CHAPTER I CASES that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance

with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997 of general circulation.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs. It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, purpose;
MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, respondents
1. refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional;
“Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for inerpreation, 2. refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
vacillation, or equivocation, there is only rom for application”. circulation, and is procedural.

“When the law is clear, it is now susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless who The ruling of the RTC is not in favor with the private respondents. However, the CA reversed
may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or erroneous.” the decision for the reason that the failure to cause such publication is mere a procedural and it
will deprive the CA of its authority to grant the application. Thus, the application "for want of
NATURE OF THE CASE jurisdiction” was granted by the CA and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado.
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such
publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared
November 19, 1991.
The Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision promulgated
on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution promulgated on November 19, 1991 by The SG disagreed an appeal by certiorari before the SC, however istead of certiorari the SC treat
Respondent Court of Appeals. his (SG) petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65, because
he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS OF THE CASE
ISSUE OF THE CASE
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. W/N the Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" in holding that
publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC even in the absence of publication of it
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch in a newspaper in general criculation.
44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.6 However, during the
pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold RULING
and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of without prejudice. No costs.
jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. The land registration court cannot validly confirm and register the title of private respondents,
due to the absence of publication in a newspaper of general circulation
However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1)
of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The
Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its FACTS OF THE CASE
import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present
case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants'
subject property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed MacArthur Highway. In a letter dated December 15, 1994,respondents-movants demanded the
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Celestino R. Contreras
by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The (Contreras), then District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of the DPWH,
reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated offered to pay for the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, per
as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan.
may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all
Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents-movants demanded the return of their property, or the
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. payment of compensation at the current fair market value. Hence, the complaint for recovery of
Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered possession with damages filed by respondents-movants.
because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense
with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and Respondents-movants were able to obtain favorable decisions in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there and the Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred
is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.19 Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum.
There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents
The SC, however, did not agree with both courts and ruled instead that just compensation should
must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
be based on the value of the property at the time of taking in 1940, which is Seventy Centavos
shall have been duly complied with.
(P0.70) per square meter. In addition, and by way of compensation, we likewise awarded an
G.R. No. 179334 April 21, 2015 interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 1940 until full payment.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and
ISSUES OF THE CASE
DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs. W/N the Motion for Reconsideration to the assailed decision regards the “just compensation”
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents. should be based on the value of the property at the time of the taking.
“The Courts first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express Expropriation is a legal proceeding that allows the government or certain public entities
terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process designated by law to dispossess a person from part or all of their property without their consent.
of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls The owners must be compensated fairly based on the market value of the property. The court
for application. Equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the may consider various factors to determine the value of the land. The expropriation must be for a
law and jurisprudence.” public purpose, otherwise the action can be dismissed.
NATURE OF THE CASE RULING
For Resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration iled by respondents-movants spouses Heracleo The SC denied the MR of the respondents and maintain its decision with modification dated July
and Ramona Tecson imploring the Court to take a second look at its July 1, 2013 Decision, the 1, 2013 which that just compensation should be based on the value of the property at the time of
dispositive portion. taking in 1940, which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter. In addition, and by way of
compensation, we likewise awarded an interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 1940 until
full payment.
Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, RULING
broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course
of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives No, "it shall be unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."
by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken
"Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
impossible or inadequate without them." The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967 set aside.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
vs.
“The first fudamental duty of the court is to apply the law.” PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.

FACTS OF THE CASE “The duty of the court is to apply the disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the
accused”
The accused in this case MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG was convicted of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. It is a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section FACTS OF THE CASE
2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as
This case is from frustrated murder to murder. (3 weeks of being confined before his death)
further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
 That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, PATRICIO AMIGO alias
said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and
"BEBOT", armed with a knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill
under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one
number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary
Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his death and
license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.
Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:
secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;
another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; the oath of office of the of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying
accused as such secret agent, a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to death and to
pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual damages and
ISSUE OF THE CASE
P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
W/N a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm.
 ISSUE OF THE CASE the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade
Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation
W/N there was an error committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of functions. Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created under the
Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. new law.

RULING On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the
No, the Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and
disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The
unconstitutional.
remedy is elsewhere — clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the
legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law. According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article VI,
Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill passed by
CHAPTER II CASES Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof"
CONSTITUTIONAL TEST IN THE PASSAGE OF A BILL After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
G.R. No. 197676 February 4, 2014
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision2 denying the petition. The trial court held
BUILDERS'ASSOCIATION, Petitioners, that the assailed provisions are relevant to the title of the law as they are intended to regulate the
vs. practice of real estate service in the country by ensuring that those who engage in it shall either
PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and be a licensed real estate broker, or under the latter’s supervision.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, Respondents.
ISSUE OF THE CASE
“The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under
reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution
and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object”
RULING
NATURE OF THE CASE
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule. Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:
Petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as unconstitutional Sections expressed in the title thereof.
28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
FACTS OF THE CASE legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls
for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed
into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and
salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so THE DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. vs.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.10 (Emphasis supplied.) ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution is NATURE OF THE CASE
satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and
aside the Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional
title.11 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu).
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing FACTS OF THE CASE
for the method and means of carrying out the general object.12
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is sixteen (16) years of age.
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect.13
Indeed, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
"so as not to cripple or impede legislation."14 by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.
Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the
Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in
Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." Aside from provisions establishing a the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
regulatory system for the professionalization of the real estate service sector, the new law less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties. Henceforth, gave support to the son, Roderigo.
real estate developers are prohibited from performing acts or transactions constituting real estate
service practice without first complying with registration and licensing requirements for their Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
business, brokers or agents, appraisers, consultants and salespersons. and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business
known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.
To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A.
No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14
Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien. In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, the Court held that –

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality." staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion for It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
Hence, the petioner filed petition for review on certiorari before the SC. altogether.

ISSUE OF THE CASE In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
W/N a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law despite
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
the fact that the law of the country of the said foreign national do not obliged the parents to
and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
support their children.
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
RULING
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not excused from complying enunciated that:
with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. Respondent also
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
support.
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
 CHAPTER III CASES

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 [T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
vs. offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
“+Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute” respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant
petition.
FACTS OF THE CASE
ISSUE OF THE CASE
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the W/N Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in parties to the conversation and merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation
a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and by a party other than those involved in the communication.
public policy."
W/N the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in
RULING
addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the The SC disagree on both issues and the petition was denied.
confrontation made by petitioner.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms,
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
participant to the communication. using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
Division) of June 19, 1989. authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that: involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as FACTS OF THE CASE
respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) The petitioners are all Justices of the Court of Appeals. Justices Veloso and Fernando claim
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200. longevity pay for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their
compensation package. Justice Gacutan, who has recently retired, claims deficiency payment of
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted her longevity pay for the services she had rendered before she joined the Judiciary, as well as a
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the re-computation of her retirement pay to include the claimed longevity pay.
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. The law under which they claim their longevity pay is provided in B.P. 129, Section 42, to wit;

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance Section 42. Longevity pay.- A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of ..the monthly basic
of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the pay shall be paid to the Justices an'd Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of
acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided , That in no
devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a case hall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added,
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. The Supreme Court ruled that the only
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the service recognized for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is
respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a service in the Judiciary, not service in any other branch of government. Hence, their previous
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be positions in the government, specifically both serving as NLRC Commissioners (Justice Veloso
professed." and Justice Gacutan) and serving as COMELEC Commissioner (Justice Fernando) cannot be
credited in the computation of their longevity pay.
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word ISSUE OF THE CASE
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word
Whether or not Section 42 of BP 129 should be given a liberal interpretation by the Cou rt.
communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing RULING
or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a
gestures)". law (in this case, the provision granting longevity pay) is to examine the law itself to see what it
plainly says. This is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction.
VERBA LEGIS OR PLAIN MEANING RULE
Section 42 of this law has heretofore been quoted, but for convenience is again quoted below
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA; No. 12-9-5-SC; & No. 13-02-07-SC June 16, 2015
Section 42. Longevity pay.-A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay
Request of Court of Appeals JusticeS Vicente S.E. Veloso, Angelita A. Gacutan Remedios shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five vears of
A. Salazar-Fernando for computation/adjustment of longevity pay. continuous, efficient , and meritorious service rndered in the judiciary; provided That in no case
shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed
“The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a
the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.
law is to examine the law itself to see what it plainly says. This is the plain meaning rule of
statutory construction” As written, the language and terms of this provision are very clear and unequivocal: longevi ty
pay is granted to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of
continuous, efficient and meritorious service i_n the Judiciary. The granted monthly longevity three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint against
pay is equivalent to 5'Yo of the monthly basic pay. petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal,
vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in
The plain reading of Section 42 shows that longevity pay is not available even to a judicial writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of her
officer who is not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer inability to refute and disprove these findings.
in the Executive simply because he or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also be
available to a judge or justice for past services he or she did not render within the Judiciary as After due hearing, the Labor Arbi ter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner
services rendered outside the Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay is not contemplated by law. company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full
backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal.
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992 Petitioner was also ordered to pay private responden t moral damages of P50,000.00.
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. On appeal, pu blic respondent National Labor Relations Commission in the questioned resolu
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, tion dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement
respondents. of private respondent bu t limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the
award for moral damages.
In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion
operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close. in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private responden t were illegal and
in ordering her reinstatement with two ( 2) years backwages.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare
parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the ISSUE OF THE CASE
investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the
company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a W/N the respondent violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting
partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, with the company's interests that cause for her suspension.
owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services ( Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often
RULING
recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing
Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived Labor Arbiter Decision: After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985,
with ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position
and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the
Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after
illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of
petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar.
P50,000.00.
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated
NLRC Decision: On December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the
company regulation by involving her:$elf in transactions conflicting with the company's
reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and
interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to th articles of partnership between
deleted the award for moral damages. December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with
Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts
respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two
of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
(2) years and deleted the award for moral damages.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent
SC Decision: On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR, but not for
Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving
dismissal.
her thirty (30) days within which to explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanation,
Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have
the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not signify expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.27 Verba legis non est
that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the
explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or
pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception,
such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between
We agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual the employer and the employee.
separation from employment was not for cause.
G.R. No. 109445, November 7, 1994
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a vs.
person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON
accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed? in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides: “When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.”

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the NATURE OF THE CASE
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309,
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other which among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused,
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
FACTS OF THE CASE
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code: Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu,
the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute
authorized by existing laws. between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment,
however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of
the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground
shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been
statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that
legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was
the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express insufficient to show conspiracy.
its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the evidence against
provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."1 The claim was filed sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages.2 In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted
with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who
that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay moral and
beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the exemplary damages and ordered deported.3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation for
deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability
there was basis for finding that he was "probably guilty." to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to
compensation under sec. 3(a).
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of
Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993: The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence
of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and "accusation is not synonymous with guilt,"4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proof
imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the
and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of unjust prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite
imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly
victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on convicted.
his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been
"unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is
ISSUE OF THE CASE
important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
Whether or not the term "unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the
virtue of a judgment of acquittal" refer to all kinds of accusation and conviction. prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum
of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
RULING

Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on
appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial
court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that
when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of
the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read:
"The following may file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."

But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The
fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the
previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his
conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be
acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in