UN Report Analysis-1
UN Report Analysis-1
UN Report Analysis-1
Submitted by:
UNSCR 1373/FTF Desk
Counter-Terrorism (CT) Wing, NACTA
Al-Qaida was reported to have established up to eight new training camps in Afghanistan,
including four in Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan and Uruzgan Provinces, with a new base to
stockpile weaponry in the Panjshir Valley.
Analysis:
The close relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaida, as indicated by their maintained
proximity and collaboration in Afghanistan, challenges the narrative of the Taliban's commitment
to severing ties with international terrorist organizations. The Taliban's attempts to downplay
these connections suggest a diplomatic strategy to gain broader international acceptance while
still leveraging Al-Qaida's support.
The establishment of new training camps and bases in various Afghan provinces underscores Al-
Qaida's sustained presence, raising concerns about the region's stability and potential threats to
global security.
Analysis:
The internal divisions within the Taliban regarding dealing with ISKP reveal the complexity of
the insurgent landscape. The creation of the Batah Unit to counter ISKP's influence reflects the
Taliban's efforts to consolidate power and maintain ideological control. However, the inclusive
recruitment strategy adopted by ISIL-K, focusing on attracting disillusioned Taliban members,
poses a challenge to the Taliban's authority and stability.
ISIL-K's increased appeal within Tajik networks indicates its ability to transcend local
affiliations, potentially expanding its influence and operational capabilities.
Interlocutors reported that TTP members and their families receive regular aid packages
from the Taliban.
A new TTP base was established in mid-2023 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, where
66 TTP individuals trained as suicide bombers. A notable development is the increase of
Afghan nationals in the TTP ranks.
Al-Qaida core and AQIS continue to provide training, ideological guidance and support
to TTP.
In July, Al-Qaida reportedly issued orders for all vehicles used by the group to be gifted
to TTP owing to fear of being targeted by the United States of America.
Analysis:
The Taliban's sympathy towards TTP and its active support, including the supply of weapons and
equipment, underscores a troubling nexus between insurgent groups in the region. The reported
transfer of vehicles from Al-Qaida to TTP indicates a strategic alliance based on mutual interests,
revealing potential coordination against common adversaries.
While drafting its counter-terrorism policies, Pakistan must tailor its strategies while
keeping in mind the diverse spectrum of terrorist organizations and their varied tactics
and goals. “One-fits-for-all” policy must be shunned and policies must cater the terrorist
organizations’ deversified approaches and they mjust be encountered accordingly.
Lastly, in the so-called Islamic Emirate, militant outfits have found a model to emulate
and practically adopt in the quest of their jihadist objectives against Pakistan. The
country’s internal dynamics are also ripe for these groups, since insurgencies thrive on
turmoil and chaos and can gain strength from political, economic, and social uncertainty.
Addressing the internal turmoil and ending the political and economic uncertainty that
currently prevails will be a fundamental step towards mitigating the insurgent challenge.
Doing so will make it difficult for such group to find recruits, further their grievances and
build anti-state narratives.