Mamluks in The Modern Egyptian Mind

MAMLUKS IN
THE MODERN
EGYPTIAN MIND
CHANGING THE MEMORY OF
THE MAMLUKS, 1919-1952
IL KWANG SUNG
Mamluks in the Modern Egyptian Mind
Il Kwang Sung
Mamluks in the
Modern Egyptian
Mind
Changing the Memory of the Mamluks, 1919–1952
Il Kwang Sung
Konkuk University
Seoul, Korea
ISBN 978-1-137-55712-4 ISBN 978-1-137-54830-6 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I have incurred debts to many institutions, colleagues, and teachers in

the process of producing this work. It is impossible to list all those whose
advice and input I have received. I am grateful to Prof. Choi Chang Mo
and Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Konkuk University in Seoul for
giving me a full-time researcher position. I am especially indebted to these
individuals. I am extremely grateful to my Ph.D. supervisor, Prof. Israel
Gershoni, for his extra-ordinary supervision and invaluable advice. I am
indebted to Prof. Amy Ayalon, Prof. Rami Ginat, Prof. Reuven Amitai,
and Prof. Kim Jung Gwan for encouragement, and to Arie Dallal for his
invaluable friendship. I am also indebted to Dr. Cho Yong Sik, Dr. Kim
Sung Un, Darom, and Jung Hyun Ho for sharing both happiness and
sadness as friends.
Finally I would like to thank my family. My parents Sung Tae Un and
Lee Whe Sun deserve special acknowledgment. Always prioritizing edu-
cation, they afforded me the luxury of scholarship. I feel fortunate and
grateful to have them at my side. My sister Sung Kyung A supported my
school expenses. I am particularly indebted to my wife Lee Jae Hee for
supporting me. Without her patience and love, this work would never
have been completed.
v
CONTENTS
Part I Mamluks in Official Memory 1
1 Introduction 3
2 Representations of the Mamluks in School Textbooks

(1921–1949) 19
3 Representations of the Mamluks in ‘Ābdīn Project

Historians’ Literatures 43
Part II Mamluks in Public Memory 57
4 Prologue: Historical Novel and Egyptian Nationalism 59
5 Representations of the Mamluks in

Historical Novels and Plays 65
vii
viii CONTENTS
6 Representations of the Mamluks in History Books

and Periodicals 123
7 Conclusion 217
Bibliography 221
Index 233
PART I
Mamluks in Official Memory

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The Mamluk periods have often been described as decade of chaos in Egypt.
Politically tyranny, oppression and destruction became the characteristic fea-
ture of their rule. The many Mamluk sultans are demonized as a warmon-
ger and lustful of power. The point of departure of the present study is to
critically delve into whether if the unfavorable attitude of modern Egyptian
historical literatures toward the Mamluks actually did so or not. Thus the
purpose of this study is to explore the ways in which modern Egyptian his-
torians and intellectuals discussed the Mamluk past to discern their percep-
tions and understandings of the Mamluks and Mamluk era. Following the
periodization of Egyptian historians, we will examine the representations of
the Mamluks in two historical periods: the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517)
era and the Mamluks under Ottoman era (1517–1811),1 focusing mostly
on the years 1760–1811. To critically analyze and compare the diverse
dimensions of distinction, contrast, and similarity among multifaceted rep-
resentations of the Mamluks presented in the years 1919 and 1952, we will
focus on historical literature of representative historians and intellectuals.
Although the Mamluks have had a great impact on the Egyptian col-
lective memory and, in particular, modern Egyptian thought, to date, the
subject has hardly been researched seriously.2 One possible explanation for
this phenomenon is that the existing scholars have given too much promi-
nence to stereotypical negative representation of the Mamluks in Egyptian
historical works. However, as we shall see, many Egyptian historians and
intellectuals presented the Mamluk era positively, and even symbolized
the Sultans as national icons. The present study aims to shed light on this
© The Author(s) 2017 3

I.K. Sung, Mamluks in the Modern Egyptian Mind,
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6_1
4 I.K. SUNG
heretofore-neglected positive dimension of the historical memory of the

Mamluks,3 and thereby seriously address the way in which Egyptian histo-
rians and intellectuals utilized the historical memory of the Mamluks for
their own political and ideological purposes.
Nevertheless, some scholars deal either with Egyptian historiography
in general, or the historiography of the ‘Urābı̄ Revolt and Mamluks spe-
cifically.4 The many studies by Egyptian and Western historiographers
include those of Jamāl al-Dı̄n al-Shayyāl and Jack A. Crabbs, focusing
on nineteenth-century Egyptian historiography, while Youssef Choueiri,
Anthony Gorman, and Yoav Di-Capua5 have researched that of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. Gorman has placed more emphasis on the
role of the state and nationalism in the development of Egyptian histori-
ography, while Di-Capua contends that Egyptian historians have focused
on the modern Egyptian state, with an emphasis on the historians’ role in
its emergence.6 Although these historians have significantly contributed to
the study of Egyptian historiography, their studies have not dealt specifi-
cally with the role of the Mamluks.
Thomas Mayer focuses on the chronological order in the changing
portrayal of the ‘Urābı̄ revolt as recorded in both official and popular
Egyptian historical writings.7 He convincingly demonstrates how modern
Egyptian historians have manipulated the history of the ‘Urābı̄ revolt for
their own purposes.
Paul Starkey outlines Egyptian history as reflected in the Egyptian
novel and dramaturgy.8 Though he covers several historical novels and
one play about the Mamluks,9 his treatment of the relationship between
history and fiction in the modern Egyptian novel is superficial, lacking a
critical analysis of the portrayal of Mamluks. Moreover, his study is limited
to historical fiction, while neglecting other historical genres.
Two existing works of scholarship address the depiction of Mamluks by
Egyptian and Arab historians, respectively.10 Yael Kimron dealt with the
representation of the Mamluks by modern Egyptian historians, whereas
Ulrich Haarmann attempted to reveal how Arab historians of the Middle
Ages perceived the Mamluks.
Haarmann researched the Arab depiction of the Mamluks, mainly that of
Arab historians of the Middle Ages, and found two contrasting, if not con-
tradictory, images of the Mamluk, both positive and negative. As is generally
accepted, most historians in Haarmann’s study had identified Mamluks as
Turkish military slaves. The historians Abū Ḥ āmid al-Qudsı̄, Ibn Khaldūn,
and Abū Shāma presented the Mamluks positively, as having saved the Arabs
from the Mongols and as protectors of Islam. In contrast, the ‘Ulamā’
INTRODUCTION 5
defined the Mamluks as Turkish military slaves and stereotypically depicted

them as Turkish barbarians.11 However, Haarmann did not touch upon
modern Egyptian historians, focusing on historians of the Middle Ages.
Kimron’s unpublished study is closely related to the present research in
that she investigates the manner in which Egypt’s Mamluk past is depicted by
modern Egyptian historians. She concludes that, for the most part, nation-
alist historians have treated the Mamluks as “the others” or “the strang-
ers.” The description of the struggle for Egyptian sovereignty excluded the
Mamluks, perceived as imperialists. Furthermore, she argues that the mod-
ernists, who were ideologically secular and liberal, perceived the Mamluks
as ardent Muslims and, therefore, wanted to expunge their names from the
national, collective memory. With that, emphasizing the ethnic Arab ele-
ment of national Egyptian identity, the pan-Arabist movement rejected the
“Turks” as part of that identity.12 Consequently, no one felt committed to
“guarding” the Mamluk past; very few historians expressed interest in add-
ing the chapter of Mamluk history to the Egyptian national collective mem-
ory, with the majority regarding it as insignificant to Egyptian history.13
The current study proposes to correct the following shortcomings in
Kimron’s work. Although Kimron explored in-depth the presentation of
the Mamluks by a number of Egyptian historians, her research has failed
to consider important Egyptian historians and intellectuals who, in con-
trast to her proposition, did indeed assimilate the history of the Mamluk
Sultanate into Egyptian history. Moreover, these historians and intellec-
tuals used the history of the Mamluks in order to strengthen Egyptian
nationalism.14 Methodologically too, Kimron analyzes the perception of
the Mamluks without distinguishing the Mamluk Sultanates from the
Mamluks under Ottoman rule.
Unlike previous studies, which have focused either on academic works
of history15 or on a limited number of historical novels,16 the current study
will also include the writings of intellectuals as well as popular literature,
such as popular periodicals, and even school textbooks as an official nar-
rative. By comparing the various historical writings in which Mamluks are
portrayed, this study seeks to provide a wider and more comprehensive
range of representations than that presented in previous studies.
The following significant historic events and knowledge concerning the
role and representation of the Mamluks will be referenced as categories
of critical analysis: (a) the identity of the Mamluks, (b) the Mamluk war
against Louis IX, King of France (1249) at al-Manṣūra, (c) the Battle of
‘Ayn Jālūt (1260) by Ẓ āhir Baybars and the Battle of Ḥ omṣ (1281) by
6 I.K. SUNG
Sayf al-Dı̄n Qalāwūn al-Alfı̄ against the Mongols, (d) the independent
movement of ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r, (1760–1772) in Egypt, and others.
These categories serve two purposes. First, change and continuity in
the Mamluk narrative is reflected through a chronological comparison of
the categories. Second, differences in the depiction of the Mamluks in the
several historiographical trends are illustrated through the prism of the
categories.
The scope of the present study will be limited to the modern Egyptian
historical narrative between 1919 and 1952. The year of 1919 is consid-
ered as a turning point, in which modern Egyptian historiography was
alleged to have appeared in its mature form. Within the new zeitgeist and
socio-political context of the time, Egyptian intellectual discourse on the
Mamluks reached its zenith, as reflected by a dynamic and important revi-
sion in Mamluk representation. Thus, this period is crucial in discussing
the concept of the Mamluk in Egyptian thought.
In the 1920s and, particularly, the early 1930s, Egyptian nationalist
historians endeavored to reinterpret Egyptian history through Egypt’s
own perspective, rather than Arab-Islamic historiography, or the Western
historiography of European Orientalists.17 This reinterpretation involved
engaging in the discourse of emancipation and rehabilitation, urging
Egyptians to free their collective memory from the burden of foreign his-
tories, purge their historical awareness of imposed prejudices, and recover
a distinct Egyptian collective memory that could serve as the solid founda-
tion for a new Egyptianist national consciousness. As far as the national-
ists were concerned, writing Egyptian history “as it actually was” meant
reconstructing the history of Egypt in a manner that displayed its “terri-
torial essence”—that is, the millennial and paramount bond between the
Nile Valley and the people of Egypt.
At the same time, monarchist historians, whose protagonists were
Muḥammad ‘Alı̄, Ibrāhı̄m, and Ismā’ı̄l, were recruited by King Fuād’s
‘Ā bdı̄n Project.18 Hence, they mainly focused on reforms and develop-
ments in administration, army, public works, and education during the
period of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ and his descendants.19 In addition to those
two monarchist and nationalist narratives, the Ottomanist narrative that
emerged in the previous century still lingered in the landscape of the
Egyptian collective memory.
During the 1930s, on the other hand, three historiographical styles
competed for hegemony in Egyptian society: “nascent academia, mon-
archist historiography, and the popular-nationalist tradition.”20 Academic
INTRODUCTION 7
historians adopted the monarchist historiography, their focus, assump-

tions, methods of work, style of writing, and, most importantly, their polit-
ical orientation.21 However, with time, academic historians shifted focus
from Muḥammad ʿAlı̄ and his family to ordinary people, and developed
an ideology of professionalism, distinguishing themselves from popular
and amateur historians. A new fashion of Egyptian nationalism emerged
in the 1930s. If the 1920s and early 1930s were a period of exclusivist,
territorial Egyptian nationalism, the period after1930 can be defined as an
era of supra-Egyptian nationalism in which three different supra-Egyptian
ideologies developed: Egyptian Islamic nationalism, integral Egyptian
nationalism, and Egyptian-Arab nationalism.22 Among them, Egyptian-
Arab nationalism became the most extensively articulated and important
variety, as evidenced by its acceptance on the part of other Arabs and
Muslims outside of Egypt. A critical analysis of these Ottomanist, mon-
archist, academic, and nationalist intellectual and historians’ perceptions
of the Mamluks provides a means of understanding the ways in which
Mamluk history has been narrated in order to institute various Egyptian
projects of modernity and nationalism.
From the perspective of cognitive psychology, any study of the repre-
sentations of the Mamluks is inseparable from the field of individual and
collective memory. According to Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, “since
collective remembrance is an activity of individuals coming together in
public to recall the past, historians would do well to reflect on the findings
of cognitive psychologists on how memory happens.”23 Accordingly, this
study seeks to offer a critical examination of the forms of memory and
public commemoration of the Mamluks and the Mamluk era, developed in
1919–1952, to celebrate the progress of Egyptian modernity and Egypt’s
struggle for national liberation. During this period, Egyptian national
identity was constructed through an imagined community. The subjects of
commemoration were dramatic episodes and dominant historical figures
who played a pivotal role in the nation’s parade toward independence,
freedom, and progress. The methods of remembering immortalize these
glorious moments and individual heroes of the nation, and narrate the
national drama. The result of these various endeavors was the creation of a
monarchic, Ottoman, or national culture of commemoration and memory
that served as a guide and an inspiration for the evolving nation.24
As mentioned, the critical examination of public commemoration of
the Mamluk era is a part of the extended field of memory studies. In
recent decades, the study of collective memory has received a great deal
8 I.K. SUNG
of critical attention from historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and cul-

tural critics. This immense boom is even referred to as “memory mania.”25
The scholarship that deals with the nature and operation of collective
memory proposes the basic framework for our examination of the history
of public commemoration in modern Egypt. The concept of “collective
memory” was first subject to systematic analysis in the work of Maurice
Halbwachs. Following in Emile Durkheim’s footsteps, Halbwachs stressed
that collective memory is a social construction. This is in stark contrast
to Henry Bergson, who conceptualized memory as an individual process
and accordingly regarded psychology as the most suitable discipline for
its analysis. The best method for examining that construction, Halbwachs
argued, was historical sociology.26 Patrick H. Hutton admitted that “Long
neglected, his [Halbwachs’] work today serves as a theoretical ground-
work in the emerging project of the history of memory.”27
Halbwachs’ main hypothesis is that collective memory takes shape and
unfolds in specific social contexts and, as such, is located within what he
termed “the social framework of memory.” For Halbwachs, individuals are
not able to exist outside society. Consequently, the social groups to which
they belong inevitably have an effect on their memories of the past. He
stated, “It is in the society that people normally acquire their memories,”
and added that “it is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize
their memories.”28 In effect, individuals can arrange their memories and
give them specific meaning only within the social framework of memory,
within which they are located as individuals: “It is to the degree that our
individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this
memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.”29
Halbwachs’ work has been a point of departure for every “scholar of
memory.” During the 1970s and 1980s, Pierre Nora made a significant
contribution to the systematic study of collective memory. In an endeavor
to operationalize Halbwachs’ focus on the social nature of collective mem-
ory, Nora conceptualized the researcher’s objective as the study of “sites
of memory” (lieux de memorie). Nora supervised the massive collaborative
effort that produced Les lieux de memorie, a multi-volume study of numer-
ous French sites of memory.
Nora’s fundamental assumption was that in the modern era, with its
acceleration of the pace of historical change, the genuine, spontaneous,
unpremeditated forms of memory that prevailed in the past are eroded
and disappear. “We speak so much of memory,” he asserted, “because
there is so little of it left.”30 Modernity therefore compels human societies
INTRODUCTION 9
to invent or produce artificial, manufactured forms of collective memory

to compensate for the elimination of more natural forms of remembrance.
Instead of real environments of memory that shaped human recollection
in the past, modern sites of memory serve as the reference points for col-
lective memory. Nora’s sites of memory encompass nearly every social and
cultural monument, flag, anthem, museum exhibit, archive, or library.31
The recreation of the historical memory of the Mamluks was also an
effective medium for Egyptian Ottomanist, monarchist, and nationalist
intellectuals for transmitting relevant political messages to their public.
Through heroic monuments and spectacles, commemoration creates
emotionally powerful evocations of episodes from the national drama:
the heroic era of the founding fathers, the noble struggle for national
liberation, and the splendid revival of national culture. Commemoration
invites citizens to see and feel the greatness and glory of their nation. The
active participation of the “Egyptian people” in these powerful communal
festivals of Ottoman, monarchic, and national commemoration is obvi-
ously crucial for the education of broad sectors of society. The collective
memory molded through commemoration reinforces a sense of a shared
Egyptian monarchic or national identity.32
Public commemoration is constructed on “national sentiment,” rather
than “rationale” as it creates a vivid tableau of national greatness, encour-
aging collective effort and sacrifice. In the words of Benedict Anderson,
“it is this fraternity that has made it possible over the past two centuries
for so many millions of people, not so much to kill as willingly to die for
such limited imaginings.”33
In order to create a new historical memory, the Ottomanist, monar-
chist, academic, and nationalist intellectuals were devoted to uncovering
the “lessons” of the past. These lessons can be learned from a histori-
cal record replete with glorious moments and splendid heroes, but may
also be tainted by unsatisfactory compromises and ignominious defeats.
For Ottomanist, monarchist, academic, and nationalist intellectuals all
tend to stress the former while ignoring the latter.34 Defeats and tragedies
receive attention not as indicators of national incapacity, but as a warn-
ing and admonition (lest we forget) for traps and pitfalls that should not
be allowed to reoccur.35 Thus, commemoration enables the producers of
the Ottomanist, monarchist, academic ideology and nationalism to either
erase a problematic past or turn it into a lesson.
The shaping of memory allows the past to be reevaluated into a mean-
ingful, teleological account of history: “Each act of commemoration
10 I.K. SUNG
reproduces a commemorative narrative, a story about a particular past

that accounts for this ritualized remembrance and provides a moral mes-
sage for the group members.”36 This narrative defines the periodization of
the nation’s history, determines the relative importance of the events and
individuals that comprise its content, and, by exclusion, mandates what is
trivial and best forgotten.
One important point that should be emphasized in this context is that
public commemoration incorporates a multiplicity of “memories.” Various
forces within civil society mark their interests by generating their own
monuments, narratives, and rituals. Different communities of memory
take tangible shapes in different communities of commemoration. Each
community of commemoration has a distinctive commemorative portfolio
from which it draws in an attempt to convince wider society of the validity
of its memory of the past and the wisdom of its vision for the future. A vari-
ety of groups utilize commemorative objects, ceremonies, song, and even
texts as weapons in an endless contest for national hegemony. Opposition
groups create subversive counter-narratives of commemoration in order to
challenge prevailing master narratives constructed by dominant groups.37
These subgroups constantly endeavor to set an alternative agenda for the
nation, using their forms of counter-commemoration to promote their
ideological and political preferences.38
In modern times, agencies connected with the state-incumbent gov-
ernments, royal families, ministries of education, and public, provincial,
or municipal authorities have often had the greatest impetus to reshape
national sites of commemoration and mold collective memory. However,
we ought to remember that the official agencies do not always monopolize
the content and themes of public commemoration and collective memory.39
Particularly in pluralist societies, public commemoration is often initiated
by a variety of civilian intellectual groups and individuals. Much recent
scholarship on public commemoration rightly distinguishes between offi-
cial commemoration, initiated and organized by the state, and unofficial
commemoration, conducted by various groups within civil society.
In their work titled War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century,
Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan recommended the adoption of a “social
agency approach” to the study of collective memory and public com-
memoration, emphasizing the importance of “secondary” agents of com-
memoration and memory, and non-official groups and individuals who
represent the different communities of memory within a society.40 First
and foremost, Winter and Sivan stress the role of “second- and third-order
INTRODUCTION 11
elites within civil society” in reproducing collective memory: The social

organization of remembrance tends to be decentralized. This claim shifts
the emphasis in this field “away from the central organization of the state
[…] towards civil society groupings, their leaders and activists.”41
Focusing on the role of non-official actors in producing memory is not
meant to deny that the state and its agencies are often “a major producer
and choreographer of commemoration.”42 However, it does draw atten-
tion to the fact that public commemoration and collective remembrance
are the result of an ongoing process of dialog, negotiation, and contesta-
tion between a variety of agents working within civil society and those
associated with the state.
One dichotomy that has become popular in the academic literature
dealing with collective memory and commemoration is John Bodnar’s
distinction between “official” and “vernacular” forms of memory. Official
memory is the creature of activities performed by “representatives of an
overreaching or official culture.” Such official agents usually “share a com-
mon interest in social unity, the continuity of existing institutions, and
loyalty to the status quo.” Vernacular forms of memory “represent an
array of specialized interest that is grounded in parts of the whole.” Rather
than providing an idealistic emphasis on unity and the covering-over of
the manifold characteristic of the official culture, vernacular culture gives
voice to “views of reality” emerging from first-hand experience in small
communities rather than the “imagined communities of a large nation.”43
Nevertheless, Bodnar contends that it is not always possible to differen-
tiate between official and vernacular forms of memory. Rather, he empha-
sized that “public memory emerged from the intersection of official and
vernacular cultural expressions.”44
Bearing in mind Bodnar’s thesis, this study focuses on selected forms of
official and public commemoration developed in the era of the Egyptian
parliamentary monarchy, from 1919 to 1952, often considered “Egypt’s
liberal age” or “liberal experiment.” With political parties competing with
each other and vigorous, if not raucous, press occupying the public sphere,
the state was only one among many agents which enabled public commem-
oration. While it is true that in some cases the processes of commemora-
tion initiated by non-official groups or associations eventually gained the
state’s stamp of approval and sometimes also its financial support, this was
mostly not the case. More often, commemoration was produced by agents
emerging from within Egyptian civil society—political parties, ad hoc lob-
bies, and individual entrepreneurs. Hence, through critically examining
12 I.K. SUNG
popular periodicals, the present study also devoted considerable attention

to the systematic examination of non-official agents of public commemo-
ration, and the projects and narratives which, together, constitute Egypt’s
“vernacular” culture of memory.45
This study deals with two groups of intellectuals: “luminaries,” or “great
thinkers,” on the one hand, and “secondary agents” on the other. The
“luminaries” were those to whom Edward Shils referred as “productive
intellectuals.”46 The luminaries outlined the contours of a future Egyptian
identity. The group of “secondary agent” intellectuals (i.e., those discov-
ering or disseminating, rather than shaping, narratives) included histori-
ans, professionals, artists, editors, and university professors.47 These agents
played an important role in the recreation, dissemination, and consolidation
of new imagery and ideology.48 Thanks to the “secondary” intellectuals,
the “great thinkers” were able to communicate with the Egyptian public.
In this context, the question of how the Mamluks were perceived by both
groups of intellectuals will be compared to the manipulation of Mamluk
history by nationalist intellectuals. Thus, the present study attempts to
examine whether Mamluk history contributed to the emergence and devel-
opment of new Egyptian nationalism, and if so, to what extent.
Two sections of this study each address a distinct system of historical
memory of the Mamluks. The first offers a critical analysis of Egyptian
school textbooks and historical works of the ‘Ā bdı̄n Project, thus discern-
ing “official forms” of historical memory of the Mamluk era.
The second section of this study will focus on “public forms” of com-
memoration of the Mamluks and Mamluk era, as mirrored in three kinds
of Egyptian historical literature. Firstly, popular periodicals provide a
diverse discourse on the Mamluks, or even conflicting interpretations of
historic events and characters. Above all, these sources are useful in tracing
how the “secondary agent” intellectuals represented the Mamluks, as the
periodical was their main medium of historical discourse. From the range
of material on the Mamluks, this study will concentrate on three main his-
toriographical trends: academic, monarchist, and nationalist. The follow-
ing are the most significant periodicals in this context: al-Hilāl, al-Risāla,
al-Manār, al-Thaqāfa, and al-Muqtat ̣af.
In addition to the periodicals, Egypt’s popular culture was also reflected
in its novels, short stories, and plays. Historical novels and plays are not just
storytelling, but may also serve as effective media for political propaganda.
Indeed, the writer often presents selected historical facts and characters,
thereby reshaping them to offer a new understanding of the past. As Georg
INTRODUCTION 13
Lukács noted, “What matters […] in the historical novel is not the retell-
ing of great historical events, but the poetic awakening of the people who
figured in those events.”49 Accordingly, this study offers a critical analysis of
the various political positions that shaped the Mamluk narrative. Moreover,
the popular historical novels and plays may also provide insights into the
popular discourse on the Mamluks within Egyptian society.
Lastly, since historians were the primary creators of Egyptian histori-
cal discourse, it is essential to examine their narratives in order to criti-
cally address the representations of the Mamluks. Above all, through this
source I will address the mainstream depictions of the Mamluks in the
Egyptian historical discourse. As previously noted, the four separate his-
toriographical trends that emerged between 1919 and 1952, by national-
ist, Ottomanist, monarchist, and academic historians, represent different
facets of the Mamluk narrative.
NOTES
1. Egyptian historians in this study viewed local Egyptian rulers who emerged
after the dissolution of the Mamluk Sultanate by the Ottomans in 1517 as
Mamluk leaders. Concerning the re-emergence of the Mamluks after 1517,
see Michael Winter, “The re-emergence of the Mamluks following the
Ottoman conquest,” in Thomas Philipp and Ulich Haarmann (eds.), The
Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), ch.5; David Ayalon, “The end of the Mamluk Sultanate: Why
did the Ottomans spare the Mamluks of Egypt and wipe out the Mamluks of
Syria?,” in David Ayalon, Islam and The Abode of War (Aldershot: Variorum
Reprints, 1994), ch.9. However, Ehud Toledano and Jane Hathaway argue
that those who emerged after the defeat of the Mamluk Sultanate by the
Ottomans were not Mamluks, as identified by many Egyptian historians, but
Ottoman–Egyptian elite. See Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in
Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of Qazdaglis (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997); Ehud R. Toledano, “The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites
(1700–1900): A Framework for Research,” in Ilan Pappé and Moshe Maoz
(eds.), Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within (London:
Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), pp. 145–162.
2. See, however, Paul Starkey, “Egyptian History in the Modern Egyptian
Novel,” in Hugh Kennedy (ed.), The Historiography of Islamic Egypt,
c.950–1800 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2001), pp. 251–262; Yael Kimron,
Perception of the Egyptian Mamluk Past by Modern Egyptian Historians
(unpublished M.A. Thesis, Tel-Aviv University, 2000). Concerning the
Mamluk image from the rise of the Ottoman Empire to the nineteenth
14 I.K. SUNG
century, see Paula Sanders, Creating Medieval Cairo (Cairo: American

University in Cairo, 2008). Concerning the Turk and the Mamluk image
from the Abbasids to modern Egypt, see Ulich Haarmann, “Ideology and
History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab image of the Turk from the
Abbasids to Modern Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies,
Vol. 20 (1988), pp. 175–196. Concerning the medieval perception of
̄ ir Baybars, see Amina A. Elbendary, “The Sultan, The Tyrant, and
al-Ẓ ah
The Hero: Changing Medieval Perceptions of al-Ẓ ah ̄ ir Baybars,” Mamluk
Studies Review, Vol. 5, 2001, pp. 141–155.
3. Yael Kimron’s unpublished MA thesis, however, deals with the perception
of the Mamluks by Egyptian historians; see Yael Kimron (2000), Perception
of the Egyptian Mamluk Past.
4. For early modern historiographical works (1800–1900), see Jamāl al-Dı̄n
al-Shayyāl, Al-Ta’rı̄kh wa al- Mu’arrikhūn fı̄ Miṣr fı̄ al-Qarn al-Tāsi”Ashar
(Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1958); Jack A. Crabbs, The
Writing of History in Nineteenth-Century Egypt: A Study in National
Transformation (Cairo: American Univ. of Cairo Press, 1984). For twenti-
eth-century historiographical works, see Youssef Choueiri, Arab History
and the Nation-State: A Study in Modern Arab Historiography, 1820–1980
(London: Routledge, 1989); ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Ibrāhı̄m al-Dasūqı̄
al-Jumay‘ı̄, Ittijāhāt al-Kitāba al-Ta’rı̄khiyya fı̄ Ta’riı̄kh Miṣr al-Ḥ adı̄th wa
al-Mu ‘āsị r (Cairo:‘Ayn lil Dirāsāt wa’l Buḥūth al-Insāniyya wa’l Ijtimā‘iyya,
1994); Thomas Mayer, The Changing Past: Egyptian Historiography of the
‘Urabi Revolt, 1882–1938 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1998);
Anthony Gorman, Historians, States and Politics in Twentieth-Century
Egypt: Contesting the Nation (London: Routledge-Curzon, 2003); Yael
Kimron (2000), op. cit; Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past:
Historians and History Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2009); Yoav Di-Capua, The Thought and
Practice of Modern Egyptian Historiography, 1890–1970 (Ph.D. Dissertation,
Princeton University, 2004).
5. Yoav Di-Capua (2004), The Thought and Practice; Idem, (2009),
Gatekeepers of the Arab Past.
6. Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, pp. 5–9.
7. For the case of Ottoman history in Egyptian historiography, see Ehud
Toledano, “Forgetting Egypt’s Ottoman Past,” Jama‘a (Beer-Sheva) 1
(Jan. 1997) [Hebrew], pp. 67–87; Idem, “Forgetting Egypt’s Ottoman
Past,” in Jayne Warner, (ed.), Cultural Horizons: A Festschrift in Honor of
Talat S. Halman, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2001),
pp. 150–167.
8. Paul Starkey (2001), “Egyptian History in the Modern Egyptian Novel.”
INTRODUCTION 15
9. Starkey deals with the following novels and play, respectively: Jūrjı̄ Zaydān’s
Al-Mamlūk al-Shārid, Muḥammad Sa‘ı̄d al-‘Aryān’s‘Alā Bāb Zuwayla,
Muḥammad Farı̄d Abū Ḥ adı̄d’s Ibnat al-Mamlūk, Gamāl al-Ghı̄tạ ̄nı̄’s Al-
Zaynı̄ Barakāt, and Tawfı̄q al-Ḥ akı̄m’s Al-Sult ̣ān al-Ḥ ā’ir.
10. Yael Kimron (2000), Perception of the Egyptian Mamluk Past and Ulrich
Haarmann (1988), “Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity.”
11. Ulrich Haarmann (1988), “Ideology and History, Identity and Alterity,”
pp. 181–185.
12. Yael Kimron (2000), Perception of the Egyptian Mamluk Past, p. V.
13. Ibid., p. VI.
14. For example, see Ḥusayn Mu’nis, Al-Sharq al-Islāmı̄ fı̄ al-‘Aṣr al-Ḥadı̄th,
2nd edition. (Cairo, 1938); Muḥammad Rifʿat, Ma‘ālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr
al-Wusṭa (Dār al-Maʿarif bi-Miṣr, 1948), pp. 155–158; Muḥammad Rifʿat,
Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr al- Wusṭa (Dār al-Ma ‘arif bi-Miṣr, 1928),
pp. 178–179; ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakı̄, Maʿārik Ḥāsima fı̄ Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr:
Damiyāt wa al-Manṣūra (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Nı̄l 1945), pp. 29, 39, 62–83;
Jamāl al-Dı̄n al-Shayyāl, Mujmal Ta’rı̄kh Damiyāt: Siyāsiyan wa Iqtiṣādiyan
(Cairo, 1949).
15. Yael Kimron (2000), Perception of the Egyptian Mamluk Past.
16. Paul Starkey (2001), “Egyptian History in the Modern Egyptian Novel.”
17. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The
Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–1930 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), p. 143.
18. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam, and the
Arabs, p. 144.
19. King Fuʾād initiated an extensive historiographical project at his ‘Ā bdı̄n
Palace in 1920. The project lasted more than twenty-five years and involved
a host of foreign archivists, philologists, and historians such as Eugenio
Griffini, Jean Deny, Angelo Sammarco, and Pierre Crabitès. This intro-
duced the monarchist project to Egyptian historiography, and the first
“public archive” was established in Egypt. Yoav Di-Capua (2009), op. cit.,
p. 12. For further reference, see Yoav Di-Capua (2009), op. cit., ch.3.
20. Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History
Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2009), p. 13.
21. Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, p. 13.
22. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation,
1930–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 1.
23. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., War and Remembrance in the
Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1999), p. 11.
24. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (2004), Commemorating the
Nation, p. 1.
16 I.K. SUNG
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 2.
27. Patrick H. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory (Hanover, NH, 1993),
p. 73.
28. Maurice Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (Paris, 1925) partially
translated by Lewis A. Coser, On Collective Memory (Chicago, 1992),
p. 38.
29. Ibid.
30. Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les lieux de mémoire,”
Representations, special issue on memory edited by Natalie Zemon Davis
and Randolph Stern, 26 (Spring 1989), p. 7.
Nation, p. 3.
32. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
33. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism 2nd edition (London, 1991), p. 7.
Nation, p. 8.
35. On this kind of manipulation of history by nationalist historians, see Yael
Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli
National Tradition (Chicago, 1995), pp. 153–208.
36. Ibid., p. 6.
Nation, p.12.
38. Alon Confino, “AHR Forum: Collective Memory and Cultural History:
Problems of Method,” American Historical Review, Vol. 102, No. 5
(December 1997), pp. 1397–1403.
39. On the limitation of state as official agency, see Jay Winter and Emmanuel
Sivan, eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge,
1999), pp.29–30, 38; Israel Gershoni, Pyramid for the Nation:
Commemoration, Memory and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century Egypt
(Tel-Aviv: Am Oved Publishers Ltd, 2006)[in Hebrew], p. 40.
40. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (1999), eds., War and Remembrance in
the Twentieth Century, pp. 29-31.
41. Ibid., p. 38.
42. Ibid., pp. 38–39.
43. John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and
Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1992), pp. 13–14.
44. John Bodnar (1992), Remaking America, p. 13.
45. Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski (2004), Commemorating the Nation,
p. 17.
INTRODUCTION 17
46. Edward Shils, “Intellectuals, Tradition, and the Traditions of Intellectuals:

Some Preliminary Considerations,” in S.N. Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard
(eds.), Intellectuals and Tradition (New York, 1992). Vol. 1, pp. 21–34.
47. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1986), op. cit., pp. 89–90.
48. Israel Gershoni, The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt, The Shiloah
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (Tel-Aviv, 1981), pp. 27–28.
For further discussion on “second rank” intellectuals, see Edward Shils
(1992) op. cit., p. 410.
49. Georg Lukács, The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell
(London: Merlin Press, 1962), p. 42.
CHAPTER 2
Representations of the Mamluks in School

Textbooks (1921–1949)
School textbooks have unique characteristics as a literary genre. A text-

book (and not only the official government-ordained one) reflects the
society it is designed to serve, its problems and aspirations, the nature of
its regime, and its guiding ideological values.1 Textbooks thus function as
a sort of “supreme historical court” whose task is to decipher “from all the
accumulated ‘pieces of the past’ the true collective memories which are
appropriate for inclusion in the canonical national historical narrative.” In
constructing the collective memory, textbooks play a dual role: on the one
hand, they provide a sense of continuity between the past and the pres-
ent, transmitting accepted historical narratives; on the other, they alter or
rewrite the past in order to meet contemporary needs.2
The manipulation of the past often involves the use of stereotypes and
prejudice in describing the “other”—the “categorization of groups into
extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups
that are considered as acting within the limits of acceptable norms and /
or values.”3 Moreover, school textbooks are written using easy vocabulary
and simplified composition in order that the readers, mostly students, can
learn and understand them efficiently.
One more general remark as to textbooks, especially those on geog-
raphy, history, and the like, is relevant. Many studies have shown that
even where there is no intention to distort the facts or garble the data,
the textbooks of one state almost never provide a proper, fair description
of another.4 It is common knowledge that textbooks in social science and

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6_2
20 I.K. SUNG
humanities do not merely convey an objective body of information. In

other words, textbooks tend to provide exaggerated, stereotyped, simpli-
fied, and biased knowledge in emotional tones in order to appeal effec-
tively to the readers.
Another crucial characteristic of school textbooks (published by the
Ministry of Education) is that they are certain to have the widest and most
clearly defined audiences. For example, although it cannot be taken for
granted that these textbooks reach exactly that number of readers due to
a relatively high percentage of pupils never even achieving literacy, data
on the Egyptian educational system indicates a readership of millions of
pupils and their parents and tens of thousands of teachers.5 However, the
importance of textbooks also lies in the fact that they are produced for
local consumption and are therefore free of the constraints that would be
applied in producing material for foreign scrutiny.6
In this chapter, therefore, the school textbooks will be perceived as
a product of a particular zeitgeist, reflecting the author’s values and
beliefs regarding a certain historical point as only his own authentic one.
Karl Mannheim clearly points out the importance of context in under-
standing a certain thought by indicating that “it is not men in general
who think, or even isolated individuals who do the thinking, but men
in certain groups who have developed a particular style of thought in an
endless series of responses to certain typical situations characterizing their
common position.” By the same token, Mannheim asserts that
It is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather it is more cor-
rect to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have
thought before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation with patterns
of thought which are appropriate to this situation and attempts to elaborate
further the inherited modes of response or to substitute others for them in
order to deal more adequately with the new challenges which have arisen
out of the shifts and changes in his situation.7
Hence, it is crucial to explain the socio-political context of textbooks as

much as text itself.
In the 1920s and early 1930s, Egyptian nationalist historical writers
committed to rewrite Egyptian history through Egypt’s own perspective,
rather than Arab-Islamic historiography, or the Western historiography of
European Orientalists.8 This nationalist reinterpretation focused mainly
on the discourse of emancipation and rehabilitation, urging Egyptians to
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MAMLUKS IN SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS (1921–1949) 21
free their collective memory from the trace of foreign histories, remove
their historical awareness of imposed prejudices, and rediscover a distinct
Egyptian collective memory that could serve as the strong foundation for
a new Egyptianist national consciousness. For the Egyptian nationalists,
rewriting Egyptian history “as it actually was” meant recreating the his-
tory of Egypt in a way that stressed its “territorial essence,” that is, the
millennial and paramount bond between the Nile Valley and the people
of Egypt.9
In addition, the historians of the 1920s rejected Thomas Carlyle’s per-
sonalist historical approach, which strongly stressed the role of gifted indi-
viduals in reshaping history, and espoused instead the positivist paradigm
with an emphasis on the importance of impersonal factors focusing on
the Egyptian nation and people.10 Accordingly, the main protagonists of
Egyptian history are not the great rulers, kings, or dynasties but rather the
Egyptian nation and people. Egyptian history is the unfolding of destiny
determined by impersonal, objective, and collective factors.11 Thus, all
Egyptians are the collective national hero of Egyptian history. The funda-
mental task of the nationalist historian is to “Egyptianize the past” (tamṣir
al-mādi) by liberating Egyptian history from an exaggerated emphasis on
the activity of kings and rulers and stressing instead the importance of
native Egyptian environment and social structure and collective forces.12
Another important historical context of the 1920s and early 1930s
we should remember is that the nationalist historical writers embraced
Hippolyte Taine’s theory of environmental determinism. The Nile Valley
population, long subject to the continuous influence of an unfaltering
physical environment, evolved an independent history that was governed
by indigenous laws and was unaffected by externalities. In the words of
prominent Egyptian intellectual Aḥmad Ḥ usayn, “Egyptian history is
nothing but the history of Egyptian who has dwelt for thousands of years
(in the environment) of the Nile Valley.”13 This environmental determin-
ism generates the “law of assimilation,” according to which all peoples,
races, religions, cultures, and languages that come into contact with
the Nile Valley and with the nation dwelling there inevitably surrender
to the Nile Valley’s physical and cultural superiority and are completely
assimilated.14
As for Muḥammad Ḥ usayn Haykal, the “fusion” (indimāj) of non-
Egyptians into the Egyptian personality (al-shakhsiyya al-miṣriyya) was a
primary process in the country’s long history. “Egypt’s history” he wrote,
“from the Pharaohs to the contemporary period is the ‘history of fusion’
22 I.K. SUNG
(ta’rı̄kh al-indimāj) between all those who sought to invade Egypt, and
the inhabitants of Egypt…The Hyksos, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arab,
the Mamluks, all became Egyptians who accepted the authority of Egypt
and who completely embodied the spirit of the Nile Valley.”15
In the early 1930s, a similar pattern to that of the 1920s is found in the
historical literatures of the “second rank” intellectuals. These intellectu-
als assimilated the Mamluk past into the Egyptian collective memory as
follows:
Invaders such as the Hyksos, the Persians, the Nubians, the Greeks, the
Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, and the Mamluk and Ottoman Turks
were all held to have had not the slightest effect on the stability and strength
of the Egyptian national personality. Instead, that personality had stamped
its characteristics upon them, Egyptianized them, and made them subject to
Egyptian historical patterns.16
However, in the late 1930s, many Egyptian historians and intellectuals

shifted their support from territorial nationalism to supra-Egyptian nation-
alism, comprising three different ideological features: Islamic Egyptian
nationalism, integral Egyptian nationalism, and Egyptian Arab national-
ism. ‘Abd Allah Afı̄fı̄, Muḥammad Sulaymān, Muṣṭafā al-Rifā‘ı̄ al-Lubbān,
Muḥibb al-Dı̄n al-Khaṭı̄b, ‘Abd al-Ḥamı̄d Sa‘ı̄d, Ismā‘ı̄l Shalabı̄ Sha‘afan,
and Ḥasan al-Bannā embraced Islamic Egyptian nationalism,17 with a fun-
damental emphasis on the unity of Muslim history.
On the other hand, integralist Egyptian nationalists, such as Aḥmad
Ḥ usayn,18 Fatḥı ̄ Raḍwān, Ibrāhı̄m Jum‘a,19 Ḥ usayn Mu’nis, Maḥmūd
Kāmil,20 Fikrı̄ Abāẓa, Maḥmūd al-Manjūrı̄,21 and Sulaymān Ḥ uzayyı̄n,
narrated history from a different perspective. In contrast to the Egyptian
nationalists of the 1920s, who viewed Arabs as foreign conquerors, inte-
gralists noted the symbiosis between Arabs (Muslims) and Egyptians.22
According to the integralist narrative, Egypt’s primacy in the Muslim world
was unquestioned under the string of independent dynasties that ruled
Egypt from the Ṭ ūlūnids to the Mamluks. Under these dynasties, Egypt
became a leader of Islam and defended Islam from the Crusaders and
Mongols. Indeed, on the whole, integral Egyptian nationalists regarded
the Mamluk Sultanate positively.
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, many integral nationalists made the
ideological shift to Egyptian Arab nationalism, which resulted from the
extensive contact with neighboring Arab countries.23 Likewise, Islamic
nationalism, integral nationalism, and Arab Egyptian nationalism dis-

missed the exclusivist territorial nationalist ideology and, instead, tended
toward the Arabism of Egypt as a part of Egypt’s Muslim identity.24 In the
Arab nationalist narrative, postulating that all Arab regions share a com-
mon historical destiny, the division of Arab history into Egyptian, Iraqi,
Syrian, and others derived from the recent, arbitrary fragmentation of the
Arab nations caused by imperialism.25
In the territorialist narrative the environment of the Nile Valley and
from which the independent Egyptian personality originated are said to
have completely assimilated Islam and Arab culture.26 The Islamic-Arab
narrative, by contrast, considers Islam and Arab cultures the reshapers of
Egypt in an Islamic-Arab image. Thus, Egypt’s Islamic-Arab characteris-
tics and the Islamic religious spirit of its people were the country’s corner-
stone in defeating its external foes and in making Egypt the political and
cultural center of Muslim civilization.27
Bearing the context of Egyptian nationalism in mind, we also should
take into account an interest of a given regime in historical writing as
another context of the school textbooks, because these are produced
under the strict supervision of the Ministry of Education and the regime.
It is true that most regimes tend to make tremendous efforts in reforming
the educational system and in rewriting school textbooks in accordance
with the regime’s new platform. Why then is the regime particularly inter-
ested in school textbooks? What kind of positive role did they possibly play
for the regime?
According to Howard Mehlinger, textbooks are the modern version
of village storytellers, since they “are responsible for conveying to youth
what adults believe they should know about their own cultures as well as
those of other societies.” In his opinion, none of the socialization instru-
ments can be compared to textbooks “in their capacity to convey a uni-
form, approved, even official version of what youths should believe.”28 In
addition, textbooks carry the authority of print. Written texts, according
to David Olson, “are devices which separate speech from speaker, and that
separation in itself makes the words impersonal, objective and above criti-
cism.” In his opinion, textbooks resemble religious rituals since both “are
devices for putting ideas and beliefs above criticism.”29
All of this taken together, it can safely be concluded that textbooks
may serve as an efficient ideological apparatus for regimes in power to
promote a certain belief system and legitimize an established political and
social order. Of many subjects, most regimes manipulate history as one
24 I.K. SUNG
of the main mediums to diffuse nationalistic ideologies into not only stu-
dents but also parents and even teachers. Arab intellectual Hisham Sharabi
describes the unique function of history in the Arab mentality as follows:
The past … lives in us and among us, it permeates our behavior in private
and in public, in our interpersonal relationships, in customs of marriage and
divorce, in rituals of birth and death, in all that immense heritage of tradi-
tions accumulated for thousands of years. A reinterpretation of this past is
in order for this will better enable us to elucidate the present and to look at
the future.30
Considering this unique function of history, it is logical for a regime to

manipulate history in order to validate the values and norms of its reborn
nation, crystallizing its rediscovered personality and enhancing its self-
image and self-representation.31
What the Egyptian monarchy sought most from history writing was to
glorify Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ and his descendants, such as Ibrāhı̄m and Ismā‘ı̄l.
King Fuād’s history-writing project reflected this trend well. He initiated
an extensive historiographical project in 1920, which is referred to as the
‘Ā bdı̄n Project, in order to rewrite Egyptian history from the point of view
of Egyptian monarchy.32 Hence, monarchist historians mainly focused on
reforms and developments in administration, the army, public works, and
education during the period of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ and his descendants.
In sum, this chapter examines the ways in which the Mamluks and the
Mamluk era are represented in two historiographic trends: Egyptian
nationalist and monarchist historiography. As we shall see, the first had a
more prominent impact on the representations of the Mamluks than the
second. It is to these interesting and multifold representations of the past,
particularly that of the Mamluks, which we now turn.
TEXTBOOKS OF THE 1920S
Mamluk Sultanate Periods

The issue of Mamluk identity may be one of the most important barom-
eters for unpacking the Mamluk representation. Although some 1920s
textbooks define the Mamluks as Turks33 or non-Arabs,34 one textbook,
influenced by Egyptian nationalism, transforms Sultan Baybars into the
King of Egypt.35
Similarly, some authors of textbooks reinterpret the war between

the Mamluks and Ottomans, representing it as one between Egypt and
the Ottomans: “The Ottomans killed Sultan al-Ghawrı̄ during the war
between the Ottoman Turks and the Egyptians, and, as a result, Egypt
was annexed to the Ottoman Empire.”36 One textbook even identified the
Mamluk dynasty with Egypt: “Egypt ceased to be one of the great inde-
pendent dynasties following the collapse of the Mamluk rule in 1517.”37
Among many other Mamluk leaders, Sultan Baybars appears in many
ways as the predominant and most positive symbol of the Mamluks. He is
described as the most famous and successful Baḥrı̄ Mamluk Sultan, with
outstanding military achievements, such as the reorganization of the army,
fleet-building, and stopping the Mongol invasion of Egypt, in 1260, at
‘Ayn Jālūt.38 An even greater accomplishment is that he succeeded in
bringing ‘Abbāsid Caliph Mustanṣir to Cairo.39 Nevertheless, Baybars was
not represented as a perfect hero. In order to overcome the Mongols, he
appears to have had a diplomatic arrangement with the Crusaders.40
In addition to Baybars, there are other positive references to the
Mamluks. First and foremost, the Mamluk era is praised as the zenith
of political, cultural, architectural, and religious development. Politically,
the King of the Baḥrı̄ Mamluks achieved geographical expansion and
gained rule over the Euphrates Peninsula as well as Hijaz, Cyrenaica, and
Dongola.41 Through this territorial expansion, Cairo became the center of
a prosperous and glorious Islamic culture, gathering riches from the East
and the West. The Mamluks even appeared to compete among themselves
in the building of mosques, Khans, schools, roads, residences, caravansa-
ries, hostels (fundaqs), and pools.42 In particular, this textbook empha-
sizes that “Kings of Islam, Mamluks, Ayyūbids, and Ottomans repaired
the Harm al-Sharif by renovation and restoration.”43 Progress was also
evident in the fields of art, science, and trade.44
Regarding the origin of the Mamluks, 1920s textbooks adopted a the-
ory that is now widely accepted among scholars. The majority of textbooks
note that the Mamluks stemmed from the ‘Abbāsid period: “The Caliphs
of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty used the services of many Mamluks as soldiers
and guards to protect themselves against Arab tribes such as the Umayyad
and the ‘Alawis.”45 Another textbook mentions that “the ‘Abbāsid Caliphs
commenced to use many Mamluks to protect themselves against the Arabs
and their power increased.”46
Some textbooks ascribe the Caliph’s dethronement by the Mamluks to
the latter’s increasing numbers: “It was a mistake to invite a great numbers
26 I.K. SUNG
of Mamluks as they denied the succession of throne by the caliphs’ son,

as was the case with the sons of Mu‘taṣim.”47 Another claims that “The
increasing number of Turkish Mamluks controlled almost everything in
the country, even matters pertaining to the palace and to the weakened
Kurdish and Arab populations.”48
The Ottoman Periods

Before embarking on a discussion of the Ottoman periods, we should
keep in mind that according to the Egyptian school books discussed in
this chapter, the Mamluks succeeded in surviving and even ruling the local
provinces of the Ottoman Empire following the downfall of the Mamluk
dynasty in 1517.49
Depicted as an early hero of Egyptian nationalism, ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r
is presented as the most important historical figure during the Ottoman
periods. One history book asserts that ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r even achieved
Egypt’s independence from the Ottomans and refused to pay the Sublime
Port Kharaj (land tax).50According to a different textbook, ‘Alı̄ Bey
al-Kabı̄r’s rule can even be considered the Mamluks’ most glorious medi-
eval regime.51 This textbook provides a detailed account of ‘Alı̄ Bey’s mili-
tary campaign, adding that ‘Alı̄ Bey attempted to strengthen Egypt by
dispatching armies into Arab cities and conquering Jeddah in order to
gain access to the Indian trade route and protect navigation of the Red
Sea. This led to the submission of the entire Arabian Peninsula.52 For these
reasons, it was not easy for the Ottomans to remove him from the throne.
They could only, with great difficulty, regain control over Egypt through a
plot against ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r and with the help of another Mamluk leader,
Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab.53
In contrast to the Mamluk Sultanate era, Mamluk leaders, except for
‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r, are portrayed as outdated and treacherous. The negative
representations of Murād and Ibrāhı̄m Bey are particularly remarkable.
Murād and Ibrāhı̄m Bey fought against the French army and were met
with heavy canon fire.54 Inevitably, they fled from the French army,55 steal-
ing money (amwāl) and, more significantly, trade profits.56 Therefore, the
French presence in Egypt is attributed to the Mamluks: “France could stay
in Egypt due to the mistake made by the Mamluks.”57
One history book suggests two convincing explanations for the Mamluk
defeat. First, the Mamluks made strategic mistakes,58 ignoring battle tac-
tics, and, second, they were deluded by their own courage and previous
victories.59
The manner in which Muḥammad Alı̄’s massacre of the Mamluks in

1811 is depicted is of the greatest importance in our discussion. Through
this episode we may not only examine the representation of the relation-
ship between Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ and the Mamluks, but also learn about the
attitudes of monarchist historians toward the Mamluks. In light of the
influence of monarchist historiography, one would expect validations of
the massacre and these rationalizations to have been examined in detail.
One history school book justified the massacre by hinting that Muḥammad
‘Alı̄ feared the Mamluks would attack Egypt.60 Obviously, this justification
of the Mamluk massacre should be understood in light of the Egyptian
Ministry of Education’s wish to glorify Muḥammad ‘Alı̄’s reign.
In sum, two points should be raised for our discussion. First, under the
influence of territorial Egyptian nationalism, the 1920s school books rep-
resented the Mamluk and Mamluk history from an Egyptianist viewpoint
by reshaping prominent Mamluk sultans (such as Baybars) as Egyptians
and by depicting ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r as a symbol of Egyptian nationalism.
Second, the 1920s textbooks reflected monarchist historical views to some
extent by justifying the Mamluk massacre by Muḥammad ‘Alı̄.
From a perspective of Egyptian nationalism, Jane Hathaway offers an
interesting idea in which nationalization of the Mamluks under Ottoman
rule is revealed in the factionalism of Faqaris and Qasimis in seventeenth-
century Egypt. Each individual faction can incorporate members from dis-
parate backgrounds by imbuing them with a sense of group cohesion; this
is particularly noticeable in a society in which two factions predominate,
since few things foster unity like hostility toward a common foe. In such
circumstances, the factions themselves had to serve as a source of cohesion
and community feeling.61
In this respect, the origin myths that contributed to factional cohesion
are invented traditions in the manner of Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence
Ranger’s classic edited volume. In most, if not all, of the cases in this
volume, the traditions in question served a nationalistic purpose: to
strengthen or even to create nationalist sentiment by fostering a sense
of group cohesion. In the case of our factions, no nationalist purpose is
served, although the tales are unquestionably used to foster group cohe-
sion. These invented traditions, in their turn, create collective memory of
the sort on which group cohesion depends.62 However, the school text-
books did not deal with the factionalism between Faqaris and Qasimis in
a serious manner.
28 I.K. SUNG

Among the three different tiers of supra-Egyptian nationalism discussed
above, the impact of integralist Egyptian nationalism on the representa-
tion of the Mamluks is remarkable in the 1930s textbooks, as can be seen
in the case Muḥammad Rif‘at. Rif‘at clearly reflects integralist Egyptian
nationalism by emphasizing the Arab assimilation into Egypt.
It was not long after their invasion of Egypt until the Arabs began to mix
with the local and village culture and married Egyptian women. After con-
verting to the faith and fortifying their dwellings, Arab soldiers forgot their
traditions, neglected their missions and began farming.63
Another significant indication that must be raised is that Rif‘at began to

relocate Egypt and the Egyptians in the context of the Arab sphere in
order to meet the expectations of those who shifted their ideology from
Egyptian territorial nationalism to Egyptian Arab nationalism. This new
and important trend is found only in post-1930s textbooks.
Despite this change, Rif‘at continues to represent the Mamluks
in Egyptianist terms. He seeks the Mamluk origins in Egypt from the
Fāt ̣imid Caliphate, rather than the ‘Abbāsid dynasty, claiming that the
Caliphate first used Mamluks in Egypt as it aspired to emulate ‘Abbāsid
in Baghdad.64
Compared to the 1920s textbooks, no significant change is made in
the identity and positive representations of the Mamluk Sultanate. Rif‘at
defines the Mamluks as the majority of white slaves, who were prisoners of
war or were purchased on the slave market.65 Above all, the Baḥrı̄ Mamluk
era was represented positively as one of Egypt’s most powerful regimes,
having the largest numbers of followers and lasting for 130 years.66 The
Qalāwūn family, on the other hand, endured for approximately 100 years.
Moreover, the Crusaders’ defeat is attributed to the power of the Mamluks,
who, invigorated with this success, took the throne from the Ayyūbids.67
In contrast to the Baḥrı̄ Mamluks, the Circassian Mamluks are described
in far more negative terms, marking their inability to instate an indepen-
dent regime due to Circassian Sultans’ fierce and endless struggle for
power.68
Rif‘at’s textbook, in particular, offers detailed information about the

Mamluk slave system and society. According to this book, young Mamluks
obtained political education and military training, and the lordship was
granted to the one who showed the greatest political power and demon-
strated excellent administrative skills.69
Interestingly, Rif‘at offers a convincing explanation for the power
struggle among the Mamluk leaders, arguing that it was derived from the
Mamluk slave system. Rif‘at argues that “every Mamluk general (leader)
owned bodyguards and officers who were in charge of the palace. In turn,
many Mamluk generals split into various factions which fought each other
for power.”70
Like Rif‘at, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥım ̄ Muṣt ̣afā holds a positive view
of the Mamluk Sultanate periods and compares them with the Ottoman
periods: “In many ways the independent Mamluk Sultanate periods
were more stable than the Ottoman periods and were marked by trade,
agriculture, architecture and the progression of science, knowledge and
production.”71
Of the many historical figures, the last Ayyūbid Sultan, Tūrānshāh,
Sultana Shajarat al-Durr, Sultan Quṭuz, and Baybars stood out as heroes.
Shajarat al-Durr is depicted in positive terms in that she persisted in
the defense against the Crusaders after the king of Ṣāliḥ al-Ayyūb had
passed away.72 Similarly, Tūrānshāh led the battle against the Crusaders at
Fāriskūr, with the help of the Muslims. However, after the victory against
the Crusaders, the Mamluks killed Tūrānshāh.73
Rif‘at’s textbook sketches Tūrānshāh’s victory as follows: “The Muslims
followed and caught them (the Crusaders) at Fāriskūr, 30,000 were killed
and King Louis IX was imprisoned.”74 The story of Tūrānshāh’s battle
against King Louis IX at Damietta should be noted since the Egyptians
appeared to have played a part in the war.75 The emphasis on the Egyptian
role in the war indicates a shift from a monarchist position that empha-
sized a certain person or hero to an Egyptian nationalist attitude which
viewed the collective Egyptian nation as the main engine of historical
development.
In contrast to the 1920s textbooks that referred to Baybars, Quṭuz is
presented as the hero who halted the Mongol invasion at ‘Ayn Jālūt in
1260. Baybars, on the other hand, is continuously praised as the Sultan
who brought the Caliphate back to Cairo,76 revived the Ṣalāḥ al-Dı̄n era
in West Asia,77 killed Quṭuz, and founded the Baḥrı̄ Mamluk dynasty.78
Baybars is also portrayed as a reformer who reorganized the port, the
30 I.K. SUNG
fortress, the network system between Cairo and Syria, and the pigeon
network (communication).79
Much as in the 1920s textbooks, the Mamluks appeared to have con-
tributed greatly to Egypt’s excellence in the fields of art and architecture
by the construction of artifacts and numerous buildings: Sultan Ḥ asan and
Qāyṭbāy mosque, schools, and hospitals.80 Especially during the Mamluk
Sultanate, Egyptian Islamic art (rather than Arabic art) flourished, such as
with fountains, lamps, censers, pitchers, and gold-coated plates, by which
Egypt became a glorious Islamic art center.81
Rif‘at’s textbook notes that the Mamluks won great fortunes from three
trade routes between the East and West: the Suez route, from the Indian
Ocean and the Red Sea to Suez; Alexandria, from the Indian Ocean to the
Persian Gulf and the Euphrates; and the land route to Constantinople—
between East and West Asia.82 Moreover, the Mamluks appeared to have
used this wealth to ease the living conditions of the poor.83
The Ottoman Periods

As was the case in the period of the Mamluk Sultanate, integral Egyptian
nationalism had a crucial impact on the representation of the Mamluks in
the Ottoman periods. For instance, in his history book, Muḥammad ‘Abd
al-Raḥım̄ Muṣt ̣afā offers one unusual explanation for the Mamluk survival
following the downfall of the Mamluk dynasty by the Ottomans in 1517.
Muṣt ̣afā provides a new insight into the Mamluk survival, by arguing that
this was possible only after the Ottomans integrated into the Egyptian
nation, in line with the theory of integral Egyptian nationalism.
In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire weakened and Ottoman

soldiers lost their courage and even integrated into the Egyptian nation. As
a result, the Ottomans were forced to seek help from the Mamluks and a
growing influence of the Mamluks made them Shaykh al–Balad.84
No significant change can be traced in the positive representation of ‘Alı̄

Bey al-Kabı̄r and Muḥammad ‘Alı̄. ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r remains a symbol of
Egyptian nationalism and independence. He became Shaykh al-Balad in
1763 and declared Egypt’s independence from the Ottomans in 1766.85
Having allied with Shaykh Ẓāhir, ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r was involved in the
war with Russia, spoke khuṭba in his name, and conquered Yemen, Jidda,
Mecca, and the Arabian Peninsula.86 With the help of successful military
campaigns, he gained the title of “Egyptian Sultan and ruler of the two
seas.”87 Around 1769, he embarked on another military battle over Syria
with Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, but due to the latter’s plot with the
Turks (Ottomans), the campaign failed.88
Similarly, Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ is also represented as a nationalist leader,
in his consent to cooperate with al-Bardı̄sı̄ and in opposing not only the
Turks (Ottomans), but also the Mamluk leader Muḥammad al-Alfı̄, who
cooperated with the British army.89
The episode of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄’s expulsion of ‘Umar Makram from
Cairo in 1809 is one of the most important points in Muṣt ̣afā’s book.90
At first glance, it is likely to indicate a negative view, blaming Muḥammad
‘Alı̄ for ‘Umar Makram’s exile. However, the episode ends with a justifica-
tion of Muḥammad ‘Ali’s measures, accusing numerous Egyptian nation-
alist leaders of constant conflict. In other words, Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ had no
choice but to exile ‘Umar Makram in order to prevent internal strife.91
Correspondingly, the massacre of the Mamluks by Muḥammad ‘Alı̄, in
1811, is also legitimized.
The story begins with the Mamluk refusal to help Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ build
a castle in Giza. Furthermore, the Mamluks refused to assist Muḥammad
‘Alı̄ each time the latter requested it. It is told as follows: “Muḥammad ‘Alı̄
must have felt the Mamluks’ betrayal and faithlessness and had no choice
but to exile them.”92 Such a justification of the massacre perpetrated by
Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ may lead to the conclusion that 1930s textbooks reflect
not only Egyptian nationalism but also a monarchist viewpoint.
After the French invasion of Egypt in 1798, the Mamluk image dete-
riorated rapidly. The Mamluk leader Murād escaped and went into hiding
in Upper Egypt, as did Ibrāhı̄m Bey in Sharqiyya (northeastern Egyptian
city).93 In October 1798, the Egyptians stood up against the British,
Turkish, and Mamluk oppression.94 The Mamluks even attempted to
regain the power they had held prior to the French expedition.95

As mentioned above in the introduction, the new zeitgeist of Egyptian
Arab nationalism predominated in Egypt’s intellectual discourse in the
1940s. It would be more accurate to assert that what occurred was a
transformation from integralist Egyptian nationalism to Egyptian Arab
32 I.K. SUNG
nationalism. Reflecting this trend, school textbooks of the 1940s express

both forms of nationalism. It should be noted that the integralist Egyptian
nationalism of the 1940s bears new features. The Egyptian influence on
the foreign regime dates back to ancient times and was not limited to the
Middle Ages:
Since ancient times Egyptian society had the power to influence foreign
regimes in Egypt. Egypt succeeded in ‘Egyptianizing’ them through its lan-
guage, rituals, and security. This occurred quickly as the foreigners were
lacking a sense of nationality. Mamluks, Turks and others ruled over Egypt
and became assimilated into the Egyptian people, remaining in the country
as parts of it rather than foreign elements.96
In the meantime, Egyptian Arab nationalism gives rise to an important

shift in the relations between Arabs and Egypt, as reflected in the school
books. Emphasizing Egypt’s crucial contribution to Arab society, a new
and positive relationship is formulated between the Arabs and Egypt:
Arabs and Turks may have destroyed Egypt as conquerors, but they did
mix with its inhabitants and with Copts and formed one group (jamı̄‘) of
Egyptian Umma.97Egypt’s Islamic tradition influenced Arab society and also
had a remarkable effect on the Arab arts and social literature.98
Even after the emergence of Egyptian Arab nationalism, the Egypt-centered

viewpoint was still the primary framework for the representation of the
Mamluks. Rif‘at refers to the Fātị mid Caliphate as that which first used the
Mamluks in Egypt to emulate ‘Abbāsid in Baghdad.99 Similarly, some 1940s
textbooks viewed Egyptians rather than Mamluk leaders as masters of his-
torical development: “When, in 1249, the Egyptians received the ominous
news of the French march towards Egypt and the conquest of Damietta,
they retreated to al-Manṣur̄ a and fortified their positions there.”100
This change also reshapes the interpretation of the battles. For exam-
ple, the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt is no longer simply a victory of the Mamluks
over the Mongols, but rather a victory of Egypt over the Mongols. Quṭuz,
rather than Baybars, defeated the Mongols in the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt in
1260 and saved Egypt from the disaster of Mongol rule.101 Even Sultan
Qalāwūn is depicted as an Egyptian Sultan,102 and the war between the
Turks (Ottomans) and the Mamluks at Marj Dābiq near Aleppo is reinter-
preted as a war between the Turks and the Egyptian army (not mentioning
the Mamluks).103
Interestingly enough, the Mamluks are also used as a symbol of

Egyptian independence: “The last Circassian Mamluk Sultan, Ṭ ūmānbāy,
was killed, and as a result Egypt lost its independence and became an
Ottoman province.”104
No significant change is found in the identity of the Mamluks. They
were perceived as white slaves who were prisoners of war or were pur-
chased on the slave market105 and were trained for horse worship, battle
skills, hunt, and the Quran.106
The Mamluks are generally described in positive terms, apart from the
Circassian Mamluks, who are accused of constantly fighting each other
for power.107 Rif‘at praises the Mamluks for being the most powerful
race that helped to defeat the Crusaders,108 and concludes that the Baḥrı̄
Mamluks stayed for 130 years upholding Egypt as the greatest power and
subduing its subjects.109 Baybars is particularly praised for shaping Egypt’s
supremacy.
Baybars re-established the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo in the name of

al-Mustanṣir. He was one of the greatest and most famous sultans and
turned Egypt into a distinguished center.110
Moreover, Baybars’ territorial expansion is also used to glorify Egypt’s

status in the region.
Baybars launched a military campaign in Nubia, where Christians still lived

and attacked the Nubians of Dongola. The Christians were subdued under
the first Muslim rule and were forced to pay Jiziya (poll tax). Egypt’s rule
spanned from the upper Euphrates and Anatolia to Sudan.111
As mentioned above, the Mamluks gained great fortunes from the trade
route between the East and West, building mosques (Sultan Ḥasan and
Qāyṭbāy mosque), schools, and hospitals, and even using the wealth to
assist the poor.112
According to Rif‘at, the Mamluks made great contributions to the arts.
The Mamluk period is described as the golden age of Egyptian Islamic art
(for its fountains, lamps, censers, pitchers, and gold-coated plates).113
The Ottoman Periods

The 1940s textbooks continued to describe ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r as a symbol
of Egyptian nationalism. One small but crucial difference is the fact that
34 I.K. SUNG
the historical context is shifted from Egypt to a wider Arab framework.

The implication of this change is that Egyptian Arab nationalism provided
the books’ authors with new insights into ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r.
‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire in

1768. He conquered Egypt and turned it into a part of the Arab world and
also attempted to conquer Syria. If the Turks had not plotted with one of
his followers, Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r may have
won the military campaign in Syria.114
The other textbooks present ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r in a positive light, depict-
ing him as an independent Egyptian ruler. One textbook notes that after
Egypt’s declaration of independence, ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r sent the wali des-
ignated by the Sublime Port back to Constantinople and refused to pay
tribute to him. He minted coins under his own name with the inscription
“Egyptian Sultan who revived the first Mamluk period.” He even suc-
ceeded in allying with Shaykh Ẓāhir al-‘Umar, ruler of Akko. One interest-
ing and crucial feature found in this textbook is that it not only represents
‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r as the most prominent of men, but also depicts him as
the precursor of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄.115 The comparison between the two
clearly serves to glorify Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ by measuring him up to ‘Alı̄ Bey
al-Kabı̄r. In addition, the 1811 Mamluk expulsion of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ is
presented as an inevitable measure for Egypt’s defense: “In order to reform
Egypt, Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ had no choice but to slay the Mamluks, who were
only responsible for Egypt’s ruin, famine, war and destruction.”116
Returning to our discussion, except for ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r the rest of the
Mamluks are characterized as failed local rulers and as oppressors. Thus,
their negative image prevails in most of the textbooks of the 1940s. Rif‘at’s
book offers several explanations for the Mamluk defeat by Napoleon’s
army: chiefly, the Mamluks were neither well-trained nor well-organized,
and could therefore not compete with the French army.117
The textbook points a finger at the Mamluk oppression as one of
the main reasons for the 1798 revolt. For example, the people were
oppressed by the internal plots among the Mamluk leaders and by the
punishments inflicted on those who refused to partake in their religious
rituals. Moreover, during the war with the French, the Mamluks are said
to have hidden fortunes in the relics of Embabeh and transferred them
to Syria.118
This negative description of the Mamluks is even found following the

French withdrawal, when they attempted to restore their power. Rifa‘t’s
textbook indicates that it was something other than factionalism within the
Mamluks that weakened their power. The book implies that Muḥammad
Bey al-Alfı̄ sided with the English while the rest of the Mamluks sided with
the French.119
CONCLUSION
The authors of school textbooks narrated the past in accordance with their
own ideological and political beliefs. From the perspective of Egyptian
nationalism, the 1920s textbooks reflected only territorial Egyptian
nationalism. However, the cases of the 1930s and 1940s textbooks are
quite different. These periods mark a tendency toward both territorial
nationalism and Egyptian Arab nationalism. For instance, unlike the 1920s
textbooks, the 1930s and 1940s textbooks locate Egypt and the Egyptians
in an Arab sphere and stress the positive relations between Egyptians and
Arabs. It can be concluded that, with the change in Egyptian national-
ism, the representations of the Mamluks in the school textbooks gradually
shifted from Egyptian territorial nationalism to Egyptian Arab national-
ism. One interesting and crucial phenomenon that should be mentioned
in this context is that the essence of Egyptian nationalism, the Egypt-
centered view, prevails in the representations of the Mamluks in the school
books throughout the discussed period.
As seen above, Egyptian nationalism is the most significant factor in
the representations of the Mamluks, but it is not the only one. Egyptian
monarchist historiography also represents the Mamluks from its own per-
spective. It is obvious that the aim of the monarchists was to glorify their
forefathers in order to maintain a sense of legitimacy. Thus, most text-
books portray Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ as a nationalist leader, attempting to justify
the Mamluk massacre by presenting the Mamluks as an obstacle to Egypt’s
progress.
Another important aspect of the Mamluk representations in the text-
books is that a sharp distinction is drawn between the Mamluk Sultanate
periods and the Mamluks under Ottoman rule. The Baḥrı̄ Mamluk
Sultanate periods, including the Baḥrı̄ Sultans, are represented as the
zenith of political power, wealth, construction, and Islamic art. In con-
trast, the Circassian Mamluk periods are described as dark eras of inter-
nal power struggles. Particularly the Mamluks under Ottoman rule are
36 I.K. SUNG
depicted as oppressors and dictators. The only positive exception is ‘Alı̄

Bey al-Kabı̄r, who is portrayed as a symbol of early Egyptian nationalism
and independence. In conclusion, the textbook authors made selective use
of Mamluk history, exploiting it to support their own ideological beliefs,
such as Egyptian nationalism or pro-monarchist ideologies.
Critical history starts with dissatisfaction with conventional memory
and a mission to correct its deficiencies. However, there is more than
one kind of discomfort with the current way of remembering. The criti-
cal scholar may be dissatisfied with what is remembered in history since
he thinks that it is inaccurate, insufficient, and/or misleading. Moreover,
there are others who would rewrite history not actually as it was, or as
they have been taught that it was, but as they would prefer it to have been.
As far as historians of this school are concerned, the goal of changing the
past is not to search for authentic or genuine truth, but to create a new
vision, better suited to their needs to resolve urgent problems in the pres-
ent and their aspirations for the future. Their aim is to rectify, to rephrase,
to replace, or even recreate the past in a more satisfying manner. Here we
may recall one of the main purposes of remembering the past, for commu-
nities as for individuals. It is to explain and perhaps to justify the present—
a present, some present, on which there may be a dispute. Where there are
conflicting loyalties or clashing interests, each will have its own version of
the past, its own narrative and presentation of the salient events.120
This is the case with the publishers and authors of Egyptian school text-
books. In sum, the school textbooks unfold a struggle between Egyptian
nationalist historiography and monarchist historiography. Even within
Egyptian nationalism, different types of nationalism, such as territorial
Egyptian nationalism and Egyptian Arab nationalism, emerge and com-
pete with each other. It can be concluded that the Egyptian school books
are used as a battlefield in which different, even contrasting, ideologies
struggle for hegemony over Egyptian society.
NOTES
1. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, “An Inquiry into Arab Textbooks,” Asian and
African Studies vol. 8, 1972. p. 1.
2. Nachman Ben-Yehuda, The Masada Myth: Collective Memory and
Mythmaking in Israel (London: 1995), pp. 273–74. See also Yael
Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli
National Tradition (Chicago: 1995), p. 4; Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic

Origins of Nations (Oxford: 1987), p. 206.
3. Daniel Bar-Tal, “Delegitimization: The Extreme Case of Stereotyping and
Prejudice,” in idem et al. (eds.), Stereotyping and Prejudice: Changing
Conceptions (New York: 1989), p. 170.
4. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh (1972), “An Inquiry into Arab Textbooks,” p. 2.
5. In 1973/74, elementary, preparatory, and high school students num-
bered 4.5 million, taught by over one hundred thousand teachers. In
1970, 48.5 million copies of textbooks had been printed. Al-Jumhūriyya,
December 23, 1970; Al-Akhbar al-Yawm , September 29, 1973; Avner
Giladi, “Israel’s Image in Recent Egyptian Textbooks,” Jerusalem
Quarterly no. 7. (Spring, 1978), p. 88.
6. Avner Giladi (1978), “Israel’s Image in Recent,” p. 96.
7. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of
Knowledge (trans.), Louis Wirth, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
LTD, 1936), p. 3.
8. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Egypt, Islam, and The Arabs: The
Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–1930 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), p. 143.
9. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam, and The
Arabs, p. 144.
10. Muḥammad Ḥ usayn Haykal, “Ta’rı̄kh al-Ḥ araka al-Qawmiyya,” in
al-Siyāsa al-Usbū‘iyya 12 (Jan. 1929), pp. 3–4; Israel Gershoni, “Imaging
and Reimaging the Past,” in History and Memory 4/2, 1992, p. 17.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Aḥmad Ḥ usayn, “Miṣr Fir‘awniyya,” al-Muqaṭt ̣am: pt.1, 6 Sep. 1930,
p. 7; Israel Gershoni (1992), “Imaging and Reimaging the Past,” p. 15.
14. Israel Gershoni (1992), “Imaging and Reimaging the Past,” p. 15.
15. Muḥammad Ḥ usayn Hayakl, “Ta’rikh al-Ḥ araka al-Qawmiyya,” in al-
Siyāsa al-Usbū‘iyya 12 (Jan. 1929), pp.3–4.
16. See Ḥ asan Subḥı,̄ “Ḥ adı̄th al-Masa’,” al-Balāgh16 (Sept. 1933), pp. 1,3;
Ḥ asan ‘Arif, “ ‘Abqariyyat al-Bi’a al-Miṣriyya,” al-Balāgh 3 (Oct. 1933),
pp. 1–11; ‘Abd al-Ḥ alı̄m Salı̄m, “al-‘Unṣur al-Miṣrı̄,” al-‘Uṣūr (Feb.
1928), pp. 636–642; Aḥmad al-Nahrı̄ and Aḥmad Baylı̄, Al-Mūjaz fı̄ al-
Tarbiya al-Wat ̣aniyya (Miṣr 1926), pp. 281–286. Quoted from Israel
Gershoni (1986), op. cit., p. 148.
17. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation,
1930–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 79–84.
For typical Islamic nationalism see, Ḥ asan al-Bannā, “Bayna al-Ams wa
38 I.K. SUNG
al-Yawm” in al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (1939) and “Da‘watuna” in al-

Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (1935). Periodicals examining Egyptian Islamic
nationalism: Al-Manār, edited by Muḥammad Rashı̄d Riḍā, and the
weekly al-Fatḥ (1926-) of Muḥibb al-Dı̄n al-Khaṭıb̄ and Majallat al-Hidāya
al-Islāmiyya (1928–), edited by Muḥammad Khaḍir Ḥ usayn, and the
Young Men’s Muslim Association periodical, Majallat al-Shubbān
al-Muslimı̄n (1929-) edited by Yāḥyā Aḥmad al-Dardirı̄. See Israel
Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1995), Redefining the Egyptian, p. 61.
18. See Ra’y Jam‘ iyyat miṣr al-Fatāh fı̄ Mu‘āhadat Sanat 1936 (Cairo, 1936).
19. See Al-Qawmiyya al-Miṣriyya al-Islāmiyya (Cairo, 1944).
20. See Miṣr al-Ghad (Cairo, 1952) and Al-ʿAmal li-Miṣr: Baʿ th Dawla wa
Iḥyā’ Majd (Cairo, 1945).
21. See Ittijāhāt al-ʿAṣr al-Jadı̄d fı̄ Miṣr (Cairo, 1937).
22. Israel Gershoni (1995), Redefining the Egyptian, p. 103.
23. Dominant among Arab nationalists: ‘Abd al-Raḥman Azzām, Ibrāhı̄m
‘Abd al-Qādir al-Māzinı̄, Maḥmūd Azmı̄, Aḥmad Ḥ usayn, and Muḥammad
Lut ̣fı̄ Jumʿa.
24. Israel Gershoni (1995), Redefining the Egyptian, p. 117.
25. Ibid., p. 120.
26. Israel Gershoni (1992), “Imaging and Reimaging the Past,” p. 26.
27. Ibid.
28. Howard . D. Mehlinger, “International Textbook Revision: Examples
from the United States,” Internationale Schulbuchforschung, No. 7,
(1985), p. 287.
29. David .R. Olson, “On the Language and Authority of Textbooks,” in
S. De Castell, A. Luke, and C. Luke (eds.), Language, Authority and
Criticism: Readings on the School Textbook (London: 1989), p. 241.
30. Hisham Sharabi, Muqaddima li-Dirāsāt al-Mujtama‘ al-‘Arabı̄ (Akko:
Dār-al-Aswar, 1987), pp. 13–29. Quoted from Emmanuel Sivan, “Arab
Revisionist Historians” in Asian & African Studies Vol.12. November
1978. No.3, p. 284.
31. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: 1986),
pp. 174–200.
32. King Fuʾād initiated an extensive historiographical project at his ʿĀ bdı̄n
Palace in 1920. The project lasted more than twenty-five years and
involved a host of foreign archivists, philologists, and historians such as
Eugenio Griffini, Jean Deny, Angelo Sammarco, and Pierre Crabitès.
Thereby, the monarchist project was introduced to Egyptian historiogra-
phy, and the first “public archive” was established in Egypt. Yoav Di-Capua
(2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab., p. 12. For further reference, see Chap. 5.
33. Salı̄m Ḥ asan Afendı̄ et al., Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr waal-Duwal al-‘Arabiyya
al- Juz’ al-Thānı̄ Sixth version (Cairo, 1923, 1925), p. 69.
34. ‘Umar Al-Iskandarı̄, Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr min Fatḥ al-ʿUthmānı̄ (Maṭbaʿat Maʿarif
bi-Shāriʿa Fajāla bi-Miṣr, 1921, 1925), p. 236. “Quṭuz halted Mongols
with help of Arab tribes in Egypt.”
35. Aḥmad Al-Iskandarı̄, Nuzhat al-Qāri’ lil Madāris al-Thānawiyya al-Juz’
al-Thānı̄ (Maṭba‘at al-Salafiyya bi-Miṣr, 1923), p. 100.
36. Aḥmad Al-Nahrı̄ and Aḥmad Baylı̄, Al-Mūjaz fı̄ al-Tarbiya al-Wat ̣aniyya
(Miṣr, 1926), p.284.
37. Salı̄m Ḥ asan Afendı̄ et al., Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr (Cairo, 1923, 1925),
p. 80.
38. ‘Umar Al-Iskandarı̄ (1921, 1925) Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr, p. 236.One textbook
mentioned it was Qut ̣uz who halted Mongols at ‘Ayn Jālūt. See Salı̄m
Ḥ asan Afendı̄ et al (1923, 1925). See also Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr, p. 72.
39. Ibid., p. 237.
40. Ibid.
41. Aḥmad Al-Iskandarı̄, Nuzhat al -Qāri’ lil Madāris al-Thānawiyya al-Juz’
al-Awwal (Maṭbaʿat Maʿarif bi-Shāriʿa Fajāla bi-Miṣr, 1921), p.199. Egypt
conquered Sudan and Syria of Arab lands. See Aḥmad Al-Nahrı̄ and
Aḥmad Baylı̄ (1926), Al-Mūjaz, p. 283.
42. Aḥmad Al-Iskandarı̄ (1921), Nuzhat al-Qāri’, p.199; Aḥmad Al-Iskandarı̄
(1923), Nuzhat al-Qāri’,pp. 101, 104. Salı̄m Ḥ asan Afendı̄ et al. (1923,
1925), Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr, pp. 74–75.
43. Ibid., p. 245.
44. Aḥmad Al-Nahrı̄ and Aḥmad Baylı̄ (1926), Al-Mūjaz, p. 283.
45. ‘Umar Al-Eskandarı̄, Ta’rı̄kh Miṣrı̄lā Fatḥ al-ʿUthmānı̄ (Maṭbaʿat Maʿarif
bi-Shāriʿa Fajāla bi-Miṣr, 1921, 1925), p. 230.
46. Salı̄m Ḥ asan Afendı̄ et al. (1923, 1925), Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr, p. 71.
47. Ibid., p. 69.
48. ‘Umar Al-Iskandarı̄ (1921, 1925), Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr ilā, p. 235.
50. Ibid.
51. ‘Umar Al-Iskandarı̄, Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr min Fatḥ al-ʿUthmānı̄ Seventh version
(Mat ̣baʿat Maʿarif bi-Shāriʿa Fajāla bi-Miṣr, 1921, 1931), p. 89.
52. Ibid.
53. Salı̄m Ḥ asan Afendı̄ et al. (1923, 1925), Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr, p. 83. See
also ʿUmar Al-Iskandarı̄ (1921, 1931), Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr min Fath, p. 90
54. Ibid., p. 87.
55. Ibid., See also, ʿUmar Al-Iskandarı̄ (1921, 1931), Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr min Fath,
p. 91.
56. ‘Umar Al-Iskandarı̄ (1921, 1931), Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr min Fatḥ, p. 91.
58. ‘Umar Al-Iskandarı̄ (1921, 1931), Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr min Fatḥ, p. 102.
59. Ibid., p. 104.
40 I.K. SUNG
60. Salı̄m Ḥ asan Afendı̄ et al. (1923, 1925), Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr, pp. 97–98.
61. Jane Hathaway, A Tale of Two Factions (Albany: State University of
New York, 1993), p. 13.
62. Ibid., p. 14.
63. Muḥammad Rifʿat and Muḥammad Aḥmad Ḥ asūna, Ma‘ālim Ta’rı̄kh al-
‘Uṣūr al-Wusṭā (Dār al-Maʿarif bi-Miṣr, 1938), p. 87.
64. Ibid., p. 159
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 165.
67. Ibid., p. 158. See also Muḥammad Rifʿat and Muḥammad Aḥmad Ḥ asūna.
Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr al-Wusṭā (Dār al-Maʿarif bi-Miṣr, 1931), p. 179.
68. Muḥammad Rif‘at (1938), Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh, p.165.
69. Ibid., p.159.
70. Ibid., p.165.
71. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥım ̄ Muṣt ̣afā, Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Ḥ adı̄th lil
Sana al-Rābiʿal-Ibtidā’ı̄ (Cairo, 1937), p. 1.
72. Muḥammad Rif‘at (1931), Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr, p. 178; Muḥammad
Rifʿat (1938), Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr, p. 157.
73. Ibid., p.179; Muḥammad Rifʿat (1938), Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr ,
p. 158.
74. Muḥammad Rif‘at (1938), Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr, p. 158.
75. Muḥammad Rif‘at (1931), Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr, p. 178; Muḥammad
Rifʿat (1938), Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr, p.157.
79. Ibid., p. 160.
80. Ibid., p. 168.
81. Ibid., p. 166.
82. Ibid., p. 167.
83. Ibid., p. 168.
84. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥım ̄ Muṣt ̣afā (1937), Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr, p. 5.
85. Ibid., p. 6.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., p. 28.
90. Ibid., p. 33.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., p. 32.
93. Ibid., p. 12.
94. Ibid., p. 16.
95. Ibid., p. 26.

96. Muḥammad Rifʿat and ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Bashrı̄, Al-Tarbiya al-Waṭaniyya
lil Madāris al-Thānawı̄ (Cairo, 1943), p. 15.
97. Ibid., p. 17.
98. Ibid., p. 15.
99. Muḥammad Rifʿat and Muḥammad Aḥmad Ḥ asūna, Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-
‘Usūr al-Wusṭā
(Dār al-Maʿarif bi-Miṣr, 1948), p. 156.
100. Ibid., p. 154.
101. Ibid., p. 157.
102. Ibid., p. 158.
103. Ibid., p. 172.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., p. 156.
106. Ibid.; Muḥammad Rifʿat, Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Siyāsı̄ fı̄ al-Azmina al -Ḥ adı̄tha:
Muqarrar lil Sana al-Rābiʿ al-Thānawiyya (Cairo: Wizārat al-Ma‘ārif
al-ʿUmūmiyya, 1949), p. 4.
107. Muḥammad Rifʿat (1949), Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Siyāsı̄, p. 3.
108. Muḥammad Rifʿat (1948), Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr, p. 155.
109. Ibid., p. 162.
110. Ibid., p. 158.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid., p. 165.
113. Ibid., p. 163.
114. Muḥammad Rifʿat (1943), Al- Tarbiya al-Wat ̣aniyya, p. 173; Muḥammad
Rifʿat (1949), Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Siyāsı̄, p. 7.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., pp. 25–26.
118. Ibid., p. 31.
120. Bernard Lewis, History Remembered, Recovered, Invented (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 55.
CHAPTER 3
Representations of the Mamluks in ‘Ā bdı̄n

Project Historians’ Literatures
MAMLUK SULTANATE ERA (1250–1517)

Before discussing in detail the representations of the Mamluks in historical
works of the ‘Ābdı̄n Project, it is essential to address the ‘Ābdı̄n Project
itself in order to critically view monarchic historiography within the rel-
evant historical context. In 1920, King Fu’ād initiated an extensive his-
toriographical project at his ‘Ābdı̄n Palace. This “Ābdı̄n Project” lasted
more than twenty-five years and involved a host of foreign archivists,
philologists, and historians such as Eugenio Griffini, Jean Deny, Angelo
Sammarco,1 and Pierre Crabitès.2 This introduced the monarchist project
to Egyptian historiography, and the first “public archive” was established
in Egypt.3
Historians Georges Douin4 and Édouard Driault, editor of the Revue des
Études Napoléoniennes, took charge of the French Archives. E.C. Fawtier-
Jones, the only woman to join the project, utilized the British Public
Record Office and cooperated closely with Douin.5 She was the daughter
of medieval historian Robert Fawtier, who taught at Fu’ād University until
1928 and most likely introduced her to his French colleagues in the ser-
vice of the king.6
In March 1928, Gabriel Hanotaux, a man of versatile talents, a former
French politician, diplomat, historian, and brilliant member of l’Académie
Française, accepted the invitation of King Fu’ād to visit to Egypt. To
Hanotaux, the king presented the great barrier hindering his ‘Ā bdı̄n
Project and highlighted the still existing gaps in Egyptian scholarship.

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6_3
44 I.K. SUNG
Hanotaux understood pretty well what Fu’ād planned to do, since he had
just finished nine years of work that primarily organized a similar historical
project: Histoire de la Nation Française, fifteen volumes of a dense repub-
lican and nationalistic history of France.7 Near the end of the meeting,
Fu’ād urged Hanotaux:
Compose the work as soon as you possibly can; do not lose even a minute.
There is indeed much to say about ancient Egypt under the Pharaohs, and
you know how attached I am to these studies. However, as for now, start
with the modern period!… The history of my grandfather Muḥammad ‘Alı̄
is hardly known; tell it, speak of the ingenious soldier Ibrāhı̄m, of the great
transformations accomplished under Sa‘ı̄d, and of my father Ismā‘ı̄l. Tie us
again to the living world…render us justice by telling the truth.8
Hanotaux and his colleagues met what Fu’ād expected from them and,
in 1930, the first volume was prepared for publication. At the same time,
Pierre Crabitès, Douin, Sammarco, and a host of other writers, all on
the King’s payroll, commenced to rewrite modern Egyptian history from
the angles of monarchy. A new recruit, British historian Henry Dodwell,
joined the ‘Ābdı̄n Project team.9
It goes without saying that the protagonists of monarchic history were
the rulers of the dynasty, especially Muḥammad ‘Alı̄, Ibrāhı̄m, and Ismā‘ı̄l.
The main subject was Egypt’s transition from a pre-modern local commu-
nity to a modern nation-state. Monarchic history inclined to focus mainly
on reforms and modern developments in the administration, army, public
works, and education. Europe was described as a benevolent entity, the
home of reason and order, which made efforts to tie Egypt to modern
civilization. Egypt, in turn having its own domestic mission civilisatrice,
was expected to export these goods made in Europe to black Africa. The
Ottoman Empire played the part of villain as antithesis of historic hero
Muḥammad ‘Alı̄. Ordinary Egyptians had no crucial role in this story.
Modern Egyptian history was to be shaped from “above” and from
“outside.”10
This historical documentation project mainly focused on the khedives,
then on the monarchy and modern Egyptian history covering the period
from 1798/1805 to 1879 (when Ismā‘ı̄l was deposed) and barely went
beyond this. The frame of this chronology fully dovetailed with the gen-
eral structure of the ‘Ā bdı̄n archive, which excluded the Ottomans and
ignored uncomfortable events such as peasant revolts, financial blunders,
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MAMLUKS IN ‘ĀBDĪN PROJECT HISTORIANS’... 45
the ‘Urābı̄ affair, and the subsequent British Occupation.11 In other words,
the task of the Ā bdı̄n Project historians was not only to commemorate the
past, but also to forget it, that is, to exercise “counter-memory.”
From a thematic point of view, the primary concern of the collection
was engagement diplomacy of Europe with the Ottoman Empire to serve
their national interests, which became known as the “Eastern Question.”
The monarchic project covered Egypt’s “Eastern Answer” to this ques-
tion and its growing political autonomy in particular. As expected, most
of the documents focused on magnificent events of diplomacy and war,
highlighting the prominent individuals who were believed to have engen-
dered these heroic deeds. The published titles of correspondence are typi-
cal examples: “Le Grand Vizir à Lord Hawkesbury,” “Le Major Général
Stuart au Grand Vizir,” and so on.12
One of the Ā bdı̄n Project historians, Gaston Louis Marie Joseph Wiet,
was born in Paris on December 18, 1887. His formal academic discipline
was practically completed by the age of 21. In October 1908, he had grad-
uated in Law (Licence en Driot) and acquired diplomas from the École
Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes at the same time. He majored
in both Classical Arabic and Colloquial Arabic, as well as in Persian and
Turkish. Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale du Caire offered him a
scholarship as “Pensionnaire” from 1909 to 1911.13
In 1926, a crucial change occurred in the life of Gaston Wiet: King
Fu’ād I of Egypt asked him to take over the directorship of the Museum
of Arab Islamic Art in Cairo, and he retained this significant position until
1951, combining his activities at the museum with his academic teaching
in Paris.14 During the Second World War, he was an energetic supporter of
General de Gaulle and served as Vice-President of the Committee of the
Free French Forces in Cairo.15
Wiet views the Mamluks in a comparatively balanced manner. Regarding
the origin of the Mamluks, Wiet accepted the prevailing theory by defin-
ing them as Turkish militia and referring to al-Mu‘taṣim as the first to
establish and use the Mamluks. Strangely, however, Mamluk Sultans are
not included in the Muslim world.16
Wiet’s favorable references to the Mamluks apply to their excellent
military ability and territorial expansion. In the same manner, Mamluk
Sultans are glorified as defenders of Islam17 or brave warriors halting
foreign attackers. Moreover, Wiet praises the Mamluks for contributing
splendid pages in Egyptian history and the founding of a vast empire.18
46 I.K. SUNG
Thus, in his view, one cannot deny a certain admiration for this people
who ran Egypt with unequalled authority.19
Wiet’s narrative concerning the Mamluks has an affinity with Egyptian
Islamic nationalism. For instance, he remarks that the Mamluk Sultans
ran the huge empire for the glory of Islam, and even Islam’s tradition
and prejudice against slaves did not prevent the Mamluks from envisaging
universal Muslim imperialism.20
Egyptian power was not confined to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
and the grand empire included other Oriental and European nations. The
Mamluks protected the Caliph from the Crusaders and the Mongols. They
found themselves at the head of Muslim civilization with real and certainly
justified prestige.21
Of the many other Mamluk Sultans,22 Baybars stands out for his victory
over the Mongols at ‘Ayn Jālūt,23 and he is recast as a genius ruler who
returned the ‘Abbasid Caliphate to Cairo.24 The most impressive homage
to Baybars is to identify him with Ṣalāḥ al-Dı̄n, who unified command in
the victorious warfare against the French Crusaders.25 Wiet also described
Sultan Ḥasan Ibn Nāṣir Muḥammad Ibn Qalāwūn as the creator of a great
Islamic empire:
Of many other Sultans he was distinguished for cleverness, glory and effi-
cient administrating.26 It was widely acknowledged to the Arab West from
Iran to Syria that the intelligence produced by Egypt, which organized resis-
tance against Crusaders and Mongols and Egypt’s political tradition saved
Islam and formed amazing unity of empire in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries.27
Despite these compliments to the Mamluk Sultans, Wiet does not

exclude criticism of the Mamluks and the Mamluk era. Above all, the era
of Mamluk rule is derided as a period of constant disorder and anarchy
due to intrigues and assassination conspiracies hatched by power-seeking
Mamluk leaders.28 The Mamluks are accused of having a burning urge to
destroy, with rage and intense passion.29 Reflecting such an atrocious situ-
ation in the last days of the Mamluk era, the Egyptian population seemed
inclined to favor the Ottomans, since they were no longer attached to the
Mamluks.30 Just as the Egyptians welcomed the Arab Muslims when they
became tired of the Greeks, they willingly accepted the Ottomans because
they could not continue to bear the Mamluks.31
We can take the word of a writer referring to the ease of the Arab conquest
of the seventh century. Syria resembles to a camel that is lying quietly. In
Syria as in Egypt, the burden of exactions and confiscation of all kinds had
eventually become intolerable and we see reappearance of turning point in
history similar to that which was inaugurated in the Muslim period. As they
had hosted the Arabs because they were tired of the Greeks, the Egyptians
saw the coming of the Ottomans without displeasure because they could no
longer bear the Mamluks.32
In sum, Wiet devoted a great deal of his book, nearly 240 pages, to cov-
ering the Mamluk Sultanate period, compared to the 117 pages of both
periods of Ayyūbids and Fāṭimids. From a thematic point of view, Wiet
stressed military success as well as the development of architecture, indus-
try, and agriculture in the Mamluk Sultanate era, which clearly indicates
Wiet’s favoring of the Mamluk Sultans.
MAMLUKS UNDER OTTOMAN RULE (1760–1811)

As a primary root of monarchist historiography, the Ā bdı̄n Project started
in 1920 as a modest library project that developed into an archival enter-
prise. Selected documents were published to serve as source material for
independent research in the framework of the emerging academe, among
others. Since the Ā bdı̄n Project was designed primarily to rewrite Egyptian
history from the perspective of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ and his descendants, it was
highly likely that the binary glorification of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ on the one
hand and delegitimization of the Mamluk Beys on the other would domi-
nate the era of Ottoman monarchist literature. Another important pre-
liminary point is that in this study most historical works, including Ā bdı̄n
Project works, dealing with the Ottoman era cover the years 1760–1820.
By and large, unfavorable remarks concerning the Mamluks converge
on two points: the internal struggle of the Mamluk Beys and the misman-
agement of political and economic affairs. For instance, François Charles-
Roux,33a member of the Ā bdı̄n Project, criticized the internal struggle
in the late eighteenth century between Muḥammad al-Alfı̄ and ‘Uthmān
Bardı̄sı̄,34 made stereotypical accusations concerning the Mamluks, and
declared that the Mamluks destroyed the economic system.35
Compared to French documentation, British diplomatic files offer
many and more diverse considerations of the Mamluks, including both
positive and negative features. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that
48 I.K. SUNG
these intriguing and mostly politically biased judgments on the Mamluks

are reached by analysis of the situation from a standpoint of British inter-
est. J.J. Morier, in his diplomatic protocol to the Under Secretary of State
for the Foreign Ministry, advised that the Mamluk Sultans should be elim-
inated in the interests of stability.
J.J. Morier to George Hammond (1763–1854) (Sous-Secrétaire d’Etat au

Ministère des Affaires étrangères de 1795 a 1806):
Having established this fact, it remains to be determined how Great
Britain is effectually to prevent the return of the French to Egypt, where
they probably would establish themselves upon so firm a basis as to preclude
the possibility of our ever driving them out again.36
Three alternatives may be chosen to secure the tranquility of Egypt should
we keep it for the Turks, the Mamluk party must be entirely destroyed.
For although our forces would in some degree keep a due subordination
amongst them, yet many disorders would arise from the existence of two
rival parties. The Mamluks are not only the natural enemies of the Turks, as
the usurpers of the power in Egypt.37
Similarly, in 1804 Britain’s Charge d’Affaires, A. Straton, carefully

assessed the chaotic situation and concluded that Egypt would not be able
recover its tranquility as long as the country remained divided between
the Mamluks and the Turks.38 Based on this assessment, he warned Lord
Hawkesbury in Pera that it was certainly possible that the Mamluks would
betray Britain:
It does not appear that this sanguinary measure was suggested to them by
any officer of the Porte; but that, distrusting the Mamluks, dissatisfied with
their situation in Egypt, conscious of having betrayed the interest of their
Sovereign…39
In the same year, in a diplomatic protocol to Lord Sian-Vincent, Captain

B. Hallowell warned of the danger of internal struggle among the Mamluk
Beys and advised him to expel Alfı̄ Bey in order to restore tranquility:
I was therefore led to enter a very minute examination of Selim Effendi by a

Mamluk who had been sent from Ibrāhı̄m Bey and ‘Uthmān Bey al-Bardı̄sı̄.
In the course of my conversation with him he assured me that Alfı̄ Bey was
a troublesome character, that he was disliked by all the Mamluks, and that
they explained his turbulent disposition to General Stuart, and requested he
would take him anywhere out of the country or tranquility would never be
restored in Egypt.40
In addition, Major E. Missett strongly doubted the Mamluks’ loyalty to

Britain, since he believed them to be scheming and treacherous:
Major Misset to Lord Hobart (Cairo 1803)

But flattering as such declarations are I am now in possession of intel-
ligence which leaves me no doubt of their insincerity and of the duplicity
and dissimulation of the Beys in all their negotiations with commanders of
the British Army, as well as with myself, and which converts into certitude
the suspicion I already entertained of their having applied to France for
protection, a suspicion which I had the honor or to communicate to Your
Lordship in my last dispatch.41
E. Missett to Lord Camden (Rosetta 1805)
Convinced that the Mamluks would join the invaders, I have written to
the principal Beys that the French Squadron, with a large body of troops on
board, having steered its course towards Egypt…
Fully aware that the object of the Beys has been preserve an interest both
with Great Britain and France and under the mask of the sincerest attach-
ment, to deceive both Powers alternately, I determined not to trust to the
professions I looked for from them in answer to the above communication.42
In terms of military capability, Major E. Missett believed that it was uncer-

tain whether the Mamluk Beys were capable of defending Egypt against a
French invasion:
Major E. Misset to Lord Hobart (Cairo 1804)

However determined Ibrāhı̄m and ‘Uthmān Bey may be to defend the
country against French, I must not conceal inform Your Lordship that43 they
do not possess the means of making any effectual resistance. The Mamluks
do not amount to three thousand, many of whom would not gain willingly
engage in warfare against armies of France.44
50 I.K. SUNG
The internal struggle among the Mamluk Beys was another reason for
Major Missett’s distrust of the Mamluks. In a diplomatic protocol to
Charles James Fox (Alexandria 1806), E. Misset describes power struggle
among ‘Uthmān Bey al-Bardı̄sı̄, Ibrāhı̄m Bey, and Muḥammad Bey al-Alfı̄
and assumes ‘Uthmān Bey al-Bardı̄sı̄ as the potential victor.45
Henry Dodwell, a member of the Ā bdı̄n Project, actively popular-
ized early modern Egyptian history from a standpoint of the monarchy,
but unlike the independent ‘Abd Raḥman al-Rāfi‘ı̄, he was a full-time
history professor, as chair in Oriental Studies at London University.
Dodwell majored in Indian history. Even though he neither read nor
spoke Arabic, with the help of the archivists and translators of the
‘Ā bdı̄n archive, he composed what became one of the most authorita-
tive accounts of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄’s career.46 Dodwell contended that the
period that preceded the French occupation was exceptionally chaotic
and repressive.47 Likewise, another Ā bdı̄n Project historian, Édouard
Driault, was convinced that during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, Egypt practically disappeared from history. That such a phenom-
enon was intentionally marginalized or denied by two eminent historians
can only be explained as an example of counter-memory, which means
forgetting the past.
Probably it is natural for Dodwell, a monarchist historian, to describe
the Mamluks as villains:
It had been entrusted to the tyranny of such of the Mamlukes as had sur-
vived massacre and had proved their unworthiness by deserting their own
master…The Beys, as the Mamluke chiefs were called, sought nothing but
personal and private ends…But they cherished few personal objects. All the
revenues that could be wrung from the country went to cover them splen-
didly in armour, to fill their stables with the noblest Arab stock, to adorn
their palaces with the finest carpets of the East, to crowd their harems with
beautiful slaves and to guard them with Negro eunuchs.48
In addition to greed, the Mamluks are accused of tyranny as well as of

causing the rapid decline of socio-economic conditions:
Under the rule of these picturesque but stupid warriors the resources of
Egypt rapidly decayed. The canals on which cultivation depended were
choked by neglect. The desert encroached while the cities shrank.49
Of the many Mamluk Beys, Alfı̄ and al-Bardı̄sı̄ Beys symbolized fierce
internal conflict:
The Turks themselves were divided…The Mamluks too had their won
Bardı̄sı̄ and Alfı̄ factions, each much more disposed to destroy the other
than to make common cause against a common danger.50
Considering the unfavorable image of the Mamluks in the narrative of

the 1811 Mamluk massacre, it is difficult to avoid the impression that
Dodwell aimed to justify the brutal massacre of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄:
The Mamluk still formed a very dangerous body, occupying Upper Egypt,
successively threatening Cairo, or driven southward, according to tempo-
rary shifts of military superiority.51
Moreover, according to Dodwell, the survivors of the Alfı̄ faction continu-

ously hoped that a more powerful English expedition would overthrow
their enemy and fancied they might ask a huge sum of money from the
English to enable them to buy Muḥammad ‘Alı̄’s troops and then over-
throw him themselves.52
Not all the ‘Ā bdı̄n materials present the Mamluks negatively. In the fol-
lowing British document, Alfı̄ Bey is portrayed as an authentic and cred-
ible figure. We should bear in mind that this positive account preceded
Britain’s disappointment in Alfı̄ Bey:
Sir G.C. Brathwaite Boughton to J. Sullivan (1803)
I have heard from several officers who served in Egypt a very high character
of al-Alfı̄ Bey, both as soldier, and as a man of uncommon frankness and
loyalty in all his dealings, which last is very much confirmed by his manners
and countenance.53
Interestingly enough, British diplomats were well aware of the fragile politi-
cal condition of Egypt and that the Turks were not able to rule the country
without the help of the Mamluk Beys. Therefore, many British diplomats
advised British politicians and decision-makers that Britain had to maintain
friendly relations with the Mamluks not only in order to protect British inter-
ests, but also to preclude the growth of French influence on Egyptian soil.54
52 I.K. SUNG
In sharp contrast to the demonization of the Mamluk Beys,

Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ is glorified as the authentic reformer and savior who
delivered Egypt and Egyptians from Mamluk oppression. British cor-
respondence simply recast Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ as prodigious, preordained,
robust, vigorous, tall, and handsome.55 Ābdı̄n Project historian Charles-
Roux even marginalized the significance of the Mamluk massacre of
Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ by treating it as a contemporary Oriental custom.56 In
a similar vein, Henry Dodwell clearly ascribed the responsibility for the
massacre to the Mamluks:
Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ tried to persuade the Mamluks to return to dwell in Cairo

under his authority. The Beys agreed to come down and settle in Giza, but
they did not arrive for nearly six months and when they did come, they
came far more prepared for war than for peace. Time honored policy now
demanded that they should be destroyed. Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ resolved to make
an end of these fallen tyrants of the country.57
In sum, most of the historical works of the Ābdı̄n Project omit the Mamluk
Sultanate era and instead focus on Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ and his offspring.58
However, in his book on modern Egyptian history, Gaston Wiet not only
depicted the Mamluk era as a golden age, but also praised the Mamluk
Sultans for their military force and territorial expansions. It is unclear,
however, whether Wiet really meant to nationalize Egypt’s past through
the glorification of the Mamluk Sultans or achieve some kind of ‘historical
objectivity.’
It is not surprising to find that the Mamluk Beys are ignored or dele-
gitimized given the fact that the primary protagonists in the history writ-
ing of Ā bdı̄n Project historians were Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ and his offspring.
Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ is recreated as the antithesis of the Mamluk Beys and as
Egypt’s national hero, eradicating the evil Mamluks and initiating a series
of progressive measures.
CONCLUSION
As compared to the depictions of the Mamluks in school textbooks, it is
difficult to find nationalist aspects in the representations of the Mamluks
in the historical works of the ‘Ābdı̄n historians. ‘Ābdı̄n historian Gaston
Wiet does offer a sympathetic portrayal of the Mamluks, but it is not very
characteristic of Egyptian nationalism. Importantly, the other ‘Ābdı̄n his-

torians did not touch upon the Mamluk Sultanate.
Regarding the Mamluk Beys under Ottoman rule, both school text-
books and the ‘Ābdı̄n historians share a similar negative view. As seen
in the case of the Egyptian school textbooks, the state is a powerful cre-
ator of historical and collective memory, though by no means ubiquitous
or omnipotent. Civil society, on the other hand, constitutes the arena in
which numerous groups generate remembrance alongside the state, and
sometimes against it. Remembrance is a product of a negotiation process
among various social groups, including the state. Of course, the agents that
generate different types of memory are not equal in terms of power and
influence; nevertheless, distinctive voices and counter-narratives are cre-
ated and expressed.59 In other words, the interaction between the diverse
social agents that operate within civil society and state institutions—an
ongoing process of contestation—is likely to continue as one of the eternal
features of remembrance.60 Therefore, it could be concluded that social
forces identifying with Egyptian nationalism predominated in the land-
scape of Egyptian historiography and had a crucial impact on the narratives
of the school textbooks. The socio-ideological contexts of the textbooks’
authors are another significant point. In the case of Muḥammad Rif‘at,
an undeniably nationalist historian,61the depictions of Mamluk Sultans or
‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r were most likely used as a tool in the fulfillment of an
ideological duty.
NOTES
1. Born in Naples in 1883, Sammarco first came to Egypt in 1922 to take up
the position of history teacher at the Italian Lycée in Cairo. From this time
on he dedicated himself to the study of Egyptian history, conducting
research, writing, and giving lectures at learned societies such as the
Institutd’Égypte and the Royal Geographical Society. In 1925, following
the death of Eugenio Griffini, Fu’ad offered Sammarco the vacant post of
librarian of ‘Abdı̄n Palace and asked him to continue the task of recon-
structing the history of contemporary Egypt. See Anthony Gorman,
Historians, State and politics in Twentieth Century Egypt (London:
Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 16–17.
2. Pierre Crabitès (1877–1943) was an American judge of the Mixed Tribunal
in Cairo and later became Chief Judge. See Anthony Gorman (2003),
Historians, State, p. 17.
54 I.K. SUNG
3. Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab Past (Berkeley: University

of California Press 2009), p. 12. For further reference, see Chap. 5.
4. Georges Douin (1884–1944) was born in France and joined the French
Navy at a young age. When he was in China he earned a…after publishing
his book on Bonaparte’s fleet in Egypt in 1922 King Fu’ād paid attention
to him. Accepting King Fu’ād’s request, Douin prepared a great deal of
documents from the reign of Muḥammad‘Alı̄ for publication, particularly
consular correspondence written by French, English, Austrian, Prussian,
and Russian representatives. For the next four years Douin mainly focused
on Muḥammad‘Alı̄ and authored a number of works on his military cam-
paigns in Syria. See Anthony Gorman (2003), Historians, State, p. 17.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 123.
8. Gabriel Hanotaux, Regards sur L’Égypte et la Palestine (Paris: Librairie
Plon, 1929), pp. 196–97; Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab
Past, p. 125.
10. Ibid., p. 135.
11. Ibid., p. 116.
12. Ibid., p. 116.
13. Myriam Rosen-Ayalon, Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet (Jerusalem:
Institute of Asian and African Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
1977), p. ix.
14. Ibid., p. x.
15. Ibid., p. x.
16. Gaston Wiet, “L’Égypte Arabe, de la Conquête Arabe à la Conquête
Ottomane 642–1517 de L’èr Chrétienne,” in Gabriel Hanotaux ed.,
Histoire de la Nation Égyptienne, vol. 4. (Paris: Société de l’histoire natio-
nale, Librairie Plon, 1933), p. 387.
17. Ibid., p. 388.
18. Ibid., p. 401.
19. Ibid., p. 402.
20. Ibid., p. 393.
21. Ibid.
22. In addition to Baybars, Wiet covered many other Mamluk Sultans includ-
ing Circassian Sultans, such as Qalāwūn, Muḥammad Ibn Qalāwūn, Faraj,
Barsbāy, Qayṭbāy, and al-Ghawrı̄.
23. Gaston Wiet (1933), “L’Égypte Arabe, de la Conquête Arabe,” p. 388.
24. Ibid., p. 400.
25. Ibid., p. 412.
26. Gaston Wiet, “Jāma‘ al-Sultān Ḥ asan: Jallālahu al-Fanniwa Waḍ‘ahu

al-Handası̄” (trans)., Muḥammad Wahhabı̄, al-Muqtaṭaf, Dec. 1938,
p. 526.
27. Ibid., p. 528.
28. Gaston Wiet (1933), “L’Égypte Arabe, de la Conquête Arabe,” p. 391.
29. Ibid., p. 391.
30. Ibid., p. 634.
31. Ibid., p. 636.
32. Ibid.
33. The French Ambassador to the Vatican offered a standard diplomatic
account which focused principally on the actions of the ruler, although
there was some discussion of the Egyptian national movement under
Muṣt ̣afā Kāmil and the emergence of Wafd. See Anthony Gorman (2003),
Historians, State, p. 19.
34. François Charles-Roux, “L’Égypte de 1801 à 1882” in Gabriel Hanotaux,
ed., Histoire de la Nation Égyptienne, vol. 6. (Paris: Société de l’histoire
nationale, Librairie Plon, 1936), p. 14.
35. François Charles-Roux (1936), “L’Égypte de 1801 à 1882,” p. 60.
36. G. Douin et E.C.Fawtier-Jones L’Angleterre et l’Égypte: La Politique
Mameluke (1801–1803), (Cairo: Société royale de géographie d’Égypte,
1929–30), vol.1, p.31. See Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab
Past, p. 115.
37. G. Douin et E.C.Fawtier-Jones (1929–30), L’Angleterre et l’Égypte: La
Politique Mameluke (1801–1803), p. 31.
38. G. Douin et E.C.Fawtier-Jones, L’Angleterre et l’Égypte: La Politique
Mameluke (1803–1807) vol.2. (Caire: Impr. Par l’Institut Français
d’Archéologie Orientale du Caire pour la Société Royale de Géographie
d’Égypte, 1930), p. xi.
39. Ibid., p. 149.
40. Ibid., p. 95.
41. Ibid., p. 48.
42. Ibid., p. 215.
43. Ibid., p. 109.
44. Ibid., p. 110.
45. Ibid., pp. 287–289.
47. Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad Ali
(Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 1–3. Dodwell’s book was previ-
ously published in 1931. See also François Charles-Roux, “L’Égypte de
1801 a 1882,” in Gabriel Hanotaux, ed., Histoire de la nation égyptienne
(Paris: Ouvrage publié sous les auspices et le haut patronage de sa majesté
FouadIer , Roi d’ Égypte, 1937), vol. 6, pp. 2–4.
56 I.K. SUNG
48. Henry Dodwell (1967), The Founder of Modern Egypt, p. 2.

49. Ibid., p. 3.
50. Ibid., p. 13.
51. Ibid., p. 33.
52. Ibid., p. 34.
53. G. Douin et E.C.Fawtier-Jones (1930), L’Angleterre et l’Égypte: La
Politique Mameluke (1803–1807), p. 36.
54. Such accounts of the Mamluks are found mostly in the era of 1801–1803;
see G. Douin et E.C.Fawtier-Jones (1929–30), L’Angleterre et l’Égypte: La
Politique Mameluke (1801–1803), pp. 50, 59, 81–85, 94–97, 119,
234–235, 241–243, 345–346.
55. François Charles-Roux(1933), L’ Égypte de 1801 à 1882 in Gabriel
Hanotaux ed., Histoire de la Nation Égyptienne, Vol. 6, pp. 16–18.
56. Ibid., p. 46.
57. Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad Ali
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 34.
58. See the list of ‘Ā bdı̄n Project literatures Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers
of Arab Past, pp. 118–119, 182–183.
59. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, War and Remembrance in the Twentieth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 30.
60. Ibid., 39.
61. Muḥammad Rif‘at will be discussed in the following chapters.
PART II
Mamluks in Public Memory

CHAPTER 4
Prologue: Historical Novel and Egyptian

Nationalism
Before we embark on an analysis of Egyptian historical novels, it is vital

to review the historical setting that preceded their emergence. In the late
1920s and early 1930s, Egypt witnessed the crystallization of the concept
of “Egyptian national literature” (al-Adab al-Qawmı̄) or “Egyptian litera-
ture” (al-Adab al-Miṣrı̄). Two features of the interwar Egyptian intellec-
tual scene played a crucial role in the development of this literature.
The first was the emergence of territorial nationalism as the predomi-
nant nationalist force in post-1919 Egypt. Most Egyptian nationalist intel-
lectuals of this period hold a belief that the creation of a new Egyptian
national image demanded a new assessment of the Egyptian environment
and a reinterpretation of Egyptian history accompanying the transforma-
tion of literary activity in Egypt.1
The second feature of the intellectual atmosphere of interwar Egypt
was the antagonistic reaction to Arabic literature (al-Adab al-‘Arabı̄) on
the part of most Egyptian nationalist intellectuals. Most Egyptian writ-
ers of the 1920s shared an antagonistic view towards previous patterns
of literary development in Egypt and believed their cultural mission as
the creation of a new Egyptian literature that should replace traditional
Arabic literature. Indeed, the only one way to remove the constraints of
traditional Arabic literature was the creation of a new Egyptian literature
that would derive its entire theme from the country’s distinctive milieu.2

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6_4
60 I.K. SUNG
As a result, the fiction created by Egyptians through most of the inter-

war period clearly mirrored the territorial nationalist orientation which
had developed in the wake of the Revolution of 1919. This literature is
characterized by realism and contemporary issues rather than historical
setting, and with a certain focus on Egyptian problems. Egypt’s Arab-
Islamic legacy, on the other hand, is not one of its focal points.3
It was only from the second half of the 1930s onwards that a sizable
corpus of Egyptian creative literature that dealt with Arab and Islamic
historical themes appeared. Indeed several Egyptian novelists commenced
to shift their attention to Arab and Islamic history in order to meet both
their growing interest in Egypt’s Arab-Islamic legacy and an increasing
receptivity to this subject-matter by Egyptian readers.4 This did not mark
the disappearance of territorialist historical fiction. For instance, in the
1940s, Muḥammad ‘Awad Muḥammad, ‘Adil Kamil, and the young Najı̄b
Maḥfūẓ continued to produce novels on Pharaonic Egypt.5
Although realism made its breakthrough in the 1940s, the decade
opened with a marked interest in the historical novel, as is indicated in
the results of the first novel-writing competition in which three of the five
top novels were historical, among them the work of Muḥammad Farı̄d
Abū Ḥ adı̄d.6 Importantly, the intimate relationship between nationalism
and history was not a novel and unique phenomenon that emerged only
in Egypt. The famous Scottish historical novelist Sir Walter Scott,7 for
example, understood the power of history in the process of state-building
and used it as raw material for his literary works.
Scott’s words spoke to the newly emergent independent nation-states
and allowed the site of the historical novel to be a crucible for the discur-
sive formation of states and races.8 History became crucially important to
national self-definition, as Lukács argues in his discussion of Scott: “The
appeal to national independence and national character is necessarily con-
nected with a reawakening of national history.”9
In this sense, the historical novel might be considered as a tool for
national self-definition, with both global aspects (form) and local ones
(effect). In modern critical and sociological terms, this phenomenon
is defined as “glocalization,” describing the amalgamation of local and
international. The historical novel is part of the typology of nation-
hood and helps to define what Benedict Anderson terms as “imagined
communities.”10
Although the historical trend in the Egyptian novel became promi-
nent from the 1930s onwards, it dates back to the turn of the twentieth
PROLOGUE: HISTORICAL NOVEL AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 61
century. Very much a romantic period, the historical trend emerged in the
1890s European novels. Jūrjı̄ Zaydān was one of the leading novelists at
the time, and his works will be discussed in the following subsections.11
Egyptian nationalism was not the only theme of the contemporary
Egyptian historical novels. Influenced by European critiques (e.g., by
Renan, d’Darcourt, Cromer, and Hanotaux) of Islamic and Egyptian soci-
ety, for Egyptian novelists, social justice became one of the literary focal
points. Ali B. Jad clarifies this point by explaining that, during 1939–1952,
the Egyptian novel of literary merit is characterized by a profound concern
with the question of social justice. According to his analysis, the earlier
generation of novelists did not deal with this matter with the exception of
the position of women in the family and society.12 Thus, it is not surprising
to find not only the issue of social justice, but also liberal political views in
the following novels. In other words, this era marks the departure from
mere ‘story-telling’ to a more political form of writing. Indeed, the writer
often presents selectively chosen historical facts and characters, thereby
reshaping them to offer a new understanding of the past. As Georg Lukács
notes, “What matters, therefore, in the historical novel is not the retell-
ing of great historical events, but the poetic awakening of the people who
figured in those events.”13
In this sense, historical novels operate on the borderline between fic-
tion and reality. Thus, the location is crucial for their very existence, since
the illusion of dealing with reality engenders a sense of truthfulness that
strengthens the epistemological status of the novel. This intoxicatingly
vague position enables the historical novel to report history (truth and
reality) and simultaneously manipulate its meaning by representing and
recasting the historical stage (fiction). The works of Zaydān, who wrote
novels, history books, and articles on the very same topics, are particularly
good examples of the blurred distinction between reality and fiction.14
Therefore, historical novels gave both the author and the reader an
opportunity to escape the unpleasant reality of the time and take refuge
in visions of a splendid past. Some of the works also offer criticism of
contemporary conditions as well as an attempt to encourage the people to
emulate the great deeds of their ancestors in order to solve the country’s
problems.15
This chapter will offer a critical analysis of such writers and examine
the manner in which they shaped the Mamluk narrative. Moreover, the
historical novels and plays of Egyptian popular literature may also provide
an insight into the popular discourse on the Mamluks in Egyptian society.
62 I.K. SUNG
NOTES
1. Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Egypt, Islam and The Arabs:
The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900–1930 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 191.
2. Ibid.
3. Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian
Nation, 1930–45 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
p. 130.
4. Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski (1995), Redefining the
Egyptian, p. 130. Much like Gershoni, Kilpatrick lists two reasons
for the appearance of historical novels: Egyptian intellectuals’
desire for recreation of cultural identity of Egypt and the influence
of Egyptian nationalism see Hilary Kilpatrick, “The Egyptian
Novel from Zaynab to 1980” in M.M. Badawi ed., The Cambridge
History of Arabic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), p. 236. Sakkut held more or less similar views of
emergence of historical novel. See Hamdi Sakkut (1971), op. cit.,
47.
5. Jan Brugman, An Introduction to the History of Modern Arabic
Literature in Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1984), pp. 291, 295–98, 316;
Hamdi Sakkut, The Egyptian Novel and It’s Main Trends from 1913
to 1952 (Cairo: Cairo University Press, 1971), pp. 72–84.
Mattityahu Peled, Religion, My Own: The Literary Works of Najib
Mahfuz (New Brunswick, 1983), pp. 28–67.
6. Hilary Kilpatrick (1992), op. cit., p. 236.
7. Sir Walter Scott, 1st Baronet, (born 15 August, 1771, Edinburgh,
Scotland—died 21 September , 1832, Abbotsford, Roxburgh,
Scotland), was a Scottish novelist, poet, historian, and biographer
who is often considered both the inventor and the greatest practi-
tioner of the historical novel. Scott’s father was a lawyer, and his
mother was the daughter of a physician. From his earliest years,
Scott was fond of listening to his elderly relatives’ accounts and
stories of the Scottish Border, and he soon became a voracious
reader of poetry, history, drama, fairy tales, and romances. He had
a remarkably retentive memory and astonished visitors by his eager
reciting of poetry. His explorations of the neighboring countryside
developed in him both a love of natural beauty and a deep appre-
ciation of the historic struggles of his Scottish forebears. Scott was
PROLOGUE: HISTORICAL NOVEL AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 63
educated at the high school at Edinburgh and also for a time at the
grammar school at Kelso. In 1786, he was apprenticed to his father
as writer to the signet, a Scots equivalent of the English solicitor
(attorney). “Ivanhoe” (1819) was the first of Scott’s novels to
adopt a purely English subject and was also his first attempt to
combine history and romance, which later influenced Victorian
medievalism. “Sir Walter Scott, 1st Baronet,” Encylopaedia
Britannica online version (2015. 9.6).
8. Jerome de Groot, The Historical Novel (London: Routledge,
2010), p. 94.
9. Georg Lukacs, The Historical Novel trans. Hannah and Stanley
Mitchell (London: Marlin Press, 1962), p. 25.
10. Jerome de Groot (2010), The Historical Novel, p. 94.
11. Hamdi Sakkut (1971), The Egyptian Novel, p. 46.
12. Ali B. Jad, Form and Technique in the Egyptian Novel 1912–1971
(London: Ithaca Press, 1983), p. 147.
13. Georg Lukács, The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah and Stanley
Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 1962), p. 42.
14. Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and
History Writings in Twentieth-Century (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2009), p. 56.
15. Hamdi Sakkut, The Egyptian Novel and its Main Trends from 1913
to 1952 (Cairo: Cairo University Press, 1971), p. 47.
CHAPTER 5
Representations of the Mamluks

in Historical Novels and Plays
Mamlūk al-Shārid (by Jūrjī Zaydān)

An Ottomanist intellectual, Jūrjī Zaydān was born in Beirut on December
14, 1861. His family belonged to the Greek Orthodox community,
though this religious affiliation does not seem to have played a crucial role
in the daily life of the family.1 Some ideological and international political
contexts indicate Zaydān’s pro-Ottoman beliefs.
In Zaydān’s opinion, the formation of a group and the means by which
it unified its members could change according to needs and time. Any
acquired or inherited characteristic could be used as a means to create
solidarity if it promised to be useful to the members of the group. The
Egyptians, for instance, could belong to and promote an Arab cultural
identity while political expedience would prompt a feeling of solidarity
with the Ottoman Empire as a whole.2
Shortly after the Young Turk Revolution, Zaydān was convinced that
the new regime would be successful because a long time was spent in pre-
paring the population before the takeover. Years later, after an attempted
counter-revolution, interference of foreign powers, and increasing cen-
trifugal tendencies within the Ottoman Empire, Zaydān believed that
the government of the Ottoman Empire should retain some absolute
powers because the people were not yet familiar with the concept of a
constitution.3

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6_5
66 I.K. SUNG
In addition to pro-Ottoman tendency, Zaydān shows an obviously

favorable attitude to Muḥammad ‘Alī. In the June 1, 1902 issue of Al-Hilāl
, Jūrjī Zaydān, as editor, stated that through a series of administrative,
military, agricultural, commercial, industrial, and educational reforms,
Muḥammad ‘Alī changed the course of Islamic history and opened an
entirely new and progressive era. This edifice was built on the ruins of a
crumbling and corrupt Ottoman Mamluk order.4
Similarly, in another novel, Istibdād al-Mamālīk, which was also dis-
cussed in this study, Zaydān’s monarchic sympathies served as the central
theme and also as a key to the critical analysis of the representation of
the Mamluks. Our main focus will therefore be the negative representa-
tion of the Mamluks, as compared to that of the Ottoman Empire and
Muḥammad ‘Alī. First and foremost, the Mamluks are accused of an insa-
tiable lust for power:
The Mamluks were used as slaves by the ‘Abbasid Caliphate. Instead Jiziya
some of them were taken from the people who lived in the province of
Turkistan, They [the Mamluks] embraced the Islamic religion and were
taught to admire the Caliphs. They ruled the country and the Caliphs
granted them [the Mamluks] sovereignty, land tax and superiority over oth-
ers. Nevertheless, they remained power-thirsty.5
The key historical event that clarifies the relationship between Muḥammad
‘Alī and the Mamluks is their massacre in 1811. This is justified in the text
by the numerous references to their enduring oppression and tyranny. For
example:
During the last days of the Ottoman era, the Mamluks played a political
role, but they brought about tyranny and destruction in the Ottoman gov-
ernment. They were never frightened until the days of the great Muḥammad
‘Alī, who massacred them.6
This glorification of Muḥammad ‘Alī clearly indicates Zaydān’s monarchic

orientation. Even the Mamluk survivors of this massacre are not depicted
in positive terms:
The Mamluk survivors of the massacre got married, but they abused their
wives. The Mamluks lamented their hard fates and were in miserable plight
and their battered women became addicted to Hashishi.7
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MAMLUKS IN HISTORICAL NOVELS AND PLAYS 67
In addition to the political oppression and the terrible abuse of women,

the Mamluks appeared to be entirely responsible for the corruption. In
a dialog between Amīr Bashīr and Ibrāhīm Pasha, the Mamluks are pre-
sented as responsible for the corruption in the country:
[Amīr Bashīr:] Without Muḥammad ‘Alī the Egyptian people could never
have achieved obedience and submissiveness. He restored order in Egypt.
…
[Ibrāhīm Pasha:] It is undeniable that the Mamluks were the source of
corruption.
[Amīr Bashīr:] These Mamluks ruled Egypt through corruption. Nothing
else can be said about them.8
[Amīr Bashīr:] After the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, the Mamluks
were appointed viceroy in the local province, but the Mamluks Bey were not afraid
of the Pashas and became tyrannical. For example, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr obtained
independence from the Ottoman governments and attacked Syria. Without
Muḥammad Abū Dhahab’s betrayal of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, Egypt and Syria could
have become independent from the Ottomans.9
…
The French came to take revenge against the Mamluks, but could not suc-
ceed without the support of the locals.10
…
Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab was a treacherous man.11
Similar accusations against the Mamluks are also made by the merchants:
[Sa‘īd (Amin Bey’s servant):] Thanks to Muḥammad ‘Alī and his son Ismā‘īl,
Egypt had a government and was secured.12
[All merchants:] No doubt, there is no one who does not know their benefit
and who can ever imagine the conditions in Egypt after the Mamluk tyr-
anny. Thus, we should thank Allah who saved us from them.13
[Sa‘īd :] Who are the Mamluks?
[Amin:] They [the Mamluks] ruled Egypt before Muḥammad ‘Alī and
killed, plundered the people and tyrannized them endlessly.14
[One of merchants said:] Thanks to Allah we were released from the Mamluks
and now but we are faced with another predicament that inhibits our victory,
in the form of the Albanians and Moroccans [north African-Mugharaba].15
[Sa‘īd asked again:] Who are they?
[The same man said:] They were soldiers in troops that fought in the battle
and saved Egypt from the French. Our lord wanted to build a new army but
they refused it and threatened the Pasha with disobedience.16
68 I.K. SUNG
[Others said:] Do not worry, our lord understood how to deal with them
and sent them to this deadly country [Sudan] and there was no other
goal but to make them deal with the insurrection and take advantage of
this chance to train the Egyptian army as they wished without Albanians
and Moroccans.17
[Sa‘īd asked:] Why does he train the army?
[They said:] There is tremendous benefit to it as one hundred trained
soldiers will encounter one thousand untrained soldiers.18
[Another one said:] Our Lord, the eternal Muḥammad ‘Alī made efforts
to strengthen security and open schools [madrasa] and this was the key
to success.19
Muḥammad ‘Alī even brought cooks from France in order to open a
cooking school.20
Of the many different types of accusations raised against the Mamluks, one
common and significant pattern is the contrast with the positive depictions
of Muḥammad ‘Alī. For example, the Mamluk tyranny in Egypt, marked
by political oppression and corruption, is compared to the new and correct
order established by Muḥammad ‘Alī. The reason for this contrast may
have resided in Zaydān’s wish to parody the crucial historical moment of
transfer from decadence to progress in his contemporary Egypt. Namely,
if the Mamluks symbolized the past, villainous origins of socio-political
ills, Muḥammad ‘Alī was glorified as the future and as a hero, savior, and
reformer who rescued the Egyptians from their suffering.
This binary pattern of demonization of the Mamluks and idealization of
Muḥammad ‘Alī and his reforms once again reflects Zaydān’s monarchic
sympathies. Zaydān’s views of the monarchy may indicate that he attributed
to Muḥammad ‘Alī and the Ottomans the ability to protect Egypt against
Western socio-political penetration until the nineteenth century. Seemingly,
Zaydān believed that Western influence had an adverse effect on Egypt.
Significantly, Amīn Bey’s (a Mamluk general who survived the 1811
massacre) retrospective view of the violent events indicates the greatness
of the Ottoman power:
Sultan Maḥmūd ordered the elimination of the Janissary as they opposed the
Sultan’s reforms. When Amīn Bey heard that the Sultan ordered to kill the
Janissary he recalled the slaughter of the Mamluks in Egypt 25 years ago.
Sultan Maḥmūd emulated his deputy Muḥammad ‘Alī, such as reorganiza-
tion of [the] army for [establishing a] new regime. Amīn Bey explained that
he participated in a war against the Greeks and that he himself handed over
the submission to Ibrāhīm Pasha.21
The more significant psychological change we see in the passage above is

that Amīn Bey not only understood the historical cause of the Mamluk
massacre, but even took a step further in joining Ibrāhīm’s (Muḥammad
‘Alī’s son) army.
Considering the unflattering descriptions of the Mamluks, Baybars is
the only heroic Mamluk figure:
[Man of castle of Egypt] Ahmad introduced water ways to Gharīb. They

[Aḥmad and Gharīb] walked to a stone Bridge on which a lion [emblem
of Baybars] was illustrated and Aḥmad explained that one of the Mamluk
Sultans, Ẓāhir Baybars, built this for transferring water from the Nile River
to a castle in Cairo.22
In addition to his monarchic sympathies, Zaydān also frequently expressed

pro-Ottoman views23:
[Gharīb:] What caused the Greek revolt?

[Salīm Agha:] Although the Greeks are an ancient people, their country is
still a vilayet of the Ottoman Empire. They do not cease to remember their
old country, in all its glory and great power. With the help of Russia, they
made a pact with a group of governments of limited independent states.24
A secret Greek nationalist organization called the “Friendly Society” or
“Company of Friends” (Filiki Eteria) was formed in Odessa in 1814.25
The sub-plot of the Greek national movement is a definite clue to

Zaydān’s pro-Ottoman tendency. The Greek nationalist movement is not
perceived as one of valid rights, but rather as one of immoral, unrigh-
teous, and treacherous rebels: “The Greeks were raging with anger and
declared disobedience, taking revenge on the prosperous country of
Sultan Maḥmūd.”26
Zaydān’s socio-religious background gives a hint about his unfavorable
attitude to the Greek nationalist movement. As a secular reformer of Christian
background, Zaydān had to redefine his relations with the Muslim Arab envi-
ronment. Zaydān believed that, regardless of their religious background, a
new basis for the relations between Christian and Muslim Arabs was found
in terms of an Arab cultural and national identity under the protection of the
Ottoman Empire. This is one reason why Zaydān supported the Ottoman
Empire. Even the story of the French invasion is employed to present the
Ottoman Empire in a flattering light: “The 1801 Ottoman military campaign
finally removed the French from Egypt.”27
70 I.K. SUNG
Zaydān’s pro-Ottomanism reflects one more socio-political and ideo-

logical atmosphere of the time: Ottomanism dominated the discourse of
Egyptian intellectuals of nineteenth-century Egypt. The main reason for
such sympathy with the Ottomans was the urgent need to respond to
the unprecedented change in the socio-political order of the area. Facing
the tide of Western political and cultural influence, Egyptian intellectuals
believed in the Ottoman Empire’s power to protect Egypt from the West.
In his pro-Ottoman and monarchist orientations, Zaydān diffused his
Egypt-centered standpoint:
[Amīn Bey:] My uncle told me that at the moment the people of Egypt are
confronted with the very deeds of the people of Syria. I think the people of
Egypt are deceived by what the French claim [i.e.] that they are Muslims
and do not drink alcoholic drinks.28
When Bonaparte secretly arrived in Egypt, the Mamluks and the people of
Egypt prepared to join forces.29
However, it would be difficult to assume from this that Zaydān’s Egyptian

nationalism was already concrete at the time.30As shown, Zaydān’s politi-
cal orientation tended toward Ottomanism,31 which is incompatible with
the independent functioning of a vilayet like Egypt. It could be for this
reason that Zaydān scorned the Greek nationalist movement, as discussed
above. This is also a clear sign of the contradiction embedded in Zaydān’s
worldview. That is to say, paradoxically, Zaydān seemed to have Egyptian
nationalist sentiments, but viewed the Greek nationalist movement as
treacherous to the Ottoman Empire. This is another sign of Zaydān’s loy-
alty to the Ottomans.
In sum, this novel offers a wide-ranging plot in which the Mamluks
are presented as the binary opposite of Muḥammad ‘Alī and the Ottoman
Empire. More than anything, it explains the antipathy toward the Mamluks.
Zaydān was an enthusiastic proponent of Muḥammad ‘Alī (and therefore
also of the concept of monarchy) and the Ottomans, while the Mamluks,
viewed as an inhibition to Egypt’s path toward a bright future, are viewed
as a historical impediment. On the other hand, Muḥammad ‘Alī and the
Ottomans are considered the saviors who regained Egypt’s prosperity and
glory, eliminating the Mamluks and undertaking extensive reforms in gov-
ernment. Through this novel, Zaydān intended not only to awaken his
mostly Egyptian readership to the glorious and recent past of Muḥammad
‘Alī’s era, but also to highlight the importance of the Ottoman Empire in
maintaining the balance of power in the region, with the European pow-
ers at its gate. It is in this context that the negative representations of the
Mamluks should be understood.
Istibdād al - Mamālīk (by Jurjī Zaydān)

Zaydān’s’ affection for the Ottoman Empire is evident in his letters to
his son, Emile.32 Most significantly, Zaydān seemed to believe that the
Ottoman Empire should remain the protector of all Arabs and Muslims
in the wake of European influence in the Muslim Arab area. Zaydān’s
pro-Ottoman orientations are the main ideological context of this novel.
Thus, it is not surprising to find many references to Mamluk oppression
and tyranny as opposed to the positive reflections on the Ottomans in his
previous novel.
The plot is exactly in line with the theme: the family of ‘Abd-al-Raḥman,
an Egyptian soap merchant, was destroyed by Mamluk oppression and
reunited, after a painstakingly long journey, in Acre following the defeat of
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr by the Ottomans. Another reason for the pro-Ottoman
trend of this novel stems from the fact that the novel was published in
1893, at the peak of pro-Ottoman historiography in Egypt. Both the per-
sonal and historical context of the novel provide us with a crucial clue to
the critical analysis of Mamluk representations.33
As Zaydān was not only a historical novelist, but also a prolific histo-
rian, it is no wonder that he began his novel with a description of eigh-
teenth-century politics. Zaydān sketched the political system of the time
by offering three Ottoman administrative systems: the Pasha, the Mamluk
Bey, and the Janissary army. The author’s antipathy toward the Mamluks
is patent at this early stage. “The Mamluk was not satisfied with the great
authority granted upon them and they returned to despotism and injustice
(oppression) and heavy levy on tax.”34 Importantly, Zaydān used the word
“go back/return,” rather than “begin/start.” This may indicate that the
Mamluk tyranny was indeed precedented.
In addition to the Mamluk oppression, the fact that many soldiers were
sent to war in the Arabian Peninsula worsened the security situation. The
gatekeeper in the novel complained about this in saying that “after many
Egyptian soldiers had gone to war the condition became very bad, increas-
ing crime such as provocation and revolt.” More seriously, the Pasha did not
notice this because the local Egyptian government ordered his isolation.35
‘Abd al-Raḥman provided a detailed account of why the Pasha did not
72 I.K. SUNG
control the situation on the ground. The reason is that the Mamluk Beys
intentionally isolated the Pasha and undermined his legitimacy by prevent-
ing the people from filing complaints.36
Political instability was also related to the Ottoman Sultan’s political con-
dition in the midst of a battle against Russia. For this reason, one of Egypt’s
noble families, al-Maḥrūqi, complained that the Pasha’s power was limited
against Mamluk opposition, and particularly after achieving independence
from the Ottomans.37 The grave socio-political conditions depicted thus far
were ascribed to the Mamluks. The Mamluks were blamed for all of Egypt’s
plights. Even ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, one of the most representative Mamluks of
the time, is represented as the foremost evildoer: “‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr was the
boldest, the greatest and the most powerful Mamluk, but he sought inde-
pendence and began to invade neighboring country.”38
Al-Maḥrūqī criticized ‘Alī Bey for working in close and exclusive coop-
eration with the Coptics.39 Al-Raḥman noted that since the emergence
of Islam, Sultans and Caliphs only depended on the advice of ‘ulamā’,
Islamic jurisprudence, and Shaykhs and religious leaders. He did, how-
ever, criticize ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr for acting in the opposite way.40
However, the strongest views on the Mamluks were expressed by
al-Maḥrūqī, who said that “it is strange that [the Mamluks] claimed to be
part of Islam, as it cannot possibly accord with their deeds, which even the
Pharaohs and Magi would not think of. The Turkish Pashas had lost their
power, leaving the authority in the hands of the Mamluks.”41 Moreover,
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is portrayed not only as a corrupted ruler, but also as one
who violated an agreement with ‘Abd al-Raḥman. The influential noble
family al-Maḥrūqī appealed to ‘Alī Bey to free Ḥasan, son of al-Raḥman,
who had been conscripted by the Mamluks. ‘Alī Bey rejected this request
by explaining that he did not make exceptions for anyone, and that every
family was obligated to defend Mecca. Before long, the Mamluks of ‘Alī
Bey accepted ‘Abd al-Raḥman’s merchandise in compensation for freeing
Ḥasan; however, ‘Alī Bey demanded not only ‘Abd al-Raḥman’s conscrip-
tion, but also payment of more merchandise for the liberty of his son,
Ḥasan. With all this, ‘Alī Bey violated the agreement by drafting them
both, even after accepting their bribe.42 ‘Alī Bey’s polygamy, in the form
of six wives, is also used against him.43
The climax of the negative campaign against ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is the
fact that Muḥammad Abu Dhahab’s betrayal of ‘Alī Bey and the latter’s
defeat are presented as justified. A monk interpreted the defeat of ‘Alī Bey
by Muḥammad Abū Dhahab not only as a punishment by God, but also as
the result of divine providence:
It is Muḥammad Abū Dhahab’s loyalty to the country, and his desire for
Sultanship that led ‘Alī Bey’s defeat. In addition, it seemed that ‘Alī Bey
oppressed people unjustly. Thus God halted these acts and punishment
awaits him. I’ve heard it with my own ears.44
Ḥasan, the son of ‘Abd al-Raḥman, agreed with the monk by adding that
the Mamluks deserved God’s punishment.
The tyranny [oppression] destroyed the country’s pillars and as a result the
immense suffering of impoverished widows and orphans demanded the
destruction of the Mamluk dynasty. How did God not answer this prayer?45
As for Ḥasan, Muḥammad Abū Dhahab is not less disloyal than ‘Alī Bey,
telling the monk that he does not believe Abū Dhahab is superior, and
adding:
Abu Dhahab is also disloyal to ‘Alī Bey because he obtained education in the
house of ‘Alī Bey, ate delicious food and married his daughter. ‘Alī Bey loved
him very much and trusted him from the bottom of his heart. Dhahab’s
battle [against ‘Alī Bey] will be a grave betrayal, but God empowers him
[Dhahab], and he will prevent the country’s betrayal [‘Alī Bey’s betrayal of
Ottoman]. However, Abū Dhahab will also be betrayed by someone, and
the unjust will not be lucky.46
However, not all blame is put on ‘Alī Bey. The description of oppression
by other Mamluks prevailed in the novel. The Mamluk army had reached
the gate with violence, plundering, injuring, and killing.47 They did not
even respect women.48
There is one interesting episode that shows how much the people
abhorred the Mamluk crimes. ‘Alī Bey ordered his soldiers to execute
Sālima, the wife of ‘Abd al-Raḥman, but instead they took her to a Coptic
monastery. Recognizing that the Mamluks were waiting at the gate, its
inhabitants were afraid to open the gate, knowing that the Mamluks were
threatening.49
Particularly, ‘Abd al-Raḥman expressed critical views of Mamluk quite
significantly, including internal struggle among the Mamluks. He said, “I
believe God [will] subdue these tyrannical Mamluks since [a] small num-
ber of them rule most Mamluks and they struggled [with] each other for
leadership and authority. They even sought help from the enemies against
their master and grabbed their [master’s] property.”50
74 I.K. SUNG
Al-Raḥman accused the Mamluks of oppression, and asserted that there

is no solution and power except God, if we ask help from Him. “If the
Mamluks entered the city [Syria], we won’t know what their tyranny and
abuse will bring here.”51 Moreover, al-Raḥman lamented over his life and
blamed it again on the Mamluks as follows. “The Mamluks spoiled my life
and scattered my gathering and stole my fortune and took my boy (Ḥasan)
away.52 Al-Raḥman even attempted to convince Shaykh Ḍāhir of Acre to
defect from ‘Alī Bey. By means of prayer, he wished for Mamluk destruc-
tion: “Our lord Sultan Caliph messenger of Allah will expel rebellious ‘Alī
Bey’ regime.”53
In addition to al-Raḥman, Ḥasan also harshly criticized the Mamluks,
speaking to a priest at Saint Ilya monastery in Beirut:
We pray to Allah that may he destroy the administration of the Mamluks.

History has never before witnessed any more brutal ruthless and oppressive
ruler than them.54
In contrast to the seemingly negative representations of the Mamluks, the

Ottoman Sultan and his regime are glorified. ‘Uthman Pasha of Egypt
persuaded Muḥammad Abū Dhahab Bey to obey the Sultan and praised
his greatness. He warned him: “If you do not surrender to the Sultan,
you will not only betray our lord [the Sultan], but also the Messenger
(God bless him and grant him salvation!) and His Law (Sharia).”55 The
expanded version of this novel elaborates the scene:
The Queen of Russia has helped you overcome the Muslims [in the Balkans]
in order to satisfy her goals there. Imagine that you take Hijāz and Syria.
What significance does the small piece of territory bear when compared to
the much broader Ottoman Empire. How can the relatively smaller armies
of Hijāz and Syria be a match for the powerful Ottoman armies which con-
quered the world with all their courage and strength.56
Although Egyptian nationalism is almost unnoticeable, the Egypt-

centered view has emerged in the formula of the “people of Egypt” and
the “Egyptian army.” For example, ‘Umad al-Dīn referred to the parents
of Ḥasan as people of Egypt.57 ‘Abd al-Raḥman arrived at al-Arish and
entered a Syria ruled by Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab and saw that the
people of Syria were ready to defend the Egyptian army.58 Furthermore,
Muḥammad Abū Dhahab’s army is referred to as the “Egyptian army” or
“Egyptian soldiers.”59
In many respects, this novel is similar to Zaydān’s other historical novel,

Mamlūk al-Shārid, analyzed in the preceding subsection. In both novels,
Zaydān’s pro-Ottoman and anti-Mamluk orientations are made patent.
In light of Zaydān’s pedagogical approach to historiography,60 the novel
aims to critique his contemporary socio-political conditions through use
of the past. Against the overwhelming wave of Western penetration of
Egyptian society, Zaydān seemed to believe that Egypt should be under
the protection of the Ottoman Empire. It is in this context that we should
view the contrasting black-and-white depictions of the Mamluks and
Ottomans. Another interesting aspect of the novel is its moralizing qual-
ity. By denouncing both Abū Dhahab and ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr and accus-
ing them of betrayal, Zaydān attempted to address a moral question to
an Egypt that underwent tremendous socio-political change. It is evident
that Zaydān’s moral question is also closely connected to the newly forged
relationship between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. Zaydān seemingly
used Abū Dhahab and ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr to persuade his readers to remain
loyal to the Ottoman Empire.
Shajarat al - Durr (by Jūrjī Zaydān) (the First

Edition Appeared in 1912; I Refer to the 1932
Version)
This novel differs from Jūrjī Zaydān’s other novels discussed in this chap-
ter in two primary ways. First, it is Zaydān’s only novel that was first pub-
lished in the twentieth century. Secondly, unlike the two novels that deal
with the Mamluks in the Ottoman era, this novel focuses on the Baḥrī
Mamluks, and particularly on the female protagonist Shajarat al-Durr.61
Any historical novel can serve as a tool to express the author’s worldview.
Zaydān’s political orientation in the two previous novels62 can be summa-
rized by two central elements: a pro-monarchist/khedivalist (Muḥammad
‘Alī) viewpoint and an Egypt-centered position. Thus, one of the primary
missions in analyzing this novel in the context of the present study is to
examine whether the author’s political views changed over time and, if so,
how and to what extent. Of course, this task demands a closer look at the
representations of the Mamluks.
The protagonist of this novel, Shajarat al-Durr, is a multifaceted char-
acter. She is portrayed as a complex human being who acts as a result of
a variety of motivations. Shajarat al-Durr is presented as a nationalistic
76 I.K. SUNG
leader who is concerned about the future of her country: “Shajarat

al-Durr worried about the internal division among the Mamluk army
over Ṭūrānshāh’s action and nodded.”63 The internal division among the
Mamluk leaders was a more immediate danger than the external ones: “I
worried that division among the Mamluk soldiers would persist and the
enemy would take advantage of it and return.”64
Moreover, Shajarat al-Durr is depicted as a tough and self-confident
woman. “She did not open her heart easily to anybody and did not trust
anyone with her decisions, thus the Mamluk leaders were afraid of her
and esteemed her.”65 Above all, it was Shajarat al-Durr’s burning ambi-
tion to be the first Sulṭana that was a decisive factor determining her
fate. Indeed, she was depicted as extremely ambitious. For instance, she
ordered Ṭūrānshāh66 to be killed and whispered to herself:
God will not raise him and kill ‘Izz al-Dīn Aybak, my beloved [ḥabibī]. He
is my beloved, but he is wicked and thus I do not trust him.67 However, if I
am determined to be the first Sulṭāna in the history of Islam, I will take ‘Izz
al-Dīn because he has my best interest at heart.68
She even dared to tempt Baybars, swearing that she would help him to
usurp the Sultanate. She lowered her voice and said to him, “you shall slay
‘Abbasid Sultan Musta‘ṣim and you would be a good Sultan.”69 It would
be safe to conclude that she surreptitiously lusted for power.
Considering Shajarat al-Durr’s hunger for power, it is not surprising to
find that she made many enemies. One merchant blames her for shifting
her loyalties to gain her master’s trust. Saḥbān (a carpet merchant) said
to another slave girl of King Ṣāliḥ al-Ayyūbī, Sallāfa: “Shajarat al-Durr
exploited her loyalty to gain the Master’s affection.”70 Hearing Shajarat al-
Durr’s unprecedented political aspirations, the jealous Sallāfa began oper-
ating all channels in order to prevent their fruition. She called ‘Izz al-Dīn
Aybak and warned him to heed Shajarat al-Durr. Sallāfa attempted to gain
‘Izz al-Dīn Aybak’s favor by hinting that the ‘Abbasid Caliph would not
recognize Shajarat al-Durr as a legitimate Sultana. Before this meeting,
she had already plotted to de-legitimize Shajarat al-Durr by expressing the
latter’s desire for power to ‘Abbasid Caliph.71
Much like Sallāfa’s wish, Caliph Musta‘ṣim sent a letter to the minis-
ters and leaders of the Egyptian army. The letter asserted that “if there
is no man who will be Sultan, we will choose and send him to you.”72
Having heard this news, the Egyptians demanded a male Sultan from the
Ayyūbid family.73
In her “campaign” against Shajarat al-Dūrr, Sallāfa even went as far as
to hatch another plot with ‘Izz al-Dīn Aybak, in an attempt to separate
her from the slave girl Shūkār. She attempted to convince Shajarat al-Durr
that Caliph Musta‘ṣim wanted to marry Shūkār.74 Subsequently, Shūkār
departed for Baghdad, and Sallāfa came to Baybars and promised him
that she would try to bring his beloved Shūkār to Egypt.75 Sallāfa believed
she was truly in love with Baybars.76 This romantic element adds to the
novel’s appeal.
So far, Baybars appeared as a straightforward man and even confessed
that he and other Mamluk leaders killed Ṭūrānshāh. He justified the kill-
ing by saying to Shajarat al-Durr that Ṭūrānshāh did not go out to fight
and was fickle, impatient, and temperamental.77 Like Shajarat al-Durr,
Baybars saw himself as the most powerful man and knew that ‘Izz al-Dīn
Aybak would be his most powerful rival.78 Similarly, it is clearly stated that
Baybars desired to be the Sultan of Egypt.79
In the meantime, Baybars was determined to travel to Baghdad to find
his beloved Shūkār. On hearing of Baybars’ visit, Wazir Mu’ayyid al-Dīn
applauded him by saying that he fulfilled his vision as, during the war
against the Crusaders, God had asked him to do so. Saḥbān uncovered his
high expectation of Baybars and added that “he participated in the battle
against the Europeans and liberated Egypt from their hands [and] may
even help us to liberate Baghdad from other Europeans.”80
Baybars finally came to Egypt to find his beloved Shūkār and met Saḥbān
and Muyid al-Dīn, and promised them he would help the new Caliph to
rule Egypt.81 Caliph Musta‘ṣim recognized Baybars’ heroic and brilliant
military achievement in saying that he would let him “head [Musta‘ṣim’s]
army to fight against the Mongols.”82 Wazir Mu’ayyid al-Dīn joined to
“put in a good word” for Baybars, remarking that he is a brave hero and a
wise man, who once united Egypt.83
Under the pressure of Hülegü’s (Mongols) persistent attack, Baybars
began to think of transferring the Caliphate from Baghdad to Cairo. He
thought to himself, “If I transfer the Caliphate to Egypt from Baghdad,
Cairo will be the center of the Islamic world. It does not necessarily require
an Amir or a Sultan, but does need a Caliph to maintain an indepen-
dent administration.”84 However, Baybars had not seriously considered
78 I.K. SUNG
transferring the Caliph from Baghdad to Cairo before he met Saḥbān. It

was Saḥbān who inspired Baybars to enthrone the Caliph in Egypt.
As in the case of other novels, Baybars is represented as a symbol of
Egyptian nationalism, but one important difference is found in this par-
ticular work. As mentioned above, Baybars only began to consider moving
the Caliphate after his meeting with Saḥbān. A heated debate between
Baybars and Saḥbān on the legitimacy of Egypt to the Caliphate sym-
bolically conveys two contrasting views of past and future. For Baybars,
a symbol of the past, it was a radically new idea to establish a Caliphate
in Egypt, let alone a Shiite Caliphate. By contrast, for Saḥbān, a symbol
of the future, and a Shiite Muslim who fled from Baghdad to Cairo, the
geographical shift was not only possible, but also a blessing from God:
[Baybars:] There are no lands that are free from the ‘Abbasid Caliphate.
[Saḥbān :] They say so, but things have changed, no doubt.
[Baybars:] Are you doing this to be free from the Caliphate?
[Saḥbān :] Certainly not, my Lord.
[Baybars:] From where do we obtain a Caliph [deputy] and who establishes
our authority in Egypt?
[Saḥbān:] Is it not true that stabilization came only from Iraq? Is it not
right that stabilization will come from Egypt? Was Egypt not such a brilliant
Caliphate [deputyship] for at least for 100 years?
Baybars could not endure it and said: You mean the country of slaves and
those of Shiite [Fāṭimid].
[Saḥbān:] What’s wrong with being a Shiite or a Sunni – these are not
Muslims from Qurayshi. The only difference is that the center of the
Caliphate will be in the country [bilad, Egypt] in which its wealth is grow-
ing, trade is expanding and fleets are built. It [Egypt] even passed Iraq in
sublime authority rather than being subdued to its power.85
Agreeing with Saḥbān, Shajarat al-Durr said to Baybars:
Oh Baybars, now it is your turn to speak and I will not add to what you
heard from him [Saḥbān] about Baghdad’s weakness or about the Egyptian
Sultanate that has been enslaved in the hands of Atabeg ‘Izz al-Dīn for eight
years.86
In addition to the Egypt-centered view, there are other contemporary

socio-political contexts that are reflected in this passage. First, secular
liberalism flourished in Egypt’s political arena in the 1910s, competing

with Egyptian nationalism and reformist Islam. During those days, liberal
nationalist political parties, such as Umma and the National Party (al-Ḥizb
al-Waṭanī), were born. Above all, many liberalist periodicals, particularly
al-Muqtaṭaf and Zaydān’s al-Hilāl, began to publish articles on classics
on European law, politics, history, geography, and philosophy, and many
new translations of these texts saw light.
At the same time, Pan-Islamism also emerged in Egypt in the 1910s.
When Shaykh ‘Alī Yūsuf advocated this ideology in 1906–7, he not only
expressed opposition to the British presence in Egypt, but also succeeded
in mobilizing Egyptian support for the Ottoman Empire. Under these
distinctive, but not necessarily contradictory, ideologies—Western egali-
tarianism and Pan-Islamism—Zaydān encouraged the Egyptians to lift the
invisible divide between Sunnis and Shiites and create one united Egypt.
Parallel with a liberal political sentiment, Zaydān underlined his
Egyptian-centered standpoint by comparing Egypt with Baghdad. As
mentioned, Musta‘ṣim recognized the supremacy of Baybars’ military
prowess. Moreover, Aḥmad Abū Bakr, the son of Caliph Musta‘ṣim, made
the mistake of ordering his army to plunder the mostly Shiite people of
Karak.87 During these atrocities, the people of Karak, including Saḥbān’s
parents, were plundered by the Caliph of Musta‘ṣim’s army. More seri-
ously, in the midst of the operation, Aḥmad found Shūkār, abducted her,
and did not report it to his father.88 The army’s oppression of the people
signifies that the downfall of the ‘Abbasid dynasty after Baghdad was at
the hands of the Mongols. It seems that Zaydān sensed this shift in the
regional division of power and felt a duty to rouse the Egyptians to pre-
pare for Egypt’s new and enlightened age.
Despite Baybars’ long and fierce debate with Saḥban, he was not yet
certain of the viability of establishing a Shiite Caliphate in Egypt, adding
that it “is not only wrong, but also not sensible.”89 Saḥbān made persistent
efforts to amend Baybars’ antipathy toward the Shiite, and particularly
toward the Alawite. After hearing that the Alawite played an important
role in the battle against the Mongols, Saḥbān said to Baybars: “It seems
that Alawites are defeating Mongols.” Baybars’ impatience with the
Alawite (Shiite) receded, and he replied to Saḥbān that the Alawites had
been “ill-treated.”90 Saḥbān kept arguing that there should be an Egyptian
Caliphate again. Saḥbān asked Baybars:
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Is it possible to persuade Hülegü to leave the ‘Abbasid Caliph? Is he really

determined to destroy it?
[Baybars:] It is sheer annihilation. He aims to kill the sons of ‘Abbasid.
….
[Baybars:] He is eradicating the ‘Abbasid dynasty, the gold of Islam.
[Saḥbān:] We will return to the Fāṭimid Caliphate.
[Baybars:] You suffer from hallucinations.91
Apart from Baybars, the Mamluks are collectively represented in negative

terms.
[Muyid al-Dīn:] We have been living in the sublime country for hundreds
of years.
[Critical of the Mamluks, Saḥbān responds:] Do you mean Egypt, where
we are now? Turks ruled Egypt, and they [the Mamluks and Turks] fought
each other for power.92
Finally, Sallāfa confessed her love to Baybars, expressing her enduring

devotion and declaring that he is now the “Sultan of Egypt.”93 Sallāfa was
executed after revealing her plot to kill Shajarat al-Dūrr and ‘Izz al-Dīn
Aybak.94
The main theme of this novel is thus summarized in three parts. First,
Zaydān intentionally chose this turbulent period in the history of Islam
and the Arabs in order to awaken his readers to Egypt’s glorious past.
More importantly, through this story, Zaydān tacitly called upon his
Egyptian readership to reclaim the country’s honor and glory. This senti-
ment is undoubtedly related to a prototype of Egyptian nationalism.
The other message hinted at in the novel is related to the sub-plot of
unity between Shiite and Sunni Muslim. The unity of Egypt’s different
sects and sectors was a fundamental factor in any form of nationalism.
It is therefore not surprising that Zaydān applied this theme. A much
more significant point is that the Shiite merchant Saḥbān played a deci-
sive role in transferring the Caliphate to Egypt. This call for unity also
promoted equality between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. Lastly, Shajarat
al-Durr symbolizes an independent and national female heroine with
self-confidence and excellent political skills. Through reshaping this
new and modern female image, Zaydān aimed at taking issue with the
subject of gender equality in Egyptian society.
Shajarat al - Durr (by Muḥammad Sa‘īd al-‘Aryān)
Muḥammad Sa‘īd al-‘Aryān ( 1905–1964), a senior Egyptian writer, grad-

uated from Dār al-‘Ulūm (a teacher training college) in 1930 and was
the first paid teacher there. He then moved to the Ministry of Education
and took part in the publication of a large number of children’s stories
in magazines. He became famous for his historical novels. His greatest
accomplishment was his work on Sindbad Magazine for children in early
1952, and he worked for the publishing house as chairman and editor for
more than ten years.
While working at the Ministry of Education, he was involved in building
school libraries in Egypt and the establishment of public centers abroad,
through which he attempted to impart knowledge to the public and also
worked hard to remove barriers to the export of books published in Egypt.
He began his career immediately after graduating from Dār al-‘Ulūm
in 1930 to work as a teacher in a primary school, Sherbin. In 1932, he
moved to the School of Qasida in Ṭanṭā, and in 1936 to the Shubra
Elementary School for Girls. In 1942, he moved into the Ministry
of Education where he supervised the public culture, and in 1944 he
became head of the press office of the Ministry. On October 18, 1945,
under a penname he criticized in newspapers some educational deci-
sions issued by the Minister ‘Abd al- Razāq Sanhūrī. As punishment, the
minister transferred him to a school in Gerga along with the separation
of his daughters from school, and when he resisted, he submitted to a
disciplinary trial. However, it was found that the order had been per-
sonal political revenge after he defended himself.
He returned to work in 1946 to be the director of the artistic office of
the Ministry of Education under Muḥammad Ḥasan Shamawī. However,
once again he criticized the minister ‘Abdul Razāk Sanhūrī and his policies,
and transferred as a secondary school teacher in 1948; he then decided to
leave government service and devote himself to literature and journalism,
but the Minister of Education, ‘Alī Ayyūb, persuaded him to abandon his
request, and he moved to a library of technical observers as assistant to the
works of art in 1949, and Ṭaha Ḥusayn and the Ministry of Education in
1950 kept him in the same post.
Many of his articles in Egyptian and Arab magazines covered different
areas of literary criticism and perspectives. He regularly wrote in periodi-
cals such as al-Thaqāfa (1935–1945), al-Risāla (1935–1953) , al-Nadha’
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(1947–1948), and the Dār al-‘Ulum newspaper (1936–1943), as well as

Pioneer, a journal issued by the teachers’ union in Egypt (1954–1964).
Shajarat al-Durr is the second of al-‘Aryān’s novels discussed in
this study. Unlike ‘Alā Bāb al-Zuwayla, which deals with the Circassian
Mamluk era, this novel sheds light on the Baḥrī Mamluk era, and par-
ticularly on Shajarat al-Durr. The novel’s composition marks another sig-
nificant shift from other novels. As the author remarks in the preface, the
work is accessible, even to a younger audience. In order to achieve this
end, al-‘Aryān used foreshadowing to develop his story. Thus, it is dif-
ficult to find much dramatic story development since the end of novel is
revealed to the reader at an early stage. For example, Abū Zuhra predicted
that Aybak would be Sultan, but his friends, Qalāwūn, Baybars, and Aqṭāy,
did not take it seriously and mocked him.95 Abū Zuhra warned Aybak that
he would die before getting married,96 prophesying that Shajarat al-Durr
would be Sultana and that Aybak’s Mamluks would remove her.97
One of the most important keys to interpreting the representations
of the Mamluks is to understand the novel’s central theme, which is
inevitably connected to the author’s worldview. In the preface, al-‘Aryān
remarked that the protagonists of the novel are Queen Shajarat al-Durr
and her husband King Sāliḥ al-Ayyūb.98 More clearly, al-‘Aryān made posi-
tive allusions to Shajarat al-Durr, some even verging on glorification, by
stressing the importance of Shajarat al-Durr to the history of Islam and
Egypt.99 Therefore, the ideological background that lies at the core of this
adoration of Shajarat al-Durr should be examined.
However since discussion of al-‘Aryān’s second novel will follow, we
will critically define al-‘Aryān’s political and ideological orientation mani-
fested in Egyptian nationalism later on. In this novel, al-‘Aryan’s nation-
alistic views were composed of two main sentiments: an Egypt-centered
standpoint and the significant role of anonymous Egyptians’ role in the
country’s historical development:
The name of Shajarat al-Durr is renowned as she was the first Sulṭāna in
Islamic history.100 Mongols were defeated at the hands of the Egyptian army
at ‘Ayn Jālūt in Palestine. It was a fatal defeat. During the reign of Shajarat
al-Durr, the Egyptian army protected al-Hijāz [Mecca].101
Another marked nationalist sentiment seen in the preface is the blurred

line between the Mamluks and the Egyptian army. This trend clearly indi-
cates that al-‘Aryān assimilated Mamluk history into Egyptian national
history. Furthermore, al-‘Aryān’s identification with Egyptian territorial
nationalism reshaped the war between the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria:
“It was the Egyptian Mamluks or the Egyptian Army of Shajarat al-Durr
who fought against Nāṣir al-Ayyūb and his Mamluks.”102 One of the
prominent features of Egyptian nationalist historiography was the pivotal
role it attributed to the Egyptian public in shaping events. This role was,
indeed, more significant than that awarded to its leaders. Accordingly,
the novel depicted women and children as active participants in the war
against the Crusaders:
At the Al-Manṣūra battle, the Egyptian army could not stop Louis IX’s
forces. Behind the Egyptian army, there were thousands of people from
the city, men, women, children seized by death. The country was soon
filled with dead bodies. Fakhr al-Dīn did nothing.103… The Egyptians were
the ones who resisted the Crusaders [Louis IX] and defended Egypt.104
… Women, children and the elderly participated in the battle against the
Crusaders at Damietta.105
Returning to Shajarat al-Durr, she was sanctified not only as a woman of noble
origins, but also as a great beauty. “She is neither Turkish nor Armenian, nor
Circassian nor European, but rather the daughter of Eve. She is immensely
beautiful, with a unique skin tone and a clever and heavenly voice.”106
Moreover, the novel convincingly narrated the secret of Shajarat al-
Durr’s birth, thereby providing the quintessential element of melodrama.
In fact, Shajarat al-Durr was the daughter of Fāṭima Khātūn, the wife of
Sultan Azbak al-Bahlwān of Tabriz. Fāṭima Khātūn was the daughter of
Toğrül of Seljūq.107 Fāṭima Khātūn forged an alliance with Sultan Jalāl
al-Dīn Khwārizm Shāh (the last Sultan of Khwārizm) and married him,
sending her daughter, Shajarat al-Durr, to Badr al-Dīn Ṣāhib al-Mosul.
Although Shajarat al-Durr was of much more respectable origins than the
daughter of Badr al-Dīn, she was nevertheless humiliated.108
Shajarat al-Durr was further portrayed as an ambitious, power-thirsty
woman. Although she remembered the prophesy of Abū Zuhra—that she
would be the Sultana of East and West but would die as a consequence—
Shajarat al-Durr did not forfeit her three main goals: men, the throne, and
military prowess.109
The fact that Shajarat al-Durr was female did not seem to affect her
military skills. When Baybars headed the troops that guarded the gate,
Shajarat al-Durr commanded the battle.110
However, Shajarat al-Durr’s most significant quality was her politi-
cal and diplomatic skills. She appeared to have enough political acumen
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to command the country. Shajarat ordered her servant (Jihān) to gather

information about Baybars111 and, more importantly, saved Ṣāliḥ al-Ayyūbī
by deceiving ‘Ashūr Khatūn, Nāṣir Dawūd’s wife. Shajarat al-Durr prom-
ised that if ‘Ashūr Khatūn freed Ṣāliḥ al- Ayyūbī, ‘Ashūr Khatūn’s hus-
band Nāṣir would become Sultan of Syria and Egypt in compensation.112
After his release, Sāliḥ Ayyūbī left for Egypt, and Shajarat al-Durr removed
Sayf al-Dīn, appointing Nāṣir as Sultan of Syria, as promised. However, it
did not take long before the relationship between Nāṣir and Sāliḥ Ayyūbī
deteriorated.113
Thanks to her excellent political and diplomatic skills, Shajarat al-
Durr enjoyed great popularity among the Egyptians. After the killing of
Ṭūrānshāh, Shajarat al-Durr’s rights to the sultancy were not contested,
although the case of a female Sultana was unprecedented in Islamic
Egypt.114
So far, we have examined the glorification and beautification of Shajarat
al-Durr, but we should also refer to different descriptions later on. In
opposition to Shajarat al-Durr’s positive representation, the Mamluks
were collectively portrayed in negative terms:
Many of these Mamluks’ lives revolved around the pleasures of food and
prosperity. When they convened, they engaged in mere mockery. When
alone, they only craved food, drink, and slave girls.115
Shajarat al-Durr and all the other Mamluk leaders were depicted as power-
thirsty. Baybars, Aqṭāy, and Qalāwūn complained about Aybak’s rise to
the throne:
Baybars: Thanks to good luck and her excellent leadership, Shajarat al-Durr
brought us victory at the battle of al-Manṣūra and the battle of Fārskūr
Aqṭāy: You should deny it, since the victory was your achievement. Without
your bravery, the battle may have turned out very differently.116
Baybars: What are you and I and those Turkmens altogether? If we are not
the army of the country, what are we and why did we not stop the disaster
befalling our country? Indeed, we have full rights to this country.117
Aqṭāy: Furthermore, she [Shajarat al-Durr] neglected our rights and
brought Aybak upon us!
Qalāwūn said Abu Zuhra al-Manjim prophesized that he (Aybak) would

be Sultan.118
Aqṭāy: Since the Turkish Mamluks were emancipated from the hands of
Crusaders, it is impossible to go back to Kurdish Sultan [Ayyūbids]. I will
push her away if Aybak al-Jāshankīr will succeed the throne.119
Aqṭāy, in particular, is portrayed as a greedy man who lusted for power

in the introduction of the protagonists in the last part of the novel.120
Aqṭāy complained about Aybak’s empowerment, and thus plotted his
assassination:
Aybak has no right to the kingship as he is not a Mamluk of Ṣāliḥ and who
is neither the most powerful nor oldest nor bravest Mamluk.121
Aqṭāy planned to kill Aybak,122 but was killed by him,123 thus fulfilling Abū
Zuhra’s prophecy.124
It is unusual to find that someone other than Baybars Quṭuz, the Mamluk
of Aybak, defeated the Mongols at the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt,125 while Baybars
is referred to as a pious Mamluk king.126
The Egypt-centered view, a crucial component of Egyptian nationalism,
is clearly present in the discussion of the letter sent to Shajarat al-Durr by
Aybak, who was in Baghdad. Having received the letter that suggests the
need for a male Sultan, Shajarat al-Durr was not confident she could fill the
position and hesitated over whether she should obey ‘Abbasid and appoint
a male Sultan.127 Aybak encouraged Shajarat al-Durr by advising her that
Egypt did not depend on Baghdad but had voluntary relations with it.128
However, the tragic strife between Aybak and Shajarat al-Durr had
developed long before, stemming from Aybak’s wish to take a wife:
Aybak wanted a child by Shajarat al-Durr, but she could not have one.
Quṭuz attempted to persuade Aybak that he had the right to rule Egypt
and marry Badr al-Dīn Lūlū, daughter of the Emir of Mosul, who resided
in Baghdad.129
Shaykh Badr al-Dīn Shanjāri, Qāḍī al-Quḍā of Egypt advised Aybak to watch
out for a Fitna (civil war) between Egypt and Ayyūbids, as in the daughter of
a prince (Shajarat al-Durr) resides in his house.130
As a result, Shajarat al-Durr’s mental condition was drastically aggravated.

At last, she became delusional:
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Shajarat al-Durr had a hallucination in which Aybak sought advice with

Badr al-Dīn Mosul’s daughter and they were mocking her. She even saw
al-Manṣūr Ṣāḥib Ḥamā sitting on the throne in her stead.131
Possessed by the fear of dethronement, Shajarat al-Durr turned to Nāṣir

Salāḥal-Dīn Sāhib of Damascus and asked him to attack Egypt.132 She also
ordered a slave to slay Aybak.133
Aybak’s death is a turning point that dramatically shifts Shajarat al-
Durr’s initial heroic portrayal, re-positioning her as an ordinary, flawed
human being. Shajarat al-Durr felt guilty about the killing of Aybak, and
repeatedly cried for help. Possessed by Satan, she was unable to make any
plan to rule.134 The mother of ̒Alī ibn Aybak explained to her son what
had happened to Aybak:
[Mother of ̒Alī ibn Aybak:] Aybak did not die a natural death. Shajarat al-
Durr killed him.
[ ̒Alī ibn Aybak:] What made you think so?
[Mother of ̒Alī ibn Aybak:] Because Aybak wanted to scare her by taking on
another wife.
[ ̒Alī ibn Aybak:] Why did you not kill him on Shajarat al-Durr’s wedding day?
[Mother of ̒Alī ibn Aybak:] I had been waiting for him.135
…
From the last scene of the novel, the emerging question is why al-‘Aryān
attempted to characterize Shajarat al-Durr as an ordinary human being,
in contrast to the heroic image that appears in the first half of the novel.
One possibility is that in this episode al-‘Aryān attempted to convince
the readers of Shajarat al-Durr’s complexity, which stands in contrast to
other heroic characters. Orit Bashkin sheds light on Shajarat al-Durr’s
intricate character.
Bashkin argues that three important discourses about women and their
roles in society are echoed in Zaydān’s historical novels. The first is a debate
pertaining to women’s isolation and lack of education. Many other Egyptian
scholars addressed the issue of female seclusion. The feminist intellectual
Malak Hifnī Nāsif (1886–1918), for example, compared women’s seclu-
sion to the practice of burying girls alive in the pre-Islamic Arabia.136 The
works of the influential Egyptian intellectual Qāsim Amīn (1863–1908),137
which denounced woman’s seclusion and called for their education, gener-
ated important discussions about womanhood in Egypt.138
Much like these scholars, al-‘Aryān raised the question of whether

Shajarat al-Durr’s seclusion stemmed from Aybak’s intention to marry
another woman. It seems that in the sub-plot of Shajarat al-Durr, al-‘Aryān
aimed to achieve two goals. First, he justified Shajarat al-Durr’s killing of
Aybak, presenting it as an inevitable measure; second, he addressed a con-
temporary issue of women’s rights and liberties in the changing Egyptian
society of the 1930s.
In sum, al-‘Aryān used the Mamluks and their history in order to under-
line two emerging contemporary issues: Egyptian nationalism and freedom,
and women’s rights. Among many other Egyptian nationalistic senti-
ments, the Egypt-centered view is clearly highlighted in Aybak and Shajarat
al-Durr’s discussion on the relationship between Egypt and Baghdad.
In Shajarat al-Durr’s portrayal as an ordinary, flesh-and-blood woman,
al-‘Aryān succeeded in presenting to his readers the issue of women’s rights.
‘Alā Bāb Zuwayla (by Muḥammad Sa‘īd al-‘Aryān)
Before embarking on a critical analysis of the Mamluk representation in

this novel, I will begin with a brief summary of its plot. Ṭūmānbāy, the last
Mamluk Sultan, was kidnapped as a child and taken from the Caucasus to
Syria, where he was sold as a slave to Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī. Qānṣūh treated
Ṭūmānbāy as a favorite despite the fact that he discovered he was the
son of Arkamas, with whom Qānṣūh had been waging a blood-feud, and
whom he now believed to be dead. However, Arkamās was not dead, and
killed Qānṣūh in the great battle of Marj Dābiq, in which the Ottomans
defeat the Mamluks.
Meanwhile, Ṭūmānbāy’s mother had set out to find her lost son, and
after a difficult journey of many years she met her husband, Arkamās.
Arkamās had just returned to Egypt after killing Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī. He
learned from his wife that Sultan Ṭūmānbāy was his son. Without reveal-
ing his identity to his wife, who had not recognized him, he took her to
Cairo to help her meet her son. However, Ṭūmānbāy was defeated by the
Ottomans and publicly hanged on the Zuwayla Gate.139 The novel is filled
with melodramatic elements, such as its tragic ending, foreshadowing, and
the secret birth storyline, and is deeply engaging for these reasons.
Compared to other novels that deal with the Baḥri Mamluk era, this
novel’s historical background, as presented in this chapter, is unique, as it
focuses on the Circassian Mamluk periods and particularly the last days of
the Mamluk dynasty, from the end of Mamluk al-Ashraf Qāytbāy’s reign to
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the Ottoman conquest (1490–1517). Six Sultans ruled during this period,
and none of them died from natural causes due to the struggle for power,
which included numerous plots and assassinations. The author seemingly
chose the Circassian Mamluks due to the precarious socio-political condi-
tion of his day, as will be discussed later on.
In addition to the power struggles, the novel vividly portrays the greed
of the Mamluk ruling class and the injustices suffered by the Egyptian
people, who were crushed by confiscations and increasing taxation, espe-
cially during the reign of Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (1501–17).140 This tendency
to portray the Circassian Mamluks in an unflattering manner is by no
means new and may be encountered in Egyptian textbooks and present-
day historiography. The negative portrayal may stem from the bloodshed
and power struggles, as compared to the Baḥri Mamluk era.
In contrast to other historical writings that deal with the topic, this
novel offers an interesting and novel background to the power struggles
and oppression, which may be far more plausible and apologetic than that
of the accepted and monolithic tone. The novel begins with the Mamluk
leaders’ veiled enmity and intrigues, as usually encountered in descrip-
tions of political life of the palace. Qānṣūh and Akbardī’s power struggle
emerged141 in the palace, and Qānṣūh hatched a plot to remove his rival,
Akbardī, in order to advance his favorite, Sultan Qāytbāy.142
There were ample rumors of conspiracy and suspicious deaths. After
the mysterious death of Karatbāy, who did not die of natural causes, it
was believed that his wife, Miṣrbāy, had murdered him in order to be
united with Sultan Nāṣir Ibn Qāytbāy. Jānibāy denied this rumor, sug-
gesting that Qānṣūh deceived her and killed Karatbāy in order to increase
his power.143 Finally, an assassination plot was hatched to depose Sultan
al-Qāytbāy. Allegedly, Qānṣūh, Khāir Ibn Malbāy, and Ṭūmān Ibn Akhī
al-Ghawrī took part in it.144 In the meantime, Ṭūmānbāy complained
about the Qāytbāy:
Is it not enough for this young boy [Sultan Qāytbāy] to cause a disaster
and disgrace in the household? The women even cooperated with his uncle
in slandering a girl [Miṣrbāy] whom he desired, beginning his betrayal and
breaking his oath. Why did these people [Egyptians] bear the blame for the
crime of the young Sultan, who did not even listen to others when they cried
for help?145
One day, Sultan Qāytbāy was killed, and al-Ẓāhir Qānṣūh assumed the
throne,146... inviting a series of plots against new Sultans, such as the ones
that aimed to kill al-Ẓāhir Qānṣūh147 and Sutlan al-Ashraf Jānbulāt.148
As a result of the ongoing internal strife, even Mamluk leader Qānṣūh
expressed exhaustion: “I feel disgust with the attempts to pacify the sons
of the Circassians – some will die at the hands of others, and they will rob
all this country’s resources (tools).”149 It is further stated that, since the
death of Sultan Qāytbāy, after many years of bloodshed, the basis of suc-
cession of the throne remained unchanged in Egypt.150
It is interesting that the power struggle had become the ridicule of the
Ottomans. Jānibāy’s husband, Khushqadam, betrayed the Mamluk Sultan
and mocked the Mamluk succession system in front of Ottoman Sultan
Salīm: “They kill each other,” he stated, “and enjoy themselves until other
Mamluks kill each other.”151
Interestingly, neither the Sultan nor the Mamluk leaders are accused of
these vicious power struggles. This new interpretation sets this novel apart.
Interestingly, it is al-‘Aryān who blamed the Sultan’s mother, Aṣlbāy, for
Sultan Qāytbāy’s isolation. “Aṣlbāy [the Sultan’s mother] monopolized
the Sultan and controlled his relations with the world. He was discon-
nected and emotionally detached from his family and surroundings.”152
According to al-‘Aryān’s keen insight, not only the Sultan’s isolation
but also the terrible power struggles stemmed not from greedy Mamluk
leaders, but from the lack of stable succession. Al-‘Aryān viewed this
abominable custom as a flaw in the system, rather than as the responsibil-
ity of individual Sultans.
When the Mamluk leaders attacked the palace, Qānṣūh made efforts
to defend it, but it did not take long before the palace fell. The rebellion
was immediately supported by Qānṣūh’s men. The third-person narrator
justified this betrayal by asking: “Those Mamluks were not older than
Qānṣūh. Are those Mamluks who are older not dead and buried? This vio-
lent dethroning replaced the proper succession of the throne. Regulated
succession was desperately absent during the Circassian Mamluk era.”153
Slave merchant Malbāy pointed out the paradox in the origins of the
Mamluk slave system:
Is it surprising that all Sultans who have succeeded the Pharaohs for over
one hundred years produced slavery? For why criticize those who hand over
[surrender] their necks to slaves and promote them [slaves] to the throne.
Is it their concern to maintain the power [authority], honor and Sultan?154
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Following Ṭūmānbāy’s death, internal palace politics entered a new

phase. Sultan al-Ghawrī was the first chosen by a council designed to select
a Sultan to succeed Ṭūmānbāy, without internal strife and bloodshed.155
Sultan al-Ghawrī assured Aṣlbāy he would not confiscate the wealth of the
deposed Sultan or dislodge him.156 It initially seemed that this reform in
the succession system was likely to settle the power struggle among the
Mamluk leaders, but the reality on the ground was far more complicated.
Despite this new succession regulation, the fragile political condition,
prone to internal struggle, remained unchanged as the faction of young
leaders was as preoccupied with its honor (nobility) and rank as it had
been before. Mostly, they understood that the only way to assume the
throne would be for the Sultan to die of natural causes.157 After Ghawrī
was chosen by agreement, none of the Mamluks struggled for that par-
ticular position; nonetheless, they continued to fight and kill each other.158
Sultan al-Ghawrī appeared to have no choice but to follow the previ-
ous practice and strengthen his power. As in the cases of previous Sultans,
al-Ghawrī tried to maintain his throne in a similar manner, ignoring all
issues except for the goal of removing his enemies and sparking dispute
among them.159 Although he was not greedy (he did not ambitiously pur-
sue revenues and fortune), he required wealth in order to remain in power.
Hence, his economic policy concentrated on the accumulation of wealth.
He even went as far as to trade in food and clothes, sell government posts,
and monopolize business and taxation revenues.160
Undoubtedly, al-Ghawrī’s most fatal mistake, and the one that deter-
mined his fate, was to betray his adherents and those who supported him.
Not having distributed the booty among his peers, he accumulated much
wealth, abandoning those Egyptians who contributed to it and helped
al-Ghawrī defeat his rivals and consequently strengthened his power.161
It is in this episode of Sultan al-Ghawrī that al-‘Aryān novelty can be
seen. By presenting al-Ghawrī’s dilemma, al-‘Aryān succeeds in posing
the paradox of governance arising from the confrontation between the
wealth of the state and the welfare of the people, thus posing to the reader
questions of political philosophy. The presentation of these general issues
may also reflect the author’s critical mind, considering Egypt’s contem-
porary socio-political situation. The conversation between al-Ghawrī and
Ṭūmānbāy II shows the former’s dilemma much more clearly.
Ṭūmānbāy II came to al-Ghawrī with complaints about the spreading
poverty and suffering. Ghawrī replied that it was inevitable to govern the
country and defend it against its enemies, such as the Ottomans. In addi-
tion, Ghawrī asked: “Did not they see great buildings such as mosques, for-
tress and vessels?” Ṭūmānbāy II replied by arguing that “the people of Egypt
did not think like you and they wanted food, security, clothes.” Ghawrī
asked, “Did not they know that the pirates of the Indian Ocean used French
canons?”162 Ṭūmānbāy II replied, “As long as the gold and silvers are used
for building the Sultans’ houses, the people will not be convinced.”163
Following the failure of his reforms, the last days of Sultan al-Ghawrī
are presented in a similar manner to those of previous Sultans: betrayal
of the Viceroy and internal division. Badr al-Dīn Ibn Muzahir, Khāir Ibn
Malbāy (Viceroy of Aleppo), hatched a plot against Ghawrī.164 Ṭūmānbāy
informed al-Ghawrī that Jānibāy had seized the people’s money and prop-
erty, and they now suffered from poverty and economic hardships.165
Facing Ottoman Sultan Salim’s attack on Syria, Mamluk leaders were
still divided by internal strife. The council charged Khāir Ibn Malbāy, the
Viceroy of Syria (Aleppo), with an attempt to assume power and reported
this to Sultan al-Ghawrī.166
There is no difference in the case of the last days of Ṭūmānbāy. An
Egyptian man named Abū Bakr al-Rammāh described the last moments
before the fatal Ottoman attack, blaming the last Mamluk Sultan for
Egypt’s miserable state:
He [the Ottoman Sultan] is a man of wealth, passion and power. Don’t you
see soldiers are getting ready to depart for war? Don’t you see our master
seeking only to take possession [vilayet] and the power to rule it? It is no
wonder that Ṭūmānbāy decided to take the burden and it is foolish that he is
going to surrender himself to his enemy and abandon the homeland to the
Ottomans. It seems that they will fall under Ottoman sovereignty.167
The Mamluk oppression of the Egyptians is detailed:
Men ceased to walk or ride on the streets for fear of death and all kinds of
menace. Women and children withdrew their heads to observe [watch] the
street, waiting for their detained fathers and husbands to come home.168 The
Mamluks attacked houses, plundered merchants, broke gates and snatched
turbans. All these kinds of behavior weakened the Sultan and caused unrest,
civil war [fitna] and violent protests.169 And these also provoked internal war
between other Mamluk leaders.170
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At last, the Mamluk oppression led to the revolt of the youths and Arabs:
Taxes were imposed on the people in the name of the Sultan. The peo-
ple were oppressed by the burdens of tax and tyranny. Arabs and youths
awaited an opportunity for strife and internal revolt in order to destroy these
Circassian Mamluks and avenge the Mamluk regime.171
In contrast to these negative images of the Mamluks, Ṭūmānbāy I is

presented as a good, faithful, and clever Sultan. In an impressive scene,
Ṭūmānbāy I accepted his painful fate. The fortune-teller Arkam al-Ramāl
visited Ṭūmānbāy I and warned him that a new brilliant star would rise.
Ṭūmānbāy I already knew about Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī172 and was not startled
by the prophecy. Rather, he thanked God for appointing a successor.173
Ghawrī seized the throne by removing Ṭūmānbāy.174
Ṭūmānbāy II is depicted as another good but tragic and even nationalist
Egyptian figure.175 He is depicted in the following positive terms: He is
a friend of the people, a son of the people. He has eyes that see, ears that
hear, a heart that feels, and a hand that gives.176 Furthermore, Ṭūmānbāy
II is described as an excellent Sultan.
There was no unrest among the people and no one disturbed this peaceful
condition created by Ṭūmānbāy’s administration. The Sultan had full com-
mand of the army and defended the borders.177
The best example of his popularity among the people can be found in the
phrase “He was the most beloved Sultan by the people.”178
Another important issue is the Egyptian nationalism embodied in the
novel, which is closely related to the political orientation and worldview of
al-‘Aryān. There is no significant difference in the Egyptian nationalistic
ethos compared to other historical literatures considered in the present
study. In one passage, al-‘Aryān emphasizes the eternity of Egyptian sov-
ereignty—one of the primary essences of nationalism.
There was an Egyptian empire extending between the Byzantine Empire

[Roman Empire or Anatolia] and the eastern and western Libyan desert,
from the border of Yemen on the Indian coast to the eastern and western
part of the Roman shores. The empire enjoyed full independence and free-
dom and no country from the east or the west threatened its sovereignty and
self-rule. Thus, it enjoyed self-sovereignty.179
Turks from Ṭūlūnids and Ikhshid and Arabs from Caliphs and slaves of
Fāṭimids, Kurds from Ibn Ayyūb and Mamluks – despite the different
regimes the empire has never been under the sovereignty of a foreign
country.180
In many instances, the Egyptians are described as nationalistic and

brave people who do not fear the Ottomans. Even after hearing that the
Ottomans are preparing another attack on Egypt, none of them sighed
or became feeble. They were happy to defend Egypt and Syria and called
upon Egyptians, Arabs, and the Mamluks to protect their honor and
women.181 ‘Izz al-Dīn writes the following:
This is justice, for what this enemy came to us for Circassian? For the sake
of Egypt? What are these Circassians in Egypt for? They are only a ruling
minority that enjoys a luxurious life.182 Although these people [Circassians]
would be dead we should defend our Harem, property, and our homeland.
Abū Bakr should rise to the throne.183
Due to the diverse aspects of Egyptian nationalism touched upon in the

novel, it is difficult to define al-‘Aryān’s Egyptian nationalism as one steady
pattern. However, it could be asserted that he showed a tendency toward
integralist Egyptian nationalism. Decisive proof of integralist Egyptian
nationalism can be seen in two different stories: one story tells of a for-
eigner who joined the Egyptian revolt, and the other reports of Arabs who
sympathized with the Egyptian cause and assimilated into Egyptian society:
Alī Ibn Raḥāb was not one of those greedy Mamluks. He did not
identify with the rebelling Egyptians. Rather, his Egyptianism
[miṣriyatahu] forced him to observe the affairs in the country between peo-
ple and their generals (leaders).184
These dangers united the spirit of Egyptians that is transmitted from gen-
eration to generation and declared at other times. There were neither evil
troops nor Arab [Bedouin] attacks on the borders, but they silently expressed
their sympathy with the Egyptian mind, identity [nufus] that is composed of
various components as water in the pot will water the edge of the vessel.185
In his integralist Egyptian nationalism, al-‘Aryān also articulates a very

positive view of Arab Egyptian nationalism:
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The Mamluks established their own type of regime and continued their cor-
rupted system. Indeed, they plundered and attacked.186 There is only one
way for liberation: a unity of authority for correcting the crooked in order
to bring to the throne an Arab or Egyptian Sultan, or one of Circassian
descent.187
The best example of Arab Egyptian nationalism is manifested in a conver-

sation between an Arab and a Shaykh:
The Arab said: Our country is not the country of the Circassians, who
arrived here as slaves sold by slave traders. One day they rose against us
and188 even purchased our slaves and confiscated our property. They pur-
sued a different order, which made our wives and daughters concubines in
their palaces. Indeed, the throne of this country should belong to Arabs as
recited in the Quran. And we put our faith in the hands of Kurds until the
Mongols attacked us, then the Kurds handed us over to the Mamluks, and
the time has now come to restore the people’s trust!189
Shaykh: If one heard your words he would consider you as the sons of
Egypt.
Arab: Sons of Egypt? They will not change unless the defeated [Egyptians]
are guided like a camel that fears its nose.
Arab: Slowly, oh brothers, we are all sons of Egypt, Circassian, Arab and
Egyptian. We are all equal in the right and duty. The despotic Sultan subdues
us by this ‘aṣabiya [esprit de corps, solidarity], that breaks us altogether.190
As expressed in the words of the Arab, al-‘Aryān seems to have dreamed

of a liberalized Egypt without social class or ethnic division. Perhaps he
was seized by nostalgia for an experiment of liberal politics in Egypt that
he himself witnessed in the 1920s. Another possible explanation is that he
kept on believing that liberalism was the only alternative to the right-wing
Egypt in which he lived.
Regardless of these considerations, al-‘Aryān elaborated his liberal
political view with criticism of the Circassian Mamluks, in many ways simi-
lar to the turbulent and radical periods of 1930s and 1940s Egypt:
For Egyptians, the present time is a period of historical decline, as there is

not agreement on the rule of the Circassian regime, imposing on it obe-
dience and loyalty. Thus they [Egyptians] were oppressed by the burden
derived from the wrongdoing of the Mamluks. Thus, they desired to remove
the yoke of the sultans who were on the Egyptian throne for 300 years.191
They did not rule justly, did not share the resources, did not provide a high
quality of living or freedom.
Their goal was to enjoy a life of luxury. Thus, the people were in a state of
deprivation and humiliation and suffered from hunger and sickness.192
These Mamluks maintained Egypt’s reputation among the eastern and west-
ern countries, but if the people were not free [liberated] by themselves and
if they were not allowed to hold independent opinions and views and par-
ticipate in the regime in order to lead respectable lives.193
What is the benefit of freedom and independence if the people do not feel
free?194
Even the People of the Book (non-Muslim adherents) joined the revolt
against the Mamluk tyranny:
Egyptians, Circassians, Shaykhs, merchants and young men revolted against

the Sultan’s oppression. The ‘aṣabiya [cohesion] united us against oppres-
sion of the Sultan and tyranny of the leaders. Those who recited the Koran
and the People of the Books participated in the revolt.195
In sum, al-‘Aryān attempted to offer a critical view of the socio-political

condition of 1930s and 1940s Egypt in the context of the last days of the
Circassian Mamluks. He succeeded in finding a common ground of politi-
cal instability between the two periods. In al-‘Aryān’s view, Egypt saw two
primary types of radical nationalism: the Muslim Brotherhood (1928–) and
Young Egypt (1933–). He viewed this reality as not very different from that
of the Circassian Mamluks, in which Egyptians suffered from oppression
and tyranny.
Against the overwhelming wave of radicalism, al-‘Aryān attempted to
call the Egyptians to strive for liberalism, underlining the precious value of
individual freedom, political participation, and proper division of political
power. He may have believed that if Egyptians had enjoyed political and
individual freedom, Egypt would not be radicalized to such an extent.
In al-‘Aryān’s liberalistic project, the role of the Circassian Mamluks
seems very marginal and limited to that of villain or oppressor. Although
Ṭūmānbāy, as indicated above, is depicted as a symbol of Egyptian nation-
alism and as a righteous Sultan, his fate was not much different from that
of previous Sultans. In Ṭūmānbāy’s last days, facing the Ottoman Sultan’s
fatal attack, the Viceroy of Syria betrayed the Sultan decisively.
Therefore, the episode of Ṭūmānbāy shows that in the absence of
orderly succession and good governance, the Ottomans succeeded in
defeating anyone. To put it differently, al-‘Aryān’s Mamluks or Sultans
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were not a direct cause of tyranny and oppression. In some sense, the
Mamluks stood apart from al-‘Aryān’s bitter criticism of the socio-polit-
ical destruction of Egypt. He stressed that the cause was the succession
system and governance. In this respect, Ṭūmānbāy was not a symbol of
success, but rather a failed and tragic hero. It is this element that sets this
novel apart from others. Therefore, it is plausible that al-‘Aryān employed
Ṭūmānbāy as an allegory for King Farūq of Egypt, expressing the urgent
need for political reform and liberalization.
One more significant difference is that the Mamluks, including many
Sultans in the novel, are not portrayed in clear black-and-white terms,
as compared to the Ottomans. Namely, the Mamluks are not set as an
antithesis to the Ottomans, as is the case in other novels. Instead, they are
represented as unfortunate heroes, who struggle to reach beyond their
limits, in a structural contradiction like that of the fate of Ṭūmānbāy, who
was hanged at Bāb Zuwayla just before uniting with his parents.
‘Alī Bey al - Kabīr (by Aḥmad Shawqī)

Aḥmad Shawqī’s (1868–1932) historical novel ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr was first
published in 1893, and later, in 1932, revised and republished. Aḥmad
Shawqī was a neo-classicist writer and poet and was born, in Cairo, to a
prominent family associated with the court of Khedive. On his paternal
side, he was of Kurdish and Arab descent, whereas his maternal ances-
tors came from Turkey and Greece. When Shawqī’s father had wasted the
family fortune, Khedive Tawfīq had to take care of the family, and Shawqī
grew up in the palace.196
In early 1891, after having worked for a while in the translation depart-
ment of the palace administration, thanks to Khedive funding he went to
France to study at the University of Montpellier.197 When he came back
to Egypt the British government exiled him from the country.198 Shawqī’s
great talent was the topicality of his poetry, which reflected the politi-
cal situation of his day. He was not religious, his political ideology was
not clearly defined, and his nationalism was a blend of Pan-Islamism and
Egyptian nationalism.199 In light of his close relationship with Khedive it is
no wonder that he was loyal to Khedive Tawfīq, against whom the rebel-
lion of Aḥmad ‘Urābī was directed. This intimate relationship may explain
Shawqī’s anonymous diatribe against ‘Urābī upon the latter’s return from
exile, for which he was frequently condemned later on.200 Shortly before
his death, Shawqī was appointed chairman of Apollo, a society of poets

founded in 1932. This group was dominated by neo-romantic poets.201
It should also be noted that Aḥmad Shawqī maintained friendly rela-
tions with Khedive Abbas II (1892). It is highly probable that this private
relationship had an impact on his literary works, including this play.202
Probably due to his partially Turkish descent, or his desire to rally the sup-
port of the Khedive (who hoped for Turkish support in his conflicts with
British occupying forces), Shawqī continued to be deeply involved in the
political developments in Turkey. He praised the Turkish success against
the Greeks and composed poems upon the acquisition of battleships by
the Turkish fleet203 as well as on the pronouncement of the Ottoman
constitution.204 Furthermore, Shawqī regretted the abolition of the
Caliphate,205and even the fact that the tyrannical Sultan, ‘Abd al-Ḥamid,
escaped a murder attempt, inspired him to write a poem. This annoyed
Arab patriots, despite their admiration of Shawqī as an Arab writer.206
During his stay in France, in 1893, Shawqī produced his first tragedy and
sent the play to Khedive Abbas II. The Khedive loved the play.207
Therefore, Shawqī could be categorized as a monarchist intellectual
with pro-Ottoman sentiments. This political orientation is the point of
departure for analyzing representations of the Mamluks. The assumption
that Shawqī was a monarchist intellectual raises the following question:
As in the case of other monarchist historical writings, did Shawqī reshape
the Mamluks in negative terms? It is not a simple question to answer since
the Mamluk image in the play is far more complicated. Indeed, the main
eponymous protagonist of this play, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, epitomizes the com-
plexity of the Mamluk image.
In light of common perceptions of monarchist and pro-Ottoman histo-
riography, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr should have been presented in a more negative
light. It would have made sense to describe him as a betrayer or a rebel,
since he was a powerful Mamluk historical figure who announced Egypt’s
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. Interestingly, by contrast, he is not
depicted as a despotic Mamluk leader, but rather as a pious one, who cared
for his people’s wellbeing:
‘Alī Bey: We fed the poor, who did not have a luxurious castle for eating.
And we irrigated Ibn Sabīl, which is not moistened by water.
And we hugged the orphan, wiping off his tears and found precious shel-
ter from us. And see the increasingly generous charities in the square, packed
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with young camels. And we built bases for education and prosperity and
erected a center for prayer. And these buildings alleviate their suffering.208
In addition to Shawqī’s pious image, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is also presented

as nationalistic leader who rejected the help of foreign powers like Russia
(which had a fleet in Acre).209 ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr explained his rejection to
the Russian commander by identifying himself as an Arab Muslim. The
Russian commander replied to ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr: “Lord, you are king of
two peoples, Acre and Egypt.”210
The only negative depiction of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr appeared close to the end
of the play. After a critical injury, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr looked back on his life:
I fought a war against the Turks [Ottomans] for my country and went as far
as to arouse the hostility of our people. I did not trust better servants and
boys and caused them to run for fortunes. Like this building of delusion was
structured, the victory went into thin air.
In those days I desired the tip of a sword.
I was carried on a bedstead of palm tree branches and treaded jewels of an
ancient throne. Thus, I built a dream in this great world.
I saw it, but did not realize it.
Now I stepped down from the throne, the thing of this world.211
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s soul-searching implicates two new and significant inter-
pretations of his military campaign against the Ottomans that Shawqī
intended to convey to his readers. First, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s retrospective
commentary on his resistance against the Ottomans in fact de-legitimizes
his struggle for autonomy. Second, consequent to this interpretation, the
Ottoman Empire is automatically viewed as a legitimate ruler that saved
Egypt from Mamluk oppression by putting an end to ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s
regime. These two perceptions clearly signify Shawqī’s pro-Ottoman
sentiment.
In addition to this sentiment, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr played an important
role in conveying Shawqī’s liberal thought. Shawqī’s powerful liberal mes-
sage in favor of reform and social justice is echoed in ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s
last will for Murād just before he died.
‘Alī Bey to Murād Bey: You administered property well, but look at you,
you are without wife and father.212 Not only the Mamluk system and its
weak base, but also the Mamluk regime is fading.
After many ancestors, a wolf was howling and a lion was crying in the
Mamluk domain.213
If the morality of the people became corrupt, all was corrupted.
Their associate killed himself, only caring about the body.
By loving women, eating endlessly, building castles and buying more boys.
Thanks to Mamluk cooperation, we ruled the country and could not do so
without that support.214
If the reformer stands up with a goal and topples the destructive mujtihad
(Muslim jurist). And if he is devoted to an army of lazy men with zeal—then
let him not see zeal, especially not hatred of other.215
Murād made an oath of allegiance to the country, and promised to reform it.
Murād, gather the Mamluk troops and awaken their dormant power return
them to submission and break despotic injustice.216
The scene of the last minute of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr sheds much light on the
character. From his genuine advice to Murād it may be safely concluded
that ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is neither tyrant nor villain. In other words, his even-
tual tragic death is not a punishment for oppression or tyranny. Rather, the
puzzle of his character could be resolved by determinism. Namely, from
the beginning ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is destined to disappear in the footnotes of
Egypt’s history regardless of his good deeds. ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is therefore
nothing but the scapegoat of historical necessity.
Indeed, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s tragic destiny becomes a paradox that makes
this play more exciting and tragic. Although ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is depicted,
at least partly, as a righteous leader who helped the poor and advised Murād
on reforms, he was nevertheless destined to be defeated by the Ottomans
due to the betrayal of his Mamluk, Abū Dhahab. It is all the more tragic
that even his adopted son, Murād, plotted to assassinate him217 and joined
Abū Dhahab’s revolt. ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr deplored the evils of his times in
the following words:
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr: Bashīr, you suffered enough. Do not make any more mis-
takes that will only bring greater suffering.
I endured the disaster, but the angry and miserable people attacked me
and my territory. Those who angrily demanded this world and my authority
were raised by my hands and in my house, and grew up.
Those who were raised as his adopted sons and grew up, intended to
destroy his work. Thus, now I will prevent them from doing harm. I will
now depart for Syria with my adherents.218
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In contrast to the complex image of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, Abū Dhahab is

depicted in a black-and-white manner:
Maḥmūd’s mother said: He is not righteous and should therefore receive no

credit. Yesterday he was disobedient to his father and hence there was malice
between them. Today he will wage a war against the lord [‘Alī Bey].219
On the other hand, Murād is a paradoxical character. On the surface,

he may seem like an attractive character. Maḥmūd’s mother said to the
slave girls: “If you would see him (Murād) walking, you would just love
him and see that he loves Egypt. He is famous in Egypt and throughout
Mashreq [the East] as the exalted and promising son of the Mamluks.”220
However, behind the scenes, Murād plotted to assassinate his father, ‘Alī
Bey al-Kabīr, by hiring Sa‘īd, a contract killer. Shams, a slave girl, reported
Murād’s evil plans to ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr.221 Sa‘īd attempted to assassinate
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, but failed,222 and confessed that the order to slay ‘Alī Bey
al-Kabīr had come from Murād.223
Shawqī’s successful portrayal of the people’s suffering under constant
warfare is indeed impressive. The soldiers in Acre declared the following:
Every time soldiers came from Egypt

Descended from Jerusalem and departed for Syria, and when Amīr [gener-
als] killed the Turks [Ottomans] in Egypt, pointing their swords, We stood
between Egypt and the Turks.224
We are sheep between the wolf and the shepherd.
Which of these two has a greater hunger for us.
The Russians will attack the castle and there will be plundering.225
The Egyptian servants complained of the suffering from the warfare

between Abū Dhahab and ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr:
We live in days of ignorance and insanity.

We are in the midst of the anarchy of a sheep pasture and are in need of
shelter. We are in the cruel battle of civil wars.
Eyes are removed and heads are on the plate.
People woke up in the valley, not in this world and faith, without movement
or life.226 The government has ceased its commerce and trade. People’s live-
lihood is in peril.
Another servant replies by complaining about the heavy taxes:

In this country there are countless burdens from loans, expenditure, levy
and poll tax. Every day a new levy came up, they levied on tax that we never
knew from the days of child. Levy poll tax on donkey and peg, bridle.227
These realistic descriptions of the daily life of simple Egyptians in despair

are critical reflections of Shawqī on his contemporary political and socio-
economic conditions, with their dramatic socio-political upheavals. Egypt
was a recognized autocracy, bolstered by the British occupation, in which
power was concentrated in the hands of big landowners, in spite of the
presence of a constitutional government. Questions of social justice (espe-
cially the rights of peasants) became inevitable, and began to gain momen-
tum among Egyptian intellectuals in the mid-1930s.
Reflecting on these winds of change, the slave girl Amāl raised a ques-
tion of human rights and social justice, arguing that slave trade is prohib-
ited in Islam:
This [slave] market defiles your glory.

Buying and selling people is not allowed in the kingdom of heaven.228
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr defends himself against the ethical challenge by explain-
ing that the slave system is an ancient convention. However, he does
request Amāl’s hand in marriage, thus ironically alluding to the truth of
her argument.229
In addition to the issue of social justice, Shawqī attempted to convey a
message of moral value to his readers, in the wake of the great transforma-
tion undergone by Egyptian society.230 At the end of the conversation with
Abū Dhahab, Ḍāhir says to himself:
This is betrayal and the Mamluks acted in betrayal. For a long time they have
been involved in betrayal and deception.231
Similarly, Muṣṭafā persuades Murād to save himself from sin:
[Muṣṭafā to Murād Bey:] Your masters were uncivil Mamluks, neglecting

their royal obligations. I wish you were a righteous shepherd of the country
[waṭan] and raise its youth.232
A clearer sign of moral value can be found in ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s advice to
Murād: If the morals of the people become corrupt, all is corrupted.233
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In light of the fact that 1930s Egypt saw the emergence of Egyptian
Arab nationalism, it is not surprising to find Arabist sentiments:
[Ḍāhir to Abū Dhahab:] All of Palestine and Syria have one root that unites
people and sect. We all are Arabs and we speak classical Arabic.234
Another indication of Arabism is, as discussed, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s rejection

of Russian military aid by identifying himself as an Arab Muslim.235
In sum, Shawqī resorts to the Mamluk history to promote two political
orientations: Egyptian nationalism and liberal values. The representations
of Mamluk oppression and tyranny are described as evil practices of the
past. By contrast, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s views on political reform and his
ethical values, as well as Amāl’s call for social justice, could be read as reac-
tions to the social and political reality of 1930s Egypt. Although in this
play Shawqī’s position on Egyptian nationalism is more restricted than
liberal political value, he shows a tendency toward Arabism in the wake of
Egyptian Arab nationalist discourse among Egyptian intellectuals.
Ibnat al - Mamlūk (by Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd)

Writer, poet, and historian Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, born in Cairo,
was raised and educated in Damanhūr. He went to the ‘Abbasiyya
Secondary School in Alexandria, and entered Higher Teachers’ College
in Cairo, obtaining his diploma in Literature and Education in 1914. In
that same year, he was designated as a board member of Aḥmad Amin’s
Lajnat al-Talīf wa al-Tarjama wa al-Nashr (Committee for Writing,
Translation, and Publication). He wrote articles on blank verse for
al-Sufūr and also wrote for al-Siyāsa, al-Usbu’iyya, and al-Hilāl. While
teaching, Abū Ḥadīd earned his license from Government Law School in
1924. In 1937, he became one of the founders of the Egyptian Society
for the Social Sciences. He then served as secretary to the University
of Alexandria (1942), vice-president of Dār al-Kutub (1943), princi-
pal of the Higher Teachers’ College (1945), cultural affairs director
(1947), and then undersecretary (1950) of the Education Ministry. He
engaged in editing work for a revival of al-Thaqāfa in 1963 as well as
serving as an adviser to Libya’s Education Ministry. His best-known
historical novel is Antara ibn Shaddad featuring Juha, the Arab folk
hero. Entering the Arabic Language Academy in 1946, he won a state
prize for literature in 1959 and 1964 and was appointed to the Supreme
Council for the Arts, Letters, and Social Sciences in 1965. In 1967 Abū
Ḥadīd died suddenly in Cairo.236
The main plot of this novel hinges on a vehement power struggle
between the Mamluks and Muḥammad ‘Alī, as well as on the Egyptians’
struggle against the British and Ottoman armies. Interestingly, as the story
unfolds the author reinterprets the rising of Muḥammad ‘Alī as an inevi-
tability in the course of history. This glorification of Muḥammad ‘Alī is
primarily achieved by legitimizing the transfer of power from the hands
of the Mamluks to those of Muḥammad ‘Alī. Indeed, the novel ends with
Muḥammad ‘Alī’s victory over the Mamluks, despite numerous Mamluk
conspiracies against him. As will be seen, the more significant message
conveyed in this novel is that it was Muḥammad ‘Alī who initiated a new
Egyptian renaissance by bringing the Mamluk era to an end.
In addition to his consistent monarchic tendency,237 Abū Ḥadīd endeav-
ored to awaken his readers’ interests in Egyptian nationalism. This focus
is seen in the preface, in which he states that he writes a history mainly for
Egyptian youth.238 These didactic intentions and messages give us a clue
regarding his representation of the Mamluks.
Given the author’s monarchist stance it is no wonder that the Mamluks
are depicted as a symbol of the problematic past and as villains who must
vanish from history’s stage (including the pious ‘Umar Bey). Among
the negative images of the Mamluks, Bardīsī’s is particularly prominent.
Firstly, he appeared as a savage239 and as a heavy tax collector. The peo-
ple of Egypt complained about him, exclaiming, “Bardīsī, what can you
extract from us paupers?”240 Bardīsī replied: “Am I the first to take money
from the people? Is not this money the government tax that was collected
to feed soldiers and establish an orderly regime?” and “Why did you not
cry out before?”241
One Shaykh groaned that “this misdeed never existed in any time
until the French arrived.”242 Furthermore, Bardīsī is depicted as having
hatched a plot against his rivals al-Alfī and Muḥammad ‘Alī and suggested
to ‘Umar Bey that he take part in it. ‘Umar Bey resisted Bardīsī’s proposal
and opposed the plot.243
Bardīsī is further depicted as a man of an ambivalent and contradictory
nature. On the one hand, he declared to Ibrāhīm Bey that he wanted to
be a man like Muḥammad ‘Alī,244 and on the other he looked down on
Muḥammad ‘Alī and called him stupid.245 In the meantime, Ibrāhīm Bey
agreed to cooperate with Bardīsī’s plot against al-Alfī and ‘Umar Bey.246
104 I.K. SUNG
Another Mamluk leader, al-Alfī, is portrayed as a stranger and a for-

eigner rather than as an authentic Egyptian leader:
He carried a short pistol and had green eyes and yellow hair, although he
wore a turban with Egyptian cloth. His language was unintelligible.247
Particularly, the internal strife among the Mamluk leaders is presented not
as temporary, but as a constant phenomenon throughout the Mamluk era.
Muḥammad ‘Alī judged that the “Mamluk struggle now reached its peak
as they were slaughtering each other in their useless factionalism”.248 By
this judgment, Muḥammad ‘Alī came to conclude that the Mamluks were
not powerful enough to fight against him.249
As in the case of other novels, the Mamluk greed is harshly con-
demned. One day, ‘Umar Makram advised Muḥammad ‘Alī that “‘Umar
Bey would not participate in the plot against [him] since he had enough
wealth.” However, Muḥammad ‘Alī thought differently and argued: “I
knew the Mamluks have enough fortunes, but that is the only thing they
care for.” Muḥammad ‘Alī concluded that “the last thing the Mamluks
care for is fortune.”250
In contrast to the stereotyped negative representations of the Mamluks,
‘Umar Bey is the only Mamluk figure who is depicted in a positive man-
ner rather than in stereotyped negative representations. Unlike other
Mamluks who were notorious for their plots and treachery, ‘Umar Bey
appeared as a straightforward honest man who refused to have any part
in the conspiracies. He is generous, kind, and respected by both peasants
and dignitaries. He did, however, order to secure Alī’s release from prison.
Indeed, Muḥammad ‘Alī recognized his bravery.
[Muḥammad ‘Alī:] “He [‘Umar Bey] is not inferior to the old Mamluks
[the Mamluk Sultanate] and dares death.”251
An important question arises from the unconventional and pious image

of ‘Umar Bey: What motivated the author to depict him in such stark
contrast with the typical negative descriptions of the Mamluks? Did the
author intend to imply anything by this unusual character? If so, what can
it be? A crucial hint may lie in the fateful ending of ‘Umar Bey. Although
he was so honest that he did not join a plot against Muḥammad ‘Alī,252
‘Umar Bey had no choice but to surrender himself to Muḥammad ‘Alī in
order to save his adopted son, ‘Alī. Thus, regardless of his virtuous deeds,
‘Umar Bey is destined to surrender to Muḥammad ‘Alī and, as a result,

he cannot play an important part in the progress of Egyptian history. In
light of the tragic destiny of the faithful and pious ‘Umar Bey, the fate of
other evildoing Mamluks is evident. From the novel’s consistently nega-
tive description, it may be concluded that good and bad Mamluks alike are
destined to be sacrificed for the country’s future.
Abū Ḥadīd’s uniqueness as a novelist resides in the glorification of
Muḥammad ‘Alī. Namely, if the Mamluks are portrayed as a symbol of past
decadence, Muḥammad ‘Alī is portrayed as the antithesis of the Mamluks, as
a symbol of an Egyptian renaissance. Abū Ḥadīd achieved this by referring to
Muḥammad ‘Alī’s victory over the Mamluks as the dawn of Egypt’s renais-
sance.253 Of course, there is one more possible interpretation of the Egyptian
renaissance: that Abū Ḥadīd may have perceived the Egyptians’ successful
struggle against the British and the Ottomans as a foreshadowing of the
renaissance. Thus, the Egyptian renaissance symbolizes the end of both the
Mamluk era and the British and Ottoman armies’ presence in Egypt.
Instead of heralding Muḥammad ‘Alī as a hero, Abū Ḥadīd describes
him as an ordinary human being, making the novel far more sophisticated
than had he been represented one-dimensionally. Through this juxtaposi-
tion, Muḥammad ‘Alī’s character is given convincing texture by two con-
tradicting images of good and bad.
To begin with the bad, many Mamluk leaders saw Muḥammad ‘Alī as
posing a serious threat to Mamluk survival. Indeed, most Mamluk lead-
ers testified that he was shrewd. Ibrāhīm Bey, for instance, stated that
Muḥammad ‘Alī was the most crafty man he had ever met.254 ‘Umar Bey
saw him in a similar way: “We have struggled with him and this fox was
not able to deceive us. Indeed, he is a fox but he uses the words of a
chicken.”255 Similarly, Suleimān declared: “This man [Muḥammad ‘Alī]
speaks with his enemies as an impetuous snake.”256
On the other hand, Muḥammad ‘Alī is also viewed favorably and is
depicted as a righteous leader. He dispatched his soldiers to the mar-
ket and appeased the people, ordering his men to maintain order and
prevent wrongdoing.257 Moreover, in order to strengthen commercial
activity, Muḥammad ‘Alī made efforts to encourage trade and help the
merchants. He promised a British merchant, Mr. William, to promote
commercial activity by lowering the price of merchandise.258 When Mr.
William doubted the sincerity of this promise, Muḥammad ‘Alī spoke
of himself as follows: “I am a soldier – I did not learn and cannot read
106 I.K. SUNG
very well – but have a natural understanding of some things and can
make myself clear.”259 Muḥammad ‘Alī even promised that he would
maintain friendship with the British merchants.260
Others also testified to Muḥammad ‘Alī’s greatness and righteous-
ness. Salīm stated, “I thank God for this man, Muḥammad ‘Alī, who has
great mercy for the people, unlike the Turkish Pashas before him.”261 In
the meantime, ‘Umar Makram legitimized Muḥammad ‘Alī’s struggle
for power in Egypt against the Ottomans. He told Muḥammad ‘Alī, “I
think, God wants from you to do much for this country.” Muḥammad ‘Alī
replied, “God wants me most to serve this country and this people.”262
Muḥammad ‘Alī is depicted as an honest man who does not conceal his
ambition to rule Egypt. He said, “I will not give up the power and there
can only be one leader to this country.”263
So far, we have explored the negative representations of the Mamluks
as opposed to the positive depictions of Muḥammad ‘Alī, as generated by
monarchist historiography. We shall now turn to another crucial variable
in the representation of the Mamluks: Egyptian nationalism. Considering
the fact that this novel was published in 1926, it is highly probable that
the impact of Egyptian nationalism on it is substantial, as it prevailed from
the 1920s onwards. As expected, many aspects of the novel are narrated
from an Egypt-centered standpoint. The most interesting and important
phenomenon is that the distinctions between the Mamluks and Egyptians
are often blurred. For example, the Mamluks are frequently referred to as
“Egyptians.” Ibrāhīm Bey argued that not the Mamluk commanders but
rather the Egyptian ones halted the Albanians264 and accused Muḥammad
‘Alī’ of dividing Egyptian power.265 Muḥammad ‘Alī also used Egypt as
one collective identity, declaring to Ḥasan Pasha: “We do not conceal one
of our Egyptian brothers.”266
Moreover, Egyptian nationalism reshaped the identity of Mamluk
leader ‘Umar Bey as Egyptian. When Bardīsī suggested that ‘Umar Bey
join his plot against al-Alfī, ‘Umar Bey replied with a question: “Why do
you want me to join this plot? Are there no other Egyptians you can trust
except me?”267 Similarly, the war between the Mamluks and the Albanian
soldiers of Muḥammad ‘Alī is reinterpreted as a war between Egyptians
and Albanians.268
Another obvious piece of evidence of the impact of Egyptian national-
ism on this novel is the fact that not the Egyptian nationalist leaders but
rather the Egyptians appeared as the real heroes to lead the resistance
against the British forces during the Battle of Rosetta. On the other hand,
‘Umar Makram, known as one of Egypt’s greatest nationalist leaders, is

described as an indecisive leader. Upon the British army’s invasion, ‘Umar
Makram ordered the Egyptians to refrain from fighting against the British
army, and instead remain and protect their property. An Egyptian Hijāj
declared: “If we had not fought against the British army, Makram would
not be with us now.”269
Although there was close strategic cooperation between the Egyptians
and Muḥammad ‘Alī against the Ottomans, one Egyptian, Maḥmūd, still
expressed suspicion of Muḥammad ‘Alī’s army and distrust of anyone
who was not Egyptian. Before the battle against the Ottomans, Maḥmūd
stated: “Muḥammad ‘Alī’s army will not achieve anything – we should do
all by ourselves.”270
The Egyptians are also referred to as sons of the country (Awlād al-
Balad ), and their significant role in the struggle against the Mamluks and
the Ottomans is recorded. The sons of the country convened around the
Mamluks for protest.271 Ibn Shama expected the sons of the country to
deny their duty to the Ottomans: “In a moment, the herald will report
that the sons of the country (Awlād al-Balad) will neither take their arms
in a day nor guard the castle at night.”272
In a similar manner, ‘Umar Makram predicted that the “sons of the
country” would play an impressive role in seizing the castle:
Behold this precious people who will be honored. For a long time they were
neglected by their rulers, but you will see their deeds in the siege of the
castle and they will be glorious.273
In sum, in this novel, Abū Ḥadīd attempted to convey two ideological

messages to his readers: a monarchist ideology and Egyptian national-
ism. Within this context, the Mamluks, the British, and the Ottomans
become part of the past crimes, whereas Muḥammad ‘Alī and the
Egyptians are viewed as the authentic heroes of tomorrow. A constant
struggle takes place between “good” and “bad,” symbolizing a power
struggle between Muḥammad ‘Alī and the Mamluk leaders and between
the Egyptians on the one hand and the British and Ottomans on the
other. In the meantime, under the influence of contemporary Egyptian
nationalist historiography, the Mamluks are referred to as Egyptians or
as Egyptian leaders. However, importantly, they are the Egyptians of the
past and not of the future.
108 I.K. SUNG
Conclusion
On the whole heroic poetry is recited aloud and is an invitation to the
audience, in the shape of a narrative, to commemorate a person’s achieve-
ment in warfare, thereby strengthening the group’s morale and collec-
tive spirit.274 The raw material for the narrative need not be limited to
empirical historical elements. Mythology, religion, and pure fiction could
be sources of narrative imagination. In general, heroic poetry centers on
a conflict—a battle between the representative heroes of the narrative and
external forces. Even human beings from another group or tribe become
epic heroes.275 It is interesting that in heroic poetry or fiction of this kind,
the success of achievement lies in the qualities displayed in the action
rather than in the result. The epic hero is not necessarily successful and, for
instance, a tragic hero may end in defeat or death, but the narrative none-
theless helps to glorify the honor and courage of the tribe or nation.276
This kind of functional, ideological, historical, or pseudo-historical nar-
rative literature is by no means monopolized by certain nations. Most
nations create heroic narratives of one kind or another, which constitute
the collective memory of the group, and serve to focus and direct the
loyalties or patriotism of its members and encourage them in struggle and
other forms of conflict.277 As mentioned, the heroic characters of Egyptian
novels are employed to recreate a new Egyptian identity and thereby rede-
fine Egyptian nationalism or underline the author’s political orientation.
Of course, the recreation of history for the purpose of such narrative
begins with what is remembered and transmitted. Unlike their predeces-
sors, the so-called traditional and classical historians, the “heroic” histo-
rians do not simply desire to repeat the previous work and pass on the
memories of the past. Rather, they aim to fill its gaps and correct its errors,
and their goals are a new understanding and interpretation of the past.
These historians may intend to obliterate the past in order to recreate it.278
They recreate the past and may therefore wield a powerful and destructive
influence. In doing so, they can enrich the collective memory and cleanse
it.279 The historical novel is composed precisely by this recreation.
In this sense, if history describes what happened, fiction remarks on
what should have happened; history gives precedence to responding to
the demands of knowledge, fiction to the demands of narrative; history
seeks rigor, fiction seeks entertaining.280 What greatly matters, therefore,
to the historical novelist is not the re-telling or repeating of great historical
events, but the imaginative awakening of the protagonist who sees them-
selves as part of these events. The reader of the historical novel is expected
to re-experience the social and human motives that caused men to think,
feel, and act just as the heroes did in historical reality.281 We have re-experi-
enced and sensed the feelings of sadness and joy just as depicted in the his-
torical reality created in the novels that deal with the Mamluks. However,
through the image and representation of the Mamluks, the instability of
the fictional description is apparent, as it is rediscovered and recreated by
each historical novelist according to his agendas. The historical reality of
the novel is created for the same purpose. Thus, in order to analyze the
representation of the Mamluks in a critical manner, the author’s agendas
and political orientation were extracted from the text.
As noted, the political orientation of Zaydān’s first two novels, Istibidād
al-Mamālīk and Mamlūk al-Shārid, can be summarized by three com-
mon components: monarchic/khedival sympathies (Muḥammad ‘Alī),
pro-Ottoman sentiments, and an Egypt-centered standpoint. Through his
monarchist tendency, Mamlūk al-Shārid justifies the 1811 expulsion of the
Mamluks by Muḥammad ‘Alī, accusing them of political oppression and
corruption. In conclusion, the Mamluks are portrayed as the villainous
past and as the perpetrators of socio-political ills that should pass away,
whereas the Ottomans and Muḥammad ‘Alī are glorified as the future
(i.e., as heroes, saviors, and reformers).
Likewise, Zaydān’s second novel, Istibidād al-Mamālīk, depicts one of
the key historical figures, Mamluk leader ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, as a traitor.
In doing so, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s struggle for power against the Ottoman
Empire is delegitimized and presented as treacherous and immoral.
Moreover, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is portrayed not only as a tyrannical ruler but
also one who violated an agreement with ‘Abd al-Raḥman to release his
son Ḥasan from conscription.
Two very different images of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr are encountered in
Zaydān’s novel and in Egyptian textbooks. In contrast to the arbitrary
image seen in Zaydān’s novel, in most history textbooks ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr
is presented as an Egyptian nationalist leader who revived the independent
Mamluk dynasty in Egypt.
Compared to the previous two novels, which indicate only the pro-
totype of Egyptian nationalism, Zaydān’s third novel, Shajarat al-Durr,
shows that his Egyptian nationalism had become much more concrete
over time. Baybars is glorified as a precursor of Egyptian nationalism who
transferred the Caliphate from Baghdad to Cairo. Although Shajarat al-
Durr is depicted as a power-thirsty woman, she also shows great concern
for Egypt’s future.
110 I.K. SUNG
On the other hand, al-‘Aryān’s novel, Shajarat al-Durr, conveys a

unique political message. Al-‘Aryān attempted to reinterpret Shajarat al-
Durr as simply a jealous woman who has little patience for her husband’s
affair with another girl. Shajarat al-Durr mirrors contemporary Egyptian
women who suffered from social and economic discrimination. With this
strong feminist tone, al-‘Aryān sought to address the subject of women’s
rights and freedom, which was one of the central issues debated among
Egyptian intellectuals at the time.
In the meantime, prominent Mamluk leaders such as Baybars and
Quṭuz Shajarat al-Durr are not very different from those encountered in
previous novels. They are all considered Egyptian nationalist leaders.
On the other hand, the Islamic and Egyptian nationalist Bākathīr com-
memorated Baybars and Quṭuz in a different way. For Bākathīr, the two
figures are not only Egyptian heroes but also Islamic champions who
defended the Islamic world against the Mongols and the Crusaders. In
Bākathīr’s novel, Quṭuz has prophetic powers and is a pious and faithful
man, ready to sacrifice himself for the Muslims. Even when he was attacked
by Baybars’ Mamluks, he ordered his bodyguards not to kill Baybars.
Quṭuz is a symbol of genuine Islamism and an Egyptian nationalist hero
who would unite the country and rebuild it under the banner of Islam.
Al-‘Aryān’s second novel, ‘Alā Bāb Zuwayla, is a blend of his two politi-
cal orientations: Egyptian nationalism and liberal political views. From the
perspective of Egyptian nationalism, the Mamluk leaders constitute two
categories: nationalist and pious rulers on the one hand and selfish and
corrupt individuals on the other. Most Mamluk leaders, such as Sultan
al-Ghawrī and Qāytbāy, are depicted as greedy and tyrannical figures. The
only worthy characters are Sultan Ṭūmānbāy I and II. Symbolizing the
Egyptian nationalist leader, these two Sultans are represented as a model
of piousness and righteousness. Nevertheless, Ṭūmānbāy II is not a typi-
cal heroic character, since he is defeated by the Ottomans in the end.
Interestingly, al-‘Aryān focuses on the absence of orderly succession and
good governance as the main cause of the last Mamluk Sultan’s (Ṭūmānbāy
II) defeat by the Ottomans.
In his critical insight into Egyptian society, the author implies that, in
the absence of immediate political liberalization that would yield individ-
ual freedom and political power, Egyptian society would become similar
to that of the last days of the Mamluk dynasty encountered in the novel.
Therefore, the majority of Mamluk Sultans can be seen as representing the
Egyptian monarch of the author’s time, particularly King Farūq.
In Shawqī’s novel, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is quite different and com-

plex compared to Istibidād al-Mamālīk of Zaydān. Although ‘Alī Bey
al-Kabīr expressed regret for struggling for Egyptian autonomy against
the Ottomans, he is not depicted as a tyrannical ruler. By contrast, he
helped the poor and advised Murād to carry out reforms in the Mamluk
army and uproot corruption. He somewhat resembles a prophet who calls
for redemption. Moreover, Shawqī’s Arabism is also expressed by ‘Alī
Bey al-Kabīr, when the latter identifies himself as an Arab Muslim to the
Russian military commander.282
As is the case in Zaydān’s novel, Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd’s favor-
able reference to Muḥammad ‘Alī prevails in his novel Ibnat al-Mamlūk.
Overall, the Mamluks play the part of villains and oppressors, whereas
Muḥammad ‘Alī appears as a savior who banished the Mamluks and rebuilt
a better Egypt. Throughout the novel, the Egyptian nationalist sentiment
is far more prevalent than the monarchist standpoint. More often than
not, Abū Ḥadīd stresses that it was not the Egyptian nationalist leader
‘Umar Makram but rather the Egyptian people who led the resistance
against the Ottomans and the British army.
Although we have witnessed diverse representations of the Mamluks in
which some common patterns are observed, the Baḥri Mamluks, such as
Baybars, Quṭuz, and Shajarat al-Durr, are blended with Egyptian nation-
alist heroes. By contrast, the Circassian Mamluk era is stereotyped as the
zenith of Mamluk tyranny and oppression due to the continuous power
struggles of the ruling classes. This turbulent part of Mamluk history is
employed to criticize Egypt’s contemporary social political reality.
Similarly, the Mamluks under the Ottoman era are not only treated
as the perpetrators of social and political stagnation in Egyptian society,
but are also presented as the antithesis of Muḥammad ‘Alī, opposing his
reforms in government.
In conclusion, Egyptian historical novelists and playwrights viewed
the teaching of history as a vital mission, indispensable to shaping and
consolidating the nation’s collective historical memory in the wake of
Egyptian nationalism and the deteriorating social and political conditions.
Therefore, Egyptian historical novelists attempted to gain a new histori-
cal understanding of the Mamluks through which they could reinterpret
and resolve their era’s political and social matters. In other words, they
utilized the past for present and future goals. Within this context, mani-
fold Mamluk images and representations in the novels and play should be
understood.
112 I.K. SUNG
Notes
1. Thomas Philipp, Gurgi Zaidan: His Life and Thought (Beirut, 1979),
p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 83.
3. Ibid., p. 75.
4. Jūrjī Zaydān, “Muḥammad ‘Alī Basha,” al-Hilāl, June 1902,
pp. 517–541.
5. Jūrjī Zaydān, Al-Mamlūk al-Shārid (Miṣr: Maṭba‘at al-Hilāl, 1931),
p. 31. This novel was first published in 1891.
6. Ibid., p. 32.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 60.
9. Ibid., p. 61.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 91.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 92.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 141.
22. Ibid., p. 28.
23. On Zaydān’s Ottomanism see also Thomas Philipp, Gurgi Zaidan: His
Life and Thought (Beirut, 1979), p. 110. In a letter to his son Emile,
Zaydān clearly articulates pro-Ottoman attitudes.
24. Jūrjī Zaydān, Al- Mamlūk al-Shārid, p. 139.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p.140. In Thomas Philipp’s view Zaydān apparently had not yet
grasped the full force of nationalism in the Balkans. For instance, Zaydān
believed that centrifugal developments in the Balkans were only the result
of ‘Abdul Ḥamid’s misrule exploited by European power interests, a
development that could, Zaydān claimed, be restored by fair (i.e., consti-
tutional) rule. Furthermore, Zaydān did not understand that the Balkan
nations had also become conscious of their own national and cultural
identity in past issues. Philipp concludes that Zaydān might believe that
the insistence of these nations to safeguard their identity was created
exclusively by a Machiavellian device of European power politics. See
Thomas Philipp, Gurgi Zaidan: His Life and Thought, pp. 75, 113.
27. Jūrjī Zaydān, Al-Mamlūk, p.131.

28. Ibid., p. 55.
29. Ibid., p. 56.
30. Thomas Philipp holds the same opinion. See his book, Gurgi Zaidan, p,
114.
31. Zaydān’s pro-Ottoman tendency is detailed in his letters to his son,
Emile. See Thomas Philipp, Gurgi Zaidan: His Life and Thought (Beirut,
1979), pp. 110–111; al-Hilāl XIII, 1904/05, p. 131 and also Thomas
Philipp, Gurgi Zaidan, p. 112. “Zaydān was foremost concerned with
this unity, because he foresaw that the collapse of the Empire would not
bring about the political independence of the Arab people, as many of his
Muslim Arab contemporaries assumed, but the intensification of
European control over the area.”
32. Zaydān wanted his son to learn Turkish, as he was doing at the time. “It
is the language of the government and will become cardinal to all fields.”
Moreover, he emphasized that Emile was foremost an Ottoman: “You are
an Ottoman by nature, because your parents are Ottomans and because
all Egyptians are Ottomans. Even if not all Ottomans are Egyptians, you
are also a Syrian Ottoman.” Thomas Philipp, Gurgi Zaidan: His Life and
Thought (Beirut, 1979), pp. 110–111.
33. Much like Zaydān, contemporary Egyptian nationalist intellectuals such
as Muṣṭafā Kāmil and Muḥammad Farīd expressed pro-monarchy and
Ottoman views. See Jack A. Crabbs, The Writing of History in Nineteenth-
Century Egypt (Cairo: American Univ. Press, 1984), chapters, 8, 9.
34. Jūrjī Zaydān, Istibdād al-Mamālīk (Cairo 1923), p. 5.
35. Ibid., p. 21.
36. Ibid., p. 19.
37. Ibid., p. 22.
38. Ibid., p. 5.
39. Ibid., p. 22.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 21. For an expanded version of this novel, see Istibdād al-
Mamālīk (n. d. Dār al-Hilāl), p. 40.
42. Ibid., pp. 28–31.
43. Ibid., p. 42.
44. Ibid., p. 141.
45. Ibid.
46. Jūrijī Zaydān, Istibdād, (Enlarged version n. d.) p. 200.
47. Jūrjī Zaydān (1923), Istibdād, p. 30. On Mamluk oppression and merci-
lessness see p. 44.
48. Ibid., p. 43.
49. Ibid., p. 47.
114 I.K. SUNG
50. Ibid., pp. 106–107.

51. Ibid., p. 108.
52. Ibid., p. 114.
53. Ibid., p. 135.
54. Jūrjī Zaydān, Istibdād (Enlarged version n. d.), p. 200.
55. Jūrjī Zaydān (1923), Istibdād, pp. 111-112.
56. Jūrjī Zaydān, Istibdād (Enlarged version), p. 162.
57. Jūrjī Zaydān (1923), Istibdād, p. 97. See also pp. 6, 124.
58. Ibid., pp. 108–109. See also p. 94.
59. Ibid., p. 113.
60. Zaydān’s ultimate aim seems to have been the education of the common
people. In 1898 he declared :
“The teaching of the elite alone, which is the situation with most nations,
is not enough. The aim is the teaching, educating and training of the
common people, because they constitute the public of the nation. No
nation will succeed in its plans as long as its common people are igno-
rant.” See al-Hilāl VII,1898/99, p. 10; Thomas Philipp, Gurgi Zaidan :
His Life and Thought (Beirut, 1979), p. 36.
61. The emergence of female characters in historical novels is connected with
the rise of leisure-reading among Egypt’s educated middle classes. See
Orit Bashkin, “Harems in the works of Jūrjī Zaydān” in Marilyn Booth,
(ed.), Harem Histories: Envisioning Places and Living Spaces (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2010), p. 291.
62. Istibdād al-Mamālīk and al-Mamlūk al-Shārid.
63. However, Shajarat al-Durr will later confess she ordered the killing of
Ṭūrānshāh.
64. Jūrjī Zaydān, Shajarat al-Durr (Miṣr: Maṭba‘a al-Hilāl, 1932), p. 13.
65. Ibid., p. 8.
66. Ibid., p. 19.
67. Ibid., p. 21.
68. Ibid. See p. 25. “Not only did Shajarat al-Durr desire for love, but she
also aspired for power. She loved high-ranked leaders and was even ready
to sacrifice all for power.”
69. Jūrjī Zaydān, Shajarat al-Durr, p. 91. See also Jurji Zaydan, Tree of
Pearls, Queen of Egypt Samah Selim (trans.), (New York: Syracuse
University Press, 2012), p. 83.
70. Ibid., p. 32.
71. Ibid., pp. 54–56.
72. Ibid., p. 60.
73. Ibid., p. 61.
74. Ibid., pp. 68–69.
75. Ibid., p. 96.
76. Ibid., p. 98.

77. Ibid., p. 17.
78. Ibid., p. 51.
79. Ibid., pp. 77–78.
80. Ibid., p. 176.
81. Ibid., p. 178.
82. Ibid., p. 198.
83. Ibid., p. 131.
84. Ibid., p. 187.
85. Ibid., p. 74.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., p. 123.
88. Ibid., p. 121.
89. Ibid., p. 75.
90. Ibid., p. 182.
91. Ibid., p. 201.
92. Ibid., p. 112.
93. Ibid., p. 210.
94. Ibid.
95. Muḥammad Sa‘īd al-‘Aryān, Shajarat al-Durr (Dār al-Ma‘ārif Bimiṣr,
1948), pp. 20–22.
96. Ibid., p. 29.
97. Ibid., p. 32.
98. Ibid., p. 7.
99. Ibid., pp. 4–7.
100. Ibid., p. 4.
101. Ibid., p. 6.
102. Ibid., p. 136.
103. Ibid., p. 82.
104. Ibid., pp. 97–98.
105. Ibid., p. 101.
106. Ibid., p. 23.
107. Ibid., p. 26.
108. Ibid., pp. 25–27.
109. Ibid., p. 85.
110. Ibid., p. 101.
111. Ibid., p. 45.
112. Ibid., pp. 61–62.
113. Ibid., p. 64.
114. Ibid., p. 119.
115. Ibid., p. 19.
116. Ibid., pp. 125–128.
116 I.K. SUNG
117. Ibid., p. 126.

118. Ibid.
119. Ibid., p. 128.
120. Ibid., p. 159.
121. Ibid., p. 139.
122. Ibid., p. 140.
123. Ibid., p. 142.
124. Ibid., p. 31, Abū Zuhra said, “He [Aqṭāy] will die before marriage.”
125. Muḥammad Sa‘īd al-‘Aryān, Shajarat, pp. 144,159.
126. Ibid., p. 159.
127. Ibid., p. 130.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid., pp. 144–147.
130. Ibid., pp. 147–149.
131. Ibid., p. 150.
132. Ibid., p. 151.
133. Ibid., p. 153.
134. Ibid., p. 155.
135. Ibid.
136. Juan R.I. Cole, “Printing and Urban Islam in the Mediterranean World,
1890–1920.” In Leila Tarazi Fawaz and C.A. Bayly (eds.), Modernity and
Culture from Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002), pp. 344–364; Orit Bashkin, “Harems in the
works of Jurji Zaydan” in Marilyn Booth, (ed.), Harem Histories:
Envisioning Places and Living Spaces (Durham: Duke University Press,
2010), p. 293.
137. Qasim Amin was a revolutionary, not only for the time period during
which he promoted his forward-minded position on women’s liberation,
but for the culture and faith within which he boldly spoke his mind. Born
into an aristocratic family in Egypt in 1863, Amin was a man ahead of his
time. He held a law degree and later a high military ranking before leav-
ing Egypt to study in France at the University of Montpellier. There, he
became knowledgeable on Western political, legal, and societal thought.
This, perhaps above all else, would lead him toward his life’s work. Upon
returning to Egypt, in 1885, Amin married into another well-to-do fam-
ily and was appointed a judge. A disciple and translator of Muhammad
Abduh within the Islamic faith, at the age of 36 Amin published bold
writings under the title Taḥrīr al-Mara’ (The Liberation of Women), to
which his teacher allegedly also made secret contributions. Given the time
period—the beginning of the twentieth century—and the traditional
Islamic culture within Egypt, Amin’s work was immediately deemed con-
troversial and received much criticism in newspapers and the press.
Nevertheless, it also quickly gained popularity and, controversial or not,

his statements in favor of the emancipation of women began to slowly
infiltrate the otherwise male-dominated and highly structured society.
138. Orit Bashkin (2010), “Harems in the works,” p. 293.
139. Hamdi Sakkut, The Egyptian Novel, and Its Main Trends from 1913 to
1952 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1971), p. 61.
140. Muḥammad Sa‘īd al-‘Aryān, ‘Alā Bāb Zuwayla (Dār al-Kātib al-Miṣrī,
1947), see chapters 21 and 22; Hamdi Sakkut (1971), The Egyptian
Novel, p. 60.
141. Muḥammad Sa‘īd al-‘Aryān, ‘Alā Bāb Zuwayla (Dār al-Kātib al-Miṣrī,
1947), pp. 57–58.
142. Ibid., pp. 57–58.
143. Ibid., p. 64.
144. Ibid., p. 78.
145. Ibid., p. 91.
146. Ibid., p. 96.
147. Ibid., p. 128.
148. Ibid., pp. 130–139. See also chapter 15.
149. Ibid., p. 93.
150. Ibid., p. 178.
151. Ibid., p. 253.
152. Ibid., p. 94.
153. Ibid., p. 129.
154. Ibid., p. 23.
155. Ibid., pp. 165–176
156. Ibid., p. 173
157. Ibid., p. 179.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid., p. 197.
162. Ibid., p. 201.
163. Ibid., p. 202.
164. Ibid., p. 220.
165. Ibid., pp. 238–241.
166. Ibid., pp. 267–276.
167. Ibid., p. 308.
168. Ibid., p. 67.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid., p. 68.
171. Ibid., p. 180.
172. Ibid., pp. 158–165.
118 I.K. SUNG
173. Ibid., p. 164.

174. Ibid., p. 176.
175. As another nationalist character, Ṭūmānbāy II demanded Sultan al-Ghawrī
to reform in governance in order to alleviate the suffering of the Egyptians.
See Ibid., p. 202.
176. Ibid., p. 180.
177. Ibid., pp. 298–299.
178. Ibid., p. 333.
179. Ibid., p. 195.
180. Ibid., p. 196.
181. Ibid., p. 300.
182. Ibid., p. 309.
183. Ibid.
184. Ibid., p. 107.
185. Ibid., p. 197.
186. Ibid., p. 73.
187. Ibid.
188. Ibid., p. 71.
189. Ibid., p. 72.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid., p. 196.
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid.
194. Ibid., p. 197.
195. Ibid., p. 106.
196. Jan Brugman, An Introduction to the History of Modern Arabic Literature
in Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1984), pp. 35–36.
197. Ibid., p. 36.
198. Ibid.
199. Ibid., p. 39.
200. Ibid.
201. Ibid., pp. 37–38.
202. On the influence of Khediv Tawfīq on Aḥmad Shawqī’s poet, see Jan
Brugman (1984) op. cit., p. 39.
203. Aḥmad Shawqī, “Al- Dusṭūr al-‘Uthmānī,” Shawqiyat I (1926), p. 268;
Jan Brugman, op. cit., p. 40.
204. Ibid., p. 335; Jan Brugman, op. cit., p. 40.
205. Jan Brugman, op. cit., p. 40.
206. Ibid.
207. Jacob M. Landau, Studies in the Arab Theater and Cinema (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), pp. 127–128. In 1932, the play
was revised and republished. See also Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey
(eds.), “Shawqī Aḥmad (1868–1932),” in Encyclopedia of Arabic
Literature Vol. 2. (London: Routledge 1998), p. 709.
208. Aḥmad Shawqī, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr (Al-Qāhira: Maṭba‘at Miṣr, 1932),
p. 31.
209. Ibid., pp. 81–85.
210. Ibid., p. 81.
211. Ibid., p. 118.
212. Ibid., p. 126.
213. Ibid.
214. Ibid., p. 126.
215. Ibid., p. 127.
216. Ibid.
217. Ibid., pp. 76–79. According to Sa‘īd’s confession, he attempted to assas-
sinate ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr under the orders of Murād.
218. Ibid., p. 34.
219. Ibid., p. 11.
220. Ibid., p. 12.
221. Ibid., p. 68.
222. Ibid., pp. 76–78.
223. Ibid., p. 79.
224. Ibid., p. 59.
225. Ibid., p. 60.
226. Ibid., p. 93.
227. Ibid., p. 94.
228. Ibid., p. 25.
229. Ibid., p. 27.
230. The search for moral values in a changing society is encountered in the
works of many other Egyptian novelists, and particularly in Nagīb
Maḥfūẓ’s Zuqāq al-Midaqq. Hilary Kilpatrick “The Egyptian Novel
From Zaynab to 1980” in M.M. Badawi ed., The Cambridge History of
Arabic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
p. 241.
231. Aḥmad Shawqī,‘Alī Bey, p. 109.
232. Ibid., p. 112.
233. Ibid., p. 126.
234. Ibid., p. 106. M.M. Badawi also interprets this as a sign of Arabism; see
his book, Modern Arabic Drama in Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge
235. Aḥmad Shawqī,‘Alī Bey, p. 81.
236. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt
(Boulder, 2000), p. 12.
120 I.K. SUNG
237. Abū Ḥadid’s appreciation of Muḥammad ‘Alī is declared in the preface:

“Representation of the dawn of Egyptian renaissance (resurrection).”
238. In the preface to the book, Abū Ḥadid remarked, “I present this part of
the eternal Egyptian history for my countrymen (waṭanī).” See also
Hamdi Sakkut, The Egyptian Novel and Its Main Trends (Cairo: The
American University in Cairo Press, 1971), pp. 48–49.
239. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, Ibnat al-Mamlūk (Al-Qāhira, Matba‘at
al-I‘timād 1926), p. 40.
240. Ibid., p. 52.
241. Ibid.
242. Ibid., p. 53.
243. Ibid., pp. 40, 70–75.
244. Ibid., p. 40.
245. Ibid., p. 44.
246. Ibid., p. 40.
247. Ibid., pp. 152–153.
248. Ibid., p. 281.
249. Ibid., p. 283.
250. Ibid., p. 288.
251. Ibid., p. 114.
252. Historically, ‘Umar Bey cooperated with Khurshid Pasha against
Muḥammad ‘Alī. Thus, Abū Ḥadīd reinvented ‘Umar Bey by counter-
memory (forgetting the actual historical facts). See Aḥmad Haykal, Al-
Adab al-Qaṣaṣī wa Masraḥī fī Miṣr (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1979), p. 250;
Daniel Crecelius “The Mamluk Beylicate of Egypt in the Last Decades
before its Destruction by Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha in 1811” in Thomas
Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann (eds.), The Mamluks and Egyptian Politics
and Society (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 148.
253. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, Ibnat, Preface.
254. Ibid., p. 46.
255. Ibid., pp. 324–328.
256. Ibid., p. 312.
257. Ibid., p. 79.
258. Ibid., p. 282.
259. Ibid.
260. Ibid., p. 283.
261. Ibid., p. 195.
262. Ibid., p. 203. Historically, the intimate relationship between ‘Umar
Makram and Muḥammad ‘Alī is doubted. As we know, Muḥammad ‘Alī
exiled ‘Umar Makram. Thus, this is second piece of evidence that Abū
Ḥadīd used counter-memory (forgetting the past intentionally) to recre-
ate the characters. For the first piece of evidence, see note 20.
263. Ibid., p. 283.
264. Ibid., p. 73.
265. Ibid., p. 74. See also p. 364. The Mamluk horsemen are referred to with
the phrase “Egyptians are best horsemen.” p. 222, where Egyptians are
identified as the Mamluks.
266. Ibid., p. 226.
267. Ibid., pp. 23, 257. See also p. 1. ‘Umar Bey is referred to as an Egyptian
leader; p. 249. Ḥasīn Bey is also considered an Egyptian.
268. Ibid., p. 95.
269. Ibid., pp. 258–265.
270. Ibid., p. 195.
271. Ibid., p. 91.
272. Ibid., p. 196. Ibn Shama also reported that a battle broke out between
the sons of the land and the Pasha’s army. p. 197.
273. Ibid., p. 203. Nevertheless, Muḥammad ‘Alī underestimated the
Egyptians’ role in battle. When Ḥasan Pasha asked Muḥammad ‘Alī, “Did
you use Awulād al-Balad in the battle,” Muḥammad ‘Alī said to himself,
“It would not be a good idea at the moment.” See p. 224.
274. Bernard Lewis, History Remembered, Recovered, Invented (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 43–44.
275. Ibid.
276. Ibid., p. 44.
277. Ibid.
278. We can refer to this as a “national memory,” the antithesis of the “recre-
ation of memory or history.”
279. Ibid., p. 55.
280. Richard Maxwell, The Historical Novel in Europe, 1650–1950 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 11.
281. Georg Lukács, The Historical Novel (London: Merlin Press, 1962), p. 42.
282. Aḥmad Shawqī, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, p. 81.
CHAPTER 6
Representations of the Mamluks in History

Books and Periodicals
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we will critically analyze the representations of the
Mamluks and the Mamluk era from the perspectives of four major historio-
graphic trends: Ottomanist, monarchist, academic, and Egyptian nation-
alist.1 Identifying with Ottoman Sultans’ allegiance to Islam, Egyptian
Ottomanist historians viewed the Ottoman Empire as a protector of Egypt
against British occupation and Western cultural penetration. Before dis-
cussing in detail the monarchist historians’ perceptions of the Mamluks, it
is essential to address the Ābdīn Project in order to critically view monar-
chic historiography within the relevant historical context. In 1920, King
Fu’ād initiated an extensive historiographical project at his ‘Ābdīn Palace.
The Ābdīn Project lasted more than twenty-five years and involved a host
of foreign archivists, philologists, and historians such as Eugenio Griffini,
Jean Deny, Angelo Sammarco,2 and Pierre Crabitès.3 Through this, the
monarchist project was introduced to Egyptian historiography, and the
first “public archive” was established in Egypt.4
Monarchist historians5 therefore perceived the past through the per-
spective of the “founder paradigm.”6 Their primary goal was to glorify
Muḥammad ‘Alī and his descendants and to distinguish them from the
Ottoman Sultans by delegitimizing the Ottoman regime. They were simi-
larly motivated to marginalize Mamluks, who, with the Ottoman Turks,
were described as dictators.
© The Author(s) 2017

I.K. Sung, Mamluks in the Modern Egyptian Mind, 123
DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6_6
124 I.K. SUNG
Academic historians followed the “founder paradigm”; however, they

distinguished themselves from the monarchists by focusing on the lives of
ordinary men and women in addition to the Egyptian monarchy.7 They
contended that Egyptian historians must “Egyptianize” (tamṣīr) history
by removing the monarchy and foreigners from the Egyptian historical
record.8 Like the monarchist historians, academic historians depicted the
Mamluks under Ottoman rule as occupiers, no less than the Ottoman
Turks themselves, yet they lauded the Mamluk Sultan Ẓāhir Baybars as a
great leader.9
Egyptian nationalist historians discussed the Mamluks more extensively
than did the monarchist and academic historians. Nationalist historians
interpreted the Mamluk Sultanate periods as the heyday of Egypt10 or of
Arab history. In their view, the glory and victory of medieval times offered
instruction that could resolve the challenges faced by the modern Egyptian
nation. Nevertheless, the Mamluks under Ottoman rule were still depicted
as being as tyrannical as the Turks, with the exception of the remarkable
Egyptian Ottoman Mamluk leader ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr (1760–1772).
MAMLUK SULTANATE PERIOD (1250–1517)
Representations of the Mamluks in Ottomanist and Monarchist

Historical Literature
To begin with Ottomanist historians, Jūrjī Zaydān stands out for his pro-
lific literary activities. From an ideological point of view, Zaydān is a mul-
tifaceted intellectual. First, his pro-Ottomanism is best reflected in a letter
to one of his friends: “it is language of our governments; after gall of
tyranny has been disappeared, after knowledge had prevailed over igno-
rance and after constitution had been proclaimed, our time has come to
demonstrate to the other nations that we are a living nation who knows to
gather and to unite, and we help our government with our tongues, pens,
and words.”11 In addition, he was an energetic historian and novelist who
harbored Egyptian nationalist sentiments, focusing mostly on the positive
aspect of the Mamluks. Indeed he continued to present Baybars as the
predominant Sultan who transferred the ‘Abbasid Caliphate to Cairo12
and established the kingdom of Egypt and Syria.13
Regarding the origins of the Mamluks, Zaydān offers nothing new:
Caliph Mu‘taṣim was first to use the Mamluks.14 As mentioned, Zaydān
differs from most Ottomanist historians in that the Egyptian nationalist
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MAMLUKS IN HISTORY BOOKS AND PERIODICALS 125
factor had an impact on his narrative. For instance, in his book, Egypt is
presented as the most ancient kingdom, successfully preserving its lan-
guage, character, and homeland.15 Zaydān’s nationalist feeling is mani-
fested best in his description of the Mamluk war against the Crusaders
and Mongols. Further, Zaydān clearly refers to the Mamluk army as the
Egyptian army in the war with the Syrians.16 Likewise, the Egyptians tak-
ing part in Quṭuz’s war against Hülegü at ‘Ayn Jālūt are embodied as the
real heroes.17 Another war against Mongol Khan Berke is reshaped as an
Egyptian war and a Muslim victory.18 The only negative mention of the
Mamluks refers to their precarious temper.19
Meanwhile, another Ottomanist historian with Islamic nationalist
tendencies, Muḥammad Farīd, shows his pro-Islam and Pharaonist out-
look in noting that the history of the Islamic Umma originated in the
Pharaonic eras.20 Farīd was an enthusiastic political and financial supporter
of Muṣṭafā Kāmil, the founder of the Egyptian National Party, and after
the latter’s premature death in 1908, Farīd was elected as second president
of that party. Farīd sought help from the Ottoman Empire while in exile
during World War I; however, he also suspected the Turks of undermin-
ing Egyptian national aims. Farīd’s occasional support for pan-Islamism
alienated Egyptian Copts.21 Farīd’s Islamist nationalist ideology clearly
reflected an account of war against the Crusaders: it was the Muslims who
halted the French at al-Manṣūra, not the Mamluks, Egyptians, or Arabs.22
As seen above, with the exception of Zaydān, Egyptian Ottomanist and
monarchist historians did not show much interest in the Mamluk Sultanate
era.23 Rather, they endeavored much more to cover the Ottoman era, as we
shall see in the following discussion. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized
that some Ottomanist historians perceived the Mamluk Sultans positively.
Representations of the Mamluks in Academic Historians’

Literature
The monarchist historians had a strong impact on the academic school’s
orientation. Thus, two historians had many points in common such as
focus, assumptions, methodology, style, institutions, and, most impor-
tantly, their historiographical and political orientation. As the forefather of
the academic school, Shafīq Ghurbāl was the most remarkable academic
historian. Slowly but surely, Ghurbāl and his disciples carefully modeled
themselves on the academic standards of the ‘Abdīn Project and formu-
lated a school that regarded itself as professional. In time, Ghurbāl and
126 I.K. SUNG
his disciples went as far as to develop an ideology of professionalism that

distinguished them from populist/amateur historians. An essential com-
ponent of this new ideology was their stress on vigorous archival research
as the exclusive way to rediscover “truth in history.” Acting against the
background of an overpowering contemporaneous growth in popular his-
toriography, the academic school strongly emphasized a particular notion
of historical objectivity that consolidated their claim to expert authority on
history writing. By the 1940s, the academic school became the only school
of history writers with a strong ethical devotion to historical objectivity.24
Challenging the ideology of the monarchist historians, the academic
historians endeavored to focus on the lives and deeds of ordinary peo-
ple through extensive research work. Furthermore, unlike the popular-
nationalist historians’ comprehensive idea of “the people,” the academic
historians attempted, at least ideally, to seek a less faceless view of the
populace. In reality, Egyptianization—tamṣīr—was a challenging project
accompanying the difficult task of navigating through the advantages and
disadvantages of European historiography and, ideally, profiting from both
worlds.25 In spite of their rhetoric, the most they produced was a division
of labor and a great degree of philosophical continuity with the monarchic
orientation, rather than a crucial change of focus and interpretation.26
Before embarking on Ghurbāl’s perception of the Mamluks, it is useful
to observe his personal background more closely, since it provides a better
understanding of the development of his historical thinking. Born in 1894
to a middle-class Muslim family of merchants in Alexandria, Ghurbāl could
easily have ended up in any decent occupation, from lawyer to engineer.
His parents certainly had enough wealth to send their son to a prominent
profession-oriented school in the company of the sons of other members
of the effendiyya class. However, Ghurbāl wanted to be a historian, rather
than a lawyer or engineer.27
In 1915, he graduated from the Higher Teachers’ College (Dār
al-Mu‘alimīn al-‘Uliyā). As the only educational institution that granted a
degree in the humanities, the college especially appealed to many literary-
minded students, such as the literary critic and novelist Muḥammad Farīd
Abū Ḥadīd. Despite being much less prestigious than a university, this
school was still a main route to enter the social world of the tarboosh-
wearing effendis.28
Unlike other young students who harbored nationalist ideas, Ghurbāl
was not interested in actual political activity or writing. This non-political
trend was the hallmark of his career. With time, his great efforts bore
fruit and, in 1915, at the age of twenty-one, Ghurbāl left Egypt for the
University of Liverpool to complete a BA in history. Once there, Ghurbāl
was in touch with Muḥammad Rif‘at, who was about to graduate. They
became friends and colleagues; Rif‘at was a future influential historian in
his own right, who would later work with Ghurbāl in a joint effort to
Egyptianize (tamṣīr) history writing.29
Ghurbāl’s BA thesis focused on the French expedition and the rise of
Muḥammad ‘Alī, which was based on comprehensive archival work with
primary sources and became the groundwork of his future graduate work
in London. After finishing a three-year teaching job in Egypt, he won
admission to the prestigious London University to pursue his MA under
the supervision of Arnold Toynbee. In London, he expanded on his BA
thesis by adding several chapters, reshaping some of his arguments, and
visiting many different archives. After two years, he submitted an innova-
tive and authoritative thesis that was later published as “The Beginnings
of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehmet Ali.”30
The work of Ghurbāl’s students demonstrates a certain pattern: Aḥmad
‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karīm dealt with education, Aḥmad Aḥmad al-Ḥitta stud-
ied agricultural reforms, ‘Alī al-Jiritlī focused on industrialization. Most
of his students mainly dealt with nineteenth-century Egypt up to the
1882 British occupation and particularly focused on various aspects of
Muḥammad ‘Alī’s invaluable contribution to the establishment of the
modern Egyptian nation-state. Similar to the monarchist historians, it
was the founder paradigm that framed and conceptualized the scope and
theme of their historical research.31
Some of the published works of academic historians indicate the scope of
affinity with the ‘Abdīn Project. Ghurbāl’s students thoroughly embraced
the monarchic chronology, especially with regard to Muḥammad ‘Alī. A
“before and after” (Muḥammad ‘Alī’s accession to power) approach was
considered a clear point of departure for any historical research. Thus,
academic historians obviously confirmed significant progress in the sta-
tus of education, commerce, industry, and agriculture. The dynasty-
strengthening Egyptian leadership revived the national spirit of Egyptians
and ensured the resurrection of the Arabic language and science, thus
directing Egypt toward becoming a modern, European-oriented state. It
is reasonable to say that the repression of Egypt’s Ottomanness during this
period was a common denominator in monarchic and popular-nationalist
historiographies.32 As Youssef Choueiri succinctly put it, “Ghurbāl has a
128 I.K. SUNG
story to tell. It is dominated by a single hero – Muḥammad ‘Alī. All the

others are either villains, ignorant, or simply unlucky.”33
It is of interest that Ghurbāl’s attitude toward the Mamluks underwent
some changes. In his 1920s history book, Ghurbāl denounced the Mamluk
Sultanate era as a theater of civil wars and brigandage.34 In particular, he
criticized the Mamluks over their ongoing internal power struggle:
The new Sultans were not more firmly established than their predecessors.
Forty-seven of them followed one another in quick succession in the short period
of two hundred and fifty years, and when in 1517 Selim the Grim turned his eyes
from Europe to oriental conquest, he was able to make short work of the Sultans
and to turn Egypt into a Turkish province.35
In his 1940s book, however, a significant positive switch occurred

in Ghurbāl’s perception of the Mamluks. He exemplifies the Mamluk
Sultanate era as the glory of Egypt revealed in Egyptian history, a dynamic
community comprising factions and groups, from lords of swords to men
of the pen, from peasantry to traders, carpet masters to educators, etc.36
Of the many Mamluk Sultans, Baybars’ reign is reinterpreted as Egypt
at its highest point: Egypt was the center of the Arab world. It was at
its peak, standing alone in the aftermath of the collapse of the ‘Abbasid
Caliphate.37 Furthermore, the Mamluk Sultans are depicted as righteous
rulers, protectors of the people in the interest of the public struggle and
the improvement of the life of the people.38 How can we explain Ghurbāl’s
substantial shift from negative to positive with regard to the Mamluks? His
critical view of the internal power struggle among the Mamluk Sultans,
cited in his 1920s book, is widely accepted by many Egyptian historians,
regardless of their different historical points of view.
It is the intensive discourse on Egyptian nationalism generated in early
twentieth-century Egypt that hints at a clue to Ghurbals’ switch to glo-
rification of the Mamluk Sultans. In the 1930s and 1940s, the ideologi-
cal environment in Egypt underwent significant changes. Influenced by
the Egyptian nationalist fervor that overwhelmed Egypt and Egyptian
intellectuals, Ghurbāl needed to discover historic heroes to glorify the
Egyptian past. It is to be assumed from this socio-ideological context that
this pressing need compelled him to reshape the Mamluk Sultans in the
role of Egyptian heroes in his subsequent work.
For Ghurbāl’s student Aḥmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karīm,39 ‘tamṣīr’ was not
merely about studying Egyptian history in Arabic rather than in French
or English. Much more than that, it was “directing attention to the study
of modern national history.” Indeed, Al-Karīm’s book on Muḥammad
‘Alī provides an important indication of how the Mamluks are treated in
conventional Egyptian history teaching.
To a limited extent, the Mamluks are introduced as a foreign entity in the coun-
try. Thus they (the Mamluks) are absent from the stages of history and seem to
have avoided mixing with Egyptians, regarding themselves as different from oth-
ers. Hence, their (the Mamluk) culture remained isolated from the mass culture of
the Egyptian Umma.40
Al-Karīm’s intention here seems to be to urge contemporary Egyptian

historians to assimilate the Mamluks into modern Egyptian national
history.
In sum, neither sophisticated nor diverse presentations of the Mamluks
are clearly shaped in Ottomanist, monarchist, and academic historical liter-
ature, since their main subject of history writing was the Ottoman periods
rather than the Mamluk Sultanate era. This marked tendency to forget the
uncomfortable past—namely, ‘counter-memory’—is completely counter
to remembering the past. Nevertheless, the tide of Egyptian nationalism
had an impact on some narratives of monarchist and academic historians,
which gave rise to styling Mamluk Sultans as national heroes.
Representations of the Mamluks in Pro-Western Intellectuals’

Literature
Before touching upon Egyptian nationalist perceptions of the Mamluks,
one should examine the Egyptian intellectuals who stressed the country’s
affiliation with Europe and its Mediterranean neighbors. Pro-Western
Egyptian intellectuals seem committed to denying any Egyptian connec-
tion with the civilization and mentality of the “Asian” Arabs by postulat-
ing a more satisfactory alternative affiliation.41 For instance, Muḥammad
Sharaf, a physician, emphasized that the Mamluks and Turks did not blend
with the Egyptians, and viewed Sultan Baybars as a ‘pure’ Arab.42
Arabs mixed with Egyptians but did not marry with (Egyptian) peasantry. The Arabs
arrived in Egypt, but did not remain there as they emigrated to north-western Africa.
Many Arabs, including Baybars, were killed in the war.
130 I.K. SUNG
In terms of its origins, modern Egypt is ancient Egypt. Any examination

of blood confirms that modern Egypt is neither African nor Asian, but
European; i.e., belonging to the peoples who live around the Mediterranean
Sea.43
A luminary intellectual, Salāma Mūsa held a similar pro-Western ideology.

To critically understand Mūsa’s historical thought, we must begin with his
Westernism. Denying any Egyptian connection with the civilization and
mentality of the “Asian” Arabs, some Egyptianist intellectuals sought to
postulate a more palatable alternative affiliation for Egyptians. Since these
intellectuals believed that Egyptians were not really linked to the Arabs,
with what regions, peoples, or civilizations were they instead affiliated?
For Mūsa, the excellence of European culture and civilization over
that of the Arabs was self-evident, and this is the reason he asserted that
Egypt would consciously base its economic, social, and intellectual life
upon European models. Mūsa’s Westernism indicated that not only were
apologists for the greatness of classical Arab civilization misguided in evad-
ing the important questions of the present, but they by mistake gave the
credit for Arab civilization to the great men of that era—medieval Arab
civilization was, actually, in debt to previous Roman, Greek, and Egyptian
culture.44
After staying in England, Mūsa strongly embraced Fabianism. Several
prominent members of the Fabian Society, including H. G. Wells and
George Bernard Shaw, influenced him deeply. Fabianism was a doctrine
that blended economic socialism with an emphasis on social and moral
regeneration through the cultivation of traditional moral values such as
culture, decency, and order. In particular, Pharaonism enabled Mūsa to
anchor his argument that Egypt was part of the West and alien to the East
by allowing him to define a progression from the culture of the Pharaohs
through that of the Greeks and on to modern Europe. His thought
counted heavily on the work of Sir Grafton Elliot Smith, who for several
years taught anatomy in the medical school of the Qaṣr al-‘Aini hospital
in Cairo. Smith was charmed by Egyptian history, and during the course
of his career produced numerous books on the subject. Most of Smith’s
books focused on the contemporary anthropological problem of the ori-
gin and diffusion of civilization. Smith’s main thesis was that the Egyptians
“created civilization and devised its fundamental arts, crafts, and beliefs, as
well as the scientific doctrines of which it was the material and intellectual
expression.”45
However, Mūsa was not only outside the Islamic community of dis-
course but was also actively opposed to a revival of interest in medieval
Arab-Islamic history because of its significant impact on contemporary
Egyptian culture. Thus, he persisted much longer than most other writers
in preferring a Pharaonic identity for Egypt, hoping thereby to achieve
three goals: (1) to inspire the Egyptians to feel pride in their national heri-
tage in order to gain an enhanced sense of their personal as well as national
dignity, both of which had been demaged by the colonial experience; (2)
to convince the Egyptian public that Egypt’s authentic golden age was the
Pharaohnic era, which was much greater than the Arab-Islamic heritage by
virtue of both its more ancient age and its outstanding accomplishments;
and (3) to establish a direct connection between the glorious Egyptian
past and the prevailing modern European civilization.46
Mūsa attacked the assumptions of the Egyptian advocates of Easternism
by denying that Egypt belonged to the East. His racialism holding that
various racial types correspond to particular mentalities and national tem-
peraments made him receptive to Elliot Smith’s contention that Egyptians,
like the Syrians and Iraqis, were “Aryans by blood” and thus distinctive
from both Africans and Asians.47 In order to verify his thesis that the origin
of Syrians was Aryan, Mūsa compared the skull form of Syrians with those
of Pharaonic times:
Syrians mixed with Europeans during the Roman periods.

More importantly, during Crusade wars, Syrians’ bloods mixed with Europeans’.
But [the] Syrian skull form preserved the form of Pharaonic periods
Semite language, such as Arabic, has no connection with Aryan language
but rather it has similarity with Mongolian language.48
To stress apparent differences between Egyptians and Arabs, Mūsa offers

as evidence common affinity found in the rituals of Mongols and Arabs:
As in the case of Arabs in China, to prevent growth of their feet, it was neces-
sary for women to wear footwear made of wood or steel…
Ancient Arab women wore white, and this ritual still remains in China…
The religious myth of Hawa is another evidence for similarity between
Mongolians and Semites. Hawa is a famous story among Semites but which
is not known to Aryans. In contrast, Mongolians knew it from ancient times.
This word, Hawa, in the population of island of Philippines of South Eastern
Asia, means woman or rib or Torah (Old Testament), just as Hawa is accepted
as a rib of ribs of Adam. [Thus] Mongolians and Semites had one origin.49
132 I.K. SUNG
Of many other Egyptian intellectuals, Salāma Mūsa was probably the most
energetic exponent of the idea that Egypt belongs to the Mediterranean or
European world rather than the Arab World. As far as he was concerned,
Egypt was part of the West rather than the East: “As my knowledge of
the East increases so does my aversion to it and my feeling that it is for-
eign to me; as my knowledge of Europe increases, so does my love and
attachment for it and my feeling that I am part of it and it is part of me.”50
Mūsa employed quasi-religious language to reject any Eastern affiliations for
Egypt and to assert that Egypt’s natural connections were with the West:
“I am a disbeliever [kafīr] in the East, a believer [mu’min] in the West.”51
On the basis of these beliefs, he called upon his fellow Egyptians to take
up the historical duty of clarifying their present “customs acquired from
Asia” and the parallel necessity of “adopting the customs of Europe.”52 In
his idea, Egyptians had to become “out-and-out Europeans” [Awrūbiyyin
ṣāliḥin].53 A substantial part of Mūsa’s historical exploration of the 1920s was
devoted to expounding upon this thesis of Egypt’s similarity to Europe.54
For both Salāma Mūsa and Dr. Muḥamad Sharaf, the contentions that
“Egyptians are not Semitic” and that “Egypt is a non-Eastern nation”
could be proved equally by means of geography, biology, and culture.
Through a detailed comparative study of the physical characteristics, social
customs, language, and material culture of Egyptians with those of other
peoples, Mūsa and Sharaf concluded that the Egyptians had close affinity
with the peoples of Europe rather than those of Asia. Mūsa and Sharaf were
also apparently the first to develop the stance that Egypt was an inseparable
part of “Mediterranean” civilization, and thus an integral part of Europe.55
To strengthen his contention of Egypt’s western orientation, Mūsa takes
us back to ancient Egypt, seeking the root of Egypt. In Mūsa’s theory,
Egyptian rulers such Ikhshidis, Fāṭimids, and the Mamluk regime are defined
as Aryan, and Egypt thereby had a connection with European blood.
The origin of the Mongols was Turks. But Egypt was connected to
Macedonian Turks, they were Europeans in terms of blood though only
spoke Turkish56
Linguistically, the ancient Egyptian language was close to ancient

Aryan language. The only distinction between Europe and Egypt is
that Europe is built on a culture of industry and Egypt is based on one
of agriculture.57
On the other hand, Mūsa also represented the Mamluks as a symbol

of authoritarianism and tyranny in order to address his preference for
European liberalism over Nazi or Fascist dictatorship. In an essay on “The
problems of Egyptian youth,” Mūsa estimated the relevance of democratic
versus authoritarian principles for Egypt. The essay was concretely pro-
democratic. For Egypt, a country at the time debating its national identity
and in the process of assimilating to and internalizing modernity, Mūsa
was quite convinced that liberal democracy was the best form of govern-
ment. Mūsa considered liberalism as a combination of freedom and prog-
ress, a system of values that permitted political liberty at the same time as
it fostered social reform.58
Coping with the sympathy with Nazism and Fascism that reared its
head in Egypt in the 1930s, Mūsa strongly supported nineteenth-century
European liberalism, encompassing religious endurance, the acceptance
and advancement of science, and the development of new technologies.
Mūsa believed that the majority of the good aspects of modernity derived
from liberalism. Thus, instead of relying on any anachronistic form of
authoritarian government that would be de facto “no different from the
tyranny of the Mamluk or the absolutism of Eastern rulers,” what was
needed in Mūsa’s thought was “spreading democratic education and
imparting the principles of liberalism in Egypt.”59
In conclusion, a somewhat contradictory memory of the Mamluks is
engendered. In a positive manner, Mūsa reinvented the Mamluk nation
as an Aryan root of Egyptians. On the other hand, the Mamluks are one
of many other tyrannical regimes highlighted to counter the climate of
Nazism and Fascism in Egypt.
Representations of the Mamluks by Egyptian Nationalist

Intellectuals and Historians.
Overview
For the Egyptian nationalist historians, the Mamluk Sultanate periods
are the major vicissitudes in Egyptian national history. Hence, diverse
groups of Egyptian nationalist historians generated and then elaborated
data in order to create a new Mamluk identity commensurate with a new
Egyptian identity, and even with one another, in line with their own ideo-
logical beliefs. Mirroring such a variety of nationalist ideologies, four dif-
ferent types of Egyptian nationalism emerged during the period under
134 I.K. SUNG
discussion: territorial nationalism, Islamic Egyptian nationalism, Egyptian

integral nationalism, and Egyptian Arab nationalism.
Although they have different views on core points, Egyptian nationalists
share many common Mamluk characteristics. To begin with the origins of
the Mamluks, most nationalist historians consider Sultan al-Mu‘taṣim the
founder of the Mamluk military “order,”60 except ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī, who
regarded Salāḥ al-Dīn as the first one to use the Mamluks. The Mamluks
are defined as white/colored/slaves/mercenaries.61 The Baḥrī Mamluk
dynasty begins with prisoners and escapees from central and northern Asia
who were bought in the slave market.62
The origins of the second Mamluk dynasty, Burjī, are Circassian or
Kipchak.63 The Mamluks did not mix with the local population and
remained isolated from them.64 ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī classified the
Mamluk military system into three different groups. The first group as
candidates for the Sultan who were sold to the Sultan, inherited from the
previous regime, or organized for him. This group, called al-Khāṣakīya,65
also served as the Sultan’s bodyguards.66 The second group comprised
trained soldiers and their offspring.67 The third were Mamluk leaders and
were equal to the Mamluk Sultans, although they obeyed their orders.68
The Egypt-centered view is one of several main components that dif-
ferentiate nationalist literature and other historical literature, which often
interconnected, blurring the border between the Mamluk army and the
Egyptian army.69 Positing that Egypt and Syria formed one united country,
Mu’nis stressed Egyptian leadership by citing historical evidence imply-
ing that Egypt freed Syria from the hands of the Crusaders. Mu’nis even
predicts what Egypt will do in the future: “It was also the Egyptian army
that protected Syria by halting the Mongols and (Insha’ Allah) Egypt will
liberate Palestine from Israel in the future.”70
Pro-Ottoman nationalist Jamāl al-Dīn Shayyāl expressed his national-
ist sentiments by reshaping Damietta as the first waṭan (homeland)71 and
by identifying the army that fought against the Crusaders as the Egyptian
army, or Egyptians.72
By the same token, Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan refers to the army of Ṭūmānbāy
I as the army of Egyptians.73 In Ḥasan’s vision of nationalist history, Egypt
is presented as the geographic hub, with an important role in trade since
it was the link between the Red Sea, Arab countries, the Far East, and the
Mediterranean Sea en route to other places.74 Thanks to this geographi-
cal advantage, Egypt rose as a worldwide political center. In reality, the
Mamluk Sultans of Egypt and Syria extended their rule to Yemen, Hijāz,
Tripoli, and Armenia.75
The second common characteristic noted in the Egyptian national-

ist narrative is the glorification of the great Mamluk Sultans, among
whom Baybars is remarkable. Regarding the origins of the Mamluks,
Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan changes nothing in adopting the existing theory
accepted by most Egyptian historians: the Mamluks were a military regime
with slave origins.76 Highlighting the Mamluk victory against the Mongols
and the Crusaders,77 many of the nationalist historians, including Ḥasan,
warmly applauded the Mamluk era for attaining Egypt’s elevated status
and for its far-reaching influence. Parallel to this, the Mamluk regime is
believed to have succeeded in establishing a great empire in which the rule
of Baybars and Qalāwūn heralded the golden days of the times.78
Many of the nationalist historians panegyrized Sultan Baybars as an
authentic reformer who reorganized the Mamluk army,79 enhanced naval
power,80 and established a postal network.81 Abū Usāma glorified Baybars
as one who possessed mystical power and saved the world from the
Mongols:
He was one of those men who depend on hidden power but also use their
rationality.82
Baybars’ era was the pillar of our present-day world.
He overcame the worst dangers and withstood the most difficult of tri-
als. Calamity was impending from all directions and the whole Arab world
fought against the annihilation by the Mongols.
Baybars united powers (Syria and Egypt) against the enemy.83
The Mamluk Sultans even contributed to some extent, constructing

the banks of the Nile River84 and encouraging agriculture.85 The most
interesting feature in the manifold views of Baybars’ character, as pre-
sented by the historians, is the way they reshaped him morally as a perfect
ruler who even freed women from male oppression:
Baybars showed much interest in women’s rights and abolished the oppres-
sion of women by men. Baybars strove to spread virtue (moral equality).
And he maintained his subjects’ standard of living.86
In a similar feminist style, ‘Azīz Abāza, renowned as one of modern

Egypt’s most outstanding poets, reshaped Aybak as a supporter of gen-
der equality. When the Mamluk leaders suspected whether Shajarat al-Durr
was a rightful heir to the Sultanate, Aybak defended her right as follows.
The Mamluk leaders of Syria said that “women are not entitled to rule
136 I.K. SUNG
according to the law, and men are entitled to own women.” Baybars added
that this is what they claimed. In contrast Aybak claimed that “they also are
heroes” and asked, “does God really favor the male sex, who is much more
ambitious, over the female sex?” At last Aybak concluded that “there is no
difference between the two sexes.”87
What motivated this extraordinary presentation of Baybars as an advo-
cate of women’s rights? The issue of women’s rights was one of the main
themes of Egyptian intellectual discourse on liberalism at the time, and
Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn Surūr and ‘Azīz Abāẓa participated in the dis-
course in an attempt to draw attention to the gravity of the inhumane
conditions of women in Egypt.
In addition to Baybars and Aybak, many other Mamluk leaders were
rebirthed as national heroes, notably Quṭuz, Qalāwūn,88 Shajarat al-Durr,
and Ṭūmānbāy. Quṭuz is glorified as a Mamluk hero who halted the Mongol
invasion at ‘Ayn Jālūt.89 Shajarat al-Durr, a woman, is presented as a brave
ruler who had good foreign policy skills and led a war against Louis IX.90
Ḥabīb Jāmātī praised Shajarat al-Durr for her political skill, too.
Shajarat al-Durr kept the serious secret of (the death of Ṣaliḥ Niẓām al-Dīn) for
three months and continued to collect intelligence on the Europeans. She then
stopped their attacks on Egypt.91
Shajarat al-Durr was the first queen who seized the throne, and the only one
to do so throughout the history of Islam.92
In his review of ‘Azīz Abāẓa’s play, Shajarat al-Durr, Anwār Fataḥ Allah
noted the contradictory image of Shajarat al-Durr, conveyed through the
sharp contrast between her image as a nationalistic heroine and her iden-
tity as a woman:
She is an outstanding figure in Egyptian history, as she was the first Muslim queen
who took the throne in Egypt when Crusaders threatened its independence.93
In her anger, sadness, and hesitation, Shajarat al-Durr was an ordinary
woman. She cried to her husband and tried to save him. Her life consisted
of human emotions.94
Fataḥ Allah seems to attempt to address seriously the issue of women’s

freedom and rights in Egyptian society by depicting Shajarat al-Durr as an
ordinary woman, complementarily to her heroine image.
However, one history book still contains a reference that undermines
her leadership as a woman:
Al-Musta‘ṣim sent a letter asking “If you do not have any man, tell me. I will
send you a man [from] among us.”95
Sultan al-Ghawrī is, in various ways, described as a national hero.

In a review of ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al Azām’s short historical novel Majālis
al-Sulṭān al-Ghawrī, Muḥammad Laṭfī Juma‘ described al-Ghawrī as
a courageous Sultan who defeated the enemy. However, al-Ghawrī had
one defect: he was wasteful, and thus needed to levy heavy taxes on the
oppressed people.96 From a cultural point of view, Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan
and ‘Abd Wahhāb ‘Azām portrayed al-Ghawrī as an open-minded leader,
who welcomed the Italian emissary Domenico Trevisiano.97
Similarly, Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd presented al-Ghawrī and other
Mamluk Sultans as pro-Western and highly civilized Sultans who pro-
moted cooperation and exchange:
In the Middle Ages, Egypt was not isolated from Europe. It was the great-
est country in the East and maintained relations with Europe in the fields of
trade and politics.98
Sultan al-Ghawrī intended to sever the relations with Italy when the
latter hinted that it would like to breach the previously held friendship;
instead, Italy wished to establish relations with Portugal, France, Spain,
and England.99
The Italian consul in Damascus also irritated the Sultan.

However, Italy sent a messenger in order to maintain its relations with Egypt
and punish the consul. Finally, al-Ghawrī revived the relations with Italy.100
Mamluk Sultans, such as Qalāwūn, allowed many Europeans to enter Egypt.
Numerous Europeans helped the Mamluk dynasty, and the Mamluk Sultans
mastered literary French.101
Moreover, Abū Ḥadīd glorified al-Ghawrī as the Sultan, who was attentive
to the people.
Qānṣuh was one of the greatest and most glorious Sultans.

He listened to the people.102
In contrast to the Western nationalist presentations of al-Ghawrī, Maḥmūd

Razaq Salīm reshaped Sultan al-Ghawrī in a brilliant Islamic fashion (this is
discussed in detail below).
138 I.K. SUNG
The last Circassian Sultan, Ṭūmānbāy II, is one of a series of Mamluk

Sultans who were reshaped as national Egyptian heroes. Muḥammad
Muṣṭafā Ziyāda remarked that the Mamluk Sultans did not take advan-
tage of the precarious situation generated by the fierce rivalry between the
Ottomans and the Safavids.103 In particular, Ziyāda described Ṭūmānbāy
II, the last Mamluk Sultan, as the “greatest Sultan.” He was exalted as the
sacred servant and protector of Egypt, and even the Pharaohs are said to
have been proud of him.”104
The Mamluks are also praised for their excellence in cultural spheres,
such as building construction and arts.105 During the Mamluk era,
Egyptians built great structures106 and carried the banner of civilization.
They were renowned throughout the world for the flourishing Islamic
art,107as well as for industry,108 trade,109 engineering, design, decoration,
and textiles.110
Interestingly, ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī offers a new theory regarding the long
survival of the Mamluk dynasty. According to this theory, the source of
their success was not their military capability, as expounded by many his-
torians. Rather, it was their encouragement of the arts and sciences that
enabled them to retain their power for so long:
The Mamluks stayed in power for around 500 years, but our regime did so
for barely 50 years. The secret of how the Mamluks remained in power for
so long is that they did more than just protect their army and regime; they
acknowledged that the reason ruling classes and nobles lasted in power is
not related to their white skin color. The gift of the Mamluks to Egypt was
artistic talent, and our gift to Egypt was science.111
Who can ignore the creatures of the banks of the Nile and the roots of the
land; the benefits of the Mamluk castles, their mosques and art traditions?112
Cotton was the main reason for foreign trade with Egypt, but it is because of
the Mamluks’ culture that many tourists visit Egypt, which no doubt made
the lives of [the] Egyptian nation hard.113
Like Shukrī, Ḥusayn Mu’nis shows an interest in the Mamluk contribu-

tion to cultural development, but for a different purpose. Mu’nis offers
Mamluk talent and culture as evidence in validation of his contention that
the Mamluk regime was more than just villainous and mercenary:
It is not correct to say that the Mamluks are just a band of evildoers and
mercenaries sucking the blood of the country and seeking all kinds of lux-
ury, since many of them were highly endowed with ability, open minds and
good intentions. For instance, it cannot be disputed that the eras of Quṭuz,
Baybars, Qalāwūn, Nāṣir Qalāwūn, his son, Lāshīn, and Barsbāy are con-
sidered as great Muslim regimes and were excellent in constructing mag-
nificent buildings, as well as developing culture. In addition, they were all
faithful Muslims respecting Islam, and many of them followed the path of
Islam in defending its territory.114
We thus encountered a completely different image of Mamluk Sultans,

in which they are re-conceptualized as extraordinary creators of a great
civilization, excelling in architecture, trade, culture, and arts. Egyptian
nationalist historians thus succeeded in ‘reinventing’ intelligent and
sophisticated Mamluk Sultans who revived the glories of Egypt.
Unflattering references to the Mamluks are made as often as those that
are glorifying. Many of the negative references accuse the Mamluk Sultans
of internal power struggles115 and tyranny and oppression of the Egyptians.
Indeed, the Mamluk regime is defined as one of chaos and intrigue and
internal conflict among factions and groups struggling for their leaders and
Sultans.116 In his poetry, Yūsuf al-Buyūmī accused many Mamluk Sultans
and leaders of injustice and tyranny. For instance, Sultan Mujaffar Hajji
(1346) committed mass killing. As for Sultan Nāṣir Ḥusayn Ibn Muḥammad
Ibn Qalāwūn, he forced women to serve him117 and subdued the people of
Cairo and vehemently killed and choked them.118 Sanjar al-Shajā‘i (wazīr
diyār [domestic] miṣriyya) is described as the most oppressive tyrant.
Barqūq is depicted as one who imprisoned Caliph Mutawākkil.119
‘Adlī Tāhir Nūr allegedly argued that monstrous Mamluks controlled
Egypt and made Egypt vicious.120 It is very interesting to find that many
nationalist historians use critical remarks about the Mamluks to denigrate
the arbitrary monarchy of the era. For instance, in order to raise the subject
of the socio-political hardship of the 1930s, Ḥusayn Mu’nis drew an analogy
between Mamluk tyranny and the autocratic political entity of the 1930s:
Thus, the subjects were weakened and enfeebled, which caused the Mamluks
to turn to tyranny and also prevented them from avoiding tyranny in favor
of altruism.121 The more the Egyptians weakened, the more the power of
the Mamluks strengthened.122 As a result, the first Mamluk dynasty ended
with no dialogue between the ruler and the ruled.123
In Mu’nis’ comparative historical analysis, with his nationalist concep-

tion, Mamluk tyranny came from the weakness of the citizens, and the
same holds true for the 1930s political crisis in Egypt. The autocratic
140 I.K. SUNG
political entity supported by the Egyptian monarchy, and generated by

the Egyptian subjects’ weakness, brought about the fierce power struggle
among Britain, the monarchy, and the Egyptian nationalists. In Mu’nis’
mind, therefore, the only remaining solution was to enable the Egyptians
to maintain the balance of power and thereby achieve an independent
Egyptian state.
From a different perspective, but for the same purpose, Zakī
Muḥammad Ḥasan posits the absence of a system of inheritance as the
main reason for the fierce power struggle among the Mamluk Sultans.124
Similar to Mu’nis’ creative correlation between authoritarian monarchy,
Mamluk tyranny, and Egypt’s turbulent socio-political crisis, Ḥasan implic-
itly blamed the autocratic monarchy for ruining Egypt, comparing 1930s
Egypt to the unstable Mamluk era.
Unlike the previous two stories, ‘Aṭṭiya al-Shaykh ascribed the vehe-
ment internal struggle for the throne, fought between Sultan al-Jāshankīr
and Sultan al-Nāṣir, to two other reasons: vicious cronies and the Sultan’s
personal greed. Al-Jāshankīr is depicted as a pious Sultan and God-fearing
man looking after the treasury, and even forbade any waste and extrava-
gance. According to al-Shaykh, al-Jāshankīr did not place the Mamluks
of his father under his orders as others did, but his vicious entourage told
him precisely what he wished to hear and concealed that which he did not
want to know. Even though the public treasury was empty and the people
were starving, al-Jāshankīr demanded more with obstinacy and filled the
treasury, and in al-Shaykh’s view this is the main factor that made the
Sultan isolate himself from the people, who were terrorized by him.125
When war was impending, all the Mamluk leaders chased their own
interests and the vicious entourages betrayed al-Jāshankīr and had a secret
understanding with Sultan al-Nāsir to topple al-Jashankir. The envi-
ous al-Jāshankīr got closer to the people, who elevated him in turn.126
However, the mercenaries gathered their bands and hunted for excesses
and lived above the means of the nation. They were occupied with plun-
dering the people and betrayed al-Jāshankīr’s trust, grabbing the property
of the nation, demolishing houses, and spreading poverty and hunger.127
No sooner had al-Jāshankīr seized the throne than he began to be
involved in evildoing. Due to his misdeeds the people cried in grievance
and did not trust each other. Furthermore, the ill-treated people demanded
justice from the tyrant.128 His misrule worsened economic conditions, and
thus the price of wheat soared dramatically. The people even expressed
political satire in song: Our Sultan is useless (rakīn) rather than a pillar
(ruken), and his deputy (slār) is tiny.129 A popular storyteller in the ‘Aṭṭiya
al-Shaykh's story describes the last day of al-Jāshankīr: the more people
sympathized with al-Nāṣir and which crowned the experienced king, the
more al-Nāṣir as a new Sultan and al-Jāshankīr was in return humiliated
and he [thus] became an atrocious man. At last al-Jāshankīr was arrested
by al-Nāṣir and executed.130
As seen above, the Sultan’s greed is explained as the main cause of the
vehement struggle for power. It sabotaged the relations with his people
and generated tyranny and injustice. Al-Shaykh seems to tell his readers
that all greedy and despotic tyrants are destined to fall. Of course, this
message could also be interpreted differently, as a warning to the arbitrary
Egyptian monarchy of al-Shaykh’s time.
Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd also elaborated on the internal struggle
between the Mamluk Sultans. After the death of Sultan Baybars, he writes,
his deputy Sultan Badr al-Dīn Biyalik ruled the country until the son of
Baybars succeeded the throne by concealing Baybars’ death.131 The main
purpose of Ḥadīd’s short story seems to have been to emphasize that a
stable succession of the throne is essential for the nation’s stability.
Representations of the Mamluks in Territorial Nationalist

So far, our discussion has focused on common features in the ways nation-
alist historians utilize the Mamluk past to promote their own ideologi-
cal beliefs. Below, we intend to trace how each Egyptian nationalist—an
Egyptian territorialist nationalist, an Egyptian Islamic nationalist, an inte-
gral Egyptian nationalist, and an Egyptian Arab nationalist—portrays the
Mamluks and the Mamluk era.
This new territorialist national history was founded on a particular
concept of time in which time was made an exclusive function of place.
According to this territorial theory, it was the physical environment that
shaped the nature of any given period or moment and dictated the rhythm
of the flow of time. Namely, time was embodied within the boundaries of
geography, and was subordinated to determinist laws of nature predomi-
nating within the natural environment.132 According to Egyptian territo-
rialism it was a “territorial clock” that formulated Egypt’s life and death.
Whatever happened over the country’s long history, all these moments
happened in the Nile Valley. Such commonality of place unified succes-
sive periods of time into one historical entity. This continuity, rather than
142 I.K. SUNG
change, was considered the backbone of Egyptian history. Territorialists

interpreted that Egypt’s “immortal life” underwent only incidental
changes over the millennia.133
Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm’s writings demonstrate an explicit expression of this
territorial conception of time. It was al-Ḥakīm’s position that time and
place together were the two driving forces that had formed the Egyptian
philosophical landscape.134 A luminary intellectual, al-Ḥakīm was con-
vinced that Egyptian thought, for thousands of years, had circled around
the enormous struggle between time, man, and place. Whereas the “Greek
were obsessed with fate and destiny, the Egyptians are obsessed with time
and place [al-zaman wa al-makan].” Indeed, for al-Ḥakīm, Egypt’s raison
d’être as a nation was to control time and place and to make them both
subordinate to the will of Egypt.135 In al-Ḥakīm’s insight, Egypt was able
to master time through its geographical and human resources. The organic
continuity of life in the Nile Valley and the perpetuity of the “Egyptian
spirit” stemming from its rootedness in that environment were considered
stronger than time.136
In a similar vein, for an Egyptian luminary territorialist intellectual,
Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, Egypt’s long history from the Pharaohs to
the contemporary period is the history of the fusion (ta’rīkh al-indimāj)
in which all those who aspired to invade Egypt became the inhabitants of
Egypt. A significant pattern is found in Haykal’s historical interpretation
in which external forces occupied the country but were successful in ruling
it only after they assimilated to it, coming under the influence of Egypt’s
territorial history. Accepting Egyptian customs and eventually becoming
Egyptian, external rulers became devoted to the advancement and pros-
perity of Egypt itself. The secret of their success was their own “surrender
to the power of the strong Egyptian character.”137
Reflecting these territorial nationalist ideas, the second luminary intel-
lectual, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, included all peoples, from the ancient
dynasty to the Mamluks, and turned them into Egyptians, as follows:
They were assimilated by virtue of the atmosphere and inhabitants of

Egypt… the Hyksos, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, the Mamluks, all
became Egyptians who accepted the authority of Egypt and who completely
embodied the spirit of the Nile Valley.138
Moreover, Haykal saw the lengthy Mamluk period (1250–1517) as the

completion of the process of the regaining of Egyptian independence and
sovereignty during the Islamic era: “The Mamluks even more than Ayyūbids
became independent rulers by means of Egypt, and Egypt became indepen-
dent by means of them.”139 The Mamluk period was portrayed as a new
golden age for the country due to their assimilation to the genius of Egypt:
politically, Egypt expanded south, west, and east; economically, it became “the
commercial crossroads between east and west.”140 Culturally, the Mamluk
Sultanate era is embodied as a heyday of Islamic civilization, promoting
knowledge, art, trade activities, industry, and so on.141 In Haykal’s glorious
nationalist narrative Sultan Baybars is commemorated as an Egyptian hero:
At a critical moment of Islamic history, it was the Mamluks under Baybars

who stopped the seemingly inexorable Mongol tide at ‘Ayn Jālūt in 1260
and who forced the Mongols back across the Euphrates. Thus, Islam was
saved from “the Tatar invasion.”142
Particularly Haykal’s territorial nationalism is clearly manifested in his

account of Mamluk military success:
“Mamluk achievements derived from the power of the Egyptian environ-

ment rather than from Muslim or Turkish source, it was vitality of the
Egyptian national personality, firmly anchored in the sureties of the Nile
Valley and expressing Egypt’s eternal aspiration for liberty and indepen-
dence, which had defeated the Mongols and ushered in an era of Egyptian
preeminence in the region and the Umma.”143
Even Haykal openly advocates Mamluk tyranny by claiming that

most regimes were despotic. He asked if historians were being fair to the
Mamluks when they defined their period as “an era of tyranny in the his-
tory of Egypt.” He pointed out that ruling regimes everywhere at this time
were “despotic regimes,” for the idea of democracy was non-existent.144
Like Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, another luminary intellectual, Ṭaha
Ḥusayn, developed a similar territorial thesis: Soon after having invaded
Egypt as foreign conquerors, the Arabs were overcome by the strength of
the Egyptian national characteristics and thus assimilated themselves into
its territorial patterns. A great number of Egyptian intellectuals embraced
this thought, which subsequently prevailed over intellectual discourse in
the post-1919 period in Egypt.145
Egyptianization is the key factor in this thesis since it included an
important sub-thesis within itself: that the Arabic language and Islamic
144 I.K. SUNG
religion brought to Egypt by Arab conquerors had been assimilated

by the Egyptian people only after both had undergone a process of
Egyptianization.146 Ṭaha Ḥusayn perceives the Arab conquest of Egypt in a
similar manner. The Arab invasion of Egypt, to him, was only one example
of a cyclical historical pattern that had become an integral part of Egypt’s
national history. For thousands of years, the Egyptian people had been
victims of “a variety of injustices and all sorts of hostility” from many
foreign invaders: Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Turks, the French, and
finally the English.147 In Ḥusayn’s view, the Arab invasion was the most
perilous of this series of foreign invasions, which even jeopardized Egypt’s
independent historical existence. As a result Egypt became a peripheral
country of a larger empire whose civilizational hub was far removed from
the Nile Valley.148
In his book Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa fī Miṣr, Ṭaha Ḥusayn sets out to
prove the existence of a distinct Egyptian personality, which has put its
stamp on every aspect of life. Although Arabic is common to all Arabs,
Egypt has a specific manner of expression.149 In order to refute the theory
put forward by Haykal and others concerning the unity of the nations of
the East, Ṭaha Ḥusayn claimed that Egyptian, Greek, Latin, and modern
French cultures all belong to a single indivisible culture, which he calls
Mediterranean and European.150
It would be a mistake to suppose that Ḥusayn was now restating the plea for
an Egyptian particularism, which many writers, such as Haykal in the 1920s,
had acclaimed earlier. Ḥusayn found no contradiction between the call for
Westernization and an admiration for Arabic culture. Unlike the champions
of the Pharaonic trend, Ḥusayn ranked ancient Arabic literature among the
world’s finest artistic creations.151 Without doubt, Ṭaha Ḥusayn’s territorial-
ism is a key to understanding his perception of the Mamluks. He assimilated
the Mamluks into the Egyptian entity by claiming that “the Macedonians,
the Mamluks, and the Fāṭimids who opted for Egyptian nationality enjoyed
glory and security.”152 Moreover, with their consequent willingness to
“assume Egyptian nationality and merge into it”153 came victory.
To sum up, Ḥusayn exemplified Mamluk assimilation into the Egyptian
entity in order to strengthen his thesis of territorial nationalism in which
Mamluks are no longer foreign military slaves but instead commemorated
as a symbol of Egyptian glory and security.
In many respects, Aḥmad Amīn adopted the prevailing theory of the
Mamluks developed by many other Egyptian nationalist. For instance, Amīn
viewed ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Mu‘taṣim as the first to have used Mamluks as
mercenaries.154 The Mamluks learned Islam, science, tradition, and cultural

elements. Soon after seizing power from the Ayyūbids, they divided their
army into several parts.155 Quṭuz is reborn as a national hero of the ‘Ayn
Jālūt war between the Mamluks and Mongols: “Facing Mongols at ‘Ayn
Jālūt, Quṭuz called help from ‘Ulamā’ (head of ‘Ulamā’ ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn
‘Abd al-Salām ) and halted them.”156 More importantly, he glorified the
Mamluk era by asserting that “during Mamluk dynasty, Egypt became the
center of Islamic culture and even surpassed Baghdad.”157 However, the
Mamluks appeared to have neither known Arabic nor enjoyed it; thereby,
there was no progress in the field of poets. It was not until Muḥammad
‘Alī’s rule that a new Egyptian resurrection (Nahḍa) came into being.158
In addition, diverse aspects of nationalism are seen in the accounts of the
Mamluks. Reflecting Islamic nationalism, Amīn used the terms Mamluk
Sultans and Islamic kings.159 Stressing Egyptian people’s role in historical
development, Amīn remarked that both Egyptian Mamluk Sultans and
Egyptian people defeated the Crusaders at al-Manṣūra.160
Under the influence of the powerful wave of this territorial nationalism
in the early 1930s, many other intellectuals assimilated the Mamluk past
into Egyptian collective historical memory as follows:
Invaders such as the Hyksos, the Persians, the Nubians, the Greeks, the
Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabs, and the Mamluk and Ottoman Turks
were all held to have had not the slightest effect on the stability and strength
of the Egyptian national personality. Instead, that personality had stamped
its characteristics upon them, Egyptianized them, and made them subject to
Egyptian historical patterns.161
As a historian and Director of the Egyptian Department of Numismatics,

Ibrāhīm Jalāl, in a similar vein, denied that the Mamluks were a different
“nation” from the Egyptians. Instead, he contended that “the Mamluks
were not a nation but rather individuals who took Egypt as a homeland,
adopting and imitating her people’s nature, character, language, science,
temperament, and traditions as their model.”162 According to his insight
into Egypt’s past, Mamluks had “settled amidst the Egyptians, assimilated
to them, intermarried with them, involved them in power and shared all
the country’s resources with them.”163 In light of his assimilation of the
Mamluks into Egypt, it is no wonder that Jalāl glorified the Mamluk era
and Sultan Baybars. Jalāl defined Mamluks as slaves from Kipchaq.164 The
Circassian kings are represented as national leaders who achieved complete
146 I.K. SUNG
independence for Egypt.165 Under the Mamluk kings’ rule Egyptians’

nobility appeared in a variety of fields: Egypt developed the treasures of its
Arab legacy, constructed the great mosque in Cairo, and promoted art, his-
tory, technology, poetry, etc. The Mamluks were glorified as pious, as were
their kings and leaders.166 Jalāl also praised Sultan Baybars for bringing the
‘Abbasid Caliph back to Cairo and restoring the city as his center.167
An anonymous author referred to the Egyptian excellence that halted
the Mongols rather than the Mamluks:
The Egyptian power had stopped the 1260 attacks of the Tatar Army on Africa
[no mention is made of Mamluks or Arabs]. It is impossible to know what would
remain of the Arab civilization had Cairo and North Africa been destroyed by
the Tatars (a clear distinction is drawn between the Arabs and the Egyptians).168
Representations of the Mamluks in Egyptian Islamic Nationalist

Literature
Egyptian Islamic nationalism was an endeavor to rebuild a religion-
based alternative to supplant the territorial nationalism that had gained
ascendancy in Egypt in the 1920s. It is worthwhile to emphasize that its
formulators were both Muslims and nationalists. Thus, it could be said
that Egyptian Islamic nationalists were the first Egyptian Muslims who
undertook the task of developing a systematic nationalist doctrine whose
reference point was firmly rooted in Islam.169 Overall, Egyptian Islamic
nationalists constantly emphasized the universal nature of the Islamic faith:
Islam is a universal religion; its credos apply regardless of geographical dif-
ference, state structures, racial backgrounds, or class differences. Nothing
can influence the validity of its tenets; its jurisdiction is not limited to
boundaries; it recognizes no human difference save righteousness; in the
words of the Prophet, “the Arab has no superiority over the non-Arab save
by virtue of his piety.”170 It was exactly this universal nature that enabled
Islam to spread throughout the world, and by which Islam would possibly
overcome geographical and ethnic barriers and unite diverse regions and
peoples in “one nation (Umma Waḥida),” bearing the banner of guidance
and struggle for the good, for the sake of all mankind.171
Before embarking on Islamic nationalist perceptions of the Mamluks,
it is essential to examine Ḥasan al-Bannā’s—a luminary Islamist intel-
lectual—understanding of the Mamluk era and the Mamluks. Al-Bannā
further developed his Islamist ideas in 1935 in a series of editorials by
called “Da‘watuna” (Our Mission). He defined a dynamic of loyalties in

order to reconcile the potential conflict between Egyptian patriotism,
Arabism, and Islamic unity. In al-Bannā’s writing, the three allegiances
to Islam were seen as interacting with and reinforcing each other. The
liberation of Egypt and the establishment of an Islamic order in Egypt
was the first step. Secondly, the struggle for Arab unity was essential,
since it was a prerequisite for achieving Islamic unity.172 The revival
of the Islamic Caliphate was sometimes referred to as the final aim,
though the eventual goal was the universal brotherhood of mankind
and the international hegemony of the Islamic nation.173
However, al-Bannā vehemently denunciated “the nationalism of pagan-
ism [qawmiyyat al-jahiliyya],” by which he criticized the contemporary
effort of modern nationalists in some Muslim countries to “revive the cus-
tom of jahiliyya [i.e., pre-Islamic pagan Arabia]” that had been superseded
by the monotheism of Islam.174 The idea to replace the bond of Islam
by such racially biased nationalism was disgraceful in al-Bannā’s view. He
proclaimed that Muslim Brothers “do not call for Pharaonicim, Arabism,
Phoenicianism, or Syrianism.” Most importantly, al-Bannā also explicitly
criticized “the nationalism of aggression [qawmiyyat al-‘udwān],” refer-
ring to “racial self-aggrandizement to a degree that produces contempt for
other races, aggression against them, and their victimization for the sake
of the honor of the nation and its existence, as is advocated, for example,
by Germany and Italy.”175
Ḥasan al-Bannā’s historical point of view was based on the unity of
Islam, stressing Egypt’s leading role in struggling against the Crusaders
and Mongols, but narrated as an experience of one Muslim community.176
However, Islamic history took a turn for the worse after its early develop-
ment and dignity, since many negative factors both internal and exter-
nal—political and sectarian discord emerged; the devitalizing pleasures
of civilization; “the transfer of authority and leadership to non-Arabs…
who had never embraced genuine Islam”; intellectual stagnation and self-
sufficiency—were responsible for the downfall of the Islamic community
after its early days of expansion and flourishing.177 The long era from 668
to 1517, in which Egypt was ruled successively by the Ṭūlūnids, Ikhshidis,
Fāṭimids, Ayyūbids, and Mamluks, is widely regarded as one of political
collapse and cultural deterioration for the Islamic community.178
For the same reason, al-Bannā expressed a negative attitude toward
the Mamluk Sultanate by describing it as having “never absorbed
genuine Islam, and those hearts never been illuminated with the light
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of the Quran…”179 Apart from this, it is hard to find other references

to the Mamluks by al-Bannā. Considering al-Bannā’s Islamic historical
point of view, it is not so surprising to see unfavorable references to the
Mamluks, who originated from Turkish or Circassian military slaves. An
interesting point is the way in which al-Bannā interpreted the seizure
of power by the Mamluks. In his view, it was religious corruption and
stagnation of piety toward Islam that caused the political breakdown of
the glorious ‘Abbasid Caliphate system and, thereby, the Mamluks filled
the power vacuum created by the former.
In contrast, according to other Islamic Egyptian nationalists, this era
of crisis for the Umma as a whole was also a time when Islamic Egypt
achieved great prominence. The importance of these independent Muslim
dynasties was that they had transformed Egypt into the leading Muslim
state of the period, “the heart of the Islamic world and its civilization.”180
The most prominent aspect of Egyptian Islamic nationalism is its
interpretation of the past from the perspective of Islam and the Islamic
Umma parallel to the Egyptian-centered viewpoint. For instance,
Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān reinterpreted the Crusader war as the war of
the Islamic army against the Crusaders.181 Born in 1891, ‘Inān majored
in law in Cairo and then went to Berlin to complete his studies. In the
early 1920s, he worked as a lawyer as well as a journalist and began to
focus on the Islamic history of Egypt and ancient Islamic civilization.
Very soon ‘Inān crystallized his nationalist idea by synthesizing classical
Islamic Arab heritage as the basis for the modern culture of Egypt and
Arab communities.182
As mentioned, Egyptian leadership remained one of the main com-
ponents of Egyptian Islamic nationalism during the Crusades. Egypt is
believed to have played an essential historic role in halting the Crusaders’
threat to Egypt and the East. ‘Inān particularly stressed the fact that
Egypt’s war against the Crusaders was to defend not only Egypt, but also
Islam and Islamic cities, against the enemy’s barbaric attacks.183 ‘Inān’s
Islamic outlook is best conveyed in the account of the Mamluk war against
the Mongols at ‘Ayn Jālūt:
Quṭuz shouted ‘Wā Islāma,’ which raised the spirits of the Egyptians
and strengthened their power and they finally succeeded in defeating the
Mongols. The Egyptian army, led by Baybars, halted the Mongols.184 It
is an important day for Egyptian history and also for Islamic history and
for the history of civilization, because the Mongols made a vow to crush
from East to West. If the Mongols crushed Egypt, they would crush the
West, Andalusia and maybe Europe, destroying all structures of Eastern and
Western civilization, whether Islamic or Christian.185 It is not only Egypt’s
victory, but also the victory of the Islamic world…After the downfall of
Baghdad, Egypt finally became the center of Islamic thought.186
In addition to ‘Ayn Jālūt, Shajarat al-Durr is reborn as an early symbol

of ‘Inān’s Islamic nationalism.
Shajarat al-Durr was the first and the last queen of Islamic Egypt.187 Shajarat
al-Durr was a patriotic leader who halted the Crusaders.188 Facing numerous
Crusader attacks, Egypt, under the leadership of Shajarat Durr, protected
Islam and Islamic countries from the enemies and removed the strongest
Christian power in the name of religion.189
For ‘Abd al-Laṭīf Ḥamza, Islam is more than a religion; it is a medium

that can bridge between Egyptians and the Eastern and Western world.190
Clearly indicating such a wider Islamic cultural identity, Ḥamza attempted
to recompose the Mamluk era of Egyptian national history through the
prism of Islam and Islamic values. Ḥamza clearly shows his preference for
Egyptian Islamic nationalism, over the existing nationalism as well as over
the Pharaonic past:
Islamic patriotism (waṭaniyya Islāmiyya) is older and greater than the

national patriotism (waṭaniyya Qawmiyya),191 which first appeared in the
hearts and feelings of people during the Middle Ages.192
The Islamic spirit, in the days of its power, replaced the Egyptians’ past,
causing them to forget their Kings and Pharaohs, as the Persians forgot their
past and like the Turks […]
Thus, we found that the Egyptians glorified the Pharaohs, but were most
interested in what the new culture transmitted in praise of a new religion
(Islam).193
Although Ḥamza acknowledged the flaws of the Mamluks, he depicted

them as pious rulers, serving the Egyptians and faithful to the Islamic
leaders:
Such circumstances led Egypt to attain high status and to become the legal
head of the Islamic world, protecting the ‘Abbasid Islamic Caliphs, and this
had a great impact on literature and science.194 One strange trait of the
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Mamluks is that they devoted great effort to the interests of the Egyptian
people and were loyal to the Islamic leaders. Historians can perceive this
aspect in the Mamluk’s public way of life, but there is room for criticism and
annoyance with regard to their private lives.195
Strongly impressed by Mamluk military ability, Ḥamza’s respect for the

Mamluks extends beyond their military power, including a sense of won-
der at their success in building a huge empire:
It is certain that historians could not possibly conceal their amazement at

this new race that ruled Egypt – the Mamluks.
They were a group of slaves that their masters bought, trained and treated
with special care. It is amazing how, in such a short time, they were able to
take control over a rich region like Egypt, not to mention the other regions.
How were they able so easily to build a huge empire, to preserve it and
protect it, Egypt and Islam from the great threat of raids by such as the
Mongols and Crusaders?196
Like other Islamic nationalist historians, Ḥamza’s Egypt-centered view

was in harmony with Egyptian Islamic nationalism. Egypt in the Mamluk
era is depicted as having enjoyed the golden days of Islamic Egypt, when
the Mamluks became great in the Islamic world and far beyond Egypt.197
Egypt was the religious and political leader since it defeated the Crusaders
and the Mongols. After transferring the ‘Abbasid Caliph to Cairo, Egypt
became the center of the Caliphate.198
In Ḥamza’s ambitious nationalist project for creating a new Islamic

Egyptian community, the Egyptians are idealized as a peaceful nation loyal
to the Islamic ruler.
Egypt loved authority and submission; the Egyptian nation did not go
against the regime. Before the Arab attack, they did not raise general revolt
against the Islamic regime. Egypt loved unity and harmony.199
Even the arrival of the Arabs in Egypt did not hinder, but rather accel-
erated, the Islamization of the Egyptians:
As soon as Arabs and Egyptians mixed, the Arab soldiers left. Egyptians were
at ease in the life of a city from which a new people emerged; that is, the
Islamic Egyptian people.
The Egyptian people were content to participate in the building of

Islamic civilization. It was the Egyptian peoples themselves, in every city,
who established science and civilization.200
In the same manner, Surūr was determined to reconstruct the Egyptian

past from the universal Islamic standpoint, by blending the Mamluks into
Egyptian history and thereby integrating Egyptian history into Islamic his-
tory.201 For Surūr, Mamluk history is not simply a part of Islamic Egyptian
national history, but rather one of the glorious pages of Islamic history.202
In highlighting the great Egyptian leadership, Muḥammad Farīd
Abū Ḥadīd positioned Egypt at the forefront of the struggle against the
Crusaders as well as a center of the Islamic world.
The Crusaders waged a war against the East, commencing to attack the
Arabs in Spain and then launching continuous fights against Muslims in
Africa. Thirteenth-century Egypt was the greatest Islamic country and the
center of the Islamic world. All Islamic countries grouped around Egypt.203
Egypt was the heart of the Islamic East, protecting Islamic countries from
Mongols and Crusaders. Baybars is depicted as the great protector of the
thirteenth-century.204
Focusing on the importance of historical building in creating histori-

cal memory, Muḥammad ‘Abd Azīz Marzūq not only utilized dominant
historical figures but also used historical buildings as a site of national col-
lective memory. For Marzūq, these historical sites, built by the Mamluk
Sultans, became “sites of memory” [lieux de mémoire], as termed by Pierre
Nora.205 Nora’s sites of memory encompass nearly every social product and
cultural artifact: monuments, flags, anthem, museum exhibits, archives,
libraries, dictionaries, calendars, and cemeteries.206 In presenting Baybars’
mosque as an early manifestation of Egyptian Islamic nationalism, Marzūq
offers it as clear evidence of Baybars’ greatness.
The Mamluks were military slaves and originated from ‘Abbasid.207

The history of this mosque (the mosque of Sultan Baybars) is a part of the
history of Islamic Egypt. The inscription on marble says: “Baybars is the
pillar of the world and of religion and the Sultan of Islam and Muslims.”208
Baybars halted the Crusaders, such as Louis IX, King of France, at
al-Manṣūra,209 and brought back the Caliph to Cairo.210 He was the founder
of the Mamluk dynasty.211 The great mosque (of Sultan Baybars) was built
by one of the greatest men of Egypt.212
152 I.K. SUNG
The second site of commemoration is Sultan Ḥassan Muḥammad Ibn

Qalāwūn’s school. Despite the fact that Ḥasan was not viewed as a righ-
teous Sultan, Marzūq stressed that the Mamluk Sultans bequeathed their
Islamic legacy:
Egypt is still a museum that preserves the greatness of Islamic Egyptian arts.
The pyramids were the banner of ancient civilizations. Islamic Egypt raised
the banner of the Middle Ages. Sultan Ḥasan’s madrasa is the best example
of Islamic legacy in the world and in Egypt.213 Does Sultan Ḥasan deserve to
be named as one who contributed to this splendid Islamic legacy? In order
to answer this question we should check the history books.214 This Sultan’s
era is characterized by the grief in the hearts of people, oppression, anarchy,
chaos, and personal greed. There were ongoing plots, and even the Sultan’s
body was not discovered. There is not even a tomb. Despite this turbulent
period, we can see the splendid Mamluk legacy.215
In addition, Marzūq commemorated Khāniqāh (the place in which Sufis

and dervishes performed their ceremonies) built by Baybars al-Thāni,216
the Dome of Sultan Qalāwūn, and even Egyptian carpets217 as a crystalliza-
tion of Egyptian Islamic architecture and art.218 Marzūq’s Egyptian Islamic
nationalism overlapped with Arab nationalism, which is best reflected in his
dual reference to Qalāwūn as the Sultan of Islam and the King of Arabs.219
In a similar vein, taking Islam as a decisive impetus for Egypt’s vic-
tory against the Mongols, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Azām reintepreted the war
between the Egyptians and Mongols as Jihad against the enemies of Islam.
Azām noted that it was Islam that led Egypt to save the Muslims in the
war against Hülegü.220 For instance, even though the Muslims were afraid
of the Mongol attacks, following the ‘Ayn Jālūt war, the Sultan made a
speech about the interest of Islam in facing these attacks. Azām glorified
this episode as a significant page of Islamic history that covers Egyptian
politics in its Jihad against the enemy of Islam.221 In this epic, Baybars,
his leaders, and ‘Ulamā’ of Egypt succeeded in restoring the ‘Abbasid
Caliphate in order to unify the hearts of all Muslims.222 Moreover, Azām
did not seem to mind the Mamluks’ greed.223 Regardless of that “flaw,”
Azām exalted Baybars as a glorious leader who had halted the Crusaders
and the Mongols, and described him as the hero of ‘Ayn Jālūt.224
More comprehensively, Aḥmad Ramzī, Egypt’s former consul general
to Syria and Lebanon, blended all three commemorative tools—heroic
moments, historical figures, and buildings—into one Islamic nationalist
collective memory. Overall, Ramzī redefined the Mamluk dynasty as an
Islamic one225 and presented Egypt as an Islamic country.226 He further

presented Quṭuz, as ‘Ayn Jālūt war hero, as the King of Islamic Egypt.227
In the same manner, Ramzī identified Baybars with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn by glori-
fying him as the greatest of a series of warrior Islamic kings.228 Following
Marzūq’s mélange of two different trends of nationalism, Ramzī inte-
grated his Islamic nationalism with Arab nationalism by depicting Baybars
as a Sultan committed not only to Islam, but also to Arabism.
Baybars believed that the right of the glorious nation and the greatness of
Egypt was reflected in the hearts of Arabism and Islam.229
Furthermore, Ramzī redefined the fortress of Ḥuṣn al-Akrād as a sym-

bolic temple of Islamic collective memory:
The Islamic army gathered in the fortress of Ḥuṣn al-Akrād.230

The kings of the Muslims, including Salāḥ al-Dīn, fought against the
Crusaders.231
Already in the late nineteenth century, the Mamluk style of building

and architecture was reinvented. There are several reasons for the revival
of the Mamluk style at that time. First, Mamluk history was neglected and
Mamluk buildings abandoned after the Ottomans commenced to control
Egypt at the end of the Mamluk dynasty. Some interpret the resurrection
of Mamluk style as a political expression to counter the effects of colonial-
ism and the huge wave of westernization that Egypt witnessed.232
Secondly, Egyptians and Europeans noticed that the traditional form of
architecture was facing the threat of extinction and thus started advocat-
ing the reuse of the style in order to preserve it. Furthermore, the influx
of European travelers to Egypt sparked an interest in the style, making
it fashionable back home—for instance, neo-Pharaonic and Islamic-style
furniture was very unique in Europe. As argued by Hend Nadim, such
a tendency eventually filtered its way back to Egypt, and the European
architects who worked in Egypt found a large number of published exam-
ples that they could use for their projects.233
The third reason for the revival of the Mamluk style was the establish-
ment of the Comité de Conservation des Monuments de l’Art Arabe in
1881 by Khedive Tawfiq. The Comité’s role was to document Islamic and
Coptic monuments; their role expanded to include the restoration and
conservation of the monuments, which helped the revival of the style,
154 I.K. SUNG
because it raised awareness among a certain section of society, the intellec-

tuals and heritage enthusiasts, a group that included upper-class Egyptians
as well as Europeans working in Egypt. These intellectual groups started
to build in the revival style, and a domino effect happened within their
circle—and a larger group began supporting the style. Furthermore, the
Egyptian royal family eventually adopted the style when it came to public
buildings, which assured the public that there had been a shift in loyalty.
The al-Rifa‘i mosque that was addressed above and the mosque attached
to ‘Abdīn Palace, the Khedival Library, and the Arab Art Museum all had
royal patronage and all possessed neo-Mamluk elements.234
Another reason, as argued by some (very much related to the first rea-
son), was a need to fight against colonialism in its various forms, be it
British or Ottoman powers. The Mamluk style was not a direct form of
nationalism, but rather an indirect one that affected people’s preferences,
including architecture as well as other areas of social life. This allowed peo-
ple to select the style they preferred most, and thus the neo-Mamluk style
made its imprint on society in domestic buildings, public buildings (such
as privately funded banks and libraries), and in some cases government
buildings (museums and ministries). The neo-Mamluk style was used
so extensively that it became the national style within a few years. Some
argued that the choice of the neo-Mamluk style is a sign of backward-
ness.235 However, its emergence proves otherwise. The Mamluk reign in
Egypt and Greater Syria was one of the strongest and richest periods in the
area’s history; thus, it was a symbol of development and understanding of
the circumstances of the time. The emergence of the revival style can be
interpreted, by this logic, as another form of nationalism.236
The neo-Mamluk style is characterized by a hybrid combination of
nineteenth-century Western European construction principles and archi-
tectural tradition derived from buildings erected during the period of
Mamluk rule in Egypt (1250–1517). The Mamluk style was largely lim-
ited to decorative elements, though certain aspects of interior design from
this period were also incorporated.237 The style flourished between 1870
and 1930, a period in which Egypt moved from a semi-autonomous status
within the Ottoman Empire to an increasing incorporation into the British
Empire, starting with the military occupation in 1882 and culminating in
the official status of protectorate by 1914.238 Thus, the emergence of the
neo-Mamluk style illustrates the belief that the Egyptian nation is capable
of “progress” (i.e., the development of a modern national style in archi-
tecture), but only under the terms of a European civilizational framework
(which can be viewed as “thematic” in the case of architecture).239
What remains to be discussed is the question of why it was to the

Mamluk, rather than any other period of the country’s history, that the
creators of an Egyptian national style in architecture looked for inspira-
tion. A significant part of the answer has already been provided in the
discussion of the Egyptian restoration practices, which demonstrated that
the postulated Mamluk style was promoted as the purest expression of
Egypt’s national identity, reducing Ottoman elements to the status of an
alien influence.240
Going back to Ramzī, the most interesting part of his Islamic nation-
alist narrative is his elevation of Sultan al-Ghawrī’s tragic defeat by the
Ottomans into a magnificent epic.
Sultan al-Ghawrī continued to Aleppo with Sībāi al-Kāfli and the leaders
of Syria, and there he united all the Mamluk armies of Egypt and Syria in
order to prepare for the day of Marj Dābiq.241Although Sībāi al-Kāfli and
al-Ghawrī were defeated by the Ottomans, their defeat and demises was a
stronger and more powerful lesson than any victory.242
In contrast to the tragic image of al-Ghawrī, Maḥmūd Razaq Salīm

described Sultan al-Ghawrī as a perfect Islamic hero. When Sultan
al-Ghawrī showed himself in public, people shouted, “Sultan al-Ashraf is
the victory of Allah” and “the beloved of Allah of Islam.”243 Salīm began
his story with the oppression of the Circassian Mamluks.
The leaders of the Circassian Mamluks oppressed the people of Cairo,
who played a key role in the Mamluk reign and their responsibilities
were limited only to choosing the Sultan. The people got used to this
regime, and depended on it. Their obedience and hatred endured.244 One
explained why the Mamluks were armed: The Mamluks were armed with
weapons in order to prevent chaos and escort the Sultan’s convoy. The
other responded: Did not you know this regime? Or did you forget the
vanity of the Jalban and Qarānaṣa (pirates)? What is the difference between
animosity and hatred? Do they really serve the country as soldiers? He
concluded that the Mamluks generated chaos and were the source of evil
and corruption. They were slaves to money and lust.245
Although the man in the passage above gives credit to the Mamluks’
military power, such as victory against the Crusaders and the Mongols, he
is nonetheless critical of them.
He noted the fact that the Mamluks eliminated the enemies from their
country for a long time. In addition, he praised the Mamluks as saviors who
stopped, attacked, and halted the Franks and Mongols coveting Egypt and
156 I.K. SUNG
Sham for 10 years. However, he lamented his misfortune by saying that they
were left with the slough of the snake and the throats of animals. He com-
plained about how the Mamluks ill-treated them (the people of Cairo) by
asking, Did you forget that they treated us in a dishonorable way? They
have been disgracing and plundering us. He harshly criticized the Mamluks,
noting that oppression was a part of their being.246 According to him, the
Mamluk army was well-disciplined under al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn’s control.
However, the Sultans who succeeded Sultan al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn were not
equal to him . Furthermore, their regime was not praiseworthy, and not
marked by mercy since the Mamluk Sultans became greedy, mean, and
ignored the religious decrees. Many of the Sultans turned away from reli-
gion (Islam). Instead, they fornicated like apes, robbed like rats, conned like
wolves. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the Sultans did protect them by
defeating their enemies. Many Sultans ordered the propagation of Islam.
The other man responded: “It is a shame that you remember that they pro-
tected you from your enemies, whereas in fact they protected themselves and
only defended their reign.” He tried to explain that what the Sultans did was
actually for them, not for the people: “Even if they did protect you, I will tell
you how and why. The Sultans protected you as a shepherd protects its cow,
fearing that its milk would dry up and its flesh would be eaten. You were not
served by them, but rather served them.”247
In addition, Sultan al-Ghawrī is idealized as a leader who under-
stood regional politics. He is further believed to have had a sharp intu-
ition, understanding the urgency of unity by addressing the threat posed
by the enemies at the country’s gates. For instance, Qānṣuh al-Ghawrī
emphasized the unity of the dynasty and denounced the civil war (fitna)
when Ṭarābāy and others complained about the wrongdoing (greed).248
The Sultan also rationalized the unity by explaining that enemies, such as
Safavid and the Ottomans, were at the gate.249 Ghawrī is represented as
having indicated a problem in the struggle for power among the Mamluk
leaders and said that “a thousand kings passed away since the Mu‘izz
al-Dīn Aybak al-Jāshankīr in his Baḥrī dynasty and Circassian dynasty, and
another thousand elapsed since Ẓāhir Barqūq Ibn Ans, don’t you see this
stupidity must be ended in our time of Egypt, no further.”250
Even morally, al-Ghawrī is iconized as a generous and merciful Sultan
who helped the destitute and downtrodden masses. Interestingly, one
character in Salīm’s short novel Shaykh Walī al-Dīn refers to the Circassian
Mamluks as pious Muslims, thus contradicting the previous tyrannical
portrayal.
The poet Shihāb al-Dīn said that these Circassian Mamluks filled the
road of this wadi with corruption and made alcohols harm than benefit.
Ghars al-Dīn (a merchant) elaborated the evildoing of the Mamluks by
noting that they oppressed Ra‘āyā (subjects) by imposing heavy taxation
on them and wasted their fortunes extravagantly. Zakī al-Dīn (tax collec-
tor) accused Atabek Qāiṭ of being corrupt and hatched a plot. In con-
trast, Shaykh Walī al-Dīn highlightened the good will of the Sultan: The
Sultan (al-Ghawrī) gave an order to congregate all the beggars (the poor)
of Cairo and he himself came to them and offered them a dinar.251 Shuhāb
al-Dīn denied the good will by noting that sometimes the Sultan refused to
approach the poor. Shaykh Walī al-Dīn offers a more favorable reference to
the Sultan by explaining that first the treasury of the Sultan must be used
for the poor but the palace also needed some wealth. Then Walī al-Dīn
stressed that the Sultan needed to cut down his expenditures. In addition,
Walī al-Dīn reminded the poet of the days of the Sultan by asking, “don’t
you remember there were no diseases in Cairo and the city was free?” He
also mentioned the fact that the Sultan did not outlaw alcohol and asked,
“what do you want the Sultan to do? To pour alcohol and ban hashish?”252
When Shuhāb al-Dīn worried that the Ottomans were at the gate,
Shaykh Walī al-Dīn answered: Do not worry, the Ottomans and the
Circassians are all Muslims, and God will send Muslims to revive us.253
One of Qāḍī referred to al-Ghawrī as: Our lord of Islamic lands.254 Sultan
al-Gawrī defined his regime as the most powerful Islamic rule.255
Sultan al-Ghawrī’s greatness as a leader is best revealed in an episode
in which his critics switched their position and chose his side. At first,
Shaykh Walī al-Dīn, Zakī al-Dīn, and Ghars al-Dīn harshly criticized
Sultan al-Ghawrī for his acts of oppression and injustice. However, after
they witnessed al-Ghawri’s reforms and mercy for his subjects, all three
changed their minds, and even defended him.
Shaykh Walī al-Dīn complained that Sultan al-Ghawrī did not listen to
the people. He stressed that the people of Egypt would not accept the ways
in which the Mamluks ruled and wondered how the Sultan dared collect
this fortune through oppression and injustice. Zakī al-Dīn (tax collector)
criticized the Sultan for going too far in imposing penalties and filling his
treasury.256 In Ghars al-Dīn’s (merchant) opinion, the Sultan gathered his
fortunes by imposing fines (penalties)and heavy taxes. Zakī al-Dīn honestly
confessed that they buy positions from the Sultan or through other means.257
In contrast to the previous negative image of the Sultan, Ghars al-Dīn makes
a much more favorable reference to him. He emphasized that people should
158 I.K. SUNG
not forget that the Sultan handed out fortunes to refugees, his generals,
and friends, and gave plenty to his Mamluks. Moreover, he argued that the
Sultan’s good deeds were the root of the Umma’s stability, and this was the
reason why he plundered the people. Shaykh Walī al-Dīn glorified the Sultan
as a generous-hearted and kind figure who was faithful to his word.258
Zakī al-Dīn defended the Sultan’s honesty by noting that he was said
to be heedless but in reality this was not so. Ghars al-Dīn said if the Sultan
had heard that several regimes thwarted a plan to eliminate a Sultan, who is
addicted to play and frivolity he would make efforts to rearrange his army
and unify the hearts of the leaders, renewing the frontier area and preparing
for potential attack.259 Walī al-Dīn pointed out that the Circassian Sultans
were strange but they loved Arabic, Turkish, and Persian literature.260
In addition to Sultan al-Ghawrī, Salīm recalled Quṭuz and iconized
him as the precursor of an Islamic Egyptian nationalist hero. According to
Salīm, several historians revealed that Quṭuz was Maḥmūd Ibn Mamdūd
and he was the son of the sister of Jalāl al-Dīn Shāh Khwārizm, who
halted the Mongols.261 More importantly, Quṭuz is described as calling
his entourages the leaders of Muslims. Furthermore, Quṭuz’s army was
referred to as an Islamic or Egyptian army. During the war against the
Mongols Quṭuz is rebirthed as a pious Islamic leader who shouted at ‘Ayn
Jālūt, “wā Islāmah” (Oh! Islam).262
Although Salīm acknowledged the rise of Arab nationalism in Egyptian
society, he nevertheless privileged Islamic nationalism:
Under the Arab banner, followed by the Arabs’ expedition, Egypt joined the
Arab world and assimilated into it.
It is not a shameful thing that the nationalist spirit derived from such assimi-
lation as long as Egypt viewed Islam as [a source of] generous justice, perfect
equity and pure brotherhood, and recognized the Islamic regime’s, public
welfare, righteousness, noble endurance and love of everything good.263
In Salīm’s analysis, the Mamluks partially contributed to the develop-

ment of a nationalist spirit264; nevertheless, the Mamluk Sultans failed to
yield sufficient power to the people, which prevented the crystallization of
nationalism under their rule.
The Mamluks were only interested in internal politics and ignored the awak-
ening power of the people.
They disregarded the masses, denied their skills and neglected their rights.
Although the Mamluks built a great and powerful Muslim country, they did
not seek to empower the people.
Notwithstanding, the Mamluks did both good and bad: They supported the
nationalist spirit by denying it.265
Salīm also made efforts to wipe out the ‘warmonger’ image attached to
the Mamluks. For example, the Mamluk wars against both the Crusaders
and Mongols were regarded as inevitable wars of defense and honor. Thus,
it is no wonder that Baybars appeared as a nationalist hero of an Egyptian
as well as an Islamic army, and, by contrast, the Crusaders are defined as
imperialist.
Egypt’s Mamluk era is one of warfare against two enemies: Tatars and Franks.
Nevertheless, the war against the two enemies was not a preemptive war;
thus, it is not proper to blame the Mamluks for that war since it was fought to
defend Egypt and the sacred Muslim lands. Again, it was not a war of greed
and desire.266 Baybars was the sultan of Egypt and led an Islamic army.267
It is obvious why Salīm depicted Sultan al-Ghawrī and Quṭuz as pious

Muslim heroes. In Salīm’s view, the root of Sultan al-Ghawrī’s and Quṭuz’s
success as political, as well as moral, leaders is none other than their reli-
gious piety. Thus, loyal to Islam, Salīm asserted that a new Egyptian
nation-state must be built based on Islamic Egyptian nationalism rather
than on other Egyptian nationalist ideologies.
In his article on the war against the Crusaders, another Islamist intel-
lectual, Aḥmad Badawī, referred to the army composed of both Egyptians
and Arabs as an Islamic army.268 He further rationalized the heavy taxes
levied by the Mamluk Sultans as a necessary measure required to defeat
the Mongols.269
So far, we have examined various types of Egyptian Islamic national-
ist literatures and focused on their representations of the Mamluks and
the Mamluk era. There are several points that must be made in this
regard. First, Egyptian Islamic nationalism deployed diverse sites of
memory, such as heroic moments, epic figures, historical buildings, and
even Egyptian art. It iconized outstanding Mamluk leaders, Shajarat
al-Dūrr, Aybak, Baybars, Quṭuz, al-Ghawrī and Ṭūmānbāy—all of
whom served as symbols of Egyptian Islamic nationalism—in order
to construct a new imagined community based on Islamic values. In
addition, the historical buildings constructed by Mamluk Sultans—
mosques, madrasas, and Khaniqa—were immortalized as temples of
Egyptian Islamic collective memory.
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Second, influenced by the progress of Egyptian Arab nationalism,

several Islamic nationalists polished their ideologies by blending Islamic
nationalism with Arab nationalism.
Representations of the Mamluks in Integral Egyptian Nationalist

Not all the supra-Egyptian nationalists after 1930 view an external refer-
ence, such as the Islamic or Arab communities, as their point of departure.
There was also a nationalist ideology retaining a supra-Egyptian dimen-
sion, which kept Egypt as its central focus. Unlike other supra-Egyptian
ideologies, integral Egyptian nationalism considered external dimen-
sions tactical, strategic, and instrumental, rather than fundamental. Egypt
remained its primary concern, while the external Egyptian identity and
role were seen as necessary mechanisms to attain specifically Egyptian
national purposes. However, integral Egyptian nationalism shared many
of the supra-Egyptian elements with Egyptian Islamic and Egyptian Arab
nationalism, which maintained an Egypt-centered core.270
The term “integral nationalism” was coined by Charles Maurras with
reference to the variant of late nineteenth- to early twentieth-century
European nationalist doctrine, which was distinguished by “the exclusive
pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity
and the steady increase of national power.”271 The general feature of integral
nationalism is based on the absoluteness of the nation: “It is not justified
by its followers in terms of service to a higher cause; the cult of the nation
becomes an end in itself.”272 Internally, integral nationalism tends to be illib-
eral and subordinates considerations of individual liberty to the demands
of national hegemony and externally, which seeks expansionism and mili-
tarism, believing the inevitability of the use of power in international rela-
tions.273 If the aspiration of Egyptian Islamic nationalists was to reinterpret
the Egyptian past from the Islamic perspective, that of the integral Egyptian
nationalists was to redefine it among the Egyptians themselves and others,
such as the Arabs and the Mamluks, by assimilating them into Egyptian-
ness. For instance, unlike the territorialists, who tend to present the Arabs
as foreign conquerors, the integralists opted for a symbiosis between Arabs/
Muslims on the one hand and Egyptians on the other.
Embracing typical integral Egyptian nationalism, Ibrāhīm Jum‘a claimed
that a historically deep blood connection was formed between Egyptians
and Arabs—that they are the same Semitic people.274 Throughout Chap.
5, Jum‘a emphatically elaborated on the way Arabs assimilated into Egypt

and the Egyptians.275 The Egypt-centered view continues to dominate
Jum‘a’s narrative. Having resisted and halted the Mongols and Crusaders,
Cairo replaced Baghdad as a center of Islamic civilization. Egypt trium-
phantly enjoyed elevated status as the center of the Islamic world.276 A
nationalist feature of great importance that should be raised is Jum‘a’s
newfound theory that Egyptian nationalism crystallized during the
Mamluk Sultanate era:
During this period, nationalism (qawmiyya), thought and the arts were seen to
mature as a result of the peaceful times enjoyed by Egypt under Mamluk rule.277
Like Jum‘a, Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan regarded integral Egyptian nation-

alism as a path to creating a new Egyptian identity to form a new Egyptian
state by the Egyptian assimilation of the Arabs. However, differing slightly
from Jum‘a, Ḥasan views the phenomenon of assimilation between
Egyptians and Arabs in a more concrete manner, meaning the total, rather
than superficial, integration of Arabs and Egyptians. Ḥasan believed that
the Egyptians fully integrated the Arabs by changing their nature, lan-
guage, culture, and religion.278 Quite interestingly, both the integralist
historians, Jum‘a and Ḥasan, vaguely alluded to the Mamluk Sultans as
Egyptian rulers without explicitly identifying the Mamluk Sultans with
Egyptian Sultans.
Like the latter two historians, Ḥasan Ḥabashī exposed himself as an inte-
gralist nationalist by hinting at a preference for an Arab-Egyptian unity
instead of a simple replication of the territorial nationalist creed of Arab
assimilation:
Arabs have assimilated into Egyptians since seventh century Egypt was actu-
ally an Egyptian-Arab unity. It was not officially proclaimed as such, but it
emerges that the two naturally cooperated with each other.279
Ḥabashī adduced one more indication of unity between Arabs and

Egyptians. This is that the unity of spirit between the Arabs and the
Egyptians was discernable in the way the Arabs participated in the struggle
against the French military campaign.280 More often than not, Ḥabashī
used the term Egyptian army instead of Mamluk army, which implies
that he integrated the Mamluks with the Egyptians. Despite his emphasis
on the symbiosis between Egyptians and Arabs, Ḥabashī maintained the
162 I.K. SUNG
Egyptian leadership of the Arab-Islamic world:
The Egyptian army halted the Mongol attack at ‘Ayn Jālūt and allowed the
Islamic Arab dynasty to survive. It was Egypt’s destiny to defend Islamic
Arab countries during the Middle Ages, without fear of the West.281 If the
Egyptian army had not stopped Louis IX, Egypt and the Arab East would
have been annexed to the French King’s territory. A nationalist spirit (Ruḥ
al-Qawmiyya) emerged following this event…
The Egyptian army has been able to protect Egypt and Palestine, as well
as the rest of the Arab world, from the threat of European attack since the
seventh century.282
Aḥmad Ḥusayn was a radical Egyptian nationalist intellectual commit-

ted to integral Egyptian nationalism. Ḥusayn was convinced that Mamluk
achievements derived from the power of the Egyptian environment rather
than from Muslim or Turkish sources. It was the vitality of the Egyptian
national personality, firmly anchored in the sureties of the Nile Valley and
expressing Egypt’s eternal aspiration for liberty and independence, that
defeated the Mongols and ushered in an era of Egyptian preeminence in
the region and the Umma.283 Although he did not refer to the Mamluks,
Ḥusayn hinted that during the Mamluk epoch Egypt was esteemed
throughout the world.
Since the Ṭūlūnid era, Egypt was independent country with its own sover-
eignty and characteristics. In the subsequent Fāṭimid era Egypt became not
only a glorious (famous) country but also emerged as global leader in the
Middle Ages. Egyptian empire returned to expanding its territory to the
East, West and South and spread its influence in Islamic Empire entirely,
which colored science, arts, civilization and everything in Egypt and influ-
enced in world completely.284
Representations of the Mamluks in Egyptian Arab Nationalist

The third Egyptian nationalist ideology, developed in the 1930s and
1940s, is the Egyptian Arab nationalism that regarded the Arab-ness of
Egypt as the heart of the matter and rejected exclusive territorial nation-
alism. Instead, Egyptian Arab nationalist ideology postulated Egyptian
identification with a larger entity—in this case, the Arab nation—and
to some extent partly overlapped Islamic nationalism, which accepts
the Arab-ness of Egypt as part of Egypt’s Muslim identity, as well as over-

lapping integral nationalism, which views the Arab world as the most imme-
diate arena of Egyptian leadership and greatness.285 However, Egyptian
Arab nationalism had its own unique character that distinguished it from
its rivals. The most significant difference was in its breadth. The Arabist
outlook was less parochial than Islamic nationalism, which, because of
its religious focus, did not appeal to non-Muslims or secularists. It was
also less solipsistic than integral nationalism, whose aggressive nature
alienated many Egyptians. Belief in Egypt as part of the Arab nation pos-
sessed greater scope for attraction than either the Islamic or the integralist
approach.286 In terms of production, a great number of intellectuals took
part in Egyptian Arab nationalist ideology; in terms of reception, it even-
tually succeeded in appealing to a wider range of Egyptian public opinion.
Its content incorporated elements of both Islamism and integralism, as
well as earlier territorialism; however, it was revised to suit its particularly
Arab perspective. As a result of its synthetic nature, Egyptian Arab nation-
alism became the most popular supra-Egyptian ideology of the era.287
Based on those tenets of Egyptian Arab nationalism, Muḥammad Jamāl
al-Dīn Surūr upgraded Egypt as an Arab country for all Arab nations
beyond being a parochial Egyptian country for Egyptians only.
The spirit of nationalism [Ruḥ al-Qawmiyya] emerged among local Arabs,

many of whom viewed Egypt as an Arab country in terms of its religion and
language. Thus, it was reasonable for them to accept an autonomous Arab
king [of Egypt] as ruler.288
Just like other nationalist intellectuals, Surūr glorified Baybars as a

national hero. He is embodied as a pious hero who worked toward a
revival of the Islamic empire289 and struggled against the Mongols and
the Crusaders.290 However, what distinguishes Surūr most from the ter-
ritorialists and the integralists is his reshaping of Baybars as Sultan of the
Arabs.291
Similarly, another Egyptian Arab nationalist, Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, designated
Sultan Nāṣir Ibn Qalāwūn as Sultan of all Arabs, ‘Ajam (non-Muslims),
and Turks.292
Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan probably manifested the Arab-ness of Egypt
in the most intensive manner. Ḥasan preferred the Egyptian Arab-ness
and Islamic Egypt to Pharaonic Egypt,293 and combined Islamic Egyptian
nationalism with Egyptian Arab nationalism as shown below:
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The Islamic mark still existed in Egypt. Egypt became the center of political,
cultural and religious development in the Islamic world.294
Ḥasan explains two processes of the Arab integration with the Egyptians.
Following the Arab occupation of Egypt, the relationship between the
two nations was renewed by the interaction between Arabization (ta‘rīb)
and Egyptianization (tamṣīr). Through this fusion process, Egypt con-
tinued to be the central Arab country295 and the spiritual hub of the
Arab Kingdom.296 Nevertheless, Ḥasan viewed the eras of the Ṭūlūnids,
Ikhshidis, Fāṭimids, Ayyūbids, and Mamluks as marked by political dis-
solution and cultural decline for the Islamic community.297
Anwar Zaqlama’s endorsement of Egyptian Arab nationalism clearly advo-
cated the placing of Egypt at the center of a wider Arab and Islamic arena:
Egypt was the heart of the Arab East and a source of civilization and art in
the Islamic world. Arabic art developed significantly through the flourishing
of art in Egypt. Egypt was in the forefront of the Arab kingdoms.298
Concerning Egypt’s central position in the world, Zaqlama empha-

sized that Sultans Baybars and Qalāwūn were pro-Western leaders who
had maintained friendly relations with Europe:
Sultan Baybars and Qalāwūn made a pact with the Europeans (e.g. France
and England) against the Mongols.
Under the rule of Sultan Nāṣir Ibn Qalāwūn, Egypt won renown for mili-
tary and diplomatic power and influence.
Throughout the Mamluk era, Egypt was not isolated from world.299
Zaqlama’s greatest compliment to the Mamluks was to present their

era as the essence of Arab history and as the source of important Arab
traditions:
The Mamluk era is the most important period in the history of the presti-
gious Arab tradition. It can be said that Mamluk art is the most splendid
Arab tradition.300
In his description of the Mamluks in contradictory terms, Aḥmad Fakrī

may have provided more realistic depictions. Fakrī asserted that “on the
one hand the Mamluks held an arbitrary tyranny, brutal and wicked, but
on the other hand they were humane, merciful and obedient to God.”301
Paradoxically, Fakrī viewed the Mamluk greed as the source of Egypt’s

greatness in the world and as the key to the country’s prominence among
Muslims.302 He believed that, thanks to such brilliant achievements, the
Sultan gained many titles (e.g., the Greatest Sultan, Sultan of Islam and
Muslims and Sultan of Arabs, non-Arabs and Turks, Conqueror of Lands,
Victor of Kings).303
Fakrī’s critical views of the Mamluks are similar to those raised by oth-
ers. The Mamluks were disposed toward evil, bore hatred, and hatched
plots. Their regime was marked by chaos, anarchy, and internal struggle
for power.304 Concerning the Mamluks’ origins, Fakrī accepted the pre-
vailing theory that they were descended from Kipchak slaves.305
In contrast to the explicit mention of the Mamluks, several nationalists
chose to ignore or forget them and instead referred to the Mamluk era sim-
ply as an Islamic or Arab period. In his discussion of the Mamluk era, Yūsuf
Haykal spoke of Islamic Arab nationalism306 or Arab nationalism.307In the
meantime, Zakī Mubārak offered the Mamluk era as evidence of integral
nationalism, but did so without mentioning the Mamluks explicitly.308
MAMLUKS UNDER THE OTTOMAN PERIOD (1517–1811)
Representations of the Mamluks in Ottomanist and Monarchist

Similar to the ‘Abdīn Project, most historical works in this chapter deal-
ing with the Ottoman era cover the years 1760–1820. As a primary
designer of monarchist historiography, the Ābdīn Project started in
1920 as a modest library project that developed into an archival enter-
prise. Selected documents were published to serve as source material
for independent research in the framework of the emerging academe,
among others. Since monarchist historiography was primarily designed
to rewrite Egyptian history from the perspective of Muḥammad ‘Alī
and his descendants, it is highly likely that the binary glorification of
Muḥammad ‘Alī on the one hand, and the delegitimization of the
Mamluk Beys on the other, would dominate monarchist literature. In a
similar vein, the primary purpose of Ottoman historians was to reshape
Egypt’s recent past from an Ottoman perspective. On this basis, it is not
difficult to assume their antipathy toward the Mamluks, who were the
primary political rivals of the Ottomans.
166 I.K. SUNG
By and large, unfavorable remarks concerning the Mamluks in

Ottomanist and monarchist historical literatures converge on two aspects:
the internal struggle of the Mamluk Beys and the mismanagement of
political and economic affairs.
A monarchist historian, ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ḥilmī al-Miṣrī, criticizes the
Mamluks for two evildoings: Mamluk tyranny and the internal struggle
among the Mamluk Beys:
Over the centuries, Egypt was ruled by many foreigners…The Mamluks tyran-
nized it and destroyed what was built for its glory. I read about them in the pages
of novels written in blood and I am close to tears.309
During the numerous Mamluk regimes, including, al-Alfī, Bardīsī, Jahin

Bey etc. Brother desired to assassinate brother and all were eager to kill
Wali. The Sublime Porte wanted to kill them all. In this era, the Egyptian
people were oppressed, men were massacred in times of peace. They [the
Mamluk Beys] were divided into many factions that fought each other. The
Ottoman army would have destroyed the Mamluks if Napoleon had not
invaded Egypt.310
However, in contrast to the demonization of the Mamluks, the army of

Ṭūsūn (son of Muḥammad ‘Alī) is regarded as the army of Egypt311
Amateur monarchist historian Prince ‘Umar Ṭūsūn remarked that the
Mamluks were disloyal312 and addicted to power:
From generation to generation, the Mamluks were trained in military skills

and were master swordsmen. Some became leaders, but envied European
training; none of them wanted to feel inferior to other troops. Eventually,
however, they stopped training and teaching and neglected studying, with
the result that their interest in military skills decreased. They became angry
about being overlooked and about the absence of promotion. Some began
to rebel and later plotted against all…In this way they complicated the reor-
ganization of the Egyptian army.313
Unflattering images of the Mamluks are also mirrored in Ottomanist

Jūrjī Zaydān’s narrative that degrades the Mamluks as corrupted and treach-
erous.314 The Mamluk era is regarded as an epoch of oppression and tyr-
anny,315 which resulted from the internal struggle for power between Bardīsī
and Alfī316 that completely ruined Egyptian politics. Zaydān clearly demon-
strated his pro-Ottoman attitude in describing the Mamluk resistance to the
Ottomans as the Mamluk rebellion against the Sultans’ authority.317
In contrast to the demonization of the Mamluk Beys, monar-

chist narratives are marked by an admiration for and glorification of
Muḥammad ‘Alī. A prominent monarchist historian, Karīm Thābit, pre-
sented the strongest glorification of Muḥammad ‘Alī in the biography
he wrote about him, which may be the most comprehensive attempt to
fuse monarchist historiography, academic research, and popular writing
in favor of the monarchy. Thābit was the first monarchy media consul-
tant in modern Egypt and editor-in-chief of the pro-British daily al-
Muqaṭṭam.318 In the preface to his book Thābit stated “All I have done
is to read what the Geographical Society published [i.e., the monar-
chy project] and to use what I felt to be indispensable for us to know
about Muḥammad ‘Alī.”319 Thābit tells his story in his own fascinat-
ingly unique and creative style, which is to narrate Muḥammad ‘Alī’s
life from “childhood to adulthood,” metaphysically hinting at the same
trajectory as if undergone by the Egyptian nation as a whole, under the
Pasha’s full command. In doing so, each chapter has a decoration quot-
ing that he either found, paraphrased,created”.320 For instance, Thābit
quoted Muḥammad ‘Alī as remarking, “I took Egypt by the sword, and
I am not going to give it away in any way but by the sword.”321 In the
same manner, as if he was actually present, Thābit portrays Muḥammad
‘Alī as an authentic, courageous, and clever reformer.
Muḥammad ‘Alī declared that he would regenerate the country and pre-
dicted that a long period of growth would follow. At the time, he was 107
years old.322 Muḥammad ‘Alī’s courage and cleverness were amazing.323 The
Mamluks attempted reconciliation with the Sublime Porte in order to take
power in Egypt. Muḥammad ‘Alī did not fear the Mamluks and was deter-
mined to get rid of them.324
Thābit’s portrayal of Muḥammad ‘Alī contains a nationalist theme

that is most interesting: he gives two nationalistic interpretations of the
Egyptians’ inauguration of Muḥammad ‘Alī as Wali—a title that can be
interpreted as local governor or protector—which was the beginning of a
new era in Egypt.325 Likewise, Muḥammad ‘Alī’s purging of the Mamluks
is justified on the nationalist grounds of neutralizing their alliance with
the English.326 It is very important to examine the Mamluk expulsion by
Muḥammad ‘Alī as it sheds light on the ways in which Ottoman and mon-
archist intellectuals treated Muḥammad ‘Alī in comparison to the attitude
they expressed toward the Mamluk Beys.
168 I.K. SUNG
Meanwhile, Thābit took the Mamluk massacre as a crucial key to

Muḥammad ‘Alī’s legitimacy and invested elaborate efforts to rationalize
his justification. Overall, Thābit intriguingly contends that Muḥammad
‘Alī had no choice but to eliminate the Mamluks in building the new
Egypt, since they rejected diplomatic solutions.
Muḥammad ‘Alī planned to reconstruct the army, and to this end he col-
lected money for arms and weapons. It may be said that Muḥammad ‘Alī
began to base the new Egypt on reforms.327 As a matter of fact, Muḥammad
‘Alī had two options. First, he wanted the Mamluks to leave freely, since he
did not believe in their wrongdoing and suggested the peaceful way, which
he preferred. But, just in case, he hatched a plot.328 After the Mamluks
turned down his resolution to demolish the pillars of his government, there
was only one way for Muḥammad ‘Alī to eliminate the Mamluks for the sake
of his country’s security.329
Thābit goes so far as to accuse Western historians of misrepresenting

the massacre and disregarding its authentic significance:
However, surprisingly embracing the betrayal of the Mamluks, some Western

historians described Muḥammad ‘Alī’s measures against the Mamluks as a
sad chapter in the history of Egypt.330 Even twentieth century European
historians did not take seriously the fact that Muḥammad ‘Alī intended to
secure the country by eliminating the Mamluks.331
In a similar vein, monarchist historian ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ḥilmī al-Miṣrī

places the advent of Muḥammad ‘Alī within the realm of Allah and His
destination. In his view, after Napoleon and the Ottomans failed to elimi-
nate the Mamluks, Allah sent the great Muḥammad ‘Alī.332
Even a pro-Ottoman nationalist historian, Muḥammad Farīd, legiti-
mized the massacre by treating it as an inevitable measure to save the
country from the Mamluks’ wrongdoing.333
The case of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, who is regarded as probably the most
prominent Mamluk figure in the Ottoman era, is a crucial key in clarifying
how the Mamluks are treated by the Ottomanist and monarchist histori-
ans. To be sure, Ottomanist historian Muḥammad Farīd had little interest
in glorifying ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, whom he viewed as a villain who rebelled
against the Ottomans.
‘Alī Bey, Shaykh al-Balad gained almost independent status for Egypt under the
Ottomans through his contact with Russia, which wanted an internecine war
in the Ottoman Empire.334 Muḥammad Abū Dhahab revolted against him.335
By contrast, another pro-Ottoman nationalist, Jūrjī Zaydān, clearly dif-

fered from other historians regarding ‘Alī Beyal-Kabīr in the context of the
nationalist atmosphere that was developing in Egypt at the time. At a criti-
cal juncture of this development, Zaydān vividly perceived the emergence
of a new Egyptian entity and found it difficult to ignore such a compelling
wave of nationalist fervor and discourse. Zaydān’s choice was to infuse the
Egyptian nationalist aspect into his narrative, which created a somewhat
contradictory image of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr. On the one hand, influenced by
his nationalist concept, Zaydān praised ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr as an independent
Egyptian ruler and identified him with the Mamluk Sultanate, while com-
paring ‘Alī Bey’s Egypt with medieval Egyptian dynasties. On the other
hand, he denounced ‘Alī Bey for his links to imperialist countries such as
Russia and Italy. Given that, in Zaydān’s day, Russia was an enemy of the
Ottoman Empire, it was reasonable that he should censure ‘Alī Bey:
Although ‘Alī Bey had revived the independence of Egypt, such as it was
in the Ṭūlūnid, Fāṭimid, Ayyūbid, Mamluk and other periods, he made alli-
ances with Italy and Russia.336
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr was betrayed by Muḥammad Bey Abū Dhahab, who made
a pact with Ottomans.337
Zaydān even justifies Abu Dhahab’s treachery:
On hearing that ‘Alī Bey had betrayed Umma and Waṭan – nation and
homeland – and had forsaken the blood of Islam by allying with Russia and
others of the Christian world. Abū Dhahab gathered the elders of the coun-
try and other men. Abū Dhahab exploited them to revolt against ‘Alī Bey.338
Ambiguously, ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī remarked that ‘Alī Bey emulated the
ruling system of the Ottoman Empire, which, however, ended with his
death.339
As shown above, both the Ottomanist and monarchist historians evinced
binary attitudes toward two major historical subjects of the time: the glori-
fication of Muḥammad ‘Alī and the demonization of the Mamluks, except
170 I.K. SUNG
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr. Both the monarchist and Ottoman historians re-concep-
tualized ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr for their own purposes. Even among the same
Ottomanist intellectuals, a certain difference is found regarding ‘Alī Bey
al-Kabīr. Zaydān used Alī Bey al-Kabīr as historical evidence of Egypt’s
independence from the Ottomans whereas Farīd viewed him as no more
than a traitor.
Representations of the Mamluks in Academic Historians’

Literature
The academic historians aimed at Egyptianizing history by means of two
procedures: reclaiming the writing of history from the European histori-
ans, and writing Egyptian history by the tamṣīr process. Consequently,
they failed to differentiate themselves significantly from monarchist litera-
ture, which is why many common features are to be seen in both monar-
chist and academic literatures. Thus, the fundamental creed of monarchist
historians, particularly the “founder paradigm,” is also the main historical
point of departure of academic historians. For instance, Ghurbāl, either
unconsciously or implicitly, maintained the founder paradigm in his histori-
cal literature. This is well manifested in his glorification of Muḥammad ‘Alī
and other historical figures, such as Baybars and Bonaparte.340 Depicted as
having extraordinary powers, it is alluded to that Muḥammad ‘Alī under-
stood the secret of moves that enabled him to change everything341 and by
which he revived industry, politics, and economics.342 One more interest-
ing point is that Ghurbāl redefined Muḥammad ‘Alī as an Ottoman, rather
than an Egyptian, ruler:
Muḥammad ‘Alī began, lived and ended as a Muslim Ottoman; among oth-
ers, his primary goal was to revive the Ottoman power in a new form. He
is equal to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in light of his attempt to revitalize the “Land of
Islam” (Dāral-Islām) both in the region and in the world. He reestablished
Ottoman power.343
In sharp contrast in his book, published in 1928, Ghurbāl presented

Muḥammad ‘Alī as merely an Albanian foreigner who laid violent hands
on property.344 Two important questions arise from this contradictory por-
trayal of Muḥammad ‘Alī: Why did Ghurbāl change his attitude toward
Muḥammad ‘Alī from negative to positive? And what motivated his pro-
Ottoman remarks? These will be addressed below.
Another academic historian, al-Bās al-Ayyūbī, succeeded in sanctifying

Muḥammad ‘Alī as a noble man, by mystifying his birth:
Muḥammad ‘Alī was born into a most exalted family. It is not generally
known when and where he born; only one noble family has claimed that he
was born in 1769.345
Significantly, the preface to al-Ayyūbī’s book hints that contemporary

Egyptian intellectuals perceive Muḥammad ‘Alī in a positive light:
Muḥammad ‘Alī renewed the glorious pride of the Nile River and inspired
a new spirit in Egypt; it was the first revival that awakened the Arab East
after long sleep. Thus, we (the al-Hilāl administration) asked al-Ayyūbī to
collect such messages and write the middle volume of the biography [of]
Muḥammad ‘Alī.346
In contrast to the glorification of Muḥammad ‘Alī, most Mamluks

under Ottoman rule are presented as the target of criticism, except for
the positive role of the Mamluk Beys who acted as mediators between
the Pasha and Ottoman subjects and in protecting the Ottomans against
others.347 Ghurbāl began his remarks on the Mamluks by comparing two
periods between the Mamluk Sultanates and Ottoman Mamluks. Egypt
in the era of Baybars differs from the years of Murād and Ibrāhīm only
as far as France under the monarchy differs from France in the era of the
Revolution and Bonaparte.348 The internal struggle among the Mamluk
leaders is Ghurbāl’s main accusation against the Mamluks:
Mamluks and their fellow–plunderers (the Bedouin) perpetrated on their

part similar horrors. They moved in Upper Egypt under four chiefs:
Ibrahim, the “doyen” of the Corps, but now so enfeebled in body and mind
that the “most inferior” Mamluks could disobey him with impunity. Bardisi,
the whose character was formed by vanity and arrogant ignorance, Elfi, the
“bête noire” of his colleagues-an energetic barbarian, not entirely unattract-
ive, and Osman Hassan, the keeper of the best of the traditions of the race.
It was Bardisi and Elfi who counted, for all practical purposes.349
Further, the Mamluks are derided as barbaric and greedy rulers:
The grinding tyranny went on unchecked. The young Circassian slave once
he set foot on the soil of Egypt saw a career opening before his eyes and felt
172 I.K. SUNG
destined to become a lord. He calculated the need his master had of him and
demanded his price. In a society whose premium mobile was gold, the Bey’s
first care was to satisfy the rapacity of his slaves.350
Strangers among themselves, they were not bound by the natural ties of
family. Ignorant and superstitious by training, the frequent murders ren-
dered them ferocious, the tumults seditious, the cabals perfidious, the dis-
simulation cowardly and the unnatural vices corrupt. A happy stroke of the
sabre won the Mamluk pre-eminence. But the upstart did not change char-
acter; in a lordly station he had the soul of a slave. Power had no other goal
than procuring women, horses, jewels and retainers. Gold was to be had
whenever found. The poor peasant was as much pillaged as the “Frank” or
Levantine merchant.351
Given all this oppression and tyranny, it is no wonder that the

Egyptians are depicted as the helpless and abject victims of those tyranni-
cal Mamluks.352
Another academic historian, Muḥammad Rif‘at Ramaḍān, clearly dif-
ferentiates between the Mamluk Beys and Mamluk Sultanates and views
the internal struggle as inherited from the Circassian Sultanate era:
The thirteenth century Mamluk dynasty rose and the Mamluk tradition
continued till nineteenth century. However, there was no royal heritage and
they remained faithful to their lord.353
With the fear, violence and internecine strife, the Sultans of the second
Mamluk dynasty struggled bitterly for power.354
Likewise, the Mamluks of the Ottoman era struggled among themselves for
influence and the rank of Bey.355
Quoting al-Jabartī, Ramaḍān thoroughly delineated the rivalry

between Faqariya and Qasimiya356 and, later, between Qazdaghuli and
Ibrāhīmiya.357 In his demonization of the Mamluks as well as the French,
al-Ayyūbī described the French army as wolves and the Mamluk Beys as
foreigners:
The Mamluks fought each other to the death and destroyed the country, the
treasury and the government.358 Facing attack by the French, the Mamluks
escaped and took cover in Syria.359 Bardīsī asked one Shaykh “What caused
this internal split (fitna)?” He answered “The wolf will ravish the foreigners
(the Mamluks)” Bardīsī knew that the local population (Ahl al-Balad) con-
sidered the Mamluks as foreigners. Destruction would follow.360
In al-Bās al-Ayyūbī’s narrative, the English army, the Turkish army, and
the Mamluk leaders are mainly blamed for engendering chaos in Egypt.361
Even after the 1811 massacre of the Mamluks, they are portrayed as never
changing their minds:
After the massacre, the remaining Mamluks asked Muḥammad ‘Alī, to spare
their lives and they were evacuated from the city to other places where they
lived in humiliation, but even if they faced being killed, not one of them
changed their mind.362
Citing Al-Jabartī’s work “Ajāib al-Āthār fī Tarājim wa al-Akhbār,” a

student of Ghurbāl, ‘Alī al-Jiritlī, accused the Mamluk Beys of destroying
Egypt and of worsening socio-economic conditions.
Ibrāhīm Bey and Murād Bey and their followers destroyed the country by
corruption.363 The Mamluks struggled with each other for domination.364
During the Mamluk period a new reform plan was introduced, but it did not
succeed in raising the standard of living much above the bottom level, and
as a result the economic chaos reached its peak.365
The episode of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr indicates that Ghurbāl’s historical

point of view changed with time. Through this discussion, we attempt
to resolve a puzzle mentioned earlier: why Ghurbāl switched his attitude
to Muḥammad ‘Alī from negative to positive. Adopting a more positive
view of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr in his book published in the 1920s, Ghurbāl
glorified him as the precursor of Muḥammad ‘Alī. Comparing ‘Alī Bey
al-Kabīr to Muḥammad ‘Alī follows a pattern that most nationalist histori-
ans employed to reshape ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr as a nationalist hero.
The tribute [of Beys] was not regularly paid and efforts were made to declare
Egypt independent, notably that of ‘Alī Bey, the ally of Catherine II and the
precursor of Mehemet Ali.366
Surprisingly, in the book Ghurbāl published in the 1940s, Alī Bey al-Kabīr
(who succeeded in establishing Egypt’s independence from the Ottoman
Empire) is derided as a traitor. Muḥammad Abū Dhahab, who helped ‘Alī
Bey al-Kabīr, is depicted as an equally unfaithful ruler.367 One possible
explanation for such a dramatic development may be that Ghurbāl’s world-
view gradually transformed from monarchist to Ottomanist. Additional
strong support for this hypothesis is that, as shown above, Ghurbāl depicted
Muḥammad ‘Alī as an Ottoman ruler rather than an Egyptian one.
174 I.K. SUNG
Nevertheless, it is truly hard to believe that, at a time when the develop-

ment of various Egyptian nationalist concepts was at its height, Ghurbāl,
the founder and doyen of the academic school, switched his historical
thinking to Ottomanism. To solve the puzzle, two contexts related to
Ghurbāl’s book Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Kabīr (1944) should be raised here.
First, Yoav Di-Capua hinted that it was published abridged in the popu-
lar series A‘lām al-Islām. The publisher, greatly affected by the Islamic
reorientation of Egyptian society since the 1930s, popularized Muslim
figures of great importance, such as Muḥammad ‘Abduh, the philosopher
al-Farābī, and the poet Abū Nuwwās.368 Thus, Ghurbāl’s book is full of
Islamic elements and rhetoric, and Muḥammad ‘Alī, in particular, is also
portrayed as a pious Ottoman Islamic ruler.
The other context is related to Ghurbāl’s uncomfortable experience in
political life. Ghurbāl’s firm resistance to universal education resulted in
his automatic removal from the Ministry of Education each time the Wafd
came to power (1942–45 and 1950–52), and most decisively in 1942,
when Prime Minister Muṣṭafā al-Naḥḥās was searching for a new residence
in Cairo. His intensive search yielded a schoolhouse, and he ordered it to
be evacuated for his convenience. Ghurbāl refused to comply with the
order, and al-Naḥḥās sent him back to academia.369 This particular episode
might have pushed Ghurbāl to seek closer cooperation with the Palace.
From the above, two reasonable assumptions can be drawn. First, in
light of the rocky relationship with the Wafd, it is far more logical to
assume that Ghurbāl intended to get closer to the Palace and King Fārūq
by glorifying Muḥammad ‘Alī as an independent ruler rather than prais-
ing the collapsed Ottoman Empire. Ghurbāl’s subsequent political move
supports this assumption. Fārūq was delighted, and on the publication of
the first edition, he held an official reception in honor of Ghurbāl. The
conferral of the title “Bey” was part of this honoring.370 Consequently,
Ghurbāl’s personal reconciliation with the Palace gave rise to the estab-
lishment of the Royal Historical Society (al-Jam‘iyyat al-Malakiyya li-al-
Dirāsāt al-Ta’rīkhiyya), the first historical association in the Arab world. It
was renamed the Egyptian Historical Society in 1952.371
The other assumption, implied in the first assumption, is that Ghurbāl
tactically reshaped Muḥammad ‘Alī as the Ottoman leader and made some
favorable remarks on the Ottoman Empire to popularize his book; nev-
ertheless, whether he truly switched to Ottomanism is open to debate.
Decisive evidence for this argument based on nationalist texts that referred
to Muḥammad ‘Alī gives more weight to the likelihood of a tactical
switch to Ottomanism. Although Ghurbāl once referred to ‘Muḥammad

‘Alī as the Ottoman ruler, he repeatedly emphasized Muḥammad ‘Alī’s
“Egyptian-ness”:
Muḥammad ‘Alī left his first homeland [Albania] and emerged in Egypt as
a hero in heroic times.372
Muḥammad ‘Alī was also rejected for being a marauding mercenary in the
Ottoman world, which tarnished his reputation for independence, reform,
and nationalist fervor.373
Moreover, it should be noted that, regardless of any ideological swing,

Ghurbāl never abandoned his nationalist sentiment, which occupies a cen-
tral place in his profession as a historian. Thus, in addition to Muḥammad
‘Alī, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr and the Mamluk Sultans are recorded as national
heroes in Ghurbāl’s writings in the1920s and 1940s. In one sense,
Ghurbāl’s affection for the Ottomans was even an expression of his grief
over the lamentable condition of Egypt and stemmed from his nationalist
feeling. That is to say, in the chaotic political crisis of his time, Ghurbāl
might have felt nostalgia for the stable days of the Ottoman Empire.
Muḥammad Rif‘at Ramaḍān, another student of Ghurbāl, probably
presented ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr in the most glorified manner:
In1768 ‘Alī Bey became Shaykh al-Balad of Egypt. He became absolute

Sultan and his reputation even reached Europe.374
‘Alī Bey had a liberal point of view.375In his wisdom and tenacity, this out-
standing man did not destroy prosperity, culture and broadmindedness; The
world was amazed by his greatness and the spirit of tolerance manifested in
the Egyptian mind that had been silenced for such a long time.376‘Alī Bey
worked day and night to establish a new government.377
Quoting Jabartī’s book, Ramaḍān went so far as to compare ‘Alī Bey to

Sultan Baybars and Qalāwūn,378 and even identified him with Muḥammad
‘Alī Pasha379:
Some historians called ‘Alī Bey Sultan of Egypt and Khan of Seas, Sharif of
Mecca.380 But we do not find any one who called him a righteous Sultan
or said ‘Alī Bey would be independent for good. And he (‘Alī Bey) himself
never used this term.381
‘Alī Bey focused on Egypt’s military arts, especially blockades, heavy artil-
lery and navy warfare.382 Reorganizing trade in Egypt, he opened the world
176 I.K. SUNG
to his people.383 ‘Alī Bey was a man of great mind and heart. In the chaotic
times, Egypt needed a man like him. He restored what the Ottoman Pasha
had shattered and subdued the chaos.384
To recreate ‘Alī Bey as a nationalistic figure, Ramaḍān provides a new

interpretation, saying that, from the beginning, ‘Alī Bey’s goal was to
build an independent Egypt:
The goal of ‘Alī Bey’s independent movement was not to exploit the fact
that the Ottoman Empire was at war with Russia. Rather it was to establish
an independent Egypt with the revival of absolute Mamluk power.385
Up to this point, Ramaḍān’s narrative does not make any difference,

but further on he takes us in a different direction. What makes Ramaḍān
different from the rest of the historians is that he criticized ‘Alī Bey for
making crucial mistakes. ‘Alī Bey is accused of failing to crystallize the
nationalistic concept, of trusting the power of people and politics, and
depending too much on Islamic thinking.
In fact, if ‘Alī Bey had urged the populace to take part in the revolt, his sta-
tus would have been enhanced, because at the time, the Egyptian people did
nothing but plunder in various ways. All this came about because there was
no crystallization of nationalist thought (Fikra al-Qawmiyya) or emphasis
on the clear meaning of patriotism (waṭaniyya)386
It is agreed that ‘Alī Bey had no nationalistic goal except insofar as it served
his own interests. The most important result was that competent people
ignored their own rationality and were more interested in religion (Islam)
than in politics, so that the Ṣūfī trend was strengthened. In the end, ‘Alī Bey
was satisfied with Islamic national thought without defining the national
entity.387
From this, we can assume that this is why ‘Alī Bey was on friendly terms
with ‘Ulamā’ such as al-Halbāwī and al-Damhūrī, with Ṣūfī Shaykh and oth-
ers who had political skills. ‘Alī Bey intended to win not only the loyalty of
people, but also their satisfaction through his power and ability to influence
them. ‘Alī Bey succeeded in achieving such goals, but individuals repressed
their anger about their suffering.388
It would seem that by accusing ‘Alī Bey of placing too much empha-
sis on Islam, Ramaḍān might have proposed integral Egyptian national-
ism or Egyptian Arab nationalism as an alternative to Islamic Egyptian
nationalism.
In addition to failing to consolidate the nationalist idea, ‘Alī Bey’s for-

eign policy is criticized for his alliance with Russia. With his thoughtful
insight, Ramaḍān judged that ‘Alī Bey’s alliance with Russia was a wrong
decision, whereupon Abū Dhahab betrayed him.
‘Alī Bey’s alliance with Russia, which deviated from the way of Islam,
together with the war between Russia and the Ottoman, caused Abū Dhahab
to change his mind.389 Some historians explained that his personal ambition
to be a Sultan led Abū Dhahab to revolt against ‘Alī Bey.390 Other histori-
ans say the Sublime Porte secretly contacted Abū Dhahab and reached an
understanding with him regarding ‘Alī Bey.391
The question that arises here concerns the motive behind this criticism
of ‘Alī Bey’s understanding with Russia. Given the fact that one of the
main goals of both academic and monarchist historians is de-Ottomaniza-
tion, it is hard to believe that Ramaḍān intended to flatter the Ottomans.
Rather, it is reasonable to assume that Ramaḍān’s argument was that it was
inappropriate for the emerging independent Egyptian community to ally
with an imperial country like Russia.
In order to glorify Muḥammad ‘Alī as a nationalist hero, many aca-
demic historians even justified the Mamluk massacre of 1811. Ghurbāl
rationalizes the massacre, noting that all possible diplomatic options with
the Mamluks ended in failure:
The Mamluks presented a more serious problem. All efforts at a pacific

accommodation between them and Muḥammad ‘Alī proved of no avail.
They [Mamluks] could not dispossess the Pasha and he could obtain no
decisive victory over them. The result was treachery and the massacre of the
major part of them in March 1811.392
In contrast to the negative image of the Mamluk Beys, Ghurbāl presents

the Egyptians in a positive light. Ghurbāl first described the Egyptians as loyal
subjects of the Ottomans by arguing that they did not take part in the revolt of
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr against the Ottomans.393 The Egyptians are also depicted as
heroes who stood against the French and English and halted them.394Another
sign of Ghurbāl’s nationalist point of view is that he attributed historical devel-
opments not only to Muḥammad ‘Alī but also to the Egyptians:
Muḥammad ‘Alī Pasha could not achieve all this, nor was he alone in
requesting it. Rather, the Egyptians themselves were drawn to the whole
project and desired to see their sons and helpers in the great structures.395
178 I.K. SUNG
To sum up, facing the strong challenge posed by the overwhelming

wave of Egyptian nationalist thought, academic historians had few options
other than to respond as best they could. It seems that the only way for
them to meet the expectations and fervor of the Egyptian public was to
combine the tenets of academic historiography and nationalist sentiment,
thereby fulfilling their commitment as citizens of the newly emerging
Egyptian nation-state.
Representations of the Mamluks in Nationalist Historical

Literature
As far as nationalist historians are concerned, the Mamluks under the
Ottoman era are less attractive than those in the era of the Mamluk
Sultanate. It is likely that they perceived the Ottoman era as a dark page
of Egyptian history and best forgotten. Nationalist historians support this
assumption by invalidating the Mamluk Beys, portraying them as tyrants
and oppressors in accordance with the two earlier schools of historians.
Before embarking on a critical examination of nationalist historians,
a brief review of ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāfi‘ī is relevant. Considered to be
a major Egyptian nationalist historian, al-Rāfi‘ī was an independent his-
torian whose only formal education was in the field of law. Like many
young, enthusiastic Egyptian nationalists at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, he thought that the law was a vocation needed for reshaping
the national reality in Egypt. However, al-Rāfi‘ī, an energetic man, did
not limit his activity to any particular field. Not only was he a freelance
journalist but also a lawyer engaging in political activity on behalf of the
National Party (al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī). Nonetheless, from the mid-1920s he
devoted most of his time and energy to the writing of sixteen detailed
tomes, covering Egyptian history from 1798 to 1959.396 If Ghurbāl is
regarded today as the “founder of modern professional scholarship,” and
as advocating “scientific” standards of inquiry and “objectivity,” al-Rāfi‘ī,
in contrast, is viewed as a politically affiliated and biased historian who
delved profoundly, by all possible means, into rewriting history to invent
the “nationalist collective memory.”397
By the early 1930s, al-Rāfi‘ī’s views had placed him not only in oppo-
sition to the monarchists, but also in opposition to Muḥammad Shafīq
Ghurbāl, of Fu’ād University (later Egyptian University), who himself
had something to address about this period. Ghurbāl was thirty-four years
old when he finally published his authoritative book, The Beginnings of
the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehmet Ali.398 Ghurbāl was young,
energetic, and about to commence his lifetime academic mission to
“professionalize” historical writing. By contrast, al-Rāfi‘ī was already an
authoritative popular historian in his own right at this point. It was then
that their sharp differences emerged.399 Contrary to Ghurbāl’s historical
viewpoint, al-Rāfi‘ī’s doctrine maintained that “Egypt and the Egyptians
created Muḥammad ‘Alī.”
In spite of their individual professional backgrounds, religions, ethnici-
ties, political orientations, or national affiliations, most of the nationalist
historians we are about to encounter were in agreement with regard to
Egypt’s Ottoman experience. Al-Rāfi‘ī was no exception. To his way of
thinking, modern Egyptian history begins in 1798, the day Napoleon first
stepped onto Egyptian soil. To the Ottomans, he devoted just one short
and insignificant chapter, in which he played down their historical con-
tribution.400 Periods and events that preceded Ottoman rule, such as the
Mamluk and Pharaonic eras, were not even dealt with in a serious man-
ner.401 In the words of al- Rāfi‘ī, all events prior to 1798 are defined as an
era of “nationalist jahiliya.”402 The two following points sum up al-Rāfi‘ī’s
historiographic activities: (1) Al-Rāfi‘ī aimed to rebut the monarchic his-
toriography of the period from 1805 to 1882, by producing a systematic
and coherent national epic. (2) Al-Rāfi‘ī played a pivotal role in the de-
Ottomanization of Egyptian history.403
Hence, it is no wonder that in al-Rāfi‘ī’s nationalist narrative the
Mamluks and their roles in the historical development are drastically mar-
ginalized or overlooked. Al-Rāfi‘ī continued to depict the Mamluks as the
oppressors, tyrants, and internecine combatants. He made one notable
point in distinguishing the Mamluk Sultanate from the Mamluk Beys by
presenting them as respectable rulers:
Literature and erudition flourished in the era of the Baḥrī and Burjī Mamluk
Sultanate.404The Mamluk Sultan sustained literature and knowledge.405
Egypt was a center of publication for Istanbul as the capital of independent
country and the capital of the Arab world as well.406
There is clear difference between the era of the Mamluk Sultanate and the
era of Mamluk Beys. The era of the Mamluk Sultanate [unlike the era of the
Mamluk Beys] is an era of civilization and culture and it learned from its
mistakes; many Sultans were erudite men of literature and culture and their
epoch is close to the periods of Islamic culture.407
The era of the Mamluk Beys is an era of decadence. Some historians mis-
takenly thought the Mamluk Beys stemmed from the Mamluk Sultanate
era. But the (blood) line of the Mamluk Sultanate was severed from the
180 I.K. SUNG
Mamluk Bey with the Ottoman invasion. Mamluk descendants were discon-
nected from one generation to the next. According to Jabaratī’s memoir,
the Mamluk Beys were not descended from the Mamluk Sultanate.408
The Mamluk Beys are accused of failing to rule the country correctly
when they had the power to do so. In al-Rāfi‘ī’s view, this political inade-
quacy led the Mamluk Beys to conduct a fierce internal struggle for power,
which proved disastrous for Egypt:
Real authority lay in the hands of the Mamluks (Shaykh al-Balad)

The Wali had no solutions and were powerless.409The internal struggle
(fitna) was waged between Ibrāhīm Bey and Murād Bey.410
The valiyet and the Mamluk regime did not deal with administration of the
country and thus damaged trade and production.411
For a long time, the Mamluks tyrannized the administration and the
Ottoman Wali.412
The only favorable references to the Mamluks in the Ottoman era are
about their brilliant battle skills and loyalty to Islam:
Many of the Mamluks strove to praise, exalt and respect Allah and the
Quran. Some were knowledgeable and some had superior military skills, but
others wanted to monopolize and exploit Egypt.413
In the wake of the French and English expeditions to Egypt, the

Mamluks faced a great and fateful ordeal. Certainly, two powerful and
advanced European armies were beyond the Mamluk Bey’s outdated cul-
tural and military capacity. Indeed, the Mamluks are portrayed as defec-
tors414 and collaborators.415 As an undeniable anti-colonialist, Al-Rāfi‘ī
also blamed the Mamluk tyranny and oppression for England’s military
intervention in Egyptian politics:
The Mamluks were responsible for chaos and oppression and it was in
England’s interest to spread the chaos and oppression in the country, using
it as a pretext to intervene in the affairs of Egypt.416
Al-Rāfi‘ī perceived the internal struggle of the Mamluk Beys as a

chronic, ongoing phenomenon; the new power struggle between Bardīsī
and Alfī417came on the heels of the previous one between Ibrāhīm Bey and
Murād Bey.418 The Mamluk oppression of Egypt reached its zenith when
Bardīsī levied heavy taxation on the Egyptians419:
Bardīsī imposed new taxes. In 1804 those new taxes caused the people
to revolt against the Mamluks.420 People gathered and shouted, “Bardīsī!
What can you take from the bankrupt?” The revolt was not only against the
Mamluks but also against the evil acts perpetrated by the Albanian soldiers.421
The Mamluks indulged in luxuries and material possessions, which

weakened their power.422 In al-Rāfi‘ī’s analysis, the only way to break the
English imperialist hold on Egypt was to eliminate the Mamluks, who had
a secret understanding with England:
The English strengthened their imperialistic policy in the hands of the

Mamluk leaders. There was no other way to foil these politics but to rid the
country of the Mamluks and eliminate them.423
For a nationalist and anti-colonialist historian like al-Rāf‘ī, the pur-

pose of writing history goes beyond replicating earlier writings. Instead,
al-Rāf‘ī’s primary goal was to rediscover the pride and glory of the
Egyptians and Egypt as manifested in history, leading to a better present
and future. In this respect, it is not surprising to find that al-Rāf‘ī’s nar-
rative has an affinity with Egyptian territorial nationalism. There are two
pieces of evidence in support of this theory. First, al-Rāf‘ī addressed the
point that the people of Egypt are the descendants of Pharaohs and Arabs,
so that Egyptian blood is blended with ancient Arab blood.424 Further, he
asserts that it is evident that, with the passage of time, the Mamluks of the
Mamluk Sultanate era assimilated into the Egyptian people.425
Al-Rāf‘ī’ also regarded nationalism as a crucial impetus for historical
development and presented it as the genuine engine for generating all
nationalist movements and resistance against foreign attackers. It was nei-
ther the Mamluk army nor the Ottomans that stopped the French expe-
dition; instead, it was the spirit of Egyptian nationalism.426 Negating the
monarchist credo founder paradigm, al-Rāf‘ī’ did not see the heroes of the
past as the only contributors to historical developments. In his national-
ist narrative, it is rather the anonymous, patriotic Egyptian individual and
public which took part in the revolt and the struggle against the Mamluks
and the French and English armies and Ottomans, who are reborn as the
real heroes and generators of historical force.427 More importantly, no one,
including the Turks, Mamluks, and English, could possibly suppress and
eliminate the nationalist aspiration (Amal Qawmī).428 Nevertheless, as is the
case of other nationalist historians, al-Rāf‘ī’ commemorated Muḥammad
‘Alī as a symbol of Egyptian nationalism429 and a genuine Egyptian
reformer, as a leader of people who resurrected the Egyptian industry.430
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A nationalist, Muhammad Rif‘at was not one of the ‘Ābdīn Project

historians; nevertheless, he had a good relationship with Ghurbāl. He was
born in an aristocratic Turkish family and obtained overseas postgraduate
qualifications earlier than both Ghurbāl and Muḥammad Ṣabrī. Sent to
England by the Ministry of Education just prior to the First World War,
Rif‘at graduated with a Masters degree from the University of Liverpool
under the supervision of Sir Charles Webster.431 However, he was not a
prolific and daring writer; he produced only a few books, all of which were
closely adapted to where the political wind was blowing. Nevertheless,
beginning in the early 1920s, he composed the standard school history
textbook and was in charge of its continuous updating until 1952. As
such, he served several key positions in the Ministry of Education, includ-
ing that of minister. Cooperating on several occasions with Ghurbāl, Rif‘at
had a decisive role in the dissemination of historical significance in the
school system. A review of three editions of his school textbook demon-
strates the decline of a monarchist interpretation and the acceptance of
more nationalist themes. In 1947, clearly reflecting his fervor for Egyptian
nationalism, Rif‘at published The Awakening of Egypt, which was com-
posed on the model of George Antonius’ classic The Arab Awakening.432
Following other nationalist historians, Muḥammad Rif‘at depicted
Muḥammad ‘Alī and his offspring, such as Ibrāhīm Pasha and al-Khedīve
Ismā‘īl, as symbols of an early independent Egyptian community.433 In
addition, Rif‘at redefined the story of Muḥammad ‘Alī as the most promi-
nent part of the awakening of nationalism by portraying him as both an
innovator who restored the army, fleet, industry, and education,434 and a
patriotic hero who halted the French and English armies. In Rif‘at’s view,
this victory enabled the Pasha’s name to resound throughout Europe.435
Surprisingly, unlike other historians, Rif‘at recorded the Mamluks of the
Ottoman era as the offspring of Circassian Mamluks.436 Aside from this, no
significant change can be traced in other portrayals of the Mamluks. On
the evidence of no intermarriage with local people, the Mamluks appeared
to have not assimilated into Egypt.437 Negative terms such as “corrupted,”
“tyrannical,” and “greedy” continuously characterized the Mamluks, with
particular emphasis on the internal division of the Mamluk Beys:
The Mamluk Beys disgraced Egypt by corruption.438

The Mamluks enjoyed a luxurious life,439disobeyed the Sublime Porte,
achieved independence in the country and committed corruption.440
The Mamluks oppressed the peasantry, who became slaves and suffered
from the poverty that befell them.441

The Mamluks wasted or hid their fortunes in ancient Embabeh and then
transferred them to Syria.442
The French military campaign eliminated the Mamluk influence.
The Mamluks were divided internally, Muḥammad al-Alfī sided with the
English, whereas others preferred to be allied to the French.443
In the wake of the French expedition, the cowardly Mamluks appear to

have sneaked away and were ultimately defeated by the new French army:
The French Republic government attempted to help the Sublime Porte to

remove the Mamluk faction, in order to consolidate the influence of the
Sultan.444 The Mamluks fled in the wake of the arrival of the French army.445
Fearing the new weapons – canon and rifle – the Mamluks retreated.446At
Embabeh the Mamluk army was defeated by the French army.447
For Rif‘at, the main reason for the Egyptian revolt of 1798 was not just
the French invasion, but also the Mamluk oppression: the Egyptians rose
against the oppression of the Mamluks as well as against France.448
In the English version of the 1940s textbook, Rif‘at shows no sign of a
change in his antagonistic tone toward the Mamluks. Murād and Ibrāhīm
Beys are continuously de-legitimized as cowards who escaped even before
the beginning of the battle against the French:
Before the Battle of Embabeh or the Battle of Pyramids, the Mamluks

themselves knew they were up against a formidable enemy, of whose tactics,
guns and formations they knew nothing, and against whom their personal
bravery and their skill on horseback would avail them little. No wonder
therefore that both Murād and Ibrāhīm, the joint masters of the country,
had made preparations to leave it even before the battle started.449
Ibrāhīm Bey with his Mamluks gave up Cairo and fled northwards Palestine
and Syria leaving Cairo to the pillagers and to the invaders outside.450
For these reasons, the Egyptians are depicted as having hated the
Mamluks as much as the French:
The Egyptians, who at heart hated both Mamluks and Turks as much as they
did the French, if not more, soon began to nourish a feeling of sympathy
towards their brethren in Islam, and when the opportune moment came,
they made no secret of their sentiments.451
184 I.K. SUNG
Meanwhile the national leaders prepared a manifesto in writing against

the Mamluks and for the transfer of Muḥammad ‘Alī. They stated that the
Mamluks, if they regained power, would not carry out their pledge to pay
an annual tribute to the sultan or send an annual quota of corn and money
to the holy places in Arabia. The Shayks of the ‘Ulamā’ and notables would
not endorse any promise given by the Mamluks, whom they accused of
plundering the land.452
Although he focused mainly on Mamluk oppression and tyranny, Rif‘at

made some favorable remarks regarding the Mamluks’ bravery, battle
skills, and familiarity with the Egyptians:
The Mamluks were able to maintain their power for the following reasons:
The Mamluks and their offspring became a powerful race when the author-
ity of soldiers and the Wali decreased and they were unable to exploit the
wealth of the Mamluks. Thanks to their bravery, the Mamluks were dis-
tinguished warriors. The power of aṣabiya (group cohesion) among the
Mamluks prevented them from assimilating into Egyptians, as others had
done, which existed as an independent, common characteristic.453
In particular, Rif‘at stresses the political skill of the Mamluk Beys:
The Mamluks were very closely connected to Egypt’s people, rituals and
language and had a complete understanding of the domestic government.
The Mamluks had authority and could use it to manage internal and exter-
nal conditions without asking for Ottoman help.454
As noted already, the 1811 massacre of the Mamluks by Muḥammad

‘Alī is an important barometer as it clarifies the understandings of both the
monarchists’ and academic intellectuals’ perceptions of the Mamluks. The
same is true for nationalist intellectuals. The discussion of the massacre of
the Mamluks also provides a crucial route to examine the ways in which
nationalists viewed Muḥammad ‘Alī.
Quoting the British consul general, Rif‘at validates the massacre by giv-
ing two reasons: it was a necessary measure for reform, and the Mamluks
posed a serious threat to Muḥammad ‘Alī :
“The massacre of the Mamluks” in the words of Sir Charles Murray the
British Consul-General, “was an atrocious crime, but it was a neces-
sary prelude to all subsequent reforms.”455 “For every drop of blood that
Muḥammad ‘Alī spilt that day,” said Dr. Bowring, “he saved more than one
innocent person.”456
But Muḥammad ‘Alī feared that they might again take up arms against him
if they knew that his forces were leaving the country to fight in a far-off and
difficult country like Arabia.457 The story of the creation of a new modern
army in Egypt is one that would add more luster to the name of Muḥammad
‘Alī than anything else.458
In the same manner, the nationalist historian Sulaymān Bek Abū ‘Izz
al-Dīn justified the massacre of the Mamluks by Muḥammad ‘Alī as a nec-
essary evil aimed to end the chaos.459 Unlike other nationalist historians,
Abū ‘Izz al-Dīn stressed the role of the Egyptian people in the country’s
historical development. In his view, it was not Muḥammad ‘Alī but rather
the Egyptian people who lay the foundations for the change of regime and
chose Muḥammad ‘Alī as their leader.
The Egyptian people gentle-heartedly sought power and took some mea-
sures to replace the regime through the French expedition to Egypt. They
found orderly government in Muḥammad ‘Alī.460
The enemy feared the power of the Egyptian people since such force had
never existed in the past.461
In the meantime, Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadid expressed a more criti-

cal view of the Mamluks by setting a sharp contrast between Muḥammad
‘Alī, the reformer, on the one hand and the villainous Mamluk Beys and
Ottomans on the other.
Since the eighteenth century there [had been] severe chaos caused by the
Ottoman army and by the leaders of Mamluks. Muḥammad ‘Alī challenged
the Ottoman government. Following the French withdrawal, the Ottoman
army, the Pasha and the Mamluk leaders took advantage of the situation and
destroyed what had remained from the previous years.
Muḥammad ‘Alī was a real reformer in a variety of fields in Egypt.462
In Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl’s nationalist narrative, the Turks, Mamluks,

and British appeared as colonial forces that had denied the power of the
people:
The tripartite power struggle between the Turks, Mamluks and British
ruined Egypt. The alliance did not recognize the importance of the country
and the people behind the curtain. The French expedition awakened the
power of the people.463
186 I.K. SUNG
As an antithesis to the three evil forces, Muḥammad ‘Alī is depicted as

an authentic reformer who restored various aspects of Egypt: army, weap-
ons, and arts. Two interesting aspects can be detected in the presentation
of Muḥammad ‘Alī. First, al-Shayyāl portrayed Muḥammad ‘Alī as a more
or less Western leader, who imported European knowledge, sent students
abroad, and built new schools.464
The second remarkable aspect is that Muḥammad ‘Alī appeared as a
nationalist leader who recognized the power of the people.465 Based on
this assessment, al-Shayyāl concluded that Muḥammad ‘Alī succeeded in
establishing an Egyptian resurrection (al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya al-Ḥadīth).466
‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī shows similar antipathy toward the Mamluks,467
except for crediting their morale and fighting spirit. Shukrī expressly
stated that the Mamluks halted the English army468 and bravely fought
to the death against the French army469 without commenting that they
defected, or hid fortunes.
Similar to Shukrī, who praised the Mamluks for their military capability,
Ḥusayn Mu’nis also expressed his warm and wholehearted support for the
Mamluks. Notably, the Mamluks are viewed as if they slowly assimilated
into Egyptians.470 Perhaps Mu’nis’ most important point is his glorification
of the Mamluks as the earliest symbol of Egyptian nationalism, a point not
made by any of the other historians encountered in the present research:
The patriotism generated in the hearts of the Mamluks was clearly mani-
fested when the French came to Egypt. The Egyptian people joined forces
with the Mamluks against the French. This is an indication of the Mamluks
nationalist feelings.471
His glorification of the Mamluks as Egyptian nationalists seems to show

that in some ways Mu’nis tended toward an integral Egyptian national-
ism, from which he derived his extraordinary nationalistic portrayal of the
Mamluks. According to Mu’nis’ critical historical review, Egyptian nation-
alism was as significant in the development of French nationalism as the
French expedition was in its influence on Egyptian nationalism and revival
(Nahḍa Miṣriyya).472Apart from the above nationalist iconization, Mu’nis
raised the usual accusations against the Mamluks.473
In contrast to Mu’nis, for Muḥammad Ṣabrī the Mamluks are no more
than villains destined to be exterminated for the sake of the unity of
Egypt.474 Ṣabrī, a French-educated historian, favorably presents the French
role in awakening Egyptian nationalism. Born in 1894, Ṣabrī was the first
historian to write a fully developed national history. In every respect, Ṣabrī

was deeply influenced by the rapid social and cultural dynamics of de-
Ottomanization. He was greatly interested in Arab literature almost from
childhood. At sixteen, he produced his first book on contemporary Arabic
poetry.475 No trace of Ottomanism is found in his work since Ṣabrī did not
learn Turkish. In 1915, he was already doing graduate study at a Ph.D.
level at the Sorbonne. He was soon referred to as “al-Surbuni.”476 Even
though Ṣabrī sympathized with Egyptian resistance against the French,
as a revolution (thawra)477 he did not hide his regret that the France
failed to eliminate the Mamluks. He believed that if the French army
had defeated the Mamluk cavalry in the first French military campaign, it
would have given rise to a new Egypt soon after Muḥammad ‘Alī subdued
the Mamluks.478
An anonymous nationalist writer drew a similar contrast between the
Mamluk Beys as an obstacle to Egyptian emancipation on the one hand
and the French saviors on the other:
Murād Bey and Ibrāhīm Bey are depicted as greedy rulers.479

Napoleon and his army removed the Mamluks who acted wickedly, cor-
rupted Egypt, oppressed the people and incarcerated those who dared to
speak out against the Sultan. Napoleon reached an agreement with the
Ottoman Sultan to remove the Mamluks from Egypt and emancipate the
people from the fire of oppression.480 The Mamluks had corrupted the best
place on earth.481
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl also found fault with the backwardness of the
Mamluk army, noting that it was unable to defeat the advanced French
troops.482
In contrast to Shayyāl and Ṣabrī, who noted the contribution of the
French army to the awakening of Egyptian nationalism, Aḥmad Khakīt
described the Mamluk army as a national entity by drawing a sharp con-
trast between the colonial French army and the Mamluk forces joined by
Egyptian people.
In the wake of Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt, Egyptian nationalist senti-

ments emerged. The Mamluks made efforts to defend Egypt against the
French army, but failed to do so since they depended on an old defense
system.483 The Mamluk leaders ignored the existence of new weaponry.484
The Egyptian people joined the Mamluk army to fight against the French.485
188 I.K. SUNG
In most Egyptian nationalist literature, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr is glorified as a

righteous ruler as well as the precursor of Egyptian nationalism. As such,
Shayyāl and al-Rāf‘ī described ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr as an Egyptian nationalist
leader and an early symbol of Egyptian nationalism:
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr 1766 seized the power and killed his rival and bid farewell
to Istanbul and refused paying Jizya. [He] Minted coin in his name and
pronounced himself as Sultan of Egypt and established independent country
of Egypt.486 But he could not stay longer since he was killed by the wicked
(sinner).487
He went out to the Arabian Peninsula and was nicknamed Sharif of Mecca,
Sultan of Egypt, King of Sea. ‘Alī Bey’s campaign in Syria was a failure since
his Mamluk officer, Abū Dhahab, betrayed him by cooperating with the
Ottomans.488
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr (1768) declared Egyptian independence from the Ottoman,
refused to pay Kharaj (tax), and minted coins in his name.489
He expanded his territory by conquering the Arabian Peninsula and Mecca,
gaining the title of Sultan of Egypt and Khaqan (King) of Sea. He dis-
patched Muḥammad Bey Abū Dhahab to conquer Syria and Abu Dhahab
conspired with the Ottomans (Sublime Port) to betray ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr,
who wanted to unite Egypt with Syria.490
Likewise, Ṣabrī depicted ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr as an authentic reformer

emulating Muḥammad ‘Alī:
Shaykh al-Balad ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr worked for separation (faṣl) and
founded an independent regime with other Beys such as Muḥammad
Abū Dhahab. He declared independence in 1771 and expelled the Ottoman
Wali from Egypt. 491
He made efforts to end the chaos and to reorganize the administration and
treasury. Militarily he conquered Yemen and the eastern part of the Red Sea,
Jeddah and Mecca and declared himself Sharif of Mecca, Sultan of Egypt
and King of Seas. Abū Dhahab betrayed him. 492
In the same way, Muḥammad Rif‘at effectively used ‘Alī Bey’s story to com-
memorate Muḥammad ‘Alī as the precursor of early Egyptian nationalism:
‘Alī Bey was the most powerful Mamluk Bey during the Ottoman rule.
He was the authentic Mamluk ruler and possessed real power. In 1766 ‘Alī
Bey declared independence, abolished the Jiziya tax, minted coins in his
name (as Sultan of Egypt) and revived the Mamluk Sultanate. He joined
forces with Shaykh Dhāhir, Amir of Acre in the struggle against the Turks.493
He initiated military campaigns in Egypt, Yemen, Jeddah, Mecca among

others and became known by the nickname of King of two Seas and Sultan
of Egypt.494 His Syrian campaign ended in failure because Muḥammad
Bey (Abū Dhahab) betrayed him.495 ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr was a prominent
leader in a dark period of Egyptian history and whose achievements match
Muḥammad ‘Alī’s reforms in the government. It is not surprising that
‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s name resounds in history and no other Mamluk bears
comparison with him.496
There is a great deal of similarity between the preceding two authors’
accounts. However, a common pattern that should be mentioned here is
that Abū Dhahab’s secret understanding with the Ottomans is said to be
behind ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s downfall. The accusation that the Ottomans
were responsible for ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr’s downfall is a clear sign that the two
nationalist historians were actively delegitimizing the Ottoman Empire.
Another nationalist historian, Nasīb Sa‘īd, glorified the defeat of the
Mamluk dynasty by the Ottoman Empire, presenting it as an early revolu-
tion and depicting Muḥammad ‘Alī as the precursor of Arab nationalism497:
The Arabs did not find shame in the surrender to the Ottoman Sultans
who defeated Sultan Ṭūmānbāy, the last Mamluk Sultan. They [the Arabs]
headed towards Damascus, and then towards Jerusalem and Cairo, and all
countries and regions (areas) welcomed them.498
Ṣabrī continued to present Muḥammad ‘Alī as an Egyptian national-

ist hero who annihilated the Mamluks and thereby saved Egyptians from
wrongdoings.499 Anwar Zaqlama shows no difference in the account of
the massacre of the Mamluks by Muḥammad ‘Alī in 1811.
It was not possible for Muḥammad ‘Alī to leave Egypt in the hands of
vicious Mamluks. Muḥammad ‘Alī did not exterminate all the Mamluks;
after the massacre, many Mamluks survived and lived under the Muḥammad
‘Alī regime and even helped Muḥammad ‘Alī to control them by providing
information about their own people.
It was the ‘Urābī revolt of 1881 that actually eliminated the Mamluks in the
end. As we know, the revolt was against the dominance of Circassians in the
Egyptian army.500
However, al-Rāf‘ī tells a totally different story about the massacre.

Al-Rāf‘ī differs most from other historians in his critical interpretation of
the Mamluk massacre. In a sense, he concedes that for Muḥammad ‘Alī, it
was an unavoidable measure to eliminate the Mamluks whom he regarded
190 I.K. SUNG
as villains devoted to wrongdoing and posing a critical threat to his power.

Nevertheless, al-Rāf‘ī openly expresses his objection to the massacre, since
such a tragic event had an unintended and counter-productive impact on
the Egyptians and consequently hindered the development of Egyptian
nationalism:
Since the Mamluk massacre in the Citadel, the [Egyptian] people were
seized with an oppressive fear so that, for a long time, bravery and calmness
were absent in their minds.501
The absence of bravery, a great quality that leads nations to aspire to suprem-
acy based on morality and nationalist virtues and the fear that occupied the
minds of the people after the massacre in the Citadel, weakened their moral
and spiritual power and resulted in the absence of a great nationalism.502
People protested against oppression at the time, and it is to be assumed that
the massacre in the Citadel subdued the spirit of protest for a long time
and gave way to fear. This new spirit probably brought Muḥammad ‘Alī
peace of mind, despite his isolation from authority. For 37 years after the
resistance was subdued, responsibility and criticism failed to emerge from
the people.503
CONCLUSION
The landscape of commemoration examined in this work was an integral
component of the Egyptian enterprise of historical memory as it devel-
oped over the course of the early twentieth century. In this setting, four
different historians and intellectual groups forged a new historical mem-
ory of the Mamluks according to their own ideological tenets. Egyptian
Ottomanists, monarchists, and academic historians and intellectuals re-
imagined and redefined the Mamluks and the Mamluk era in order to
modernize the Egyptian community. Egyptian nationalist historians and
intellectuals went one step further and aimed to resurrect the Egyptian
nation by immortalizing heroic and glorious moments of the Egyptian
past. By reevaluating the past, Egyptian intellectuals attempted to design a
new Egyptian identity for the sake of both the emerging Egyptian nation-
state and its bright future.
Ottomanist historians carefully examined the possibility of unity of all
Muslims under Ottoman rule as a weapon against British colonialism. It
is therefore not very surprising that Ottomanist historians did not show
much interest in the Mamluk era.
For the monarchist and academic historians seeking to record modern

Egyptian history by modernizing the writing of history, Napoleon’s expe-
dition to Egypt served as a point of departure. As a result, both histori-
cal schools preferred to forget the Mamluks as a symbol of the past and
instead focused on Muḥammad ‘Alī and his descendants. Although the
academic historians endeavored to combine professional objectivity with
the Egyptianization of history in order to create a supposed gap between
themselves and the monarchist historians, they may not have been very suc-
cessful. In reality, the nationalist historians were the ones who undertook
the weighty mission of Egyptianization. For this reason, the monarchists,
Ottomanists, and academic historians and intellectuals alike showed little
interest in elevating the Mamluk Sultanate periods. Ottomanist intellec-
tual Jūrjī Zaydān is exceptional. With his pro-Ottoman orientation and
nationalist sensibilities, Zaydān was more sympathetic toward the Mamluks
and believed they should be a symbol of Egyptian pride. Nevertheless, the
monarchist, Ottomanist, and academic historians each admitted that the
Mamluk Sultans also engendered anarchy, disorder, and bloodshed.
The founder of the academic school, Shafiq Ghurbāl, shifted from
very negative depictions of the Mamluks to far more favorable ones. The
reason for this shift seems to reside in Ghurbāl’s nationalist fervor. Like
Ghurbāl, his student ‘Abd al-Karīm urged his contemporary historians to
include the Mamluks in their historiography.
On the other hand, the Ottomanist, monarchist, and academic histo-
rians set the Mamluks during the Ottoman era as the antithesis of the
Ottoman Empire, Muḥammad ‘Alī, and the Egyptian people, which all
symbolized progress and splendor. Karim Thābit and Henry Dodwell’s
justifications of the Mamluk massacre by Muḥammad ‘Alī clearly demon-
strate the absolute contrast between Muḥammad ‘Alī and the Mamluks.
In the same manner, the Mamluk leader ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, who revolted
against the Ottomans, is presented as a traitor. In using ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr as
a means to address their ambitions for Egyptian nationalism, Muḥammad
Rif‘at and Jūrjī Zaydān created the complete counter-narrative: ‘Alī Bey
al-Kabīr was transformed into the precursor of Egyptian nationalism. The
academic historians Muḥammad Rif‘at Ramaḍān and Ghurbāl continued
to view the Mamluk Beys as power-thirsty oppressors with the exception
of ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, the only Mamluk who is depicted as Muḥammad
‘Alī’s precursor. In their expressions of nationalist ambitions, Ramaḍān
and Ghurbāl vindicated the 1811 Mamluk massacre by Muḥammad ‘Alī
to safeguard his position as a nationalist hero.
192 I.K. SUNG
In contrast to the previous three intellectual groups, Egyptian national-

ist intellectuals took the Mamluks as the main subject of their work. Not
only did they thus create far more diverse images, but they also explicitly
used the Mamluks and Mamluk history to serve their nationalist need to
construct a new Egyptian identity and state. The nationalist movement,
in its successive phases, constructed and reconstructed a wealth of sites of
public commemoration intended to disseminate particular national mes-
sages in order to build national consciousness and to mold the Egyptian
national memory.
The contours of Egyptian collective memory in large part reflect the
development of national aspirations, national sentiment, and national
identity. In the process, they shared some common nationalist characteris-
tics. First, the border between the Mamluk army and the Egyptian army is
blurred. Second, nearly all nationalist historians depict Baybars as the peak
of Egyptian nationalism manifested in the Middle Ages. He is even por-
trayed as a women’s rights activist, over and above his role as a nationalist
hero who halted the Crusaders and the Mongols.
One fascinating interpretation encountered in both ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī’s
and Ḥusayn Mu’nis’ texts suggests that the Mamluk interest in and ener-
getic support of cultural development was the secret to the endurance of
the Mamluk dynasty. Furthermore, Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan and Mu’nis
implicitly addressed the real issue of the era—Egypt’s political crisis—by
drawing an analogy between the Mamluk tyranny and oppression and the
arbitrary Egyptian monarchy.
Recreating the Mamluks and the Mamluk era in an Islamic mode,
Egypt’s Islamic nationalist historians, Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān and
‘Abd Laṭīf Ḥamza, fully integrated Mamluk history into the glorious pages
of Egyptian Islamic history. The Mamluk Sultans were thus presented as
pious Muslim leaders. For instance, Baybars is glorified as “defence of
Islam”. The integralists Ibrāhīm Jum‘a and Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan put an
emphasis on the Egyptian-ness of the Mamluks and Arabs. To some extent,
contrasting the integralist redefinition of Egypt, Egyptian Arab nationalist
historians, like Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn Surūr and ‘Alī Ibrāhīm Ḥasan,
have newly referred to the Mamluk Sultans as the Sultans of Arabs and
others by relocating Egypt as part of a wider Arab culture and region.
In contrast to their exaltation of the Mamluk era, most national-
ist intellectuals viewed the Mamluk Beys as villains. On the other hand,
Muḥammad ‘Alī, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr, and the Egyptian nation were system-
atically elevated.
Several important findings should be raised here. First, all four differ-
ent intellectual groups held a broadly negative view of the Mamluk Beys
under Ottoman rule. Their vilification of the Mamluks stems mostly from
the belief that the latter were an obstacle to the modernization of Egypt.
On the other hand, nationalist historians saw the Mamluks as the enemy
of emerging Egyptian nationalism and the nascent Egyptian nation-state.
Above all others, ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāfi‘ī accused the Mamluk Beys of
allowing the British or the French armies access to Egyptian soil. In con-
trast, Ḥusayn Mu’nis described the Mamluks as partners in the Egyptian
nationalist efforts against the French army.
Second, the hegemony of Egyptian nationalism was so strong that it
had a great impact on the representations of the Mamluks. Needless to
say, nationalist intellectuals and even monarchist and academic intellectu-
als were pressured by the nationalist wave to reshape the image of Mamluk
leader ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr. In this nationalist context, ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr was
reshaped as the symbol of Egyptian independence in the narratives of both
monarchist and academic intellectuals.
The last, but probably most significant, finding is that the Mamluk
Sultans are recreated as the designers of a flourishing civilization: art,
architecture, science, and even medicine blossomed under their reign.
By annihilating the purely demonic imagery of the Mamluks, national-
ist intellectuals re-imagined and perpetuated intelligent and sophisticated
Mamluk Sultans as models for their contemporary Egyptian leaders.
NOTES
1. For previous studies based on a similar approach, see Yoav Di-Capua,
Gatekeepers of the Arab Past (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2009) and Anthony Gorman, Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth
Century Egypt (New York: Routledge, 2003).
2. Born in Naples in 1883, Sammarco first came to Egypt in 1922 to take
up the position of history teacher at the Italian Lycée in Cairo. From this
time on, he dedicated himself to the study of Egyptian history, conduct-
ing research, writing, and giving lectures at learned societies such as the
Institut d’Égypte and the Royal Geographical Society. In 1925, following
the death of Eugenio Griffini, Fu’ad offered Sammarco the vacant post of
librarian of ‘Abdīn Palace and asked him to continue the task of recon-
structing the history of contemporary Egypt. See Anthony Gorman,
Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egypt (London:
Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 16–17.
194 I.K. SUNG
3. Pierre Crabitès (1877–1943) was an American judge of the Mixed

Tribunal in Cairo and later became Chief Judge. See Anthony Gorman
(2003), Historians, State, p. 17.
4. Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, p. 12. For further
reference, see Chap. 5.
5. For example, Georges Douin, Une mission militaire française auprès de
Mohamed Aly (Le Caire, 1923); Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern
Egypt: A Study of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1967) first published 1931; Karīm Thābit, Muḥammad ‘Alī, 2nd
edition (Cairo, 1943).
6. The “Founder paradigm” is based on three assumptions: (1) The accep-
tance of the modern European-type national-state as the “culmination of
history.” (2) The view of Egypt as a unified, singular, self-conscious player
and the ultimate subject of modern histories and a suitable unit of analy-
sis. (3) The acceptance of the huge contribution of Muḥammad ‘Alī to
the creation of the modern Egyptian nation-state. Yoav Di-Capua (2009),
Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, pp.177, 191.
7. For example, Shafīq Ghurbāl, The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question
and the Rise of Mehemet Ali (London: George Routledge & Sons, LTD,
1947); Idem, Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Kabīr (Cairo: Dār Ajya’ al-Kutub al-
‘Arabiyya 1944); Aḥmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karīm, Ta’rīkh al-taʿlīm fī ‘aṣr
Muḥammad ʿAlī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1938); ‘Alī
Jiritlī, Ta’rīkh al-Sināʿa fī Miṣr fī al-Niṣf al-Awwal min al-Qarn al-Tāsi‘
‘Ashar (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif bi Miṣr, al-Jam‘iyya al-Malikiyya lil-Dirāsāt
al-Ta’rīkhiyya, 1952); Muḥammad Rif‘at Ramaḍān, ‘Alī Bek al-Kabīr
(Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1950).
8. Muḥammad Anīs, “Shafīq Ghurbāl wa Madrasat al-Ta’rīkh al-Miṣrī
al-Ḥadīth,” al-Majalla (November 1961), p. 13.
9. See Shafīq Ghurbāl (1944), Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Kabīr, pp. 1–16.
10. For example, Mu’nis, ‘Inān and Rif‘at clearly hold a positive attitude
toward the Mamluk Sultanate. See Ḥusayn Mu’nis (1938), op. cit.;
Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān, Mawāqif Hāsima fī Ta’rīkh al- Islām (Cairo:
Lajna al-Ta’līf wa al-Tarjama wa al-Nashr, 1934); Muḥammad Rif‘at,
Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Siyāsī fī al-Azmina al-Ḥadītha (Cairo, 1934). However,
‘Abd al-Raḥman Rāfi‘ī’s attitude toward the Mamluk Sultanate is ambiva-
lent. See his books Ta’rīkh al-Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya wa Taṭawwur Niẓām
al-Ḥukm fī Miṣr, Vol.1 (1929); Idem, Ta’rīkh al-Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya wa
Taṭawwur Niẓām al-Ḥukm fi Miṣr: Aṣr Muḥammad ‘Alī , Vol.3 (1930).
11. Jūrjī Zaydān, The Autobiography of Jurji Zaydan, trans. and ed. Thomas
Philipp (Washington DC: Three Continents Press, 1990), p. 78. See also
Thomas Philipp, Gurgi Zaidan: His Life and Thought (Beirut, 1979),
pp. 110–111; al-Hilāl XIII, 1904/05, p. 131 and Thomas Philipp,
Gurgi Zaidan, p. 112. “Zaydān was foremost concerned with this unity,
because he foresaw that the collapse of the Empire would not bring about
the political independence of the Arab people, as many of his Muslim
Arab contemporaries assumed, but the intensification of European con-
trol over the area.”
12. Jūrjī Zaydān, Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Ḥadīth Part 1 (1911), p. 319.
13. Ibid., p. 320.
14. Ibid., p. 308.
15. Jūrjī Zaydān, Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Ḥadīth Part 1(1911), pp. 3–4.
16. Ibid., pp. 312–313. Zaydān also refers to the army of Ṭūmānbāy, Qānṣuh
al-Ghawrī and Qāyṭbāy as the Egyptian army. See pp. 358–362.
17. Ibid., p. 316–317.
18. Ibid., p. 323.
19. Ibid., p. 334.
20. Muḥammad Farīd, Ta’rīkh al-Dawla al-‘Aliyya al-‘Uthmāniyya First pub-
lished 1896 (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1987), Preface.
21. Goldschmidt, Arthur, Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt (London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 53.
22. Muḥammad Farīd, Ta’rīkh al-Dawla al-‘Aliyya al-‘Uthmāniyya, p. 31.
23. Except Wiet, the rest of the ‘Ābdīn Project historians did not deal with
the Mamluk Sultanate era seriously, as demonstrated in the first part of
this study.
24. Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, p.188.
25. Ibid., p.195.
26. Ibid., pp. 195–196.
27. Ibid., p. 188.
28. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, “Kalimat Ta’bin,” Al-Majalla al-Ta
’rikhīyya al-Miṣriyya 11(1963), pp. 36–45;Yoav Di-Capua (2009),
Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, p. 189.
29. Muḥammad Rif‘at, “Kalimat Ta’bin,” Al-Majalla al-Ta’rikhīyya al-
Miṣriyya 11(1963), pp.7–9.
30. Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, pp. 189–190.
31. Ibid., p. 190.
32. Ibid., p. 191.
33. Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab History and The Nation-State: A Study in
Modern Arab Historiography, 1820–1980 (London: Routledge, 1989),
p. 71.
34. Shafīq Ghurbāl, The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and The Rise of
Mehmet Ali (George Routledge & Sons, LTD 1928), p. 1.
35. Ibid.
36. Shafīq Ghurbāl, Muḥammad ‘Alī Bey al-Kabīr (Miṣr: Lajnat Tarjamat
Dāirat al-Ma‘ārif al-Islāmiyya, 1944), p. 11.
196 I.K. SUNG
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 12.
39. About ‘Abd al-Karīm see Anthony Gorman, Historians, State and Politics
in Twentieth Century Egypt (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003),
pp. 30–32.
40. Aḥmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karīm, Ta’rīkh al-Ta‘līm fī al-‘Aṣr Muḥammad ‘Alī
(Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1938), p. 19.
41. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam, p. 115.
42. Muḥammad Sharaf, “Al-Miṣriyyūn Umma Ghayr Sharqiyya,” Al-Majalla
al-Jadīda June 1, 1930, p. 964.
43. Ibid.
44. Vernon Egger (1986), A Fabian in Egypt: Salamah Musa and the Rise of
the Professional Classes in Egypt. 1909–1939 (Lanham: University Press of
America, 1986), p. 129; Salāma Mūsa, “Al Thaqāfa wa al-Haḍara,” al-
Hilāl 36 (December 1927), p. 173.
45. Sir Grafton Elliot Smith, The Ancient Egyptians and the Origin of
Civilization (Freeport New York: Books for Libraries Press, Reprint of
1923 version, 1970), p. 210. Mūsa published an Arabic summary of this
book under the title Miṣr Aṣl al-Haḍāra (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Majalla
al-Jadīda, n.d. 1935).
46. Vernon Egger (1986), A Fabian in Egypt, p. 137.
47. Salāma Mūsa, “Qati‘at al-Māḍi,” al-Ḥadīth 2 (January 1928), p. 33;
Vernon Egger (1986), A Fabian in Egypt, p. 129.
48. Salāma Mūsa, “Aṣr al-‘Arab wa Sāmīin,” al-Hilāl March, 1921, p. 973.
49. Ibid., p. 974.
50. Salāma Mūsa, Al-Yawm wa al-Ghad (Cairo, 1927), p. 7; Israel Gershoni
and James P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam and the Arabs, p. 115.
51. Ibid., p. 9; Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam
and The Arabs, p. 115.
54. Ibid., pp. 113–131, 160–165, 229–257; Salāma Mūsa, Mukhtarat
Salāma Mūsa (Cairo 1926), pp. 48–54, 2261–264; Salāma Mūsa,
“al-Miṣriyyūn Umma Gharbiyya,” al-Hilāl (Dec. 1928), pp. 177–181;
Salāma Mūsa “Al-Sharq wa al-Gharb,” al-Risāla Dec. 1928, pp. 46–50;
Salāma Mūsa, “al-Sharq Sharq wa al-Gharb Gharb, ” al-Majalla al-
Jadīda, (May 1930), pp. 882–888.
55. Ibid., pp. 229–234, 241–242, 247–257; Salāma Mūsa, “Ila Ayyahuma
Naḥnu Aqrabu: al-Sharq aw al-Gharb?, ”al-Hilāl (July 1927), pp. 1072–
1074; Salāma Mūsa, “al-Miṣriyyūn Umma Gharbiyya,” al-Hilāl (Dec.
1928), pp. 177–181; Salāma Mūsa “Al-Sharq wa al-Gharb,” al-Risāla

(Dec. 1928), pp. 46–50; Muḥammad Sharaf, “Taqaddum al-‘Ulum wa
al-Funūn: Laysa al-Miṣriyyun Sāmīyyin,” al-Majalla al-Jadīda 9 (May
1930), pp. 897–900; Muḥammad Sharaf, “al-Miṣriyyūn Umma Ghayr
Sharqiyya,” al-Majalla al-Jadīda (June 1930), pp. 961–964.
56. Salāma Mūsa, “Miṣriyyun Umma Gharbiya,” al-Hilāl Dec. 37/21928,
p. 180.
57. Ibid., p. 181.
58. Salāma Mūsa, “Masā’il al-Shabab al-Miṣriyyin,” al-Majalla al-Jadīda
Apr. 1938, pp. 80–87; Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (2010),
Confronting Fascism, p. 129.
59. Salāma Musa (1938), “Masā’il al-Shabab al-Miṣriyyin,” pp. 80–87; Israel
Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (2010), Confronting Fascism, p. 130.
60. ‘Alī Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Ta’rīkh al-Mamālīk al-Baḥrī wa fī ‘Aṣr al-Naṣir
Muḥammad bi Wajhi Khāṣṣ (Cairo, 1948), p. 21; Jurjī Zaydān, Ta’rīkh
Miṣr al-Ḥadīth Part 1(1911), p. 308.
61. ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī, Miṣr min ‘Ahad al-Mamālīk ilā Nihāyat Ḥukm Ismā‘īl
(Miṣr, 1934), p. 22.
62. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī (1929), Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya wa Taṭawwur al-
Niẓam al-Ḥukm, p. 16.
63. Ibid; Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan (1937), Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya, p.68;
Muḥammad Ṣabrī (1927), Tarīkh al-Aṣr al-Ḥadīth: Miṣr min Muḥammad
Alī ilā al-Yawm, 3rd version, p. 18; Jurjī Zaydān, Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Ḥadīth
Part 1, (1911), pp. 308, 344; Muḥammad Rif‘at, Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Siyāsī fī
al-Azmina al-Ḥadītha (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Amīriyya Bibūlāq, 1926),
p. 13.
64. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī (1929), Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya wa Taṭawwur al-
Niẓam al-Ḥukm, p. 16. Of course, some historians hold the opposite
theory, that the Mamluks mixed or assimilated into Egyptians, as we will
see below.
65. ‘
Abd al-Raḥman Zakī, Ma‘ārik Ḥasima fī Ta’rīkh Miṣr (Cairo, 1945),
p. 75. These Mamluks are named Royal Mamluks, too. See Linda
A. Northrup, “The Bahri Mamluk Sultanate, 1250–1390” in Carl
F. Petry edit., The Cambridge History of Egypt Vol. 1 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 260.
66. David Ayalon, “Studies on Structure of the Mamluk Army—I,” in
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies Vol.15, No. 2
(1953), p. 213.
67. ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī (1945), Ma‘ārik Ḥasima fī Ta’rīkh Miṣr, p. 75.
68. Ibid.. On the Mamluk military structure see David Ayalon, “Studies on
Structure of the Mamluk Army—I,” in Bulletin of the School of Oriental
and African Studies Vol. 15, No. 2 (1953), pp. 203–228.; Idem “Studies
198 I.K. SUNG
on Structure of the Mamluk Army—II,” in Bulletin of the School of

Oriental and African Studies Vol. 15, No. 3 (1953), pp. 448–476.
69. ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī (1934), Miṣr min ‘Ahd al-Mamālīk ilā Nihāyat Ḥukm
Ismā‘īl, p. 24; Ḥusayn Mu’nis, Al-Sharq al-Islāmī fī al-Aṣr al-Ḥadīth
(Cairo, 1938), p. 27; Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān, Mawāqif Ḥasima fī
Ta’rīkh al-Islām 2nd edition (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya
bi al-Qāhira, 1934), p. 150.
70. Ḥusayn Mu’nis, Miṣr wa Risālatuha (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, n. d.), p. 109.
71. Jamāl al-Dīn Shayyāl, Mujmal Ta’rīkh Damiyāt Siyāsiya wa Iqtisādiya
(Cairo, 1949), Preface.
72. Jamāl al-Dīn Shayyāl (1949), Mujmal Ta’rīkh Damiyāt Siyāsiya wa
Iqtisādiya, p. 33.
73. Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan and ‘Alī Ibrāhīm Ḥasan (1939), Al-Nuẓum al-
Islāmiyya, p. 134.
74. Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan, Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya (Miṣr, 1937), p.54.
75. Ḥusayn Mu’nis, Al-Sharq al-Islāmī fī al-Aṣr al-Ḥadīth (Cairo, 1938),
p. 25.
76. Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan (1937), Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya, p. j.
77. Ibid.; ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī, Ma‘ārik Ḥasima fī Ta’rīkh Miṣr (Cairo,
1945), pp. 65, 74; Jamāl al-Dīn Shayyāl, Mujmal Ta’rīkh Damiyāt Siyāsiya
wa Iqtisādiya (Cairo, 1949), p. 36.
78. Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan (1937), Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya , p. 26; Muḥammad
Rif‘at, Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Siyāsī fī al-Azmina al-Ḥadītha (Cairo: Maṭba‘at
al-Amīriyya Bibūlāq, 1926), pp. 9, 13; Aḥmad Shukrī (1934), Miṣr min
‘Ahd al-Mamālīk ilā Nihāyat Ḥukm Ismā‘īl , p. 24; ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī
(1945), Ma‘ārik Ḥasima fī Ta’rīkh Miṣr, p. 4; Muḥammad Ṣabrī, L’Empire
Égyptienne sous Mohamed Ali et La Question d’Orient (1811–1849) (Paris:
Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner 1930), p. 19; Muḥammad Ṣabrī
(1927), Ta’rīkh al-Aṣr al-Ḥadith: Miṣr min Muḥammad Alī ilā al-Yawm
3rd version, p. 17; Jamāl al-Dīn Shayyāl (1949), Mujmal Ta’rīkh Damiyāt,
p. 41; Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyat “Khawṭir Mahājir,” al-Risāla Sep. 30,
1940, p. 1502.
Islāmiyya , p. 244; Abū Usāma, “Malik Ẓāhir,” al-Risāla Nov. 23, 1942,
p. 107; Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayāl, “Ẓāhir Baybars fī al-Eskandriya,” al-
Thaqāfa May 16, 1949, pp. 21–22, 33.
Islāmiyya, p. 252.
81. Ibid., p. 258; Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan (1937), Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya , p.45.
82. Abū Usāma, “Malik Ẓāhir,”al-Risāla Nov. 23, 1942, p. 1078.
83. Ibid., p. 1079.
Islāmiyya, p. 319.
85. Ibid., p. 320.
86. Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn Surūr, Ẓāhir Baybars wa Ḥaḍārat Miṣr fi ‘Aṣrhu
(Cairo, 1938), p 154.
87. ‘Azīz Abāẓa, “Min Shajarat al-Durr,” al-Risāla Oct. 24, 1949, p. 1519.
88. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayāl, “Al-Iskandrya fī Aṣr al-Nāṣir Muḥammd Ibn
Qalāwūn,” al-Thaqāfa Sep. 18, 1950, pp. 10–14. Qalāwūn constructed a
canal in al-Iskandriya, too.
89. Jamāl al-Dīn Shayyāl (1949), Mujmal Ta’rīkh Damiyāt Siyāsiya, p. 41.
See also ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī, Ma‘ārik Ḥasima fī Ta’rīkh Miṣr, pp. 4, 65.
90. ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī (1945), Ma‘ārik Ḥasima fī Ta’rīkh Miṣr, pp. 64, 72;
Jamāl al-Dīn Shayyāl (1949), Mujmal Ta’rīkh Damiyāt Siyāsiya, p. 33.
91. Ḥabīb Jāmātī, “Shajarat al-Durr and Ḍārbat al-Raml,” al-Hilāl, July
1947, p. 102.
92. Ibid., p. 103.
93. Anwār Fataḥ Allah, “Masraḥiyat Shajarat al-Dūrr,” al-Risāla, Nov. 13,
1950, p. 1291.
94. Ibid., p. 1294.
95. ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī (1945), Ma‘ārik Ḥasima fī Ta’rīkh Miṣr, p. 63.
96. Muḥammad Laṭfī Juma‘, “Majālis al-Ghawrī,”al-Risāla, May 5, 1941,
p. 632.
97. Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan, “Al-Sulṭān al-Gawrī: Yastaqbilu Safīr al-Bundaq-
iyya,” al-Thaqāfa, Apr. 4, 1939, p. 26; ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Azām, “Al-Sulṭān
al-Ghawrī,” al-Risāla Sep. 26.1938, pp. 1574–1577. Azām depicted
Al-Sultān al-Ghawrī is as a man of literature, history, poet, music, and
religion (Islam).
98. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd,“Manẓar min Mufāwaḍāt Miṣr
al-Ta’rīkhiya,”al-Thaqāfa Dec. 28,1943, p. 18.
99. Ibid., pp. 18–25.
100. Ibid.
101. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, “Al-Anāṣir al-Ūrubbiya fī Dawlat Ṣalātīn
Miṣr,” al-Thaqāfa, Dec. 7, 1943, pp. 9–11.
102. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, “Ṣūra min Qānṣuh al-Ghawrī,” al-Thaqāfa,
March 21, 1944, pp. 14–16.
103. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyāda, “Nihāyat al-Salāṭīn al-Mamālik fī Miṣr,”
Majalla Ta’rīkhiyya al-Miṣriyya, May 1951, p. 198.
104. Ibid., p. 228.
105. Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan (1937), Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya, pp.60–94. Popular
arts progressed significantly during the era of Sultan Nāṣir Ibn Muḥammad
Qalāwūn; see Ṣabrī Farīd “Dār al-Athār al-‘Arabiya bil-Qāhira: Tuḥafhā
al-Khashabiya wa al-Ājiya wa al-‘Aẓamiya, ” al-Muqtaṭaf, Dec. 1931,
pp. 465–67. On buildings and arts, see Muḥammad Muṣṭafā, “Banā
200 I.K. SUNG
al-Qāhira al-Muslimūn,” al-Risāla Apr. 19, 1943, p. 314. Absorbing

Turkish and Frankish (Western) style, Chinese porcelain in Middle Ages
Egypt of the Mamluk Sultanate era became a central feature of Islamic
buildings. See anon., “Al-‘Umāra al-Islāmiyya fī Miṣr,” al-Hilāl, Dec.
35/2 1926, pp. 193–194.
106. On Mamluk building of schools and mosques, see ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī,
“Al-Dār al-Islāmiyya,”al-Muqtaṭaf, Aug. 1941, pp. 217–18. Qalāwūn
exalted Egyptian status by constructing marvelous buildings and develop-
ing arts and thought; see Aḥmad Jakī Bāsha, al-Hilāl Dec. 32/3 1924,
p. 263.
107. On the development of the lamp glass manufacturing industry in the
Mamluk Sultanate era see Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan, “Al-Mishkāwāt
al-Zajājiya fi Aṣr al-Mamālīk,” al-Thaqāfa, Mar. 1940, pp. 31–35.
108. The Mamluk era was the peak of the mineral industry, for example cop-
per, silver, and gold crafts; see Yūsuf Aḥmad, “Izdahār Ṣinā‘a al-Naḥās wa
Inḥaṭāṭihā fī Miṣr fī Aṣr al-Islāmī,” al-Muqtaṭaf , Jan. 1932, pp. 79–82.
109. The Mamluk Sultans initiated special tax policy for inns to encourage
trade activities; see R Tamīmī “Al-Niẓām wa al-Ṭuruq al-Tijāriya,” al-
Muqtaṭaf, Apr. 1941, p. 404.
110. Ḥusayn Mu’nis (1938), Al-Sharq al-Islāmī, p. 26.
111. ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī, Miṣr min ‘Ahd al-Mamālīk ilā Nihāyat Ḥukm Ismāʿīl
(Cairo, 1934), p. 25.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ḥusayn Mu’nis (1938), Al-Sharq al-Islāmī, pp. 24–25.
115. Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Ghanni Ḥasan, “Ṣalāt ‘Ilmiya: Baina Miṣr wa
al-Shām,” al-Risāla, Mar. 6, 1944, p. 212.
116. Muḥammad Ṣabrī (1927), Tarīkh al-Aṣr al-Ḥadīth, pp. 18–20.
117. Yūsuf al-Buyūmī, “Al-Shi‘r fī al-Aṣr al-Mamlūkī: Hal yumathilu al-Ḥayāt
fīha ?,” al-Risāla, Mar. 8, 1948, p. 278.
118. Ibid., p. 279.
119. Ibid.
120. ‘Adlī Tāhir Nūr, “Al-Miṣriyyūn al-Muḥadithūn,” al-Risāla, Nov. 9, 1942,
p. 1048.
121. Ḥusayn Mu’nis (1938), Al-Sharq al-Islāmī, p. 24; Muḥammad Ṣabrī
(1927), Tarīkh al-Aṣr al-Ḥadīth, p. 19; ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī (1934), Miṣr
min ‘Ahd al-Mamālīk, p. 23; ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī, Ma‘ārik Ḥasima fī
Ta’rīkh Miṣr (Cairo, 1945), p. 66.
p. 26.
123. Ibid.
124. Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan (1937), Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya, p. 68.
125. ‘Aṭṭiya al-Shaykh, “‘Adūw al-Sha‘b al-Jāshankīr,” al-Risāla March 13,

1950, p. 309.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. ‘Aṭṭiya al-Shaykh, “‘Adūw al-Sha‘b al-Jāshankīr,”al-Risāla March 20,
1950, p. 330.
129. Ibid.
130. ‘Aṭṭiya al-Shaykh, “‘Adūw al-Sha‘b al-Jāshankīr,”al-Risāla, March 27,
1950, p. 354.
131. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, “Amīr Badr al-Dīn Bayalik,” al-Hilāl, Dec.
51/5, 1943, p. 649.
132. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam and the
Arabs, p. 145.
133. Ibid.
134. Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, Taḥta Shams al-Fikr second ed. (Cairo, 1941),
pp. 116–121.
135. Ibid., pp. 116–117.
136. Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm,‘Awdat al-Ruḥ II, (Cairo, 1933), pp. 37–56.
137. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, Tarājim miṣriyya wa gharbiyya (Cairo,
1929), p. 15.
138. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, “Ta’rīkh al-Ḥaraka al Qawmiyya,” al-Siyāsa
al-Usbūʿiyya Jan. 12, 1929, pp. 3–4.Quoted Israel Gershoni and James
P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam, p. 148. See also Muḥammad Ḥusayn
Haykal, Tarājim miṣriyya wa gharbiyya (Cairo, 1929).
139. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal (1929), Tarājim miṣriyya, p. 22.
140. Ibid., pp. 21–22, 25.
141. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal (1929), “Ta’rīkh al-Ḥaraka al Qawmiyya,”
al-Siyāsa al-Usbu‘iyya, pp. 3–4.
142. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal (1929), Tarājim miṣriyya, pp. 19–20.
143. Ibid., pp. 19–25; Aḥmad Ḥusayn, Īmānī (Cairo, 1936), pp. 55–56;
Ibrāhīm Jalāl,“Miṣr al-Mustaqilla Qabla al-Fatḥal-‘Uthmānī,” pp. 666–
667; Anwar Zaqlama, “Miṣr wa Urūbba fī ‘Ahd al-Mamālīk,” al-Majalla
al-Jadīda, Sep. 1930, pp. 1323–1326.
144. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal (1929), “Ta’rīkh al-Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya,”
pp.3–4. Haykal (1929), Tarājim miṣriyya wa, p. 25.
Arabs, p. 154.
146. Ibid.
147. Ṭaha Ḥusayn, “Da’ira” in Kawakab al-Sharq Aug. 28, 1933, p. 6. Israel
Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam and the Arabs,
p. 154.
Arabs, pp. 154–155.
202 I.K. SUNG
149. David Semah, Four Egyptian Literary Critics (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1974),
p. 118.
150. Ṭaha Ḥusayn, Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa fī Miṣr (trans.) Sidney Glazer, The
Future of Culture in Egypt (Washington: American Council of Learned
Societies, 1954), pp. 7–9.
151. Ṭaha Ḥusayn, Ḥadīth al-Arbi‘ā’ I (Cairo, 1976), pp. 13–16.
152. Ṭaha Ḥusayn, Ḥadīth al-Arbi‘ā’ III Tenth ed. (Cairo, 1976), p. 98.
Published previously in 1925 and 1926. Quoted from Israel Gershoni
and James P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam, p.153.
153. Ṭaha Ḥusayn (1976), Ḥadīth al-Arbi‘a’ III, p. 98.
154. Aḥmad Amīn, “Sulṭān al-‘Ulamā’,” al-Thaqāfa June 9,1942, p. 4.
155. Ibid., p. 5.
156. Ibid., p. 6.
157. Aḥmad Amīn, “Mulūk al-Islām wa al-Adab al-‘Arabī,” al-Hilāl, Aug.
1937, p. 1091.
158. Ibid.
159. Aḥmad Amīn, “Sulṭān al-‘Ulamā’,” al-Thaqāfa May 26, 1942, p. 8.
160. Ibid., p.7.
161. See Ḥasan Subḥī, “Ḥadīth al-Masa’,” al-Balāgh16 (Sept. 1933), pp. 1,3;
Ḥasan ‘Arif, “‘Abqariyyat al-Bi’a al-Miṣriyya,” al-Balāgh 3 (Oct. 1933),
pp.1–11; ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Salīm, “al-‘Unṣr al-Miṣrī,” al-‘Uṣūr (Feb. 1928),
pp. 636–642; Aḥmad al-Nahrī and Aḥmad Baylī, Al-Mujaz fī al-Tarbiya
al-Waṭaniyya (Miṣr 1926), pp. 281–286. Quoted from Israel Gershoni
and James P. Jankowski (1986), Egypt, Islam, p. 148.
162. Ibrāhīm Jalāl, “Miṣr al-Mustaqilla Qabla al-Fatḥ al-‘Uthmānī,” al-Hilāl,
April 1930, pp. 666–667.
163. Ibid., p. 667.
164. Ibid., p. 666.
165. Ibid., p. 665.
166. Ibid., p. 666.
167. Ibrāhīm Jalāl,“Khilāf al-‘Abbāsīya bi-Baghdad thumma bi-Miṣr,”al-Hilāl
38/7, May 1930, p. 818.
168. Anon., “Al-Tatār wa al-‘Arab,” al-Hilāl37/1 Nov. 1928, p. 82.
169. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1995), Redefining Egyptian
Nation, p. 79.
170. Ḥasan al-Banna, “Da’watuna” in Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (Cairo, 1937),
p. 20; Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1995), Redefining
Egyptian Nation, p. 80.
Nation, p. 80.
172. On the Muslim Brotherhood’s perception of Arab nationalism see Israel
Gershoni, “Arabization of Islam: the Egyptian Salafiyya and the Rise of
Arabism in pre-revolutionary Egypt,” Asian and African Studies, Vol.

13(1979), pp. 22–57.
173. Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt (Lebanon: Ithaca
Press, 1998), p. 79.
174. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Confronting Fascism in Egypt
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 215.
175. Ḥasan al-Bannā, Da‘watuna (Cairo, 1937), p. 19.
176. Ḥasan al-Bannā, Bayna ak-Ams wa al-Yawm (1938), p. 17; English trans-
lation Charles Wendell, Five Tracts of Ḥasan al-Bannā (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1978), p. 24. Israel Gershoni and James
P. Jankowski (1995), Redefining the Egyptian Nation, p. 88. On Egypt’s
important role in leading the Islamic world, see Muḥammad Zakī Ḥasan
and ʿAbd al-Raḥman Zakī, Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya (Cairo, 1937).
177. Ḥasan al-Bannā, Bayna al-Ams wa al-Yawm (1938), p. 8–11; Charles
Wendell (1978), Five Tracts of Ḥasan al-Bannā, pp. 18–20; Israel
Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (1995), Redefining the Egyptian
Nation, p. 87.
178. Ḥasan al-Bannā (1938), Bayna al-Ams wa al-Yawm, p. 27; Charles
Wendell (1978), Five Tracts of Ḥasan al-Bannā, p. 33.
179. Ḥasan al-Bannā (1938), Bayna al-Ams wa al-Yawm. See also Majmūʿa
Rasāil al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā (Beirut, 1965), p. 131. This is
available in English translation; see Five Tracts of Ḥasan al-Bannā (trans.)
Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 19.
180. Zakī Ḥasan and ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī (1937), Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya ,
Preface and pp. 10–11.
181. Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān, Mawāqif Ḥāsima fī Ta’rīkh al-Islām 2nd edi-
tion (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya bi al-Qāhira, 1934),
p. 143.
182. Israel Gershoni, Egypt and Fascism, 1922–1937 (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved,
1999)[in Hebrew], p. 437.
183. Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān (1934), Mawāqif Ḥāsima, p. 150; “It was
historical mission of Egypt to protect Islam and Islamic country from
Crusaders and Mongols.” See Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān, “Malikat
Shajarat al-Durr 8,” al-Kātib al-Miṣrī. vol. 9. June–Sept., 1946, p. 80;
“During 14th century Egypt was an independent country.” See
Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān, “Al-Mujtama‘ al-Miṣrī fī al-Qarn al-Khāmis
‘Ashr,” al-Siyāsa al-Usbu ‘iyya Dec. 29 1928, pp. 14–15.
184. Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān (1934), Mawāqif Ḥāsima, p. 167.
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid . See also Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān, “Malikat Shajarat al-Durr 8,”
al-Kātib al-Miṣrī June–Sept. Vol. 9, 1946, p. 79.
187. Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān (1946), “Malikat Shajarat al-Durr 8,” al-
204 I.K. SUNG
Kātib al-Miṣrī, p. 77.

188. Ibid., p. 78.
189. Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān, “Malikat Shajarat al-Durr 5,” al-Kātib al-
Miṣrī Vol. 8. Feb–May, 1946, p. 611.
190. ‘Abd al-Laṭīf Ḥamza, Al-Ḥaraka al-Fikriyya fī Miṣr fī al-‘Aṣraīni al-
Ayyūbī wa al-Mamlūkī al-Awwal (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1947),
p. 361.
191. Ibid.
192. ‘Abd al- Laṭīf Ḥamza (1947), Al-Ḥaraka al-Fikriyya, p. 362.
193. Ibid., p. 360.
194. Ibid., p. 41.
195. Ibid., p. 42.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid., p. 41.
198. Ibid., p. 364.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid., p. 359.
201. Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn Surūr, Dawla Buna Qalāwūn fī Miṣr (Miṣr: Dār
al-Fikr al-‘Arabī 1947), p. 3.
202. Ibid., p. 3.
203. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, “Rijāl Ṣana‘hum al-Ta’rīkh,” al-Hilāl Jan–
Feb. 43/1, 1945, p. 85.
204. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadīd, “Maidan al-Baqaq,”al-Risāla, Oct. 22,
1934, p. 1728.
205. Pierre Nora, ed., Les lieux de mémorie (seven vol.; Paris, 1984–1992).
Partial English translation of this assemblage see Lawrence B. Kritzman,
ed., Realms of Memory; Rethinking the French Past Vol. 3 ( New York:
Colombia University Press, 1996–1998).
206. Pierre Nora, ed., Les lieux de mémorie (seven vol.; Paris, 1984–1992);
Lawrence B. Kritzman, ed., Realms of Memory (three vol; New York,
1996–1998).
207. Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Azīz Marzūq,“Jāma‘ al-Ẓāhir Baybars
al-Bunduqdārī,” al-Majalla al-Ta’rīkhiyya al-Miṣriya, May 1950, p. 97.
208. Ibid., pp. 91, 94.
209. Ibid., p. 95.
210. Ibid., p. 96.
211. Ibid., p. 97.
212. Ibid., p. 102.
213. Muḥammad‘Abd al-Azīz Marzūq, “Madrasat al-Sulṭān Ḥasan,” al-Hilāl
52/2 1944, p. 292.
214. Ibid., p. 233.
215. Ibid., p. 234.
216. Muḥammad‘Abd al-Azīz Marzūq, “Khāniqāh Baybars al-Thāni,” al-

Hilāl 53/3 July 1945.
217. Muḥammad‘Abd al-Azīz Marzūq, “Ṭanāfis al-Qāhira,” al- Hilāl
51/1,1943, pp. 76–80.
218. Muḥammad‘Abd al-Azīz Marzūq, “Qubbat al-Sulṭān al-Qalāwūn,” al-
Hilāl 52/4, July 1944, pp. 520–523.
219. Ibid.
220. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Azām, “Berke Khān: Awwāl Muslim min Mulūk al-Tatār
1,” al-Risāla Jan.17, 1944, p. 51.
221. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Azām, “Berke Khān: Awwāl Muslim min Mulūk al-Tatār
2,” al-Risāla Feb.7, 1944, p. 124.
222. Ibid.
223. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Azām,“Muḥī al-Dīn al-Nawawī wa al-Sulṭān Baybars,”al-
Risāla Nov. 16, 1942, p. 1056. Shaykh appealed to Baybars to stop tak-
ing fortunes from his subjects.
224. Ibid.
225. Aḥmad Ramzī, “Taḥqiqāt Ta’rīkhiya,” al-Risāla June 16, 1947, pp. 665–
667. Ramzī contended that the Egyptian army fought against the
Crusaders and Mongols. See Aḥmad Ramzī, “Wa Aina Ṣalaḥiya Miṣr,”
al-Risāla Feb. 5, 1946, p. 128. On the era of Sayf al-Dīn Qalāwūn, see
Aḥmad Ramzī, “Fataḥ ‘Akā (1291),”al-Risāla Oct. 28, 1946, p. 1188.
On redefining the Baḥrī Mamluk era from the perspective of Islam see
Aḥmad Ramzī, “‘Alā Ṭarīq al-Ḥamalāt al-Miṣiryya fī Lbnān: Ayyām
Dawlat Salāṭīn al-Mamālīk al-Baḥriyya,” al-Risāla Sep. 26, 1949; “‘Alā
Ṭarīq al-Ḥamalāt al-Miṣirya fī Lbnān : Ayyām Dawlat Salāṭīn al-Mamālīk
al-Baḥriyya,” al-Risāla Oct. 3, 1949; “Al-Mughūl fī Miṣr wa
Qawānīnuhum,” al-Risāla Aug.14, 1950, pp. 913–916.
226. Aḥmad Ramzī, “Wa Aina Ṣalaḥiya Miṣr,” al-Risāla Feb. 5, 1946, p. 128.
227. Aḥmad Ramzī,“Alā Hāmish Ma‘raka ‘Ayn Jālūt: Baina Miṣr wa Lbnān,”
al-Risāla Apr. 21, 1947, p. 443. Similarly, Ramzī glorified Quṭuz as the
hero of ‘Ayn Jālūt and referred to his army as an Islamic army; see Aḥmad
Ramzī, “Naẓra li-ma‘rakat ‘Ayn Jālūt,” al-Risāla Apr. 1, 1946, p. 348.
228. Aḥmad Ramzī, “Wafā al-Malik al-Ẓāhir wa Madfinhu,” al-Risāla Nov.
25, 1946, p. 1300.
229. Ibid.
230. Aḥmad Ramzī, “Ziyāra li-Ḥuṣn al-Akrād,” al-Risāla June 14, 1948,
p. 670. Ramzī also praises marvelous Mamluk buildings; see Aḥmad
Ramzī, “Āthār al-Mulūk wa al-Salāṭīn al-Miṣriīn bi-medīnatī al-Quds wa
al-Khalīl,” al-Risāla June 28, 1948, pp. 720–722.
231. Aḥmad Ramzī, “Ziyāra li-Ḥuṣn al-Akrād,”al-Risāla June 14, 1948,
pp. 671–672.
232. Laila Kamal Marei, Revival of Mamluk Architecture in the 19th & 20th
206 I.K. SUNG
Centuries (unpublished MA Thesis, American University in Cairo, 2013),

p. 38.
233. Ibid., p. 39; Hend Asaad Nadim, The Building of the American University
in Cairo: An Example of Mamluk Revival Style (unpublished MA Thesis,
American University in Cairo, 1992), p. 9.
234. Laila Kamal Marei, Revival of Mamluk Architecture in the 19th & 20th
Centuries (unpublished MA Thesis, American University of Cairo),
pp. 39–40.
235. Ibid., p. 40.
236. Ibid., pp. 40–41.
237. Mercedes Le Volait and Robert Ilbert “Neo-Arabic Renaissance in Egypt,
1870–1930,” Mimar 13: Architecture in Development. Singapore:
Concept Media Ltd. (1984), p. 26.Concerning the Mamluks arts and
architecture, see Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Islamic Architecture in Cairo;
An Introduction (Cairo, 1989); Cairo of the Mamluks: A History of the
Architecture and Its Culture (Cairo, 2007); Idem (ed.) The Arts of the
Mamluks in Egypt and Syria: Evolution and Impact (Goettingen, 2012);
Nasser Rabbat, “The Formation of the Neo-Mamluk Style in Modern
Egypt” in Pollak, Martha [ed]. The Education of the Architect:
Historiography, Urbanism, and the Growth of Architectural Knowledge:
Essays Presented to Stanford Anderson on His Sixty-Second Birthday
(Cambridge, MA; London, England: MIT Press, 1997).
238. Gorčin Dizdar, The Neo-Mamluk Style in Architecture, 24th
(December 2010), p. 2. http://www.academia.edu/432897/The_Neo-
Mamluk_Style_in_Architecture.
239. Ibid., p. 8.
240. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
241. Aḥmad Ramzī,“Sībāi al-Kāfli: Akhir Nā’ib lil-Mamlaka al-Miṣrīyya bil-
Shām,”al-Risāla July 16, 1945, p. 787.
242. Ibid.
243. Maḥmūd Razāq Salīm, “Qānṣuh al-Ghawrī: Sulṭān Miṣr al-Shahīd,”
al-Risāla Apr. 30, 1951, p. 517.
244. Ibid., p. 513.
245. Ibid., p. 514.
246. Ibid., p. 515.
247. Ibid.
al-Risāla June 4, 1951, pp. 640–645.
249. Ibid., pp. 640–645.
250. Ibid., p. 645.
251. Maḥmūd Razāq Salīm,“Qānṣuh al-Ghawrī: Sulṭān Miṣr al-Shahīd,”
al-Risāla July 23, 1951, p. 838.
252. Ibid., p. 839.

253. Ibid., p. 840.
254. Maḥmūd Razaāq Salīm,“Qānṣuh al-Ghawrī: Sulṭān Miṣr al-Shahīd,”
al-Risāla Oct. 8,1951, p.1160.
255. Ibid., p. 1161.
al-Risāla July 9, 1951, p. 790.
al- Risāla July 16, 1951, p. 818
al-Risāla Dec. 3, 1951, p. 1383.
259. Maḥmūd Razāq Salīm (Dec. 3, 1951), “Qānṣuh al-Ghawrī,” p. 1384.
260. Ibid., p. 1385.
261. Maḥmūd Razāq Salīm, “‘Ibratān min ‘Abr al-Ta’rīkh,” al-Risāla Dec.13,
1948, p. 1400.
262. Maḥmūd Razāq Salīm (1948), “‘Ibratān min ‘Abr,” p. 1401.
263. Maḥmūd Razāq Salīm, “Al-Rūḥ al-Qawmiyya,” al-Risāla Feb. 28, 1949,
p. 252.
264. Ibid., p. 255.
265. Ibid., p. 253.
266. Maḥmūd Razāq Salīm, “Adab al-Ḥarb,” al-Risāla June 14, 1948, p. 673.
267. Ibid., p. 674. Salīm also referred to the Mamluk army as an Egyptian
army. See “Adab al-Ḥarb,” al-Risāla June 14, 1948, p. 673.
268. Aḥmad Aḥmad Badawī, “Al-Quwwa al-Ḥarbiya li-Miṣr wa al-Shām fī Aṣr
al-Ḥurūb al-Ṣalībīya,” al-Risāla Feb. 7, 1949, p. 165.
269. Aḥmad Aḥmad Badawī, “Al-Quwwa al-Ḥarbiya li-Miṣr wa al-Shām fī Aṣr
al-Ḥurūb al-Ṣalībīya,” al-Risāla Feb. 21, 1949, p. 222.
Nation, p. 97.
271. Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism
(New York, 1931), p. 165.
272. Peter Alter, Nationalism (London, 1985), pp. 38–41.
Nation, p. 97.
274. Ibrāhīm Jum‘a, Qawmiyya al- Miṣriyyaal-Islāmiyya (Cairo, 1944), p. 50.
275. Ibid., pp. 50–65.
276. Ibid., p. 91.
277. Ibid.
278. Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan (1937) and ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī (1945), Fī
Miṣr al-Islāmiyya, pp. 10–11.
279. Ḥasan Ḥabashi, Al-Sharq al-‘Arabī bayna Shaqqay al-Raḥa: Ḥamla
al-Qadīs Luwīs ‘alā Miṣr wa al-Shām (Cairo, 1949), p. 55.
208 I.K. SUNG
280. Ibid., p. 55.

281. Ibid., p. 10.
282. Ibid., p. 129.
283. Aḥmad Ḥusayn, Īmānī (Cairo, 1936), pp. 55–56; Muḥammad Ḥusayn
Haykal (1929), Tarājim, pp. 19–23.
284. Aḥmad Ḥusayn, “Īmānī,” in Mu’allif Aḥmad Ḥusayn (Cairo: Dār
al-Shurūq, 1981), pp. 30–31.
Nation, p. 117.
286. Ibid.
287. Ibid.
288. Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn Surūr, Ẓāhir Baybars wa Ḥaḍārat Miṣr fī ‘Aṣrhu
(Cairo, 1938), p. 32.
289. Ibid., p. 65.
290. Ibid., p. 71.
291. Ibid., p. 74.
292. ‘Alī Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, Ta’rīkh al-Mamālīk al-Baḥrī wa fī ‘Aṣr al-Nāṣir
Muḥammad bi Wajhi Khāsṣ̣ (Cairo, 1948), p. 158.
293. Zakī Muhammad Ḥasan, ‘Abd al-Raḥman Zakī at al, Fī Miṣr al-Islāmiyya
(Miṣr, 1937), Preface.
294. Ibid., p. ‫أ‬.
295. Ibid., p. ‫ب‬.
296. Ibid., p. ‫د‬.
297. Ibid., pp. 5–6.
298. Anwar Zaqlama, Al- Mamālīk fī Miṣr (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Majalla
al-Jadīda, n. d.), p. 140.
299. Anwar Zaqlama, “Miṣr wa Urubba fī ‘Ahd al-Mamālīk,” Al-Majalla al-
Jadīda Sep. 1, 1930, pp. 1323–1326.
300. Anwar Zaqlama (n.d.), Al- Mamālīk fī Miṣr, pp. 162–163.
301. Aḥmad Fakrī, “Al-Mamlūk,”al-Kātib al-Miṣrī Jan. 3, 1946, p. 129.
302. Ibid., p. 129.
303. Ibid.
304. Ibid., p. 128.
305. Ibid., p. 127.
306. Yūsuf Haykal, “Awāmil al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiya,”al-Thaqāfa Apr. 28, 1942,
pp. 1–4.
307. Yūsuf Haykal, “Markaz Miṣr min al-Bilād al-‘Arabiya,”al-Thaqāfa Apr.
21, 1942, pp.493–496;Yūsuf Haykal, “Al-Sha‘b al-‘Arabī,”al-Thaqāfa
Apr. 14, 1942, pp. 461–464.
308. Zakī Mubārak, “Miṣr wa al-Bilād al-‘Arabiyya,”al-Risāla Aug. 8, 1938,
pp. 1306–1308.
309. ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ḥilmī al-Miṣrī, Muḥammad‘Alī al-Kabīr Munsh Miṣr al-
Hadīth (Cairo, 1947), p. 17.
310. Ibid., p. 19, Footnote 1.

311. ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ḥilmī Al-Miṣrī (1947), op. cit., p. 22.
312. ‘Umar Ṭūsūn, Al-Jaish al-Miṣrī al-Barrī wa al-Baḥrī (Al-Qāhira, Maktaba
Madbūlī, 1996), p. 5. This book was previously published in
1933–1934.
313. Ibid., p. 8.
314. Jūrjī Zaydān, Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Ḥadīth Part 2 (1911), p. 86.
315. Ibid., pp. 72, 152.
316. Ibid., pp. 86, 144, 150.
317. Ibid., p. 92.
318. Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past (Berkeley: California
319. Karīm Thābit, Muḥammad ‘Alī (Miṣr: Maṭba‘at al-Ma‘ārif Maktabatiha,
1943), p. 9.
321. Karīm Thābit, Muḥammad ‘Alī (Miṣr: Maṭba‘at al-Ma‘ārif Maktabatiha,
1943), p. 65.
322. Ibid., p. 15.
323. Ibid., p. 19.
324. Ibid., p. 29.
325. Ibid., p. 40.
326. Ibid., p. 56.
327. Ibid., p. 60.
328. Ibid., p. 61.
329. Ibid., p. 62.
330. Ibid.
331. Ibid.
332. ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ḥilmī al-Miṣrī, MuḥammadʿAlī al-Kabīr Munshʾ Miṣr al-
Hadīth (Cairo, 1947), p. 19, Footnote 1.
333. Muḥammad Farīd, Ta’rīkh al-Dawla al-‘Aliya al-ʿ Uthmāniyya First pub-
lished 1896 (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1987), p. 203.
334. Muḥammad Farīd (1987), Ta’rīkh al-Dawla, p. 159.
335. Ibid.
336. Jūrjī Zaydān (1911), Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Ḥadīth Part 2, p. 62.
337. Ibid., p. 63.
338. Ibid., p. 65.
339. ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī, Miṣr min ‘Ahd al-Mamālīk ilā Nihāyat Ḥukm Ismā‘īl
(Cairo, 1934), p. 26.
340. Shafīq Ghurbāl, Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Kabīr (Miṣr: Lajnat Tarjamat Dāirat
al-Ma‘ārif al-Islāmiyya, 1944), pp. 10, 11.
341. Ibid., p. 41.
210 I.K. SUNG
342. Ibid., p. 44.

343. Ibid., pp. 9, 62.
344. Shafīq Ghurbāl, The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and The Rise of
Mehmet Ali (George Routledge & Sons, LTD 1928), p. 281.
345. Al-Bās al-Ayyūbī, Muḥammad ‘Alī (Miṣr: Idārat al-Hilāl, 1923), p. 6.
346. Ibid., Preface.
347. Shafīq Ghurbāl (1944), Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Kabīr, p. 14.
348. Ibid., p. 11.
349. Ibid., pp. 30–32.
350. Shafīq Ghurbāl (1928), The Beginnings of the Egyptian, p. 2.
351. Ibid.
352. Ibid., p. 208.
353. Muḥammad Rif‘at Ramaḍān, ‘Alī Bek al-Kabīr (Cairo: Dār Fikr al-‘Arabī,
1950), p. 11.
354. Ibid., p. 13.
355. Ibid., p. 14.
356. Ibid., p. 16.
357. Ibid., pp. 16–17. See ‘Abd al-Raḥman Ibn Ḥasan Al-Jabartī, ‘Ajāib al-
Āthār fī al-Tarājim wa al-Akhbār (Cairo: Maktaba Madbūlī, 1997).
359. Ibid., p. 34.
360. Ibid., pp. 22, 35.
361. Ibid., p. 21.
363. ‘Alī al-Jiritlī, Ta’rīkh al-Sina‘a fi Miṣr fī Nuṣf al-Awāl Min Qarn al-Tāsi‘
‘Ashr (Dār Ma‘ārif Bi-miṣr, 1952), p. 11.
364. Ibid., p. 51.
365. Ibid., p. 40.
367. Shafīq Ghurbāl (1944), Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Kabīr, p. 21. Di-Capua
argues that through composing a new book, “Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Kabīr,”
Ghurbāl attempted to show that academic knowledge could also be pop-
ular. Yoav Di-Capua (2009), Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, p. 209.
369. Ibid; Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Rahim Muṣṭafā in a preface to Ghurbāl’s Muḥammad
‘Alī al-Kabīr, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Al-Hilāl, 1987), pp. 10–11.
371. Ibid., p. 210.
373. Ibid., p. 63.
374. James Bruce, Voyage en Nubie et en Abassinie, entrepris pour découvrir les
sources du Nil, pendant les années 1768–1773 (Paris 1790); Muḥammad
Rif‘at Ramaḍān, ‘Alī Bek al-Kabīr (Cairo: Dār Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1950),
p. 34.
375. Muḥammad Rif‘at Ramaḍān (1950), ‘Alī Bek al-Kabīr, pp. 202–203.
376. Ibid., p. 208.
377. Ibid., p. 75.
378. Al-Jabaratī (1997), ‘Ajāib al-Āthār fī al-Tarājim wa al-Akhbār ;
Muḥammad Rif‘at Ramaḍān (1950), ‘Alī Bek al-Kabīr, p. 57.
379. Muḥammad Rif‘at Ramaḍān (1950), ‘Alī Bek al-Kabīr, p. 205.
380. Ibid., p. 60.
381. Ibid.
382. Ibid., p. 110.
383. Ibid., p. 128.
384. Ibid., p. 202.
385. Ibid., p. 57.
386. Ibid., p. 216.
387. Ibid.
388. Ibid., p. 217.
389. Ibid., pp. 173–174.
390. Ibid., p. 174.
391. Ibid.
394. Ibid., p. 16.
395. Ibid., p. 63.
396. Yoav Di-Capua, “Jabarati of the 20th Century: The National Epic of
‘Abd al-Raḥman al- Rāfi‘ī and Other Egyptian Histories,” in International
Journal of Middle East Studies Vol. 36, (2004), p. 429.
397. Ibid., p. 430.
399. Ibid., p. 157.
400. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāfi‘ī (1929), Ta’rīkh al-Haraka al-Qawmiyya vol. 1,
pp. 27–70.
401. However, in 1963, al-Rāfi‘ī updated his corpus by publishing one last
volume, which traces the origins of modern nationalist spirit back through
the Pharaonic, Greco-Roman, and Byzantine eras. See‘Abd al-Raḥman
al-Rāfi‘ī, Ta’rīkh al-Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya fī Miṣr al-Qadīman min Fajr
al-Ta’rīkh ilā al-Fatḥ al-‘Arabī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya,
1963).
403. Ibid., p. 150.
404. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī (1929), Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya, Vol. 1, p. 44.
405. Ibid., p. 45.
212 I.K. SUNG
406. Ibid., p. 46.

407. Ibid., pp. 47–48.
408. Ibid., p. 48.
409. Ibid., p. 20.
410. Ibid.
411. Ibid., p. 43.
412. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī (1929), Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya wa Taṭawwur
al-Niẓam al-Ḥukm,Vol. 2, p. 83.
413. Ibid., p. 86
414. Ibid., p. 90.
415. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī (1929), Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya, Vol. 3, pp. 34,
40–41.
417. Ibid., p. 351. See also ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī (1930), Ḥaraka al-Qaw-
miyya wa Taṭawwur al-Niẓam al-Ḥukm, Vol. 3, p. 34.
419. Ibid., p. 352.
420. Ibid., p. 353.
421. Ibid., p. 354.
425. Ibid., p. 50.
426. Ibid., p. 48.
427. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī (1929), Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya, Vol. 2, pp. 286,
310, 382. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī (1929), Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya , Vol. 1,
p. 5.
428. Ibid., p. 5.
429. ‘Abd al-Raāman al-Rāf‘ī, “Muḥammad ‘Alī: Hal Qaṣad min Ḥurub
Mulkan wa Istiqlālan,” al-Hilāl 45/10 Aug.1937, pp. 1106–1109. See
also ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī, “Al-Umarāu al-Quwwād fī al-Usra
al-Muḥammadiya al-‘Aliwiya,” al-Hilāl 46/4 Feb. 1938, pp. 412–415.
430. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī, “Akhṭa al-T’arīkh al-Miṣrī al-Ḥadīth ,” al-Hilāl
42/2 March 1944, pp. 183–185.
431. Anthony Gorman, Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century
Egypt (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 22.
432. Yoav Di-Capua (2009) Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, p. 148. Concerning
Rif‘at, see also Anthony Gorman (2003), Historians, State and Politics in
Twentieth Century Egypt, pp. 22–23.
433. Muḥammad Rif‘at, “Al-Kedīwī Ismā‘īl,” al-Muqtaṭaf Apr. 1924, p. 425.
434. Muḥammad Rif‘at, “Muḥammad ‘Alī: Bā‘th Nahḍat al-Ta‘līm wa
al-Thaqāfa,” al-Hilāl Apr. 45/6, 1937, p. 617.
435. Muḥammad Rif‘at, Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Siyāsī fī al-Azmina al-Ḥadītha (Cairo:

Maṭba‘at al-Amīriyya Bibūlāq, 1926), p. 106.
436. Ibid., p. 12.
437. Ibid., p. 16.
438. Ibid., p. 12.
439. Ibid., p. 14.
440. Ibid., p. 39.
441. Ibid., pp. 15–16.
442. Ibid., p. 53.
443. Ibid., p. 89.
444. Ibid., p. 40.
445. Ibid., p. 45.
446. Ibid., p. 46.
447. Ibid., p. 47.
448. Ibid., p. 54.
449. Muḥammad Rifaat Bey, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London:
Longmans Green and co.1947), p. 5.
450. Ibid., p. 6.
451. Ibid., p. 11.
452. Ibid., p. 31.
453. Muḥammad Rif‘at (1926), Ta’rīkh Miṣr al-Siyāsī, p. 17.
454. Ibid.
455. Muḥammad Rifaat Bey, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London,
Longmans Green and co.1947), p. 33.
456. Ibid., p. 33.
457. Ibid., p. 31.
458. Ibid., p. 36.
459. Sulaymān Bek Abū ‘Izz al-Dīn, “Al-Sulṭān Maḥmūd wa Muḥammad ‘Alī
al-Kabīr,” al-Muqtaṭaf June 1929, p. 30.
460. Sulaymān Bek Abū ‘Izz al-Dīn (1929), “Al-Sulṭān Maḥmūd wa
Muḥammad ‘Alī al-Kabīr,” pp. 30–31.
461. Ibid.
462. Muḥammad Farīd Abū Ḥadid, “Rijāl Sana‘u al-Ta’rīkh,” al-Hilāl Jan–
Feb. 1945, p. 86. See also Al-Jizāl Fījān, “Nahḍa al-Jaysh fī ‘Ahd
Muḥammad ‘Alī,” al-Hilāl July 36/9, 1938, pp. 983–986.
463. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl,“Muḥammad ‘Alī wa Ṣila bi al-Gharb,”al-Hilāl
March–April, 1946, p. 237.
464. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl (1946), “Muḥammad ‘Alī wa Ṣila bi al-Gharb,”
pp. 238–240. On reformer image, see also Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl,
“Al-Naql ‘an al-Gharb Wasīla Muḥammad ‘Alī lil-Ṣalāh,” al-Thaqāfa June
12, 1950, pp. 3–5; and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, “Ilā Ayy Ḥad Afād al-
Mujtama‘ al-Miṣrī ,” al-Thaqāfa Apr. 1950, pp. 12–15.
214 I.K. SUNG
465. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, “Al-Naql ‘an al-Gharb Wasīla Muḥammad ‘Alī lil
Ṣalāh,” al-Thaqāfa June 12, 1950, pp. 3–5.
466. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, “Muḥammad ‘Alī wa Ṣila bi al-Gharb,” al-Hilāl
March–April, 1946, pp. 238–240.
467. It was hard for the Mamluks to fight the modern French army; see ‘Alī
Aḥmad Shukrī (1934), Miṣr min ‘Ahd al-Mamālīk ilā Nihāyat Ḥukm
Ismā‘īl, p. 28. On Mamluk oppression, see p. 41. On struggle between
al-Alfī and Bardīsī see p. 62. On heavy taxation of Bardīsī see p. 66.
468. ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī (1934), Miṣr min ‘Ahd al-Mamālīk ilā Nihāyat Ḥukm
Ismā‘īl, p. 27.
469. Ibid., p. 35.
p. 56.
471. Ibid.
472. Ibid., pp. 58, 87.
473. On Mamluk oppression, see Ḥusayn Mu’nis (1938), Al-Sharq, p. 31; The
Mamluks underestimated and ignored the power of the French army, see
p. 58. On the Mamluk evildoings, see p. 102.
474. Muḥammad Ṣabrī (1930), L’Empire Égyptienne sous Mohamed Ali et La
Question d’Orient (1811–1849), p. 30.
475. Aḥmad Ḥusayn al-Ṭamāwī, Ṣabrī al-Surbūnī: Sīra Ta’rīkhiya wa Ṣurat
Ḥayā (Cairo: A’lām al-‘Arab, 1986), pp. 21–44; Yoav Di-Capua (2009),
Gatekeepers of the Arab Past, p. 85.
477. ‘Alī Aḥmad Shukrī (1934), Miṣr min ‘Ahd, p. 50.
478. Muḥammad Ṣabrī (1927), Tarīkh al-Aṣr al-Ḥadīth: Miṣr min Muḥammad
Alī ilā al-Yawm 3rd version, p. 26.
479. Anon., “Miṣr wa Nabūliūn,” al-Thaqāfa Oct. 29, 1940, p. 19.
480. Anon., “‘Alā Hāmish Sīrat Nābuliūn fī Miṣr, ” al-Thaqāfa Nov. 5 1940,
pp. 12–13.
481. Ibid., p. 13.
482. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, “Ittiṣāl al-‘Ulamā’ al-Miṣriin bi‘ulamā’ al-Ḥamla
al-Faransiya wa Athar Hādha,” al- Thaqāfa June 12, 1947, pp. 3–5.
483. Aḥmad Khakī, “Al-Muqāwama al-Sha‘biya ‘ind Qudūm Nābuliūn ilā
Miṣr,” al-Thaqāfa Jan. 7, 1941, p. 10.
484. Ibid., p. 11.
485. Ibid., pp. 12–13.
486. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, “Miṣr wa Ṭarīq al-Hind,” al-Muqtaṭaf Jan.
1941, p. 55.
487. Ibid., p. 56.
488. ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāf‘ī (1929), Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya, Vol.1, p. 22.
489. Ibid., p. 21.
490. Ibid., p. 22.

491. Muḥammad Ṣabrī (1927), Tarīkh al-Aṣr al-Ḥadīth, pp. 20, 23.
492. Ibid., p. 23.
493. Ibid., p. 18.
494. Ibid., pp. 18–19.
495. Ibid., p. 19.
496. Ibid., p. 20.
497. Nasīb Sa‘īd, “Thawrat al-‘Arab al-Kubrā,” al-Risāla Nov. 16, 1942,
pp. 1062–1063.
498. Ibid., p. 1062.
499. Muḥammad Ṣabrī (1927), Tarīkh al-Aṣr al-Ḥadīth, p. 37.
500. Anwar Zaqlama, “Ākhar ‘Ahd Miṣr bi-al-Mamālīk,” al-Hilāl Feb 37/4,
1929, pp. 474–477.
502. Ibid.
503. Ibid., p. 112.
CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
The present study examined representations of the Mamluks in a variety

of historical texts marked by two different types of historical memories:
“official” and “public.” From the perspective of social agents, the Mamluk
landscape of historical memory and commemoration encountered in this
study was an array of images designed by Egyptian Ottomanist, monar-
chist, and nationalist historians and intellectuals and developed over the
course of the twentieth century.
Of course, commemoration shaped and reshaped different identities
and aspirations in different contexts and during different times. Hence,
Mamluk history is selectively narrated or neglected in accordance with
different ideological or political needs. This complexity of representation
yielded an intricate web of commemorative sites, reflecting alternative his-
torical narratives, each emphasizing particular objects and messages. The
triumph of one narrative was the folly of another, and one writer’s national
hero was another’s villain.
Official “historical” representations of the Mamluks were propagated
by the Egyptian monarchy and appeared throughout school textbooks
between 1920 and 1950 and in the works of ‘Ā bdı̄n historians. Official
memory was one of the many mechanisms from which Egyptian rule
derived legitimacy, supporting its hegemony in Egyptian society in the
face of challenges posed by oppositional groups. Hence, it is little wonder
that Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ and his descendants were the foremost protagonists
of the monarchist narrative.

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6_7
218 I.K. SUNG
Surprisingly, the favorable portrayal of the Mamluk Sultanate can be

seen both in the historical works of the Ā bdı̄n Project and in school text-
books. ‘Ā bdı̄n historian Gaston Wiet addressed the Mamluk era in great
length and described it as a glorious time of military power and civili-
zation. Moreover, the authors of the textbooks glorifying the Mamluk
Sultans narrated history from an Egypt-centered point of view, referring
to the Mamluk leaders as Egyptian or Arab Sultans. The Egyptianization
or Arabization of heroic historical figures marks the impact of Egyptian
nationalism on school textbooks.
In contrast to the celebration of the Mamluk Sultans, the Mamluk Beys
of the Ottoman era are remembered as tyrants and oppressors, except for
‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r, who is depicted as a forerunner of Egyptian nationalism.
Unlike official forms of memory, a variety of memories of the Mamluks
are invented in the forms of public memory. Among the diverse types of
nationalist trends, one may find territorialist, integralist, Islamic, and Arab
nationalism. Many nationalist intellectuals explicitly used the Mamluk past
in order to construct an imagined Egyptian community based on national-
historical memory. They did so by portraying remarkable Mamluk Sultans
as Egyptian national heroes who halted the Mongols and the Crusaders.
However, in accordance with the authors’ different ideological orienta-
tions, these Sultans could be reborn as Egyptian, Islamic, or Arab. In addi-
tion, many nationalist historians and intellectuals noted that the Mamluk
Sultans attained the zenith of Islamic or Arab civilization, producing
the finest art, science, and architecture. This glorification, they believed,
would stimulate Egypt to regain the splendors of the past.
Importantly, some nationalist intellectuals and historians went as far as
to iconize the great Mamluk Sultans as creators of a marvelous civiliza-
tion. Others, in depicting Mamluk Sultans such as Baybars and Aybak as
righteous leaders who cared for and restored the rights and freedom of
women, took issue with gender inequality. Others implicitly criticized the
Egyptian monarchy of their time by using the Mamluk oppression and
tyranny as a metaphor for their own arbitrary monarchy.
On the other hand, the Mamluk Beys of the Ottoman era are de-
legitimized as an antiquated regime that collaborated with the oppressive
and corrupt British and French colonialists.
Comparing the historical memories of the Mamluks shaped in official
and public memory shows that there is one distinctive similarity discerned
between the two types of memory. Both forms of memory address the
CONCLUSION 219
Mamluk era as a golden age, but view the Mamluk Beys as a dark time of
colonialism and oppression.
As Bodnar states, the boundary between official and vernacular forms
of memory is likely to be blurred. Bodnar went even further and empha-
sized that “public memory emerged from the intersection of official and
vernacular cultural expressions.”1 This also applies to the representations
of the Mamluks.
Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the historical representations
of the Mamluks, two salient patterns may be traced in the landscape of
memorialization in early twentieth-century Egypt. In focusing on the
Mamluk Beys under Ottomans rule, Ottomanist and monarchist histo-
rians and intellectuals tended to give salience to the backwardness and
oppression of the Mamluk Beys in order to strengthen their ideological
and political agendas (the glorification of the Ottoman Empire as a merci-
ful and pious protector of Egypt in the face of Western colonization, or
the elevation of Muḥammad ‘Alı̄ as an authentic reformer and savior, who
led Egypt toward progress and development, respectively).
By contrast, in stressing the triumph of the great Mamluk Sultans,
nationalist historians and intellectuals presented the territorial expansions
and victories against the Mongols and the Crusaders as historical evidence
of the glory of Egypt. These positive depictions negate the conventional
assumptions that most Egyptian historians perceived the Mamluks in a
negative manner. Thus, the apparent objective of nationalist historians
and intellectuals was to redefine Egyptian identity by reconstructing a
national-historical memory for the emerging Egyptian nation-state.
As a result, the historical memory of the Mamluks is shaped in a rather
contradictory manner: it is presented in terms of treachery, evil, and deca-
dence, but also as a source of glory, pride, nascent Egyptian nationalism,
and hope for the future. In other words, most monarchist and academic
historians and intellectuals used the Mamluk Beys as an epitome of evil,
oppression, and tyranny. ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r is an exception to the rule and is
presented as a nationalist hero. By contrast, nationalist historians elevated
the Mamluk Sultans and ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r as emblems of Egyptian nation-
alism, whereas the Mamluk Beys are de-legitimized as dictators and anti-
nationalists. Such blatantly contradictory images of the Mamluks—that is,
evil versus good—are the creation of a turbulent Egypt in which many his-
torians and intellectuals with different or conflicting viewpoints on moder-
nity and the nation-state struggled for the promotion of their beliefs.
220 I.K. SUNG
As the case study of the Mamluks undoubtedly indicates, the fervor for
the past surpasses market forces or international politics. History successfully
responds to all kinds of identities and necessity, from a better understanding
of ourselves and our world, to answers about who we were, what we have
to do now, and even what we will be. It is therefore no wonder that many
nations have found great interest in representation of the past, in order
to identify themselves, define modernity, and create nationalist thought.2
History certainly offers many resources not only for the modernity program
or the legitimization of the Egyptian monarchy, but also for the shaping
of nationalism. The historical memory recovered from the past becomes a
driving force of change and a means of constructing new values and ideas,
and helps to cope with present difficulties and bring the nation into being.
By introducing a highly selective attitude to the past, alternating between
rejection and acceptance, suppression and elaboration, remembering and
forgetting, the diverse agents of memory have reconstructed a new national
memory and tradition in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this
process, a new nation relies heavily on both invented history and tradition.3
What maintains and fosters nation is the shared commemoration of
the nation’s splendid achievements and the shared sorrow over its defeats.
The deeper history seems to reach into the past, the more concrete and
durable the nation appears and the worthier its claims.4 Each particular
vestige of the past eventually perishes, but all are collectively immortal.
Whether it is commemorated or rejected, remembered or ignored, the
past is omnipresent.5
In this respect, the Egyptians are no exception. The contradictory,
and in some cases paradoxical, understandings and presentations of the
Mamluks are a product of the struggle of ideological hegemony fought
among various social agents.
NOTES
1. John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and
Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1992), p. 13.
2. Margaret Macmillan, Dangerous Game: The Use and Abuses of History (New
York: A Modern Library Chronicles Book, 2009), p. 6.
3. Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and Making of Israeli
National Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1995), p. 3.
4. Margaret Macmillan (2009), op. cit., pp. 81–82.
5. David Lowenthal, Past is Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), p. xv.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. PRIMARY SOURCES
1. Egyptian School Textbooks (1921–1949)
Subject Number of school Grades Year of publication

textbooks
National 1 2 Secondary 1926, 1943
History 2 16 Primary, secondary 1920–1949
Arabic Reader3 4 Secondary 1921–1947
Al-Iskandarı ̄, Aḥmad. Nuzhat al -Qāri’ lil Madāris al-Thānawiyya al-Juz’ al-Thānı̄

(Maṭbaʿat al-Salafiyya bi-Miṣr, 1923).
Al-Iskandarı ̄, Aḥmad. Nuzhat al-Qāri’ lil Madāris al-Thānawiyya al-Juz’ al-Thānı̄
(Maṭbaʿat al-Salafiyya bi-Miṣr, 1947).
Al-Iskandarı ̄, Aḥmad. Nuzhat al-Qāri’ lil Madāris al-Thānawiyya al-Juz’ al-Awwal
(Maṭbaʿat Maʿarif bi-Shāriʿa Fajāla bi-Miṣr, 1921).
Al-Iskandarı ̄, Aḥmad. Nuzhat al -Qāri’ lil Madāris al-Thānawiyya al-Juz’ al-Awwal
(Maṭbaʿat Maʿarif bi-Shāriʿa Fajāla bi-Miṣr, 1938).
Al-Iskandarı ̄, ʿUmar. Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr ilā al-Fatḥ al-ʿUthmānı̄ (Maṭbaʿat Maʿarif
bi-Shāriʿa Fajāla bi-Miṣr, 1925).
Al-Iskandarı ̄, ʿUmar. Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr min al-Fatḥ al-ʿUthmānı̄ (Maṭbaʿat Maʿarif

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6
222 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Al-Iskandarı ̄, ʿUmar. Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr ilā al-Fatḥ al-ʿUthmānı̄ (Maṭbaʿat Maʿarif

Al-Nahrı̄, Aḥmad and Aḥmad Baylı̄. Al-Mūjaz fı̄ al-Tarbiyya al-Waṭaniyya (Miṣr,
1926).
Ḥasan, Salı ̄m Afendı ̄ et al. Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr wa al-Duwal al-ʿArabiyya al- Juz’
al-Thānı̄ 6th version (Cairo, 1925).
Ḥasan, Salı ̄m Afendı ̄ et al. Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr wa al-Duwal al-ʿArabiyya al-Juz’
al-Thānı̄ 4th version (Cairo, 1923).
Ḥasan, Salı ̄m Afendı ̄ et al. Ṣafwat Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr wa al-Duwal al-ʿArabiyya al-Juz’
al-Awwal (Cairo, 1928).
Ḥ asan, Salı̄m et al. Ta’rı̄kh Urūbbā al-Ḥ adı̄th wa Athar Ḥ aḍāratiha al-Juz’
al-Thānı̄ (Cairo, 1920).
Ḥ asan, Salı̄m et al. Ta’rı̄kh Urūbbā al-Ḥ adı̄th wa Athar Ḥ aḍāratiha al-Juz’ al-
Awwal (Cairo, 1920).
Ḥ asan, Salı̄m et al. Ta’rı̄kh Urūbbā al-Ḥ adı̄th wa Athar Ḥ aḍāratiha al-Juz’ al-
Awwal (Cairo, 1923).
Muṣṭafā, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥı ̄m. Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Ḥadı̄th lil Sana
al-Rābiʿal-Ibtidā’ı̄ (Cairo, 1937).
Rifʿat, Muḥammad, Muḥammad Aḥmad Ḥasūna. Maʿālim Ta’rı̄kh al-ʿUṣūr al-Wusṭā
(Dār al-Maʿārif bi-Miṣr, 1948).
(Dār al-Maʿarif bi-Miṣr, 1931).
Rifʿat, Muḥammad. Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Siyāsı̄ fı̄ al -Azmina al-Ḥadı̄tha: Muqarrar lil
Sana al-Rābiʿ al-Thānawiyya (Cairo: Wizārat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUmūmiyya, 1949).
Rifʿat, Muḥammad. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Bishrı ̄. Tarbiyya al-Waṭaniyya lil Madāris
al-Thānawyya (Cairo, 1943).
2. Historical Literature of the ‘Ā bdı̄n Project Historians
Charles-Roux, François. “L’Égypte de 1801 à 1882,” in Gabriel Hanotaux, (ed.),
Histoire de la nation égyptienne vol. 6. (Paris: Ouvrage publié sous les auspices
et le haut patronage de sa majesté Fouad Ier, Roi d’ Égypte, 1937).
Dodwell, Henry. The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad Ali
(Cambridge University Press, 1967).
Dodwell, Henry. Muḥammad ʿAlı̄ trans. ʿAlı ̄ Aḥmad Shukrı ̄ (Miṣr, n. d.).
Douin, G. et E.C.Fawtier-Jones. L’Angleterre et l’Égypte: La Politique Mameluke
(1801–1803),vol. 1. (Cairo: Société royale de géographie d’Égypte, 1929–30).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223
Douin, G. et E.C.Fawtire-Jones. L’Angleterre et l’Égypte: La Politique Mameluke

(1803–1807), vol. 2. (Caire: Impr. Par l’Institut Français d’Archéologie
Orientale du Caire pour la Société Royale de Géographie d’Égypte, 1930).
Hanotaux, Gabriel. Regards sur L’Égypte et la Palestine (Paris: Librairie Plon,
1929).
Wiet Gaston. “L’Égypte Arabe, de la Conquête Arabe à la Conquête Ottomane
642–1517 de L’èr Chrétienne,” in Gabriel Hanotaux (ed.), Histoire de la Nation
Égyptienne, vol. 4. (Paris: Société de l’histoire nationale, Librairie Plon, 1933).
Wiet, Gaston. “Jāma‘ al-Sultān Ḥ asan: Jallālahu al-Fanniwa Waḍ‘ahu al-Handası̄”
(trans)., Muḥammad Wahhabı̄ al-Muqtat ̣af, (Dec. 1938), pp. 525–541.
3. Historical Novels and Play on Mamluks
1. Mamluk Sultanate period
Al-‘Aryān, Muḥammad Sa‘ı̄d. ‘Alā Bāb Zuwayla (Dār al-Kātib al-Miṣrı̄ 1947).
Al-‘Aryān, Muḥammad Sa‘ı̄d. Shajarat al-Durr (Dār al-Ma‘arif lil Ṭ abā‘a w’l
Nashr, 1947).
Zaydān, Jūrjı̄. Shajarat al-Durr (Miṣr: Maṭba‘at al-Hilāl, 1932).
2. Ottoman period
Abū Ḥ adı̄d, Muḥammad Farı̄d. Ibnat al-Mamlūk (Al-Qāhira, Matḅ a‘at al-I‘timād
1926).
Zaydān, Jūrjı̄. Al-Mamlūk al-Shārid (Miṣr: Maṭba‘at al-Hilāl, 1931).
Zaydān, Jūrjı̄. Istibdād al-Mamālı̄k (Misṣr: Maṭba‘at al-Hilāl, 1923).
3. Play
Shawqı̄, Aḥmad. Riwāyat ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r aw Dawlat al-Mamālı̄k (Al-Qāhira:
Matḅ a‘at Miṣr, 1932).
4. History Books in Arabic, English and French
1) Mamluk Sultanate period
Al-Ghı̄t ̣anı̄ Gamāl. (ed.). Sı̄rat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybars (Cairo, 1996).
Al-Maqrı̄zı̄, Aḥmad ibn ‘Alı̄ ‘Abd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad. Kitāb al-Sulūk li-
Ma‘rifat Duwal al-Mulūk, vol. 1.(ed.), Muḥammad Muṣt ̣afā Ziyāda (Cairo,
1957).
Al-Nuwayrı̄, Shihāb al-Dı̄n Aḥamad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. Nihāyat al-Arab fı̄
Funūn al-Adab (Cairo, 1992).
Al-Ẓāhir, Muḥyı̄ al-Dı̄n Ibn ‘Abd. Al-Rawḍ al-Ẓāhir fi Sı̄rat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir
(ed.),‘Abd al- ‘Azı̄z al-Khuwayṭir (Riyadh, 1976).
Ḥabashı ̄, Ḥasan. Nūr al-Dı̄n wa’l- Ṣalı̄biyyūna (Cairo: Dār li Fikr al-ʿArabı ̄, 1948).
Ḥ abashı̄, Ḥ asan. Al-Sharq al-‘Arabı̄ bayna Shaqqay al-Raḥa: Ḥ amlat al-Qadı̄s
Luwı̄s ‘alā Miṣr wa’ l-Shām (Cairo, 1949).
Ḥasan, ʿAlı ̄ Ibrāhı ̄m. Dirāsāt fı̄ Ta’rı̄kh al-Mamālı̄k al-Baḥriyya wa fı̄ ʿAṣr al-Nāṣir
Muḥammad bi-Wajh Khāṣṣ (Cairo, 1944).
Ḥasan, ʿAlı ̄ Ibrāhı ̄m. Al-Niẓam al-Islāmiyya (Miṣr: Maktabat al-Naḍa al-Miṣriyya,
1939).
224 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ḥamza, ʿAbd al-Laṭı ̄f. Al-Ḥaraka al-Fikriyya fı̄ Miṣr fı̄ al-ʿAṣraini al-Ayyūbı̄ wa
al-Mamlūkı̄ al-Awwal (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabı ̄, 1947).
Ḥamza, ʿAbd al-Laṭı ̄f. Adab al-Ḥurūb al-Ṣalı̄biyya (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabı ̄,
1949).
ʿInān, Muḥammad ʿAbdallah. Mawāqif Ḥāsima fı̄ Ta’rı̄kh al-Islām 2nd edition.
(Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya bi’ l-Qāhira, 1934).
ʿInān, Muḥammad ʿAbdallah. Miṣr al-Islāmiyya wa Ta’rı̄kh al-Khiṭaṭ al-Miṣriyya
(Cairo, 1931).
Ibn Iyās, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad. Badā’i‘ al-Zuhūr fı̄ Waqā’i‘ al-Duhūr, (ed.),
Muḥammad Muṣtạ fā (Cairo/Wiesbaden, 1960–92) vol. 1. Part.1.
Jalāl, Ibrāhı ̄m. Al-Amı̄r Ḥaidar: Qiṣṣa min Aṣr al-Sulṭān Qāyṭbāy ʿan Ḥayāt
al-Mujtamaʿ al-Miṣrı̄ (Miṣr, 1945).
Mu’nis, Ḥ usayn. Miṣr wa Risālatuhā (Cairo, n.d).
Mu’nis, Ḥ usayn. Al-Sharq al-Islāmı̄ fı̄ al-‘Aṣr al-Ḥ adı̄th, 2nd edition. (Cairo,
1938).
Rāfiʿı ̄, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Ta’rı̄kh al-Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya wa Taṭawwur Niẓam
al-Ḥukm vol. 1–3. (Miṣr: Maṭba‘at al-Nahḍa, 1929–1930).
Shayyāl, Jamāl al-Dı̄n. Mujmal Ta’rı̄kh Damiyāt Siyāsiyyan wa Iqtiṣādiyyan (Cairo,
1949).
Shukrı ̄, ʿAlı ̄ Aḥmad. Miṣr min ʿAhd al-Mamālı̄k ilā Nihāyat Ḥukm Ismāʿı̄l (Cairo,
1934).
Surūr, Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dı ̄n. Ẓāhir Baybars wa Ḥaḍāra Miṣr fı̄ ʿAṣrihi (Cairo,
1938).
Surūr, Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dı ̄n. Dawlat Banı̄ Qalāwūn fı̄ Miṣr al-Ḥāla al-Siyāsiyya
wa al-Iqtiṣādiyya fı̄ ʿAhdiha bi Wajh Khāṣṣ (Cairo, 1943).
Zakı ̄, ʿAbd al-Raḥman. Maʿārik Ḥāsima fı̄ Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr (Cairo, 1945).
Zaqlama, Anwār. Al- Mamālı̄k fı̄ Miṣr (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Majalla al-Jadı ̄da, n. d.).
Zaydān, Jūrjı̄. Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Ḥadı̄th Part 1, 2 (1911)
Ziyāda, Niqūla. ʿ Ālam al-ʿUṣūr al-Wusṭa fı̄ Urūbbā (Jaffa: al-Maktab al-ʿAṣriyya,
1948).
2) Mamluks under Ottoman rule
ʿAbd Al-Karı ̄m, Aḥmad ʿIzzat. Ta’rı̄kh al-Taʿlı̄m fı̄ ʿAṣr Muḥammad ʿAlı̄ (Cairo:
Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1938).
Al-Ayyūbı ̄, Al-Bās. Muḥammad ʿAlı̄: Sı̄ratuhu wa Aʿmāluhu wa Athāruhu (Idāra
al-Hilāl bi-Miṣr, 1923).
Al-Jabartı ̄, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Al-Jabarti’s Chronicle of the First Seven Months of the
French Occupation of Egypt (edit. and trans.) S. Moreh (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975).
Al-Miṣrı ̄, ʿAbd al-Ḥalı ̄m Ḥilmı ̄. Muḥammad ʿAlı̄ al-Kabı̄r Munshʾ Miṣr al-Ḥadı̄th
(Cairo, 1947).
Farı ̄d, Muḥammad. Ta’rı̄kh al-Dawla al-‘Ilyya al-ʿ Uthmāniyya First published
1896 (Beirut: Dār al-Jı ̄l, 1987).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 225
Ghurbāl, Shafı ̄q. Muḥammad ʿAlı̄ al-Kabı̄r (Cairo: Dār Ajya’ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya,
1944).
Ghurbāl, Shafı̄q. The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehemet
Ali (London: George Routledge & Sons, LTD, 1928).
Jiritlı ̄, ʿAlı ̄. Ta’rı̄kh al-Ṣināʿa fı̄ Miṣr fı̄ al-Niṣf al-Awwal min al-Qarn al-Tāsiʿʿashar
(Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif bi-Misṣr, al-Jamʿiyya al-Malikiyya lil-Dirāsāt al-Ta’rı ̄khiyya,
1952).
Kāmil, Muṣṭafā. Al-Mas’ala al-Sharqiyya 2nd version (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Liwā ’
1909).
Rāfiʿı ̄, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Ta’rı̄kh al-Ḥaraka al-Qawmiyya wa Taṭawwur Niẓām
al-Ḥukm fi Miṣr : Aṣr Muḥammad ʿAlı̄, vol. 3. (1930).
Rāfiʿı ̄, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Aṣr Muḥammad ʿAlı̄ (Al-Qāhira: Maktabat al-Nahḍa
Miṣriyya, 1951).
Ramaḍān, Muḥammad Rifʿat. ‘Alı̄ Bek al-Kabı̄r (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabı ̄,
1950)
Rifʿat, Muḥammad. Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Siyāsı̄ fı̄ al-Azmina al-Ḥadı̄tha (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat
al-Raḥmaniyya, 1926).
Rifʿat, Muḥammad. Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Siyāsı̄ fı̄ al-Azmina al-Ḥadı̄tha (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat
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Thābit, Karı ̄m. Muḥammad ʿAlı̄, 2nd edition (Cairo, 1943).
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Zaydān, Jūrjı ̄. Kitāb Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Ḥadı̄th min Fatḥ al-Islāmı̄ ilā Hādhā al-Aṣr
maʿa Fadhlaka fı̄ Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Qadı̄m (Cairo, 1925).
3) Intellectual’s literatures on the Mamluks
Al-Bannā, Ḥasan. Bayna al-Ams wa al-Yawm (Cairo, 1939).
Al-Bannā, Ḥasan. Daʿwatuna (Cairo, 1990).
Al-Bannā, Ḥasan. Five Tracts of Ḥasan al-Bannā (trans.) Charles Wendell
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Al-Ḥakı̄m, Tawfı̄q. Taḥta Shams al-Fikr (Cairo, 1941).
Al-Ḥakı̄m, Tawfı̄q. ‘Awdat al-Ruḥ II (Cairo, 1933).
Al-Jumayʿı ̄, ʿAbd al-Munʿim Ibrāhı ̄m al-Dasūqı ̄. Ittijāhāt al-Kitāba al-Ta’rı̄khiyya fı̄
Ta’rı̄kh Miṣr al-Ḥadı̄th wa al-Muʿāṣir (Cairo:ʿAyn lil Dirāsāt wa’l Buḥūth
al-Insāniyya wa al-Ijtimāʿiyya, 1994).
Al-Manjūrı ̄, Maḥmūd. Ittijāhāt al-ʿAṣr al-Jadı̄d fı̄ Miṣr (Cairo, 1937).
Al-Shayyāl, Jamāl al-Dı ̄n. Al-Ta’rı̄kh wa al-Mu’arrikhūn fı̄ Miṣr fı̄ al-Qarn al-Tāsiʿ
ʿAshar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1958).
Ḥasan, Muḥammad Zakı ̄ and ʿAbd al-Raḥman Zakı ̄. Fı̄ Miṣr al-Islāmiyya (Cairo,
1937).
Haykal, Muḥammad Ḥusayn. Tarājim Miṣriyya wa Gharbiyya (Cairo, 1929).
Haykal, Muḥammad Ḥusayn. Fı̄ Awqāt al-Farāgh (Cairo, 1925).
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Ḥusayn, Aḥmad. Ra’y Jamʿ iyyat Miṣr al-Fatāh fı̄ Muʿāhadat Sanat 1936 (Cairo,
1936).
Ḥusayn, Aḥmad. Īmānı̄ (Cairo, 1936).
Ḥusayn, Ṭaha. Ḥadı̄th al- Arbiʿā’ III (Cairo, 1976).
Ḥusayn, Ṭaha. Mustaqbal al-Thaqāfa fi Miṣr (trans.) Sidney Glazer, The Future of
Culture in Egypt (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954).
Kāmil, Maḥmūd. Miṣr al-Ghad (Cairo, 1952).
Kāmil, Maḥmūd. Al-ʿAmal li-Miṣr: Baʿth Dawla wa Iḥyā’ Majd (Cairo, 1945).
Raḍwān, Fatḥı̄. Al-Qawmiyya al-Miṣriyya al-Islāmiyya (Cairo, 1944).
5. Egyptian Periodicals
al-Balāgh al-Usbuʿiyya
al-Hilāl
al-Kātib al-Miṣrı̄
al-Majalla
al-Majalla al-Jadı̄da
al-Majalla al-Ta’rikhı̄yya al-Miṣriyya
al-Manār
al-Muqtaṭaf
al-Risāla
al-Siyāsa al-Usbuʿiyya
al-Thaqāfa
B. SECONDARY SOURCES
Al-Sayyid [Marsot], Afaf Lutfi. Egypt’s Liberal Experiment, 1922–1936 (Berkeley,
1977).
Alter, Peter. Nationalism (London, 1985).
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism, 2nd edition (London, 1991).
Arthur, Goldschmidt. Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt (London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2000).
Ayalon, Ami. The Press in the Arab Middle East: A History (New York, 1995).
Ayalon, David. “Studies on Structure of the Mamluk Army—I.” In Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies vol. 15, no. 2 (1953), pp. 203–228.
Ayalon, David. “Studies on Structure of the Mamluk Army—II.” In Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies vol. 15, no. 3 (1953), pp. 448–476.
Ayalon, David. “The End of the Mamluk Sultanate: Why Did the Ottomans Spare
the Mamluks of Egypt and Wipe Out the Mamluks of Syria?” In David Ayalon,
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INDEX
A Aḥmad Ḥ usayn, 21, 37n13, 162

‘Abbasid , 14n2, 25, 28, 32, 33, 46, Aḥmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karı̄m, 127,
56, 76, 78–80, 85, 124, 128, 128, 194n7, 196n40
144, 146, 148–52 Aḥmad Ramzı̄, 152, 205n225–228,
‘Abd al-Ḥ alı̄m Ḥ ilmı̄ al-Miṣrı̄, 168 205n231, 206n241
‘Abd al-Laṭıf̄ Ḥ amza, 149, 203n190, Aḥmad Shawqı̄, 96–102, 118n204,
203n192 119n210, 119n233, 119n237,
‘Abd al-Razāq Sanhūrı̄, 81 121n284
‘Abd al-Wahhāb al Azām, 137 Aḥmad ‘Urābı̄, 96
‘Ā bdı̄n Palace, 15n19, 38n32, 43, Akbardı̄, 88
53n1, 123, 154, 193n2 Alawite, 79
‘Ā bdı̄n Project, 6, 12, 24, 43–56, 123, ‘Alı̄ Aḥmad Shukrı̄, 134, 138, 169,
125, 127, 165, 182, 195n23, 218 186, 192, 197n61, 197n69,
‘Abd Raḥman al-Rāfi‘ı̄, 50, 193 200n111, 209n339, 213n468,
‘Abduh, Muḥammad, 116n139, 174 214n477
Abū Usāma, 135, 198n79, ‘Alı̄ al-Jiritlı̄, 127, 173, 210n363
198n82 ‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r, 6, 26, 27, 30,
Abū Zuhra, 82–5, 116n124 33, 34, 36, 53, 67, 71, 72, 75,
Adam, 131 96–102, 109, 111, 119n219
‘Adlı̄ Tāhir Nūr, 200n120 124, 168–170, 173, 175,
Aḥmad Aḥmad al-Ḥ itta, 127 177, 188, 189, 191–3,
Aḥmad Amı̄n, 102, 144, 202n154, 218, 219
202n159 al-Jāshankı̄r, 85, 140, 141, 156
Aḥmad Badawı̄, 159 allegiance, 99, 123, 147
Aḥmad Fakrı̄, 164, 165, 208n301 al-Maḥrūqı̄, 72

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54830-6
234 INDEX
al-Manṣur̄ a, 5, 32, 83, 84, 125, 145, 151 C

al-Mu‘taṣim, 45, 134, 144 castle, 31, 69, 97, 99, 100, 107, 138
alternative, 10, 48, 94, 129, 130, 146, Choueiri, Youssef, 4, 14n4, 127
176, 217 Circassian, 89, 93–5, 134, 145, 148,
Amı̄n Bey, 67–70 157, 171, 189
Amı̄r Bashı̄r, 67 Circassian Mamluks, 28, 33, 36,
antithesis, 44, 52, 96, 105, 111, 82, 87, 88, 92, 94, 95, 111,
121n280, 186, 191 155–7, 182
Anwar Fataḥ Allah, 136, 199n93 civilizations, 23, 44, 46, 129–32, 138,
Anwar Zaqlama, 164, 189, 139, 143, 146–9, 151, 152, 161,
208n298–300, 215n500 162, 164, 179, 193, 218
apologists, 130 collective memory (memories), 3,
Aqṭāy, 84, 85 5–11, 19, 21, 22, 27, 53, 108,
Arabic literature, 59, 144 151–3, 159, 178, 192
Arab nationalism, 152, 153, 158, 160, commemorate, 45, 108, 188
165, 189, 202n172, 218 context, 6, 8, 10, 12, 20, 21, 23, 28,
Aryans, 131 34, 35, 43, 53, 65, 71, 75, 78,
assassinate, 99, 100, 166 95, 107, 111, 123, 128, 169,
assimilate, 5, 129 174, 193, 217
Aṭt ̣iya al-Shaykh, 140, 200n125, contradiction, 14, 70, 96
200n126, 200n128, 200n130 conveys, 20, 23, 78, 98, 101,
autocracy, 101 107, 110
Awlād al-Balad, 107, 121n275 corrupt, 66, 99, 101, 110, 157,
Aybak, 82, 84–7, 135, 136, 218 172, 218
‘Ayn Jālūt, 5, 25, 29, 32, 39n38, 46, corruption, 67, 68, 109, 111, 148,
82, 85, 125, 136, 143, 145, 148, 155, 157, 173, 182
149, 152, 153, 158, 162, counter-memory, 45, 50, 129
205n227 Crusaders, 22, 25, 28, 29, 33, 46, 77,
Ayyūbids, 25, 28, 47, 77, 85, 143, 83, 85, 110, 125, 134–6, 145,
145, 147, 164, 169 147–53, 155, 159, 161, 163,
‘Azı̄z Abāẓa, 135, 136, 198n87 192, 218, 219
cultural penetration, 123
B
Badr al-Dı̄n, 83 D
Badr al-Dı̄n Biyalik, 141 Dār al-‘Ulūm, 81
Badr al-Dı̄n Lūlū, 85, 86 delegitimizing, 123, 189
Baḥrı̄ Mamluk, 25, 33, 35, 75, 87, demonization, 52, 68, 166, 167,
88, 111 169, 172
beliefs, 20, 23, 35, 65, 130, 132, 133, description, 5, 9, 35, 69, 71, 73, 84,
141, 219 88, 101, 104, 105, 109, 125, 164
Benedict Anderson, 9, 16n33 60 despair, 101
binary pattern, 68 despotic, 94, 97, 99, 141, 143
INDEX 235
determinism, 21, 99 G
didactic, 103 glorification, 47, 52, 66, 82, 84, 103,
discrimination, 110 105, 128, 135, 165, 167,
Dodwell, Henry, 44, 50–2, 55n47, 169–71, 186, 218, 219
56n48, 56n57, 191, 194n5 glorify, 24, 27, 33–5, 108, 123,
Douin, Georges, 43, 54n4, 194n5 128, 177
Greek, 22, 46, 47, 68–70, 97, 130,
142, 144, 145
E
Easternism, 131
effendiyya, 126 H
Egyptian Arab nationalism, 7, 22, 28, Hanotaux, Gabriel, 43, 44, 54n8,
31, 32, 34–6, 102, 134, 160, 55n34, 56n55 61
162–4, 176 Ḥ asan al-Bannā, 22, 146, 147,
Egyptianism, 93 202n170, 202n175–179
Egyptian monarchy, 24, 124, 140, Ḥ asan Ḥ abashı̄, 161
141, 192, 217, 218, 220 Ḥ asan Ibrāhı̄m Ḥ asan, 198n73,
Egyptian nationalist, 6, 20–2, 24, 29, 198n78
31, 36, 59, 70, 83, 106, 107, Hawa, 131
109–11, 123, 124, 128, 129, hegemony, 6, 10, 36, 147, 160, 193,
133–41, 144, 148, 158–62, 169, 217, 220
174, 178, 186–90, 192, 193 heyday, 124, 143
Egyptian national literature, 59 historical narrative, 6, 19, 217
Egyptian popular literature, 61 historical novel, 4, 5, 12, 13, 59–63,
Embabeh, 35, 183 65–121, 137
environment, 9, 21, 23, 59, 69, 128, historical novelist, 60, 71, 108,
141–3, 162 109, 111
Eugenio Griffini, 15n19, 38n32, 43, historiography, 4, 6, 7, 20, 24, 27,
53n1, 123, 193n2 34–6, 43, 47, 53, 71, 75, 83, 88,
expulsion, 31, 34, 109, 167 97, 106, 107, 123, 126, 165,
167, 178, 179, 181
History, 4–10, 12, 19–24, 26, 27, 30,
F 36, 44, 45, 47, 50, 52, 59–61,
Fabianism, 130 66, 74, 76, 79, 80, 82, 87, 99,
Fascism, 133 102, 103, 105, 108, 109, 111,
Fāt ̣ima Khātūn, 83 123–215, 217, 218, 220
Fātị mids, 93, 132, 144, 147, 164 Hülegü, 77, 80, 125, 152
fitna, 91, 156, 172, 180 Ḥ usayn Mu’nis, 15n14, 22, 138, 139,
forefather, 35, 125 186, 192, 193, 198n70, 198n75,
founder paradigm, 123, 124, 127, 200n110, 200n114, 200n121,
170, 181, 194n6 213n470
Fu’ād (King), 43–5, 53, 123 Ḥ uṣn al-Akrād, 153
236 INDEX
I L
Ibrāhı̄m Bey, 26, 31, 48, 50, 103, 105, liberalism, 79, 94, 95, 133, 136
106, 173, 180, 183, 187 liberalization, 96, 110
Ibrāhı̄m Ḥ asan, 163 Louis IX (King), 5, 29, 151, 162
Ibrāhı̄m Jalāl, 145, 146, 202n162 Lukács, Georg, 13, 17n49, 60, 61,
Ibrāhı̄m Jum‘a, 22, 160, 161, 192, 63n9, 121n283
207n274, 207n277
Ibrāhı̄m Pasha, 67, 68, 71, 182
Identity, 5, 7, 9, 12, 23, 24, 28, M
33, 65, 69, 87, 93, 106, 108, Maḥmūd Ibn Mamdūd, 158
112n26, 131, 133, 136, 149, Maḥmūd Razaq Salı̄m, 137, 155,
155, 160, 161, 163, 190, 206n243, 206n248,
192, 219 206n256–259, 207n262,
Ikhshidis, 132, 147, 164 207n263, 207n266
imaginative awakening, 108 Mamluk, 3, 19–41, 43–56, 61,
imagined communities, 7, 11, 60, 159 65–121, 123–215, 217
insight, 13, 30, 34, 61, 89, 110, 142, manifold, 11, 111, 135
145, 177 manipulate, 23, 24, 61
Integral Egyptian nationalism, 7, 22, marginalize, 50, 52, 123, 179
30, 160–2, 176, 186 Marj Dābiq, 32, 87, 155
intellectuals, 3, 5, 9, 12, 22, 59, 70, massacre, 27, 31, 35, 50–2, 66, 68,
101, 102, 110, 128–41, 143, 69, 168, 173, 177, 184, 185,
145, 154, 163, 167, 170, 171, 189–91
184, 190–3, 217–19 medieval, 26, 43, 124, 130, 131, 169
Islamic Egyptian nationalism, 22, 134, Mongol, 4, 6, 22, 25, 29, 32, 46, 77,
159, 163, 176 79, 82, 85, 94, 110, 125, 131,
‘Izz al-Dı̄n Aybak, 76, 77, 80 132, 134–6, 143, 145–52, 155,
158, 159, 161–4, 192, 218, 219
Muḥammad ‘Abdallah ‘Inān, 148,
J 192, 194n10, 197n69, 203n181,
jahiliyya, 147 203n183, 203n186, 203n189
Jalāl al-Dı̄n Khwārizm Shāh, 83 Muḥammad ‘Abd Azı̄z Marzūq,
Jamāl al-Dı̄n Shayyāl, 134, 198n71, 151–3, 204n213, 204n214,
198n72, 199n89 204n216–218
Joseph Wiet, 45–7, 52, 218 Muḥammad ‘Alı̄, 6, 24, 27, 30, 31,
Jūrjı̄ Zaydān, 66, 114n69, 34, 35, 44, 47, 50–2, 66–70, 75,
116n138, 166 103–7, 109, 111, 123, 127–9,
145, 165–71, 173–5, 177, 179,
182, 184–92, 217, 219
K Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab, 26,
Kāmil, Muṣt ̣afā, 55n33, 113n33, 125 31, 34, 67, 72–4, 188, 189
Khāniqāh, 152 Muḥammad Bey al-Alfı̄, 35, 50
INDEX 237
Muḥammad Farı̄d Abū Ḥadı̄d, O

60, 102–11, 126, 137, 141, oppression, 31, 34, 52, 66–8, 71, 73,
151, 111, 185 74, 79, 88, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98,
Muḥammad Ḥ usayn Haykal, 21, 99, 102, 109, 111, 135, 139,
37n10, 37n11, 142–4, 152, 155–7, 166, 172, 180, 183,
201n137–139 184, 187, 190, 192, 218, 219
Muḥammad Laṭfı̄ Juma‘, 137, 199n96 Ottoman Empire, 25, 26, 30, 34, 44,
Muḥammad Muṣt ̣afā Ziyāda, 138, 45, 65–7, 69–71, 74, 75, 79, 97,
199n103 98, 109, 123, 125, 154, 169,
Muḥammad Rif‘at, 28–30, 32–4, 173–6, 189, 191, 219
40n68, 53, 56n61, 127, 172, Ottomans, 13n1, 25, 26, 30–2, 44,
182–4, 188, 191, 195n29, 46, 47, 67, 68, 70–2, 75, 87, 89,
213n453 91, 93, 95, 96, 98–100, 105–7,
Muḥammad Rif ‘at Ramaḍān, 172, 109–11, 113n32, 138, 153,
175–7, 191, 210n353, 210n375, 155–7, 165, 166, 168–71, 175,
210n378, 210n379 177, 179, 181, 185, 188, 189,
Muḥammad Sa‘ı̄d al-‘Aryān, 6, 81–9, 191, 219
110, 117n142, 117n143 overwhelming, 75, 95, 178
Muḥammad Ṣabrı̄, 182, 186–9,
200n116, 214n474, 214n478,
214n491, 214n499 P
Muḥammad Shafı̄q Ghurbāl, 125–8, Pan-Islamism, 79, 96, 125
170, 171, 173–5, 177–9, parallel, 79, 132, 135, 148
182, 191 perceptions, 3, 5, 7, 97, 98, 123, 126,
Muḥammad Sharaf, 129, 132, 196n42 128, 129, 144, 146, 184
Murād Bey, 98, 101, 173, 180, 187 Pharaonic, 60, 125, 131, 144, 149,
Musta‘ṣim, 77, 79 163, 179
Pharaonism, 130
Pierre Crabitès, 15n19, 38n32, 43,
N 44, 53n2, 123, 194n3
Napoleon, 34, 166, 168, 179, 187, 191 pious, 85, 97, 98, 103–5, 110, 140,
Nāsị r al-Ayyūb, 83 146, 149, 156, 158, 159, 163,
nationalist ideology, 23, 125, 133, 174, 192, 219
159, 160, 162, 163 plots, 34, 88, 89, 104, 152, 165
nationalist intellectuals, 7, 9, 12, 59, political orientation, 7, 70, 75, 92, 97,
113n33, 133–41, 162, 163, 184, 102, 108–10, 125, 179
192, 193, 218 popular discourse, 13, 61
Nazism, 133 portrayal, 4, 52, 86–8, 100, 156, 167,
neo-Mamluk, 154, 206n237 170, 182, 186, 218
neo-Pharaonic, 153 precursor, 34, 109, 158, 173, 188,
Nile Valley, 6, 21–3, 141–4, 162 189, 191
nostalgia, 94, 175 predominant, 25, 59, 124
238 INDEX
Q standpoint, 48, 50, 70, 79, 82, 106,

Qāḍı ̄ al-Quḍā, 85 109, 111, 151
Qalāwūn, 28, 54n22, 82, 84, 135, stereotyped, 20, 104, 111
137, 139, 164, 175 Sulṭāna, 76, 82–4
Qānṣūh al-Ghawrı̄, 87, 88, 92, 156, Sultan al-Ghawrı̄, 25, 90, 91, 110,
206n243 118n177, 137, 155–9
Qāsim Amı̄n, 86, 116n139 Sultan Baybars, 24, 25, 129, 135,
Qāytbāy, 33, 88, 110 141, 143, 145, 146, 151,
164, 175
Sultan Ḥ asan, 30, 33, 152
R Sultan Ḥ asan Ibn Nāsị r Muḥammad
radicalism, 95 Ibn Qalāwūn, 46, 152
realism, 60 Sultan Ḥ assan Muḥammad Ibn
recreation, 9, 12, 62n4, 108, Qalāwūn, 152
121n280 Sultan Qāyṭbāy, 88, 89, 152
reinterpret, 6, 25, 103, 110, 111, 160 supra-Egyptian nationalism, 7,
reinterpretation, 6, 20, 24, 59 22, 28
remarkable, 26, 28, 32, 124, 125, Surūr, Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dı̄n, 136,
135, 186, 218 151, 163, 192, 198n86,
remembrance, 7, 9–11, 53 204n201, 208n288
renaissance, 103, 105, 120n239 symbol, 25, 27, 30, 33, 36, 78, 95,
rewrite, 19, 20, 24, 36, 44, 47, 165 96, 103, 105, 110, 133, 144,
149, 154, 159, 181, 182, 186,
188, 191, 193
S
Saḥbān, 76–80
Salāḥ al-Dı̄n, 29, 46, 134, 153, 170 T
Salāma Mūsa, 130–3, 196n48, tamṣīr, 164
196n50, 197n56, 197n58, Ṭ arābāy, 156
197n59 Tawfı̄q al-Hakı̄m, 15n9, 142,
Sallāfa, 76, 77, 80 201n134, 201n136
Shajarat al-Durr, 29, 75–87, 109–11, territorial, 6, 21, 23, 25, 33, 45, 52,
114n63, 135, 136, 149, 159 82, 142, 143, 219
Shaykh al-Balad, 30, 169, 175, 188 territorial nationalism, 22, 28, 35, 59,
Shaykh ‘Alı̄ Yūsuf, 79 134, 143–6, 162, 181
Shaykh Ẓ āhir al-‘Umar, 34 textbook, 5, 12, 19–41, 52, 53, 88,
shepherd, 100, 101, 156 109, 182, 183, 217, 218
Shihāb al-Dı̄n, 157 tragic, 85, 87, 92, 96, 99, 105, 108,
Shūkār, 77, 79 155, 190
signify, 79, 98 Ṭ ūlūnids, 22, 93, 147, 164, 169
social agents, 53, 217, 220 Ṭ ūmānbāy, 33, 87, 88, 92, 95, 96,
stagnation, 111, 147, 148 110, 134, 159
INDEX 239
Ṭ ūmānbāy II, 90–2, 110, 138 victimization, 147

Tūrānshāh, 29, 76, 77, 84, villain, 44, 50, 95, 99, 103, 111, 128,
114n63 168, 186, 190, 192, 217
tyranny, 50, 66–8, 71, 73, 74, 92,
95, 96, 99, 102, 111, 124,
133, 139–41, 143, 164, 166, W
171, 172, 180, 184, 192, Wafd, 55n33, 174
218, 219 Walter Scott, 60, 62n7
Westernism, 130
Westernization, 144, 153
U
‘Umar Makram, 31, 104, 106, 107,
111, 120n264 Y
underline, 79, 87, 108 Yūsuf al-Buyūmı̄, 200n117
usurp, 76
‘Uthmān Bey al-Bardı̄sı̄, 48, 50
Z
Ẓ āhir Barqūq Ibn Ans, 156
V Zakı̄ Muḥammad Ḥ asan, 135, 137,
validate, 24, 184 140, 161, 192, 198n76

Mamluks in The Modern Egyptian Mind

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MAMLUKS IN

ISBN 978-1-137-55712-4 ISBN 978-1-137-54830-6 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016955188

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

Cover image © FromOldBooks.org / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

I have incurred debts to many institutions, colleagues, and teachers in

Part I Mamluks in Official Memory 1

2 Representations of the Mamluks in School Textbooks

3 Representations of the Mamluks in ‘Ābdīn Project

Part II Mamluks in Public Memory 57

4 Prologue: Historical Novel and Egyptian Nationalism 59

5 Representations of the Mamluks in

6 Representations of the Mamluks in History Books

Mamluks in Official Memory

© The Author(s) 2017 3

heretofore-neglected positive dimension of the historical memory of the

defined the Mamluks as Turkish military slaves and stereotypically depicted

historians adopted the monarchist historiography, their focus, assump-

of critical attention from historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and cul-

to invent or produce artificial, manufactured forms of collective memory

reproduces a commemorative narrative, a story about a particular past

elites within civil society” in reproducing collective memory: The social

popular periodicals, the present study also devoted considerable attention

century, see Paula Sanders, Creating Medieval Cairo (Cairo: American

46. Edward Shils, “Intellectuals, Tradition, and the Traditions of Intellectuals:

Representations of the Mamluks in School

School textbooks have unique characteristics as a literary genre. A text-

© The Author(s) 2017 19

humanities do not merely convey an objective body of information. In

Hence, it is crucial to explain the socio-political context of textbooks as

However, in the late 1930s, many Egyptian historians and intellectuals

nationalism, integral nationalism, and Arab Egyptian nationalism dis-

Considering this unique function of history, it is logical for a regime to

TEXTBOOKS OF THE 1920S

Mamluk Sultanate Periods

Similarly, some authors of textbooks reinterpret the war between

of Mamluks as they denied the succession of throne by the caliphs’ son,

The Ottoman Periods

The manner in which Muḥammad Alı̄’s massacre of the Mamluks in

TEXTBOOKS OF THE 1930S

Mamluk Sultanate Periods

Another significant indication that must be raised is that Rif‘at began to

Rif‘at’s textbook, in particular, offers detailed information about the

The Ottoman Periods

In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire weakened and Ottoman

No significant change can be traced in the positive representation of ‘Alı̄

TEXTBOOKS OF THE 1940S

nationalism. Reflecting this trend, school textbooks of the 1940s express

In the meantime, Egyptian Arab nationalism gives rise to an important

Even after the emergence of Egyptian Arab nationalism, the Egypt-centered

Interestingly enough, the Mamluks are also used as a symbol of

Baybars re-established the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate in Cairo in the name of

Moreover, Baybars’ territorial expansion is also used to glorify Egypt’s

Baybars launched a military campaign in Nubia, where Christians still lived

The Ottoman Periods

the historical context is shifted from Egypt to a wider Arab framework.

‘Alı̄ Bey al-Kabı̄r achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire in

Istibdād al - Mamālīk (by Jurjī Zaydān)

Shajarat al - Durr (by Jūrjī Zaydān) (the First

transferring the Caliph from Baghdad to Cairo before he met Saḥbān. It

Shajarat al - Durr (by Muḥammad Sa‘īd al-‘Aryān)