Quantum Cryptography for Enhanced Network

Security: A Comprehensive Survey of Research,

Developments, and Future Directions
Mst Shapna Akter∗
∗Department of Computer Science, Kennesaw State University, USA
{∗ makter2@students.kennesaw.edu}

Abstract—With the ever-growing concern for internet secu- detected, thus providing information-theoretic security [3].
rity, the field of quantum cryptography emerges as a promis- In contrast to classical cryptographic techniques, which rely
ing solution for enhancing the security of networking systems. on the computational difficulty of solving certain mathe-
In this paper, 20 notable papers from leading conferences and
journals are reviewed and categorized based on their focus matical problems, QKD guarantees security even against
on various aspects of quantum cryptography, including key adversaries with unlimited computational power [4]. Over
distribution, quantum bit commitment, post-quantum cryp- the years, QKD has garnered significant attention from both
tography, and counterfactual quantum key distribution. The academia and industry, leading to the development of vari-
paper explores the motivations and challenges of employing ous QKD protocols, such as BB84 bennett2020quantum,
quantum cryptography, addressing security and privacy con-
cerns along with existing solutions. Secure key distribution, a E91 [5], and continuous variable QKD [6]. These pro-
critical component in ensuring the confidentiality and integrity tocols have been the subject of extensive research, with
of transmitted information over a network, is emphasized in efforts dedicated to improving their efficiency, security, and
the discussion. The survey examines the potential of quantum applicability to real-world communication networks [7].
cryptography to enable secure key exchange between parties, One major area of research in quantum cryptography has
even when faced with eavesdropping, and other applications
of quantum cryptography. Additionally, the paper analyzes been the development and optimization of QKD protocols.
the methodologies, findings, and limitations of each reviewed Researchers have investigated different approaches to op-
study, pinpointing trends such as the increasing focus on timize key rates, reduce the quantum bit error rate, and
practical implementation of quantum cryptography proto- increase the distance over which secure communication
cols and the growing interest in post-quantum cryptography
can be achieved [8]. These optimizations have led to the
research. Furthermore, the survey identifies challenges and
open research questions, including the need for more effi- proposal of new protocols, such as measurement-device-
cient quantum repeater networks, improved security proofs independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [9] and twin-field QKD
for continuous variable quantum key distribution, and the (TF-QKD) [10], which offer improved performance and
development of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. robustness against various types of attacks. In addition to
the development of new protocols, researchers have also
I. INTRODUCTION
focused on identifying and mitigating potential security
The emergence of quantum computing has brought forth loopholes in existing QKD protocols [11]. For example,
both challenges and opportunities in the realm of cryp- photon-number-splitting attacks and detector blinding at-
tography. Quantum computers hold the potential to rev- tacks have been shown to compromise the security of
olutionize various industries by tackling complex prob- several QKD implementations. Various countermeasures
lems; however, they also present a significant threat to have been proposed and implemented to address these
existing cryptographic systems’ security [1]. Consequently, vulnerabilities, such as the decoy-state method [12] and
researchers have turned to quantum cryptography, utilizing the use of secure detectors [13]. Another crucial aspect
quantum mechanics principles to create secure communi- of quantum cryptography research is the integration of
cation systems that withstand both classical and quantum QKD into existing communication networks. One approach
attacks. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic has been to incorporate QKD into optical networks, which
technique that enables two parties to securely exchange form the backbone of modern communication infrastructure
encryption keys over a public channel [2]. QKD protocols [14]. Several studies have investigated the feasibility of
exploit the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics, implementing QKD in wavelength-division multiplexing
such as superposition, entanglement, and the no-cloning (WDM) networks and passive optical networks (PONs)
theorem, to ensure that any eavesdropping attempt can be
[15]. These studies demonstrate the potential of QKD to en- Nurhadi and Syambas [21] provide an overview of
hance the security of optical networks without significantly various QKD protocols, including BB84, E91, BBM92,
affecting their performance. The integration of QKD into B92, Six-State Protocol, DPS, SARG04, COW, and S13.
optical networks has also led to the development of new The authors then conduct simulations of three of these
service models, such as Key-as-a-Service (KaaS) [8]. KaaS protocols, BB84, B92, and BBM92, using a quantum
provides secure key distribution for virtual optical networks simulator. The results show that B92 protocol has the
(VONs) by incorporating QKD into the underlying optical smallest probability of error, while BB84 has the largest
infrastructure. By offering security as a service, KaaS probability of error. Kalra and Poonia [22] propose a
enables network operators to easily deploy QKD-based new protocol that is a variation of the BB84 protocol
security solutions in existing networks, potentially paving and show that it is twice as capacitive as compared to
the way for widespread adoption of quantum cryptography. the BB84 protocol, with almost half the error rate. The
Moreover, as quantum computing technology progresses, it proposed protocol uses random bases for modulation
has become increasingly important to explore cryptographic and encoding on the basis of random bits, and both the
techniques that can withstand the potential threat posed sender and the receiver get two keys. Sasaki et al. [23]
by quantum computers. This has led to the emergence of propose a QKD protocol that uses a single-photon source
post-quantum cryptography, a field dedicated to developing to generate a sequence of pulses, each containing one or
cryptographic algorithms that remain secure even in the zero photons, which is sent to a receiver. The security
presence of quantum adversaries [16, 17]. Lattice-based of the protocol relies on the laws of quantum mechanics
cryptography, code-based cryptography, and isogeny-based and the assumption that any measurement or disturbance
cryptography are among the most promising post-quantum by an eavesdropper can be detected. Dirks et al. [24]
cryptographic techniques being investigated [18]. While explore the technical feasibility of a Geostationary Earth
quantum cryptography has shown tremendous potential for Orbit Quantum Key Distribution (GEOQKD) system that
enhancing network security, several challenges and open combines untrusted and trusted mode BBM92 protocols to
research questions remain to be addressed. For instance, achieve a maximum tolerable loss of 41dB per channel,
the development of efficient quantum repeater networks with key rates of 1.1bit/s in untrusted and 300bit/s in
is essential to increase the range of QKD systems [19]. trusted mode. The study proposes a realistic design for
Improved security proofs for continuous variable QKD and the space segment and presents a system architecture
other protocols are necessary to ensure their robustness that allows the GEOQKD system to operate in both
against potential attacks [6, 7]. Furthermore, the practical untrusted and trusted modes with high pointing accuracies.
implementation of quantum cryptography systems, includ- Williams et al. [25] present a QKD protocol that uses
ing miniaturization, cost reduction, and compatibility with time-bin encoding with entangled photon pairs to achieve
existing infrastructure, is a critical area of ongoing research secure communication. The protocol was implemented
[20]. in a practical setup and was tested to demonstrate time
synchronization and eavesdropper detection capabilities.
II. RELATED WORK
Schimpf et al. [26] discussed a study on using a blinking-
In this literature review, we analyze the advancements and free source of polarization-entangled photon pairs based
challenges in the field of quantum cryptography, focusing on a GaAs QD for QKD. The study addresses the problem
on quantum key distribution (QKD), post-quantum of degradation of entanglement at higher temperatures
cryptography, and the integration of QKD into optical and proposes to operate the source at a temperature of
networks. A total of 20 papers, along with additional at least 20 K and to use a pulsed two-photon-excitation
related works, were selected from leading conferences and scheme to maintain fidelity to the Bell state. Amer et al.
journals, including [27] presented a study on the performance of quantum
repeater QKD grid networks with the inclusion of a
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Protocols minority of trusted nodes. The analysis also identifies
limitations in such networks, particularly related to BSM
QKD protocols have been extensively studied to enable success probability and decoherence rate, and suggests the
secure key exchange between two parties. The seminal use of trusted nodes even with ideal repeater technology.
BB84 protocol, introduced by Bennett and Brassard [2], is Ding et al. [28] proposed a new approach to optimize the
one of the earliest and most widely studied QKD protocols. parameters of practical QKD systems using the random
Subsequent research led to the development of other QKD forest (RF) algorithm. The proposed method has potential
protocols, such as the E91 protocol [5] and continuous applications in practical QKD networks and contributes to
variable QKD [6]. Each protocol leverages the unique the development of quantum communication technologies.
properties of quantum mechanics to provide information- Dhoha et al. [29] provided a literature review of QKD and
theoretic security [3].
quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocols. The focus of and concluded that lightweight and secure post-quantum
the paper is on the practical implementation of the BB84 cryptography for small devices is expected to emerge in the
QKD protocol, both with and without the existence of an near future. Ahn et al. [37] analyzed the potential impact
eavesdropper. The findings show that BB84 is an effective of quantum computing on DER networks and proposed
QKD protocol. Yao et al. [30] discuss the use of quantum using PQC and QKD to protect them. The study suggested
random number generators (QRNGs and QKD protocols researching optimal cost and network configuration for
in cryptography, and provide a theoretical analysis of cost-effective and high-performance quantum-safe networks
their security based on entropic uncertainty relations. in DER systems. Gupta et al. [38] explored the use of
The authors use Theorem II.1 to show that by choosing blockchain technology in e-voting systems and proposed
suitable classical sampling strategies, one may analyze the a double-layered security system that uses a QKD algo-
behavior of ideal states which always behave appropriately rithm for secure communication. The study highlights the
for the given strategy, and that the real state is close, in potential for future research in blockchain with quantum
trace distance, to these ideal states. computer countermeasures. Lin et al. [39] identified se-
curity loopholes in CV-QKD and proposed modifications
Post-Quantum Cryptography to existing protocols. The study suggested further research
to develop security proofs based on collective attacks and
Mujdei et al. [31] investigated side-channel attacks on practical source and channel loss. Cao et al. [40] proposed
Kyber, Saber, and NTRU post-quantum cryptographic a KaaS framework for integrating QKD into optical net-
schemes. They proposed a new attack strategy and works, enhancing their security. The performance evalua-
demonstrated its effectiveness against countermeasures tion demonstrated the framework’s potential as a practical
like randomization techniques. This study highlights solution for incorporating QKD in optical networks. Su et
the importance of considering side-channel attacks in al. [41] presented a simple information-theoretic proof of
post-quantum cryptography design and implementation. security for the BB84 QKD protocol. The findings provide
Imana et al. [32] proposed two efficient architectures for a clear and straightforward proof of security, offering new
arithmetic operations in InvBRLWE-based encryption, insights into security issues in quantum key distribution.
improving area-time complexities and power efficiency.
The authors provided a theoretical analysis and FPGA- III. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION
based implementation, showing potential for use in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method of secure
BRLWE/InvBRLWE-based cryptoprocessor applications. communication that uses quantum mechanics to distribute
Prakasan et al. [33] addressed security issues in the cryptographic keys between two parties. The basic idea is
classical channel of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) that the act of measuring a quantum system disturbs it in a
by proposing an authenticated-encryption scheme using detectable way, so any eavesdropper trying to intercept the
NTRU and Falcon algorithms. The scheme enhances key would leave a trace. Alice and Bob generate a shared
security without significant performance trade-offs and key by exchanging quantum states (such as photons) and
offers a viable solution for QKD security concerns. measuring them in a particular way. By comparing their
Sajimon et al. [34] evaluated PQC algorithms for IoT measurements, they can detect any attempted eavesdropping
devices and identified Kyber, Saber, Dilithium, and Falcon and use the remaining key bits to establish a secret key for
as optimal implementations. The study also recommended encrypting and decrypting messages. QKD offers perfect
LightSaber-KEM and Dilithium2 for quantum resistance. secrecy, meaning that the encrypted message cannot be
The research methodology involved using Raspberry Pi 4 deciphered by an eavesdropper, but it has limitations in
for performance evaluation and can be extended to assess terms of distance and speed of communication.
quantum-resistant TLS and DTLS schemes for IoT.
IV. MOTIVATION AND CHALLENGES
Security Issues and Countermeasures The increasing dependence on digital technologies
has led to a growing demand for secure and privacy-
Abidin et al. [35] discussed the use of quantum cryp- preserving cryptographic protocols. Quantum cryptography
tography and QKD in the DARPA Quantum Network for has emerged as a promising solution to address these chal-
secure VPN communication. The study elaborated on QKD lenges, particularly in the field of cryptocurrency. Quantum
protocols, algorithms, and their implementation with IPsec. cryptocurrency involves the use of quantum cryptography
The article highlights the promising nature of quantum protocols to provide secure transactions that are resistant to
cryptography for securing cyberspace and addressing inter- attacks from quantum computers. However, the implemen-
net security concerns. Kumar et al. [36] examined various tation of these protocols poses several challenges, and secu-
post-quantum cryptographic approaches for securing IoT rity and privacy issues need to be carefully considered. One
networks. The paper compared recent work in this area of the primary challenges in the implementation of quantum
Category Algorithms/Protocols Source Findings Challenges
QKD Protocols BB84, E91, BBM92, B92, Nurhadi et al. [21] B92 has the smallest probabil- -
Six-State Protocol, DPS, ity of error
SARG04, COW, S13
QKD Protocols BB84 variation Kalra and Poonia [22] Twice as capacitive as BB84 -
with almost half the error rate
QKD Protocols Single-photon source pro- Sasaki et al. [23] Secure key distribution based -
tocol on quantum mechanics
QKD Protocols GEOQKD system Dirks et al. [24] Achieves maximum tolerable -
loss of 41dB per channel
QKD Protocols Time-bin encoding with Williams et al. [25] Demonstrates time synchro- -
entangled photon pairs nization and eavesdropper de-
tection
QKD Protocols GaAs QD for QKD Schimpf et al. [26] Maintains fidelity to the Bell Degradation of entanglement
state at higher temperatures at higher temperatures
QKD Protocols Quantum repeater QKD Amer et al. [27] Identifies limitations in BSM -
grid networks success probability and deco-
herence rate
QKD Protocols Random forest algorithm Ding et al. [28] Contributes to the develop- -
for QKD parameter opti- ment of quantum communica-
mization tion technologies
QKD and QBC Proto- BB84 Dhoha et al. [29] Effective QKD protocol -
cols
QRNG and QKD Entropic uncertainty rela- Yao et al. [30] Analyzes behavior of ideal -
tions states for QRNG and QKD
Post-Quantum Cryp- Kyber, Saber, NTRU Mujdei et al. [31] Proposed new attack strategy Side-channel attacks
tography against countermeasures
Post-Quantum Cryp- InvBRLWE-based encryp- Imana et al. [32] Improved area-time complexi- -
tography tion ties and power efficiency
Post-Quantum Cryp- NTRU and Falcon algo- Prakasan et al. [33] Enhances security without sig- -
tography rithms nificant performance trade-offs
Post-Quantum Cryp- Kyber, Saber, Dilithium, Sajimon et al. [34] Optimal implementations for -
tography Falcon IoT devices
Security Issues and QKD in DARPA Quantum Abidin et al. [35] Promising nature of quantum -
Countermeasures Network cryptography for securing cy-
berspace
Security Issues and Post-quantum Kumar et al. [36] Lightweight and secure post- -
Countermeasures cryptographic approaches quantum cryptography for
for IoT small devices is expected to
emerge
Security Issues and QKD in DER networks Ahn et al. [37] Proposes using PQC and QKD Optimal cost and network
Countermeasures to protect DER networks configuration for quantum-safe
networks
Security Issues and Blockchain with QKD Gupta et al. [38] Proposed double-layered secu- -
Countermeasures rity system using QKD algo-
rithm for secure communica-
tion
Security Issues and CV-QKD modifications Lin et al. [39] Identifies security loopholes in Security proofs based on col-
Countermeasures CV-QKD lective attacks and practical
source/channel loss
Security Issues and Integrating QKD into op- Cao et al. [40] Proposed KaaS framework for -
Countermeasures tical networks incorporating QKD in optical
networks
Security Issues and BB84 QKD protocol secu- Su et al. [41] Provides a simple information- -
Countermeasures rity proof theoretic proof of security for
BB84

TABLE I: Summary of advancements and challenges in quantum cryptography.

 challenges and issues mentioned above. Table 1 provides
an overview of the papers reviewed in this survey, in-
cluding their focus, methodology, findings, and limitations.
The papers cover a range of topics, including quantum
key distribution, post-quantum cryptography, counterfactual
quantum key distribution, and key management. Through
the survey, we aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of
the current state of research in quantum cryptocurrency and
identify key challenges and future research directions.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our review of the literature on quantum cryptography,
including quantum key distribution (QKD), post-quantum
Fig. 1: Basic Block Diagram of QKD System cryptography, and their integration into optical networks,
has led to several significant findings and highlighted areas
for further discussion.

cryptocurrency is the development of secure quantum key QKD Protocols: Various QKD protocols such as
distribution (QKD) protocols. QKD protocols provide a se- BB84, E91, B92, and others have been developed to
cure method for generating shared secret keys between two enable secure key exchange between parties. While each
parties that can be used for cryptographic applications. Sev- protocol leverages the unique properties of quantum
eral QKD protocols have been proposed, including BB84, mechanics to provide information-theoretic security, they
E91, and B92. However, these protocols are vulnerable to face challenges in terms of performance, efficiency, and
attacks from quantum computers, and more robust protocols potential vulnerabilities. Further research and optimization
need to be developed. Another challenge in the implementa- of these protocols are required to enhance their practical
tion of quantum cryptocurrency is the development of post- implementation in quantum communication systems.
quantum cryptographic algorithms. Post-quantum cryptog-
raphy refers to cryptographic algorithms that are resistant to Post-Quantum Cryptography: Several post-quantum
attacks from both classical and quantum computers. While cryptographic techniques, including lattice-based cryptog-
several post-quantum cryptographic algorithms have been raphy, code-based cryptography, and isogeny-based cryp-
proposed, such as lattice-based cryptography, code-based tography, are being explored to develop cryptographic al-
cryptography, and hash-based cryptography, they are not gorithms that remain secure in the presence of quantum
yet widely adopted, and more research is needed to ensure adversaries. These algorithms show promise, but more
their security and efficiency. Security and privacy issues research is needed to ensure their security, efficiency, and
also need to be carefully considered in the implementation wide adoption in the face of quantum threats.
of quantum cryptocurrency. One of the primary security Integration of QKD into Optical Networks: The
concerns in quantum cryptocurrency is the possibility of integration of QKD into optical networks, such as Key-
quantum hacking. Quantum hacking involves intercepting as-a-Service (KaaS) models, has led to the development
and manipulating the qubits used in quantum cryptogra- of new service models and facilitated the deployment of
phy protocols, which can compromise the security of the QKD-based security solutions in existing networks. This
system. Several countermeasures have been proposed to advancement paves the way for widespread adoption of
prevent quantum hacking, such as decoy state methods quantum cryptography. However, practical implementation
and entanglement-based QKD protocols. Privacy is another challenges, including miniaturization, cost reduction, and
important consideration in quantum cryptocurrency. While compatibility with existing infrastructure, remain to be
quantum cryptography protocols provide a high degree of addressed.
security, they do not necessarily provide privacy. For exam-
ple, in QKD protocols, the privacy of the communication Security Issues and Countermeasures: Quantum
depends on the ability of the two parties to keep the hacking, side-channel attacks, and other vulnerabilities
secret key secure. If one party’s system is compromised, pose challenges to the security of quantum cryptography
the privacy of the communication can be compromised systems. Countermeasures such as decoy state methods,
as well. Solutions to these issues include privacy ampli- entanglement-based QKD protocols, privacy amplification
fication protocols and quantum coin flipping protocols. protocols, and quantum coin flipping protocols have been
Several research papers have been published on the topic of proposed to mitigate these threats. Further research is
quantum cryptocurrency, proposing various solutions to the needed to develop robust security measures that can
withstand the evolving threat landscape. 5. Quantum Cryptocurrency Security and Privacy: In
the context of quantum cryptocurrency, there is a need to
Quantum Cryptocurrency: The implementation of address specific security and privacy challenges. Research
quantum cryptography in cryptocurrency presents unique should focus on the development of secure and private
challenges, including secure QKD protocols, post-quantum quantum cryptocurrency systems, including the integration
cryptographic algorithms, and privacy concerns. While of privacy-preserving techniques and novel protocols that
research has been conducted to address these challenges, can protect user privacy while maintaining the security of
more work is needed to develop secure and efficient transactions.
quantum cryptocurrency systems. 6. Scalability and Interoperability: Practical implemen-
tation of quantum cryptography solutions requires scalable
Quantum cryptography holds significant potential for en- and interoperable systems that can seamlessly integrate with
hancing network security and privacy. Despite the progress existing communication infrastructure. Research should fo-
made in the field, several challenges and open research cus on developing scalable quantum cryptography systems
questions remain. Addressing these challenges and advanc- and protocols that can be easily deployed and integrated
ing the state of research in quantum cryptography will with existing networks and technologies.
contribute to the development of secure communication 7. Experimental Demonstration and Deployment: While
technologies and pave the way for practical applications, many quantum cryptography protocols and algorithms have
such as quantum cryptocurrency. been proposed and analyzed theoretically, there is a need for
more experimental demonstrations and real-world deploy-
VI. CHALLENGES AND OPEN RESEARCH QUESTIONS ments. Experimental research should focus on validating
and optimizing protocols, algorithms, and countermeasures
The following challenges and open research questions in realistic settings to better understand their performance
have been identified based on our review of the literature and limitations.
on quantum cryptography and quantum cryptocurrency: 8. Quantum Hacking and Countermeasures: As
quantum computing advances, the potential for quantum
1. Robust and Efficient QKD Protocols: The devel- hacking and other sophisticated attacks grows. Research
opment of practical, efficient, and robust QKD protocols should focus on identifying and addressing potential
is crucial for the widespread adoption of quantum cryp- security vulnerabilities in quantum cryptography systems
tography. Further research is needed to optimize existing and developing robust countermeasures that can withstand
protocols, address potential vulnerabilities, and devise new evolving threats.
protocols that can withstand advanced attacks, including
those from quantum adversaries. Addressing these challenges and open research questions
2. Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithm Develop- will contribute to the development of secure and practical
ment and Standardization: As the field of post-quantum quantum cryptography solutions and pave the way for
cryptography advances, more research is needed to ensure applications such as quantum cryptocurrency, enhancing
the security, efficiency, and interoperability of post-quantum the security and privacy of digital communication in the
cryptographic algorithms. Additionally, the development of quantum era.
standardized cryptographic algorithms and protocols that
can be widely adopted by industry and government is crit- VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
ical for securing communication systems against quantum The development and optimization of robust QKD pro-
threats. tocols that can withstand advanced attacks, as well as
3. Quantum-Resistant IoT Devices: With the increas- the exploration of secure and efficient post-quantum cryp-
ing prevalence of IoT devices, it is essential to develop tographic algorithms, ensuring their interoperability and
lightweight and efficient cryptographic solutions that can standardization. As IoT devices become more prevalent,
be implemented on resource-constrained devices. Research lightweight and efficient cryptographic solutions tailored
should focus on optimizing post-quantum cryptographic for resource-constrained devices will be crucial. This will
algorithms for IoT devices and exploring efficient QKD involve optimizing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms
solutions tailored for IoT environments. and QKD solutions for IoT environments. In addition,
4. Secure Key Management and Storage: The security research should explore novel approaches for key manage-
of quantum cryptography systems depends on the secure ment, distribution, and storage in quantum cryptography
management and storage of cryptographic keys. Research systems to maintain security in the face of quantum threats.
should explore novel approaches for key management, The development of secure and private quantum cryp-
distribution, and storage that can maintain security even tocurrency systems is another important area for research,
in the presence of quantum threats. which involves integrating privacy-preserving techniques
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