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Analysis Report

Analysis on Thirty-third report of the United Nation’s Analytical Support and


Sanctions Monitoring Team

Submitted by:
UNSCR 1373/FTF Desk
Counter-Terrorism (CT) Wing, NACTA

Usman Umar Syed Qasim Mehboob


Jr. Analyst Analyst
Introduction:
The report underscores the intricate and evolving dynamics among terrorist groups in South
Asia. The symbiotic relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaida, despite attempts to conceal
their ties, raises concerns about regional stability and global security. The internal divisions
within the Taliban regarding ISKP highlight the complexity of insurgent alliances, with ISIL-K's
inclusive recruitment strategy challenging the Taliban's authority. The collaborative efforts
between the Taliban and TTP, supported by Al-Qaida and AQIS, reveal a troubling nexus,
emphasizing the need for a comprehensive approach to address the interconnected and evolving
nature of extremist networks. The reported transfer of resources from Al-Qaida to TTP further
exemplifies the strategic alliances formed in this complex landscape, underscoring the urgency
for nuanced counterterrorism strategies to mitigate the potential cross-border threats emanating
from the region.

Key Findings about Al Qaida:


 The relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaida remains close, and the latter maintains
a holding pattern in Afghanistan under Taliban patronage.

 The Taliban continues to seek to reduce the visibility of these relationships.

 Al-Qaida was reported to have established up to eight new training camps in Afghanistan,
including four in Ghazni, Laghman, Parwan and Uruzgan Provinces, with a new base to
stockpile weaponry in the Panjshir Valley.

 Al Qaida’s presence in Afghanistan is characterized by training camps, madrasas, and


safe houses.

Analysis:
The close relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaida, as indicated by their maintained
proximity and collaboration in Afghanistan, challenges the narrative of the Taliban's commitment
to severing ties with international terrorist organizations. The Taliban's attempts to downplay
these connections suggest a diplomatic strategy to gain broader international acceptance while
still leveraging Al-Qaida's support.
The establishment of new training camps and bases in various Afghan provinces underscores Al-
Qaida's sustained presence, raising concerns about the region's stability and potential threats to
global security.

Key Findings about ISKP:


 Taliban leadership to some extent remained divided over approaches in dealing with both
the ISKP and Salafist communities sympathetic to it.
 The recently created Batah Unit within the Taliban General Directorate of Intelligence
aims to ensure that educated ISIL-K prisoners abandon Salafist ideology and embrace
Deobandism.

 In contrast, ISIL-K adopted a more inclusive recruitment strategy, welcoming non-


Salafists and focusing on attracting disillusioned Taliban and foreign fighters.

 ISIL-K also increased its appeal within Tajik networks.

Analysis:
The internal divisions within the Taliban regarding dealing with ISKP reveal the complexity of
the insurgent landscape. The creation of the Batah Unit to counter ISKP's influence reflects the
Taliban's efforts to consolidate power and maintain ideological control. However, the inclusive
recruitment strategy adopted by ISIL-K, focusing on attracting disillusioned Taliban members,
poses a challenge to the Taliban's authority and stability.
ISIL-K's increased appeal within Tajik networks indicates its ability to transcend local
affiliations, potentially expanding its influence and operational capabilities.

Key Findings about TTP:


 The Taliban are generally sympathetic to TTP aims. Besides supplying weapons and
equipment, Taliban rank and file, Al-Qaida core and AQIS fighters assisted TTP forces in
cross-border attacks.

 Interlocutors reported that TTP members and their families receive regular aid packages
from the Taliban.

 A new TTP base was established in mid-2023 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, where
66 TTP individuals trained as suicide bombers. A notable development is the increase of
Afghan nationals in the TTP ranks.

 Al-Qaida core and AQIS continue to provide training, ideological guidance and support
to TTP.

 In July, Al-Qaida reportedly issued orders for all vehicles used by the group to be gifted
to TTP owing to fear of being targeted by the United States of America.

Analysis:
The Taliban's sympathy towards TTP and its active support, including the supply of weapons and
equipment, underscores a troubling nexus between insurgent groups in the region. The reported
transfer of vehicles from Al-Qaida to TTP indicates a strategic alliance based on mutual interests,
revealing potential coordination against common adversaries.

Wayforward for Pakistan:


 Pakistan must engage with other neighboring countries to hold a dialogue regrading
terrorism since it’s a trans-national menace. The terrorist groups present in Afghanistan
has the capacity to conduct cross-border attacks so it’s in common good to pose a
concerted and coordinated effort. Pakistan must take China in its loop when dealing with
Afghanistan because China is key player in the region. For this purpose, Pakistan can
establish a dedicated national task force comprising of high-level individuals from
Foreign Office, military, bureaucracy and academia to engage with Afghanistan and other
countries regrading terrorism.

 While drafting its counter-terrorism policies, Pakistan must tailor its strategies while
keeping in mind the diverse spectrum of terrorist organizations and their varied tactics
and goals. “One-fits-for-all” policy must be shunned and policies must cater the terrorist
organizations’ deversified approaches and they mjust be encountered accordingly.

 Pakistan must establish the state-of-the-art excellence center to rehabilitate and


reintegrate the extremists and terrorists who have reverted back. It will also help to
understand the intricacies of terorist organiztions by analyzing their former members.

 Lastly, in the so-called Islamic Emirate, militant outfits have found a model to emulate
and practically adopt in the quest of their jihadist objectives against Pakistan. The
country’s internal dynamics are also ripe for these groups, since insurgencies thrive on
turmoil and chaos and can gain strength from political, economic, and social uncertainty.

 Addressing the internal turmoil and ending the political and economic uncertainty that
currently prevails will be a fundamental step towards mitigating the insurgent challenge.
Doing so will make it difficult for such group to find recruits, further their grievances and
build anti-state narratives.

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