Safety And Risk Management

Risk Assessment of a 3-phase Separator

Figure 1: P&ID of an Oil and Gas 1st Stage (3-Phase) Separator

1.0 SAFETY DATA
Below failure/ year rate data is used for the further analysis in the report. Presented data
source/ justification is given in remarks column.
TABLE-1
S. Failure rate
Items References (or Remarks)
No. Faults/Year

Data from "Estimating the Reliability of Systems" (1)

1 PT 3.024x10-2
is used

2 PV 2x10-2 Assumed

3 PC 1.5x10-2 Assumed

4 LC 1.5 x10-2 Assumed

5 LV 2x10-2 Assumed

6 LT 3x10-2 Assumed

7 PSV 3.72x10-2 "UKAEA PRV Failure Rate Data By Valve Type" (2)

Ignition Frequency in
8 0.1 Assumed
case vessel failure

Choke valve is considered more reliable than normal

9 Choke 5x10-4 pressure or flow control valve, therefore failure rate is
considered lower than normal control valves.

Vessel Failure due to 1% failure rate is assumed for 10 years design life of the
10 1x10-4
Corrosion vessel

This value is assumed for the defects of demister, weir,

11 Misc. Defects 1x10-3
inlet device etc.

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2.0 WHAT-IF ANALYSIS

The fundamental purpose of What-if analysis is to identify possible hazards and

operability problems or concerns. What-if is a method in which question is asked to the
group members of the study, they carefully consider and think potential scenarios and its
consequences that such an error or failure is precipitated.
By using What-if technique 3-phase separator is analyzed in below three sheets. Against
each question potential hazards are discussed and its consequences are discussed,
available safeguard are mentioned, and if safeguard is not there than recommendations
are proposed.
A mix phase stream from well is entered in 3-phase separator. In the separator gas, oil
and water streams are being separated as shown in the node marked P&ID in Annexure-
I.

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 3.0 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

Top event is considered the PT fail close for the overpressure scenario. In this analysis pressure
transmitter (PT) failure frequency is taken as 3.028x10-2 /year. PSV failure rate on demand is
considered as 0.0372/ year. In case of pressure vessel failure 10% chances are considered for the
fire and if the fire will not accrue than 90% chances of loss containment. Refer to above Table-1
for the failure data. By using these figures event tree is drawn as below for the various scenario:

Event Tree Analysis

Initial Event PSV did not work Vessel Rupture Ignition Outcome Frequency

P1 P 2 P 3 P 4
P4 = 0.1 Fire = 1.124x10-4/year
success
P3 = 1
success
Loss of P1 P2 P3(1- P4)
success Failure Containment =1.1012x10-3/year
P2 = 0.0372 (1- P4) =0.9
Failure Safe P1 P2 (1- P3) =0
PT Malfunction (1-P3) = 0
P1=3.024x10-2/year

P1 (1- P2)
Failure Safe =0.02911/ year
(1-P2)
= 0.9628

There is only one layer of protection i.e., PSV as shown in the P&ID. In case if the PSV
does not work, fire scenario probability is estimated 1.124x10-4/year and loss of
containment probability is estimated as 1.1012x10-3/year.

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4.0 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

Fault tree analysis has been carried out based on failure data as presented in above Table-
1 for pressure transmiter (PT), pressure controler (PC), pressure control valve (PV), level
controller (LC) oil side, level transmitter (LT) oil side, level control valve (LV) oil side,
pressure safety valve (PSV), choke valve, possible ignition rate in case of PSV failure,
failure due to corrosion and misc. internal failures.

From above analysis in case PT falure fire case probability is calculated as 6.13 x 10 -4/
year.

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5.0 LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS (LOPA) BASED SIL
The objective of the Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is to determine the SIL level
required for the necessary risk reduction. For Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) of
separation system presented in the P&ID, basic failure data is taken from above Table-1.

In a result of Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) recommendations are proposed in

LOPA table which are summarized below.

Recommendation no.1.1 Pressure alarm high and high high to be configured on existing
pressure controller/ transmitter to alert operator for necessary action.

Refer to recommendation no. 1.2 At inlet of production separator an Emergency

Shutdown Valve (ESDV) to be provided with dedicated pressure transmitter (PT) and
pressure controller in case of activation of pressure alarm high high that will closed to the
ESDV. This SIF shall be SIL2 rated.

Refer to recommendation no. 2.1 At oil section on existing level controller/ transmitter
level alarm low and low low to be configured.

Refer to recommendation no. 2.2 A separate dedicated LT and LC to be provided on the

bridle on oil side and a Shutdown Valve (SDV) to be provided on oil leg at downstream
of LV. On activation of level low low this SDV will be closed. This SIF shall be SIL2
rated.

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6.0 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEEDURE FOR CONFINED SPACE ENTRY
AND WORK PERMIT(3)

During every 5 years shutdown safety precautions are most important in separator
(pressure vessel) maintenance inspection activities. Pressure vessel is a enclosed space
and vessel’s internal inspection activities involve exposure to all of the hazard confined
space entry. For the entrance in the vessel, compliance for the prerequisites for issuance
of PTWS are maindatdory. Following safety procedure shoul be followed:
 Vessel should be depressurized and isolated from all sources such as liquids, gases or
vapor by using the blinds/ blind flanges.

 Purge the vessel through inert gas (Nitrogen).

 For the evacuation of the vapor from the vessel blower can be used.

 LEL should be measured and assure that it is within the allowable limit. Also perform
periodic gas tests to assure that hazardous vapor has been removed from inside the
vessel and from the relevant area.

 Vessel internally inspected by authorized inspector who should know hazards that
may be faced during entry.

 Limit the the other activities near the subject vessel.

 Secure area with posts and flags.

 In case of emergency relevant staff should be alert.

 Vessel integrity assessment should be carried out. Inspection may include

surveillance, internals inspection such as demister pad, weir, inlet device, vortex
breaker etc., external inspection and wall thickness inspection.

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 Work Permit for Confined Space Entry Permit(3)

Contractor Name: __________________________ Date/ Time Issued: ______________/________________

Area Code: __________________________ Date/ Time Expires: _____________/_________________
Permit Number_______________

HAZARDS IN THE CONFINED SPACE: () REQUIRED ENTRY EQUIPMENT: ()

 Oxygen deficiency (<19.5%)  Ear muffs
 Toxic gasses  Coveralls
 Flammable hazards  Respirator
 Electrical hazards  Explosion proof lighting
 Chemical hazards  Fire Extinguishers
 Other ___________________________________  Other ____________________

AUTHORIZED WORKERS
Entrants
Name: _________________________________________
Attendants
Name: _________________________________________
Supervisors _________________________________________
Name:
Entry Conditions: ___________________________________________________________________________

ENTRY PREPARATIONS  Review hazards and work procedure ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

 Notify relevant employees of work  Notify available emergency team Test will be done before entry
 Process/ utility lines isolation  Atmospheric test satisfactory Continuous monitoring? Yes No
 locks and tags are applied  Required PPE worn Test frequency: ____________________
 Area secured with posts  Communication plan Testing method: _________________
 Space available for working  Other ________________________
 Required ventilation established

TEST PEL  i ii iii iv

O2 Min 19.5% 
O2 Max 23.5% 
Flammability 10% LFL 
Carbon Monoxide 35 ppm 
H2S 5 ppm 
Toxic 
Temperature 

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ISSUING AUTHORITY Time: Name: ______________________________
________________ ______________________________
Certify that required entry conditions are met Date: ______________
Signature:

References:

1) “Estimating the Reliability of Systems” By A. P. Fraas

2) Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station 22nd
Annual International Symposium, Chapter ‘UKAEA PRV Failure Rate Data By Valve Type’.

3) Confined space working permits https://www.xosafety.com, https://www.hse.gov.uk,

https://www.gsa.gov

Acknowledgements
I gratefully acknowledge the efforts of Mr Muhammad Rizwan, Graduate of MSc
Advanced Chemical Engineering during 2022-23 for the compilation of this exercise.

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