानं प्रयासत्तिरिति वाच्यम्, To remedy such a defect, if it is

instead said - it is not smokeness that leads to the perception
of all smoke, rather, it is the cognition of smokeness that leads
to it (and it is possible to incorrectly perceive smokeness).
Let us assume, for argument's sake, that the extrasensory
perception of smoke through the perception of smokeness is
valid. There are two possibilities for how this may occur. 1)
The seer sees smokeness in general, after which he sees
every instance of smoke. 2) He sees any particular instance of
smoke. In it, he sees smokeness. That perception of
smokeness leads him to see all other instances of smoke.

The siddhikAra refutes the first possibility now.

तच्च धूमेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षदशायां धूमज्ञानात्प्राक् नास्त्येव | When smoke comes into
contact with the senses, the cognition of smokeness cannot
arise prior to the cognition of smoke.

निर्विकल्पके मानाभावात्, To counter this, if it be said that the

indeterminate cognition of smokeness precedes the cognition
of smoke, such a postulate has no basis.
In nyAya, it is postulated that prior to every determinate
cognition of an object, there is an indeterminate cognition of
its qualifier. Therefore, if an object is seen with its attributes
(in a determinate cognition), there is an indeterminate
cognition of the attributes that precedes it - no one is aware of
such a cognition, but it must necessarily exist because of the
cause-effect relationship between the cognition of the qualifier
and the cognition of the qualified. Such a cause-effect
relationship is rejected by the siddhikAra.

विशिष्टज्ञानत्वेन विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन च कार्यकारणभावानभ्युपगमात्, However there is no

cause-effect relationship between the cognition of the qualifier
and the cognition of the qualified.

क् लृ
प्तकार्यकारणभाववि
अवयक्लृप्तकार्यकारणभाववि
शे शे सर्वव्यवहारोपपत्ते: | Any activity
षेणैवश्य
षेणैव
occurs only on the basis of the necessary causal factors.
Every aspect of the object that is in contact with the eye is
seeable. If there is a man with a stick walking down a road, as
long as there is contact between the eyes and both the man
and his stick, the seer will have the qualified (vishiShTa)
cognition of the man with his stick. There is no rule that the
seer must see his stick (qualifier) first, and only after that is it
possible to have the cognition of the man with his stick.
The siddhikAra then refutes the second possibility.

नच धूमत्वेन सन्निकृष्टधूमव्यक्तिज्ञाननन्तरं तत्समानाकारमसन्निकृष्टधूमगोचरं

ज्ञानान्तरमुत्पद्यत इत्यत्र मानमस्ति ; There is no proof to claim that
the perception of smokeness, seen by the eyes to be present
in an individual instance of smoke, leads to the perception of
all the smoke in the world similarly endowed with smokeness,
even when such smoke is not directly in contact with the eyes.
धूमत्वेन पुरोवर्तिनं धूमं साक्षात्करोमि न व्यवहितमित्यनुभवाच्च | अन्यथा
जगतीगतसकलधूमव्यक्तीरहं साक्षात्करोमीत्यनुव्यवसीयेत | For everyone's
experience is "I see the smoke in front of my eyes". If the
doctrine of extrasensory perception was correct, one should
have the experience - "I see all the world's smoke in front of
me".
नचैवमनुभवशरणीयैरभ्युपेयते । However, that does not happen, and thus
those that set store by personal experience cannot accept
such a theory.

The eighth argument refuting sAmAnya lakshaNA pratyAsatti

किञ्च सामान्यप्रत्यासत्त्यङ्गीकारे यत् प्रमेयं, तदभिदेयं, यत्प्रमेयवत्,
तदभिधेयवदित्यादि व्याप्तिपरिच्छेदे सार्वज्ञापत्ति: | नचेष्टैव सा ; परज्ञानविषयो घटो
न वेत्यादिसंशयानुपपत्ते: |
Moreover, if this doctrine of extrasensory perception is
accepted, then on the basis of the invariable concomitance
"that which is knowable is expressible, or that which has
knowability, has expressibility", one would have omniscience.
That is not desirable, because it would contradict experience.
If one has omniscience, the doubt that one experiences - "do
others see this pot or not?" would not arise.

The argument the siddhikAra makes is that if a thing is

knowable, it has knowability. According to the pUrvapakshin,
the cognisance of the universal class leads to the cognisance
of every instance of that class. Knowability is the class of all
things knowable - Thus everything knowable becomes
cognised by perceiving knowability, if one accepts this theory.
This leads to omniscience. This is not desirable for it
contradicts everyone's experience. One does not know what
someone else knows or does not, for instance.
नच- घटत्वप्रकारकघटविषयकनिश्चयो घटसंशयविरोधी, प्रमेयमिति निश्चयस्तु घटविषयोऽपि न
घटत्वप्रकारक इति - वाच्यम् ;
The opponent argues - "Only the cognition which has pot as its
object (viShaya), and potness as its attribute (prakAra), can
overrule a doubt about (someone else's) cognisance of a pot.
However, in the cognition "The pot is knowable", the prakAra
is knowability, not potness. Thus the cognition of knowability
cannot remove the doubt whether someone else sees this pot
or not. As the doubt can still arise, extrasensory perception is
not disproved."

The siddhikAra rebuts such an argument.

ष्ट्
यप्रतियोगि
भासमानवै ष्ट्यप्रतियोगिन नशि
एव प्रकारत्वात्, घटत्वस्यापि प्रमेयमिति ज्ञाने
ष्ट्
यप्रतियोगि त्
वा
भासमानवै ष्ट्यप्रतियोगित्वात् , This is not correct, as prakAra is
त्
शि
the feature that appears to be present in the object of the
cognition. In the cognition "the pot is knowable", potness is a
feature that appears to be present. If the pot has knowability,
it must have potness too. Otherwise it wouldn't be cognised as
a pot that contains knowability. So potness is the prakAra
even in that cognition.

घटत्वप्रकारकनिश्चयस्य घटत्वज्ञानजन्यविशेषणाददोष इति चेत्, if it is said - "As the

cognition having potness as its attribute is born from the
cognition of potness, there is no defect".
The opponent wishes to add one more condition for a pot's
cognition to rule out any doubt about someone else's cognition
of a pot seen by oneself - in addition to that cognition 1) having
the pot as its object and 2) potness as its attribute (which was
disproved by the siddhikAra), it is also said that 3) the pot-
cognition is born from the cognition of potness.
The cognition "this pot is knowable" is not born from the
cognition of potness, and therefore such a cognition,
according to this rule, would be unable to overrule the doubt
about someone else's cognition of the pot. Thus siddhikAra's
argument against extrasensory perception does not stand.

If this is the opponent's argument:

न विशेषणज्ञानत्वेनैव तस्य जनकता वाच्या; तस्या: प्रागेव निरासात् ; (The
opponent's) justification for adding such a condition is that the
cognition of the qualified (vishiShTa) is born from the cognition
of the qualifier (visheShaNa). However, this has already been
disproved previously.
The siddhikAra's contention is that if the cognition of a pot
qualified by potness is not necessarily born from the prior
cognition of potness, then one cannot argue that the prior
cognition of potness is absent in the cognition the "pot is
knowable" and therefore it should be unable to overrule the
said doubt. Therefore the doubt is overruled. If it is overruled,
one would be omniscient, which is absurd. By reductio ad
absurdum, extrasensory perception is disproven.

It was said by the advaitin that the relationship between the

qualifier and the substance (potness and pot) was a qualifier-
qualified relationship. The opponent may instead argue that
their relationship is an intrinsic one, a svarUpa sambandha,
and not a qualifier-qualified relationship. As a result, in the
cognition "everything is known", as one does not cognise an
intrinsic relationship between pot and potness, it cannot
overrule a doubt about others' cognition of a pot. This
argument is being refuted next.
षा भ्
युपगमे चानिर्वचनीयवादापत्ते:, If the relationship of the
स्वरूपसंबन्धवि षाभ्युपगमेशे
qualifier is intrinsic, it leads to the advatin's doctrine of
inexpressibility. An intrinsic relationship is postulated only
when every other relationship has been rendered impossible,
that is, one cannot explain the nature of the relationship and
therefore settles on calling it an intrinsic one. If an intrinsic
relationship is ultimately inexpressible, the opponent is
endorsing the advaitin's doctrine of inexpressibility.

The siddhikAra concludes this elaborate refutation of sAmAnya

lakshaNA pratyAsatti
इत्यादिदूषणानि बहुतरमूहनीयानि | Thus one may infer several defects
in such a doctrine.

Coming back to the primary topic of this chapter,

तस्मात् सामान्यप्रत्यासत्त्या निषेधमात्रप्रतियोगित्वोपस्थितौ तदभावग्रहात् बाध
इत्यनुपपन्नमेव | As the doctrine of extrasensory perception on
the basis of the perception of the universal is unacceptable,
one cannot define reality as the absence of every negation
about the object, and as a consequence, such a reality of the
world is not perceptible and therefore the inference of the
world's unreality cannot be overruled by the perception of its
reality.
sAkshi bAdhoddhAra:
Having dismissed the possibility of a contradiction of the
inference of the world's unreality by two forms of perception
(sensory perception, and extrasensory perception) in the
previous chapter, the siddhikAra moves to the next argument
raised by the nyAyAmritakAra in this chapter - that such an
inference is contradicted by sAkshi pratyaksha, perception by
the inner witness.

According to the dvaitin, sAkshi pratyaksha is the highest

instrument available for valid knowledge. It is the purest form
of sense organ, the witnessing consciousness, and the
knowledge perceived by the sAkshi is incontrovertible.

With this background, the nyAyAmritakAra asks:

ननु - प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वे शुक्तिरूप्यादेः प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ
त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वरूपं मिथ्यात्वं कथं प्रत्यक्षं स्यात्? As
perception can only perceive the present, how can it be
claimed that the shell-silver etc. has an unreality of the nature
of the absolute absence in all three periods of time in the locus
of their appearance?

Therefore if it is said that the perception of unreality means

that the perception of absence in all three periods of time is
possible, it cannot be by ordinary perception, but by the
witness, the sAkshi. Thus one must admit that the sAkshi
perceives a future absence of the mithyA object.

अथ तत्र रजतत्वविरोधिशुक्तित्वे साक्षात्कृते तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या च रजतत्वाभावे निश्चिते

मिथ्यैव रजतमभादिति तादृङ्निषेधप्रत्यय: स्वसंबन्धसर्वाभासकेन
सक्षिणैवोपपन्न:, - Therefore, when the shell-ness, which happens
to be mutually exclusive with silver-ness, is perceived, then as
no other conclusion is possible (ie one can infer thus), one
becomes certain of the absence of silver-ness. As a result, one
comes to know that it was an unreal silver that appeared
previously. Such a cognition of absence (in all three periods of
time), is only possible for the sAkshi, which reveals everything
that appears in front of it.
Therefore, as we have established that the sAkshi can see the
future absence of an unreal object,
तर्हि साक्षात् स्वविषयस्य गगनादेर्भाविकालनिषेधाप्रतियोगित्वं सकलकालग्राहिणा
साक्षिणा गृह्यतां - let us admit that space, which is directly
witnessed by the sAkshi now, is also not sublated in the
future. The sAkshi in revealing something as existing today,
should also be capable of revealing the existence of that thing
in all periods of time.

In the case of the perception of unreality by the sAkshi, that

was through the medium of the inferential cognition (or
arthApatti vritti, the cognition of circumstantial inference). If
the sAkshi, through indirect perception, can deliver a verdict
of the absence of silver in all three periods of time, why cannot
the sAkshi, by directly perceiving the existence of space in the
present, prove the existence of space in all three periods of
time?

Extending this, if space is perceived by the sAkshi to exist in

all three periods of time, the inference of its absence is
contradicted by sAkshi pratyaksha, the inner witness'
perception.

The siddhikAra responds to this line of argument:

इति - चेन्न; If this is your argument, no.
When unreality is defined as the absence in all three periods of
time, there is no requirement that such an absence is
perceived in all three periods of time for the cognition of
unreality. Rather, all that is required is that the silver is
absolutely absent - it has atyantAbhAva.

साक्षिणो विद्यमानसर्वावभासकत्वेनाविद्यमानभाविबाधाभावभासकत्वानुपपत्ते: Holding that the

sAkshi reveals everything perceptible in its presence does not
imply that the sAkshi can overrule a future sublation of the
object.
The vivaraNakAra's intent is not to say that the absence of an
objects in all three periods of time is perceptible. All he wishes
to say is that the absence in the present is perceptible -
however that absence happens to be an absence in all three
periods of time.
ज्ञानस्य भ्रमप्रमासाधरणत्वेन प्रमाणाबाधकत्वाच्च | sAkshi will reveal
both valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, and there is no
way that such a perception by the sAkshi can overrule an
inferential cognition.

The pUrvapakshi says:

ननु - ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं गृह्णन् साक्षी घटादिगतमबाध्यत्वम् गृह्णात्येव, नहि विषयाबाधमनन्तर्भाव्य
प्रामाण्यग्रहणं नाम इति - चेन्न; If the sAkshi gathers that a
knowledge, say the knowledge of a pot, is valid (it has
prAmANya), then it must follow that the sAkshi gathers the
unsublatability of the pot too. Knowing the validity of a
cognition is nothing but knowing the unsublatability of the
object of the cognition.

The siddhikAra replies,

व्यवहारकालाबाध्यत्वमात्रेण प्रवृत्तौ अविसंवादोपपत्ते:, तद्रूपगतप्रामाण्यस्य
साक्षिणा ग्रहणेऽपि विरोधाभावात् | True, but as it is possible to transact
with an object whose unsublatability is empirical, if the sAkshi
were to gather a notion of validity limited to such an extent, it
would be no contradiction to the inference of the world's
unreality.
The siddhikAra is saying that for any object to have utility, it is
sufficient if that object is unsublated transactionally. There is
no requirement that the object is unsublatable in all periods of
time for it to have utility. If the sAkshi reveals that the
cognition of the object is valid empirical, such a knowledge
would not be contradictory to the unreality of the object. For
unreality is not incongruous with empirical unsublatability.

नहि घटादिज्ञानस्यसंवादिप्रवृत्तिजनकतावच्छेदकं प्रामाण्यं त्रिकालाबाध्यविषयकत्वं, किन्तु

शुक्तिरूप्यादिज्ञानव्यावृत्तं व्यवहारकालाबाध्यविषयकसकलज्ञानवृत्ति व्यवहारकालाबाध्यविषयकत्वमेव |
The condition present in a pot cognition that leads to fruitful
activity with the pot (and thus leading one to surmise that
such a cognition is valid) is not because the pot is
unsublatable in all time. Rather, the condition for fruitful
activity is that the cognition is not of apparently real
(prAtibhAsika) objects such as shell-silver etc., and that the
object is unsublated empirically (during vyavahAra). Thus all
that is implied by the validity of a cognition discerned on the
basis of the cognition leading to fruitful activity, is that its
object is not sublated during vyavahAra.

तच्च न भाविकालबाधविरोधीत्युक्तम् | Such a validity does not rule out

the possibility of a future sublation.

Therefore if it is said that the sAkshi reveals the validity of a

cognition (as postulated by the dvaitin), it does not certify that
its object is unsublatable in all periods of time.

भाविकालबाधतदभावौ नच मानं विना साक्षिणा ग्रहीतुं शक्यौ, तस्य विद्यमानमात्रग्राहित्वादिति

चोक्तम् | In fact, the sublation of objects in the future (or not)
cannot be determined in the absence of a valid means of
knowledge that establishes it, because as we have already
said, the sAkshi reveals whatever is in front of it - be it real or
unreal.

ननु - तर्हि देहात्मैक्यज्ञान"मुष्णं जल"मित्यादि ज्ञानं च प्रमा स्यात्, व्यवहारदशायां

विषयाबाधात् - इति चेन्न ;
The pUrvapakshi asks: If as you say, the absence of sublation
in vyavahAra is the criterion for validity, then the erroneous
knowledge "I am this body", or the mistaken cognition "the
water is hot" would end up being valid.

आब्रह्मज्ञानमबाधितत्वेन तेषामपि घटादिज्ञानसमानयोगक्षेमत्वात् | The

siddhikAra says - that is not a problem, because we hold that
until the rise of brahma jnAna, such erroneous cognitions have
a similar level of reality to the cognitions of everyday objects
such as pots, etc.

ननु - कालान्तरस्थमपि यत् बाधकं तदपि किं यत्कालावच्छेदेन अनेन स्वार्थो

गृहितस्तत्कालावच्छेदेनैव तन्निषेधति, उतान्यकालावच्छेदेन, आद्ये कथमस्य
प्रामाण्यम्? अन्त्ये अनित्यत्वादिकमेव - इति चेन्न;
The pUrvapakshi asks - in relation to the perception of objects
that are sublated by a cognition arising at a different time,
were they absent when they were seen, or is their absence
only from the time the sublating cognition arises? If it is the
former, the original perception cannot be a valid cognition? If
it is the latter, sublation only establishes the object's
impermanence, not its unreality.
The siddhikAra says - No.
अबाध्यत्वरूपप्रामाण्यस्य प्रपञ्चज्ञाने मयानङ्गीकारात्, यत्कालावच्छेदेनैवानेन स्वार्थो
गृहीतस्तत्कालावच्छेदेनैव तन्निषेधाभ्युपगमात् | I do not accept that the
validity of the world's perception is because the world's reality
is unsublated. The world is absent even when it is seen. Then
what kind of validity is accepted by the siddhikAra? He
clarifies thus:

यच्च प्रामाण्यम् मयाभ्युपेयते तत् व्यवहारदशायां विपरीतप्रमारूपबाधकस्यानुत्पन्नत्वादस्त्येव | The

validity of the world's cognition that I accept is (limited to) an
empirical one, that is - (thus far), no other cognition disproving
the former cognition's validity has arisen.

To summarise, the siddhikAra's position is that the validity of

the world's perception is not because the world is
unsublatable, but the validity is because nothing has (thus far)
proven it to be invalid.

The pUrvapakshi then says:

नच - यत् भवतां घटादिबुद्धे: प्रातिभासिकबुद्धितो वैलक्षण्यं विषयस्य व्यावहारिकसत्त्वसाधकं
तदेवेह मम विषयस्य पारमार्थिकसत्त्वसाधकमस्त्विति - वाच्यम् ; You say that
the cognition of pots etc. (vyAvahArika), is different from the
cognition of the apparently real (prAtibhAsika). That difference
establishes that the former has empirical existence
(vyAvahArika sattA). Let it be that such a difference
establishes the absolute reality of (pAramArthika sattA) those
objects.

The siddhikAra says: Do not argue thus.

प्रातिभासिकबुद्धिवैलक्षण्यं हि घटादिबुद्धे:
सप्रकारकज्ञानाबाध्यविषयकत्वादिरूपं, तन्न पारमार्थिकसत्त्वं घटादे: साधयितुं
शक्तम्; The nature of the difference between the cognition of
apparently real objects from the cognition of pots, etc., is of
the nature of unsublatability by an attributive cognition
(saprakAraka jnAna). That is, the sublating cognition reveals
the prakAra, the attributes of the underlying object
(saprakAraka jnAna). Such a cognition cannot prove the
absolute reality of the pots etc.
Brahman, which is accepted as absolutely real by both the
dvaitin and advaitin is unsublated by a non-attributive
cognition of Brahman. The world, on the other hand is
unsublated only by attributive cognitions. Thus in order to
prove that the world is absolutely real, one needs to establish
that a non-attributive cognition of Brahman leaves the world
unsublated. An attributive cognition is not sufficient to prove
the world's absolute reality.

देहात्मैक्यज्ञाने ब्रह्मज्ञानाव्यवहितभ्रमे च व्यभिचारात् | Moreover, there would

be a contradiction in the case of the cognition of the body as
the self, and in the case of an illusion subsisting in the instant
before the rise of brahma jnAna.

To explain, the object of the erroneous cognition of the self as

the body is unsublated by any attributive knowledge, but it is
accepted even by the dvaitin as not ultimately real.

Secondly, if we assume that someone has had the vision of

shell-silver at some time. Let us also assume that in the very
next instant, the knowledge of brahman arises in his mind,
which according to the advaitin, sublates the entire world.
When the world itself gets sublated, so does the shell-silver.
Thus one can say in this example that such a shell-silver is not
sublated by an attributive cognition - the knowledge of
brahman is non-attributive. According to the opponent's rule,
this would make shell-silver absolutely real, as it is unsublated
by any attributive cognition. That would be absurd.

ननु - 'घटस्सन्' 'रूप्यम् मिथ्येति' प्रतीत्योरवि षेशे

षेकथं 'घटो मिथ्या रूप्यमिथ्यात्वं न मिथ्ये'ति
विशेष:?
The opponent asks : empirically, the cognition "the pot exists"
and the cognition "shell-silver is unreal" both arise. There is no
qualifying basis to say that one is valid and other is invalid.
However, you say that the existence of the pot is unreal, but
the unreality of shell-silver is not unreal. Why is that?
He continues:
नच तदपि मिथ्यैव; रूप्यतात्त्विकत्वापत्ते: You cannot say that the unreality of
the shell-silver is also unreal, for that would make the shell-
silver real.
- इति चेन्न; The siddhikAra says, not so.
मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वेऽपि यथा न रूप्यस्य तात्त्विकत्वं तत्रोपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात् | As we
have already said in the chapter on mithyAtva's mithyAtva, even
if unreality is unreal, it will not lead to the shell-silver's reality.

नच - पारमार्थिकसत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षागोचारत्वे
तीना
मप् रसक्तप् रतिषेधकता
तन्निषेधरुतीनामप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधकता श्रुस्यादिति - वाच्यं
The opponent says - As absolute reality is beyond the reach of
sensory perception, to interpret the vedas by saying that such
a reality is absent in the world means they are denying
something which was never known. The world's absolute
reality is imperceptible, thus it need not be denied by the
shruti.

The siddhikAra - don't argue thus, because:

तासां चक्षुरादिप्रसक्तद्वैतनिषेधपरत्वात्, The intention of those shrutis is to

deny the reality of the duality that is cognised by the eyes etc.

पारमार्थिकत्वेन द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वेऽपि नाप्रसक्तनिषेधकत्वं; Even if it is argued that

those shrutis do not claim the absolute absence of the world,
but intend to deny that the existence of the world is ultimately
real (that is, they do not say the world is absent, they merely
say that the world does not really exist) - even then, such a
denial is not the negation of something unstated. They still
serve a purpose.

परोक्षप्रसक्ते: संभवात् Because, there is a possibility that such a

reality is indirectly known. For instance, one may have a doubt
that the world exists, as it is seen - thus, shrutis that deny
ultimate reality to the world are not denying something that is
not claimed by anyone.

'नान्तरिक्षेऽग्निश्चेतव्य' इत्यादिवदप्रस्क्तप्रतिषेधस्याप्युपपत्तेच श्च| Even if it is

denying an impossibility, such statements are seen in the
veda. For example, this statement occurs in the vedas "do not
perform a sacrifice in space". It is not possible to build an altar
in space, so how can a sacrifice be performed there? Thus the
denial of an impossibility does not imply the invalidity of the
statement.

The pUrvapakshi then asks,

नच - अतात्त्विकप्रपञ्चे यदि तात्त्विकत्वमप्यध्यक्षेण न गृह्यते, कथं तर्हि
तस्यातत्त्वावेदकत्वम् ? If perception is not capable of revealing
the unreal world as real, why is it claimed (by you, the
advaitin) that perception does not have a truth-declaring
character?
नहि तदेव तत्त्वेनावेदयत् अत्तात्त्विकं नाम, दृश्यते च सार्वलौकिकप्रपञ्चे
पारमार्थिकत्वानुभव To reveal something "as it actually is", means
that it reveals the reality of things. It is observed from
everyone's experience of the world, that it is absolutely real.
Therefore, if perception reveals the reality of the world, it must
be true, and if it is true, such a perception will overrule any
inference which contradicts it.

इति - वाच्यम् ; The siddhikAra says - Do not argue thus, because

नह्यस्माकम् तत्त्वावेदकत्वं तद्वति प्रकराकत्वं, तद्भिन्नत्वमतत्त्वावेदकत्वम्,
The truth-declaring character of any means of knowledge,
according to us, is not in revealing "a thing as it is", nor is the
absence of truth-declaring character in revealing something
that does not exist as existing.
किन्त्वबाधितविषयत्वं तत्त्वावेदकत्वम्, बाधितविषयत्वं चातत्त्वावेदकत्वम्, Rather,
the truth-declaring character of a means of knowledge is in
revealing that which is not sublated, and its absence is in
revealing that which is sublated.
अबाधितविषयत्वं च श्रौते ब्रह्मज्ञान एव, न तद्भिन्नज्ञाने
तात्पर्यवद्वेदत्वेनैव तत्त्वावबोधकत्वात् | Having an unsublatable
object is ultimately true only in the case of the cognition of
brahman, which cognition is born from the shruti, and not for
any other means of knowledge. Even shruti sentences that
speak of things other than Brahman (perform agnihotra
sacrifice, do no harm, etc.), are not unsublatable. Does this
make some part of vedic revelation truthful, and another part
not truthful? No, when we talk of truth-declaring character
being only in sentences that reveal brahman, what is meant is
that the ultimate import of veda is in revealing those
sentences - all other revelation have secondary import.

तथाच प्रपञ्चप्रत्यक्षस्य तात्विकत्वागोचरत्वेऽप्यतत्त्वावेदकत्वं

सङ्गच्छते | Therefore, even though the perception of the world
does not reveal its ultimate reality, one can say that
perception does not have a truth-declaring character.

It was said that the experience of everyone is that the world is

real, therefore one perceives the reality of the world. Such a
perception has the ability to overcome the inference of the
world's unreality. That is not true. Even when there is an
indirect experience of something, one tends to mistakenly call
it as direct perception.
सार्वलौकिकी पारमार्थिकत्वप्रसिद्धिस्तु
जलगतपिपासोपशमनसामर्थ्यप्रसिद्धिवत् परोक्षतयाप्युपपन्ना नापरोक्षत्वपर्यवसायिनी
। The common experience of reality of the world, does not
mean that the experience is a direct one. For example, the
knowledge that water quenches thirst is an inferential one,
and thus an indirect experience. I knew that a glass of water
quenched my thirst in the past. I am thirsty now, thus another
glass of water should quench my thirst, but that cognition is
not perception because one has not drunk that glass of water
yet. Therefore, it is only an inference, and thus indirect.
However, because one is intimately aware of it, one thinks it is
a matter of perception.

Just because one is intimately aware of the world's reality,

one cannot declare that such an experience is perception.
Therefore, one cannot argue that by virtue of it being
perception, it can overrule the inference of the world's
unreality.

Thus we say so in the following verse:

तस्मादध्यक्षयोग्यस्य सत्त्वस्येहानिरुक्तित: |
नाध्यक्षबाधो मिथ्यात्वलिङ्गस्यात्रोपपद्यते ||
Therefore, that which is capable of being perceived, cannot be
declared as real. What is known by an inference of unreality
cannot be disproved by perception.

न लौकिकं न सामन्यजन्यं साक्ष्यात्मकं न च |

प्रत्यक्षं बाधते लिङ्गं मिथ्यात्वस्यानुमापकम् ||
Neither sensory perception, nor extra-sensory perception
(sAmAnya lakshaNa pratyAsatti / alaukika pratyaksha), nor the
perception by the sAkshi can disprove the inference of
unreality.
sann ghaTa iti pratyakshe
adhiShThAnAnuvedha:
The next chapter in the advaita siddhi is to establish that
when objects in the world are perceived, the existence that
each object appears to have, does not in reality belong to the
object, but to the substratum, Brahman.

The siddhikAra starts off the chapter with this proposition:

'किन्चेदं रूप्यं' इत्यत्र इदमितिवत् 'सन् घट' इत्यत्रापि सदित्यधिष्ठानभूतं ब्रह्मैव
भासते | When the shell silver is observed - "This is shell silver",
it is Brahman, the substratum, that appears as existence in the
aspect "This is".

नच - चाक्षुषादिज्ञाने रूपदिहीनस्य ब्रह्मण: कथं स्फुरणमिति - वाच्यम् ;

The opponent may ask - "How can Brahman, which is without
form, appear?", but that is incorrect because:

रूपादिहीनस्यापि कालादिन्यायेन स्फुरणस्य प्रागेवोपपादितत्वात् | It has already

been established that it is possible for formless entities, like
time, to be perceived.

When a pot is seen, its temporal existence, (ie, "it is seen

now") is also included within the range of perception. If time
can be seen, then Brahman, as existence, which is the
substratum for all objects, can be seen too.

नन्वेवं - 'नीलो घट: मिथ्या रूप्यमसन्नृशृङ्ग'मित्यादावपि 'नील' इत्यादिरधिष्ठानानुवेध इति

स्यात्,
The opponent argues - If that is the case, in each of the
following cognitions: "The pot is black", "The silver is unreal",
"The hare's horn is non-existent", 'black', 'unreal' and 'non-
existent' can also be said to be the substrata, and thus
Brahman.

If being observed in every perception of an object makes it a

substratum, then blackness, unreality or non-existence should
also be Brahman.
नच - नैल्यं घटादिष्वस्ति, सत्त्वं तु नेति - वाच्यम् ; The advaitin may argue that
while blackness exists in the pot, existence does not -
however this would be an incorrect argument, because:

या
अस्यारोपितत्वसिद्ध्युत्तरकालीनत्वेनान्योन्यारयात् ; because proving
त्
श्र
that (that existence does not belong to the pot) can happen
only after it is proved that the pot is unreal, and therefore this
suffers from the flaw of mutual dependence.

Existence can be said to not belong to the pot only if the pot is
first proved to be unreal. However, this argument is being
made in the context of trying to prove that the pot is unreal.

अन्यथा 'सत्यं ज्ञान' मित्यत्रापि सत्यमित्यधिष्ठानानुवेध एव स्यात् Otherwise,

in (the definition of Brahman given in the taittirIya upaniShad
as) "Existence, Consciousness, Bliss", it can be argued that
Existence belongs to the substratum, onto which Brahman is
superimposed.

These were the opponent's arguments against the idea of

existence of objects really being Brahman, the substratum.

The siddhikAra now responds: - इति चेन्न; If this is your argument,

no.

सन्नित्यस्य 'घट' इत्यनेन सामानिधिकरणस्य बाधित्वात् | Because there is

a contradiction if existence were to be located in the pot.

तथाहि - सत्ताजातिस्फुरणनिबन्धनं वा स्वरुपसत्त्वनिबन्धनं वा

कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वनिबन्धनं वा सामानिधिकरण्यं स्यात् | That (existence belonging
to the pot) would only be possible if 1) existence was a jAti, a
universal class, to which the pot belonged 2) existence was
the nature of the pot, or 3) if the pot could not be sublated in
any of the three periods of time.

नचाभावादिसाधारणसत्प्रतीतौ सत्ताजातिस्फुरणं संभवति; अभावादिषु त्वयापि

तदनङ्गीकारात् | It cannot be the first, because in the perception
of absence, when absence is seen to exist, it cannot be argued
that it is existence as a class that is seen in absence. You too
agree that absence cannot belong to a class of existent
entities.
नच क्वचित्साक्षात्संबन्धेन क्वचित् परस्परासंबन्धेन सदिति प्रतीत्युपपत्ति:, One
cannot say that some objects belong to the class of the
existent directly (for example in existent objects such as
pots), whereas in some other instances (like absence), they
belong to the class of the existent indirectly (through the
medium of the counterpositive of the absence, for instance).
विजातीयसम्बन्धेन समानाकारप्रतीत्यनुपपत्ते:, अन्यथा संबन्धभेद एव न
सिद्ध्येत् | One cannot hold that two distinct (the existing pot
and its absence) have a like appearance, otherwise, the
cognition of difference itself would not be possible.

नच स्वरूपसत्त्वेनाभावादौ तत्प्रतीति:, अननुगमात्, It cannot be said that

in the case of absence, the relationship with existence is
inherent (whereas in the case of existent entities, the
relationship of class and particulars), because that would be
an inconsistent postulation.
अननुगतेनापि अनुगतप्रतीतौ जातिमात्रोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् | Even if that
inconsistency was ignored for the sake of the argument, we
have to remember that the reason why existence as a class
was introduced in the first place was to explain how many
objects appear to exist. If it is now said that completely
different entities, such as an object and its absence, can have
a common relationship with existence, there is no reason to
postulate that existence is a class. If everything exists, then
there is no need to postulate existence as a class to which
everything belongs.

अतएव न सर्वत्रापि सर्वरूपसत्त्वेनैव सद्व्यवहार:, एकेनैव सर्वानुगतेन

सर्वत्र सत्प्रतीत्युपपत्तौ बहुनां तद्धेतुत्वकल्पने मानाभावात् | Therefore (if
existence is seen in every perception of objects), it cannot be
said that the experience everywhere is an unique one inherent
to that object. When every perception of existence is of the
same existence, there is no basis to claim that the existence
seen in every object is inherently different.

नापि कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वनिबन्धनं तत् ; तस्य चक्षुराद्यगम्यत्वस्योक्तत्वात्, 'सदिदं रजत' मित्यादिभ्रमे

अभावाच्च | Nor is the existence of something, the absence of its
sublation in all three periods of time, because the
perceptibility of such an existence has already been disproven;
moreover, in the illusion "This is silver", such an existence
does not exist.

तस्मादेकं सर्वाधिष्ठानमेव सदिति सर्वत्रानुभूयत इति युक्तम्, Therefore, it

is appropriate to say that it is the one existence that is the
substratum of everything and is experienced everywhere.

The opponent had argued that blackness, unreality and non-

existence can also be Brahman. That is being disproven next.

नीलादेस्तु घटादिसामानाधिकरण्ये किमपि नास्ति बाधकम्, (While there is a

contradiction if existence belonged to pots,) there is no
contradiction if blackness etc, belonged to pots, etc.
न वा नीलादेरधिष्ठानत्वम् संभवति; प्रागसत्त्वात् Nor can blackness be said
to be their substratum, for in the absence of the pot, there is
no blackness either. Moreover, the pot may not be black in the
past, it may be black now. Therefore, one cannot say that pot
is superimposed on blackness.
नीलपीतादिप्रातिस्विकानन्ताधिष्ठानकल्पने गौरवात्, Further, to grant the status of
substratum to different colours like black, yellow is a needless
addition of assumptions that makes the proposition unwieldy.
अधिष्ठेयतुल्ययोगक्षेमत्वाच्च | अधिष्ठेयविषमसत्ताकमेव ह्यधिष्ठानं भवति;
Moreover, they (colours) have the same order of reality as the
objects (pots, etc.) they inhere in, and thus cannot be the
substratum which necessarily has a different (higher) order of
reality than the superimposed.

'मिथ्या रूप्यमसन्नृशृङ्ग' मित्यादौ मिथ्यात्वासत्त्वयोरधिष्ठानत्वशङ्कापि नास्तीति शून्यवादापत्ते: |

Therefore, there cannot even be a trace of a doubt that
unreality or non-existence can be the substratum, because
that would lead to nihilism.
तत्र चानुपपत्तिरुक्ता; वक्ष्यते च | The impossibility of that (nihilism) has
been said, and will be explained further later.

यत्तु - 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्त' मित्यत्रापि तथा स्यात् - इति | तन्न; यतो न तत्र
सत्तासम्बन्धेन सत्त्वम् किन्तु स्वरूपेणैवेत्युक्तदोषानवका त्त् | It was said
शा
that the existence in vedic sentences such as "Existence,
Consciosuness, Bliss" etc also can be a substratum for
Brahman. That is not possible, because the existence there (in
Brahman) is not a relativistic one, but an inherent one. Thus, to
claim that Brahman is superimposed (a relation) on existence
is not possible at all.

नचैवं घटादावपि स्वरूपेणैव तथात्वम् ; पूर्वमेव निराकृ तत्वात्, One cannot argue
thereby that the existence of pots, etc., is also inherent , as
that has been disproved already.

| Therefore, it is the existence-

इति सन्घट इति प्रत्यक्षेऽधिष्ठानानुवेधनिरूपणम्
substratum that appears in the perception "The pot exists".
jAtyupakramanyAyAdibhi:
pratyakshaprAbalyanirAsa:
The next chapter in the advaita siddhi examines the relative
strength of direct perception compared to the other means of
knowledge. The nyAyAmritakAra cites various rules
from pUrva-mImAmsa to argue for the relative strength of
perception. Using this, he wishes to prove that when
perception is in contradiction with inference, perception will
overrule the conclusion of inference. Perception according to
him, proves the reality of the world. The advaitin says that
inference proves its unreality. The nyAyAmritakAra wishes to
prove that even if the advaitin's inference was correct,
perception would overrule it.

This was refuted by the siddhikAra in several ways. In a

previous chapter, he had argued that perception does not
prove a reality to the world that is contradictory to the
unreality postulated by inference. In other words, the
empirical reality that is observed by perception, is the same
as the unreality established by inference.
In the current chapter, he refutes this argument differently - he
argues that perception cannot rule out inference per se.

अथ जात्युपक्रमादिन्यायै: प्रत्यक्षप्राबल्यनिरास: | Now we shall refute

the arguments to establish the relative strength of direct
perception using pUrva mImAmsa maxims such as innate
character (jAti), first arising (upakrama) etc.

किञ्च निश्चितप्रामाण्यमेव प्रत्यक्षमितरबाधकं भवेत्, नचात्र प्रामाण्यं निश्चितम्;

आगमविरोधात्, अनुमानविरोधात्, भाविबाधाभावानिर्णयाच्च, Only when the
validity of perception is certain, can it override other means of
knowledge. However, the validity of perception is not certain
here, for it contradicts shruti (sentences such as "there is no
multiplicity here"), inference (of the world's unreality), and
because the absence of a future sublation of the world is
uncertain in the present.
The pUrvapakshi replies:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रबलमनुमानागामबाधकम्, नानुमानागमौ, प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्ये
तद्विरोधाभावेनानुमानागमयो: प्रामाण्यम्, तयो: प्रामाण्ये च तद्विरोधात्
या
प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्यमित्यन्योन्यारयात्त्, नहि प्रत्यक्षस्य
श्र
प्रामाण्येप्येवमन्योन्यारययश्र:, तस्यानपक्षेत्वात् -

प्रत्यक्षमेव प्रबलमनुमानागामबाधकम्, नानुमानागमौ, Direct perception is

definitely stronger and is capable of overruling scripture and
inference. Scripture and inference are incapable of
contradicting perception by themselves, because
प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्ये तद्विरोधाभावेनानुमानागमयो: प्रामाण्यम् if perception
is invalid, because it is unable to contradict scripture and
inference, their validity is established
या
तयो: प्रामाण्ये च तद्विरोधात् प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्यमित्यन्योन्यारयात् , and
त्
श्र
the validity of scripture and inference proves the invalidity of a
contradictory perception, leading to a mutual dependence
between the two.
Thus the validity of scripture and inference requires that a
perception that overrules them is invalid, and in the absence of
invalidity in perception, scripture and inference that contradict
such a valid perception are themselves invalid.
:, तस्यानपक्षेत्वात्
नहि प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रामाण्येप्येवमन्योन्यारययश्र
However, the validity of perception does not suffer from a
similar flaw of mutual dependence, for it does not require the
invalidity of other means of knowledge for its own validity.

The basic argument made by the pUrvapakshi is that when

there are two means of knowledge of equal strength, and if
they happen to contradict each other, the validity of one is
dependent on the invalidity of the other; however, if one of the
two is stronger than the other, the validity of the stronger
means of knowledge is independent - it does not depend on the
invalidity of the other.

The siddhikAra responds:

- इति चेन्न ; if this is the argument, no.
ना त्
चन्द्रतारकादिपरिमाणप्रत्यक्षे अनुमानागमविरोधेन तस्याप्रामाण्यदर्नात्र्श
तेनापि
मपेक्
स्वप्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थमितराविरोधस्यावयमपेक्षणीयत्वात्षणी यत्वा
त् | The moon and
श्य
stars may appear to be small, but because it is contradictory
to inference and scientific testimony, it is established as
invalid. Thus even in the case of perception, its validity is
dependent on the absence of contradiction by other means of
knowledge. One cannot argue on the basis of the absolute
strength of perception that its validity is not affected by a
contradiction by other means of knowledge.

यतुल्यत्
वा
तथाचान्योन्यारयतुल्यत्वात्त्श्रपरस्परविरोधेन प्रामाण्यसन्देहे
सत्यनाप्ताप्रणीतत्वादिना प्रमाजनकत्वव्याप्तेः वेदप्रामाण्यनिश्चये जाते तेन
स्वतस्सम्भावितदोषस्य प्रत्यक्षया बाधात् अस्मन्मते क्वान्योन्याश्रय:? Thus, as
mutual dependency is similarly present, when the two means
of knowledge are in contradiction, the validity of perception is
also similarly called into doubt. That being so, as vedic
scripture is not a creation of faulty agents, its capacity for
giving rise to valid knowledge must be admitted. Therefore, as
there is the cognition of certainty of the validity of the vedas,
how can the fault of mutual dependence be levied against us,
even when that vedic scripture is in contradiction with
perception, which has the potential for being faulty, as it is
born from sense organs, which could be mistaken?

अन्यथा देहात्मैक्यप्रत्यक्षबुद्ध्या बाधाद्देहभिन्नत्वमप्यात्मनो नागमानुमानाभ्यां सिद्ध्येत् |

If you insist on perception being always stronger than
scripture and inference, the scriptural teaching of "you are the
self, not the body", which is accepted by you too, would be
overruled by everyone's perception "I am a human being".

First argument of the pUrvapakshi

Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, because that strength
is a universal characteristic that is present in perception.
The opponent says:
ननु - प्रत्यक्षमनुमानद्यपेक्षया जात्यैव प्रबलम् ; कथमन्यथा
औ ष् ण् य प्र त् य क्षे ण वह्निशैत्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्ध: ?
The strength of perception compared to inference, etc. is an
intrinsic property to all perception. If that is not accepted,
what prevents one from claiming that the perception "fire is
hot" is also overruled by an inference claiming "fire is cold"?
नच - तत्रोपजीव्यत्वनिबन्धनं प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकत्वम्; धर्म्यादेश्चक्षुरादिनैव
सिद्धेस्त्वचोऽनुपजीव्यत्वात्,
You may argue - "As the inference of fire being cold is
dependent on the sense of touch to establish the meaning of
coldness, such an inference, which depends on the sense of
touch, cannot overrule the very same sense of touch which
establishes that fire is hot."
This is untrue, because one cannot say that the inference of
fire being cold is dependent on touch, because the cognition of
fire itself is by sight, so the inference of fire depends on sight,
not touch.
किञ्च प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्यम् अनुमाद्यगृहीतरेखोपरेखादिग्राहकत्वात्
Moreover, the relative strength of perception is well
established because it reveals things that other means of
knowledge cannot - No amount of inference can prove whether
one line is bigger than the other. Only perception can do that.
अनुमानाद्यनिवर्तितदिङ्ग्मोहादिनिवर्तकत्वाच्च Similarly, if one has lost
their sense of bearings, one cannot infer which direction is
which, only perception can reveal that. Therefore, perception
is certainly stronger than inference.

The siddhikAra replies:

- इति चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.
त्वाचप्रत्यक्षस्याप्युपजीव्यत्वेनैव शैत्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वसम्भवात्, It is only
because the sense of touch is the basis (upajIvya) for the
inference for fire's coldness, that it is able to overrule the
latter.
चक्षुरादिना धर्म्यादिग्रहेऽपि त्वचं विना साध्यप्रसिद्धेरभावात् | Even though fire is
seen, heat or coldness can only be known by touch, not
otherwise.
तथाच न जात्या प्राबल्ये मानमस्ति | Therefore one cannot say that the
relative strength of perception is something intrinsic to it.

The opponent had argued that as perception is able to reveal

things that only it can, it is superior to other means of
knowledge. The siddhikAra refutes this next.
तदगृहीतग्राहित्वमपि न प्राबल्ये प्रयोजकम् ; The fact that perception
reveals things that are otherwise unknown does not make
perception universally stronger.
प्रत्यक्षागृहीतधर्मादिग्राहकत्वेन परोक्षप्रमाणस्यैव प्राबल्यापत्ते: |
Because, by that logic, as only mediate knowledge (scripture)
reveals merit and sin (puNya, pApa etc) which are not
otherwise revealed by perception, they would end up stronger
than perception.
नाप्यनुमानाद्यनिवर्तितदिङ्ग्मोहादिनिवर्तकत्वेन प्राबल्यम् ; एतावता हि वैधर्म्यमात्रं सिद्धम् | Just
because a confusion about directions is unresolved by
inference, but is clarified by perception, one cannot conclude
that perception is universally stronger than perception. By that
much, all that is proven is that perception and inference are
different.

नच तावतेतरप्रमाणापेक्षया प्राबल्यं भवति |

रगभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वाच्चक्
अन्यथात्वाचप्रत्यक्षानिवर्तितवं'रगभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वाच्चक्षुषु
शो
षोऽपि त्वगपेक्षया
प्राबल्यं स्यात् । With that much alone, the strength of perception
compared to other means of knowledge is not proven. If the
criterion for universal strength is that in any particular
instance, one means of knowledge happens to overrule the
other, then another example can be quoted to arrive at an
opposite conclusion. For example, someone may touch a piece
of bamboo and mistake it for a snake (because both are
smooth to touch), but when they see the object carefully they
realise it is a bamboo stick, not a snake. By that much, can
you say that sight is always stronger than touch ?

ततच श्चचित्रनिम्नोन्न्तज्ञानस्य चाक्षुषस्य तद्विरोधित्वाचज्ञानात् बाधो न स्यात् | If that

was universally true, an experience where touch overrules
sight would not occur. For example, sometimes a picture of an
object is so natural that the object it depicts appears to be
real, but when someone reaches to touch it, it is discovered to
be only a picture. Touch disproves what sight revealed. Does
that make touch stronger than sight always?

प्रत्युतागमस्यैव सर्वत: प्राबल्यं स्मार्यते | However, in reality, we

hold that vedic scripture is stronger than all other means of
knowledge.

'प्राबल्यमागमस्यैव जात्या तेषु त्रिषु स्मृतम् | ' इति | As the smriti says,
shruti is the strongest of the three - perception, inference and
shruti.

नच - तद्वैदिकार्थविषयमिति - वाच्यम् ; अद्वैतस्यापि वैदिकार्थत्वात् | Do not

argue that the veda's authority is limited to only scriptural
matters, for non-duality also happens to be within that realm.

क्वच प्रत्यक्षत: प्राप्तमनुमानागमबाधितमिति तु

परीक्षितप्रामाण्यप्रत्यक्षविषयम् | In some instances, where the
results of perception are well-tested, and there is certainty
that it is the truth, such a perception is capable of overruling
inference and scripture, requiring them to be reinterpreted.
However, that does not mean that all inference and scripture
lose their validity.

Second argument of the pUrvapakshi

Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, because of the
mImAmsa maxim of upakrama nyAya, it is the first one to arise.
Until now, we had looked at the first argument advanced by
the opponent, that perception was stronger because of a
characteristic that is intrinsic and universal to all perception.
Now we will consider a second argument.
ननु - प्रत्यक्षस्यासंजातविरोधित्वादुपक्रमन्यायेनैव प्राबल्यम् |
Perception is stronger than other means of knowledge, on the
basis of the rule that the means of knowledge that arises first
is the strongest. When it arises, it is not accompanied by a
doubt over its veracity, and a means of knowledge that arises
afterwards cannot overrule it.

The world is first perceived to be real, it is only later when

someone studies advaita that they are told it is mithyA. The
first cognition is the correct one, because there was no doubt
when it arose.

उक्तंहि - 'असंजातविरोधित्वादर्थवादो यथाश्रुत:| आस्थेयस्तद्विरुद्धस्य विध्युद्देशस्य

लक्षणा'
According to pUrva mImAmsa: "When an arthavAda is
encountered without anything to contradict it, it has to be
interpreted literally (as heard). Where there is a (subsequent)
injunction that contradicts that literal meaning, it is the
injunction that has to be reinterpreted to take a secondary
meaning."

This rule occurs in the context of an arthavAda which says

that the rig veda was born from agni (fire), the yajur veda from
vAyu (wind), sAma veda from Aditya (the sun). Later, there is
an injunction which says that one should recite the rig loudly,
the yajus quietly, etc. Here a question is raised - Do the words
rig, yajus, etc. in the injunction refer to some individual mantra
occurring in the respective veda or the should the entire veda
be recited thus? The pUrva mImAmsaka argues that when the
arthavAda is heard, there is no doubt that it refers to the entire
rig veda being born from agni, yajurveda from vAyu etc. When
the injunction subsequently arises, it needs to be interpreted
in line with the arthavAda - therefore, that meaning must be
used when there is a doubt whether the injunction applies to
only mantra or the entire veda.

The nyAyAmritakAra is invoking that rule and argues that

when the world is perceived, there is no doubt about its
validity, therefore when an inference or the veda itself is
contradicting that perception, one must reinterpret the
inference and the veda to bring it in line with perception, and
not the other way around.

The siddhikAra responds:

- इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
The mImAmsa "principle of first arising" can only be applied
where there is a link between the arthavAda and the
injunction. If the veda only stipulates injunctions and
prohibitions, people may not be inspired to follow them. Thus
arthavAda portions occur to extol the benefits of following a
particular injunction, or the dangers of doing something
prohibited.

यत एकवाक्यस्थ परस्परसापेक्षपदत्वेन उभयो: साम्ये सति

उपक्रमस्थवेदपदानुरोधेन उपसंहारस्थर्गादिपदानां मन्त्रमात्रवाचिनां कृ त्स्नवेदपरत्वे
निर्णीतेऽपि न प्रकृते तन्न्याय: संभवति;
Where the arthavAda and injunction constitute one sentence,
that is, where both deal with the same topic, on account of the
mutual dependence between each other, there is an equality
assigned to both, and the word "veda" that appears in the
beginning (in the arthavAda) is taken to mean the entire veda
even though the word "rig", etc. appearing subsequently (in the
injunction) seems to indicate only a particular mantra.
However, that rule cannot be applied in our context.

तस्
उभयो: साम्याभावात्, गृहीतप्रमाणभावश्रुत्यपेक्षया भ्रमविलक्षणत्वेनानिचितस्य यश्चि
प्रत्यक्षस्य न्यूनबलत्वात् ; because, there is no equality between the
world's reality as perceived and its mithyAtva as stipulated by
shruti - for, a perception whose validity is in doubt is weaker
than the shruti whose validity is certain.

अन्यथा 'इदं रजत' मिति भ्रमोऽपि 'इयं शुक्ति' रिति आप्तोपदे पक्षया
पक्षयाशा
प्रबलं
स्यात् | Otherwise (if it is not accepted that the relative
certainty of validity between the two contradictory means of
knowledge is the determining factor of which one overrules
the other), then the illusion of shell-silver perceived will end up
overruling a statement made by a wise well-wisher that "it is
actually a shell".

Let us assume that a person rushes to pick up a shell thinking

it is silver and is stopped by a well-wisher who advises him
that it is only a shell. The illusion occurs before the verbal
testimony, and as it arises there is no doubt in the seer's mind
that it is valid (it is not accompanied by an overruling
cognition). If the opponent is true, that would be sufficient for
the illusion to overrule the verbal testimony, but that would
end up with the wrong result.

Third argument of the pUrvapakshi

Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, because it is
shIghragAmi, it is the quickest to produce a result.
The siddhikAra says:
एतेन - लिङ्गात् श्रुतेरिव शीघ्रगामित्वात् प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्यम्, तदुक्तम् - 'प्रत्यक्षे
चानुमेने च यथा लोके बलाबलम् | शीघ्रमन्थरगामित्वात्तथैव श्रुतिलिङ्गयो: ॥' इत्यपास्तम् ; By
the above, your following argument is also refuted.
The opponent's argument: Similar to shruti being accepted as
stronger than inference, on account of it producing a result
quicker than inference, perception is stronger than both. As
was said elsewhere: "In worldly matters it is accepted that
perception is stronger than inference because it produces a
result faster than inference, similarly in vedic matters shruti is
stronger than inference".
In a particular portion of the rig veda there is a mantra which
says "Indra, you do not deceive those that worship you with
offerings. You provide them with all manner of happiness".
Hearing this, one may think the deity being invoked with this
mantra is Indra, on account of the indicatory mark, linga, that
refers to the god Indra. However, the shruti in the same
context provides an injunction "the wife of the sacrificer
worships the gArhapatya agni with this mantra".

Here, the shruti is directly saying that the deity being invoked
is gArhapatya agni, and not Indra. Therefore, the shruti is
taken to be stronger than the indicatory mark, because it is
more direct in producing the knowledge compared to the
indicatory mark whereby one has to infer the meaning.
Similarly, the opponent argues that between perception on the
one hand and shruti and inference on the other, the former is
stronger because it is more direct in meaning.

With the inference of fire in the mountain, one needs to first

perceive smoke in the mountain, he must have the prior
knowledge of invariable concomitance that wherever smoke is
present, fire must also be present, the sight of smoke must
trigger the memory of the invariable concomitance, which will
finally allow him to conclude that fire must also be present.
Instead of this process, if he had seen fire in the first instance,
that would be a quicker way to come to the conclusion. If the
speed of arriving at a conclusion is the basis for relative
strength, perception is stronger than inference.
Similarly shruti is also slower than perception. The teacher
must first teach the veda to the student, the student should
understand the language, the words must meet various criteria
to generate the appropriate meaning, etc. Thus on the same
basis, shruti too can be argued to be weaker than perception.

परीक्षतस्य मन्थरगामिनोऽपि प्राबल्यात् | The siddhikAra refutes this line

of argument on the grounds that the strength of a means of
knowledge is in it being verified to be true, even if it happens
to be slower.

Fourth argument of the pUrvapakshi

Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, invoking the
mImAmsa principle of sAmAnya-visheSha nyAya, special and general rules.
The opponent then argues that perception is stronger because
of the mImAmsa maxim of sAmAnya visheShya nyAya.

There is a general rule that is applicable across various rituals

that when a 'homa' (offering of oblations directed to a
particular deity in the sacrificial fire) is performed, it is to be
performed in the AhavanIya fire. However, there is a special
rule in the case of a particular homa performed in the
jyotiShToma sacrifice, which is a soma sacrifice. The soma, a
particular species of creeper used in the sacrifice, is to be
purchased in exchange for a very particular kind of calf - A
one-year old black calf with yellow eyes must be offered to the
seller of the soma. The veda further prescribes that a homa
must be performed at the place where the offered cow plants
its hooves.

There are two conflicting injunctions - a general rule that the

homa is to be performed at the place of AhavanIya fire, and
another specific to the jyotiShToma, that it is to be performed
at the location of the hoofprint. A doubt occurs - which rule is
to be followed in the jyotiShToma? According to pUrva
mImAmsa, when there is a rule applicable generally in
contradiction to another applied in a specific situation, the
special rule prevails. The opponent tries to apply this maxim to
argue that perception is stronger than veda.

न च - 'यदाहवनीये जुहोति' इत्यस्मात् 'पदे जुहोती'त्यस्य विशेष्यत्वेन प्राबल्यात्

घटविषयसत्त्वग्राहिण: प्रत्यक्षस्य सामान्यतो द्वैतनिषेधकश्रुत्यपेक्षया प्राबल्यमिति - वाच्यम्;
The siddhikAra says, do not argue thus - 'As the special rule
"offer the oblations at the hoof" is accepted to be stronger
than the general rule "offer oblations in the AhavanIya",
perception establishing the reality of a particular pot must also
be accepted to be stronger then a general denial of duality'.
This is not applicable in the context because,
षन् या
सामान्यवि षन्यायस्यशेयस् य निश्चितप्रामाणभावोभयविषयत्वात्, the maxim of special and
general rules can only be applied when the validity of both
rules is certain. In this context, perception is not always valid -
it sometimes produces valid cognition, and sometimes invalid.
Therefore this mImAmsa maxim cannot be applied here.

अन्यथा 'अयं गौरश्व' इत्यादेरपि गौरश्वो न भवतीत्यादित: प्राबल्यं भवेत् | If this

was not true, if someone were to say "this cow is a horse", to
indicate that a particular cow happens to run fast, such a
statement applicable to a particular case where a figurative
meaning is intended, would always overrule the general
statement, "a cow and horse are different", even where that
particular meaning is not valid, which would be an absurd
situation. Therefore, the mImAmsa maxim is to be applied only
in the context where both rules happen to be true, and not
indiscriminately.

Fifth argument of the pUrvapakshi

Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, invoking the
mImAmsa principle of sAvakAsha - niravakAsha nyAya, the application of rules
in a manner that offers scope for both rules.

The pUrvapakshi's argument is summarised first:

In the portion of the veda describing the procedure for the
jyotishToma sacrifice, there is an injunction:
यत्किञ्चित्प्राचीनमग्नीषोमीयात्तेनोपांशुचरति - Any subsidiary rituals (dIkshaNIya,
yUpAvaTam, dharbhairavasTRNam, RtvikvaraNam, etc) that
precede the agnIShomIya sacrifice (part of the jyotiShToma)
must be performed in a quiet voice (only the performer should
be able to hear the mantras).

However after this injunction, there is a sentence 'यावत्या वाचा

कामयेत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूयात्', one may chant the mantra howsoever
one desires (whether loudly, quietly, etc) in the dIkshaNIya
sacrifice.

This raises a question - the mantras in the dIkshaNIya, which

is a sacrifice that occurs before the agnIShomIya, must be
spoken in a quiet voice according to the first rule. However,
the second rule says that one may chant the mantras
howsoever one desires. If the sacrificer interprets the
contradiction to say the first rule overrules the second one,
then the latter is rendered useless - the freedom to chant the
mantra in any tone exists only for the dIkshaNIya, and no other
ritual. It would have no scope for application. However, if one
does go with the second rule, and chants the mantra loudly, he
would be in violation of the first rule.

In such a situation, pUrvamImAmsa stipulates that in this

case, the first rule should be reinterpreted to give avakAsha,
scope for the second rule's application. Breaking the first rule
and applying the second rule is acceptable so that the
legitimacy of both rules is preserved. If one just applied the
first rule in all precedent rituals, the second one will have no
area of application, and its validity would be lost.

Therefore, the interpretation according to pUrvamImAmsa

states that in all precedent rituals except the dIkshaNIya, the
first rule (chanting quietly) is applied, and in the dIkshaNIya
alone, the second rule (freedom to chant as one desires) is
applied.

This is generalised into a maxim called sAvakAsha -

niravakAsha nyAya, which essentially means that when there
are two rules - one which has a broad scope for application,
and another one which has a narrow scope for application, and
one is faced with a choice of which rule to apply in any given
situation, one must always apply the rule with the narrower
scope in its specific area of scope, and the other rule with the
broader rule can be applied in other areas.

The pUrvapakshi invokes that rule and tries to prove that

perception is stronger than inference and shruti.

नच - यथा 'यत्किञ्चित्प्राचीनमग्नीषोमीयात्तेनोपांशुचरतित्यत्रत्यस्य यत्किञ्चिच्छब्दस्य

यत्किन्चित्प्रकृ तवाचित्वेन सामान्याविषयत्वेऽपि दीक्षणीयाव्यतिरिक्ते सावकाशत्ववत् 'यावत्या
वाचा कामयेत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूया ' दित्यनेन निरवकाशेन संकोचस्तथा प्रत्यक्षेण
निरवकाशेन वृत्त्यन्तरेनानेकार्थत्वेन वा विषयान्तरपरत्वेन सावका या या : श्रुते: सङ्कोच: किं न
शा
स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;

He says:
यथा 'यत्किञ्चित्प्राचीनमग्नीषोमीयात्तेनोपांशुचरतित्यत्रत्यस्य यत्किञ्चिच्छब्दस्य यत्किन्चित्प्रकृ तवाचित्वेन
सामान्याविषयत्वेऽपि दीक्षणीयाव्यतिरिक्ते सावकाशत्ववत् Like in the case of
the injunction "In any sacrifice preceding the agnIShOmIya,
one must chant the mantras quietly", the words "in any", are
interpreted to apply to all sacrifices except the dIkshaNIya,

'यावत्या वाचा कामयेत तावत्या दीक्षणीयायामनुब्रूयात्' इत्यनेन निरवकाशेन सङ्कोच: in

order to preserve the scope of application of the other
injunction "One can chant in the dIkshaNIya as one desires",
for in the absence of reinterpreting those words in that
manner, the second rule would have no application

या
तथा प्रत्यक्षेण निरवकाशेन वृत्त्यन्तरेणानेकार्थत्वेन वा विषयान्तरपरत्वेन सावका या : श्रुते:
शा
सङ्कोच: किं न स्यात् ? Similarly, why cannot shruti, which has such
a broad scope for interpretation - the same words can refer to
different things, by direct denotation (shakti vritti), or by
implication (lakshaNA vritti) or can be reinterpreted saying
that their import is in conveying something else altogether -
be interpreted in such a way that the reality of the world that
is conveyed by perception is not lost? Perception cannot be
reinterpreted in any other way, so it has a limited scope,
whereas shruti can take a range of meaning, and therefore it is
the latter that must be reinterpreted, in line with the pUrva
mImAmsa maxim of sAvakAsha niravakAsha nyAya.

To such an argument, the siddhikAra says no. नच वाच्यम्

तेरपि
तात्पर्यलिङ्गैरुपक्रमादिभिर्द्वैतनिषेधपरत्वे अवधृते अद्वैतरुतेरपि श्रु
निरवकाशत्वात्, The six marks of intention (ShaDvidha tAtparya
linga), which are used to determine the import of shruti, such
as upakrama (the beginning), etc. all consistently point to
shruti's import lying in the denial of duality. That being the
case, shruti sentences that talk of non-duality also do not have
scope of reinterpretation, and are niravakAsha.

प्रत्यक्षस्यापि व्यावहारिकद्वैतविषयतया सावकाशत्वात्, Whereas, the reality

conveyed by perception can be said to be empirical,
vyAvahArika, and therefore it has scope to convey something
else.

The siddhikAra turns the nyAyAmritakAra's argument around

and says that it is perception that has scope for
reinterpretation, not shruti.
विरुद्धयोश्च द्वयो 'रहं मनुष्य' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षे 'आकाशवत्सर्वगतच श्चनित्य'
इत्यादिरुत्योरिवत्यो रि वश्रुतात्त्विकप्रामाण्यानुपपत्त्या कस्यचिद्व्यावहारिकं कस्यचित्तात्त्विकं
प्रामाण्यमभ्युपेयम् ; अत्यन्ताप्रामाण्यस्यान्याय्यत्वात्,
It is accepted by the dvaitin, that these two contradictory
cognitions - our perception of ourselves as "I am a human
being" and that shruti statement that I am "all pervading like
space, and eternal" - cannot both be equally valid. Therefore,
as there is no reason to say that both are wrong, one is taken
to be empirically true and the other absolutely so.
तेर् व् यावहा रि
कप्
तत्राद्वैतरुतेर्व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यसम्भवे रामाण्
यसम् भवेश्रुद्वैतग्राहिप्रत्यक्षादेस्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यं
भवेत्, If it was possible for shruti talking of non-duality to be
deemed empirically valid, one can argue that the perception
that conveys duality is absolutely valid.
तदसम्भवे तु बलादेवाद्वैतरुतेस्तात्त्विकं तेस् तात्
त्विकंश्रुप्रामाण्यमिति
प्रत्यक्षादेर्व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यं पर्यवस्यतीति कृ तबुद्धयो विदांकु र्वन्तु |
However as that is impossible (because all the six indicatory
marks of import point to shruti's import only in non-duality),
one is left with no other choice but to say that it is shruti
advocating non-duality that is ultimately true, and that
perception is only empirically valid. May intelligent people
understand it thus.

Sixth argument of the pUrvapakshi

Perception is stronger than all other means of knowledge, invoking the
mImAmsa principle of bahubAdha anyAyya, any interpretation of contradictory
rules should minimise the number of things negatively affected by the
interpretation.

The opponent argues thus:

ननु - पञ्चदशरात्रे प्रथमेऽहन्यग्निष्टुन्नामके नामातिदेशेन
एकाहाग्निष्टुद्धर्मभूता सुब्रह्मण्याग्नेयी प्राप्ता,
In the panchadasha rAtra sacrifice, which occurs over 15 days,
the first day of the sacrifice is termed agniShTut. The term
agniShTut conveys that a particular sAma called the Agneyi
subrahmaNya should be sung then.

The panchadasha rAtra belongs to a group of sacrifices called

vikRti, which have a corresponding template sacrifice called
the prakRti. There are different kinds of prakRti sacrifices,
each of which serves as a basic procedural template for the
varied vikRti sacrifices. The general rule is prakRtivat vikRti:
kartavyA - the procedure in the vikRti follows the prakRti.The
prakRti that the panchadasha sacrifice is based on, says that a
sAma called the Aindri subrahmaNya is to be sung on all days.
There is a conflict now because the name agniShTut indicates
that Agneyi subrahmaNya is to be sung on day 1. However, the
prakRti manual says that Aindri subrahmaNya is to be followed
on all days. If Agneyi subrahmaNya is sung on all days, it
would invalidate the prakRti rule 15 times. If the Aindri
subrahmaNya is sung on all days, it would invalidate the first
rule only on one day.

हस्सु
तस्या अल्पविषयत्वाच्चतुर्द हस्सु शा
चोदके न प्राप्त्या ऐन्द्र्या सुब्रह्मण्यया
However, as that (the first rule) is only a limited one, the other
rule of Aindri subrahmaNya being sung is proved to be correct
over 14 days and is hence said to be stronger.

बहुविषयया यथा बाधा:, बहुबाधस्यान्याय्यत्वात् Because, several things

would be harmed otherwise from the principle of avoiding harm
to the many.

तथा द्वैतग्राहिप्रत्यक्ष तदुपजीव्यनुमान, कर्मकाण्डसगुणोपासनावाक्यादिरूपबहुप्रमाणाबाधायाः,

अद्वैतवाक्यस्य प्रतीतार्थबाध: किं न स्यात् ? Similarly, to avoid the
violation of perception conveying that duality is real,
inference, which is dependent on perception, entire portions of
the vedas dealing with ritualistic performance (karma kANDa)
and advocating the meditation of God (saguNa upAsana), why
is it not more appropriate to discard the apparent meaning of
sentences in the shruti that talk of non-duality. Why can we
not reinterpret them instead?

That is why it is said:

तदुक्तम् - 'बहुप्रमाणविरोधे चैकस्याप्रामाण्यम् | दृष्टं शुक्तिरजतादिज्ञाने' Instead of
contradicting many means of knowledge, it is better to accept
the invalidity of one. It is better to rule out the reality of the
seen shell-silver than to violate many other means of
knowledge in trying to establish its reality.

The siddhikAra responds

इति - चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.
दृष्टान्ते बहुविषयया बाधोऽत्र बहुभिरिति वैषम्यात् The example and the
exemplified are different. In the example, several ends are
affected, whereas in the exemplified, several means are
affected.

To explain:

In the example, there are two competing rules, one which

applies to many things and the other which applies to one
thing alone. The choice is which rule to pick between the two.
If the first rule is picked, only the one thing referred to by the
second rule would be negated. If the second rule is accepted,
it would lead to a negation of all things referred to by the first
one.

The exemplified is different from this because the opponent is

advocating the preservation of a multiplicity of means of
knowledge by denying the validity of one means of knowledge.
The basic principle is to minimise the number of ends harmed
by a decision to pick one rule, not to minimise the number of
rules harmed by the selection of any one. If there are multiple
incorrect rules contradicting one correct rule, one cannot say
that by this mImAmsa maxim, one has to necessarily preserve
the many incorrect ones.

देहात्मैक्ये प्रत्यक्षानुमानशब्दाभासादिसत्त्वे अपि Even though everyone

seems to consider the body to be the self, even when it is
apparently proven by perception, scientific inference and
everyday language, देहात्मभेदबोधकस्यानन्यपरत्वेन प्राबल्यवत् we accept
that the validity of shruti which says that the body and the self
are different, on the basis that it is the shruti which is stronger
than them all, because of every indicator of the import of that
sentence points to that interpretation, and so it cannot be
reinterpreted to mean anything else.
Thus even here, one means of knowledge is said to overrule
many other means of knowledge, because it is stronger than
them all.

: प्राबल्यात् Here too, as the shruti

तेश्रु
अत्रापि अनन्यपरत्वेनाद्वैतरुते
that advocates non-duality cannot be interpreted in any other
way, it is stronger than perception.

Having argued for the strength of shruti all along, the

siddhikAra ends with a sting in the tail:

विद्याविद्याभेदेन विद्वदविद्वत्पुरुषभेदेन च विरोधाभावादिति | Really speaking, there is no

contradiction between shruti and the other means of
knowledge, because one is said from the standpoint of
knowledge and the other from the standpoint of ignorance.
Moreover, the former is meant for the wise person, and the
latter is directed to the everyday layman. That being the case,
the two means of knowledge are not in contradiction with
each other.

इति प्रत्यक्षस्य जात्युपक्रमन्यायादिभि: प्राबल्यनिराकरणम् || Thus, the

strength of perception, argued on the basis of the mImAmsa
principles of intrinsic characteristics, first arising, etc, has
been refuted.
upajIvyatvena pratyaksha
prAbalya nirAkaraNam
अथोपजीव्यत्वेन प्रत्यक्षप्राबल्यनिराकरणम् |

The next chapter in the Advaita Siddhi is the refutation of the

argument that as all means of knowledge are fundamentally
dependent on perception, perception is supreme and
incontrovertible by any of them.

The nyAyAmritakAra's opening arguments:

ननु - उक्तन्यायै: प्रत्यक्षस्य जात्या प्राबल्याभावेऽपि उपजीव्यत्वेन
प्राबल्यम् ;
Even if perception's is not supreme on account of universal
characteristics etc, it is stronger than other means of
knowledge because they are all dependent on perception.

उपजीव्यत्वं चानुमानागमापेक्षिताशेषार्थग्राहकतया, सा च क्वचित् साक्षात् क्वचित्परंपरया ; The

dependence on perception is necessary for every aspect of
inference and scripture. That dependence can sometimes be
direct, sometimes indirect.

दृष्टं चापेक्षितैकदेशग्राहिणामप्युजीव्यत्वम् तद्विरुद्धग्रहणे तेन बाधच श्च; For it has

been observed that where even one aspect of the means of
knowledge(e.g inference or scripture) is dependent on any
other means, if their results end up contradicting the means
upon which they depend, they themselves stand disproved as a
whole.

For example:
यथा - घटविभुत्वानुमाने पक्षग्राहिणा अक्ष्णा, नरशिरश्शुचित्वानुमाने
साध्यग्राहकेणागमेन, मनोवैभवानुमाने
ज्ञानासमवाय्याधारत्वहेतुग्राहकेणानुमानेन, किमु वक्तव्यमपेक्षिताशेषग्राहिणा
स्वविरुद्धग्राहकस्य बाध:?

1) घटविभुत्वानुमाने पक्षग्राहिणा अक्ष्णा, In the case of the (flawed)

inference "the pot is all-pervading" (e.g. घट: विभु: सत्त्वात् गगनवत् -
the pot is all pervading, because it is existent, like space), the
paksha of the inference (pot's size) is a matter of perception.
The result of the inference where its paksha is dependent on
perception, cannot contradict the results of the perception of
the paksha itself.

नरशिरश्शुचित्वानुमाने साध्यग्राहकेणागमेन, In the case of the (flawed)

inference of the human skull being ritually pure (नरशिरःकपालं शुचि:
प्राण्यंगत्वात् शंखवत् - the human skull is pure, because it is like
the conch, a body part of a living creature), as the sAdhya of
ritual purity can only be derived from scripture, the results of
such a dependent inference cannot contradict the statements
of scripture.

मनोवैभवानुमाने ज्ञानासमवाय्याधारत्वरूपहेतुग्राहकेणानुमानेन, In the

(flawed) inference that the mind is all-pervading (मनः विभु
ज्ञानासमावाय्याधारत्वात् आत्मवत् - the mind is all pervading,
because it is the locus of contact with the self, and the self is
all pervading, so the mind must also be all pervading), the hetu
of the inference, "because the mind is a non-inherence based
cause for cognition" contradicts the inference upon which it is
dependent - that is, the inference that establishes that
cognition is born out of the samyoga (contact) between the
mind and the self.

To explain, in nyAya an inference is made which establishes

that cognition, which inheres in the self (cognition and the self
have a samavAya relationship), is born as a result of a non-
inherent cause (asamavAyi kAraNa). The non-inherent cause is
said to be the samyoga (contact) between the mind and the
self. However, this very inference proves that the mind cannot
be all-pervading. How? In order for samyoga to occur between
two entities, at least one of the entities must be finite. This is
because samyoga is a temporary relationship that is born
when one entity comes into contact with the other. Two
infinite entities cannot temporarily be in contact with each
other. Either they are permanently in contact or not at all. The
self is admitted to be all-pervading, therefore if the mind must
come into contact with the self, the mind cannot be all-
pervading.
If someone tried to argue that the mind was all-pervading,
because it is like the self, and shares with the self the quality
of being the locus of contact which is admitted to be the cause
of cognition, then because this inference contradicts the very
reason with which the inference is made, it stands refuted.

Using these examples, the nyAyAmritakAra argues - the

contradiction of any one element of inference with the means
of knowledge upon which that element is dependent, is
sufficient to overrule the entire inference. That being so:

किमु वक्तव्यमपेक्षिताशेषग्राहिणा स्वविरुद्धग्राहकस्य बाध:? What can be said of

the inference of the world's unreality, where every aspect of
the inference is dependent upon perception, and is
contradicted by perception?

He takes up scripture for analysis next.

चक्षुरादेश्च शब्दतज्जन्यज्ञानप्रामाण्याद्यग्राहित्वेऽपि
त्रसाक् ष्या दि सजाती
तद्ग्राहिरोत्रसाक्ष्यादिसजातीयत्वादुपजीव्यत्वम् यत् वा
दु
पजीव्
यत्
वम् | While sight cannot
श्रो
reveal that which is known through scripture (i.e the world's
unreality which is revealed by scripture, according to the
advaitin), as the scripture is revealed via hearing, which
belongs to the same species of sense organs as sight, shruti
too is dependent on sensory perception, and cannot contradict
it.

The advaitin cannot refute the argument that a means of

knowledge cannot contradict any member of the species upon
which it is dependent because such a species-based
dependence is observed elsewhere.

दृष्टं च नरशिर:कपालाशुचित्वबोधकागामस्य
चित्वा गमसजाती
तच्छुचित्वानुमानोपजीव्यचित्वागमसजातीयत्वेन यत्
वेनशुतदनुमानात् प्राबल्यम्,
The inference of the purity of the human skull, uses the
scripture that establishes the conch as pure as the illustration
for its inference. There is a contradictory scripture which
explicitly says that the human skull is ritually impure.
Therefore an inference that depends on one section of
scripture for its functioning cannot contradict another section
of scripture, because all scripture belongs to the same
species.

नचेन्द्रियमपि स्वज्ञानार्थमनुमानमुपजीवतीति सम एवोपजीव्योपजीवकभाव:,

अज्ञातकरणतया ज्ञानजननार्थमनुमानानपेक्षणात् , अनुमानागमादिना तु
ज्ञानजननार्थमेव तदपेक्षणादिति विशेषात् ;
One cannot say that the sense organs are dependent on
inference to determine whether they are functioning well (or
not) and therefore perception too is dependent on inference.
The advaitin may argue that one checks whether one's eyes
are functioning well by testing the results using inference.
However, that example is not valid because, in order to reveal
something, the sense organ requires neither the prior
knowledge of its own existence nor the prior knowledge of its
proper functioning. Whereas, inference and scripture require
perception even for revealing things.

**** The siddhikAra's response:

- इति चेन्न; उपजीव्याविरोधात् | If this is the argument, no. There is no
contradiction with a pramANa upon which it is dependent.

तथाहि - यत्स्वरूपमुपजीव्यते तन्न बाध्यते, बाध्यते च तात्त्विकत्वाकार:, स च न

उपजीव्यते; कारणत्वे तस्याप्रवे त्त् | That which inference and
शा
scripture are dependent upon is not contradicted by them.
That which is contradicted by them is the ultimate reality of
the world, however they are not dependent on the ultimate
reality of the world for their functioning. The reality of the
world is not a requirement for its perception.

तदुक्तम् - 'पूर्वसंबन्धनियमे हेतुत्वे तुल्य एव नौ | हेतुतत्त्वबहिर्भूतसत्त्वासत्त्वकथा वृथा ||'

इति |
As has been said in the khaNDana khaNDa khAdya by Sri
Harsha - 'The presence of the cause prior to the effect is
accepted by both of us. However, the reality or unreality of the
cause is extrinsic to its ability to cause its effect.'

किं चापेक्षितग्राहित्वमात्रेण चेदुपजीव्यता, तथा च बाधकत्वम्,

तदाऽपेक्षितप्रतियोगिग्राहकत्वेन 'इदं रजत' मिति भ्रमस्य बाधोपजीव्यत्वात्
कथं 'नेदं रजत' मिति बाधबुद्धिस्तद्विरुद्धोदीयात् ? If you say that the
dependence of a thing (A) upon another thing (B), means the
prior knowledge of (B), and therefore (B) cannot be
contradicted by (A), then as the sublation of the illusion of
shell-silver requires the prior cognition of the illusory shell-
silver which is the object of sublation, the sublation will be
'dependent' upon the illusion (according to you), and the
sublating cognition "this is not silver" can never remove the
shell-silver illusion.

अथ निषेध्यार्थसमर्पकतया प्रतियोगिज्ञानत्वेन तस्योपजीव्यत्त्वेऽपि तत्प्रामाण्यं

नोपजीव्यम्, Therefore, it must be admitted that even though the
sublation requires the prior knowledge of the thing which is
sublated, it does not require the validity of the knowledge of
the object for its functioning.

नहि प्रतियोगिप्रमात्वेनाभावज्ञानजनकता ; गौरवात्,

ना च, किन्तु तज्ज्ञानत्वेनैव; लाघवात्, The
च्
प्रतियोगिभ्रमादप्यभावज्ञानदर्नाच्चर्श
knowledge of the absence of an object is not an effect of the
reality of that object. Such a requirement is superfluous.
Moreover, even where the object is unreal, the (subsequent)
cognition of its absence can arise. Rather, it is more
parsimonious to say that all that is required for the cognisance
of its absence is the prior knowledge of the object.

अतस्तद्विरुद्धविषयकं ज्ञानमुदीयादेवेति ब्रूषे, तुल्यमिदं प्रकृतेऽपि,

पक्षज्ञानत्वादिना कारणता, नतु तत्प्रमात्वादिनापीति | Therefore, if you
say that the cognition of absence of shell-silver requires its
opposite, the prior perception of shell-silver, then that much is
true in the current context too. We have no problems in
admitting that the absence of the world, as established by
inference and scripture, is dependent on the prior perception
of the world. The dependence of inference upon perception is
limited to revealing its components such as the paksha, hetu,
etc, and does not stem from the validity of the perception of
those things.

*** The second definition of dependence.

अथ - यत् प्रामाण्यं स्वरूपसिद्ध्यर्थमपवादनिरासार्थे च यत् प्रामाण्यमुपजीवति
तत्तस्योपजीव्यम् ; यथा स्मृतेरनुभव:, नच रजतभ्रमस्तथा - इति चेत्,
Therefore, if you say - If the validity of a cognition is dependent
on the validity of another cognition for its functioning, or to
disprove its invalidity, then it is dependent on such a
cognition. Like in the case of memory, it is dependent on the
validity of prior experience. However, the negation of the
illusory silver is not dependent on the validity of the illusory
silver -

तर्हि व्याप्तिधियोऽपि नानुमित्युपजीव्यत्वं स्यात् ; लिङ्गाभासादपि वह्निमति वह्निप्रमादर्शनात् | Then

the inference will no longer be dependent on invariable
concomitance, because sometimes, even when the indicator is
incorrectly perceived, the right conclusion can be inferred. For
example, when fog is mistaken for smoke and fire is inferred,
that conclusion may be correct, even when there is no fog in
reality.

To explain, the opponent redefined dependence as the validity

of a cognition being a result of the validity of another cognition.
It is admitted that cause of inference is the cognition of
invariable concomitance. However, where fire is rightly
inferred (its cognition is valid) because of illusory smoke (its
cognition is invalid), it must be admitted that under the
opponent's definition, the inference of fire is not 'dependent'
on invariable concomitance.

*** The third definition of dependence

The opponent says:
ननु - येन विना यस्योत्थानं नास्ति तत्तस्योपजीव्यमित्येव वक्तव्यम् ; The absence of
which prevents the rise of the other, is the one upon which the
latter is dependent.

तथाच रजतभ्रमस्योपजीव्यत्वमस्त्येव, नतु प्राबल्यम्; नह्युपजीव्यत्वमात्रेण प्राबल्यम् ; किन्तु

परीक्षिततया | Thus, the negation of the illusory silver is
dependent on the illusion of silver. Supremacy does not stem
from dependence alone, but also from the verification of that
upon which one is dependent.

परीक्षा च सजातीयविजातीयसंवादविसंवादाभावरूपा | Verification here

means that the object which is cognised remains as is and
does not change into something else.

नच तौ रजतभ्रमे स्त:; प्रकृते चाक्षस्य परीक्षितत्वेन प्राबल्यम् | These two

aspects do not exist for the silver illusion (the silver does not
remain as silver, it is proven to be shell later), whereas in our
context, the world continues to remain as is (even after the
rise of cognition of brahman), thus it is verified and therefore
incontrovertible.

अस्ति हि 'सन्घट' इति विशेषदर्शनजन्यज्ञानानान्तरं घटार्थक्रियाप्रत्यक्षे क्लृप्तदूरादिदोषाभावाच्च | In

the case of perception of the objects that constitute the world,
like the cognition of the pot, etc., one verifies it by seeing the
pot performing its function as expected, and disproves its
invalidity by the absence of mitigating factors such as
distance, which could have led to its misperception.

भेदश्
एवमेव जीवे भेदरुतौ
श्रु रुतौशा
निषेध्यार्पकभेदश्रुति: साक्षिप्रत्यक्षं चादोषत्वात्
परीक्षितमिति तदपि न बाध्यम् |
Similarly, as the scriptural portions that speak of difference
between the individual and God and the perception of the inner
witness (sAkshi) are defect free, they are thus verified, and
cannot be overruled by scriptural portions that speak of the
unity of the individual and God.

The opponent adds a further requirement to the verification

process - proving the absence of defects.

एवमेव च दोषाभावादिज्ञानरूपपरीक्षायामपि अनावासे सेश्वा

वेदे पौरुषेयत्वाभावज्ञाने
त्वदुक्तानुमाने च योग्यानुपलब्ध्यादिना हेत्वाभासादिराहित्यज्ञाने ब्रह्ममीमांसायां
प्रत्यधिकरणं सिद्धान्त्यभिप्रेत्यार्थे उपक्रमाद्यानुगुण्यज्ञाने चानाश्वास:
स्यादिति प्रमाणतदाभासव्यवस्था न स्यात् ;
However, if one does not accept that verification includes the
cognition of the absence of defects, one would end up
disbelieving the following:
1) the absence of human agency in the creation of vedas,
2) the absence of defects such as imperceptibility in your
inference (of the world's unreality),
3) the use of rules of textual interpretation such as the subject
matter of the introductory portion of texts (upakramA), etc. by
the advaitin in determining the import of scripture.
Therefore, there would be no basis to determine if a cognition
is valid or not.

The siddhikAra responds:

- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument, then no.

परीक्षा हि प्रवृत्ति संवादविसंवादाभावदोषाभावादिरूपा , तया च

स्वसमानदेशकालीनविषयाबाध्यत्वं प्रामाण्यस्य व्यवस्थाप्यते धूमेन
स्वसमानदेशकालीनवह्निरेव |
Verification is testing if the cognition of the object leads to
fruitful action, whether it changes into anything else and if it is
free from defects. By such a verification, all that is proven is a
validity which is of the nature of the absence of negation of an
object at the same time and place as its cognition, like the co-
presence of fire in the same time and location as smoke.

तथाच व्यवहारदशामात्राबाध्यत्वम् देहात्मैक्यसाधारणं परीक्षितप्रमाणे व्यवस्थितमिति

Therefore, such a validity is at the same level as the notion of
the body as the self (which has been accepted as ultimately
erroneous by the opponent himself), that is, the absence of
negation is only in a transactional sense.

कथमत्यन्ताबाध्यत्वाभावग्राहकागमानुमानयो: प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् ? Therefore, why

would inference and scripture, which stipulate the absence of
absolute unsbulatability in the world, not be fruitful?

सप् रमा
णतदा भासव्
यवस्
तस्माद्विवासप्रमाणतदाभासव्यवस्थाथाश्वा
जिवेशभेदादिकं च व्यावहारिकमित्युपपन्नमेव
सर्वे जगन्मिथ्येति || The validity and invalidity of a cognition
being thus accounted for, the difference cognised between the
individual and God etc., is proven to be only transactional and
the entire world's unreality stands proven.

The opponent asks:

ननु - प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्ये तत्सिद्धस्य व्याप्त्यादेर्बाधेनानुमेयादेरनुमित्यादिप्रामाण्यस्य च बाध:,
अनुमेयादेर्व्याप्त्यादिना अनुमितिप्रामाण्यादिना च समानयोगक्षेमत्वात्,
If perception is invalid, the knowledge of invariable
concomitance which is dependent on perception is invalidated.
Thereby, the inferred object and the inferential cognition are
also negated. The inferred object, the invariable concomitance
and the validity of inferential cognition must all have the same
level of reality as a rule.

If it is not accepted that they have the same level of reality,

अन्यथा प्रातिभासिकव्याप्त्यादिमता बाष्प्याध्यस्तधूमेन तात्त्विको व्यावहारिको
वाग्निः The apparent smoke superimposed on fog, in conjunction
with an apparent invariable concomitance will end up implying
an absolutely real fire, or a transactionally real fire
व्यावहारिकव्याप्त्यादिमता धूमेन तात्त्विकोऽग्निः or, a transactionally real
invariable concomitance and smoke will end up implying an
absolutely real fire
व्यावहारिके णाबाधेन विरुद्धधर्माधिकरणत्वेन च विश्वस्य जीवेशभेदस्य च तात्त्विकं सत्त्वं
सिद्ध्येत् And similarly, because it is transactionally
unsublated and because it would end up having contradictory
attributes, the world and the difference between the individual
and God would end up absolutely real.

The siddhikAra replies:

- इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.

एतावता हि व्याप्त्यादिसमानसत्ताकमनुमेयं सिद्ध्यत्वित्यापत्ते: फलितार्थ:, स चास्माकमिष्टं

एव ; नहि ब्रह्मभिन्नं क्वचिदत्यन्ताबाध्यमस्ति | By your argument, all that is
proven is that the invariable concomitance and inferential
cognition have the same level of reality as the inferred object.
That is desirable for us, because we hold that nothing apart
from Brahman is ultimately unsublatable. Therefore, if your
rule was correct, the inferred object, the inference and the
concomitance would all be only transactionally
real. According to advaita, the inference of unreality - even
unreality itself - is unreal.

नचायमनुमेयादेर्व्याप्त्यादिना समसत्ताकत्वनियमोऽप्यस्ति; However, your rule that

"the inferred object, etc. must necessarily have the same level
of reality", is not true.

नात्, Because (as we

व्यभिचारिणापि लिङ्गेन साध्यवति पक्षे अनुमितिप्रमादर्नात्र्श
have already said), even if the hetu is incorrect, it can lead to
an inference where the sAdhya is present in the paksha.

The siddhikAra gives two examples:

ध्वनिधर्मह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादिविशिष्टत्वेन मिथ्याभूतैरपि नित्यैर्विभुभिर्वर्णै: सत्या शाब्दप्रतीति: क्रियत इति

मीमाम्सकै रभ्युपगमात्,
Even though, according to pUrva mImAmsa, the eternal and all
pervading phonemes (varNas), are unreal when associated
with sound (dhvani) attributes such as short, elongated etc,
they are able to reveal a real meaning.

In pUrva mImAmsa, the word नगः and नागः may have the same
real phonemes (na and ga), which are unreal when associated
with different sounds, they reveal valid but different
meanings.

The previous case was an illustration of where the indicator

was unreal, but the indicated object was real. Now the
situation where the indicator is real, but the indicated object is
unreal will be illustrated.

This example is from nyAya. According to nyAya, earth (clay)

has the attribute of smell. The pot, which is a creation of the
clay, also must have the attribute of smell. The naiyyAyika
however holds that in the first instant after its creation from
clay, the attribute of smell is not present in the pot - the pot
generates the attribute within itself from the second instant of
its creation. Thus, in the first instant, the prior absence of
smell is present in the pot.

गन्धप्रागभावावच्छिन्ने घटे तात्त्विकव्याप्त्यादिमतापि

पृथिवीत्वेनातात्त्विकगन्धानुमितिर्दर्नात्र्श ना , In the instant where the pot
त्
contains the prior absence of smell, there may be a valid
concomitance (where there is earth, there is smell), but when
the pot is seen as earth, the result of the concomitance (smell)
is not present.

नात् | Similarly, one is able to infer the

प्रतिबिम्बेन च बिम्बानुमितिर्दर्नात्र्श
presence of the real object from its unreal reflection.

नच - तत्रापि बिम्बरहितावृत्तिरुपा व्याप्तिस्तात्त्विक्येवेति - वाच्यम् ; The opponent

may argue - 'In that case, the invariable concomitance of the
form "where the original is absent, the reflection is absent" is
real. So it is a real invariable concomitance that proves the
real inferred object.' - but that is not correct, because:

एवं सत्यवृत्तिगगनादेरपि व्याप्यतापत्ते: | That cannot be a real

concomitance, because if it were real, space, which is not
located anywhere, would end up present everywhere (the
invariable concomitance of the opponent is similar to the
argument that if no location in the world exists, space does
not exist too).

नच - तत्र बिम्बपूर्वकत्वमेवानुमीयते,
बिम्बव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तव्यतिरेकप्रतियोगित्वरूपेणाप्रातिभासिकेन हेतुनेति,
Do not argue thus: There (in the example), the object that is
inferred is the precedence of the reflection by the original,
which is real. The means of proving this is real too (not
prAtibhAsika) - because the reflection happens to be the
counter-positive of the absence occurring as a result of the
absence of the original. Thus, a real means proves a real
result.

This is incorrect, because:

प्रयुक्तत्वं हि न तज्जन्यजन्यत्वादिरूपम् ; व्यतिरेकयो: परस्परं तदभावात्, In the

hetu cited, the words "occurring as a result of" cannot mean
"that which causes" or "is caused by"; because no causality is
possible between two absences.

किन्तु व्याप्यव्यापकभाव:, तथाच बिम्बव्यतिरेकव्यापकव्यतिरेकप्रतियोगित्वं हेतु:, स

चाकाशादौ व्यभिचार्येव | Therefore, what it ought to mean is that one is
invariably concomitant with the other. Therefore, the hetu in
your inference should be - "because the reflection is the
counter-positive of the absence which is invariably
concomitant with the absence of the original" - which is the
same concomitance which failed due to vyabhichAra in the
case of space, etc.

vyabhichAra occurs where the hetu is present, but the sAdhya

is absent. Space is absent when all loci are absent (hetu is
present), but space is not preceded by its locus (sAdhya is
absent).

तस्मात्तत्र प्रतिबिम्बेनैव बिम्बानुमानम्, Therefore, it must be

admitted that the existence of the original object is inferred by
the reflection alone.
अनुमेयस्य लिङ्गव्याप्त्यादिसमानसत्ताकत्वनियमस्यापास्तत्वात् | Therefore, the rule
that "the inferred object has to have the same level of reality
as the reason, invariable concomitance etc," has been
disproved.

Inference and scripture were said to be dependent on

perception. Until now, we have dealt with inference. The
siddhikAra takes up scripture next.

एतेन - शब्देऽपि योग्यतासमानसत्ताके न शब्दार्थेन भवितव्यम्, योग्यतावाक्यार्थयो:

समानसत्ताकत्वनियमादिति कथं वेदान्तवाक्यार्थो योग्यताबाधेऽप्यबाधित: स्यादिति -
परास्तम् ;
By this the following statement stands refuted - "In the case of
verbal cognition too, the compatibility of words (yogyatA) must
be of the same order of reality as the word meaning (the
objects they denote), because verbal compatibility and
sentence meaning must go hand-in-hand. Therefore, if the
verbal compatibility in vedAntic sentences is denied validity,
how can their sentence meaning be ultimately real?"
It stands refuted because:

वेदान्तवाक्ये अखण्डार्थरूपवाक्यार्थाबाधरूपाया योग्यताया अप्यबाधाच्च | In the

case of vedAntic sentences, verbal compatibility, which is of
the nature of the impartite, unsublatable sentence meaning, is
itself unsublated.

Impartite sentences, are a separate class of sentences in

advaita vedAnta, which lead to the rise of valid knowledge
which consist of nothing other than the direct or indirect
meaning recalled by non-synonymous words taken as one
whole. The verba compatibility in such sentences is non-
different from sentence meaning, which in the case of
vedAntic sentences, is the unsublatable Brahman.

नच - तथापि वेदान्ततज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वे कथं तात्त्विकाद्वैतसिद्धिरीति वाच्यम्;

Do not argue thus - "Even then, as the validity of vedAnta, and
the cognition it gives rise to, is unreal, how can they lead one
to an ultimately real Non-Duality?"

शब्दतज्ज्ञान तात्त्विकत्वं हि न विषयतात्त्विकत्वे तन्त्रम्, Because the reality of

words, or the cognition they produce, does not confer reality to
the meaning they denote / their object, and vice versa.

इदं रजतमित्यनाप्तवाक्यस्य तज्जन्यभ्रमस्य च त्वन्मते तात्त्विकत्वेऽपि

तद्विषयस्यतात्त्विकत्वात् | For, according to you, the sentence "this
is silver" uttered by an untrustworthy individual and the
cognition of illusion are both real, but the object of the
sentence (and illusion) is unreal.

नच - ज्ञानप्रामाण्यस्य मिथ्यात्वे विषयस्यापि मिथ्यात्वं शुक्तिरूप्यज्ञाने दृष्टमिति प्रकृतेऽपि

ज्ञानप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वे विषयस्यापि मिथ्यात्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue - "The validity of cognition being unreal (false), its
object is also unreal, like in the instance of the cognition of
shell-silver. Similarly, in our context, the validity of the
cognition derived from vedAntic sentences being unreal, its
object (Non-duality) also must be unreal."

प्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वम् हि न विषयमिथ्यात्वे प्रयोजकम् , The unreality of the

validity of a cognition does not always imply the unreality of
its object.

भ्रमप्रमाबहिर्भूते निर्विकल्पके विषयबाधाभावात्, Non-determinate cognitions,

which are admitted to be neither valid nor invalid, do not have
a sublatable object.
Non-determinate cognitions are a special class of cognitions in
nyAya which do not fall under the purview of valid or invalid
knowledge.

किन्तु तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकत्वादिरूपमप्रामाण्यमेव तथा तच्च प्रकृते नास्त्येव |

Rather, it is an invalidity which is of the nature of cognising an
object as something which it is not, that implies the
sublatability of the cognised. However, as that does not apply
in the case of vedAntic sentences, one cannot say that their
object is sublatable.

नच - अर्थाबाधरूपप्रामाण्यस्य मिथ्यात्वादर्थस्यापि मिथ्यात्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;

Do not argue thus - "If the validity of cognition is of the nature
of having an unsublatable object, and if the validity is unreal,
the object of the sentence must also be sublatable."
अबाधितार्थविषयत्वं हि यत् प्रामाण्यं तस्य मिथ्यात्वम् प्रकृतेनार्थाबाधात्; If the
validity of sentences means the unsublatability of their object,
then in our context, even if the validity of vedAntic sentences
is sublated, the meaning, Brahman is not.

तद्बाधकप्रमाणासंभवात्, तस्य सर्वबाधावधित्वात्, किन्तु

तद्विषयत्वरूपसंबन्धबाधात्तथा |
For, there is no cognition that is capable of sublating the
object of those sentences (Brahman ) - because Brahman is
that which remains when everything else has been sublated.
Rather, it has been said so (that is, the validity of the nature of
having an 'unsublatable object' was said to be sublatable) on
account of the sublation of the relationship between
sentences and their sentence meaning, Brahman.

That is, if validity means having an unsublatable object

(abAdhitArtha viShayatva), and if that validity is sublated, it is
not the unsublatability of Brahman (abAdhitArthatva) that is
sublated, but Brahman's objectification (viShayatva).

तथाचाबाधितार्थविषयत्वरुपप्रामाण्यमिथ्यात्वेऽपि नार्थो मिथ्या | Therefore,

even if the validity of cognitions, of the nature of "having an
unsublatable object", is unreal, their object need not be unreal.

विशिष्टस्यैकांशमिथ्यात्वेऽप्यपरांशसत्यत्वात्, यथा दण्डबाधनिबन्धनदण्डिपुरुषबाधेऽपि पुरुषो न बाधित

एवेति || For, it is possible for one aspect of a qualified object to
be real, even if another part is unreal - like in the instance of
sublation of the qualified cognition "the man with a stick",
because of the sublation of the stick, the man need not be
sublated.

इति अद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रत्यक्षोपजीव्यत्वभङ्ग: || This concludes the

chapter on the rejection of the primacy of perception, on
account of universal dependence.
pratyakshasya anumAna
bAdhyatvam
In the previous chapters, the opponent's arguments supporting
the supremacy of perception relative to other means of
knowledge were refuted. In this chapter, the siddhikAra
establishes that perception is capable of being sublated by
inference.

अथ प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानबाध्यत्वम् | Now, the sublatability of

perception by inferential cognition is taken up.

किञ्च विपक्षबाधकसचिवमनुमानमपि प्रत्यक्षबाधकम् | An inferential cognition

that is supported by a logical argument that disproves its
contradiction, is capable of overruling perception.

The opponent objects to this by arguing that inference is

inherently incapable of overruling perception, and if anyone
insisted that it was possible, it would contradict the rules of
scriptural interpretation laid down in mImAmsa.

ननु - एवमपि 'औदुम्बरीं स्पृष्ट्वा उद्गायेत्', 'ऐन्द्र्या गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठते', 'शरमयं

बर्हिर्भवतीति' श्रुतित्रयग्राहि प्रत्यक्षं यथाक्रमं 'औदुम्बरी सर्वा वेष्टयितव्ये' ति
स्मृतिरूपेण सर्ववेष्टनरुत्यनुमानेन त् यनुमा , 'कदाचन स्तरीरसि नेन्द्र सचसिसिश्चदाशुष' इति
नेनश्रु
मन्त्रसामर्थ्यलक्षणेनेन्द्रशेषत्वश्रुत्यनुमानेन, चोदनालिङ्गरूपेण कु शश्रुत्यनुमानेन च बाध्येत इति
सर्वमीमांसोन्मृदिता स्यादिति

He says:
ननु - एवमपि...इति सर्वमीमांसोन्मृदिता स्यात् (Holding that inference can
overrule perception) would contradict the rules of exegesis
established by mImAmsa. Why?

'औदुम्बरीं स्पृष्ट्वा उद्गायेत्','ऐन्द्र्या गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठते', 'शरमयं बर्हिर्भवतीति'

श्रुतित्रयग्राहि प्रत्यक्षं
In the following three instances, the directly perceived shruti
would end up being overruled by inference:
1) "(the sAma veda priest) should recite while touching the
post made from a fig tree",
2) "the gArhapatya fire is to be worshipped with the aindri rik",
3) "spread the shara-grass (reed) as the ceremonial seat,
barhis".

Because:
यथाक्रमं 'औदुम्बरी सर्वा वेष्टयितव्ये' ति स्मृतिरूपेण सर्ववेष्टनरुत्यनुमानेन त्
यनु मा ,
नेनश्रु
'कदाचन स्तरीरसि नेन्द्र सचसिसिश्चदाशुष' इति मन्त्रसामर्थ्यलक्षणेनेन्द्रशेषत्वश्रुत्यनुमानेन,
चोदनालिङ्गरूपेण कु शश्रुत्यनुमानेन च बाध्येत
1) The first shruti would be overruled by the smRti which says
"the fig post is to be fully covered with cloth". This smRti leads
one to conclude that the fig post is to be fully covered up. If
the smRti overruled the shruti, the fig post would need to be
covered, and the priest will not be able to directly touch the
post while reciting the sAma. However, according to
siddhAnta, the shruti prevails.

2) The second shruti would be overruled by the inference that

since the name of the rig mantra is aindri, and the word Indra
occurs in the mantra 'Oh Indra, you do not deceive those that
make offerings to you", it is Indra who is the subject of the
mantra. If that inference prevailed, it would contradict the
shruti injunction, which said that it is the gArhapatya agni who
is worshipped with the aindri mantra. The inference
presupposes that there is an inferred shruti injunction which
establishes that Indra is the object of the aindri mantra.
However, it is accepted that the actual shruti is stronger than
an inferred shruti.

If inference has the ability to overrule perception, the basis

upon which the mImAmsaka postulates the relative strength of
the actual shruti to the inferred shruti (which the advaitin
agrees with) would be defeated.

3) The third shruti would be overruled by the inference that

this particular injunction is similar to the general injunction
(codanA) in the prakRti (archetypal or model) sacrifice, and
therefore would lead one to conclude that it is kusha (darbha
grass) that is to be spread as the ceremonial seat, not the
shara.
The paurNamAsa sacrifice (prakRti) says that kusha-grass is to
be spread as the ceremonial seat, but the somAraudra-caru
sacrifice (vikRti) specifically stipulates that shara-grass is to
be used. There is a general rule that the vikRti is to be
performed like the prakRti, but if there is a specific injunction
in the vikRti that differs from the prakRti, the vikRti injunction
prevails. If perception could be overruled by inference, the
somAraudra injunction which is directly received (heard),
would be overruled by the inference that one ought to apply
the paurNamAsa injunction instead.

The opponent thus argues that if inference was capable of

overruling perception, the rules of ritual exegesis, as laid out
in pUrva mImAmsa and accepted by the advaitin, would be
contradicted.

The siddhikAra responds to this argument:

- चेन्न; वैषम्यात्, No, for the examples are not applicable in this
context.

तथाहि - किमिदमापद्यते, श्रुतित्रयग्राहिप्रत्यक्षमनुमानैर्बाध्यतेति वा,

ति त्
प्रत्यक्षविषयीभूतरुतित्रयमिति रयमि ति श्रुवा |
What is meant when it is said that "the three directly
perceived shruti statements are contradicted by inference"?

a) Is it - "perception, which reveals the three shruti

statements, is contradicted by inference"?, or

b) Is it - "the three shruti statements, which are revealed by

perception, are contradicted by inference"?

नाद्य: विरोधाभावेन तद्बाध्यबाधकभावस्य शास्त्रार्थत्वाभावात्, It is certainly not the

first. As the contradiction of the existence of the shruti-s is not
intended by smRti / inference, the denial of the perception of
shruti is not the intended meaning of smRti.

अस्माभिरनभ्युपगमाच्च, अनुक्तोपलम्भमात्रत्वे निरनुयोज्यानुयोगापत्ते: | Nor do

we claim that to be the case. By criticising us for something
not said by us, you are censuring the uncensurable
(niranuyojya anuyoga - one of the 22 nigraha sthAna-s, points
of failure in debate, as outlined in nyAya).

ति
अतएव न द्वितीय:, प्रत्यक्षविषयीभूतरुतित्रयस्य त्
रयस्
यश्रुलिङ्गबाधकत्वपरेऽपि शास्त्रे
प्रत्यक्षस्य लिङ्गबाध्यत्वे विरोधाभावात्, Therefore, the second option is also
ruled out. Even if it was argued by reductio ad absurdum that the
siddhAntin's view would lead to the eventuality that inference
would end up contradicting a shruti known through perception,
(and as a result, it is argued that the original presumption is
wrong), there is no scriptural contradiction in holding that
inference overrules perception.

The opponent wants to argue that as inference cannot overrule

scripture (which is the object of perception), inference cannot
overrule perception. However, even if scripture was known
through perception, the inability of inference to overrule
scripture does not preclude the ability of inference to overrule
perception. The denial of one does not imply the denial of the
other because:

नहि शब्दप्रत्यक्षयोरैक्यमस्ति; शब्दस्य च सर्वप्रमाणापेक्षया बलवत्त्वमवोचाम |

Scripture and perception are not identical. In fact, we hold that
scripture is the supreme means of knowledge, stronger than
every other.

तस्मान्मौढ्यमात्रमेतन्मीमांसाविरोधोद्भावनम् | Therefore, it is only out

of confusion that one can proclaim that this would lead to the
contradiction of the rules of ritual exegesis as laid out in
pUrvamImAmsa.

ननु - प्रत्यक्षस्य लिङ्गबाध्यत्वे वह्न्यौष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षं शैत्यानुमानस्यात्मस्थायित्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानं च

क्षणिकत्वानुमानस्य बाधकं न स्यात्,
The opponent tries another tack - If perception is capable of
being overruled by inference, the following two arguments
would end up being contradicted:
1) It is held that the direct perception of the heat of fire,
outweighs any spurious arguments made about fire being cold.
2) It is held that the universal direct experience of the same "I"
being present from one instant to the next, disproves the
Buddhist argument for the momentariness of consciousness
प्रत्युतानुमानमेव तयोर्बाधकं स्यात् Rather, the advaitin's position
would lead to such spurious inferences overruling facts
established by direct perception.

The siddhikAra responds:

इति चेन्न; अर्थक्रियासंवादेन श्रुत्यनुग्रहेण च तत्र प्रत्यक्षयो:
प्राबल्येनानुमानबाधकत्वात् | No, in each of the two examples cited,
perception is supported by validation in performance (fire's
heat leads to specific measurable outcomes which validates
the experience of heat) and shruti (which says that the self
that is recognised as the object of the "I" cognition is not
momentary). As a result, such a validated perception overrules
inference.

अपरीक्षितप्रत्यक्षं हि परीक्षितानुमानापेक्षया दुर्बलं, 'नीलं नभ' इति

प्रत्यक्षमिव नभोनीरूपत्वानुमानापेक्षया, अतो न सामान्यतो दृष्टमात्रेण सर्वसङ्करापत्ति: |
Whereas, it is an unvalidated perception that is said to be
weaker than validated inference. Like the perception of
blueness in the sky is said to be weaker than the logical
argument that sky is colourless, because the latter has various
supporting arguments that validate it. Therefore, we cannot
stipulate a rule of universal strength of perception based on its
application in a few examples.

The opponent argues against the rule that a validated

inference can overrule an invalidated perception.
नन्वेवं - पत्वेन
वेनशुशृङ्गानुमानमपि स्यात् ; लाघवात् पत्वमेव
त् त्
वमेवशुशृङ्गवत्त्वे तन्त्रं,
By this much, you could argue that all animals have horns,
because it is more parsimonious to say that being an animal is
sufficient to imply being endowed with a horn.
षगोत्
वा दि
नतु तद्वि षगोत्वादिकम्शे कम् ; अननुगतत्वेन गौरवात् इत्येतत्तर्कसघ्रीचीनत्वेन
प्रत्यक्षापेक्षया प्राबल्यात्, अनुकूलतर्कसाचिव्यमेव हि अनुमाने बलम् | You
would be unable to qualify your inference to say that it is a
particular kind of animal, ie "cow", etc., that has horns,
because the genus of animals is more pervasive than the cow
species. Thus, one could say that such an inference, which is
supported by the principle of parsimony, is stronger than
perception, for the strength of inference is dependent on some
supportive logic (such as this).
एवंच येनके नचित् सामान्यधर्मेण सर्वत्र यत्किञ्चिदनुमेयम् |Thereby, any
inference in the world can be argued to be stronger than
perception, based on the application of some generic attribute
लाघवतर्कसाचिव्यस्य सत्त्वात्, तावतैव प्रत्यक्षबाधकत्वादिति व्यावहारिक्यापि व्यवस्था न
स्यात्, for every inference can be validated citing support from
the principle of parsimony. As a consequence, there would be
no room for the empirical invalidation of any inference on
account of it being contradictory to perception.
नह्यत्र प्रत्यक्षबाधादन्यो दोषोऽस्ति Because, apart from the one defect
of being contradictory to perception, there is no other defect in
any of the inferences mentioned previously.

Therefore, one must necessarily accept that inference can be

invalidated, merely on the basis of it being contradictory to
perception.

The siddhikAra responds:

- इति चेन्न; अयोग्यङ्गादिसाधने
ङ्
गादिसाधनेशृप्रत्यक्षबाधस्यासंभवेन No, because if
the inference seeks to prove the existence of an
imperceptible horn, even "being contradictory to perception"
cannot be an invalidating defect.

तत्र व्याप्तिग्राहकतर्केष्वाभासत्वस्य त्वयाऽपि वक्तव्यत्वेन Therefore, in such an

instance, even you will have to admit that the failure of the
inference is not because it is contradicted by perception, but
because there is no example to prove the concomitance "every
animal has a horn, whether perceptible or otherwise", and it is
this lack of a valid example that invalidates it, and not
because it is contradictory to perception.

व्यवस्थाया उभयसमाधेयत्वात्, न हि तर्काभाससध्रीचीनुमानम् प्रमाणमिति

के नाप्यभ्युपेयते ; This accommodation being something that has to
be necessarily accepted by both of us, no one can claim that
an inference where the concomitance is flawed is a valid
cognition.

अत उपपन्नं सत्तर्कसचिवमनुमानं प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकमिति Therefore, it is

quite appropriate to say that the inference which is supported
by a valid argument is the one capable of overruling
perception.
|| इति प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानबाध्यत्वसिद्धि: || Thus, the invalidation of
perception by inference has been established.
pratyakshasya Agama
bAdhyatvam
अथ प्रत्यक्षस्यागमबाध्यत्वम्
The next chapter is the argument that perception can be
overruled by shruti.

किञ्च परीक्षितप्रमाणभावशब्दबाध्यमपि प्रत्यक्षम् | Perception is capable

of being overruled by validated verbal testimony. The opponent
objects to this.

ननु - प्रत्यक्षं यदि शब्दबाध्यं स्यात्तदा जैमिनिना 'तस्माद्धूम एवाग्नेर्दिवा ददृशे

नार्चि' इत्याद्यर्थवादस्यात् 'अदितिर्द्यौ' रित्यादिमन्त्रस्य दृष्टविरोधेनाप्रामाण्ये प्राप्ते,
गुणवादस्तु 'गुणादविप्रतिषेध: स्या' दित्यादिना गौणार्थता नोच्येत,
'तत्सिद्धिजातिसारूप्यप्र साभूमलिङ्गसमवाया
साभू मलिङ् गसमवा या ' इति तत्सिद्धिपेटिकायाम् 'यजमान:
शं
प्रस्तर' इत्यादेर्गौणार्थता च नोच्येत, त्वयापि प्रत्यक्षाविरोधाय
तत्त्वम्पदयोर्लक्षणा नोच्येत, श्रुतिविरोधे प्रत्यक्षस्यैव प्रामाण्यसम्भवात्,

ननु - प्रत्यक्षं यदि शब्दबाध्यं स्यात्तदा If perception is capable of being

overruled by verbal testimony, then,

जैमिनिना 'तस्माद्धूम एवाग्नेर्दिवा ददृशे नार्चि' इत्याद्यर्थवादस्य 'अदितिर्द्यौ '

रित्यादिमन्त्रस्य दृष्टविरोधेनाप्रामाण्ये प्राप्ते, गुणवादस्तु 'गुणादविप्रतिषेध: स्या' दित्यादिना
गौणार्थता नोच्येत, Eulogistic statements such as "Therefore, it is
smoke alone that is perceptible in daytime, not fire" and
mantras which say "The sky is Aditi", etc. would end up
overruling perception, and Jaimini would not have held
that shruti cannot be contradictory to perception and
attributed a figurative meaning to shruti when it is
contradictory with that which is directly seen.

'तत्सिद्धिजातिसारूप्यप्र साभूमलिङ्गसमवाया
साभूमलिङ् गसमवा या' इति तत्सिद्धिपेटिकायाम् 'यजमान:
शं
प्रस्तर' इत्यादेर्गौणार्थता च नोच्येत, Jaimini, in the tatsiddhi peTikA of
the mImAmsa sUtra-s (peTikA - a collection of adhikaraNas (topics)
all having the same import), would not have outlined the six
circumstances under which the shruti would take a figurative
meaning, like in the case of the vedic sentence "The sacrificer
is the prastara, (clump of darbha grass)".

Lord Jaimini prescribes six circumstances where the primary

meaning of a word used in shruti is discarded, and a secondary,
figurative meaning needs to be adopted:

1) tatsiddhi - where a thing performs the function of the other.

For example, the vedic sentence 'yajamAna: prastara:' refers to
the yajamAna (sacrificer) as a prastara, a clump of darbha grass.
Here the prastara is a substitute for the sacrificer, and can be
used in situations in place of the sacrificer when he is
physically absent.

2) jAti - where the same characteristic possessed by two

things is the basis for a word referring to one thing directly is
instead used to imply the other. For example, the vedic
sentence 'agnir brAhmaNa:' refers to the brAhmaNa as agni on
account of both agni and brAhmaNa being born from the mouth
of virAT . Again the brAhmaNa is not fire in reality, only
figuratively.

3) sArUpya - where similarity is the basis for comparison. For

example, the vedic sentence 'Adityo yUpah' where the sacrificial
post, the yUpa, which has been newly painted, is figuratively
referred to as the sun because both shine brilliantly. This is a
case of the yUpa being compared to the sun, again a figurative
usage.

4) prashamsA - praise. For example, the vedic sentence 'apashavo

vA anye go ashvebhya:', where the veda says that animals other than
the cow and horse are not animals at all. The aim of the veda
is not to actually claim that the other animals are not animals
in fact, but to praise the cow and horse.

5) bhUma - if a majority of things share a common ground, then

the usage of the word to convey the majority only also includes
the minority. E.g. the sentence 'sRShTi: upadadhAti' - here, the
word sRShTi refers to a kind of brick used in the construction of
the yajnavedi, the sacrificial altar. There are several mantras
that contain the word 'sRShTi:' which are recited during the
construction of the altar (upadhAna). In addition to these
mantras, a few other mantras that occur in the same location
are also to be chanted. Thus on the basis that a majority of the
mantras refer to a common ground (bhUma), the
word sRShTi: refers to both the many mantras that explicitly
contain with the word, and those few that do not.

6) linga samavAya - presence of indicatory attributes. The

sentence 'prANabhRt upadadhAti' - here prANAbhRt refers to another
kind of brick used in the yajnavedi construction. Only the first
mantra chanted when constructing the vedi contains the
word prANAbhrt, the remaining mantras contain only the
word prANa. Thus by prANabhRt, not only is the mantra
containing the exact word prANabhRt meant, but also other
mantras containing the word prANa.

The opponent continues:

त्वयापि प्रत्यक्षाविरोधाय तत्त्वम्पदयोर्लक्षणा नोच्येत, श्रुतिविरोधे प्रत्यक्षस्यैव

अप्रामाण्यसम्भवात्, If you (the advaitin) had really held that, in
places where shruti and perception are contradictory to each
other, it is perception alone that is rendered invalid, you (the
advaitin) too would not have taken the implied meaning of the
terms "You" and "That" in the mahAvAkya "You are That" in order
to avoid a contradiction with perception.

He assumes a reply that the advaitin would give and refutes it

next.

नच - तात्पर्यलिङ्गानामुपक्रमादीनामत्र
तीनाममु ख्
या र्
थत्वमिति
सत्त्वान्नद्वैतरुतीनाममुख्यार्थत्वमिति श्रु- वाच्यम्;
You may say "In this case (the mahAvAkya), as the indicatory
marks of import (tAtparya linga) such as the beginning (and etc.)
are present, shruti statements that talk of absolute Oneness
cannot be said to take a non-primary meaning (amukhyArtham)",
but that would be incorrect, because:

'यजमान: प्रस्तर' इत्यादावपूर्वत्वाद्येकैकलिङ्गस्य तात्पर्यग्राहकस्य

विद्यमानत्वात् | Because, in vedic statements such as "the
sacrificer is the prastara", a single indicatory mark of import -
uniqueness - exists. You may say that multiple indicatory
marks would be required, but:

एकैकलिङ्गस्य तात्पर्यनिर्णायकत्वे लिङ्गानन्तरमनुवादकमेव, त्वन्मते

प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे भेदे श्रुतिरिव, किं बाहुल्येन इति
Even if there is one indicatory mark, that should be sufficient
to prove the import of the shruti, and any other indicatory mark
would only serve as a repetition of it. You agree that repetition
should be ignored - for in the context of shruti statements that
refer to difference, you argue that shruti is not conveying
difference as real, rather it is merely repeating difference that
is perceived.

In summary, the opponent is arguing that multiple indicatory

marks are not required to indicate the intention of shruti. Even
one indicatory mark is sufficient to convey import. Such an
individual, indicatory mark is present in the vedic sentence
"the sacrificer is the prastara", thus conveying that such a
meaning must be the import of the shruti. If that is the import
of shruti, the sacrificer must be said to be the lump of grass in a
direct sense. However, the principles of mImAmsa rule
that shruti is only figuratively comparing the sacrificer to the
lump of grass. Hence, the advaitin must admit that
when shruti and perception contradict, it is shruti that needs to
discard its primary meaning and take a secondary meaning -
perception is incontrovertible. If shruti statements such as
"There is no multiplicity here whatsoever" are cited to prove
the world's unreality, it must be admitted that such a
statement is only being made in a secondary, figurative sense.
The world is very much real.
The siddhikAra replies:
- चेन्न; No.
The basic argument that is going to be advanced by the
siddhikAra is that the instances where the meaning
of shruti was adjusted were cases where the direct meaning
was in contradiction with perception, whereas advaita shruti is
not in contradiction with perception at all.

वाक्यशेषप्रमाणान्तरसंवादार्थक्रियादिपरीक्षापरीक्षितस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्येन व्यवहारदशायामेव

एतद्विरुद्धार्थग्राहिणो 'धूम एवाग्नेर्दिवा ददृशे' 'अदितिद्यौ' 'र्यजमान: प्रस्तर'
इत्यादेस्तद्विरुद्धेनामुख्यार्थत्वेऽपि अद्वैतागमस्य
परीक्षितप्रमाणाविरोधाभावेन मुख्यार्थत्वोपपत्ते: |

वाक्यशेषप्रमाणान्तरसंवादार्थक्रियादिपरीक्षापरीक्षितस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य प्राबल्येन The tests

for the validity of perception are if a) the subsequent words in
a sentence (correspond to what was perceived), b) other
means of knowledge corrorborate it, and c) the objects of
perception fulfil a practical utility
व्यवहारदशायामेव एतद्विरुद्धार्थग्राहिणो 'धूम एवाग्नेर्दिवा ददृशे' 'अदितिद्यौ'
'र्यजमान: प्रस्तर' इत्यादेस्तद्विरुद्धेनामुख्यार्थत्वेऽपि and because a
contradiction with such a validated perception is observed
even in a transactional sense in vedic sentences such as "In
the day, the smoke alone is seen", "the sky is the Aditi", and
"the sacrificer is the prastara", etc., it is said that
those shruti sentences take a non-primary meaning.
अद्वैतागमस्य परीक्षितप्रमाणाविरोधाभावेन मुख्यार्थत्वोपपत्ते: | Whereas
as shruti statements conveying the absolute Oneness of reality
do not contradict any other validated means of knowledge, one
must attribute their meaning to be conveyed in a direct, literal
sense.

प्रत्यक्षादेर्हि परीक्षया व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यमात्रं सिद्धम् ; तच्च नाद्वैतागमेन बाध्यते,

बाध्यते तु तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यम्, तत्तु परीक्षया न सिद्धमेव, अतो न विरोध: |
The validity of perception that is established by testing is only
a transactional validity. Such a validity does not
contradict advaita shruti-s. If there was an absolutely valid
means of knowledge that had contradicted advaita-shruti, one
would have to concede that the latter was invalid. However, no
means of testing of perception can prove its ultimate validity
(ie no means of testing perception can prove that its object is
unsublated in all three periods of time). Therefore, there is no
contradiction at all between a perception whose domain is
transactional, and advaita-shruti whose domain is
transcendental.

'धूम एवाग्ने' रित्यादेस्तु मुख्यार्थत्वे प्रत्यक्षादेर्व्यावहारिकम् प्रामाण्यं व्याहन्येत |

अतो विरोधात्तत्रामुख्यार्थत्वमिति विवेक: | If vedic sentences such as "In the
day, smoke alone is seen" were to convey their meaning in a
literal sense, the validity of perception in a transactional sense
itself would be called into question. That would be a
contradiction, and therefore in such instances, shruti is said to
take a figurative meaning.

यत्तु - प्रत्यक्षाविरोधाय तत्त्वंपदयोर्लक्षणा नाश्रीयेतेति - तन्न; If it is said

"There would be no need to resort to the implied meanings of
"You" and "That" in order to avoid a contradiction with
perception, (because according to the advaitin, there is no
contradiction in the first place)" - that would be incorrect.

Because:

षड्विधलिङ्गैर्गतिसामान्येन चाखण्ड एवावधार्यमाणस्य तात्पर्यस्यानुपपत्ते:

जीवेशगतसर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादीनामैक्यान्वयेऽनुपपत्तेच श्च
तात्पर्यविषयीभूताखण्डप्रतीतिनिर्वाहाय लक्षणाङ्गीकरणस्यैवोचितत्वात्,
तात्पर्यवीषयीभूतान्वयनिर्वाहाय लक्षणाश्रयणस्य सर्वत्र दर्शनात् |
षड्विधलिङ्गैर्गतिसामान्येन चाखण्ड एवावधार्यमाणस्य तात्पर्यस्यानुपपत्ते: It has
been determined, by means of the six indicatory marks of
import being in unison, that the ultimate import of shruti is to
convey the absolute impartite Oneness of jIva and Brahman.
जीवेशगतसर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादीनामैक्यान्वयेऽनुपपत्तेच श्च(In the
absence of taking the implied meaning), the identity of the jIva,
endowed with limited knowledge, with Ishvara, endowed with
omniscience, cannot be logically conveyed in the sentence.
तात्पर्यविषयीभूताखण्डप्रतीतिनिर्वाहाय लक्षणाङ्गीकरणस्यैवोचितत्वात्,
तात्पर्यवीषयीभूतान्वयनिर्वाहाय लक्षणाश्रयणस्य सर्वत्र दर्शनात् | Therefore, it is
for the right understanding of that impartite Oneness, which happens to
be the ultimate import of shruti that the the terms "You",
referring to the jIva, and "That", referring to Brahman, take
their implied meanings (and not in a bid to avoid contradiction with
perception). For, it is commonly accepted everywhere, that in
order to logically convey the import of scripture, implication is
resorted to.

नच - एवं सति अमुख्यार्थत्वं स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;

Nor can it be argued that if implication is resorted to, the
primary meaning is given up.

तद्धि प्रतीयमानार्थपरित्यागेनार्थान्तरपरत्वं वा, अशक्यार्थत्वं वा | That

(giving up the primary meaning) can either mean that the
apparent meaning is discarded and something else is adopted,
or that an indirect meaning denoted by the word is conveyed.

नाद्य:, सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतीयमानस्यैक्यस्यात्यागात्।

The former does not apply here, because the apparent
meaning of the sentence "You are that" arrived at by observing
that the case-endings of the terms are the same, is one of
identity - which is not given up by us.

नान्त्यः, जहदजहल्लक्षणारयणेन यणेनश्रशक्यैकदेशपरित्यगेऽपि 'सोऽयं देवदत्त' इत्यादिवाक्य

एव शक्यैकदेशस्यान्वयाभ्युपगमात्, विशेषणबाधेन विशेष्यमात्रान्वयस्यैवात्र लक्षणाशब्देन व्यपदेशात् |
Nor can it be the latter, because even though by means
of jahadajahallakshaNA, a part of the primary denoted meaning of
the word is discarded, our interpretation of the sentence
adopts another part of the primary denoted meaning, like in
the case of the sentence "He is the very same Devadatta (that
was seen previously)". The meaning of the term lakshaNA, or
implication, in this context is that while the qualifiers are given
up, the underlying object is retained in arriving at the sentence
meaning of identity. It is not that something else altogether is
taken up instead of the primary meaning.
तथा चोक्तं वाचास्पतिमिश्रै: - 'प्रस्तरादिवाक्यमन्य षत्वादमुख्यार्थम्शे
षत्वादमु
ख्यार्थम्, अद्वैतवाक्यं
षत् वा न्
मुख् या र्
त्वनन्य षत्वान्मुख्यार्थमेवशेथमेव | This has been echoed by the revered
Vachaspati Misra - "Sentences such as 'the sacrificer is
the prastara' take a figurative meaning, being subordinate to
some other (injunctive) sentence, whereas as sentences
speaking of advaita (Oneness) independently convey their
import, they take a primary meaning.
उक्तं हि शाबरभाष्ये - 'न विधौ पर: शब्दार्थ इती' ति || As has been argued in
the 'Shabara bhAShya' - "The injunction cannot take a
secondary meaning".

यथाचापूर्वत्वाद्येकै कतात्पर्यलिङ्गेन 'यजमान प्रसतर' इत्याद्यर्थवादवाक्यानां न

स्वार्थपरत्वं तथा वक्ष्याम: | We will later show how sentences such as
"the sacrificer is the prastara", etc., by merely containing single
indications of import such as uniqueness, cannot take their
meaning just based on the direct meaning of their words.

It was said that sentences that are subordinate to some other

sentences do not take a primary meaning, whereas sentences
that are not subordinate to other sentences do take a primary
meaning. The opponent objects to this. He argues:
ननु - अन्य षत्वानन्य
षत्
शे वानन्यशे षत्वेनामुख्यार्थत्वमुख्यार्थवयो: प्रयोजके, किं तु
षत्वेशे
षेऽपिमानन्तरविरोधे 'इयं गौ: क्रय्या बहुक्षीरे' त्यादौ लोके
मानान्तरविरोधाविरोधौ; अन्य षेऽपिशे
'सोऽरोदी' दित्यादौ च वेदे प्रस्तरादिवाक्यवदमुख्यवृत्तेरनारयणात् यणा ,
त्
श्र

ननु - अन्य षत्वानन्य

षत्
शे वानन्यशे
षत्वेनामुख्यार्थत्वमुख्यार्थवयो: प्रयोजके, किं तु
षत्वेशे
मानान्तरविरोधाविरोधौ; Being subordinate to another, or not, does not
imply the sentence takes a secondary or primary
meaning. Rather it is dependent on whether the sentence is
contradicted by some other means of knowledge or not.

षेऽपिमानन्तराविरोधे 'इयं गौ: क्रय्या बहुक्षीरे' त्यादौ लोके , 'सोऽरोदी' दित्यादौ च

अन्य षेऽपिशे
वेदे प्रस्तरादिवाक्यवदमुख्यवृत्तेरनारयणात् यणा , Because, even ordinary
त्
श्र
sentences such as "This cow ought to be bought because it
gives a large quantity of milk", which happens to be
subordinate (to the intended instruction to buy the cow), or
vedic sentences such as "He wept" (which is subordinate to
the prohibition of offering silver in a sacrifice), it is not
accepted that they take a secondary meaning, like in the case
of the sentence "the sacrificer is the prastara".

The opponent is referring to a sentence in the veda, which

occurs in the context of a prohibition of offering silver
as dakshiNA in a sacrifice. The veda recalls a story where "He
(Rudra) wept", and those tears formed silver. The opponent
argues that the sentence "He wept" is subordinate to the
prohibition, but it takes a primary meaning. Similarly, the
sentence advertising the qualities of the cow ("It gives a lot of
milk") is made to encourage the buyer to purchase it. Thus, it
too is subordinate to the intention of the speaker that the
buyer purchases it from him. In both cases, the sentences take
the direct meanings of the words, despite being subordinate to
some other sentence.

षेऽपि'सोमेन यजेते' त्यादौ वैयधिकरण्येनान्वये विरुद्धत्रिकद्वयापत्त्या

अनन्य षेऽपिशे
सामानाधिकरण्येनान्वये प्रत्यक्षाविरोधाय च सोमवता योगेनेति मत्वर्थलक्षणाया
यणा
आरयणात् श्र|
त्
And conversely, sentences such as "one should sacrifice with
the soma juice" which are not subordinate to another on
account of them being Injunctions, it is accepted that the
sentence meaning is arrived at by employing possessive
indication i.e. 'matvartha' lakshaNA and interpreted as "by the
sacrifice containing the use of soma, (one attains heaven)",
and other interpretations such as sAmAnAdhikaraNya
anvaya (colocated connection) and vaiyadhikaraNya anvaya (non-
colocated connection) are discarded on account of being
contrary to perception and leading to the contradiction of
three pairs, respectively.

The details of why matvartha lakshaNA is applicable

whereas sAmAnAdhikaraNya anvaya and vaiyadhikaraNa anvaya are not,
is not particularly relevant to the main discussion here. Suffice
it to say, even in injunctions such as 'somena yajeta', which are not
subordinate to any other sentence, the sentence meaning is
arrived at by implication (lakshaNA).

However, for the sake of completion, an explanation is provided

below. Those not interested in such minutiae, can ignore the
section between the two sets of asterisks below.

********
In the case of sAmAnAdhikaraNya anvaya, the injunction 'somena yajeta'
is interpreted as 'somena yAgena iShTam bhAvayet' ("Through
the sacrifice, the soma, one ought to achieve the desired
object"). Here, the words soma and yAga, have the same case-
ending, which means that they both refer to the same object -
that is they are the same. This is incorrect, for the word soma
refers to the creeper and the word yAga refers to the sacrifice.
Thus, a sAmAnAdhikaraNya anvaya of the injunction contradicts
perception.

If it was instead argued that one ought to interpret the

sentence in such a way that the case-endings
of soma and yAga are different (vaiyadhikaraNya anvaya),
this is achieved by splitting the injunction into two sub-clauses
- 'somena yAgam bhAvayet' (perform the sacrifice with soma), and
'yAgena iShTam bhAvayet' (attain one's desires through the
sacrifice). Here, the word yAga in the first sub-clause is in the
second case and in the second sub-clause, it is in the third
case - thhus the problem of contradicting perception is
avoided. However, we have another contradiction in that the
word yAga ends up having three attributes in the first sub-
clause which contradict the attributes the same word has in
the second sub-clause.

To explain, in the first sub-clause 'somena yAgam bhAvayet', meaning

- by means of the soma, one ought to perform the sacrifice -
the word yAga, is
a) the pradhAna, the primary (to perform the sacrifice, soma is
used)
b) the anuvAdya, it is statement of a known thing.
c) the uddeshya, the object (of the clause).

Whereas, in the second sub-clause 'yAgena iShTam bhAvayet',

meaning - by means of the sacrifice, one ought to attain
heaven - the same word yAga is
a) the guNa, secondary (heaven is the primary, sacrifice is the
secondary)
b) the vidheya, that which is prescribed to attain the unknown /
unattained (the performance of the sacrifice is prescribed).
c) the upAdeya, the means (the sacrifice is the means to attain
heaven).

Now pradhAnatva is contradictory to guNatva, anuvAdyatva is

contradictory to vidheyatva, and uddeshyatva is contradictory
to upAdeyatva. Therefore, an interpretation of the injunction into
two sub-clauses is also unacceptable.

There this injunction is interpreted using matvartha lakshaNA,

that is, the possessive suffix 'matup', is applied thus
- somavatA yAgena iShTam bhAvayet to mean 'the desired
heaven is to be attained using the sacrifice endowed with /
containing soma'.
********

एवं विचारविधायके - 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासे' ति सूत्रे 'तद्विजिज्ञासास्वे' ति

श्रुतौ मानान्तराविरोधेन विध्यन्वयाय जिज्ञासाशब्देन विचारलक्षणाया: 'सर्वं खल्विदं
ब्रह्मे' त्यादौ चामुख्यार्थताया: स्वीकृतत्वात्, सर्वस्यापि वाक्यस्यावाच्ये ब्रह्मणि
लक्षणाया एवेष्टत्वेनामुख्यार्थत्वनिषेधायोगाच्च,
अन्वयानुपपत्तेस्तात्पर्यानुपपत्तेर्वा लक्षणाबीजस्य विध्यविधिसाधारणत्वाच्च, शाबरं तु
वचनमर्थवादमुख्यत्वाय विधौ न लक्षनेत्येवंपरम् ;
Therefore, in the sUtra 'Now then an enquiry into Brahman',
which is an injunction to enquire, and the shruti 'May you
enquire into That', the meaning of the word jijnAsa is
interpreted as 'enquiry', so that it does not contradict what is
otherwise known and so that the syntactical connection in the
context of an injunction is possible (that is, it is not possible to
enjoin someone to 'desire knowledge of' anything, which is the
primary meaning of the word jijnAsa. In vedic sentences like
'Everything is verily Brahman', it is accepted that the
secondary meaning is taken - for it is accepted by the advaitin
that all sentences that refer to Brahman, which is beyond the
reach of words, do so by implication - therefore it is not
possible to deny secondary meanings in such sentences. (If it
is argued that an enquiry into Brahman is not an injunction),
irrespective of whether a sentence is an injunction or not, the
basis for resorting to implication is either if the syntactical
connection of primary meanings is impossible or if the primary
meaning is not the import of the sentences. In the case of the
quotation by Shabara, it is to say that arthavAda (eulogistic
passages) take secondary meaning that he says that in
injunctions one cannot use secondary meanings.

तस्मान्न प्रत्यक्षं शब्दबाध्यं Therefore, perception is incapable of

being sublated by verbal cognition.

In summary, the siddhikAra had cited Vachaspati Misra and

Shabara to argue that subordinate sentences must be
reinterpreted to be in line with the sentences that they depend
upon, and therefore take a secondary meaning, whereas,
sentences that are independent pramANas must be understood
to take a primary meaning. The opponent refuted this by saying
that being subordinate to another sentence or otherwise does
not imply taking a primary meaning or otherwise - rather it is
the presence or absence of a contradiction by another means
of knowledge that implies a primary or secondary denotation.
If verbal cognition, born from vedic sentences, is contradicted
by perception, then it is the vedic sentence that ought to be
reinterpreted, and not perception that is overruled.

The siddhikAra replies to this.

- इति चेन्न; भावानवबोधात् | If this is your argument, you have not

understood our meaning.
तात्पर्यविषयीभूतार्थबोधकत्वम् हि मुख्यार्थत्वं, न शक्यार्थमात्रबोधकत्वम्;
अन्यार्थतात्पर्यकत्वाच्चामुख्यार्थत्वम्; न लाक्षणिकत्वमात्रम् | Primary
meaning is that which is the true import of the sentence, and
not the direct meaning of words alone. Secondary meaning is
that which is something other than the true import of the
sentence, and not the implied meaning alone.

तथा चाद्वैतागमस्य स्वतात्पर्यविषयीभूतार्थबोधकत्वनिर्वाहाय लक्षनाश्रयणेऽपि

मुख्यार्थत्वमुपपन्नमित्यवोचाम |
Therefore we say that advaita shruti, if it resorts to implication
in order to convey its true import, then it is still conveying its
primary meaning.

एवं च 'सोमेन यजेते'-त्यादिवि ष्टविधेर्वि

ष्
शेटवि
धेर्विशे
षणेशि
षणे
तात्पर्याभावान्मत्वर्थलक्षणायामपि स्वार्थापरित्यागाच्च नामुख्यार्थत्वम् |
Similarly, even though the import of the qualified injunction
'perform the sacrifice with soma', which is interpreted by
possessive indication to mean 'perform the sacrifice endowed
with soma', is not in the qualifier (soma) - because the
interpretation does not abandon its import (which is an
injunction to perform the sacrifice), the sentence cannot be
said to convey a non-primary meaning.

जिज्ञासापदे तु ज्ञाधातुनेष्यमाणज्ञानलक्षणाङ्गीकारानङ्गीकारमतभेदेऽपि
सन्प्रत्ययस्य विचारे जहल्लक्षणाभ्युपगमस्योभयत्र तुल्यत्वात् शक्यार्थपरित्यागेऽपि
विधितात्पर्यनिर्वाहात् नामुख्यार्थत्वम् |
On the other hand, even though in relation to the term, jijnAsa -
which, being formed by the root jnA- (to know) and the
desiderative suffix -san, means a desire to know - there is a
difference of opinion as to whether it is possible to desire
knowledge or not; in either case, this word is interpreted
through jahallakshaNA, to mean enquiry. That is, both schools
accept that the primary denotative meaning is renounced.
Despite this, as the desired sense of an 'injunction' is
accomplished, we conclude that the sentence has not taken
its secondary meaning.
न हि वाक्यार्थप्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या पदमात्रे लक्षणायामपि वाक्यस्यामुख्यार्थत्वम् ;
प्रतीतस्यानन्य षत्वेनशे षत्वेन मुख्यार्थत्वात् |
If it is not possible to convey the meaning of a sentence
without resorting to the secondary meaning of its constituent
words, it does not result in the sentence meaning becoming
secondary, because, as the meaning is not subordinate to
anything else, it is primary.

यत्र पुन: प्रतीत एव वाक्यार्थोऽन्यविशेषत्वेन कल्प्यते, तत्र वाक्यस्यामुख्यार्थत्वमेव | However,

where the meaning of the sentence is subordinate to
something else, it is a secondary meaning, even if the
meanings of all the words in the sentence are primary.

अन्यद्धि पदतात्पर्यमन्यच्च वाक्यतात्पर्यम् ; 'सैन्धवमानय' 'गङ्गायां वसन्ती' त्यादौ

वाक्यतात्पर्यैक्येऽपि पदतात्पर्यभेदात्, 'विषं भुङ्क्ष्वे' त्यादौ पदतात्पर्याभेदेऽपि
वाक्यतात्पर्यभेदात् |
The import of sentences and words are distinct. In the case of
sentences like, 'Bring the saindhava', or 'They stay on the
Ganga', the sentence-import is the same, despite the word-
import being different (the word saindhava could refer to either
salt or a horse, and the word ganga can either refer to the river,
or its bank), whereas in sentences such as 'Consume poison',
despite the word-import being the same, the sentence-import
can be different (either a statement asking someone "to
consume poison", or a statement enjoining the listener not to
dine in someone's house because "it would be as good as
consuming poison").

अत एव ' इयं गौ: क्रय्या बहुक्षीरे' त्यादि वाक्यार्थस्यावश्यम् क्रे तव्येति विधिशेषत्वेन
तत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वात्, 'सोऽरोदी' दित्यादिवाक्यार्थस्य च 'बर्हिषि रजतं न देयं हिरण्यं
दक्षिणे' ति विधिशेषत्वेन रजतनिन्दाद्वार तत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वात् 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म
तज्जलानि' ति वाक्यार्थस्य 'शान्त उपासीते' ति
शमविधिशेषत्वेनात्यनायाससिद्धत्वरूपतत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वादमुख्यत्वमेव |
Therefore, in the examples cited, such as -
"This cow is worth buying as it gives a lot of milk" is
subordinate to the speaker's intent to get a buyer "to buy the
cow" and should be taken as indirectly indicating the
excellence of the cow.
"He wept" is subordinate to the injunction, "silver should not
be given as a sacrificial gift, which must be gold", and
indirectly indicates the excellence of the gift of gold through
the medium of deprecation of silver.
"Brahman is verily everything" is subordinate to the injunction
"Meditate with calmness", and serves to indirectly indicate the
excellence of meditation with calmness, which consists in it
being very easily accomplished.

अत एव - मानान्तरविरोध एव लक्षाणेति - अपास्तम् ; 'इयं गौ: क्रय्या बहुक्षीरे' त्यादिना

प्राशस्त्यलक्षणायाम् व्यभिचारात्, किं तु
परमतात्पर्यविषयीभूतार्थप्रतीतिनिर्वाहायैव सर्वार्थवादेषु लक्षणा,
Therefore, the opponent's contention that - it is only when
there is a contradiction with another means of knowledge that
implication is resorted to - has been refuted. For an indirect
indication of excellence occurs in the sentence "This cow
should be bought as it gives a lot of milk", even when it is not
contrary to any other cognition. Rather, we conclude that in all
eulogistic passages, we resort to secondary meaning only for
the purpose of bringing about the correct understanding of the
import of the passage.

एतावांस्तु विशेष: - विधिप्राशस्त्ये लक्षणात: प्रागर्थवादवाक्यार्थज्ञानं, तस्य

प्रमाणान्तरविरोधे बाध एव; यथा 'प्रजापतिरात्मनो वपामुदक्खिद' दित्यादौ | अत एव
तत्र गुणवादमात्रम्,
This is the only difference - Where the eulogistic passage
occurring before an injunction is contradictory to another valid
cognition, such as in the instance of "prajApati cut out his own
marrow and offered it in sacrifice", then it is clearly rejected
as false. In such cases it is only a guNavAda.
प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्तौ त्वनुवादमात्रम् 'अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज' मित्यादौ | whereas,
if it is repeating something already known, then it is
an anuvAda, and not an authoritative means of knowledge, like
in the vedic sentence "fire is the remedy for cold".
अत एव तदुभयत्राबाधिताज्ञातज्ञापकत्वरूपप्रामाण्यानिर्वाहादप्रामाण्यम् |
Therefore, in both cases, as the meaning conveyed by them is
contradicted, or is not something hitherto unknown, they are
not considered a valid and authoritative means of knowledge.
यत्र पुन: प्रमाणान्तरप्राप्तिविरोधौ न स्तस्तत्र प्रामाण्यशरीरनिर्वहात्
भूतार्थवादत्वम् - यथा 'इन्द्रो वृत्राय वज्रमुदयच्छ' दित्यादौ, अयमेव देवताधिकरणन्याय: |
However, where the meaning is otherwise unknown and is
uncontradicted by any other valid cognition, the validity and
authoritativeness of the text is very much present, like in the
instance of bhUtArthavAda. Like for example the sentence, "Indra
killed Vritra with his thunderbolt" is not contradicted by
another valid means of knowledge, nor does it reveal
something otherwise known. This alone has been explained in
the devatA adhikaraNa section of the brahma sUtra.

The opponent interjects:

ननु - 'तर्ह्यादित्यो यूप' इत्यादौ वाक्यार्थप्रतीत्यर्थमेव लक्षणाङ्गीकारादमुख्यार्थत्वम् न स्यात् ;
"If that is the case, in sentences such as 'The sun is the
sacrificial post', etc., their secondary interpretation (lakshaNA)
would be accepted only to reveal the sentence-import, and it
would not be possible to regard those sentences taking a
secondary meaning".

The siddhikAra responds:

न स्याद्यद्यादित्यसदृ' शायूप इति वाक्यार्थपर्यवसानं स्यात्, किन्तु गुणवृत्त्या प्रतीतस्यापि
वाक्यार्थस्य यूपे प शा(बध्नातीति विधिशेषत्वेन तत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वमस्त्येव,
तेनैवामुख्यत्वं, न त्वादित्यपदगौणतयेति तत्सिद्धिपेटिकायां
सर्वोदाहरणेष्ववान्तरवाक्यार्थप्रतीतये गुणवृत्तिप्रकारा: प्रदर् तार्शि ताइति द्रष्टव्यम् |
न स्याद्यद्यादित्यसदृ' शायूप इति वाक्यार्थपर्यवसानं स्यात्, It would not be
possible to regard that sentence taking a secondary meaning,
if the meaning that we had ended up with was that "the
sacrificial post is like the sun".
किन्तु गुणवृत्त्या प्रतीतस्यापि वाक्यार्थस्य यूपे प शा(बध्नातीति विधिशेषत्वेन
तत्प्राशस्त्यलक्षकत्वमस्त्येव, However, despite there being an
appearance of the sentence-meaning being arrived at by a
secondary denotation, it is in-fact arrived at by noting that it
is subordinate to the injunction, "The animal is tied to the
post", thereby conveying that that sentence serves only to
denote the excellence of the post (to which the animal is to be
bound) by indirect indication.
तेनैवामुख्यत्वं, न त्वादित्यपदगौणतयेति It is through that alone that
the sentence is regarded as taking a secondary meaning and
not due to the comparison being figurative through the use of
the word "sun".
तत्सिद्धिपेटिकायां सर्वोदाहरणेष्ववान्तरवाक्यार्थप्रतीतये गुणवृत्तिप्रकारा:
ताइति द्रष्टव्यम् | Thus, in every example used in the topics in
प्रदर् तार्शि
the mImAmsa sUtra-s comprising tat-siddhi, etc., secondary
denotation is resorted to for the sake of the comprehension of
other sentences that appear in connection with the examples
cited.

कर्मप्राशस्त्यलक्षणा च सर्वार्थवादसाधारणी तत्रास्त्येवेति नामुख्यार्थत्वानुपपत्ति: | As

all eulogistic passages contain within them an indirect
indication of excellence of an underlying ritual, this (praise) is
present there (in all the examples included within the tat-siddhi
sUtra-s), and therefore a secondary meaning is not incongruous.

अत उपपन्नं प्रस्तरादिवाक्यवैषम्यमद्वैतवाक्यस्य | Therefore, it is

appropriate to hold that sentences with an advaita-import are
quite different from eulogistic passages such as "the sacrificer
is the prastara", and the rule applicable in the latter cannot be
applied in the former.

यच्चोक्तमर्थवादमुख्यार्थत्वाय विधौ न लक्षणेत्येवंपरं शबरस्वामिवचनमिति, तन्न; When it was

said by the opponent that the sentence in the Shabara
bhAShya "We cannot resort to a secondary meaning for an
Injunction" actually meant that "eulogistic passages need to
take a secondary meaning", that cannot be correct.

The siddhikAra quotes an instance from the third chapter and

fourth section of the pUrva mImAmsa sUtra-s. The discussion
pertains to a sacrifice called the "ashva pratigraha iShTi" (the
sacrifice in connection with the gift of the horse) and in this
context, there is a eulogistic passage occurring in the veda.
PrajApati donated horses to VaruNa and as a result, he lost the
divinity within himself and was afflicted by disease. To rid
himself of the disease, he offered four potshards of oblations
to VaruNa, which relieved him of the problem.

In this context, there is an injunction which uses the term

"yAvato ashvAn pratigRhNIyAt tAvato varuNAn catuShkapAlAn nirvapet", which
literally means "as many horses one receives in gift, so many
oblations of four-potshards ought to be offered to VaruNa". This
interpretation is deemed incorrect in pUrva mImAmsa, because in
the story, it is PrajApati who gifts the horse, is afflicted by the
disease, and makes a remedial offering of four-potshards to
VaruNa. Therefore, the term "pratigRhNIyAt", meaning 'receives' is
reinterpreted as "pratigrAhayet", meaning "making someone
receive", therefore ensuring that it is the donor of the horse
who has the responsibility of offering the four-potshards to
varuNa.

प्
रतिग्रहेष्
टौ
अवप्रतिग्रहेष्टौ श्व'प्रतिगृह्णीया' दिति विधौ प्रतिग्राहयेदिति व्यवधारणकल्पनाया
अर्थवादानुसारेण प्रयोजकव्यापारलक्षणाया अङ्गीकारात् ; In the context
of the sacrifice in connection with the gift of the horse, the
term "receives" in the injunction is interpreted as "makes one
receive", to be in concordance with the prior eulogistic
passage and thus, it is accepted that the sense of the causal
in the injunction is arrived at by a secondary indication.

तस्माद्विधौ तात्पर्यवति वाक्ये प्रतीयमानवाक्यार्थातिरिक्तोऽन्य: शेषी नास्तीत्येवंपरं

तद्वचनम् | Therefore, it must be admitted that the right meaning
of the Shabara bhAShya sentence is that "In an injunction
which is of definite import, there is no other predominant
factor other than the meaning of the sentence."

अत: सिद्धमद्वैतागमस्य लाक्षणिकत्वेऽपि मुख्यार्थत्वात् प्रत्यक्षबाधकत्वमिति शिवम्

Therefore, it is established that even if advaita sentences in
the veda are taken in their indicated secondary denotation, the
meanings arrived at are primary, and hence they are capable of
overruling direct perception.
|| इति प्रत्यक्षस्यागमबाध्यत्वम् ||
apacCheda nyAya vaiShamya
bhanga:
The shruti, according to the advaitin, reveals the world to
be mithyA. Perception reveals it to be real. These two means of
knowledge are accepted as valid by the advaitin, but when the
two are in contradiction, which takes precedence? In
the bhAmati, Sri VAchaspati MiSra has argued that shruti takes
precedence, and cites a mImAmsa principle, apacCheda nyAya, in
support.

In summary, apacCheda nyAya is a rule that is used to determine

the relative strength of two non-simultaneous, mutually
independent, contradictory cognitions. According to this
maxim, the cognition that arises last (and is itself not sublated
by another pramANa later) is stronger than the cognition that
occured previously.

Sri AnandabodhAchArya, in his pramANamAla has argued that

perception of the world first leads to the cognition of its
existence. Later, upon the study of vedic scriptures and mental
contemplation upon their subject matter, one understands that
the world is mithyA. Because this knowledge occurs after the
perception of the world, it overrules perception by apacCheda
nyAya.

Before we proceed to review the application of the nyAya in

the current context, it may be useful to understand it in its
original context.

The context of apacCheda nyAya

During the morning pressing of the soma (prAtassavanam) in
the jyotiShToma sacrifice, the priests performing the sacrifice
along with the sacrificer, walk from the location of
the AhavanIya inside the house to the cAtvAla (a trench or pit, the
earth from which is used to construct the mahAvedi or
altar) outside, where the bahiShpavamAna hymn is to be sung.

The shruti prescribes a very particular order and way by which

the five officiating priests and the sacrificer need to proceed
to that place. It is said that they need to walk in a single file,
led by the adhvaryu in the front, followed by the prastotA, then
the pratihartA, then the udgAta, then the brahmA and finally
the yajamAna, the sacrificer. While walking thus, each person in
the procession needs to grab hold of the tucked-up waist cloth
of the person in front. If, for whatever reason, any one of
the prastotA, pratihartA or udgAtA lets go (apacCheda, or
disconnection) of the cloth, then depending on which
particular priest has the apacCheda, certain expiatory rites are
to be followed.

If the priest called the udgAta lets go, as an expiation, the

current round of the sacrifice (called a prayoga) is completed
without dakshiNA (ritualistic fees paid by the sacrificer to the
officiating priests), and it is restarted from scratch a second
time (with dakshiNA). If the priest called the pratihartA lets go,
the expiation is that all the material wealth of the sacrificer is
to be offered to the priests (sarvasva dakshiNA) in the
current prayoga.

This arrangement raises a question, if there are

multiple apacCheda-s in one prayoga, what is the expiation? If the
two mutually independent nimitta-s (circumstantial causal
factors) occur simultaneously, either expiation is permissible,
but if they occur in sequence, Jaimini rules that the
latter nimitta prevails in determining the specific expiation
required - पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिवत् (mImAmsa sUtra 6.5.54).

The argument of advaitin-s prior to the nyAyAmRta

The use of apacCheda nyAya in the context of advaita was first
adopted by Sri MaNDana MiSra, the author of brahma
siddhi. VAcaspati MiSra, the author of bhAmati, taking the brahma
siddhi argument as his basis, used this maxim to argue in the
context of the commentary to the adhyAsa bhAShya, that because
the knowledge of the self as limited as known from perception
is contradictory to knowledge of the self as unlimited as
revealed by shruti, and because the knowledge revealed by
the shruti is logically subsequent to the knowledge revealed by
perception, it is shruti-'s conclusion that overrules perception.
The advaitin uses the same principle to argue that as
both shruti and the inference of the world's mithyAtva are
logically subsequent to the perception of the world's reality,
they should overrule perception.

They are logically subsequent to perception because a denial

of reality presupposes an apparent comprehension of reality
first. Thus perception, which reveals the reality of the world
must necessarily come before the denial of reality conveyed
by shruti and inference. Secondly, an understanding
of shruti requires one to have heard the words first, and
inference requires both that the hetu is perceived in
the paksha, and that the hetu and sAdhya have been perceived to
be invariably coexistent elsewhere. Thus both shruti and
inference require perception to have occurred first. Due to
these reasons, it is appropriate to hold that inference
and shruti are logically consequent to perception.

That being the case, when the two (inference and shruti on one
hand, and perception on the other) are in contradiction, by the
application of apacCheda nyAya, the cognition revealed
by shruti and inference should overrule the cognition revealed
by perception.

The argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra

The nyAyAmRtakAra disagrees and argues that the application
of apacCheda nyAya is inadmissible in the scenario because of
certain differences. In his view, there are three conditions for
the application of apacCheda nyAya -
1) there is a sequence in the application of the pramANa-s,
2) the two pramANA-s are contradictory to each other,
3) despite the contradiction, as a rule, the former pramANa is
not completely sublated by the application of apacCheda nyAya.

In the case of the jyotiShToma, all three conditions are met.

There are two nimitta-s that occur in sequence, each of which is
backed by a shruti injunction. There is a contradiction because
if the udgAtR apacCheda and pratihartR apacCheda both occur, one is
left with the doubt whether dakshiNA is payable or not.
The udgAtR apacCheda requires that no dakshiNA is payable in the
current prayoga, whereas the pratihartR apacCheda requires that
everything is donated as dakshiNA in the current round.

Despite this, even if the expiation for the udgAtR apacCheda is

overruled by the expiation of the pratihartR apacCheda on account
of the latter taking precedence because that nimitta occurs
later, there are still instances where the former expiation has
scope for application. Three such incidents are highlighted in
the text (discussed below).Thus, he concludes that the validity
of the prior injunction is not denied - it is merely not applicable
in the current instance of the sacrifice.

However, in the context of advaita

shruti and perception, apacCheda nyAya is inadmissible because
the conditions for its operation are not met. While there is a
sequence of pramANa-s (perception reveals the world's reality
first, and later shruti/inference reveal its unreality), and they
are contradictory to each other, if it is held that apacCheda
nyAya is admissible, perception ends up losing its status as a
valid means of knowledge - in other words, the third condition
for the application of this maxim is not met. Thus, he argues in
a chapter titled apacCheda nyAya vaiShamya in
the nyAyAmRta that apacCheda nyAya is inadmissible in this context.

The siddhikAra refutes this in this chapter of the advaita

siddhi, titled apacCheda nyAya vaiShamya bhanga: - the refutation of the
inadmissibility of apacCheda nyAya.

He says:
किं चापच्छेदन्यायेनाप्यागमस्य प्राबल्यम् | shruti is the stronger (means of
knowledge), because of apaccheda nyAya.

यथा हि 'पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिव' दित्यधिकरणे

उद्गात्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकादक्षिणयागेन परेण
प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकसर्वस्वदक्षिणयागस्य पूर्वसिद्धनिमित्तकस्य बाध
इति स्थितम्,
यथा हि 'पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं प्रकृतिव' दित्यधिकरणे Following the
section from the pUrva mImAmsa sUtra-s (6.5.54) titled 'When there
are two sequential (nimitta-s), the former is weaker, like in the
current instance",
उद्गात्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकादक्षिणयागेन परेण
प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकसर्वस्वदक्षिणयागस्य पूर्वसिद्धनिमित्तकस्य बाध
इति स्थितम् the performance of the sacrifice
without dakshiNA, which is the expiation needed as a result of
the udgAtR apacCheda, overrules the expiation needed as a result
of the pratihartR apacCheda, which is the performance of the
sacrifice where all of the sacrificer's material wealth is given
away,
because the expiation resulting from the first occurring causal
factor is deemed to have been overruled by the expiation
resulting from the second causal factor.

तथेहापि उदीच्यागमेन पूर्वस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य बाध: | Similarly, it follows

that here too, shruti, which reveals its object subsequent to
perception's revelation, it is the prior perception that is
overruled.

The opponent objects:

ननु - प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकसर्वस्वदक्षिणयागस्य
प्रतिहर्तृमात्रापच्छेदे, युगपदपच्छेदे, क्रमेणापच्छेदेऽपि प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदस्य
पचात्वे त्
वेश्चा
च अवकाश इति युक्त: उद्गात्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकादक्षिणयागेन बाध:,
प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकसर्वस्वदक्षिणयागस्य प्रतिहर्तृमात्रापच्छेदे,
युगपदपच्छेदे, क्रमेणापच्छेदेऽपि प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदस्य पचात्वेत् च अवकाश Because
वेश्चा
the sacrifice involving the dakshiNA of all the material
wealth has scope for application when one of the following occurs
1) the pratihartR apacCheda alone occurs, or
2) if the pratihartR apacCheda occurs simultaneously (with udgAtR
apacCheda), or
3) if it occurs in sequence, the pratihartR apacCheda occurs last,
इति युक्त: उद्गात्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकादक्षिणयागेन बाध: Therefore, it is
appropriate to hold that the sacrifice
without dakshiNA occurring as a result of udgAtR apacCheda can
overrule the sacrifice involving the dakshiNA of all material
wealth occurring as a result of pratihartR apacCheda.
अन्यथा 'यदि प्रतिहर्ता अपच्छिद्येत सर्ववेदसं दद्या' दिति शास्त्रमप्रामाणम् स्यात्,
Otherwise, the scriptural injunction prescribing that "upon the
occurrence of pratihartR apacCheda, sacrifice all the material
wealth", would be rendered invalid, apramANa.
If there was no scope for its application, the validity of the
scriptural injunction would be lost.

अत एव 'विप्रतिषेधाद्विकल्प: स्या 'दित्यधिकरणे द्वयोर्युगपदपच्छेदे विकल्प उक्त: | Therefore

(in order to preserve the validity of either scriptural injunction),
the mImAmsa sUtra (6.5.51) "Because there is conflict of texts,
choosing either is optional" rules that where there is a
simultaneous apacCheda, one can use the expiation for either
option.

किञ्च 'यद्युद्गाता जघन्य: स्यात्पुनर्यज्ञे सर्ववेदसं दद्यादथेतरस्मि' न्नित्यधिकरणे

उद्गात्रपच्छेदस्य प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदात्परत्वे उद्गात्रपच्छेदनिमित्तं पूर्वं
प्रयोगं दक्षिणाहीनं संपाद्य कर्तव्यज्योतिष्टोमस्य द्वितीयप्रयोगे 'तद्दद्यात्यत्पूर्वस्मिन्
दास्यन् स्यात् ' इति श्रुत्युक्ता या दक्षिणा सा
पूर्वभाविप्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकपूर्वप्रयोगस्थसर्वस्वदित्साया अबाधेन
सर्वस्वरूपैव, न तु या ज्योतिष्टोमे नित्या द्वादशशतरूपा |
किञ्च 'यद्युद्गाता जघन्य: स्यात्पुनर्यज्ञे सर्ववेदसं दद्यादथेतरस्मि' न्नित्यधिकरणे
Moreover, from the sUtra (6.5.55) titled "When the udgAtR
(apacCheda) occurs last, perform the sacrifice again with
the dakshiNA of all material wealth, as in the case of the other",
उद्गात्रपच्छेदस्य प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदात्परत्वे उद्गात्रपच्छेदनिमित्तं पूर्वं
प्रयोगं दक्षिणाहीनं संपाद्य it is said that, when the udgAtR
apacCheda occurs after the pratihartR apacCheda, then after
completing the first round of the sacrifice without any dakshiNA,
pursuant to the expiation required for the udgAtR apacCheda,
कर्तव्यज्योतिष्टोमस्य द्वितीयप्रयोगे 'तद्दद्यात्यत्पूर्वस्मिन् दास्यन् स्यात् ' इति श्रुत्युक्ता या
दक्षिणा the dakshiNA, which is to be given the second time
the jyotiShToma is performed, is, in accordance with
the shruti injunction "perform a sacrifice again with
the dakshiNa that was determined to be given the first time"
सा पूर्वभाविप्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदनिमित्तकपूर्वप्रयोगस्थसर्वस्वदित्साया अबाधेन
सर्वस्वरूपैव, is certainly all the material wealth, because that
has not been overruled, having been the desire of the
sacrificer following the occurrence of the pratihartR apacCheda in
the first round of the sacrifice (before the udgAtR
apacCheda occurred).
न तु या ज्योतिष्टोमे नित्या द्वादशशतरूपा | and not the the
regular dakshiNA prescribed for jyotiShToma, which is 112 (cows).

तस्मान्न प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदस्य सर्वथा बाध:, Therefore, the absolute

invalidation of the expiation following pratihartR apacCheda does
not occur.
किं तु प्रयोगान्तरे निक्षेप इत्युक्तम्, उक्तं हि टुप्टीकायाम् - 'तस्य प्रयोगान्तरे निक्षेप
' इति | Rather, that expiation occurs in the next round of the
sacrifice. As has been said in the TupTIkA (of KumAriLa
BhaTTa),"It is taken to the next round".

अपिच क्रमिकनिमित्तद्वयेन क्रमेणादक्षिणसर्वस्वदक्षिणयो: प्रयोगयो: संभवेन विरोध एव नास्ति;

यथा बदरीफले क्रमिकनिमित्तवतो: श्यामरक्तयो: | Further, there is no
contradiction in holding that, where the causal factors occur
sequentially, the sacrifice is without dakshiNA first and later
the same sacrifice has the dakshiNA of all wealth. It is like the
example of a berry, and it is no contradiction to say that it
starts off green first and later turns red.

उक्तं ह्यपच्छेदाधिकरणे - 'नैमित्तिकशास्त्रस्य ह्ययमर्थ:, 'निमित्तोपजननात्

प्रागन्यथाकर्तव्योऽपि क्रतुर्निमित्ते सत्येवं कर्तव्य: ' इति | This has been said
in the apacCheda chapter of shAstra dIpikA of PArthasArathi
MiSra (6.5.19) - "The intended meaning of the scripture dealing
with circumstantial occurrences is this - even if the sacrifice
had to be otherwise performed prior to the occurrence of the
circumstantial condition, it should, after the arrival of the
circumstantial condition, be performed in concordance with
the circumstantial injunction".

This does not imply there is a universal invalidation of the

previous way in all situations as a result of the occurrence of
the circumstantial condition.

तस्मादपच्छेदन्याय: सावकाशविषय:, अद्वैतागमेन प्रत्यक्षबाधे तु न

ऽस्ति
प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्यस्यावक'ऽस्ति - Therefore, the maxim of apacCheda
शो
nyAya must be interpreted in such a way that there is scope for
the validation of all scripture. However, in the case of its
application where perception is overruled by advaita shruti, there
would be no scope for the validity of perception at all.

The siddhikAra offers his reply.

- इति चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.

उद्गात्रपच्छेदाभावे युगपदुभयापच्छेदे प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदस्य उद्गात्रपच्छेदे

 त्
पाचात्ये येश्चा
च ज्योतिष्टोमद्वितीयप्रयोगे
स्
त्
रस्
प्रतिहर्त्रपच्छेदनिमित्तसर्वस्वदक्षिणयागप्रतिपादक स्त्रस्ययशा
सावकाशत्ववद्व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्ये प्रत्यक्षस्यापि सावकाशत्वात्,
Perception too has scope for application, as an empirical
means of knowledge, just like the scriptural injunction for the
performance of the sacrifice of all material wealth upon the
occurrence of pratihartR apacCheda has scope in certain
scenarios - 1) in the absence of udgAtR apacCheda 2) when the
two apacCheda-s occur simultaneously 3) when it occurs after
the udgAtR apacCheda.

तत्रैकप्रयोगे विरोधवदत्रापि तात्त्विकां शाविरोधात् | If there was a

requirement for both to occur in the same sacrifice (that is, if
no dakshiNA was to be given in the same sacrifice
where dakshiNA of all material wealth had to occur) there
would be a contradiction. Similarly, here too, a contradiction
with perception is only in the aspect of revealing the ultimate
reality of the world (that is perception still has scope in
revealing the phenomenal reality of the world).

अत एव
श्रुत्
योर्
निर्गु
णनि ष्प्
रपञ्चश्रुतिभ्
या
सगुणसप्रपञ्चरुत्योर्निर्गुणनिष्प्रपञ्चरुतिभ्याम मश्रु
पच्छेदन्यायेन बाध इति सुष्ठूक्तम् | Therefore, vivaraNAchArya's
statement is appropriate - "it is by the maxim of apacCheda
nyAya that texts describing Brahman with attributes, or reality
of the world are overruled by texts postulating Brahman
without attributes and unreality of the world."

तदुक्तमानन्दबोधाचार्यै: - 'तत्परत्वात्परत्वाच्च निर्दोषत्वाच्च वैदिकं | पूर्वस्य

बाधकं नायं सर्प इत्यादिवाक्यवत् ||' इति |
In this context, AnandabodhAchArya had declared - "Vedic texts
overrule all prior cognitions, like the statement "this is not a
snake, (it is a rope)", due to three reasons - 1) tatparatvAt - the
import of shruti is in advaita, 2) paratvAt - it arises after other
cognitions and 3) nirdoShatvAt, it is free from defects

The opponent objects to this:

ननु - मानान्तरविरोधे श्रुतेस्तत्परत्वमसिद्धम् , परत्वं तु प्रमानन्तरभ्रमे व्यभिचारि | Where
the meaning of shruti is contradictory to other forms of
cognition, it cannot be said to be its import. As regards to it
possessing primacy on account of it arising after other
cognitions, that rule fails in the case of an illusion arising after
valid cognition.

दृश्यते च 'न क्त्वा सेडि' ति परं प्रति 'मृडमृदगुधकु षक्लिशवदवस: क्त्वे' ति पूर्वमपि
बाधकम्, In PANini's ashtAdhyAyi, the sUtra न क्त्वा सेट् (1.2.18) occurs
after the sUtra मृडमृदगुधकु षक्लिशवदवस: क्त्वा (1.2.7). Despite occurring
first, the sUtra 1.2.7 which says क्त्वा becomes कित् for सेट् verbs
like मृडमृद etc., overrules sUtra 1.2.18 which says that क्त्वा does
not become कित् for सेट् Therefore, the rule that something
occurring later necessarily overrules the former does not
apply.

निर्दोषत्वं त्वर्थान्तरप्रामाण्येनान्यथासिद्धम्, In relation to

the veda being without defects, that can be true even if the
meaning of the veda is different from the one given by
the advaitin.

Therefore, none of the three reasons given for shruti overruling

perception are correct.

तदुक्तं - 'तत्परत्वमसिद्धत्वात्परत्वं व्यभिचारत: | निर्दोषताऽन्यथासिद्धे: प्राबल्यम् नैव

साधयेत्' - Thus it is said in the following verse - "The import
of shruti being in advaita is not proven, its primacy owing to it
occurring subsequently is not true universally, and it being
defect-free does not prove the outcome desired by the advaitin.
Therefore, shruti's superiority to perception is not proven."

The siddhikAra responds:

इति चेन्न ; प्रत्यक्षादेर्व्यावहारिकम् प्रामाण्यं, श्रुतेस्तु तात्त्विकमिति विरोधाभावेन
तत्परत्वसिद्धे: | If this is the argument, no. The validity of
perception is empirical, whereas shruti's validity is ultimately
real. Therefore, there being no contradiction between the two,
the import of shruti in advaita is certainly present.

परशब्देन च मानान्तराबाधितपरत्वं विवक्षितम्, तेन प्रमानन्तरभ्रमे न व्यभिचार:, तस्य

तदुत्तरभाविमानबाधितत्वात् | By paratva, what is meant is that it is
the last cognition and is unsublated by any other means of
cognition. Therefore the argument that an illusion occurring
after valid cognition is an exception to this rule is not relevant,
because the illusion itself is sublated by another valid
cognition later.

In relation to aShTAdhyAyi, the sUtra न क्त्वा सेट् is saying that the

suffix क्त्वा cannot be considered कित् (kit) for a सेट् verbal root (a
verb containing इट्). The sUtra मृडमृदगुधकु ष क्लिशवदवस: क्त्वा is a
counter-rule which says that in the case of सेट् verb roots such
as मृड, मृद etc, they can be considered kit, like in the case
of mRDitvA, mRditvA, etc.

The siddhikAra says:

'न क्त्वा से'डित्यस्य तु पाठत: परत्वेऽपि स्वभावसिद्धकित्त्वस्यानेनापाकरणं विना
पुनस्तत्प्रतिप्रसवार्थं 'मृडमृदे' त्यादेरप्रवृत्तेस्तादपेक्षया अर्थत:
पूर्वत्वमेव;
कित् will naturally apply wherever the suffix क्त्वा is used. Without
this being first denied in the case of सेट् verbs with the न क्त्वा
सेट् sUtra, there would be no need to reassert (pratiprasava - the
denial of a negation) that it will specifically apply in the case
of the verbal roots मृड, मृद, etc. From this, it follows that, despite
न क्त्वा सेट् sUtra (1.2.17) being textually subsequent to the
मृडमृदगुधकु षक्लिशवदवस: क्त्वा (1.2.7), it logically precedes the मृडमृद sUtra.

There is a mImAmsa rule - "पाठक्रमादर्थक्रमो बलीयान्" - a logical

sequence is always more powerful than a textual sequence. In
this case, logical sequence takes precedence, and as the
negation of negation in the मृडमृद sUtra must logically follow the
negation in the न क्त्वा sUtra, it is no surprise that the
मृडमृद logically overrules the न क्त्वा sUtra.

अपवादापवादे उत्सर्गस्यैव स्थिरत्वात् अतो निर्दोषत्वमपि नान्यथासिद्धम् ; When

the denial is denied, it is the second denial that will prevail.
Therefore, the veda-s being defect-free does not result in dvaita /
saguNatva shruti prevailing.

तात्पर्यविषय एव प्रामाण्यस्याभ्युपेयत्वात्
इत्यबोधमात्रविजृम्भितमपच्छेदन्यायवैषम्याभिधानमिति || As the validity
of scriptures is in things of import alone, to say that apacCheda
nyAya does not apply in this case stems from a lack of
understanding alone.
इत्यपच्छेदन्यायवैषम्यभङ्ग: || This concludes the chapter on the
denial of inapplicability of apacCheda nyAya in relation to the
world's unreality.

Post script:

The direct meaning of the mImAmsa sUtra पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यं

प्रकृतिवत् is - When two occur sequentially, the former is weaker,
like in the current instance.

The sUtra does not explicitly say which two items occur
sequentially. The potential pairs could be - either the
two apacCheda-s, or the two expiations covering the apacCheda-s,
or the two injunctions in the veda for the two apacCheda-s, or the
sentence meaning of those two injunctions, or the two
cognitions arising in the mind of the sacrificer, following his
perception of the two apacCheda-s and the understanding of
the vedic requirement upon each apacCheda's occurrence.

As the subject matter of the sUtra is the determination of

relative strength or weakness between a pair, it presupposes
that the two items constituting the pair must occur in
sequence and be in contradiction with each other (a
discussion on relative strength is not needed if there is no
contradiction). Vedic sentences cannot be said to be in
sequence, so the pair referred to in the sUtra cannot be the
two vedic injunctions. Therefore, nor can it be the sentence
meaning of the two injunctions, or the corresponding
expiations. Neither can it be the two apacCheda-s, as they do not
mutually contradict each other, for both are seen to occur,
sometimes even simultaneously. That being so, the
consideration of the relative strength between the two pairs is
most appropriate if it is between the two opposing cognitions
arising in the mind of the sacrificer - whether a sacrifice
with dakshiNA ought to be performed, or whether a sacrifice
with no dakshiNA ought to be performed in the current prayoga.

The nyAyAmRtakAra on the other hand, considers that the pair

being referred to in the sUtra to be the two injunctions (or
more generally, pramANa-s), and takes it as the sublation of the
former pramANa, by the latter pramANa. However, as the validity
of any sentence in the veda cannot be denied, he postulates
that the scope of apacCheda nyAya needs to necessarily be within
the purview of the non-sublatability of the prior pramANa, and
claims that it is on these grounds that the application
of apacCheda nyAya is deemed inadmissible in a situation where
perception is completely overruled.

This however, is not the intention of the pUrva mImAmsa sUtra, or

for that matter, the application of apacCheda nyAya by VAchaspati
MiSra and other advaitin-s in the context of advaita
shruti / mithyAtva inference. It is not the validity of the prior
means of knowledge that is being denied by the maxim, rather
it is the relative weakness of the prior comprehension in the
mind of the subject in comparison to the latter
comprehension.

When the first apacCheda occurs, the sacrificer becomes

cognisant of the need for a particular course of expiation.
When a different apacCheda occurs later, the sacrificer
dismisses his prior thinking as no longer applicable, and then
thinks that the second expiation is appropriate. Thus the
relative prAbalya / daurbalya, strength and weakness is not of
the means of knowledge, but the validity of the cognition -
whether "no dakshiNA should be given", or whether "everything
ought to be given as dakshiNA" in a particular prayoga.

Secondly, the nyAyAmRtakAra had argued that there is no

contradiction for there to be a test of relative strength and
weakness. In one instance of the sacrifice, dakshiNA is not
given, and in a subsequent instance, everything is given. He
had compared it to the case of the raw berry changing colour
when it ripens. To say that the green berry has become red,
does not invalidate that it was red in the past. This was his
contention.

This is an incorrect comparison because the contradiction

being referred to is within one instance of the sacrifice -
should dakshiNA be given now or not, and if so, what should be
given? The sacrifice that was without dakshiNA did not become
the sacrifice with dakshiNA, like in the instance of the green
berry turning red. A prayoga without dakshiNA is different from
the next prayoga with dakshiNA, whereas a berry which is green
is not different from the berry which is red. The berry cannot
be green and red at the same time - that would be a
contradiction. Neither can the prayoga be both with and
without dakshiNA simultaneously.

Thus, it is the validity of two contradicting cognitions

occurring one after the other that is the subject matter
of apacCheda nyAya, not the validity of contradicting pramANA-s. A
question may be asked here - isn't the validity of cognition
ultimately a test of the validity of the pramANa that gave rise to
it? Not necessarily. When shruti says "if udgAtR
apacCheda occurs, perform the sacrifice with no dakshiNA", what
is really meant is that if that happens to be the final apacCheda,
do so. The same applies in the case of the injunction
governing pratihartR apacCheda. As one cannot predict the future
to say whether an apacCheda that has occurred is the final one
or not, one notionally assumes that it is the last one - until the
earlier of the completion of the sacrifice, or the occurrence of
another apacCheda. That notion of finality and the conclusion that "this is
the expiation that needs to be performed" is the one that is disproved
upon another apacCheda. This ignorance of whether the course
of action that one is pursuing is the correct one or not, is that
which is the cause for the future sublatability of the underlying
cognition that one had assumed to be true.

The same holds good for the perception of the world's reality.
Until one is convinced of the import of shruti lying in advaita, one
continues to hold on to a notion of reality assumed as a result
of perception. Perception is not incorrect, the notion that
perception reveals ultimate reality is incorrect. When one
understands that the import of scripture is in non-duality, the
notion of reality arising from perception is cast aside, like in
the case of apacCheda nyAya.
mithyAtva anumite:
shaityAnumitisAmya bhanga:
अथ मिथ्यात्वानुमिते: शैत्यानुमितिसाम्यभङ्ग: |
The refutation of the argument - the inference of the
world's mithyAtva is akin to logically proving that fire is cold - is
taken up next.

The opponent argues:

ननु - यदि प्रत्यक्षबाधितमप्यनुमानं साधयेत्तदा वह्न्यनौष्ण्यमपि साधयेत् ; If
inference is capable of overruling perception, then even the
(spurious) inference proving that fire is cold would be possible.

तथाच कालात्ययापदिष्टकथा सर्वत्रोच्छिद्येत And therefore, contradiction

(bAdha) as a ground for rejection of flawed inference would be
invalidated everywhere.

नच - औष्ण्यप्रतियोगिकाभावे साध्ये पक्ष एव प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिरिति तत्र

बाध: सावकाश:, अतो न व्यावहारिकसत्त्वग्राहके णाध्यक्षेण बाध्यत इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can you argue thus - there is scope for contradiction in the
case of the inference of coldness of fire, because if the
absence of heat is the object to be proven (the sAdhya), the
ground (the paksha) in which its absence is to be proven would
itself be unavailable. Therefore, the inference of the world's
unreality is not contradicted by the perception of empirical
reality.

The opponent assumes that the siddhAntin offers the following

argument to show the dissimilarity between the inference of
the world's unreality with the inference of fire's coldness:

Coldness is the absence of heat. However, the very notion of

heat is only known in the presence of fire and not otherwise. A
heat present in something, when fire is totally absent, is not
seen anywhere. Thus if we get the notion of heat by observing
fire, and having thus known heat, postulate that heat is absent
in fire, it would be a contradiction.
This is different from our context - the idea of reality is not
something that is exclusively known by observing the world. It
is known already, because both the opponent and
the siddhAntin agree that Brahman is real. Thus to argue that
such a reality is not present in the world is not a
contradiction.

The dvaitin argues that such an argument does not refute the
grounds for similarity with the (patently absurd) inference of
fire's coldness.

वह्निविशेषे औष्ण्याभावानुमाने शैत्यानुमाने वा तदभावात्, पक्षातिरिक्तस्य

प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिस्थलस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् | If one is seeking to infer
that the fire in a particular place is cold, then, as heat is
known from fires elsewhere, the grounds for the implausibility
of such an inference are circumvented.

Thus, if one does not accept that perception can inherently

overrule inference, you end up with situations where absurd
inferences cannot be overruled.

The opponent continues:

नच - यत्र प्रत्यक्षं प्रबलं तत्र बाधव्यवस्था, नचात्र तथेति न बाध इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "Contradiction by perception is
accepted only where perception is stronger, but as it is not the
case here, there is no contradiction"

प्रकृतेऽप्यौष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षसमकक्ष्यस्य प्राबल्यप्रयोजकस्य विद्यमानत्वात्,

अनौष्ण्यानुमितेर्मिथ्यात्वानुमितेच श्चसमानयोगक्षेमात् |
Because the determinant of the relative strength of the
perception of fire is present even in the context under
discussion (the perception of the world's reality), therefore the
inference of fire's coldness is comparable to the inference of
the world's unreality (in that both are equally flawed).

नच - मिथ्यात्ववादिनां प्रतिपन्नोपाधावौष्ण्यनिषेधग्राह्यनुमानेन मिथ्यात्वानुमिते:

समत्वमिष्टमेवेति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that - "the equivalence with the inference
of fire's coldness is desirable for those who argue for the
world's unreality, because the establishment of the absence of
heat is consistent with the inference of the world's reality,
which seeks to prove the absence of things in their very locus
of appearance".

औष्ण्यानौष्ण्ययोर्भावाभावरूपतया तदनुमितिसाम्येऽपि शैत्यानुमितिसाम्यस्यानभ्युपगमात्,

शैत्यस्यौष्ण्याभावरूपत्वाभावात् | Because, while you can claim that an
inference proving the absence of heat is similar to the
inference of the absence of the world (its mithyAtva), it is not
possible to claim equivalence with the inference of the fire's
coldness, because coldness is not the same as the absence of
heat.

Coldness is an existent property, whereas the absence of

existence of the world is not.

तस्मात् बाधस्य दोषता वा त्याज्या, औष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षायजमानत्वप्रत्यक्षादे:

सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षापेक्षया विशेषो वा वक्तव्य: | Therefore, either
contradiction as a hetvAbhAsa (a ground for the failure of
inference) will have to be given up, or alternatively, some
special difference between perception of the world's reality on
the one hand and the perception of fire's heat, or the
perception of the sacrificer not being the prastara (a clump
of darbha), etc., will have to be postulated.

नच - औष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षं परिक्षितोभयवादिसिद्धप्रामाण्यं, सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षं तु न

तथेति विशेषं - इति वाच्यं ।
That special difference cannot be that both of us agree that
the perception of heat is valid on account of it being verified,
whereas the perception of reality is not so.

सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्रामाण्यासम्मतौ हेत्वभावात्, परीक्षायास्तुल्यत्वात्

Because, there is no basis to argue that the world's reality,
despite being perceived, is invalid - for verification as a test for
the validity of perception is equally applicable here.

Until now, the arguments of the opponent were presented.

The siddhikAra begins his refutation next.

- इति चेन्मैवम् ; If this is the argument, not so.

विरुद्धार्थग्राहित्वेन विशेषात्, The difference (between the inference of fire's
coldness and the mithyAtva of the world) is that there is a
contradiction (between perception and inference in one case,
but not in the other).

प्रत्यक्षसिद्धायजमानत्वौष्ण्यादिवच्छब्दलिङ्गग्राह्ययजमानत्वानौष्ण्याद्यपि
व्यावहारिकमिति समत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेण बाध्यते,
The objects of perception - the heat of the fire, and the fact
that the prastara is not the sacrificer - have empirical reality.
As are the objects of inference - the coldness of fire,
and shruti - that the prastara is the sacrificer. These being both
empirically real, there is an actual contradiction between
perception and inference and perception and shruti, and they
can be overruled by perception.

प्रकृते तु सत्त्वं व्यावहारिकं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं तद्विरुद्धं च न मिथ्यात्वम् ; तस्य

पारमार्थिकसत्त्वविरोधात् | Whereas, in the topic under discussion,
the empirical reality (of the world) established by perception is
not contradictory to the mithyAtva established by inference. It
only contradicts the absolute validity (of the world).

अतो न तत् व्यावहारिकसत्त्वग्राहके णाध्यक्षेण बाध्यते | Thus that inference

cannot be contradicted by perception, which can only reveal
the empirical reality of the world.

The opponent retorts -

ननु - एवं वदतस्तव को वाऽभिप्राय:? किं तात्त्विकविषयत्वात् बाधकतैव मिथ्यात्वानुमानादेर्न
बाध्यता, उत सत्त्वमिथ्यात्वग्राहिणोर्व्यावहारिकतात्त्विकविषययो:
परस्परविरुद्धविषयत्वाभावात् न बाध्यबाधकभाव: |
What is your intention in saying this? Is it that
1) as inference of unreality reveals the absolutely real, it is
capable of overruling (perception), but is itself not overruled,
or is it that
2) there is no overruled-overruling relationship between
the pramANa which reveals reality and that which
reveals mithyAtva because their objects being empirical reality
and absolute reality respectively are not contradictory to each
other?

अन्त्येऽपि किमध्यक्षसिद्धव्यावहारिकसत्त्वमगृहीत्वैव तदसिद्धस्य

तात्त्विकसत्त्वस्यैवाभावम् गृह्नात्यनुमानादि, उत प्रत्यक्षविषयीकृतस्यैव
तात्त्विकमभावम् |
Additionally, in the latter alternative, are you saying that
1) inference reveals the absence of absolute reality, which
reality is not revealed by perception as it can only reveal
empirical reality? Or
2) is inference revealing the absence of absolute reality, which
happens to be revealed by perception?

नान्त्य:, प्रत्यक्षविषयाभावग्राहिणि तदबाधकत्वोक्त्ययोगात् | It is not the

last option, because if inference is revealing the absence of a
reality that happens to be affirmed by perception, then it
cannot be argued by you that inference is not in contradiction
with perception.

न द्वितीय:, प्रत्यक्षागृहीतप्रतिषेधकत्वेनाप्रसक्तप्रतिषेधापत्ते:,
प्रत्यक्षविषयस्य तात्त्विकापत्तेच श्च| Nor is it the second option,
because by contradicting something that perception does not
reveal, it is negating something which was never postulated in
the first place. (Such a negation ends up being redundant.)
Further, as inference does not contradict perception, the
object of perception stands unrefuted and real.

न प्रथम:, उपजीव्यप्रत्यक्षविरोधेनानुमित्यादिविषयस्य तात्त्विकत्वासिद्धि:, It

is not the first option either, because if inference contradicts
perception which is its upajIvya, very basis, then the validity of
inference itself is in question - and the reality of the object of
inference is not proven.

It is the siddhikAra's turn to respond to this particular

argument.
इति चेन्न । No.

प्रथमे द्वितीये च पक्षे अनुपपत्त्यभावात्। There is no issue with the first

or second options.

तथाहि - प्रथमेपक्षे न तात्त्विकत्वासिद्धिः यस्मा 'दिदं रजत'मित्यनेन 'नेदं रजत'

नात् परीक्षितमेव बाधकमभ्युपेयम् | To explain, it cannot
मित्यस्य बाधदर्नात्र्श
be said that the absolute validity of inference has not yet been
established (because it contradicts perception, upon which it
is upajIvya, dependent), for it has been observed that the
cognition "this is not silver" is capable of overruling the
cognition "this is silver" (despite the general rule that for
something to be negated, its object must be thought to exist).

Thus mere dependence (upajIvyatva) does not confer validity to

an erroneous cognition.

परीक्षा च प्रवृत्तिसंवादादिरूपा व्यवहारदशायामबाध्यत्वम् विनानुपपन्ना

बाधग् राहि
तद्द बाधग्राहिणम्णम् बाधते, नाद्वैतश्रुत्यनुमानादिकमित्युक्तमेव |
शा
Verification, like the natural inclination towards an object, etc.
is not possible without that object being empirically real, and if
a cognition tries to contradict its empirical reality, then such a
verification would invalidate the cognition. However,
neither advaita shruti nor the inference of mithyAtva falsifies the
empirical reality of the world.

द्वितीयेऽपि पक्षे नाप्रसक्तप्रतिषेध:, परोक्षप्रसक्ते: संभवात् | The charge that -

something unpostulated / impossible is being negated - is not
applicable in the second option, because (even though
perception does not reveal the world to be absolutely real),
one may consider the world to be absolutely real through some
other indirect means of knowledge. Therefore, it is possible for
the inference of mithyAtva to reject such a notion.

यत्तु के चिदात्मनि तात्विकसत्त्वप्रसिद्ध्या प्रसक्तिमुपपादयन्ति | तन्न ; Some

people however argue that the notion of absolute reality is
known as being present in the Self, and that much is sufficient
for its subsequent negation in the world. However, that is not
correct.

नहि प्रतियोगिज्ञानमात्रं प्रसक्ति:, किं तर्हि निषेधाधिकरणकप्रतियोगिज्ञानम् | Merely

knowing the object of negation is not sufficient for negation to
have scope of application. Then what? The object of negation
must appear to exist in the locus of negation, for it to have
scope.

नचात्मा निषेधाधिकरणम् ; तस्मात्परोक्षप्रसक्तिरेव दर्शनीया | And the locus

where absolute reality is being denied is not the Self (but the
world), therefore it must be admitted that one has some
indirect notion of the possibility of the world having absolute
reality and that much is sufficient for it to be denied in the
world through inference and shruti.

अथ वा माभूत् प्रसक्ति:, अभावप्रत्यक्षे हि संसर्गारोपत्वेन सोपयुज्यते,

शब्दानुमानयोस्तु, तस्या: क्वोपयोग: | Alternatively, let there be no
requirement for prasakti (the possibility) of something for its
denial later. While the perception of the absence of something
requires that such a thing is superimposed in that location,
what purpose does such a requirement serve for verbal
testimony and inference? (That is, inference and verbal
testimony are not contingent upon the knowledge of the
possible existence of their object).

नचाप्रसक्तौ निषेधवैयर्थ्यम्, अनर्थनिवृत्तिरूपस्य प्रयोजनस्य विद्यमानत्वात् | Nor can it

be said that as such a possibility does not exist, its negation
serves no purpose - because in this case, it serves the purpose
of removing all evil (i.e the cessation of the evils of samsAra).

नच प्रत्यक्षविषयतात्त्विकत्वापत्ति:, तद्विषयाधिकरणस्यैव
पारमार्थिकत्वव्यतिरेकस्य बोधनात् |
Nor does this lead to the object of perception ending up as
absolutely real, because the absence of absolute reality in the
world is what is being revealed by the inference.

तथाच न काप्यनुपपत्ति: | Therefore, there are no logical incongruities.

The nyAyAmRta tarangiNi raises an objection in this context.

On what basis did the siddhikAra allege that negation in verbal
testimony and inference does not require the possibility of the
existence of the object of negation? On the contrary, not
requiring such a possibility will contradict pUrva mImAmsa.

In the darsha pUrNamAsa ritual two sacrifices called Ajya

bhAgam are prescribed. Two statements occur in this context -
करोति | न सोमे अध्वरेत् | - In the performance of
न तौ प/ शाR
the pashu sacrifice, do not do perform these two. Do not
perform these in the soma sacrifice.

The pUrva mImAmsa scripture raises a doubt - is the second

statement a prohibition (a niShedha) or is it arthavAda? There is
no pramANa that raises the possibility (prasakti) of the Ajya
bhAga being performed in a soma sacrifice. Therefore, the
second statement is not a niShedha, rather it is arthavAda.

On the other hand, the pashu sacrifice, is a vikRti sacrifice,

which is modeled on the prakRti, which is the darsha pUrNamAsa.
In the darsha pUrNamAsa, the two Ajya bhAga sacrifices are
performed. By the rule, prakRtivat vikRti: kartavyA (perform
the vikRti on the lines of the prakRti), there is scope for the
performance of the Ajya bhAga-s at the pashu sacrifice. In order
to rule out such a prasakti, the first statement is made.
Therefore it is a niShedha, and not an arthavAda.

In this case, pUrva mImAmsa contends that prohibitions (niShedha-

s) in shruti (which falls under the category of verbal testimony)
require a prior prasakti. Why did the siddhikAra argue that verbal
testimony does not require prasakti?

In response, the laghuchandrika by gauDa brahmAnanda argues that

the intention of the siddhikAra has not been understood by
the tarangiNikAra. Every vedic sentence that negates does not
fall under the category of a niShedha (prohibition). It is only
classified thus when there is a natural inclination towards a
particular activity or for something to be understood in a
particular way (ie, pravRtti), and a scriptural statement forbids /
negates it.

The sentence do not perform the Ajya bhAgam in

a soma sacrifice is not preventing the listener from an activity
that they would otherwise have naturally performed (for
the soma sacrifice has no scope for Ajya bhAgam). Thus it is
an arthavAda and not a niShedha, because it is verbalising what
is already known.

The point that the siddhikAra is making is that verbal sentences

do not need prior prasakti for their meaning to be understood.
Irrespective of whether there is prior prasakti or not
(irrespective of whether the ultimate reality of the world is
known previously or not), the sentence from the veda denying
its ultimate reality conveys meaning to a listener who
understands the language of the shruti.

Coming back to the advaita siddhi, the siddhikAra continues:

तदुक्तं खण्डनकृद्भि: - 'पारमार्थिकमद्वैतं प्रविय श्य
शरणं श्रुति: | विरोधादुपजीव्येन न
बिभेति कदाचन ||' इति |
The khaNDanakAra, Sriharsha says - Shruti is revealing advaita as
the ultimate reality, and as such is not scared of contradicting
the pramANa upon which it is dependent.

The opponent asks:

ननु - एवामप्यनौष्ण्यं तात्विकमिति तदनुमितिरपि न बाध्येत

व्यावहारिकौष्ण्यग्राहिणाध्यक्षेण ; (If that be the case) why don't you argue
that the inference of fire's coldness is real and is not
contradicted by perception which only reveals empirical
reality?

एवं 'चादित्यो यूप' इत्यादावपि 'तात्त्विकादित्यतां यूपस्याश्रितस्य शरणं श्रुति: |

विरोधादुपजीव्येन न बिभेति कदाचन ||' इत्याद्यपि स्यात् Similarly,
in shruti sentences such as "The sun is the sacrificial post", it
can be argued that - 'the sun is the sacrificial post' is the
reality, and shruti need not be reinterpreted out of fear of
contradicting perception, upon which it is dependent.

- इति चेन्न ; The siddhikAra responds - No.

अनौष्ण्यं तात्त्विकं स्यादिति कोऽर्थ:? What do you mean by "the

absence of fire's heat is real"?
यदि तत्त्वत औष्ण्यं नास्तीत्यर्थ:, तदा अद्वैते पर्यवसादिष्टापत्ति: | If you say
the heat is not present in reality, then it is desirable, because
it leads to advaita.
यदि व्यवहारतोऽपि नास्तीति, तदा व्यवहाराविसंवादादिरूपपरीक्षितत्वविशिष्टमौष्ण्यप्रत्यक्षं बाधकमिति
नानौष्ण्यस्य तात्त्विकत्वसिद्धि: | If you are saying it is absent even
empirically, then because that is contradicted by perception
which has been verified in practice to be empirically real, the
empirical absence of heat is not established by such an
inference.

एतेन शैत्यानुमानं व्याख्यातम् | By the same argument, the case of the

inference of fire's coldness can also be explained.

एवमादित्ययूपभेदस्य तत्त्वतो व्यवाहरतो वा निषेधे योज्यम् | Similarly, in the

case of the difference between the sun and the sacrificial
post, one must question whether the negation of difference is
being said to be ultimately real or empirically real.

श्रुतेरन्यशेषतया आदित्ययूपाभेदपरत्वाभावेन परीक्षितप्रत्यक्षविरोधेन गौणार्थतया

स्तावकत्वोपपत्तेच। ।श्च
That sentence (the sun is the sacrificial post) is subsidiary to a
vedic injunction, and its import is not in revealing an identity
between the sun and the sacrificial post. Moreover, such a
meaning would contradict a validated perception. That being
the case, the shruti sentence, by taking a figurative meaning,
serves to extol the sacrificial post.

अतएव - 'तात्त्विकादित्यतां यूपस्ये' त्यादिना अद्वैतरुते

तेश्रु'रादित्यो यूप'
तिसाम्यापादनम्
इत्यादिरुतिसाम्यापादनम् श्रु- अपास्तम् | Thus, your verse alleging
similarity between the shruti statement "the sun is the
sacrificial post" and the shruti statements
revealing advaita has been refuted.

न च -अनुमितिसिद्धमिथ्यात्वग्राहकत्वे सत्यद्वैतरुतिरनुवादिका
ति रनु
वादिकाश्रुस्यात्,
यथा'ऽ ग्नि र्हि म स् य भेषज' मित्यादिश्रुति:
प्रमाणान्तरगृहीतहिमनिवारणशक्त्यनुवादिकेति वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - If mithyAtva is already established by
inference, shruti that reveals advaita is merely repeating what
is known (anuvAda), and therefore does not have validity - like
the vedic statement "fire is the remedy for cold" is called
an anuvAda on account of revealing something that is already
known through some other pramANa.

स्वस्वचमत्कारानुसारिणोऽनुमानस्य सकलसाधारण्याभावेन तस्य

श्रुत्यनुवादकत्वाप्रयोजकत्वात् | Because as inference's ability to reveal its
meaning is ultimately dependent on each person's logical
ability, it is not universal, thus a shruti which reveals the same
truth cannot be said to be merely repeating what inference has
revealed.

तदुक्तं - 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठाना' दित्यत्र वचास्पतिमिश्रै: - 'यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थ: कु शलैरनुमातृभि: |

अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ||' इति |
Thus has been argued by vAcaspati miSra in the context of
the sUtra "It cannot be established by logical reasoning" -
"Even if a skilful logician presents an inference after great
effort, others more skilled (abhiyuktatara:) can turn up and prove
its opposite."

दृष्टान्तीकृ तश्रुतौ तु हिमनिवृत्तिकारणतया वह्नौ

सर्वसाधारणप्रत्यक्षार्थापत्तिभ्यामवसेयत्वाद्वैषम्यम् ;
On the other hand, as the exemplified shruti sentence
revealing fire's propensity to remove coldness is universally
known by all through pratyaksha and arthApatti, it is different from
the shruti revealing the mithyAtva of the world.

तस्मान्मिथ्यवानुमानस्य न वह्निशैत्यानुमितिसाम्यम् ||
Therefore, the inference of the world's mithyAtva is not similar
to the inference of fire's coldness.
pratyakshasya lingAdyabAdhyatve
bAdhakam
किं च परीक्षितत्वेनैव प्राबल्यं, नोपजीव्यत्वादिना। अनुमानशब्दबाध्यत्वस्य
प्रत्यक्षेऽपि दर्शनात्।
The supremacy of a cognition depends on it being validated by
testing, and does not arise because other means of knowledge
depend on it, etc. - for it has been observed that even
perception can be invalidated by inference and verbal
testimony.

तथा हि- इदं रजतमिति प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानाप्तवचनाभ्यां, नभोनैल्यप्रत्यक्षस्य

नीरूपत्वग्राहकानुमानेन, `गौरोऽहं' इत्यस्य `अहमिहैवास्मि सदने जानानः' इत्यस्य
चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षस्य चानुमानागमाभ्यां `पीतः शङ्खस्तिक्तो गुडः'
नु मा
इत्यादेचानुमानाप्तवचनाभ्यांना प्तवचना भ्यां श्चा
बाधो दृश्यते।
Thus, the following is observed
a) The perception "this is silver" is invalidated by inference
and the words of a trustworthy person.
b) The perception of the blueness of the sky is invalidated by
an inference of space's formlessness.
c) Perceptual cognitions such as "I am fair-skinned", "I am in
this house" or the "moon being a finger-length's size" are
invalidated by scriptural texts and inferences.
d) The perception of the conch-shell as yellow, or jaggery as
bitter are invalidated by inferences and the words of a
trustworthy person.

Some ancient writers object to this view. Their objections are

presented and refuted first. They argue that invalid
perceptual cognitions can be set aside only valid perceptual
cognitions.

षदर् शनमेवशेविरोधीत्यभ्युपेयम्; अन्यथा

ननु साक्षात्कारिभ्रमे साक्षात्कारिवि षदर्नमेव
र्श
परोक्षप्रमाया अपरोक्षभ्रमनिवर्तकत्वोपपत्तौ वेदान्तवाक्यानामपरोक्ष
ज्ञानजनकत्वव्युत्पादनप्रयासे व्यर्थः स्याद् - इति चेन्न।
"It must be admitted that erroneous perceptions can be
disproved by valid perceptions alone. If that is not accepted, it
will lead to the eventuality that valid, but indirect cognitions
are capable of invalidating direct, but erroneous cognitions.
That being so, it would render useless the effort undertaken
(by early advaitin-s) to establish that scriptural texts of vedAnta
are capable of producing direct, perceptual knowledge" - If this
is the argument, no.

The siddhikAra argues that the cognition of a snake in place of a

rope has three components - 1) The perception of the illusory
snake 2) The notion of the validity of such a cognition and 3)
The notion of reality of the snake. While (1) is a perceptual
error, (2) and (3) are not - they are indirect cognitions.

`नायं सर्पः' इत्यादिवाक्यादिना सविलासाज्ञाननिवृत्त्यभावेऽपि

भ्रमगताप्रमाणत्वज्ञापनेन भ्रमप्रमाणत्वबुद्धेस्तद्विषयसत्यताबुद्धेच श्च
निवर्तनात्। While the statement "This is not a snake" is not
capable of removing the ignorance of rope and its effects
(snake), it removes the the notion of validity of the illusion and
the reality of its object, by conveying the illusoriness of the
cognition and its consequent invalidity.
तावता च भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वव्यपदे त्। त् That much alone is meant to be
।शा
conveyed by the invalidation of illusion (not the complete
removal of ignorance - the root cause of the illusion - and its
effects).
भ्रमे प्रामाण्यविभ्रमस्य तद्विषये सत्यताविभ्रमस्य च
परोक्षत्वेनापरोक्षबाधानपेक्षत्वात्। As the mistaken notions of the
validity of the illusion and the reality of its object are
(themselves) indirect cognitions, there is no requirement that
the cognition invalidating those two be direct.
न हि दुष्टकरणाजन्यत्वमबाधितविषयत्वं वा प्रामाण्यं कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षम्। Even if such
a requirement were to exist, the perception of such a validity
is an impossibility. No one is capable of perceiving that the
source of a cognition is faultless, nor perceptually conclude
that its object is eternally unsublatable.
न वा सर्वदेशसर्वकालसर्वपुरुषाबाध्यत्वरूपं विषयसत्यत्वम्। Similarly, nor is it
possible to perceive a reality of the world which is of the
nature of being unsublatable at all places, for all time, by all
people.
अतस्तयोः परोक्षप्रमाबाध्यत्वमुचितमेव। Therefore, it is quite
appropriate to hold that an illusory perception can be
invalidated by a valid, indirect cognition.
तयोच श्चबाधितयोः रजतादिभ्रमः स्वरूपेण सन्नपि स्वकार्याक्षमत्वादसन्निवेति
बाधित इत्युच्यत इत्यनवद्यम्।There is no error therefore in saying
that, even though the illusion of silver persists, the actions
following the illusory cognition cease, and being as good as
non-existent, it is considered invalidated.

The opponent makes his case.

ननु - `इदं रजतम्' इत्यत्र सयुक्तिकं प्रत्यक्षं बाधकं, न युक्तिमात्रम्।
The cognition "this is silver" is invalidated by perception
backed by logical inference, not by logical inference alone.
That is, the person who saw silver first and then saw that it
was absent subsequently, is doubtful about the validity of the
original cognition and uses logical inference to conclude that
the first cognition was invalid and the second valid. Thus it is
the sight of the absence of silver, backed up by logical
analysis that led him to the right conclusion, not logical
analysis alone.
`गौरोऽहम्' इत्यत्रापि `मम शरीरम्' इति बलवत् प्रत्यक्षमेव बाधकम्।
The cognition "I am fair-skinned" is also invalidated by the
strong perception that "this is my body" (therefore this body
and I must be different and fairness belongs to the body, not
me).
`अहमिहैवास्मि सदने जानान' इति तु प्रमाणमेव, जीवस्याणुत्वाद् the
cognition "I am here in this house" is valid, because the jIva is
atomic by nature.

The siddhikAra refutes this line of argument

- इति चेन्न। If this is the argument, no.
रजताभेदशरीराभेदप्रत्यक्षयोर्जाग्रतोः युक्त्या प्रतिबन्धाक्षमत्वे
तद्विषयप्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तेरेवानवका त्। त् So long as the perceptual
।शा
cognitions "this is silver" and "I am the body" are present in
full strength, they will prevent the rise of a contrary
perception, until some amount of logical analysis has
weakened them.
न च तत्र परम्परासम्बन्धेन कर्दमलिप्ते वस्त्रे `नीलं वस्त्रम्' इतिवद् `गौरोऽहम्' इति गौणम्;
Nor can it be argued that the notion "I am fair-skinned" is
figurative usage, like in the case of the cloth made dirty
through contact with mud being called "a dirty cloth". The
question is whether this is a case of an erroneous perception
or merely figurative usage. The siddhikAra responds:
कर्दमवस्त्रयोरिव शरीरात्मनोर्भेदानध्यवसायेन दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैषम्यात्। The example
and the exemplified are different because, unlike the case of
mud and the cloth (which are known to be different when the
statement "dirty cloth" is made), the difference between the
body and the self is not known.
तथा चात्रैक्याध्यास एवोचितः। Therefore the (mutual) superimposition of
the self with the body is quite appropriate.
एवं च `उष्णं जलम्' इत्यत्रापि यदि कर्दमवस्त्रयोरिव तोयतेजसोर्भेदग्रहः, तदा
गौणतैव। Similar is the case of the statement "the water is hot" -
if it is made knowing that water and fire are different (and thus
their properties - coolness and heat - cannot coexist), then like
in the instance of the cloth and mud, such usage is figurative.
यदिच शरीरात्मवद् भेदानध्यवसायस्तदाऽध्यास एव। If one makes the
statement without knowing their difference, like in the case of
the statement "I am the body", then it is an erroneous
statement indeed.
तथा च युक्तिबाध्यमेवेति तदप्युदाहरणम्। Thus, that too is an example to
prove that one aspect of an illusory perception is invalidated
by indirect cognitions like logical inference.
यत्त्वहमिहैवेति प्रमाणमित्युक्तम्, तन्न। However, if it is argued that the
cognition "I am here in the house" is valid, that is incorrect.
आत्मनः `आकाशवत् सर्वगतच श्च ' इति सर्वगतत्वेन इहैवेति
व्यवच्छेदस्याप्रमाणिकत्वात्। The self being all-pervading, based on the
vedic statement "All-pervading, like space", for it to be limited
to "here" would be invalid.
न च जीवोऽणुः, युगपदेव पाद रोऽवच्छेदेनरो
ऽवच् छेदेनशि सुखदुःखानुभवात्। Nor can the
individual self held to be atomic, because of the experience of
pleasure or pain simultaneously in the head and the foot.
न ह्योकोऽणुरेकदा व्यवहितदेशद्वयावच्छिन्नो भवति। An atomic particle cannot
simultaneously be present in two separate locations.
नच युगपत्प्रतीतिर्भ्रमः, उत्सर्गसिद्धप्रामाण्यपरित्यागे बीजाभावात्। विस्तरेण चैतदग्रे
वक्ष्यामः। Nor is the cognition of simultaneity an illusion, because
there is no causal factor present which justifies giving up
something which is experienced. This will be elaborately
discussed later (in the second paricCheda).

The opponent argues:

ननु- नभोनैल्यप्रत्यक्षस्य नीरूपत्वग्राहकानुमानेन न बाधः, लिङ्गाभावात्। There is no
inferential reason (hetu / linga) to hold that the perception of the
sky's blueness is invalidated by the inference of its
formlessness.

The logician divides size into four categories

- aNu (atomic), mahat (large), dIrgha (long) and hrasva (short).
Both space and the self are accepted by the logician as being
infinite in size (paramamahat), and therefore he uses the
inferential reason of pramamahattva to argue that just like space
is infinite in size like the self, it is also formless like the self.

The second inferential reason that he uses is dravya

anArambhakatvam - not being the cause of another substance. He
holds that space is formless like the self because it is not the
cause of any other substance, just like the self.

The opponent argues that neither of these inferential reasons

apply to the advaitin and therefore he cannot argue that the
perception of the sky's blueness is overruled by the inference
of its formlessness.

न च परममहत्त्वद्रव्यानारम्भकत्वादेर्लिङ्गत्वम्, त्वन्मते असिद्धेः।

Neither (1) infinite size nor (2) its non-causation of another
substance are inferential reasons, because they do not apply
in your position.
The advaitin holds that the self is larger than space from the
vedic statement ज्यायानाका त्त् (shatapatha brAhmaNa 6.3.2), so space
शा
cannot be infinite in size. Similarly the vedic
statement आका द्वायुः
द्
वायुः (taittirIya upaniShad 2.1.1) says that from
शा
space, wind was born, so the non-causation of another
substance cannot apply to space either.

निःस्पर्शत्वं तु तमसि व्यभिचारि। Nor can its (3) intangibility be said to be

an inferential reason, for darkness is intangible, but it has form
according to the advaitin.

पृथिव्यादित्रयेतरभूतत्वादि चाप्रयोजकम्। Nor can the reason be (4)

"being a material substance different from the earth, water
and fire", for there is no reason as to why that would imply the
formlessness of space.

तथा च नीरूपत्वग्राहकसाक्षिप्रत्यक्षमेव तद्बाधकं वाच्यम्, therefore it must be

admitted that the formlessness of space only arises due
its perception as formless by the sAkshi, the inner witness.

न च रूपग्रहणासमर्थस्य साक्षिणः कथं नीरूपत्वग्राहकत्वमिति वाच्यम्। Now, it cannot be

argued that the inner witness, being incapable of perceiving
form, is incapable of perceiving formlessness as well.

चाग्राहकस्यापि
पि चाग्राहकस्यापि चक्षुषस्तदभावग्राहकत्ववदुपपत्तेः, because even if eyes are
शा
incapable of perceiving the presence of ghosts, it is possible
to say that the absence of ghosts is perceptible by them.

परेणापि साक्षिणोऽपि रूपवत्तमोग्राहकत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च Moreover, the opponent

(advaitin) admits that the inner witness is capable of perceiving
the form of darkness.

अचाक्षुषेऽपि नभसि वायाविव चक्षुषैव रूपाभावग्रहणसम्भवेन चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्षबाधात् Therefore,

even though eyes, cannot see space, the absence of form in
space, like in the case of wind, can be the object of visual
perception.

The siddhikAra responds to this argument:

इति चेन्न। If this is the argument, no.

`नीलं नभः' इति प्रत्यक्षे जाग्रति रूपाभावग्रहणस्य चक्षुषा साक्षिणा चासम्भवात्। When
the perception "the sky is blue" arises, it prevents the
possibility of the cognisance of the absence of form by the
eyes and the inner witness.

तथा च बलवती युक्तिरेव तद्बाधिका। Only a very strong inferential

cognition of its opposite can overrule it.

न च लिङ्गाभावः, चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायिरूपाविशेषितप्रतीतिविषयत्वाद्रूपवदिति लिङ्गसम्भवात्।

There is a valid inferential reason for space's formlessness - it
is revealed by the opening of eyes and concealed by their
closing. The example for such an inference is form itself,
which is revealed when the eyes are opened and concealed
when they are closed.

न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्, नभो यदि सरूपं स्यात्तदा चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायिप्रतीतौ रूपासम्बन्धितया

विषयो न स्यादिति तर्कोपपत्तेः। Nor can it be said that such an
inferential reason does not imply the formlessness of space -
because logic to support this can be provided. If space had
form, it would not appear as formless when the eyes are
opened.

न चेष्टापत्तिः, सविधे रूपासम्बन्धितया नभसः सिद्धेः सर्वजनसम्मतत्वात्। Nor is this

(space's formlessness not being proven) desirable, because it
is universally accepted that space, when proximate to the
observer, is absolutely without any form.

नभसः साक्षिवेद्यतायामपि चक्षुरन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानमवर्जनीयमेव। अन्यथाऽन्धस्यापि

तद्ग्रहणं स्यात्। Therefore, even if space is cognised by the inner
witness, the fact that its perception by the witness is
dependent on the eye being open, cannot be set aside. If the
inner self did not depend on the eyes to be available, then even
the blind would be able to perceive space. Therefore, the
perception of space by the inner witness is dependent on the
eyes. The eyes reveal form, and because they do not reveal
form, space has no form.
Sri Appayya DIkshitar, in another context, considers another
opponent's argument for space possessing form. The opponent
argues that space's form is not seen due to it being in
extremely close proximity to the eyes. He compares this to the
case of a fog, which is not seen when one is close to it, but it
is perceptible from a distance. Appayya DIkshitar, in response,
argues that the case of space and fog is different - neither fog
nor its form are seen at close quarters, whereas space is seen,
but its form is not.

न च पञ्चीकरणाद्रूपवदारब्धत्वेन नभसो नीरूपत्वं बाधितमिति वाच्यम्।

Nor can it be argued that the process of quintuplication of
space leads to the contradiction of the absence of form.

pancIkaraNa or quintuplication is a process described in

advaita scripture for the creation of gross elements from
subtle elements. Each gross element is created from one half
of the main subtle element, and one-eighth from each of the
other four subtle elements. So gross space consists of one-half
subtle space and one-eighth of subtle wind, fire, water and
earth.

A doubt arises in this context. pancIkaraNa implies that space

has form, because it consists of parts of fire, water and earth,
each of which have form. The siddhikAra refutes this argument.

त्रिवृत्करणपक्षेऽस्य दूषणस्यानवकाशात्। There is a view that shruti

conveys that trivRtkaraNa, triplication, is the process that is
outlined in shruti (not pancIkaraNa). If that was true, then the
defect outlined would not apply.

The process of trivRtkaraNa is based on the ChAndogya

mantra 6.3.3 तासां त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेकैकां करवाणीति सेयं देवतेमास्तिस्रो देवता
अनेनैव जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविय श्य नामरूपे व्याकरोत्. The three elements
which combine to form gross elements are Fire, Water and
Earth - space is outside the scope of trivRtkaraNa, and therefore
it cannot be invoked to prove that space has form.

The bhAmati holds that the right view of creation is trivRtkaraNa,

not pancIkaraNa, and the reason outlined
in amalAnanda's commentary (kalpataru) is that this is
because pancIkaraNa would imply that space has form. However
this view is not accepted in mainstream advaita - pancIkaraNa is
the accepted process.

Therefore, the siddhikAra provides a stronger refutation.

पञ्चीकरणपक्षेऽपि अपञ्चीकरणद यां यांशा
यस्मिन् भूते यो गुणः स
पञ्चीकरणाद्व्यवहारयोग्यो भवतीत्येतावन्मात्राभ्युपगमान्नाका शारूपारम्भप्रसङ्गः।
However, even if creation was on the basis of quintuplication,
the attributes that are present in the main subtle element are
the ones that become manifest in the gross element, making
them perceptible to the sense organs, and therefore it cannot
be asserted that by quintuplication itself, the attributes of form
present in other subtle elements become available for
perception in gross space.

न च `नायं सर्पः' इत्युक्तोऽपि, `किमेवं वदसि परम् ? अपि पुनः परामृय श्य सिश्य
पयसि ?' इति
नान्न शब्दमात्रं रज्जुसर्पादिभ्रमनिवर्त्तकम्, किं तु प्रत्यक्षमेवेति वाच्यम्।
प्रतिवचनदर्नान्नर्श
Nor can it be argued thus - "It cannot be said that verbal
testimony by itself is capable of rejecting the illusion of snake
in the rope, rather it is perception alone (that is so capable) -
because, even if someone (trustworthy) says 'This is not a
snake', the seer reverts with a counterquestion - 'Do you
merely say so, or do you actually see it to be so?'

प्रतिवचनस्थले भ्रमप्रमादादिशङ्काक्रान्तत्वेन `नायं सर्पः'

ङ्
काना क्
रा न् तत्
इत्यादेर्दुर्बलतया न भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वम्। यत्र तु तादृक्ङ्कानाक्रान्तत्वं वंक्श
तत्र
ङ्
काना क्रा न्तपि त्रा
भ्रमनिवर्तकतैव। अत एव तादृक्ङ्कानाक्रान्तपित्रादिवचसि दिवचसिक्श
नेदृक्प्रतिवचनं, किन्तु
सिद्धवत्प्रवृत्त्यादिकमेव।
In the case of such a response, it is evident that if the words
'this is not a snake' are accompanied by doubts about their
validity, they are weak, and hence incapable of supplanting the
illusion. However, where they are not accompanied by such
doubts, they are certainly capable of overruling the illusion.
That is why when someone trustworthy, like one's father for
instance, speaks these words, the hearer is not afflicted by
such doubts, does not respond in the said manner, accepts the
validity of the statement, and proceeds accordingly.

ज्वालैक्यप्रत्यक्षमप्येवमेव युक्तिबाध्यम्।
Similarly, the cognition that it is one identical flame that burns
continuously is also overruled by the right inference.
न च निर्वापितारोपितस्थले स्पष्टतरभेदप्रत्यक्षबाधितं तदित्यन्यत्रापि दीर्घेयं न ह्रस्वेति
भेदप्रत्यक्षमेव तद्बाधकमिति वाच्यम्।
Nor can it be argued thus - "When the flame is blown out and lit
again, it becomes quite clear that what appears as one flame
is actually a series of different flames that continuously
appear and disappear, and elsewhere too, when sometimes the
flame is long, and sometimes short, it is the direct perception
of different flames that overrules an erroneous perception of
identity."
निर्वापितारोपितातिरिक्तस्थले तावदयं विचारः। तत्र च दीर्घेयं न ह्रस्वेति भेदप्रत्यक्षं
वक्तुमशक्यम्। यैव ह्रस्वा सैवेदानीं दीर्घेति ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वाभ्यामुपस्थितयोरभेदस्य
साक्षात्क्रियमाणत्वात्।
Where the flame is not blown out and lit again, it is not
possible to say that one has a direct perception of different
flames, such as "this is long, that was short", etc - because,
the direct cognition that people have is one of identity, that is,
"that which was short is the one that which is long now"
तथा च ज्वालाप्रत्यभिज्ञा युक्तिबाध्यैव। Therefore, the recognition of the
flame as the same throughout is repudiated by logical
reasoning alone, not direct perception.

सर्वदा पित्तदूषितनेत्रस्य `पीतः शङ्खः' इति प्रत्यक्षे चन्द्रप्रादेशत्वप्रत्यक्षे च

परोक्षातिरिक्तस्य बाधकस्य शङ्कितुमप्यशक्यत्वात् युक्त्यादिबाध्यतैव वक्तव्या।
The repudiation of the erroneous cognition "the conch-shell is
yellow" for someone who is permanently afflicted by jaundice,
or the erroneous cognition of the moon being the size of
a prAdeshika (finger span) by any cognition other than an
indirect one being impossible, it must be admitted that the
overruling of perception in such cases is by reasoning alone.

The opponent objects:

ननु सर्वत्रैवात्र प्रकारान्तरेणासत्कल्पे प्रत्यक्षे मानान्तरप्रवृत्तिः। In all
these instances, when perception arises, it does so
accompanied by a doubt about its validity, its only then that
other means of cognition start having a scope for application.

तथा हि - द्विविधं ज्ञानम्। द्विकोटिकमेककोटिकं च। अन्त्यमपि द्विविधं

अप्रामाण्यशङ्काकलङ्कितं तदकलङ्कितं च।
To explain, cognitions are of two types. (1) those which
entertain the possibility of two alternatives (in the case of
doubt, etc.) (2) those where only one alternative is presented.
The latter case is further subdivided into two. a) those which
are accompanied by a doubt about their invalidity and b) those
which are not so tainted.
तत्राद्यौ सर्वप्रमाणावकाशदौ।
अर्थापरिच्छेदकत्वादप्रामाण्यशङ्काकलङ्कितत्वाच्च। Of these, the first
option in each category, allows for the operation of other
means of cognition, because of two reasons - 1) there is no
certainty in the outcome revealed and 2) it is accompanied by
a doubt about its validity.
अप्रामाण्यधीकलङ्कितत्वं च द्वेधा भवति। दुष्टकरणकत्वनिश्चयादर्थाभावनिश्चयाच्च। A
cognition can be accompanied by a doubt about its validity due
to two reasons - 1) if there is certainty that the instrument of
knowledge giving rise to the cognition is faulty, or 2) if there is
certainty that the object revealed by the cognition does not
exist.

कत्
वप्
रती ति र्दूरदो षनि
बन्
तथा शैलाग्रस्थितविटपिनां प्रादे कत्वप्रतीतिर्दूरदोषनिबन्धनाधनाशि
दृष्टेति दूरतस्थस्य चन्द्रमसः
कत् वप्रत्
प्रादे कत्वप्रत्ययो ययो दोषनिबन्धन एवेति निर्णीयते। Therefore, because of the
शि
knowledge of distance between the seer and the perceived
objects, there is certainty that the size of trees on the top of a
hill cannot be the size of a finger's length, even though
perception reveals them to be so. It follows that the moon,
which is even further away, cannot be the size of a finger, even
though it appears to be as such.
एवमाका शासमीपे नीरूपत्वनिश्चयाद्दूरे रूपवत्त्वधीर्दूरदोषजन्येति प्रागेव निश्चियते।
Similarly, because proximate space is known with certainty to
be colourless, it is clear that the perception of sky in the
distance being blue must be due to a defect.
`पीतः शङ्खः' इत्यादि प्रत्यक्षं तु प्राथमिकपरीक्षितप्रत्यक्षेण `शङ्खो न पीतः'
इत्यर्थाभाव निश्चयादप्रामाण्यज्ञानास्कन्दितमेवोत्पद्यते। A person who sees the
yellowness of the conch already has the verified knowledge
that the conch is white, therefore his perception of yellowness
is accompanied by the certainty of its incorrectness.
एवं सवितृसुषिरादिप्रत्यक्षमपि ।Similarly, the perception of a hole in
the sun, which happens to some people, is also wrong.
तथा च चन्द्रादिप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षं दूरादिदोषनिश्चयात्, `पीतः शङ्खः' इत्यदिप्रत्यक्षं
प्राथमिकार्थाभावनिचयादेव या देवश्चबाधितमिति पचादनुमानागमादिप्रसर
दनु मा नागमा दिप्रसरश्चा
इति न
ताभ्यां तद्बाध:। Therefore the perception of the smallness of the
moon is disproved by the certain knowledge that the
perception suffers from the defect of distance, and the
yellowness of the conch is disproved by the certainty that it
cannot be yellow, and it is after they have been thus
repudiated, that there is any scope for the operation of
inference or scripture. That being so, scripture and inference
are not the ones that are contradicting perception.

येन हि यस्य भ्रमत्वं ज्ञायतेः, तत्तस्य बाधकमित्युच्यते। The cognition

that reveals the illusoriness of another cognition is the one
that can be called the overruling or contradicting cognition.
न च चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वादिप्रत्यक्षस्यागमादिना भ्रमत्वं ज्ञायते। भ्रमत्वज्ञानोत्तरकालमेव
तत्प्रवृत्तेः। Scriptural cognitions etc., cannot be called the
overruling cognitions because they do not reveal the
illusoriness of the perception of the smallness of the moon, for
they (scriptural cognitions) only start operating after their (the
perception of the size of the moon) illusoriness has already
been established.
अप्रमाण्यज्ञानाकलङ्कितं तु स्वार्थपरिच्छेदकं निःशङ्कप्रवृत्तिजननयोग्यम्। A
cognition not afflicted by a doubt about its validity is the one
that is capable of revealing its object with certainty, and of
leading to fruitful activity backed by conviction.
यथा `वह्निरुष्ण एव',`प्रस्तरो यजमानभिन्न एव', `घटः सन्नेव इत्यादि
 ना न्
तन्नान्यस्यावकाशदर्नान्नान्येन ना येनर्शबाध्यम्। For example, the cognitions
न्
"fire is hot indeed", "the prastara is certainly different from the
sacrificer", "the pot certainly exists", do not allow room for
any other means of knowledge, and therefore cannot be
contradicted by any other cognitions.
न ह्यत्र प्रागेव दूरादिदोषधीर्वा अर्थाभावनिचयोयो श्चवा कोट्यन्तरालम्बित्वं वाऽस्ति। In none
of these cognitions, is there a prior cognition of defects (such
as distance), or certainty that their objects do not exist, or the
possibility of any other alternative outcome.

The opponent next invokes the six summary indicators of

meaning according to pUrva mImAmsa - shruti, linga, vAkya, sthAna,
prakaraNa, samAkhya (ref: pUrva mImAmsa sUtra 3.3.14) - to prove his
point.

A short explanation of each of the terms is provided below for

ease of comprehension.
1) shruti - when a word or collection of words independently
conveys its primary / conventional meaning, without relying on
other words or the context.
2) linga - when the meaning of a word is not clear and its
suggestive meaning is brought by some other word.
3) vAkya - when the meaning of a word or word-collection is
derived from a self-contained sentence unit.
4) sthAna - when the location of a sentence or a certain order of
the text contributes largely to its interpretation.
5) prakaraNa - when the sentence meaning is not clear and it is
derived from the context in which it occurs.
6) samAkhya - when a compound word is split into its
components and its meaning is thus determined.

The general rule of interpretation is that the one that occurs

previously in the sUtra (shruti, linga, vAkya, sthAna, prakaraNa, samAkhya)
is stronger than the one that occurs later. So shruti is the
strongest and samAkhya is the weakest. However, there are
exceptions. Sometimes, prakaraNa backed by shruti is stronger
than linga.
The opponent argues:

किं च क्वचित् प्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षान्तरगौरवाद्युक्तिबाध्यं भवतु, क्वचिच्च लिङ्गादिकं

श्रुतिगौरवात् श्रुत्यनुसारिप्रकरणादिबाध्यं भवतु, राजामात्य इव राजगौरवेण राजभृत्यबाध्यः,
Sometimes, we may admit that perception is overruled by
reasoning, but that is due to the support of some other, more
valid perceptual cognitions. Sometimes, implied indication
(linga) may be overruled by context (prakaraNa), but only when it
is backed by the power of direct connotation (shruti). Like for
example a minister is sometimes overruled by the king's
servant, on account of the authority vested in him by the king.
तथापि न युक्तिमात्रस्य प्रकरणमात्रस्य वा प्रत्यक्षलिङ्गादिबाधकत्वम्।
प्रत्यक्षाद्यनुसारित्वस्य सर्वत्राभावात्।
Even so, it must be recognised that neither reasoning on its
own, nor context on its own is universally capable of
overruling perception and implied indication, respectively,
because the support of perception etc. (and shruti) cannot be
present in every instance.

न हि प्रधानभूताचमनादिपदार्थविषयया `आचामेदुपवीति दक्षिणाचारः' इत्यादिस्मृत्या

पदार्थधर्मभूतक्रमादिविषया `वेदं कृ त्वा वेदिं करोति' इति श्रुतिर्वेदकरणानन्तरं
क्षुतनिमित्तकाचमनोपनिपाते बाध्यत इत्यन्यत्रापि तथा भवितव्यम्
It may so happen that the smRti injunction "if one sneezes in
the middle of a ritual, perform an Achamanam" sometimes
overrules the shruti injunction "commence the construction of
the vedi (altar) immediately after making the veda (a clump of
darbha grass)" - because the sacrificer happens to have
sneezed just after the veda was made, necessitating him to
perform the Achamanam before proceeding to construct the vedi.
However, that by itself does not mean
that smRti overrules shruti everywhere.

The siddhikAra responds to this argument.

इति चेत्, मैवम्। If this is said, not so.
यतो युक्तिरेवैषा। Because it is by reasoning that one proves that
perception is flawed.
यत् यद्दूरस्थाल्पपरिमाणज्ञानं, तत् तद्दूरदोषनिबन्धनमप्रमा, शैलाग्रस्थविटप्यल्पपरिमाणज्ञानवत्
इदमपि तथेति। Wherever the object of perception appears small,
it is because of the discrepancy of distance and such a
cognition is incorrect. Like in the instance of the trees on the
hilltop appearing small. This too is like that.
तथा चैवंरूपया युक्त्यैव चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वादिप्रत्यक्षस्य बाधं वदन् युक्त्या न प्रत्यक्षस्य बाध इति
वचनेनाजैषीः परं मन्दबुद्धे ! मन्दाक्षम्, न तु परम्।
Thus even as you are arguing for the repudiation of the
perception on the basis of logical reasoning, you insist that
logical reasoning is incapable of overthrowing perception. In
arguing so, you have only forsaken shame, not achieved
victory.
एवं `पीतः शङ्खः' इति प्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्राचीनार्थाभावप्रत्यक्षं न बाधकम्,
तस्येदानीमभावात्। Similarly, the rejection of the cognition "the
conch-shell is yellow" is not due to a pre-existing perceptual
cognition of its whiteness, for the latter is not present at the
time of the former cognition.
न च तत्स्मृतिर्बाधिका, तस्या अनुभवात् दुर्बलत्वात्। Nor can the memory of
its whiteness overrule the present perception of yellowness,
because memory is weaker than direct experience.
के वलं युक्त्युत्पादन एव सोपयुज्यते। तेन युक्त्यागमाभ्यामेवोदाहृतस्थलेषु बाधः। The only
purpose that it (memory) serves is to trigger the reasoning
process. Therefore, it must be admitted that in all the cases
under discussion, the repudiation of perceptual cognitions is
by reasoning and scripture.

यत्तु क्वचिद्युक्त्यादेर्बाधकत्वदर्शनमात्रेण सर्वत्र न बाधकत्वं वक्तुं शक्यम्, युक्त्यादिबाधकताया

अनुस्रियमाणप्रत्यक्षगौरवनिबन्धनत्वात् इत्युक्तम्। तदनुक्तोपालम्भनम्।
It was argued that "it is not possible to extrapolate as a
general rule that reasoning and scripture are able to overrule
perception on the basis of a few examples, because in such
instances, reasoning etc have the support of a stronger
perception which confers them with the ability to overthrow
(the weaker) perception - however, this is not universally true"
- This is refuting something we never stated in the first place.

न हि मया क्वचिद्दर्शनमात्रेण युक्तर्बाधकता सर्वत्रोच्यते, अपि तु

चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वशङ्खपीतत्वप्रत्यक्षादौ यावदागमादेर्बाधकताप्रयोजकं दृष्टं तावत्सत्त्वेन।
I did not claim that reasoning is capable of overruling all
perception on the basis of a few examples alone. Rather, the
argument made was - if the conditions which allow reasoning
and scripture to overrule the perception of the smallness of
the moon and the yellowness of the conch, are present in other
instances, then they too will overrule perceptions.

न च तत्रानुस्रियमाणं प्रत्यक्षमस्ति, यद्गौरवेण बाधकतायामन्यथासिद्धिं ब्रूयाः।

On the other hand, there is no other stronger perception that
supports reasoning and scripture in the instances quoted - one
has not had the direct perception of the true size of the moon,
so to argue that reasoning is able to overrule the perception of
moon's smallness only with the aid of a stronger perception is
not valid. If the perception of a different object, or of the same
object, but from a different time, is invoked as support, that is
only describing the process of inference and memory, not
proving that it is perception that contradicts perception.

कत्वप्
रत्
यक्
तस्माच्चन्द्रप्रादे कत्वप्रत्यक्षस्यषस्
यशि
प्रपञ्चसत्त्वप्रत्यक्षस्य च तुल्यवदेव
बाध्यता। युक्त्यागमयोश्च तुल्यवदेव बाधकतेति। Therefore, the perception
of the smallness of the moon and the world's reality are equal
in their capacity to be sublated; the sublating ability of
reasoning and scripture are also similarly equal.

न हि चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्रागेव दुष्टकरणकत्वनिश्चयः। नैकट्यस्यापि

क्वचिद्दोषत्वेन सर्वत्र परिमाणज्ञानाविवासप्रसङ्गात्। सप् रसङ् गात् Nor can it be argued
।श्वा
that the perception of the moon's smallness was already
known to be defective (because of the discrepancy introduced
by distance), because even if the object happens to be too
close, it appears to be unnaturally large. Thus, any faith in the
validity of the size cognition will be lost if you say that the
presence of discrepancies is already known.
किन्त्वागमादिना बाधानन्तरमेव। Rather, the cognition that the
perception of the smallness of moon is incorrect because it is
far away from earth - is only known after the original
perception has been overruled by verbal testimony and logical
reasoning first.

तद्वत् प्रकृतेऽपि मिथ्यात्वसिद्ध्यनन्तरमेवाविद्यारूपदोषनिश्चयः। Similarly, in our

context too, only after there is the certain cognition of the
unreality of the world as a result of inferential reasoning
and vedic scripture, does one have the certainty that the prior
notion of reality was because of the defect of ignorance.

तथा च सर्वात्मना साम्यम्। Thus this is similar to the example.

यत्तु दृष्टस्य वस्तुनो बलवद्दृष्टिं विना अन्यद्बाधकं नास्तीत्युक्तं तत् दुर्बलशब्दलिङ्गादिविषयम्।

What was said elsewhere - "that which is known through
perception can only be repudiated by a stronger perception,
and nothing else" - must be understood to mean to cover
instances where the validity of reasoning and verbal testimony
has not been validated by examination.

यदप्युक्तं विवरणे, `यत्राविचारपुरस्सरमेव प्रत्यक्षावभासमप्यनुमानादिना

बाधितमुच्छिन्नव्यवहारं भवति। तत्र तथा भवतु। यत्र पुनर्विचार
पदवीमुपारूढयोर्ज्ञानयोर्बलाबलचिन्तया बाधनिचयस्तत्र यस्तत्रश्चनानुमानादिना
प्रत्यक्षस्य मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः' इति,
In the instance of the sentence from the panchapAdika
vivaraNa (quoted by the nyAyAmRtakAra): "If without enquiry, it has
been determined that that perception is overruled by reasoning
etc., so be it. However, if the relative strength of two
contradictory cognitions is enquired into, and one is
determined to be stronger than the other, then it must follow
that inference cannot disprove perception".

On the face of it, this quote seems to prove the nyAyAmRtakAra's

position that perception cannot be overturned by reasoning
and scripture. However, the siddhikAra clarifies the intent of
the vivaraNakAra:

तदपि गृहीतप्रामाण्यकशब्दतदुपजीव्यनुमानातिरिक्तयुक्तिविषयम् । Here too, the sentence

is only concerned with those instances where the validity of
scripture, and inferences that are dependent on such
scripture, has not been verified.
येश्चबलाबलचिन्ताया एवानवका त्।।
एकत्र प्रामाण्यनिचये त् Where the
।।शा
validity (of scripture and inference) has been confirmed, there
is no requirement for a consideration of the relative strengths
of one pramANa versus the other.

Thus an enquiry into the relative strength of pramANa-s is only

needed when one is unsure of the validity of a scriptural
statement. If one has verified the validity of scripture, then it
can certainly overturn perception. In the case
of shruti revealing the mithyAtva of the world, there is certainty
in its validity, so the vivaraNa sentence does not apply in this
context.

।। इति प्रत्यक्षस्य लिङ्गाद्यबाध्यत्वे बाधकम्।।

This concludes the chapter on the refutation of the
impossibility of inference and scripture overruling perception.
bhAvibAdhopapatti:
अथ भाविबाधोपपत्ति: |

The core argument of the next chapter of the advaita siddhi is

that the world is capable of being sublated in the future (bhAvi
bAdha upapatti).

The siddhikAra commences his argument.

एवंच 'भाविबाधनिचयाच्चे
याच् 'ति यदुक्तं, तदप्युपपन्नतरमेव ; The statement
चेश्च
made, namely, "On account of certainty that there will be
sublation in the future", is an eminently logical one.

However, as perception stands uncontradicted in the present,

how can the future possibility of its contradiction be grounds
to set it aside? To answer such a possible doubt, the
siddhikAra says:

प्रकारान्तरेणाबाधितस्य चन्द्रप्रादेशिकत्वप्रत्यक्षस्य यथा आगमेन बाध:, तथा

प्रकारान्तरेणाबाधितस्य 'सन् घट' इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षस्य मिथ्यात्वबोधकागमेन बाध इति
निर्णयात् | The perception of the moon being the size of a digit may
be uncontradicted in the present, but we say that it is
overruled by scripture which reveals its true size (jyotiSa).
Similarly, the perception "this pot exists", may be
uncontradicted in the present, but it is also sublated by the
scripture that reveals its mithyAtva - of this, one can be
certain.

In the nyAyAmRta, it was argued that the doubt in relation to a

future sublation of the world is itself impossible, and therefore
such a doubt cannot be cited as grounds for the invalidation of
perception. The siddhikAra considers this next.

एवंच - भाविबाधशङ्कामादाय यत्परैर्दूषणमुक्तम् तदनुक्तोपलम्भनतया - अपास्तम् |

Moreover, the defect that was cited by some (i.e the
nyAyAmRtakAra) assuming that our position was grounded on
"a doubt" about the future sublation of the world - stands
rejected because it is imputing something that was never
claimed by us.
advaitin-s do not argue that perception is accompanied by
a doubt that the object revealed by it could be sublated in the
future. Rather, what we say is that there is the certainty that
the world will be sublated when the knowledge of identity with
Brahman arises. However, even if we had claimed that it was
a doubt, not a certainty, in relation to the future sublation, the
cited defect is not problematic.

वस्तुतस्तु - बाधशङ्कामादायापि प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकतोद्धार: समीचीन एव ; In

reality, even if our position was that there was a doubt about
future sublation, it would be sufficient grounds to overturn the
refutation of pratyaksha bAdha (contradiction with
perception).

How does such a doubt arise? Perception says the world is

real. Scripture says it is unreal. The two are in contradiction.

प्रत्यक्षशब्दयोर्बलाबलविचारात् प्राक् किमयं शब्द उपचरितार्थ: ; आहोस्वित्

प्रत्यक्षमप्रमाणमिति शङ्कायामुभयोरबाधकत्वप्राप्तौ
This is so because the question "Which one among shruti and
perception is stronger?" arises only when there is an apparent
contradiction between the two. However, before such an
analysis of relative strength is conducted, when there is a
doubt whether shruti takes a figurative meaning or whether
perception is invalid, there is no question of contradiction
between the two. (If shruti statements revealing mithyAtva are
only figurative, there is no contradiction with perception. If
perception is invalid, there is no question of an invalid means
of knowledge contradicting shruti. Thus in either 'koTi' of the
doubt, there is no contradiction between perception and
shruti).

तात्पर्यलिङ्गै: श्रूयमाणार्थपरतया निश्चितस्यागमस्योपचरितार्थत्वशङ्काव्युदासेन

लब्धावकाशत्वसंभवात् |
That being the case, as the vedic statements revealing the
mithyAtva of the world are supported by the six indicatory
marks that reveal that such statements are the primary import
of scripture, it follows that the direct meaning apparent from
hearing those statements is correct, and therefore there is no
room for doubting that the shruti's meaning is figurative (it
cannot be figurative, it is the direct, "as-heard", meaning of the
words). From this it follows that the other doubt in question -
whether the object of perception will be sublated in the future
- does have scope, ie, such a doubt is very much possible.

नच - शब्दलिङ्गयो: प्रत्यक्षाबाधकतया प्रत्यक्षान्तरस्याप्रमाणतया

शङ्क्यमानत्वेनाबाधकतया च बाधकसामान्याभावे निश्चिते बाधशङ्का न युक्तेति - वाच्यं ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "As scripture and inference are
incapable of overruling perception, and if there is another
perception which invalidates this perception, it would lead to a
doubt about the validity of the sublating perception itself, it is
quite clear that there are no means of knowledge capable of
contradicting perception. That being so, a doubt about the
future invalidation of perception is untenable".

शब्दलिङ्गयो: प्रत्यक्षाबाधकत्वस्य व्यवस्थापितत्वात्प्रत्येकं विशेषाभावनिश्चयेऽपि

विशेषाणामियत्तावधारणदशायाम् संशयसंभवात्,
This is a flawed argument because - The grounds for inference
and scripture to overrule perception have already been
established. Even if one is certain that perception is not
overruled in individual instances of pramANa-s, because one is
unsure whether these are the only possible instances for
contradictory means, a doubt lingers whether perception is
sublatable or not.

The basic argument is that the nyAyAmRtakAra is taking 3-4

instances and argues that in such instances, perception is not
overruled. Using this, he generalises to conclude that it is
impossible to overrule perception, and that, even a doubt
about such a possibility cannot be entertained.

The term इयत्तावधारणं is used by the siddhikAra. To explain this

with an example: Of the elements, only earth, water and fire
have form. No other element has form. Therefore if it would be
correct to say that wind, which is different from earth, water
and fire, has no form. A person may know that each of earth,
water and fire have have no form (विशेषाभावनिश्चयेऽपि), so long as he
lacks the knowledge that "only" those three have form
(विशेषाणामियत्तावधारणदशायाम्), he may still be doubtful whether wind
has form or not (संशयसंभवात्).
प्रत्यक्षस्याप्रमाणतया शङ्क्यमानत्वेन शङ्काविरहोपपादनस्यासम्भवदुक्तिकत्वाच्च | As the
possibility of another perception being able to invalidate this
perception was entertained (by the nyAyAmRtakAra himself),
to deny any doubt in relation to the future invalidation of
perception is untenable.

अथैवं - जाग्रदादिज्ञानस्याप्रमात्वे स्वप्नदृष्टस्य शुक्तिरूप्यादेश्च बाधासिद्धौ

कथं दृष्टान्त्सिद्धि: - स्यादिति चेन्न ; Therefore if it is said - "If the
perceptual knowledge obtained in the waking state is invalid,
then as there would be no means to sublate the dream, or the
shell silver (for objects in a dream are sublated by waking up
and seeing that they do not exist, and the shell silver is
sublated by the perception of the shell), there would be no
example (dRShTAnta) necessary to substantiate the inference
of the world's mithyAtva" - we refute such an argument.

The argument is that the inference of the world's reality uses

the dRShTAnta of shell-silver and dream objects. However,
their unreality can only be established by the perception of real
objects in their place. However if perception itself is invalid,
then the unreality of the dream and the shell-silver itself is not
established. That being so, there is no substantive basis to
establish the inference of the world's mithyAtva.

This is rejected for three reasons:

आरोप्यसत्ताधिकसत्ताकविषयत्वेनापेक्षिकप्रमाणत्वेनान्यूनसत्ताकविषयत्वे
न वा बाधकत्वात् |
1) आरोप्यसत्ताधिकसत्ताकविषयत्वेन As the cognition has an object
having a higher order of reality than the sublated object
2) आपेक्षिकप्रमाणत्वेन or, because the validity of cognition (in
the waking state) is relatively higher
3) अन्यूनसत्ताकविषयत्वेन वा बाधकत्वात् | or because the object of the
cognition is not of a lower order of reality compared to the
sublated object, it can be a sublating cognition.

As these reasons apply in the case of dream objects and shell-

silver, they are sublated, and can be used as examples in the
mithyAtva inference.
The nyAyAmRtakAra had quoted a verse from kumArila
bhaTTa's Sloka vArttikam in support.

अतएव यदुक्तं बौद्धं प्रति भट्टवार्तिके - "प्रतियोगिनि दृष्टे च जाग्रद्बोधे मृषा

भवेत् | स्वप्नादिदृष्टिरस्माकं तव भेदोऽपि किं कृ त: ||" इति - तत्सङ्गच्छते |
Therefore, the verse from the BhattavArttika (quoted by the
nyAyAmRtakAra against the advaitin) was directed to the
Buddhist, not us - "When the superseding object (pratiyogi) is
seen using a valid cognition, dream objects etc are
invalidated. This is the basis for us (to declare them to be
unreal). However, if you say the waking perception is also
invalid, what is the basis for dreams to be unreal?"

This verse has scope against the Buddhists, not the advaitin-s
- for we say that perceptions in the waking state etc are valid
until it is superceded by a higher truth, just like taking oneself
to be a human being is very much valid in a transactional
sense, even though from a higher standpoint, that is accepted
as incorrect, even by the dvaitin himself. ShankarAchArya had
made the same point by quoting an ancient writer in the
samnvaya sUtra:
देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं तु आ आत्मनिचयात्॥ या
त्॥श्च

The nyAyAmRtakAra postulates a condition for a cognition to

be capable of sublating an object. Taking the example of the
shell-silver, he argues that merely a generic cognition such as
"this is an object" will not sublate the silver. The cognition has
to reveal a hitherto unknown aspect of the proximate object.
For example, the cognition that sublates the shell-silver should
reveal that the object in front is a shell, not silver. Extending
this rule in the case of the world, the advaitin argues that the
world is sublated only when one has had the cognition of the
self, Atma. However, the self is self-evident, svaprakAsha. The
cognition of the self can sublate the world (according to the
rule that was postulated), only if it reveals something unknown
about the object. As the self is ever known, there is nothing
unknown revealed by the cognition of the self. As a result, it
cannot be the sublating cognition, and as there is no other
cognition capable of sublating the world, it is not mithyA.
The siddhikAra refutes this.
ननु - भ्रामकालीनापरोक्षबुद्ध्यविषयवि षविषयैवशे
षविषयैव धीर्बाधिका दृष्टा , नच विश्वबाधिका
धीस्तथेति - चेन्न;
If it is argued thus - "For a cognition to be capable of sublating,
it must reveal a characteristic of the object that is not
perceived during the time of an illusion, however the world-
sublating cognition is not capable of doing that" - no.

अधिष्ठानतत्वज्ञानत्वेनैव भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वात्, विश्वनिवर्तकब्रह्मज्ञानस्य तथात्वात् |

The capacity of a cognition to sublate the illusion is by it
revealing the reality of the substratum of the illusion, and the
cognition of Brahman, which is the world-sublating cognition,
certainly does that.

The siddhikAra's contention is that the rule cannot simply be

that the sublating cognition reveals an unknown aspect of the
object, but that it reveals that unknown aspect, the ignorance
of which, is the cause of the illusion. In the case of the shell-
silver, the cognition of the market price of silver too reveals a
hitherto unknown aspect of the perceived object (and thus
satisfies the condition for a sublating cognition, as stipulated
by the nyAyAmRtakAra) but cannot be said to sublate the
shell-silver. The cause of the illusion is the ignorance of the
nature of the proximate object. The seer does not know that
the object before is a shell, and as a result superimposes a
piece of silver upon it. If he later comes to realise that the
object is a shell, such a knowledge removes the ignorance,
which was the cause of the illusion of silver. In the case of the
cognition of the self, it removes the ignorance of the self's true
nature, which led to the illusion of the world. Therefore, it is
capable of sublating the world illusion.

Anticipating such a response, the nyAyAmRtakAra argues that

even so, the world-sublating cognition must reveal an unknown
attribute of the self, but the advaitin argues that the cognition
is nishprakAraka, an attribute-less cognition.
नच - सप्रकारिकैव धीर्भ्रमनिवर्तिका, इयं तु निष्प्रकारिका कथं तथेति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue thus: "It is only an attributive cognition that is
sublating, whereas here the supposedly sublating cognition is
attributeless, so how can it be so?"
निवर्तकतायां सप्रकारकत्वस्य गौरवादप्रवेशात् | Because, the attributiveness of
the sublating cognition, being a superfluous requirement, is
not needed.

ननु - आवयककश्य
: सप्रकारकत्वनियम:, व्यावृत्ताकारज्ञानत्वेनैव भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वात्, अन्यथा
अनुवृत्ताकारज्ञानादपि तन्निवृत्त्यापत्तेरिति - चेत् ;
If it is argued thus: "The attributiveness of the cognition is a
necessary condition, because only a distinguishing cognition
that reveals the object distinctly from other objects is capable
of sublating the illusion. If that is not accepted, even a
generic, non-distinguishing cognition of the object can sublate
the illusion".

To explain, the cognition "this is a shell" distinguishes it from

silver, and thus removes the illusion, whereas merely a
cognition "this is some object" is not capable of removing the
illusion because such a cognition would equally be true
whether the proximate object was shell or silver. Shell-ness
is a characteristic that is present only in the shell, not silver
and can serve as a basis to distinguish the two objects,
whereas object-ness is a characteristic common to both the
shell and silver and cannot serve as a basis to distinguish the
two.

The cognition of the self that is world-sublating, does not

reveal, according to the advaitin, any attributes in the self.
Therefore it contains no basis to distinguish the self from the
world, and is incapable of sublating the world. This is the
argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra.

The siddhikAra says:

सत्यम्, व्यावृत्ताकारत्वेन ज्ञानस्य भ्रमनिवर्तकता, नतु विशेषप्रकारकत्वनियम: | True,
while the sublating cognition must be a distinguishing
cognition, there is no requirement that must distinguish based
on an attribute.

For example, the person who sees silver instead of shell may
know that a shell is different fro silver, but possessing the
knowledge of difference, he continues seeing the silver. Thus
it is not the cognition of difference which is necessary in the
sublating cognition, rather it is the cognition that the object in
front is a shell, not silver - ie, this object has shell-ness, not
silver-ness.

That may well be the case, but even there, an attribute

belonging to the object is revealed, whereas the cognition of
the self reveals no attributes. To explain why it is still capable
of distinguishing the world from its substratum, the self and
thus sublate the world, the siddhikAra continues:

तथाहि - व्यावृत्ताकारता हि द्वेधा भवति | To explain, a cognition's ability to

distinguish is possible in two ways.

विशेषणादुपलक्षणाच्च | By means of a qualifying feature (visheShaNa) and

circumstantial identifier (upalakshaNa). More details here.

The visheShaNa is an intrinsic feature of the object, on the

basis of which it is distinguished from the rest. So, for
example, when we ask someone to fetch the blue pot from the
next room, the hearer identifies the correct pot based on its
colour, and when he fetches the pot, it is not the pot alone that
is brought, but the pot, along with its colour, blue.

The upalakshaNa need not be present in the object which it

identifies, it need not even be present at the point of time
when that object is uniquely identified versus others. When
someone says that the house with crow is Devadatta's, the
crow is not an intrinsic characteristic of the house, it is merely
a circumstantial presence which is the basis for distinguishing
Devadatta's house from other houses. When the house is
identified, the crow need not even be sitting in the house, but
the memory of the crow sitting there is sufficient to identify
the house in the present.

upalakshaNa itself is of two kinds - Where the upalakshaNa

points to some attribute which is present in the object, and
where the upalakshaNa identifies the object itself.

Continuing with the example of the crow used to identify the

house, it has been observed that sometimes when the crow
flies away, the straw in the thatching of the roof stands upright
as a result of the crow gripping onto it tightly when flying
away. The slightly raised straws in the house serve as a clue
to the seer that the crow was sitting there in the past. In such
a case, the crow does not reveal the house directly, but it
reveals it through an attribute that it left behind in the house.
This is called dharmAntara uplakshaNam. Where there is no such
attribute left behind, but the crow serves to identify the house
by itself, it is called svarUpa upalaksaNam.

तत्राद्ये सप्रकारकत्वनियम: In the former (visheShaNa), where the

distinguishing cognition identifies the object on the basis of a
visheShaNa present in the object, it is an attributive cognition.

द्वितीयेऽपि धर्मान्तरस्य यदुपलक्षणं तस्माद्व्यावृत्ताकारत्वे सप्रकारकतैव | Even in

the second case (upalakshaNa), where the distinguishing
cognition identifies the object on the basis of some attribute
left behind (dharmAntara), it is an attributive cognition.

यदि तु स्वरूपोपलक्षणाद्व्यावृत्ताकारता, तथा निष्प्रकारकतैव However, where

the cognition distinguishes the object based on the object's
own nature, then the cognition need not contain an attribute.

, Because the uplakshaNa (based on

उपलक्षणस्य तत्राप्रवे त्त्
शा
which the object is distinguished) does not form part of the
object distinguished.

This may raise the question, even if the object is distinguished

on its own basis, can the object itself not be revealed as an
attribute in the cognition? To address this, the siddhikAra
says:

स्वस्य च स्वस्मिन्नप्रकारकत्वात् | The object itself cannot be

revealed as its own attribute in a cognition.

Logicians argue that sometimes an object can be its own

attribute. For example, in nyAya, it is said that everything is
knowable. Thus every object has knowability. However,
knowability itself must be knowable (if it did not, the
proposition that everything is knowable would not be true).
Therefore, knowability must possess knowability as an
attribute. So, why cannot the cognition of the self reveal the
self as an attribute of the self (and thus end up being
attributive)?

नच - प्रमेयत्वादिवत् स्वस्यैव स्वस्मिन् प्रकारकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not

argue that "like knowability, it is possible for a thing to be its
own attribute".

त्वयापि के वलान्वयिन्येवागत्या तथाङ्गीकारात्, नतु सर्वत्र | Because you too

concede that this stipulation is only for universal attributes,
and not everywhere. The advaitin does not accept the
existence of any such universal attributes, and so knowability
cannot be used against him as an example to establish that
the self can have itself as its own attribute.

The exact mechanism by which a cognition reveals object will

be discussed in detail in the pratikarmavyavasthA chapter of
the advaita siddhi, but briefly, it is held that each cognition
takes on the AkAra of the object and thus helps reveal it.
Normally, the word 'AkAra' is translated as shape, but that is
not the intended meaning of the term here. 'AkAra' is a
technical term denoting the relationship between the cognition
and its object.

The nyAyAmRtakAra seizes on this to argue that the AkAra of

a cognition is the same as its prakAra (attribute), and because
it is the same, the cognition of Brahman being brahmAkAra, is
brahma-prakAra also, and thus the world sublating cognition
has Brahman as its attribute.

In nyAya, it is held that every vishiShTa buddhi (composite

cognition) reveals three aspects of an object -
the visheShya (substance), the prakAra (attribute),
and samsarga (their relationship). Thus the cognition of a pot
comprises the pot as the visheShya, its colour as the prakAra
and their relationship (the pot endowed with colour) as its
samsarga.
अथ - आकारप्रकारयोरभेदात् ब्रह्माकारतैव ब्रह्मबुद्धेस्तत्प्रकारतेति - चेत्,
न | if you argue that as AkAra and prakAra are the same, the
brahmAkAra cognition has brahman as its prakAra - no.

विशिष्टबुद्धेर्विशेष्याकारत्वेऽपि तदप्रकारकत्वात्, आकारप्रकारयोर्भेदात् ।AkAra and

prakAra are different because while the substance in a
composite cognition has AkAratva, it cannot be a prakAra.

आकारच श्चवृत्तिनिष्ठ: कश्चिद्धर्मोऽसाधारणव्यवहारहेतुरिति वक्ष्यते |

AkAra is that attribute of a cognition, which is the cause of a
specific activity. This will be discussed later.

For example, while sight and touch reveal both the substance
and its attribute, smell and fragrance only reveal the attribute
and not the substance. Is it possible for a cognition to reveal
just the substance and not its attributes?

The nyAyAmRtakAra had argued that this is not possible for

cognition. The siddhikAra gives an example from nyAya where
verbal cognitions can refer to only the substance without
referring to its attribute.

The word space is different from the word pot. All the pots in
the world can be referred to by the single word pot. This is so
because the word pot refers not only to the particular pot, it
also refers to its underlying pot-ness. However, in the case of
space, as space is one and all pervading, one need not infer
that the word refers to the particular space as well as space-
ness.

If it is argued that space must also have some attribute, and

thus the word space must refer to space-ness also, we ask
what is space-ness? That is, what is the attribute present in
space? The technical definition of space in nyAya is AkAsha:
shabdAshraya: - Space is that which is the basis for the
attribute of sound.

If the word space refers to space including it being the locus

of sound, then the definition of space would be repetitive,
punarukti. If the word AkAsha refers to its attribute
(shabdAshrayatva), the definition AkAsha: shabdAshraya:
would be tantamount to saying the basis of sound is that
which is the basis of sound.

Therefore we must accept that the word space only refers to

the substance space, and not to its quality of being the locus
of sound. This has been accepted by the tattvachintAmaNikara
(gangeSa upAdhyAya).

यत् वो पलक्
तस्माद्यथाऽऽकाशपदाच्छब्दारयत्वोपलक्षितधर्मिस्वरूपमात्रं षि तधर् मि स्वरूपमा त्
रं श्रज्ञायते,
तद्वदत्रापि द्वितीयाभावाद्युपलक्षितब्रह्मस्वरूपज्ञानं व्यावृत्ताकारं द्वैतनिवर्तकमपरोक्षम् | Just like
the word space is known to only denote the substance
identified by the upalakshaNa of being the locus of sound,
similarly here too, the direct knowledge of Brahman in its
essential nature as identified by the upalakshaNa of the
absence of duality, is able to sublate duality.

यथाच शब्दात्तादृग्ज्ञानसंभवस्तथा वक्ष्यते | The mechanism by which words can

generate such a verbal cognition will be discussed later (in the
third paricCheda).

The nyAyAmRtakAra takes a different tack. If someone sees

the illusion of the shell-silver, and later that illusion is
sublated, the sublating cognition only removes the illusion. It
does not alter the fact that the seer had seen the illusion
previously. Nor does it sublate the fact that the seer was
previously ignorant of the object being a shell. Nor does it
sublate a possible defect present in the eye which caused him
to see silver instead of a shell. Nor does it sublate the seer
himself.

नच - बाधकधियां भ्रमतद्धेत्वज्ञानदोषाध्यस्तद्रष्ट्रादीनामबाधकत्वं दृष्टमिति

कथं ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य तद्बाधकत्वं घटतामिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue thus:
"The sublating cognition does not remove the (prior) illusion,
nor its cause, ignorance, defective organs, the superimposition
of seer-ness, etc. That being so, how is it said that with
brahma jnAna, each of those things are sublated?"

यत्र हि स्वप्ने द्रष्टारं दुष्टकरणवन्तम् कल्पयित्वा तस्य भ्रमं कल्पयति, तत्र जागरज्ञानेन
सर्वेषां निवृत्तिदर्शनात् | Because, it is possible to imagine a seer with
defective eyes seeing an illusion in a dream, all of which are
sublated upon waking.

जाग्रद्दशयामपि यदा मनुष्यप्रकृ तौ चैतन्यं कल्पयित्वा तत्समीपवर्तिन्यनादर्

त्
वंकल्पयित्वा स्वप्रतिबिम्बमयं पयतीति
एवादर्त्वंर्श ती तिश्य
कल्पयति, तदा नायं चेतनो न चायमादर्श
ना च्
इति प्रमया सर्वनिवृत्तिदर्नाच्चर्श च नेयमादृष्टचरी कल्पना | When awake, it is
possible to superimpose consciousness in the toy figure of a
man, to imagine that a proximate a toy mirror is real, to
imagine him seeing his reflection in a mirror. And then, with
the right knowledge that there is neither a conscious entity,
nor a real mirror (nor a reflection, etc), all the superimposed
imaginations are sublated. Thus what is being postulated is
not outside the realms of possibility.

तथाचेयं शुक्तिरित्याद्यधिष्ठानज्ञानं रज्ज्वां सर्पभ्रममिव द्रष्ट्राध्यासं मा निवीवृतत्, तत्कस्य

हेतो:? Therefore, what is the reason to argue that, like in the
instances of the shell-silver illusion, the seer of the rope-snake
illusion is not sublated?

तदधिष्ठानसाक्षात्कारत्वाभावात्, It is so because the substratum of

the illusion of seer-ness has not been clearly perceived there.
The shell is the substratum of the illusion of shell-silver, not of
the illusion of being a seer in the first place.

दि प्
रपञ्चभ्रममि
ब्रह्मज्ञानं त्वाका दिप्रपञ्चभ्रममिववशा
द्रष्टुर्दोषादिभ्रममपि निवर्तयेदेव, तत्कस्य हेतो:?
What indeed is the cause for the illusion of being the seer, his
defective sense organs, etc. are removed, like the illusion of
the world comprising space etc., upon the dawn of brahma
jnAna?

षभ्रमाधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारत्वात् | It is so because the direct

अ षभ्रमाधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारत्वात्शे
cognition of the substratum of all illusions (Brahman).

एवंच बाधबुद्धित्वं न दोषाद्यबाधकत्वे प्रयोजकम्, अपि तु

तद्भ्रमाधिष्ठानतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारभिन्नत्वमिति द्रष्टव्यम् | Thus, there is no
rule that a sublating cognition cannot sublate the defects that
aided the occurrence of the illusion. Rather, it is the sublating
cognition being different from the direct cognition of the
substratum of the illusion of the defect that prevents it from
being able to sublate the defect.
ननु - कल्पितत्वादुक्तदृष्टान्तेन तत् बाध्यताम्, इह तु कथमिति - चेत्, If you say: "All
the examples involve something imagined, whereas in the
present case, the world cannot be a figment of
someone's imagination, so how do your arguments apply?"
हन्त ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य कल्पितत्वमङ्गीकु र्वतामस्माकमिदमनिष्टं महदापादितं देवानां
प्रियेण | Well, it would be naive to ask us such a question as if
it were something undesirable to us, when we hold that
everything other than Brahman is an imagination.

*******
The nyAyAmRtakAra invokes the perception by the sAkshi to
argue for their reality.

ननु - साक्षिप्रत्यक्षं न बाध्यम् ; दोषाजन्यत्वात्, प्रत्युत श्रुतिजनिताद्वैतज्ञानमेव बाध्यम् ;

Those that are revealed by the sAkshi cannot be sublatable,
because they are revealed by a source which is defect-free,
rather, it is shruti revealing advaita which must be taken to be
defective.

तात्पर्यभ्रमरूपदोषजन्यत्वादिति चेत् because such a cognition is born

out of an ignorance of the true import of shruti.

- न; If this is the argument, no

चैतन्यस्य स्वरूपतो दोषाजन्यत्वेऽपि तदवच्छेदिकाया अविद्यावृत्तेर्दोषजन्यत्वात् ;

While consciousness intrinsically is defect free, the cognition
that delimits it can be avidyA vritti (a cognition in the causal
layer)

तत्प्रतिफलितचैतन्यस्यैव साक्षिपदार्थत्वात् | And it is the

consciousness reflected in such a vritti that is called the
sAkshi.

अद्वैततात्पर्यग्रहस्य च प्रत्यक्षाद्यविरोधेन प्रमारूपतया दोषत्वाभावात् न

तज्जन्यमद्वैतज्ञानं बाध्यम् ; As the import of shruti revealing
advaita is not contradictory to perception etc, its import
cannot be caused into question, nor can the advaita revealed
by such a shruti deemed to be sublatable.
भ्रमजन्यवत्वस्य विषयबाधाप्रयोजकत्वाच्च | It is not necessary that a
cognition born from a defective source can only reveal objects
that are sublatable.

*******

नच - बाधकतुल्यमानताकद्वैतरुतिसंवादिद्वैतप्रत्यक्षं
तिसंवादिद्
वैतप्रत्यक् षंश्रुकथं बाध्यमिति - वाच्यम्
; Nor can it be argued thus: "shruti revealing duality has an
equal status as a pramANa in comparison to shruti revealing
non-duality, and supports perception that reveals duality.
Thus, how can it be contradicted?"
तेरनु वा
द्वैतस्य प्रत्यक्षादिलौकिकमानसिद्धत्वेन तद्बोधकरुतेरनुवादकतया दकतया श्रु
तिसाम्याभा
फलवदज्ञातस्वार्थतात्पर्यकाद्वैतरुतिसाम्याभावात् वा श्रु| Duality is already
त्
known through other means of knowledge, thus the status of
shruti which talks of duality is only to repeat something
already known, and cannot be held to be of the same status as
shruti revealing non-duality, which serves a useful purpose, it
reveals something hitherto unknown and is supported by
indicatory marks of import.

Another objection is raised. In an illusion, the silver is

erroneously seen to be identical to the shell. The sublating
cognition reveals the identity to be false, and shows that the
object in front is shell, which is different from silver.
ननु - बाधकधीबोध्यम् न बाध्यम्, भेदच श्चबाधकधीबोध्य:. तया स्वविषयस्य
भिन्नत्वेनैव ग्रहान्नेदं रजतमितिवत् अभिन्नतयोदासीनतया ग्रहणे बाधकत्वायोगादिति -
चेत्, न ;
The nyAyAmRtakAra argues:
बाधकधीबोध्यम् न बाध्यम् भेदच श्चबाधकधीबोध्य: That which is known
through the sublating knowledge is not sublated itself, and
difference is what is conveyed by the sublating knowledge.
तया स्वविषयस्य भिन्नत्वेनैव ग्रहान्नेदं रजतमितिवत् Like in the case of the
sublating cognition, "This is not silver", it reveals that the
illusion is different from the object it reveals.
अभिन्नतयोदासीनतया ग्रहणे बाधकत्वायोगादिति - thus the sublating
cognition is incapable of conveying either identity, or the
absence of both identity and difference.

The siddhikAra responds: if this is your argument, no.

बाधकधियो भेदविषयत्वानभ्युपगमात्, इयं शुक्तिरित्येव बाधबुद्ध्युदयात् ।
Because difference is not the object of the sublating cognition
- the sublating cognition is not "this is not silver", but "this is
a shell".
तस्यास्तु नेदं रजतमिति भेदबुद्धि: फलम् | The resulting knowledge of that
sublating cognition is "this is not silver".
| Thus the requirement for the sublating
कीश्य
व्यावृत्ताकारतैव बाधधिय आवयकी
cognition is that it be able to distinguish the revealed object.
सा च स्वरूपोपलक्षणबलान्निष्प्रकारकब्रह्मज्ञानेऽपि अस्तीति न
बाधकधीबोध्यत्वम् भेदस्य | That requirement exists for the non-
attributive cognition of brahman revealed through the
mechanism of svarUpa upalakshaNa, therefore there is no
requirement that the sublating cognition reveal difference.

**********
The NAK attacks the idea of doubt.
ननु - स्वप्नविलक्षणं फलपर्यन्तपरीक्षायामिति चेच्छङ्का स्यात्, तदा
शति श्रुप्
रत्यक् षतत् प्
रामा ण्
यशङ्
अद्वैतरुतिप्रत्यक्षतत्प्रामाण्यङ्कायामद्वैतरुतिरपि काया मद्
वैतश्
रु
तिरपिश्रुन सिद्ध्येत् |
If a doubt that something is not a dream-object is said to
persist until it is proven otherwise through an examination,
then the direct perception of shruti revealing advaita itself is
called into question.
How can one be sure that the advaita shruti that is heard is
actually a sentence from the veda, and not somewhere else?
How do we know that we have heard this correctly? There has
to be some limit to doubt.
बाधेऽपि बाधशङ्कायामबाधितबाधप्रसिद्धरपि न स्यात्; If there is doubt
whether the sublating cognition will lead to sublation, then the
sublation itself is not known to be unsublated.
बाधितबाधशङ्कायाचाबाध्यत्वाविरोधात् बा ध्
यत् वावि
रो धा त् | If however, the doubt
श्चा
regarding the sublatability of the sublating cognition has been
sublated itself, then there is nothing to opposing the
unsublatability of the sublating cognition.
भाविबाधशङ्कापातेन स्वक्रियाव्याघातच श्चस्यात् | If a doubt regarding
the future sublatability of the world is cited, it will harm the
very purpose of the advaitin. If a doubt regarding future
sublation always persists, what is the reason for any activity in
the present?
शङ्काप्रत्यक्षेऽपि शङ्कायां शङ्कापि न सिद्ध्येत् | If one perceives a doubt about
the doubt itself, then the doubt itself does not achieve its
result.
एवं सर्वत्र शङ्काप्रसारात् सर्वविप्लवापत्तिरिति Therefore, if everything is
up for doubt, nothing can be achieved.

The siddhikAra responds:

- इति चेत्, मैवं मंस्था: | No, that is not my position. Only if there is a
genuine reason, is there scope for doubt. I am not saying doubt
should be entertained without rhyme or reason.
यत: समत्वेन प्रमाणान्तरे उपस्थित एव निश्चितेऽपि सत्त्वादौ शङ्का भवतीति ब्रूम:,
Because there is another equal pramANa which provides
certainty to a contradictory result to this pramANa, can there
be a doubt.
नतु निश्चितमात्रे शङ्का भवतीति | It is not merely on account of there being
certainty that a particular pramANa is incorrect.

तथाच यदुक्तं बौद्धं प्रति भट्टवार्तिके - "दुष्टज्ञानगृहीतार्थप्रतिषेधोऽपि युज्यते |

गृहीतमात्रबाधे तु स्वपक्षोऽपि न सिद्ध्यति ||" इति,
The nyAyAmRtakAra had quoted from kumArila bhaTTa's sloka
vArtikam, which was directed against the buddhist. The verse
says: "If a defect is cited and as a result of which, something
that appears is deemed to be incorrect, that is acceptable. If
on the other hand, if everything that appears is deemed to be
incorrect, then the appearance of such a denial itself must be
denied."
तदपि न विरुध्यते ; गृहीतमात्रबाधस्य तच्छङ्कायाचानुक्ते
नु
क् : | That too does not
तेश्चा
contradict the advaita position, because we do not say there
is a doubt about the reality of the world simply on account of
its appearance - we say so on the basis of shruti revealing that
duality is unreal.
********

The nyAyAmRtakAra comes up with further objections:

ननु - सत्त्वादिप्रत्यक्षे क्लृप्तदूरादिदोषाभावनिश्चये कथं शङ्कोदय:, In the absence of
any defects such as distance etc, how can a doubt about
reality revealed by perception arise?
नच - क्लृप्तानामभावनिश्चयेऽप्यक्लृप्तस्य शङ्का स्यात् ; Nor can it be argued that
even when one is unaware of perception being defective, there
may be defects that one is unaware of (e.g. the unknown
unknowns).
शब्दे क्लृप्तवक्तृनिबन्धदोषस्य नित्यत्वेन वेदे अभावेऽपि दोषान्तरशङ्काया: सुवचतत्वात्, Such
an argument can be turned against the speaker itself - even if
one is unaware of defects in the eternal shruti, it is possible
for other defects to be present.
नच - स्वाप्नप्रत्यक्षे तदा दूराद्यभावनिश्चयेऽप्यप्रमाण्यदर्शनेन तद्वदत्रापि शङ्केति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that even if there are no defects such as
distance etc in the dream perception, it is said to be invalid,
similarly here too a doubt can exist in relation to the validity of
what is being seen.
शून्यमेव तत्त्वमिति स्वाप्नवेदेऽपि तदा
र्श येऽप्
यप्
रा मा ण्
भ्रान्त्यादिदोषाभावनिचयेऽप्यप्रामाण्यदर्नस्य यदर् शनस् यश्चवेदेऽपि समानत्वात्; An
illusory sentence heard in the dream "Everything is shUnyam"
which is mistaken to be part of a veda while in the dream is
said to be invalid, so can we say that in the waking state too,
the same logic applies to the veda?
(If you argue that like the dream-state perception despite
being defect-free is still deemed invalid, and therefore the
waking-state perception must also be deemed invalid, despite
being defect-free, I will argue that the dream veda despite
being defect-free is deemed invalid, so why is the veda heard
in the waking state not be deemed invalid?)
स्वप्नवैषम्यानुभवस्तूभयत्रापि समान - The difference in the reality of
the dream state and waking state is equal - whether we are
using it to compare perception or the veda.

The siddhikAra says in reply:

- इति चेत्, न; If this is the argument, no.
सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षाद्वैतागमयो: क्लृप्तदोषाभावनिश्चयस्य समानत्वेन
प्रामाण्यशङ्कायामप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् | Even though there is a similarity
between perception that reveals reality and shruti talking of
non duality (the certainty that defects are absent in both), that
in itself is not sufficient to prevent a doubt from arising.
नहि सत्प्रतिपक्षे उभयत्र दोषाभावनिश्चय: किमत्र तत्त्वमिति जिज्ञासां
प्रतिबध्नाति; In the satpratipaksha hetvAbhAsa, there are two
contradicting reasons which are certainly defect free, and thus
this certainty does not prevent one from having the doubt,
which one of the two is correct?

The nyAyAmritakAra may argue that when there is visheSha

darshana about any alternative, that will prevent a doubt from
arising. What is visheSha darshana? If a person sees an object
from a distance and does not know if that object is a man or a
tree, upon spotting some specific features such as arms etc,
or leaves etc, such a doubt may be prevented. In the case of
shruti and pratyaksha, the visheSha darshana is certainty
about the absence of defects. That being present, how can
doubts arise?

विरुद्धविशेषादर्शनकालिकस्यैव विशेष शङ्काप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्; A visheSha darshana from

one pramANa can prevent a doubt from arising only if there is
no other visheSha darshana from another pramANa, which
contradicts this one.

******
Now the siddhikAra refutes another argument of the
nyAyAmritakAra in relation to sAkshi pratyaksha.

अवच्छेदकवृत्त्यनित्यत्वेन च साक्षिप्रत्यक्षस्य दोषजन्यत्वोक्ते: | It has

already been said that despite consciousness being eternal
and defect free, the sAkshi is consciousness associated with a
delimiting cognition, which is non-eternal and defective, and
that can affect the ultimate reality of the object revealed by
the sAkshi.

The nyAyAmRtakAra continues:

अतएव यदुक्तं तार्किकै: - " तदेव ह्याशङ्क्यते यस्मिन्नाशङ्क्यमाने
स्वक्रियाव्याघातादयो दोषा न भवन्ति" |
udayanAchArya had said, "Only that can be doubted which
does not result in disproving oneself".
उक्तंच भट्टवार्तिके बौद्धं प्रति - " इह जन्मनि के षाञ्चिन्न तावदुपपद्यते |
योग्यावस्थागतानां तु न विद्म: किं भविष्यति||" इति |
kumArila bhaTTa had said against the buddhist - "No one in
this present birth knows that the world is unreal. If it is said
that yogis can realise this truth, how can we, being ignorant,
postulate that a yogi will see it thus?"
तथा च प्रामाण्यस्योत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ च स्वतस्त्वादिह Therefore, because
we admit that the validity of a pramANa is both upon its rise,
and when it is known,
चोत्पत्तिस्वतस्त्वापवादस्य दोषस्य ज्ञप्तिस्वतस्त्वापवादस्य बाधस्य चादर्शनात्, and
since any doubt in relation to the validity of perception when
rising is absent because of it is defect free, and any doubt in
relation to its validity when cognised is absent because there
is no sublating cognition present
निर्मूलशङ्कायाश्च स्वक्रियाविरोधेनानुत्थानाभ्युपगमात् and because a baseless
doubt is not accepted on the basis that it will harm one's own
purpose,
स्वस्थं प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रामाण्यमिति the validity of perception is
absolutely certain.

The siddhikAra replies

- तदपि निरस्तम्; आगमादिप्रमाणमूलकशङ्काया एव स्वीकारात् | This too has
been refuted, because the basis of the doubt is only because
of its contradiction with shruti.

रूप्यादिनिषेधस्य तु "नेदं रजत"मित्यादेरद्वैतश्रुत्यनुगुणत्वेन नाप्रामाण्यशङ्कास्कन्दनम् | The

negation of shell silver by the cognition "this is not silver" is
not up for doubt, because the shruti-s revealing advaita are
supportive it.
अतो न वृद्धिमिच्छतो मूलहान्यापत्ति : | Thus you cannot argue that we have
lost our principal in an effort to earn interest.
नापि 'सन्घट' इत्यादे 'र्नेदं रजत' मित्यनेन समानयोगक्षेमता ; Nor is the
cognition "the pot exists" comparable to the cognition "this is
not silver".
ति वि रोधा वि
अद्वैतरुतिविरोधाविरोधाभ्यां रो
धा भ्यां श्रुविशेषात् | The first one is contrary to
advaita shruti, whereas the second one is not.
*****

अतएव - सौषुप्तिकानन्दानुभवस्याप्यप्रामाण्ये कथमात्मन आनन्दरूपता तात्त्विकी,

तेरनु भू ता ता त्त्
विकानन्
दानु
वादकत्वो
पपत्
तेरि
आनन्दरुतेरनुभूतातात्त्विकानन्दानुवादकत्वोपपत्तेरिति तिश्रु- अपास्तम् ;
Thus, the following statement has been rejected too: "One can
similarly argue that the shruti which talks of Atma's nature
revealed in deep sleep as bliss, is also unreal, as it is simply a
repetition of one's experience".
ति
वि रो
धा
आनन्दस्य ब्रह्मरूपत्वेनाद्वैतरुतिविरोधाभावेन भावेनश्रुतदप्रामाण्यप्रयोजकाभावात् |
अतएव नानदश्रुतेरप्रामाण्यम् | The nature of Brahman is not contradictory
to shruti revealing non-duality and therefore it does not imply
its invalidity.
*****

When one is certain about something, a contrarian cognition

will not arise. However, this rule has an exception in verbal
cognitions. Despite certainty that water cannot catch fire, the
words "The lake is on fire", lead to their cognition. The verbal
cognition may be invalid, but so long as one understands the
words, mere certainty about outcome does not prevent a
contrarian verbal cognitions from rising.

तदुक्तं खण्डने - "अत्यन्तासत्यपि ज्ञानमर्थे शब्द: करोति हि | अबाधात्तु

लाम्
प्रमामत्र स्वत: प्रामाण्यनिचलाम् श्च||" इति | As was said by Sriharsha
in the khaNDana - "Even if the object of verbal cognitions is
totally wrong (atyanta asati), the words will certainly generate
knowledge. However, the validity of words need not always be
necessarily present. Here (in the case of shruti) though, not
only does it have intrinsic validity, its object is also
unsublated. Therefore one can be certain that shruti will
generate valid, uncontradictable knowledge.

This is supportive to advaita, but the nyAyAmRtakAra had

quoted it to say that previous advaita teachers had supported
the intrinsic validity of perception.

रवा
उक्तचं सुरेवरवार्तिके र्ति केश्व- "अतोऽवबोधकत्वेन दुष्टकारणवर्जनात् | अबाधाच्च
प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिवच्छ्रुते: ||" इति | It was also said by
sureshvarAchArya in his vArttika - "advaita shruti is just like
perception in that it generates certain knowledge, it arises
from a defect free source, its object is unsublated."

The nyAyAmRtakAra had seized upon this to argue that

sureshvarAchArya himself agrees perception is valid. To this,
the siddhikAra says:
अत्र च चाक्षादिवदिति निर्दशनं व्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यमात्रेणेति द्रष्टव्यम् | The words "like in
the case of visual cognitions, etc." is only a concession that
perception has empirical validity (not that it is ultimately
valid).

एवंच तात्त्विकप्रामाण्याभावेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादीनां व्यवाहिरकप्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात् न

स्वक्रियाव्याघात: | Thereby, even if perception etc do not have
ultimate validity, this does not lead to the failure of all activity
because it still has empirical validity.

न वा "प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् | त्रयं सुविदितं कार्ये धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता ||"

इत्यादि स्मृतिविरोध: |
Neither is there a contradiction with manusmRti - "Three
things ought to be known well to determine dharma -
perception, inference and scripture". Here too, smRti is talking
of perception's empirical validity.
तस्मात्सिद्धं बाधनिचयेनयेनश्चतच्छङ्क्या वा
प्रत्यक्षादेरद्वैतागमानुमानाद्यविरोधित्वम् || Therefore, based on the
certainty of future sublation, or based on a doubt regarding it,
inference and scripture cannot be overruled by perception.
This concludes the chapter on the future sublatability of the
world.
mithyAtva anumAnasya anumAna
bAdhoddhAra: (part 1)
The current chapter of the advaita siddhi continues with the
argument that the charge of contradiction cannot be applied
to the inference of the world's unreality. Previously,
contradiction by perception was denied, now contradiction
by inference will be denied. Hence the title of the chapter
- anumAna bAdha uddhAra.
The opponent commences the argument:
स्यादेतत् - अध्यक्षस्य भिन्नविषयत्वादिना बाधाक्षमत्वेऽपि अनुमानमेव बाधकं
स्यात् | Even if perception is incapable of contradicting the
inference of unreality, because it reveals a different object
(that is, perception reveals the empirical reality of the world
whereas the advaitin's inference denies its absolute reality),
it can be contradicted by inference itself.
He proceeds with an elaborate inference.
तथाहि - ब्रह्मप्रमान्येन वेदान्ततात्पर्यप्रमितिजन्यज्ञानान्येन वा मोक्षहेतुज्ञानान्येन वा
अबाध्यत्वे सत्यसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वे सति ब्रह्मान्यत्, विमतं वा, सत्,
परमार्थसद्वा, प्रातिभासिकत्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्यसद्विलक्षणत्वात्, ब्रह्मवत्, व्यतिरेके ण
शशशृङ्गवद्वेति - चेन्न;

The paksha - the ground for the inference

Four options are cited.
1) ब्रह्मप्रमान्येन अबाध्यत्वे सति That which is not sublated by
any cognition other than the right cognition of Brahman,
In the vivaraNa sub-school, Brahman is the object of
cognition, whereas in bhAmati, it is argued that Brahman
cannot be the object of cognition. The opponent anticipates
a particular rebuttal from the bhAmati sub-school which
could argue that paksha is superfluous because there is no
such thing as a cognition of Brahman, so he refines the
paksha thus:

2) वेदान्ततात्पर्यप्रमितिजन्यज्ञानान्येन वा अबाध्यत्वे सति Or, that which is not

sublated by any cognition other than the one generated by
the right understanding of the import of vedAnta
There is some debate whether the comprehension of import
is responsible for the comprehension of sentence meaning,
or not. One group argues that AkAnksha, yogyatA,
sannidhi and tAtparya are needed for sentence meaning and
another group says that only the first three are needed.
AkAnksha is the mutual expectancy of the words that
constitute a sentence. For example, the verb "give" has the
expectation of the object that is to be given, a giver, and a
taker. Similarly, the object has an expectation of a verb, and
the agents involved, etc.
yogyatA is the appropriateness or the absence of
contradiction of the words in a sentence. For example "the
water is on fire" is an inappropriate sentence because water
cannot be on fire. It is contradicted by experience.
sannidhi is the mutual juxtaposition of words in space and
time. Different words can only be considered to form a
sentence and convey meaning if there is a reasonable
temporal / spatial sequence.
tAtparya is the import, or intention that is meant to be
conveyed. Sometimes, the same words can mean different
things in different situations. The word saindhava can mean
horse or salt and the context and the intent of the speaker
will determine what is meant when used in a sentence.
There is some debate whether the understanding of import
leads to sentence meaning or not, with the naysayers
holding that the understanding of the import of the sentence
in certain places can only come after understanding the
sentence meaning, so if the sentence meaning requires
understanding the import, it leads to the defect of mutual
dependency. The yes camp argue otherwise, but we need
not go into that right now.
As some people argue that sentence meaning is not a result
of "understanding the import of vedAnta" in the second option
listed above, a third option is listed.
3) मोक्षहेतुज्ञानान्येन वा अबाध्यत्वे सति Or, that which is not sublated
by any cognition other than the one which is the cause of
liberation
4) विमतं वा Or, that which is the vimatam, the paksha in the
advaitin's inference
असत्त्वानधिकरणत्वे सति ब्रह्मान्यत् And, that which is not the
locus of non-existence while being different from Brahman
(these two features are added to each of the four options
listed above)
Having elaborately defined the paksha, the sAdhya is taken up
next.

sAdhya - the hypothesis

सत्, Is existent.
The advaitin will say that the world is existent empirically,
and therefore such an inference by the opponent is not
proving anything new (it suffers from the defect of siddha
sAdhanam). Anticipating this, he offers an alternative:
परमार्थसद्वा, Or, is ultimately existent.

hetu - the reason

प्रातिभासिकत्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्यसद्विलक्षणत्वात् Because it happens to be
different from the absolutely non-existent (asat) while not
being apparently real (prAtibhAsika).

driShTAnta
ब्रह्मवत्, व्यतिरेके ण शशशृङ्गवद्वेति - Like Brahman, or unlike the hare's
horn.
The inference in full is as follows:

ब्रह्मप्रमान्येन वेदान्ततात्पर्यप्रमितिजन्यज्ञानान्येन वा मोक्षहेतुज्ञानान्येन वा अबाध्यत्वे

सत्यसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वे सति ब्रह्मान्यत्, विमतं वा, सत्, परमार्थसद्वा,
प्रातिभासिकत्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्यसद्विलक्षणत्वात्, ब्रह्मवत्, व्यतिरेके ण शशशृङ्गवद्वा
That which is not sublated by any cognition other than the
right cognition of Brahman, or the cognition generated by
the right understanding of the import of vedAnta, or the
cognition which is the cause of liberation, or that which is
the entity which the advaitin wishes to establish as unreal
with his inference, and that which is not the locus of non-
existence while being different from Brahman is existent, or
alternatively, ultimately existent, because it happens to be
different from the absolutely non-existent while not being
only apparently real, like Brahman, or alternatively, the
hare's horn.
इति चेन्न; The opponent argues that such an inference will
overrule the inference of the world's unreality. The siddhikAra,
in response says - No.

Defects in the hetu

त्वन्मते प्रातिभासिकस्याप्यसत्त्वेन व्यर्थविशेषणतया व्याप्यत्वासिद्धे:, As there is no
separate category called apparently real in your school (the
shell-silver is non-existent in dvaita, not apparently real),
there is a redundant adjective in the hetu, which will lead to
a situation of vyApyatva asiddhi - the hetu will limit the
inference to only a subset of the sAdhya.
The accepted syllogism is that wherever smoke is seen, fire
is seen. The smoke is the hetu for fire, the sAdhya. If we were
to add an adjective, black to the smoke and say that the
syllogism is that wherever black smoke is seen, fire is
present, it affects the syllogism because it limits the
presence of the fire only to a specific type of smoke, when
the fact is that smoke, irrespective of its colour, can only
occur when fire is present.
त्
अस्मन्मतमारित्य हेतूकरणे च देहात्मैक्ये ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्ये व्यभिचारात् |
यश्रि
If on the other hand, it is said that the hetu is directed
towards us (who accept a category called the apparently
real), then the syllogism will suffer from the defect
of vyabhichAra (the invariable concomitance is disproven
because the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is absent) in the
case of the illusion of the body as the self, which is
unsublated by any cognition other than the knowledge of
Brahman.
Taking the body to be the self is an illusion (the sAdhya of
reality is absent) even when the hetu is present (the hetu of
not being apparently real while being different from the
absolutely non-existent is true in this illusion's case).
नहि प्रातिभासिकत्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानेतरबाध्यत्वादन्यत् | That which is
apparently real is not different from (i.e., is the same as)
being sublated by a cognition other than the knowledge of
Brahman.

Defects in the paksha

त्वया हि प्रातिभासिकस्य शुक्तिरूप्यादेरपक्षत्वाय सत्यन्तमाद्यं विशेषणत्रयं विकल्पेन पक्षे
प्रक्षिप्तम् |
You decided to exclude apparently real objects such as the
shell-silver etc by adding the three qualifiers, ending with
the word sati, in the paksha.
तत्र ब्रह्म वृत्तिव्याप्यमिति मतेनाद्यम्, तदनभ्युपगमे तु शाब्दप्रमां प्रति तात्पर्यप्रमा हेतुरिति मतेन
यत्वा
द्वितीयम्, अन्योन्यारयत्वात् श्रन सा हेतुरिति मतेन तृतीयम् | The first qualifier
त्
was provided if Brahman is considered to be the object of
cognition (vivaraNa), the second qualifier was provided if that
is not accepted (bhAmati) and if import is considered to one of
the contributory factors for the comprehension of sentence
meaning, and the third one was provided if it cannot be a
contributory factor because it would mean that
comprehension of import and comprehension of sentence
meaning are mutually dependent.
तथाच प्रातिभासिकस्यासत्त्वानधिकरणत्वमङ्गीकृ तमेव; Thereby, that the
apparently real is different from the absolutely non-existent
has been certainly accepted (by the opponent).
अन्यथा तुच्छवारकासत्त्वानधिकरणत्वविशेषणेनैव तद्व्यावृत्तावेतावत्प्रयासवैयर्थ्यापत्ते: | If that
was not the case (that is they were the same), as the
qualifier "not being the locus for non-existence", which
excludes the absolutely non-existent, would be sufficient to
exclude that (apparently-real objects) also, the effort in
introducing the various qualifiers in the paksha is
unnecessary.
एवं च देहात्मैक्यस्यापि पक्षत्वे बाध एव | Moreover, the inference suffers
from the flaw of inherent contradiction in that the illusion of
the body as the self has become part of the paksha.
The opponent accepts that the notion of the body as the self
is an illusion, and to include that in the paksha in a syllogism
meant to prove the reality of the paksha is inherently
contradictory.
बाधे च सति पक्षविशेषणस्य पक्षत्वस्यासिद्ध्याश्रयासिद्धिरपि | If despite its
contradiction, it is considered a part of the paksha, then as
the attribute of the paksha and the paksha itself are non-
existent (the illusion does not exist), the locus of the
inference would end up non-existent (AshrayAsiddhi).

In the previous chapter on the defect of upAdhi here and here,

various upAdhi-s were cited as defects in the advaitin's
inference. If the opponent tries to use the same upAdhi-s as
ways to protect his own inference, the following answer is
given.

अतएव स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वे सतीति वा

स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यबाधाविषयत्वे सतीति वा
स्वसमानाधिकरणकर्मप्रागभावसमानकालीनज्ञानाबाध्यत्वे सतीति वा
विशेषणप्रक्षेपेऽपि न निस्तार:, देहात्मैक्ये पुर्वोक्तदोषाव्यावृत्तेरेव |
Even if the following qualifiers are added, it does not
exclude the body-self-identity from the paksha and remedy
the previously cited defect:
a) स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यदोषजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वे सतीति वा That which is
not the object of the cognition born as a result of the defect
not sublated by what is considered to be the sublating
cognition (of that thing).
The body-self illusion is a product of the defect of ignorance,
so the sublating cognition of the body-as-self identity
sublates the defect of ignorance that gave rise to the
illusion too. So this qualifier cannot exclude it.
b) स्वबाधकाभिमताबाध्यबाधाविषयत्वे सतीति वा Or, that which is not
the object of a cognition considered to be a sublating
cognition of a thing and which sublates it, while not
sublating the object in question.
The body-as-self-identity does not remain unsublated when
the cognition that sublates the world illusion arises.
c) स्वसमानाधिकरणकर्मप्रागभावसमानकालीनज्ञानाबाध्यत्वे सतीति वा
That which is unsublated by the cognition that is
contemporaneous and colocated with the prior absence
of karma.
According to nyAya, cognitions are located in the self. The
opponent argues that the absence of karma-s (future effects
of karma-s performed to date, is located in a seed or causal
form, waiting to be fructified) is also located in the self. The
only cognition that is not contemporaneous and colocated
with this prior absence of karma is the cognition of Brahman,
because when it arises, it sublates all karma. When karma is
sublated, its prior absence is also sublated, as there is no
counterpositive for it.
In the case of the body-self-identity, the only cognition that
sublates it is the cognition of Brahman. Thus, it is
unsublated by every cognition that is contemporaneous and
colocated with the prior absence of karma.
Defects in the sAdhya
The opponent had argued that the sAdhya is either existent
or ultimately existent.
The advaitin argues:
यत्तु - प्रथमे साध्ये व्यावहारिकसत्त्वमादाय सिद्धसाधनम्, द्वितीयसाध्ये तु वादिन:
परमार्थत्वविशेषणं व्यर्थम् ; व्यावर्त्याप्रसिद्धे: - इति |
In the case of the first sAdhya, by classifying existence as
empirical existence, there is the charge of proving
something already accepted by the advaitin. In the latter,
there is no need to qualify existence as "ultimate", because
there is no difference of categories within existence for (one
group of) the debaters (as the dvaitin has only one class of
existence), necessitating a qualifier to identify a particular
one.
The opponent responds:
तन्न; That is not true.
व्यावहारिकसत्त्वं सत्त्वेन व्यवहारमात्रमिति मतेन प्रथमप्रयोगात्, The first usage is to
denote empirical existence, an existence that is
transactional.
अनुगतं पृथग्व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वमिति तु मते द्वितीय: प्रयोग: | The second usage,
however, is to denote an ultimate reality that pervades
every transactional reality.
नच विशेषणं व्यर्थम् ; Thus it cannot be said that the qualifier is
redundant.
परार्थानुमाने परं प्रति सिद्धसाधनोद्धारस्य तत्प्रयोजनत्वात्, It serves to remove
the charge of proving an already proven thing when this
inference is directed to some other groups, who accept
different orders of reality.
Logicians attempt to prove the existence of God through
reason. The opponent uses this inference as an example to
prove that qualifiers need not necessarily be used to
distinguish one item from the rest.

ईश्वारानुमाने जन्यकृ त्यजन्यमित्यत्र जन्यत्वस्येव विश्वपरमार्थत्ववादिनं प्रति परमार्थत्वस्य

प्रमेयत्वादिवदुपरञ्जकत्वेन विशेषणत्वोपपत्तेश्च | In the inference to prove the
existence of God, the term "not a product of finite effort",
contains the qualifier "finite". To the mImAmsaka, the qualifier
"finite" is redundant, because he holds that all efforts are
finite. But such an inference is still used because the
inference can be applied to other groups. In the same way,
the word "ultimately" can be used as a qualifier that does
not serve to differentiate, like in the case of "knowability".
To explain, knowability is kevalAnvayi, i.e universally present.
Therefore when the word "knowable" is used, it cannot
serve to uniquely identify an object - because if it is present
in every thing, by calling something knowable, it cannot
identify that object separately from an unknowable object. It
merely serves to say that the object is knowable.
The opponent's contention is that there is no requirement
that a qualifier can only be used if both debaters accept that
it serves to distinguish one thing from the other. Even if one
of the two accept it, that justifies its inclusion.
The siddhikAra responds:
तस्मात् पूर्वोक्त एव दोष: | हेतौ च व्यर्थविशेषणत्वदोष: | Therefore, the defect
stated previously alone remains (vyabhichAra in
dehAtmaikya). The issue of using a redundant qualifier in the
hetu is problematic.

यद्यपि मतद्वयेऽपि अप्रामाणिकस्यापि निषेधप्रतियोगित्वाभ्युपगमादारोपितत्वेनोभयसंमतत्वरूपस्य

वा प्रतिभासमात्रशरीरत्वरूपस्य वा प्रातिभासिकत्वस्य प्रसिद्धिरस्ति, अन्यथा सिद्धान्तेऽपि
मिथ्यात्वानुमाने प्रातिभासिकान्यस्यैव पक्षीकर्तव्यत्वाद्दोषसाम्यं स्यात्; तथापि हेतौ
प्रातिभासिकत्वविशेषणं व्यर्थम् ;
Because, even though the following is true, reality qualified
as "apparent" in the hetu is redundant:
In both of our systems, that a non-existent object can also
be the object of negation, is accepted. So the idea of
apparent reality - either as a superimposed object that is
accepted by both of us, or as something having existence
only at the time of cognition, is recognised. Otherwise (i.e,
that prAtibhAsika is known to both, is not accepted), then, as
even the advaitin's inference of reality needs to remove
apparent reality from the paksha, the cited defect against
the dvaitin would apply equally to the advaitin too.
The siddhikAra will go on to argue that a concomitance is
possible between "not being a substratum" and "ultimate
reality". Such a concomitance is seen in pure
consciousness, which is ultimately real, but not a
substratum (because it is completely independent of
relations). Thus, the opponent's hetu to prove ultimate
reality need not be "not a substratum for apparent reality",
simply "not a substratum" would have been enough.
अनधिकरण्त्वे सत्यसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वमात्रस्यैव परमार्थसत्त्वसाधकत्वोपपत्ते: In
order to prove that the world is ultimately real, it is
sufficient to say that the world, while not being a
substratum, is not the locus of non-existence.

Defects in the dRShTAnta

शुद्धमेव हि ब्रह्म दृष्टान्तत्वेनाभ्युपेयम्; धर्मवतो दृष्टान्तत्वे साध्यवैकल्यापत्ते: | It
is only pure Brahman that can be cited as an example,
because Brahman with attributes will lead to sAdhya vaikalya -
the hetu is not present in the example. Brahman with
attributes is not admitted to be absolutely real.
साध्यं तु बाधाभावरूपत्वादधिकरणस्वरूपमेव न धर्म:,
धर्म्यतिरिक्ताभावानभ्युपगमस्योक्तत्वात्, The sAdhya is the absence of
sublatability, wherein the absence is of the nature of the
substratum, and not an attribute - because there is no absence
apart from the locus itself.

According to advaita, Brahman (Existence) is not that which

has the attribute of existence. That is, Brahman does not
have existence, it IS existence. The nature of existence is
the absence of sublatability in all periods of time. Does it
mean that Brahman has the absence of sublatability as an
attribute in it? No.
To explain, when we say that "there is no pot on the
ground", while the logician may say that the ground has the
absence of the pot as an attribute, in advaita, there is no
absence attribute present in the ground, for that would be a
contradiction in terms. Rather, the ground, the locus, is the
absence. Therefore, Brahman does not have the absence of
sublatabilty, it is the absence of sublatability.

तथाच चक्षुस्तैजसत्त्वानुमाने रूपादिषु मध्य इत्यस्यासिद्धिवारकस्यापि व्याप्तिग्रहौपयिकत्वेन

व्यभिचारवारकविशेषणतुल्यतया यद्यपि सार्थकत्वम्; व्यभिचारवारकस्यापि सार्थकत्वे
व्याप्तिग्रहौपयिकत्वमात्रस्य तन्त्रत्वात्;
In the inference to prove that sight has (some) aspect of fire,
the qualifier "amongst form, etc", serves to establish the
invariable concomitance by removing the defect
of asiddhi (the hetu not being in the paksha), and thus being
equivalent to the usage of a qualifier to remove the defect
of vyabhichAra (the hetu is present in the paksha, but
the sAdhya is not), serves a purpose. As a rule, the usage of
the qualifier to remove vyabhichAra is only for the purposes of
establishing the concomitance.
तथापि 'क्षित्यादिकं न कर्तृजन्यं शरीराजन्यत्वा' दित्यत्र शरीरस्येव व्याप्तिग्रहानुपयोगित्वेन
प्रातिभासिकत्वस्य वैयर्थ्यमेव; Even so, like in the Buddhist's inference,
"Space etc., are not products of a creator, because they are
not created by an embodied entity", the usage of the
qualifier "embodied" does not serve the purpose of establishing
the concomitance and is thus deemed redundant - the
qualifier "apparently real" (in the dvaitins' inference) also does
not serve the purpose of establishing the concomitance, and
is deemed redundant.
The siddhikAra gives two examples - the first where a
qualifier is permitted even when there is no vyabhichAra, and
the second where a qualifier is not permitted as there is
no vyabhichAra. He argues that the dvaitin's inference falls into
the second category.
1) The logician tries to prove that eyes are a product of fire
through the inference, चक्षुः तैजसं रूपादिषु मध्ये रूपस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वात्, दीपवत् -
The eyes, have the characteristic of fire, because they are
able to reveal form alone amongst form, etc. (sound, touch,
form, taste and smell), like a lamp. The hetu is "because
they reveal form amongst the attributes of form, etc". The
opponent argues that the reason why the qualifier "amongst
the attributes of form, etc." is added is because without it,
the hetu would not be present in the paksha (asiddhi). The eyes
reveal form and form-ness, so if we don't qualify "form
alone" in the clause, "form alone among the five attributes in
question", someone could cite some other attribute that the
eyes reveal, leading to asiddhi. The siddhikAra argues that the
addition of the qualifier in this instance is not because
of asiddhi alone, but because the asiddhi leads to the
concomitance itself not being observed. That is, because
the hetu is not present in the example too (because the lamp
reveals heat, in addition to form), there is no place where
the hetu and sAdhya occur together, causing the inference to
fail. Therefore, a qualifier can be permitted to be added to
the hetu in the case of asiddhi (not just vyabhichAra) also,
provided that such an asiddhi pervades the example too, and
prevents the comprehension of the concomitance itself. It is
only in such circumstances that a qualifier for the removal
of asiddhi has equivalence with the qualifier that is used for
the removal of vyabhichAra.
2) The second example is the redundant qualifier in the
Buddhist's inference for the non-existence of God. This is in
response to the logician who had argued for God's existence
using the argument that the world is a product of a Creator,
because it is a product. The Buddhist refutes this by arguing
that the world is not the product of a Creator, because it is
not created by a person with a body (unlike the pot, where
the potter has a body). The logician refutes this inference by
arguing that the qualifier "with a body" is redundant because
the concomitance can simply be achieved if the hetu was
"because it is not created". A qualifier can only be added if it
serves to remove vyabhichAra, and there is no vyabhichAra in
the inference.
Similarly in the present inference, the adjective "empirically
real" is redundant.
The siddhikAra continues:

दावजन्यत्वकर् तृ
जन्यत्वाभावयोरि
आका दावजन्यत्वकर्तृजन्यत्वाभावयोरिववशा
निर्धर्मके
ब्रह्मण्यनधिकरणत्वपरमार्थसत्त्वयोर्व्याप्तिग्रहोपपत्ते: | Like (the
logician's) space, which is neither created, nor a product of
God (and thus to simply argue for "not being created" would
have been sufficient), unqualified Brahman too, being both
ultimately real and not a substratum, there is a
concomitance between two.
The hetu in the opponent's inference for the world's absolute
reality could simply have been - "because it is not a
substratum" and not "because it is not a substratum for
apparent reality".
The siddhikAra extends this argument further to say that not
only is this a redundant qualifier, it also leads to asiddhi.
तथा चैकामसिद्धिं परिहरतो द्वितीयासिद्ध्यापत्ति: | Thus, in trying to remedy
one asiddhi, it leads to a second asiddhi.
स्वरुपासिद्धिपरिहारार्थं विशेषणं प्रक्षिपतो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिरित्यर्थ:, व्याप्तावनुपयोगस्य
दर्शितत्वात् |
The qualifier introduced to remove svarUpAsiddhi (to ensure
that the paksha has the hetu), has led
to vyApyatvAsiddhi (asiddhi caused by a redundant qualifier in
the hetu), that it does not help to establish concomitance,
has already been proven.
किञ्च व्यावहारिकसत्त्वमात्रेणैवोपपत्ते: उक् तहे तो र प्र यो ज कत् व म् ; The
said hetu also does not prove the sAdhya, because all it
proves is empirical reality.
परमार्थसत्त्वे बाधानुपपत्तिलक्षणप्रतिकूलतर्कपराघाताच्च | There is also
the contrarian logic that if the world was ultimately real, it
would not be sublatable (so the usage in the paksha is
untenable).
The opponent objects:
ननु - ब्रह्मण्यसत्प्रातिभासिकव्यावृत्तिरूपं हेतुं प्रति व्यावर्तकतया प्रयोजकत्वेन
परमार्थसत्त्वं क्लृप्तं; अपृथिवीव्यावृत्तिं प्रति पृथिवीत्वस्येवासद्व्यावृत्तिं प्रति तद्विरुद्धसत्त्वस्यैव
प्रयोजकत्वात् |
With regards to Brahman, its absolute reality is the
necessary condition for the exclusion of apparent reality and
non-existence, and thus a hetu of the nature of the exclusion
of apparent reality and non-existence establishes ultimate
existence. This is similar to the characteristic of earth being
the necessary condition to the exclusion for the
characteristics of the other four elements. Thus for the
negation of non-existence what is required is its opposite,
existence.
ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वादिकं तु न तत्प्रयोजकम् ; साक्षादसत्त्वाविरोधित्वात्, प्रपञ्चे तदभावाच्च;
साधा , परमार्थसत्त्वमेव तत्प्रयोजकम् ।
रणंश्व
तथाच ब्रह्मविवसाधारणं
Neither consciousness, nor bliss, imply the exclusion of non-
existence, because they do not directly negate non-
existence. Moreover, they are not present in the world.
Therefore, the only quality that is common to the world and
Brahman, which can be the basis for the exclusion of non-
existence, is ultimate existence.
न च - विश्वमिथ्यात्वात्परमार्थसत्त्वमपि न विश्वसाधारणम्, ज्ञानत्वानन्दत्वादिति - वाच्यम् ;
यापत् :
तेश्र
अन्योन्यारयापत्ते
Nor can it be argued that as the world is mithyA, ultimate
existence is not present in the world, like consciousness or
bliss, because that leads to the fallacy of mutual
dependence. In order to prove mithyAtva, we will require it not
have ultimate existence and in order to prove ultimate
existence, we will have to say the world is mithyA.

To such an argument, the siddhikAra responds:

- इति चेत्, अयुक्तमेतत्; नहि प्रातिभासिकासतोरेका व्यावृत्तिरुभयी वा समव्याप्ता;
येनैकप्रयोजकप्रयोज्या भवेत्, किन्तु प्रातिभासिकव्यावृत्तिप्रयोजकं
सत् वक्तव्यम् ;
साधरणमेवश्वा
ब्रह्मविवासत्साधरणमेव
If so, it is untenable. Neither the exclusion of apparent
reality or non-existence, on their own or together, imply
ultimate existence, or vice versa, for the absence of one to
prove the other and vice-versa. Rather, the exclusion of
apparent reality requires a feature common to Brahman, the
world and the non-existent.
असत्यपि प्रातिभासिकत्वाभावात्, एवमसद्व्यावृत्तावपि प्रयोजकं
प्
रातिभासिकसाधरणमेवश्ववक्तव्यम् ; प्रातिभासिके ऽप्यसत्त्वाभावात् |
ब्रह्मविवप्रातिभासिकसाधरणमेव
For the non-existent too lack apparent reality, and thus the
exclusion of non-existence requires a feature common to
Brahman, the world and the apparently real.

तथाच तत्प्रयोजकद्वयसमावेशादेव ब्रह्मण्युभयव्यावृत्युपपत्तौ

नीलत्वघटत्वरूपावच्छेदकद्वयसमावेशोपपन्ननीलघटत्ववन्नातिरिक्तप्रयोजककल्पनायामस्ति
किञ्चिन्मानमिति कृ तबुद्धय एव विदांकु र्वन्तु |
Therefore, it is only because Brahman contains the two
features that it is possible to exclude apparent reality and
the non-existence from it. It is only by the presence of the
two qualifiers of blueness and potness that it is possible to
postulate (the existence of) a blue pot. There is no basis to
postulate that there is another implying factor necessary.
This is something to be considered by the discerning.
नात् |
नित्यत्वं चोपाधि:, तुच्छप्रातिभासिकयोर्नित्यत्वव्यतिरेके साध्यव्यतिरेकदर्नात्र्श
Moreover, the opponent's inference suffers from the flaw of
eternality being the upAdhi (vitiating condition). Eternality is
present in the example (Brahman), but not in the paksha (the
world). This is so because where the sAdhya is present, i.e in
objects which are neither non-existent, nor apparently real,
it is possible for the eternality to be absent.
Following this, the nyAyAmRtakAra, considers six alternatives
to the hetu, which will be considered.

Alternative hetu 1
अत एवानिषेध्यत्वेन प्रमां प्रति साक्षाद्विषयत्वादित्यपि न हेतु: |
Therefore, "without being sublated, it is the direct object of
valid knowledge" also cannot be the hetu.
किञ्च प्रमात्वं तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वं तत्त्वावेदकत्वं वा | The validity of cognition is
because it contains an attribute that exists in the object, or
because it reveals something real.
आद्ये दृष्टान्तस्य साधनवैकल्यम् | नहि परमार्थसत: शुद्धस्य ब्रह्मण:
सप्रकारकज्ञानविषयत्वम् | In the former case, the hetu is not
present in the example. Pure Brahman which is ultimately
real, cannot be the object of an attributive cognition.
नच धर्मवतो दृष्तान्ततेत्युक्तं ; तस्य पक्षकु क्षिनिक्षिप्तत्वेन निश्चितसाध्यवत्त्वाभावात् | Nor can
the example be Brahman with attributes, because it is
included within the paksha, its reality is not certain.
 षपर्यवसानाद्धेतुग्रहे
द्वितीये तत्त्वावेदकत्वस्याबधितविषयत्वरूपत्वेन साध्यावि षपर्यवसानाद्धेतुग्रहेशे
सिद्धसाधनम् | हेत्वग्रहे तु स्वरूपासिद्धि: I
In the second, as revealing something real is of the nature of
having a sublatable object, it is no different from the sAdhya.
If the sAdhya itself is the hetu, and the hetu is known, then it
is stating the obvious. If the hetu is not known, then it
is svarUpAsiddhi (hetu is not present in the paksha).
Alternative hetu 2
यत्तु - प्रमाविषयत्वमात्रेणैव परमार्थत्वोपपत्तौ विशेषणे व्यर्थे; इति | तन्न; Alternatively - if
"being the object of valid cognition" is the hetu for proving
ultimate reality, the other adjectives being redundant - that
is incorrect.

पुरोवर्तिनं रजततया जानामीत्याद्यनुव्यवसायरूपप्रमाविषये प्रातिभासिके व्यभिचारवारकत्वात्

साक्षात्पदस्य, तत्रैव च मिथ्यात्वप्रमिते: साक्षाद्विषये व्यभिचारवारकत्वात्
अनिषेध्यत्वेनेत्यस्य नह्यनुव्यवसायमिथ्यात्वप्रमे भ्रमे भवत: |
The meta cognition (cognition of the cognition) "I know the
object in front of me as silver", may be a valid one (for it is
true that I think so) but its object is an apparently real one.
To avoid such a vyabhichAra, the qualifier "direct" may be
added. However, as the direct object of the cognition is
unreal, to avoid vyabhichAra, even if the qualifier "unsublated"
is added, a valid meta cognition cannot become invalid.
To explain, even if the said qualifiers are added, the issue is
that the meta cognition, which is valid would be rendered
invalid, which would be wrong.
Alternative hetu 3
नाप्यनिषेध्यत्वेनेश्वरं प्रति साक्षादपरोक्षत्वं हेतु:, Nor can the hetu be "is
the object of God's direct perception (of a thing) as
unsublated".
सत्यत्वसिद्धिं विना अनिषेध्यत्वेनेत्यस्यासिद्धे: | तथा चान्योन्याश्रय: |
Because, without first establishing what is real, it is not
possible to know what unsublatability means, and therefore
there is the defect of mutual dependence.
नचेश्वरज्ञानविषयस्य प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वे तस्य भ्रान्तत्वप्रसङ्ग:, मिथ्याभूतस्य मिथ्यात्वेनैव ग्रहणात्
ऐन्द्रजालिकवत् भ्रान्तत्वायोगात्, Nor can it be alleged that if the world,
which is the object of God's cognition, is unreal, he comes
deluded - because, like the case of the magician, knowing
an unreal entity as unreal cannot make one deluded.
अन्यथा सविषयकभ्रमज्ञातृत्वेन भ्रान्तस्य दुर्वारत्वापत्ते: | If that is not
accepted, then it would be impossible to avoid the charge of
delusion just because one knows the object of an illusory
cognition (seeing an unreal reflection does not make one
deluded).
अथ - निषेध्यत्वेन ज्ञाने तत्पालनार्थमीश्वरस्य प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् - न; ऐन्द्रजालिकप्रवृत्तिवदीश्वरप्रवृत्तेरपि
तथाविधत्वात् |
Therefore, if it is argued that God will have no motivation to
preserve an unreal object, no. God's motivation to protect
the unreal is as true as a magician's motivation to preserve
his magic trick.
mithyAtva anumAnasya anumAna
bAdhoddhAra: (part 2)
Alternative hetu 4
नापि सप्रकाराबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वं हेतु:, Nor can the hetu be
"whose utility is unsublated by any attributive cognition".

न
सप्र
कारकजाग्र
द् बो
धाबाध्यस्वप्न
जलावगाहनप्रि
यासङ्ग षि
मादिवि षिता
ताप्र
प्र
शे
माणीभूतज्ञानस्यार्थकारित्वदर्शनेन तद्विषये तत्र व्यभिचारात् | Because there is
a vyabhichAra of the hetu in the case of dreams where ones
bathes in a river, spends time with a dear one, etc. They
may be unsublated by any attributive cognition upon waking
up and have a certain utility to them (because they can give
happiness etc to the dreamer), but cannot be considered to
be valid (because their objects are unreal).
There is one school of thought within advaita that dreams
are sublated upon waking up, and another school that holds
that the dreams disappear on waking up, but their objects
cannot be considered as sublated. The above reply is from
the latter perspective.
अथ तत्र ज्ञानमेव सुखादिजनकं तच्चाबाध्यमेवेति मतं, तदसत्; Now, if it is held
that it is the cognition alone that gives rise to happiness,
and that alone (not its object) is unsublated, that is not
correct.
ज्ञानमात्रस्य हि तादृक्सुखाजनकत्वेन किञ्चित्विशेषितस्यैव तथात्वम् वाच्यम्, Because, it is
not cognition alone that gives rise to happiness, it is a
cognition of a particular object that give rise happiness.
ज्ञाने च विशेषो नार्थातिरिक्त: | The qualifier of a cognition is nothing but
the object that it reveals.
तदुक्तम् - 'अर्थेनैव विशेषो हि निराकारतया धियाम् |' इति | It has been said -
"it is by objects, that cognitions are qualified, for cognitions
are otherwise formless".
This is a quote from the nyAyakusumAnjali by
udayanAchArya had said:

षोहि निराकारतया धियाम् | क्रियैव वि षोशे

अर्थेनैव वि षोशे षोहेतु: व्यवहारेषु
कर्मणाम् ||
अर्थेनेत्यर्थ एवेत्यर्थ: | The use of the third case (arthena)
implies that it is by objects alone that cognitions are
qualified.
तथा च मिथ्याभूतविशेषितस्य जनकत्वाभ्युपगमे मिथ्याभूतस्यापि जनकत्वाद्व्यभिचार एव |
Therefore, if a cognition qualified by an unreal object can
give rise (to happiness), then it follows that an unreal object
also does so, and therefore there is a vyabhichAra for the hetu.
तथा चोक्तं शास्त्रदीपिकायां बौद्धं प्रति - 'अथ सुखज्ञानमेवार्थक्रिया तच्चाव्यभिचार्येव |
नहि क्वचिदप्यसति सुखे सुखज्ञानमस्तीतियाशङ्क्य सत्यमेतन्न तु तेन
पूर्वज्ञानप्रामाण्याध्यवसानं युक्तं ; अप्रमाणेनापि प्रियासङ्गमविज्ञानेन स्वप्नावस्थायां
नात् |' इति |
सुखदर्नात्र्श
Thus has been said in the shAstra dIpikA (by pArthasArathi miSra)
to the Buddhist - "It is the cognition of happiness alone
which has utility, and therefore there is no vyabhichAra; for a
happiness which does not exist, cannot lead to the cognition
of happiness - If this is the doubt, then that is true. However,
that does not mean that the former knowledge was a valid
one. For even an illusory cognition, such as the cognition of
uniting with a loved one in a dream, can lead to
experiencing happiness in the dream".
The Buddhist had argued that even without objects, it is
possible for cognitions to arise. To refute him, pArthasArathi
miSra had said this. The object may be illusory, but it is still
needed for the cognition.
ननु - विषयविशेषोपलक्षितस्यैव ज्ञानस्य सुखजनकत्वमस्तु, तत् कु तो विषयस्य जनकत्वमिति -
चेन्न;
If it is said - Let us hold that it is cognitions, whose objects
are not contemporaneously present, that is, they are
the upalakshaNa-s of the cognition, that give rise to happiness.
If so, how can it be argued that it is objects that give rise to
it? - No.
There are no attributes that are intrinsic to the cognition
that give rise to a particular effect like the cognition of
happiness.

स्वरूपाणामननुगततया ज्ञानत्वादेश्चातिप्रसक्ततया
अनुगतानतिप्रसक्तोपलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकाभावादुपलक्षणत्वासंभवात् |
There is nothing intrinsic in the nature of a cognition that
allows a cognition to objectify a particular kind of object
(sadness, happiness, desire, anger etc.), and because it
would be an overstatement to conclude that the attributes
present in cognitions, such as knowledge-ness etc., are
capable of classifying knowledge (into such categories),
neither the cognition by itself, nor an attribute present in it,
can be an upalakshyatAvacChedaka, a basis for it to be qualified
by a non-existent qualifier, and therefore an object, not
present in some form at the time of the cognition, cannot
serve to be an upalakshaNa of the cognition.
ननु - विशेषणत्वमप्यसंभवि अनागतज्ञानजन्ये तत्कालाविद्यमानस्य विषयस्य
पूर्वभावित्वरूपजनकत्वासंभवात् - इति चेन्न;
If it is said that - Objects cannot be qualifiers of cognitions,
because in the case of cognitions of the future, as their
objects have not come into existence yet, it is incorrect to
hold that a future object leads to a current cognition - No.
स्वव्यापरजन्ये व्यापारिणोऽसतो जनकत्ववत् स्वज्ञानजन्येऽप्यसतो जनकत्वसंभवात्,

Just like a vedic sacrifice (vyApAriNa) that has already been

completed and is no longer existent, is held to be the cause
of a particular result (even after a length of time, possibly
even years afterwards), through the medium of
the adRShTa generated by it, even a non-existent object can
lead to its cognition.
यत्वेनैवा भ्यु
पगमा
अतीतानागतावस्थस्यासत्त्वधर्मारयत्वेनैवाभ्युपगमात् , For, in nyAya,
त्
श्र
it is accepted that the past and future states of objects can
be the loci of the attributes of absence. The future pot is
held to be the counterpositive of its prior absence
(prAgabhAva), the destroyed pot is held to be the
counterpositive of the absence of destruction (dhvamsa).
अन्यथा ध्वंसप्रागभावप्रतियोगित्ववत् ज्ञानविषयत्वादीनामनाश्रयत्वापत्ते:,
Otherwise, the objecthood (viShayatA) of the cognition of prior
absence and the absence of destruction, will end up without
a locus, because their objects are non-existing.
If the opponent accepts that a non existent sacrifice leads
to heaven on the basis of vedic statements (svargakAmo yajeta),
but otherwise objects that the non existent cannot lead to
effects, we say:
प्रमाणबलात् कारणत्वाभ्युपगमस्यात्रापि तुल्यत्वात् | (Just like in the case
of vedic sacrifices being held to be the causes of results),
there is a valid reason that establishes causation here too
(i.e the cognition of objects causing outcomes, as opposed
to cognitions alone).

कतया
किञ्च स्वरूपाबाध्यस्य विषयाबाध्यत्वदर्शनेन विषयबाधे स्वरूपबाधस्यावयकतया श्य
स्वप्नादिज्ञानं सदेवेत्यस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात्, Moreover, when the
cognitions themselves are not sublated, it has been
observed that the objects of such cognitions are unsublated
too. Therefore, it must be held that the sublation of objects
leads to the sublation of their cognitions too. So, it cannot
be said that dream cognitions are real when their objects
are unreal.
अनादित्वस्य विषमव्याप्तस्योपाधित्वाच्च | Further, the one sided invariable
concomitance (viShama vyApti) with beginninglessness is
present as an upAdhi in such an inference of reality.
To explain: The opponent's inference is विमतं परमार्थसत्
सप्रकाराबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वात्.
The sAdhya of the opponent's inference is परमार्थसत्. There are
six beginningless entities accepted in advaita: Brahman,
ignorance, their relationship, jIva, Ishvara, and the difference
between the two. Of these, ultimate reality is present in
Brahman alone. Thus whatever is ultimately real is
beginningless, but whatever is beginningless is not
ultimately real. So the one-sided invariable concomitance
with beginningless exists for परमार्थसत्, ultimate reality,
the sAdhya of the opponent's inference.
The hetu of the opponent's inference is
सप्रकाराबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वात्. Brahman, which is beginning-
less, despite being unsublatable, does not have utility. So
whatever is beginningless is not unsublated by an attributive
cognition and have utility. The world which is unsublated by
an attributive cognition and have utility, is not
beginningless. Thus there is no one-sided invariable
concomitance between beginninglessness and
सप्रकाराबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वं, being unsublated by an
attributive cognition and have utility, the hetu.
The definition of the defect upAdhi is साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति
साधनाव्यापकत्वम् - that which is present invariably with
the sAdhya, but not present invariably with the hetu. As
explained, the one-sided invariable concomitance with
beginninglessness satisfies that requirement for the
opponent's inference and hence it is flawed.
नच - अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं प्रति परमार्थत्वस्य ब्रह्मणि
प्रयोजकत्वेनावधारणादकारणककार्योत्पत्तिरूपविपक्षबाधक तर्केण हेतो: साध्यव्यापककतया
तदव्यापकतयोपाधे: साध्याव्यापकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue thus - As it is known that having utility implies
absolute reality (like in Brahman), and because of the
rebuttal reasoning that without a cause, an effect will not
come into being, it follows that wherever the hetu (having
utility) is present, the sAdhya (being ultimately real) is
invariably present, and therefore if the upAdhi (one-sided
concomitance with beginninglessness) is not present
wherever the hetu is present, it follows that the upAdhi is not
present wherever the sAdhya is present either. (Therefore as
this does not fulfil the requirement of pervading the sAdhya,
but not pervading the hetu, it is not an upAdhi at all.)
This stands refuted because:

प्रातिभासिकरज्जुसर्पादौ भयकम्पादिकार्यकारित्वदर्शनेन प्रातिभासिकसाधारणस्य तुच्छव्यावृत्तस्य

प्रतीतिकालसत्त्वस्यैवार्थक्रियाकारित्वं प्रति प्रयोजकत्वात्, It has been observed that
even apparently real objects such as the rope-snake can
lead to effects such as fear, shivering etc. Thus, it follows
that the object which is different from the absolutely unreal
(tucCha), has in common with the apparently real, the nature
of having utility as long as it appears to exist.

प्रातिभासिकस्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वानभ्युपगमे सप्रकाराबाध्येति
षेणवैयर्थ्यापत्ते:, If it is not admitted that the
हेतुवि षेणवैयर्थ्यापत्तेशे
apparently real have utility, the qualifier "that which is
unsublated by an attributive cognition" would be redundant
in the hetu.
कस्मिन्नपि देशे कस्मिन्नपि काले के नापि पुरुषेणाबाध्यत्वं हि परमार्थसत्त्वम्; तदपेक्षया
प्रतीतिकालसत्त्वस्य लघुत्वाच्च | That which is unsublated by anyone in
any place in any time is that which is ultimately real.
Compared to that, it is more parsimonious to hold that the
world exists only for as long as its appearance.
किञ्च शुद्धस्यार्थक्रियाकारित्वाभावात् साधनविकलत्वम्, उपहितस्य पक्षनिक्षेपात्
साध्यविकलत्वम् | Moreover, as pure Brahman (consciousness)
does not have any utility, if the example (Brahman) referred
to it, the hetu would not be present. If it instead referred to
qualified (Brahman), the sAdhya of ultimate reality would not
be present.

5th Alternative for hetu

आरोपितमिथ्यात्वकत्वादित्यपि न हेतु:, "Unreality being
superimposed" cannot be a hetu either.
आरोपितत्वं प्रातिभासिकत्वं चेत्, प्रपञ्चे हेतोरसिद्धि: ; If being
superimposed means being apparently real, then
the hetu does not exist for the world.
तत्सिद्धे: पारमार्थिकसिद्ध्युत्तरकालीनत्वात् | If it is known, that is only after
knowing ultimate reality.
व्यावहारिकत्वं चेत्, शुक्तिरूपादौ व्यभिचार:, If it (being superimposed) means
having empirical reality, then that is absent for the shell
silver.
उभयसाधारण्येऽप्ययमेव दोष: | If you say it is either, the same
defects prevail.

6th Alternative for hetu

कल्पकरहितत्वादित्यपि न हेतु:, "Because they do not have a Creator" is
also not a hetu.
असति व्यभिचारात् यथाश्रुतस्यासिद्धेश्च | The absolutely absent (asat) do not
have a Creator either (but cannot be called real by any
stretch). As it contradicts the veda-s which say the world
was created by Brahman, the hetu is absent in the paksha,
and therefore, taken literally, there is asiddhi.
The opponent argues:
ननु - नासिद्धि:, शुद्धं हि चैतन्यं न कल्पकम् ; अद्रष्टृत्वात्, नोपहितम् ;
कल्पितत्वादेवान्यथानवस्थानात्, Surely there is no asiddhi. Pure
Consciousness cannot be the Creator, because it is not the
seer (and the vedic statements on creation start off with
statements such as "He saw"). Nor is Brahman with limiting
adjuncts the Creator, because according to the advaitin, such
a Brahman is also unreal, and thus this will lead to infinite
regress.
तथाच यावद्विशेषाभावे कल्पकसामान्याभावसिद्धि:
Thus in the absence of any qualifiers for Brahman, it follows
that there is no Creator of the world.
The siddhikAra responds:
- इति चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.
शुद्धस्याप्यनाद्यविद्योपधानवशेन कलपकत्वोपपत्ते: | It is Pure Consciousness that
creates the world, using the limiting adjunct of ignorance.
कल्पकत्वं हि कल्पनां प्रत्याश्रयत्वं, विषयत्वं, भासकत्वं वा | Being a Creator can
mean either: being the locus of creation, being the object of
creation, or revealing creation.
तच्च सर्वं कल्पनासमसत्ताकत्वेन शुद्धत्वाव्याघातकम् | As all of these are of the
same order of reality as the creation itself, there is no harm
to purity of consciousness.
रिरि
तदुक्तं संक्षेप रिरिके - 'आरयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी
केशा यत्वविषयत्वभागिनीश्रनिर्विभागचितिरेव के वला |
पूर्वसिद्धतमसो हि पश्चिमो नाश्रयो भवति नापि गोचर: ||' इति | That is why it was
said in the samkshepa shAririka: Both the locus and object of
ignorance is Pure Consciousness itself. A darkness which
presupposes (both the jIva or the Ishvara) cannot be located
in them, which logically follow from it.
अस्तु वोपहितस्य कल्पकत्वम्, नचानवस्था;
अविद्याध्यासस्याध्यासान्तरानपेक्षत्वात्,
स्वपरसाधारणसर्वनिर्वाहकत्वोपपत्ते:, Even if Brahman with
limiting adjuncts is postulated as the Creator, there is no
infinite regress because, the superimposition of ignorance
on Brahman does not presuppose any other superimposition.
It is able to achieve the superimposition of itself and other
things just by itself.

अकल्पितस्य कल्पकत्वादर्शनाच्च कल्पितप्रतिबिम्बविशिष्टादर्शादेरादर्शान्तरे

प्रतिबिम्बकल्पकत्वदर्शनाच्च, For the superimposition of something by a
non-superimposed entity has not been observed anywhere. It
is only a mirror containing a superimposed reflection that is
able to reflect that onto other mirrors. If the original mirror
had no reflection in it, what would be reflected on to other
mirrors?
It may be argued that it is the original that is reflected in the
second mirror, but
बिम्बस्य द्वितीयादर्शसंमुखत्वाभावेन तत्र कल्पकत्वायोगात् ; अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात् |
where the original is not front of the second mirror, the
original cannot be held to be the Creator of the
superimposition. Otherwise, even an object not in front of a
mirror will be capable of being reflected, which would be
inappropriate.
विस्तरेण चैतदग्रे वक्ष्याम: | This will be elaborately examined later.
तदेवं निराकृ ता: परमार्थसत्त्वे साध्ये ष डमी हेतव: | Thus, the six hetu-s to
establish the absolute reality of the world have been
refuted.
एवमन्येऽपि निराकार्या: | Similarly, others may be refuted.
Until now the hetu-s were varied while keeping
the paksha and sAdhya the same. Now different inferences
will be taken up where those elements will be varied as
well.

Inference # 2
अथ - विमतं, न सद्विलक्षणम्, असद्विलक्षणत्वादात्मवदिति अनुमानान्तरं
भविष्यतीति - मतम् | तन्न; Now, if this is offered as an alternative
inference - The world is not different from the existent,
because it is different from the non-existent, like the self -
no.
प्रातिभासिके शुक्तिरूप्यादौ व्यभिचारात् | Because that inference fails in the
case of apparently real entities such as shell-silver.
नच - तत्रासद्विलक्षणत्वहेतुरेव नास्तीति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that
the hetu - "being different from the non-existent" - is absent
in shell silver.
असद्विलक्षणत्वाभावे हि अपरोक्षतया प्रतीतिरेव न स्यात् | If "being
different from non-existent" was absent (in shell-silver), it
would not be directly seen.
ननु - तर्ह्यसद्विलक्षणत्वे तद्विरुद्धसद्विलक्षणत्वायोगः। तथाच साध्यस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात् - इति
चेन्न; If it is so argued - if it is different from the non-existent,
then it is not appropriate for it to be different from the
existent, and so the sAdhya is present - no.
सत्त्वे सर्वजनसिद्धबाधविरोधात्, If it was real, then it would not
be sublatable by everyone.

गजादौ गोवैलक्षण्येऽपि तद्विरुद्धाश्ववैलक्षण्ययोगवत्

सद्वैलक्षण्येऽप्यसद्वैलक्षण्ययोगोपपत्ते: प्रथममिथ्यात्वनिरुक्तावुक्तत्वात् |
Thus, even though an elephant is different from a cow, it can
be said to be different to the horse as well. Similarly, even if
something is different from the existent, it is possible for it
to be different the non-existent too. This has already been
said in the chapter on the first definition of mithyAtva.

Inference # 3

ननु - विमतं, न चैतन्याज्ञानकार्यम्, न तत्कार्यधीविषय:, न तत्कार्यसत्त्ववत्, न

तज्ज्ञानबाध्यसत्त्ववद्वा, तस्मिन्नपरोक्षेऽप्यनिषेध्यत्वेन साक्षाद्भासमानत्वात्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा
घटे अपरोक्षेऽप्यनिषेध्यत्वेन साक्षाद्भासमान: पटो न घटाज्ञानकार्यादि:,
The opponent says - The world
sAdhya - a) is not a product of the ignorance of
consciousness, or b) is not the object of a cognition of its
products, or c) does not contain the existence that is
present in its products, or d) does not contain the existence
that is present in those objects that are sublated by its
cognition.
hetu - because when it is perceived in that, it appears as
unsublated.
For whatever appears thus, is so (real). The cloth that
appears to be inside a pot, appears unsublated, and is not a
product of the ignorance of the pot, etc.
विपक्षे च तदापरोक्ष्ये तदज्ञानव्याहतिरेव बाधिका, Any opposition to this is
refuted on the basis that when it is cognised directly, its
ignorance is destroyed (so it must be real).
नचासिद्धि:, अधिष्ठानतया सुखादिसाक्षित्वेन तदानीमपि चैतन्यापरोक्ष्यात् Nor can
it be held that there is asiddhi (the world does not appear
unsublated in consciousness), because as consciousness is
the substratum and witness of happiness etc, even when
happiness is seen in its locus, consciousness is directly
cognised as the inner witness (but that does not sublate the
happiness that is observed).

The siddhikAra says:

- इति चेन्न; No.
सामान्याकारेणापरोक्ष्येऽपि शुक्त्यादौ रजतादेरनिषेध्यत्वेन साक्षाद्भासमानतया तत्र
व्यभिचारात् |
This inference fails here - Even if it is directly perceived in a
generic manner, for so long as it has not been perceived as
a shell, the silver continues to directly appear as
unsublated.
अथ व्यावृत्ताकारेण यस्मिन् भासमाने यदनिषेध्यत्वेन साक्षात् भासते, तन्न तदज्ञानकार्यादीति
व्याप्तिरिति मन्यसे, तर्ह्यसिद्धिः। Now, if you think that if an object is
perceived with its specific distinguishing characteristics in
a particular locus and directly appears to be unsublated
there, it cannot be the product of the ignorance of that
locus, such a concomitance is not proven.
नहि चैतन्यमिदानीं भ्रमनिवर्तकत्वाभिमतव्यावृत्ताकारापरोक्षप्रतीतिविषय:, तथा सत्यधिष्ठानमेव न
स्यात् | Consciousness is not presently the object of a direct
cognition that reveals its distinguishing characteristics,
considered to be one capable of removing the world
illusion. If Consciousness was known thus, then it would
not even be the substratum.
यदा तु वेदन्तवाक्यजन्यवृत्तौ व्यावृत्ताकारतया अपरोक्षं, तदा अनिषेध्यत्वेन प्रपञ्चे
आपरोक्ष्यशङ्कापि नास्ति | However, when it is directly cognised
with its distinguishing features through a thought born
from vedAntic sentences, there can not even be a doubt that
the world will be seen unsublated.
अत: प्रमाणजन्यासाधारणाकारभानस्यैव
अज्ञानविरोधित्वान्नापरोक्षतामात्रेणाज्ञानपराहतिप्रसङ्ग: |
Therefore, as its opposition to ignorance only arises for its
particular appearance in a cognition that is born through a
valid means of knowledge, Consciousness cannot be
required to remove ignorance merely through a generic
direct perception.
यत्त्वज्ञानपदेन ज्ञानाभावोक्तौ सिद्धसाधनम्; अनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानोक्तौ च तस्य
खपुष्पायमाणत्वेन प्रतियोग्यप्रसिद्धिरिति | तत्तुच्छम्; If it is said - if by the word
ignorance (in the above statement), the absence of
knowledge is meant, then that is stating the obvious. If by it,
an inexpressible (as existent or non-existent) ignorance is
meant, then like the sky-flower, a completely unknown
entity, it cannot be the counterpositive of absence - that is
not a worthwhile argument.
असत्प्रतियोगिकाभावं स्वीकुर्वत: पराभ्युपगममात्रेणैव प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिसंभवात् | For
someone who accepts that even an absolutely non-existent
entity can be the counterpositive of absence (the dvaitin), it
is possible to accept that something (inexpressible as
existent or non-existent) can be the counterpositive of
absence, on the basis of an opponent recognising such an
entity.

Inference # 4

ननु - विमतं, नात्मन्यध्यस्तम्; आत्मसाक्षात्कारवत् प्रवृत्तिविषयत्वात्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा

घटसाक्षात्कारवत्प्रवृत्तिविषयो पटो न तत्राध्यस्त:,
The world is not superimposed on the Self, because even
those who have clearly cognised the Self transact with it -
whatever is thus, will be like that. Someone who has
cognised a pot does not transact with a cloth thinking it is
superimposed on the pot.
न चासिद्धि:, ईश्वरजीवन्मुक्तयोरात्मसाक्षात्कारवतोरपि जगद्रक्षणभिक्षाटनादौ प्रवृत्ते:, Nor can it
be argued that there is asiddhi (the hetu is not present in
the paksha), ie because God, and those that have attained
liberation while living, transact with the world - God, by
sustaining the world, and the liberated ones keeping the
body alive through seeking alms, etc.
शङ्खे अध्यस्तमपि पीतत्वं न शङ्खश्वेतत्वसाक्षात्कारवत्प्रवृत्तिविषय इति न तत्र व्यभिचार - No
one who has seen that a conch is white, and that the
yellowness seen in it is only illusory, will seek to remove the
yellowness in the conch through physical means.
In response, the siddhikAra says:
- इति चेन्न; प्रतिबिम्बे व्यभिचारात् | No. The inference fails in the case of a
reflection.

स हि मुखैक्यसाक्षात्कारवत्प्रवृत्तिविषयो मुखेऽध्यस्त: | People still transact with

the reflection, despite knowing it is a superimposition, and
that it is identical with the original.
तद्व्यतिरेके णोपलभ्यमानत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च | Being cognised as different from
that (the substratum) is an upAdhi to the inference.
The person who has seen the pot knows that the pot and the
cloth are different, whereas the world is not known to be
different from Brahman.

Inference # 5
एवंच - विमतं, नेश्वरमायाकल्पितम्, तं प्रत्यपरोक्षत्वात्, यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा चैत्रं प्रत्यपरोक्षे घटो न
चैत्रमायाकल्पित: ; विमतं, न जीवकल्पितम्, तस्मिन् सुषुप्तेऽप्यवस्थितत्वात्, आत्मवत्,
The world is not a creation of Ishvara's mAya, because it is an
object of his direct perception, like the pot seen by Chaitra
is not a creation of his mAya.
Similarly, the world is not creation of the jIva's mAya, because
it continues to exist even when he is asleep, like the Self.
नचासिद्धि:, प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्; अदृष्टादेरभावे पुनरुत्थानायोगाच्च - There is no
asiddhi here, because of the recognition (of the world after
waking up). If unseen factors (such as the results of karma)
were absent, he would not have woken up.
The siddhikAra says:
- इत्यपि निरस्तम् ; आद्ये ऐन्द्रजालिकं प्रत्यपरोक्षे तन्मायाकल्पिते व्यभिचारात्,
मायाविद्ययोरभेदेन देहात्मैक्यभ्रमे व्यभिचाराच्च | That also stands refuted. The
first inference fails in the case of a magician who perceives
his own illusion, which is his creation. Further, as mAya and
ignorance are identical, the inference fails in the case of the
illusion of the body as the self.
द्वितीये त्वसिद्धे: | The second inference fails because of asiddhi.
नच प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रपञ्चस्य स्थायित्वसिद्धेर्नासिद्धि: ,
सुषुप्तिकालस्थायित्वासाधकत्वस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञाया दृष्टिसृष्टिसमर्थने वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्,
अदृष्टादे: कारणात्मनाऽवस्थितत्वेन पुनरुत्थानसंभवाच्च | Nor can it be argued
that the recognition of the world upon waking up proves its
continued existence in deep sleep. In the chapter on dRShTi
sRShTi, it will be established that recognition does not imply
the continued existence of the world in deep sleep. In the
case of unseen causal factors (adRShTa), they are held to
exist in their causal state, so there is no impossibility of
waking up.

Inference #6
मिथ्यात्वं आत्मान्यसर्ववृत्ति न, मिथ्यामात्रवृत्तित्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यत्ववत् - इत्यपि न;
मिथ्यात्वन्यूनवृत्तित्वस्योपाधित्वात् |
"Unreality is not something that is present in everything
other than the Self, because it only exists in unreal objects,
like shell silver" - this too is refuted, because of
the upAdhi of "belonging to a category smaller than unreal
objects". Every shell-silver is an unreal object, but every
unreal object is not shell-silver. However, wherever unreality
is present, is unreal, and whatever is unreal has unreality.
मिथ्यात्वं च सदसद्विलक्षणत्वम्, सद्विलक्षणत्वमात्रं वा | The term
"unreality" in the paksha can either mean the absence of
existence and non-existence, or the absence of existence
alone.
आद्ये सिद्धसाधनम्, तस्यात्मान्यसर्वमध्यपतितासद्वृत्तित्वाभावात् | If the former,
that is stating the obvious, because we also agree that
unreality is not present in everything other the Self (The
absolutely non-existent are not unreal).
द्वितीये तु हेतौ मिथ्यापदस्य सदसद्वैलक्षण्यपरत्वे स्वरूपासिद्धि:, In the
latter, if the term "mithyA" occurring in the hetu means "other
than the existent and non-existent", there is svarUpAsiddhi.
The hetu is not present in the paksha, which only means
"absence of existence".
सद्वैलक्षण्यरूपे पक्षे तुच्छसाधारणे
सदसद्विलक्षणेतरावृत्तित्वरूपहेतुत्वाभावात् | As the paksha is the
"absence of existence", tucCha, is part of the paksha, but
the hetu of being "only present in those that are other than
the existent and non-existent" is absent there
(hence svarUpAsiddhi).
तस्यापि सद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रपरत्वे संदिग्धानैकान्तिकता; If the meaning
of the term "mithyA" in the hetu is also "being different from
existence", there is the defect of a doubtful vyabhichAra.
साध्याभाववत्यात्मभेदे हेतुसन्देहात् | Because there is a doubt
whether the hetu (being located in objects other than the
existent) is present where the sAdhya is absent, in
everything other that the Self.
अप्रयोजकत्वादिकं च पूर्वोक्तम् दूषणमनुवर्तत एव | The previously cited
defects of not implying the sAdhya etc apply to this inference
also.

Inference #7
आत्मा, परमार्थसदन्य:, पदार्थत्वादनात्मवत् | नच कल्पितात्मप्रतियोगिकभेदेनार्थान्तरम् ;
कल्पितमिथ्यात्वेन मिथ्यात्वानुमानेऽपि सिद्धसाधनापत्तेरित्यपि न;
"The Self is an ultimately real entity, different from other
ultimately real entities, because it too is a substance, like
the non-Self. Nor can it be said that this does not prove the
reality of the world, as such a difference with the Self is
imaginary, because such a charge applies to the inference
of unreality too - that too is proving something known only
an imagined unreality to the world."
If so, no.
व्यावहरिकपदार्थमादाय सिद्धसाधने अतिप्रसङ्गाभावात्,
अनानन्दत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च | If the object having empirical reality
is stating the obvious, that is not a defect. Further, bliss is
an upAdhi.
mithyAtva anumAnasya anumAna
bAdhoddhAra: (part 3)
Inference #8
अथ आत्मा, यावत्स्वरूपमनुवर्तमानानात्मवान्, यावत्स्वरूपमनुवर्तमानभावरूपानात्मवान् वा
स्वज्ञानाबाध्यानात्मवान्, स्वज्ञानाबाध्यभावरूपानात्मवान्वा, पदार्थत्वात्,
भावत्वाद्वा घटादिवत् इति |
The Self contains within it the non-Self a) for as long as the
the Self as an entity persists, or b) which is of the nature of
existence1,2, for as long as the Self as an entity persists, or c)
which is unsublated by its (the Self's) knowledge, or d)
which is of the nature of existence1,2 and which is unsublated
by its (the Self's) the knowledge, because it is a substance,
or because it is of the nature of existence, like a pot.

अत्र पञ्चमप्रकाराविद्यानिवृत्त्यभ्युपगमपक्षे सिद्धसाधनपरिहाराय

षणम् - If it is accepted that the end of
साध्ययोर्भावरूपपदमनात्मवि षणम्शे
avidyA is of the fifth category2 , the qualifier "of the nature of
existence" is added to the non-Self in the sAdhya-s, to avoid
the charge of proving something known.
1
This is to cover the view of maNDana miSra, who argues in
the brahma siddhi that while the world is sublated upon
liberation, the absence of the objects of the world persists
even then. The opponent wishes to prove that the world
continues to exist even after sublation, in a positive,
existential form.
2
This is the view of AnandabodhAchArya, who argues the nature
of avidyA nivritti, the end of ignorance after liberation, does not
fit into any of the four known categories: existent (sat), non-
existent (asat), existent and non-existent (sadasat), and neither
existence nor non-existent (sadasatvilakshaNam).
The siddhikAra responds
इत्यपि मन्दम् | 'यावत्स्वरूप' मित्यस्य यत्किञ्चित्स्वरूपपरत्वे सिद्धसाधनात्,
आत्मस्वरूपपरत्वे साध्याप्रसिद्धे: |
This too is not very clever. By the term "for as long as the
entity", if the entity is some object, then that is stating the
obvious (the statement "a thing persists as long as its
persists" is tautological), and if it means the Self itself, then
such a sAdhya is unknown. Why?
नहि यावदात्मस्वरूपमनुवर्तमानोऽनात्मा प्रसिद्धोऽस्ति; तथा सत्यनुमानवैयर्थ्यात् | There
is no object that we are aware of, which persists for as long
as the Self persists. If such an ever-existent thing was
already known, then why bother proving its existence by
inference?
अथ - स्वरूपपदस्य समभिव्याहृतपरत्वाद्व्याप्तिग्रहद यां
यांशा
दृष्टान्तस्वरूपं
पक्षधर्मताग्रहदशायां चात्मस्वरूपमेव प्राप्यत इति न साध्याप्रसिद्धिर्न वा सिद्धसाधनमिति
- चेन्न ; Now if this be said - "The term 'entity' refers to the
object in the example when the concomitance is being
cognised, and when determining the qualifiers of
the paksha (that is when determining if the hetu is present in
the paksha) the term refers to the Self - thus neither is
the sAdhya unknown, nor is it stating the obvious.- No.
शब्दस्वभावोपन्यासस्यानुमाने अनुपयोगात् | While a word can mean different
things in different contexts, the rules of debate do not allow
this in an inference (because then, it would be impossible to
refute such an inference - if the opponent were to refute it
using one meaning of the word, the speaker can simply
claim that the meaning of the word was something else).
स्वज्ञानाबाध्येत्यत्र स्वशब्देऽपि तुल्योऽयं दोष: | The word "it" (sva) in
the context of "its knowledge" also suffers from the same
flaw.

Inference #9
अतएव - विमता, बन्धनिवृत्ति:,
स्वप्रतियोगिविषयविषयकज्ञानाबाध्यानात्मसमकालीना,
उक्तज्ञानाबाध्यभावरूपानात्मसमकालीना वा; बन्धनिवृत्तित्वात् ;
निगलबन्धनिवृत्तिवदित्यापि - निरस्तम् ;
Thus, the following has been refuted in a similar manner -
"The cessation of bondage a) is contemporaneous with the
non-Self which has not been sublated by a cognition having
as its object, the object of bondage*, or b) is
contemporaneous with the non-Self, which is of the nature
of existence, because it is the cessation of bondage, like the
release from handcuffs / chains (is not a result of the
cognition of the object to which one is chained)."
*sva = cessation of bondage, svapratiyogi =
bondage, svapratiyogiviShaya = the object of
bondage, svapratiyogiviShayaviShayakajnAna = a cognition having
as its object the object of bondage, tadabAdhya anAtma = a non-
Self which is unsublated by such a cognition, tatsamakAlIna =
is contemporaneous with such an object
This inference has been refuted on the same lines as before
- that is, the word bondage in the paksha refers to a bondage
due to ignorance whereas the same word in the example
means handcuffs.
पक्षदृष्टान्तयोर्बन्धपदार्थस्यैकस्याभावेन स्वरूपासिद्धि साधनवैकल्यान्यतरापातात् | The
word bandha in the paksha and the example do not mean the
same, thus either this will result in svarUpAsiddhi (the hetu is
not present in the paksha) or sAdhanavaikalya (the hetu is not
present in the example).
स्वपदे चोक्त: साध्याप्रसिद्धिदोष: | The word "sva" can take
different meanings, leading to the defect of the sAdhya not
being known.
षणवैयर्थ्यात् व्याप्यत्वासिद्धि: | Further, as the term
हेतौ च बन्धेतिवि षणवैयर्थ्यात्शे
"bondage" is superfluous in the hetu (no vyabhichAra is
removed by its presence), its use leads to vyApyatvAsiddhi.
अप्रयोजकत्वं च कस्याश्चिन्निवृत्तेरनात्मसमानकालीनत्वदर्शनंं निवृत्तिमात्रस्य तथात्वसाधने If
the contemporaneity of all cessation is what is meant to be
proved, then as there is always some cessation which is
contemporaneous with non-Self, the hetu "cessation" does
not necessarily imply such a sAdhya.
संसारकालीनाया दु:खनिवृत्ते: समानाधिकरणदु:खप्रागभावकालीनत्वदर्शनमिव
दु:खनिवृत्तिमात्रस्य तथात्वसाधने | Like the observation of the colocation
of the prior absence of future pain with the cessation of
some pain during samsAra, if the hetu was merely the
"cessation of pain", it wouldn't prove the sAdhya.
नन्वेवं - सामान्यानुमानेषु निराकृ तेषु विशिष्यानुमानं भविष्यति | After the general
inferences have been disproved, specific inferences will be
taken up.

Specific inference #1
आत्मधी:, न स्वविषयविषयकधीबाध्या, धीत्वात्, शुक्तिधीवत् - The cognition
of the Self is not sublated by a cognition that has its object
the object of the cognition itself - because it a cognition,
like the cognition of the shell.
इत्यपि बालभाषितम् ; This inference is also childlike babble.
The cognition of the Self is inimical to the ignorance which
has the Self as its object. When ignorance is destroyed by
the cognition of the Self, the cognition of the Self is also
destroyed, as its material cause ignorance is destroyed. The
siddhikAra uses this to construct a upAdhi (vitiating
condition) for the opponent's inference.
स्वविरोध्यविषयकप्रत्ययविषयकत्वस्योपाधित्वात्, The cognition not
having an object whose cognition is inimical to the cognition
itself is an upAdhi to the inference. This characteristic is
present in the example (cognition of the shell), but not in
the paksha (cognition of the Self).
The cognition of the shell has as its object the shell, whose
cognition being the cognition of the shell, is not inimical to
the cognition of the shell itself. The cognition of the Self has
as its object the Self, whose cognition is inimical to the
cognition of the Self because it destroys the material cause
for all cognitions, including it.

अन्धोऽयं रूपज्ञानवानित्यन्धस्य रूपविषयतया कल्पितं यत् ज्ञानं तस्य रूपं नान्धगम्यमिति

नेन व्यभिचारात् |
स्वविषयविषयकप्रत्ययबाध्यत्वदर्नेनर्श
The cognition "this blind person possesses the cognition of
colour", which has an imaginary cognition which has colour
as its object, is sublated by the cognition "colour is not seen
by the blind" (which too has colour as its object), and thus
the quality of being sublated by a cognition which has the
same object as itself is seen, thus falsifying the inference.
कल्पितत्वात्तत्र तद्बाधने प्रकृ तेऽपि वृत्ते: कल्पितत्वं समम् | If it is said that that
cognition is sublated because it happens to be an illusory
one, then such illusoriness is present in the cognition here
(cognition of the Self) too.
धीपदेन चैतन्यमात्रविवक्षायां तु सिद्धसाधनमेव | If by the word "cognition",
consciousness is meant, then as consciousness is
fundamentally unsublatable, the inference is stating the
obvious.

Specific inference #2
The opponent's next inference says that the shell appears
as silver because it has the quality of shininess. This quality
does not get sublated when the silver is sublated. However
the ignorance which is said to be the cause of the world
illusion, is sublated when the substratum is cognised. This is
a discrepancy.
आत्माधिष्ठानकभ्रमहेतु: , न स्वकार्यभ्रमाधिष्ठानज्ञानबाध्य:, भ्रमहेतुत्वात्,
यदेवं तदेवम्, यथा शुक्त्यधिष्ठानकभ्रमहेतुकाचादीत्यपि न साधु;
The cause of the world illusion, which has the Self as its
substratum, is not sublated by the cognition of its illusory
product's substratum, because it happens to be the cause of
the illusion. Wherever that happens, this too does. Like the
shininess of the shell, which has the shell as its locus and
which caused the illusion to appear knowledge of the shell
does not get sublated when the shell is seen.
The siddhikAra says - this too is not correct.

व्यावृत्ताकाराधिष्ठानज्ञानानवधित्वस्य स्वकार्यभ्रमाधिष्ठानानारोपितत्वस्य वा
उपाधित्वात्;
Two upAdhi-s are cited by the siddhikAra.
1) Being other than that which remains after the cognition of
the substratum with the distinguishing characteristics of the
(substratum) has arisen. brahmAnanda in
the laghuchandrika says here - यं प्रति व्यावर्तकधर्मवत्तया ज्ञातं सत्
स्वजन्यभ्रमाधिष्ठानं स्वजन्यभ्रमनिवर्तकं तदन्यत्वस्य इत्यर्थ:. That
which is other than: an entity whose cognition is endowed
with an attribute that excludes it, which cognition's object
is the substratum of the illusion created by the defect, and
which is the cause of the destruction of the defect's effect,
the illusion.
To explain:
The stated upAdhi has two parts: 1) Being other than 2) that
which meets the following conditions (together, the
"Conditions"):
a) The cognition of which is endowed with an attribute that
excludes the entity
b) Which cognition has as its object the substratum of the
illusion which is a product of the entity.
c) Which cognition is the cause of the destruction of the
illusion which is a product of the entity.
In the case of the example (the shell-silver) - the cognition
that contains an attribute excluding it (this is not silver), is
the cognition of the shell. The object of the cognition, the
shell, is the substratum of the illusion created by the defect
of shininess. Upon the cognition of the shell, the illusion of
the silver is removed.
However, the only entity which meets those Conditions is
the shell. Shininess is a thing different from the shell (it is a
property, whereas the latter is a substance). Thus shininess
contains the upAdhi.
In the case of the exemplified, the cognition of the world
that excludes it, is the cognition of Brahman endowed with
absence of duality. The object of such cognition is Brahman.
Knowing which, the illusion of the world created due to
ignorance is removed. It also happens to be the substratum
of the illusion created by ignorance. However, ignorance is
an entity which meets those Conditions. The cognition that
excludes ignorance is the one and the same cognition of
Brahman which meets those Conditions. Therefore,
ignorance is not an entity that is other than that which
satisfies those conditions.
Thus, such a feature is present in the example, but not in
the paksha, and hence this is an upAdhi.
2) Alternatively, that which is not superimposed on the same
substratum upon which its product, the illusion, is also
superimposed - can also be cited as an upAdhi. Shininess is
not superimposed on the the substratum of its product, the
silver illusion, i.e. the shell (it is the shell's real property).
Ignorance is superimposed on Brahman, which happens to
be the substratum of the world illusion, which is a product of
ignorance. Thus, as such a feature is present in the
example, but not in the paksha, it is an upAdhi.
The opponent had said that the cause of the illusion is itself
not sublated by the cognition of the substratum. That is
being refuted with an example.

दूरादिदोषादुपलादौ यत्र चाकचक्यकल्पना तेन चाकचक्यदोषेण शुक्ताविव रजतकल्पना

नेन व्यभिचाराच्च |
तत्राधिष्ठानज्ञानेन चाकचक्यरूप्ययोरुभयोरपि बाधदर्नेनर्श
The inference fails where the shininess itself is an illusory
one, which can occur in objects seen from great distance,
and that shininess leads to the illusion of silver, like in a
shell. When the substratum is properly observed, both the
silver and shininess are sublated.
For example, the mirage observed over hot sand sometimes
gives rise to the illusion that there is shiny silver present.
Upon closer observation, it is revealed to be sand, and both
the shininess, and its product, the illusion of silver are
sublated.

Specific inference #3
ब्रह्मान्यानादिपरमार्थसत्, अनादित्वात्, ब्रह्मवदित्यपि न भद्रम् ; The
following inference is incorrect too - "Every other
beginningless entity other than Brahman is ultimately real,
because it is beginningless, like Brahman".
ध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वस्योपाधित्वात् | Because, being a
counterpositive of destruction is an upAdhi for the inference.
Brahman is not destroyed, the others are.

Specific inference #4
ब्रह्म, देशकालसंबन्धं विना नावतिष्ठते, पदार्थत्वात्, घटवदित्यपि न; The following
is also not correct - "Brahman cannot be without some
relation to space and time, because it is a substance, like a
pot".

कालसंबन्धं विना नावतिष्ठत इत्यस्य यदा ब्रह्म तदावश्यं कालसंबन्ध इत्येवंरुपा

व्याप्तिरित्यर्थ: | When it is said that Brahman does not exist
without some relation to time, the concomitance must mean
that when It exists, It does so with a relation with time.
तथा च सुस्थिरं सिद्धसाधनम् | नहि यस्मिन् काले ब्रह्म तस्मिन् काले ब्रह्मण:
कालसंबन्धो नास्ति | This is definitely stating the obvious, for we do
not say that when Brahman exists, It does not have a
relation with time.
एवं यत्रात्मा तत्र कालसंबन्ध इति दैशिकव्याप्तावपि सिद्धसाधनम् | Wherever the
Self is present, there is a relation with time - such a spatial
concomitance also is stating the obvious.
नहि देशकालासंबन्ध: कदाप्यस्ति | It is not unrelated to time and space at
any time.
परममुक्तौ तु न देशो न काल इति सुस्थिरं सिद्धसाधनम् | However, as there is
no space and time in the ultimate release, this is stating the
obvious.
Specific inference #5

ब्रह्मान्यद्वेदैकगम्यम् धर्मादिपरमार्थसत्, श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वात्,

ब्रह्मवदित्यपि न साधु; This too is not correct - Everything other
than Brahman that is known solely from the veda-s,
like dharma, etc is ultimately real, because it is the object of
the import of shruti, like Brahman.
पारमार्थिकत्वेन श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्वस्योपाधित्वात् | Because of the upAdhi, "being
the ultimate import of scripture". It is Brahman alone that is
the ultimate import of scripture, dharma etc., are only of
subsidiary import.

Specific inference #6
साक्षिवेद्यं सुखादिपरमार्थसत्, अनिषेध्यत्वेन दोषाजन्यज्ञानं प्रति
साक्षाद्विषयत्वात्; आत्मवदित्यापि न; This too is not correct -
"Things that are revealed by the inner witness, such as
happiness, etc., are ultimately real, because they are direct,
unsublated objects of a non-defective source, like the Self".
शुक्तिरूप्यादिषु व्यभिचारात् | Such an inference fails, because it equally
applies to objects such as the shell-silver, etc., which are
direct objects of the inner witness.
तेषां दोषजन्यवृत्तिविषयत्वेऽपि दोषाजन्यसाक्षिविषयत्वात्, Even though they arise due
to a defective source (ignorance), they are revealed by the
inner witness, which is defect free.
शुद्धस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वानभ्युपगमे दृष्टान्तस्य साधनविकलत्वाच्च | If Pure
Consciousness is not held to be an object of cognition, the
concomitance fails in the example. It is ultimately real, but
it is not the object of the witness through a thought.
दोषजन्यज्ञानाविषयत्वविवक्षायां वाऽसिद्धो हेतु: ; साक्ष्यवच्छेदिकाया
अविद्यावृत्तेर्दोषजन्यत्वात् | If the hetu is reinterpreted to mean
that it is not an object of a defective source (as opposed to
being an object of a non-defective source), then there
is asiddhi, because as the inner witness is itself
consciousness delimited by ignorance, the hetu will not be
in the paksha, because it the inner witness that reveals
happiness.
ब्
दज्ञाना त्
मकविकल्पस्
असद्गोचर ब्दज्ञानात्मकविकल्पस्य दोषाजन्यत्वेनासति व्यभिचाराच्च | The
यशा
inference also fails in the case of verbal cognitions of
absolutely non-existent objects, known as vikalpa. The source
of the vikalpa is not defective, but its object is non-existent.
आत्मनो वृत्तिविषयत्वाभ्युपगमे दोषजन्यदेहात्मैक्यभ्रमविषयत्वात् साधनविकलो दृष्टान्त:, If the
Self is accepted to be the object of a cognition, then
the hetu does not exist in the example because of the
illusion of the body taken to be the Self. The Self becomes
the object of an erroneous cognition.

तदनभ्युपगमे तु अविषयत्वमात्रस्यैव परमार्थसत्त्वसाधकत्वोपपत्तौ दोषजन्यज्ञानेति

विशेषणवैयर्थ्याद्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धि:, If that is not acceptable, as "not being
an object" itself is sufficient to establish absolute reality,
the qualifiers "erroneous cognition" being redundant
qualifiers, we have the defect of vyApyatvAsiddhi.
तावन्मात्रं च पक्षे स्वरूपासिद्धमित्यन्यत्र विस्तर: | However, if only that
much is the hetu (not being an object), then there
is svarUpAsiddhi, as the hetu is not present in
the paksha (because happiness is an object).

Specific inference #7
There are two kinds of objects - a) if they exist they are
known, and b) those that exist even when unknown.
विमतंपरमार्थसत्, स्वविषयज्ञानात्पूर्वभावित्वात्, आत्मवदित्यपि न, This
inference is flawed too - "The world is ultimately real,
because it exists even before its cognition, like the Self".
दृष्टिसृष्टिपक्षे असिद्धे: | Because this will lead to asiddhi in the
case of dRShTi sRShTi.
विषमव्याप्तस्यानादित्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च | The one-sided concomitance with
beginningless is an upAdhi. Whatever is beginningless is not
the Self, but whatever is the Self is beginningless. Whatever
is beginningless, need not exist before it is cognised, and
whatever exists before it is cognised need not be
beginningless either. Thus it exists in the example, but not
in the exemplified.

Specific inference #8
अन्योन्याभावातिरिक्तैतद्घटसमानाधिकरणैतद्घटप्रतियोगिकाभावत्वं,
एतद्घटसमानकालीनावृत्ति

अन्योन्याभावातिरिक्तैतद्घटसामानाधिकरणैतद्घटप्रतियोगिकाभावमात्रवृत्
तित्वात्, एतद्घटप्रागभावत्ववत्, व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभावपक्षे व्यधिकरणधर्मानवच्छिन्नेत्यपि
विशेषणीयम् |
An absence having the pot as its counterpositive, which is
other than its difference, and which is located in the same
locus as as the pot, cannot exist there at the same time as
the pot, because any absence of a pot other than
difference, can be present in a locus only when the pot is
absent there, like the prior absence of a pot. If the absence
of some other substance's properties in this substance is
admitted as a separate category of absence, then a qualifier
stating that the absence "does not refer to the absence of
the properties of another substance" must be added.
Within nyAya there are two groups - one that
admits vyadhikaraNa dharmAvacChinna pratiyogitAka abhAva - an
absence that has a counterpositive endowed with properties
of some other substance. Every object is endowed
with vyadhikaraNa dharma avacChinna pratiyogitA abhAva according to
them. This theory was proposed by SondaDopAdhyAya but was
rejected by GangeSopAdhyAya in tattva chintAmaNi.
अत्र च स्वसमानाधिकरण: स्वसमानकालीनो
योऽत्यन्ताभावस्तदप्रतियोगित्वलक्षणसत्त्वसिद्धिरित्यपि न साधु ;
Here, the end result that obtains is the non
counterpositiveness of an absence that is colocated in time
and space with the counterpositive. The pot cannot be both
present and absent in the same location at the same time.
The siddhikAra says such an inference is also wrong.

साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकस्यैतद्घटप्रतियोगिकजन्यजनकान्यतरमात्रवृत्
तित्वस्योपाधित्वात् |
The inference has an upAdhi - Being either the a) the
destruction, which is born from the counterpositiveness of
the pot, and b) the prior absence, which gives rise to the
counterpositiveness of the pot, is something that is present
wherever the sAdhya endowed with the hetu is present.
The example (prior absence) is one of prior absence or
destruction, but the exemplified can be absolute absence as
well (it can be any of the other three types of absences,
except difference).
नच - पक्षीभूतधर्मस्यात्यन्ताभाववृत्तित्वसन्देहे साधनाव्यापकत्वसन्देह इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that as the presence of absolute
absence, which is intended to be the attribute of the paksha,
is doubtful (it could be one of prior absence or destruction),
whether it fails to pervade the hetu is doubtful (and
therefore, whether the stated defect of upAdhi, is really an
upAdhi or not, is called into question).
विपक्षबाधकतर्कानवतारदशायां सन्दिग्धोपाधेरपि दूषणत्वसम्भवात्, Because, for so
long as there is the absence of logic to refute the opponent's
logic, even a doubtful upAdhi can lead to a defective
inference.
घटात्यन्ताभावत्वे च व्यभिचारात्, संयोगसंबन्धेन घटवत्यपि भूतले समवाय
संबन्धेन घटात्यन्ताभावसत्त्वात् Moreover, the inference fails for
the absolute absence of the pot - even if the pot is present in
contact with the ground, it can be said to be absent inhering
in the ground - so the pot and its absence can both be
present simultaneously in one location (in nyAya).
साध्याभाववति हेतोर्वृत्तेरित्यलमतिविस्तरेण॥ As the sAdhya is
absent but hetu is present, there is the defect of vyabhichAra.
This much explication is sufficient.
This concludes the chapter on the possibility of inference
contradicting the inference of world's unreality.
mithyAtve visheShAnumAnam
The previous chapter was a refutation of anumAna-s provided by
the nyAyAmRtakAra against the mithyAtva of the world. The
purpose of that chapter was defence. In this chapter,
the siddhikAra goes on the attack and provides several anumAna-
s to prove the mithyAtva of the world. At the end of this chapter,
he will conclude by saying that the opponent's inferences are
few and have been refuted, whereas he has provided
more anumAna-s which are irrefutable.

मिथ्यात्वे च विशेषतोऽनुमानानि | The specific inferences in relation

to mithyAtva (are as follows):

(1) ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यब्रह्मान्यासत्त्वानधिकरणत्वम्
पारमार्थिकसत्त्वाधिकरणावृत्ति, ब्रह्मावृत्तित्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यत्ववत्,
परमार्थसद्भेदवच्च,
Here the paksha is not the world, but the pakshatAvacChadeka
dharma - the qualities identified to be present in the world, in
the generic inference of the world's mithyAtva.
paksha - The qualities of : a) unsublatability by anything (any
cognition) other than the cognition of Brahman, b) being other
than Brahman c) Not being the locus of non-existence
sAdhya - are not located in the locus of ultimate reality
hetu - because they are not present in Brahman.
dRShTAnta 1 - Like shell-silverness. This is not present in
Brahman. It is also not present in a substance which is
ultimately real.
dRShTAnta 2 - or, Like the quality of being different from ultimate
reality.

(2) विमतं, मिथ्या, ब्रह्मान्यत्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यवत्,

The object under discussion is mithyA, because it is different
from Brahman, like shell silver.

(3) परमार्थसत्त्वं, स्वसमानाधिकरणान्योन्याभावप्रतियोग्यवृत्ति,

सदितरावृत्तित्वात्, ब्रह्मत्ववत्,
Absolute reality is not present in the counterpositive of a
difference of another object which is absolutely real, because
it is not present in anything other than the existent, like
Brahman-hood.

Potness is present in a pot. The difference from other pots is

present in the same pot. However, ultimate reality is not
present in any other ultimately real object different from
Brahman.

(4) ब्रह्मत्वमेकत्वम् वा सत्त्वव्यापकम्, सत्त्वसमानाधिकरणत्वात्,

असद्वैलक्षण्यवत्,
The nature of Brahman, or alternatively, Oneness, is pervaded
by existence, because it is colocated with Existence, like
difference from Non-Existence.

असद्वैलक्षण्य, or difference from non-existence is colocated

with existence (in Brahman) - thus, the hetu is present in the
example. Whatever is existent is different from the non-
existent or alternatively, existence pervades that which is
different from the non-existent. Thus the sAdhya is present.
From this, we can draw a generic concomitance - whatever is
colocated with existence, is pervaded by existence.

Similarly, existence pervades Brahman and Oneness. By

implication, that which is not Brahman, or that which is not the
only One, is not existent.

The world, which is admitted to be not Brahman, and in which

there is multiplicity, is not existent.

(5) व्याप्यवृत्तिघटादि:, जन्याभावातिरिक्तस्वसमानाधिकरणाभावमात्रप्रतियोगी,

अभावप्रतियोगित्वात्, अभिधेयत्ववत् |
An object which is fully present in its location (to exclude the
case of the avyApya vRtti - e.g, the monkey present in the top of
the tree, but absent in the bottom), is the counterpositive of
every absence colocated with the object, excluding an
absence that has a beginning (the absence of destruction),
because it is the counterpositive of an absence, like the
quality of expressibility.

A question may arise here - in the madhva school, expressibility

is kevalAnvayi, that is, it is universally present. How then can the
hetu - being the counterpositive of absence - apply for
something that is present everywhere?

अभिधेयत्वं हि परमते के वलान्वयित्वादन्योन्याभावमात्र प्रतियोगी | In other

schools (madhva), as abhidheyatva, expressibility, is universally
present, (the sAdhya should be taken as) the counterpositive
of difference from everything else.

To explain, a pot can be spoken about, that is, it has

expressibility. However, the quality of expressibility is
different from the pot itself. Thus, if the sAdhya was understood
here as being the counterpositive of a difference (difference is
one of the four kinds of absence in nyAya) colocated with
expressibility, one can observe the concomitance of
the sAdhya and the hetu.

स च समानाधिकरण एव, अस्मन्मते तु मिथ्यैवेति, नोभयथापि साध्यवैकल्यम् | That

(expressibility) is certainly colocated (with anyonyAbhAva,
difference). In our system however, there is no such thing
as kevalAnvayi. Expressibility is only present for that which
is mithyA. Thus, whether expressibility is kevalAnvayi or mithyA, it
is colocated with absence. Therefore, the absence of
the sAdhya in the example, sAdhya vaikalya, cannot be alleged.

(6) अत्यन्ताभाव:, प्रतियोग्यवच्छिन्नवृत्ति:, नित्याभावत्वादन्योन्याभाववत् |

Absence is contemporaneous and colocated (kAla / desha
avacChinna) with the counterpositive, because it is an eternal
absence, like difference.
Prior absence has an end, posterior absence has a beginning,
difference and absence have no beginning or end. If something
is absent where it is seen, it is mithyA.

(7) अत्यन्ताभावत्वं प्रतियोग्य षाधिकरणवृत्तिमात्रवृत्तिशे

षाधिकरणवृ त्
ति मात्रवृ
त्
ति, प्रतियोग्यवच्छिन्न
वृत्तिमात्रवृत्ति वा, नित्याभावमात्रवृत्तित्वात्, अन्योन्याभावत्ववत् |
Absence-ness, is located in an (absence) which is present
wherever the counterpositive is present, or alternatively, is
located in an (absence) which is associated with every
location of the counterpositive, because it is located in every
eternal absence, like difference.
(8) घटात्यन्ताभावत्त्वम्, प्रतियोगिजनकाभावसमानाधिकरणवृत्ति,
एतत्कपालसमानकालीनैतद्घटप्रतियोगिकाभाववृत्तित्वात्, प्रमेयत्ववत् |
The absolute absence-ness of the pot is present in an
(absence) which is colocated with that object (pot-shards)
which is location of the counterpositive's (pot's) prior-
absence*, because it is located in the absolute absence
which has this pot as a counterpositive which is
contemporaneous with these pot-shards, like the feature of
knowability.

* Literally translated, pratiyogi janaka abhAva means an absence

that is the cause of the counterpositive. In nyAya, prior absence
is stated to be one of the causes of the birth of the
counterpositive.

In the ancients' sub-school within nyAya, it was held that prior

absence (prAgabhAva) and absolute absence (atyantAbhAva) cannot
be colocated simultaneously. If it is now proved that absolute
absence of the pot can co-exist with its prior-absence, then it
is possible only if the pot is mithyA.

The qualifier "which is contemporaneous with the pot-shards"

is to remove the flaw of vyabhichAra in the case of the pot's
posterior-absence (dhvamsa) caused due to the destruction of
the pot-shards. Such a posterior-absence is contemporaneous
with the pot's absolute absence, but is not colocated in the
pot-shards, which are the location of the pot's prior absence
(because the pot-shards themselves have been destroyed). In
such an instance, the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is not,
leading to vyabhichAra. The use of the stated qualifier removes
such a possibility.

The example of knowability is appropriate because it is

located in the thing which is colocated with the pot's prior
absence (sAdhya) and which is also present in this pot's
absence, which is contemporaneous with these pot-shards
(hetu).

(9) एतत्कपालमेतत्घटात्यन्ताभावाधिकरणमाधारत्वात्पटादिवत् |
This pot shard is the substratum for the absolute absence of
this pot, as it is its support, like the cloth. A cloth, upon which
a pot is placed is the support of the cloth (hetu), and at the
same time the pot is not located in the cloth (sAdhya).

(10) ब्रह्मत्वं न परमार्थसन्निष्ठान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकम्,

ब्रह्मवृत्तित्वादसद्वैलक्षण्यवत्,
Brahman-hood is not the qualifier of the counterpositive of a
difference with any other object in which absolutely reality is
present, because it is located in Brahman, like difference from
the absolutely non-existent. Essentially this sAdhya proves that
there is no other object other than Brahman which is
absolutely real. Refer anumAna 4 for the reasons for the
appropriateness of asat vailakshaNya as an example.

(11) परमार्थसत्प्रतियोगिको भेदो न परमार्थसन्निष्ठ:

परमार्थसत्प्रतियोगिकत्वात्, परमार्थसत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकाभाववत्,
A difference which has an absolutely real object as its
counterpositive cannot be located in an absolutely real object,
because it has the absolutely real object as its
counterpositive, like an absence which has as its
counterpositive an object which has absolutely reality as its
qualifier.

The absence of absolute reality cannot be located in an

absolutely real entity hence the sAdhya is present. The
absence of absolute reality has absolute reality as its
counterpositive, so the hetu is present too.

(12) भेदत्वावच्छिन्नं, सद्विलक्षणप्रतियोग्यधिकरणान्यतरवत्,

अभावत्वाच्छुक्तिरूप्यप्रतियोगिकाभाववत्,
In every difference between two entities, at least one entity is
not absolutely real because it is a kind of absence, like the
absence of shell-silver.
To explain, if at least one item in every pair of different items is
not ultimately real, then it follows that there cannot be two
(different) ultimately real items.

(13) परमार्थसन्निष्ठो भेद:, न परमार्थसत्प्रतियोगिक:,

परमार्थसदधिकरणत्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यप्रतियोगिकभेदवत्,
Any difference residing in Brahman, does not have an
ultimately real object as its counterpositive, because it has an
ultimately real object as its substratum, like the difference
which has the shell silver as its counterpositive.
The difference with shell-silver is present in Brahman (hetu),
and does not have an ultimately real object as its
counterpositive (sAdhya).

(14) मिथ्यात्वं, ब्रह्मतुच्छोभयातिरिक्तत्वव्यापकम्, सकलमिथ्यावृत्तित्वात्,

मिथ्यात्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वाद्वा, दृश्यत्ववत्,
mithyAtva is present in every object except Brahman and the
absolutely non-existent (tucCha / asat) because a) all objects
that are mithyA have mithyAtva or b) where mithyAtva is absent,
this is absent. The example for such a concomitance is
knowability.

Knowability is present in every location except Brahman and

the non-existent. It is also present in every mithyA object
(first hetu), and where mithyAtva is absent, knowability is
absent. So both hetu-s and sAdhya are invariably concomitant.

(15) दृश्यत्वं परमार्थसदवृत्ति, अभिधेयमात्रवृत्तित्वाच्छुक्तिरूप्यत्ववत्,

Knowability is not present in the ultimately real, because it is
present in objects denotable by words, like shell silver-ness.
Shell-silverness is not present in Brahman (sAdhya), and is the
object of a word (hetu).

(16) दृश्यत्वं, परमार्थसद्भिन्नत्वव्याप्यम्, दृश्येतरावृत्तिधर्मत्वात्, प्रातिभासिकत्ववत्

Wherever knowability is present, is different from the
ultimately real, because it is not located in any object which is
not knowable, like apparent reality.
Whatever is apparently real is different from the ultimately real
(sAdhya), and apparent reality can never be located in an object
which is not knowable - because it wouldn't be apparent
otherwise (hetu).

(17) उभयसिद्धमसद्विलक्षणं मिथ्यात्वासमानाधिकरणधर्मानधिकरणम्,

आधारत्वाच्छुक्तिरूप्यवत्,
That which has been accepted by both (the dvaitin and
the advaitin) as different from the non-existent (e.g the world),
is not the locus of any attribute that is not colocated
with mithyAtva, because it is a locus, like the shell silver.
Every attribute in shell-silver is colocated with mithyAtva.

(18) प्रतियोग्यवच्छिन्नो देश:, अत्यन्ताभावारययश्र

:, आधारत्वात्कालवत्
The location of the counterpositive is also the locus of the
absence of the counterpositive, because it is a locus, like
time.
Both the object and its absence are located in time.

(19) आत्मत्वावच्छिन्नं
परमार्थसत्त्वाधिकरणप्रतियोगिकभेदत्वावच्छिन्नरहितं, परमार्थसत्वात्,
परमार्थसत्त्वावच्छिन्नवत्,
The one endowed with self-hood (the self) is not endowed with
a difference which has as its counterpositive, the locus of
ultimate reality, because it is ultimately real, like anything
which is endowed with ultimate reality.

If there was another entity endowed with ultimate reality, the

self would be endowed with a difference which has an
ultimately real entity as its counterpositive. It may be argued
that the example, "that which is endowed with ultimate
reality", is part of the paksha, and therefore cannot be used.
However, the inference mentioned by the tattvachintAmaNikAra,
पृथिवी इतरभिन्ना गन्धवत्वात् घटवत् (the earth element is different from
the rest, because it has smell, like a pot), the example (pot) is
also within the scope of the earth element (it is part of
the paksha), but it is cited anyway on the basis that both
the sAdhya and the hetu are established in its case, which is
sufficient to gather the knowledge of invariable concomitance
(vyApti grahaNam) that can be applied elsewhere.

परमार्थसति परमार्थसद्भेदाङ्गीकारवादिमतेऽपि सद्भेदो न

परमार्थसत्ववन्निष्ठ: | किन्तु, घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्ननिष्ठ एव |
Even those who hold that an ultimately real entity can be the
locus of difference with other ultimately real entities, they will
agree that "difference from the existent" is not located in the
absolutely real. Rather, even they will have to admit that such
a difference is located in those objects that are endowed with
pot-ness, etc.
The dvaitin may say that one ultimately real entity is different
from another ultimately real entity, but he will not say that
such a difference has ultimate existence as its qualifier. That
is, the difference is not paramArtha sattvAvacChinna bheda:, which can
only exist if the counterpositive of difference is not ultimately
real (aparamArtha sattvAvacChinna).

(20) शुक्तिरुप्यं, मिथ्यात्वेन प्रपञ्चान्न भिद्यते, व्यवहारविषयत्वात्, ब्रह्मवत् |

The shell silver is not different from the world on account of
its mithyAtva, because it is an object of activity, like Brahman.
This may appear odd as the advaitin holds that Brahman is not
the object of any activity (vyavahAra), but as this anumAna is
directed towards the dvaitin, who accepts that Brahman can be
the object of vyavahAra, it is acceptable.

साध्यसत्त्वमात्र त्रेधा | स्वस्यामिथ्यात्वेन, उभयोर्मिथ्यात्वेन,

उभयोरमिथ्यत्वेन वा |
The sAdhya is present here in three ways - either the paksha is
not mithyA itself, or if both the world and paksha are mithyA or
both are not mithyA.

तत्रान्तिमपक्षस्यासंभवात् The third option is an impossibility, as it

would not be possible to argue that both the world and the
shell-silver are not mithyA (even the opponent concedes that
the shell-silver is unreal).
पक्षे साध्यसिद्धिपर्यवसानं मध्यमपक्षेण, If the opponent accepts the
middle option, then it stands proven that the world and the
shell-silver are mithyA.
दृष्टान्ते तु प्रथमपक्षेणेति विवेक: In the case of the example,
the sAdhya is present, in Brahman (Brahman is not different
from the world on account of its mithyAtva, because Brahman is
not mithyA in the first place).

(21) विमतं मिथ्या, मोक्षहेतुज्ञानाविषयत्वे सत्यसदन्यत्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यवत्,

The object of contention (e.g the world) is unreal, because it is
not an object of the cognition that causes enlightenment and
is different from the absolutely non-existent, like shell-silver.

(22) मोक्षहेतुज्ञानविषयत्वं, परमार्थसत्त्वव्यापकम्, परमार्थसत्त्वसमानाधिकरणत्वात्,

परमार्थिकत्वेन श्रुतितात्पर्यविषयत्ववत्
Being the object of a cognition that causes enlightenment is
present where ultimate reality is present, because it is
colocated with ultimate reality, like being the object of the
ultimate import of shruti. Ultimate reality is colocated with
being the object of the ultimate import of shruti - in Brahman.

(23) एतेत्पटात्यन्ताभाव:, एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठ:, एतत्पटानाद्यभावत्वात्,

एतत्पटान्योन्याभाववत्,
The absence of this cloth is located in these threads, because
it is a beginningless absence of this cloth, like the difference
from this cloth. The difference of the threads from the cloth is
located in the threads (sAdhya) and is beginningless (hetu).
Why was the qualifier beginningless added to the hetu?

तन्तुनाशजन्यपटनाशस्य कदापि तन्तुवृत्तिता नास्तीति तत्र व्यभिचारवारणायानादिपदम् | In

order to remedy the vyabhichAra that would otherwise be
possible in the case of the destruction of the cloth that is
caused by the destruction of the threads. In that instance, the
threads themselves would be destroyed, so the absence of the
cloth would not be "located in these threads". Therefore, by
adding the word "beginningless", the absence that has a
beginning (i.e the absence caused due to destruction) is
removed, averting such a possibility.

यविभागेनश्रनाशस्तदत्यन्ताभावस्य पक्षत्वे त्वनादिपदमानादेयमेव |

यस्य पटस्यारयविभागेन
If the paksha is qualified such that it only refers to the
destruction of the cloth on account of the threads unraveling,
there would be no necessity to qualify the hetu using the word,
"beginningless".

अत्र चैतत्पटप्रतियोगिकात्यन्ताभावत्वावच्छिन्नस्य पक्षीकरणान्न

संबन्धान्तरेणात्यन्ताभावमादायांशत: सिद्धसाधनम्; It may be argued
that inference is partially stating the obvious, because it is
always possible to say that the cloth is absent on the basis of
some other relationship with the threads. However that would
be untenable because the paksha has been defined such that
every kind of absence of this cloth is present in these threads
(atyantAbhAvatvAvacChinna).

त्वात्
पक्षतावच्छेदकावच्छेदेन साध्यसिद्धेरुद्देयत्वात् | For the intent is to
श्य
prove that every cloth in the world is absent in its material
cause (pakshatAvacChedakAvacChedena), and that is only possible if
the cloth is mithyA.

समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नो व्यधिकरणधर्मानवच्छिन्नश्च य: एतत्पटात्यन्ताभाव: स एव वा

पक्ष: |
Alternatively it can be said that the paksha is merely an
absence of the cloth in a material cause-effect relationship
with the thread and that which is not the absence of some
other object in these threads.

तन्तुशब्देन च पटोपादानकारणमुक्तम् | तत्र च प्रागभावस्य सत्वान्न तेन

व्यभिचार: |
By the word thread, the material cause of the cloth is meant.
One cannot cite vyabhichAra in prior absence, for the prior
absence of the cloth in threads is accepted.

कार्यकारणयोरभेदेन सिद्धसाधनादिदूषणानि प्रागेव तत्त्वप्रदीपिकानुमानोपन्यासे

निराकृ तानि | It may be argued on account of the non-difference of
the effect with the cause, that the effect is absent in the
cause (as it identical with the cause), but these have already
been refuted in the context of the explanation of
the anumAna from the tattvapradIpikA (in the chapter on amshitva
hetu).

(24) यद्वा - समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नोऽयमेतत्पटात्यन्ताभाव:, एतत्तन्तुनिष्ठ:,

एतत्पटप्रतियोगिकात्यन्ताभावत्वात्,
संबन्धान्तरावच्छिन्नैतत्पटात्यन्ताभाववदिति विशिष्यानुमानम् |
Alternatively, the absence of this cloth with a material cause-
effect relationship with the thread, is located in the thread,
because it is an absence that this cloth as its counterpositive,
like the absence of the cloth with some other relationship.
This can be a special anumAna.

(25) अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वानधिकरणत्वे सत्युक्तपक्षतावच्छेदकवत्,

स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि, अनात्मत्वात्, संयोगवत् |
That which has the stated qualifiers for the paksha (that which
is sublated by nothing other than right cognition of Brahman,
that which is capable of being known as existing, that which is
different from Brahman) and fully pervades its locus, is the
counterpositive of its own absence in its locus, because it is
not the self, like the relationship of contact. Wherever contact
is present, there will be a part which is not in contact (sAdhya)
and contact is not the self (hetu).

The opponent may try to allege a vyabhichAra for the absence of

the world on the basis that the absence of the world is not the
self (hetu is thus present), but it is not the counterpositive of
its absence in its own locus (the sAdhya is absent). To this,
the siddhikAra says:
नच विश्वात्यन्ताभावे व्यभिचार:, तस्याधिकरण्स्वरूपत्वे अनात्मत्वहेतोरेवाभावात्,
अतिरिक्तत्वे तस्य मिथ्यात्वेनात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितया साध्यस्यैव सत्त्वात् |
Nor can it be alleged that the inference fails (vyabhichAra) in the
case of the absence of the world, because the absence of the
world is of the nature of the substratum, the self, and
therefore, the hetu of not being the self is absent. If the
absence of the world is taken to be different to the self,
the sAdhya is present because being mithyA, it is
the counterpositive of its absence in its locus.

नच - अत्यन्ताभावस्यात्यन्ताभावे तत्प्रतियोगित्वलक्षणमिथ्यात्वासिद्धिरिति
वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that if the absence is absent, then
a mithyAtva of the nature of counterpositiveness is denied.
अभावे अभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य भावगताभावप्रतियोगित्वाविरोधित्वात्,
Because, the counterpositiveness of absence is not lost by the
absence of absence.
प्रागभावस्यात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि तत्प्रतियोगित्वस्य घटादौ
सर्वसिद्धत्वात् | Even if the prior absence of the pot is the
counterpositive of its absence, its counterpositive, the pot is
not denied.
उपपादितञ्चैतन्मिथ्यात्वमिथ्यात्वे | This has been proved in the
chapter on the mithyAtva of mithyA.

वच्छेदेना वि
द्
यमा
अत्रचाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वानधिकरणशब्देनेकदे वच्छेदेनाविद्यमानत् नत्शा
षणंविवक्षितम् | Here, by the qualifier "the exclusion
वं पक्षवि षणंशे
of avyApya vritti in the substratum" in the paksha, that which is
absent only in one part of the locus is meant.

By this statement, two possible defects are remedied.

तेन - स्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वोक्तौ बाध: | the first
is bAdha, contradiction. The logician defines avyApya vritti as
that which is absent in its locus. The sAdhya is "is absent in its
locus". If by avyApya vritti anadhikaraNa, we had simply meant that
which is not absent in its locus, then it is tantamount
to saying - that which is not absent in its locus is absent in its
locus, which would be a contradiction. What we mean instead
is - excluding those objects that are only partly located in their
locus, every object is absent in its own locus.

अवयववृत्तित्वानधिकरणत्वोक्तौ घटादीनामपक्षत्वापत्तिरिति दूषणद्वयमपास्तम् | If avyApya

vritti anadhikaraNatva was defined as that which is not located in
its parts, then it would exclude pots etc, that are said to be
located in their parts.

अनात्मत्वहेतुस्तु जडत्वहेतुव्याख्यानेनैव व्याख्यात: |

The hetu of not being the self has been explained in the
chapter on jaDatva.

(26) अत एव नित्यद्रव्यान्यदव्याप्यवृत्तित्वानधिकरणमुक्तपक्षतावच्छेदकवत्,
के वलान्वय्यत्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि, पदार्थत्वात्, नित्यद्रव्यवदित्यपि साधु |

Therefore - That which is other than an eternal substance,

excludes avyApya vritti, and has the (three) stated qualifiers
determining pakshatA, is the counterpositive of absence
everywhere, because it is a substance, like eternal substances
- this too is appropriate.
दृष्टान्तश्चायं पररीत्या | The example is based on nyAya philosophy,
not advaita. Eternal substances in nyAya are those which
have no locus. Thus they are not located anywhere.
स्वमते तु शुक्तिरूप्यवदित्येव । In advaita, the example is the shell silver.

नच - स्वरूपेणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वे अत्यन्तासत्त्वापात:;
तद्वैलक्षण्यप्रयोजकाभावादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued - if something is absent by nature, it
is absolutely non-existent (asat), as there is no means to
differentiate that (from mithyA).

उत्पत्तिनिवृत्त्योरन्यतरप्रतियोगित्वेन परिहारात् | mithyA objects have a

birth and death, unlike asat, and thus there is a basis to
differentiate them.

(27) आत्मत्वावच्छिन्नधर्मिको भेदो न परमार्थसत्प्रतियोगिक:,

आत्माप्रतियोगित्वात्, शुक्तिरूप्यप्रतियोगिकभेदवत् |
The difference that has the self as its substratum does not
have a counterpositive which is ultimately real because it
does not have the self as its counterpositive, like the
difference which has the shell-silver as its counterpositive.
The opponent may argue that there is vyabhichAra in the
contact between the pot and the cloth. The hetu is present,
as contact does not have the self as its counterpositive.
However the sAdhya is not present, because the
counterpositive of contact is ultimately real (according to the
opponent). To this the siddhikAra argues:

नच घटपटसंयोगे व्यभिचार:, There is no vyabhichAra for the contact

between the pot and the cloth.
हेतुमत्तया निर्णीते अङ्कुरादाविव साध्यसन्देहस्यादोषत्वात् | Where the hetu is
certain and the sAdhya in doubt, there can be no vyabhichAra, like
in the case of saplings etc.

A vyabhichAra occurs if the hetu is present, but the sAdhya is

not. There are also certain instances where it is doubtful
whether a vyabhichAra is present or not. A doubtful vyabhichAra is
a defect only there is certainty that the sAdhya is present but
there is a doubt whether the hetu is present or not. There can
be no defect if there is certainty that the hetu is present but
there is a doubt whether the sAdhya is present or not - no
inference would be possible at all, as before every inference
there is certainty that the hetu is present in the paksha, the
doubt is in relation to the existence or non-existence of
the sAdhya in the paksha.

The anumAna क्षिति: सकर्तृका कार्यत्वात् घटवत् - Creation has a creator,

because it is a product, like a pot. A doubt is raised whether
there is a vyabhichAra in the case of अङ्कुर:, a sapling. It is clear
that a sapling is a product (hetu's presence is certain), but it is
not certain that it has a creator (sAdhya's presence
is uncertain). Here, such a suspected vyabhichAra cannot be
cited as a defect because the sapling is within the paksha - it
is a part of Creation, and therefore an uncertainty about the
presence of the sAdhya in some part of the paksha is not really
a defect that can be leveled at the inference.

एवमन्येऽपि प्रयोगा यथोचितमारचनीया विपश्चिद्भिरिति दिक् I Similarly intelligent

one can come up with other anumAna-s to show the mithyAtva of
the world - I have showed them the way.

He tells the nyAyAmRtakAra:

'हेतवोऽभीष्टसिद्ध्यर्थम् सम्यञ्चो बहवच श्चन: |
अल्पा: परस्य दृष्टाश्चेत्यत्र स्पष्टमुदीरितम् ||
We have provided several defect-free hetu-s to prove what is
desirable (by us), whereas others have been able to
demonstrate fewer hetu-s, which have proven to be defective.
That has been demonstrated here.

अभीष्टसिद्धावनुकूलतर्कबलाबलं चात्र परीक्ष्य यत्नात् |

प्रवक्ष्यते दोषगण: परेषां न खेदनीयं तु मनोऽधुनैव ||'
In order to achieve the desired result, a lot of effort has been
spent to show the respective strengths and weaknesses of
various supporting reasons for each of our anumAna-s.
Many more defects will be cited in the opponent's anumAna-s, so
he should not be disheartened with this much itself.

इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ विश्वमिथ्यात्वे विशेषतोऽनुमानानि || This concludes the

chapter in the advaita siddhi on the special anumAna-s to prove
the world's mithyAtva.
Agama bAdhoddhAra: (part 1)
This chapter refutes the charge that shruti disproves the
mithyAtva of the world
The opponent says -
ननु - अस्तु शब्दबाध:, तथाहि - 'विश्वं सत्यं', 'यच्चिके त सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं',
'याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान्व्यदधाच्छाश्वतीभ्य: समाभ्य:' इत्यादिरुतिभि
तिभि:
श्रु
Scripture refutes the inference of the world's mithyAtva. For
example the shruti statements:
a) "The world is satyam, real",
b) "Whatever is considered as satyam is verily not an illusion",
c) "(It is Ishvara who maintains and preserves the universe), by
appropriately allocating various functions of the universe to
the various prajApati-s",

'असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीवर रश्व

' मित्यादि स्मृतिभि:
The smRti (Bhagavat gIta) statement such as "Those who hold that
the world is unreal, without any support, that there is
no Ishvara, (are endowed with demonic qualities)",

'नाभाव उपलब्धे:' 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिव' दित्यादिसूत्रैश्च विश्वस्य सत्यत्वप्रतिपादनात्

इति
the brahma sUtra statements such as "it cannot be absolutely
unreal, because it is the object of experience", "the (world of
the waking state) is different from the dream world", etc, all
establish the reality of the world.

Thus each of the three main prasthAna-s (central texts

of sanAtana dharma) - the shruti, the smRti and the nyAya prasthAna -
all establish that the world is real.

The siddhikAra takes up this argument next:

- चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.

श्रुतेस्तत्परत्वाभावात् | shruti does not have that meaning.

The full text of the mantra which contains the quoted section
"vishvam satyam" is:
तथाहि - 'विश्वं सत्यं मघवाना युवोरिदापश्च न प्रमिणन्ति व्रतं वाम् |
अच्छेन्द्राब्रह्मणस्पती हविर्नो अन्नं युजेव वाजिन जिगात' मिति
ऋक् सं हि ता द्वि ती या ष्ट कवा क् य स् या य म र्थ : | This mantra is in the
second aShTaka of the rig veda.

The siddhikAra provides the meaning of the entire mantra:

हे इन्द्राब्रह्मणस्पती ! Oh Indra and BrahmaNaspati,
मघवाना मघवानौ मघमिति धननाम, धनवन्तौ मघवन्ताविति वा | The word maghavAn is
derived from the root magha which means wealth.
Thus maghavAn means he who is endowed with wealth.
विवं श्वंसर्वं सत्यं कर्म, सद्भूतत्वात्, फलस्यावयम्भावित्वाद्वाम्
भावित्
वाद्
वाश्य
| vishvam means 'all' and satyam means 'karma / rituals / actions',
because it is existent, or called so because rituals will
definitely bear fruit.
तादृ शा(कर्म युवयोरित् such rituals done for you (done to please you),
will be effective
युवयो: इत् इत्थमवधारणे वा | Or alternatively, only those actions
performed by you are effective. इत् means ittham, thus, or
definitively.
युवामेवोद्दिश्य सर्वाणि कर्माण्यनुष्ठेयानीत्यर्थ: | The intended meaning is that all
vedic rituals should be directed towards you two alone.
आपो व्यापनशीला देवता: | By Apa:, are meant the devatA-s, as they are
all pervading, like the waters. That is, they can take a body
anywhere and be present.
चनेत्येतत्पदद्वयपदसमुदाय:, ऐकपद्यं त्वध्यापकसंप्रदायसिद्धं | The word
चन is a confluence of च and न, and have to be interpreted
separately. The use of चन as one word by padakAra-s is by
convention.
वां युवयोर्व्रतं संकल्पं कर्म वा | न प्रमिणन्ति न हिंसन्ति (मीङ् हिंसायां, क्रै यादिक:,)
किन्त्वनुमोदन्त इति यावत् | vAm - your, vratam - vow, or action. na
pramiNAnti - cannot be harmed. The root mIng means to hurt /
harm. No one can block your actions, rather, they will support
it. (Any ritual / action performed or blessed by you cannot be
afflicted by anyone else. On the contrary, it will be supported
by all).
नोऽस्माकं हविर्दध्यादिकं अन्नं च पुरोडा दिकम् दि
कम् च | Our sacrificial offerings
शा
- such as curd, rice, puroDAshA etc
अच्छ अभिलक्ष्य acCha, made facing you
वाजिना वेगवन्तावश्वाविव | vAjinA, like fast horses
युजा युक्तौ सन्तौ | yujA, that are yoked.
जिगातं देवयजनमागच्छतम् | (जिगातिर्गतिकर्मा जौहोत्यादिक:) jigAtam, please
come at once to consume our offerings at the sacrifice
 वि
वेति
अन्नं घासं प्रति अवाविवेति वा | like horses running towards grass.
श्वा
In summary, one interpretation of this mantra is - Oh Indra and
Brihaspati, you who are endowed with riches, all these rituals
should be directed to you alone, as only your actions / rituals
directed towards you certainly bear fruit, and no devatAs are
able to harm or affect them, rather, they are supportive of
them. Therefore, please come at once to this sacrifice and
accept these offerings we make facing you, like fast horses
galloping towards grass.

यद्वा - हे इन्द्राब्रह्मणस्पती! विश्वं सत्त्वेन परिदृयमानंमा नं जगत्, Alternatively -

श्य
Oh Indra and BrahmaNaspati, the universe, which appears to be
real
युवयोरित् युवयोरेव, युवाभ्यामेव सृष्टम् | is yours, has been created by you
अथवा - युवयोरेव विश्वं सर्वं स्तोत्रं, सत्यं यथार्थम् | Alternatively, all
(vishvam = sarvam = all) the eulogies directed towards you are
true (satyam = real).
यद्यत् गुणजातं स्तुत्वा प्रतिपाद्यते तत्सर्वं युवयोर्विद्यमानमेव न त्वारोपितमित्यर्थ: |
Whatever qualities you are said to have in our praises, are all
present in you in reality and not superimposed for the sake of
eulogising. That is, our praises of you are no exaggeration -
they are true statements.
आपो व्यापनशीला देवता:, अबुपलक्षितानि पञ्चभूतानि वा | Apa can refer to
the devatAs due to them being all pervading. Alternatively, the
term waters could refer to all the five elements by implication.
युवयोर्व्रतं जगदुत्पादानाख्यं कर्म न हिंसन्ति | इत्थं महानुभावौ युवां जिगातम् | When you
two set out to create the world, no one can afflict it. Oh great
ones, please come to our sacrifice.
शेषं पूर्ववद्व्याख्येयम् | The remaining is as per the previous
interpretation.

तथाच स्तुतिपरतया नास्य विश्वसत्यत्वे तात्पर्यम् || As can been seen, the

mantra is not speaking about the world's reality, its import is
as a eulogy.

'शाक्मना शाको अरुण: सुपर्ण आयो मह: शूर: सनादनील: | यच्चिके त सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं वसु
स्पार्हमुत जेतोत दाता' इत्यस्याप्यष्टमाष्टकस्थस्येन्द्रस्तुतिपरतया न
विश्वसत्यत्वे तात्पर्यम् |
The second quote (यच्चिके त सत्यमित्तन्न मोघं), which occurs in the
eighth aShTaka (8.17.6) of the rig veda is also a eulogy directed
towards Indra, and not to talk of the world's reality

तथाहि - शाक्मना शाकै व शाक्मा तेन शाक्मना, बलेन | The word shAkmanA is
derived from shAka meaning strength. Thus shakmAna means
"with strength".
शाक: शक्त:, स्वशक्त्यैव सर्वं कर्तुं शक्त इत्यर्थ: | shAka: means 'the
strong one', who is able to do everything with his own
strength
नहीन्द्रस्य सहायान्तरापेक्षास्ति इन्द्रत्वादेव | Indra, by virtue of
being Indra, is able to achieve his aims without anyone else's
help.
अरुण: अरुणवर्ण: कश्चित् शोभवर्ण: पक्षी आगच्छतीत्यध्याहार:, उपसर्गरुते :
तेश्रु
| aruNa, a delightful, red coloured bird arrives. Only the letter आ
is present in the mantra, but by the rule 'upasarga shrute: yogakriyA
adhyAhAra:' - if only a preposition is present in the veda, a verb
can be affixed to it, even if not explicitly present - the verb
"moves" is affixed to आ to mean "arrives"
यो महो महान् शूर: विक्रान्त:, 'yo maho' the mighty one, 'shUra:' who uses
his strength to great effect
सनात् पुराण:, is sanAt, ancient
अनील: अनीड: नीडस्याकर्ता | 'anIla', and has no need for a resting
place.
न हीन्द्रो अग्निवत् कु त्रचिदपि यज्ञे पक्षे निके तनं करोति | Unlike agni,
the devatA of fire, Indra does not reside in any place like the
sacrificial altar, etc. He is ever on the move, never resting.
एवं सुपर्ण इत्यादिरूपकेणेन्द्रमाह | To Indra who is compared to
such a bird, the following has been said:
स इन्द्र इदमिदानीं कर्तव्यमिति यच्चिकेत जानाति, तत्सत्यमित्सत्यमेव |
If Indra decides (yacciketa) that "such and such" must be done
now, that will certainly be done (satyam it).
न मोघं न व्यर्थं | without fail (na mogham)
स: स्पार्हं स्पृहणीयं, वसु निवासार्हं, धनं जेता जयति | शत्रुभ्य: सका त्त् | He wins
शा
unfritterable (vasu) wealth, the object of everyone's desire,
(spArham), instantaneously from his enemies.
उत अपि, दाता ददाति च स्तोतृभ्य: | Not only does he win this wealth,
he bestows this wealth upon his worshippers.
जेता दातेति तृन् तेन 'न लोके 'त्यादिना षष्ठीप्रतिषेध: | By the application of the
'na loke' sUtra (from pANini's aShTAdhyAyi), the तृन् verbal suffix of
the roots for winning (जेतृ) and donating (दातृ), is not used in the
sixth case ending, but in the second case. Instead of saying
धनस्य दाता it is meant in the sense of धनं दाता.
एवमेवान्यदपि सत्यत्वप्रतिपादकमुन्नेयम् | Thus one must understand
that if the word 'satyam' is used in the context of the world, it
has to be interpreted to reveal the correct meaning.

'याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान्व्यदधा'दित्यापि वाक्यं न प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वे प्रमाणम् | Nor is the

sentence from the IshAvAsya upaniShad a proof for the world's
reality either.
तस्य पूर्वसृष्टप्रकारेण सर्जनमर्थ: नतु जगत्सत्यत्वं जगत्सर्जनगतसत्यत्वं
वा | The meaning of yathA and tathA are to indicate the creation
of the universe in the current cycle is similar to the process in
the previous cycle, and not to reveal the reality of the world,
nor to state the reality of the process of creation.

यत्र च स्तुत्यादिपरत्वं नास्ति, तत्रापि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धानुवादकतया 'अग्निर्हिमस्य

भेषज'मित्यादिवाक्यवन्न तत्परत्वम् | Even where the context is not as a
eulogy, any references to the world's reality in the shruti are
only repetitions of the world's reality discerned by direct
perception, and therefore, like in the instance of
the shruti statement 'fire is a remedy for coldness', the
import is not in revealing what is already known.

Having demonstrated that the three instances quoted from the

shruti do not have the import of revealing the world's reality,
the siddhikAra turns his attention to the series of arguments put
forward by the nyAyAmRtakAra in the corresponding chapter in
the nyAyAmRta.

***First argument - the advaitin argues that the reality of the world is the reality of
Brahman. However, that is not a fact that is known through perception. How can it
be then held that a shruti statement that reveals the world's reality is simply a
repetition of a reality known through perception? ***
नच - त्वन्मते सर्वत्र ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्यैव स्फुरणात्तदतिरिक्तस्य
कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वरूपस्य घटादिसत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेणाप्राप्ते: तद्बोधकत्वेन
श्रुतेर्नानुवादकमिति - वाच्यम्;
He says: "In your system, it is Brahman's reality that appears
everywhere else. However, perception does not reveal a reality
of the pot etc that is unsublatable in all three periods of time.
Thus, when shruti reveals such a reality to the world, it is not a
repetition."
The siddhikAra says, no.

इतरसत्वबाधपुरस्सरत्वात् ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्फुरणाभ्युपगमस्य तत्रैव

सत्यत्
वस्
सत्यादिपदप्रवृत्तिस्वीकारेण तदतिरिक्तविवसत्यत्वस्य यश्वशाब्दबोधाविषयत्वात्
तदादायानुवादकत्वापरिहारात् |
As it is Brahman's reality that appears everywhere, it
presupposes that nothing else has a reality of its own.
Therefore, the word real in a sentence can be used only to
mean such a reality that belongs to that object, the reality
revealed by statements speaking of the world's reality cannot
be something other than that, it cannot be anything other than
stating that the world has a reality of its own. Therefore the
claim that the shruti is merely repeating what is discerned by
perception still holds.

The pUrvapakshi changes tack. He wants to say there are some

things whose existence cannot be known through perception.
Thus shruti in saying the world is real is revealing the reality of
all those things that are not known by perception, and the
statement is not a case of superfluous repetition.

अथ - 'पृथिवी इतरभिन्ना' 'न हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानी' त्यादौ घटादावेकदेशे प्रत्यक्षेण,

ब्राह्मणादवेकदे शावाक्यान्तरेण, विधेयसिद्धावपि सर्वत्रासिद्धत्वात् यथा नानुवादकत्वं तथा
विश्वमात्रसत्यत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षेणाप्राप्तत्वात् नानुवादकत्वमिति - मन्यसे, मैवम्;
He says -
Perception may reveal that the pot etc is different from some
other particular object. Similarly, there is a sentence in the
veda which prohibits violence against Brahmanas. Despite
this, the statements "the earth is different from others" or "do
no harm to any living creature" are not considered superfluous
repetitions, because while the former pair of facts may be
known in specific instances, that they are universally true is
not known. Similarly, the vedic statement 'the world is real' is
not a superfluous repetition, because there are things that are
beyond perception and hence a statement to reveal their
reality is necessary.
The siddhikAra says - That is not so. Because

दृष्टान्ते हि पृथिवीत्वं हिंसात्वं च एकोऽनुगतो धर्म इति तदवच्छेदेन विधेयस्याप्राप्तत्वेन

तत्र नानुवादकत्वं युक्तम्,
In the examples cited, the attributes of violence and earthness
are common to the objects in question. (In the case of
violence, this includes everything capable of being the object
of violence, such as an animal, human being, a particular group
of humans, etc. In the case of earthness, it includes every
earthen object.) Thus, as their reference in association with a
particular instance may not be known, a universal statement
that covers every particular instance where the attribute may
apply can reveal a hitherto unknown fact, making the universal
statement useful.

इह तु विश्वत्वं नाम नैको धर्मोऽस्ति, किन्तु विश्वशब्द: सर्वनामत्वात्तेन तेन रूपेण

घटपटादीनामुपस्थापक: |
Here though, there is no one attribute called "everythingness"
that pervades every single object of the world. Rather, as the
word "everything" is a pronoun, it includes the pot, cloth within
its ambit only as themselves individually. Thus, the pot is
included within the ambit of "everything" not because there is
a quality called "everythingness" that it possesses, rather it is
included within "everything" as a pot - because it possesses
"potness".
तेषु च प्रत्येकं सत्त्वं गृहीतमेवेति कथं नानुवादकत्वम् ; However, as each
such object's existence is already known (if it wasn't known, it
would not be included within the definition of "everything"),
there is nothing new in a shruti statement whose meaning is
interpreted as "everything is real". Therefore how can such a
statement not be a superfluous repetition?
प्रकारवैलक्षण्याभावात् | There is no object based difference that
is unknown.

***Second argument - the same statement can occur in two sub-branches of the
veda, but not be considered a repetition, why is a shruti statement about the world's
reality a repetition?***
नच - एक खास्थविधिवाक्यैकार्थ
खास्
शा थवि धि वाक्यैकार् थशा खान्तरस्थविधि वा
खान्तरस्थविधिवाक्यस्य क्यस् यशापुरुषान्तरं प्रतीव
येन पुंसा वादिविप्रतिपत्त्यादिना घटादिसत्ता प्रत्यक्षेण न निर्णीता तं प्रत्यर्थवत्त्वेन
नानुवादकत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The opponent argues - An injunction occurring in one branch of
the veda is not considered a repetition of the same injunction
occurring in another branch of the veda, because the two
injunctions are meant for two different people. Similarly, the
vedic statement of the world's reality is meaningful for the
person confused about the reality of the pot due to conflicting
arguments made by opposing debaters, and for whom it is not
certain that perception has revealed the reality of the pot.
Thus, the vedic statement of the world's reality is not a
repetition.
The siddhikAra rejects this saying:

एवं सत्यनुवादस्थलस्यैवाभावप्रसङ्गात् | If that is the case, there can

be no place for a repetition at all. There will always be
someone who does not know a particular fact, and as long as
such a person exists, a statement of that fact will not be a
repetition. This leads to the outcome that a superfluous
repetition is only possible if everyone knows everything.

नच सर्वाविवादस्थलमेवोदाहरणम् ; सर्वाविवादस्य निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वात् | Nor can it

be said that a repetition is only possible for facts that are
accepted by everyone, because there is no such fact that is
universally accepted. Even if it were so accepted, how can we
know that everyone accepts it? No conclusive determination
of universal acceptance is possible. Even if some such thing is
accepted by everyone today it may not be acceptable
yesterday or in the future.

What determines whether something is the original statement

(purovAda) in the veda and something else a repetition (anuvAda)?

पुरोवादपूर्वकत्वादनुवादस्यात्रायं पुरोवाद इत्यस्यैवाभावात् न

शाखान्तरस्थावाक्यस्यानुवादकत्वप्रसंग: | It cannot be said that sentences
occurring in one branch of the veda is a repetition of it
occurring in another branch, because no one branch of the
veda came before or after the other. Similarly, within one
branch of the veda itself, no one sentence can be said to be
occurring first.

***Third argument - a vedic statement about the world's reality cannot be a

repetition because ShankarAchArya's logic would be contradicted***
In the sambandha bhAShya (introduction) to the bRhadAraNyaka
upaniShad, ShankarAchArya establishes that perception does not
reveal that the self is different from the body - if perception
could reveal it, the materialist (chArvAka) who accepts the
validity of perception alone, would not hold that the body itself
is the self. Thus it follows that perception is incapable of
revealing that the self is different from the body, and this
establishes the ground for shruti to reveal this as fact.

The opponent cites this bhAShya to argue that the world's

reality cannot be revealed by perception, because if it was so
revealed, the advaitin who accepts the validity of perception,
would not claim the world is unreal. That being the case,
the veda, in claiming the world as real is not merely repeating
what is otherwise known through perception.

यत्तु - बृहादारण्यकभाष्ये देहभिन्नात्मबोधिकाया: 'अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्य' इत्यादिरुते :

तेश्रु
प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तानुवादित्वमाशङ्क्य वादिविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनादित्यादिना तत्परिहृतं ; तथाच
प्रत्यक्षसिद्धसत्त्वग्राहकत्वेऽपि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासार्थकत्वेन नानुवादकत्वं
प्रकृतेऽपीत्युक्तम् ; तदयुक्तम् ;
It is inappropriate to argue thus - In the bRhadAraNyaka bhAShya, it
was argued that the kaTha shruti "It is known as 'It exists'" is
not merely repeating a fact that is known through perception,
by citing the opposing view of opponents. That being so, even
if it were known through perception that the world is real, it
can be argued that the shruti's statement serves to repudiate
opposing views.
भाष्यार्थानवबोधात् | The meaning of the bhAShya has not been
understood.

तथाहि - तत्र वादिविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनेन देहाव्यतिरिक्तत्वेनात्मन: प्रत्यक्षतैव नास्ति | To

explain - there, by means of showing opposing views, it was
established that the self as different from the body, is not a
matter of direct perception.

अन्यथा प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण्यवादिनचार्वाकादेस्तत्र र्
वाकादेस्तत्रश्चा
विप्रतिपत्तिर्न स्यादित्युक्तम्, नतु
वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासेनास्तीत्यादेस्सार्थकत्वम्, अननुवादकत्वं वा | otherwise,
the chArvAka who accepts only perception as valid, would not
hold an opposing view. Therefore, the import of the bhAShya is
not in establishing that the purposefulness of the shruti lies in
refuting the opponent's views, nor is it in proving that the
shruti is not a mere repetition of a known fact.
That is, the import of the bhAShya is only to say that the fact
that the self is different from the body is not known by
perception - which is established by means of showing the
different views on the topic among various groups of
philosophers. It is not to ascribe meaningfulness to the shruti's
statement nor is it in proving the absence of repetition in
the shruti statement.

तथाचोक्तं तत्रैव - "तस्माज्जन्मान्तरसंबन्ध्यात्मास्तित्वे

षोपाये च शास्त्रं प्रवर्तत" इति | This
जन्मान्तरेष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारवि षोपायेशे
has been said so in the bhAShya itself - "Therefore, scripture's
aim is to establish the existence of a soul which has multiple
births, to prescribe the means for obtaining desirable ends,
and to reveal that which is to be avoided for avoiding
undesirable ends in the life after."

The purpose of the bhAShya is not to save shruti from the

charge of repetition, but to establish that perception cannot
reveal the existence of a self different from the body.

***Fourth argument - shruti is revealing that the world is ultimately real, a fact
which is hitherto unknown.***

The opponent wishes to argue that the reality known through

perception is empirical (vyAvahArika), whereas shruti serves to
prove that the world's reality is ultimate (pAramArthika). Thus
shruti is not merely repeating perception.

To prove this, he takes the example of

the chAturmAsya sacrifice. The ritual consists of four parvas,
parts - वैश्वदेव, वरुणप्रघास, साकमेध, शुनासीरीय. There is a standard
methodology for agni praNayanam, the ritualistic transportation of
the sacrificial fire, common to all soma sacrifices. However,
the two central parva-s in the chAturmAsya are said to have a
different methodology for agni praNayanam on the basis that the
vedic injunction द्वयो: प्रणयन्ति prescribes this special agni
praNayanam for the two middle parva-s only because it occurs in
the context of those two parva-s and not the other two.

The opponent says:

ननु - चातुर्मास्यमध्यपवर्णो: 'द्वयो: प्रणयन्ती'ति वाक्यस्य
चोदकप्राप्ताग्निप्रणयनव्यतिरिक्ताग्निप्रणयनविधायकत्ववत्
प्र
त्यक्ष
प् रा
प्तव्यावहारिकसत्त्वविलक्ष णत् रि
कालनिषे
धाप्र
तियोगिवरू पसत्वप्र
मापकत्वं प्रकृतेऽस्त्विति - चेन्न;

चतुर्मास्यमध्यपवर्णो: 'द्वयो: प्रणयन्ती'ति वाक्यस्य

चोदकप्राप्ताग्निप्रणयनव्यतिरिक्ताग्निप्रणयनविधायकत्ववत् Like in the instance of the
injunction "the fire is brought in the two", which is interpreted
to mean that a special method of bringing the fire is to be used
in the two middle parva-s of the chAturmAsya sacrifice, which is
different from the common method of bringing the fire,

प्र
त्यक्ष
प् रा
प्तव्यावहारिकसत्त्वविलक्ष
णत् रि
कालनिषे
धाप्र
तियोगित्वरू पसत्वप्र
मापकत्वं प्रकृतेऽस्त्विति Let it be so that in the present context,
vedic sentences speaking of the world's reality ascribe a
reality that is unsublated in three periods of time, which is
different from the empirical reality revealed by perception.

The siddhikAra responds:

- इति चेन्न; If this is your argument no.

ति वि
त्रैकालिकसत्त्वनिषेधकरुतिविरोधेन रोधेनश्रुविश्वसत्यत्वश्रुतेस्त्रैकालिकसत्त्वपरत्वाभावात् |
Because if the meaning of the shruti was interpreted thus, it
would run contrary to other portions of the shruti (e.g. neha nAnAsti
kinchana, udaramantaram kurute, etc) which negate the world in all
three periods of time. Therefore the import of the shruti which
talks of the world's reality cannot be in revealing its ultimate
reality in all three periods of time.

The siddhikAra says:

नच - वैपरीत्यमेव किं न स्यात् ? विनिगमकाभावादिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued
thus - "Why cannot the opposite be true (that is, the shruti that
talks of the reality of the world is true, and that which talks of
the world's unreality is false) ? For, there is no basis to
determine that only the one is correct and the other is not."

तात्पर्यान्यथानुपपत्तिगतिसामान्यामेव विनिगमकत्वात् | There are ways to

determine which takes precedence, namely:
1) the one which reveals the true import of shruti 2) the
incorrectness of the one which would lead to irreconcilable
problems 3) that which has been supported by multiple shruti-
s

ति र्
हि
अद्वैतरुतिर्हि श्रुषड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेता | The six primary marks of import
are all present only in the shruti that teaches of the ultimate
oneness of reality.

In an analysis that is quite unique to the advaita

siddhi, MadhusUdana sarasvatI classifies the six marks of import
into two categories - a triad that pertain to the idea/meaning
being conveyed (artha niShTha) and a triad pertaining to the
manner in which it is being conveyed (shabda niShTha).

The nature of the validity is said to possess three

characteristics - 1) the object it reveals must be ajnAta,
unknown. 2) It must not be abAdhita, contradicted. 3) It must
be prayojanavat, have utility.

तत्र त्रिविधं तात्पर्यलिङ्गं

प्रामाण्यशरीरघटकमर्थनिष्ठमज्ञातत्वमबाधितत्वं प्रयोजनवत्वं च | Three of
the indicatory marks of import are central to the nature of the
validity of a pramANa and directly speak to the idea / meaning
that is being conveyed by shruti by establishing that 1) the
idea revealed is ajnAta, unknown. 2) is abAdhita, contradicted. 3)
is prayojanavat, has utility.

श्चे|
त्रिविधं तु शब्दनिष्ठमतिप्रसङ्गवारकमुपक्रमोपसंहारयोरैकरूप्यं अभ्यास: अर्थवादचेतिति
Whereas the remaining three are necessary to exclude
extraneous matters not central to the import of the shruti in
question, by describing the manner in which the idea is
conveyed - they are:
1) upakrama / upasamhAra - if the opening and concluding passages
of a particular section in question speak of the same idea, then
it is clear that that idea is the import of that shruti section.
2) abhyAsa - if the same message is repeated multiple times
within the same section, that too indicates that that message
is the import.
3) arthavAda - if a story is used to convey the importance of the
message, one can gather that the message is the import.
तत्र शब्दनिष्ठलिङ्गत्रये तावन्न विवाद:, सर्वासामेवोपनिषदामेवं प्रवृत्तत्वात् |
There can be no argument that the triad corresponding to the
manner in which an idea is conveyed is present in
the shruti sections that talk of advaita - for these are present in
that manner in every upaniShad.

मानान्तरासिद्धतया मोक्षहेतुज्ञानविषयतया च अज्ञातत्वम् सप्रयोजनत्वं च निर्विवादमेव |

Moreover, that the object is unknown and that it has utility is
not in doubt, for advaita is not known through any other means
of knowledge, and its cognition is the direct cause of
liberation.

अबाधितत्वमात्रं सन्दिग्धम् | There can only be some doubt in

relation to whether such a cognition is contradicted.

तच्चान्यथानुपपत्तिगतिसामान्याभ्यां च निर्णीयते | This can be clarified by

the untenability of an alternative explanation and by the unity
in the message of the upaniShad-s.

To explain:
नहि सर्वप्रपञ्चनिषेधरूपमद्वैतम् व्यावहारिकम्, येन तत्र श्रुतेर्व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यं
स्यात् ; अतस्तत्र तात्त्विकमेव प्रामाण्यम्, द्वैतसत्यत्वं तु व्यावहारिकम्; अतस्तत्र न
श्रुतेस्तात्त्विकं प्रामाण्यम्;
Advaita, which by definition is only possible when the entire
world has been negated, cannot be empirical (for there is
nothing to transact with). If it was empirical, one could
possible argue that the shruti that conveys advaita has
empirical validity. Therefore it must follow that that shruti can
only have absolute validity. Whereas there is a benefit from
considering the empirical reality of the world for day to day
transactions. Therefore, there is no need to claim the absolute
validity of the shruti that conveys the duality of the world.

If advaita shruti is not absolutely valid, it leads to the outcome

that it has no validity at all. It cannot have empirical validity,
because the validity of advaita shruti empirically is an
impossibility, when we encounter a real world in day to day
transactions. However, all shruti must have some validity -
whether empirical or ultimate. Therefore, when all other
alternatives have been exhausted, what remains must be the
truth - advaita shruti has ultimate validity.

परस्परविरुद्धयोर्द्वयोस्तात्त्विकत्वायोगात्, वस्तुनि च विकल्पासंभवात्,

Only one of two contradictory outcomes can be absolutely
valid, for there can be no choice in the nature of a thing.

तात्त्विकव्यावहारिकप्रामाण्यभेदेन च व्यवस्थोपपत्ते: अतत्परत्वेनावधारितस्य

विश्वसत्यत्ववाक्यस्यैवान्यथा व्याख्यातुमुचितत्वात् |
Because it is possible to accommodate one as empirically
valid, and the other as ultimately valid, it is appropriate to
reinterpret the shruti which speaks of the reality of the world
in a different manner, for conveying such a reality is not the
import of shruti.

How is it possible to reinterpret the statement "vishvam satyam",

the world is real? The words in the sentence are
in sAmAnAdhikaraNyam, that is, their case endings are the same.

तथा हि - चतुर्धा हि सामानाधिकरण्यम् ; अध्यासे 'इदं रजत' मित्यादौ, बाधायां 'स्थाणु:

पुमानि'त्येवमादौ विशेषणविशेष्यभावे 'नीलमुत्पल' मित्यादौ अभेदे 'तत्त्वमसी'त्येवमादौ
|
Grammatically, there are four possible kinds
of sAmAnAdhikaraNyam:
1) in the case of superimposition, such as "idam rajatam" "this (is)
silver"
2) in the case of sublation, "sthANu: pumAn" "the pillar is a
person"
3) in the case of adjective and noun, "blue lotus"
4) identity "you are that".

अत्र च बाधायामध्यासे वा सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्तेर्न सत्यत्वबोधकरुते :

तेश्रु
षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेताद्वैतश्रुतिबाधकत्वम् | If the shruti spoke of the reality (of
the world) as a sublation or superimposition, such a sentence
is incapable of overruling the shruti conveying advaita, which
has been established as the import of shruti by way of the six
indicatory marks of import.

The opponent tries to refute this:

ननु - आत्मन आनन्दत्वबोधिका श्रुतिरपि 'सुखं सुप्तोऽस्मी'ति
 तिवद्भवेत्
साक्षिप्रत्यक्षसिद्धानन्दानुवादिनी सत्त्वरुतिवद्भवेत् श्रु- इति चेन्न;
"(By extension then), the shruti which reveals the nature of the
self as bliss, like the shruti that reveals the world as real, is
also a repetition of the common experience "I slept well",
which is a matter of direct perception by the inner witness,
the sAkshi".

The siddhikAra says no.

साक्षिण उपहितानन्दविषयत्वेन श्रुतेश्च निरुपाधिकानन्दविषयत्वेन

भिन्नविषयत्वादनुवादत्वायोगात् | The experience by the inner witness
during deep sleep is of bliss conditioned by the adjunct
(ignorance), whereas, the bliss of the self revealed by
the shruti is unconditioned by any adjuncts. As their subject
matter is different, shruti cannot be a repetition.

तदा हि स्वरूपानन्दो गृह्यते | स्वरूपं चाज्ञानोपहितमेव साक्षिविषय: | The bliss that

is the nature of oneself is experienced, but it one conditioned
by ignorance.

***Fifth argument - shruti, by confirming the reality of the world already known, is
strengthening the conviction of the world's reality.***

ननु - 'तत्त्वमसी'त्यादौ नवकृ त्वोऽभ्यासवत् पिपासितस्य

जलगोचरप्रमाणसंप्लववद्वैक्ये षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गवद्भावरूपाज्ञाने प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे 'तम
ति र्
दा र्ढ्
या र्
था
आसी'दित्यादिश्रुतिवत् सत्त्वरुतिर्दार्ढ्यार्था श्रु- इति चेन्न ;
The opponent argues: The shruti that conveys the reality of the
world is to strengthen the conviction in the world's reality (and
not a repetition to be dismissed), like
1) The nine-fold repetition of the statement "That Thou Art" in
the ChAndogya upaniShad
2) A thirsty person seeking to confirm whether his vision of
water is indeed real
3) The six-fold indicatory marks of import
4) Despite the direct experience of an ignorance which is of
the nature of a positive entity, the nAsadIya sUkta confirms this
with the statement "There was darkness"

The siddhikAra responds: If this is the argument, no.

षवि
अ षवि
शे शे
षग्राहितप्रत्यक्षप्राप्ते तद्दार्ढ्यार्थमन्यानपेक्षणात् | When
षग्राहितप्रत्यक्षप्राप्तेशे
perception reveals the object with all its features directly,
there is no need to take reinforce it with an indirect means of
knowledge which only reveals the object partially.
पिपासितस्य शब्दलिङ्गानन्तरं जले प्रत्यक्षमपेक्षितम्, न तु प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं
शब्दलिङ्गे | all kinds of specificity being revealed by perception,
there is no reason to strengthen this with another means of
knowledge. A thirsty man, after inferring the presence of
water, will seek to confirm by directly seeing it. Once someone
has already seen water directly, there is no need to strengthen
it further with inference and verbal testimony.

नच - तर्हि 'तम आसी'दित्यादे: न किञ्चिदवेषिदमिति प्रत्यक्षसिद्धाज्ञान दार्ढ्यार्थत्वं न

स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be insisted thus - "If that is so, it must be admitted
that the shruti statement 'There was darkness' does not have
validity because it does not reinforce the experience of
ignorance in the cognition 'I do not know anything' ".

'तम आसी' दित्यस्य सृष्टिपूर्वकालसंबन्धित्वेनाज्ञानग्राहितया

सुषुप्तिकालसंबन्धित्वेनाज्ञानग्राहकं प्रत्यक्षमपेक्ष्य भिन्नविषयत्वेनैव
प्रामाण्यसंभवात् | The shruti, in saying "There was darkness" is
revealing the presence of ignorance before creation, whereas
the experience of ignorance in deep sleep is revealing the
presence of ignorance in sleep, therefore their subject matter
being different, shruti still has validity.
Agama bAdhoddhAra: (part 2)
***Sixth argument of the opponent - shruti talking of the reality of the world is a
case of pratiprasava***
In pUrvamImAmsa, there is a category of statements
called pratiprasava. The vidhi is an injunction (something ought
to be done), the niShedha is a prohibition (something is
forbidden). The pratiprasava is a negation of negation.

There is a shruti which mentions that a goat has 26 ribs,

षड्विंशतिरस्य वङ्क्रय:. In another mantra, the 34 ribs of the horse are
talked about, चतुस्त्रिंशद्वाजिनो देवबन्धो (RV 1.162.18). In
the ashvamedha sacrifice, which involves the sacrifice of the
horse, a question arises. Should the mantra referring to the ribs
of the goat be used, or the one referring to the horse? Here it
is determined that despite one thinking that
the mantra referring to the horse ought to be used, it is the one
referring to the goat that should be used instead - न चतुस्त्रिंशति इति
ब्रूयात् षड्विंशतिरित्येव ब्रूयात्.

This is an example of pratiprasava, an exception to an exception,

or a suspension of a prohibition. The opponent argues that the
reality of the world that is known by perception, may be
circumstantially refuted by the shruti talking of its mithyAtva, but
that is subsequently reinstated by another shruti revealing its
reality. This is the basic argument of the opponent.

He says:
ननु - 'षड्विंशतिरस्य वङ्क्रय:' इति मन्त्रस्याश्वमेधे चोदकप्राप्तस्य 'चतुस्त्रिंशद्वाजिनो देवबन्धो' रिति
वैशेषिकमन्त्रेणापोदितस्य षड्विंशतिरित्येव ब्रूयादिति वचनवत् प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तजगत्सत्त्वस्य
मिथ्यात्वश्रुत्यापाततोऽपोदितस्य प्रतिप्रसवार्थं सत्त्वरुतिति : - इति चेन्न;
श्रु
The mantra "Twenty-six are its ribs" is the mantra that is to be
used in the ashvamedha, on the basis of the injunction. Despite
the mantra "Thirty-four ribs of the swift charger, kin of the
gods" being specifically applicable in the ashvamedha, it is
superseded by the statement "Use the mantra 'twenty six are
the ribs' itself". Similarly, as the reality of the world based on
perception would otherwise be negated by the mithyAtva of the
world revealed by shruti, the purpose of the shruti talking of the
world's reality is as a pratiprasava, to reinstate what it had
denied previously.

The siddhikAra says - no.

मिथ्यात्वश्रुते: प्रत्यक्षबाधकत्वाभ्युपगमे तस्या: बलवत्त्वेन तद्विरोधात्

तेरन् यपरत्वाद्
देवता धिकरण्
यन्याया
सत्यत्वरुतेरन्यपरत्वाद्देवताधिकरण्यन्यायासंभवाच्च संभवा च्
चश्रुप्रतिप्रसवार्थत्वस्य
वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् | It is not possible to say that shruti statements
talking of the world's reality
are pratiprasava, because shruti being stronger than perception,
the mithyAtva shruti is capable of overruling perception. Such
a shruti which is revealing a matter of import is incapable of
being superseded by another shruti which happens to be
weaker, as its meaning is actually something else. The logic of
the devatAdhikaraNA is not applicable.

In the devatAdhikaraNa of the brahma sUtra, it is argued that some

eulogies (arthavAda) in the veda can be factually true. There is
a sloka that describes three kinds of arthavAda - विरोधे गुणवादः स्यात्
अनुवादोऽवधारिते । भूतार्थवादस्तद्धानात् अर्थवादस्त्रिधा मतः ॥ - one
is guNavAda, which is contradicted by some other means of
knowledge, another is anuvAda, which is a restatement of that
which is already known, and the third is bhUtArthavAda, which is
neither supported nor refuted by other means of knowledge -
the last category must be taken as being factually true.

The siddhikAra says that one cannot invoke the devatAdhikaraNa

nyAya, because there are several shruti statements that
contradict the shruti statement talking of the world's reality.

***Seventh argument of the opponent - A shruti statement can be considered a

repetition if it is a restatement of something valid ***
ननु - सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्ये तेनैव मिथ्यात्वश्रुत्यनुमानादिबाध:, तदप्रामाण्ये ने
तेरनु वा
तेन सत्त्वरुतेरनुवादकत्वम् दकत्वम् श्रु - इति चेन्न; The opponent says - if the
reality conveyed by perception is valid, that will
overrule mithyAtva shruti and inference. If it is not valid, then
the shruti which conveys the world's reality cannot be
considered as a repetition.

The siddhikAra says, no.

प्रत्यक्षाप्रामाण्येऽपि तत्सिद्धबोधकस्यानुवादकत्वसंभवात् | Even if
perception is invalid, a repetition of what it reveals (existence)
can be an anuvAda. anuvAda is a repetition of that which is
known, not a repetition that which is known as valid.

द्
बोधोक्
तवमा त्रम्
नहि प्रमितप्रमापकत्वमनुवादकत्वम्, किन्तु पचाद्बोधोक्तवमात्रम् |A
श्चा
repetition of a thing revealed by valid knowledge is not anuvAda.
Rather, it is the subsequent repetition of a thing already
known.

त्
त्
पचात्त्वंवंच प्रमाणावधिकमप्रमाणावधिकं चेति न कश्चिद्विशेष: | Being
श्चा
'subsequent' can mean revealing that which is known by either
a valid, or an invalid means of knowledge.

नच - श्रुते: सर्वसिद्धप्रमाणभावाया: सदर्थत्वायानानुवादकत्वाय च

प्रत्यक्षाप्राप्ततात्त्विकसत्त्वविषयत्वमवयम्म् श्य
वक्तव्यं, तथाचाप्रमाणेन
प्रत्यक्षेण कथं श्रुतेरनुवादकत्वमिति - वाच्यं ;
Nor can it be argued thus - Everything that the shruti reveals is
true. Therefore, in order for what is revealed to be true, and
not a mere repetition, it must be accepted that the veda
reveals the ultimate reality of the world, not otherwise known
through perception. That being the case, how can it be held
that the shruti is repeating perception which is not a valid
means of knowledge (in this case)?

सत्त्वांशस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वेऽपि वाक्यार्थस्य क्रियादिसमभिव्याहारसिद्धस्यापूर्वत्वेन

तिवि रुद्
धता
तद्विषयतयैवाननुवादकत्वोपपत्तावद्वैतरुतिविरुद्धतात्त्विकस त्त्वि कसश्रु
त्त्वविषयत्वकल्पनायास्तदर्थमयोगात् | Even though the existence of a
sentence is known through perception, as the relationship
between its words is not known previously, the sentence
meaning can be unknown, and in that respect, it is held that a
particular sentence is non-repetitive. That being the case, the
notion of the absolute reality of the world being revealed by
the shruti is in direct contradiction with that shruti which
reveals advaita. This cannot prove that (whatever it reveals is
true and not a repetition).

तीनां
परमार्थसद्विषयता तु सर्वरुतीनां श्रुशुद्धब्रह्मतात्पर्यकत्वेनैव | The import of all
shruti-s lies in stating that ultimate reality is in Pure Brahman
alone.
अवान्तरतात्पर्यमादाय व्यावहारिकसद्विषयतेति कर्मकाण्डप्रामाण्योपपादने वक्ष्यते | We will
say that the ritualistic portions of the veda have a secondary
import, and their validity is on the basis of their objects having
empirical validity.

***Eighth argument of the opponent - Perception reveals a reality only with the
blessing of the veda. Thus vedas are not a repeat of perception.***
नच - प्रत्यक्षं स्वप्रामाण्यनिर्णयार्थं श्रुतिसंवादमपक्षेत इति न तेन श्रुतेरनुवादकत्वम् ;
अन्यथा 'सत्यं ज्ञानं' 'नेह नाने'त्यादिरुत्रप्यनुवादिनी
त्रप् यनु वा दि नी श्रुस्यात्, ब्रह्मसत्त्वस्य
लोकतो भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वेन लिङ्गेन च मिथ्यात्वस्य दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानेनावेदमूलप्रवाहानादिविज्ञानवादादिना
च प्राप्तेरिति,- वाच्यं;

Nor can it be argued thus -

"Perception is dependent upon the vedas for its own validity,
thus shruti is not a repetition of perception.
Otherwise, vedic sentences such as "Existence,
Consciousness" and "There is no multiplicity here" would end
up being mere repetition. That Brahman is Existence is known
in the world, as the substratum for illusions, and
the mithyAtva of the world is known using inferences based on
knowability, and through the works of vijnAnavAdin buddhists,
who are outside vedic fold and argue that the universe is
based on a beginningless series of illusions."

यदि दृष्टेऽप्यर्थे प्रत्यक्षं स्वप्रामाण्यनिर्णयाय श्रुतिसंवादमपेक्षेत तदा श्रुतिसंवादविरहिणि दृष्टे

कु त्रापि निश्शङ्कप्रवृत्ति: न स्यात् | If the perception of things necessarily
requires the support of veda for its validity, then it is
impossible to have any certainty about the perception /
experience of anything not mentioned in the veda.

न स्याच्चैवम'ग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज'मित्याद्यपि अनुवादकम् | By this logic, even

vedic statements accepted as mere repetitions, such as "heat
is the opposite of cold" would not be a repetition.

नचेष्टापत्ति:, मानान्तरगृहीतप्रमाणभावप्रत्यक्षनिर्णीते मानान्तरस्याननुवादकत्वे

जगत्यनुवादकत्वकथोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् | Nor is that desirable, because if
the determination of the validity of perception requires the
support of some other means of knowledge, and as a result
such a means of knowledge is not a repetition, the idea of
some sentences being repetitions itself is an impossibility.
नच 'सत्यं ज्ञानं' 'नेह नाने'त्यादेरप्यनुवादकतापत्ति:, अनुवादकता हि न तावत्
प्रत्यक्षेण; ब्रह्मत्वसामानाधिकरण्येन सत्त्वादिकं ह्यनेन प्रतिपादनीयम्, तच्च
न प्रत्यक्षगम्यम् |
Nor can statements such as "Existence, Consciousness" and
"There is no multiplicity here" end being repetitions. The
former is not a repetition as a result of perceptive knowledge,
for perception does not reveal that Existence is colocated with
Brahman-hood.

नाप्यनुमानेन; नहि तर्क:, सर्वदेशकालीनपुरुषसाधारण इत्यादिना प्रागेव निराकृ तत्वात् |

Nor is it knowable by inference or logical reasoning. That It
(Brahman being Existence, Consciousness etc) is something
that is commonly accepted by everyone has been refuted
already.

नापि प्रवाहानादिविज्ञानवादिमतेन;
त्
यवधि कपू
र्वत्
वाभावा
तस्यापौरुषेयरुत्यवधिकपूर्वत्वाभावात् श्रु| Nor is shruti repeating
त्
the vijnAnavAda system of beginningless sequence of
cognitions, for such a system cannot precede the shruti which
is the work of no individual.

***Ninth argument of the opponent - shruti is not a repetition because it reveals

that the world is real independent of perception***
नच - सत्त्वरुते : सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षानपेक्षत्वात् न सापेक्षानुवादकत्वम्,
तेश्रु
निरपेक्षानुवादकत्वं तु धारावाहनवन्नाप्रामाण्यहेतु:, उक्तं हि नयविवेके - 'सापेक्षानुवादे हि न
प्रमिति:, नतु दैवानुवादे, धारावाहनवदिति' इति वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus:
"shruti reveals the reality of the world independently of
perception, thus it is not a case of dependent repetition. An
independent repetition, like the sequence of cognitions
involved in perception cannot be a cause for the invalidation of
the revealed object. As has been stated in
the mImAmsa work, nayaviveka (by bhavanAtha miSra) - A dependent
repetition is not a valid means of knowledge, however, an
incidental repetition is not invalid, like the sequence of
cognitions".

यतो लाघवादनुवादकत्वमेवाप्रामाण्ये प्रयोजकम्, नतु सापेक्षानुवादकत्वम्; Because,

applying the principle of parsimony, it is repetition that implies
the invalidity of the cognition, not dependent repetition.

The dependence of one means of knowledge on the other, does

not determine its status as a valid means of knowledge, rather,
it is whether it reveals something that is already known to the
knower.

अनधिगतार्थबोधकत्वस्य प्रामाण्यघटकस्य तावतैव गतार्थत्वात् |

A means of knowledge can be considered a valid means of
knowledge, only to the extent it reveals that which is not
already known.
नच तर्हि धारावाहनबुद्धावप्रामाण्यम् ; तस्या: वर्तमानार्थग्राहकत्वेन
ष्
टग् रा
तत्तत्क्षणवि ष्टग्राहकतया हकतया शि
अनुवादकत्वाभावात् किन्तु श्रुतेरतत्परत्वे
प्राप्तत्वमात्रमेव प्रयोजकम्; But that does not mean that a
sequence of perceptive cognitions is invalidated, because
each instance of the cognition reveals the existence of the
object in that present instant, and therefore the object
revealed is qualified by that instant of time. As that changes
with each instant, the successive cognition of the same object
is not a repetition. Therefore, if something already known is
mentioned by shruti, it follows that the import of the shruti is
not in revealing that thing.
अन्यथा वैफल्येन स्वाध्यायविधिग्रहणानुपपत्ते: | Otherwise, the
statement to study one's own branch of the veda would be
rendered unfruitful.

It will raise a question on whether commonly occurring

statements in different branches of the vedas are a dependent
or independent repetitions, leading to the loss of validity of
one's own branch. The injunction is made because each
branch of the veda is held to reveal a complete, useful body of
information. If each branch's validity is not upheld
independently, then the injunction to study one's own branch
of the veda would fruitless.

ति
अपिचेयं सत्त्वरुतिरपि रपि श्रुसत्त्वप्रत्यक्षसापेक्षत्वात् सापेक्षानुवादिन्येव |
Moreover, as the shruti that reveals reality depends on the
perception of reality, it too is dependent, making it a case of
dependent repetition.
नहि सत्त्वप्रत्यक्षं विना तन्मूलशक्त्यादिग्रहमूलकशब्दप्रवृत्तिसंभव: |
Without the perception of reality, the cognition of word
meaning, and the usage of language to communicate itself
would not be possible.

That is, without actually seeing the object referred to by a

word, it is not possible to know that this particular word
corresponds to that object. Without revealing shakti, the direct
connotation between word and meaning, verbal testimony
cannot be considered a valid means of knowledge.

अतएव यत्र तु प्रमाणान्तरसंवादस्तत्र प्रमाणान्तरादिवार्थवादादपि सोऽर्थ:

प्रसिध्यति द्वयो: परस्परानपेक्षयो: प्रत्यक्षानुमानयोरिवैकार्थप्रवृत्ते:,
प्रमात्रपेक्षया त्वनुवादकत्वम् |
Therefore, just like where two means of knowledge agree with
each other, it does not mean that one of them is automatically
invalid, an arthavAda may also reveal the same meaning and if
someone does not know it, for them it is a valid means of
knowledge. Inference and perception may reveal the same
meaning without depending on each other. Whether something
is a repetition or not thus depends on the knowledge of the
knower.
प्रमाता ह्यव्युत्पन्न: प्रथमं प्रत्यक्षादिभ्यो यथा अर्थमवगच्छति, न तथाऽऽम्नायत: |
The understanding gained by a person perceiving something
for the first time, is not the same as someone who hears a
word for the first time without knowing what object it
corresponds to.

तत्र व्युत्पत्त्येपक्ष्त्वादिति वाचस्पतिमतमप्येतमर्थं संवादयति, तेनाम्नायस्य व्युत्पत्त्यपेक्षत्वेन

प्रत्यक्षसापेक्षत्वस्यैवोक्ते: | Therefore, vAcaspati miSra argues
that verbal testimony is dependent on the knowledge of the
connection between word and meaning. Hence it was said that
even the veda ends up becoming dependent on perception,
because of its dependence on the knowledge of word-meaning
connection.

***Tenth argument of the opponent - shruti is not a repetition because it serves a

particular purpose***

नच - वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासप्रयोजनकत्वेन न निष्प्रयोजनानुवादकत्वं, सप्रयोजनानुवादकत्वं तु न

स्वार्थपरत्वविरोधि:;
Nor can it be argued thus: "The veda mentions that the world
is real to remove the doubt created by the opponent, and thus
that repetition is not without use. A repetition that serves a
purpose is not inimical to the direct import of its words.

This is further illustrated using a pUrvamImAmsa principle.

In darshapUrNamAsa sacrifices, which comprise 6 sacrifices in

total, 3 corresponding to the full moon, and 3 to the new moon.
There is a vedic injunction - दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्याम् स्वर्गकामो यजेत - "the one
interested in heaven, must perform
the darsha and pUrNamAsa sacrifices". The case ending is
indicative of two sacrifices to be performed. Here a dual
number is referred to, but it is not two sacrifices, but a pair
comprising three sacrifices each.

There is another vedic sentence - य एवं विद्वान् पौर्णमासी यजते य एवं

विद्वान् अमावास्यां यजते - "the wise one who performs
the paurNamAsa sacrifice, the one who performs
the amAvAsya sacrifice" - which refers to each sacrifice in the
singular. This is a repetition, but according to pUrvamImAmsa, the
repetition is not without use, for it is used to indicate that
each sacrifice refers to a group of three, and the two together
is a justification for the use of the dual number in the other
injunction.

The opponent argues:

विद्वद्वाक्ये समुदायद्वित्वापादनरूपप्रयोजनवत्त्वेनानुवाद्यस्वार्थपरताया दृष्टत्वात्,
In the sentence referring to the wise person, the repetition is
justified on the grounds of having the purpose of indicating two
groups of sacrifices, and therefore such a repetition does
result in its meaning having import.

अत एव तत्र वाक्यैक्वाक्यतोक्ता; thus the two sentences even though

physically separate, should be seen as one and interpreted to
yield a coherent meaning. This is a case of vAkyaikya vAkyatA.

अन्यथा अर्थवादवत् पदैक्यवाक्यतैव स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;

If that is not accepted, like any other eulogy, the second
sentence would have to be reduced to one word (praise or
censure).

The idea of multiple sentences having unitary meaning has

been explored extensively in pUrvamImAmsa, which argues
that ekavAkyatA is of two types
- padaikyavAkyatA and vAkyaikyavAkyatA. padaikavAkyatA where whole
sentences are boiled down to a word such as praise or
censure, to indicate that the group of sentences together
serves as praise for an injunction or as censure that justify a
prohibition. vAkyaikyavAkyatA where two sentences, even if they
were to give a meaning on their own, but when when come
together, serve to complete the other and give a unitary
meaning.

The siddhikAra says - Do not argue so, because:

प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासरूपप्रयोजनवत्त्वेन प्रमाणान्तरस्य सप्रयोजनतया
स्वार्थपरत्वोक्तौ 'अग्निर्हिमस्य भेषज' मित्याद्यपि तेनैव प्रयोजनेन
सप्रयोजनं, स्वार्थपरं च स्यात् | If it is argued that even something
known through perception can have import in its direct
meaning if so happens to have the purpose of removing doubts,
then even obviously repetitive statements such as "heat is the
remedy for cold" will end as not being repetitions and it could
be argued that the veda's purpose is in stating obviously
superfluous things.

तथाच न प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे वादिविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासार्थमन्यापेक्षा, दृष्टान्ते तु समुदायानुवादेन

द्वित्वसम्पादनस्योद्देश्यस्यान्यतो लब्धुमशक्यतया तेन प्रयोजनेन स्वार्थपरत्वस्य वक्तुं
शक्यत्वात् | That which is already known by perception, does not
require some other means of knowledge to dispel a doubt
created by an opponent; however, in the example, the
repetition is made with the aim of ensuring the validity of the
dual usage in the primary injunction, which would otherwise
not be possible. Thus in that case it is possible to say that the
repetition has import and is justified.

एतदभिप्रायं च पूर्वोक्तं नयविवेकवाक्यम् | This is the intended meaning of

the previously stated sentence from the nayaviveka.

नच - अनुवादत्वेऽपि नैष्फल्यमात्रम्, नत्वप्रामाण्यम् याथार्थ्यमेव प्रामाण्यं, नत्वनधिगतार्थत्वे

सति याथार्थ्यमिति - वाच्यम्;
Nor can it be argued thus - "Even it was a repetition, all it
means is that will not yield a result, not that it is invalid - for
validity arises from stating facts, and not that it reveals that
which is unknown otherwise." - because:

तात्पर्यविषये शब्द: प्रमाणम् 'यत्पर: शब्द: स शब्दार्थ' इत्यभियुक्ताभ्युपगमात्,

अन्यथा स्वाध्यायविधिग्रहणानुपपत्तेरुक्तत्वाच्च | The validity of the
spoken word is in stating its import, based on the statement
(from the shAbara bhAshya), "the meaning of shruti lies in its
import." Otherwise the injunction to study one's own branch of
the veda would be rendered meaningless.

नह्यन्यत:सिद्धेऽर्थे शास्त्रतात्पर्यम्, अतो न तत्र प्रामाण्यम् | The import of

scripture cannot be in revealing something that is known
otherwise, thus its validity is not in such statements.

यदाहुर्भट्टाचार्या: - 'अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थव' दिति | As has been said by kumArila

bhaTTa - "Scripture's purpose is in revealing the unknown."

ननु - अयमनुवाद: न 'वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवते'त्यादिवत् स्तुत्यर्थ:, न वा 'दध्ना

जुहोती'त्यादिवदन्यविधानार्थ:, अनुवाद्यत्वेऽप्यन्यविधानाय प्रमाणानूदितस्य
तात्तिविकत्वनियमात्, नहि 'व्रीहीन्प्रोक्षती' त्यादावारोपितव्रीह्यादेर्धी:,
अनुवाद्यस्यासत्त्वे ह्याश्रयासिद्धौ धर्मधर्मिसंसर्गरूपानुमितिवेद्य
इवानुवाद्यविधेयसंसर्गरूपवाक्यार्थो बाधित: स्यात् -
The opponent argues - "This repetition is not for the purpose
of praise, like the statement "vAyu (wind) is verily a deity with
speed" (used to indicate that the one who
propitiates vAyu through the sacrifice can attain their desired
result quickly. Nor is it used to prescribe something else, like
the statement "offer curd in a sacrifice", for a repetition by a
valid means of knowledge to reveal something else must
necessarily reveal a real thing. The statement "sprinkle paddy"
does not advocate the sprinkling of an unreal entity. If the
object of a repetition is unreal, then the reference to it will
suffer from the defect of AshrayAsiddhi. If the paksha in an
inference is absent, then no inference between
the paksha and sAdhya is possible, similarly if the object of a
repetition is unreal, a prescription with regard to it stands
contradicted.
The siddhikAra responds:

इति चेन्न; अस्यानुवादस्याप्राप्तान्यप्राप्त्यर्थत्वात् |

If this is the argument, no. The meaning of this particular
repetition is to reveal something else that is unknown. It is to
reveal that Indra's actions will happen without obstruction.

नच प्रमाणानूदितस्य तात्त्विकत्वनियम:, स्वप्नाध्याये, शुक्तौ 'नेदं रजत' मिति वाक्ये

च व्यभिचारात् | There is no rule that every object of a valid means of
knowledge must be necessarily be real. That rule breaks down
in the case of the scripture related to the interpretation of
dreams and the statement in relation to the shell, "this is not
silver" - the objects of both are not real.

अथ तत्र ज्ञानविषयतया निषेध्यतया चानुवाद इति न तात्त्विकत्वं, In each case,

the invocation of an unreal entity is done as the object of a
cognition, and with the purpose of negation, respectively.

तर्हि प्रकृतेऽपि 'नेह नाने' ति निषेधार्थत्वादस्यानुवादस्य न तात्त्विकत्वमिति ग्रहाण |

Similarly, as the world has been invoked in the present context
with a view to negate it in statements such as "there is no
multiplicity here", one must gather that reality to the world is
not conferred merely by a reference to it.

अतएव न वाक्यार्थस्यासत्त्वप्रसङ्ग:, तात्पर्यविषयस्य सत्त्वात् Thus the meaning

of the sentence is not in an unreal thing, because the sentence
of import. is referring to the non dual existence of Brahman, an
absolutely real entity.

अथ - 'किञ्चने' त्यनेनैवानुवादस्य कृ तत्वात् किमधिके नेति - चेन्न; Therefore the

following is refuted - "Having achieved the desired result by
denying 'whatever' (kinchana) duality that exists through the
sentence 'there is no multiplicity here whatsoever', what is
achieved by further references to it?".

सामान्यतो निषेधस्य हि 'किञ्चने' त्यनेन निषेध्यसमर्पणेऽपि विशिष्य निषेधे विशिष्य

निषेध्यसमर्पणस्योपयोगात् | Because, even if a general negation is
achieved by 'whatsoever', there is some utility in further
references for the purpose of negating some aspects
specifically. It provides clarity about the nature of Brahman,
that there are no divisions/attributes in Brahman at all.

अथ - निषेधवाक्यस्य न निषेध्यसमर्पकवाक्यान्तरापेक्षा; अन्यथा ' न कलञ्जं भक्षये' दित्यादावापि

निषेध्यसमर्पणार्थे 'कलञ्जं भक्षये' दित्यादिवाक्यान्तरसापेक्षत्वप्रसङ्ग - इति चेन्न;
Therefore, if the following is said - "There is no necessity that
a negation needs to invoke the object of negation first.
Otherwise, the prohibition "Do not eat meat" would presuppose
an injunction to 'Eat meat' " - no.

सर्वत्रापेक्षानियमाभावात्, सति संभवे प्रकृते त्यागायोगात्, There is no

rule that a negation necessarily requires an affirmation first.
However, as the affirmation exists in our context, there is no
need to renounce it.

'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति' 'नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाती'-त्यादौ वाक्यान्तरप्राप्तस्य निषेधदर्शनाच्च |

In the atirAtra sacrifice, the use of the ShoDashi vessel is both
prescribed and denied. Here the denial is of something that is
first prescribed. That is considered a vikalpa, a choice - one
may use the ShoDashi, or not - it is a choice.

नच तद्वदेव विकल्पापत्ति:, सिद्धे वस्तुनि विकल्पायोगात्, The present context is

not a choice (one cannot choose the world to be either real or
unreal - it can only be one of the two) like that. While an action
can have choice, a fact about an object cannot be a matter of
choice

ग्रहणाग्रहणवाक्ययोरुभयोरपि मानान्तराप्राप्तविषयत्वेन तुल्यबलत्ववदिह

तेर् मा ना न्
तरप् रा प्
तवि
सत्त्वरुतेर्मानान्तरप्राप्तविषयत्वेन षयत् वेनश्रुनिषेधश्रुतेश्चाप्राप्तविषयत्वेन
तुल्यबलत्वाभावाच्च | As the use of a particular vessel, or its
prohibition is not available from any other source of
knowledge, both statements are considered of equal strength.
Unlike that, here the reality of the world is known from
another means of knowledge, whereas its negation is not
known from other means of knowledge - Thus
the shruti conveying the world's reality and its mithyAtva are not
of equal strength.

अतएव निषेधवाक्यप्राबल्यात्तदनुरोधेनेतरन्नीयते ; Thus as the statement of

negation is stronger, the other statement needs to be
reinterpreted accordingly.
अप्राप्तान्यप्राप्त्यर्थत्वेऽप्यलौकिकस्य 'आपच श्चन
प्रमिणन्ती'त्यादिपदार्थसंसर्गस्य विधेयस्य सत्वान्न निषेध्यार्थानुवादकत्वमिति - चेन्न;
If the following is said - Even if a sentence revealing the
unknown is stronger than that which is otherwise known, as
the meaning of the veda mantra "waters (the gods) cannot
block (your efforts)" is referring to an (unknown) other worldly
matter and the interrelationship between the words that leads
to sentence meaning was not previously known, the reality of
the world is spoken in such a context, it cannot be argued that
the sentence is a repetition made for the purpose of
subsequent negation - no.

तदन्यपरत्वस्य प्रागेवोक्तत्वात् | Because the intended meaning of

the mantra is something else (it is to eulogise Indra), not
proving the world's reality, as has been said before.

***Eleventh argument of the opponent - shruti is not a repetition because the

statement does not follow the syntax of a repetition***

ननु - 'यत्तन्ने' ति निषेधानुवादलिङ्गाभावान्नानुवाद:, न; यत्किञ्चिल्लिङ्गाभावेन लैङ्गिकाभावस्य

वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् |
If it is said - The indicatory marks of repetition with a view to
subsequent negation, words such as "Whatever is ", and "That
is", being absent, this is not a case of repetition - No. The
absence of the indicatory marks does not signify the absence
of the indicated repetition.

ननु - तर्हि 'तत्सत्यमि'त्याद्यपि 'न सत्तन्नासदुच्यत' इति, 'असद्वा इदमग्र आसी'

दिति च निषेधाय 'सन्घट:' 'सद्घटज्ञानं' 'सत्सुखस्फुरण' मित्यादिसिद्धब्रह्मसत्त्वानुवादि स्यात्
- इति चेन्न;
If it is said - Then, the vedic sentence 'that is real' etc, is also a
repetition for the negation that occurs in other sentences like
'it is neither real, nor unreal", "There was non existence in the
beginning, verily". The existence of Brahman, as revealed in
the shruti, would be a repetition of the existence that is
revealed in cognitions such "The pot exists", "The cognition of
the pot exists", "The cognition of happiness exists" - no.

ब्रह्मत्वसामानाधिकरण्येन सत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षादिभ्योऽप्राप्ते: शून्यवादप्रसङ्गेन

तस्य निषेधायोगाच्च | Because, an existence that is colocated with
Brahman-hood is not an object of perception. Moreover, this
argument would lead to Brahman being non-existent which
is shUnyavAda.

'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मे' त्यत्रानुवादलिङ्गसम्भवेन कल्पनाच्च | If the indicatory

marks of repetition are insisted upon, the statement "Whatever
is all this, is the self" meets the requirement.

तेरपि
एवमानन्दरुतेरपि , 'अदु:खमसुखं सम' मिति निषेधाय न
श्रु
प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तानन्दानुवादित्वम् ;
In response to the charge that shruti speaking of Brahman's
bliss is a repetition of experiential bliss, it can be argued that
the shruti statement 'it is different from both happiness and
sadness' serves to negate that Brahman's bliss is
experienceable. Thus the object of shruti talking of Brahman's
bliss is not referring to experiential bliss and hence that is not
a repetition of a known fact.

दु:खसाहचर्येण सुखस्यापि वैषयिकस्यैव ग्रहणेन तन्निषेधाय

ब्रह्मरूपसुखानुवादायोगात् | Moreover, as any happiness experienced
through objects is accompanied by sadness, a statement
talking of Brahman's bliss is not a repetition.

एतच्च सर्वमुक्तं विवरणे - निषप्रपञ्चास्थूलादिवाक्यानुसारेण 'इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मे' त्यादीनि

निषेध्यसमर्पकत्वेनैकवाक्यतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते ; सुषुप्तौ निष्प्रपञ्चतायां
नादि
पुरुषार्थत्वदर्नादितिर्शति|
All this has been said in the panchapAdikA vivaraNa - Sentences
such as "all this is the Self" must be interpreted in such a way
as to indicate the negation of the world's reality, so that there
is consistency of meaning with sentences that reveal the
nature of Brahman as one completely devoid of the world, such
as "not gross", etc; for the achievement of the fundamental
aims of human existence lies in the attainment of Brahman in
which the world is completely absent, which is experienced in
deep sleep.

अथ - निष्प्रपञ्चता न पुरुषार्थ:, मूर्च्छायाम् तत्त्वादर्नात्र्श

नात्, नच - तदा तदज्ञानमात्रं नतु
तदभाव इति - वाच्यम् ; समं सुषुप्तावपीति - चेन्न ;
Therefore if the following is said (by the opponent): The
negation of the world is not the fundamental aim of human
pursuit, because that is even experienced in a coma. Nor can
it be argued that in a coma, ignorance is present, but not the
absence of the world, because such a state is comparable to
deep sleep - no.

मूर्च्छायां स्वरूपसुखस्फुरणाभावात् | In a coma, the experience of one's

own bliss is not had.

तथाच सूत्रम् - "मुग्धेऽर्धसंपत्ति: परि षाशे

षा' दिति | As was said in the brahmasUtra,
"The comatose state is a partial attainment (of the deep
sleep), that being the remaining alternative".

सुषुप्तिमुक्तिकालीननिष्प्रपञ्चातायां स्वरूपसुखानुभवेन तस्या: पुरुषार्थत्वात् |

In deep sleep and the liberated state, the absence of the world
and experience of bliss that is one's own nature being present,
the attainment of the object of human endeavour is present.

तथाच श्रुति: - 'द्वितीयाद्वै भयं भवतीति |' As a result, shruti makes the
statement - "It is from a sense of duality that fear persists."

अथ 'तस्मादेकाकी न रमत' इति श्रुते: सप्रपञ्चतापि पुरुषार्थ:, न; तस्या

दु:खसाधनत्वेन पुरुषार्थत्वायोगात्, कर्मकाण्डवदस्या: श्रुते: अविवेकिपुरुषपरत्वाच्च |
Thus, if it was said that the vedic statement "Hence the single
person does not enjoy himself" indicates that duality is the
object of human endeavour, no - because, as it is a cause of
sorrow, it cannot be the object of human pursuit. Like the
vedic portion dealing with rituals, the sentence is directed
towards the ignorant.

ननु - 'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेती' ति

भेदज्ञानस्य मोक्षहेतुत्वश्रवणात् कथं न सप्रपञ्चता पुरुषार्थ - इति चेन्न;
The opponent says - "The shruti statement 'By knowing the
highest self, the impeller, as different from oneself, one attains
immortality' indicates that it is by knowledge of difference that
liberation is attained - that being the case, how can duality
not be the aim of human endeavour?".

The siddhikAra says no.

मते: पूर्वं ममापि प्रेरकपृथक्त्वदृष्टे: सगुणब्रह्मज्ञानवत् प्रेरकत्वेन
ब्रह्मज्ञानस्यापि परम्परयोपकारकत्वात्,
'एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्य'मित्यादिवाक्यस्वारस्यादभेदज्ञानस्यैव साक्षात् मोक्षहेतुत्वात् |
My view too is that prior to knowledge, one sees the impeller
as different from oneself. Like the knowledge of Brahman with
attributes, seeing Brahman as the impeller does help in the
attainment of Brahman, albeit indirectly. Sentences such as "It
should be known in one form only", because they use terms
such as 'only', indicate that it is the knowledge of identity
alone that is the direct cause of liberation.

अतएव प्रेरकत्वज्ञानस्य जोषहेतुत्वमुक्तम् | Thus, where the

knowledge of the impeller has been said to be a cause of bliss,
it refers to empirical, temporary bliss.

तथोत्तरत्रापि 'वेदविदो विदित्वा लीना ब्रह्मणि तत्परा ये विमुक्तास्तदात्मतत्त्वं प्रसमीक्ष्य

देही एक: कृ तार्थो भवते वीतशोक' इत्यभेद एव श्रूयते | In the very same
mantra, identity has been referred to - "Learning about
Brahman from the knowers of the veda, abiding in Brahman,
and dwelling there constantly, the ones freed from birth and
death clearly see that the true nature of the self is free from
embodiedness and become one, fulfilled, and free from
sorrow."

अतो न भेदज्ञानस्य मोक्षहेतुत्वम् | Thus the cognition of difference

cannot be a cause for liberation.
Agama bAdhoddhAra: (part 3)
एतेन - 'नेह नाने'ति श्रुतिरेव 'विश्वं सत्य' मित्यबाध्यत्वरूपबाधनिषेधाय
विज्ञानवादिप्राप्तविश्वनिषेधानुवादिनी किं न स्यादिति - निरस्तम् ;
From this, the following argument stands refuted: "In order to
set aside the negation postulated by shruti "there is no
multiplicity here", which would otherwise negate the reality of
the world conveyed through sentences such as "the world is
real", why can we not say that the mithyAtva shruti is only a
repetition of the negation of the world's reality postulated
by vijnAnavAdins?"

Why?
भावाभावयो: परस्परविरहरूपत्वे समेऽपि भावग्रहो निरपेक्षत्वात् नाभावग्रहमपेक्षते,
अभावग्रहस्तु सप्रतियोगितया भावग्रहमपेक्षते |
Even though the existence and non-existence of a thing are of
the nature of mutual absence of each other, as the existence
of a thing does not depend on anything else, it does not
depend on the non-existence of that thing too. However, the
cognition of absence requires the cognition of the
counterpositive of the absence.

अतो 'नेति नेति' श्रुतेरेव सत्त्वरुत्यपेक्षा

त्
यपेक्षा, नतु सत्वरुतेर्नेति
श्रु तेर्नेतिश्रुश्रुत्यपेक्षा; अन्यथा
या
अन्योन्यारयापत्ते पत् :|
तेश्र
Therefore, the shruti which says "not this, not this" presupposes
the shruti which says "the world is real", whereas the reverse
cannot be true - otherwise this will lead to mutual dependence

***Twelfth argument of the opponent - this is a case of the utsarga apavAda

maxim***
ननु - उत्सर्गापवादन्यायोऽस्तु, यथा हि 'न हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानी'ति श्रुतिरविषेशप्रवृत्तापि
हिंसात्वसामान्यस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्राप्तत्वान्निषेध्योपस्थितौ नाग्नीषोमीयवाक्यमपि
निषेध्यसमर्पणायापेक्षते,
The opponent argues - Let this be an instance where
the utsarga-apavAda (the general and special rule) maxim applies
(essentially if a general rule and specific rule are in
contradiction, the special rule prevails). Just like in the case
of the general prohibition "Do not harm any living creature",
where it is known through perception that any violence in
general is harm, it follows that violence is generally prohibited,
it is accepted that the specific rule "In
the agniShomIya sacrifice, the animal is sacrificed", is not
overruled -
तथा 'नेति ने'त्यादिरुतिरविषेप्रवृत्तापि
शति रवि षेशप् रवृ त्
तापि श्रु
प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तघटादिसत्त्वरूपनिषेध्यमादाय निराकाङ्क्षा सती न
प्रत्यक्षाप्राप्तधर्माधर्मादिसत्यत्वबोधिकां 'विश्वं सत्य'मित्यादिश्रुतिमपि
निषेध्यसमर्पणायापेक्षितुमर्हति,
In the same way, even though the shruti "not this, not this", negates
in general the reality of the objects of perception such as pots
etc, those which are outside the scope of perception, such
as dharma and adharma, which are known to be the real from
the shruti "the world is real", are incapable of being negated by
the general negation.
यत्र तु मानान्तरेण निषेध्यस्याप्राप्तिस्तत्र निषेध्यसमर्पणाय श्रुत्यन्तरमपेक्षत एव ;
Where the object of negation is not known by any other means
of knowledge, there is the expectation of another shruti which
reveals that object to us.
यथा षोडशिग्रहणाग्रहणयो:, मानान्तरेण निषेध्योपस्थितावपि वाक्यापेक्षणे अग्नीषोमीयहिंसाया अपि
निषिद्धत्वेनाधर्मत्वं स्यात् -
Like the usage and non-usage of the ShoDashi vessel (that is,
the negation of the usage of the ShoDashi vessel presupposes
that there is another shruti sentence which postulates that
such a vessel is capable of being used). Even if the object of
negation is revealed through some other means of knowledge,
if the killing of animals in the agniShomIya sacrifice was also
said to be negated by the general prohibition of harm, then it
would follow that the performance of the sacrifice would
be adharma (which would be undesirable, as the veda-s would
never enjoin anyone to the path of adharma).

इति चेत्, मैवम् ; To such an argument, the siddhikAra says: Not so.
His argument is that the maxim is not applicable here because
of two major differences.
1) The prescription of the killing of the animal in
the agniShomIya sacrifice is a specific incident, whereas the
negation of violence to all creatures covers the entire universe
of violence. It is a very small exception to a universal rule of
non-violence. Whereas the object of negation (neti neti)
and vishvam satyam are equal in scope. The entire negation
would be negated if the latter prevailed.
2) Secondly, the prescription of the animal sacrifice is part of
an injunction, a vidhi, where a specific benefit accrues as a
result of the performance of a sacrifice. Such an action,
performed for the accrual of the benefit, is not known
otherwise, thus the vedic injunction has import, svArthatAtparya.
Whereas, the words vishvam satyam occurs in the context of a
eulogy. The eulogy does not have import, it serves as praise
for another action.

अग्नीषोमीयवाक्यस्य निषेधविषयन्यूनविषयत्वेनानन्यशेषतया स्वार्थतात्पर्यवत्त्वेन च न

निषेध्यसमर्पणद्वारेण निषेध्यवाक्यशेषता,
The object of the agniShomIya sentence (violence towards the
animal in this specific context) being much smaller in scope
than the negation (of violence towards all creatures), it is not
subsidiary to another statement and the meaning of the
sentence is the import of the shruti. Therefore, it is not the
object that is being negated in the general prohibition.
'विश्वं सत्य'मित्यादेस्तु निषेधविषयसमविषयत्वेन स्वार्थतात्पर्यरहितत्वेन च
निषेध्यसमर्पणद्वारेण निषेधवाक्यशेषतोचितैव | Whereas as the scope of
the shruti "the world is real" is equal to the scope of the object of
negation ("there is no multiplicity here"), and occurring as it does in
the context of praising Indra's actions, the direct sentence
meaning is not the import of shruti, it is appropriate to say that
it too falls under the purview of the general negation of
everything.
अतएव प्रत्यक्षाप्राप्तधर्मादिसत्त्वोपस्थापनेन वाक्यसाफल्यमपि |
स्वार्थतात्पर्यरहितत्वेन च नाग्नीषोमीयवाक्यतुल्यत्वमित्युक्तम् | Therefore, that
the sentence's purpose is served is in establishing the reality
of dharma etc, which are beyond the ken of perception is also
not comparable to the injunction "sacrifice the animal in
the agniShomIya", as the direct sentence meaning is not the
import of the shruti.
अतो दृश्यत्वादिहेतोर्धर्माद्यंशेऽपि श्रुत्या न बाध: | Thus the mithyAtva of dharma etc,
which was established on account of their knowability, cannot
be overruled by ("the world is real") shruti.

Until now, it was argued that the primary import of the "world
is real" shruti was as a eulogy to Indra. He presents an
alternative, as a concession to the opponent (tuShyatu durjana
nyAya).
अथवा - व्यावहारिकसत्त्वपरेयं विश्वसत्यत्वश्रुति: | Alternatively, this shruti is
revealing the empirical reality of the world.
नच व्यावहारिकसत्त्वे सर्वाविप्रतिपत्तेस्तत्प्रतिपादनवैयर्थ्यम् ; Nor can it be
argued that the shruti would be redundant here as the world's
empirical reality is universally accepted.
दशाविशेषे स्वर्गनरकादिसत्त्वप्रतिपादनेन तत्प्राप्तिपरिहारार्थं
प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरेव तत्प्रयोजनत्वात् | For the shruti serves the
purpose of revealing the specific circumstances under which
heaven and hell are attained, and the means to attain and
avoid them.
It cannot be argued that such an interpretation would be
contradictory to the shruti that talks of the world's mithyAtva,
because:
व्यावहारिकत्वम् च ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यत्वं न त्वबाध्यत्वम् ; मिथ्यात्वबोधकश्रुतिविरोधात्
| empirical reality is the unsublatability of a thing by anything
other than the cognition of brahman, rather than mere
unsublatability, and therefore it is not contradictory to mithyAtva
shruti.

नचैवं दृढभ्रान्तिजनकत्वात् अत्यन्ताप्रामाण्यापत्ति:, स्वप्नार्थप्रतिपादनवदुपपत्ते: |

Nor does this mean that the veda becomes completely invalid
on account of it teaching totally illusory things, because, like
the scripture on the interpretation of dreams, it serves a
purpose
एतावानेव विशेष: - तत्प्रातिभासिकं, इदं तु व्यावहारिकमिति | The difference
between the two is this much - that is apparent reality,
whereas this is empirical.

ननु - मिथ्यात्वश्रुतेर्लक्षणया अखण्डचिन्मात्रपरत्वेन विश्वसत्त्वबोधनाविरोधित्वमेव, न;

अखण्डार्थबोधस्य द्वितीयाभावबुद्धिद्वारकत्वेन जगत्सत्यत्वविरोधित्वात् |
If it be argued - As mithyAtva shruti is indirectly referring to the
impartite consciousness, it cannot contradict the shruti that
reveals the world's reality - that is not true, because the
knowledge of the impartite one is only possible through the
knowledge of the absence of duality, and therefore it is in
contrary to the shruti talking of the world's reality.

नच
तेरप्रामा ण्
यप्रसङ्
प्रपञ्चसत्वरुतेरप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्ग :, अतत्त्वावेदकत्वस्यावान्तरतात्पर्यमादा
गश्रु
येष्टत्वात्, Nor can it be said that this leads to invalidity of
the shruti that talks of the world's reality, because even if such
a shruti reveals an object that is not ultimately real, it still
serves a purpose by having a secondary import, which is
desirable.
तीना
परमतात्पर्येण तु तत्त्वावेदकत्वं सर्वरुतीनामपिमपिश्रुसमम् ; From the point
of view of ultimate import though, all shruti-s are unified in
what they consider to be ultimately real.

प्रातिभासिकव्यावृत्तस्य व्यावहारिकस्य तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वादिरूपस्य

निराकर्तमुशक्यत्वात् |
An empirical reality, differing from apparent reality, which
happens to be of the nature a thing-as-it-is (the attribute
present in the object matches the attribute in the cognition of
the object), cannot be denied.
आसां व्यावहारिकं प्रामाण्यमव्याहतमेव | That the world's reality is
empirically valid has not been denied by us.

'असद्वा इदमग्र आसी'दित्यादिश्रुत्यनुरोधेनापि 'तत्सत्य'मित्यादिर्श्रुतिर्न ब्रह्मणि

व्यावहारिकसत्त्वपरा; ब्रह्मणो व्यवहारातीत्वात्, तस्यापरमार्थत्वे च निरधिष्ठानतया
शून्यवादापत्ते:, किन्चित्तत्त्वमगृहीत्वा च बाधानुपपत्ते: |
In line with shruti such as 'Non-existence was verily present in the
beginning', one cannot say that the intention of the shruti 'That is
real' is to convey that Brahman's reality is empirical, because
Brahman is beyond transactions. If Brahman is not ultimately
real, there would be no substratum, leading to nihilism.
Without holding on to any real entity, it would not be possible
to deny anything either.

In order to talk of the absence of pot, we need to have known

the presence of the substratum, the ground. Without holding on
to the reality of the ground, one cannot talk of the absence of
the pot.

अतएव सत्यत्वरुतिविरोधेन ति विरोधेनश्रुमिथ्यात्वश्रुतिरेवान्यपरेत्यपि न; षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गोपेतत्वेन

मिथ्यात्वश्रुतेरनन्यपरतया प्रबलत्वात्, Thus, if it is said that it is
the mithyAtva shruti that needs to be reinterpreted because it
contradicts the shruti talking of reality, no, because, mithyAtva
shruti, being endowed with the six-fold indicatory marks of
import, it is the stronger of the two, and need not be
reinterpreted.
वैदिकतात्पर्यविषयस्य च तात्त्विकत्वनियमेन तात्पर्यज्ञापकानामपि लिङ्गानामर्थतथात्व
एव पर्यवसानात् | As a result of the rule that the object of
the veda which has import must real, it follows that the
indicatory marks of import must be meaningful.
ति वाक्यस् थपदा
सत्त्वरुतिवाक्यस्थपदानाम् ना श्रुचान्यपरत्वान्न सत्त्वे तात्पर्यलिङ्गाशङ्का | As
म्
the shruti that talks of the world's reality has some other
import, one need not doubt whether indicatory marks of import
are present in such a shruti or not.

ननु - यदि सत्त्वरुतिति: प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तार्थत्वान्न स्वार्थपरा, तर्हि मिथ्यात्वश्रुतिरपि

श्रु
तद्विरुद्धार्थत्वात् स्वार्थपरा न स्यात्,
तत्प्राप्तितद्विरोधयोस्तात्पर्याभावहेत्वोरुभयत्रापि समत्वात् - इति चेन्न;
The opponent argues - If the shruti talking of reality does not
have import in its sentence meaning because it is revealing
something known through perception, mithyAtva shruti too cannot
have import in its sentence meaning because it contradicts
that (perception), as the cause for not having import - agreeing
with another means of knowledge (hence not unique) and
disagreeing with another means of knowledge (hence
contradictory) - are common to both.
- इति चेन्न; the siddhikAra responds - if this is the argument, no.

प्रत्यक्षापेक्षया चन्द्राधिकपरिमाणबोधकागमस्येव मिथ्यात्वबोधकागमस्यापि बलवत्त्वेन

त्यपेक्षया
प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तानुवादिसत्त्वरुत्यपेक्षयापि पिश्रुबलवत्त्वात् ; अन्यथोभयोरापि
अप्रामाण्यापत्ते: |
Like the scripture that establishes that the size of the moon is
larger than what is perceived, the scripture that reveals the
world is mithyA is stronger than a shruti that simply repeats
something reported by perception. If that is not accepted (if
perception is indeed stronger than the two), neither mithyAtva
shruti nor satyatva shruti would have validity (the former because
it is contradicted, and the latter because it is simply repeating
perception).

री - 'अतत्परा तत्परवेदवाक्यैर्विरुध्यमाना गुणवाद

रकेशा
तदुक्तं सङ्क्षेप रीरके
एवेति | Thus it was said in the sankshepa shAriraka -
"the shruti which does not have import, and contradicts
another shruti having import, is only a guNavAda".
 षमि थ्
यात्
वश्रु
ति
अतएवानन्य षमिथ्यात्वरुतिविरोधात्
श्रु वि
रोधा
त्शेन
प्रत्यक्षागृहीतत्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्यत्वपरा
ति
रित्
यु
क्
जगत्सत्यत्वरुतिरित्युक्तम्तम्श्रु|
Therefore, as mithyAtva shruti's purpose is to reveal only that and
not something else, it cannot be argued that satyatva shruti is
revealing a reality to the world unknown from perception
which is unsublated in any period of time.

चश्रुप्राबल्ये निरवकाशत्वतात्पर्यवत्त्वादिकमेव प्रयोजकम्, न निषेधवाक्यत्वम् |

श्चतेश्
अद्वैतरुतेच
The reason why advaita shruti is stronger, is because if its direct
sentence meaning is not taken, then it will have no scope for
application at all, not because it simply happens to be a
statement of negation.

एतेन - निषेधवाक्यत्वेन प्राबल्ये किति तद्धिते वृद्धिविधायकात् 'कितिचे' ति सूत्रात्

सामान्यतो गुणवृद्धिनिषेधकं 'किङ्गि चे'ति सूत्रं बलवत्स्यात् ,
अग्नीषोमीयवाक्यादहिंसावाक्यं षोडशिनो ग्रहणवाक्यादग्रहणवाक्यम् 'सत्यं ज्ञान'
मित्यादिवाक्यात्, 'असद्वा इदमग्र आसी'दित्यादिवाक्यं च बलवत्स्यादित्यपास्तम् |

By this, the following argument is refuted:

"If the statement of negation is always stronger than the
statement of injunction, then
a) the aShTAdhyAyi sUtra कितिचेत्, which stipulates that the इ and उ
in the कित् suffix attain guNa and vRddhi (ie become ऐ and औ
respectively) would be negated by the sUtra किङ्गिचेत् which says
that vriddhi and guNa should not be be brought in,
b) The performed of the agnIShOmIya sacrifice would be
committing adharma, for it would violate the general prohibition
of violence,
c) The option of taking the soma juice in the ShoDashi will be
overruled by the negation,
d) The sentence "Brahman is Existence, Consciousness, Bliss"
will be overruled by the sentence "Non-existence was all that
was present in the beginning".

The siddhikAra refutes these arguments because his argument

was not that the sentence of negation is necessarily stronger
than the injunction.

षभावादिनासावकाशत्वनिरवकाशत्वादिरूपबलवैपरीत्यात्, 'विश्वं
सामान्यवि षभावादिनाशे
 षतयाच सावकाशत्वादे: प्रागुक्तत्वात् |
सत्य'मित्यादेस्तु व्यावहारिकसत्यविषयतया अन्य षतयाशे
As a specific statement is stronger than a general one, it
follows that a statement which cannot be interpreted
otherwise will be stronger than a statement with multiple
interpretations, the sentence "the world is real" can have the
meaning of empirical reality and is subsidiary to another
sentence, it can be interpreted otherwise.

तिविरो
तस्मान्न सत्त्वरुतिविरोध : || Therefore, mithyAtva shruti is not in
धश्रु
contradiction with satyatva shruti.

Until now the topic of contradiction by shruti was taken up.

Next the topic of contradiction by smRti will be taken up.

नापि 'असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीवरम् श्व| एतां बुद्धिमवष्टभ्य

रम्
नष्टात्मनोऽल्पबुद्धय: ||' इत्यादिस्मृतिविरोध:, Nor is the world's unreality
contradicted by smRti "Those who say that the world is non-
existent, has no basis, and say that there is no God in the
world" "Holding on to this view, they are of depraved
character, of poor intellect"
सद्विविक्तत्वादिनो जगत्यसद्वैलक्षण्याङ्गीकारेण
तत्प्रतिपादकस्मृतिविरोधाभावात् | Those who say that the world is
different from the existent, also accept that it is different from
the non-existent, therefore there is no contradiction with
the smRti which refers to those that argue that it is non-
existent.

Next the siddhikAra establishes that there is no contradiction

with the brahmasUtra.

ननु - 'नाभाव उपलब्धे:' 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिव' दिति सूत्रद्वयेन जगत:

पारमार्थिकसत्त्वबोधनेन विरोध:,
The opponent says - The two sUtra-s 'It is not absolutely non-existent,
because it is available for perception' and 'Because it has different attributes
compared to the dream' establish that the world is ultimately real
and thus contradict the mithyAtva of the world.
He continues:
नचानेन शून्यवादिनिरासार्थेनासद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रप्रतिपादनान्न
विरोध:, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षण्यस्यासद्वैलक्षण्यस्य शून्यवादिमतेऽपि सत्त्वेन
तन्मतनिरासार्थत्वानुपपत्ते:, Nor can it be argued that these sUtra-s
only refute the nihilist (shUnyavAdin buddhist) by showing that
the world is not non-existent and therefore there is no
contradiction - because, the shUnyavAdin-s also accept that
the world has a utility which is absent from the purely non-
existent, and the sUtra-s cannot refute them on such an
interpretation.
निषेधाप्रतियोगित्वरूपस्यासद्वैलक्षण्यस्य त्वयाप्यनङ्गीकारात् असद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य
साधने सूत्रे स्वप्नवैलक्षण्योक्त्ययोगाच्च, You too agree that the
world is not of the nature of an unsublatable non-existence,
thus the mere show of difference from non-existence in the
sUtra, is insufficient to establish that the world is different
from a dream.
व्यावहारिकसत्यत्वमात्रेण स्वप्नवैलक्षण्यस्य त्वयाप्यङ्गीकारात्,
असद्वैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य तन्मतेऽपि सत्त्वाच्च, You too agree that the
world being empirically real is different from the dream, and
that the real in your system is totally different from the non-
existent.
तदुक्तं बौद्धै: - 'द्वे सत्त्वे समुपारित्य त् बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना' The Buddhist
यश्रि
says -"Our acceptance of reality is by accepting two truths
(not being non-existent and having utility)".
Thus, it follows that these two sUtra-s must necessarily
establish the ultimate reality of the world.

The siddhikAra responds:

इति - चेन्न; सूत्रार्थानवबोधात् Not so, because the meaning of the
sUtra-s has not been understood by you.
तथाहि - सद्रूपात् ब्रह्मणो जगत्सर्गं वदत: समन्वयस्य सर्वमसदित्यनुमानेन
विरोधसन्देहे 'न सन्नासन्न सदसत् न चानुभयतत्त्वकम् | विमतं तर्कपीड्यत्वान्मरीचिषु
यथोदकम् ||' इति ब्रह्मसाधारणयान्निस्तत्त्वतायां प्राप्तायां सूत्रेण परिहार: |
To explain - There is a doubt as to how to reconcile the view of
those who argue that it is from the Existence, Brahman, that
the world is created, with the inference that everything is non-
existent. The Buddhists say that - "it is neither existent, nor
non-existent, nor existent and non-existent, nor neither. The
object under discussion (the world) is beyond logic, like the
appearance of water in the mirage." From this it appears that
Brahman too shares the characteristic of not being each of the
four categories, and therefore it too is shUnya (void). It is this
doubt that is being addressed by the sUtra-s.
How?
सतो ब्रह्मणो नाभाव: न शून्यत्वं, उपलब्धे: सत्त्वेन प्रमाणात् प्रतीते: | The
sUtra, "It is not non-existent, because it is capable of being
perceived" means - Existence, or Brahman, is not of the nature
of non-existence, not a void, because it is capable of being
perceived, that is it is known as existing from a valid means of
knowledge.

तथाच किञ्चित्परमार्थसदवश्यम् शून्यवादिनापि स्वीकार्यम्; अन्यथा बाधस्य

निरवधिकत्वप्रसङ्गादिति सूत्रार्थ: सच न प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वविरोधी | Further, even
the shUnyavAdin-s have to agree to some entity that is ultimately
real, for it will lead to a sublation into a void. Thus,
this sUtra is not to prove that the world is not mithyA.

तथाचोक्तं - 'बाधितोऽपह्नवो मानै: व्यावहारिकमानता | मानानां तात्त्विकं किञ्चित् वस्तु

नाश्रित्य दुर्भणे'ति |
Thus it has been said - "The negation of empirical reality can
be (only) by a valid means of knowledge, and unless those
means of knowledge rest upon a real substratum, they cannot
perform their function".

नापि स्वप्नावैधर्म्योक्त्ययोग:, तस्या: 'विमतं निस्तत्त्वं तर्कपीड्यत्वात्

मरुमरीचिकाजलव'दित्यनुमाने
नपरत्
बाध्यत्वप्रमाणागम्यत्वदोषजन्यत्वाद्युपाधिप्रदर्नपरत्वात्र्श वा
त्
विज्ञानवादिनिराकरणपरेणापि नानेन सूत्रेण विरोध: |
Nor is the statement that "it is different from the dream"
inappropriate. Its purpose is to prove that the inference "The
object under discussion (the world) is void, because it is
beyond logic, like mirage water", has the following defects
of upAdhi (adjunct) (1) sublatability (upon waking up) - the
dream has that, the world does not, (2) it is not observed by a
valid means of knowledge - the dream is not seen by any valid
means of knowledge, whereas the world is, (3) it is born from a
defective source - the dream is caused due to sleep obscuring
the senses, the world is not. The sUtra can also be said to
refute the vijnAnavAdin buddhists. Therefore for these two
reasons, the sUtra does not refute the reality of the world.

रूपादिरहितब्रह्मजगदुपादानत्वप्रतिपादकसमन्वयस्य नीलाद्याकारं विज्ञानं साध्यता अनुमानेन

विरोधसन्देहे A doubt may arise here: Advaita, which holds that the
attributeless Brahman is the material cause of the universe is
contrary to the vijnAnavAdin, who holds that forms such as blue
etc are only forms of momentary consciousness.
They quote a verse in this regard:
'स्वप्नधीसाम्यतो बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्याऽर्थस्य सहेक्षणात् | तद्भेदेनानिरूप्यत्वात्
ज्ञानाकारोऽर्थ ईष्यताम् ||
External objects are like objects seen in dreams, where the
object and cognitions are seen together, and it is impossible to
prove that there is a difference between the two - therefore it
follows that objects are simply forms in consciousness.
They also cite an inference in this regard:
विमता धी:, न ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तालम्बना, धीत्वात्, स्वप्नधीवत् | The object under
discussion (the world) is only a cognition, because it cannot be
known without a cognition, like dream objects.
विपक्षे च ज्ञानाभानेऽप्यर्थभानप्रसङ्गो बाधक: | If that is not true, then it
would be possible to know a thing even without cognising it.
महि
नहि भिन्न्योरवमहिषयोषयो : सहोपलम्भनियमोऽस्ति | Otherwise there is
श्व
nothing stopping an animal to simultaneously appear as the
horse and as the buffalo, which are two intrinsically different
animals.
तस्मान्न ज्ञानातिरिक्तम् सदिति प्राप्ते परिहारसूत्रम् 'नाभाव उपलब्धे'रित्यादि |
Therefore, as it appears that there is no object apart from its
cognition, the sUtra-s such as "it is not not-existent, because
it appears" are needed to refute such views.

बाधेन सोपाधिकतानुमाने उपायभावेन सहोपलम्भ: सारूप्यतो

बुद्धितदर्थभेदस्थूलार्थभङ्गे भवतोऽपि तुल्य: |
There are 3 defects in the inference: 1) the illustration (dream)
is sublated 2) the simultaneous presence of the two (objects
and their cognition) is because one is the means for the other,
and so, it does not mean that they are the same (the eye is not
the pot, even though we need the eyes to see the pot) 3) the
similarity between cognition and its object implies that there
are two things, not one (because the relation of similarity two
things that are similar). Even though you may claim that there
is no gross object, you have to accept there is some object.

सूत्रार्थस्तु, नाभाव: - ज्ञानातिरिक्तस्यार्थस्य नासत्त्वम्, किन्तु

व्यवहारदशाबाध्यार्थक्रियाकारितवरूपं सत्त्वमेव | उपलब्धे: - ज्ञानातिरेकेण
प्रमाणैरुपलब्धे: | The meaning of the sUtra, in this context,
becomes - Not non-existent, the object in the absence of
cognition is not non-existent, for it has an empirical reality of
the nature of being unsublated and having utility; because it
is perceived, it is known by a means of knowledge that is
different from consciousness.

नाय | The sUtra "it being

स्वप्नवैध्यर्म्योक्ति: बाध्यत्वाद्युपाधिप्रदर्नायर्श
different from a dream" is for the purpose of showing the
defect such as the adjunct of sublatability, etc.

तेन बाधात् सोपाधिकत्वाच्च पूर्वानुमानं दुष्टमित्यर्थ: | The inference

mentioned previously is defective because it is contradicted
by it (the sUtra), and because it has the defect of adjunct.

तस्मान्नैवमपि विरोधशङ्का | Thus even in this interpretation, one need

not doubt whether the world's mithyAtva is refuted.

तदुक्तं तस्मान्न ज्ञानाकारोऽर्थ:, किन्तु बाह्य: | स चार्थक्रियाकारित्वसत्त्वोपेतोऽपि

शाति
अद्वैतरुतिव वशा
त् त्
श्रुब्रह्मणि कल्पितो न परमार्थसन्नितिसिद्धान्तस्य सुगतमताद्भेद
इति | Thus it was said - There are external objects, and one
cannot say that cognition alone is the external world. It has
empirical reality of the nature of utility, and not ultimate
reality, on the basis of advaita shruti, which says that the world is
superimposed on Brahman. This is the difference with
Buddhism.

उक्तंचात्मत्त्वविवेके - 'न ग्राह्यभेदमवधूय धियोऽस्ति वृत्तिस्तत्द्बाधने बलिनि वेदनये

: | नोचेदनित्यमिदमीदृशमेव विश्वं तथ्यं तथागतमतस्य तु कोऽवकाश:||' इति |
जयरी श्री
Thus it was said in the Atma tattva viveka by udayanAchArya against
the Buddhists - "There is no connection between external
objects and their cognitions. When the objects are sublated, it
is the position of (advaita) veda that attains victory compared to
the rest. If that is not accepted (if the objects are not
sublated), then the world is temporary and must be accepted
as such. In either position, where is the scope for the way of
the Buddha?"

धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधश्च प्रागेव परिहृत इति शिवम् || That the very pramANa that
reveals the object contradicts the advaitin's view that it is
mithyA, has already been refuted.
इति विश्वमिथ्यत्वस्यागमादिबाधोद्धार: | This concludes the chapter on the
refutation of the contradiction of the world's unreality by
scripture.
asatassādhakatvopapatti:
अथासतस्साधकत्वोपपत्ति: |

The opponent wishes to argue that the inference of the world's

unreality has another set of defects. He says that unreal things
(ie things which are sublatable) are not able to prove /
establish / achieve anything. His argument is that things which
have vyAvhArika satya (empirical reality) cannot be mithyA,
because they have utility - they are used to achieve things
transactionally. Unreal things cannot prove / achieve anything.

The opponent argues:

ननु - सत्त्वसाधकानां मिथ्यात्वसाधकानुमानेभ्य: प्राबल्यम् ; Those (pramANas) that
establish the reality (of the world) are stronger than the
inference that establishes the mithyAtva of the world. Why?

मिथ्यात्वसाधकप्रतिज्ञाद्युपनीत पक्षादीनां मिथ्यात्वाबोधने सर्वमिथ्यात्वासिद्धि:,

Because, if the elements constituting the pratijnA (of the
inference) such as the paksha etc., are not proven to be mithyA
by the very inference of the mithyAtva of the world, it follows
that universal mithyAtva stands unproven.

The opponent's argument is as follows: The inference of the

world's mithyAtva follows the statement of the inferential
reasoning - "The world is mithyA, like the shell silver". Are the
elements of the inferential statement - such as the word "the
world" - ie the paksha, or the words "The world is mithyA" (the
hypothesis) - mithyA? If they are not mithyA, then as the world
consists of words and objects denoted by words, it stands that
there are some things in the world (such as these words),
which are not mithyA. Thus universal mithyAtva stands
disproven. If on the other hand, the words are mithyA, they are
false - and how can false statements prove something real?

यासिद् ध्
यादिकंश्रचेति - If the inference does
तद्बोधने परस्परव्याहतिरारयासिद्ध्यादिकं
prove that those words are mithyA, a statement
containing mithyA words cannot prove anything, and if it
cannot prove anything, it cannot prove that the words
are mithyA either - leading to a paradoxical outcome. This
would lead to AshrayAsiddhi etc - the paksha itself would end up
not existing, so how can such an inference prove anything?

The siddhikAra responds to this argument -

- चेन्न; If this is the argument, no.

मिथ्यात्वसाधकप्रतिज्ञाद्युपनीतपक्षादीनां मिथ्यात्वबोधनेऽपि व्याहत्यभावात्, Even if the

elements of the pratijnA (the hypothesis of the inference), such
as paksha, etc., are proven to be mithyA by the very same
inference, that in itself will not invalidate the inference.

प्रतिज्ञादिभिस्तेषां त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपसत्त्वाप्रतिपादनात् | Because

the pratijnA etc., does not prove the existence of the words in
all three periods of time.

ननु - साधकत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या परमार्थसत्त्वमायाति परमार्थसत एव साधकत्वात्,

साधकताया: प्राक् सत्त्वघटितत्वात्,
The opponent states his case - As its ability to prove
(mithyAtva) cannot exist otherwise, it follows that the proof must
be ultimately real for it to be a proof (that is, the proof must be
ultimately real if it is seeking to prove something). The proof's
ability to prove something presupposes that the proof be real.

नतु धीमात्रविषयत्वं, अपरोक्षधीविषयत्वं, सत्त्वेन तादृशधीविषयत्वम् वा

साधकताप्रयोजकम्; तुच्छे नित्यातीन्द्रिये चातिव्याप्त्यव्याप्तिभ्याम् |
None of - 1) being the object of cognition, 2) being the object of
direct cognition, or 3) being known as existent by being the
object of cognition - is sufficient to prove its object.

The first alternative (धीमात्रविषयत्वं) stretches the definition beyond

its remit (ativyApti), because absolutely absent (tucCha) objects
are the object of cognition too - they are the objects of vikalpa
vritti, as stated in the yoga sUtra 1.9 शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यो विकल्पः.

The second alternative (अपरोक्षधीविषयत्वं), does not cover all

cases (avyApti), because objects that are beyond sensory
perception, such as dharma (puNya) and adharma (pApa) are not
perceptible, but are still capable of causing happiness and
sorrow respectively.
तत्त्वेन ज्ञानमपि न तत्र प्रयोजकम्; वह्नित्वेनाज्ञातेपि वह्नौ दाहकत्वदर्शनात्, वह्नित्वेन
नाच्च, Nor is the cognition revealing the
ज्ञातेऽपि गुञ्जापुञ्जे तददर्नाच्चर्श
nature of the object sufficient to establish its causative power,
because fire's ability to burn exists even when it is not known
to be fire, and even when something is known as fire, it is
insufficient to establish its capacity to burn, because
sometimes a pile of red berries is mistaken to be a flame,
which is incapable of burning.

नापि त्रिचतुरकक्ष्यास्वबाधितासत्त्वप्रतीतिस्तन्त्रम्;
Nor does revealing something to be real three or four times (ie
it is not contradicted those times) confer the ability to prove
something.

वत्वस्य चापत्ते:, गौरोऽहं 'नीलम् नभ'

आत्मनो गौरवत्वेनानित्यत्वस्य नभसो नैल्येन स्पर्वत्वस्यर्श
इत्यादिप्रतीतावपि त्रिचतुरकक्ष्यस्वबाधात्, Because the notions 'I am
fair' or 'I am not eternal' or 'the sky is blue' which are not
contradicted many times, but that in itself does not prove that
the self has colour or the sky is really blue.

Therefore, the only way a pramANa can prove the reality of

something is if that pramANa itself is real.

यौक्तिकबाधस्य त्वन्मते प्रकृतेऽपि भावादिति Thus these kinds of logical

contradictions exist, even according to you, in your inferential
reasoning.

This was the argument of the

opponent. The siddhikAra responds -
- चेन्न; No.
यादृश्या बुध्या तव नभोनैल्यादिधीव्यावृत्त्या घटादौ सत्त्वसिद्धि:, तादृक्बुद्धिविषयत्वस्यैव
साधकत्वे तन्त्रत्वात् | The cognition (basis) by which it is possible
for you to say that the pot is real whereas the sky is not blue,
even when it appears so, the same basis is sufficient for
proving / establishing / achieving something.

अत एव लोकप्रसिद्धिस्तन्त्रमितीष्टसिद्ध्युक्तमप्युक्ताभिप्रायेण सम्यगेव | That is

why vimuktAtman's statement in the iShTasiddhi - "(this is a) well
known means (vyAvahArika jnAna) to establish the mithyAtva of
the world" - is appropriate, because it was said with this in
mind.

एवं त्रिचतुरकक्ष्यास्वबाधिता वादिप्रतिवादिप्राश्निकादीनाम्

सत्त्वबुद्धिस्तन्त्रमित्युपपन्नमेव | In the same way, that which is
unsublated after being challenged by opponents and
questioners etc three or four times is accepted as sufficient to
establish that the object is real. (However such a proof is not
proof of its absolute reality, merely its transactional reality).

गुञ्जापुञ्जस्य वह्नित्वे आत्मनो गौरत्वे नभसो नीलत्वे च तादृग्बुद्धिविषयत्वस्य

तवाप्यसंप्रतिपत्ते: ; You also must accept that mistaking a pile
of red berries to be a flame, or thinking that one is fair, etc., or
that the sky is blue are disproven by such a test (when it is
tested 2-3 times, its falsity is proven).

अन्यथा तेषामपि तत्र सत्त्वसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् | If it is not accepted, you

will have to admit that those mistaken notions are also true.

Therefore, the following argument by the opponent is also

incorrect:
अथ - यादृश्या शब्दे क्लृप्तदोषरहितया बुद्ध्या तव ब्रह्मणि सत्त्वसिद्धि:, तादृया श्या
प्रत्यक्षे क्लृप्तदोषरहितया मम जगति सत्त्वसिद्धिरस्तु साधकतुल्यत्वादिति - चेन्न;
"Just like the absence of defects in the shruti is accepted by
you (the advaitin) as sufficient to prove the absolute reality of
Brahman, the absence of defects in perception is sufficient for
me (the dvaitin) to prove the reality of the world. Our standard
of proof is thus the same."

ब्रह्मसत्त्वबुद्धिवत् जगत्सत्त्वबुद्धेरबाधितत्वाभावात्, त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वरूपस्य

सत्त्वस्य प्रत्यक्षाविषयताया उक्तत्वाच्च | (The reason why that
argument is flawed, is because) unlike the cognition of the
Brahman's reality, the cognition of the world is sublated.
Further, it has already been stated (in a previous chapter) that
the nature of reality revealed by perception is not
unsublatability in all three periods of time.

नच - बुद्धिविषयत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वे वह्नित्वेनाज्ञातस्य वह्नेरदाहकत्वप्रसङ्ग:, अमृतत्वेन

ज्ञातस्य च विषस्य सञ्जीवकत्वप्रसङ्ग इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor is the following argument of the opponent valid: "If simply
cognising a thing is proving its reality, then if something is not
known to be fire, it should not burn, and simply thinking that
something is amRtam (elixir), should be sufficient to confer
immortality."

There is no requirement that everyone should know fire to be

fire for it to burn - as long as someone knows it as such, that is
sufficient.

रादिसाधा रणस्
वह्नौ तादृग्बुद्धिविषयत्वस्येवरादिसाधारणस्य यश्वसत्त्वात्, विषे
सञ्जीवकत्वप्रसङ्गस्य नभोनैल्यादितुल्यत्वात् | Ishvara, who is omniscient,
does know that the object is fire. Consuming poison leading to
immortality, or considering the sky to be blue, can be similarly
addressed (They do not end up correct just because someone
has a notion, albeit, an incorrect one, about them. Rather, they
are incorrect, because they are subsequently superseded by
right cognitions.).

वस्तुतस्तु - ज्ञाताज्ञातसाधारणं व्यावहारिकं सत्त्वमेव साधकत्वे तन्त्रम् ;

Really speaking, whether something is known or unknown, as
long as it has empirical reality, that is a sufficient basis for its
effectiveness (utility).

तच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यत्वमेव; तच्च न मिथ्यात्वघटितम् ; Empirical reality

is defined as that which remains unsublated by any cognition
other than the cognition of Brahman. Such a reality is not
bound up with the concept of mithyAtva. Empirical reality does
not presuppose the acceptance of its mithyAtva - for example,
the dvaitin agrees that objects in the world are empirically
valid, even when he does not accept they are mithyA.
Therefore, it cannot be argued that empirical reality
and mithyAtva are mutually dependent - that the acceptance of
one presupposes the acceptance of the other. We say that that
which is empirically real is mithyA, even when one is not
aware of it. To know something as empirically real, one need
not accept its mithyAtva, and vice versa.

अत्यन्ताबाध्ये ब्रह्मज्ञानबाध्ये च तुल्यत्वात् अत एव नेदं

परमार्थसत्त्वव्याप्यम् | As effectiveness is equally true for the
eternally unsublated and that which is only sublated by
cognition of Brahman, effectiveness does not imply absolute
reality.

एवंच परमार्थसत्त्वस्य साधकतायामतन्त्रत्वेन तदभावेऽपि न

साधकतानुपपत्ति: | Moreover, it is not necessary that the proof
needs to be ultimately real for it be capable of proving its
object. Therefore, in the absence of absolute reality, its ability
to prove its object is not compromised.

एतेन - व्यावहारिकत्वम् ब्रह्मज्ञानबाध्यत्वम् वा, व्यावहारिकविषयत्वे सति सत्त्वं वा,

सत्त्वेन व्यवहारमात्रं वा | नाद्य:, मिथ्यात्वसिद्धे: प्राक् तदसिद्ध्या अन्योन्यारयात्
या श्र| नापि
त्
द्वितीय:, तस्यास्माकं मिथ्यात्वाविरोधित्वेनेष्टत्वात् | न तृतीय:, सत्त्वाभावे
साधकत्वानुपपत्तेरिति - निरस्तम् ;
By this, the following argument of the opponent is refuted:

"Does empirical reality mean that the thing in question is 1)

sublated by the cognition of Brahman 2) being capable of being
transacted with, while being real 3) it is transacted with the
notion that it is real.
It is not the first, because before establishing its mithyAtva,
one cannot establish its empirical reality - the two ideas are
mutually dependent.
It is not the second either, because such a definition of
empirical reality does not imply the mithyAtva of the object, and
hence desirable to us.
It is not the third, if something happens to be not real, it
cannot have effectiveness, i.e. prove the mithyAtva of the world.

उक्तनिरुक्तेरदुष्टत्वात् | (The argument is flawed), our definition of

empirical reality, does not suffer from these defects.

Nor is the following argument valid:

नच - हेत्वादीनाम् व्यावहारिकसत्त्वे साध्यस्यापि व्यावहारिकसत्त्वमेव
वि
स्यादनुमितिविषयसाध्यस्य परामर्विषयहेतुनार्श षयहेतु नासमानसत्ताकत्वनियमादिति - वाच्यम्
;
If the hetu, paksha etc. in the inference are empirically real, the
sAdhya of the inference, i.e mithyAtva would also be empirically
real. The object of the inferential cognition being the sAdhya, it
must as a rule be of the same order of reality as the object of
the concomitance, the hetu.
दृश्यत्ववन्मिथ्यात्वस्यापि व्यावहरिकत्वेन समानसत्ताकत्वस्येष्टत्वात्, Such an
outcome is desirable to us - mithyAtva is of the same order of
reality as knowability, the hetu in the inference of the
world's mithyAtva (see the chapter on mithyAtvasya mithyAtva).

, धूलीपटले धूमभ्रमादपि वह्न्युमितिप्रदर्शनात्, However,

समानसत्ताकत्वनियमासिद्धेच श्च
it must be stated that there is no rule that the hetu and
the sAdhya in the inference must be of the same order of
reality. Sometimes one mistakes a dust-cloud to be smoke and
use that smoke as a hetu to infer the presence of fire. It may
end up that the fire is actually present. Thus in such a
scenario, the sAdhya (fire) is empirically real (vyAvahArika),
whereas the hetu (smoke) is only apparently real (prAtibhAsika).

Similarly it is possible that a vyAvahArika hetu leads to

a prAtibhAsika sAdhya. It is accepted that the earth is the element
that is endowed with the attribute of smell. (Each of the
elements inherits the attributes of its cause, while having a
unique attribute that its cause does not possess). In nyAya, it is
accepted that in the first instance of the pot's creation, it does
not possess smell. They argue that the pot gets the attribute
of smell only from the second instance of its creation.
The siddhikAra uses this as an example to present the instance
where someone uses the right reason to arrive at the wrong
answer.

गन्धव्याप्यपृथिवीत्वप्रमातोऽपि गन्धप्रागभावावच्छिन्ने घटे पक्षे

या मनु
मि ति
बाधास्फूर्तिद यामनुमितिभ्रमदर्नाच्च
र्श भ् रमदर् शना च् चशा| Even when it is valid that
whatever is made of earth has the attribute of smell, when it is
argued on this basis that the first instance of the pot's
creation also must have smell it would be contradicted
(in nyAya).

This is a pretty odd position taken by the naiyyAyika, but we

don't argue the rightness or wrongness of it, we merely use
this to establish that it is possible for the right reasons to lead
to wrong results.

तिवेद्यत्वोपपत्ति
मिथ्यात्वस्य मिथ्यात्वेऽपि तत्वावेदकरुतिवेद्यत्वोपपत्ति :, Even
श्रु
if mithyAtva itself is mithyA, it is possible for a (mithyA) shruti to
reveal absolute reality.
सत्त्वेन सत इव मिथ्यात्वेन मिथ्याभूतस्यापि प्रमाणगम्यत्वाविरोधात्, Because its
validity is not affected in revealing a mithyA thing as mithyA,
just like revealing a real thing as real.
एकां शातत्त्वावेदकत्वाभावेऽपि अपरां शातत्त्वावेदकत्वोपपत्ते: | Even if
in one aspect, it were to reveal an entity that does not have
ultimate reality (karma kANDa revealing karma), it is possible to
reveal an absolutely real entity in another aspect (the jnAna
kANDa revealing Brahman).

ननु - व्यावहारिकत्वं साधकतायामतन्त्रं ; अज्ञानादिसाधके परमार्थसति साक्षिणी

तदभावादिति - चेन्न;
The following argument is not correct - "Empirical reality is an
insufficient basis for effectiveness, because the sAkshi, the
inner witness, which is absolutely real, reveals ignorance
which is only empirically real. If something had to be
empirically real for it to have utility, that rule fails in the case
of the inner witness, which is absolutely real."

ब्रह्मज्ञानेतराबाध्यत्वस्यात्यन्ताबाध्यत्वेऽपि सत्त्वस्योक्तत्वात् | It has

already been said that which is unsublated by anything other
than the cognition of Brahman, has the ability to be effective.
Such a definition applies to both the ultimate real (that which
is eternally unsublated) and the empirically real (that which is
unsublated by anything other the cognition of Brahman).

Here the siddhikAra does not challenge the notion that the inner
witness is ultimately real. Therefore, this is a case of abhyupetya
vAda - even if that was the case, there is no problem to our
argument.

त्रैविध्यविभागे पारमार्थिकव्यावृत्तव्यावहारिकत्वनिरुक्तावपि जनकतायां

तत्साधारण्येऽप्यदोषात् | In the chapter on the three orders of
reality, even though empirical reality will be distinguished from
ultimate reality, in being effective, they both are equally
capable.

वस्तुतस्तु - साक्ष्यप्यज्ञानोपहित एवाज्ञानादिसाधक:, स च व्यावहारिक एव ;

However, in reality, the inner witness is consciousness
delimited by ignorance. It is also capable of revealing
ignorance. It is also only empirically real.

अनुपहितेन परमार्थसदाकारेण तस्यासाधकत्वात्, Further, as pure

consciousness, as the ultimately real entity, it is not able to
reveal ignorance. Thus, truly speaking, the one ultimate reality
does not have utility, as it is not associated with anything else.

एवंच व्यावहारिकसत्त्वमेव सर्वत्र साधकतायां प्रयोजकमिति स्थितम् | Therefore,

it stands proven that it is empirical reality alone that is
universally capable of denoting effectiveness.

यथाचाज्ञानोपहितस्य साक्षित्वेऽपि नात्माश्रयादिदोष:, तथोक्तं दृश्यत्वहेतूपपादने प्राक् ;

अग्रे च वक्ष्यते | It had been said in the chapter
on knowability (dRshyatva), that there is no case of self
dependency or AtmAshraya on account of the inner witness
being delimited by ignorance. This will be further discussed in
the future.

यत्र च यत्साधकं व्यावहारिकं , तत्र तद्व्यावहारिकम् ; यत्र तु साधकं प्रातीतिकम्, तत्र

फलमपि तत्रैव ; Where the establishing means is empirically
real, the established entity is empirically real too. Where the
establishing means is apparently real, the established entity is
also apparently real only.

न तु व्यावहारिकमिति सर्वविधिप्रतिषेधादिव्यवहारासङ्कर: | Therefore, there

needs to be no confusion that an empirically real portion of the
vedas dealing with injunctions and prohibitions has no utility in
empirically real transactions based on such instructions.

अतएव - लोकस्यापि व्यतिक्रमे विचारस्य यादृच्छिकवाङ्गमात्रतापत्तिरित्युदयनोक्तमपि - निरस्तम् ;

Thus the following statement by udayanAchArya which was
quoted to support the opponent's stand, stands refuted - "If
enquiry is conducted in a manner contrary to that which is
universally accepted, then it can only lead to a situation of
anything goes, i.e anything that occurs in one's head is stated
in argument.

व्यावहारिकसत्त्वेन लोकमर्यादानतिक्रमात् | It is refuted because what we have

said does not go against worldly convention - in fact we are
stating that it is empirically real, because it is accepted
empirically.

The opponent had quoted kumArila bhaTTa's words (सत्यत्वं न

सामन्यं मृषार्थपरमार्थयोः, विरोधात्, न हि सिंहत्वं सामान्यं सिंहवृक्षयोः - reality
cannot be common to both the unreal and the real, for that
would be contradictory. Just like one does not say that both
the tree and the lion share the common attribute of lion-ness)
in support.

भट्टाचार्यवचनानि विरुद्धत्वेन भासमानानि सत्त्वत्रैविध्यानिरूपणायामविरोधेन

व्याख्यास्यन्ते | The siddhikAra says - even if the great teacher
Bhatta's words appear to be opposed to this, but we will prove
that is not so, in the chapter on sattAtraividhyanirUpaNam -
establishing the three orders of reality.

तस्मात् पक्षादिसर्वमिथ्यात्वसाधनेऽपि न व्याहति: || Thus, there is no

contradiction in saying that the inference is capable of
establishing the mithyAtva of the world, even when every
component in the inference, such as paksha etc is mithyA.

इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ असत: साधकत्वोपपत्ति: | This concludes the chapter

on asata: sAdhakatva upapatti.
asata: sAdhakatvAbhAve
bAdhakanirUpaNam (part 1)
अथासत: साधकत्वाभावे बाधकनिरूपणम् |
In the previous chapter, it was established that even objects
that are vyAvahArika, that is, have empirical reality (but not
ultimate reality) are capable of being sAdhaka-s, i.e.,
achieving / proving things. The opponent in this chapter
argues that mithyA objects cannot have sAdhakatva (asata:
sAdhakatvAbhAva:). The siddhikAra provides logic to refute that
view in this chapter (hence, asata: sAdhakatvAbhAve
bAdhakanirUpaNam).
The opponent’s view is that only ultimately real objects are
capable of achieving something. In response,
the advaitin argues that all that is required for achieving
something is that the object is not asat, it is tucChavilakshaNam.
The opponent argues that such a position suffers from the
flaw of gauravatva, or superfluousness.

ननु - सत्त्वापेक्षया तुच्छविलक्षणत्वादेर्गौरवतरत्वेन साधकत्वे कथं तन्त्रत्वमिति -चेन्न ;

The opponent says - To prove sAdhakatva, or the power to
establish things, if instead of saying that the object is sat, if
it is held that it is not asat, then such a position is
superfluous, it suffers from gauravatva. How can that be the
basis then?
The siddhikAra says - no. What do you mean by sat?

त्रिकालबाधविरहरूपस्य सत्त्वस्य लघुत्वाभावात्, A sat (reality) which means

unsublatability in all three periods of time is not
parsimonious (compared to saying it is not asat)
जात्यादिरूपस्य तस्य मिथ्यात्वाविरोधित्वात्, If that (sat, or reality) is something
which is a jAti (ie a category of things), then such a
conception is not contradictory to mithyAtva (the opponent's
intent is not achieved)
नेन पारमार्थिकसत्त्वस्य
उभयसिद्धे सद्विविक्ते साधकत्वदर्नेनर्श
साधकत्वाप्रयोजकत्वाच्च | Something that both (dvaitin and
the advaitin) agree is not sat, is seen to have sAdhakatva.
Further, pAramArthikatva does not imply sAdhakatva.
How so?
तथाहि - प्रतिबिम्बे बिम्बसाधकत्वं तावदस्ति | To explain - the reflection
proves the existence of the original.
तस्य बिम्बात्मना सत्त्वेऽपि प्रतिबिम्बाकारेणासत्त्वात् परमार्थसत्त्वं न साधकत्वे
प्रयोजकम् | Even though that (the reflection) is real when seen
as the original, as the reflection, it is not real - therefore, it
follows that it is not necessary that only real things
have sAdhakatva.

एवं स्वप्नार्थस्यासतोऽपि भाविशुभाशुभसूचकत्वम् | Similarly, even though

dreams are unreal, they are able to indicate good / bad
events in the waking state.
यद्यपि तत्रत्यदर्शनस्यैव सूचकत्वम् ; Even if it is argued that, while the
dream object is unreal, the dream jnAna (cognition) is real,
and therefore it is only a real cognition that is an indication
of good / bad events…
'पुरुषम् कृ ष्णं कृ ष्णदन्तं पश्यती'त्यादिश्रुतिबलात् ; for example, on the basis of
the shruti which says "if you see a dark man with black teeth
in the dream, (know that that indicates the death of the
dreamer)".
तथापि दर्शनमात्रस्यातिप्रसक्तत्वेन विषयोऽप्यवश्यमपेक्षणीय एव | Even then, to say
that only the cognition has sAdhakatva, is an untenable
extension, because the dream cognition presupposes dream
objects.

एवं स्फटिकलौहित्यस्य उपाधिसन्निधानसाधकत्वं च | Similarly, the

redness of the crystal establishes that there is an upAdhi (an
adjunct, ie a red flower) close-by.
नच - लौहित्यं स्फटिके न मिथ्या, किन्तु धर्ममात्रप्रतिबिम्ब इति न पृथगुदाहरणमिति -
वाच्यम् | It cannot be argued that - The redness of a crystal is
not mithyA (ie, is real). It is the reflection of the attribute of
the upAdhi in the crystal. Thus, it is not a different example
to the one of reflection provided earlier.
Because:
धर्मिभूतमुखादिनैरपेक्ष्येण तद्धर्मभूतरूपादिप्रतिबिम्बादर्शनात्, One never
observes the reflection of the attribute (form) alone, without
the substance (the face) that has the form. Thus, the
redness of the crystal is not a case of reflection.
प्रतिबिम्बस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वनियमेन लौहित्यस्य स्फटिके व्याप्यवृत्तिप्रतीत्ययोगाच्च | Moreover,
there is a difference in the two examples. The reflection
occupies only a part of the mirror (avyApya vRtti), whereas the
redness observed in the crystal pervades the crystal in its
entirety (vyApya vRtti).
लौहित्ये स्फटिकस्य त्वारोपे तस्य प्रतिबिम्बत्वम्, स्फटिके लौहित्यारोपे तु तस्य मिथ्यात्वमिति
विवेक: | If the crystal had been superimposed on the redness,
then that can be classified as a reflection. Whereas here,
the redness is superimposed on the crystal (it appears to
belong to the crystal). Thus, such a redness must be mithyA.
That is the difference.
स्फटिकमणेरिवोपधाननिमित्तो लोहितिमेति लोहितिम्नो मिथ्यात्वं दर्शितं
प्रतिबिम्बसत्यत्ववादिभि: पञ्चपादिकाकृ द्भि: | Even the author of
the panchapAdika (padmapAdAchArya) who considers reflections
to be real (because they are identical with the original),
shows that the redness of the crystal is unreal with the
words - “Like the crystal whose redness is on account of
the proximate object”.

एवं रेखातादात्म्येनारोपितानां वर्णानामर्थसाधकत्वं | Similarly, varNa-s, the letters

of a language are superimposed on written lines (the script)
and together, they indicate sound / meaning. The script is
not the letter itself, the letter is assumed to be the script, by
convention.
नच - रेखास्मारिता वर्णा एवार्थसाधका इति - वाच्यम् ; It cannot be argued that
it is not superimposed letters, but letters that are
recollected by the written script, that confer meaning.
 वमयंशैश
आ"वमयं ककारोऽयं गकार इत्यनुभवात् अभेदेनैव स्मरणात्, विवेके सत्यपि
दृढतरसंस्कारवशात् नारोपनिवृत्ति: | We recall them as being identical with
the letters, such as this set of lines is the sound “ka”, this is
“ga”, etc. Even when one knows the difference, as the
association is so strong, that superimposition is not
removed.
अतएव ककारं पठति लिखति चेति सार्वलौकिको व्यवहार: | As a result, we
observe everyday usage like “He is reading ‘ka’, writing ‘ka’,
etc.”.
षप्रत्यायकत्वम् | Further,
वर्णारोपितदीर्घह्रस्वत्वादीनाम् च नगो नागो इत्यादावर्थवि षप्रत्यायकत्वम्शे
the superimposition of elongations/shortening of the vowels
in the script allows for the distinct comprehension of the
meanings of words such as naga (tree / mountain)
and nAga (snake / elephant) – they share the same
consonants, but the meanings are different on account of
the elongations in the vowels, indicated by the script.

नच - वर्णेष्वनारोपितध्वनिसाहित्यं तदभिव्यक्तिरूपं वा दैर्घ्यं प्रत्यायकम्, एवं

ह्रस्वत्वादिकमपीति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued thus – It is the
unsuperimposed sound which manifests as the elongation or
shortening, not the script.
ध्वनीनामस्फुरणेऽपि दीर्घो वर्ण इत्यादिप्रत्ययात् | Because, even when
the sound itself is not heard, it is possible to infer that the
speaker is trying to say an elongated vowel.

ननु - आरोपितेन वर्णदैर्घ्यादिना कथं तात्त्विकार्थसिद्धि:, न ह्यारोपितेन धूमेन

तात्त्विकवह्निसिद्धिरिति - चेन्न;
The opponent says – “How can a superimposed elongation /
shortening of letters indicate a real meaning? For, an unreal
smoke does not prove the presence of a real fire.”

The siddhikAra says - no.

साधकतावच्छेदकरूपवत्वमेव साधकताया: प्रयोजकं , न त्वारोपितत्वमनारोपितत्वं वा –
The ability to prove something is because of the
characteristic of sAdhakatva, not whether it happens to be real
or not.

धूमाभासस्य त्वसाधकत्वम्; साधकतावच्छेदकरूपव्याप्यत्यभावात्, नासत्त्वात् ;

Unreal smoke may not establish fire because it does not
have the ability to prove the existence of fire, and not
because it is non-existent.
अनाभासत्वग्रहच श्चतत्र
बहुलोर्ध्वतादिग्रहणवद्व्याप्तिग्रहणार्थमेवापेक्षित: | To know that
the smoke is not unreal, we need to check whether there is
a lot of smoke, it is going upwards, etc. Therefore, what is
needed is whether there is a vyApti (concomitance) between
the sAdhaka (the hetu, the indicator) and sAdhya (the
indicated).
तदुक्तं वाचास्पतिमिश्रै: - 'यथा सत्यत्वावि षेऽपिशे
षेऽपिचक्षुषा रूपमेव ज्ञाप्यते न रस:,
तथैवासत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि वर्णदैर्घ्यादिना सत्यं ज्ञाप्यते, नतु धूमाभासादिने'ति |
As was said by vAcaspati miSra in the ArambhaNAdhikaraNa -
"even though they are real, the eyes are only able to see, but
not taste. Similarly, even though they are unreal, elongated
letters are able to reveal a real object, when an unreal
smoke is unable to do so."

दृष्टं हि मायाकल्पितहस्त्यादे: रज्जुसर्पादेश्च भयादिहेतुत्वं सवितृसुषिरस्य च मरणसूचकत्वम्

शङ्काविषस्य च मरणहेतुत्वम् | It has been observed that a) An unreal
elephant and b) an unreal snake observed in place of the
rope can cause a real fear; c) that a non-existent hole seen
in the sun can be an indication of imminent death and that d)
the fear that one has consumed poison (even when that
doubt is unfounded) can lead to death.

ननु - तत्र शङ्कैव भयमुप्त्पाद्य धातुव्याकुलतामुत्पादयति सैव मरणहेतु:, नतु शङ्कितं विषमपि
;
The opponent says - there it is the doubt alone that creates
fear, leading to the imbalance in the humours in the body
(the kapham, vAtam, pittam of ayurveda) leading to death. The
cause of death is not the unreal poison.
एवं सवितृसुषिरमायाकल्पितगजादीनामपि ज्ञानमेव तत्तदर्थक्रियाकारि, नत्वर्थोऽपि ;
Similarly, in the case of the hole in the sun, the magical
elephant etc, it is the cognition (ie the illusion) that leads to
the various outcomes described, and not the non-existent
objects themselves.
तथाच सर्वत्रोदाहृतस्थलेषु ज्ञानमेव हेतु:, तच्च स्वरूपत: सत्यमेव; in all the
examples, it is the cognition that is the cause (for action),
and that cognition is intrinsically real.
अन्वयव्यतिरेकावपि ज्ञानस्यैव कारणतां ग्राहयत:, नहि संनिहितं सर्पमजानानो
बिभेति | By the logic of anvaya and vyatireka also, it is the
cognition that is the cause. The person who has not seen
the rope snake nearby, will not fear it. Thus, it is not the
existence of the rope-snake that causes fear, but its
cognition.

नच - अर्थानवच्छिन्नस्य ज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्गादर्थावच्छिन्नमेव ज्ञानं

हेतु: ; तथाचार्थोऽपि हेतुरेवेति - वाच्यम् ; The advaitin may argue thus –
“If a cognition which does not include its object is
considered as a cause (for a particular outcome), then it will
lead to the situation that any cognition can lead to any
outcome. Therefore, it must be admitted that cognition in
association with the object is the cause. Hence, the object
too must be admitted to be the cause.” – That is not correct
(this is the dvaitin speaking), because:
अर्थावच्छिन्नस्य ज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वेऽपि अवच्छेदकस्यार्थस्य
ताटस्थ्येनाहेतुत्वोपपत्ते: - Even though cognition in association with
objects is the cause, as the association of the object with
the cognition is only incidental, the object cannot be called
the cause.

There are several examples where an incidentally present

entity does not do anything. The opponent gives 11 different
examples. Like:
1) घटावच्छिन्नस्य तदत्यन्ताभावतद्ध्वम्सादेर्घटदेशकालभिन्नदेशकालादित्वेऽप्यवच्छेदकस्य
घटस्य तदभाववत्, The absolute-absence of the pot and its
posterior-absence (absence post the pot’s destruction), may
be located in a time and place other than the time and locus
of the pot, but that is not the case for the delimitor of the
absence, the pot. The pot cannot be located in a time and
space other than when and where the pot is present.

2) घटेच्छाब्रह्मज्ञानयोर्घटज्ञानवेदान्तसाध्यत्वेऽपि घटब्रह्मणो:
तदभाववत्, Even though the desire for a pot arises because of
the knowledge of the pot, the pot itself does not exist
because of the knowledge of the pot. Even though the
cognition of Brahman is born from vedAnta, Brahman itself is
not born from vedAnta.

3) घटप्रागभावस्य घटं प्रति जनकत्वेऽपि घटस्याजनकत्ववत्, Even though

the absence of the pot is said to be one of the causes of the
creation of the pot, the pot itself is not considered to be the
cause of the pot.

4) विशेषादर्शनस्य भ्रमं प्रति जनकत्वेऽपि विशेषदर्शनस्य तदभाववत् Even though the

absence of specific knowledge can lead to illusion (when
only the shiny side of the shell is seen, and its black
underside of the shell is not, one mistakes the shining object
to be silver), specific knowledge does not lead to illusion.
5) विहिताकरणस्य प्रत्यवायजनकत्वेऽपि विहितकरणस्य तदभाववत् Even though the
failure to perform the prescribed ritual leads
to pratyavAya (sin), the performance of prescribed ritual does
not.

6) स्वर्गकामनाया: यागजनकत्वेऽपि स्वर्गस्य तदजनकत्ववत् Even though the

desire for heaven leads one to perform the sacrifice, heaven
does not lead to the sacrifice.

7) अतीतादिस्मृत्यादेर्दु:खादिजनकत्वेऽप्यतीतादेस्तदजनकत्ववत् Even though the

memory of past objects is a cause of sorrow etc., the past
objects themselves do not generate sorrow. The memory of
Sita caused Rama's grief, Sita did not.

8) असद्विषयकपरोक्षज्ञानस्य तद्व्यवहारहेतुत्वेऽप्यसतस्तदभाववत् Even though

the knowledge of an asat object leads to activity,
the asat object itself does not lead to vyavahAra.

9) चिकीर्षतघटबुद्धेर्घटहेतुत्वेऽपि घटस्य तदहेतुत्ववत् Even though the desire to

create a pot is needed to create a pot, a pot is not sufficient
to create a pot.

10) ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य तदज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वेऽप्युदासीनस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणस्तदभाववत् Even

though the cognition of Brahman removes the ignorance of
Brahman, Brahman does not remove the ignorance of
Brahman.
11) ब्रह्माज्ञानस्य जगत्परिणामिकारणत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणस्तदभाववच्च | Even
though the ignorance of Brahman is the changing material
cause for the world, Brahman is not the changing material
cause for the world.

Thus, through all these examples, the nyAyAmRtakAra wishes

to argue that where two factors have an incidental
association, both of them together cannot be held to be the
cause of an outcome. Only that factor which directly leads
to the outcome is the cause of the outcome, not the
incidentally associated factor. Extending this to the issue
under discussion, he argues that even though the dream
object in association with the dream cognition is the cause
of fear, the object by itself cannot be called the cause of
fear, because being unreal, its association with the
cognition is merely incidental. The dream object is what is
known as an upalakshaNa.

He continues:
नच - तथापि मिथ्यार्थे ज्ञानव्यावर्तकताऽस्तीत्यसतोऽपि हेतुत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can
the advaitin argue thus - Even so, as a mithyA object
distinguishes one cognition from the other (i.e. a rope-snake
cognition is different from a pot cognition, because the rope-
snake is different from the pot), it must be admitted that
the mithyA object is independently the cause of (activity).
Because:
नहि व्यावृत्तधीहेतुत्वं व्यावर्तकत्वं, किन्तु व्यावृत्तिधीहेतुधीविषयत्वमेव; सत्यपि दण्डे तदज्ञाने
व्यावृत्त्यज्ञानात् | The object being the cause of a distinguishing
cognition is not the basis for distinguishing, rather it is being
the object of the cognition that is the cause of the
distinguishing knowledge.
To explain: Even though the stick is present, if it is not
known, the individual holding the stick cannot be identified
as a daNDI – a stick endowed individual.

The mere existence of the stick does not act as a cause for
the separating knowledge of the individual as a daNDI. The
knowledge of the stick causes us to perceive the person as
a “daNDI”, which distinguishes him from other people not
holding sticks.

The advaitin may argue:

अथावच्छेदकस्य मिथ्यात्वे अवच्छिन्नस्यापि तन्नियम:, The mithyAtva of the
delimitor (upAdhi) necessarily implies the mithyAtva of the
delimited (upahita).

न; तुच्छ्ज्ञाने तुच्छवैलक्षण्ये च तुच्छत्वस्य, प्रातिभासिकाद्वैलक्षण्ये प्रातिभासिकत्वस्य,

पञ्चमप्रकारायामात्मस्वरूपभूतायां वा अनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानस्य निवृत्तौ
चतुर्थप्रकारानिर्वचनीयत्वस्य, पारमार्थिकात्मस्वरूपे तद्भिन्ने वा अनृतद्वैतस्याभावेऽनृतत्वस्य
चादर्शनात् तत्रावच्छेदकानामसदादीनाम् ताटस्थ्येऽत्रापि तथास्त्विति - चेत्,
न;
No – because such a rule fails in the following places:
1) तुच्छ्ज्ञाने तुच्छवैलक्षण्ये च तुच्छत्वस्य, The cognition of non-existent
objects (delimited) is not absolutely non-existent, but the
object (delimitor) is.

2) प्रातिभासिकाद्वैलक्षण्ये प्रातिभासिकत्वस्य, That which is “different from

prAtibhAsika” (delimited) does not have prAtibhAsikatva, but
a prAtibhAsika object (delimitor) does.

3) पञ्चमप्रकारायामात्मस्वरूपभूतायां वा अनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानस्य निवृत्तौ

चतुर्थप्रकारानिर्वचनीयत्वस्य, The removal of ignorance (avidyA nivRtti) is
considered to be the fifth category in ontology (as
postulated by AnandabodhAchArya), but avidyA itself is of the
fourth category, anirvachanIyam. Alternatively, the nature of
the self is sat, but the cognition of the self is anirvachanIyam.
AnandabodhAchArya postulated that the removal of the
ignorance belongs to a separate (fifth) category of ontology
compared to the any of the four previously acknowledged
categores – sat (real), asat (absolutely unreal), sadasat (real
and absolutely unreal), sadasatvilakshaNam / anirvachanIyam (that
which is neither / cannot be spoken of as real nor unreal).
4) पारमार्थिकात्मस्वरूपे तद्भिन्ने वा
The quality of pAramArthika is located in the self, but that
which is different from pAramArthika is not located in the self.
5) अनृतद्वैतस्याभावेऽनृतत्वस्य चादर्शनात्
The absence of unreal duality does not contain unreality
itself.

तत्रावच्छेदकानामसदादीनाम् ताटस्थ्येऽत्रापि तथास्त्विति In each of these cases,

even though the delimitors are unreal, but as they are
incidental, they do not make the delimited unreal. Let that
be the case here also.
Until here was the argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra.
The siddhikAra says in response: - चेत्, अत्रोच्यते - if this is the
argument, here is our reply:
यदुक्तं ताटस्थ्यलक्षणमुपलक्षणत्वमेव सर्वत्रावच्छेदस्येति, तन्न It was said
wherever anything is delimited, it is only incidentally so, and
therefore all the delimitors are upalakshaNa-s – that is
incorrect.
विशेषणत्वे सम्भवत्युपलक्षणत्वायोगात् | Because, if it is proven that
the delimitor is present as a visheShaNa, it cannot be
considered upalakshaNa.

विशेषणत्वबाधपूर्वकत्वादुपलक्षणत्वकल्पनाया: ; The postulation of a

differentiator as an upalakshaNa is only possible when it being
a visheShaNa has been ruled out first.

अन्यथा 'दण्डी प्रैषवानन्वाह' 'लोहितोष्णीषा ऋत्वि ज : प्रचरन्ती'त्यादावापि वेदे

दण्डलौहित्यादेरुपलक्षणत्वात् तदभावेऽपि अनुष्ठानप्रसङ्ग:, If this is not
accepted, if the vedic statements such as "the one with the
stick chants the invocation for invitation" and "the red
turbanned priests walk about", are interpreted such that the
qualifiers “stick” and “red” respectively are understood to
be upalakshaNa-s, it would mean that even in the absence of
the qualifiers, the vedic sacrifice can be conducted, which
would erroneous.
To explain, the veda prescribes that the Rtwik that invites
the devatA-s to the sacrifice needs to do so holding a stick,
दण्डी प्रैषवानन्वाह. This is called praiSha mantra uccAraNam. The priest is
called a daNDI, because the mantra must be uttered only
when he is holding the stick, not otherwise. Thus
the daNDa must be a visheShaNa not a upalakshaNa in
the praiSha mantra.
There is another example, that the Rtwik-s have to wander
about the sacrificial hall wearing a red turban लोहितोष्णीषा
ऋत्विज: प्रचरन्ति. If the qualifier “red-turbanned” was
an upalakshaNa, then even without wearing the red turban they
would be allowed to walk about in the sacrificial hall, but
doing so would invalidate the sacrifice.

'सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानी'त्यत्र सर्वशब्दस्य सर्वनामसंज्ञा न स्यात्, In

the pANini sUtra 'all, etc., are pronouns', the word 'all' would
not be included in the list of pronouns.
There is a sUtra in vyAkaraNa called सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानि
- sarva etc are together called pronouns. Here if sarva is
taken as an upalakshaNa in the term “sarva etc”, then sarva
would not be included in the list of pronouns.
'जन्माद्यस्य यत' इत्यत्र जन्मनो ब्रह्मलक्षणत्वम् न स्यात् ;
In the brahma sUtra, 'From whom the universe takes birth etc.',
Brahman would no longer be considered to be the source of
the universe.

विशेषणार्थत्वेन तद्गुणसम्विज्ञानबहुव्रीहिसंभवेऽप्युपलक्षणार्थत्वेनातद्गुणसम्विज्ञानबहुव्रीहिस्वीकारप्रसङ्गात्
|
If they - all in “all etc” (sarvAdi) and birth in “birth etc”
(janmAdi)) - are considered as visheShaNa-s, the compound
would be a tadguNasamvijnAna bahuvrIhi, whereas if they
are upalakshaNa-s it would end up becoming atadguNasamvijnAna
bahuvrIhi.

एवं 'असिपाणय: प्रवेशयन्ता'मित्यादिलौकिकप्रयोगेऽपि प्रतिबिम्बादिज्ञानानां जनकत्वे च

विशेषणतया प्रतिबिम्बादीनामपि जनकत्वे बाधाभावात् नोपलक्षणत्वपक्षो युज्यते, Similarly,
the statement "(only) sword-bearing people may enter" is
made in everyday speech on the basis that the qualifier
“sword-bearing” is a visheShaNa and not an upalakshaNa. Where
the reflection of an image gives rise to the knowledge of the
original, the knowledge of the original thus gained contains
with it the cognition of the reflection as well, which
knowledge is not sublated – therefore they cannot be used
as a upalakshaNa-s.
उदाहृतस्थलेषु सर्वत्र बाधकमस्त्येवेति विशेष: | Whereas, in each of the
instances provided by the nyAyAmRtakAra, the usage as
a visheShaNa has been sublated, leading them to be classified
as upalakshaNa. That does not mean that objects as the
delimitor of cognitions are upalakshaNa-s for cognitions.
तथाहि - प्रथमे घटदेशकालौ गृहीत्वा तद्भिन्नदेशकालत्वं तदत्यन्ताभावादौ ग्राह्यम् ; घटस्यापि
तत्संबन्धे तद्देशकालभिन्नदेशकालत्वमेव व्याहतं स्यात् | Therefore - in the first
example, it is after first knowing the location and time of the
pot, can one know the time and location of its absolute
absence and absence post-destruction. Whereas, once the
pot is known to exist in a specific time and place, it would
be a contradiction in terms to even look for its existence in
any other time and space. Thus, as the absence of the pot in
the same time and space as its location would be a
contradiction, the pot is an upalakshaNa in the cognition “the
absence of the pot in the location and time of its existence”.

द्वितीये त्विष्टापत्ति:, क्वचित् घटज्ञानस्य घटेच्छाजनकत्ववत् घटं प्रत्यपि जनकत्वात्,

ब्रह्मणो वेदान्तसाध्यत्वे तु नित्यत्वविरोध: | The second example is
desirable to us – Sometimes, just like the knowledge of a pot
can lead to the desire for a pot, it can also lead to the
creation of the pot also. However, to hold that Brahman is
born from vedAnta, would contradict the eternality of
Brahman, so it cannot occur.

तृतीये प्रागभाववत् घटस्य स्वजनकत्वे प्रतियोगिप्रागभावयो: समानकालीनत्वापत्ति:,

स्वावधिकपूर्वत्वघटितजनकत्वस्य स्वस्मिन्व्याहतत्वम् च | In the third
example, if the pot, like its prior absence, is a cause for its
own creation, then the counterpositive and the prior
absence would end up existing at the same time. As
causation would require the presence of the cause in the
prior instance of the effect’s creation, it would mean that
the pot existed prior to its own creation. Again, a case of
contradiction, hence such a possibility is denied.

चतुर्थे पञ्चमे च प्रतियोगितदभावयो: सहावृत्त्या भ्रमप्रत्यवाययोरनुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्ग: | In the

fourth and fifth examples as the counter-positive and its
absence cannot co-exist simultaneously, illusion
and pratyavAya will not be generated. It was said that the
absence of particular knowledge and the absence of the
performance of prescribed rituals lead to the rise of illusion
and pratyavAya respectively. If the particular knowledge is
present, the illusion does not arise, because the existence
and absence of particular cannot coexist. Similarly, if
prescribed duties are performed, pratyavAya does not arise
because the performance and the non-performance of
prescribed rituals cannot coexist.

षष्ठे कामनावत् कामनाविषयस्य यागजनकत्वे तस्य प्राक्सत्तया तत्कामनैव व्याहन्येत; सिद्धे

इच्छाविरहात् | In the sixth example, like desire, if the object of
desire (heaven) is also capable of impelling the performance
of the sacrifice, then as the heaven is already obtained
before the rise of the desire of heaven, the desire itself will
have no reason to exist. Desire cannot arise for attained
objects.

: | In the
सप्तमे अतीतस्य जनकत्वे कार्याव्यवहितपूर्वकाले स्वस्वव्यापारान्यतरसत्त्वापत्ति
seventh, if it is said that a past object is the cause
(happiness / sadness, as opposed to the memory of a past
object doing so), then either it or its effect would exist in the
instant before the existence of the effect. Either option
would be problematic - the past object cannot exist in the
present, nor can the effect exist before its creation.

अष्टमे असतो जनकत्वे नि:स्वरूपत्वव्याघात: | In the eighth, if the non-

existent object leads to activity, then that activity will itself
be non-existent, without a svarUpa of its own. Therefore, we
say that it is the cognition of the non-existent object that
leads to activity.
नवमे चिकीर्षितघटज्ञानवत् स्वस्य जनकत्वे पूर्वव्याघात: | In the ninth, if the pot,
like the desire for the pot, were to be the cause for the pot,
then it will suffer from the same defect outlined earlier.

दशमे उदासीनस्य ब्रह्मणो न निवर्तकत्वम् ; स्वरूपत: उपहितस्यैव वृत्तिविषयत्वेन तस्या

विषयत्वात् , उपहितस्य च निवर्तकत्वमस्त्येव | In the tenth, relation-less
Brahman will not remove ignorance. Brahman becomes an
object of cognition when it is upahita (delimited) by the
cognition. That upahita Brahman will certainly remove
ignorance.
एकाद शाब्रह्माज्ञानस्य परिणामिकारणत्वेऽपिन ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वं कार्ये
जडत्वोपलम्भात् | in the eleventh, even though the ignorance of
Brahman is said to be the cause of the world, Brahman is
not the cause of the world because the world is seen to be
inert.

एवंविधबाधकबलेन तत्रोपलक्षणत्वस्वीकारात् नच प्रकृ ते बाधकमस्ति; Therefore, in

each instance, there is a contributing contradiction that
necessitates the usage to be an upalakshaNa. However, in the
context under discussion (that it is possible for unreal
objects to have the potency to cause an effect) there is no
contradiction which requires the classification of objects
as upalakshaNa-s.

अव्यवहितदेशकालादिवृत्तित्वस्य प्रातिभासिकसाधारणत्वात् | Existing in the

time and location of their effect (and thus can be the cause)
is a feature shared with prAtibhAsika objects.

षात् | For example, in the

इदानीमत्र सर्प इत्यादिप्रतीत्यवि षात्शे
cognition “There is a snake there”.

न हि क्वचित् बाधकबलेन मुख्यपरित्याग: कृ त इति सर्वत्र तथैव भविष्यति; Just

because in some cases that causation of unreal objects has
been denied because of a particular contradiction, it does
not mean that as a rule, everywhere that must be true.
उत्कर्षाद्यनुविधानाच्च | Especially so, because we do see that
there is gradation in the effect created, it must follow that
that is because of the gradation in the causes.

तथाहि - स्वप्ने जागरे चोत्कृ ष्टकलधौतदर्शनात् उत्कृष्टं सुखं

नाच्चोत्कृष्टंभयादि दृश्यते ; Thus - in the dream and
उत्कृष्टसर्पादिदर्नाच्चोत्कृष्टंर्श
waking states, when one observes that the precious metal is
of superior quality, one derives a greater pleasures, and
when observes a fearsome snake, the fear that it inspires is
greater. The amount of happiness or fear one experiences is
proportional to the degree of quality or size of the object
seen. Thus, to say that it is only the cognition of the object
and not the object itself that gives rise to the effect, would
be incorrect.

विषयस्याकारणत्वे तदुत्कर्षानुविधानं कार्ये न स्यात्; न ह्यकारणोत्कर्ष: कार्यमनुविधत्ते इति

न्यायात् | If the object was not a cause for the effect (i.e. if its
cognition was the cause), then it would not be possible to
explain the variance in the quality of the effect, because of
the rule that without a higher quality of the cause, we
cannot account for the quality of the effect.

नच ज्ञानप्रकर्षादेव तत्प्रकर्ष:, ज्ञानेऽपि विषयगतप्रकर्षं विहायान्यस्य प्रकर्षस्याभावात् | It cannot

be said that the superiority of the cognition is the reason to
account for the superiority of the effect, because the
superiority of the cognition itself cannot stem from anything
apart from the object's superiority.

अथ ज्ञानगता जातिरेव प्रकर्ष: | If it is argued that superiority is a

characteristic (jAti) of the cognition…

न, चाक्षुषत्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्, विषयप्रकर्षेणैवोपपत्तौ चाक्षुषत्वादिव्याप्यनानाजात्यङ्गीकारे

गौरवान्मानाभावाच्च | …No, because one cannot separate that
characteristic from characteristics such as visual
perceptiveness, etc., leading to the confusion between
categories. Moreover, instead of saying that intensity of the
experience is due to the superiority of the object seen, to
say that it is due to some specification that cannot be
clearly distinguished from other cognitive characteristics
such as visual perceptiveness, etc., is unnecessarily
complicated.

किं च भयादिजनकत्वे सर्पाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वमेव कारणतावच्छेदकमास्थेयम् | Further,

the determining characteristic of serpent knowledge in
causing fear must be regarded to be the association of that
cognition with the object, serpent.

ज्ञानत्वेन जनकत्वे अतिप्रसङ्गात् | To argue that the determining factor

of the cognition is because of itself is a stretch.

तथाच मिथ्यात्वावच्छिन्नत्वाकारेण ज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वात् भ्रमस्थले ज्ञानमात्रस्य जनकत्वेऽपि मिथ्याभूतस्य

जनकत्वमागतमेव | As the association of cognitions with unreal
objects confers unreality to the cognitions also, if it is
argued that it is only the cognitions of illusion that lead to
the effect (and not the illusory objects), then as such
cognitions themselves are illusory, it follows that unreal
things can cause effects.

जनकतावच्छेदकरूपेण च मिथ्यात्वे रूपान्तरेण सत्त्वमप्यसत्त्वात् नातिरिच्यते; अनुपयोगात्

| If the cognition’s ability to create an effect is in one aspect
which is unreal, and even if the cognition happens to be real
in another aspect, then that does not negate the proposition
that an unreal thing can lead to real effects, because the
real aspect of the cognition is not relevant to its causative
power.

तदुक्तं खण्डनकृ द्भि: - 'अन्यदा सत्त्वं तु पाटच्चरलुण्ठितवेश्मनि यामिकजागरणवृत्तान्तमनुसरती'

ति | as Sriharsha says in khaNDanakhaNDa khAdya – “If it is said
that the cause happens to be existent at some other time,
then it is as useful as saying that the guard woke up after
the thief has bolted with the house’s belongings.”

Until now, we had established that the cognition is unreal on

account of its association with an unreal object. Now that
illusory cognitions are intrinsically mithyA will be proven.

स्वरूपेणापि तु भ्रमज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वमस्त्येव; The illusory cognition is

intrinsically mithyA too.
स्वरूपतो बाधाभावे विषयतोऽप्यबाधप्रसङ्गात् | Because, if the cognition is
not intrinsically sublatable, its object will end up
unsublated.

नच गुणजन्यत्वमुपाधि:, Being born from a faultless source is not a

vitiating condition to this argument.

Which argument ? It is unstated, but we can infer it.

रज्जुसर्पादिविषयकम् भ्रमज्ञानम् अबाधितविषयकम् स्वरूपतो अबाधितविषयत्वात्
समीचीनज्ञानवत् - The erroneous knowledge of the snake rope,
is not sublated, because it is intrinsically unsublated, like
right knowledge.

At first glance, being born from a faultless source appears to

be a vitiating condition here.
Valid knowledge is born from a faultless source, but the
illusory cognition of the rope snake cannot be said to be
born from a faultless so
asata: sAdhakatvAbhAve
bAdhakanirUpaNam (part 2)
Until now was the argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra.
The siddhikAra now responds.:

तन्न; सर्पज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नस्यासर्पज्ञानाद्व्यावृत्तौ प्रयोजकं न तत्तत्स्वरूपमेव;

सर्वज्ञानसाधारण्याभावात्, किन्त्वनुगतो धर्म: कश्चित् |
That is not correct. The differentiator that separates the
cognition of non-snake, from the cognition endowed with
snake-cognition-ness (that is, snake cognition), is not
intrinsic to the cognitions themselves - because the intrinsic
nature of all cognitions is the same. On the other hand, it is
differentiated on the basis of some attribute present in
them.

सोऽपि सर्पज्ञानमात्रे न जातिरूप:, प्रयक्षत्वानुमानत्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्,

किन्तूपाधिरूप: |
That attribute is not a category (jAti) of cognition that is
located in all snake-cognitions, because the cognition of the
same object can sometimes be direct, sometimes indirect
and therefore, one could mistaken for the other. Rather, the
adjunct of the cognition is the differentiator.

स च स्वरूपसंबन्धेनाध्यासिकसंबन्धेन वा संबन्धिभूतविषयादन्यो न भवति;

मानाभावात् |
That adjunct is svarUpasambandha, or AdhyAsika sambandha – in
either case, it is not different from the sambandhi, the object
of the cognition, for there is no proof to hold that it is
different.

अत एव धर्म्यन्तरसंबन्धमनपेक्ष्य विलक्षणमित्युक्तानुमानं बाधितं द्रष्टव्यं व्यभिचारि

च | Thus, the inference that the difference between the
cognition of the snake, and the cognition of another object
is known, without taking recourse to the object, has been
contradicted and is defective because of vyabhichAra. Why?

तथाहि - घटसंयोग:, पटसंयोगान्न जात्या भिद्यते, तदवृत्तिजात्यनधिकरणत्वात्, To explain

- the contact that the pot has (with the ground) and the
contact that the cloth has (with the ground) are not different
because of the jAti. There is no jAti present in any of the
contacts that can be used to differentiate one with the
other.

किं तु घटरूपोपाधिनैवेति धर्म्यन्तरसंबन्धमपेक्ष्यैव विलक्षणे

घटसंयोगित्वावच्छिन्ने साध्याभाववति उक्तहेतुसत्त्वाद्व्यभिचार:,
अप्रयोजकं च | Rather, the difference arises only on the basis
of the pot-upAdhi etc. Thus, as the difference arises on the
basis of the relationship with the substratum, it follows that
with regards to the one endowed with pot contact-ness (i.e.,
pot contact), the sAdhya is absent, but the stated hetu is
present, and therefore the inference suffers from vyabhichAra.
Further, such a hetu does not prove the sAdhya, and hence
is aprayojaka.

नच - उपलक्षणीभूतचैत्रसंबन्धेनापि कलमाङ्कुरादेर्व्यावृत्ततापत्ति:, विपक्षबाधायामिष्टापत्ते:

| It was said that the connection with some unrelated factor
like Chaitra can end up as a differentiator between the rice
and wheat saplings. If it does, so be it – that is not
undesirable for us.

न हि जातेर्व्यावर्तकत्वे उपाधिरव्यावर्तको भवति | If the jAti was a

differentiator, it does not mean that the upAdhi is not.

एवं शिलोद्धरणमाषोद्धरणकृ त्यो: परस्परं जात्या व्यावृत्तावपि विषयरूपोपाधिनापि व्यावृत्तिरविरुद्धा |

For example, even if the effort to lift a rock and a bag of
grains is different on the basis of a jAti, it does not rule out
that there is some difference on account of the
object upAdhi.

शिलोद्धरणे च जातिविशेषविशिष्टाया: कृ तेर्जनकत्वेन तद्रहिताया माषोद्धरणकृ तेस्तदनिष्पत्तिरविरुद्धा |

If some jAti exists in the effort required to lift a stone which
is absent in the case of lifting a sack of grains, that does not
prove that they are not different because of the objects also,
and hence does not contradict our position.

व्यावृत्तेरन्यतोऽपि सिद्धिसंभवे कार्यकारणभावादिनिर्वाहाय जातिविशेषस्यापि कल्पनात्,

अतीतासद्विषयकज्ञानव्यवहारादौ चातीतासतोरेव व्यावर्तकत्वम् | Even if
differentiation is done in some other way and that if a jAti is
postulated to account for the maintenance of a cause and
effect relationship, the differentiation of activity involving
past objects from activity involving non-existent objects is
on the basis of the past objects and the non-existent objects
only.

न हि व्यावृत्तिधीजनकत्वं तत्; येन सत्त्वाभावे प्राक्सत्त्वशरीरतया न स्यात्, किं तु

व्यावृत्तिधीजनकधीविषयत्वमित्युक्तम् | That differentiator is not the
cognition being born from a differentiating cognition, for
prior to the existence of the differentiating cognition, the
differentiation would not exist. Rather, it was said that the
differentiation is because of being the object of a knowledge
that gives rise to the differentiating knowledge. That is, the
object knowledge.

तच्चातीतादौ सुलभमेव | In activity involving past objects, that

differentiation is easily apparent. The objects experienced in
the past give rise to memories, whereas non-existent
objects do not lead to a recollection.

नमपिनिरस्तम् ; That is why, the case of

अत एवाभावादिनिदर्नमपिर्श
differentiation of absence arising without taking recourse to
the counterpositives has also been disproved.

उक्तरूपव्यावर्तकत्वस्यात्यन्तासत्यपि संभवेन कदाचित् सति संभवस्य

कै मुतिकन्यायसिद्धत्वात् | As the differentiation as defined can exist in
absolutely non-existent objects, what to talk of those that
exist at some time?

ननु - विषयस्य व्यावर्तकत्वेऽपि सर्वत्र विशेषणत्वासंभवात् उपलक्षणत्वमेव वाच्यम् ; The

opponent objects – even if the object is the differentiator,
they need not be visheShaNa-s everywhere, and therefore their
causation must be admitted to be as upalakshaNa-s.

उपलक्षणेन चोपलक्ष्यगतस्वसंबन्धव्यतिरिक्त: कश्चिद्धर्म एवोपस्थाप्यते, काके नेव

गृहसंबन्धिना तद्गतसंस्थानविशेष: ; As upalakshaNa-s, they establish some
attribute in the upalakshya independent of the connection
between the upalakshaNa and the upalakshya. Like in the case
of the crow used to identify the house, which leaves a mark
in the house (the hay in the roof is standing up indicating
that the crow had been sitting there previously and has
subsequently flown away), which is then later use to
differentiate that house from other houses.

तथाच स एव व्यावर्तक इति विषयसंबन्धमनपेक्ष्य स्वगतेनैव धर्मेण ज्ञानस्य व्यावृत्तिरिति

Thus, that (established attribute) itself is the differentiator.
Therefore, without requiring some connection between with
the object, the cognition is able to differentiate based on
some attributed located in it. Thus the cognition itself
becomes the differentiator.
- चेन्न; The siddhikAra says - If this is the argument no.

विषयस्य विशेषणत्ववदुपलक्षणत्वस्याप्यनभ्युपगमात् | Just like you had argued that

the thing is not a visheShaNa, it is not an upalakshaNa either.

ष्ये व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिर्जन्यते, तद्विशेषणं व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिकाले

येन हि स्वोपरागाद्वि ष्येशे
विशेष्योपरञ्जकमित्यर्थ:, यथा गोत्वादि | That which generates the
differentiating knowledge due to its association with
the visheShya but which is dependent on the visheShya at the
time of differentiation is classified as a visheShaNa. For
example, the cowness differentiates a cow from the horse,
and is dependent on the individual cow at the time of
differentiation.

येन च स्वोपरागमुदासीनं कु र्वता विशेष्यगतव्यावर्तकधर्मोपस्थापनेन व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिर्जन्यते

तदुपलक्षणम् , यथा काकादि | That which is not associated with
the visheShya, but differentiates the visheShya by establishing a
differentiating attribute in the visheShya is upalakshaNa, like the
crow, etc.

A house is identified by saying that the one with the crow is

Devadatta’s house. The crow does not belong to the house.
It happened to be seated there. However, when it flies off
the house clutching the straw on the roof of the house.
There are still some pieces of straw on the roof which are
left standing, indicating that the crow had sat there. That
clue is used to identify Devadatta’s house.

यत्तु - विशेष्ये नोपरञ्जकम्, न वा धर्मान्तरोपस्थापकम्, अथ च व्यावर्तकं तदुपाधि:

However, that which does not associate with the visheShya,
nor does it establish some attribute in the visheShya, but is
still a differentiator, is an upAdhi.

यथा पङ्कजशब्दप्रयोगे पद्मत्वं , यथा वोद्भिदादिशब्दप्रयोगे यागत्वावन्तरजातिविशेष: | For

example, when the word pankaja is used to identify a lotus,
and the word udbhid is used to denote a special type of
sacrifice.

अत्र हि पद्मत्वयागत्वावान्तरधर्मौ पङ्कजनिकर्तरि फलो द्भे दन कर्त रि च न

धर्मान्तरमुपस्थापयत:, अप्रतीते: ; Here the lotus is
called pankaja because it is born from the mud, and a
particular kind of sacrifice is called udbhid due to a unique
result being created from the sacrifice. Neither differentiator
establishes an attribute in the substratum, for such a thing
is not observed.

न वा स्वोपरक्तां बुद्धिं जनयत:, समुदाये शक्त्यन्तरानभ्युपगमात्, Nor is there

some intrinsic connection revealed between the word and
the object. In the jAti, no other shakti is accepted.

अथ च कु मुदज्योतिष्टोमादिभ्यो व्यावर्तकावित्युपाधी एव | Thus, they are

understood to be upAdhi-s by which lotuses and
the jyotiShToma sacrifices are differentiated.

इदं च प्राभाकराणां भाट्टानां च संमतमुदाहरणयुगलम् | These two examples

are acceptable to both the prAbhAkara and bhATTa sub-
schools of pUrvamImAmsa.

तार्किकाणाम् त्वाकाशशब्दप्रयोगे शब्दाश्रयत्वमुदाहरणम् | To convey the idea to

logicians, the example of the word space to indicate being
the locus of sound is used.

अतेवाविद्यादिकं साक्षित्वादावुपाधिरिति सिद्धान्तो वेदान्तिनाम् | It is for

this reason that ignorance etc are said to be the upAdhi-s of
the sAkshi in vedAnta siddhAnta.

अतो यत्र विषयस्य विशेषणत्वम् न संभवति, तत्कालासत्त्वात्,

तत्रोपाधित्वाभ्युपगमान्नोपलक्षणत्वनिबन्धनदोषावकाश:, Where the object cannot
have a qualifier, because the qualifier is not present at the
time, its differentiation on the basis of an upAdhi does not
suffer from the same defects as upalakshaNa-s.

संदेहे तु विशेषणत्वमेवाभ्यर्हितत्वादुपेयते | If there is a doubt about the

existence of the object, we should use a visheShaNa.

तस्माद्विषय एव सर्वत्र ज्ञाने व्यावर्तक: | Therefore, in all instances,

objects alone are the differentiator of cognitions.
एकविषयकस्मृत्यनुभवयोःपरोक्षापरोक्षयोच श्चविषयमनपेक्ष्य जात्या
परस्परव्यावृत्तिदर्शनात्, सर्वत्र विषयनिरपेक्षा जातिरेव व्यावर्तिके ति न युक्तम् ; It may be
that in the case of the experience of the object and the
memory, which are direct and indirect cognitions
respectively, mutual differentiation is possible on the basis
of jAti, without resorting to the object, but that does not
mean that in every case one can use a jAti to differentiate,
without depending on the object.

भिन्नविषयके समानजातीये तदसंभवात् | For, that is not possible for the

cognition of different objects, or those cognitions belonging
to the same jAti.

नच - तत्रापि जातिरस्ति क्षीरादिमाधुर्यवदिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be held that –

there too, jAti exists, like in the case of the sweetness of
milk being used to differentiate milk from sugar, honey etc.

चाक्षुषत्वादिना सङ्करस्योक्तत्वात् | Because, it has been already said

that using visual perceptibility differentiate can lead to
mixing up of cognitions.

नच - तव मते तत्तद्व्यावृत्तेस्तत्तदाकारत्वेन चैतन्यस्य तत्प्रतिबिम्बितत्वेन वा मम तु तत्तज्ज्ञानस्य

तत्तदीयस्वभावत्वेन तत्तद्व्यवहारजननशक्तत्वेन वा स्वत एव वैलक्षण्यमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus – In your system (advaita), the
differentiation of objects is based on the cognition taking on
the object's Akara, and consciousness being either delimited
by such a cognition, or being reflected in such a cognition.
In my system (dvaita) though, the cognition of each object
differentiates itself from the cognition of other object, by its
own (the cognition’s own) nature, or alternatively by its
power to lead to a particular kind of activity, or alternatively
by itself it is different.

विषयस्यैवाकारसमपर्कत्वेन स्वभावव्यवहारयो: परिचायकत्वेन च तन्नैरपेक्ष्येण व्यावर्तकताया

वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् ; Because cognition is able to perform its function
only by taking on the ‘AkAra’ of the object, and by ignoring
it, it is not possible to explain how one cognition is different
from the other.

अस्माभिच श्चतुच्छे जनकत्वस्यानुक्तत्वात् | We never admit that the

absolutely non-existent (like the hare’s horn etc., are
capable of inducing activity.
विशेषणत्वोपाधित्वयो: संभवे च नोपलक्षणत्वमित्युक्तम् | Further, as we can prove
that this differentiation is possible
through visheShaNa or upAdhi, the charge that we are resorting
to upalakshaNa does not apply.

नच 'कथमसत: सज्जायेते'ति श्रुत्या 'नासतोऽदृष्ट्वा' दिति सूत्रेण शशविषाणादिभ्य:

नादित्यादिभाष्येण च विरोध: , Nor can it be argued thus –
सदुत्पत्त्यदर्नादित्यादिभाष्येणर्श
This contention contradicts the shruti “How can sat be born
from asat?”, the sUtra, “asat cannot be the cause, because
such a scenario is observed nowhere” and the bhAShya,
which says that “that the birth of an existent object cannot
be from a non-existent object such as the hare’s horn”.

तेषां तुच्छे जनकत्वनिषेधपरत्वात्, अस्माभिच श्चतुच्छे जनकत्वस्यानुक्तत्वात् | Because,

all those have the negation of tucCha (absolutely non-
existent entities) being the cause of anything as their
primary intent. We never claim that tucCha is the cause of
things.

तस्मात् सद्विविक्तत्वं साधनमिति सिद्धम् || Therefore, it follows that

‘being other than sat’ is a sAdhana (hetu in the inferential
reasoning) for mithyAtva.

इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ असत: साधकत्वाभावे बाधकम्|| Thus, in this chapter

of the advaita siddhi, we have refuted the argument
that asat (mithyA objects) cannot prove / establish anything.
dRgdRshya sambandha bhanga:
(part 1)
अथ दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धभङ्ग: |
The next chapter in the advaita siddhi is the commencement of
the anukUla tarka, or supportive logic to the inference of the
world's reality. In any anumAna (inference), the opponent can
insinuate aprayojaka shaNkA / vyabhichAra - हेतु अस्तु साध्यं मास्तु, that
is, he can allege that the presence of the hetu does not
necessarily imply that the sAdhya is present. To refute such a
charge, one needs to provide some supporting logic to
strengthen the inferential reasoning.

For example, in the inference of fire in the mountain,

the hetu or reason is dhUmavatvAt, because there is smoke in the
mountain. The opponent may argue that smoke does not
necessarily imply fire. To this, the anukUla tarka, or supportive
reasoning given is the cause-effect relationship between fire
and smoke. If smoke did not imply fire, it would mean that
such a cause-effect relationship is invalidated.

In the inference of the mithyAtva of the world, the hetu or

reason is dRshyatvAt, knowability - The world is mithyA, because
it is knowable. The opponent alleges that knowability need not
imply the world's mithyAtva. The anukUla tarka or supportive
reasoning given by the advaitin in this chapter is that there is
no real relationship possible between the seer and the seen
(objects) - despite this, the world is cognised. Therefore, it
follows that there is an AdhyAsika sambandha, an unreal
relationship between the seer and the world. Therefore, the
world too is unreal.

This is the reasoning provided

by ChitsukhAchArya and AnandabodhAchArya - dRgdRshya sambandhAnupa
patti - the impossibility of a relationship between dRk (the
knower) and dRshya (the known).

The methodology adopted in this chapter is pArisheSha nyAya -

review all possible alternatives for a real relationship between
cognition and the world, refuting all such alternatives and
concluding by saying that if no real relationship is possible, it
must follow that there is an unreal relationship between the
two.

The pUrvapakshi says

ननु - मिथ्यात्वानुमानमप्रयोजकं , सत्यत्वेऽपि दृश्यत्वोपपत्तेरिति - The inference of the
world's mithyAtva does not prove its objective (because there is
no supporting reasoning for it). Even if the world was real, it
would be possible to cognise it.
The siddhikAra responds
चेन्न; दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्ते: | No. Because no real relationship is possible
between the seer and the seen.

नहि ज्ञानं ज्ञेयासंबद्धमेव प्रकाशकम् ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् | jnAna does not

reveal an object without being connected / associated with the
object. If it did, it would be atiprasanga - any cognition can
reveal any object. I can study English and gain an
understanding of French.
नापि संबद्धम् ; Nor can jnAna have a (real) connection with
objects.

The word jnAna in the advaitin's parlance applies to both

consciousness and cognition.
आत्मस्वरूपस्य तद्गुणस्य वा ज्ञानस्य ज्ञॆज्ञॆयेनसंयोगसमवययोरभावात्, jnAna,
whether it means the Self (ie consciousness), or whether it
means an attribute of the Self (according to nyAya) can neither
be in a samyoga relationship or samavAya relationship with
objects.

It cannot be in a samyoga with objects - if jnAna is the Self, the

Self is not in contact with anything. If it refers to an attribute
of the Self, samyoga in nyAya can only be between two dravya-s,
substances. It cannot be between an attribute and a
substance. So if jnAna is an attribute of the self, it cannot have
a samyoga with anything.

It cannot be in a samavAya with objects. In nyAya, jnAna is in

a samavAya relationship with the Atma, not with other objects.
Further, samavAya is a permanent relationship with objects.
If jnAna had a samavAya relationship with other objects, it
would imply that the objects are forever cognised, which is not
supported by experience.

अन्यस्य चानाध्यासिकस्य संबन्धस्याभावात् | There is no other relationship

between the two, other than an unreal one.

The opponent may argue that things are the objects of

knowledge - thus things and knowledge share a subject-object
relationship. The siddhikAra denies that also.
नच विषयविषयिभाव: स:, it cannot have a subject-object relation either.

विषयित्वविषयत्वरूपस्य एकैकमात्रनिष्ठत्वेन द्विनिष्ठसंबन्धात्मकत्वासंभवात्, दुर्निरूपत्वाच्च | A

relationship which by definition must exist in two entities,
cannot be of the nature of subject-object, because the nature
of a subject and nature of object are located in only entity -
either the subject or the object. It is difficult to define such a
relationship as well.

To explain, the attribute of being a subject is only located in

the subject and the attribute of being an object is located only
in the object. Therefore, a relationship which always exists in
both the related entities cannot be of the nature of subject-
object.

Further, it is impossible to prove establish what

constitutes viShayatva (being an object) or viShayitva (being a
subject). How did the pot suddenly become a viShaya? What is
this new factor called viShayatva that the pot obtains due
to jnAna?

तथा हि - 1) विषयत्वं किं ज्ञानजन्यफलाधारत्वं, As the bhATTa mImAmsaka-

s say, does viShayatva mean being the locus of a result that
accrues to the object as a result of a cognition?
The bhATTa-s call this by various names - prAcakyam, jnAtatA, etc.
Can viShayatva mean being the basis, the reason why an object
becomes known by a cognition?

2) किं वा ज्ञानजन्यहानादिबुद्धिगोचरत्वं,
Or else is it (as according to some), that which leads to a
notion of avoiding etc, as a result of being cognised? It is said
that when an object is known, it can lead to three outcomes.
The knower can think that:
a) the object is grAhyam, to be obtained; or
b) it is tyAjyam, to be avoided; or
c) udAsInam, something to be indifferent about.

Is viShayatva that which leads to a thought that the object

should be obtained, avoided, or be indifferent towards?

3) उत ज्ञानकर्मत्वम्
Or is viShayatva the karmatva (object-caseness) of jnAna?
In Sanskrit grammar, certain verbs are akarmaka - do not have
an object, while others are sakarmaka - have an object. For
example, the verb tiShThati (sit) is akarmaka - the action sitting
does not have an object (the question, what do you sit?, is a
nonsensical one). The verb bhunkte (eat), on the other hand,
is sakarmaka - one eats something.
Thus, is viShayatvam the karmatva of the jnAna, the object case-
ness? Just as action and its object have karma
kArakatva sambandha, do jnAna and viShaya have karma kArakatva
sambandha?

4) ज्ञानाकारार्पकत्वं वा,
or is viShayatvam that which causes the thought to take on
the shape of the object?

Some school of buddhists (yogAchAra) say that a cognition taking

a particular shape is erroneously considered as an external
object. One sub-school says that no objects exist, while
another says external objects do exist. However, they all
agree that a thought pattern of an object is necessary for
cognition. Therefore, is viShayatvam that which causes the
thought to take the shape of the object?

There is a problem with this definition - one cannot say that

only the object is required for the thought to take the shape of
the object - there are other things required. For example, one
needs eyes to see the object etc. If we say that the thing
which causes the jnAna to take that shape is the viShaya of
the jnAna, then even the eyes will also end up as
the viShaya of jnAna. That is not true however. To correct this, it
is said:

5) दृश्यमानत्वे सति तत्त्वं वा, or, that which causes the thought to
take the shape of the object, while being itself perceivable is
viShayatva?

6) ज्ञानजन्यव्यवहारयोग्यत्वं वा, or, is viShayatva being capable of

being an object of vyavahAra (activity) that is a result of jnAna?

7) सन्निकृष्टकरणेन यज्ज्ञानमुत्पाद्यते तत्त्वं वा, or is viShayatvam the

characteristic of the object that gives rise to a cognition as a
result of the sense organs coming into contact with the
object?

For a pot to be perceived by the eyes, it is necessary for a

prior relation between the eyes and the pot. Thus we can
say viShayatva is that which is a result of a sense organ's
relation with an object, which leads to the object being
revealed by the jnAna. That is, the object comes to have a
connection with a sense organ, as a result of which it becomes
revealed by a cognition, and becomes the viShaya of the jnAna.
The characteristic of that object is viShayatva.

8) यस्यां संविदि योऽर्थोऽवभासते स तस्या विषय:, तथाच संविदि भासमानत्वमिति वा, or

the object which is illumined in a particular cognition is the
object of the cognition. viShayatva is the characteristic of the
object being illumined in cognition.

This is a definition found in the prAbhAkAra work - prakaraNa

panchikA (by shAlinAtha miSra).

9) संबन्धान्तरमन्तरा ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वं वा | or viShayatva is that

qualifier of a cognition which does not depend on any other
relationship. To explain, that which differentiates one
cognition from the other (pot cognition from a tree cognition
for example), without resorting to any other relationship is
the viShayatva. A pot differentiates a pot cognition from a tree
cognition without requiring any other relationship between the
pot and the cognition.

Nine alternative definitions to viShayatva were proposed.

The siddhikAra proceeds to refute them sequentially.

1) आद्ये फलं न तावत् ज्ञातता, In the first, one cannot say

that jnAtata, becoming known, is a result of the jnAna.
According to bhATTa mImAmsa, cognition is beyond sensory
perception. However, when an object becomes known, it
allows us to infer the presence of cognition. A seer when
asked 'What do you see?', will reply 'a pot', and not 'cognition
of pot'.
अनङ्गीकारात्; advaitin-s do not accept that a new attribute
called jnAtatA enters the object when it becomes known.
According to us, the removal of ignorance is jnAtatA, and not
something new that is created due to knowledge.
अतीतादावभावाच्च | Even if such an attribute was accepted, it does
not exist in remote cognitions of past objects, etc.
The object of memory need not exist in the present, for
example the memory of a pot seen in the past. When that
memory is recalled now, one cannot insist that a new attribute
called jnAtatA enters that past pot. However, the pot that is
recalled is the object of the memory. Similarly, the cognition of
future objects does not create this new attribute in those
objects.

But can anything other than jnAtatA be the result of

knowledge? The siddhikAra says no.

2) नापि हानादि:, Neither can avoidance etc (or a wish to take up, or
indifference) be a result of cognition.
गगनादौ तदभावात्, None of these three apply for the cognition of the
sky, etc (even indifference does not apply)
कलधौतमलादेरपि तज्ज्ञानविषयत्व प्रसङ्गाच्च | If a person picks up a coin
from the floor, which after picking up he realises is dirty. As he
has picked up the dirt as well, the dirt would end up
having viShayatva according to this definition, but the fact is
that such a viShayatva is not a result of his cognition of the dirt
to begin with.
नाप्यभिज्ञाभिलपने; Neither can referring to the object verbally
(abhilapana) or identifying the object (abhijnA) be used to define
the viShayatva of the object.
तयोर्ज्ञेयावृत्तित्वात् | Because, both of them are not located in
the known object - The locus of verbal reference or
identification is not the object, but the speaker/identifier. So
how can the object get viShayatva?

नच - विषयविषयिभावेन ते तत्र स्त इति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that

those two (verbal reference / identification) exist in the object
through a subject-object relation,

तस्यैव विचार्यमाणत्वात् | because that is the very thing that we are

currently trying to define - what makes the object the object in
a subject-object relation?

अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि | Therefore, the second option is also not

correct.

3) न तृतीय:, ईश्वरज्ञानस्यातीतादिज्ञानस्य च कर्मकारकाजन्यत्वेन निर्विषयत्व प्रसङ्गात् | The

third definition is not correct. God's cognition, and the
cognition of past objects etc is not born from the objective /
accusative case (i.e. the cognition of an object is not a result
of the object being a contributory factor to its cognition, as the
object of the activity of cognition), and would end up having no
objects.

A kAraka (case) is something which enables the kriyA, action to

occur. Thus, it is one of the causes of action. There are
different factors,
like kartA (actor), karma (object), karaNa (instrument) etc.,
needed for an action to happen. Thus, the ultimate meaning
of kAraka is being the cause for an action. In examining
knowledge, we ask if the object of knowledge, as a
contributory factor of knowledge, is always needed?

God's knowledge, for example, does not need a karma kAraka. It

is an eternal knowledge, so it cannot have a cause. If it has no
cause, it cannot have any contributing causal factors and
therefore, no kAraka-s either.

Similarly for the cognition of past objects, the object is not

physically present when the cognition arises. Thus, as the
object is not present in the immediately previous instant of the
cognition (अव्यवहित पूर्वक्षणं), it cannot be considered a cause
of the cognition. This will mean that past objects cannot be
called karma kAraka. Thus, this definition will make these
cognitions as objectless, which is incorrect.

4) न चतुर्थ:, it is not the fourth alternative either

ज्ञानतदाकारयोरभेदेन सर्वेषां ज्ञानहेतूनाम् विषयत्वापातात्, As thought

and its pattern are identical, every cause of the thought, will
end up being a cause of the thought pattern (light, sense
organs, mind, Atma), and every cause of cognition will end up
as the object of the cognition as well.

अनुमित्यादिविषये तदभावाच्च | Further, the object of inference etc

will end up not meeting that definition. The object of the
inference of fire in the mountain is fire, but fire is not the
cause of the inference.

5) न पञ्चम:, दृश्यमानत्वस्य विषयत्वघटितत्वेनात्माश्रयात् | Neither is it the fifth

alternative, because to say something is दृश्यमानं, ie revealable by
cognition, is inextricably linked within the concept of being the
object of knowledge, thus such a definition of viShayatvam is
self-referential.

We are trying to determine what jnana viShayatvam is, ie what is

the characteristic of an object that makes it revealed by jnAna.
If you say that that factor is because it is revealable, you are
not proving anything - the definition refers to itself.

6) न षष्ठ:, योग्यतायां योग्यतान्तराभावात् | Neither is it the sixth definition,

because to know that something is capable of being an object
of vyavahAra, one must know what that capability is beforehand
- however, knowing that capability (ie for capability to be an
object of knowledge), requires that capability be capable of
being known, which requires another capability, and so on and
so forth, ad infinitum, leading to infinite regress.

नच - योग्यता योग्यातां विनैव योग्या, यथा दृश्यत्वं दृश्यत्वान्तरं विनैव दृश्यमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be alleged that - capability does not need another
capability to be capable, just like one knowability does not
require another knowability in order to be knowable.

अवच्छेदकरूपापरिचये योग्यताया एव ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् | Because, without a

determining factor, a means to know whether the object is
capable of being an object of vyavahAra born out of its
cognition, it is not possible to determine if the object is
capable or not. There is a requirement for a yogyatAvacChedakam.

या
नच ज्ञानविषयत्वम् तदवच्छेदकम्; आत्मारयात् श्र| One cannot say that
त्
being an object of knowledge is that determining factor,
because that would be self-referential.

7) न सप्तम:, नित्येश्वरज्ञानस्य निर्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गात् | The seventh definition is also

not correct, because God's cognition would end up object-less.
As God's cognition is eternal, it cannot be a result of the
object coming into contact with His sense organs.

8) नाष्टम:, संविदीति न तावदधिकरणसप्तमी:, ज्ञानस्य ज्ञॆज्ञॆयानधिकरणत्वात्|

The eighth is also not correct. The seventh case-ending in the
words "in cognition" does not imply that cognition is the locus
of the object, because the cognition is inside the person and
the object is somewhere outside - so the known cannot be
located within knowledge.

नापि विषयसप्तमी ; तस्यैव निरूप्यमाणत्वात्, Nor can the phrase "in cognition"
in the definition be used in the sense of meaning the object of
cognition (viShaya saptami), because that is the very thing we are
trying to define.

संविदो विषयत्वं संवेद्यस्य च विषयित्वमिति वैपरीत्यापाताच्च | Further, it (viShaya

saptami) may lead to the eventuality that cognition is the object
and the object is the subject.

नापि सति सप्तमी; भासमनत्वस्य विषयताघटितत्वेनात्माश्रयात् | It cannot be sati

saptami (i.e., when cognition is present, that which is illumined)
either, because the idea of illumination is inextricably linked
with the idea of viShayatvam, thus one cannot talk of revealing /
illumination prior to defining viShayatva, ending up becoming
self-referential.

9) नापि नवम:, मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र रूपज्ञानसमवायस्य संबन्धान्तरं विनैव

रूपज्ञानावच्छेदकस्य 'इदं रूप'मिति ज्ञानेऽपि विषयत्वापातात् | Nor is it the ninth
definition either - when someone says "I have the knowledge
of colour", as the 'inherent relationship of colour in me' is also
present as a qualifier in the cognition of colour without
requiring any other relationship, it too would end up becoming
the object of the cognition.

When someone sees an object, he says that object appears to

me (mat samavetam) - this is said using nyAya terminology - There
is a samavAya sambandha between me (Atma) and the cognition of
colour. The object of the cognition of colour is colour, not
the samavAya of the cognition of colour in me.

In nyAya, it is postulated that samavAya does not depend on any

other sambandha to perform its function, because that will lead
to infinite regress (if samavAya needed another samavAya, that
would lead to another, that to another, and so on).

In the cognition in question, samavAya is

between Atma and rUpajnAna - if it is not connected to both,
then it cannot be a sambandha. Thus samavAya exists in rUpajnAna,
but it does not require any other sambandha to be present there.
Thus samavAya ends up as a qualifier of rUpajnAna without any
other sambandha. If something that is present as a qualifier
of jnAna without requiring any other sambandha is the viShaya or
the object of the cognition, then, in the cognition "this is a
colour", the 'samavAya of the cognition with me' will also end up
as the object of the cognition.

Thus far, nine definitions of viShayatvam were considered and

dismissed. The opponent takes a different tack.
In pUrvamImAmsa, there is a rule that whatever a knowledgeable
person, an abhiyukta, considers to be a mantra is taken as
a mantra. A long discussion is conducted to consider other
possible definitions of what constitutes a mantra, following
which it is determined that none of them apply, and therefore,
a mantra is simply something that a knowledgeable person
deems to be a mantra. The opponent uses this to argue that the
same approach be considered for viShayatvam also.

The pUrvapakshi argues -

ननु - ज्ञानविषय इत्यभियुक्तप्रयोग एव ज्ञानविषययो: संबन्ध:, Let the
relationship between cognition and its object simply be what a
knowledgeable person considers to be the object of
knowledge.
यथा अभियुक्तस्य मन्त्र इति प्रयोगविषयत्वमेव मन्त्रलक्षणम्, similar to the
definition of a mantra being that which a knowledgable
considers to be a mantra.
न चान्योन्याश्रयः, Nor is this a case of mutual dependence in saying
that something is considered to be an object of knowledge
because a knowledgeable person says so, and a
knowledgeable person says so because he considers it to be
an object of knowledge.
पूर्वपूर्वप्रयोगमपेक्ष्योत्तरोत्तरप्रयोगादिति For what has been said
by knowledgeable people in the past has been accepted as
valid by those that follow them, which is considered as valid
by their succeeding generations etc.

- चेन्न; To such an argument, the siddhikAra says no.

एतावता हि ज्ञेयत्वमात्रं सामान्यत: स्यात्, न त्वेतद्ज्ञानविषयत्वम् | With
such a definition all that is established is that something is
knowable, not the objectification of the thing by a particular
cognition. We are not simply interested in saying that
something can be known, but in examining what makes a thing
the object of a particular cognition.

न चास्मिन् सादौ पूर्वप्रयोगमपेक्ष्य उत्तरोत्तरप्रयोगो वक्तुं शक्यते;

न्तत्
तस्यानादिमात्रविरान्तत्वात् वात् | For a usage that has a beginning at a
श्रा
particular point in time, it cannot be held that every current
instance of the usage is on the basis of a prior usage, for such
an explanation only works for cases which are beginning-less.

योऽपि
किञ्च प्रयोगोऽपि स्वविषये संबन्ध इत्यात्मारयोऽपि श्र| Moreover, if we
seek to define what constitutes usage, we end up with the
meaning being the object of knowledge, which would up a self-
referential definition.

The opponent says -

ननु - यद् ज्ञानं यदभिलपनरूपव्यवहारकारणम् स तस्य विषय:, The cognition of
which thing results in the activity (vyavahAra) of the nature of
verbally referring to it, that thing is the object of that
cognition. If a person says 'this is a pot', then he must have
had a cognition of a pot. The object of that pot-cognition is the
pot.

करणपाटवाद्यभावेन व्यवहारानुदयेऽपि सहकारिविरहप्रयुक्तकार्याभाववत्त्वरूपं

कारणत्वमस्त्येव, Even where the sense organ does not function (he
may be mute / there is no one to talk to, etc.) and thus the
activity (of speech) is absent, causation is not denied - as the
absence of the effect on account of the absence of the
enabling factors of the cause, does not imply the absence of
the cause.

Causation may directly lead to a result sometimes (phalopahita

kAraNam), but sometimes the effect does not arise even when
the cause is present, because the enabling factors needed to
produce the effect are absent, but one cannot deny that
causative power of the cause. For example, the potter remains
one of the causes of the pot, even when the pot is not created
because of the absence of other necessary factors such as
clay, etc.

नच निर्विकल्पकविषये अव्याप्ति: Nor can it be alleged that the definition

does not apply in the case of indeterminate cognition.

According to nyAya, prior to the knowledge of a thing

(determinate cognition or savikalpaka jnAna), there arises an
indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka jnAna). Only after
the nirvikalpaka jnAna arises can savikalapaka jnAna arise. In nyAya,
every object has attributes. It is also held that prior to the
knowledge of any qualified object (vishiShTa), it is necessary to
have the knowledge of the qualifier (visheShaNa). That is, the
cognition of the visheShaNa is a cause for the cognition of
the vishiShTa. This is a general rule in nyAya.
For example, in the savikalpaka jnAna, "this is a pot", the pot is
the object of the cognition. The pot is not just an attribute-less
pot, but a pot qualified by pot-ness, thus it is a vishiShTa.
The naiyyAyika says that if one needs to know that something is
a pot, one needs to know what pot-ness is first. This
knowledge of the visheShaNa is what the naiyyAyika refers to
as nirvikalpaka jnAna, and says that this nirvikalpaka jnAna is a cause
for the savikalpaka jnAna. There is another school of thought
within nyAya that says that the visheShya also is cognised by
a nirvikalpaka jnAna, but some naiyyAyika-s hold that only
the visheShaNa is cognised by nirvikalpaka jnAna. In any
case, nyAya holds that a nirvikalpaka jnAna precedes
every savikalpaka jnAna.

No one is aware of the existence of such an indeterminate

cognition, let alone speak about it. Thus, even though
the nirvikalpaka jnAna has an object (the visheShaNa or the visheShya),
under this definition it will end up object-less, thus the
definition suffers from avyApti.

It must be noted that the naiyyAyika nirvikalpaka jnAna is different

from the advaitin's nirvikalpaka jnAna. According to
the advaitin, nirvikalpaka jnAna only refers to the akhaNDAkAra vRtti,
the impartite cognition of Brahman.

तस्यानङ्गीकारात्, The opponent says, one cannot hold that the

definition suffers from avyApti, because the dvaitin does not
accept nirvikalpaka jnAna in the first place. He continues:

न च यत्तद्भ्यामाननुगमो दोष:, Nor can it be held that the usage of the

words "which" (yat) and "that" (tat) in the definition means that
it is not a universal definition that applies to all cognitions.
That is, each cognition will have a separate definition for what
constitutes its object (if I talk of pot, then the pot is the object
of the pot-cognition which led me to talk of the pot. If I talk of
a tree, then the tree is the object of the tree-cognition which
led me to talk of the tree, etc.).

विषयत्वेनश्नतस्यादोषत्वात्, it is not a
कस्य को विषय इति अननुगतस्यैव प्रनविषयत्वेन
defect of the definition that each cognition has its own object,
and there is no one common object for all cognitions. Each
cognition has its own object, so what is the defect in saying
that there is a definition that applies to each cognition
separately?

नच घटज्ञानान्तरम् प्रमादात् यत्र पट इति व्यवहारस्तत्र घटज्ञानस्य

पटाभिलपनरूपव्यवहारजनकत्वेन पटविषयत्वापत्ति:, Nor can one argue
that if someone erroneously says that there is a cloth present
when in reality they have seen a pot, the cloth erroneously
ends up as the object of the pot-cognition, merely by the
activity of the talk of a cloth occurring as a result of the
cognition of the pot.

समानविषयाभिलापं प्रत्येव ज्ञानस्य जनकतया भिन्नविषयतया

तत्राजनकत्वादिति To say that the verbal activity is a result of
cognition only holds good when the object of the cognition and
what is talked about are the same. If one sees one thing and
talks of something else, it cannot be held that the cognition
led to the talk.

The siddhikAra replies

- चेन्न; if this is the argument, no.

This definition cannot be understood. One has to first know

how a particular cognition will lead to someone speaking. Only
after that can we say the object of the words is the object of
the cognition.

What is the determining factor (kAraNatAvacChedaka dharma) for a

cognition to have the capability to lead to a particular activity?
This kAraNatAvacChedaka can only be known after a person
speaks of it. Thus, it is impossible to claim that there is a
common determining factor, avacChedaka dharma, existing in every
cognition.

अभिलपनरूपव्यवहारजननयोग्यत्वं न प्रातिस्विकरूपेण निर्णेयम्; अवच्छेदकत्वस्य

फलनिर्णेयत्वात् ; The capacity of a particular cognition to
generate a particular verbal activity cannot be known from the
cognitions themselves - that a cognition is capable of leading
to that outcome can only be observed from the result of the
cognition - the generated verbal activity.

नात्, अजनितफले प्रातिस्विकयोग्यतायां मानाभावात्, The

प्रतिस्वं च फलादर्नात्र्श
result is not observed from each such cognition, and without a
result, there is no basis to claim that that cognition had such a
capacity.

किन्तु तत्र तत्रानुगततत्तद्वृत्तिविषयत्वेन | Rather, the cognition's

capacity to produce a particular outcome (speaking about
something) is because the cognition has its object as an
inherent attribute.

The cognition of the pot leads talk of the pot. Thus, if you say
that the objectification of the pot by pot-cognition is known by
the pot-related verbal activity it leads to, then as we have
demonstrated, that the pot-cognition has the capacity to lead
to pot-related verbal activity is only determined when holding
on to the fact that the pot is the object of pot-cognition. This is
circular logic.
: | This is a case of AtmAshraya, self reference.
तथाच आत्मारययश्र

The nyAyAmritakAra had offered some corrections to the

definition of objectification as that which confers object-caseness
(jnAna karmatva) to the cognition. The siddhikAra responds to these
corrections.

The nyAyAmritakAra's correction is cited verbatim first. The अतएव

- निरस्तम् is siddhikAra's response to the nyAyAmritakAra.

अतएव - "ज्ञानकर्मत्वम् विषयत्वं, कर्मत्वं च न कारकविशेष:; येनातीतादौ तदभावो भवेत्,

किन्तु क्रियाधीनव्यवहारयोग्यत्वरूपातिश्यवत्त्वम् ; अन्यथा घटं करोतीत्यादावसिद्धं घटादि न जनकं
सिद्धं च न कृ तिकर्मेति द्वितीयविभक्तिरनर्थिका स्यादिति" - निरस्तम् ;
By this, the following has been refuted -
"ज्ञानकर्मत्वम् विषयत्वं, कर्मत्वं च न कारकविशेष:; येनातीतादौ तदभावो भवेत्, किन्तु In
defining viShayatva as jnAna karmatva, the word karmatva does not
refer to a particular kind of case-ending (kAraka) which could
have left it open to the charge that it would not apply to past
objects etc.,
किन्तु क्रियाधीनव्यवहारयोग्यत्वरूपातिश्यवत्त्वम् Rather, karmatva refers to the the
special characteristic of being capable of utility that accrues
to an object as a result of an action (here action = cognising)

अन्यथा घटं करोतीत्यादौ असिद्धं घटादि न जनकं सिद्धं च न कृ तिकर्मेति

द्वितीयविभक्तिरनर्थिका स्यात् Otherwise, in sentences like "he creates a
pot", one can claim that the accusative case-ending is
redundant, citing arguments such as - is the object of that
sentence an existent or a non-existent pot? If non-existent, a
non-existent pot cannot lead to the creation of the pot, and if it
is an existent pot, an existing pot will not lead to the creation
of the pot (it already exists, so why make it?).

Thus, the nyAyAmRtakAra says, let us define the object of any

action to be the suitability for achieving an utilitarian objective
that accrues to the thing as a result of the action. In the case
of making a pot, the pot's creation leads to it being used to
carry and store water. Thus, the pot can be said to be the
object of the activity of making it.
dRgdRshya sambandha bhanga:
(part 2)
The siddhikAra quotes this argument of the nyAyAmRtakAra and
says -
अतएव - निरस्तम् Therefore, this argument has thus been refuted.

He says "therefore" to indicate that a similar argument to what

he had talked about overrules the nyAyAmRtakAra's statement.
What determines the capacity to be useful? He explains
further:

व्यवहारयोग्यत्वं न व्यवहाररूपफलोपहितत्वम् ; कु त्रचित् प्रतिरुद्धे व्यवहारे अव्याप्ते: | The

capacity to be useful does not mean that in every instance, it
is useful. If it did, then sometimes when that usefulness is not
manifest, it would mean that the action would have no object.

नापि तत्स्वरूपयोग्यत्वम् ; विषयत्वादन्यस्य तस्यासंभवादिति पूर्वोक्तदोषात् | Nor

does usefulness mean that a thing is useful just by itself. What
does that mean? Apart from being the object of cognition,
there is nothing else to determine usefulness, leading to the
same defects as previously cited (self-reliance).

नच - अवच्छेदकात् भिन्नं सहकारिविरहप्रयुक्तकार्याभाववत्त्वं तदिति - वाच्यम् ;

अनुगतावच्छेदकधर्मं विना तस्यापि ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् | Don't argue that -
"There is something else apart from the qualifier (of the
cognition - the object) that determines capacity to be useful or
not. The absence of usefulness in some cases is because some
of the enabling factors for being useful are absent, not because
the capacity to be useful is absent." - because without having
some attribute inherent in the cognition (ie the object itself)
one cannot determine whether the cognition is capable of
leading to useful activity or not.

How can one determine that the reason a cognition does not
lead to activity is because there are no enabling factors? Only
after the cognition has produced its result can we determine if
it has the capacity to produce the result or not. Thus, if the
intent of saying this is to prove that apart from the object,
there are some reasons why a cognition produces a result and
we can use those reasons to define the meaning of what
constitutes an object, we argue that it is impossible to
determine what those reasons are in the absence of the object
itself.

In the satkAryavAda school, it is relatively easy to explain the

use of the sentence "he makes a pot". We say that the
"existent but unmanifest" pot, becomes manifest.

In the case of asatkAryavAda, even though a person refers to a

non-existent pot when he says "he makes a pot", the activity is
actually in relation to the lump of clay. The word pot in the
sentence by nirUDha lakshaNA refers to the lump of pot etc.

घटं करोतीत्यत्र सिद्धस्यैव कपालादे: कृ तिकर्मता In the sentence "(he) makes a

pot", it is the existent pot shards that are the object of the
action.

व्यापारकार्यतया सिद्धस्यैव कृ तिकर्मताङ्गीकारात् | Because it has been admitted

that the object of an action, being a part of some transaction,
can only be existent.

अतएव निष्पादनावाचिधातुसमभिव्याहृतकर्मपदे शक्यावयवे निरूढलक्षणामाहुरसत्कार्यवादिन: | It is

for this reason that the asatkAryavAdin-s hold that, when
verbs denoting the action of "bringing about", or
"accomplishing" are used in conjunction with a word in the
accusative case-ending, their meaning is an indirect reference
to the components of the effect, on the basis of accepted
usage, which in this case (nirUDha lakshaNA), refers to the
pot-shards that make up the pot.

That is, when the sentence "the pot is created" is used by

a naiyyAyika, the word pot in the accusative sense is
interpreted to refer to the pot-shards being joined up (to form
the pot).

सत्कार्यवादिनां तु पूर्वसतोऽप्यभिव्यञ्जनीयतया न कारकत्वकृ तिकर्मत्वयोरनुपपत्ति: |

With respect to satkaryavAdin-s on the other hand, even
though the object of creation is held to exist prior to its
creation, as it is in an unmanifest state then, there is no
incongruity in holding that the kArakatva there refers to being
the object of an action.

With that response, it has been established

that karmatvam in jnAnakarmatvam does refer
to kArakatva, a particular case ending (accusative), and all
the defects that accrue as a result of that (such as the
definition failing in the case of God's cognition, and the
cognition of past objects, etc.) still apply.

The nyAyAmRtakAra had refined the eighth definition

of viShayatva (given by prAbhAkarA-s)
next. The siddhikAra refutes that refined definition on the
same grounds. He says:
एतेन - 'यस्यां संविदी'त्यादिपुर्वोक्तेऽपि न दोष: संविदिति सति सप्तमी,
भास्मानत्वं च व्यवहारयोग्यत्वम्, तच्च सति कारणान्तरे व्यवहारावश्यम्भाव इत्येतदपि -
निरस्तम् |

For the same reason, the following argument of

the nyAyAmRtakAra also stands refuted:
'यस्यां संविदी'त्यादिपूर्वोक्तेऽपि न दोष: संविदिति सति सप्तमी, The phrase
"in which cognition" in what was previously said (that is, in the
definition of what constitutes being the object of a cognition)
is not defective, because the seventh case-ending "in
cognition" is a case of sati saptami.

A quick recap of the different kinds of seventh-case ending:

1) viShaya saptami - to denote an object. mokshe icChA - the
desire for liberation. Here, liberation is the object of the desire.
2) adhikaraNa saptami - to denote the locus of a
thing. bhUtale ghaTa: - the pot is on the ground. The ground is
the locus for the pot.
3) aupasleshika saptami - to denote something close by
(kUpe gargakulam - The garga kula live next to the
well, gangAyAm ghoSha: - the hut near the Ganges (this is not
considered to be lakshaNA in the vyAkaraNa system of
philosophy)
4) sati saptami - to denote the linking of two things. रामं वनं गते
सति अयोध्यायां जना: अत्यन्तं शोकाकु ला: अभवन् | When Rama went to
the forest, the people of Ayodhya were plunged in sorrow.
There are two activities - Rama going to the forest, and people
feeling sorrowful. The arrival of sorrow and the departure of
Rama are linked.

The nyAyAmRtakAra says let this be a case of sati saptami.

यस्यां संविदि योऽर्थोऽवभासते स तस्या विषय: The object that is
illuminated when cognition is present, is the object of the
cognition. What is illumination then?
भास्मानत्वं च व्यवहारयोग्यत्वम्, Illumination means the suitability for
activity.
तच्च सति कारणान्तरे व्यवहारावश्यम्भाव: When that is present (illumination
occurs), the activity certainly happens when other
contributory factors are also present.

- इत्येतदपि निरस्तम् - This too stands refuted, says the siddhikAra.

The same problems cited in the previous argument with
determining what constitutes yogyatvam,
the yogyatAvacChedakam resurface. Apart from the object of
the cognition, there is nothing else within the cognition itself
that confers yogyatvam to it. However, we are trying to define
what is the object of cognition in the first place. So to define
the object of cognition using terms that refer to the object of
cognition is a case of AtmAshraya, or self referential, circular
logic.

The next definition proposed by

the nyAyAmRtakAra for viShayatva, is a difficult one to
understand. We will have to take a step back to understand his
thinking.

When we see a pot, we have the cognition of the pot. The pot is
considered to be the avacChedaka, the qualifier of the pot-
cognition. We are trying to determine if there is a sambandha,
a connection, between the pot and its cognition.

When we have the cognition, "I know the pot", I am the knower,
and there is a samavAya sambandha between me and the pot
cognition. That is, the cognition inheres (is present) in me.
Here, I too am a qualifier, an avacChedaka for the cognition,
because this cognition is not had by others. However, even
though I am an avacChedaka for the cognition, I am not the
object of the cognition. The pot, on the other hand, is
an avacChedaka for the cognition, but there is no samavAya
sambandha between the pot and the cognition.

Using this, the nyAyAmRtakAra postulates a rule - if

something is the object of a cognition, it will be
the avacChedaka of the cognition, but will not have any other
relationship with the cognition. He says:

ननु - य: संबन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य यज्ज्ञानावच्छेदको यज्ज्ञानानवच्छिन्नस्वभावश्च स तस्य विषय:,

A thing, which qualifies the cognition without having any other
relationship with the cognition, while itself not being qualified
by the cognition - is the object of the cognition.

यद्यप्यात्मा स्वविषयज्ञानसमवायवान् ; तथापि न तस्य ज्ञानावच्छेदे

समवायापेक्षा, Even though I have a samavAya sambandha with
cognition of myself, I do not depend on the samavAya
sambandha to be a qualifier of the cognition. In this case, I am
the object of the I-cognition.

The nyAyAmRtakAra talks of the reflexive cognition of oneself

and says that in this case, I am both the object and locus of
the I-cognition. Here, "I" qualifies the cognition both as the
object and as the locus, and the qualification of the cognition
by "I" as the object is not dependent upon the samavAya
sambandha - ie, upon the cognition being located within me.

ज्ञानासमवायिनोऽपि घटादेस्तदवच्छेदकत्वदर्शनात्, For, it has been observed

that even though things such as pots etc do not have
a samavAya sambandha with the cognition, they are qualifiers
of their cognition.

Why did the nyAyAmRtakAra add the phrase यज्ज्ञानानवच्छिन्नस्वभावश्च

(is not qualified by the cognition) to the definition? He clarifies:

यद्यपि च रूपज्ञानं मत्समवेतं ध्वस्तमिष्टमित्यादौ रूपज्ञानाविषया

अप्यात्मसमवायेच्छाध्वंसादय: संबन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य ज्ञानावच्छेदका:,
तथापि समवेतेष्यमाणप्रतियोग्यात्मकरूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावा एव;
संबन्धेच्छादीनां संबन्धीष्यमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादिति नातिव्याप्ति: |

यद्यपि च रूपज्ञानं मत्समवेतं ध्वस्तमिष्टमित्यादौ Even though it is possible for me

to say "the colour-cognition that is located in me is destroyed /
is desirable, etc"
रूपज्ञानाविषया अप्यात्मसमवायेच्छाध्वंसादय: संबन्धान्तरमनपेक्ष्य
ज्ञानावच्छेदका:, the "destruction", the "desire", "being located
in me", do not have any other relationship with the colour-
cognition.
Without the phrase in question (यज्ज्ञानानवच्छिन्नस्वभावश्च) being
appended to the definition, they would end up as the objects of
colour-cognition because they qualify the colour-cognition
(destruction of cognition, desire for cognition, the cognition is
located in me) while not having any relationship with the
colour-cognition.
तथापि समवेतेष्यमाणप्रतियोग्यात्मकरूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावा एव; Even
so, "being located in me", "desire" and "destruction" are all
qualified by the colour cognition.
Whenever we talk of desire, it is always of something. Similarly
destruction, it is always for something. Similarly for being
located in me, it is always something that is located in me.
Therefore, each of those things are qualified by the cognition
and qualify the cognition at the same time. Hence, they cannot
be the objects of the cognition. Therefore, he adds a clause to
the definition "but are not themselves qualified by the
cognition" so that objects such as pots etc are picked up, but
things like "desire etc" are excluded.
संबन्धेच्छादीनां संबन्धीष्यमाणाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादिति नातिव्याप्ति: As
relationships such as desire etc are intrinsically linked with / in
association with the items related, there is no ativyApti (they
are not picked up by the definition).

ज्ञानविषयस्तु न ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभाव:, The object of the cognition is

not qualified by the cognition (they exist independently of their
cognition)
ज्ञानस्य घटाद्यवच्छिन्नस्वभावत्ववत् घटादेर्ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वादर्शनात् | For, it is seen
that while the cognition is always qualified by its object such
as pot, etc, the pot, etc. is not qualified by its cognition.

The next statement requires a bit of an introduction. The

cognition of the pot is called vyavasAya jnAna, and the pot
meta-cognition, i.e, cognition of the cognition of the pot is
called anuvyavasAya jnAna. "I know a pot" is vyavasAya
jnAna, "I know that I know the pot" is anuvyvasAya jnAna.

According to the bhATTa mImAmsa school, the cognition of

cognition (anuvyasaAya jnAna) is inferred from the
cognition, vyavasAya jnAna. They bhATTa-s argue that one can
infer that one has had the cognition of the pot, from the
cognition of the pot. We know that the pot cognition is related
to the pot (ghaTa avacChinna), therefore it follows that
the anuvyasAya jnAna of the pot cognition is related to the
pot cognition (ghaTajnAna avacChinna). With that as the
background, the nyAyAmRtakAra examines if the definition of
being the object of cognition applies to anuvyavasAya jnAna:

यद्यपि स्वग्राहकज्ञानविषयीभूतं ज्ञानविषयकानुमित्यनुव्यवासायादिकं ज्ञानं

ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावं ; Even though the inference, anuvyavasAya
jnAna, which has the cognition of a thing (sva) as its object, and
is itself qualified by the vyavasAya jnAna which objectifies that
thing,
तथापि स्वयं यत् ज्ञानं प्रति विषयस्तदवच्छिन्नस्वभावं नेति नाव्याप्तिरिति the vyavasAya
jnAna, which is the object of the anuvyavasAya jnAna, is not
qualified by the latter. Therefore there is no under-extension of
the definition for cognitions, which happen to be the object of
meta-cognitions.

The definition of object, to put simply is - that which qualifies

the cognition without requiring another relationship with the
cognition, but is not itself qualified by the cognition. The meta-
cognition of the pot has the cognition of the pot as its object.
The cognition of the pot qualifies the meta-cognition of the pot,
but the cognition of the pot is not itself qualified by the meta-
cognition. Therefore, the definition of what constitutes an
object applies to the objects of meta-cognitions too.

The siddhikAra responds to this.

- चेन्न; मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्याकारकज्ञानस्यात्मसमवायविषयकत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात् ;
This is not correct. Atma-samavAya (being located in me) is
an object of the cognition "colour-cognition is located in me",
but your definition does not apply to it.

According to nyAya, 'समवायस्तु एक एव' - there is only

one samavAya sambandha universally. Thus the samavAya
sambandha between me and colour-cognition, and
the samavAya sambandha between me and the cognition
"colour-cognition is located within me" are the
same. samavAya sambandha is the qualifier for the cognition
"colour-cognition is located in me".

Further, samavAya sambandha, which is a relationship

between me and the cognition "colour-cognition is located in
me", must be intrinsically qualified by both the elements in the
relationship (any relationship is qualified by the items related).
Therefore, samavAya is also qualified by the cognition
"colour-cognition is located in me".
In other words, samavAya sambandha despite being the
object of the cognition (colour-cognition is located in me), ends
up being qualified by the same cognition that it qualifies,
therefore the definition of being an object does not apply
to samavAya sambandha.

आत्मसमवायस्य संबन्धत्वेन संबन्धिभूतस्वज्ञानावच्छिन्नत्वात्,

As AtmasamavAya is a relationship, it is
qualified by the elements related, the cognition of the object
(and me).

घटस्य ज्ञानमिति प्रतीत्या घटावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वं यथा ज्ञानस्य, तथा ज्ञातो घट इति

प्रतीत्या घटस्यापि ज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावत्वेनासंभवाच्च | Like the nature
of the pot-cognition as qualified by the pot is revealed in the
notion "pot's cognition", the nature of the pot as qualified by
the pot-cognition is revealed in the notion "the pot is known".
Therefore, even the pot would fail to be included in this
definition of "being an object of cognition".

अथ - यज्ज्ञानं यदीयस्वभावं, स तस्य विषय:, मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र तु समवाय एव

रूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावो, न तु रूपज्ञानं तदवच्छिन्नस्वभावम् ; इदंच ज्ञानस्यैव
विषयत्वमुक्तम्; नत्विच्छादिसाधारणमिति नाव्याप्तिरिति - चेन्न;

Therefore the statement -

"यज्ज्ञानं यदीयस्वभावं, स तस्य विषय:, The cognition of that which leads to
the cognition being called "its cognition" is the object of the
cognition.

When a pot is cognised, it is called घटस्य ज्ञानं, घटीयज्ञानं - the pot's

cognition is pot-cognition. However the reverse, ज्ञानस्य घट:, is
not used. This is because the pot is the object of cognition, the
cognition is not an object of the pot.

मत्समवेतं रूपज्ञानमित्यत्र तु समवाय एव रूपज्ञानावच्छिन्नस्वभावो, न तु रूपज्ञानं

तदवच्छिन्नस्वभावम् ; In the cognition "colour-cognition is located
in me", it is the samavAya sambandha (located in me) alone
which is qualified by the colour-cognition, the colour-cognition
is not qualified by samavAya sambandha. That is, this is a
cognition of colour-cognition having samavAya in me, not a
cognition of "samavAya in me" having colour-cognition.

इदंच ज्ञानस्यैव विषयत्वमुक्तम्; नत्विच्छादिसाधारणमिति नाव्याप्तिरिति This is only

establishing how cognition can be the object - it does not
commonly apply to desires, and therefore there is no
overextension.

The siddhikAra refutes this by saying इति चेन्न. When the

possessive suffix was used (यदीय or the sixth case ending), that
is denoting a relationship. What is that relationship?

या
यदीयस्वभावमिति तद्धितस्य यद्विषयकत्वार्थकत्वे आत्मारयात् श्र, If the derived noun
त्
(taddhita) yadIya (whose cognition) denotes the object whose
cognition is being referred to, then such a usage in the
definition would make it self-referential (we are trying to define
the relationship between cognition and object, and you are
defining it by saying it is something which relations the
cognition and the object).

अर्थान्तरस्य निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्, No other meaning can possible be

attributed.

रूपज्ञानाभावाभावस्य रूपज्ञानरूपत्वेन रूपज्ञानस्याप्यभावीयतया तद्विषयत्वापत्ते: | As the

absence of the absence of colour-cognition is the same as
colour-cognition, the cognition of colour ends up having as its
object, the the absence of colour cognition. To explain, the
definition was यज्ज्ञानं यदीयस्वभावं, स तस्य
विषय:. rupajnAna is rupajnAnAbhAvAbhAva: - or rUpajnAna ends up
having rUpajnAnAbhAva as its object, abhAvIyatayA, as the absence of the
absence of colour-cognition.

The nyAyAmRtakAra suggests the next possible definition

of viShayatvam. He says:
ननु - ज्ञानजनककरणसन्निकर्षारयत्वं
यत्वंश्रतद्विषयत्वम्, Being an object of
a cognition is being located in the contact with the instrument
which gives to the cognition.

In nyAya, for the perception of any object requires contact

between four substances - 1) Atma, the self, 2) Mind, 3) Sense
organs and 4) the object. The Atma comes into contact
(samyoga) with the mind, the mind with the sense organs, the
sense organs with the object, leading to the notion "I see the
pot".

Using this, the nyAyAmRtakAra says that viShayatva, which

is located in that viShaya (the object) which has come into
contact with the sense-organ. The sense organ is the jnAna
janaka karaNa, the instrument that has given rise to the
cognition. The sense organ coming into contact with an object
is termed as jnAna janaka karaNa sannikarSha. viShayatva is
that which is located in such an object, or jnAna janaka
karaNa sannikarSha Ashrayatvam.

He refutes a couple of possible objections to such a definition.

नच रूपज्ञानकरणमनस्सन्निकर्षाश्रयस्यात्मनस्तद्विषयत्वापत्ति:,
Don't argue thus - the cognition of colour requires the contact
of the eye with the object, the eye with the mind, and the mind
with the self. If we take the instrument that gives rise to the
cognition of colour as the mind, then contact of the mind is
with the self. Such a definition could therefore lead to the self
being the object of colour-cognition.

करणपदेनासाधारणज्ञानकरणस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात्, Because - by the word instrument

in the definition, what is meant is the uncommon cause that
gives rise to a specific type of knowledge. The eyes generate
knowledge of sight alone, not sound, or smell, whereas the
mind is the common cause for the cognition of sight, sound,
smell, etc. The mind is not meant here by the word instrument
for the locus of the contact with the instrument to refer to the
self.

यस्
नच साधारणज्ञानकरणचक्षुसन्निकर्षारयस्ययश्रमनसोऽपि रूपज्ञानविषयत्वापत्ति:, Nor
can it be argued that as the eyes are in contact with the mind,
the the mind to ends up becoming an object of the cognition of
colour.

सन्निकर्षपदेनाप्यसाधारणज्ञानजनकसन्निकर्षस्यैवोक्तत्वादिति Because,
the term contact in the definition refers to the unique contact
which gives rise to cognition. For example, the object of pot-
visual-cognition, is that which the eyes are uniquely in contact
with, the pot. The contact between the eyes and the mind is
common for every object seen, but the pot-cognition can only
rise when there is contact between the eyes and the pot.

- चेन्न; चक्षुर्मनस्संयोगस्यापि चाक्षुषज्ञानासाधारणत्वेन मनसोऽपि चाक्षुषज्ञानविषयत्वापत्ते:,

परोक्षविषये अव्याप्तेच श्च|

The siddhikAra says - no.

As the contact between the eyes and the mind is
a unique cause for visual-cognition, the mind too becomes the
object for all visual-cognition. Further, in the case of indirect
cognitions such as inference etc, there is no contact between
the sense organ and the object of inference, so this definition
will not apply to the objects of indirect cognitions.

नच - तत्र लिङ्गज्ञानं करणम्, तत्र च लिङ्गिन: तद्व्याप्तत्वं संबन्धोऽस्तीति - वाच्यम् ;

Nor can it be said that the instrument in the case of inference
etc is the cognition of the linga (hetu) in invariable
concomitance, vyApti, with the lingi (sAdhya).

The object of the inference is fire. The instrument that gives

rise to the inference is the invariable concomitance. The word
लिङ्गं here refers to the hetu which is present in both the
invariable concomitance and the paksha. The लिङ्गि is
the sAdhya of the inference. The relation here is that
the lingi is concomitant with the linga.
लिङ्गस्यापि स्वज्ञानसंबन्धित्वेनानुमितिविषयत्वापत्ते: | The hetu also
ends up becoming the object of the inferential cognition as
well - because, just like the sAdhya is concomitant with
the hetu, the hetu is concomitant with itself too.

नचानुमितौ तद्व्याप्ततारूपसंबन्ध एव विषयतानियामक:,

Nor can it be argued that the factor that determines being an
object of an inferential cognition is limited to that which
appears to be invariably concomitant in the inference.
The inferential cognition is वह्निव्याप्य धूमवान् पर्वतः - the mountain is
pervaded by smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire.
When the inference arises, it arises because the invariable
concomitance of the smoke with fire is what is invoked. The
invariable concomitance of the smoke with itself, while true, is
not what is invoked, giving rise to the inference of fire.

व्यापकतावच्छेदकव्यापकसंबन्धादीनाम् विषयत्वापत्ते: | To this the siddhikAra says

no, because if you argue thus, the qualifiers that are necessary
for being the inferred entity (vyApakatAvacChedakam) and
the relation with the inferred entity (vyApakasambandha)
would also end up the objects of the inferential cognition.

To explain - the fire (vyApaka) and the mountain have samyoga

sambandha (are in contact). That they are in contact is known
as a result of the concomitance. Similarly, the fire (vyApaka)
that is inferred by the inference is known to be endowed with
fire-ness (vyApakatAvacChedakam). If we say that everything
that is known through the concomitance ends up the object of
the concomitance, then the fire's contact with the mountain
and the fire-ness of the fire would also end up as objects of the
cognition.

In nyAya, cognition is of two types - cognition that arises

(janya jnAna) and cognition that is eternal (nitya jnAna,
i.e. Ishvara's cognition). Everything is an object
to Ishvara's cognition. As it is eternal, it cannot have a cause,
thus, if being an object is defined in terms of the accusative
case, Ishvara's cognition will end up not having an object. To
avoid this, the nyAyAmRtakAra postulates some refinements.

This is based on the definition of earth, prithivI. When heat is

applied to earth, there is a change in its colour. Thus a
definition of earth is postulated पाकजरूपवत्त्वं पृथिवीत्वम् - that
which is endowed with colour born from heat is earth.
However, it is said that a conch when subject to heat, does not
change colour. However, the conch too is a product of earth.
That being the case, to avoid the definition not applying to
cases of earth which do not change colour, the logician defines
earth as पाकजरूपसमानाधिकरणजातिमत्त्वम् - that which is endowed
with a universal which is colocated with a colour born out of
heat. However, this too suffers from the flaw that dravyatva, or
substance-ness is also colocated with prithivItvam - and the
definition can be extended to dravyatva.
However dravyatva applies to water and the other elements
also. Thus this is a case of over-extension. To avoid this, the
phrase द्रव्यत्व व्याप्य (that universal which is a subset of dravyatva,
substance-ness) is added to the definition. That is, every
instance of the earth element is a substance, but every
substance is not earth - thus by saying द्रव्यत्व व्याप्य, what is meant
is a subset of substance-ness.

A similar approach is taken by the nyAyAmRtakAra. A pot

becomes the object of a cognition born from the eyes. The
object of the cognition is the avacChedaka or qualifier of the
cognition. That is common to both our perception and Ishvara's
perception.

नच - ज्ञानकरणसन्निकर्षसमानाधिकरणो ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यधर्मो
विषयत्वम्, इदंच नित्यपरोक्षसाधरणिमिति - वाच्यम् ;
The siddhikAra says: don't argue thus - "That which is
colocated with the contact with the instrument of cognition,
and that which is a direct subset of the qualifier-ness of the
cognition is viShayatva, being the object of cognition. This
definition applies commonly to cognitions of those objects
which are eternally beyond the range of perception".

Why does the nyAyAmRtakAra adds the phrase "direct

subset"? The pot is the qualifier (avacChedaka) to the pot-
cognition. The attribute of "being the qualifier of cognition"
(jnAna avacChedakatva) is present in the pot. Being a pot
(ghaTatva) is a subset of jnAna avacChedakatva. That is,
cognitions objectify many things, some of which are pots.
Thus ghaTatva is present in a subset of those items that
have jnAna avacChedakatva.

The nyAyA process of cognition, as we have discussed, is that

the Atma and mind have samyoga, the mind and the sense
organs have samyoga, the sense organs and the object
have samyoga - this leads to the cognition "I see the object".
The object is said to be jnAna avacChedaka, a qualifier of
cognition. As the mind is in contact with the senses which are
in contact with the object, it can also be said that
that manatva is also a jnAna avacChedaka through a remote
contact with the object. Therefore, to exclude chakshutva,
manatva, Atmatva etc, the nyAyAmRtakAra says sAkshAt
vyApya dharma (direct subset).

The siddhikAra responds to this by sayihg:

वस्तुत्वादिकमेव विषयत्वमित्यापत्ते:, All this means is that being a thing is
being an object of cognition,
ज्ञानावच्छेदकत्वस्य रूपज्ञानाविषये समवायेऽपि सत्त्वेनातिव्याप्तेच श्च| In
the cognition of colour, as the samavAya too has the attribute
of being the qualifier of the cognition, it will mean that
the samavAya also ends up as an object of the cognition
under this definition, which is a case of ativyApti, or over-
extension.

In nyAya, if no sambandha can be defined between two

entities which are somehow related, they classify the relation
as a svarUpa sambandha. For example, the relationship
between the pot and its absence is classified as svarUpa
sambandha. Without a relationship between the pot and its
absence, it would not be possible to claim "There is no pot
here", but the relationship between the two cannot be
classified into any other form of relationship. Hence, a new
relationship called svarUpasambandha is postulated. The
definition of svarUpasambandha is that it is indefinable,
unclassifiable into any of the other types of sambandha.

नच - ज्ञानज्ञेययो: स्वरुपसंबन्ध एव विषयत्वमिति - वाच्यम् ;

The siddhikAra says that one cannot argue that the
relationship between cognition and its object is a case
of svarUpasambandha either.
असिद्धे: | Because what is svarUpa sambandha is itself not
proven.

तथाहि - स्वरूपसंबन्ध इत्यस्य सवरूपं संबन्ध इत्यर्थत्वे

संयोगादावतिव्याप्ति:, If svarUpasambandha means that
the nature (svarUpa) of it is that it is a relationship
(sambandha), then such a definition would over-extend
to samyogasambandha and samvavAya sambandha (ie if
the svarUpa refers
to samyoga and samavayAya then svarUpa
sambandha would end up meaning samyoga
sambandha and samavAya sambandha) -
however samyoga and samavAya are not considered to
be svarUpasambandha.

नच तदुभयान्यत्वं विशेषणम् ; Nor can it be said

that svarUpasambandha is something other than the two
objects being related.
हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोरपि स्वरूपसंबन्धापत्ते:, If it is simply something other than
the two objects, then two unrelated entities like the Himalaya-
s and the Vindhya mountain range can also be said to be
connected by svarUpasambandha.
To remedy this, the pp says:
संबन्धान्तरमन्तरेण विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वं स्वरुपसंबन्ध इति चेन्न; If it is said
that svarUpasambandha is that which leads to a cognition
that two objects are related when there is no other relation
between them.
आत्मानं जानामीत्यत्राव्याप्ते:, Because this definition would not
apply to the cognition "I know myself", because the self is both
the object of the cognition and the locus of the cognition - thus
one cannot say that the cognition and its object
have svarUpasambandha wherein no other sambandha is
possible (because the locus - located relationship between the
cognition and the self is present).
तत्र संबन्धान्तरस्य समवायस्यैव सत्त्वात् Because there is
another sambandha, samavAya that is present.
अतीन्द्रियाभावादावव्याप्तेच श्च , Moreover, this definition would also
not apply to the absence of objects that are beyond the senses
etc.
dharma / adharma are beyond the senses. The pot does not
have dharma / adharma. The absence of adharma is present
in the pot. There is no sambandha possible between this
cognition and the absence of adharma. Therefore there
is avyApti of this definition in the absence of atIndriya.
न हि तस्य विशिष्टप्रतितिजननयोग्यत्वे मानमस्ति | There is absolutely no basis to
claim that they (the absence of objects beyond the senses) are
capable of generating a cognition of relation.
अन्यथा तेन विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननापत्ते: | Otherwise we would be able to say
so.

What is the relationship that you are referring to here?

किं च विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वं धर्मो वा संबन्ध:, तादृशस्वरूपद्वयमेव वा | 1) Is

the relationship the attribute of being capable of generating a
cognition of relation? 2) Or are the cognition and its object
themselves together the relationship?

आद्ये स्वरूपस्य संबन्धत्वव्याघात:, In the first alternative, that

the svarUpa of the cognition and its object (i.e., the cognition
and the object themselves) are related is contradicted
प्रतीतिघटितस्यास्यचाक्षुषादिज्ञानागोचरत्वप्रसङ्गच श्च| As the definition
of svarUpa sambandha definition is inextricably linked with
the cognition (of relation), the visual cognition of svarUpa
sambandha would not be possible.

When the naiyyAyika postulates a svarUpa

sambandha between the ground and the absence of the pot,
he does so because of the cognition "I don't see the pot on the
ground" - that is, the svarUpasambandha between the ground
and the pot-absence is itself perceptible. Now,
when svarUpasambandha between the ground and the
absence of the pot is defined to be a capacity to generate a
cognition of relation, then as that capacity is not perceptible,
the svarUpasambandha would not be perceptible. However, as
we have seen, the svarUpasambandha between the ground
and the pot-absence is perceptible according to
the naiyyAyika. Therefore, we will have a situation where the
definition of svarUpasambandha will not apply in situations
where the svarUpasambandha is visually perceptible.

न द्वितीय:, अननुगमात् | It cannot be the second alternative either,

because if the two entities are themselves
the svarUpasambandha, then as there are an infinite pairs of
objects possible, there would no common definition
of svarUpasambandha universally.
dRgdRshya sambandha bhaNga:
(part 3)
किं चैवमभावभ्रमानुपपत्ति:, तत्रापि विशिष्टप्रतीतिसंभवेस्वरूपसंबन्धस्यैव सत्त्वात् | Moreover,
this would mean that the illusion of absence would not be
possible, because the cognition of relation would necessarily
require the presence of svarUpasambandha.

In the svarUpasambandha between absence and its locus,

any appearance of absence would necessarily require the
absence to be actually present. If svarUpasambandha was
defined as the svarUpa-s of the absence and the ground,
without the svarUpa of the absence and the ground being
both present, how can the absence be perceived on the
ground? Therefore, there would be no situation where there
was no absence, but someone mistakenly sees absence.

नच प्रमाघटितं तल्लक्षणम् वास्तवसंबन्धसत्त्वे प्रमात्वस्याप्यापाद्यत्वात् | Nor

can one insist that the definition implies
that svarUpasambandha means the capacity to generate
a valid cognition, because if the sambandha is real, then the
validity of the cognition is automatically implied.

अन्यथा तत्र तस्याप्रमात्वे संबन्धाभाव: तस्मिन्च न्श्च

तस्य
या
अप्रमात्वमित्यन्योन्यारयात् श्र| Otherwise, one has to say that where
त्
there is an illusion, there is no svarUpasambandha possible.
Similarly, to know that sambandha is not possible, we have to
say that the cognition is not a valid one. Thus the validity of
the cognition and what is a svarUpasambandha end up
mutually dependent, having anyonyAshraya.

The opponent argues:

A daNDI-n is a person with a stick. There is
a samyoga (contact) relationship between the person and the
stick, which is seen. A person seeing this may not know this
is samyoga at the time that he sees this and may understand
this later after studying nyAya. Thus there is
a samyogatvAvacChinna sambandha present, but it may not
be known.

Similarly, if there are two svarUpa-s that are capable of

generating a cognition of the two entities in relationship
(sambandha vishiShTa pratIti). To know that the entities
themselves are capable of generating a cognition of
relationship between them, we cannot rely on the effect (the
cognition of relationship), to know whether they themselves
have the capacity - there is not much benefit in inferring that
something is capable of generating an outcome, after the
outcome is generated itself. There has to be
some avacChedaka dharma (determining attribute) that
allows one to know that capability directly. For example, by
knowing that daNDatva (stick-ness) is present in the object
(stick), we know that it is capable of being used to make a pot.
There is no need to know that the relationship
as yogyatAavacChedakaavacChinna sambandha (a
relationship that is endowed with the determining
characteristic of leading to a cognition of relationship) as long
as that sambandhatva is known.

This addresses the charge by the advaitin that the

relationship is not seeable because the yogyatAvacChedaka -
the characteristic that establishes whether the svarUpa of
the objects themselves is capable of leading to a cognition of
relationship between them - is not seeable.

ननु - संबन्धान्तरमन्तरेण विशिष्टप्रतीतिजनन्योग्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नस्वरूपस्य संबन्धत्वं

संयोगत्वावच्छिन्नस्य दण्डीत्यादौ संबन्धत्ववत्,
Just like in the cognition of a daNDin, a man with a stick, the
relationship of the man with the stick is such that even when
the relationship is not known to be samyoga, one knows that
the man is in contact with the stick, without requiring the
perception of any other relationship between the two, (in
the svarUpasambandha, the cognition and its object are
innately endowed with the capability to show them as being
related even when one does not know what that characteristic
is).
To explain:
विशिष्टबुद्धिश्चावच्छेदकाविषयिण्येवावच्छेद्यविषया, In the cognition of the relation,
without revealing the nature of that relationship (अवच्छेदक
अविषयिणि), the relation between the two entities, which happens
to be endowed with that particular nature is revealed
(अवच्छेद्य विषया)
ष् टबुद्
अतो न स्वरूपसंबन्धगोचरवि ष्टबुद्धेचाक्षुषत्वविरोध
श्चा धेश् चाक्
षु
षत्
वविरोध:शि; Therefore, the
charge that the visual perception of the svarUpa
sambandha is not possible in the cognition of relationship
between two objects, is unfounded.

नच - तर्ह्यभावप्रमाभ्रमयो: स्वरूपद्वयमात्रविषयत्वावि षात्शे

षात्
प्रमाभ्रमव्यवस्थानुपपत्तिरिति - वाच्यम् ; Do not argue then that as
the svarUpa sambandha is the same whether the cognition of
absence is a valid one or an invalid one, it would become
impossible to distinguish between a valid cognition and invalid
cognition. Because:

घटाभाववति घटाभावज्ञानत्वेन तद्भिन्नज्ञानत्वेन च व्यवस्थोपपत्ते: | Where there is

the absence of a pot on the ground, if the person perceives the
absence, that would be valid, whereas its opposite - ie, seeing
the absence of a pot where the pot is present is invalid. These
two scenarios are different, and that is sufficient to determine
which is valid and invalid.

ननु - अतिरिक्ताविषयत्वे तस्यैवानुपपत्ति:, नहि भवद्रीत्या तस्योभयात्मकत्वेन

तदुभयसत्त्वेन व्यधिकरणप्रकारत्वरूपभ्रमत्वस्यैवाभावे भ्रमतदन्यत्वाभ्यां व्यवस्था
संभवतीति - चेन्न;
If the advaitin argues thus - "(The absence and the ground are
common to both scenarios, and because their svarUpa is the
relationship, the relationship is also common). When no
other sambandha is perceived (to differentiate the two), it is
not possible to differentiate the two scenarios. In your
(dvaitin's) system as the sambandha is of the nature of both
(the absence and the ground), which is present in both
(scenarios), there is no possibility itself for an illusion where
something else is seen in the place of something else
(vyadhikaraNa prakArakatva bhrama). Therefore, it is not
possible to differentiate between illusion and valid cognition." -
No.
घटाभावाभावस्य घटत्वेन तद्वति घटाभावज्ञानस्य व्यधिकरणप्रकारकत्वसंभवात् | It is possible
for vyadhikaraNa prakArakatva bhrama because it is possible
for the cognition of pot absence to occur when the pot
absence is absent (ie the pot is present).

Let us look at the 2 scenarios of pot absence being seen:

1) where a pot is really absent - The cognition of pot absence
is occurring where the pot is absent.
2) where a pot is really present - The pot, is the absence of pot-
absence. The pot absence is present here as the absence of
pot absence. Thus, the pot absence and the ground are present
even in that scenario, and because the svarUpa of the two is
present, it is possible for one to erroneously think "the pot is
absent on the ground" - even when the pot is actually
present.Thus such a vyadhikaraNa prakArakatva bhrama is
indeed possible.

किं च भ्रमस्य वस्तुगत्या यत् घटवत्स विषय:, नतु प्रमाया इत्यतिरिक्तविषयत्वमस्त्येव;

Moreover, the object of the two cognitions is different. The
'ground with the pot' seen in an illusion is different from the
'ground with the pot' seen in a right cognition. Thus, there is an
additional difference between valid cognitions and illusion.

नचातीन्द्रियाभावे अव्याप्ति:, There is no under-extension of the

definition in the case of the absence of extra-sensory objects.
That is, it is possible to discern the capability of the absence
of extra-sensory objects to generate a cognition of relation?
The opponent postulates a mechanism to determine the
capability in the case of
1) absolute absence, atyantAbhAva
2) prior absence, prAgabhAva / posterior absence,
pradhvamsAbhAva
3) difference, anyonyAbhAva

अत्यन्ताभावे प्रतियोगिदे न्यदेत्वं न्

श यदेशत् ,शाin the case of absolute
वं
absence, the capability of absolute absence to generate a
cognition of relationship is in places other than where the
counterpositive of the absence is present. That is, the absolute
absence of the pot's ability to generate the cognition "there is
a pot absent here" is in all places other than where the pot is
present.
प्रागभावादौ प्रतियोगिदेशत्वे सति प्रतियोगिकालान्यकालत्वं, In the case
of prior and posterior absence, their capability to generate a
cognition of relationship is in the locus of counterpositive, but
in a different time to the existence of the counterpositive.
अन्योन्याभावे प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकदे न्यदेत्वं न्
श यदेशत् ,शा
वं
विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननयोग्यतावच्छेदकम् | In the case of difference, its capability
to generate a cognition of relationship is in a place other than
where the attribute of being a counterpositive of difference
with the locus, is present.

In the given example of dharma and adharma being absent in

a pot, the pot and the absence of dharma are said to
have svarUpa sambandha because the capacity to generate a
cognition of relationship (ie "The pot has the absence
of dharma") is because: 1) dharma / adharma can only be
present in Atma, hence the pratiyogidesha, the locus of the
the counter-positive is the Atma. 2). The pot is not located in
the Atma (according to the dvaitin), hence the pot has
pratiyogidesha anyadeshatva, thus the pot has the yogyatva, or
the capability of leading to the cognition, "the pot does not
contain dharma".

तदवच्छिन्नत्वं च विशिष्टप्रतीत्यजनके ऽप्यतीन्द्रियाभावे सुलभम्, therefore being

endowed with such a yogyatva is easily provable, leading to
the absence of super-sensory objects having the capacity to
lead to a cognition of relationship.
नह्यरण्यस्थो दण्डो न घटजननयोग्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्न It is not that a stick found in a
forest is incapable of being used to make a pot (to rotate the
potter's wheel) - it may not be so used, but it certainly has the
capacity to aid in the creation of a pot.

This was the opponent's argument to establish yogyatva as

something intrinsic to the the object's svarUpa itself.
इति - चेत्, मैवम् ; The siddhikAra saysL not so.

There is a rule that if something is eternal, and has

a yogyatva, the capacity to lead to a result, it will eventually
lead to the result. A stick found in the forest may not be used
to create the pot, because it can get destroyed before it is so
used. However, if something is eternal, and has the capacity to
produce an outcome, it will eventually produce the outcome.
नित्यस्यातीन्द्रियस्याकाशात्यन्ताभावादेर्विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्वे अवयंश्यं
विशिष्टप्रत्ययजननकत्वप्रसङ्गात् | If the absence of an eternal, super-sensory
object, like the eternal absence of space*, has the capacity to
lead to the perception of a relationship, it will eventually lead
to the perception of a relationship. This is a problem, because
if an eternal super-sensory object has the capacity to lead to
perception, it will no longer be super-sensory. The error here is
not that it is eternal, but that it is eternally capable of leading
to perception and be imperceptible simultaneously.
* space is eternal, and so is its absence - and is considered to
be something not perceptible by the senses in nyAya.

नित्यस्य स्वरूपयोग्यस्य सहकारिसमवधाननियमात् | Because of the rule that

if something is eternally capable of being
in svarUpasmbandha, it will lead to it being perceived as such.

:, The
किं च विशिष्टस्य प्रत्यय इत्यत्र स्वरूपसंबन्धस्य षष्ठ्यर्थत्वे आत्मारययश्र
usage of the sixth-case ending (denoting relationship) in the
phrase "cognition of a relationship" is self-referential. We are
trying to determine the definition of the relationship between
cognition and its object, and using a case ending denoting
relationship in defining the relationship is self-referential.
संबन्धमात्रस्य तदर्थत्वे
ष्
टा त्
मसंबन्धिसमूहालम्बनवि घटपटादावतिव्याप्ति:, If it refers
षयेशि
आत्मत्वादिवि ष्टात्मसंबन्धिसमूहालम्बनविषये
to relationship in general, then in the cognition of multiple
objects as being related to oneself in a single cognition, where
we perceive many things as related to us, but not in relation to
each other, the relations with each other would end up as
objects of the cognition.

To explain, a samUhAlambana jnAna is where there are

multiple objects of a cognition, which each object being a
separate, primary object of the cognition. For example, if I see
5 people, I also see the clothes worn by each person, but I
don't see the relationship between the different people.

When I see a man wearing a white shirt, whiteness is a

qualifier for the qualified shirt. The shirt in turn is a qualifier
for the man, who is the primary object (mukhya visheShya) of
the cognition. A samUhAlambana jnAna is where there
multiple mukhya visheShya's in the cognition, but there is no
relationship between the mukhya visheShya.

If the relationship between the object and cognition is that

there is merely defined as having "some relationship" because
that is the nature of the cognition and object, then
each mukhya visheShya in the samUhAlambana jnAna will
have svarUpa sambandha with the cognition. That is,
the svarUpa of each object has sambandha yogyatva, or
capacity to be in relationship. That being so, why cannot the
objects not have sambandha with each other as well?

So when we see a pot and cloth etc in the same cognition,

even when there is is no relationship between the pot and the
cloth, as the same cognition is capable of having svarUpa
sambandha with the pot and cloth, the two objects
themselves will end up having svarUpa sambandha also. Thus
there is a problem in merely taking svarUpa sambandha to be
the relationship between cognition and its object.
The siddhikAra took the example of samUhAlambana of
oneself and the pot and cloth. In this samUhAlambana Atma
jnAna, there would end up be a svarUpa sambandha between
the pot and the cloth.

तयोरपि विशिष्टसंबन्ध्यविशिष्टविषयज्ञानजनकत्वात् | As the one cognition is

related to each of the objects, the unrelated objects
themselves end up becoming related.

ज्ञानस्याभाव: ज्ञातोऽभाव इति प्रतीत्योर्वैलक्षण्यं न स्यात् ; There

would be no difference between the absence of cognition and
the cognition of absence. However, there is a very big
difference between the two. If I am doing some work, there is
the absence of the pot cognition in my mind. However, if I see
the ground, I perceive the absence of the pot there. The two
circumstances are very different.
ज्ञानाभावयोरुभयोरेवोभयत्र स्वरूपसंबन्धत्वे विषयकृ तविशेषाभावात् |
As svarUpasambandha is the cognition and absence, there is no
way to differentiate between the two situations.

Until now, the svarUpa of the two objects being the relationship
called svarUpasambandha was being refuted. Now
the siddhikAra refutes the position where there is an attribute in
addition to the svarUpa which is taken to be
the svarUpasambandha.

अतएव - विशिष्टप्रतीति जननयोग्यत्वं ज्ञानज्ञेयादिस्थले अतिरिक्तमेव संबन्ध

इति - निरस्तम् ; It is for this reason that the statement - the
capability to generate a cognition of relationship is an
additional attribute in the case of cognition and its object.
अतीन्द्रिये नित्याभावेऽव्याप्ते: | Because the definition does not apply in
the case of the eternal absence of a super-sensory object. If
there is the capacity to generate, it will end up generating a
perception of relation, but that would be self-defeating (it
would not be super-sensory any longer).
न हि तत्र विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यता; फलोपधानापत्ते:, In that instance must
be no capability to generate a perception of relationship. If
such a capability existed, it would certainly do so.

Sometimes, the relationship between two things is perceptible,

like the samyoga between the pot and the ground. However,
there are instances, where the relationship is not perceptible.
This is because if there are many factors involved in the
relationship which are not perceptible, the relationship itself is
not perceptible.

Similarly, if the svarUpa sambandha between cognition and its

object is defined as that which is capable of leading to the
perception that the two are related, such a relationship is not
perceptible, because the factors involved in it are not
perceptible.

प्रतीतिघटितस्य चक्षुषादिप्रतीतावविषयत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च | As definition of

svarUpasambandha is linked with the cognition (which are not
perceptible), it would lead to the svarUpasambandha is not
perceptible by the eyes, etc.

तस्मात्सत्यत्वे संबन्धानुपपत्तेराध्यासिक एव दृग्दृश्ययो: संबन्ध इति |

Therefore, as there is no real relationship possible cognition
and its object, it follows that there is only an unreal
relationship between the two.

इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वे दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धभङ्ग: ||

Thus we have established that the real relationship between
cognition and its object, which is necessary to prove the
reality of the world, is not possible.

This is one of the most important anukUla tarka, or supportive

reasoning used to establish the mithyAtva of the universe.
anukUlatarka nirUpaNam (part 1)
The supportive reasoning for mithyAtva anumAna, the anukUla
tarka is being established in this chapter.

In the previous chapter it was said that as there can be no real

relationship between the seer and the seen, it follows that
there must be an unreal, superimposed relationship between
the two. The opponent raises an objection to this: If the seer is
one, and the seen has a superimposed relationship with the
seer, everyone should be able to see the same illusion at the
same time.
However, that is not the case -
1) Some see a snake where a rope lies, some a crack in the
ground, some the rope itself.
2) If the world too is superimposed on the one seer, everyone
should see the pot that is in front of one person.
3) Even for the same person, he only sees the object when his
eyes are open and not otherwise.

स्यादेतत् - सर्वस्यापि दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मकदृगध्यस्तत्वेऽपि कस्यचित् कदाचित्

कञ्चित् प्रतिप्रका ययशा त्वयाऽपि
तत्तत्सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यतत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारक एवानावृतदृक्संबन्ध:
स्वीकृत:, तथाच सत्यत्वेऽपि तद्द्वारक एव संबन्धोऽस्तु, किमाध्यासिकसंबन्धदुर्व्यसनेन,
नहि भवतां विज्ञानवादिनामिव तत्तज्ज्ञाने तत्तदर्थाध्यासस्वीकार:, शुद्धदृश: स्वतो
भेदाभावात् उपाधिवि ष्टायाष्टाया भेदेऽपि घटादिवत्तस्या अपि मिथ्यात्वेनाधिष्ठानत्वायोगादिति -
शि
चेन्न;

स्यादेतत् - सर्वस्यापि दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मकदृगध्यस्तत्वेऽपि - Even if that were

to be the case (that the seer and seen do not have a real
relationship) - given that everything seen is superimposed on
the (one) seer, which is Brahman

- in order for (an object) to be seen

कस्यचित् कदाचित् कञ्चित् प्रतिप्रका ययशा
only be some, at sometime, in some place (when it should be seen by
everyone, everywhere, all the time)

त्वयाऽपि तत्तत्सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यतत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारक
एवानावृतदृक्संबन्ध: स्वीकृत: You too will have to accept that (this
difference in perception is through) the medium of the cognition,
which arises due to the senses being in contact with each (object), taking on
the shape of the object, (and by doing so, removes the veil of
ignorance over the object). Thus, you also will have to accept a
relationship between the unveiled consciousness and (the object) through the
medium of such a cognition (vRtti).

तथाच सत्यत्वेऽपि तद्द्वारक एव संबन्धोऽस्तु, That being the case, let the
relationship between the seer and the seen be a relationship arising through the
medium of the cognition.

किमाध्यासिकसंबन्धदुर्व्यसनेन, What is to be achieved by your insistence on a

superimposed relationship between the seer and the seen?

नहि भवतां विज्ञानवादिनामिव तत्तज्ज्ञाने तत्तदर्थाध्यासस्वीकार:, You are not

like the vijnAnavAdi, who argues that each object is superimposed on its own
cognition.

The advaitin does not say that objects are superimposed on

thought, rather, he says that objects are superimposed on
consciousness.

शुद्धदृश: स्वतो भेदाभावात् उपाधिवि ष्टाया ष्टाया शि

भेदेऽपि घटादिवत्तस्या अपि
मिथ्यात्वेनाधिष्ठानत्वायोगात् If you say that the relationship of superimposition is with
pure consciousness, as there is no internal difference within pure
consciousness, (there can be no accounting for difference in
perceived empirical reality); if you say that (the relationship) is with
"consciousness delimited by the adjunct cognition" because of which there is a
difference (in perception), then as that too ("consciousness
delimited by cognition") is as much mithyA as pots, etc., it cannot be the
substratum.

Thus, you cannot claim that the relationship between the seer
and the seen is a superimposition. It must be a real
relationship through the medium of cognition. There is no need
for the seen to be mithyA.

इति चेन्न - the siddhikAra says, if this is your argument, no.

The dvaitin had said that the relationship between the seer and
the seen was through the medium of cognition - that is,
consciousness has a relationship with cognition, and cognition
has a relationship with the seen object. However, as cognition
is inert, it cannot illuminate the object. There has to be a
conscious entity that is capable of illumining the object.
However, a conscious entity cannot reveal something if it
doesn't have a direct relationship with the object. Why do we
say this?

This is akin to the example that the illumination of an object

only occurs when light directly falls on it. There has to be a
direct relationship between the light and the object for it to be
illumined. If light does not directly fall on an object - if it falls
on a wall, and if behind the wall, there is an object, that light
cannot illuminate that object. Similarly,

प्रकाशस्य साक्षात् स्वसंसृष्टप्रकाशकत्वनियमेन चैतन्यस्य परम्परासंबन्धेन

विषयप्रकाशकत्वायोगात् | Consciousness cannot illuminate an object through an
indirect relationship (through vRtti) with the object, (just like) light as a rule
only illuminates an object if it directly falls on it.

Two connections are required for an object to be cognised - a

connection between consciousness (located/reflected in the
thought) and the object, and a connection between thought
and the object.

नहि प्रदीप: परम्परासंबद्धं प्रकाशयति; अतो विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्यमनावृतमेव प्रकाशकम्,

आवरणभङ्गच श्चवृत्त्या; अतो वृत्ते: पूर्वमाध्यासिकसंबन्धे विद्यमानेऽपि दृश्याऽप्रतीतिरुपपन्ना
|
A lamp does not illuminate anything indirectly. Therefore, it is only the unveiled
consciousness, which is the substratum of the object, which is the cause for
illumination, where the removal of the veil is by means of a cognition. Thus, even
though there is a prior superimposed relationship between consciousness and the
object, it is possible to explain why it is not seen (as long as ignorance
veils it) .

This is the methodology to explain perception in advaita - When

there is contact between the eyes and the object, the mind
has a connection with the object. The modification of the mind
that makes contact with the object is called vRtti (cognition).
This vRtti is also called jnAna, because a reflection of
consciousness is present in the vRtti. Consciousness is present
in the pot too, but does not illuminate the pot when it (the
object delimited consciousness) is veiled by ignorance. When
the vRtti has a connection with the pot, it destroys the
ignorance that is veiling the consciousness that is the
substratum of the pot, and as a result, the unveiled
consciousness illuminates the pot.

The nyAyAmRtakAra asks - is it the consciousness reflected in

the thought that illuminates the object, or is it the
consciousness delimited by the pot which becomes manifest
(abhivyaktam) when the ignorance located in that consciousness
is removed (AvaraNa bhaNga)?

अतएव - वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापात:,

घटाभिव्यक्तचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आवयकेन केनश्य
वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव घटप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तौ
तदधिष्ठानचिदभिव्यक्तिकलपनायोग इति - निरस्तम् ;
The siddhikAra says:
It is for this reason that the following statement by the nyAyAmRtakAra is
rejected -
The nyAyAmrtakAra's statement under discussion:
वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापात:
If it is consciousness reflected in the thought that illuminates the pot, then the
rule of a superimposed connection (between the seer and seen) is
rejected (as the superimposed connection is supposed to be
between consciousness and the object, not consciousness
reflected in thought and the object).
According to the advaitin, the object exists even before the
thought that objectifies it, thus the superimposed connection
cannot be between the consciousness reflected in thought and
the object.
घटाभिव्यक्तचैतन्यस्य घटप्रकाशकत्वे आवयकेन केनश्य
वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव घटप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्तौ
तदधिष्ठानचिदभिव्यक्तिकलपनायोग: - if the pot manifested consciousness reveals
the pot, then because it is also necessary to postulate the presence of
consciousness reflected in thought for the pot to be seen (for the former
cannot reveal the pot without the presence of the latter), there
is no need to postulate that the substratum consciousness becomes manifest (for
the pot to be seen).
If that consciousness is not the substratum of the object, it is
not superimposed on it. If it is not superimposed, the object is
not mithyA. There would be no supportive logic or anukUla
tarka for drishyatva to imply mithyAtva.
Why was the nyAyAmRtakAra's argument rejected? Because what
has been said disproves this. Both the consciousness
delimited by the object and the consciousness reflected in
thought are required to know the pot. The latter is to remove
the the veil of ignorance, and the former to illuminate the
object. If this is not true, the difference between pratyaksha,
direct cognitions and paroksha, indirect cognitions, which is
apparent in transactions, would be lost.

परोक्षविलक्षणस्फुटतरव्यवहारार्थम् विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तिकल्पनाया युक्तत्वात् |

It is appropriate to postulate a consciousness that is the substratum to the object
which becomes manifest, to account for the difference experienced between
indirect knowledge vs clear, direct perception.

Perception is not necessarily clearer knowledge than indirect

cognition. What does the siddhikAra mean by saying that direct
perception is clearer? He means that with indirect knowledge,
we only get limited knowledge of the object; whereas with
direct perception, we know several things about what it
reveals. Therefore pratyaksha is sphuTatara, clearer.

Both perception and other means of knowledge require a

thought and by consequence, consciousness reflected in the
thought. There is no difference between direct perception and
indirect knowledge as far as the requirement for
consciousness reflected in thought is concerned.

However, the reason direct knowledge results in "clearer"

knowledge of the object than indirect knowledge is that in
indirect knowledge, the indirect cognition does not remove the
veil over the consciousness delimited by the object. On the
other hand in direct perception, the perceptual cognition
removes the veil over the object delimited consciousness.
Thus perception reveals the object more clearly than indirect
knowledge.

नच - शुद्धचैतन्यस्य चरमसाक्षात्कारात्पूर्वम् नाभिव्यक्ति:, अभिव्यक्तस्य च घटाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य न

तदधिष्ठानत्वम्, आत्मारयादिति या दि ति श्र- वाच्यम् ;
नच - इति - वाच्यम् Do not argue thus:
शुद्धचैतन्यस्य चरमसाक्षात्कारात्पूर्वम् नाभिव्यक्ति:,
Pure consciousness cannot become manifest prior to the rise of the final
cognition (the direct cognition of Brahman that is the cause for
the cessation of samsAra).
Manifestation of the substratum consciousness means the
removal of the ignorance that obscures the object. What is the
substratum? If it is pure consciousness, the ignorance which
obscures pure consciousness will only be removed with the
final cognition of brahman (brahma jnAna). Therefore if it is
pure consciousness that is required to become manifest for
the cognition of objects, until the rise of brahma jnAna, no
object will be cognised.

या दि
अभिव्यक्तस्य च घटाद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य न तदधिष्ठानत्वम्, आत्मारयादिति तिश्र
If the manifested consciousness is pot-delimited consciousness, it cannot be the
substratum, as that would be circular logic.
The pot delimited consciousness cannot be the substratum of
the pot. If the pot is superimposed on pot delimited
consciousness, it would be a case of self-referential error. The
delimitation of consciousness would require the delimiter, the
pot, and the pot would require the delimited consciousness as
a substratum for its superimposition.

The siddhikAra's reply is that consciousness is the substratum

(not pot delimited consciousness), but there are
several tUlAvdiya-s (secondary ignorance-s) that veil objects. To
illuminate the object, the removal of tUlAvidya is sufficient. A
superimposed connection (between objects and
consciousness) continues to exist, and at the same time, the
manifestation of the consciousness delimited by the object
leads to the object being seen.

चरमसाक्षात्कारात् पूर्वमपि शुद्धचैतन्यस्याविद्यावशादधिष्ठानभूतस्य

मुलाज्ञाननिवृत्तिलक्षणाभिव्यक्त्यभावेऽपि
षा दिनि वृत् तिलक् षणा
तदवस्थावि षादिनिवृत्तिलक्षणाभिव्यक्त्याशेभिव्
यक् त्याविषयप्रकाशकत्वोपपत्ते: |
Even prior to the rise of the final cognition (brahma jnAna) - ie, even prior
to the manifestation of pure consciousness resulting from the removal of primal
nescience, and therefore, even though it does not become manifest as a result of
the removal of primal nescience, it is possible for the object to be illuminated as
a result of the manifestation of consciousness owing to the removal of secondary
nescience (referred to as avasthA visheSha ajnAna here).

नच - घटप्रकाशिकाया: दृशो मिथ्यात्वे नाधिष्ठानत्वं सत्यत्वे दोषाजन्यत्वेन प्रमात्वात् सत्यं

 रज्जुरिति
स्वविषयं प्रति नाधिष्ठानत्वमित्युभयत:पा रज्जुरिति - वाच्यम् ;
शा
Do not argue thus - If the consciousness that illuminates the pot is unreal, it
cannot be the substratum. If it is real, as it is valid knowledge, being born from
a non-defective source, its object has to be real and it cannot be the substratum of
that object. Thus there is a noose (for you) on either end of the rope.

The siddhikAra says:

यतो दोषाजन्यत्वं न प्रमात्वप्रयोजकम्, चैतन्यस्य सर्वत्र दोषाजन्यत्वात्, किन्तु
दोषाजनयवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नत्वं ; प्रकृते च तदभावात् न विषयस्य सत्यत्वम् |
(This stands rejected) because the consciousness not being born from a
defective source does not imply validity to the cognition, for consciousness is not
born from a defective source anywhere (even in an illusion,
consciousness is not born from a defect, for it is never
born). Rather, it is consciousness being de-limited by a cognition that is born
from a non-defective source that implies the reality of that object. In our
context, as that does not apply (the cognition that manifests
consciousness is born from a defective source, avidyA), the
reality of the object is not implied.

अतो मिथ्याभूतविषयं प्रत्यधिष्ठानत्वं सत्याया दृशो युक्तं |

Thus, it is possible for the real seer (consciousness) to be the substratum
of an unreal object.

ननु - तात्त्विकसंबन्धासंभवे आध्यासिकसंबन्धकल्पनम्,

The nyAyAmRtakAra counters - only if a real relationship is proven to be
impossible, can a superimposed relationship be postulated.

It is not proven that a real relationship is impossible. Just

because it is not contact or inherence, it does not mean that
the relationships is unreal.

स एव तु कु त: क्लृप्तसंयोगबाधे गुणगुणिनो: समवायवत्तदुभयबाधे तृतीयस्य

संभवात्, But where was that proven? After every kind of samyoga is
rejected, (a real relationship), samavAya is postulated. So even if
both (samyoga and sambandha) are rejected, a third (real
relationship) is still possible.

In the cognition "jnAto ghaTa:" (the pot is known), there is a

relationship between the seer (consciosuness) and the pot. It
is neither samyoga nor samavAya, but some connection is
experienced. If it is experienced, it must exist. Why should we
automatically assume it is unreal?

नच तत्र मानाभाव:, समवायवदनुमाध्यक्षयो: सत्त्वात् Nor can it be said that there

is no proof (pramANa) for this. Just like in the case
of (proving) samavAya, this is proven by perception and inference.

When the object is seen by perception, there is a relationship

experienced between consciousness and the pot - one does
not need another proof when the experience itself is there. If
someone really desires an inference, that is also possible thus:
-

The naiyyAyika provides an anumAna to prove the existence

of samavAya - नीलो घटः इति विशिष्टबुद्धिः विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धविषया, विशिष्टधीत्वात्,
घटवद्भूतलमिति विशिष्टबुद्धिवत् - The qualified cognition, blue pot,
objectifies the relationship between the locus and the
qualifier, because it is a qualified cognition, like the qualified
cognition "the ground with the pot".

तथाहि -
परस्परासंयुक्तासमवेतवि षणवि षणवि
शेशे शिशेष्यकवि
ष्यकवि शि ष्टधी र्
ष्टधीर्वि वि
शेषणवि
षणवि शे
शेष्यसंबन्धविशिष्टविषया, विशिष्टधीत्वात्, दण्डीति विशिष्टधीवत् ;
Thus - two entities that appear related in a qualified cognition, but are neither
in contact, nor inherent in each other, are related to each other in an attribute-
attributed relationship (visheShaNa visheShya bhAva), because they are
seen (directly cognised) in a relational cognition, like the relational
cognition of a man carrying a stick.

To extend this, the cognition ghaTo driShTa: is the a relational

cognition. Here ghaTa: is visheShya, jnAnam is visheShaNa.

Therefore, we can postulate some third relationship to be

present to explain the appearance of the relational cognition.

Another inference is provided. There is a rule that the object is

a cause for its direct perception - विषयतासम्बन्धेन प्रत्यक्षं प्रति
तादात्म्यसंबन्धेन विषय: कारणम् | For the perception objectifying an
object, the object itself is the cause. In the relational
cognition ghaTo driShTa:, the cause for the generation of the
relational cognition is the relation between pot and the
cognition.

ष्
टधी त्वा
उक्ता जन्यप्रमा, विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धनिमित्तिका, अबाधितजन्यवि ष्टधीत्वात्त्,
शि
संमतवत् ; The said valid cognition that arises is a result of the relationship
between the attribute and the attributed, because that cognition is a relational
one that is born and uncontradicted. The example is that which is acceptable to
both of us. (daNDI puruSha:)

The two adjectives are used keeping the naiyyAyika in mind.

With the qualifier "uncontradicted", vyabhichAra in the shell
silver is avoided. There is no relationship between the shell
and silver, so it cannot be the hetu for the cognition of silver in
the shell.
With "born", vyabhichAra with respect to Ishvara's cognition of
shell silver is removed. Ishvara's cognition is not born and
uncontradicted. The the shell silver will be seen by Him too (as
he is omniscient, he sees all, including someone's illusions),
the relationship between the shell and silver is not the cause
of Ishvara's cognition for the shell silver.

The third anumAna is to prove that the sambandha must be

real.
षणवि
विमता धी:, अबाधितवि षणवि
शे शेष्यसंबन् धवि षया
ष्यसंबन्धविषयाशे
ष्
टधी त्
वा द्
दण्
अबाधितजन्यवि ष्टधीत्वाद्दण्डीति डीति विशिष्टधीवत् ;
शि
The cognition under discussion has as its object an unsublated relationship
between the locus and qualifier, because the cognition is unsublated, generated,
and relational, like the relational cognition of the man with stick.

An opponent may say - "Chaitra, the owner of the cow is

present here". The cognition of the cow-owner Chaitra is a
relational one, but the cow is not physically present, so there
can neither be a samyoga, nor a samavAya relationship
between the two. There is no relationship here.

गोमान्श्चैत्र इत्यादेरपि पक्षकुक्षिनिक्षेप एवेति न तत्र व्यभिचारशङ्का | To such an

objection, the nyAyAmRtakAra says - The cognition "Chaitra, the
cow-owner" too is within the the paksha (ie a third relationship that is real) thus
one cannot raise an objection of vyabhichAra there.

तथा च संयोगसमवायातिरिक्तसंबन्धसिद्धि: - Thus we have established that

there is a third relationship apart from samyoga and samavAya.
The siddhikAra says
इति चेन्न ; If this is your argument, no.

प्रथमे द्वितीये चार्थान्तरम् ; आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यैव विषयत्वेन निमित्तत्वेन चोपपत्ते: | The

first two inferences suffer from the defect arthAntara (do not prove a real
relationship), because even a superimposed relationship can be the object
and cause (of relational cognitions).
In the first inference you had said that the relationship is real
because it is the object of the relational cognition, in the
second inference you had said that the relationship is real
because it is the cause for the relational cognition. Both these
do not imply a real relationship.

द्वितीये परोक्षधीषु व्यभिचाराच्च | In the second case, there is vyabhichAra for indirect
cognitions.

When we infer that there is fire in the mountain, there is a

relational cognition that arises (parvato vahnimAn). The
relationship between the mountain and fire is not directly
seen, it is inferred. The relationship between the locus and the
qualifier is the cause only for direct cognitions, not indirect
cognitions. Thus the relationship between the fire and the
mountain is not a cause for the rise of the relational
cognition, parvato vahnimAn. If only the relationship which is a
cause for the rise of a relational cognition can be cognised in
the relational cognition, it follows that as the relation is not a
cause for the relational inferential cognition, it follows that
such a relation cannot be cognised. There is vyabhichAra,
because while the hetu of the inference (abAdhita janya dhI) is
present, the sAdhya (visheShaNa visheShya sambandha nimittikA) is
absent for inferential cognitions.

तृतीये ब्रह्मज्ञानपर्यन्ताबाधितत्वेन सिद्धसाधनमेव | In the third, if

unsublated means that which is unsublated until brahmajnAna, then such a
relationship is accepted by me - it is a case of siddha sAdhana.

सर्वथा अबाधितधीविषयत्वे साध्ये साध्यवैकल्यम् | If it means that which is

always unsublated, then that is a case of sAdhya vaikalya - ie such
a sAdhya is absent in the example as then there is no example
of any relationship that remains unsublated.

नच - तात्त्विकसंबन्धबाधे आध्यासिकसंबन्धसिद्धि:, तथाच

संयोगसमवायातिरिक्ततात्त्विकसंबन्धबाधपर्यन्तं नाध्यासिकसंबन्धसंभावना, तथाच
कथमर्थान्तरसिद्धसाधनसाध्यवैकल्यानीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can one argue thus - Only when a real relation is disproved, can one
postulate an unreal relation. Therefore, until a (real) relation other than
samyoga and samavAya is contradicted, it cannot be an unreal
relationship. Thus how are defects
of arthAntara, siddhasAdhana, sAdhyavaikalya, etc possible?

तात्त्विकसंबन्धस्य व्यापकानुपलब्ध्याबाधात् | Because a real relationship is disproven

by the absence of vyApaka.

The absence of the vyApaka will prove the absence of vyApya.

What is the vyApaka, ie that which is proven when a real
relationship exists?

तथाहि - तात्त्विकसंबन्धस्य व्यापको देशकालविप्रकर्षाभाव: | To clarify -

the vyApaka for a real relation is the absence of temporal and spatial distance
between the two entities.

Where there is a real relation between two things (vyApya), the

two things must necessarily be present at the same place and
the same time (vyApaka).

सचातीतादिविषयकज्ञानादीनां नास्त्येवेति कथं तात्त्विकस्तेषाम् संबन्ध:

| That (the absence of temporal and spatial distance) is absent in
the case of the cognition of past events, then how can there be any real relation
between them?
The absence of temporal and spatial distance being absent
means there is either a temporal distance or spatial distance.

The samavAya relation is postulated as eternal by the logician

(invoking the principle of parsimony). It is considered eternal
even when the the objects related by samavAya are themselves
destroyed. The samavAya between a pot and its shape exists
even if the pot and its shape are destroyed.

नच - समवायवत् सम्बन्ध्यभावविप्रकर्षाद्यविरुद्धत्वेनैव - वाच्यम् ;

Don't argue thus - this (relationship) is like samavAya, which is
uncontradicted even when the two related items themselves are not existent and
even there is a spatio-temporal distance (between the related items).

समवायस्यापि देशकालविप्रकृ ष्टयो: संबन्धव्यवहाराप्रयोजकत्वात्

| Because samavAya too cannot relate two entities if there is a spatio-temporal
distance between them.

नहि संबन्ध्यभावेऽपि सन् समवायोऽद्य नष्टं घटं श्वस्तनेन रूपेण विशिनष्टि | If a pot
breaks today, and takes another form tomorrow, no samavAya can exist today
between the pot and its future form.

नचाध्यासिकत्वे संबन्धस्य साध्ये धर्मिग्राहकमानबाध:, विशिष्टबुद्धित्वेन

प्रथमतात्त्विकातात्त्विकसाधारणसंबन्धत्वस्यैव सिद्धे: |
Nor is it the case that if the relationship is superimposed, the very cognition that
reveals the relationship contradicts it (the notion that the relationship
is supeirmposed), because by the relational cognition all that is known that
the relationship is present, irrespective of whether it is real or unreal.

To explain dharmigrAhakapramANa bAdha - normally to disprove

something, a refuting reason is used. Sometimes, instead of a
refuting reason, one can disprove it by using the very proof for
the existence of that thing to argue for its non-existence.

In nyAya, the mind is considered to be paramANu

rUpa (atomic). Atma is considered to be vibhu (all-pervading).
Some groups within mImAmsa argue that the mind is all-
pervading.

The mImAmsaka's inference for this as follows: मनो विभु

यत्वा
ज्ञानासमवायिकारणसंयोगारयत्वात् श्रआत्मवत्. The mind is all pervading
त्
because like the Atma, it happens to be the locus for
the samyoga between the mind and Atma, and an asamavAyi
kAraNa (ie it is a cause for cognition, but is not its material
cause).

The naiyyAyika says that the anumAna is flawed because

the Atma mana samyoga, which is the basis to argue that the mind
is all-pervading, is itself not possible if both the mind
and Atma are all pervading, because two all pervading entities
cannot have samyoga. There has to be some movement in at
least one of the two sambandhi's for samyoga to occur. If both
entities of the relation are all-pervading, there is no possibility
for movement. In the absence of movement, no samyoga is
possible.

Thus the very basis to argue for something, is proved to be

absent and the absence is used by the opponent to disprove
the thing implied by the basis. Such a technique is
called dharmi grAhaka pramANa bAdha.

The nyAyAmRtakAra says that there is dharmigrAhakapramANa

bAdha in the siddhikAra's position that the observed relation
between the seer and the seen is unreal. If it is observed, the
relation must exist, so how can it be unreal?

किं च संबन्धग्राहक एव
तात्त्विकसंबन्धव्यापकानुपलब्धिरूपबाधसहकृताध्यासिकसंबन्धे पर्यवस्यति
| As the inference that reveals the relationship (between the seer and the
seen) is accompanied by the absence of the condition which should have been
necessarily present if the relationship had been real - in the absence of such an
unreality contradicting condition - one is left with the conclusion that the
relationship is unreal.

To explain itarabAdhasahakRta - When a person infers fire in the

mountain, it is a mountain fire. The fire he sees in the kitchen
is kitchen fire. The fire he saw in the kitchen is not mountain
fire, so how is it possible to use that kitchen fire to prove
mountain fire?

When he is certain that the fire in the mountain can only be

mountain fire and nothing else, by seeing smoke, his inference
will be of mountain fire alone. This is called इतरबाधसहकृतपरामर्
,
which can lead to a specific knowledge of mountain fire.

To show this in another inference: Any created object must

have a creator - yat janyam tat sakartRkam.

Now this raises the question of whether the creator is one or

many. One creator who creates all beings, as he is omnipotent,
is considered to be right, because it is more parsimonious to
postulate one creator. If it is accepted that it is more
parsimonious to have one creator, then the inference that
reveals that the world is created, will also reveal that its
creator is only one. This is another case of itarabAdhasahakRta
parAmarsha. The inference arises with the conviction that the
alternatives are untrue.

Similarly as the inference for the relationship between

consciousness and object rises along with the cognition that
the two entities are not spatially or temporally proximate, it
follows that the relationship must be unreal.

That is, when the inference proving a relationship between the

seer and the seen arises, it is accompanied by the cognition of
a spatial and temporal distance between the two, with the net
result that all that the inference proves is an unreal
relationship.

अतो न धर्मिग्राहकबाधशङ्कापि | Thus one need not doubt that the argument for the
proof of the unreality of the relationship is self-defeating.

न चैवं - युतसिद्धयोरेव संयोगरूपसंबन्धदर्नादयुतसिद्धिरपिर्श

नादयुतसिद् धिरपिसमवायस्य बाधिका
स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Do not argue on the basis of this that - "As relationships such as samyoga are
always seen when the relationship is impermanent (in the samyoga), permanence
would end up disproving samavAya."

The opponent argues that by such an argument one can

disprove samavAya. Substances (padArtha) are divided into two
categories - yutasiddha (things which were not in contact
previously, but are now in contact) and ayutasiddha (things that
were always in contact. They were never not in contact). The
permanence of the contact need not be two-way between the
entities, it can be one way too. A form is always in contact
with a pot, but a pot need not always be in contact with that
form. The former is ayutasiddhi, the latter is yutasiddhi.

If a real samavAya is refuted on the grounds that pot and its

colour have a permanent relationship, it would mean that no
real samavAya is possible between pot and colour, which
would be undesirable. Therefore, there is no requirement for
impermanence for the

This is a flawed argument, similar to saying that the presence

of a space-time distance between two entities, proves that
relationship cannot be real. This is the nyAyAmRtakAra's argument
- the siddhikAra refutes this.

अयुतसिद्धयोरपि क्वचित्संबन्धदर्शनेन युतसिद्धत्वस्य संबन्धाप्रयोजक्त्वात्, यस्मिन्

सत्यवयंश्यं संबन्ध: स एव संबन्धस्य प्रयोजक इति समव्याप्तत्वाभावेन
युतसिद्ध्यनुपलब्धेरबाधकत्वात्,
Impermanence is not a necessary condition for a relationship because with
permanence too a relationship is seen. That factor whose presence is a necessary
condition for a relationship is the one that implies the relationship. Therefore as
there is no mutually invariable concomitance between the two, the absence of
impermanence does not act as a contradicting reason (for the reality of the
relationship).
यत्र संबन्धस्तत्रावयंश्यं युतसिद्धिरिति विषमव्याप्तिकल्पनेऽपि मानाभावात्, There is no basis to
postulate a one way invariable concomitance because wherever there is a
relationship there must be impermanence is also not true.

नात्, There is no supporting logic for it.

अनुकूलतर्कादर्नात्र्श

A concomitance occurs in the example does not imply it

occurs everywhere.

नेन विप्रकर्षे तददर्नेनर्श

देशकालविप्रकर्षाभाववतां तु सर्वेषां संबन्धदर्नेनर्श नेन च समव्याप्ततया
प्रयोजकस्य देशकालविप्रकर्षाभावस्यानुपलब्धे:
मङ्गीकरणी
संबन्धबाधकत्वस्यावयमङ्गीकरणीयत्वात् यत् वा
त् |
श्य
On the other hand, the absence of spatial or temporal distance is always
accompanied by a real relationship everywhere, and when such a distance is
present, it is seen that a real relationship is absent. Thus, as there is a mutually
invariant concomitance, it must necessarily be conceded that the presence of
spatial and temporal distance will disprove a real relationship.

नहि प्रयोजकाभावे प्रयोज्यसंभव: | When the implying condition is absent, the

implied cannot be present.

The opponent then provides various examples where

sambandha must be accepted even in the presence of spatio-
temporal distance. The relationship between the seer and the
seen is similar to these.
नन्वेवं - 1) ध्वंसादेरतीतादिना, There must be a relationship between the destruction
(of a pot and the pot) with past objects (The counterpositive of
destruction is in the past having been destroyed).

Without it, even after a hammer blow breaks the pot, one will
have to say that the pot does not get destroyed. Rather one
will have to say that another entity called destruction gets
added to it. Ie Destruction and the pot will simultaneously
exist. That is an absurd proposition. Therefore, there must be a
relationship between destruction and the object destroyed.
However these two never temporally coexist.

2) मिथ्यात्वलक्षणान्तर्गतस्यात्यन्ताभावस्य प्रतियोगिना, The absolute absence included

within the (second) definition of mithyAtva and its counterpositive (must
have a relationship).
The absolute absence is for all time, but its counterpositive
appears to exist only in the present. If no relationship existed
between the two prior to the object's appearance, then
mithyAtva itself will not exist.
3) शक्ते: शक्येन, the power (present in the cause to produce an
effect) and the effect (must necessarily have a relationship).
If it did not, anything can be created from anything.
4) अज्ञानस्याज्ञेयेन, ignorance and its object (must necessarily
have a relationship).
These two need not exist simultaneously, so can we say that
ignorance has no relationship with its object?
5) इच्छाया इष्यमाणेन, desire and its object (must have a relationship),
but they don't exist together at the same time. One desires
something that one does not have. If one acquires the object
of desire, he stops desiring it.
6) व्यवहारस्य व्यवहर्तव्येन, transactions (speech) and the transacted (must
have a relationship). Alternatively, perceptual cognitions and
their object must have a relationship.
7) वाक्यस्यार्थेन, sentence and its meaning (must have a relationship).
However a sentence and its meaning are not located in the
same place.
8) वृत्तिरूपज्ञानस्य ज्ञेयेन, a thought and its object (must have a
relationship).
संबन्धो नेति त्वद्वाक्योक्तसंबन्धाभावस्य ज्ञानेनासम्बन्धात्
स्वन्यायस्वक्रियास्ववचनविरोधा: स्यु:, If cognition and its object don't have a
relationship, your statement will also be unrelated to its meaning, leading to a
violation of your own rule, actions and speech.
anukUla tarka nirUpaNam (part
2)
The siddhikAra in reply says:

संबन्धानुभवस्य ज्ञानद्वारकसंबन्धेनाप्युपपत्तेरतिरिक्तसंबन्धकल्पने
मानाभावात्, As the experience of the relationship (between desire
and its objects) is possible through the medium of cognition is
possible, there is no basis to overrule that and postulate
another relationship.

ज्ञानाधीनसंबन्धान्तरस्याननुभवात् | There is no experience of a

relationship different from than one born as a result of
knowledge.

ज्ञाने त्विन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिना न संबन्धानुभवोपपत्ति:,

इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादीनामतीन्द्रियत्वेन तेषामनुमित्यादिनोपस्थितिं विनैव
घटज्ञानमित्यादि संबन्धानुभवात् | However, in the case of cognition,
there is no experience of the cognition's relationship being a
result of the contact with sense organs. As the contact
between sense organs and the object is itself not a perceptible
experience, the relationship perceived in the cognition of pots etc, is
without the presence of an inferential cognition of the contact
(of the pot) with sense organs.

स्मृतौ तु अनुभवाधीनसंबन्धस्य शङ्कैव नास्ति; अनुभवस्य तदानीमसत्त्वात्, उभयोरपि

ज्ञानत्वेन तुल्यवदेव संबन्धसंभवाच्च | There is no possibility to
even doubt that the relationship of memory with its object is
subject to experience, because the experience itself does not
exist when it is recalled. Both (memory and experience) are
equivalent, in the sense both are dependent on the relationship
between cognition and the object.

A person sees silver and a stone. However he desires silver

and not stone. If the cognition is the cause of desire, then a
person on seeing the stone and silver simultaneously should
desire both simultaneously, but he only desires only silver.
Why?

This simultaneous cognition is termed samUhAlambanam.

In nyAya, multiple attributes cannot originate simultaneously
in the Atma, they can only occur in sequence. So two
cognitions (jnAna is considered to be a visheSha guNa of
the Atma) cannot originate in the Atma simultaneously, they
can only do so in sequence. To account for the simultaneous
cognition of multiple objects, they postulate a different type of
cognition termed samUhAlambana jnAna.

Thus, if the relationship that desire has with its object is that
desire is born from the cognition of the object, the object of
the cognition must be the object of the desire. In the case
of samUhAlambana jnAna, there are multiple objects to the
cognition, but the object of desire is not necessarily every
object of the samUhAlambana jnAna.

The nyAyAmRtakAra raises such an objection, to which

the siddhikAra says
नच - समूहालम्बनजन्यैकविषयेच्छायामुभयविष्यत्वापत्ति:,
जनकज्ञानस्योभयविषयत्वादिति - वाच्यम्;
Do not argue thus - the object of one desire born from a group cognition must be
multiple, because the cognition that gives rise to desire has multiple objects.

The same problem lies in the nyAyAmRtakAra's position too. He

says that the cognition which arises from the contact of the
senses with object must have a real relationship with its
object. Desire is born from the cognition of the object. If the
cognition is of a group, desire also must be of the entire group.

अतिरिक्तसंबन्धपक्षेऽपि तुल्यत्वात् | Because the problem exists even for the

position that postulates that the relationship (of desire with object) is
different (to the relationship between cognition and its object).

This argument only works when arguing against an opponent

(jalpa katha), not when teaching a student (vAda katha). Now he
gives an answer for vAda.

The cognition of silver is considered to be the cause for desire,

because it has silver as its object (rajata viShayatvena kAraNa).
The samUhAlambana jnAna is the cause of silver desire not
because it has the group of objects as its object, but because
it has silver as its object.
The kAraNatAvacChedaka dharma (the reason for the cognition to be
the cause of desire) of the cognition is rajata viShayatva, having
silver as its object. The relationship between desire and its
object is svajanakatAvacchedaka viShayatva (having the thing as the
object of a cognition that gives rise to desire). It is only
the rajata viShayatva of the cognition that leads to desire.

अथैकविषयावच्छेदेनैव ज्ञानस्य जनकत्वात् नोभयविषयत्वं, Now, the

cognition (samUhAlambana jnAna) gives rise (to desire) because it
objectifies (that) one object (whose desire it is the cause for) and
thus, (desire) need not have multiple objects.

समं ममाऽपि; This explanation is the same for me too.

जनकज्ञाने जनकतावच्छेदकविषयत्वस्यैव संबन्धत्वात्

| The (desire's) relationship with an object is it (the desire) being born
from a cognition that objectifies that thing.

The nyAyAmRtakAra says Ishvara's desire will not have any

object as a result. There is no cognition that gives rise to
Ishvara's desire. In the nyAya system, Ishvara's cognition
(jnAna), desire (icChA), and effort (kRti) are all eternal. As
Ishvara's desire is eternal, nothing can give rise to it.
In response, the siddhikAra says
नच नित्येश्वरेच्छाया विषयत्वसंबन्धानुपपत्ति: Nor does this mean that Ishvara's desire will
end up not having a relationship with its object (as it is not created from
a cognition).
तस्या: अस्माभिरनङ्गीकारात्, Because that is not accepted by us.
According to advaita, Ishvara's desire is a modification of mAya,
and not eternal. His cognition is svarUpa
chaitanya (consciousness) and thus eternal, but Ishvara's desire
is a modification in mAyA and not eternal. The shruti also has
statements such as tadaikshata, sokAmayata etc. Thus even for
Him, cognition leads to desire.

From a nyAya perspective, the challenge is addressed next. A

permanent cognition and permanent desire are not known in
the world. Ishvara's existence is proven by inference in nyAya.
In the anumAna for Ishvara it is said that Ishvara can create the
world only in association with jnAna, icChA and kRti. Instead of
proving the existence of each of these through some other
means, the naiyyAyika holds that it is more parsimonious to
postulate their permanence in Ishvara. That is, if they are not
taken as permanent, it will lead to further speculations as to
why he got the desire to create, what is its cause etc. To avoid
these speculations, which will add to further assumptions,
these are simply assumed to be eternal.

तार्किकाणामपि तत्साधकमानबलेन विलक्षणसंबन्धकल्पनेऽपि

जन्यज्ञानजन्येच्छयोरुक्तप्रकारेणैव विषयताभ्युपगमात्,
For the logicians too, from the strength of the means used to prove that (the
existence of eternal desire) if one postulates a different
relationship (between eternal desire and eternal cognition), it is
possible for impermanent desires to be related to objects through the stated
manner through impermanent cognitions.

To explain, as Ishvara's cognition is different from any living

being's cognition, His desire too can be different from the
desire of anyone else. There is no requirement therefore that
the relationship between our desire and objects should be the
same relationship as the one between Ishvara's desire and
objects.

नच - पुत्रादिधीजन्यसुखादे: पुत्रादिविषयत्वापत्ति:, इच्छान्यायादिति - वाच्यम्;

वैषम्यात् |
Nor can it be argued (as was done by the nyAyAmRtakAra) that - Like
the rule in case of desires, happiness born from the cognition of children, etc will
end up having children, etc. as its object.

There is a difference between the two situations. Only a few

things are
considered saviShayaka - jnAna, icchA, kRti, samskAra, dveSha.
Things other than these cannot have saviShayatva. What is the
difference?

ज्ञानजन्यत्वस्य समानात्वेऽपि इच्छादावेव सविषयत्वप्रतीति:, न तु सुखादौ |

Even though both are generated by cognition, it is only desire
that appears to have an object, whereas happiness does not.

वस्तुस्वाभाव्यात् त्वयाप्यस्यैवार्थस्य वक्तव्यत्वात् | Because of the nature of

the thing, you too will have to concede that.

अन्यथा स्फटिके जपाकुसुमसन्निधानाल्लौहित्यवल्लोष्टेऽप्यापाद्येत |

Otherwise, one could query why a lump of clay does not
appear red when a red flower is placed next to it, whereas a
transparent crystal appears so.

The opponent tries a different argument. The import of the

portion of vedas dealing with rituals i dharma and adharma (that
which leads to puNya and pApa). There has to be some
relationship between dharma and the import.

अथ धर्मे तात्पर्यस्यानध्यासात्तात्पर्यसंबन्धो न स्यात् , न; If it is said - just like

without import being superimposed on dharma, it is possible for dharma to be
the import (objects need not be superimposed on
consciousness) - No.

What is tAtparya?

The naiyyAyika who does not hold to the aupauruSheyatva of

any sentence says tAtparya is vakturicChA, the intention of the
speaker. This is not therefore different from the icChA example
that we explained before.
However, there is no vaktA for those that hold that Veda is
apauruSheya. They say:

कत्वम्
तात्पर्यं हि तत्प्रतीत्युद्देयकत्वम् , प्रतीतेच श्चज्ञेयान्तरेणेव धर्मेणाऽपि
श्य
संबन्धोऽध्यास एव, प्रतीतिद्वारा च धर्मतात्पर्ययो: संबन्ध इत्यनुपपत्त्यभावात् |

कत्
तात्पर्यं हि तत्प्रतीत्युद्देयकत्वम् वम्श्यImport is the understanding which is set
out to be revealed (by the word).
प्रतीतेच श्चज्ञेयान्तरेणेव धर्मेणाऽपि संबन्धोऽध्यास एव, The relationship of
understanding with dharma, is like the relationship between understanding and
objects, a superimposed one.
प्रतीतिद्वारा च धर्मतात्पर्ययो: संबन्ध इत्यनुपपत्त्यभावात् | Thus there is
nothing wrong in postulating a relationship between dharma
and import through the means of understanding.

Just like the relationship between objects and desire is

through cognition, the relationship between import
and dharma is through understanding.

नच - ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशत्वेन प्रदीपसाम्येऽपि आन्तरत्वेन

तद्वैलक्षण्यमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् ; अत इच्छादिवद्विप्रकृष्टेनापि संबन्ध: स्यात्,
अन्यथा प्रदीपवदेवाध्यासिकसंबन्धोऽपि न स्यात्, परोक्षवृत्तौ
विप्रकृ ष्टसंबन्धदर्शनाच्चेति - वाच्यम् ;

Don't argue thus नच - ज्ञानस्य प्रकाशत्वेन प्रदीपसाम्येऽपि आन्तरत्वेन

तद्वैलक्षण्यमङ्गीकर्तव्यम् ; Even though cognition when viewed as
illumination is similar to a lamp, as it is internal, a difference must be conceded.
(That is, you cannot say that like the light from a lamp
illuminates only those objects that it directly comes into
contact with, consciousness illuminates only those it is in
direct contact with, not through a vRtti)

अत इच्छादिवद्विप्रकृष्टेनापि संबन्ध: स्यात्, Therefore, like desire etc., its

relationship with objects is also remote (through some other medium).

अन्यथा प्रदीपवदेवाध्यासिकसंबन्धोऽपि न स्यात्, Otherwise, like a lamp,

consciousness' relationship with objects cannot be unreal.
The relationship between light and its object is samyoga
sambandha, if consciousness and light are not different,
consciousness too must have a samyoga sambandha with its
object.
Therefore a difference between the two must be accepted.
परोक्षवृत्तौ विप्रकृ ष्टसंबन्धदर्शनाच्चेति - वाच्यम् ; In the case of an indirect
thought (like inference of a smoke which is not seen
directly), a remote relationship is seen (without postulating an
unreal relationship between those thoughts and their objects).

The siddhikAra says - Don't say this because

देशकालविप्रकर्षाभावस्य संबन्धसामान्यप्रयोजकत्वे
संभवत्यान्तरप्रतियोगिकसंबन्धभिन्नसंबन्ध एवास्य प्रयोजकत्वमिति
कल्पनाबीजाभावात् | As the absence of a spatial and temporal distance is necessary
for any real relationship, there is no basis to claim that such a rule is only true for
all relationships except an internal relationship.

If you say such a rule is true only for external objects, but is
not true where one of the two is internal, some unique reason
has to be prescribed for this. Thus, two reasons have to be
prescribed (something for external, and something for internal)
in your explanation, whereas only one reason needs to be
prescribed for my explanation. Thus my explanation is simpler
than yours.

इच्छायास्तु नेष्यमाणेन साक्षात्संबन्ध:, किं तु ज्ञानद्वारक: परंपरासंबन्ध

एवेत्युक्तम् | It was said that desire does not have a direct relationship with the
desired object, rather it is through the medium of cognition, and thus it is a
transitive relationship.

There are two entities involved in cognition - consciousness

and thought. Consciousness and objects have a superimposed
relation. In direct cognition, thought, object and consciousness
are all directly related. In indirect cognition, thought and the
object are not in direct contact. Thus consciousness delimited
by thought is not directly in contact with the object.

परोक्षस्थलेतु यद्यप्यधिष्ठानचैतन्येन साक्षादेव संबन्ध:; तथापि विषयाकारवृत्त्या

साक्षात्संबन्धाभावात् वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्येन विषयस्य परंपरासंबन्ध एव |
In the case of indirect cognitions, while the relationship between the object with
its substratum consciousness is direct, as the sambandha between thought and its
object is not direct, the relationship between consciousness delmited by the
thought and the object too is only transitive (remote).

In nyAya, the sense of hearing is actually space. However it is

space delimited within the ear (कर्णशष्कु ल्यवच्छिन्नं आकाश:) that is
responsible for hearing. What is the relationship between that
ear space and sound heard outside? It is not a direct
relationship. According to nyAya, the sound heard outside,
creates sound waves. Each wave creates a subsequent wave in
its adjacent space, which creates the next sound wave, and so
and so forth, until it reaches the space delimited within the
ear. Thus the ear does not hear an outside sound outside,
rather it hears a sound from a soundwave within the ear-
enclosed space, which is a remote product of the original
sound created outside.

Similarly thought is within the mind. The consciousness

delimited by thought is also internal. It cannot have a direct
relationship with the object. Its association with the object is
through thought. In the case of sound even though sound
occurs in space, it is not the sound outside that is heard, but
the sound in the space enclosed by the ear which is heard.
Similarly, even though the mountain fire is also superimposed
on consciousness, it is inferred by the consciousness delimited
by a remote cognition.

So an unreal sambandha between the consciousness and the

remote object is still postulated.

The opponent then argues:

ननु - तवापि मते ज्ञेयस्य न स्वज्ञानेऽध्यस्तत्वनियम:,

In your system too, cognition and its object need not have a
superimposed relationship always.
1) अनध्यस्तस्य तुच्छस्य
Absolutely absent entities (tucCha) are not superimposed (on cognition);
The advaitin argues that the world is neither sat, nor asat.
By asat, tucCha is meant. To say that something is not asat, one
must know what asat is. If the relationship between objects
and their cognition is superimposed, the relationship between
asat and its cognition must also be superimposed. However, if
it is superimposed, it would be mithyA, and not tucCha. Therefore
the relationship between cognition and objects cannot be
superimposed.

2) पञ्चमप्रकारत्वपक्षे अविद्यानिवृत्ते:
In the sub-school which says that the dissolution of ignorance has a fifth order of
reality, that and its cognition are not superimposed.
AnandabodhAchArya argued that avidyAnivRtti (dissolution) cannot
belong to any of the four known ontological categories (sat, asat,
sadasat, sadasat vilakshaNam) and hence must belong to a new, fifth
category of reality. If avidyAnivRtti has occurred, one must know
that it has occurred, for which it must be cognised. If the
relationship between cognitions and their object is
superimposed, the relationship between the cognition
of avidyAnivRtti and avidyAnivRtti must also be superimposed. If it
is superimposed, then avidyAnivRtti must be mithyA, not of a fifth
order of reality.

3) भावाद्वैतपक्षे अभावस्य च दृग्रूपत्वेऽपि स्वज्ञानेऽनध्यासात्,

Absence in (maNDana miSra's) bhAvAdvaita school is not considered to be
superimposed on its cognition, even if its cognition is of the nature of
consciousness.
maNDana miSra in his brahmasiddhi argued that upon the dawn of
knowledge the world is rendered absent. That is, during moksha,
the absence of the world is present. However, this does not
militate against advaita, because with advaita what is meant is
the absence of anything existent (bhAva) apart from Brahman.
This does not rule out the existence of absence (abhAva).
Hence, bhAvAdvaita. The nyAyAmRtakAra argues that
if abhAva was mithyA, it too must be rendered absent upon the
dawn of knowledge. Therefore, in this position, it must be true
that the relationship between cognition and abhAva is
something other that a superimposed one.
There are two readings to this sentence of the nyAyAmRta -
दृग्रूपत्वेऽपि and अदृग्रूपत्वेऽपि, both of which are acceptable. In the
former, the meaning is - even if their cognition is of the nature
of consciousness, the objects are not superimposed on those
cognitions. In the latter, the meaning is - even if the object
themselves are not the witnessing consciousness, ie even the
objects belong to the category of the dRshya, the seen, they are
not superimposed on their cognitions.
Both readings can thus be understood.

4) अपरोक्षैकरसे ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तस्य व्यावहारिकस्यातीतादेर्नित्यातीन्द्रियस्य च

परोक्षानुभवरूपे स्वज्ञानेऽनध्यासात्,
Past objects and objects that are eternally beyond the range of the senses, which
despite both being empirically real entities superimposed on Brahman, of the
nature of pure direct consciousness, are remotely experienced, and therefore
cannot be superimposed on their cognitions.

The nyAyAmRtakAra argues that the shruti says that

consciousness is always known directly (यत्साक्षाद् अपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म).
Thus, everything that is superimposed on it must also directly
perceived. However, many objects within empirical reality are
remotely cognised (those that are always remote such as
those objects which are beyond the reach of the senses, or
those that are sometimes remote, such as the memory of
those objects seen in the past). Therefore, if all objects are
superimposed on consciousness, which is ultimately the same
as cognition, how can one account for the difference between
the direct cognition of some objects and the indirect cognition
of some other objects? Therefore one must admit that the
relationship between cognition and remote objects is not one
of superimposition, it is something else that explains why they
are experienced remotely.

5) स्मर्यमाणस्य च स्मृतिरूपे स्वज्ञानेऽनध्यासात्,

The recollected is not superimposed on its cognition, recollection

6) प्रातिभासिकस्य च प्रातिभासिके स्वज्ञानेऽनध्यासात्, त्वन्मते

भ्रमरूपज्ञानस्यापि कल्पितत्वादिति

The apparently real object (shell-silver) is not superimposed on the

cognition of the apparently real (cognition of shell-silver), because n your
system, the cognition of illusion is itself superimposed.

In anirvachanIya khyAti, both silver and its appearance are adhyAsa.

The former is arthAdhyAsa, the latter is jnAnAdhyAsa. Both
are prAtibhAsika, apparently real. Thus one cannot be
superimposed on the other.

- चेत्; मैवम् ; The siddhikAra responds: Not so.

1) तुच्छस्याज्ञेयत्वेन ज्ञाने अध्यासाभावाद् tucCha can never be known,

hence it cannot be superimposed.

How can one talk of sadasat vilakshaNatvam if asat can never be

known? The answer is that it is not known through a valid or
invalid cognitions, rather, it is known through a vikalpa
vRtti (shabdajnAnAnupAti vastu shUnya). That is, it is known as
the non-existent object corresponding to word's such as hare's
horn etc. When we hear the word hare's horn, we understand
what the meaning is, but there is no corresponding object
relating to the word. Any cognition shows the existence of
something (even absence shows the presence of absence).
However vikalpa does not show the existence of hare's horn.
With such a verbal cognition, it is possible to talk of asat, and
through that, one can refer to that which is different from
asat.

ज्ञेयस्य हि ज्ञानेऽध्यास:, तुच्छस्य तु न ज्ञेयतेत्यग्रे वक्ष्यते |

Only the known is superimposed on jnAna (consciousness), but tucCha is
not the object of jnAna. This will be further explained (in the
chapter anirvacanIyatve arthApatti pramANam)

2) पञ्चमप्रकाराविद्यानिवृत्तेरपि प्रतियोग्यधिकरणे ध्वंसस्यापि तत्र

वृत्तेरवश्यंभावात् अध्यास एव संबन्ध: | As there is necessarily cognition
of avidyAnivritti, which belongs to the fifth ontological category,
and dhvamsa (destruction) located in the locus of the counterpositive, both are
certainly superimposed.

In nyAya, the destruction (dhvamsa) of the pot is located in the

pot-shards. The destruction of the pot, therefore appears along
with the appearance of the pot-shards. Just like the pot-shards
are superimposed on consciousness, the destruction of the pot
is also so superimposed. The same is the case for avidyAnivRtti.

3) वस्तुतस्त्वविद्यानिवृत्ते: पञ्चामप्रकारत्वं च भावाद्वैतं चानभ्युपगमपराहतम् |

However, really speaking, avidyAnivRtti's belonging to the fifth
category of reality and bhavAdvaita are not accepted (as
siddhAnta) and one does not need address the defects in those
systems.

यथाचाविद्यानिवृत्तेर्ब्रह्मरूपत्वं सर्वाद्वैतं च तथोपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यते |

That avidyAnivritti and abhAva in bhAvAdvaita are of the nature of
Brahman itself will be explained later.

When the rope is directly seen (pratyaksha), the snake illusion

also is directly seen. If the rope is remote (paroksha), the snake
is also remote. Thus, we can infer a general rule that the
directness or indirectness of the illusion is dependent on the
directness or indirectness of the substratum.
Brahman is the substratum of illusion. It is always directly
perceived. Then why are some objects of the world directly
perceived and others not directly perceived?

If to remedy this, it is said that the objects are superimposed

on thought, which can be direct or indirect, leading to the
direct or indirect cognition of objects, such an argument is not
acceptable to the advaitin. This is the vijnAnavAdin's position. This
is also called sAkArajnAnavAda. The vRtti (thought) takes
the AkAra of objects and that is why objects appear as
such. The siddhikAra answers this objection.

4) अपरोक्षैकरसे ब्रह्मण्यध्यस्तस्यातीतादेरनुमित्यादिरूपज्ञाने
अनाध्यासेऽपि यस्मिन्श्चैतन्ये तदध्यस्तं तदेव चैतन्यमनुमित्यादिरूपवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नमिति
नाध्यासानुपपत्ति:
Past objects, and inferred objects etc which are superimposed on the directly
perceived Brahman are not superimposed on the memory and inferential
knowledge etc by which they are known. However, the consciousness on which
the objects are superimposed is the same consciousness which is delimited by
indirect cognitions such as inference etc.

अतिप्रसङ्गपरिहारार्थं चैतन्यस्य विषयसंबन्धे वृत्त्युपरागापेक्षायामपि नाधिष्ठानत्वे तदपेक्षा

| To remove the over-extension error (if consciousness and objects
have a direct sambandha, as consciousness is one, everyone
should see an object, when anyone sees it), if it is said that the
relationship between consciousness and objects requires a thought, that is not
needed for consciousness to be the substratum for the superimposition of objects
on it.

Now, it may be asked how can remote objects and

consciousness have a direct superimposed relationship if the
cognition that reveals them is remote? To such a question, it is
being said:

5) and 6) एवमेव नित्यपरोक्षस्थले स्मृतिस्थलेऽपि प्रातिभासिकस्य

प्रातिभासिक्यां वृत्तावनध्यासेऽप्यधिष्ठानविषयकवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तचैतन्य एवाध्यास इति न
काप्यनुपपत्ति: | Therefore, while the objects that are eternally beyond direct
perception, those objects recalled by memory, and those illusory objects seen by
cognition of empirically real objects, are not admitted to be superimposed on the
the thoughts that objectify them, it is possible for them to be superimposed on the
substratum consciousness of objects that becomes manifest as a result of the
cognition of the objects.

नच - रूप्यादिकमिदमंशावच्छिन्नचैतन्येऽध्यस्तं, भासते च अविद्यावृत्ति

प्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनेति विषयिणि ज्ञाने विषयस्याध्यास: कथमिति - वाच्यम्

Nor can it be argued thus - The illusory silver is superimposed on the

consciousness that is delimited by the unknown object, known to the seer simply
as 'this' (when a person sees silver, he first senses that there is
some object there, he does not first know what it is. Thus it is
called the consciousness which appears to him as something,
called 'this'.) However it appears to him due to the consciousness reflected in
the avidyA vritti. That being the case how is it argued that the object is
superimposed on the subject's consciousness?

The substratum is different, the revealing consciousness is

different. The advaitin had said that consciousness and objects
have a superimposed relationship. However, the superimposed
relationship silver is not with the consciousness that reveals
it, the avidyA vritti ahacChinna chaitanya but with the shukti avacChinna
chaitanya (consciousness delimited by the shell). How then can
it be argued that objects are superimposed on the subject, as
was argued in the adhyAsa
bhAShya (अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्
माणां चाध्यासः)

एकावच्छिन्न एवापरावाच्छेदेन निरपेक्षोपाधेरिवात्र भेदकत्वाभावात्, As it is the

same consciousness that is delimited by one and delimited by the other, unlike in
the case of nirapeksha upAdhi (independent adjunct), there is no
difference in the two.

upAdhi-s (adjuncts) have been classified

into sApeksha and nirapeksha. When there are two pots in the
same place, they are sApeksha upAdhi. When the two pots are in
different places, they are nirapeksha upAdhi. It is postulated that
space delimited by the two pots in the first is the same,
whereas in the latter, it is different.

The manovRtti (mental cognition) of "this" is located in the

same place as the avidyAvRtti (of silver), thus the consciousness
delimited by two upAdhi-s is the same.

One of the theories of error (khyAti vAda) is akhyAti vAda, postulated

by the prAbhAkara mImAmsaka. According to him, there is no
illusion at all. In the cognition of shell-silver, he says that the
eyes reveal this, the silver is recalled by memory. Owing to a
lack of discrimination between the perception of "this" and the
memory of "silver", leads to the transaction "this is silver". He
does not concede that a cognition of the nature "this is silver"
arises.
Now, the advaitin accepts two vRtti-s in illusory cognitions
- manovritti of "this" and avidyAvritti of "silver". It may be alleged
that this position mirrors the prAbhAkAra-
s position. vivaraNAchArya refutes this by saying that vRtti-s may
be two, but jnAna is one. The phalam, the chaitanya that is
reflected in the two vRtti-s is one.

अतएव अभियुक्तै: फलैक्यादैक्यं ज्ञानस्योच्यते | Therefore, (as

both avidyAvRtti and manovRtti are present in the same
place), the manifested consciousness is one and hence cognition is one.

नच - रूप्यादे: स्वज्ञानेऽध्यस्तत्वे रूप्यज्ञानस्य अज्ञाने

भ्रमोत्पत्तिस्तज्ज्ञानेन तन्निवृत्तिरिति च स्यात्,
अधिष्ठानाज्ञानज्ञानाभ्यामध्यासस्य जन्मनिवृत्त्योर्नियतत्वात्, ज्ञानं
रजतमिति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गाच्चेति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "If the shell silver etc is superimposed on the
cognition of shell-silver, when one is ignorant of the cognition of shell-silver (the
substratum) the illusion would arise, and by its knowledge (the cognition
of shell-silver) the illusion would be destroyed, because of the rule that the
ignorance of the substratum is the cause for illusions and the knowledge of the
substratum is the cause for the sublation of illusions. It would also lead to the
situation that the cognition that arises is "the cognition is silver", not "this is
silver (because the substratum is partly seen in the illusion)".

The nyAyAmRtakAra is arguing based on a misunderstanding (or

misstatement) of the advaitin's position that it is
consciousness upon which illusions are superimposed (he is
characterising the advaitin's position of dRshya being
superimposed on dRk, to mean objects being superimposed
on cognition). Extending these too illusions, he argues that the
object of illusions must be superimposed on illusory
cognitions.

Extending this further he alleges that as the ignorance of the

substratum leads to illusions, the ignorance of shell-silver
cognition would lead to the appearance of shell-silver.
Similarly, as the knowledge of the substratum destroys
illusions, knowledge of shell-silver cognition would lead to the
destruction of shell-silver.

The superimposition is between consciousness and objects,

not cognitions and objects. The ignorance of shell undergoes
modification into silver and silver cognition.

In the case of shell-silver illusion, the superimposition of the

silver is not on the silver-cognition, but on the consciousness
delimited by "this". At the time of the perception of silver as
this, the consciousness delimited by "this" (idam amsha avacChinna
chaitanya) happens to be the same as consciousness delimited
by the cognition of silver (rajatAkAra vritti avacChinna chaitanya), being
colocated, but the substratum of the silver is not the
consciousness delimited by the cognition of silver, rather the
substratum if consciousness delimited by "this".

रजताकारवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य रजतभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वानभ्युपगमात्,
वच्छिन् नचैतन्
इदमं वच्छिन्नचैतन्यमेव यमेवशा तु रजतभ्रमाधिष्ठानम्, तच्च
दैवाद्रजताकारवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यमपि, नैतावता भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वे तदपेक्षा |
Consciousness delimited by the cognition that takes the shape of silver is not
admitted to be the substratum of the silver. Rather, it is the consciousness
delimited by "this" alone that is the substratum to the illusory silver. It so
happens that it is also the consciousness delimited by the cognition taking the
shape of silver (at the time of the perception of the
illusion). However by that much itself, it does not become the substratum.

Another argument was made by the nyAyAmRtakAra. In the

illusion, "this is silver", the "this aspect" is known. If the
consciousness delimited by "this" is the substratum of the
silver, it is also known. Then how can it be argued that one was
ignorant of the substratum, and that ignorance caused the
illusion? Here the substratum is known, but the illusion still
occurs. Further, the knowledge of the substratum should
destroy the illusion. Again, the substratum is known, but the
illusion is not destroyed, it persists. Therefore, it must be
accepted that the substratum of the illusion is not the "this"
delimited consciousness.
To this, the siddhikAra replies, yes, the "this" delimited
consciousness is the substratum, but the cause of the illusion
of silver as "this" is the ignorance of "this" as shell. When
"this" is known to be a shell, the illusion is destroyed.

Thus the general rule is - if the form of the substratum whose

ignorance causes the illusion, becomes known, that is the
knowledge that destroyes the illusion and not any general
knowledge of the substratum.

क्तित्वा द्
या कारेणा
तस्य च भ्रमविरोधिक्तित्वाद्याकारेणाज्ञानं ज् शुभ्रमकारणम् | The cause of the
ञानं
illusion is the ignorance of consciousness delimited by "this" in its aspect as the
shell that is in opposition to the illusion.

तेनाकारेण ज्ञानं भ्रमनिवर्तकम् | The knowledge of it in that aspect,

removes the illusion.

It was argued by the nyAyAmRtakAra that saying that objects are

superimposed on consciousness is like saying the silver is
superimposed on the silver cognition. If that was true, one
would have the knowledge "the cognition is silver" instead of
"this is silver". The siddhikAra refutes this:
अतएव न ज्ञानं रजतमिति भ्रमाकारापत्ति:, वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नस्यैव
ज्ञानत्वात्तस्यचाधिष्ठानत्वाभावात् | It is for this reason that there is no
possibility of the illusion being of the nature "the cognition is silver", because
knowledge is really consciousness delimited by cognition, and that is not the
substratum.

अधिष्ठानतादात्म्येन चारोप्यप्रतीतिरिति इदं रजतमित्येव भ्रमाकार: | As

superimpositions always appear identical to the substratum, the illusion can only
be of the form: "this" is silver.

The nyAyAmRtakAra continues assuming that objects are

superimposed on their cognitions.
ननु - घटादे: स्वसन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यस्वज्ञानात् पूर्वे सत्त्वेन तत्राध्यासो न
युक्त: |
He says - "Known objects like pots etc, must exist prior to their cognition,
because their cognition is born from the contact of the senses with those objects.
Thus, to say they are superimposed there, is inappropriate."

नच - या घटेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजा वृत्तिस्तया घटो नो प्रकाय श्य

: | येन च प्रकायो श्यो
घटाधिष्ठानचैतन्येन न
तत्सन्निकर्षजमिति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued (by
the advaitin) that - The pot is not illuminated by the cognition that is born
from the contact of the senses with the pot. The consciousness that illuminates the
pot is its substratum, which is not born from the contact with senses.

That is incorrect because:

वृत्त्यतिरिक्तज्ञाने मानाभावात् | There is no basis to claim that jnAna is anything but

cognition.

अज्ञाननिवृत्तेरपि तत एव भावादिति The destruction of ignorance is only

possible due to that alone.

- चेन्न; the siddhikAra replies, this is not correct.

Cognitions (vRtti) is called jnAna only figuratively. The real

meaning of jnAna is consciousness alone. In the vivaraNa, it is
said अन्त:करणवृत्तौ ज्ञानत्वोपचारात् - mental cognitions are
figuratively referred to as jnAna.

The advaitin's position is that there must be something other

than the thought which makes one aware of the thought, that
is consciousness. Further, knowing that one does not know
something is also because of consciousness. Before one
knows the unknown using the thought, there has to be
something which tells him he doesn't know that thing.

वृत्त्युदयात् प्रागज्ञातार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं वृत्त्यतिरिक्तज्ञानस्यावश्यमभ्युपेयत्वात् | Prior to the

rise of cognition (to know a hitherto unknown object), one must
certainly accept a jnAna (consciousness) other than the cognition itself to
be aware of the existence of an unknown object.

अन्यथा तस्य साधकाभावेन शशशृङ्गतुल्यतया सन्निकर्षतज्जन्यज्ञानहेतुत्वेन

प्राक् सत्त्वकल्पना निष्प्रामाणिकी स्यात् | If that consciousness is not accepted,
there is nothing to prove the existence of the unknown object, and as its cognition
is only born from the contact of that object with senses, prior to the rise of
cognition, the postulation of the object's existence would be without basis.

तस्माद्यादृशस्यघटादेरिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षारयत्वेन यत् वेनश्रज्ञानकारणत्वं तादृशस्य

साधकं किञ्चिन्मानमवश्यमभ्युपेयम् |
Therefore, in order for objects such as pots, etc. to be said to be one of the causes
of their cognitions, on account of the contact of the senses with objects, there has
to be some independent basis accepted for the existence of those objects.

अन्यथाऽन्वयव्यतिरेकयोरग्रहेण कार्यकारणभावाग्रहात्
सर्वमानमेयादिव्यवस्थोच्छिद्येत | Otherwise, as a cause-effect relationship is
not known because co-presence and co-absence are not known, all empirical
activity involving knowledge and the known is lost.

If that consciousness is not accepted, every activity in the

world based on the knowledge of things would be harmed, for
the cause effect relationship would be absent, as the
existence of the cause (objects) prior to the effect (their
cognitions) is not known, neither is the absence of the cause
prior to the knowledge of the effect known.

Before the rise of knowledge of the object, one has to know

that such an object exists. The knowledge of the object's
existence leads to the knowledge of the object itself. The
knowledge of the object itself cannot prove the existence of
the object, because the object is admitted to be the cause of
its cognition.

तच्च मानं न वृत्तिरूपं ; तदानीं वृत्तिकारणाप्रवृत्तेरिति तद्विलक्षणं नित्यं

स्वप्रकाशमेकमेव लाघवात्, That basis (for the existence of
objects) cannot be a cognition, because the cause for the cognitions is not
present. By the principle of parsimony, it must be something different from the
cognition, eternal, self evident and one.
anukUlatarka nirUpaNam (part 3)
वृत्तिगतोत्पत्ति विनाशजडत्वादिभिस्तदम्स्पर्शात् | That consciousness is untouched
by the properties of cognitions such as birth, death, inertness
etc.

तदेव च नानाविधोपाधिसंबन्धान्नानाविध्व्यवहारभाक् भवति नभ इव घटमणिमल्लिकाद्युपाधिभेदेन;

तच्चाज्ञानसाधकत्वात्स्वरूपतो नाज्ञाननिवर्तकं , वृत्त्युपरक्तं त्वज्ञाननिवर्तकमिति न
वृत्तेरनुपयोग: |
It is That alone, when associated with different types of
adjuncts, appears to take on different functions, like space in
different enclosures such jars, pots, earthen-ware, etc. As it is
That (consciousness) which reveals ignorance, It cannot by
itself destroy ignorance. However when
That (consciousness) is associated with cognition it can can
remove ignorance, thus cognitions too serve a purpose.

तथाच सर्वाज्ञानसाधके साक्षिचैतन्ये तस्मिन् घटादेरध्यास इति

काऽनुपपत्ति:? Therefore, what is inappropriate about saying that
pots etc are superimposed on the witness consciousness
which reveals every kind of ignorance?

राचार्
तदुक्तं सुरेवराचार्यै : - 'सर्वतीर्थदृ शाH
यैश्व सिद्धि: स्वाभिप्रेतस्य वस्तुन: |
यदभ्युपगमादेव तत्सिद्धिर्वार्यते कु त: ||' इति |
Thus, sureshvarAchArya (said in his vArttika) - The
basis (witness consciousness), upon which, all proponents of
various philosophical systems establish their positions, how
can that be denied by anyone?

Unless one has certainty that "I know X", X will be doubtful.
This is not possible unless the witness consciousness reveals
that "I know that I know X". Only if the witness consciousness
is accepted, can anything be proven.

He has also said that to say the eyes etc. are pramANam,
sAkshi has to be accepted.
'सर्वतीर्थदृ शाH
तावत्सामान्यं मानलक्षणम् | अज्ञातार्थावगमनं त्वदुक्ते तन्न युज्यते
||'
Every philosophical system accepts a common definition of
proof, that is, they reveal something that is not otherwise
known. However, without accepting a witness-consciousness,
that definition would be not be possible.

There are two possibilities:

'स्वत: सिद्धोऽथवासिद्धो देहादिस्ते भवन् भवेत् | प्रमाणानां प्रमाणत्वं नोभयत्रापि
लभ्यते ||'
Are the objects of cognition, such as the body etc, self-evident
or not self-evident according to you? In either case, the validity
of valid cognitions is not possible.

'प्रमाणान्यन्तरेणापि देहादिश्चेत् प्रसिध्यति | वद प्रमाणै: कोन्वर्थो न हि सिद्धस्य

साधनम् ||'
If the body etc (objects) are self-evident, pray tell what is the
use of means of knowledge that reveal the known?

'स्वतोऽसिद्धे प्रमेये तु नासतो व्यञ्जिका प्रमा | नाभिव्यनक्ति सविता शशशृङ्गं

स्फुरन्नपि |'
If the known are not self-evident, then cognitions would end up
revealing non-existent entities. The sun, despite being of the
nature of illumination, cannot illuminate a hare's horn.

The nyAyAmRtakAra says that there is a contradiction

between this view and the view of the panchadashI. In
the panchadashI, vidyAraNya svAminah had said that there
are two types of cognitions - "This is a pot" and "The pot is
known" - the former cognition has the pot as its object, in the
latter, both pot and pot-cognition are the object.

इति नच - 'घटोऽयमित्यसौ उक्तिराभासस्य प्रसादत: | विज्ञातो घट

इत्युक्तिर्ब्रह्मानुभवतो भवेत् ||' इति वदता वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितस्य घटानधिष्ठानचैतन्यस्य
घटानुभवत्वोक्ति विरोध इति - वाच्यम् |
Nor can it be argued that - "(The verse from the panchadashI) 'The
consciousness reflected in the thought reveals the pot as "this is a pot". The
cognition "the pot is known" is revealed by the witness consciousness.' is
contradicted by the statement that illumination of the pot is
not the consciousness delimited by the cognition, which is not
the substratum of the pot.

If it is said that the substratum of the pot reveals the pot, it

contradicts vidyAraNya svAminah's comment that it is the
consciousness reflected in the thought that reveals the pot.

The siddhikAra says: No.

वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य घटाधिष्ठानचैतन्येन सह भेदाभावात्, चैतन्यस्यैकत्वात् | There is
no difference between the consciousness reflected in
cognition and pot-substratum consciousness, as the
consciousness is one.

Even if the upAdhi-s (delimiters / adjuncts) are two, as they are

in the same place, the upahita (the delimited) will not be
different.

यथाचैकस्यैव चैतन्यस्य सर्वभासकत्वं तथा विस्तरेणोपपादितं 'नाभाव

उपलब्धेरित्यस्मिन्नधिकरणे' भाष्यकृद्भि: |
The manner in which it is possible for the one consciousness
to illuminate all has been elaborately proven by
the bhAshyakAra in the chapter titled "It is not absence,
because it is perceived".

When refuting the Buddhist, in the nAbhAva upalabdhe:

adhikaraNa (it is not absence, for it is perceived),
the bhAShyakAra has explained in detail how the one
consciousness reveals everything. The Buddhist holds that
cognition is self-evident. The bhAShyakAra argues that
cognition is not self-evident in the sense that it reveals itself,
because in the absence of things to reveal, the thought itself is
not revealed. It needs a consciousness to reveal the presence
of cognition. That consciousness is self-evident, in the sense
that it does not need anything else to reveal it. It is the
revealer of everything.
The nyAyAmRtakAra makes another argument.

ननु - दृश्यत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या मिथ्यात्वमित्यर्थापत्तिर्विवक्षिता, किं वा सत्यत्वे दृश्यत्वं न

स्यादित्यनुकूलतर्कमात्रम् |
What is intended here? The arthApatti that as there is no way
to explain the perceptibility of objects (Akshepaka), they must
be mithyA (Akshepya)? Or, alternatively is it merely a supporting
logic for the inference of the world's unreality that if the world
was real, it would not be cognised?

नाद्य:, तत्सामग्र्यभावात् | It cannot be the first, as the causes of

arthApatti are not present.

तथाहि - आक्षेप्यस्योपपादकत्वं ; प्रमाणाविरुद्धत्वं,

आक्षेपकस्यानुपपद्यमानत्वं, प्रमितत्वंचेत्यर्थापत्तिसामग्री |
The causes of arthApatti are
1) The Akshepya (the thing proven) must result in
the Akshepaka (the reason).
2) The Akshepya must not be contradicted by some other valid
means of knowledge.
3) The Akshepaka must not be otherwise possible (without the
presence of the Akshepya).
4) There needs to be certainty that the Akshepaka is present.

In the arthApatti, "fat Devadatta does not eat during the day,
hence he must be eating at night". The Akshepaka is
Devadatta being "fat". The Akshepya is "he must be eating at
night".
1) Him eating at night results in him being fat.
2) His eating at night is not contradicted by other means of
knowledge.
3) Him being fat is not otherwise possible without him eating
at night (as it is known that he does not eat during the day).
4) That he is fat is a matter of perception.

The opponent continues:

प्रकृते चाक्षेप्यसंबन्धिनो मिथ्यात्वं नाक्षेपकस्य संबन्धस्योपपादकत्वम्, प्रत्युत
प्रतिकूलमेव |
In our context, the Akshepya, the mithyAtva of the seen world,
does not result in the Akshepaka, the connection between
consciousness and the world. Rather if there was no
connection between consciousness and the world, it would not
be seen. It contradicts, not implies.

नचाध्यस्तत्वरूपसंबन्धस्य न तत्प्रतिकूलम्; Nor can it be argued that an

unreal connection (between consciousness and the
world) does not overrule (the world's cognisability).

तस्याद्याप्यसिद्धेरनाक्षेपकत्वात् | Because, as that too (the

untenability of the connection between consciousness and the
world) has not been proven, it cannot be the proof (of the
world's unreality).
That is, the nature of the connection between consciousness
and the world has not been proven beyond doubt, hence it
cannot be used to prove the unreality of the world. Hence the
first criterion for the arthApatti of the unreality of the world
due to the cognisability of the world, has failed.

प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धं चेदमाक्षेप्यम् | Moreover, this Akshepya (world's

unreality) itself is contradicted by perception.

There is a rule termed bhUyonugraha nyAya, which is a

corollary of the utilitarian principle, which postulates that if
there are two contradictory ideas - one whose validity benefits
many things, another whose validity only serves a single
purpose, and only one of the two can be valid - it is better to
sacrifice the validiyt of the one which benefits the fewer, in
order to preserve the one that supports many.

नाप्येकस्य दृश्यत्वस्योपपत्तये प्रमितानेकस्य त्यागो युक्त: | (Invoking

the bhUyonugraha nyAya), In order to preserve a single
cognisability, it is inappropriate to sacrifice (the validity
of) many cognitions accepted as valid.
आक्षेपकं च न दृगध्यस्तत्वं ; तस्यैव फलत आक्षेप्यत्वात् | The
proof (Akshepaka) cannot be "being superimposed on the
seer", because that is the very thing to be proved (how can
you use the superimposition of the world to be the proof for the
unreality of the world, which is nothing but superimposition in
other words?).

नापि दृग्विषयत्वरूपो दृग्संबन्ध:, तवासिद्धे: | Nor can it be "a connection with

consciousness of the nature of being the object of
consciousness", because for you, consciousness has no
objects at all.

दृगधीनसिद्धिकत्वम्; दृग्विषयत्वातिरिक्तस्य तस्यासिद्धे: | Nor can it be "its

relevation being dependent upon consciousness", because it is
not something other than being the object of the seer (which
has already been denied).

Thus far, the first option, i.e,

the arthApatti of mithyAtva based on dRshyatva, was
denied. Next he is going to refute the second option, i.e, the
absence of a connection between consciousness and objects
is an anukUla tarka, a supportive reasoning, for the inference
of the world's mithyAtva.

नान्त्य:, सत्त्वेऽप्युक्तरीत्या सम्बन्धान्तरेणैव दृश्यत्वस्योपपन्नतया

अनुपपत्तेरभावादिति It is not the latter (either). Even if the world
was real, as its cognisability is possible even if there is a
different, real connection (between consciousness and the
seen world), cognisability is possibile, and therefore the
implausibility of a connection between the seer and seen, is
absent.

To this argument, the siddhikAra says:

- चेन्न ; अनुकूलतर्कस्यैव प्रक्रान्तत्वेनार्थापत्तिर्वेत्यादिविकल्पानवका त्त्

,
शा
उभयथाप्यदोषाच्च | No. When this has been brought up in the
context of supportive reasoning, there is no scope to raise the
possibility of whether it has been done for the purpose of
arthApatti (to prove the world's unreality). Even so, there are
no defects in either alternative (whether
proving mithyAtva using arthApatti, or using the untenability
of a connection between consciousness and objects as a
supportive reasoning).

The four criteria outlined by the nyAyAmRtakAra are not

restricted to arthApatti alone, they are relevant for inferences
too. However, the unique criterion specific
to arthApatti is vyatireka vyApti - the negative
concomitance - if Devadatta did not eat at night, he wouldn't
be well-nourished.
The naiyyAyikas who accept vyatireka vyApti, don't postulate
a separate pramANa called arthApatti. The advaitins do not
admit to vyatireka vyApti as a cause for anumAna. The
reason is because it is acceptable for the presence of hetu to
be used to imply the presence of sAdhya. However to use the
absence of the sAdhya to imply the absence of the hetu, as a
basis for the existence of the sAdhya is a step too far.

तथाहि - सत्यत्वे दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्ति: | If the world is real, there would

have to be a real connection between the seen and seer, but
that is not possible.

मिथ्यात्वं च तदुपपादकम्, न तत्संबन्धप्रतिकूलम्; If the world is mithyA, then

a superimposed relationship between consciousness and
objects is possible. That would not be contradictory to such a
relationship.

When the shell-silver is mithyA and the shell is real, and there
is the possibility of an unreal relationship between the two. A
real silver and real shell have no real connection. So why is it
argued that the world being mithyA is contradictory to a
superimposed relationship between the world and Brahman?
While a real connection between two objects requires both to
be real, an unreal connection does not necessarily require both
entities to be real.

मिथ्यत्वेऽपि शुक्तिरुपस्येदमंशोऽध्यस्तत्वरूपसंबन्धदर्शनेन संबन्धसामान्ये प्रतिकूलत्वाभावात्

| Even if the world was mithyA, as the shell silver is seen to
have a superimposed relationship with the consciousness
delimited by "this", one cannot say in general that all
relationships are contradicted.

Looking at it from the perspective of the arthApatti,

the advaitin's Akshepaka is cognisability, ie being the object
of consciousness, and using that, superimposition is being
proven. Thus the charge that the advaitin is
using mithyAtva to prove mithyAtva does not stand.

आक्षेपकोऽपि दृग्विषयत्वरूपो दृक्संबन्ध एव अध्यासरूपस्य दृग्विषयत्वस्य ममाऽपि

संप्रतिपत्ते:, It is acceptable to me also to use the Akshepaka of
a being an object of consciousness, of the nature of being
connected with consciousness, to prove that the connection is
unreal.

तात्त्विकस्यैव तस्य निषेधात् | The reality of that is what is being

negated.

The nyAyAmRtakAra had argued that the Akshepaka needs to

be proven and a superimposed objectification by
consciousness is not proven. However, the Akshepaka is
being an object of consciousess, and that is already known. It
so happens to be unreal.
न चाध्यस्तत्वस्याद्याप्यसिद्धि:; It cannot be said that a superimposed
relationship is unproven.

This is a kind of inference called parisheSha anumAna. Once

all other explanations for an observed phenomenon have been
invalidated, whatever remains must be true. There would be no
explanation for the observed phenomenon, if we do not accept
the last remaining explanation.
We observe the world, thus that the world is the object of
consciousness is proven. Now, when we try to examine the
nature of the connection between consciousness and the
world, we have invalidated any possibility of a real relationship.
Therefore, what remains - that the relationship between
consciousness and the world is an unreal one - must be true.

दृक्संबन्धसामान्यस्याक्षेपकस्य
षनि षेधेऽप् यधस्
प्रसक्तवि षनिषेधेऽप्यधस्तत्वरूपवि
शे तत्
वरू
पवि
शेषपर्
यवसानेना
षपर्यवसानेनाशे
सिद्ध्यभावात् | For the Akshepaka of a general connection with
consciousness, as every specific qualifier (explanation) has
been negated, the only qualifier that remains is being a
superimposed connection, and therefore it cannot be held that
an unreal relationship remains unproven.

न हि अध्यस्तसंबन्धत्वेनाक्षेपकता, किं तु संबन्धत्वेन | The arthApatti

is not done on the basis of the Akshepaka being an unreal
connection, rather, it is done merely on the basis of it being a
connection.

सा चाध्यस्तत्वसंबन्धसंभावनयाप्यबाधित एवेति | Now, if the connection

happens to be unreal, that in itself does not invalidate the
arthApatti.

नच - घटस्य ज्ञानमिति धीसिद्धसंबन्धसामान्यस्याध्यस्तत्वं न विशेष:, न हि रूप्यस्य शुक्तिरिति

प्रतीतिरस्तीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be alleged that the qualifier of the connection
cannot be "being unreal", because the usage "The pot's
cognition" indicates merely a connection (unqualified),
(whereas in the case of unreal connections), there is no usage
like "the silver's shell".

The opponent argues that where there is a superimposition

such as a shell-silver, the real shell appears as the unreal
silver, and not as the silver's shell, whereas in the case of a pot
(which is real, according to the opponent) and cognitions
(real), the cognition appears as "pot's cognition".

रूप्यस्य शुक्तिरिति प्रतीत्यभावेऽपि रूप्यस्य शुक्तिरधिष्ठानमिति प्रतीत्या अध्यस्तत्वस्य

षत्वसिद्
संबन्धवि षत्वसिद्धेशे धे:, Even though no one says 'silver's shell', as
it is possible for the cognition 'silver's substratum is the shell'
to occur, that is sufficient to qualify their relationship

चैत्रस्य मित्र इति प्रतीत्यभावेऽपि चैत्रस्य पिता मित्र इति प्रतीतिवत् , For
example, even though no one says 'Chaitra's Mitra', it is
possible to say 'Chaitra's father is Mitra'.

If the relationship of son is possible there, why not relationship

of superimposition here? The sixth case-ending can be used
only with a word that denotes a relationship. The word Chaitra
does not denote a relationship, but the word father denotes a
relationship, hence the sixth case-ending can be used in that
context.

आक्षेप्यमत्र प्रमाणाविरुद्धमेव; The Akshepya (mithyAtva) is not

contradictory to any means of knowledge.

अध्यक्षादिविरोधस्य प्रागेव परिहृतत्वात् | And any contradiction by

perception etc has already been refuted.

आक्षेपके च प्रमितत्वमनपेक्षितमेव अप्रमितेनापि प्रतिबिम्बेन

नात् | The Akshepaka need not be validated because
बिम्बाक्षेपदर्नात्र्श
even an unreal reflection proves the existence of a real
original.

तर्कपरतायामपि नाप्रयोजकता; Even if this is taken as reasoning

(anukUla tarka), it does no fail. There is an underlying
concomitance.

The opponent had asked why should the object be mithyA for
it to be seen. Why cannot the object be real and it be seen? To
answer this, the siddhikAra says:
सत्यत्वे संबन्धानुपपत्तेर्भवदुक्तन्यायखण्डनेन प्रथमत एवोपपादितत्वात्
| Your reason has been refuted in the beginning by saying that
if the world is real, there can be no relationship with
consciousness.

The opponent had asked - you should first prove that if the
object is real, it will not be cognisable. Only then can it be
argued that as the world has cognisability, it cannot be real.
Why does reality prove the absence of cognisability?

The siddhikAra says:

दृश्यत्वाभावस्यापादकमत्र सत्त्वमनिर्वाच्यत्वाभावो वा त्रिकालाबाध्यत्वं वा उभयथाऽपि

न दोष: | The nature of reality which would have proven the
absence of cognisability in the world, is the absence
of anirvAcyatva or the the absence of sublatability in any period
of time. There is no defect in either option.

नचानिर्वाच्यत्वाभावस्य तुच्छे परोक्षधीवेद्यतया दृश्येऽपि सत्त्वेन व्यभिचार:, Nor

can it be alleged, that as the tucCha which has the absence
of anirvAcyatva, is known by an indirect cognition, and therefore,
even though real (being not anirvAcya), it is known - and thus
there is a vyabhichAra to the rule postulated.

The siddhikAra says no. tucCha is not known, because while

words can refer to it, there is no object corresponding to the
words that can be the object of thought. Such a vRtti is called
a vikalpa vRtti.

कारणसामर्थ्येन तत्र तदाकारवृत्तिसमुल्लासेऽपि दृक्संबन्धरूपस्य दृश्यत्वस्य

तुच्छविरोधनस्तत्राभावात्, तुच्छाकारताया वृत्तिगत्वेऽपि वृत्तिसंबन्धस्य
तुच्छगतत्वाभावोपपत्ते: | Even though there is the the causal
capability to refer to that as that (ie words reveal
the tucCha has tucCha), knowability of the nature of being
connected with consciousess, which would have invalidated it
being tucCha, is absent there. Even though there is a vRtti that
revals it to be tucCha, there is no connection between
the vRtti and the tucCha.

नापि - यथा सतो ब्रह्मण: स्वव्यवहृत्या संबन्ध:, तथा घटादेरपि सत एव स्वज्ञानेन

संबन्धोस्त्विति - वाच्यम् ; Nor can it be argued that, just like the real
Brahman has a connection with activities involving it, a pot,
being real, must have a similar relationship with its cognition.

दृष्टान्ते ब्रह्मण्यध्यासस्यैव व्यवहृतिसंबन्धत्वात् | Because, in the example,

any connection of Brahman with activities is only because they
are superimposed on it.

तथाच उभयसंबन्धिसत्त्वे विषयविषयिभावानुपपत्ति: नाप्रयोजकत्वादिना परिभूयते

| Therefore, the postulate that when "both the elements in a
relationship are real, a subject-object relationship between
them is not possible" has not been disproven as a result
of aprayojakatvam (the inability to prove).

एतेन - आध्यासिक: संबन्धो नाम अध्यस्तसंबन्धो वा, अध्यस्तत्वमेव वा, आद्ये

संबन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वेऽपि संबन्धिनो दृश्यस्य दृश इव मिथ्यात्वानुपपत्ति: | द्वितीये
ज्ञानस्याप्यध्यस्तत्वेन तत्र अध्यासानुपपत्ति:
स्वज्ञानपरंपरायामध्यासस्वीकारे अनवस्था चेति - निरस्तम्,
By this, the following argument has been disproven - "Does a
superimposed relationship mean that the relationship is a
superimposition, or is it superimposition itself? If the former,
even if the relationship is unreal, objects of consciousness can
be real, like consciousness. If the latter, as the cognition of a
object is also superimposed, the object cannot be
superimposed on it. If every cognition is supermiposed on its
own cognition, it will lead to infinite regress."

What does a superimposed relationship between the seer and

seen mean? Does it mean that the relationship between the
seer and seen is superimposed? Or does it mean that seen is
superimposed on seer?

If the former, even if the relationship between the seer and

seen is superimposed, it does not necessarily imply the
superimposed nature of the seen. The seer is not accepted to
be superimposed, so why should the seen be superimposed?

If the latter, what is the seer? If it means the cognition, then

the seen cannot be superimposed on it, because the cognition
itself is superimposed. If it is argued that that is possible, the
question becomes what is the cognition superimposed upon. If
it is superimposed on another cognition that reveals it, then
what is that cognition superimposed upon? This will lead to
the postulation of an infinite series of cognitions which are
both the substratum of their objects, and are superimposed on
the cognitions to which they are the objects.

The siddhikAra says this is wrong.

ज्ञानं हि वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यम्, Because jnAna is actually consciousness
delimited by cognition.

तत्रावच्छेदिकाया वृत्तेर्जडाया अध्यस्तत्वेऽप्यवच्छेद्यस्य चैतन्यस्य प्रकाशरूपस्य

अनध्यस्तत्वेन तत्र दृश्यस्याध्यासात् दृश्यमिथ्यात्वेऽप्यनवस्थाविरहस्योपपत्ते: |
There, even if the delimiting cognition being inert, is
superimposed, the delimited consciousness, being of the
nature of illumination is not superimposed, and thus there, if
even if the seen is superimposed and therefore it is mithyA, the
charge of infinite regress is avoided.

अत एव - शाब्दवृत्तिविषयो ब्रह्म न वृत्तौ कल्पितमविद्याविषयो ब्रह्माविद्यायां न कल्पितं यथा,

तथा दृश्यं न दृशि कल्पितम् ; तथाच दृक्दृश्यादेस्तात्त्विक एव संबन्ध:,
सामान्यसंबन्धेनैवातिप्रसङ्गे निरस्ते विशेषजिज्ञासा विशेषोक्तिश्च
विशेषविशेषजिज्ञासादिवदनर्थिकै वेति - निरस्तम्,
That is why the following is refuted - "Just like (1) Brahman,
which is the object of a cognition born from words, is not
superimposed on the cognition, and (2) Brahman, the object of
ignorance, is not superimposed on ignorance, objects of
cognition are not superimposed on the seer. Thus, it follows
that the relationship between the seer and seen is real alone.
When it is possible to avoid any cognition revealing any object
by merely postulating that there is a relationship between the
cognition and the object, there is no need to enquire into the
nature of the relationship, nor is there a need to define the
relationship. Such an endeavour would serve no useful
purpose, because every qualifier can have its own qualification
and so on and so forth."

The nyAyAmRtakAra is saying that when we say there is a

real sambandha between the seer and seen, there are no
problems. It may be asked why does this particular cognition
reveal this particular object, and not something else
(atiprasanga), to which the reply is because this cognition and
this object have some connection. There is no purpose served
in trying to determine the nature of that relationship. Even if
we enquire into it and come up with some specific feature in
that cognition, another question can be raised, what makes
this cognition have this specific feature that it allows it to
cognise this object? This will only lead to a fruitless enquiry
with no end.

The siddhikAra says no.

वृत्त्यविद्ययो: ब्रह्मणोऽनध्यासेऽपि तयोरेव ब्रह्मण्यध्यासात् संबन्धोपपत्ते:,

अतस्तत्रतात्त्विकसंबन्धाभावात्, कथं तद्दृष्टान्तेन दृग्दृश्ययोरपि तत्त्विकसंबन्ध
इत्युच्यते?
Even though Brahman is not superimposed on cognition and
ignorance, it is they (cognition and ignorance) that are
superimposed on Brahman, and so a connection with them is
possible because of that (superimposition). Therefore, as there
is no real relationship present, how can those examples prove
a real relationship between the seer and the seen?

प्रसिद्धवि षेशेषेबाधिते सामान्यस्यैव बाधक कया कया

शंअतिप्रसङ्गे प्राप्ते
विशेषजिज्ञासाया विशेषोक्तेश्च साफल्यात् न ते निरर्थिके |
As all, well-known types of relationship are negated, one starts
doubting whether a relationship in general itself exists, and
therefore the doubt arises whether any knowledge can reveal
any object. Hence, the desire to know the nature of the
connection, and the requirement to address it are important,
and cannot be said to serve no purpose.

एतेन - संबन्धस्य प्रामाणिकत्वे यथाकथञ्चन लक्षणं भविष्यति | तथाहि -

संयोगसमवायान्तर्भावे तल्लक्षणमेव लक्षणं भविष्यति, तदनन्तर्भावे तु
तदुभयभिन्नसम्बन्धत्वमेव लक्षणमस्त्विति - निरस्तम् ;
With this, the following has been refuted - if the connection is
real, let its definition be anything. If it is one
of samyoga or samavAya, then that itself can be its definition. If it
is different from them, then let the definition be some other
relation other than those two.

उक्तयुक्त्या प्रामाणिक संबन्धस्य संयोगसमवायान्तर्भावस्य च दूषितत्वात्

| Because, based on the reason mentioned previously (the two
related entities need to be at the same place and time for their
relation to be real), a real relationship that is one
of samyoga or samavAya has been rejected, as defective.

तदुभयबहिर्भूतसंबन्धत्वं तु वयमपि न निराकु र्म:, किं तु तस्य प्रामाणिकत्वम् | We

do not deny that it is a relationship different
(from samyoga and samavAya). Rather, we deny its reality.

किं च दृग्दृश्ययो: न तात्त्विकसंबन्ध:, संबन्धिभिन्नत्वे अनवस्थानात् | Moreover,

the relationship between the seer and the seen cannot be real,
because if it were different from the related entities, it would
lead to infinite regress.
How does the relationship relate the two entities if it is
different from them? If through another relationship, then that
would require another relationship etc leading to infinite
regress.

नच दृश्यत्वान्तरहीनस्य दृश्यत्वादेरिव संबन्धस्यापि स्वनिर्वाहकत्वं क्वचित् भविष्यतीति -

वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus "Just like cognisability does not require another
cognisability for its functioning, ie to imply that something is cognised, a
relationship sometimes does not require another relationship to relate the
entities".
If cognisability was not cognised it would not be mithyA, so
something should make it cognisable. Is it itself, or something
else? If it is something else, that should require something else
cognise it, leading to infinite regress too. The opponent
says kvacit, sometimes, because in the case of samyoga, it is
accepted that a samyoga requires a samavAya for
a samyoga relationship to exist between two entities. So
sometimes you need something else, sometimes nothing else
apart from the relationship itself is needed.

The siddhikAra says no.

दृश्यत्वमपि दृकसंबन्ध एव | (We say that) cognisability functions because it too is

a relationship with consciousness.

तस्य च स्वनिर्वाहकत्वं न मायिकत्वं विनेति नास्माकं प्रतिकूलमभ्यधायि देवानांप्रियेण ;

अभिन्नत्वे संबन्धत्वायोगात् |
Its functioning is not possible without mAyA (it being illusory), and therefore, it
does not contradict us, simple-minded fellow! If the relationship is the same as
the entity, then it cannot be relate the entity.

नचैवमाध्यासिकसंबन्धत्वेऽप्येतद्दोषप्रसङ्ग:, तस्य मायिकत्वेन मायायाश्चाघटितघटनापटीयस्त्वेन

सर्वानुपपत्तेर्भूषणत्वात् |
Don't argue that the same problem exists if the relationship is superimposed,
because it is illusory, and the nature of mAya is to make the seemingly impossible,
possible. Its very impossibility is its attribute.

नच - अतिप्रसङ्गनिराकरणार्थं दृग्दृश्ययो: संबन्धनिर्वचनं प्रकृतं, न तु

विषयत्वनिर्वचनम्, अतो विषयत्वखण्डनमनुक्तोपालम्भनमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "We are discussing the nature of the relationship to
address the possible charge that cognition can reveal any object. We are not
discussing what makes objects cognisable. Therefore, to use this discussion to
deny the possibility of objectification, is refuting something that was not stated
by us."

विषयत्वखण्डनेन निरुच्यमानप्रकृ तसंबन्धस्यैव खण्डनात् |

Because by the refutation of objectification of objects by cognition, it is the
refutation of the connection between objects and consciousness that is being
spoken here.

नच - विषयित्वानिरुक्तावपि विषयिण: सत्यत्ववत् विषयत्वानिरुक्तावपि विषय: सत्य: स्यादिति -

वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "Just like it is accepted that the subject is real, even
when we do not seek to define what makes it the subject, let us say that the object
is real even when we do not define the nature of what makes it the object."

विषयित्वानिरुक्तावपि विषयाध्यासेनैव तदुपपत्त्या विषयिण: सत्यत्वं युक्तम्, विषयत्वानिरुक्तौ तु

विषयस्य सत्यत्वं न युक्तम् ;
Because, even though we have not defined what makes it the subject, we say that
the subject is real because of the object being superimposed upon it (as any
superimposition requires a real substratum), without defining what makes an
object, it is not possible to state that the object too is real.

विषयिणोऽनध्यस्तत्वेन विषयाध्यासमन्तरेणान्यस्योपपादकस्याभावात् |
As the subject is not the one superimposed, apart from the object being defined
as that which is superimposed on the subject, there is no other definition for what
constitutes being an object. The shell silver does not have an
existence apart from being superimposed on the substratum.

यत्र तु विषयिण: एवाध्यास: तत्र विषय: सत्य एव ; यथा ज्ञानविषयो ब्रह्म |

However, where the subject is the one superimposed, there the object is real, for
example, where Brahman is the object of the cognition of Brahman.

नचोभयाध्यास:, शून्यवादप्रसङ्गात् |
Both cannot be superimposed, because that leads to shUnyavAda.

अन्यतराध्यासे च विनिगमकमनुवृत्तत्वव्यावृत्तत्वप्रकाशत्वजडत्वादिकमेव |
In determining which is superimposed on which, the reasoning adopted to choose
which is real and which is superimposed is one of invariance (is real) and
variance (is unreal), and consciousness (is real) and inertness (is
unreal)
.
The substratum is the one that is unchanging and the
superimposed is the one that is changing. Like in the varying
cognitions of the same rope as "this rope", "this snake", "this
crack in the ground", the "this" delimited consciousness is the
one common factor unchanging in all different cognitions.
तस्माद्विषयिणो नित्यदृशोऽनध्यासात् विषयस्यैवात्राध्यास: |
Therefore, as the subject is of the nature of the eternal consciousness (hence,
unvarying and self-luminous), it is the object alone that is superimposed
here.

नच - 'प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वविषयावरणे' - त्यादियुक्त्या दृग्विषयत्वरूपदृश्यत्वस्य हेतुकरणेन

च त्वयाऽपि विषयत्वं निर्वाच्यमेवेति - वाच्यम्;
Nor can it be argued thus - Statements such as "Every valid cognition is
preceded by the object of the cognition being veiled" (in
the panchapAdikAvivaraNam) employ cognisability of the nature of being the
object of consciousness, as a means to establish ignorance, thus it follows that the
advaitin too has a responsibility to define the nature of what constitues being an
object of consciousness".

The burden of defining what constitutes being an object of

consciousness, does not lie merely with the dvaitin, it is
the advaitin's too, because prior advaita AchArya's have used
statements such as "being the object of valid cognitions", as a
means to establish the existence of ignorance that precedes
the rise of valid cognitions.

तत्त्वतोऽनिर्वाच्यत्वेऽप्यध्यस्तत्वेन घटादिसमकक्षनिर्वाच्यत्वस्य संभवात्

Because even if I do not define that objectification as something real, if I define it
as something that is superimposed, that definition of a similar type to pots etc is
sufficient for me, but not for you.
The advaitin can get away with defining the nature of
objectification in the same way as the nature of objects‌, ie as
being anirvachanIya (neither real nor unreal) and superimposed.

ननु - कथं प्रमाणज्ञानविषयोऽध्यस्त इति - चेन्न;

If it is argued - How can the objects of valid cognitions be unreal? - No.
प्रपञ्चविषयकज्ञाने तत्त्वावेदकत्वलक्षण्प्रामाण्याभावादिति गृहाण |
Because, the validity of the cognitions of the world's objects does not lie in
revealing their objects as absolutely unsublatable.
anukUla tarka nirUpaNam (part
4)
अतएव - यादृशं विषयत्वं ते वृत्तिं प्रति चिदात्मन: | तादृ शा(विषयत्वं मे दृश्यस्यापि दृशं प्रतीति -
निरस्तम्;
It for this reason that the following statement stands refuted - "Whatever is the
nature of objectification present for the Self with respect to the impartite
cognition, the same objectification I confer upon the seen objects in relation to
the seer".

The self does not become an object of the cognition even

there, it is the witness of the cognition. Thus even there it is
the cognition alone that is superimposed, not the seer.

चिदात्मनोऽनाध्यासेऽपि वृत्तेस्तत्राध्यस्तत्वेन तद्दृष्टान्तेन प्रकृतेऽप्यनध्यासस्य

वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् |
It cannot be said that as the self is not superimposed, the current context is not a
case of superimposition, because even if the self is not superimposed, the
cognition of the self is superimposed.

The nyAyAmRtakAra's argument is presented next:

स्यादेतत् - मिथ्यात्वंनिर्ब्रुवता तत्साधनं दृश्यत्वादिकं निर्वक्त्तव्यमेव, नहि घटाद्यसङ्कीर्णाकारज्ञानं
विना तद्विलक्षणव्यवहार: ;
The one seeking to establish mithyAtva must certainly define the means to
establish it, such as cognisability, etc. Without a cognition clearly outlining the
pot shape, one cannot distinguish it from other objects.

अथ अनिरुक्तासङ्कीर्णाकारज्ञानमात्रेण तदुपपत्ति:, तर्हि तुल्यं ममापि |

If one argues that even when one is not able to articulate what distinguishes one
object from the other, it is possible to know that they are different, then the same
holds true in my case too.
One is able to differentiate a pot from a cloth, but one may
struggle to explain the difference. But if that is the case for
the advaitin, that is the same as for the dvaitin in this situation -
even without being to articulate the nature of the relationship
between the seer and seen, the objectification of the seen is
possible.
इयांस्तु विशेष:, यत्तव स आकार: सद्विलक्षण:, मम तु
त्वन्मतिसिद्धप्रातिभासिकवैलक्षण्यसाधकमानसिद्धसत्ताक:,
This much is the difference though - the AkAra of the cognition, by which a thing
becomes the object of the cognition, is for you different from sat, whereas for me
it is the same means to prove that it is a sat that happens to be different from
what you consider to be prAtibhAsika.

न हि लक्षणोक्त्यनुक्तिभ्यां सदसद्वैलक्षण्यरूपानिर्वचनीयत्वहानिलाभौ ;
The failure to define something does not mean it is inexplicable as real or unreal.

ब्रह्मण्यपि श्रौतस्यापि जगत्कारणत्वादिलक्षणस्य कारणत्वखण्डनरीत्या असंभवात्,

In the khaNDanakhaNDakhAdya, SriharSha argues that causation itself is
impossible, therefore defining Brahman as the cause of the world etc as done in
the shruti would also be impossible. However that does not make
Brahman unreal.

त्वयैव - 'कीदृक्तत्प्रत्यगिति चेत्तादृगीदृगिति द्वयम् | यत्र न

प्रसरत्येतत्प्रत्यगित्यवधारये'तिब्रह्मणोऽपि दुर्निरूपत्वोक्तेश्च,
On the basis of what you too have said - "What is that inner self? To such a
question, know that It is that which cannot be defined as either "this" or "that"
- Brahman is also inexpressible.

प्रपञ्चेऽपि त्वदुक्तानिर्वाच्यत्वसमकक्षलक्षणसंभवाच्च,
Thus the definition of inexpressibility that you say is present in Brahman can be
said to be in the world too.

'यत्कटिनं सा पृथिवी'तयादिरुत्या
त्
याश्रुपृथिव्यादीनामपि लक्षणत्वोक्तेश्च |
Whereas, the world too can be defined on the basis of what was stated in the
shruti "The earth is that which is firm".

तस्मादनिर्वाच्यत्वं न सत्त्वविरोधि | Therefore inexpressibly does not overrule

reality.

सत्त्वेऽप्यद्बुधत्वातनिर्वचनीयत्वोपपत्ते: | For even when real, if something

is wonderful, it may not be expressible.

नच निर्वाच्यत्वमपि सत्त्वप्रयोजकम् ; नहि शुक्तिरूप्यस्यापीतरभेदसाधकं रूप्यत्वं

प्रातीतिकजातिरूपतया सुवचमपि सत्यम् ।
Nor is expressibility the proof of reality. One can define the shell-silver in
contrast to the real silver by saying that it belongs to the class of apparent things,
but that does not make it real.

किं च ब्रह्मण आनन्दत्वज्ञानत्वसत्यत्वस्वप्रकाशत्वादि खण्डनोक्तरीत्या दुर्वचमिति

ब्रह्म तत्त्वतोऽनानन्दाद्यात्मकं स्यात् |
Moreover, as was said in the khaNDana Brahman's bliss, consciousness, reality,
self revealing nature cannot be defined, and that would end up making
Brahman's nature to not truly be bliss, etc.

तस्मादिक्षुक्षीरादिमाधुर्यवदनिर्वाच्यमपि विषयत्वं सदेवेति,

Therefore, like the difference between the sweetness of sugarcane and milk which
cannot be articulated, objectification despite being inexpressible, is real.

By inexpressibility, what is meant is the inexpressibility as real

or unreal, not inexpressibility in general.
The siddhikAra responds

अत्रोच्यते - दृश्यत्वादेरनिर्वाच्यत्वं किं सत्त्वेन, उत स्वरूपेण |

Here it is being said - Does the inexpressibility of cognisability etc refer to its
reality, or does it mean that its nature cannot be expressed? That is, are you
saying that cognisability's reality cannot be expressed, or can
its nature not be expressed?

नाद्य:, सत्त्वेनानिर्वाचनीयत्वेऽपि तत्तदाभासलक्षणानालिङ्गितत्वमात्रेण

हेतुत्वोपपत्ते: तन्निर्वचनानपेक्षणात् |
Its not the first, because even if its reality cannot be defined, as long as the reason
is free from all possible defects, it can prove an outcome, and there is no reason to
define the reality of the reason.

न द्वितीय:, तात्त्विकातात्त्विकसाधरणेन दृक्संबन्धत्वादिना रूपेण दृग्विषयत्वस्य

निर्वक्तुम्शक्यत्वात् |
It is not the second either, because being an object of consciousness, whether real
or unreal, is capable of being defined as having a relationship with consciousness.

लक्षणोक्त्यनुक्त्योर्न सदसद्वैलक्षण्यरूपानिर्वाच्यत्वहानिलाभकरत्वमिति यदवोच:,

तदपि न ;
The statement that the ability or inability to define the relationship is harmful /
supportive of its inexpressibility of the nature being different from the real and
unreal, is also not true.

पूर्वोक्तव्यापकानुलब्धिसहिताया लक्षणानिरुक्ते: उक्तरूपानिर्वचनीयत्वप्रयोजकत्वात्

|
Because that which proves the inexpressibility of the stated nature is the inability
to define the relationship when the two entities being related are not present in
the same time and space.

यत्त्वानन्दत्वादिना धर्मेण कीदृगित्यादिना स्वरूपेण च दुर्निरूपत्वात्

ब्रह्मणोऽप्यनिर्वचनीयत्वप्रसङ्ग इति तन्न;
It is not true that as the nature of its attribute bliss, and the nature of Brahman
of being a particular type could not be explained, Brahman too would end up
being unreal.

आनन्दत्वादिधर्मवत्तया दीर्निरूपत्वेऽपि दु:खप्रत्यनीकत्वाद्युपलक्षितस्वरूपस्य

सत्त्वेन निर्वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् |
Even though the nature of bliss as an attribute of Brahman cannot be stated, but
as it can be stated as that entity which is indicated by the absence of sorrow. That
characteristic is only a temporary indicator, it is not an intrinsic attribute of
Brahman.

नचैवं प्रपञ्चे सत्वं शक्यनिर्वचनम् बाधकसद्भावात् |

Nor can it be argued that the world's reality can be stated in the same way,
because there are contradicting reasons for it (there is sorrow in the
world).

अतएव - कटिनस्पर्शत्त्वादिना पृथिवीत्वादीनां निर्वचनमस्त्येव, सत्त्वेऽप्यद्भुतत्वादिना

अनिर्वाच्यत्वोपपत्तिरिति - निरस्तम् ;
Hence the following statement is refuted - "The earth etc can certainly be defined
as that which is firm to touch. Despite this, it is possible to say it is inexpressible,
because it happens to be wonderful."

नहि निरुक्तविरहमात्रेणानिर्वाच्यत्वं ब्रूम:, किं तु सत्त्वादिना निरुक्तिविरहेण |

We don't merely say that something is inexpressible because one it is not possible
to define it - rather, we say that it say it is inexpressible as being real or unreal.

स च प्रपञ्चे बाधकादस्त्येव |
As the world is sublated, such an inexpressibility does exist for the world.

नच - ज्ञाने विषयस्यध्यस्तत्वे तदज्ञानजन्यं तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यं चाध्यासं प्रति विषयत्वं

तदनुविद्धतया प्रतीत्यभावच श्चन सम्भवतीति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus - "If objects are superimposed on cognitions, then the
ignorance of cognitions will be the cause for the objects and the knowledge of
cognitions will sublate them, but then the substratum of superimpositions would
need to appear along with the superimposed object too. However, no one sees the
cognition along with the object".

चैतन्यमात्राज्ञानजन्यत्वात् |
Because it is the ignorance of consciousness alone that leads to the
superimposition of the world.

तज्ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाच्च घटादिप्रपञ्चस्येत्युक्तत्वात् |
It has already been said that the cognition of that consciousness leads to the
sublation of the world, pots etc.

सदिति प्रतीयमानाधिष्ठानचैतन्यानुविद्धतया प्रतीयमानत्वमप्यस्तेव |

However, the appearance of the substratum consciousness along with the world
does occur, because the world appears as existing. The existence that
appears in the cognition of the world is the substratum
consciousness.

तस्मात्सत्यत्वे दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धत्वानुपपत्तिर्दृढैव ||
Therefore, the untenability of a real relationship between consciousness and its
objects is certain.

इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वानुकूलतर्कनिरूपणम् ||
pratikarmavyavasthA (part 1)
अथ प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थोपपत्ति: |
From the panchapAdikA vivaraNam onwards, several works
have considered this topic of pratikarmavyavasthA. By karma,
jnAna viShaya is meant. The same object is seen by one, but
may not be seen by someone else. What is the mechanism
(vyavasthA) to explain for the difference in what is perceived
by each person (prati karma)?

The nyAyAmRtakAra had cited several defects against the

pratikarmavyavasthA postulated by the vivaraNakAra.

He says:

ननु - विश्वस्याध्यासिकत्वे प्रातिभासिकस्थल इव विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाधीनाया:

प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थाया अनुपपत्तिरिति - चेन्न ;
If the world is mithyA, then like in the case of prAtibhAsika
objects, the pratikarmavyavasthA that is subject to the
contact between sense organs and the object is untenable.

Let's take the example of shell silver, a prAtibhAsika object. It

is admitted that the shell silver only exists when it seen.
However, it has to be accepted that it is not the eyes that see
the shell silver, because for the eyes to see any object, there
has to be some pre-existing connection possible between the
eyes and the object. However, no such connection is possible,
because the shell silver did not exist prior to its cognition. If
the eyes do not see it, how to account for the fact that one
person sees it, but others do not?

The siddhikAra says no.

वृत्ते: पूर्वमेव घटादीनां चैतन्येऽध्यासेन प्रातिभासिकस्थालापेक्षया वैलक्षण्यात् |
As the world, comprising of pots etc., is superimposed on
consciousness even prior to the rise of the vRtti, it is different
from prAtibhAsika.

Thus pratikarmavyavasthA for the objects of the world is

possible.
तथाहि - अन्त: करणं चक्षुर्वत्तेर्जोवयवि | To explain - the mind, like the eyes
is a product of fire (ie the fire principle is more predominant in
the case of eyes and the mind).

The organ of sight get a connection with objects by traveling

to the object. It does so quickly like a ray of light because it is
a product of fire. Similar to sight, the mind also travels to the
object in an instant and grasps it.

तच्चेन्द्रियद्वारेण तत्संयुक्तं विषयं व्याप्य तदाकार भवति |

The mind travels through the medium of sense organs
pervades the object which is in contact with the sense organs
and takes its AkAra (objectifies it).

यथा नद्याद्युदकं प्रणाड्या नि:सृत्य के दाराद्याकारं भवति, सैव वृत्तिरित्युच्यते |

Like water in a river is transported by a canal to a field and
envelops the field and takes its shape, that transformation of
the mind is called vRtti.

तत्र जीवचैतन्यमविद्योपाधिकं सत् सर्वगतं अन्त:करणोपाधिकं सत्

परिच्छिन्नमिति मतद्वयम् | There are two schools of thought here, one
which says that the jIvAtma is consciousness with avidyA
upAdhi and is all pervading, and the other, which says that it is
limited on account of being delimited by the mind.

तत्राद्ये विषयप्रकाशकं जीवचैतन्यम् |

In the first case, the all pervading jIva chaitanya is the
revealer of everything.

द्वितीये ब्रह्मचैतन्यम् |
In the second case, brahman is the revealer of everything.

Then why does jIva not see everything in the first case?

आद्ये पक्षेऽपि जीवचैतन्यमविद्यानावृतम् आवृतं च |

The first case is divided into two – one where the jIva is veiled
by ignorance and one where he is not.

In the school which holds that the jIva is covered by

ignorance, until the vRtti destroys the covering over the
object, he does not witness it. In the other school which says
that the jIva is not covered by ignorance, until the vRtti
establishes a connection between the jIva and the object, the
jIva does not see the object.

तत्राद्ये वृत्तिर्जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयोपरागार्था |

In the former (where the jIva is not covered by ignorance), the
vRtti is needed to establish the connection (for the jIva
consciousness) with the object.

द्वितीये त्वावरणाभिभवार्था |
In the latter, however, (where the jIva is covered by
ignorance), the vRtti is necessary to remove ignorance.

परिच्छिन्नत्वपक्षे तु जीवचैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकतदधिष्ठानचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्त्यर्था |

Where the jIva is limited, the vRtti is necessary to unite the
jIva consciousness with the substratum consciousness which
reveals the object.

अनावृतत्वपक्षे ह्यनावृतं सर्वगतमपि जीवचैतन्यं तत्तदाकारवृत्त्यैवोपरज्यते,

न तु विषयै:, असङ्गत्वात्,
Where the jIva is not veiled by ignorance, the jIva
consciousness, despite being unobstructed and all pervading,
cannot have any relationship with objects, being relationless,
(therefore) the vRtti objectifying the object serves as the
connecting medium with objects.

यथा गोत्वं सर्वगतमपि सास्नादिमद्व्यक्त्याऽभिव्यज्यते, न तु के सरादिमद्व्यक्त्या ;

For example, despite the (jAti) gotva being all pervading, it is
manifest only in the individuals having a dewlap, not in
individuals having manes.

यथावा प्रदीप्रभा आकाशगन्धरसादिव्यापिन्यापि तान्न प्रकाशयन्ती रूपसंसर्गितया

रूपमेव प्रकाशयति तद्वत्,
Or, despite a ray of light pervading space, fragrance, taste etc,
it does not reveal them, but only reveals form, when it happens
to be in contact with it.

A question may be raised here – As the jIva is free of relations,

how can it have a relationship with vRtti? Because that is its
nature. The jIva in this school is defined as consciousness
delimited by ignorance, so by nature, it has a relationship with
vRtti. However, as it is relationless, it has no relation with
objects.

के वलाग्न्यदाह्यस्यापि अय:पिण्डादिसमारूढाग्निदाह्यत्ववच्च के वलचैतन्याप्रकाश्यस्यापि

घटादेस्तत्तदाकारवृत्त्युपारूढचैतन्यप्रकाश्यत्वम् युक्तम् |
Even though, fire on its own (ie without fuel) cannot burn,
when in association with an iron ball, burns, consciousness by
itself cannot reveal objects, but when reflected in vRtti
objectifying pots, etc., can reveal them.

एवञ्चानावृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारा चैतन्यस्य तत्तदुपरागे

तत्तदर्थप्रकाश: |
Therefore, in the school where consciousness is unveiled, it is
through the association with thought objectifying each object,
that consciousness is able to reveal them.

आवृतत्वपक्षे तत्तदाकारवृत्त्या तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणाभिभवेन

तत्तदर्थप्रकाश: |
Where the jIva consciousness is veiled, the object is revealed
when the veil obstructing the consciousness delimited by the
object is removed by the vRtti objectifying the object.

अन्त:करणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यरूपत्वे जीवस्यावच्छेदकान्त:करणतत्तद्विष्याकारवृत्त्या
तत्तद्विषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्य्याभेदााभिव्यक्तौ तत्तत्प्रकाश: |
Where the jIva is consciousness delimited by the mind, the
object is revealed when the vRtti belonging to the mind, which
happens to the delimiter of the jIva, objectifies the object, and
through that vRtti, the jIva consciousness becomes one with
the object delimited consciousness.

यद्यपि प्रकाशकमधिष्ठानचैतन्यं सर्वगतं जीवचैतन्यंचान्त:करणावच्छिन्नम् ; तथापि

चैतन्याभेदेनाभिव्यक्तत्वात् व्यवस्थोपपत्ति: |
Even though the revealer is the substratum consciousness
which is all pervading and the jIva consciousness is delimited,
the mechanism (for pratikarmavyavasthA) is possible because
of the jIva consciousness becoming one with the substratum
consciousness.
Until now the siddhikAra provided a very quick summary of the
three primary prakriyA-s (teaching methodologies) within
advaita for pratikarmavyavasthA. He then cites the key
objections from the nyAyAmRtakAra on this topic:
ननु - इयं प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थानोपपद्यते, तथाहि -
स्वसन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यस्वज्ञानात् पूर्वं घटादे: सत्वे
प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वव्याप्तकाल्पनिकत्वायोग: |
This pratikarmavyavasthA is untenable, because if objects
such as pots, etc exist prior to the cognitions born from the
senses that come into contact them, then they cannot be
mithyA where things exist only when they are cognised.

नच काल्पनिकत्वविशेष: प्रातिभासिकत्वादिरेव तद्व्याप्त:, गौरवात्,

Nor can it be argued that such a definition of mithyAtva only
applies for prAtibhAsika objects, because such a qualifier is
superfluous. It will lead to the defect of vyApyatvAsiddhi,
because apart from objects such as shell silver which have
this quality (of existing only when they appear), there are no
other mithyA objects.

नच प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वाभावेऽपि ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वादिनैव कल्पितत्वं भविष्यति ;

Nor can it be argued that even in the absence of existence
only at the time of appearance, a mithyAtva of the nature of
being sublatable by cognition etc, will be possible.

प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वाभावेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाभावस्याप्यापाद्यत्वात्,
Because, if existence at the time of cognition is absent,
sublation by cognition also will be absent.

If this is true then the world is real, how can it appear? He

says

सत् यत्
वेनश्ववा, मिथ्यात्वेऽपि
प्रतीतेर्विवसत्यत्वेन
स्वप्नादिवदिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षनिरपेक्षतयावोपपत्ते:,
The appearance of the world is still possible if the world was
real, and even if the world was mithyA, like in the case of the
dream, it is possible to see things even without the contact of
sense organs with things.

Thus pratikarmavyavasthA is untenable with advaita.

Then how to account for the difference between objects such
as pots and shell silver?

व्यावहारिकत्वस्यापि भ्रान्तिदैर्घ्यमात्रेणोपपत्तेचेतिति
श्चे
Concepts like empirical reality (vyAvahArikatva) can be simply
explained by the duration of the illusion

Having quoted the objections of the nyAyAmRtakAra, the

siddhikAra says
- चेत्, मैवम्; It is not as you say.

प्रतीतिमात्रशरीरत्वस्य कल्पितत्वं न व्याप्यम् ; दृग्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्त्यादिसहकृ तोक्तानुमानात्

प्रपञ्चे कल्पितत्वे सिद्धे प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलाच्च स्थायित्वे तत्रैव व्यभिचारात् |
the
mithyAtva does not imply existence only at the time of
appearance, because as
mithyAtva of the world has already been established by an
inference supported by the impossibility of any relationship
between consciousness and the seen, and the continued
existence of the world is established by recognition (the object
seen now was the same object seen yesterday), there is an
exception to such a rule right there.

The opponent had cited the concomitance – wherever there is

mithyAtva, there is existence only at the time of cognition.
However, the inference of mithyAtva has already revealed that
the object is mithyA. At the same time, pratyabhijnA,
recognition, has established that the same object existed even
before the cognition now, so right there, there is an exception
to the concomitance.

नच - शुक्तिरूप्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञासाम्यं प्रकृतप्रत्यभिज्ञाया इति - वाच्यम् ;

Nor can it be argued that the recognition cited here is of the
same nature as the recognition of illusory silver (one may have
mistaken the shell for silver many times, and draw a false
recognition).

षेऽपिवणिग्वीथीस्थशुक्तिरूप्ययो: परिक्षितत्वापरिक्षितत्वाभ्यां
प्रतीत्यवि षेऽपिशे
षसंभवा
स्थायित्वास्थायित्वरूपवि षसंभवात्शे त् |
There is a difference in the recognition of the shop silver and
shell silver in that one has been confirmed and the other is
unconfirmed, one recognition persists and the other
recognition does not.

Thus the first objection has been discussed.

तथापिवा परोक्षवृत्तेरिवापरोक्षवृत्तेरपि प्रकाशत्वमस्तु, किं

तदुपरक्तचैतन्येनेति चेन्न ;
If you say – “Even so, let the case of perception be like for
indirect cognition (which does not travel to the object)
revealing its object. What is gained by saying that it is
revealed by consciousness associated with cognition?” - No.

परोक्षस्थलेऽपि परोक्षवृत्त्युपरक्तचैतन्यस्यैव प्रकाशकत्वात् |

Because we hold that even in the case of indirect cognition, it
is consciousness associated with the vRtti that is the revealer.

अथ तत्राप्यपरोक्षैकरसचैतन्योपरागे विषयापरोक्ष्यप्रसङ्ग: न;
If it is thought that as consciousness is ever perceived, every
cognition will be a perception (even indirect cognitions), no.

विषयचैन्याभिव्यक्तावेव विषयस्यापरोक्ष्यम् | नच परोक्षस्थले तदस्ति ; विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावेन

विषयपर्यन्तं वृत्तेरगमनात्, अन्तरेष तत्र धीसमुल्लासात् |
The object is perceived only when the object delimited
consciousness becomes manifest, ie, the ignorance in the
object delimited consciousness is removed. That does not
happen in the case of indirect cognition, as the vRtti stays
inside the mind itself and does not reach the location of the
object on account of the senses not being connected to the
object.

अपरोक्षस्थाले तु प्रमातृचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्ताधिष्ठानचैतन्योपरागो विषयेऽस्ति

;
Wherease in the case of perception, consciousness becomes
associated with the object when the knower-consciousness
becomes one with the substratum-consciousness.

In the case of perception, the vRtti travels to the object,

removes the ignorance located in the consciousness delimited
by the object, which reveals the object, and the seer perceives
it when the consciousness delimited by the mind, becomes
one with the consciousness delimited by the object through
the connection of the consciousness delimited by the vRtti.

It is held that any kAraka, a factor in action, is a cause for the

kriya, the action. In the case of perception, the object is the
karma kAraka, the object of the cognition. Therefore, it is
admitted that one of the causes of the perception of objects is
the object itself. However, in the case of indirect cognitions,
the object cannot be said to be the cause, because there may
be scenarios when the object itself does not exist but the
object is cognised, like in the case of memory, etc.

तत्र विषयस्य कर्मकारकत्वात् | There (in perceptions), the object is the

karma kAraka,
नच वृत्तिगतविशेषादापरोक्ष्यं ; Nor can it be said that perception is simply a
type of vRtti.
तत्र हि विशेषो विषयकृ तश्चेदोमिति ब्रूम: | However, if it is said that the type
of vRtti becomes perception on account of the object, that is
acceptable to us.
जातिकृतस्तु विशेषो न संभवति ; But if it is said that is some jAti, that is
not possible.
सोऽयमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायां परोक्षत्वापरोक्षत्वयो: सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्,
Because sometimes there are elements of perception and
indirect cognition can be mixed up in the same cognition itself
– for example, in the recognition “This one (perceived here) is
that (the one recalled)”. This mixing up or sankara, is inimical
to there being a jAti of cognitions called pratyaksha jAti or
paroksha jAti.
अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात्, Moreover, parokshatva or perception-ness
does not fully pervade the cognition. Every jAti has to fully
pervade its vyakti, whereas in the case of recognition etc, a
part of it is perception and a part of it is memory.
प्रमात्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गाच्च | Further the same cognition can
have validity mixed-up.

pramAtva is present in some cognitions, pratyakshatva in

some other cognitions. pramAtva and pratyakshatva or not
always present together - sometimes bhramatva and
pratyakshatva are present together, and sometimes pramAtva
and parokshatva are present together. Thus pratyakshatva and
pramAtva can be mixed up sometimes.

किं च वृत्तेर्जडत्वादेव न प्रकाशकत्वम् | Moreover, as cognition is inert, it

cannot reveal anything.

The nyAyAmRtakAra argues that while the mind may be inert,

it is not necessary that its product, vRtti will be inert too.
नच - वृत्तावन्त:करणावृत्त्यापि स्वप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानत्ववदिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that - Just like jnAnatva is present in
vRtti, but not in the mind, svaprakAshatva, self effulgence, can
be present in vritti, but not in the mind.
त्मसंबन्
स्वप्रका त्मसंबन्धेनैव धेनैवशा तस्या: प्रकाशत्वोपपत्तौ तत्स्वप्रकाशत्वे मानाभावात् |
It is only through its association with the self effulgent Atma
that the vRtti is luminous, there is no proof to state that it is
self-effulgent.

किं च घटं जानामीत्यनुभूयमानसकर्मकवृत्त्यन्या संवित् घटप्रकाशरूपा घट: प्रकाशत

इत्याकारकानुभवसिद्धैव |
Moreover, it is known from experience that the consciousness
that illuminates the pot “The pot shines”, which has no object,
is different to the cognition "I know the pot" which happens to
be sakarmaka, has an object.

The shining has no object (The pot does not shine at

something), whereas the cognition has an object (it is the
cognition of the pot). This follows that there are two elements
in every knowledge – the illumination by consciousness, and
the cognition (removal of ignorance) by a vRtti.

नच - करोति यतते चलति गच्छतीत्यादवेकार्थत्वेऽपि सकर्मकाकर्मकस्वभावत्वदर्नात्र्श

नात्
अत्राप्येकार्थत्वेऽपि तथा स्यादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be said – “Even though the words karoti (kRn) and
yatate (yat) both mean the same (doing), but the root kRn is
sakarmaka, whereas the root yat is akarmaka. Similarly while
calati and gacChati both mean the same (to go), the former is
akarmaka and the latter is sakarmaka. Let this also be the
same (prakAshate which is akarmaka is the same as jAnAmi
which is sakarmaka)”.
The siddhikAra responds
तत्राप्येकार्थत्वाभावात् | अनुकूलयत्नो हि कृ ञ् धात्वर्थ:, यत्यर्थस्तु यत्नमात्रम्,
There too the verbs do not denote the same meaning. The root
the root kRn is indicative of causative action, whereas yat is
merely indicating an attempt.

There is a kArika that outlines the circumstances in which

some well known sakarmaka verb roots become akarkama
धातो: अर्थान्तरे वृत्ते: धात्वर्थेन उपसङ्ग्रहात् प्रसिद्धे: अविवक्षात: कर्मण:
अकर्मिका क्रिया
1) भारं वहति - He bears the load. Here vahati is sakarmakam.
Whereas, नदी वहति - the river is flowing. Here vahati is akarmaka.
There is a difference in the meaning (अर्थान्तरे वृत्ते:)
2) इच्छति / स्पर्धते - स: अपरस्य पराभिभवम् इच्छति (he wishes to
defeat the other person). स: तेन सह स्पर्धते (he is competing /
fighting with him). In the first case, the defeat of the opponent
is not part of the meaning of the word icChati, whereas in the
latter, the defeat of the opponent is included within the
meaning of the word spardhate (धात्वर्थेन उपसङ्ग्रहात्)
3) In some cases, the object of the verb is very obvious
(प्रसिद्धे:), like the word वर्षति does not require us to say पर्जन्यो
वर्षति. However, if some other object is to be intended, which is
not naturally known in association with the verb (देवा: पुष्पाणि
वर्षन्ति), it becomes sakarmaka.
4) Sometimes it is not intended to say what is the object of the
verb (अविवक्षात:). So there the verb can become akarmaka - स:
गच्छति.

This is a kArika that occurs in vyAkaraNa. Here the siddhikAra

says that as karoti contains some aspect not included in
yatate, it is said to be different. There is another kArika that
specifically addresses this. कृ ञ: अकर्मकतापत्ते: नहि यत्नोऽर्थ: इष्यते
किन्तु उत्पादनमेव अत: कर्मवत्स्यात् यगादपि |

एवं गम्यर्थ उत्तरसंयोगफलक: स्पन्द:, चलत्यर्थस्तु स्पन्दमात्रम् ;

Similarly, there is a difference between gacChati and calati.
calati means movement. Whereas gacChati is a movement that
is capable of moving from one place to another.
तथाचैकार्थकत्वे कु त्रापि न सकर्मकत्वाकर्मकत्वव्यवस्था |
Therefore it is not appropriate to say that the same meaning
can sometimes be sakarmaka and sometimes akarmaka.

नच - त्वन्मते परिणतेतरकर्मकत्वात् परिणतिवि षभूतायाशे

षभूतायावृत्ते: कथं
सकर्मकत्वमिति - वाच्यम्,
Nor can it be argued – “As the verb pariNate (transforms) is
akarmaka in your system, so how can vRtti, which is a kind of
transformation (of the mind) be sakarmaka?”

एकस्य हि सकर्मकत्वाकर्मकत्वे एकरूपेण विरुद्धे न तु रूपान्तरेणापि ; मानाभावात्,

Just because something cannot be both akarmakatva and
sakarmakatva in one form of the action, there is no basis to
say it cannot be akarmaka and sakarmaka in a different form
of the same action.

For example, even though pariNAmatva is akarmaka, but

jnAnatva, icChAtva, which are pariNAma of antah karaNa, can
have sakarmakatva. देवदत्त: कु ठारेण वृक्षं छि न त्ति - he cuts the tree with
an axe. Here छिनत्ति is an axe. The same can be conveyed by
saying कु ठारं उद्यच्छत्ति वृक्षे निपातयति - there is no additional meaning
in छिनत्ति that is not conveyed in उद्यच्छत्ति निपातयति (brings the
axe and hits the tree). In the former while the tree is the object
of the word छिनत्ति, the tree is not the object of the verbs
उद्यच्छत्ति निपातयति. The karma of one action becomes the karaNa
for the same action when conveyed using a different verb,
even though the action is the same.

The same action is sakarmaka in one form and akarmaka in

another form.

यथा स्थितेरकर्मिकाया अपि अगमनत्वेन रूपेण सकर्मकत्वम् ;

तथा परिणतित्वेन रूपेणाकर्मिकाया अपि वृत्ते: ज्ञानत्वेन सकर्मकत्वं
भविष्यतीत्यदोष: |
Just like “being” is akarkama in its form of not moving, but in
another form as “not going” becomes sakarmaka. Similarly,
even though “transformation” is akarmaka, the vRtti, being a
type of knowledge, will end up as sakarmaka.
ननु तर्ह्यतीत: प्रकाशते इति धीर्न स्यात्,
The opponent argues – “Then there can be no vRtti of the type
‘the past object is revealed’. The opponent picks an example of
the recollection of a past object. The object does not exist in
the present. If it is true that a vRtti must have an object, then
there can be recollection of past objects.

The siddhikAra says:

न ; इष्टापत्ते:, तत्रापि वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यसत्त्वेन प्रकाशत इत्यादिप्रयोग
संभवाच्च |
No, because that is desirable to us. Even there, the presence
of consciousness reflected in the vRtti (recollection vRtti)
means that it is possible to say that it is revealed. Thus, it is
not the vRtti that shines, it is consciousness reflected in the
vRtti.

Another objection is raised:

ननु यथा अज्ञानविरोधिवृत्तावनुभवत्वं नास्ति, किं तु अन्यत्र; तथा
द्वेषविरोधिवृत्तेरन्यत्रेच्छात्वमित्यपि स्यादिति - चेन्न ;
Just like it is said that jnAnatva is not present in the vRtti that
is inimical to ignorance, but is present in something else (in
advaita it is consciousness that is jnAnam, not vRtti), then let
it be the case that icChAtvam is not present in the vRtti that is
inimical to hatred.

This is just a vitaNDAvAda. The siddhikAra says no

बाधकसत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां विशेषात्, The difference is that there is a

contradiction is present in one and not the other. There is a
contradicting pramANa in saying that jnAnatva natva exists in
the vRtti, whereas, there is no contradiction in saying
icChAtvam can reside in a vritti that is the dispeller of hatred.

According to advaita, vRtti is momentary so it cannot be

accepted as the jnAna referred to in satyam jnAnam anantam
brahma - jnAna has been said to be permanent and self
effulgent, the vRtti is neither.

अत्रेव तत्र सकर्मकाकर्मकविलक्षणक्रियाननुभवाच्च |

Here itself (in the case of jAnAti and prakAshate), there is a
difference of sakarkmakatva and akarmakatva that is
experienced. However in desire and hatred such a difference is
not a matter of experience. Both are sakarmaka, have an
object.

However, really speaking, we experience a situation where

one does not hate nor desire something, one is merely
indifferent. Thus the argument that the absence of desire is
hate, and vice versa is not correct. We can accept both as
different vRtti-s.

यथा च वृत्त्यतिरिक्तभानसिद्धिस्तथा स्वयं ज्योतिष्ट्वप्रस्तावे विस्तरेण वक्ष्याम: |

The existence of an illumination other than the vRtti will be
explained in detail in the chapter on self effulgence.
pratikarmavyavasthA (part 2)
In the case of the perception of external objects, the mind
travels towards the object and transforms upon contact with
it. This transformation is called vRtti. The movement to the
object is called vRtti nirgamanam. In the case of indirect
cognition, the mind does not travel outside the body, but
attains a transformation, also a vRtti. In both cases, the
vRtti is inert, but despite so, because it removes ignorance
allowing consciousness to shine unveiled, the vRtti itself is
figuratively called jnAna. However, there is a requirement
for a consciousness different from the vRtti to reveal the
object.
The opponent says - even if all this was true, we don't
accept that the mind travels outside to the object. The
advaitin is the only person who says that jnAna of an
external object occurs externally.
ननु - अस्तु चैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकत्वं, तथाप्यन्त:करणस्य देहान्निर्गति: न कल्पया;
परोक्षवैलक्षण्याय विषयस्याभिव्यक्तापरोक्षचिदुपराग एव वक्तव्य:, चिदुपरागादौ
चापरोक्षवृत्तेस्तदाकारत्वमेव तन्त्रम् ; तस्य च तत्संश्लेषं विनापि परोक्षवृत्तेरिव
तत्सन्निकृ ष्टकरणजन्यत्वेनैवोपपत्ति:,

अस्तु चैतन्यस्य विषयप्रकाशकत्वं, तथाप्यन्त:करणस्य देहान्निर्गति: न कल्पया; परोक्षवैलक्षण्याय

विषयस्याभिव्यक्तापरोक्षचिदुपराग एव वक्तव्य:,
He says: even if consciousness is the one that reveals the
object, it is not appropriate to postulate that the mind
travels out of the body. One can simply say that the object
coming into direct contact with unveiled consciousness is
the basis to differentiate direct perception from indirect
perception.
It is not necessary to say that consciousness becomes
manifest/unveiled by this outgoing mind in order to
differentiate perception from indirect cognition.

चिदुपरागादौ चापरोक्षवृत्तेस्तदाकारत्वमेव तन्त्रम्

For consciousness to be unveiled all that is needed is a
pratyaksha vritti taking on the AkAra of the object.
Why is a pratyaksha vRtti able to unveil the object
consciousness, ie remove the ignorance in the object
delimited consciousness, even without traveling outside?
The nyAyAmRtakAra postulates that this does not require
the vRtti to travel out of the body to the object, it can occur
even if one accepts that is simply the nature of pratyaksha
vRtti, ie there is an intrinsic difference in the nature of the
pratyaksha vRtti and paroksha vRtti. By postulating such a
difference, we can argue for a direct relationship in the case
of pratyaksha vRtti and indirect relationship in the case
paroksha vRtti, and not stipulate the vRtti traveling
outwards.
How does vRtti take on the AkAra of the viShaya?
तस्य च तत्संश्लेषं विनापि परोक्षवृत्तेरिव तत्सन्निकृ ष्टकरणजन्यत्वेनैवोपपत्ति:,
That can happen even without the vRtti travelling out, like in
the case of paroksha vRtti. It is possible as the vRtti arises
upon the contact of the senses with the object.
In the case of inferences such as the inference of fire in the
mountain, it is the cognition of invariable concomitance that
gives rise the inference of the fire. That vRtti does not
require contact with the fire itself. How is a pratyaksha vRtti
born differently to a paroksha vRtti? The nyAyAmRtakAra
postulates that it arises because of the contact of the
senses with the object. Thus in his system, the mind does
not travel in vRtti form to the object, rather the mind stays
inside the body, only the senses make contact with the
object.
नतु प्रभाया एव वृत्तेस्तदावरणनिवर्तकत्वादौ तत्संश्लेषस्तन्त्रं,
It is not the case that the vRtti must necessarily make
contact with the object, unlike light, which must necessarily
directly fall on the object to illuminate it.

नेत्रान्निर्गच्छद्ध्रुवाद्याकारवृत्त्यैव
ष्
टनेत् रस्
थकज्ज लादेर् ध्
रु
वनेत्रमध्यवर्ति
स्वसंलिष्टनेत्रस्थकज्जलादेर्ध्रुवनेत्रमध्यवर्तिन :
नश्लि

परमाण्वादेश्चापरोक्षत्वापातादिति
For that would mean that a vRtti that leaves through the
eyes and takes on the AkAra of the Pole Star, will
necessarily cause everything that it is in contact with in the
distance between the seer and the object, such as the
eyeliner in the seer’s eyes, atoms in the intervening space,
etc.
The siddhikAra replies

- चेत् न ; if this is the argument, no.

विषयेष्वभिव्यक्तचिदुपरागे न तदाकारत्वमात्रं तन्त्रम् ; परोक्षस्थलेऽपि प्रसङ्गात्, किं तु तत्संश्लेष:,
For the consciousness within objects to shine, it is not just
sufficient for the vRtti to take on the AkAra of the objects,
for that much is true even for indirect cognitions, rather
what is needed is contact with the objects.
In order for an object to be perceived (not indirectly known),
there has to be something that unveils the consciousness
pervading the object and a connection between the seer and
that unveiled consciousness.
If all that is required is vRtti taking on the AkAra of the
object for that object to be perceived, that much is true
even in the case of the inference of fire in the mountain.
There is a vahni AkAra vRtti even there, however the
experience is that one knows that there is fire in the
mountain, but one does not directly see that fire. Therefore
vRtti taking on the AkAra is insufficient for perception.
प्रभाया विषयसन्निकृ ष्टतेजस्त्वेनावरणाभिभावकत्वदर्शनात् For, it is seen that a ray of
light is able to reveal an object only when it comes into
contact with the object, and removing darkness that
envelops it.
The general rule that can be extracted from this is that for
light to remove darkness over an object, it has to fall on the
object - if light is somewhere and the object is somewhere
else, the object will not be seen.
:, The mind too, being
तैजसस्य मनसोऽप्यज्ञानरूपावरणाभिभवाय तत्संश्लेष आवयककश्य
of the nature of fire (light), requires contact with the object,
in order to remove the veil over the object.

ध्रुवादिदेहमध्यवर्तिपरमाण्वादावतिप्रसङ्गस्तु तदाकारत्वप्रयोजकसामग्रीविरहादेव
परिहरणीय: ;
The argument that all objects between the eye and the Pole
Star, such as atoms etc, will be seen must be refuted on the
basis that they lack all the required criteria required for the
vRtti to take on the AkAra of such objects.
The object should be pratyaksha yogya, capable of being
perceived, it should have form, be of a sufficiently large size,
be at a distance that is perceivable, etc.

अन्यथेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादेर्विद्यमानत्वात् परमाण्वाद्याकारताया दुर्निवारत्वापत्ते: |

Otherwise, as the senses leaving the body to make contact
with the object, can also be said to take on the AkAra of
atoms etc, and this charge cannot be refuted (by you).
तस्मात् प्रभाविशेषान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यत् क्लृप्तं सन्निकृष्टतेजस्त्वेनावरणाभिभावकत्वं,
तस्य तदाकारत्वरूपविशेषापेक्षायामपि न त्याग: |
Therefore, by saying that the contact with the object is
necessary for the removal of ignorance, following the logic
of copresence and coabsence (anvaya-vyatireka) of the vRtti
on account of it being a product of fire, we do not give up
the necessity for the vRtti taking on the AkAra of the
object.
That is, the vRtti must not only make contact with the
object, it must also take on the AkAra of the object in order
for the ignorance in the consciousness delimited by the
object to be removed.
केश्य
नहि पृथिवीत्वगन्धत्वादिना कार्यकारणभावे आवयके अनित्यगुणत्वद्रव्यत्वादिना तत्त्याग:
|
For in nyAya, just because we say that gandhatva (smell) is
born in that which has prithivItva (earth), it does not mean
that the general rule that an impermanent attribute can only
be born in a dravya (substance) is given up.
If there is a special rule, why must a general rule also be
accepted? If we say this pot requires this wheel, stick, how
do we know what is required for a pot that has not come
into existence yet?
अतएव - तदितरहेतुसाकल्ये सति घटचक्षु:सन्निकर्षस्यैव घटानुभवजनकत्वम्, नतु
घटमन:सन्निकर्षस्य, तद्विलंबेन तद्विलंबाभावादिति - निरस्तम् ;
By this the following has been refuted – “All else being
present, it it is sufficient for the eyes to come into contact
with the pot, there is no need for the mind to come into
contact with the pot. For a delay in that (contact with the
mind) does not delay that (the perception of the pot).”
आवरणभङ्गे सन्निकृष्टतेज:कारणत्वावधारणेन तस्याप्यावश्यकत्वात् |
As the removal of a veil (ignorance) requires a form of light
(vRtti) that too is required (the vRtti making contact with the
object).

नच - स्पार्नप्रत्यक्षेर्श
नप्रत्यक्षे
चाक्षुरादिवन्नियतगोलकद्वाराभावेनान्त:करणनिर्गत्ययोगादावरणाभिभवानुपपत्तिरिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be said – “Then in the case of touch, as the vRtti
does not travel through the instrument of touch externally
towards the object, like in the case of sight, the unveiling of
ignorance would not be possible.”
The vRtti in the case of touch is not admitted to travel
outside the body. So if external travel is required, then one
should not be able to feel anything by touch.
सर्वत्र तत्तदिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानस्यैव द्वारत्वसंभवात् |
Every sense organ is the means for the vRtti to reach its
object only via the locus of the sense organ. In the case of
eyes, the vRtti makes contact with the object via the locus
of sight, eyes towards the object. In the case of touch, the
vRtti makes contact with the object via the locus of touch,
skin.

नच - अन्त:करणवृत्तित्वाविशेषादिच्छद्वेषादिरूपवृत्तयोऽपि देहान्निर्गत्य विषयसंसृष्टा भवन्तीति कथं न

स्वीक्रियत इति - वाच्यम्,
Nor can it be argued – “As they are mental vRttis too, why
don’t you accept that desire, hatred etc also travel outside
the body to come into contact with their objects?”
आवरणाभिभावकतेजस्त्वस्य तत्प्रमापकस्य ज्ञानवत् तत्राभावात् |
The removal of ignorance that needs that (the vRtti to come
out), like in the case of cognitions, is not present there.
There is no reason like the removal of ignorance for the
desire vRtti to make contact with the object.

ननु - घटप्रकाशकं चैतन्यमुपदेशसाहस्त्र्यनुसारेण घटाकारधीस्था चिद्वा ;

परागर्थप्रमेयेष्वित्यादिवार्त्तिकोक्तरीत्या
धीप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्तविषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्यं वा, नाद्य: ;
आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापातात् | न द्वितीय:, आवयकेन
केनश्य
विषयसंसलिष्टवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव तदज्ञाननिवृत्तिवत् तत्प्रकाशस्याप्युपपत्तौ किं
विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तिकल्पनेनेति - चेन्न ;
The opponent says

घटप्रकाशकं चैतन्यमुपदेशसाहस्त्र्यनुसारेण घटाकारधीस्था चिद्वा

Is the illuminator of the pot, the consciousness that is
reflected in the ghaTAkAra vritti along the lines of what was
said in the upadesha sAhasrI?
(This is the position of upadesha sAhasri, based on which it
is said in the panchadashi-
घटैकाकार धीस्थाचित् घटमेवावभासयेत् | घटस्य ज्ञा तता ब्रह्मचैतन्
ये ना व भा सये त् || What the panchadashIkAra wishes to say
here is that the notion “this is a pot” is a result of the
consciousness reflected in the pot-cognition, whereas the
illumination of the pot, “the pot is known”, is due to
Brahman. The nyAyAmRtakAra has interpreted this to mean
that the illumination of the pot is by the consciousness
reflected in the thought.)

परागर्थप्रमेयेष्वित्यादिवार्त्तिकोक्तरीत्या
धीप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्याभेदाभिव्यक्तविषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्यं वा,
Or is it the object delimited unveiled consciousness that has
become one with the consciousness reflected in the object
cognition, like stated in the vArttika “In external objects
that are known…” ?
In the vArttika it is said
प रा ग र्थ प्र मे ये षु या फलत्वेन सम् म ता ।
संवित् सैवेह मे यो ऽ र्थ : वेदान्तोक्ति प्रमाणत: ||
This vArttika is saying that the phalam (object delimited
consciousness) that shines when external objects that are
known, is the consciousness which must be known through
the statements of vedAnta. That is, the vArttikakAra is
saying that it is the object delimited consciousness which
reveals all things.

The nyAyAmRtakAra alleges that the two AchArya-s are

contradicting each other, and there is a problem in either
position.
नाद्य: ; आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापातात् |
It cannot be the former, because it will mean that the
AdhyAsika samandha, the superimposed connection
between the seer (revealer) and the seen (objects) will be
disproven.
To explain, in the dRgdRshyasambandha anupapattih
chapter, it was argued that the seer if consciousness, and
that all objects are superimposed on consciousness
because there is no other relationship possible between the
seer and the seen. If we now say that the seer (revealer) is
consciousness reflected in the vRtti, the object can exist
even before the vRtti arose, so the object cannot be
superimposed on such a seer.
केनश्य
न द्वितीय:, आवयकेन विषयसंसलिष्टवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्येनैव तदज्ञाननिवृत्तिवत्
तत्प्रकाशस्याप्युपपत्तौ किं विषयाधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तिकल्पनेन
It cannot be the second option either, because we can say
that like in the case of the removal of ignorance, the
revelation of objects also happens due to the consciousness
reflected in the vRtti that has come into contact with the
object. That being the case, what purpose is served by
saying it is the object substratum consciousness that
reveals the object?
The siddhikAra responds:
इति - चेन्न - If this is the argument, no.

प्रकाशकं तावत् अधिष्ठानचैतन्यम् | It is the substratum-

consciousness of the object which reveals the object.
तच्चाध्यासेन विषयै: सह साक्षात्संबद्धं प्रकाशस्य च स्वयं भासमानस्य
स्वसंबद्धसर्वभासकत्वमपि क्लृप्तमेव ; एतदनभ्युपगमे कल्पनान्तरगौरवापत्ते: |
तच्चाध्यासेन विषयै: सह साक्षात्संबद्धं - That (substratum-
consciousness) can reveal the superimposed object only
when it has a direct relationship with the object

प्रकाशस्य च स्वयं भासमानस्य स्वसंबद्धसर्वभासकत्वमपि क्लृप्तमेव

The illuminator which reveals itself will reveal everything
that it comes into contact with (the lamp that lights up a
room, reveals itself and the room)
एतदनभ्युपगमे कल्पनान्तरगौरवापत्ते: | To say this is not the case and
postulate something else would be superfluous.

तच्चानभिव्यक्तं निर्विकल्परूपमाच्छादितदीपवन्न प्रकाशकमिति तदभिव्यक्तिरपेक्षिता |

When that happens to be veiled, it cannot reveal anything,
like the naiyyAyika’s indeterminate cognition or a covered
lamp, and therefore its unveiling is necessary.
This unveiling of ignorance happens for both direct and
indirect cognitions, but the ignorance that is unveiled is
slightly different. To understand this we must first know that
ignorance of an object is classified into two –
asattvApAdakam (I do not know that it exists) and
abhAnApAdakam (I do not see it). In the case of perceptions,
both types of ignorance are removed (I see the pot, and I
also know it exists), whereas in the case of indirect
cognitions, only the asattvApAdaka ajnAna is removed (I
only know that the fire exists in the mountain, I do not see
it). The siddhikAra alludes to this idea here:
तच्च परोक्षस्थले वृत्त्यवच्छेदेनैवाभिव्यज्यते | In the case of indirect cognitions,
it is consciousness delimited by vRtti that is unveiled.
अपरोक्षस्थले तु वृत्तिसंपर्कादापन्नजाड्याभिभवे विषयेऽभिव्यज्यते ; वृत्तेर्विषयपर्यन्तत्वात् |
However, in the case of direct cognition, as the cognition
comes into contact with the object, the consciousness
delimited by the object is (also unveiled), as a result of the
removal of the inertness (ignorance) located in (the
consciousness delimited by) the object, because of
cognition coming into contact with the object. This is
possible because the cognition reaches the object.
Therefore, we have to admit that the revealer of objects is
the substratum consciousness, not consciousness reflected
in the thought.
नच परोक्षस्थलेऽप्येवं प्रसङ्ग:, द्वाराभावेनान्त:करणनिर्गत्यभावात् |
Nor is this the case for indirect cognitions too (the unveiling
of object consciousness does not happen in the case of
indirect cognitions), as the sense organs, which are the
doorways (for the mind to come into contact with the object)
are not involved, and the mind does not 'travel' (to the
object).
We keep referring to vRtti taking on the AkAra of the object.
In this case, AkAra does not mean shape, ie we do not
intend to say that the vRtti takes on the shape of the object.
What does AkAra mean?
ननु - वृत्तेस्तदाकारत्वं न तावत्तद्विषयत्वम् ; त्वयैव निरासात् |
The opponent says – The vRtti taking on the AkAra of the
object does not mean that the vRtti objectifies the object,
for you yourself have refuted such a possibility (in the
chapter on dRgdRshyasambandha anupapapatti, we have
said that defining viShayatva is an impossibility).
नापि तस्मिन् चैतन्योपरागयोग्यतापादकत्वं, तदज्ञानाभिभावकत्वं वा; उभयोरपि तदाकारत्वप्रयोज्यत्वेन
तत्त्वायोगात् |
Nor is it that which causes the vRtti to have the capacity to
establish a connection between the object and
consciousness, nor the removal of ignorance of the object,
for both only describe the results of AkAratva, not the nature
of AkAratva.
नापि घटादिवत् पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारत्वम्; साकारवादापातात्,
संस्थानहीनजातिगुणादिवृत्तेर्निराकारत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च ;
Nor is AkAra taking on the shape of the object, like a pot’s
broad base and narrow neck, for that would end up in
sAkAravAda (vijnAnavAda / yogAchAra Buddhism). It would
also mean that everything which is not a combination of
parts such as jAti, guNa etc would end nirAkAra.

घटपटाविति समूहालम्बने विरुद्धनानाकारत्वापत्तेश्चेति

In the combined cognition of a pot and cloth, it will end up
having multiple, contradictory shapes.
The siddhikAra says:
- चेन्न ; अस्तीत्यादितद्विषयकव्यवहारप्रतिबन्धकाज्ञाननिवर्तनयोग्यत्वस्य,
षा
तत्सन्निकृ ष्टकरणजन्यत्वस्य वा तदाकारत्वरूपत्वात् तदुभयं च स्वकारणाधीनस्वभाववि षात्|
त्शे
No. As AkAra is of the nature of that (i) which confers to the
vRtti the capacity to remove the ignorance which obstructs
notions such as "it exists", etc., related to an object, or (ii)
which is born from the pramANa (karaNa) coming into
contact with the object, for both explanations, the particular
nature of the tadAkAravRtti is dependent on the cause
which gives rise to it.
In the case of cognition of the pot, the eyes are in contact
with the pot, and the vRtti that is generated as a result of
sight coming into contact with the pot is the ghaTAkAra
vRtti.
In the case of paroksha like the inference of fire, the vyApti
(concomitance) is the pramANa that is relation with fire.
Thus vahni AkAra vritti is that which is born from the vyApti.
In the case of verbal cognitions (linguistic cognitions), the
padArtha jnana (the meaning of the words) is in contact with
the object (sentence meaning) and gives rise to shabda
jnAna, linguistic meaning thus the AkAra vritti for shabda is
that which is born from the padArtha jnAna.
However, there may be a doubt whether this explanation has
some issues. The first explanation is also dependent on the
result of the tadAkAra vRtti, not explaining the nature of
AkAra. What is the yogyatAvacChedakam - the
characteristic present in the vRtti, the karaNatA
avacChedaka, that leads to that particular outcome (the
object becoming known)?
The second explanation needs a kAryatA avacChedakam -
why is the vritti created thus? The answer is that the AkAra
is a particular type of sambandha between the object and
the vRtti that is revealed by the sAkshi. The yogyatva,
capacity, is automatically known when the vRtti arises.
Hence there is no anyonyAshraya (to know the AkAra, you
have to look at the result, and to know if the result is
possible you need the AkAra) as alleged by the
nyAyAmRtakAra. The AkAra is automatically known when
the vRtti arises, as the sAkshi reveals that this vRtti is
tadAkAra.
न चात्माश्रय:, निवृत्तिजननस्वरूपयोग्यतया फलोपधानस्य साध्यत्वेन स्वानपेक्षणात् |
Nor is this a case of AtmAshraya, self-reference (it is not
that the AkAra is its own result). Rather the AkAra is the
avacChedaka dharma (svarUpayogyatA of the vRtti) that
gives the vRtti the capacity to remove ignorance which is
the result (phalopAdhAna), therefore the result and the
AkAra are two different things.
ननु - दृशि विषयाध्यासस्वीकर्तुर्जीवचैतन्यं वा विषयदृक् ब्रह्मचैतन्यं वा |
The opponent asks - Those who say that the world is
superimposed, do they say that the seer of the word is jIva
consciousness or Brahman consciousness?
नाद्य:, जीवे अवच्छिन्नचित्स्वरूपे कल्पिते अध्यासायोगात् |
It can't be the former, the jIva being of the nature of limited
consciousness is itself superimposed and nothing can be
superimposed on it.
नच - विषयदृक् जीवचैतन्यमेव, अध्यासस्तु ब्रह्मचैतन्य इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that the seer of the world is the jIva
consciousness only, whereas the superimposition is upon
Brahman consciousness.
दृश्ययोरेवाध्यासिकसंबन्धापत्ते:, अध्यस्थाधिष्ठानयोरुभयोरपि दृग्भिन्नत्वात् |
It will lead to the situation where the seen is superimposed
on the seen because both the superimposed (world) and the
substratum (Brahman) are different from the seer (and hence
both are seen).
अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि ; सवि षब्रह्मणोऽपिशे
षब्रह्मणोऽपिकल्पितत्वेन तत्राध्यासायोगाच्च |
Therefore, the second is not correct either, as Brahman with
features is also superimposed, nothing can be superimposed
upon it.
नच - शुद्धचैतन्यमेकमेव ; तदेवाधिष्ठानम्, तत्रावच्छेदकमविद्यादिकं नाधिष्ठानकोटौ प्रविशति ; तदेव च
षात् , तथा च जीवचैतन्यस्य दृक्त्वेऽपि
जीवशब्देन ब्रह्मशब्देन च व्यपदिश्यते, उपाधिवि षात्शे
दृश्याध्यासो नानुपन्न इति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued thus – “Pure consciousness is one only.
That alone is the substratum. Delimiting factors such as
ignorance etc do not form part of the substratum. That
consciousness is referred to by words such as “jIva”,
“Brahman” etc. Therefore even if the jIva consciousness is
the seer, the superimposition of the seen (upon the seer) is
not inappropriate”.

शुद्धचैतन्यस्य आसंसारमावृतत्वेन जगदान्ध्यप्रसङ्गादिति

Because, as pure consciousness is hidden until the end of
samsara, the universe will be plunged into darkness. As it is
the substratum that reveals the object, if the substratum
itself is hidden until the end of samsAra, nothing can be
revealed until then.
- चेन्न ; मूलाविद्यानिवृत्त्यभावेन सर्वत आवरणाभिभवाभावेऽपि
घटाद्यवच्छेदेनावरणभिभवात् आन्ध्यविरहोपपत्ते: |
The siddhikAra says – If this is the argument, no. Even
though the removal of primal nescience has not occurred
and therefore, in that aspect the unveiling of consciousness
has not happened, as the unveiling of consciousness
delimited by objects such as pots etc can happen, the world
need not be plunged into darkness until the end of
samsAra.
ननु - तर्हीदानीमपि ब्रह्मस्फुरणे चरमवृत्तिवैयर्थ्यं ; अधिकभानेऽपि तस्य स्फुरणात् ,
The opponent says – If that is the case, as Brahman is
apparent now itself and there is no need for the final
akhaNDAkAra vRtti, for even if something is seen in addition
to Brahman, Brahman too is seen.
नह्यखण्डार्थवेदान्तजन्यायां वृत्तौ भावो अभावो वा विशेषणमुपलक्षणम् वा प्रकार: प्रकाशत,
For, in the akhaNDAkAra vRtti born from vedAnta, there is no
attribute, whether existent or non-existent, whether as a
visheShaNa or upalakshaNa, that appears.
That being the case,there is no difference between the
akhaNDAkAra vRtti and any other vRtti.
The siddhikAra replies
इति - चेन्न ;
If this is said, no.
satyam jnAnam anantam brahma is akhandArtha jnAna. So is
tattvamasi. Both objectify brahman, but the former is not
able to remove primal nescience whereas the latter is able
to. The reason is that both the meaning of the word “That”
and the meaning of the word “You” have to be present as
upalakshaNa-s, prior to the comprehension of the sentence
meaning, in order for the primal nescience to be removed.
उपाध्यविषयकब्रह्मस्फुरणस्य चरमवृत्तिप्रयुक्तत्वेन तस्या: साफल्यात्,
The akhaNDAkAra vRtti is successful in that (removal of
primal ignorance) because that vRtti reveals only brahman
and no upAdhi.
प्रकारास्फु रणम् तु तस्या: भूषणमेव ;
The fact that no attribute appears is a feature (not a
defect).
इदानीन्तनस्फुरणस्य सप्रकारत्वेनोपाधिविषयत्वात्,
All the vRttis that have arisen until now have attributes, and
therefore they objectify the upAdhi too.
'एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्य'मित्यादिश्रुतिबलात्

स्वसमानविषयज्ञानादेवचाज्ञाननिवृत्तेरखण्डचिन्मत्रज्ञानस्यैव
मोक्षहेतुत्वावधारणात् ।
On the strength of the shruti statement "One must see that
One alone”, and because of the rule that ignorance and
knowledge should have the same object, it is only the
impartite cognition of Brahman that is the cause for
moksha.
 यां
नच- अन्त:करणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यस्य जीवत्वे सुषुप्तिद यां शातदभावेन कृ तहान्याद्यापत्तिरिति -
वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that - if the jIva is consciousness
delimited by the mind, then in deep sleep as the mind is
absent, as the jIva is gone, all the karma-s performed by him
will also cease, without giving their result”. When he
awakens, if it is said that a new jiva is born, he will bear
fruits of karmas that he hasn't performed.

The siddhikAra refutes it thus-

तदाप्यस्य कारणात्मनाऽवस्थानात्, स्थूलसूक्ष्मसाधारणस्यान्त:करणस्योपाधित्वात् |
Even then (during deep sleep), the jIva is present, in his
causal state. When referring to the mind as the upAdhi, it is
said without qualifiers of causal or manifest etc.
What is the pramANa for this?
'तदापीते:संसारव्यपदे शा
'दित्यस्मिन् सूत्रेचायमर्थ: स्पष्टतर: |
This has been more clearly explained in the sUtra, "Until the
end of samsAra, the mind continues".

नच - वृत्त्युपरक्तत्वं चैतन्यस्य न तत्प्रतिबिम्बितत्वम् ; दर्पणे मुख्यस्येवनुद्भूतरूपेऽन्त:करणे

शब्दान्यप्रतिबिम्बनोपाधिताया अचाक्षुषचैतन्यस्य प्रतिबिम्बिततायाश्चायोगादिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can this be argued - The connection that is made
(between consciousness and the object) by the vRtti is not a
reflection of consciousness in the vRtti, because like the
face reflected in the mirror, the mind (and its vRtti) being
itself not visible, is incapable of reflecting anything other
than sound. Further, consciousness which is not visually
perceptible is incapable of being reflected..
The siddhikAra says no.
pratikarmavyavasthA (part 3)
उद्भूतरुपवत्त्वं न प्रतिबिम्बनोपाधिताप्रयोजकम् ;
The visibility of the reflecting medium does not confer the
capacity of reflection upon the medium.
अस्वच्छेऽपि लोष्टादौ प्रतिबिम्बापत्ते:, किं तु स्वच्छत्वम्,
Because even an unrefined surface surface (that is visible)
would have the capacity to reflect then. Rather, it is the
refinement of the medium that determines its capacity to
reflect.
तच्च प्रकाशस्वभावत्वेन मनसस्तत्परिणामभूताया वृत्तेश्चास्त्येव ;
As the nature of the mind is of light, the mind and the vRtti
which is a modification of the mind possess that
characteristic. The mind is said to be a product of the sattva
aspect of the five subtle elements and is of the nature of
light.

त्रिगुणात्मकस्याप्यज्ञानस्य स्वच्छसत्त्वात्मकताया अपि सत्त्वेन तत्रापि

प्रतिबिम्बितोपाधिताया: सत्त्वात् |
Even though ignorance is composed of all three guNa-s, as it
also contains pure sattva, it too possesses the
characteristic that enables reflections to occur.
नापि चाक्षुषत्वं प्रतिबिम्बितत्वप्रयोजकम् |
Further, nor is the capacity of being reflected dependent on
the material being visible.
: प्रतिबिम्बितत्वदर्शनात् |
देशा
अचाक्षुषस्याप्याका दे
Because it is observed that space, even though not visible,
is reflected (in water etc).
A point to be noted is that the reflection of consciousness
implies that it is available in the mind. That does not mean
that it is a physical reflection.
ननु - चाक्षुषवृत्त्युपारूढचित: कथं रूपमात्रप्रकाशकत्वम् ? नच प्रभावन्नियम:; वैषम्यात्,
The nyAyAmRtakAra objects – Why does the consciousness
reflected in the vision vRtti only reveal form? It cannot be
argued that it is because it is like light which can only
reveal form. There is a difference between the two.
तथाहि - प्रभायां तमोविरोधित्वं रूपं प्रतीव गन्धादीन् प्रत्यपि समम् ;
To explain – Just light has the capacity to remove darkness
that obscures the cognition of form, it must have the
capacity to reveal smell too.
नहि सा गन्धदेशस्थं तमो न निवर्तयति,
Nor can it be argued that that does not remove the
ignorance that obstructs the cognition of smell.
नच - अज्ञाननिरोधित्वलक्षणं प्रकाशकत्वं रूपं प्रत्येव, नतु रसादीन्प्रतीति - वाच्यम् ;
Don't say the nature of illumination which removes
ignorance can only reveal form, not taste, etc.
अज्ञाननिवर्तकस्य वृत्तिभिन्नेऽङ्गीकारात्,
Because you (the advaitin) have not accepted that
consciousness in the absence of vRtti is capable of
removing ignorance.
There is another difference between light and
consciousness.
प्रभाया रूपग्राहकचक्षु:सहकारित्ववत् गन्धादिग्राहिघ्राणादिसहकारित्वाभावेऽपि चितो
ग्राहकान्तरासहकारित्वेन तद्वत्सहकारिविलम्बेन विलम्बस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् |
Even though light does not support the revelation of smell by
the eye unlike the revelation of form by the eye,
consciousness is not a supportive cause for the revelation of
form, smell etc - it is the primary revealer. On that basis, the
absence of the supportive cause cannot be cited as a reason
for the absence of revelation.
That is, consciousness should reveal everything.
तथाच चित: सर्वगतत्वेन सर्वसंबन्धाद्रूपादिवत् गुरुत्वादेरप्याश्रयद्वारा साक्षाद्वा
संबन्धित्वात् प्रकाशापत्ति:,
Therefore, as consciousness is all pervading, it is connected
to every object, it should like form, also reveal weight (and
other such imperceptible things) on account of it
illuminating everything either as it is their locus or directly.
वृत्त्युपरक्तचित्संबन्धेनैव प्रकाशकत्वात्,
As long as consciousness has a relationship with objects by
means of vRtti, it should reveal everything.
'असङ्गो ह्यं पुरुष' इति श्रुतिस्तु तत्कृ तलेपाभावपरा,नतु संबन्धनिषेधिका ;
However, the Shruti "this puruSha is free of any relations"
does not mean there is no relation, rather what it means
that the relations do not attach to Brahman (i.e. relations do
not sully it, not that it has no relations)
'स यत्तत्र यत्किञ्चित्पश्यत्यनन्वागस्तेन भवती'ति पूर्ववाक्यात्,
The previous sentence of the Shruti says – “Whatever he
sees in the dream, he’s not associated with them”.
'यथाकाशस्थितो नित्यं वायु: सर्वत्रगो महा'नित्यादिस्मृतेश्चेति
The smRti also says – “Like wind even when located in
space, travels everywhere”. Thus consciousness is all
pervading even if associated with things.
- चेन्न ; The siddhikAra now responds to the argument - no.
प्रभाया रूपरसादिदेशगततमोनाशकत्वं तत्संबन्धाद्युज्यते, चैतन्यस्य तु स्वभावतोऽसंबद्धत्वात्
तदाकारवृत्त्या तदेकसंबन्धस्योपदानात् कथमन्यावभासकत्वप्रसङ्ग:?
While light removes the darkness in the location of form,
taste etc and is related to the object through that
relationships, consciousness being intrinsically unrelated, is
connected to the object through a tadAkAra vRtti, and thus
as the relationship is based on that AkAra, how can it reveal
anything else?
The vRtti establishes a connection between consciousness
and object. If the vRtti is a visual one, then as its AkAra is
form, the consciousness will reveal only that AkAra.
स्वभावतो ह्यसङ्गत्वे 'असङ्गो ह्यं पुरुष' इति श्रुति: प्रमाणम् |
The pramANa for this is the Shruti is “Consciousness is
unrelated”.

नचैषा लेपाभावपरा अकर्तृत्वप्रतिपादनाय संबन्धाभावपरत्वात् यथाचैतत्तथा व्यक्तमाकरे

|
This section is not to say that the consciousness is
unattached. Rather the import of the section is to prove that
consciousness is actionless, which it does through revealing
that it has no relation to anything. The exact means by
which it does so has been revealed in the bhAShya.
एवं स्मृतिरप्येतच्छ्रुत्यनुरोधेन नेया अत: सर्वै: सह संबन्धाभावात् न
सर्वावभास:, किं तु यदाकारा वृत्तिस्तस्यैव |
Thus the smRti must be explained in line with the shruti,
therefore as consciousness is not associated with anything,
it does not reveal everything, rather it reveals only that
which comes into contact with the tadAkAra vritti.
There is a manovRtti for "idam" (this) and avidyAvRtti for
"rajatam" (silver). The two together give rise to "idam
rajatam" (this is silver).
अत एवं 'इदं रजत' मिति भ्रमे इदमाकारवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्येन रजतभानानुपत्ते:
द्
बिम्बाग्रा
हकेश्चि
रजताकाराप्यविद्यावृत्तिरभ्युपेयते; स्वतचिद्बिम्बाग्राहके चैतन्यस्य तदाकारत्वायोगात्,
द्
बिम्बग्रा त्वन्त:करणवृत्त्यादौ न वृत्त्यपेक्षेति नानावस्था |
हकेश्चि
स्वतचिद्बिम्बग्राहके
That is why in the 'this is silver' illusion, as the 'this'
cognition delimited consciousness cannot reveal the silver,
it has been postulated that there is another vRtti which is
silver-AkAra. The object on its own is not able to reflect
consciousness in its own AkAra. Thus, in addition to the
silver, there is a requirement for the silver-AkAra vRtti. The
mind and its vRtti-s, though, are able to reflect
consciousness and do not require any other vRtti for
themselves to be revealed. Thus, there is no infinite regress
involved in the cognition of thought.
नच - आरयसंबन्धावि
शेयसंबन्
धाविशे
षेऽपि
षेऽपि श्ररूपाकारा वृत्तिर्न गन्धाद्याकारेति कु त इति - वाच्यम्;
Nor can it be argued that even though both form and
fragrance exist in the same locus, then why does the form-
AkAra vRtti arise, but not the fragrance-AkAra vRtti (in the
case of visual perception)?
शेयसंबन्
धवि
यथा तव चाक्षुषज्ञाने आरयसंबन्धवि शे
षेऽपि
षेऽपि श्रन गन्धो विषय:, तथाऽस्माकमपि चक्षुर्द्वारकवृत्तौ
न गन्धाद्याकारत्वम्,
Because just like you say that the object being the same,
the vRtti of sight does not objectify smell, we hold that the
vRtti contacting the object through the eyes cannot take the
AkAra of fragrance etc.
इन्द्रियविषयसंबन्धानां स्वभावस्य नियामकस्य समानत्वात् |
That each sense organ is only able to objectify a particular
aspect of the object only is common to us both.
ननु -आध्यासिकसंबन्धो वृत्ते: पूर्वमप्यस्त्येव, अन्यस्तूपरागो न दृश्यत्वे तन्त्रमिति किं
तदर्थया वृत्त्येति - चेन्न ;
The opponent objects - the mithyA relationship between
consciousness and objects exists even before the vRtti
(then why is a vRtti needed to create another relationship
between the object and consciousness?). If another
relationship is required, you cannot say that it is the
relationship between consciousness and objects that leads
to the object becoming knowable. (As that is not acceptable
to you), what purpose is served by the vRtti?
The siddhikAra responds - no.
जीवचैतन्यस्याधिष्ठानचैतन्यस्य वाऽभेदभिव्यक्त्यर्थत्वाद्वृत्ते: |
The vRtti is needed to make the jIva consciousness one with
the substratum consciousness.
अन्यथा मयेदं विदितमिति संबन्धावभासो न स्यात् |
If that is not accepted, the cognition of the relationship
(between me and the object) in 'I know this” will not occur.
ननु - जीवचैतन्यस्यासङ्गत्वे ब्रह्मचैतन्यं सुतरामसङ्गम्, तथाच
मायोपाधिकविषयोपरागत्वात् स्वत: सार्वज्ञ्यं न स्यात् ,
The nyAyAmRtakAra objects – If you say the jIva
consciousness is relationless, then Brahman is even more
so. If it is argued that even Brahman needs mAyA upAdhi to
make the connection with objects, His intrinsic omniscience
will be lost.
नच - ब्रह्म सर्वोपादानत्वादुपाधिं विनैव स्वस्वरूपवत्वस्वाभिन्नं जगदवभासयतीति
- वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be argued that as Brahman is the material cause
for everything, even without any adjunct, he is intrinsically
non different from anything in the world, and therefore
knows everything.
उपादानत्वं न तावद्विशिष्टनिष्ठं परिणामित्वम् ;
Because material causation cannot mean being the cause
for transformation located in Brahman endowed with
mAyA.
आध्यासिकसंबन्धस्यातन्त्रतापत्ते:,
As it breaks the rule of the superimposed relationship. The
world is supposed to be superimposed on consciousness. If
the world is a product of consciousness, the relationship is
not of superimposed and substratum, it is one of cause and
effect.
अनाद्यविद्यादिकं प्रति तदभावाच्च,
Such a relationship does not apply to beginningless entities
such as ignorance.
नापि शुद्धनिष्ठमधिष्ठानत्वम् ;
Nor does it (material causation) refer to being the
substratum that is located in pure consciousness.

शुद्धस्य सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वशक्तित्वादेरभावादिति
Because pure consciousness does not have omniscience,
omnipotence etc (only consciousness endowed with mAyA
has those qualities).
The siddhikAra replies
- चेन्न ; No.

ब्रह्मणोऽसंगत्वेऽपि सर्वेषां तत्राध्यासेन मायोपाधिं विनैव तस्य सर्वप्रकाशकतया

सार्वज्ञ्योपपत्ते: |
Even though Brahman is relationless, as the entire world is
superimposed there, even without a mAyA vRtti establishing
a relationship it can be called omniscient on account of
illuminating everything.
In the chitsukhi there is a Sloka (4th paricCheda, 4th sloka) -

स्वरुपतः प्रमाणैर्वा सर्वज्ञत्वं द्विधा स्थितम् ।

तच्चोभयं विनाविद्यासम्बन्धं नैव सिध्यति ।।
Omnisicience is of two types - one that is intrinsic, one that
is achieved through the vRtti. Both cannot be proven without
some sort of relationship with ignorance.
नच - शुद्धनिष्ठमधिष्ठानत्वं नोपादानत्वम् सार्वज्ञ्याभावादित्युक्तमिति - वाच्यम् ;
Nor can it be said that you have already said being the
substratum, which is a quality present in pure
consciousness, cannot mean material causation, because it
is not omniscient.
अविद्याकल्पितानां सर्वज्ञत्वादीनाम् शुद्धे सत्त्वात् |
An omniscience can be postulated in pure consciousness as
a result of ignorance.
अन्यथा तेषां तटस्थलक्षणत्वमपि न स्यात् |
Otherwise the taTastha lakshaNa of Brahman as the cause
of the world would be an impossibility.
ननु - आवरणाभिभवार्थत्वपक्षो न युक्त:, विवर्ताधिष्ठानस्य चिन्मात्रस्याज्ञानादिसाक्षित्वेन सदा
प्रकाशनात्, अन्यस्याज्ञानकल्पित्स्यावरणस्याभावादिति - चेन्न ;
The nyAyAmRtakAra makes a different objection - it is not
logical to say that the vRtti is to remove the veil of
ignorance (over consciousness), because as the changeless
substratum, consciousness is witness to the ignorance, and
therefore it is eternally known. There is no other ignorance
of anything else that can be the veil.
Ignorance can be a veil of only a conscious entity. An inert
object does not require a covering as it would not be known
anyway. As the changeless substratum, pure consciousness
is the witness of ignorance too. So how can such an
ignorance cover the consciousness - because when one
knows ignorance, that consciousness is automatically
known. If such a consciousness is known, how can you say
ignorance veils it? If you say ignorance veils something else,
then as anything else apart from consciousness is a creation
of ignorance, that cannot be covered by ignorance. As
ignorance is beginningless, its object must also be
beginningless. A product cannot be beginningless. Thus, a
product of ignorance cannot be the object of ignorance.
The siddhikAra says - If this is the argument, no. He says:

ऽप्यशनाया द्
यतीतत्वादिना
अज्ञानादिसाक्षित्वेन स्वप्रका ऽप्यनायाद्यतीतत्वादिना
श शे
प्रकाशाभावादावरणस्यावश्यकत्वात् |
Even if consciousness as the witness of ignorance is self-
evident, as its freedom from hunger, thirst, old age, death
etc., is unknown, a veil becomes necessary to account for
this.
What is the locus of the veil? If the veil is in the object,
when it is removed, it becomes visible to everyone. If the
veil is in the seer, when it is removed, only he can see it.
The opponent uses this to argue
ननु - अज्ञानस्य नयनपटलवत् पुङ्गतत्वे चैत्रस्याज्ञाननाशेऽपि मैत्रस्य तदनाशात् अप्रका' शा
युक्त:, विषयगतत्वे तु चैत्रार्जितया वृत्त्या अज्ञाने दीपेन तमसीव नाशिते मैत्रस्यापि प्रकाश:
स्यादिति - चेन्न ;
If ignorance is like a film covering the eyes, when Chaitra's
ignorance is removed, Maitra would not see the object
because his ignorance is not destroyed. Whereas if
ignorance is in the object, when it is removed due to
Chaitra's vRtti, like darkness being removed by light, Maitra
too would see it.
Thus, ignorance would have to be in the seer, not the object.
So says the opponent.
To this, the siddhikAra says - no.
He presents his position with respect to ignorance –
ignorance is one, but its powers are many.
चैत्रावरणशक्तेरेवाज्ञानगतायाश्चैत्रार्जितवृत्त्या नाशितत्वेन स पश्यति, न मैत्र:,
तत्प्रतियोगिकावरणशक्तेरनाशात्,
It is the power of ignorance that veils the object for Chaitra
alone that is removed because of Chaitra's vRtti and as a
result he sees the object, not Maitra, because the power of
ignorance that veils the object for Maitra is not destroyed.
आवरणशक्तीनां द्रष्टृविषयभेदाभ्यां भिन्नत्वात्,
(This is) because the powers of veiling are different for
different objects and people.
तमस्तु न तथेत्येकानीतप्रदीपेनाप्यन्यान्प्रति प्रकाशो युज्यते |
Whereas darkness is not like that. When any one person
brings a lamp, it removes darkness for all.
एतेन - एकाज्ञानपक्षे शुक्तिज्ञानेन तदज्ञाननिवृत्तौ सद्य एव मोक्षापात:, अनिवृत्तौ
रूप्यादे: सविलासाविद्यानिवृत्तिरूपबाधायोग इति - निरस्तम् ;
By this the following is refuted - "If it is held that ignorance
is one, when the shell knowledge destroys shell ignorance,
the seer will end up as instantly liberated. If that ignorance
is not removed, it would be impossible for the sublation of
silver along with its cause, ignorance."
How then can this be used for an example in the inference of
the world’s mithyAtva?
This has been answered because in the one ignorance
position, that one ignorance has several powers which veil
each object, so when a particular veiling power is removed,
only that particular object is revealed and not something
else.

ऽपि
आवरणशक्तिना ऽपि शेमूलाज्ञाननाशाभावेन सद्यो मोक्षाभावस्य रूप्यादौ
सविलासशक्तिमदविद्यानिवृत्तिरूपबाधस्यचोपपत्ते: |
Even though the veiling power (over the shell) is destroyed,
as mUlAjnAna (primal nescience) is not destroyed, instant
liberation does not occur. The sublation of the shell silver
along with its cause, the ignorance containing that power, is
also thus possible.
In vedAnta paribhASha there is a difference drawn between
bAdha and nivRtti. The locus of dream objects is pure
consciousness. However, if that is the substratum, how does
the dream state end because the direct perception of
Brahman does not occur in the dream? The answer is that
bAdha does not happen, nivRtti happens. nivRtti does not
require the direct cognition of the locus, even another
illusory cognition can do nivRtti, whereas bAdha requires
the cognition of the substratum. The dream objects have
nivRtti because of the illusory cognition of the waking world.
Where the material cause does not get destroyed, but the
effect is destroyed, nivRtti is said to happen (ie where the
clay pot breaks, but clay is not destroyed).
The opponent says this principle must be used in the
position that ignorance is only one (eka ajnAna paksha). He
says:
ननु - एकाज्ञानपक्षे रूप्यादे: शुक्तिज्ञानेन स्वकारणे प्रविलयमात्रं क्रियते, मुद्गरप्रहारेणेव
घटस्य, न त्वज्ञानं निवर्त्यत इति ते मतम् न युक्तम् ;
“Your position that - as ignorance is said to be only one,
the shell silver etc, merely resolves into its cause by the
cognition of the shell, like in the destruction of a pot by a
hammer, whereas ignorance is not destroyed (he says so,
taking the advaitin advocating the position that ignorance is
one) - is incorrect.
In the panchapAdika, it is said that the sUtra - athAto
brahmajijnAsa - proves that bondage is mithyA. How? By
atha, the one desiring freedom from bondage is denoted. So
a person desiring freedom from bondage, has the desire for
knowing brahman (brahmajijnAsa). Therefore, the cognition
of Brahman is denoted as a means for the destruction of
bondage. The cognition of any object only destroys the
ignorance of that object. Therefore, the cognition of
Brahman, which has been enjoined for one desiring freedom
from bondage, can only destroy the ignorance of Brahman.
This follows that the ignorance of Brahman is the cause of
bondage, and therefore bondage must be mithyA.
The nyAyAmRtakAra takes the panchapAdikAkAra’s
statement ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकम् – that cognition only removes
ignorance – to argue that the shell cognition can only
remove shell ignorance, it cannot remove the shell silver.
Cognition cannot remove the shell silver without ignorance
also being destroyed. However if it is said ignorance is
destroyed, as ignorance is only one, one should be instantly
liberated when shell ignorance is destroyed.

यतो ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमिति व्याप्तिबलात्

ज्ञानस्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिद्वारैवान्यविरोधित्वेनाज्ञानमनिवर्त्य रूप्यादिनिवर्तकत्वायोगात्
This is incorrect, because on the strength of the
(panchapAdikAkAra’s) concomitance that knowledge can
remove only ignorance, knowledge's ability to sublate an
object is only through the means of destroying ignorance, it
is not possible to remove the shell silver without removing
ignorance too.
शुक्तिज्ञानेनाज्ञानानिवृत्तावभिव्यक्तचैतन्यसंबन्धाभावेन भ्रान्ताविव बाधेऽपि शुक्तेरप्रकाशापत्तेश्चेति -
If ignorance is not removed by the cognition of the shell, as
the connection with consciousness does not occur, then,
like in the case of illusion, even following the sublation of
silver, the shell remains unseen.
The siddhikAra says:
चेन्न ; no.
यतो ज्ञानमज्ञाननिवर्तकमिति व्याप्तेरुछेदविषयत्वात्,
The statement that cognition removes ignorance refers to
the total elimination of ignorance, root and all.
The intention of the panchapAdikAkAra is in saying that if
cognition succeeds in destroying something along with its
cause, it follows that the cause of that thing is ignorance.
स्वकारणे सूक्ष्मरूपेणावस्थाने तदनङ्गीकारात्,
That (concomitance) does not accept that the object is
resolved back into its cause in a subtle form, like in the case
of the example.

शुक्तिज्ञानस्य चानवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणमूलाज्ञानानिवर्तकत्वेऽपि
अवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणरूपतूलाज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वेनाभिव्यक्तचैतन्यसंबन्धा
यां
त् बाधद यां रूप्यनिवृत्तिशुक्तिप्रकाशयोरप्युपपत्ते: |
शा
Even though the shell cognition does not have the capacity
to remove the primal nescience veiling the undelimited
consciousness, as it has the capacity to remove a
secondary nescience veiling the object delimited
consciousness, upon sublation, the connection with
consciousness happens and therefore both sublation of
silver and the illumination of shell can happen.
नच - उपादेयभूतया वृत्त्योपादानभूताविद्याभिभवो न घटते;
नादिति- वाच्यम् ;
उपादेयेनोपादानभिभवादर्नादितिर्श
Nor can it be argued that "the vRtti which is after all a
product of nescience cannot overpower its own cause,
nescience - For the destruction of the cause by the effect is
not seen anywhere."
वृश्चिकादिना गोमयादेरुपादानस्याप्यभिभवदर्शनात् | For it is seen that a scorpion
which is born from cow-dung, is born by destroying its
material cause.
The ArambhavAda philosopher (logician) argues that the
transformation of the cause into the effect is not real. He
argues that the cause disintegrates into paramANu-s,
atomic particles, which reintegrate into the effect. Thus, to
say that the cause transforms into the effect is wrong in his
view.
The siddhikAra says, this does not apply to us because we
don't agree with ArambhavAda.
आरम्भवादानभ्युपगमाच्च न गोमयावयवानामुपादानत्वशङ्का | As we do not accept
ArambhavAda, one cannot raise an objection citing that it is
the parts of the cow-dung (i.e., paramANu) that are the
material cause.
The nyAyAmRtakAra raises another objection:
ननु - चक्षुरादिजन्यशुक्त्यादिवृत्ते: सप्रकारिकाया: निष्प्रकारकशुद्धचैतन्याविषयतया
तदावरणरूपमूलाज्ञानाभिभवाभावेऽप्यवच्छिन्नविषयया तया
अवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणरूपतूलाज्ञानाभिभवो युज्यत इति ते मतमयुक्तम् ;
Your view that – as the cognition of the shell that is born
from sense organs such as eyes etc, is a partite cognition,
and does not have the impartite pure consciousness as its
object, it can remove the secondary nescience that veils the
object delimited consciousness, even if it is unable to
remove the primal nescience that veils pure consciousness –
is wrong.
Why? Ignorance veils only that which requires obstruction.
There is no need to postulate an ignorance to explain why
the inert object is not seen, because an inert object needs
no veil, it is incapable of revealing itself. Therefore, one can
postulate ignorance only to explain why the self-evident
consciousness is not automatically known.
अवच्छिन्ने अविद्याकल्पिते अप्रसक्तप्रका शामूलाविद्याया इव
तदावरणशक्तेरयोगात्,
As delimited consciousness is unreal as it is a result of
ignorance, it is incapable of revealing itself. Therefore,
unlike in the case of primal nescience, there is no basis to
postulate a secondary ignorance (to explain why it is not
revealed).
त्वयानभ्युपगतत्वाच्च,
You too agree that it is not primary ignorance that obstructs
delimited consciousness.
If it is said that it is the self, endowed with inertness that is
being veiled - that is, when it is said that ignorance covers
consciousness delimited by the shell, it will mean that it is
consciousness that is covered, because the shell, being
inert does not require ignorance to cover it. Thus, the
cognition that removes such an ignorance, would need to
objectify consciousness but not its attribute, the shell - only
then, will ignorance and the cognition that removes it have
the same object. Therefore, it must be accepted that the
vRtti that has the shell as its object must objectify
consciousness for it to remove the ignorance that gives rise
to the shell. As a result, it will mean that the cognition of
shell leads to moksha.

जडविशिष्टात्मानं प्रति तदभ्युपगमेच विशेषणानावारकविशिष्टावारकशक्त्यभिभवस्य

विशेष्यावारकशक्त्यभिभवं विनाऽयोगेन शुक्त्याकारवृत्त्यैव शुद्धात्मप्रकाशापातादिति
If it is said that consciousness delimited by the inert (object)
is veiled by a secondary ignorance, then as the removal of
ignorance with the power to veil the qualified consciousness
(consciousness delimited by the shell) but not the qualifier
(shell), is not possible without the removal of ignorance
which veils the undelimited (consciousness), the cognition
of the shell will end up revealing pure consciousness itself.
The siddhikAra says
- चेन्न ; अनवबोधात् | No, it has not been understood.
न ह्यविद्याकल्पितेऽवच्छिन्ने अस्माभिरविद्या वा तच्छक्तिर्वाभ्युपेयते, किं तु
चैतन्यमात्र एव ;
According to us, neither the consciousness that is a product
of ignorance nor the object delimited consciousness that is
veiled ignorance or its power (and thus is the object of
ignorance). Rather it is consciousness alone (that is veiled
by ignorance).
If in a dark room there is a pot, the space within the pot
would be dark too. When a lamp is placed within the pot, the
darkness delimited by the pot is removed, illuminating the
pot space - by that much, the room is not illuminated.
Similarly, consciousness which is covered by ignorance is
delimited by the shell. When a cognition in the AkAra of the
shell arises, it removes the ignorance in the shell-delimited
consciousness allowing that consciousness to reveal the
shell. That does not mean that consciousness overall is
revealed.
तस्मिंस्तु सर्वं जडमध्यस्तमस्तीत्येकाश्रयाश्रितत्वसंबन्धात् जडावच्छिन्नचैतन्यमावृतमिति व्यपदेश:,
On that (pure consciousness) everything inert is
superimposed. Therefore, as both ignorance and the inert
object are collocated in the same ignorance, it is said that
the consciousness delimited by the inert object is veiled.

घटाद्याकारवृत्त्या तु तदधिष्ठानचैतन्याभिव्यक्तौ तदवच्छेदेनैव तन्निष्ठावरणाभिभवो जायत इति

न शुद्धात्मप्रकाशापत्ति: |
When the pot AkAra vRtti arises, the pot’s substratum
consciousness shines when the ignorance located in the
pot-delimited consciousness is destroyed, but that does not
mean that pure consciousness shines.
pratikarmavyavasthA (part 4)
री
तदुक्तं सम्क्षेप रीरके - 'आरयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी
रकेशा यत्वविषयत्वभागिनीश्रनिर्विभागचितिरेव के वला |
पूर्वसिद्धतमसो हि पश्चिमो नाश्रयो भवति नापि गोचर: ||'
Thus, it has been said in the samkshepa shAriraka - the
locus and object of darkness (ignorance) is the partless
consciousness alone. That which presupposes ignorance
(the jIva) cannot be the locus or the object of ignorance.
'बहु निगद्य किमत्र वदाम्यहं शृणुत सङ्ग्रहमद्वय सने | सकलवाङ्ग्मनसातिगता चिति:
सनेशा
सकलवाङ्ग्मनसव्यवहारभाक् ||' इति च |
“Having said a lot, what else can I say here? I will therefore
be brief in describing the advaita scripture. Consciousness,
which is beyond the reach of mind and speech, is the
illuminator of every activity involving mind and speech.”
षप्रच्यवाद्वा,
तस्मादविद्यायां सत्यामपि शक्त्यभिभवाद्वा तूलाज्ञाननाशाद्वा अवस्थावि षप्रच्यवाद्वाशे
द्
वा
एकदेशना द्वा , भीरुभटवदपसरणाद्वा, कटवत्संवेष्टनाद्वा,
शा
आवरणभङ्गानिर्मोक्षबाधानामुपपत्ति: |
Therefore even when ignorance persists - by the destruction
of a particular power of ignorance, or by the destruction of a
secondary ignorance, or by the end of a particular state of
ignorance, or by the destruction of ignorance in one
particular place, or like a fearful soldier running at the sight
of the enemy (but not destroyed), or like a mat which is
folded (but not removed) - the removal of the veil, the
absence of moksha (during samsara) and sublation of a
particular illusion are all possible.
ननु - अवस्थावि षाणामज्ञानाभिन्नत्वेशे
षाणामज्ञानाभिन्नत्वेएकाज्ञानपक्षक्षति:,
अज्ञानभिन्नत्वे च साक्षात् ज्ञानेन निवृत्ति: भ्रमाद्युपादानत्वंच न स्यात्, तेषामिव
रूप्यस्यैवोपदाननाशं विना नाशप्रसङ्गश्च, शुक्त्यज्ञानं नष्टमित्यनुभवविरोधश्चेति - चेन्न ;
The nyAyAmRtakAra asks:
षाणामज्ञानाभिन्नत्वेएकाज्ञानपक्षक्षति:, If the different
अवस्थावि षाणामज्ञानाभिन्नत्वेशे
states of ignorance are the same as ignorance, then the
position of ignorance being one is harmed (there are many
states of ignorance, which is as good as saying that
ignorance is not one).
अज्ञानभिन्नत्वे च साक्षात् ज्ञानेन निवृत्ति: भ्रमाद्युपादानत्वंच न स्यात्, if they are
different from ignorance, they will not be directly removed
by cognition. Also, if they are not ignorance, they cannot be
the material cause of illusions.
तेषामिव रूप्यस्यैवोपदाननाशं विना नाशप्रसङ्गश्च, then, like them, it is possible to
argue that the silver to be destroyed even without the
destruction of its material cause.
To explain, if it is said that these special states of
ignorance, are different from ignorance, and are removed by
knowledge, then you must admit that it is possible for things
other ignorance which are destroyed by knowledge. If so,
the reason to postulate that it is ignorance of the shell
which is the material cause for the silver, is lost. Why? Such
a postulation is made by you because you need to explain
how silver, which is something other than ignorance, is
destroyed by knowledge. Therefore, you say that silver is
not destroyed directly by knowledge, rather it is destroyed
because its material cause, ignorance is destroyed by
knowledge. Now if you agree things other than ignorance
can also be destroyed by knowledge, let us say that silver is
directly destroyed by knowledge.
In fact, you do not need to postulate a secondary ignorance
at all.
शुक्त्यज्ञानं नष्टमित्यनुभवविरोधश्च moreover, this contradicts the
experience "the ignorance of shell is destroyed".
इति चेन्न - The siddhikAra says: No.
यतोऽवस्था तावदवस्थावतोऽभिन्नैव For, the state of a thing and the thing
itself are not different. Even if the body is one, it can have
multiple states - youth, middle age, old age, etc. Similarly,
even if ignorance is one, it can have multiple states.
अज्ञानैक्यं तु सर्वावस्थानुस्यूतैकाकारमादाय | However, ignorance
is said to be one because in every state, there is one
ignorance that is present in and through all states.
एवंचाज्ञानावस्थाया अज्ञानत्वेन न ज्ञानसाक्षान्निवर्त्यत्वाद्यनुपपत्ति: | Therefore,
as the state of ignorance is ignorance itself, there is no
untenability in them being directly removed by ignorance.
यत्त्ववस्थाविशेषाणामिव रूप्यस्यैवोपादाननिवृत्तिं विना निवृत्त्यापादानं, तदयुक्तम् ; Whereas,
your statement - like in the case of states of ignorance, the
sublation of silver would also end up becoming possible
even without the destruction of ignorance - is not correct.
अज्ञान एव ज्ञानस्य साक्षाद्विरोधावधारणेनाज्ञानावस्थायास्तदभिन्नाया:
ज्ञानसाक्षान्निवर्त्यत्वार्हत्वात्,
As it is ignorance alone that is directly in opposition to
knowledge, states of ignorance, being non-different to
ignorance, are capable of being directly removed by
knowledge.
न तु रूप्यादीनाम् ; अनीदृक्त्वात् | And not silver etc, for it is not so (i.e.
the illusory silver is not directly in opposition to
knowledge).
Until now the position that “ignorance is one” was being
discussed. Now the position that “ignorance is many” will be
discussed.
अनेकाज्ञानपक्षे तु शङ्कापि नोदेति | These doubts do not exist if it is
held that ignorance is many.
The nyAyAmRtakAra raises doubts in this position. There are
several types of ignorance associated with every object. If a
particular pot knowledge removes a particular pot
ignorance, as the other types of ignorance veiling that same
pot still exist, how is the pot seen? If all the types of
ignorance with respect to the pot are removed, then the pot
would always be seen.
ननु - अस्मिन्पक्षे एकया वृत्त्या सर्वतदज्ञानस्य निवृत्ति:, उत एकतदज्ञानस्य ;
In this system, does one cognition remove all types of
ignorance, or does it remove only one ignorance?
आद्ये पुन: शुक्ते: कदाप्यप्रकाशो न स्यात्, अन्त्ये वृत्तिकालेऽपि प्रकाशो न स्यात्,
एकस्यावरणस्य निवृत्तावप्यावरणान्तरानिवृत्तेरिति
If the former, the shell would never be not seen. If the latter,
even after the rise of the cognition, the shell would not be
seen, because even if one covering is removed, the other
coverings would remain.
The siddhikAra says:
चेन्न ; If this is the argument, no.

ऽपितयैवावरणान्तराणां प्रतिरुद्धत्वात् यावत् सा तिष्ठति

एकया वृत्त्या एकाज्ञानना ऽपिशे
तावत्प्रकाश:, तस्यामपगतायां पुनरप्रकाशश्चोपपद्यते ;
Even though only one ignorance associated with the object
is destroyed by one cognition, and prevents other types of
ignorance from obscuring the object, and so, for as long as
that cognition lasts, the object is illuminated. Once that
cognition resolves, the object is no longer illuminated.
अज्ञानस्य ज्ञानप्रागभाव स्थानीयत्वात् | Because the place occupied by
ignorance (in my system) is (similar to) the prior absence of
cognition (in your system).
Before we know an object, we say we do not know it. The
cause of not knowing according to the tArkika is jnAna
prAgabhAva, or the prior absence of knowledge. There must
be several jnAna prAgabhAva-s present in the object -
because that object is going to be known multiple times by
the same knower. Then why do we say that the object is
seen when any one jnAnaprAgabhAva ends? We say the
nature of jnAna is to obstruct the action of other jnAna
prAgabhAva-s which would otherwise lead one to conclude
that "I do not know the object".
यथा तव एकं ज्ञानमेकमेव प्रागभावं नाशयति, तन्नाशरूपेणोदयात्
प्रागभावान्तरनिबन्धनमज्ञातत्वादिव्यवहारं च प्रतिबध्नाति ; तथा ममाप्येकं ज्ञानमेकमेवाज्ञानं निवर्तयति,
अज्ञानान्तरनिबन्धनं च प्रयोजनं प्रतिबध्नातीति किमनुपपन्नम् ?
Just like in your system, one cognition ends only one prior
absence of cognition. As the nature of cognition arising is
the end of prior absence of cognition, it prevents other prior
absences of cognition of that object from leading to
activities such as "not known" etc – In the same way, in my
system, one cognition ends only one ignorance, and it
prevents the other types of ignorance (from doing the same
activities). What can be wrong with this?
A question may be asked - what does pratibandhaka /
obstacle mean? The tArkika may define it as kAraNIbhUta
abhAva pratiyogitva. If the absence of A is a cause for B,
then A is a pratibandhaka/obstacle of B. The siddhAntin had
said, when ignorance is present, the resulting activity is that
the person does not know that object, i.e. ajnAta
vyavahAra.
When knowledge arises, it acts as an obstacle for the
activity of not knowing the object. The opponent may argue
that if knowledge is an obstacle to ajnAta vyavahAra, the
absence of knowledge should lead to ajnAta vyavahAra.
However, we say that the cause of ajnAta vyavahAra is
ignorance in our system, not the absence of knowledge.
Therefore, ignorance should not be called a pratibandhaka.
To refute such a doubt, the siddhikAra says:
अत्र च प्रतिबन्धपदेन कार्यानुपपत्तिप्रयोजकत्वं कारणाभावप्रतिबन्धकसाधारणमभिहितम् |
The word pratibandhaka here means that which is the cause
for something not happening. An obstacle defined either as
the absence of a cause or the presence of the something
preventing a result, share the common characteristic of non-
production of result.
Therefore, even if ignorance is present, the presence of
knowledge can prevent the ajnAta vyavahAra, the activity of
not knowing.
षपक्षेऽपिप्रकाशाप्रकाशावुपपादनीयौ |
एवमवस्थावि षपक्षेऽपिशे
The same explanation can be used to explain the situation
where there are multiple states of ignorance. Even if other
states of ignorance are present, cognition acts as an
obstacle to their activity.

एवममूर्तस्याज्ञानस्य यद्यपि दण्डादिना गवादीनामिवापसरणं करादिना कटादीनामिव

संवेष्टनं च न संभवति; तथापि कार्याक्षमत्वसाम्येनापसरणसंवेष्टनपक्षौ योजनीयौ |
In this manner, despite ignorance being intangible and
cannot be driven away like cows being driven away with a
stick, or folded away like a mat folded by hand, those
examples have been said with the intention of conveying the
inability of ignorance from producing its effect (obscuring its
object and leading to the activity of not knowing that which
it veils).
Previously cognition was said to be a pratibandhaka, an
obstacle to ignorance, now it is compared to an uttejaka, a
catalyst.
यथाहि उत्तेजकाभावसहकृतस्य मणे: प्रतिबन्धकतायामुत्तेजकसत्त्वे प्रतिबन्धककार्याक्षमत्वम्
; तथा वृत्त्यभावसहकृ तस्याज्ञानस्य प्रतिबन्धकातायां वृत्तौ सत्यां तत्कार्यानुदय इति द्रष्टव्यम् |
Just like the inhibitor gemstone (chandrakAnta) in the
absence of a catalyst (sUryakAnta) inhibits fire, but in the
presence of the catalyst is unable to inhibit, ignorance in the
absence of vRtti inhibits the illumination of the object, but in
the presence of the vRtti is unable to prevent the
illumination of the object.
The nyAyAmRtakAra raises another objection. If
consciousness is self-evident, everyone should know it. If
they do, everyone should be free. The advaitin could say that
even though certain aspects are known, its nature as infinite
bliss is not known. If that was the argument, he says
ननु चैतन्यस्य निरवयवत्वात् तस्यैकदेशेन प्रकाशो न युज्यते ; As consciousness is
partless, it is not correct to say that one part is known (and
another is not).
अथाकाश इव तत्तदर्थावच्छिन्नत्वमेकदेशशब्दार्थ:, If it is said that it is like
space, and delimited by objects, and such a delimitation is
being referred to as a part of consciousness,
तर्हि नागन्तुकपदार्थावच्छिन्नचैतन्यमनाद्यज्ञानस्य विषय: ;
Then, beginningless ignorance cannot be objectify
consciousness delimited by objects that have not yet come
into existence.
Suppose the advaitin argues that parts in consciousness are
possible because of certain boundaries or delimiters.
However, those delimiters are held by the advaitin to be
imagined in consciousness out of ignorance. Therefore,
those logical delimiters presuppose ignorance. So, before
them, ignorance must have obscured pure consciousness
fully. How can you say that a part of consciousness was
known but part obscured by ignorance then when the parts
themselves are imagined due to ignorance?
निर्विषयस्यावरणस्यायोगात्,
Nor can ignorance without an object be a veil.
प्रागनवच्छिन्नावरणमेवेदानीमवच्छिन्नावरणं जातमित्यपि न ;
Nor can it be said that in the beginning, unlimited
consciousness was obscured, and now, limited
consciousness is being obscured.
पत् :;
तेशा
अवच्छिन्नचैतन्यज्ञानेनैवानवच्छिन्नावरणना पत्ते
Because if the same veil covers both, by the destruction of
the veil over limited consciousness, the veil over unlimited
would be destroyed too.
एतेन व्यक्तित: पूर्वं जातिरिव विषयात्पूर्वमज्ञानमस्तीति निरस्तमिति
By this, like refuting the argument that the jAti can exist
before a vyakti, saying that ignorance exists before the
object also stands refuted.
The siddhikAra says
- चेन्न ; अनाद्यज्ञानविषये अनादिचैतन्ये तत्तदागन्तुकपदार्थावच्छेदाभ्युपगमात्,
No. The object of beginningless ignorance is the
beginningless consciousness, and it is that consciousness
which is said to be delimited by objects that have
subsequently arrived.
'आरयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी
यत्वविषयत्वभागिनीश्रनिर्विभागचितिरेव के वले'त्युक्तत्वात् |
As has been said in the samkshepa shAriraka, the locus and
object of ignorance is the partless consciousness.
यदवच्छिन्नगोचरा च वृत्तिस्तदवच्छेदेनैवावरणापसरणात् नानवच्छिन्नचैतन्यावरणभङ्गप्रसङ्ग: |
The delimited consciousness that is the object of the vRtti is
the same delimited consciousness whose veil has been
removed, and therefore, there is no scope for the veil in the
undelimited consciousness to be removed by the vRtti.
अत एव वृत्तिविषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्यात् प्रागज्ञानमस्तीत्यभिप्रायेण विषयात्प्रागज्ञानमस्तीति साधूक्तम् |
Therefore, with the view that ignorance has existed even
prior to the consciousness delimited by the thing, which is
also the object of the vRtti, it is appropriate to say the
ignorance has existed prior to objects.
तस्मादधिष्ठानचैतन्यं स्वाध्यस्तं भासयतीति सिद्धम् |
Therefore, it has been proven that it is the substratum
consciousness that reveals the object that is superimposed
upon it.
तदयमत्र निष्कर्ष: - यद्यपि विषयप्रकाशकं विषयाधिष्ठानभूतं प्रमेयचैतन्यम्, अन्त:करणावच्छिन्नचैतन्यं
तु तस्य प्रमातृ, अन्त:करणवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्यं तु प्रमाणम् ;
This is extracted meaning – while the illuminator of the
object is the substratum of the object which is the
consciousness delimited by the known object, the
consciousness delimited by the mind is the knower, the
consciousness delimited by cognition is the knowledge / means of
knowledge.
तथापि यदीयान्त:करणवृत्त्या विषयपर्यन्तं चाक्षुरादिद्वारा निस्सृतया यत्प्रकाशकं चैतन्यं
यत्प्रमातृचैतन्याभेदेनाभिव्यज्यते तमेव स एव जानाति नान्यं नान्यो वा |
It is only that object - which has been revealed by the
consciousness delimited by the object, because of becoming
one with the consciousness of that knower, whose vRtti has
emanated from the eyes etc and reached that object - which
is known by that knower, and no other object, and by no
other knower.
अतेवैकवृत्त्युपारूढलक्षणैकलोलीभावापन्नं प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयचैतन्यं भवति |
Therefore, through the means of the one vRtti enveloping
the knower, knowledge and the known, consciousness
delimited by the knower, knowledge and the known, become
one.

ततस्तदवच्छेदेनाज्ञाननिवृत्त्या निवृत्त्या भासमानं प्रमेयचैतन्यमपरोक्षं फलमित्युच्यते

तत् स्वयं भासमानं सत् स्वाध्यस्तं घटाद्यपि भासयतीति तत्
फलव्याप्यमित्युपेयते |
By the removal of ignorance in that (object) delimited
consciousness,
the revealed (1) object consciousness is called phalam,
perception. That while revealing itself, also reveals
everything (pots etc) that is superimposed upon it. Thus it
(the pot) is called phala vyApya, pervaded by the phala.

(1) nivRttyA bhAsamAnam - Here, the implication is not that thought reveals consciousness

- consciousness being self-evident, it does not need thought to reveal it. Rather, the

intended meaning of the term revealed - bhAsamAnam- is that consciousness is the locus
of the nivRtti, removal of ignorance. The tritIyA vibhakti is not used in the sense of karaNa,

instrument, but in the sense of abheda, identity with nivRtti.

यन्निष्ठा च यदाकारा वृतिर्भवति तन्निष्ठं तदाकारमज्ञानं सा नाशयतीति नियमात्

प्रमातृप्रमेयोभयव्यापिन्यपरोक्षवृत्ति: स्वावच्छेदेनावरणमपसारयति ; प्रकाशस्य
नात् |
स्वावच्छेदेनावरणापसारकत्वदर्नात्र्श
Based on the rule that the person in whom the vRtti is
located, and the object whose AkAra the vRtti takes, is the
person for whom, and the object whose ignorance is
destroyed, the perceptive cognition which pervades both the
knower and the known removes the ignorance in the
consciousness delimited by them (ie the consciousness
delimited by the knower and the consciousness delimited by
the known). Just like light, which removes darkness
wherever it falls (and not elsewhere).
अत: प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नस्यासत्त्वावरणस्य प्रमेयावच्छिन्नस्याभानावरणस्य चापसरणात् घटोऽयं मे
स्फुरतीत्याद्यपरोक्षव्यवहार: |
Therefore, in the case of direct perception, because of the
removal of the ignorance of existence located in the knower
and the ignorance of appearance located in the known, one
has the perceptive experience "This pot is seen by me".
Ignorance is divided into two types - asattvApAdaka and
abhAnApAdaka. The asattvApAdaka ignorance is the one
that one leads to say "I don't know that the pot exists", the
abhAnApAdaka ignorance is the one that one that leads one
to say "I can't see the pot".
In the case of direct perception such as "I see a pot ", the
vRtti pervades both the knower consciousness and object
consciousness and thus we can infer that both kinds of
ignorance are removed. In the case of indirect cognition
such as "I infer the presence of fire in the mountain", the
cognition does not pervade the fire, it exists only within the
knower, thus one concludes that the ignorance of existence
is removed, but the ignorance of appearance remains.
Therefore, the siddhikAra postulates that the ignorance of
existence is present in the knower consciousness, and the
ignorance of appearance is present in the object
consciousness. This is more for ease of understanding than
anything else. brahmAnanda, on the other hand says that the
ignorance of existence also must be present in the object -
to explain the rise of illusion of shell silver.
परोक्षस्थले तु इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षलक्षणद्वाराभावादन्त:करणनिस्सरणाभावेन विषयपर्यन्तं

वृत्तेरगमनात्
On the other hand, in the case of indirect cognition, as the
contact by means of senses organs is not present, the mind
is not carried to the object, as the vRtti does not reach it,

विषयावच्छिन्नप्रमेयचैतन्येन सह प्रमातृचैतन्यस्यैकवृत्त्युपारूढत्वाभावेनापरोक्षतयाऽभिव्यक्त्यभावेऽपि
the knower consciousness and object consciousness do not
merge through the medium of the vRtti, and even though the
object consciousness does not shine forth like in the case of
perception,

प्रमातृप्रमाणचैतन्ययोरेकलोलीभावापत्त्या प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नमसत्त्वावरणमात्रं निवर्तते

the knower consciousness and knowledge consciousness do
merge, and the ignorance of existence that exists in the
knower is removed.
तावन्मात्रस्य वृत्त्यवच्छिन्नत्वात् |
because the vRtti pervades only that much (the knower and
the knowledge)
इदमेव सुषुप्तिव्यावृत्तिशब्देन विवरणाचार्यैर्व्याख्यातम् | It is this that has
been spoken of as 'suShupti vyAvRtti' by vivaraNAchArya.
The vivaraNAchArya had said that in the case of inference
'suShupti vyAvRtti' occurs - अनुमेयादौ सुषुप्तिव्यावृत्ति:. While
the literal meaning of the sentence is that the inferential
cognition 'removes sleep', which does not make sense, what
is meant is that the ignorance of existence that is present is
removed. The word suShupti, in this context means
asattvApAdaka ajnAna. As GauDapAdAchArya says in the
mANDUkya kArika, बीजनिद्रायुतः प्राज्ञः.
A question can be raised, if the pramAtA's AvaraNa is gone,
but the prameya's is not, how can the pramAtA know the
prameya? The siddhikAra says:

विषयावच्छिन्नाभानावरणतत्कार्यसद्भावेऽपि प्रमात्रवच्छिन्नासत्त्वावरणनिवृत्त्या अनुमानादौ

व्यवहारोपपत्ति: |
Even though the ignorance of appearance in the object
delimited consciousness and its effect ('I do not see the
object’) are present, as the ignorance of the existence of the
object present in the knower is removed, inferences can
work etc.
अत एव जानाम्यहं पर्वते वह्निरस्तीति, स तु कीदृश इति मे न भातीत्यादिव्यवहार: |
Thus, one says "I know that there is fire in the mountain,
although how it is, I do not know".
त्रयाणामेकलोलीभावे अपरोक्षत्वम् ; द्वयोरेकलोलीभावे तु परोक्षत्वमिति न संकर: |
When three become one it is perception, and when two
become one it is indirect cognition, and thus no mix up of
the two.
वृत्तेश्च विषयेण सह साक्षादेवापरोक्षस्थले संबन्ध:,
In the case of perception, the vRtti is directly connected to
the object. Here the word sambandha does not refer to
AkAra sambandha, but that both are located in the same
place.
परोक्षस्थाले त्वनुमितेरनुमेयेन तद्व्याप्यज्ञानजन्यत्वम्, शाब्द्या: संसर्गेण सह
तदाश्रयवाचकपदजन्यत्वम्, स्मृते: स्मर्तव्येन सह तद्विषयानुभवजन्यत्वं |
In indirect cognitions like inference, the connection of the
fire with the inferential cognition is that the latter is born
from the knowledge of fire's concomitant, smoke. In the
case of verbal cognitions, the connection of the syntactical
meaning of words with the verbal cognition is that the latter
is born from the words which are the locus of that
syntactical meaning. In the case of recollection, the
connection of the object recollected and the cognition of
recollection is that the latter is born from the prior
experience of the object.
एवमन्यत्रापि परम्परासंबन्ध एवेति परोक्षापरोक्षविभाग: |
In the same way, in other places of indirect cognitions also,
there is an indirect relationship between the cognition and
its object, and that is the difference between perception and
indirect cognitions.
विस्तरेण व्युत्पदितास्माभिरियं प्रक्रिया सिद्धान्तबिन्दौ |
We have expansively treated this methodology in the
siddhAnta bindu.
तस्माद्विषयस्य मिथ्यात्वेऽपि प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थोपपन्नेति दिक् |
Thus, even when the object is mithyA, it is possible to
account for pratikarmavyavasthA.
इत्यद्वैतसिद्धौ प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थोपपत्ति: ||