Second Memo From GCI To The UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee' and Their 2009 ENQUIRY Into

Second Memo from GCI
to the UK House of Commons

‘Environmental Audit Committee’
and their 2009 ENQUIRY into
‘Targets in the UK Climate Act: -
Where did they come from?
Were the models upon which they were based valid’?
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2
Contents
Summary for Policy Makers 4
CCC Odds are Worse than 50:50 for a maximum 2 Degrees Scenario 6
GCI Odds are Better than 50:50 for a maximum 2 Degrees Scenario 7
1 Introduction 8
The Environmental Audit Committee [EAC] Enquiry into the Climate Act
Was the Government misled by the CCC?
Political Derivation of UK Government emissions scenario in the CCC report
2 Sink performance 9
‘Sink- Efficiency’ - is this what the EAC Enquiry really turns on?
Comment on UK Government preferred emissions scenario in the CCC report
Argument unresolved 10
Sources and Sinks - Government imprudence with a ‘Wicked Problem’?
3 IPCC Climate modelling 14
IPCC - 1994-2007 - with various contraction:concentrations scenarios.

IPCC coupled/uncoupled for contraction:concentrations scenarios
IPCC AR4 18-19
Results for climate sensitivity 6°C. MAGICC 5.3; Hansen et al. (2008).
4 CCC lead scenario 22
Setting the goal-posts around “2016:4% low”.

Is this claim unreliably ‘optimistic’?
5 Analysis of CCC scenario range 24
CCC’s 2016:4% Low - 10th Percentile

CCC’s 2016:4% Low - Median
CCC’s 2028:3% - Median and 10 & 90th Percentiles
Appendices 22
A Method & modelling used for defining UK emissions reduction targets

B Correspondence
3
Summary for Policy Makers
Introduction
1. The EAC Enquiry set up in April 2009 asked about “’targets’ in the UK Climate Act: - where did they
come from and were the model[s] on which they were based valid?”
2. Detail supporting this summary is given in this “Second Memo from GCI to the UK House of Commons
Environmental Audit Committee and their 2009 Enquiry into Targets in the UK Climate Act”.
3. The Committee on Climate Change [CCC] acknowledged that the targets originally came from the
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution [RCEP] Report [2000]. The RCEP report recognised
the validity of the Contraction and Convergence [C&C] model and advocated its adoption as the global
mitigation framework.
Global context
1. UK targets and budgets will be subject to an international treaty mandated by the UNFCCC. This treaty
must comply with the existing Convention in achieving a safe and sustainable level of concentrations
in the atmosphere to avoid dangerous climate change, in accordance with the UNFCCC principles of
equity and precaution.
2. C&C has been proposed by many as the necessary global framework for the treaty. Evidence given
by Lord Turner [CCC Chair] to both the EAC and the Energy and Climate Change Committee [ECCC]
in February and March this year acknowledged the CCC report was, “strong support for what GCI has
been saying” and confirmed two global C&C points of relevance to policy makers:
• that converging to equal per capita entitlements globally is the only option that is in his words,
“doable and fair” for organising and sharing the full-term emissions-contraction-event to bring us
to UNFCCC-compliance.
• that “if, for reasons of urgency the rate of global contraction has to be accelerated, for reasons of
equity the rate of international convergence has to be accelerated relative to that.”
3. We urge the Parliamentarians of the EAC to continue their advocacy of C&C, aware that many others
are now making this judgement as well [see page 9 this memo].
UK targets and budgets are too little too late
1. The CCC report has a calculated policy prescription for the global emissions contraction event, with the
leading scenario designated 2016:4% low [see pages 22 & 23 this memo] and Government repeatedly
claim this gives us a 50:50 chance of avoiding a two degree Celsius temperature rise globally. It thus
prescribes the contraction event, rather than proposing the C&C model as a basis of negotiation.
2. CCC say this is broadly in line with the 50% cut in emissions globally by 2050 agreed at the G-8 in
2007/8 (base year not specified). However, the global emissions reduction target calculated by CCC
and shown in the Appendix is 34%-46% below 1990 levels by 2050. By comparison, the EU target is to
reduce global emissions to at least 50% below 1990 levels by that date.
3. It embeds a convergence to equal per capita sharing globally by 2050, requiring therefore an 80% cut
in emissions by 2050 for the UK and Annex One parties. It thus prescribes the convergence year, rather
than proposing the C&C model as a basis of negotiation.
4. The CCC says it is fully up to date with the latest coupled-carbon-cycle feedback. While CCC correctly
note that, “feedbacks further alter GHG concentrations in response to climate change: in particular,
carbon cycle feedbacks are likely to add to CO2 concentrations and have been incorporated into the
latest model projections”. The prescription was processed by the Hadley Centre with the use of an
out-of-date version of the ‘MAGICC’ model [4.1] with assumptions made in 2004. The next version of
MAGICC was 5.3, “brought up to date after IPCC AR4 [2007]” and the current version is 6.
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5. IPCC AR4 says, “The emission reduction to meet a particular stabilisation level reported in the
mitigation studies assessed here might be underestimated due to carbon cycle feedbacks,” and “CO2
emissions in most models do not include emissions from decay of above ground biomass that remains
after logging and deforestation, and from tundra-melt, peat fires and drained peat soils.”
6. The impression is spun that the CCC’s scenario is consistent with 50:50 odds for avoiding atmospheric
concentrations of 500 ppmv CO e and a global 2o Celsius temperature rise though in the fine-print of the
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CCC Appendix, the odds of success in avoiding 2o C are shown as 44% and not 50%.
7. The CCC’s UK emissions reduction targets and carbon budgets are thus founded on global targets that
are insufficient to provide an acceptable level of security to remain within 2o C warming above pre-industrial
levels. Further, the UK strategy is highly dependent on COP 15 arriving at an agreement that would secure
the objective of keeping global temperature rise to within the 2o C limit. Failure at Copenhagen would result in
delay to Peak and could require significantly faster rates of reduction to be adopted.
CCC Methods and modelling
1. GCI asked the CCC and the Hadley Centre about the coupled-carbon-cycle feedback effects that we
observed were omitted from the scenarios and they spent much time asserting that these effects had
all been dealt with. We questioned the unexpectedly rapid gains in ‘sink-efficiency’ shown in the CCC
scenarios and the Hadley Centre offered to perform runs of the GCM to seek corroboration of what they
had done with MAGICC. As things stand this has not yet been done and we recommend that the EAC
press for this. As a holding position the Hadley Centre observed that these rates of efficiency gain seem
to be, “physically reasonable behaviour for some plausible values of the model parameters we use in
MAGICC to represent the uncertainty in scientific understanding.”
2. This is a vague and an insufficient response, as it quantitatively:
3. Contradicts all IPCC published contraction:concentration scenarios for the last 15 years [pp 14/15]
4. Contradicts the coupled carbon-cycle feedback models from the C4MIP results published in IPCC AR4
[2007] and profoundly contradicts James Hansen [see memo pp 16/17 19/20].
5. Repeats the same parameters in all nine of the CCC scenarios, from 2014:3% low to 2028:1.5% and
from 1.5 - 5.25 degrees Celsius temperature rise, monotonically.
6. The “plausible values of the model parameters” they used in MAGICC were not revealed in the CCC
report. However, it appears they were uniformly applied throughout the range of scenarios with a wide
range of temperature variance.
7. This procedure raises questions on the validity of the CCC/Hadley Centre approach: the monotonic
application of assumptions and parameters across all emissions scenarios modelled with widely
differing values. In this way the CCC scenarios mimic a conceptual shortcoming in models over the last
17 years: - tipping points and the fact that the most important feedback effects leading to these, are still
not in the climate-models being used.
GCI target and budget recommendation for enough, soon enough
1. As shown on pages 6 and 7, GCI proposes that to keep within 2 degrees, a global contraction budget
no more than 350 - 400 GTC, with a minimum 80% cut all emissions globally by 2050 and negotiating a
convergence to equal per capita shares of this globally to have occurred within one third of the timeline for
contraction i.e. no later than 2030. This is as indicated in GCI’s first memorandum to the EAC enquiry.
2. We also recommend that the EAC recommend to the UK Government and its negotiators a more can
did and coherent C&C basis for their negotiating strategy at the UNFCCC. Their handling of the C&C
argument so far has been a ‘half-truth’; lacking transparency it has been partial and prescriptive.
3. We are confident that arguing the ‘whole truth’ of C&C - the truth of contraction and the reconciliation
of convergence - and openly encouraging this truly global ‘framework-based market’ to be the stated
basis of negotiation and reconciliation at the UNFCCC, will foster the atmosphere of ‘justice without
vengeance’ that the process now so urgently needs.
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CCC Odds are Worse than 50:50 for a maximum 2 Degrees Scenario
6
GCI Odds are Better than 50:50 for a maximum 2 Degrees Scenario
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1. Introduction
The Environmental Audit Committee [EAC] Enquiry into the Climate Act
1. The EAC Enquiry - “Targets in the UK Climate Act - Where did they Come From and were the models
upon which they were based valid?” - was set up in April 2009. It was done in response to a challenge
to the evidence given in February to the EAC by Adair Turner, the Chair of the UK Government’s
Climate Change Committee [CCC]. Speaking about the CCC ‘Building a Low Carbon Economy’
Report and the Climate Act that was based on it, Adair Turner informed the EAC that in all the ‘climate-
modelling’ upon which their targets were based, all the relevant feedback effects - or coupled carbon
cycle feedback effects - were included. GCI challenged this point saying the situation was worse than
had been portrayed by CCC.
2. Both to the EAC and to the new Climate Minister at DECC, Adair Turner explained the rationale behind
the ‘new’ Government target of an 80% emissions cut in the UK by 2050: - it all came from the Royal
Commission Report of 2000 that had advocated the principle of Contraction and Convergence [C&C].
Starting there he argued, if the world agreed as a whole to a 50% cut in emissions by 2050, an 80% cut
within this for the UK and all the Developing Countries, would bring everyone to a per capita average
globally of 2 tonnes CO2e by 2050. He said there was no other way likely to the ‘global climate deal’ so
urgently needed to keep at or below 2 degrees Celsius and so avoid dangerous rates of climate change.
3. After 2000 the EAC has steadily supported the principle of C&C but the Government had steadily
resisted it. EAC members knew this ‘convergence’ to equal per capita globally was a turnaround for the
Government.
Was the Government misled by the CCC?

1. As the authors of the C&C principle since 1990 and the formal calculus since 1995, GCI has tracked the
growing support for C&C internationally. So we had an interest in this evolution in the UK Government’s
position which we welcomed. However, we wrote to the EAC Chairman saying that Adair Tuner had
unintentionally misled the EAC on the matter of all the feedbacks being ‘in’ the models.
2. We referred EAC to the IPCC AR4 WG1 Chapter 10. In this the coupled carbon cycle feedback models
were clearly distinguished from the uncoupled carbon cycle feedback models where the quantitative
differences between these emissions scenarios for different ‘contraction:concentration-events’ was
shown to be very considerable [see pages 16 and 17 of this memo].
3. GCI’s evidence to the EAC Enquiry showed the reduced size of future ‘contraction:concentration-
events’ in the coupled runs was a major revision of the ‘contraction:concentration-events’ reported by
IPCC as necessary for ‘stabilization’ of ghg levels in the atmosphere.
4. The IPCC had published information on this starting in 1994 and again in 1995 [SAR], again 2000 [TAR]
and again in the main report in 2007 [AR4] [see pages 16 and 17 of this memo]. However, in the Policy
Maker’s Summary of the AR4 attention was repeatedly drawn to increasing inefficiency of sinks and
concern was expressed about the omission from the models of potentially major feedback effects.
Political Derivation of UK Government emissions scenario in the CCC report

1. A global-consensus-seeking position on ‘Post-Kyoto Emissions’ was started by Al Gore on Earth Day
2006: - a global cut in emissions of 50% by 2050 inside which the Developed Countries would cut by
80% to arrive at a global per capita emissions average of around two tonnes per person per annum by
that date. This ‘two-degrees’ ‘C&C-position’ was then acknowledged, taken up, advocated and even
supported widely: -
• Nicholas Stern saw it as a position with ‘ethical attractions’ in his 2006 Report.
• It was adopted by UNDP in their Annual Report for 2007.
• It was argued for at the Government’s Progressive Governance Conference in 2008.
• Angela Merkel advocated it in 2008.
• Nicholas Sarkozy advocated it in 2008.
• Ross Garnaut [Stern’s opposite number in Australia] advocated it in his Report
• C&C was advocated at the G-8 in 2007 and 2008.
• The 15th SAARC summit adopted C&C in 2008.
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2. The UK Government adopted C&C in the CCC’s BLCE Report and the Climate Act in December 2008.
Adair Turner told the EAC in February, “The core [of the UK Climate Act] is contract and converge.
We cannot imagine a global deal which is both doable and fair which doesn’t end up by mid-century
with roughly equal rights per capita to emit and that is clearly said in the report. This is strong support
for what GCI has been saying.”
3. A selection of institutional support for C&C shows it has been extensive and high-level
• RIBA adopted C&C in 2006.
• The International Union of Architects adopted C&C in 2008.
• The British Medical Association adopted C&C in 2008.
• The LANCET/UCL Commission adopted C&C in 2008.
• The World Health Organization promoted the need for C&C in the 2008 report.
• The Asia Development Bank advocated C&C in their 2009 ‘Development Challenge’.
• The Global Humanitarian Forum in Geneva adopted it in 2009.
• The World Bank acknowledged it in their report in 2009.
• The UN World Economic and Social survey acknowledged it in their report in 2009.
• The Optimum Population Trust adopted C&C with a ‘population base--year’ in 2009.
4. The extent of support over the years for C&C is now vastly greater than this. It is certainly true to say it
is the most widely cited model in the debate and arguably the most widely supported.
5. The purpose of making these comments about the global C&C frame-of-reference is to encourage the
UK Government to avoid the political cost of arguing the case for C&C locally through to the Climate Act
yet irrationally failing to advocate this global rationale globally at the UNFCCC negotiations.
6. Negotiations are now breaking down yet again over the predictably iterative and worsening quarrel
between Developed and Developing Countries over the principled sharing of the future rights to emit
subject to the overall limit that achieves the objective of the UNFCCC.
7. After the G-8 2007, Angela Merkel stated that convergence to equal per capita globally, but not
further than that as that would not be fair, is what she supported. However, arguing for accelerated
convergence, Developing Countries are calling for deeper cuts and sooner by the Developed Countries.
In the context of a necessary demand for a global contraction that caps everyone, Developed Countries’
are fumbling this and in response, stating that ‘science does not trump equity, India is now openly
supporting China’s yet more extreme demand for ‘accumulated per capita convergence’ and looney
leftist proposals [such as GDRs] are being introduced in support of this demanding negative emissions
rights for Developed Countries within two decades plus huge reparation payments to the injured parties.
8. As the UNFCCC Secretariat itself has said, “Contraction and Convergence is inevitably required to
achieve the objective of the UNFCCC [2004].” For UNFCCC-compliance, validation of this rests on
the issue of the correct rates of C&C, as rates which fail to achieve the objective of the UNFCCC will
progressivley invalidate everything.
2. Sink performance
Sink- Efficiency’ - is this what the EAC Enquiry really turns on?
1. Having repeatedly advocated C&C since 2005, EAC members were aware of these matters. The feeling
was that while adopting the right principle was welcome, advocating it at the wrong rates was not and
negotiating the right rates was the inevitable requirement.
2. Evidence taken by the DECC Committee from Adair Turner in March, agreed with proposition that if for
reasons of urgency that rate of Contraction had to be accelerated, then for reasons of equity the rate
of Convergence had to be accelerated relative to that. However, for the rest of the year, evidence from
CCC and the UKMO and letters from Adair Turner Ministers at DECC resisted this, simply saying that all
feedback warnings had been heeded and all feedback effects had been modelled.
3. This is incorrect. Analysis of the CCC position shows that contrary to these claims, ‘sink-efficiency’ will
increase dramatically and this extraordinary claim is what the EAC enquiry now turns on.
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Comment on UK Government preferred emissions scenario in the CCC report
1. The UK climate change Act is based on the report of the Committee on Climate Change [CCC] from
December 2008. The CCC report correctly says that: - “Work on the carbon cycle in particular has
highlighted the danger that global warming will reduce the rate of absorption of atmospheric CO2 by
terrestrial carbon sinks, such as forests, and the oceans. These currently absorb around half of all
manmade CO2 emissions.”
2. The report then goes on: - “However, as temperatures increase, the effectiveness of sinks is predicted
to decline. For any given level of manmade emissions, this would result in a higher long-term increase
in CO2 concentrations and hence temperatures.”
3. In conclusion, the CCC report actually says that with its ‘preferred’ scenario, humanity has a worse
than 50:50 chance of avoiding more than 2 degree Celsius temperature rise with the CO2 emissions
contraction-event as quantified here, although in the fine print it gives only a 44% chance.
4. The CCC published spreadsheets setting out the quantitative detail for this their preferred scenario.
These show that while temperature continues to rise until 2134 and to a value of 2.134 Degrees
Celsius, concentrations fall very rapidly as emissions fall.
5. With slim argument and without any evidence to support this and much evidence to suggest the
unlikeliness of these claims, the Government’s preferred scenario shows that the ratio of source:sinks
or the sink-efficiency for CO2 suddenly increases from 50% of emissions to more than 100% within 40
years while temperature continues to rise [see pages 26 and 27 of this memo].
6. This rate of gain for sink-efficiency [negative feedback] is without precedent and is very suspect as
are the alleged 50:50 odds for ‘success’ that are based upon it. It means somewhat improbably that
the natural sinks will actually pull CO2 out of the atmosphere faster than we are adding CO2 to it with
emissions.
Argument unresolved.
1. The sudden arrival of this extent of negative feedback is momentous. If ‘true’, why wasn’t it even
mentioned? Could it be that nobody even noticed it?
2. The contradiction between what CCC says and what its model shows is clear. Yet Ministers from
DECC, the CCC executive and technical experts from the Hadley Centre have been defending the
CCC position throughout this year, coordinating their message in letters and evidence to the record in
the enquiry by the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee [EAC] and beyond without any
mention or apparently even awareness of this
3. The Hadley Centre have now [in September 2009] acknowledged there is an issue and have con
sidered running the GCM again to see if it corroborates what the CCC scenario shows. This is not a
small issue. GCI submits this memo to the EAC wondering whether it will happen. It remains to be seen
how the Hadley Centre, the CCC and DECC deal with this.
4. We wrote to the Hadley Centre on 21 10 2009 to ask if they agree that in the two images [here on
pages 6 and 7] the odds for remaining at or below 2 degrees Celsius are better in the case marked
‘better’ than they are in the case marked ‘worse’?
5. As at 23 10 2009, we have not yet received a reply though the key meeting between EAC and the CCC
is on the 27 10 2009.
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Sources and Sinks - Government imprudence with a ‘Wicked Problem’?
1. The issue of climate change has been described as ‘a wicked problem’.
2. In fact long-before we settle on the correct path for resolving this, the challenge of conceptualising,
let-alone measuring the changing relationship between sources and sinks of greenhouse gas into the
future is itself a truly ‘wicked problem’.
3. In very simple terms of ‘stock-and-flow’ it helps to understand this relationship with the following bath-
tap-plug analogy: -
• emissions ‘sources’ are a ‘flow’ [like water from a tap] into
• the atmosphere which is a ‘stock’ [like a bath where the water accumulates]
• with ‘sinks’ [like a plug-hole] where flow drains away from the atmosphere [bath].
4. Since industrialisation sources of human emissions to the atmosphere have risen [like a tap flowing
faster and faster] raising the level of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere [like a bath level
rising] while the sinks [the plug-hole] initially grew at an average of half the rate of the emissions.
5. The resulting ‘airborne fraction of emissions’ was on average constant at 50% of emissions over time
and so CO2 concentrations rose over the two hundred years since industrialisation from 280 to over 380
parts per million by volume, nudging global temperature upwards and changing global climate.
6. The really wicked problem of conceptualising relates to what happens next: - i.e. in the future.
7. If emissions contraction is recognized as a way of stopping the rise of concentrations, the key question
is: - what is the rate of emissions contraction required to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the
atmosphere at a level below dangerous i.e. to be UNFCCC-compliant? In other words, how fast do we
need to turn the tap off?
8. The diagram opposite shows the past where concentrations rose at a roughly constant rate of 50% of
emissions retained in the atmosphere with the other 50% of emissions returned to the natural sinks
in the biosphere on land and in the ocean. A key here is that as sources expanded, sinks expanded
to accommodate around half of what was emitted but as sink-efficiency decreases, they appear to be
absorbing less than 50%.
9. What the diagram opposite suggests is that in the future the relationship between source and sinks is a
dimension of understanding that is highly contested.
10. What happens to concentrations depends variously on: -
• the rate of emissions contraction [the only factor we can directly control]
• the rate of sink-failure or sink-recovery [a factor over which we have less if any control]
• even that sinks can turn to sources [as a forest burns down for example]
• even that sinks can expand more rapidly than sources contract and so take away more than 100%
of emissions [as the UK Government is saying] which would increase ocean-acidification even as we
were ‘solving the problem’
• all interactively affected by the rate of temperature change triggered by the above.
11. Trying to mathematically model this is the only way we can try to organize to meet the conceptual
challenge. Having said that, the models are only models and we all know that many significant factors
[like methane release from the clathrate deposits and CO2 release from melted tundra] are left out.
We can only guess at what the temperature-led ‘tipping points’ are, beyond which, those factors
come irresistibly into play. We do know that while temperature rises, we are going closer to these tip
ping points, not further away from them. It is considerations of these acute risks that have led James
Hansen to create 350.0rg and demand 100% cuts by even 2020, ‘bull-dozing coal fired power plants’ if
necessary [see pages 20 and 21 of this document].
12. So for the UK Government to advocate the “2016:4% low” scenario to generate a global consensus for
C&C with ‘50:50’ odds while depending on this ‘heroic’ source:sink modelling is misleading.
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3. IPCC climate modelling
IPCC - 1994-2007 - with various contraction:concentrations scenarios.
1. 1. Since the 1980s ‘climate models’ have been developed to help predict the future atmospheric
concentration of CO2 and CH4 under various forest and fossil-fuel burning ‘scenarios’. With that, the
implications of this array of potential ‘futures’ on global temperature and climate change have been
assessed.
2. A main focus of these has been on the ‘carbon-cycle’ through the oceans, atmosphere and biosphere,
but as influenced by the impact of the emissions of these gases from human sources as a result of the
start of burning forests and fossil fuels [coal, oil, gas] with the onset of industrialisation.
3. The principal carbon cycle model used to help answer this question was the ‘Berne Model’ and out
put from it was first published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] in 1994.
Five ‘scenarios’ were published; these were future carbon-emissions ‘contraction-events’ or ‘budg
ets’ for outcomes of 350, 450, 550, 650 and 750 ppmv atmospheric CO2 concentration in the global
atmosphere.
4. These reflected a judgment given in the IPCC’s ‘First Assessment Report’ [FAR] from 1990. In 1990
the atmospheric CO2 concentration was 353 parts per million by volume [ppmv] or 25% above the pre-
industrial maximum value of 280 ppmv. IPCC’s judgment was that an immediate 60-80% cut in human
emissions of CO2 would be needed if the upward rise in the atmospheric concentration of CO2 in that
year were to be halted immediately. They didn’t say it had to be done and they didn’t say it didn’t; but
two things were crucial.
5. First: - it was apparently not the 100% cessation of emissions that was required. Continuing with
40-20% of emissions was judged to be
consistent with atmosphere CO2 ‘stabilisa
tion’. This view came from observing human
emissions and global concentrations of
CO2 since 1800. Measurements covering
those 200 years showed [a] roughly half of
any year’s emissions from human sources
returned to the apparently enlarging natural
‘sinks’ for CO2 and [b] the other half remained
in the atmosphere - where a pattern
seemed to have emerged of what became
misleadingly known as the ‘Constant Airborne
Fraction’ [CAF].
6. Second: - the ‘airborne fraction’. Whether
this fraction was in reality constant or not,
it was cumulative because the human
emissions that stayed in the atmosphere
added up over time as a rising ‘stock’. That
explained the rise in ppmv of atmospheric
concentrations of CO2. By June 1992 the
UN had agreed a Climate Convention, the
objective of which was to stabilise the rise
of ghg in the global atmosphere below a
value that was ‘dangerous’. The probability
of ‘positive-feedback’ where natural ‘sinks’
ceased to enlarge, shrank and even turned to
sources, so accelerating the rates of climate
change was largely ignored, as they were
‘speculative’ and difficult to model.
7. Fossil fuel dependency had become
fundamental to modern economic activity
and the correlation of GDP to CO2 from fossil
fuel burning has been and remains at nearly
100%. The heat-trapping implications of rising
CO2 had serious implications for the future.
The climate change questions ‘how much
how soon’ became ‘will the benefits of global
growth gradually be outweighed by the dam
ages caused by global climate changes’.
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8. All the questions about UK carbon budgets in the Climate Act asked by the EAC relate to that global
question. In this ‘battle-of-the-rates’ the C&C propositions offered by GCI for the last 15 years relate to
feedbacks and fighting that battle by answering that question rationally.
9. With the 350 ppmv budget removed and one for 1,000 ppmv added due to pressure from industry
lobbyists in Working Group Three of IPCC, the IPCC re-published these Berne-Model-type results from
1995 onwards. As is shown below, for the IPCC 1995 Second Assessment Report [SAR] the 2001
Third Assessment Report [TAR] and the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report [AR4], these scenarios were
repeated and have remained the standard reference set for the ‘climate-policy’ community for more than
ten years until the present time.
10. It is of note that over 300 years of future time with CO2 concentrations theoretically stabilising ‘safely’
at up to 1,000 ppmv, on the back of finding, extracting and combusting an inventory of up to 2 trillion
tonnes of future fossil fuel resources, these scenarios all modelled contraction:concentration events
that, ignoring the positive feedbacks not-too-mention the rapid depletion of reserves of oil and gas,
ludicrously assumed the airborne fraction of emissions in these scenarios would all remain constant at
around 50% right up to 1,000 ppmv.
15
IPCC Coupled/Uncoupled for various contraction:concentrations Scenarios
1. However, in Chapter 10 of IPCC AR4 [2007] Working Group One [WG1] an important contribution from
the ‘Models Inter-Comparison Group’ was included which addressed this feedback issue openly for
the first time. All the carbon-cycle emissions scenarios were revisited comparing the past ‘Uncoupled’
model runs with the new ‘Coupled’ model runs, with IPCC saying: -
2. “There is unanimous agreement among the coupled climate carbon cycle models driven by emission
scenarios run so far that future climate change would reduce the efficiency of the Earth system (land
and ocean) to absorb anthropogenic CO2.”
3. Published in a non-headline-grabbing manner with a complexity of graphic information that discouraged
interpretation, the graphic [exactly as below] appeared on page 791 where: -
4. Three models: -
• Berne 2002,
• UVic 2004 and
• Hadley 2006
5. in two versions each: -
• Uncoupled and
• Coupled
6. for four ‘scenarios’: -
• 450 ppmv
• 550 ppmv
• 750 ppmv
• 1000 ppmv
7. were largely superimposed on each other
[as shown].
8. Because of the density of this overlay,
but especially because of the significance
of the acknowledgement of the positive-
feedback issue being modeled and
published by IPCC for the first time, GCI
wrote to the Technical Support Unit [TSU]
of IPCC Working Group One [WG1] to
get confirmation that the information as
shown in the graphics on page 13 had
correctly disentangled the IPCC graphic
on page 12. With thanks, TSU confirmed
this saying, “we wish out authors had
been this clear.”
9. The principal reason for this enquiry was
the quite extraordinary discovery that in
all the coupled-uncoupled comparisons
and unclearly shown in the images
published in the AR4, two different paths
for emissions globally were being shown
prior to 2000, as is shown by following
the dotted lines.
10. The reason for this was finally given by the Hadley Centre who said that when ‘coupling’ to reflect
feedbacks was calculated, the revision of source:sink relations in the carbon-cycle showed that sink-
function in the models had certainly been over-estimated prospectively and retrospectively as well.
11. In other words, with the ‘weight-record’ of concentrations and past fossil fuel emissions well docu
mented, the modelers concluded that the recent historic emissions from deforestation had also been
overestimated, throwing their estimates of the strength of sink-function into further doubt.
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It is the uncoupled and the coupled contraction events for 450 ppmv that are relevant here as they show 50%
and 80% cuts by 2050 respectively.
Difference by weight between

450 ppmv Coupled and Uncoupled Emissions
Emissions Giga Tonnes

Coupled and Uncoupled Emissions
550 ppmv

750 ppmv

1000 ppmv
17
IPCC AR4 Contraction:Concentrations: Temperature Scenarios:
are more pessimistic than CCC/UK Government projections
18
1. While Please observe this is note [a] on the table 5.1: -
While
2. “ThePlease
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4. is equilibrium
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Progress since the TAR enables an assessment that climate sensitivity is likely to be in the range following a doubling
of 2 to
of CO2 concentration. Progress since the TAR enables an assessment that climate
4.5 C with a best estimate of about 3 C, and it is very unlikely to be less than 1.5 C. Values higher than sensitivity is
4.5 C cannot be excluded but agreement of models with observations is not as good for those values.to
likely to be in the range of 2 to 4.5 C with a best estimate of about 3 C, and it is very unlikely
be less than 1.5 C. Values higher than 4.5 C cannot be excluded but agreement of models with
[WG1 8.6 9.6 Box 10.2 SPM]. Feedbacks can amplify or dampen the response to a given forcing. Direct
observations is not as good for those values. [WG1 8.6 9.6 Box 10.2 SPM]. Feedbacks can am-
emissions of water vapour [a greenhouse gas] by human activities make a negligible contribution to
plify or dampen the response to a given forcing. Direct emissions of water vapour [a greenhouse
radiative forcing.
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anthropogenic emissionsterrestrial
remaining andinocean uptake of atmospheric
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larger atmospheric CO 2
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increases and greater climate change for a given emissions scenario, leads
the to
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the strength of this feedback varies markedly among models. [WG1 7.3 TW 5.4 SPM WG2 4.4.].”
5. This is in AR4 Chapter 10 where carbon cycle feedbacks are discussed and calculated [as per GCI
This is intoAR4
memo EAC]Chapter 10 where carbon cycle feedbacks are discussed and calculated
[as per GCI memo to EAC]
6. “There is unanimous agreement among the coupled climate carbon cycle models driven by emission
scenarios
“Thererun so far that future
is unanimous climate change
agreement among would reduce theclimate
the coupled efficiency of the cycle
carbon Earth system
models(land
driven
andby emission
ocean) scenarios
to absorb run so far
anthropogenic CO2that future
. There climate
is evidence change
that the COwould
2
reduce
airborne the
fraction is efficien-
increasing,
so cy of the Earth
accelerating system
the rate (landchange.”
of climate and ocean) to absorb anthropogenic CO2. There is evi-
dence that the CO2 airborne fraction is increasing, so accelerating the rate of climate
change.”
19
1. As the CCC says, “the [CCC’s] spreadsheets, contain all the relevant inputs and outputs of the climate
modelling work carried out for the 2008 report by the Committee on Climate. Change (CCC). Inputs
were constructed by the CCC and outputs were produced by the Met Office Hadley Centre using a
modified version of the MAGICC 4.1 climate model. See the Chapter 1 technical appendix: projecting
global emissions, concentrations and temperatures for further details.”
2. The BLCE Report itself states that, “The MAGICC climate model is used here (www.cgd.ucar.edu/
cas/wigley/magicc/) with a distribution of climate sensitivity taken from Murphy, J.M., et al. (2004).
Quantification of modelling uncertainties in a large ensemble of climate change simulations. Nature,
429, 768–772.”
3. We trust there is still a consensus-seeking agenda operating between the EAC, the CCC and GCI. So
in case there is any perception that the criticisms levelled by GCI against the CCC’s work are extreme’,
participants may care to consider the graphic output alongside which comes from Stanton et al [Oct
2009] using the much more recent MAGICC version 5.3 in conjunction with inputs as created by Jim
Hansen.
4. Hansen is now progenitor of the global “350.org” campaign and we can note from these charts that
in order to control temperature and concentrations at rates that this fairly eminent scientist deems
necessary to avoid a catastrophe, in his most extreme case, global emissions are required to go deeply
below zero by 2020!
5. Yet the 50% cut by 2050 advocated by the CCC is described by Mark Bainbridge of the CCC as
‘drastic’. Hardly. Situated between Hansen and CCC, the GCI recommendation to the EAC in April for
a global emissions contraction involving a minimum 80% cut with accelerated convergence to perhaps
2020 is reasonable, practical, doable [negotiable] and also supported.
6. GCI wrote to Mark Bainbridge of the CCC asking, “Were you aware that the source:sink ratio output
from the MAGICC model shown for the “2016:4% low” scenario was more than 100% sink-efficiency
after 2050?” [shown in the GCI analysis]
7. He wrote saying “We are aware that atmospheric CO2 concentrations start to fall in our low emission
trajectories. Once strong climate action has been taken and emissions have been cut drastically, there
will still be elevated concentrations. So natural sinks will still be taking up large amounts of carbon even
though emissions are small, and hence the source/sink ratio in this future is unlikely to be the same as it
is today.”
8. GCI responded with graphics examining CCC’s scenario. We then pursued this matter of ‘sink-
efficiency’ with the Hadley Centre. They have now agreed that this analysis of the ‘model-runs’ behind
UK Government ‘Climate-Targets’ in new and the analysis charted is correct. They responded further
saying, ‘it really got us thinking - in fact we were thinking of doing some runs with the GCM’ to see if it
could produce these results’ . They also agreed that there are many things that are relevant in the area
of feedbacks that are not yet in the climate-models largely because of the great difficulty of modelling
events like large methane release etc. However difficult to model this may be, this is no small omission.
In the light of the odds given by CCC, we asked CCC to consider the negative-albedo effects of that
on rising temperature locally [Arctic], aggravated by CO2 and CH4 release from the thawed tundra
locally and to sum something about that back into the carefully worded odds attending the CCC’s global
averages.
9. As the graphics suggest, the issue of where the goal posts are set up, frames any sensible and
coherent adjudication of this. CCC’s goal-posts of 10 Percentile and 90 Percentile around the ‘median’
path preferred by CCC on the “2016:4% low” path CCC has preferred, sound [as probably intended]
like choosing the moderate middle. In fact this has statistically skewed these goal posts to the point of
near absurdity. The ‘10 Percentile’ path is not just improbable, it is obvious to any experienced analyst
that it is completely impossible. However, the 90 Percentile path is not impossible, nor is it necessarily
improbable either.
Results for climate sensitivity 6°C.
Error bars represent range of values from climate sensitivity
1.5 to 10°C. [Ackerman et al with MAGICC 5.3; Hansen et al. (2008)].
20
Fig B3: Hansen’s Global Average Annual
2.00
Temperature Change (0C 1990)
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
-0.50
-1.00
2000 2100 2200 2300 2400
450
Fig B2: Hansen
CO2 Emissions in ppmv
400
350
300
250
2000 2100 2200 2300 2400
12
9 Fig B1: Hansen & WRE 350

CO2 Emissions in GTC
6
-3
2000 2100 2200 2300 2400
21
4. CCC lead scenario
Setting the Goal-Posts around “2016:4% low”.

1. When dealing with sink performance in this memorandum, GCI analyses CO2 separately [that is CO2 as
shown in the CCC scenario spreadsheets] precisely in order to clarify the emissions:source:sink arithmetic
in the CCC’s modelling. This is done to reveal that, contrary to all the verbal warnings in IPCC AR4 and
elsewhere about declining sink-efficiency as temperature rises, this CCC scenario in fact shows the very
opposite: - the CCC claims that a dramatic gain in sink efficiency occurs in their preferred scenario. This
despite even the ‘median’ case temperature rise they calculated, continuing for more than a century [till
~2120], during which time land-sinks are under assault due to fires, logging and die-back, oceans that are
warmer and increasingly ‘acidic’ with carbonic acid due to increased carbon absorption, are occurring, all
of which constitute the decreasing and not the increasing efficiency of sinks.
2. ‘Sink-Efficiency’ is measured here like this: -
• 50% ‘sink-efficiency’ - For the last 200 years, we have observed a trend average of around 50%
sink-efficiency: - i.e. for any year’s human source CO2 emissions as they rose from a few million
tonnes carbon in 1800 to 8 GTC in 2000, 50% was returned to an enlarging natural sink [that no-
one can adequately explain]. The other 50% was retained in the atmosphere where it has been
accumulating and it is this accumulation that explains the accelerating rise from 280 parts per million
by volume [ppmv] in 1800 to nearly 390 ppmv at the present time.
• 100% ‘sink-efficiency’ is when human and other sources of emissions equal sinks, [not
experienced in the trend average of the last 200 years - i.e. since industrialisation].
• More than 100% ‘sink-efficiency’ - When human and other sources of emissions are less than
what the sinks are removing and this is what Government is forecasting. Other than when going into
an ice-age, over Centuries, no precedent exist for this phenomenon in the human record.
3. The Climate Act was passed into law by the UK Parliament in 2008. It is based on targets for global
temperature and global greenhouse gas concentration rise which in turn come from a greenhouse gas
[ghg] ‘emissions-scenario’ created by the Government’s ‘Climate Change Committee’ [CCC].
4. This ‘scenario’ - alongside - was selected from the several created and it is called the ‘2016:4% low’
scenario. It is from this that the so-called ‘median’ case has been preferred as the reference case.
5. What the CCC calls the ‘drastic’ ghg emission budget for CO2 only was created by the CCC; it is
shown in red in the graphic below. It rises from 8 Gigatonne Carbon [GTC] in 2000, to 12 GTC in 2016,
whereafter it declines to 50% of 1990 values by 2050 and on asymptotically towards zero, nearly
reached by 2100 and beyond.
6. The other greenhouse gases [not shown here] are projected for the same period were projected by the
CCC, adding an annual 3 GTC ‘equivalent’ to the emissions curve with concentrations raised ~50 ppmv
pro-rata [above what is shown here for CO2 only] throughout as a result. The temperature curves shown
are for all gases [i.e. not just CO2].
7. Between these goalposts of percentiles at 10% and 90%, the ‘median’ scenario is what the
Government’s claim to have a ‘50:50’ chance of avoiding more than a 2 degree Celsius temperature
rise globally is based.
Is this claim unreliably ‘optimistic’?

1. It certainly appears to be because, reversing the source:sink arithmetic published by the IPCC for the
last thirteen years, the assumptions driving these model runs of MAGICC by UKMO quite remarkably
calculate a very rapid increase in the ‘efficiency’ of the sinks for CO2 over the next thirty to forty years
[see pages 24 - 29 of this memo for details]. The ‘Median’ case is shown to achieve more than 100%
efficiency by 2050 and the 10 Percentile case more than 100% efficiency by 2040.
2. Remarkably, this ‘good-news’ was not mentioned anywhere: [so we ask, was it even noticed?].
3. Even though the 90 Percentile case is shown to achieve 100% efficiency by 2070 it is with
concentrations already at 500 ppmv and global temperature already at 3 degrees.
22
23
5. Analysis of CCC scenario range
1. In the CCC’s ‘10th Percentile’ trace:

• Temperature rises to no higher than 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit above pre-industrial by 2120 and
declines slightly thereafter
• CO2 concentrations, deviating quickly from an Airborne Fraction of 50%, rise to ~430 ppmv by
around 2030 and decline thereafter to ~370 ppmv by 2200.
• CO2 emissions from all human sources, rise from 8 GTC in 2000 to 12 GTC in 2016 after which they
contract as shown until 2200. Budget integrals as shown here: -
1800 - 2000 475 GTC

2000 - 2100 480 GTC
2100 - 2200 10 GTC
2000 - 2200 490 GTC
2. CO2 concentrations are shown with a frame of reference [the shaded area] where emissions are added
up constantly at both 50%/year and 100%/year. The 10th Percentile line quickly deviates from the
Airborne Fraction Constant at 50% of emissions and is equal to 100% of emissions by ~2040.
How is this changing ‘airborne fraction’ calculated?

• For the purposes of calculating changing source:sink ratios, atmospheric concentrations in ppmv are
converted to a ‘weight’ of carbon in GTC [1 ppmv CO2 = 2.13 GTC] year on year [2000-2200] for all
three lines i.e. 10 percentile, median & 90 percentile.
• These weights are then subtracted one year from the next [2000-2200], to get ‘weight-change’ in
‘concentrations’ year on year [2000-2200].
• Then CCC given-emissions for each year [2000-2200] are made minus the ‘weight change for each
year [2000-2200] for the ‘RETURNED’ fraction’ &
• Then CCC given-emissions for each year [2000-2200] are made minus the ‘RETURNED’ fraction to
get the ‘RETAINED fraction as shown in the graphic alongside.
Sink-Efficiency?
• In this context “Sink-efficiency” [all in terms of gain/loss in GTC] means when: -
• sinks=sources - sinks are 100% efficient
• sinks<sources - sinks are less than 100% efficient
• sinks>sources - sinks are more than 100% efficient
Rate of Change in Sink-Efficiency - 10th Percentile

3. The rate of gain in ‘sink-efficiency’ between 2000 and 2040 is very rapid indeed. It goes from below
60% efficient to 100% efficient by 2040 and significantly more efficient after 2040. This means that after
2040 sinks are removing the equivalent of all sources, plus a rising amount that equals more than twice
all sources after 2070.
4. All the evidence so far - as reported by IPCC for the last 15 years is that the airborne fraction has been
constant at around 50% and that it is now very gradually increasing as sink efficiency decreases with
rising temperature.
5. When all the evidence reported is that sinks are becoming less-efficient as temperatures rise, to
suggest that this rate of gain in this scenario is remotely credible is deeply irresponsible as it is plainly
inconceivable that this should occur.
24
25
CCC’s 2016:4% Low – Median
1. In the CCC’s ‘Median’ trace: -

• Temperature rises to slightly more than two degrees Fahrenheit above pre-industrial by 2130 and
declines very slightly thereafter
• Deviating less quickly from an Airborne Fraction of 50%, CO2 concentrations rise to ~450 ppmv by
around 2050 and declines thereafter to ~400 ppmv by 2200.
1800 - 2000 475 GTC

2000 - 2100 480 GTC
2100 - 2200 10 GTC
2000 - 2200 490 GTC
up constantly at both 50%/year and 100%/year. The Median line deviates less quickly from the Airborne
Fraction Constant at 50% of emissions and is equal to 100% of emissions by ~2050.

three lines i.e. 10%-ile, median & 90%-ile.
• Then CCC given-emissions for each year [2000-2200] are made minus the ‘RETURNED’ fraction ‘to
get the ‘RETAINED fraction’ as shown in the graphic alongside.
Sink-Efficiency?
Rate of Change in Sink-Efficiency – Median

3. The rate of gain in ‘sink-efficiency’ between 2000 and 2050 is rapid. It goes from ~50% efficient to
100% efficient by 2050 and significantly more efficient after 2050. This means that after 2050 sinks are
removing the equivalent of all sources, plus a rising amount that equals more than twice all sources
after 2100.
4. The fact this ‘good news’ was not mentioned, suggests it wasn’t even ‘noticed’.
5. All the evidence so far [as reported by IPCC for the last 15 years] is that the airborne fraction has
been constant at around 50% and that it is now very gradually increasing as temperature rises and
sink efficiency decreases. When all the evidence reported is that sinks are becoming less-efficient as
temperatures rise, suggesting that this rate of gain is credible is optimistic to say the least. Interestingly
as land-sinks are under attack from fires, die-back, clearfelling and tundra-melt, this suggests that the
oceans will be taking up the excess and thereby acidifying that much faster which also reduces sink-
function.
26
27
1. In the CCC’s ‘90th Percentile’ trace: -

• Temperature is still rising above 3.5 degrees Fahrenheit above pre-industrial after 2200.
• Increasingly the Airborne Fraction beyond 50%, CO2 concentrations rise to ~550 ppmv by 2200 and,
harbouring ‘runaway’, appears even to increase after that.
1800 - 2000 475 GTC

2000 - 2100 480 GTC
2100 - 2200 10 GTC
2000 - 2200 490 GTC
up constantly at both 50%/year and 100%/year. The 90th Percentile line deviates goes above the
Airborne Fraction Constant at 50% of emissions in 2000 and rises to an average of 70% of emissions
by ~2050.

three lines i.e. 10%-ile, median & 90%-ile.
• Then CCC given-emissions for each year [2000-2200] are made minus the ‘RETURNED’ fraction
‘RETAINED fraction as shown as shown in the graphic alongside.
Sink-Efficiency?
Rate of Change in Sink-Efficiency - 90th Percentile

3. The rate of change in ‘sink-efficiency’ between 2000 and 2070 is progressive. In this definition, it goes
from ~50% efficient to ~100% efficient by 2070. This means that after 2070 sinks are removing the
equivalent of the sources, less whatever amounts where natural sinks themselves turn to sources.
4. The fact this ‘bad news’ was not mentioned, suggests it wasn’t even ‘noticed’ either
5. All the evidence so far [as reported by IPCC for the last 15 years] is that the airborne fraction has been
constant at around 50% and that it is now very gradually increasing as temperature rises and ‘total’
sink efficiency decreases. When all the evidence reported is that total sinks are becoming less-efficient
as temperatures rise, suggesting that this rate of loss is credible is not irresponsible. If these rates of
change are experienced and sinks become sources, it is overwhelmingly likely that the period during
which human actions trying to mitigate climate ius being superseded by ‘runaway’ conditions.
28
29
CCC’s 2028:3% - 10th Median and 90th Percentile
1. In these 10th, Median and 90th Percentile traces for the CCC’s 2028 scenario: -
• Temperature is still rising above 4.5 degrees Fahrenheit above pre-industrial after 2200.
• Increasingly the Airborne Fraction beyond 50% for 60 years and CO2 concentrations rise beyond
500 ppmv and harbours ‘runaway’.
• CO2 and all other greenhouse gas emissions from all human sources, rise from 11 GTC in 2000 to
18 GTC in 2028 after which they contract as shown until 2200. CO2 budget integrals as shown here: -
1800 - 2000 475 GTC

2000 - 2100 747 GTC
2100 - 2200 148 GTC
2000 - 2200 895 GTC
2. All gas concentrations and temperature are shown for the 10th, the median 90th Percentiles.
3. The monotonicity of overall approach is clearly evidenced at these higher values.
4. Deviations here [shown opposite] are less alarming [i.e. more ‘optimistic’] than those projected in IPCC
AR4 [as shown below] which are for CO2 only measured as the gas molecule and not the carbon atom
[conversion 1 tonne carbon equals 3.666 tonnes CO2]: -
30
NOTE
18 Gigatonnes Carbon Equivalent
measured as the carbon atoms
equals 60 Gigatonnes CO2 Equivalent
measured as the gas-molecules
18 GTC
31
Appendix A
Notes on the method and modelling used for defining
UK emissions reduction targets
Summary
1. The Committee on Climate Change’s UK emissions reduction targets and carbon budgets are founded
on global targets that are insufficient to provide an acceptable level of security to remain within 2oC
warming above pre-industrial levels. The UK strategy is highly dependent on COP15 arriving at an
agreement that would secure the objective of keeping global temperature rise to within the 2oC limit.
Failure at Copenhagen would result in delay to Peak and could require significantly faster rates of
reduction to be adopted.
2. Annual percentage rates of global emissions reduction were determined at the outset on the basis of
supposed economic feasibility. These reduction rates were then used to drive trajectories with a high
probability of failure to keep within 2oC temperature rise by 2100. This has led to a “best we can do”
outcome rather than “what is required”. It falls far short of the UNFCCC principle of precaution.
3. The CCC Report does not explain how full account was taken of the findings of the C4MIP and IPCC
AR4 WGI coupled modelling exercises in preparation for the CCC/Hadley modelling exercise. Since the
report was produced, a new version of MAGICC/SCENGEN (version 5.3.v2) has been released with
significant changes to treatment of carbon cycle feedbacks and climate sensitivity.
4. The method used for developing global and UK targets did not fully demonstrate rational and
transparent risk assessment and evaluation of options. The balance between science-based and
political decisions is not clear enough. The model used lacked transparency and is presented as a black
box.
5. Presentation of findings and conclusions in the CCC reporting documentation is confusing and could
possibly mislead. Targets are given a 50% probability of staying within 2oC where this is not consistent
with the modelling results presented. Incorrect claims for consistency of results with the work of others
and difficulties of reconciling the results of different coupled modelling exercises result in increased
uncertainty about the reliability of targets and budgets.
1. Introduction
1. The UK Government asked the Committee on Climate Change to recommend the level of UK carbon
budgets, subject to a legally binding constraint that the emissions reduction by 2020 must be at least
26% relative to 1990. The Committee recommended UK carbon budgets for the first three budget
periods, 2008-12, 2013-17 and 2018-22. The CCC in conjunction with the Hadley Centre determined
global and UK emissions reduction targets as the foundation for the UK carbon budgeting exercise.
2. These targets and budgets were published by the Committee in its report “Building a low carbon
economy” in December 2008.
3. In March 2009, the parliamentary Environment Audit Committee initiated an enquiry into UK carbon
budgets. GCI submitted written evidence to the Committee, stating:
4. “To keep within the 2 degrees Celsius temperature limit, the budgets need to be based on a global
emissions contraction of 80% by 2050 and where the airborne fraction may still stay constant at ~50%
giving a 450 ppmv outcome. But with sinks failing at ~0.5%/yr, the outcome may still be >450ppmv”.
(GCI Memorandum to the EAC, 27 April 2009)
5. These notes were produced by GCI for the enquiry following additional evidence presented during the
hearings. The main sources used by GCI were the Committee’s report and its Technical Appendix.
Reference is also made to written evidence submitted to the EAC enquiry. References to these and
other sources are given at the end of the notes.
32
2. Role of the Committee on Climate Change
1. The role of the Committee on Climate Change is outlined in the Chairman’s Foreword to the
Committee’s report, “Building a low carbon economy”:
2. “Our role is to recommend a path of emissions which is appropriate as a UK contribution to global
climate change mitigation, and to identify whether that path is feasible at manageable economic cost,
given the range of different technologies and policy levers which could be deployed. This Report
therefore sets out alternative ways in which emission reductions could be achieved, and assesses
whether there are reasonable scenarios in which different combinations of actions would deliver the
required emission reductions path”. (CCC Report, Page v)
3. These “terms of reference” appear to place the development of emissions paths ahead of the feasibility
test. This would give the opportunity to develop science–based paths, allowing a proper assessment of
risk and cost in the latter part of the global trajectory feasibility study.
3. Method used by the Committee on Climate Change

1. The method used to develop emissions reduction targets is described in the CCC Report and its Chapter
1 Technical Appendix and Spreadsheet. In outline, the method used consists of the following steps:
Set a global climate objective
2. The broad global climate objective set by the Committee was:
3. to limit our central expectation of temperature rise to 2°C, or as close as possible. In addition we
propose an additional rule which is to reduce the risk of extremely dangerous climate change to very
low levels (e.g. less than 1%). We have made the judgment that 4ºC this century would be this ‘extreme
danger’ threshold” (CCC Report page 16).
4. Consideration of climate risk at this stage is addressed in terms of a target temperature threshold of
2oC following an assessment of scientific evidence, with a further limit in percentage probability terms
for the extreme case of 4oC. No thresholds are set at this stage for levels of concentration of ghg’s in
the atmosphere. Risk of exceeding 4oC is restricted to a 1% probability; risk of exceeding 2oC is not
restricted to any other measure.
Prepare global emissions reduction scenarios

1. The Committee took the following approach:
2. “The number of different emissions scenarios which could be modelled is infinite. We therefore need to
choose a manageable number of trajectories which together cover the range of likely desirable policies.
We do this by varying three parameters: the year at which we assume that global emissions peak, the
pace of emissions reduction achievable thereafter, and the ultimate emissions floor. In each case the
path of emissions before peaking is assumed to follow a baseline scenario. CO2 emissions include
those relating to land-use as well as those from fossil fuels and industrial processes, and emissions of
other relevant gases are also accounted for”. (CCC Report, Page 21)
3. Having noted that the potential number of scenarios is infinite, the CCC chose a manageable number
to cover a range of desirable policies. The desirability of low risk was not overtly recognised amongst
these and the ensuing parameters.
33
Peak year
1. The Committee chose two options: 2016 and 2028.
2. “For simplicity we have assumed two peaking years - 2016 and 2028. The former represents a case
where the world community successfully commits to a global deal in Copenhagen in 2009, as set out
in the “Bali Action Plan” of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the
latter peaking year represents a much less optimistic world: Annex I and non-Annex I emissions both
continue to follow the baseline until the world commits to action at a later date. In reality it is difficult
to know for certain when global emissions will peak. A seven year period between achieving a global
deal in Copenhagen and the peak in emissions does not seem unreasonable however, given that
agreements will need to be ratified and policies will need to be developed and implemented”. (CCC
Technical Appendix, Page 10)
3. In the event that COP 15 does not deliver an effective and workable agreement, a later peak may become
necessary, with faster rates of emissions reduction relative to 2016. Meinshausen, at Exeter in 2006, said
that the peak should occur in or by 2015 and that any delay of global action by 10 years would nearly
double the required reduction rates around 2025. He went on to say that each 5 year delay would require
a +1% increase in the rate of reduction. More recently in interview (2009), Pachauri has said that the
peak year must be no later than 2015. A peak year of 2028 would probably require substantially greater
rates to avoid exceeding 2oC, as discovered somewhat later in the exercise by the CCC.
Baseline scenario
1. The Committee chose to use IPCC SRES A1B:
2. “In order to select which single SRES marker scenario is most appropriate for use as a baseline we
compared them to observed emissions trends since 2000, along with estimates of emissions, population
and economic growth. Data on recent CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and industrial activity are
available on an annual basis and are the most reliable. Comparison of the SRES scenarios against
these data suggests the A1B scenario accounts most closely for both the magnitude and annual growth
of these emissions, especially since around 2004. Furthermore, recent IEA forecasts of CO2 emissions
from fossil fuel use and industrial activity out to 2050 show closest matches to SRES scenarios A1B
and A2”. (CCC Technical Appendix, Page 7)
3. “In terms of population the A1B scenario forecasts a world population in 2050 of 8.7 billion, comparing
favourably to the UN’s most recent medium projection of 9.2 billion (7.8 to 10.8 billion). The A1B
estimate of current and projected economic growth is at the upper end of the SRES scenarios, although
at an average 3% per annum between 1990 and 2100, it is similar to the annual average growth rate
experienced between 1970 and 2007 of 3.1%”. (CCC Technical Appendix, Page 9)
Pace of emissions reduction

1. In defining a range of annual reductions, the Committee adopted a separate approach for each gas.
The approach for CO2 was as follows
2. “All CO2 emissions are reduced at rates from 1.5% to 4% per annum. Our most rapid annual reduction
rate leads to CO2 emissions of around 12 Gt/yr in 2050, a reduction of 48 Gt/yr relative to baseline
emissions. This is consistent with the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) strongest mitigation scenario,
which shows that a reduction of around 48 Gt/yr is possible by 2050 relative to their baseline for a cost
of $200-500 per tonne of CO2.” (Technical Appendix, Page 10)
3. The IEA scenario referred to in the Technical Appendix is the Blue scenario which gives a 48Gt/yr
CO2-only reduction relative to baseline. The original IEA baseline was taken to 2030; for the Energy
Technology Perspectives exercise this was extended to 2050. The claim of consistency relates only to
the 48Gt/yr reduction for the most rapid CCC rate of 4% with a 2016 peak . No explanation or reference
is given for the other rates used by CCC.
4. The full set of rates used were as follow:
5. “Trajectories with global emissions peaking in 2028, and with subsequent reductions in total CO2
emissions of 1.5% per annum, 2% per annum, and 3% per annum (these are labeled trajectory
2028:1.5%, 2028:2%, and 2028:3%). Other GHG’s are reduced at consistent rates.
34
6. Trajectories with global emissions peaking in 2016 and with subsequent reductions in total CO2
emissions of 1.5%, 2%, 3%, and 4% (labeled 2016:1.5%, 2016:2%, 2016:3%, 2016:3%low, and
2016:4%low). Other GHG’s are reduced at consistent rates”. (CCC Report, Page 21)
7. The floor for emissions reduction was set at 11GtCO2e for the first six trajectories above, and reduced to
6GtCO2e for the last two, designated “low”.
8. Another scenario, 2014:3%low, was modelled and described in the Technical Appendix, but is not
mentioned in the CCC Report.
9. The Committee provided the input rates of emissions reduction for each ghg as described above. They
are broadly based on considerations of economic feasibility. The trajectories are driven by these input
rates in the range 1.5-4%. No further consideration is given to risk at this stage, for example by setting
target limits of probability for exceeding the temperature threshold. From these trajectories, the Hadley
Centre produced carbon equivalents for each input ghg and then calculated the aggregate CO2e for
input to the modelling process.
Model concentrations, temperatures and probabilities

1. The base scenario, SRES A1B, and the eight reduction scenarios were processed with the MAGICC 4.1
model and summarised in the CCC Report. Detailed results were published in the Technical Appendix
and Spreadsheet. A ninth scenario, 2014:3%low, was processed but not presented in the CCC Report.
2. Modelling results are summarised below:
3. 2100 probability of temperature rise staying within 2oC per scenario.
o
Scenario C increase Probability
2014:3%low+ 2.00 0.49
2016:4%low 2.00 0.44
2016:3% 2.00 0.37
2016:3%low 2.00 0.35
2016:2% 2.00 0.27
2016:1.5% 2.00 0.20
2028:3% 2.00 0.17
2028:2% 2.00 0.09
2028:1.5% 2.00 0.05
SRES A1B 2.00 0.00
2050 probability of temperature staying within 2oC per scenario.
2014:3%low+ 2.00 0.80

2016:4%low 2.00 0.75
2016:3%low 2.00 0.72
2016:3% 2.00 0.75
2016:2% 2.00 0.72
2016:1.5% 2.00 0.70
2028:3% 2.00 0.56
2028:2% 2.00 0.56
2028:1.5% 2.00 0.57
SRES A1B 2.00 0.22
Source: Technical Appendix, Spreadsheet, Trajectory cdf’s.
35
Trajectory Descriptions
Kyoto CO2 Kyoto 2050 Kyoto Cumulative emissions Chance

Trajectory Peaking emissions emission emissions emissions cut, from (GtCO2e) of staying
name year peak decrease floor 1990- 2000- 2007- under 2oC
(GtCO2e) after peak (GtCO2e) 1990 2000 2007 2050 2050 2050 by 2100
2016:4%low 2016 56.80 4%/yr 6 46% 51% 59% 2423 2045 1743 44%
2016:3%low 2016 56.70 3%/yr 6 33% 40% 50% 2536 2158 1856 37%
2014:3%low+ 2014 55.93 3%/yr 6 46% 51% 59% 2252 1879 1579 49%
2016:3% 2016 56.70 3%/yr 11 34% 40% 50% 2535 2157 1855 37%
2016:2% 2016 56.59 2%/yr 11 14% 22% 35% 2676 2298 1996 27%
2016:1.5% 2016 56.53 1.5%/yr 11 2% 11% 26% 2757 2379 2077 20%
2028:3% 2028 65.48 3%/yr 11 0% 9% 25% 3067 2688 2386 17%
2028:2% 2028 65.09 2%/yr 11 -9% 9% 3152 2774 2471 9%
2028:1.5% 2028 64.88 1.5%/yr 11 1% 3200 2821 2519 5%
Source: Technical Appendix, Spreadsheet, Plots
1. Detailed modelling results are shown in the Technical Appendix for all nine scenarios specified by
the Committee, in addition to the baseline SRES A1B. Six of the nine scenarios specified have a less
than 40% chance of staying under 2oC by 2100 and all nine have less than 50% probability. The only
scenario above 40% probability referenced in the Report is 2016:4%low with a probability of just 44%.
The scenario with the highest probability of remaining below 2oC by 2100 was 2014:3%low, with a
probability of 49%; no reason is given for its exclusion from the Report.
2. A range of options where all have less than 50% probability of success presents a very difficult choice
for policymakers.
Select preferred scenarios

1. The following scenarios were selected for the calculation of UK targets, with some important provisos:
2. Global 2050 emissions target, in terms of Kyoto GHG emissions, arising from trajectories 2016:3%low
and 2016:4%low.
Source: CCC Report, Table 1.2.
3. The Committee pointed out the importance of cumulative emissions and longer term emissions
reduction beyond 2050:
4. “It is important to note, however, that while discussion of a global deal tends to focus on emissions in
2050, two other considerations are also important:
• The climate impact of our preferred trajectories depends primarily upon the cumulative emissions
profile. Cumulative emissions between 1990 and 2050 for the trajectories recommended here are
2,420 GtCO2e to 2,540 GtCO2e, of which we estimate around 780 GtCO2e has been used already.
• In addition, the climate impact of our preferred trajectories depends upon further emission
reduction beyond 2050: emissions should fall to between 8 GtCO2e and 10 GtCO2e by 2100,with a
cumulative budget between 2051 and 2100 of 590 GtCO2e to 760 GtCO2e. Should missions not fall
further beyond 2050 then the climate outcomes set out in this section will not be achieved”. (CCC
Report, Page 26)
36
The modelling process calculated concentrations for each scenario:
1. “Trajectories with emissions peaking in 2016: all the trajectories except a 1.5% annual reduction
after 2016 would keep concentrations below 550ppm of CO2 equivalent, according to central model
estimates (Figure 1.10). Only reductions at 3% or 4% per year would limit the chance of reaching 4ºC
to very low levels, with central model estimates indicating a 2.2°C temperature rise this century from the
2016:3% trajectories, and a 2.1°C rise from 2016:4% low. Even in these cases it should be noted that
the chances of exceeding 2°C by 2100 would be 63% and 56% respectively, according to our model
distributions (Figure 1.11)”. (CCC Report, Page 21)
2. The relationships between emissions, concentrations and temperature are not fully described in the
Report and Appendix, although a degree of uncertainty is expressed.
3. The results for 2014:3%low were comparable with those for 2016:4%low in terms of emissions reduction:
both showed a 46% reduction on 1990 levels by 2050. However, the absolute emissions reduction was
greater by 171GtCO2e and the probability of staying under 2oC by 2100 was significantly higher at 49%
compared with 44%. The probability of staying under 2oC by 2200 was about the same at 47%.
4. As the CCC Report noted, the chances of the preferred cases exceeding 2°C by 2100 would be 63%
and 56% respectively. In the case of the discarded 2014:3%low this was 51%.
5. The Hadley Centre, in its written evidence to the EAC, said that “The Committee on Climate Change’s
2016:4%low scenario corresponds to a CO2 emission reduction of around 50% on 1990 levels by 2050.
Using the Met Office Hadley Centre model, it corresponds to a median warming of a little over 2ºC, with
a probability of around 50% of exceeding 2ºC”.
6. In a letter to GCI, the Hadley Centre said: “ For each emissions scenario an output from the simulations
was a probability distribution showing how likely different amounts of 21st century warming will be. The
Committee on Climate Change then selected the emissions scenario that showed a 50% chance of
limiting warming to approximately 2oC above pre-industrial levels at 2100, as well as reducing the risk of
a 4oC rise to very low levels.” (Hadley letter to GCI
7. The Spreadsheet Plot for the 2016:4%low scenario gives 46% CO2e reduction on 1990 levels by 2050
and a probability of 56% of exceeding 2ºC by 2100. (Technical Appendix, Spreadsheet, Plots, Trajectory
Descriptions)
Set global emissions reduction target

1. The following statement can be reconciled with the model output results summarised in 3c) Trajectory
Descriptions above.
2. “The Committee believes that it is a reasonable judgement that the objective should be to achieve a
global commitment to a peak of emissions within the next ten years, with a subsequent reduction of all
CO2 emissions at 3% per annum or more, accompanied by similar effort for other GHG’s (the feasibility
and cost of this reduction is considered in the Chapter 2). This would imply a global level of Kyoto GHG
emissions of between 20 and 24 gigatonnes25 on a CO2-equivalent basis (GtCO2e) in 2050 compared
with a 1990 level of about 36 GtCO2e and an estimated current level of about 48 GtCO2e. A global
reduction of about 34% to 46% below 1990 levels and of 50% to 59% below current levels are therefore
likely to be required to meet the global climate objectives we proposed in Section 3 above (Table 1.2).
This is broadly in line with the commitments made at the G8 meetings at Heiligendamm and Hokkaido,
which committed the G8 nations to a broad (global) 50% reduction without specifying the precise base
year”. (CCC Report, Page 26).
3. The global CO2e emissions reduction target proposed here by the CCC is 34%-46% below 1990 levels by
2050. The EU target is to reduce emissions to at least 50% below 1990 levels by 2050:
4. “The EU firmly believes that global warming must not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels since there
is strong scientific evidence that the risk of irreversible and possibly catastrophic environmental changes
will become far greater beyond this threshold. Keeping within 2°C will require global emissions to peak by
2020 and then be at least halved from 1990 levels by 2050”. (The European Commission stated objective
at Poznan 2008).
5. The global level of Kyoto GHG emissions of between 20 and 24 gigatonnes on a CO2-equivalent basis
(GtCO2e) in 2050 referred to above is used as the basis for UK targets.
37
Set UK emissions reduction targets
1. UK targets were directly derived from the calculated global emissions reduction targets, using the
principle of equal per capita emissions.
2. “The simplest approach is to assume that in the long-term every person on the planet is entitled to an
equal share of GHG emissions. If the world in total is to reduce emissions to a range of 20 GtCO2e to 24
GtCO2e by 2050, this would imply a per capita allowance of between 2.1 to 2.6 tonnes CO2-equivalent
(assuming a global population in 2050 of about 9.2 billion). A global deal on this basis would require that
the UK reduces emissions to something like 146 MtCO2e to 180 MtCO2e compared to a 1990 baseline
of 797 MtCO2e – this includes bunker fuels used for international aviation and shipping and emissions
relating to land-use. This implies cuts of between 78% and 82% versus the 1990 baseline”. (CCC
Report, page 27)
3. This estimate was based on population projections of global (9.2 billion) and UK (69 million) to suggest
a UK emissions reduction of between 78% and 82%. The CCC selected 80% as the target.
4. When working on the per capita principle, per capita emissions calculations can be based on the
population for any given year. Population figures may therefore be past or current actual or hypothetical
future, in this case 40 years forward. Other less speculative values are available.
4. The MAGICC Model

1. The Committee with the Hadley Centre modelled concentrations, temperature and probability
distributions of temperature increases for each trajectory. The MAGICC 4.1 climate model was used
with a distribution of climate sensitivity taken from Murphy, J.M., et al. (2004).
Probability of staying below (by 2100)
1.0 A1B
0.9 2016:1.5%
0.8 2016:2%
0.7 2016:3%
0.6 2014:3%low+
0.5 2016:3%low
2016:4%low
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
Tem perature above pre-industrial (deg C)
Source: Technical Appendix, Spreadsheet Plots
2. There is some confusion in the presentation of method and results in the CCC Report and in the
submissions to the EAC enquiry.
38
Climate-carbon cycle coupled modelling
1. The Hadley Centre has said that full account had been taken of the findings on feedbacks from the
C4MIP and AR4 WGI coupled modelling experience in preparation for the CCC modelling exercise:
2. “The models used by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) did include a coupling between climate
and the carbon cycle and took full account of the ‘coupled’ model research presented in the AR4 WG1
report, the C4MIP study and related research”. (Hadley letter to GCI, 2009).
C4MIP
3. The Friedlingstein report on the C4MIP coupled modelling exercise (2005) contained the following
summary:
4. “There was unanimous agreement among the models that future climate change will reduce the
efficiency of the earth system to absorb the anthropogenic carbon perturbation. A larger fraction of
anthropogenic CO2 will stay airborne if climate change is accounted for. By the end of the twenty-first
century, this additional CO2 varied between 20 and 200 ppm for the two extreme models, the majority of
the models lying between 50 and 100 ppm. The higher CO2 levels led to an additional climate warming
ranging between 0.1° and 1.5°C”. (Friedlingstein et al., AMS Vol.19, 2006)
5. Hadley summarised C4MIP as follows:
6. “All of the models run in C4MIP demonstrated that coupling the climate to the carbon cycle is important
and that by 2100 climate change leads to the biosphere being less able to absorb CO2. A key result
from the study was the significant variation across the models in the size of this effect, demonstrating
sizeable uncertainty in representing the climate-carbon cycle feedback. Although C4MIP found that the
Hadley Centre model showed the strongest feedback effect, the other ten models are also credible and
their results cannot therefore be ruled out. (Hadley letter to GCI 2009)
IPCC AR4 WG1 (2007)
7. The IPCC AR4 WG1 report gave a summary of the C4MIP project (WG1Chapter 7). It also gave the
results of a later three model joint exercise using Hadley SM, Uvic EMIC and BERN 2.5CC EMIC. The
Hadley SM curve in this exercise showed emissions reducing to zero by about 2060. In response to a
question put by GCI, Hadley said:
8. “The Hadley Centre curve shows a simple model set up to replicate the more complex Hadley
Centre model used in C4MIP. The simple model was then used to study the emissions that lead to
a stabilisation level for CO2 of 450ppm for a single pathway. For this particular pathway, and only
considering CO2, the curve does show when coupling of climate to the carbon cycle is included, as it
was by the CCC, emission levels would have to reduce further to achieve a given stabilisation level of
CO2 concentrations. However, given that all the models in C4MIP and fig 10.21 are considered credible
we believe the appropriate scientific approach is to include information from the full range of available
models not just the results of a single (worst case) model. To that extent the Hadley SM curve on
the graph is not, by itself, a good indication of the need to reduce emissions targets further than was
indicated in the CCC simulations”. (Hadley letter to GCI 2009)
CCC Report
9. The CCC Report does not fully explain what account was taken of these earlier coupled modelling
exercises in MAGICC 4, although the process is mentioned in the Technical Appendix::
10. “Our analysis draws on a normal distribution of carbon cycle strength parameters fitted to the behaviour
of a range of fully coupled climate-carbon cycle models29, and a lognormal distribution of ocean mixing
rates fitted to the general circulation models employed by the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report. We use
the default MAGICC value for aerosol radiative forcing from a given unit of aerosol. A key uncertainty
is the choice of climate sensitivity probability distribution. We have investigated this sensitivity using a
range of different distributions available in the literature. Our investigation of this sensitivity led us to
choose a distribution presented in Murphy et al. (2004)”. (Chapter 1 Technical Appendix, Page 16)
11. The Hadley Centre subsequently expanded on this in response to a question from GCI:
39
12. “This parity between the eleven models (C4MIP) meant it was important, in the work carried out for the
Committee on Climate Change, that the results from all C4MIP models were used to select the strength
of interaction between the climate and carbon cycle. Several different future emissions scenarios were
then run through a climate model (which has a treatment of the carbon cycle), in each case estimating
uncertainty in temperature and greenhouse gas concentrations. The full uncertainty range was due in
part to the range of climate-carbon cycle feedbacks characterised in C4MIP. For each emissions scenario
an output from the simulations was a probability distribution showing how likely different amounts of 21st
century warming will be. The Committee on Climate Change then selected the emissions scenario that
showed a 50% chance of limiting warming to approximately 2C above pre-industrial levels at 2100, as well
as reducing the risk of a 4C rise to very low levels”. (Hadley letter to GCI 2009)
13. Having ascribed credibility and parity to all eleven C4MIP models, CCC/Hadley used the results to
select the strength of interaction between the climate and carbon cycle. The values selected and how
they were selected are not mentioned in the letter or the CCC Report.
14. The CCC Report makes no attributed reference to the Hadley SM, Uvic EMIC and BERN 2.5CC EMIC joint exercise.
15. In written evidence to the EAC, DECC said:
16. “We agree with the Committee that more work is needed to determine whether MAGICC (as well as
other simple climate models) is able to reliably emulate the response of general circulation models to
significant emissions reductions”.
17. “Work being carried out under the DECC/Defra-funded ‘AVOID’ Programme will provide further insight into the
sensitivity of climate outcomes to variations in both emissions pathways and climate model parameters”.
18. Since the CCC Report was produced, a new version of MAGICC/SCENGEN (version 5.3.v2) has been
released replacing version 4.1. There have been many changes, mainly to SCENGEN. These changes have
been made primarily for consistency with the Working Group 1 report of the IPCC Fourth Assessment (AR4).
Consistency with other modelling exercises:

The CCC Report claimed consistency of findings with other model analyses:
1. “Other investigations into the emissions reduction required to limit the risk of exceeding 2°C have come
to a range of broadly consistent conclusions. One recent study showed that peaking in 2010 to 2015
followed by a 3% reduction in fossil fuel CO2 emissions would give a 25% to 75% probability range of
exceeding 2°C (Meinshausen, 2006). Our results are in broad agreement but are at the less optimistic
end of this range (63%), reflecting the fact that we have accounted for the observed higher growth of
emissions up to peaking. In the supporting material for this report we show how, for the same level of
emissions in 2050, more rapid emissions reduction prior to 2020 can reduce the probability of exceeding
2°C. Both our trajectories and those in the above study suggest that GHG concentrations will have to
overshoot an acceptable long-term level and then fall before temperatures have reached equilibrium.
Stronger action would be required if it is assumed that overshooting is not acceptable. For instance,
another study shows that long-term stabilisation at 450ppm of CO2 equivalent without overshooting
(leaving a roughly 50% probability of exceeding 2°C) will require a 6.5% annual reduction in fossil fuel CO2
emissions given current emissions growth (Anderson and Bows, 2008) . Others have recommended an
80% global reduction by 2050 relative to 1990, in order to further reduce the risks of exceeding 2°C (Parry
et al., 2008)”. (CCC Report, Page 25).
2. The Hadley Centre held a different view:
3. “The Anderson and Bows simulations suggest that more rapid post peak reductions in emissions than that
estimated by the Committee on Climate Change will be required to achieve similar temperature outcomes.
We believe this is an artefact of their method, and that this method is not as suitable as that used by the
Committee on Climate Change and Met Office Hadley Centre”. (Hadley written evidence to EAC)
4. “The Parry et al. scenarios use a similar approach to the Committee on Climate Change work and give
a consistent result”. (Hadley written evidence to EAC)
5. The range of broadly consistent conclusions claimed by the Committee appears to be unsubstantiated.
Of the three cases mentioned, Anderson and Bows clearly recommend stronger action and the case of
Martin Parry, Jean Palutikof, Clair Hanson and Jason Lowe, (June 2008), would seem to be in favour of
an 80% global reduction by 2050. Source references are given in Section 6 below.
40
6. There was a presumption that overshooting would be acceptable in the recommended trajectory. As the CCC
Report notes, stronger action would be required if it is assumed that overshooting is not acceptable. This was
not considered when selecting reduction rates. A rate in excess of 4% would be required to avoid overshooting.
The Hadley remark on Anderson and Bows also implies that overshooting is acceptable without question.
7. In September or October 2007, Hadley presented to Defra the results of a modelling exercise showing
emissions for the three major greenhouse gasses (CO2, CH4 and N2O) expressed as carbon equivalent
emissions and the predicted temperature rise for these scenarios. Peak years selected were 2013 and
2036, with SRES A2 as the baseline. The equivalent carbon emissions were projected to reach zero by
about 2060 for the first of these cases (see 6. References).
5. Conclusions
1. The CCC’s UK emissions reduction targets and carbon budgets are founded on global targets that are
insufficient to provide an acceptable level of security to remain within 2oC warming above pre-industrial levels.
2. This shortfall stems from inception of the CCC/Hadley project when cost of mitigation was allowed
to prevail over risk of climate damages. No detailed terms of reference are published in the reports.
However the role description for the CCC recognises first the requirement for an appropriate emissions
path and secondly a test of political and economic feasibility. In practice, these were not carried out in
sequence; nor did the “terms of reference” make this requirement clear. A rational approach would be to
place the recommendation of a suitable range of emissions reduction paths ahead of the feasibility test.
This would give the opportunity to develop a range of science–based paths, followed by an informed
assessment of risk and cost. Failure to do this has resulted in a global target with significantly less than
50% probability of success whilst opening the door to short-term overshooting from the outset.
3. The Peak year choice of 2016 is dependent upon success at COP15 in Copenhagen; there is no
fallback position in UK plans. It is unlikely that a necessary and sufficient agreement will be negotiated
in December of this year, such that global emissions can start being reduced at the end of 2015.
4. Peak 2014 was discarded for 2016 with the latter having lower probability of success and higher
absolute emissions. In a recent interview Chairman of the IPPC, Rajendra Pachauri, said that global
emissions reduction must peak by 2015 latest. Modelling should guide the decision on latest Peak year.
2028 was modelled without justification and found to be too high risk. At the rates used, this should
have been apparent from the outset.
5. Annual rates of emissions reduction were chosen by the CCC on broad economic and political grounds,
driving trajectories to low levels of probability of success. Probabilities of all 9 trajectories give <50%
success for the year 2100. The 2016 trajectories gave a success range of 20-44%. The 2014 trajectory,
with a 49% success level, was excluded without reason being given. Presentation of the CCC preferred
trajectory for targets and budgets as having a 50% probability of staying within 2oC is not consistent with
the modelling results and is misleading. The range of trajectories selected was unsuitable; experience
would suggest that it was unnecessary to model the lower end and that more demanding cases should
have been included at the top end.
6. There is a danger that as perceived climate risk increases, targets are set with reduced rates of
probability of success rather than applying faster emissions reduction rates. Overshooting also
becomes an increasingly attractive short-term palliative.
7. It is highly improbable that any major venture, political, military or economic, would willingly be
undertaken on the basis of a less than 50% probability of success. New options with greater investment
and lower risk would be required. Meinshausen et al. (2005 and 2006) have suggested a probability
level of 60% or greater. A reduction rate of 5-6% or more might be appropriate for that level of security.
8. Assessment of level of risk of not staying within 2oC increase should be part of the declared objectives
of the exercise rather than a product of the chosen rates of annual emissions reduction. Trajectories
should be targeted on possible levels of risk, for example 50%, 60% and 70% probability of success.
Economic and political decisions can then be taken within a proper assessment of climate risk.
41
9. Incorrect claims for consistency of results with the work of others and difficulties of reconciling the
results of different coupled modelling exercises results in increased uncertainty in the reliability of
targets and budgets. In principle, a safety margin or contingency provision should be made to reduce
risk. There is no safety margin with a 50% success forecast. Less than 50% is high risk and not in
accord with the UNFCCC principle of precaution.
10. Claims that the MAGICC 4.1 exercise did include coupling between climate and the carbon cycle and
took full account of the ‘coupled’ model research presented in the C4MIP study, the AR4 WG1 report
and related research have not been demonstrated in the CCC Report. Since the report was published,
MAGICC 4.1 has been superceded by version 5.2, with significant increase in feedback impact and
changes to climate sensitivity values.
11. The IPCC AR4 WGI three climate-carbon cycle models (Hadley SM, Uvic EMIC and BERN 2.5CC)
included the Hadley model showing global emissions falling to zero soon after 2050. Hadley explained
that this result could not on its own be regarded as relevant to the CCC exercise since the other two
models produced less stringent results. Such a multi model approach could possibly have led to
different conclusions from those of the CCC/Hadley exercise.
6. References
1. Committee on Climate Change: “Building a low carbon economy”
http://www.theccc.org.uk/pdf/TSO-ClimateChange.pdf
2. Technical Appendix Chapter 1
http://www.theccc.org.uk/other_docs/Ch1%20technical%20appendix%20- %20projecting%20
global%20emissions,%20concentrations%20and%20temperatures.pdf
3. Technical Appendix Spreadsheet
http://www.theccc.org.uk/pdfs/Ch1%20spreadsheet%20-%20model%20emissions%20and%20
climate%20data%20-%20final.xls
4. Technical Appendix to Chapter 2
http://www.theccc.org.uk/pdfs/Tech%20Appendix%20Final.pdf
5. MAGICC/SCENGEN
http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/wigley/magicc/index.html
6. M.G.J. den Elzen , M. Meinshausen (2005), Report 728001031/2005: Meeting the EU 2°C climate
target: global and regional emission implications.
http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/728001031.pdf
7. Meinshausen M., et al. (2006) Multi-gas emissions pathways to meet climate targets. Climatic
Change, 75 (1-2), 151-194.
http://www.springerlink.com/content/2185481704614445/fulltext.pdf
8. Anderson, K. & Bows, A. (2008) Reframing the climate change challenge in light of post-2000
emission trends. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A, 366 (1882), 3863-3882.
http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/journal_papers/fulltext.pdf
9. Martin Parry, Jean Palutikof, Clair Hanson and Jason Lowe (2008): Squaring up to reality nature
reports climate change Vol. 2 June 2008.
http://www.nature.com/climate/2008/0806/pdf/climate.2008.50.pdf
10. DECC (CCC) written evidence to the EAC:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmenvaud/memo/carbonbudgets/
uccb0202.htm
11. GCI written evidence to the EAC:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmenvaud/memo/carbonbudgets/
uccb07.pdf
12. Hadley written evidence to the EAC: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/
cmenvaud/memo/carbonbudgets/uccb0802.htm
42
Appendix B - Correspondence with GCI during 2009
Dr Jason Lowe
Head of Mitigation Advice
Direct tel: +44(0)118 378 5612
Direct fax: +44(0)118 3785615
jason.lowe@metoffice.gov.uk
Dear Mr Meyer, Received 4th August 2009
Thank you for your enquiry of 13th July about the evidence the Met Office provided to the Environmental
Audit Committee’s inquiry into carbon budgets. Before addressing your questions directly, I thought it would
be helpful to give some background on the work that has been carried out to understand the impact of
feedback between the climate system and the carbon cycle – which as you understand is an extremely
important and evolving area of current research.
The C4MIP project, summarised in Chapter 7 of the IPCC AR4 WG1 report, set out to understand the
importance of coupling the carbon cycle to climate change and its impact on the evolution of atmospheric
concentrations of CO2. Eleven models that explicitly represented the interaction between climate and the
carbon cycle were used in the project.
Each model was driven by a single emissions scenario - SRES A2 – and was run twice, once with climate
coupled to the carbon cycle and once without. Each model simulation produced an evolving estimate of
the total atmospheric concentration of CO2. By comparing the coupled to the uncoupled simulations, it was
possible to gain an indication of the importance of feedback between climate and the carbon cycle.
All of the models run in C4MIP demonstrated that coupling the climate to the carbon cycle is important
and that by 2100 climate change leads to the biosphere being less able to absorb CO2. A key result from
the study was the significant variation across the models in the size of this effect, demonstrating sizeable
uncertainty in representing the climate-carbon cycle feedback. Although C4MIP found that the Hadley
Centre model showed the strongest feedback effect, the other ten models are also credible and their results
cannot therefore be ruled out.
This parity between the eleven models meant it was important, in the work carried out for the Committee
on Climate Change, that the results from all C4MIP models were used to select the strength of interaction
between the climate and carbon cycle. Several different future emissions scenarios were then run through
a climate model (which has a treatment of the carbon cycle), in each case estimating uncertainty in
temperature and greenhouse gas concentrations. The full uncertainty range was due in part to the range of
climate-carbon cycle feedbacks characterised in C4MIP. For each emissions scenario an output from the
simulations was a probability
distribution showing how likely different amounts of 21st century warming will be. The Committee on Climate
Change then selected the emissions scenario that showed a 50% chance of limiting warming to approximately
2C above pre-industrial levels at 2100, as well as reducing the risk of a 4C rise to very low levels.
Before the simulations for the Committee on Climate Change, the Hadley Centre and two other modelling
centres had already carried out studies specifically to evaluate the impact of climate change on carbon
cycle feedbacks, and therefore the emissions required to reach atmospheric stabilisation at a number of
concentration levels. These are shown in fig 10.21 in the IPCC AR4 WG1 report. Emissions pathways
were based on CO2 only, unlike the more realistic Committee on Climate Change simulations which
included aerosols and other Kyoto gases. Also relevant is that the Hadley SM simulations in fig 10.21
were constrained so that atmospheric CO2 followed a particular pathway to 450ppm. In the Committee on
Climate Change simulations the atmospheric concentrations were not constrained in the same way. Instead
the emphasis was placed on the pathway of global temperature rise.
43
It is important to recognise the limitation of the experiments reported in fig 10.21 – which were largely
to gain an understanding of the nature of the coupling between climate and carbon cycle rather than to
provide definitive guidance on emissions reduction targets.
The models used by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) did include a coupling between climate and
the carbon cycle and took full account of the ‘coupled’ model research presented in the AR4 WG1 report,
the C4MIP study and related research.
To answer your specific questions directly:
Question One
As I pointed out in the written evidence from GCI that you said that you looked at, my reading of the
figure from IPCC AR4 Chapter 10 [I have attached it to this message again as well] is that with ‘coupling’
introduced, the image in fact shows the extent of the need to reduce the full-term emissions contraction-
event associated with a given reference curve for concentrations.
Can you confirm that that is your understanding please?
Response: The graph taken from fig 10.21 of the IPCC AR4 WG1 report shows the results of three models.
The Hadley Centre curve shows a simple model set up to replicate the more complex Hadley Centre model
used in C4MIP. The simple model was then used to study the emissions that lead to a stabilisation level for
CO2 of 450ppm for a single pathway. For this particular pathway, and only considering CO2, the curve does
show when coupling of climate to the carbon cycle is included, as it was by the CCC, emission levels would
have to reduce further to achieve a given stabilisation level of CO2 concentrations. However, given that all
the models in C4MIP and fig 10.21 are considered credible we believe the appropriate scientific approach
is to include information from the full range of available models not just the results of a single (worst case)
model. To that extent the Hadley SM curve on the graph is not, by itself, a good indication of the need
reduce emissions targets further than was indicated in the CCC simulations.
Question Two
In the example graphic taken from the IPCC AR4 in what is tagged as the C4MIP ‘Hadley SM’ model with
runs for 450 ppmv it shows very clearly that what in the IPCC image is called: -
[a] ‘uncoupled’ for 450 ppm requires a 50% cut in carbon emissions globally by 2050 and
[b] ‘coupled’ for 450 ppmv requires an 80% cut in carbon emissions globally by 2050.
Can you confirm that that is your understanding of this image please?
Response: As explained above, fig 10.21 does not show results from C4MIP. The Hadley SM result shows
the output of a simple climate model set up to emulate the more complex Hadley Centre model used
in C4MIP. Furthermore, using the results of a single mode for a pathway of a particular shape and only
considering CO2 to make general conclusions about global emissions reduction targets for a single year,
2050, is not appropriate. It is also important when discussing percentage emission reductions by 2050 to
state the year to which they are relative. The CCC expressed their recommendations for UK emissions
relative to 1990.
Question Three
You went on to say, “The precise values we use to work out the magnitude of the coupling comes from
elsewhere in IPCC and from a study referred to as a C4MIP study, which to date is the most comprehensive
analysis of that particular type of feedback onto the carbon cycle.”
The runs in question and highlighted in the attached graphic from the IPCC AR4 bear the tag ‘Hadley SM’,.
Can you as a member of the UKMO Hadley Centre please explain to me what ‘elsewhere in the IPCC’
refers to?
Response: Chapter 7 of the AR4 WG1 report summarises the results of the C4MIP project while table 7.4
presents the range of coupling factors for all 11 of the models used. C4MIP is mentioned extensively in
section 10.4.1 of the IPCC AR4 WG1 report (the section from which you have taken fig 10.21).
I hope this information is useful.
Yours sincerely
Dr. Jason Lowe
Head of Mitigation Advice
44
14 Hadley presentation to Defra (Sept –Oct 2007)
45
GLOBAL COMMONS INSTITUTE
21st May 2009
Joan Ruddock MP
Parliamentary Undersecretary of State,
Department of Energy and Climate Change
3 Whitehall Place
London SW1A 2HD
Dear Ms Ruddock
Contraction and Convergence

As you and your colleagues have acknowledged, with COP-15 now only months away,
this is a critical year for climate change politics globally. We are really running out of
time: -
1. to avoid exceeding the Government’s stated aim of an overall two degree Cel-
sius temperature rise globally and therefore
2. the truly horrifying prospect of runaway rates of climate change.
So I continue to be perplexed by your now routine dismissal of Contraction and Con-
vergence with remarks hinging on whether it is fair or not.
In the European Committee A 12 May 09] you said to Colin Challen MP: -
“As always when I hear him speak, my hon. Friend referred to his favourite subject
of contraction and convergence. He knows that many people are sympathetic to the
idea that fairness should come out of a contraction and convergence process.”
The primary issue with C&C is Contraction and Concentrations.

With runaway rates of climate change the real danger that threatens is going beyond
another degree Celsius temperature rise where this may well become unstoppable.
So the question is this: - is the global ‘contraction’ rate sufficient to keep within two
degrees and achieve the objective of the UNFCCC? [See enclosure].
Convergence is only relevant if the right rate of Contraction is engaged.

Rationality dictates that only when ‘convergence’ is understood as a function of the
right rate of contraction, is ‘fairness’ - whatever that is? - relevant.
In its absence, remarks about ‘fairness’ are irrelevant and misleading and make me
question the reliability of your sources of information.
You went on to say: -
“In the Council conclusions of 2008, the EU suggested that it should be possible
to move to 2 tonnes per capita by 2050. However, I am sorry to tell him that that
model is not acceptable to other countries. I am sure that he knows that. I say to
him again that when we are trying to get a global agreement, we must work with the
grain and go where we think the compromise can be struck. Although his suggestion
might be the ideal method and the world might come round to it, it cannot be built in
at this point in negotiations on getting to 2020, and certainly not by the EU.”
Global Commons Institute [GCI], 37

46 Ravenswood Road, London E17 9LY.
This formulation appears to be based on what Lord Nicholas
Stern incautiously propagated two years ago as his ‘simple
arithmetic’ of climate change, a position which he himself has
now conspicuously disowned [see enclosure].
So, for all this, I do enclose a copy of a GCI document. It is evidence to a current
enquiry by the UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee [EAC] into the
subject of ‘carbon-budgets’ in the UK Climate Act asking, ‘where did they come from
ánd were the models on which they were based up to date?’
This evidence shows the real arithmetic of Contraction and Convergence and why Lord
Stern needed to disown the simple arithmetic of his that you quote and it leads to
these simple questions from me to you: -
1. who advises you and which ‘Council’ are you referring to
2. why do you refute all the support in Europe for C&C e.g. Merkel [see enclosure]
3. when you and the other nameless parties you quote as finding ‘the model’ un-
acceptable, did you mean Stern’s model of simple arithmetic, or C&C per se?
Please, before you answer, do take account of the evidence enclosed. It gives factual
information about C&C and rational rates of its application in the light of feedbacks as
published in IPCC AR4. While you do, please note that Lord Adair Turner has: -
1. already confirmed to EAC that the carbon-budgets in the UK Climate Act came
from Contraction and Convergence and that;
2. now, taking account of the revised position on urgency of Lord Stern’s and oth-
ers, further agreed with the Committee on Energy and Climate Change, that if
the rate of contraction must be accelerated for reasons of urgency, the rate of
convergence must be accelerated relative to that for reasons of equity.
C&C is a methodology that shows how that is done rationally. This supports and works
with the grain of the climate negotiations within the scientifically defined limits that
constrain us all. That is why C&C is now very widely cited and supported around the
world, but it seems that you and your colleagues at DECC are unaware of this.
It seems that with nearly twenty years of a random and failed approach and time now
running out, you continue with an opaque party line from DEFRA that ignores the C&C
methodology and that we cannot continue to cause this problem faster than we act to
avoid it with impunity.
More bureaucratic answers avoiding this, based on a ‘faux’ consensus of the lowest
common denominator, inspire no confidence. Globally rational C&C-based arguments
to the climate negotiations that consciously demonstrate we are acting in concert to
stop this problem faster than we cause it, will inspire confidence. These will answer
growing public axieties about the death-trap into which we move without them.
With kind regards
Aubrey Meyer
GCI
cc Greg Clark MP, Colin Challen MP, Tim Yeo MP, Martin Caton MP, Joan Walley MP,
Robin Stott MD, Prof Ross Garnaut ANU, Sunand Prasad RIBA, Nicholas Stern, Adair
Turner, Bill McGuire UCL, Andrew Dlugolecki CII, Tony McMichael WHO, Mike Hutchin-
son Tangent Films Julian Rush ITN; Nik Gowing BBC TV - full list on request.
Global Commons Institute [GCI], 37 Ravenswood
47 Road, London E17 9LY.
30th May, 2009
Joan Ruddock MP
3 Whitehall Place
London SW1A 2HD
Dear Ms Ruddock
No acknowledgement of receipt of the letter I sent to you on the 21st of May has
been received, let alone a reply.
Furthermore, my attempts yesterday to establish with DEC/DEFRA and your Parlia-
mentary Office whether the letter had been received by you or not, proved - over some
hours - completely unsuccessful. [Your parliamentary office assistant Jessica turned out
to be the only person during this process, who was at least polite and helpful].
So I am sending the orginal letter and its enclosure to you again recorded delivery
and I am asking you please to acknowledge receipt of this.
You can probably detect that I am more than a little irritated by this state of affairs
and I certainly am. Since writing to you, it has further come to my attention that your
colleague Mr Jos Delbeke, Deputy Director General of the Environment Directorate in
the European Commission has also been publicly making ridiculous, untruthful and
misleading assertions about contraction and convergence: -
“It’s an extreme interpretation of fairness. It means tremendous transfer of resourc-
es - billions and billions a year from the West - and I’m not sure that’s on the cards
in the current economic climate.”
and I have written to him about this [enclosed copy].
After the inaccurate report around C&C related issues commissioned by DEFRA from
EcoFys [2006 and quoted in the CCC report to Parliament] this seems to me to be a
yet further indication of the kind of now routinely iterative nonsense about C&C that
has been created over the years by you and your EC/DEFRA/DECC colleagues. That
this represents a squandering of the small political capital we all have left in this mat-
ter, is extraordinary and unforgivable and a cause for shame amongst yourselves.
Once again I am copying this letter around and I now give you an assurance that - af-
ter twenty years of making a rational, sustained and not unsuccessful effort to articu-
late and advocate C&C - I will continue to press this matter upon you until I am satis-
fied that an honest and measured response to my questions has been provided.
With kind regards
Yours sincerely
Aubrey Meyer
GCI
cc Greg Clark MP, Colin Challen MP, Tim Yeo MP, Martin Caton MP, Joan Walley MP,
Robin Stott MD, Prof Ross Garnaut ANU, Sunand Prasad RIBA, Nicholas Stern, Adair
Turner, Bill McGuire UCL, Andrew Dlugolecki CII, Tony McMichael WHO, Mike Hutchin-
son Tangent Films Julian Rush ITN; Nik Gowing BBC TV - full list on request.
Global Commons Institute [GCI], 37 Ravenswood Road, London E17 9LY.
48
2. “The emission reduction to meet a particular stabilisation level reported in the mitigation studies
While Please
assessed observe
here this
might be is note [a] on
underestimated duethe table 5.1:
to missing - cycle feedbacks [ see Topic 2.3]”
carbon
“The
3. This emission2.3
is section reduction to sensitivity
- Climate meet a particular stabilisation level reported in the mitigation studies
and feedbacks
4. “The equilibrium sensitivity is a measure of the climate system response to sustained radiative
This is section 2.3 - Climate sensitivity and feedbacks
forcing. It is defined as the equilibrium global average surface warming following a doubling of
CO“The
2
equilibrium sensitivity
concentration. is a measure
Progress since the TAR ofenables
the climate system response
an assessment that to sustained
climate radia- is
sensitivity
tive forcing. It is defined as the equilibrium global average surface warming following a doubling
of CO2 concentration. Progress since the TAR enables an assessment that climate sensitivity is
to be less
likely to than
be in1.5
theC. Values
range of 2higher
to 4.5 thanC with4.5 C cannot
a best estimatebe excluded
of about 3butC, agreement
and it is very ofunlikely
modelsto
with observations is not as good for those values. [WG1 8.6 9.6 Box
be less than 1.5 C. Values higher than 4.5 C cannot be excluded but agreement of models with10.2 SPM]. Feedbacks
canobservations is not as the
amplify or dampen good for thosetovalues.
response a given [WG1 8.6 9.6
forcing. Boxemissions
Direct 10.2 SPM]. ofFeedbacks
water vapourcan am-
plify or dampen
[a greenhouse gas]thebyresponse to a givenmake
human activities forcing. Direct emissions
a negligible of water
contribution vapour [aforcing.
to radiative greenhouse
gas] by human activities make a negligible contribution to radiative forcing. however, as global
However, as global temperature increases, tropospheric water vapour concentrations increase
temperature increases, tropospheric water vapour concentrations increase and this represents a
and this represents
key positive feedback a keybutpositive feedback
not a forcing but notchange.
of climate a forcing of climate
Water vapourchange.
changes Water vapour
respresent the
changes
largest represent the largest
feedback affecting feedback
climate affecting
equilibrium climateand
sensitivity equilibrium
are now sensitivity and arethatn
better understood now
in the
better TAR. Cloudthan
understood feedbacks remain
in the TAR. the largest
Cloud source
feedbacks of uncertainty.
remain the largest Spatial
source patters of climate
of uncertainty.
response are largely controlled by climate processes and feedbacks.
Spatial patters of climate response are largely controlled by climate processes and feedbacks.For example, sea-ice albedo
feedbacks tend to enhance the high latitude response. [WG1, 2.8 8.6 9.2 TS 2.1.3 TS 2.5 SPM].
For example, sea-ice albedo feedbacks tend to enhance the high latitude response. [WG1, 2.8
8.6Warming reduces
9.2 TS 2.1.3 TS terrestrial and ocean reduces
2.5 SPM].Warming uptake ofterrestrial
atmospheric andCO2
oceanincreasing
uptake the fraction of an-
of atmospheric
thropogenic emissions remaining in the atmosphere. This positive
CO2 increasing the fraction of anthropogenic emissions remaining in the atmosphere. This carbon cycle feedback leads to
larger atmospheric CO2 increases and greater climate change for a given emissions scenario, but
positive carbon cycle feedback leads to larger atmospheric CO2 increases
the strength of this feedback varies markedly among models. [WG1
and greater climate
7.3 TW 5.4 SPM WG2 4.4.].”
change for a given emissions scenario, but the strength of this feedback varies markedly
This is in models.
among AR4 Chapter
[WG1 7.3 10 TWwhere carbon
5.4 SPM WG2 cycle feedbacks are discussed and calculated
4.4.].”
5. This is in AR4 Chapter 10 where carbon cycle feedbacks are discussed and calculated [as per
“There is unanimous agreement among the coupled climate carbon cycle models driven
GCI memo to EAC]
by emission scenarios run so far that future climate change would reduce the efficien-
cy ofisthe
6. “There Earth system
unanimous (land among
agreement and ocean) to absorb
the coupled anthropogenic
climate carbon cycleCO2. There
models is evi-
driven by
emission scenarios run so far that future climate change would reduce the efficiency of the
change.”
Earth system (land and ocean) to absorb anthropogenic CO2. There is evidence that the CO2
airborne fraction is increasing, so accelerating the rate of climate change.”
49
50
51
18th June, 2009
Joan Ruddock MP
3 Whitehall Place
London SW1A 2HD
Dear Ms Ruddock
Thank you for your letter of the 15th of June replying to mine of the 21st of May. You acknowl-
edged receipt of the enclosure, GCI’s evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee [EAC].
I do not understand why therefore, you entirely ignored its contents to do with the issue of
positive feedback effects as presented in IPCC AR4. This was the core of GCI’s evidence given
to EAC. In avoiding this you fail to take the point of letter which said: -
The primary issue with C&C is Contraction:Concentrations.
“With runaway rates of climate change the real danger that threatens is going beyond
another degree Celsius temperature rise where this may well become unstoppable.
So the question is this: - what global ‘contraction’ rate sufficient to keep within
two degrees and achieve the objective of the UNFCCC?”
The adjusted quantification of contraction:concentration profiles in the light of these, was
published in the AR4 [Chapter 10 WG1] in 2007. The coupled-model runs from the Hadley
Centre show each ‘coupled’ [i.e. with ‘feedbacks’] contraction-event has to be shrunk by
~40% to achieve the atmosphere concentration in ppmv against those that have routinely
been published as ‘uncoupled’ [i.e. without ‘feedbacks’] by IPCC four times in a row in the
four reports since 1994. Remarks in the IPCC AR-4 Summary for Policy Makers [overleaf] that
these omitted feedback effects are positive are unambiguous.
This is a major change in the IPCC’s assessment of the extent of the global emissions con-
traction that is needed to meet the most significant policy challenge in history - namely how
to avoid runaway rates of climate change - yet you are ignoring it; why?
Please will you explain how you DECC, DEFRA and the EU do intend to take account of this, in
the UK Climate Act and at the UNFCCC? Also, what global temperature average does the Gov-
ernment’s announcement that we in the UK must be prepared to adapt to temperature rises of
4 degrees in the UK, imply? I fear that it implies that we soon will have failed to avoid runaway
climate change and this fills me with dread as we cannot conceivably ‘adapt’ to this.
Avoiding these issues and making the wrong arguments about ‘Contraction & Convergence’ leads
to the ‘resistance’ to it that you mention. The right argument represents its rationale - that we
must collectively organize to live within the limit that saves us from runaway climate change. The
international emissions shares must add up to a global whole no greater than the limit whereby
we must solve this problem faster than we are creating it. The opposite continues to be true.
What I am asking you for is reassurance that you and the Government understand this in re-
lation to the C&C rationale and the consequent need to reframe and restructure the ‘political’
debate at the UNFCCC in the light of it. Please will you provide this? Your answers so far do not.
In the recent words of Jim Hansen, “The greatest danger is continued ignorance and denial
which could make tragic consequences unavoidable.”
Yours sincerely
Aubrey Meyer
cc Greg Clark MP, Colin Challen MP, Tim Yeo MP, Martin Caton MP, Joan Walley MP, Robin Stott
MD, Prof Ross Garnaut ANU, Sunand Prasad RIBA, Nicholas Stern, Adair Turner, Bill McGuire
UCL, Andrew Dlugolecki CII, Tony McMichael WHO, Mike Hutchinson Tangent Films Julian Rush
ITN; Nik Gowing BBC TV - full list on request.
52
2. “The emission reduction to meet a particular stabilisation level reported in the mitigation studies
While Please
assessed observe
here this
might be is note [a] on
underestimated duethe table 5.1:
to missing - cycle feedbacks [ see Topic 2.3]”
carbon
“The
3. This emission2.3
is section reduction to sensitivity
- Climate meet a particular stabilisation level reported in the mitigation studies
and feedbacks
4. “The equilibrium sensitivity is a measure of the climate system response to sustained radiative
This is section 2.3 - Climate sensitivity and feedbacks
forcing. It is defined as the equilibrium global average surface warming following a doubling of
CO“The
2
equilibrium sensitivity
concentration. is a measure
Progress since the TAR ofenables
the climate system response
an assessment that to sustained
climate radia- is
sensitivity
tive forcing. It is defined as the equilibrium global average surface warming following a doubling
of CO2 concentration. Progress since the TAR enables an assessment that climate sensitivity is
to be less
likely to than
be in1.5
theC. Values
range of 2higher
to 4.5 thanC with4.5 C cannot
a best estimatebe excluded
of about 3butC, agreement
and it is very ofunlikely
modelsto
with observations is not as good for those values. [WG1 8.6 9.6 Box
be less than 1.5 C. Values higher than 4.5 C cannot be excluded but agreement of models with10.2 SPM]. Feedbacks
canobservations is not as the
amplify or dampen good for thosetovalues.
response a given [WG1 8.6 9.6
forcing. Boxemissions
Direct 10.2 SPM]. ofFeedbacks
water vapourcan am-
plify or dampen
[a greenhouse gas]thebyresponse to a givenmake
human activities forcing. Direct emissions
a negligible of water
contribution vapour [aforcing.
to radiative greenhouse
gas] by human activities make a negligible contribution to radiative forcing. however, as global
However, as global temperature increases, tropospheric water vapour concentrations increase
temperature increases, tropospheric water vapour concentrations increase and this represents a
and this represents
key positive feedback a keybutpositive feedback
not a forcing but notchange.
of climate a forcing of climate
Water vapourchange.
changes Water vapour
respresent the
changes
largest represent the largest
feedback affecting feedback
climate affecting
equilibrium climateand
sensitivity equilibrium
are now sensitivity and arethatn
better understood now
in the
better TAR. Cloudthan
understood feedbacks remain
in the TAR. the largest
Cloud source
feedbacks of uncertainty.
remain the largest Spatial
source patters of climate
of uncertainty.
response are largely controlled by climate processes and feedbacks.
Spatial patters of climate response are largely controlled by climate processes and feedbacks.For example, sea-ice albedo
feedbacks tend to enhance the high latitude response. [WG1, 2.8 8.6 9.2 TS 2.1.3 TS 2.5 SPM].
For example, sea-ice albedo feedbacks tend to enhance the high latitude response. [WG1, 2.8
8.6Warming reduces
9.2 TS 2.1.3 TS terrestrial and ocean reduces
2.5 SPM].Warming uptake ofterrestrial
atmospheric andCO2
oceanincreasing
uptake the fraction of an-
of atmospheric
thropogenic emissions remaining in the atmosphere. This positive
CO2 increasing the fraction of anthropogenic emissions remaining in the atmosphere. This carbon cycle feedback leads to
larger atmospheric CO2 increases and greater climate change for a given emissions scenario, but
positive carbon cycle feedback leads to larger atmospheric CO2 increases
the strength of this feedback varies markedly among models. [WG1
and greater climate
7.3 TW 5.4 SPM WG2 4.4.].”
change for a given emissions scenario, but the strength of this feedback varies markedly
This is in models.
among AR4 Chapter
[WG1 7.3 10 TWwhere carbon
5.4 SPM WG2 cycle feedbacks are discussed and calculated
4.4.].”
5. This is in AR4 Chapter 10 where carbon cycle feedbacks are discussed and calculated [as per
“There is unanimous agreement among the coupled climate carbon cycle models driven
GCI memo to EAC]
by emission scenarios run so far that future climate change would reduce the efficien-
cy ofisthe
6. “There Earth system
unanimous (land among
agreement and ocean) to absorb
the coupled anthropogenic
climate carbon cycleCO2. There
models is evi-
driven by
emission scenarios run so far that future climate change would reduce the efficiency of the
change.”
Earth system (land and ocean) to absorb anthropogenic CO2. There is evidence that the CO2
airborne fraction is increasing, so accelerating the rate of climate change.”
53
54
55
29th September, 2009
Joan Ruddock MP
3 Whitehall Place
London SW1A 2HD
Dear Ms Ruddock
Thank you for your letter of the 17th of September.
I reassure you that I am very happy to acknowledge that DECC and its members in-
cluding yourself, under Ed Milliband’s leadership, have been making a serious effort to
take Climate Change to the front-line and argue the case for an effective global deal.
This is much appreciated by people in and beyond the GCI community.
However, the letter you sent me reflecting the views of the UK modelling community
which you kindly passed on to me does not contain good evidence to support the views
you represent.
The arguments so-far about ‘coupled models’ have been completely overtaken by the
trend data for CO2 emissions:concentrations in the CCC technical annexes. These clear-
ly show that, contrary to the repeated claims by people who’ve been involved in this to
the effect that all the feedback concerns over the carbon-cycle and the failing strength
of the sink function have been dealt with in the CCC work, the opposite is true: - CCC
published trend data for CO2 emissions:concentrations in the CCC’s technical annexes
show the complete opposite, namely that the sink function is increasing dramatically -
see image overleaf. It is faithfully produced from the CCC preferred case for 50:50 odds
on avoiding more that a 2 degrees Celsius rise in global temperature.
I re-iterate that it is in AR4 Chapter 10 where carbon cycle feedbacks are discussed
and calculated [as per GCI memo to EAC]: - “There is unanimous agreement among
the coupled climate carbon cycle models driven by emission scenarios run so far that
future climate change would reduce the efficiency of the Earth system (land
and ocean) to absorb anthropogenic CO2. There is evidence that the CO2 air-
borne fraction is increasing, so accelerating the rate of climate change.”
I do not want DECC’s efforts to be frustrated, to go unrewarded or indeed to be ridi-
culed because of the extent to which on this substantive matter, you are being misled.
However, as things stand, I am certain that you being misled and that the consequenc-
es of this matter being systematically avoided for nearly a year will be deeply counter-
productive unless this matter is sorted out immediately.
The ending of the EAC enquiry provides an opportunity to do this.
I hope you agree and that you confirm this please.
With kind regards
Aubrey Meyer
Please note address change
GCI
57 Howard Road
LONDON E17 4SH
Ph 0208 520 4742
56
From: “ccu.correspondence@defra.gsi.gov.uk”
To: aubrey.meyer@btinternet.com
Sent: Tuesday, 20 October, 2009 4:52:33 PM
Subject: Response to your Query : - Ref:DWOE000153070 - Climate change science
Dear Aubrey,
Thank you for your letter of 29 September in response to Joan Ruddock?s letter of 17
September. I have been asked to reply on her behalf.
This Department fully appreciates your concern about ensuring that projected chang-
es in the behaviour of carbon sinks are taken into account when establishing an ap-
propriate emissions target for the UK. As you correctly realise, potential feedbacks
arising from possible changes in the properties of these sinks are of crucial impor-
tance in assessing the severity of future climate change. Therefore, as you may re-
call, in her recent letter the Minister assured you that the carbon-cycle feedback was
included in the Committee on Climate Change?s (CCC?s) analysis.
We undertake independent research to ensure the validity of the CCC?s work, and
have found close agreement with their findings, in which carbon feedbacks were in-
cluded. As you are undoubtedly aware, the Earth?s climate is a very complex system,
and it is therefore difficult to unravel the precise details of each feedback from the
overall outcome. From your enclosed plot it is not evident that this has been taken
into account when arriving at your conclusion regarding the carbon cycle simulation
in the models used by the CCC. This is perhaps why your conclusion is at odds with
the CCC.
You will of course appreciate that we need to base our decisions on advice from sci-
entific experts in the field of climate change. We maintain regular contact with a
number of these scientists from a range of internationally respected organisations.
In closing, on behalf of DECC , I welcome your interest and motivation to ensure
transparency in the process leading to important decisions concerning our planet and
also for the valuable contributions you have made in the past to the climate change
debate.
Yours sincerely,
Hilary Cartwright-Taylor
Customer Contact Unit
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Dear Hilary
Thank you for your note.
You appear to have misunderstood the material sent to Ms Ruddock by GCI: - our con-
clusion is not at odds - as-you-put-it - with the CCC. You may not be aware that, on
the contrary, the Hadley Centre have now confirmed that the GCI source-sink plot sent
correctly lays out exactly what they/CCC presented. The success odds are the issue.
Apart from that that thank you for your appreciative remarks.
Yours sincerely
Aubrey Meyer
GCI
57 Howard Road
LONDON E17 4SH
Ph 0208 520 4742
57
1st May 2009
Lord Adair Turner

Chairman
The Independent Climate Change Committee
c/o The Financial Services Authority
25 The North Colonnade
Canary Wharf
London E14 5HS
Dear Lord Turner,
It is as the Chairman of the Independent UK Climate Change Committee that I write

to you. Not being able to find an address for that committee I have written care of the
address above.
Sparked by your evidence to the UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Com-

mittee [EAC] on the 4th of February, EAC have initiated an enquiry into the subject of
‘carbon-budgets’ in the UK Climate Act and asks ‘where did they come from?’ *
I read how you became involved in an exchange with EAC members on the subject of
Contraction and Convergence saying that the Act was pretty strong support for what I
have been saying.
As that may or may not be the case, I have taken the liberty of enclosing a copy of a
GCI document that contains evidence to that enquiry as it is some indication of what I
actually have been saying for most of the last twenty years.
This may be helpful to the committee, so I thought in the circumstances it might be

helpful to you too. I hope so.
With kind regards
Aubrey Meyer
GCI

58
29th May 2009
Lord Adair Turner

Chairman
The Independent Climate Change Committee
4th Floor, Manning House,
22 Carlisle Place,
London,
SW1P 1JA
Dear Lord Turner,

A month ago I wrote to you in your role as the Chairman of the Independent UK Cli-
mate Change Committee. Initially unable to find an address for that committee, I did
send it care of the FSA address. Not having had a reply and now having found the
address above, I am sending you this letter again and I would grateful to you it you
would kindly acknowledge receipt of this and respond to the points raised.
Sparked by your evidence to the UK House of Commons Environmental Audit Com-
mittee [EAC] on the 4th of February, EAC have initiated an enquiry into the subject of
‘carbon-budgets’ in the UK Climate Act and asks ‘where did they come from?’
I read how you were involved in an exchange with EAC members on the subject of
Contraction and Convergence saying that the Act was pretty strong support for what I
have been saying. As that may or may not be the case, I have taken the liberty of en-
closing a copy of a GCI document that contains evidence to that EAC enquiry as it is
some indication of what I actually have been saying for most of the last twenty years,
as distinct from the often somewhat random constructions that have been put upon
what I have actually been saying.
This may be helpful to the EAC and I thought in the circumstances it might be helpful
to you and yours too. I hope so. Please let me know.
Since I am rewriting this letter now I wish also to ask you about this. Your evidence
about the Act to the EAC included the remark, “We did not call it Contract and Converge.
Apart from anything else, for some reason which I do not quite understand, this has
ended up in a slightly emotive sense and it also gets interpreted in particular ways.”
I am unable to explain these remarks. So it would helpful to me to know if you can
explain what [especially the underlined] words mean. Many confused and mislead-
ing statements and even straight disinformation about C&C come from the mouths of
various [including eminent] parties still at this time. This is true for example in the UK
Parliament and the European Commission, as the enclosed letters to Ms Ruddock and
Mr Delbeke indicate. Perhaps you can help sort this out? I hope so.
With kind regards
Yours sincerely
Aubrey Meyer
GCI
59
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Second Memo from GCI

to the UK House of Commons

Summary for Policy Makers 4

3 IPCC Climate modelling 14

IPCC - 1994-2007 - with various contraction:concentrations scenarios.

IPCC AR4 18-19

4 CCC lead scenario 22

Setting the goal-posts around “2016:4% low”.

5 Analysis of CCC scenario range 24

CCC’s 2016:4% Low - 10th Percentile

A Method & modelling used for defining UK emissions reduction targets

UK targets and budgets are too little too late

CCC Methods and modelling

GCI target and budget recommendation for enough, soon enough

Was the Government misled by the CCC?

Political Derivation of UK Government emissions scenario in the CCC report

Difference by weight between

Emissions Giga Tonnes

Difference by weight between

Difference by weight between

9 Fig B1: Hansen & WRE 350

Setting the Goal-Posts around “2016:4% low”.

Is this claim unreliably ‘optimistic’?

CCC’s 2016:4% Low - 10th Percentile

1. In the CCC’s ‘10th Percentile’ trace:

1800 - 2000 475 GTC

How is this changing ‘airborne fraction’ calculated?

Rate of Change in Sink-Efficiency - 10th Percentile

1. In the CCC’s ‘Median’ trace: -

1800 - 2000 475 GTC

How is this changing ‘airborne fraction’ calculated?

Rate of Change in Sink-Efficiency – Median

1. In the CCC’s ‘90th Percentile’ trace: -

1800 - 2000 475 GTC

How is this changing ‘airborne fraction’ calculated?

Rate of Change in Sink-Efficiency - 90th Percentile

1800 - 2000 475 GTC

3. Method used by the Committee on Climate Change

Prepare global emissions reduction scenarios

Pace of emissions reduction

Model concentrations, temperatures and probabilities

2050 probability of temperature staying within 2oC per scenario.

2014:3%low+ 2.00 0.80

Source: Technical Appendix, Spreadsheet, Trajectory cdf’s.

Kyoto CO2 Kyoto 2050 Kyoto Cumulative emissions Chance

Source: Technical Appendix, Spreadsheet, Plots

Select preferred scenarios

Source: CCC Report, Table 1.2.

Set global emissions reduction target

4. The MAGICC Model

Source: Technical Appendix, Spreadsheet Plots

Consistency with other modelling exercises:

11. GCI written evidence to the EAC:

Contraction and Convergence

The primary issue with C&C is Contraction and Concentrations.

Convergence is only relevant if the right rate of Contraction is engaged.

Global Commons Institute [GCI], 37

1st May 2009

Lord Adair Turner