Hoover Digest, 2024, No. 2, Spring

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T H E H O OV E R I N S T I T U T I O N • S TA N F O R D U N I V E R S I T Y
The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace was established
at Stanford University in 1919 by Herbert Hoover, a member of Stanford’s
pioneer graduating class of 1895 and the thirty-first president of the United
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ON THE COVER
CONDOLEEZZA RICE
Tad and Dianne Taube Director
German-born artist and graphic designer
Winold Reiss (1886–1953) painted this ERIC WAKIN
portrait of Wades in the Water, a leader Deputy Director,
and warrior of the Blackfeet tribe, in full Director of Library & Archives
regalia. Reiss befriended many of the
Blackfeet beginning in 1920, when he first
sojourned on their Montana reservation.
Many twentieth-century Americans were
drawn to stories and imagery of the West
and were fascinated with Indians. This
painting was one of several to appear on
a railroad calendar, a framing that told
of technological change pushing aside
traditional ways. See story, page 218.
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Spring 2024
HOOVER D IG EST
T HE E CO N O M Y
9 Social Security’s Fateful Day
Two roads diverged in 1977, and Congress took the one that
led to higher taxes and—ten years from now—an empty trust
fund. By Andrew G. Biggs, John F. Cogan, and Daniel Heil
14 High Noon
Advanced economies can’t outrun debt and taxes any longer.
By Michael J. Boskin
19 When Milton Friedman Speaks . . .

Hoover fellow Jennifer Burns explores the fruitful life and
continuing influence of Milton Friedman, a Hoover luminary
and one of the twentieth century’s most brilliant economists.
By Peter Boettke
ISRAEL
27 Empires in a Clear Light
The “colonialism” slander remains just that—a slander.
By Peter Berkowitz
34 Worse than Hitler

The Nazis took pains to hide the atrocities they committed
against Jews. The Hamas killers celebrated theirs.
By Andrew Roberts
H O O V E R D IG E ST • S p ring 2024 3
40 Cheerleaders for Terror
The progressive left has long nursed an old hatred under
its mantle of “social justice.” Because Jews have refused to
become either victims or oppressors, leftists are casting them
out. By Aharon Friedman and Joshua D. Rauh
49 Life or Death Questions

Israeli commentator Daniel Gordis says October 7 obliterated
Israelis’ belief that they could live in quasi-peace among
their enemies. Now comes “a profound conversation about
why Jewish sovereignty was an important project in the first
place.” By Russ Roberts
IRAN
59 Tehran Wins Tenure
Iran wields great ideological power on American university
campuses. How could this have happened? By Russell A.
Berman
67 Shamed and Confused

American colleges denounce their own country while excusing
Islamicists. Iran finds this extremely useful.
By Mariam Memarsadeghi
4 H O O VER DIGEST • Spr i n g 2024

73 Guns and Paranoia
Tehran built its entire revolutionary edifice on an obsession
with the “Great Satan” and all its purported harms. By Abbas
Milani
R U SS I A A N D UK R A IN E
80 Can Ukraine Still Win?
If anything can break the bloody stalemate, perhaps it’s
an innovative—and overwhelming—air attack. By Rose
Gottemoeller and Michael Ryan
85 The Russian Way

Wherever Russian armies march, war crimes follow. The
viciousness is the message. By David Petraeus and
Andrew Roberts
89 The Last Crusade

There’s only one way to grasp Russia’s hate for a free Ukraine:
listen for echoes of religion and empire. By Ralph Peters
C H I N A A N D TA IWA N
98 “It Will Be Decided Here”
Settling the great-power rivalry between the United States
and China, analysts Dan Blumenthal and Elbridge A. Colby
argue, will come down to American strength, confidence, and
national values. By Peter Robinson
F O R E I GN P O L ICY
108 Bipolar Disorders
An international survey shows the familiar “us versus
them” views of the world have splintered into countless
permutations. Time for new rules. By Timothy Garton Ash
D E F EN S E
113 The Cost of a Dangerous World
How can we build, deploy, and pay for tomorrow’s military?
Like this. By Michael J. Boskin
119 Hearts and Minds—and Force

Counterinsurgency campaigns of the past used harsh tactics
that harmed civilians and drove away supporters. In small
wars, is there a better way? By David M. DiCrescenzo and
Arun Shankar
T E C HN O LO GY
129 Tech New World
The Stanford Emerging Technology Review sets out on a journey
to understand, explain, and use tomorrow’s transformational
tech. By Condoleezza Rice, John B. Taylor, Jennifer Widom,
and Amy B. Zegart
T HE E NVIR O N ME N T
136 Wasting of the Green
As First World groups shovel money into climate schemes,
they forgo real progress against hunger, sickness, and poverty.
By Bjorn Lomborg

E D U C ATIO N
140 A Nation Still at Risk
Forty years ago, an urgent report called for the transformation
of American schools. Stephen L. Bowen, leader of the Hoover
Education Success Initiative, discusses how far we still have to
go. By Jonathan Movroydis
C AL I FO R N IA
147 Facts Meet Fakery
Politicians think they’re qualified to teach California students
to recognize “fake news.” Think about that. By Lee E.
Ohanian
I N T E RVIE W
152 Canceling the Cancelers
Hoover fellow Niall Ferguson probes the spread of an
insidious ideology in America’s institutions of higher learning
and offers a suggestion: start over. By Peter Robinson
VA LU ES
164 Friends, Romans . . . Influencers?
Ancient Rome is supposedly trendy. Time for a few untrendy
lessons about the life and death of empires. By Bruce S.
Thornton
171 Whom Can We Trust?

Brandice Canes-Wrone, head of Hoover’s new Center for
Revitalizing American Institutions, looks for ways to bring
fresh life to American democracy. By Jonathan Movroydis
HI STORY A N D C ULTUR E
177 Dependent No More
It’s been a hundred years since the United States granted
citizenship to American Indians. Will it take a hundred more
before it frees tribes to make their own decisions?
By Terry L. Anderson and Dominic P. Parker
188 Memorial Day: One Life

To honor our fallen warriors, remember them as individuals.
A commander’s eulogy. By H. R. McMaster
194 The Spirit of ’44

The men who faced death during the D-Day landings were
sure of their country—and they knew what their sacrifice
meant. By Victor Davis Hanson
HO OV E R A R C HIVE S
198 The Last Years of Nikola Tesla
A Hoover collection illuminates the ideas, aspirations, and
eccentricities of the “pure scientific genius, a poet in science”
who begged the World War II Allies to help him build a
fantastical weapon to save his beloved Yugoslavia. By Ognjen
Kovačević and Bertrand M. Patenaude
218 On the Cover

T HE E CON OM Y
Social Security’s
Fateful Day
Two roads diverged in 1977, and Congress took the
one that led to higher taxes and—ten years from
now—an empty trust fund.
By Andrew G. Biggs, John F. Cogan, and Daniel Heil
D
ecember 20, 1977: if not a date that will live in infamy, a date on
which a Social Security funding crisis was made inevitable.
Had Congress acted differently that day, by adopting the
unanimous recommendations of a congressionally appointed
expert panel, Social Security’s $22 trillion funding shortfall would not exist,
and retirees would not face a 20 percent benefit cut when Social Security’s
trust fund runs dry in 2034.
As Congress considers a bipartisan fiscal commission to recommend
reforms, it should bear in mind that the coming Social Security funding crisis
is a man-made catastrophe, not a natural disaster.
Since the Social Security Act was passed in 1935, policy makers have
known that changing demographics—specifically, rising numbers of benefi-
ciaries relative to workers paying into the program—would over time cause
Social Security to become more costly.
Andrew G. Biggs is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

John F. Cogan is the Leonard and Shirley Ely Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution and participates in Hoover’s task forces on energy, the economy, and
health care. Daniel Heil is a policy fellow at the Hoover Institution.
H O O V E R D IG E ST • sp ring 2024 9
[Taylor Jones—for the Hoover Digest]
What wasn’t inevitable was a funding crisis. In fact, from 1950 to 1971, Con-
gress was able to increase benefits nine times. That changed in 1977, when
Social Security amendments responded to a technical error in 1972 legisla-
tion that caused retirement benefits to skyrocket and threatened insolvency
by 1979.
The 1977 law sought
to slow the rapid growth
in benefits for future The road not taken: linking the growth
retirees. At the time, of initial benefits to the rate of inflation.
Congress considered two
options. The first, recommended by an expert commission headed by Har-
vard economist William Hsiao, would link the growth of the initial benefits
paid to new retirees to the rate of inflation. The second approach, favored
by the Carter administration, would index initial benefits to national average
wage growth.
While differing only in seemingly technical ways, the two approaches had
dramatically different effects on Social Security’s long-term finances. Simply
put, the Hsiao Commission’s recommendation was fully sustainable under
then-legislated tax rates. It would allow, as the commission wrote, “future
generations to decide what benefit increases are appropriate and what tax
rates to finance them are acceptable.”
In contrast, the alternative approach of “wage indexing” initial benefits
could not be sustained without substantially higher future taxes.
The Hsiao Commission bluntly criticized that policy, saying that it “gravely
doubts the fairness and wisdom of now promising benefits at such a level
that we must commit our
sons and daughters to a
higher tax rate than we Despite knowing since 1984 that
ourselves are willing to Social Security promised far more
pay.” Congress, never- benefits than it could pay, Congress
theless, opted for wage has never passed legislation to
indexing. In doing so,
address this.
Congress guaranteed a
future Social Security funding crisis.
While politicians will happily increase Social Security benefits, they avoid
at all costs reducing them, in particular after (falsely) telling Americans that
these are benefits they have earned and paid for. In reality, a typical couple
retiring in the late 2030s is promised 62 percent more in lifetime benefits
than they paid in taxes, according to SSA’s actuaries.
This explains why, despite being aware since 1984 that Social Security
promised far more benefits than it could pay, Congress has never passed leg-
islation to address this. Year after year, elected officials passed the problem
on to future legislators, who themselves passed it on, until after four decades
a funding crisis approached.
That pattern continues. President Biden, while floating a partial Social
Security fix during the 2020 campaign, has not promoted reform since
taking office. Former president Trump, the Republican frontrunner for
2024, vocally opposes any
benefit reductions but
Over the next ten years, Social Secu- has no plans to pay for
rity will add nearly $3 trillion to the his promises.
publicly held national debt. And so, during the next
ten years, Social Security
will add nearly $3 trillion to the publicly held national debt. Come 2034, the
trust fund will be depleted, and Congress will face the task of addressing
what we’ve calculated will be a $360 billion funding gap in that year alone,
with increasing shortfalls in years to come. All in the interest of paying
inflation-adjusted benefits nearly twice as high in 2034 as were paid to retir-
ees in 1970.
Had our elected officials acted differently on December 20, 1977, and
adopted the Hsiao Commission’s policy, Social Security would be financially
solvent, and its small surpluses could be applied to lowering the public debt
burden rather than adding to it. Although benefits would be about 12 percent
lower than they are today, their inflation-adjusted value would still be about
60 percent higher than in 1977, and a looming insolvency would not threaten
future benefits.
Seniors’ incomes would still be at record high levels because of increases
in benefits from private retirement plans and in earnings in retirement. And
with Social Security fully funded in perpetuity, Congress could have enacted
targeted benefit increases to protect the poorest retirees.
Instead, Congress locked in benefit growth rates that are unsustainable
and yet seemingly impossible to arrest. This history lesson, that Congress
should not commit future Americans to tax rates that current Americans
are unwilling to pay, should not be lost on policy makers as Social Security
reforms are debated.
12 H O O VER DI GEST • spri n g 2024

Reprinted by permission of The Hill (www.thehill.com). © 2024 Capitol
Hill Publishing Corporation. All rights reserved.
Available from Stanford University Press is The High

Cost of Good Intentions: A History of US Federal
Entitlement Programs, by John F. Cogan. To order, visit
www.sup.org.
T H E ECO N O M Y
High Noon
Advanced economies can’t outrun debt and taxes
any longer.
A
round the world,
advanced economies are Key points
facing heightened fiscal » Most advanced economies are
saddled with bloated, financially
challenges, owing to the unsustainable welfare states.
simple fact that most have bloated, » Pressure on health and public-
financially unsustainable welfare pension benefits will only increase.
states. As Mario Draghi said over a » The renewed risk of war,

terrorism, and other threats means
decade ago, when he was serving as
defense spending will have to
the president of the European Central grow. Leaders will have to figure
Bank, “The European social model is out how to do this.
already gone.” Equally, America risks

falling into the same trap if it doesn’t control spending and rein in public debt.
The math is straightforward. Consider the case of welfare-type social bene-
fits that are financed by payroll taxes. The average payroll-tax rate needed to
cover such spending (now or later with interest, if financed with government
debt) is equal to the dependency rate times the replacement rate—that is,
the ratio of benefit recipients to taxpaying workers multiplied by the ratio of
average benefits to average wages being taxed.
Michael J. Boskin is the Wohlford Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institu-
tion and the Tully M. Friedman Professor of Economics at Stanford University.
He is a member of Hoover’s task forces on energy policy, economic policy, and
national security.
14 H O O VER DI GEST • Spri n g 2024

This equation does not even include the taxes needed to pay for other
government-funded programs, from defense and policing to roads and
schools. Yes, other kinds of taxes can be used to cover these costs, and vari-
ous changes can be made to the benefit formulas and tax schedules. Ulti-
mately, though, if you have many people receiving considerable benefits, you
will (eventually) have very high tax rates. As Shakespeare’s Hamlet mused,
“Aye, there’s the rub.”
Make no mistake: high tax rates are not desirable, regardless of the
social benefits they support. They can be extraordinarily harmful, because
they reduce incentives
and thereby damage the
economy—starving the High tax rates are undesirable,
proverbial goose that regardless of the social benefits they
lays the golden eggs. support.
By some estimates,
Europe’s tax rates are already close to the peak of the Laffer curve, where
additional tax hikes no longer increase revenue, and may even cause it to
fall.
Moreover, some economists believe that higher taxes are the reason that
European economies’ real (inflation-adjusted) per capita GDP is lower than
in the United States. Even if that is an overstatement of the causality, taxes
are almost certainly an important factor. Most European countries collect
revenues equal to about half their GDP, whereas the US ratio is about
one-third (Canada and the United Kingdom are in between, at around
42 percent).
For example, America’s after-tax real GDP per capita (in terms of purchas-
ing power parity) is significantly higher than that of Sweden and Denmark,
two countries that American progressives eagerly want to emulate. Of
course, Swedes and Danes get more publicly provided services, spend less
on defense (though they are now committed to raising their meager defense
budgets), and work less. But even after accounting for such adjustments,
Americans on average are considerably richer.
With populations aging rapidly across advanced economies, the concomi-
tant fiscal pressure on health and public-pension benefits (such as Medi-
care and Social Security in the United States) will only increase. Over the
next dozen years, the ratio of people aged twenty-five to sixty-four to those
sixty-five and older is projected to plummet in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada, from roughly 3-to-1 to 2-to-1. That follows the trend
already seen in Germany, France, and Italy, where the ratio is projected to
be well below 2-to-1 by 2035. In these economies, the fastest-growing demo-
graphic group comprises those aged eighty-five and up. While we should
welcome longer lifespans, we also must recognize the associated costs for
public budgets.
Worse, with the exception of Northern European countries, advanced econ-
omies have accumulated much larger public debts over the past decade and
a half. For a while, this additional fiscal pressure was masked by extremely
low interest rates; but now, interest costs are ballooning everywhere (though
they are somewhat more manageable in inflation-adjusted terms). As central
banks continue to unwind their huge holdings of government debt (equal to

around 20 percent of GDP in the US Federal Reserve’s case), they will be
competing with governments’ efforts to finance large new deficits and roll
over maturing debt.
While some of the debt-financed spending in response to the 2008
financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic was justified, the subsequent
failure to consolidate budgets was extremely irresponsible, leaving many
economies highly vulnerable to another shock. It is now more urgent than
ever for governments to reform their welfare states, including by target-
ing benefits more narrowly to the needy and introducing stronger work
incentives. The best approach is to allow for a gradual slowing of spending
to avoid the economically disruptive forced changes that Draghi and others
(including me) have long predicted.
Back when advanced economies were growing rapidly, leaving greater debt
burdens to future generations arguably was not a problem because it was
assumed that our children and grandchildren would be much richer and thus
capable of affording higher taxes. But with productivity growth having long
since slowed, the intergenerational inequity we have created is indefensible.
Viewed in this light, the
policies favored by the
Few political leaders have been political left are a recipe
willing to confront reality and propose for making a bad situation
solutions. worse. If we want to sup-
port stronger economic
growth and intergenerational equity, we should reject proposals for higher
tax rates on businesses and personal capital income, as these will reduce
incentives to save and invest.
The renewed risk of war, terrorism, and other security threats means that
defense spending will have to increase substantially. Economists have long
agreed that investments in the military can justifiably be financed by debt, on
both efficiency and intergenerational-equity grounds. But to support these
necessary outlays, we must get serious about today’s growing fiscal pres-
sures. The sooner policies to address them are implemented, the better. Few
political leaders have been willing to confront reality and propose solutions.
Those who do deserve voters’ support.
Reprinted by permission of Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.

org). © 2024 Project Syndicate Inc. All rights reserved.
New from the Hoover Institution Press is Getting

Monetary Policy Back on Track, edited by Michael D.
Bordo, John H. Cochrane, and John B. Taylor. To order,
call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.

T HE E CON OM Y
When Milton
Friedman
Speaks . . .
Hoover fellow Jennifer Burns explores the fruitful
life and continuing influence of Milton Friedman,
a Hoover luminary and one of the twentieth
century’s most brilliant economists.
By Peter Boettke
T
hough standing around five feet tall, Milton Friedman was a
giant among economists in the twentieth century. Arguably only
John Maynard Keynes walked as easily in the halls of power,
academia, newsrooms, and public-speaking venues. Friedman,
throughout his career, was recognized as an elite economic scientist, an
unusually astute policy analyst, and a prized op-ed writer. He was a highly
in-demand public speaker who was as comfortable on popular afternoon
Milton Friedman, recipient of the 1976 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic

Sciences, was a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. Jennifer Burns
is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and an associate professor of history
at Stanford University. Her latest book is Milton Friedman: The Last Conser-
vative (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2023). Peter Boettke is the Distinguished
University Professor of Economics and Philosophy and the director of the F. A.
Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the
Mercatus Center at George Mason University.
OUT OF CHICAGO: The life of Hoover senior research fellow Milton Friedman
(1912–2006), shown accepting the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1988, is
also the life of his economic ideas, which had a profound impact in the latter
twentieth century and continue to shape economic thinking. [White House Photo-
graphic Collection]
TV shows such as The Phil Donahue Show as he was in the classroom at the
University of Chicago.
Friedman earned the highest recognitions an economist can receive: the
John Bates Clark Medal, the presidency of the American Economic Asso-
ciation, and the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. He was also
a bestselling author, a
popular columnist for
When Milton Friedman spoke, his Newsweek, a frequent
peers, his students, those with politi contributor to the
cal power, and the public listened. He Wall Street Journal, and a
educated an entire generation. recipient of the Presiden-
tial Medal of Freedom. On
December 19, 1969, Friedman’s face graced the cover of Time magazine. When
he spoke, his peers, his students, those with political power, and the public
listened. He educated an entire generation with his TV series Free to Choose,

and when the accompanying book by the same title was published, it became
an international bestseller, translated into more than two dozen languages
and selling over a million copies.
Writing his biography presents a unique challenge owing to the immen-
sity of his professional stature and the duration of his excellence from the
1930s through the early 2000s. Jennifer Burns, in Milton Friedman: The
Last Conservative, is every bit up to the challenge. Deeply researched and
beautifully written, her book makes the personal and intellectual life of
Friedman jump off the page. Burns not only captures Friedman’s life but
conveys in her telling of
that story the broader
intellectual life of Friedman grasped that economic
America and the global instability was not an inherent fea
political and economic ture of capitalism but a consequence
order of the twentieth
of policy mismanagement.
century. Her book gives
us a history of the Chicago School and monetarism while delineating the
methodological, analytical, and ideological battle lines of the economics
profession.
Along the way, we learn about the broader contours of the intellectual and
political movements of the Cold War, among them the tension-filled coalition
of free-market classical liberals and conservative anti-communist Republi-
cans, and right-wing extremists from whom Friedman consistently strove
to distance himself. And we learn too about the international spread of free
market ideas between 1980 and 2005.
THE ROAD TO OPTIMISM

Milton Friedman was born in Brooklyn in 1912 into a Jewish immigrant fam-
ily and raised in Rahway, New Jersey. Burns explains that while Friedman
was not religiously observant, his identity was undeniably Jewish, and he was
keenly aware of the tragic reality of the Holocaust and the strong currents
of anti-Semitism in the United States, which created barriers to individual
progress that should not have been in place. In his lifetime, though, he expe-
rienced the continuous diminution of overt discrimination against Jews and
the increase of opportunities for hardworking and talented individuals. This
experience fueled his optimism about the power of the market to liberate
people, as well as to guide their decision making toward the efficient utiliza-
tion of scarce resources. Consider, for example, the opening clips of Free to
Choose, which stressed the opportunities for a better life that immigrants
OPPORTUNITY AWAITS: The new Milton Friedman biography by Hoover
fellow Jennifer Burns also gives a history of the Chicago School and mon
etarism—delineating the methodological, analytical, and ideological battle
lines of the economics profession. [Roger Ressmeyer/CORBIS—Creative Commons]
experienced in the first decades of the twentieth century in the United

States. The free mobility of capital and labor led to material improvement in
the lives of multitudes and provided a foundation for an expansion of indi-
vidual freedom.
For Friedman, this optimism was important as a bulwark against the
loss of faith in the free enterprise system that other economists of his
generation suffered in the wake of the Great Depression. The experience
of the Depression (both its causes and its political consequences) was the
other critical factor shaping Friedman’s worldview: economic instabil-
ity was not an inherent feature of capitalism but a consequence of policy
mismanagement.
Friedman earned his undergraduate degree at Rutgers, where he came
under the influence of Arthur Burns, the prominent economist and future
chairman of the Federal Reserve. In Burns, Friedman had not only a mentor
22 H O O V ER DI GEST • spri n g 2024

but also a significant supporter strategically placed at the pinnacle of the
policy-making world.
In 1932, Friedman enrolled for graduate work at the University of Chicago.
There, he was schooled by Frank Knight and Henry Simons in the analytics
of the price system, the quantity theory of money, and a commitment to use
economic reasoning to solve problems in the world—such as the economic
downturn of the Great Depression.
Jennifer Burns details the potential this group of economists saw in
unleashing the competitive market system in general, and the price system
in particular, to solve social problems through structuring incentives and
communicating vital information by changes in relative prices, and by the
profit-and-loss statements recorded by enterprises in the ordinary conduct
of commerce. “Economics is the one and all-inclusive science of conduct,”
Knight stressed to his students. That science applied not only to trading
activity within the market but to any and all choices an individual might
make in conducting his life.
As Burns describes,
Friedman and his cohort
The influence of Room 7 in Chicago’s
of fellow graduate stu-
economics department would be evi
dents (most famously
George Stigler) would dent throughout Friedman’s career as
gather in Room 7 of the an academic and public intellectual.
economics building with
Simons and Aaron Director (the brother of Friedman’s future wife, Rose) and
pursue the depths and limits of economic reasoning, in the process absorbing
the Knight-Simons brand of economics and political economy. The influence
of Room 7 would be evident throughout Friedman’s career as an academic
and public intellectual.
FEMALE COLLEAGUES
Jennifer Burns has unearthed many gems in Friedman’s life and career, and
among the most fascinating is her discussion of the female economists who
worked closely with him. Rose Director Friedman was a constant in his life,
and she helped him in both acknowledged and unacknowledged ways with
Capitalism and Freedom, Free to Choose, and his Newsweek columns. Rose was
also Milton’s connection to the research of Dorothy Brady and Margaret Reid
in the fields of consumption economics and home economics. They were the
first developers of the permanent-income hypothesis, which posited that con-
sumption patterns were formed from future expectations and consumption
smoothing rather than transitory changes in income. This foundational idea
cut out one of the legs of the Keynesian argument about consumption behav-
ior and the multiplier effect of government spending on aggregate economic
performance.
Friedman’s long and productive collaboration with Anna Schwartz led
to A Monetary History of the United States, which transformed the economic
profession’s view of monetary theory and policy and had a significant impact
on central bankers throughout the world. This work also undermined the
Keynesian argument that monetary policy was ineffective, and instead dem-
onstrated that sound monetary policy was a critical factor in the wealth or
poverty of nations.
Burns does not shy away from highlighting blind spots from which Fried-
man may have suffered, which included his penchant for viewing economic-
policy advice as medicine and economists as analogous to Doctors without
Borders. As his fame and reputation grew, he traveled across the globe
to free and oppressed nations alike. He was never a paid consultant but
traveled as a visiting scholar who was granted audiences with leadership.
He told the various political leaders and policy makers he met with about
the distortions caused by monetary-policy mismanagement, the burdens of
overregulation, and the power of private property and the price system to
ameliorate social problems and promote peace and prosperity. His optimism
made him believe that sound economics could save even the sickest eco-
nomic patient.
Friedman did learn from some of the criticisms leveled at him in this
regard. In 2002, for example, when asked if he regretted his mantra
“privatize, privatize, privatize” during a 1979 trip to China, Friedman
replied that he did. He would amend his statement to “privatize, privatize,
privatize—provided there is a rule of law.” In making this revision, he
returned to the teachings of Knight and Simons in Room 7, which sought
to combine price theory with attentiveness to the institutional context of
law and politics.
SENSE AND SUSTAINABILITY

Friedman was a lifelong learner who took in influences from a variety of
experiences and thinkers and molded them into his own approach. His expe-
rience in Washington in the 1930s did not turn him into a New Dealer, nor
did his work at Columbia and the National Bureau of Economic Research
turn him into an old-school institutionalist. Instead, these experiences
taught him how price theory could be applied outside of the classroom to

tackle real-world problems. Economic theory was not a mere intellectual
exercise for clever people to enjoy but was a serious science to be deployed
to make sense of the senseless and to design policies that would be both
sensible and sustainable.
As Burns explains, it was not merely Friedman’s uniquely persuasive
powers as a writer and speaker that made his ideas have the impact they
did. Those powers were no doubt impressive, but they do not account for
how his positions went
from being held by a
distinct minority to Economic theory was not a mere
defining an era. That intellectual exercise for clever people
can be explained only to enjoy but a serious science to be
by the fact that Fried-
deployed.
man’s ideas and insights
“matched experience, offered new ways to tackle old problems, and predicted
what would happen next.” It is because his theories align so closely with
reality that “Friedman is too fundamental a thinker to set aside.” His ideas
improved our understanding of the operation of economic systems, and in
the realm of practical affairs led to improvements in the lives of billions of
individuals as they escaped extreme poverty in the developing world, freed
themselves from the grasp of totalitarians in the former communist world,
and shook off the malaise of stagnation and inflation in the Western demo-
cratic states.
Milton Friedman: The Last Conservative is a brilliant book, written by a
first-rate scholar in accessible and graceful prose. It is also an immensely
enjoyable read and an enticing invitation for this generation to learn anew
from Friedman.
Reprinted by permission of National Review. © 2024 National Review Inc.

All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Milton

Friedman on Freedom: Selections from The Collected
Works of Milton Friedman, edited by Robert Leeson
and Charles G. Palm. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or
visit www.hooverpress.org.
FRO M H OOVER INSTITU TION PR E SS
Getting Monetary Policy

Back on Track
Edited by Michael D. Bordo,
John H. Cochrane, and John B. Taylor
Experts in economic policy debate the 2021 surge

in inflation, why the Federal Reserve was slow to
respond, and whether rule-like policy is the best
approach to controlling inflation.
For more information, visit hooverpress.org

ISR A E L
Empires in a
Clear Light
The “colonialism” slander remains just that—a
slander.
By Peter Berkowitz
L
eft-wing intellectuals
have transformed Key points
the complex history » The colonialism slander undercuts US
diplomacy and enfeebles democracy in
of “colonialism” into America.
an all-encompassing slander » Left-wing anti-colonialists contend
against the West. A practice that the perpetration of heinous crimes—
including genocide—belongs to the es-
dating back to the ancient
sence of the West’s colonialism.
world, colonialism involves a
» Universities must stress reasoned his-
nation’s transferring a portion torical scholarship rather than partisan
of its population into a foreign posturing.
land and assuming responsi-

bility for administering it. In the United Kingdom and the United States,
professors of literature, history, political theory, and international relations
routinely teach that the subjugation of non-Western peoples belongs to the
essence of the West—they primarily mean the British Empire, America, and
Israel. The anti-colonialists further contend that the perpetration of heinous
Peter Berkowitz is the Tad and Dianne Taube Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution and a member of Hoover’s Military History in Contemporary Conflict
Working Group.
RIGOROUS: In his bestselling book Colonialism: A Moral Reckoning, Oxford
professor Nigel Biggar conducts an incisive scholarly study into “the compli-
cated, morally ambiguous truth” about the British Empire. What Biggar calls
the “unscrupulous indifference to truth” displayed by anti-colonialists also
applies to histories of the Middle East. [Tom Pilston—Panos Pictures]
crimes—including genocide, the systematic effort to wipe out a people—
belongs to the essence of the West’s colonialism.
So successful have the professors been in promulgating the belief that the
West has engaged in centuries of relentlessly brutal conquest and malevolent
domination that the colonialism slander has found its way into the US State
Department bureaucracy. In November, Axios reporters Hans Nichols and
Barak Ravid revealed
that “a junior State
Department employee The obscene abuse of the term
who is organizing a dis- “genocide” has been used against
sent cable on the White Israel and its right of self-defense.
House’s policy on Israel
has used social media to publicly accuse President Biden of being ‘complicit
in genocide’ toward the people of Gaza.”
An organizer of the leaked cable and author of the accusation that the
president whom she serves is complicit in genocide, Sylvia Yacoub is “a
foreign affairs officer in the Bureau of Middle East Affairs for more than two
years.” The obscene abuse of the term “genocide” to characterize Israel’s
exercise of its right of self-defense is a tell-tale sign that Yacoub subscribes to
the colonialism slander. Had she described the jubilantly executed atrocities
and proudly proclaimed goal of the Hamas jihadists as genocide, she would
have employed the term correctly.
The colonialism slander blinds its adherents to basic facts and crucial dis-
tinctions. On October 7, in grotesque violation of the laws of war, the terror-
ists massacred some 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and abducted 240, mostly
civilians, in furtherance
of their oft-repeated aim
to destroy the Jewish
The colonialism slander blinds its
state. In contrast, and
adherents to basic facts and crucial
in compliance with the
laws of war, Israel has distinctions.
targeted Hamas combat-
ants and their military infrastructure. Before attacking Hamas strongholds,
which the terrorists illegally built inside and under Gaza’s cities, Israel has
warned Palestinian civilians to leave and has directed them to safe areas. The
tragic loss of civilian life in Gaza has resulted from Hamas’s callous conver-
sion of civilian areas into war zones.
It turns out, according to Eitan Fischberger, that Sylvia Yacoub, a gradu-
ate of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) at Georgetown
University, “wrote her thesis paper about colonialism and its role in inter-
national relations.” In “The Georgetown Effect,” an article in City Journal,
Fischberger explained that Yacoub’s thesis reflected the priorities of her
alma mater: “SFS’s curriculum, faculty viewpoints, and campus activities”
revolve around colonialism and “decolonization.”
ATTACKS ON TRUTH
In his bestselling book Colonialism: A Moral Reckoning, Nigel Biggar pro-
vides a meticulous accounting of colonialism and the West. A professor
emeritus of moral and pastoral theology at Oxford, Biggar writes that in
late 2017, he was “plunged into the ‘culture war’ over colonialism.” Shortly
after publishing an exploration in The Times of London of colonialism’s
contributions as well as its costs, “all hell broke loose.” Critics targeted for
termination his scholarly project “Ethics and Empire,” his distinguished
partner resigned from the enterprise, and nearly two hundred scholars
from around the world denounced him in one online statement, as did
fifty-eight Oxford colleagues in another. Biggar responded in exemplary
fashion by producing an incisive scholarly study—some three hundred
pages of closely argued text and one hundred and thirty pages of learned
endnotes—examining “the complicated, morally ambiguous truth” about
the British Empire’s colonialism.
By contrast, Biggar
emphasizes that the
Edward Said is a quasi-proph- “unscrupulous indiffer-
et of “de-colonization” and his ence to truth” displayed
Orientalism a quasi-bible. by the anti-colonialists—
for whom the late Edward
Said, a Columbia University professor of literature, is a quasi-prophet and
his Orientalism a quasi-bible—reveals that their slanders serve a political
function: the diminution of the West. “One important way of corroding faith
in the West is to denigrate its record, a major part of which is the history of
European empires,” observes Biggar. “And of all those empires, the primary
target is the British one, which was by far the largest and gave birth to the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.”
Biggar’s “moral assessment” of the British Empire’s colonialism—which
stretches from before 1600 and the creation of the East India Company to
the empire’s post–World War II dissolution—is informed by a species of
Christian realism. He believes that basic moral principles are real and know-
able; human beings are equal in dignity because they are “accountable for

the spending of their lives to a God who looks with compassion upon their
limitations and burdens”; cultures may be unequal in many respects; govern-
ment, which is indispensable, rightly pursues the national interest despite its
inevitable unjust acts; war can be necessary and just; and “history contains
an ocean of injustice, most of it unremedied and now lying beyond correction
in this world.”
In one long sentence,
Biggar summarizes the “If the [British] empire initially pre-
evils—these encom- sided over the slave trade and slav-
pass “not only culpable
ery, it renounced both in the name of
wrongdoing or injustice,
basic human equality.”
but also unintended
harms,” but do not include genocide—perpetrated by British colonialism.
The debit side of the ledger comprises “brutal slavery; the epidemic spread
of devastating disease; economic and social disruption; the unjust displace-
ment of natives by settlers; failures of colonial government to prevent settler
abuse and famine; elements of racial alienation and racist contempt; policies
of needlessly wholesale
cultural suppression;
miscarriages of justice; “History contains an ocean of injus-
instances of unjustifiable tice, most of it unremedied and now
military aggression and lying beyond correction in this world.”
the indiscriminate and
disproportionate use of force; and the failure to admit native talent to the
higher echelons of colonial government on terms of equality quickly enough
to forestall the buildup of nationalist resentment.”
Then there is the ledger’s credit side. In one comparatively short sentence,
Biggar distills the steps Britain undertook to mitigate colonialism’s shame-
ful dimensions and the contributions of which it can be proud: “If the empire
initially presided over the slave trade and slavery, it renounced both in the
name of basic human equality and then led endeavors to suppress them
worldwide for a hundred and fifty years.”
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORLD

The empire also: moderated the disruptive impact of Western modernity
upon very unmodern societies; promoted a worldwide free market that
gave native producers and entrepreneurs new economic opportunities;
created regional peace by imposing an overarching imperial authority
on multiple warring peoples; perforce involved representatives of native
peoples in the lower levels of government; sought to relieve the plight of
the rural poor and protect them against rapacious landlords; provided a
civil service and judiciary that was generally and extraordinarily incor-
rupt; developed public infrastructure, albeit usually through private
investment; made foreign investment attractive by reducing the risks
through establishing political stability and the rule of law; disseminated
modern agricultural methods and medicine; stood against German
aggression—first militarist, then Nazi—and stood for international law
and order in the two world wars, helping to save both the Western and
the non-Western world for liberal democracy; brought up three of the
most prosperous and liberal states now on earth—Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand—and gave birth to two more, the United States and
Israel; evolved into a loose, consensual, multiracial, international orga-
nization, the (British) Commonwealth of Nations, which some states
that never belonged to the British Empire have opted to join; helped to
plan and realize first the League of Nations and then the United Nations;
through the Commonwealth applied moral pressure to South Africa to
abandon its policy of apartheid; through the wartime anti-fascist alliance
of 1939–45, evolved into an important part of the postwar Western alli-
ance against Soviet and Chinese communism; and still has a significant
afterlife in the Western military alliance of NATO and influential eco-
nomic development agencies.
An admirable scholarly achievement, Biggar’s rigorous assessment
invites critical engagement. However, the very idea of carefully consid-
ering colonialism’s contributions as well as its costs is anathema to the
anti-colonialists. Their postmodern progressivism leaves little room
for dissent from the dogma that colonialism was implacably racist and
rapacious. For the anti-colonialists, the appeal to historical evidence
and reasoned argument amounts to one more noxious feature of the
colonial mindset.
As Biggar observes in his epilogue, anti-colonialists embrace “the ideas
that ‘truth’ is whatever the anti-colonialist revolution requires and that
revolutionary vitality should be preferred to bourgeois reason.”
The widespread colonialism slander undercuts US diplomacy and
enfeebles democracy in America. A crucial part of the remedy consists
in cultivating professors who will engage in reasoned scholarship rather
than partisan posturing and will reorient classrooms around education in,
rather than indoctrination against, the West.

Reprinted by permission of Real Clear Politics. © 2024 RealClearHold-
ings LLC. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is

Terrorism, the Laws of War, and the Constitution:
Debating the Enemy Combatant Cases, edited by
Peter Berkowitz. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit
www.hooverpress.org.
I S R A EL
Worse than
Hitler
The Nazis took pains to hide the atrocities they
committed against Jews. The Hamas killers
celebrated theirs.
By Andrew Roberts
M
y late publisher Lord George Weidenfeld knew about the
Nazis. Escaping from Vienna soon after the Anschluss in
1938, he managed to save his immediate family from the
Holocaust, although he lost many other relatives to it. He
broadcasted to the Third Reich while working for the BBC during the Second
World War, and published Albert Speer’s memoirs after it. If anyone could
get into the psyche of the Nazis, George could.
It therefore came as a surprise when, over tea in the Carlyle Hotel in New
York nearly a decade ago, George said, “There are people who are worse
anti-Semites than the Nazis.” He went on to explain why Al-Qaeda, Hamas,
and Islamic Jihad, although of course not as genocidal on the same physical
scale as the Nazis, were qualitatively worse than the Nazis in their belief
systems, impulses, and instincts.
Andrew Roberts is the Roger and Martha Mertz Visiting Fellow at the
Hoover Institution, a member of Hoover’s Working Group on the Role of Mili-
tary History in Contemporary Conflict, and a member of the House of Lords.
He is the host of a Hoover Institution podcast, Secrets of Statecraft with
Andrew Roberts.

George died in January 2016. Had he been alive on October 7 last year,
he would have had the satisfaction of having his view, once considered
controversial, very publicly justified. For whereas the Nazis went to great
lengths to hide their crimes from the world, because they knew they were
crimes, Hamas has done the exact opposite, because they do not consider
them to be so.
“NEVER TO BE WRITTEN”
In October 1943, Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, delivered a noto-
rious speech to fifty of his senior lieutenants in Posen. “I want to speak
frankly to you about an extremely grave matter,” he said. “We can talk
about it among ourselves, yet we will never speak of it in public. . . . I am
referring to the evacuation of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish
people. . . . It is a page of glory in our history that has never been written
and is never to be written.”
By total contrast, the Hamas killers eighty years later attached GoPro
cameras to their helmets so they could livestream their atrocities over social
media. Although the Nazis burnt Jews alive in barns on their retreat in 1945,
they did not film themselves doing it. There are plenty of photographs of
Nazis standing around death-pits full of Jewish corpses, but these were taken
for private delectation rather than public consumption.
When on January 27, 1945, the Red Army reached Auschwitz, they found
only seven thousand living skeletons there, out of a normal camp population
of one hundred and forty thousand, because the Nazis had marched the rest
westwards, partly to kill the death-marchers but also because they did not
want evidence of their crimes to be uncovered. Gassing operations there had
ended in November 1944, and attempts were made to destroy the gas cham-
bers. “Killing installations had been dismantled,” writes Ian Kershaw in his
book The End, “and attempts made to raze the traces of the camp’s murder-
ous activities.”
The sheer glee with which Hamas, by contrast, killed parents in front of
their children and children in front of their parents was broadcast to the
world. Nazi sadism was routine and widespread, but it wasn’t built into their
actual operational plans in the way that Hamas’s sadism has been.
The gas chambers were invented in part because the Nazis did not much
enjoy the actual process of killing Jews as much as Himmler hoped they
might. As Laurence Rees notes of Himmler in 1941, “He had observed two
years before the psychological damage that shooting Jews at close range
had caused his team of killers, and so he had overseen the development of
a system of murder via the gas chambers that to an extent distanced from
emotional trauma.”
No such trauma is evident in Hamas’s teams of killers, who phoned up their
parents on October 7 to boast about the number of Jews they had killed.
After invading countries, the Nazis often took hostages to ensure the
compliance of the local population with their proclamations. The mayor,
businessmen, the popular village priest, and other worthies would be taken
hostage and threatened with execution if resistance were offered to Nazi
rule. It was brutal and in contravention of all the rules of war, but even the
Nazis, foul as they were, did not deliberately take nine-month-old babies and
young children, women, and octogenarians hostage, as Hamas has done. Nor
did the Nazis use babies in incubators and children in hospital ICU units as
human shields.
The Nazis recognized that if the Red Cross or other international agencies
uncovered evidence of the Holocaust there would be an international out-
cry, whereas Hamas has
spotted something about
Instead of demonstrations against the modern world that
Hamas’s atrocities, there are protests has meant that instead of
further victimizing the victims. demonstrations against
their atrocities and
hostage-taking, the largest demonstrations globally have taken place against
the victim, Israel. Even movements traditionally seen as on the left, such as
the women’s movement, have failed to raise their voices against the mass
rape of Israeli women on October 7.
Rape has been seen in every conflict since the dawn of time. The officer
corps of civilized countries denounce it, and in the Second World War even
the barbaric Nazis had strict rules against their Aryan master-race hav-
ing sex with people they considered Untermenschen. “One of the differences
between the atrocities committed by the Nazis who were carrying out the
Final Solution and many other war crimes of the twentieth century,” writes
Laurence Rees in his book Auschwitz, “is the overt insistence by the Nazis
that their troops refrain from sexual violence, not out of humanity but out of
ideology. . . . The Jews and Slavic population of the East represented, to the
Nazis, racially dangerous peoples. . . . Slav and Jewish women (especially the
latter) were absolutely out of bounds. Killing Jewish women was a duty, but
having sex with them was a crime.”
Of course, this was regularly ignored in practice. Maris Rowe-McCulloch’s
article “Sexual Violence Under Occupation During World War II” shows

how the Nazis regularly forced women into military brothels; indeed, there
was a brothel in Auschwitz itself. SS officers who raped Jewish women
there tended to be transferred out but not punished. One officer, Gerhard
Palitzsch, was arrested, but only transferred to a sub-camp of Birkenau.
German officers were instructed not to punish rape when it occurred, as a
1940 memorandum from Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch in Regina
Mühlhäuser’s article “Reframing Sexual Violence as a Weapon and Strategy
of War” shows. But that is different from the Hamas leadership giving their
men orders to rape as many Jewish women as they could find and film them-
selves doing it, and in all too many cases taking them hostage afterwards or
killing them.
In Hitler’s Willing Executioners, Daniel Goldhagen notes how “Hitler opted
for genocide at the first moment that the policy became practical. The
moment that the opportunity existed for the only Final Solution that was
final, Hitler seized the opportunity to bring about his ideal of a world forever
freed of Jewry and made the leap to genocide.” This came in 1941 when both
Poland and the western USSR were under his control. (More than half of all
Europe’s Jews lived in the Soviet Union then.) “Demonological racial anti-
Semitism was the motive force of the eliminationist program,” Goldhagen
adds, “pushing it to its logical genocidal conclusion once German military
prowess succeeded in creating appropriate conditions.”
Yet Hamas embarked on its genocidal attack when it had southern Israel
under its control for only a few hours, and thus when it knew that the Israeli
response would be instantaneous and devastating. Unlike the Nazis, who
hoped that their murders could be hidden by the fog of war and complete
territorial domination,
Hamas grasped at its
window of opportunity in The Nazis assumed they would never
the full knowledge that
have to pay for their crimes. Hamas
it would be punished for
knew its crimes would be broadcast
it, and soon. Whereas
the Nazis assumed they all over the world.
would win the war and
thus would never have to face retribution for their crimes, Hamas knew it
was only a matter of hours away, yet still they launched their attack, caring
nothing for the effect on ordinary Gazans. Their lust for torturing and mur-
dering Jews was therefore even more powerful than that of the Nazis, who
waited until the front line had pushed forward before sending in the Einsatz-
kommando to wipe out Polish and Russian Jewish communities.
IMBUED WITH HATE
Toward the end of the war, senior Nazis like Heinrich Himmler and Ernst
Kaltenbrunner tried to exchange Jews for cash, exposing how fundamentally
cynical and corrupt they were, but also how they were willing to put greed
over the killing impulse. Hamas, by contrast, was doing well amid the relative
hiatus in military activity before October 7, with thousands of Gazans being
issued work permits to
earn more in Israel than
Hamas did not put its greed for cash they ever could in Gaza.
over its one true love: killing Jews. Unlike even the heinous
anti-Semites Himmler
and Kaltenbrunner, therefore, Hamas has not put its greed for cash over its
one true love: killing Jews.
“Very many, probably most, Germans were opposed to the Jews during
the Third Reich,” writes Ian Kershaw in his book Hitler, the Germans, and
the Final Solution, “welcomed their exclusion from the economy and society,
and saw them as natural outsiders to the German ‘National Community,’ a
dangerous minority against whom it was legitimate to discriminate. Most
would have drawn the line at physical maltreatment. The very secrecy of
the Final Solution demonstrates more clearly than anything else the fact
that the Nazi leadership felt it could not rely on popular backing for its
exterminationist policy.”
Here, too, the contrast with Hamas is obvious. The elimination of Jews is
openly promised in the Hamas constitution, as it tacitly is in the “from the
river to the sea” chant so
beloved of today’s dem-
The elimination of Jews is promised onstrators in the West.
in the Hamas constitution, as it is in Gazans voted for Hamas
the chant “from the river to the sea.” in 2005 in far greater
proportions than Germans
voted for the Nazis in 1932, and a good proportion of them celebrated wildly
when Hamas paraded its hostages through the streets of Gaza on the afternoon
of October 7.
Kershaw writes of how “the Final Solution would not have been possible
without the . . . depersonalization and debasement of the figure of the Jew.” In
both Gaza and the West Bank, printed educational textbooks present Jews
as despicable, worthless, and sinister figures, utterly depersonalized and
debased. This is a recipe for further generational conflict. Kershaw argues

that in Nazi Germany, ordinary Germans’ “ ‘mild’ anti-Semitism was clearly
quite incapable of containing the progressive radical dynamism of the racial
fanatics and the deadly bureaucratization of the doctrine of race-hatred.”
This is still more true of Gaza today.
George Weidenfeld was therefore correct back in 2015, and the events of
October 7 have confirmed it. Hamas is—while taking into account the wild
disparity in the sheer geographical and numerical extent of its crimes—qual-
itatively even more anti-Semitic than the Nazis were. One thing in which they
are exactly equal, however, is that Nazi barbarism had to be utterly extir-
pated, and that goes for Hamas too.
Reprinted by permission of the Washington Free Beacon (freebeacon.com).

© 2024 W
ashington Free Beacon. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is The

Challenge of Dawa: Political Islam as Ideology and
Movement and How to Counter It, by Ayaan Hirsi Ali.
To download a copy, visit www.hooverpress.org.
I S R A EL
Cheerleaders
for Terror
The progressive left has long nursed an old hatred
under its mantle of “social justice.” Because
Jews have refused to become either victims or
oppressors, leftists are casting them out.
By Aharon Friedman and Joshua D. Rauh
T
he Hamas massacre on
October 7, 2023, set off celebra- Key points
tory rallies around the world. » Outbreaks of hatred of
Israel and Jews are fully in
Immediately afterward, a mix- harmony with the ideologi-
ture of Islamists and progressive reaction- cal roots of the reactionary
progressives.
aries began publicly supporting the Hamas
» Jews have succeeded out of
atrocities as a form of justified resistance to
proportion to their numbers.
Israel and the Jews. That makes them suspect.
Many of the protesters have been calling » From before its founding,
for the destruction of Israel within any Israel has made sacrifices
and taken great risks to make
boundaries. Although some progressives peace with the Arab world.
seem not to understand what “from the These overtures were, and
still are, rejected.
river to the sea” refers to, or who defend
Aharon Friedman is a director and senior tax counsel at the Federal Policy
Group. Joshua D. Rauh is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the
Ormond Family Professor of Finance at Stanford University’s Graduate School of
Business. He leads the Hoover Institution State and Local Government Initiative.

the phrase as innocuous, when questioned further many admit to wanting to
remove Israel from the map entirely, as students at Oxford and Cambridge
revealed when speaking with commentator Ben Shapiro.
The hateful reaction by radical Islamists is not surprising. Jews have his-
torically been harshly discriminated against in most Muslim countries. At
least 820,000 Jews were expelled from, or fled violence and discrimination
in, Middle Eastern and
North African countries
between 1948 and 1972. At least 820,000 Jews were expelled
But the reactionary from, or fled, Middle Eastern and
progressive move-
North African countries between
ment’s doubling down
on its opposition to
1948 and 1972.
Israel, in concert with
the Islamists, has been more shocking to some in that movement, especially
given a strong presence of liberal Jews. Yet the response is fully in harmony
with the ideological underpinnings of the progressive movement, and reveal-
ing of those foundations to anyone who did not previously understand them.
IDEOLOGICAL SCAPEGOAT
The first place to look to understand the reactionary progressives’ response
is their theory of social justice, under which individuals are judged primar-
ily not on their own actions but rather as members of an ethnic, religious,
racial, or other identity. A view of the world that rejects individual responsi-
bility also rejects traditional Western philosophy. Individual responsibility is
paramount to so much of the thinking that undergirds free societies, includ-
ing that put forward by philosophers such as John Locke and John Stuart
Mill, and individual responsibility is one of the pillars upon which the United
States was founded.
For example, the reactionary progressive left calls relentlessly for more
wealth and income redistribution. If inequality exists in a given place, the
progressive movement’s solution is more government intervention and
redistribution. A person’s lot is determined by the group to which he belongs.
In this model, oppression of groups is the cause of unequal outcomes. This
creates a world not about individuals but only about groups, and those
are assigned to categories: a group is either a victimizer or victimized, an
oppressor or the oppressed, a colonizer or the colonized.
If some individuals or groups of individuals are less wealthy than others, the
progressive movement rejects the examination of the underlying social and
cultural issues that might cause some to fail and others to succeed. The dis-
integration of the family and failing schools in poor communities are ignored;
instead, anyone who is wealthier is accused of exploitation. If one group is poor,
the progressive movement assigns the blame to another group that is richer.
Jews pose a problem for this approach. They are a minority—amounting
to some 16.1 million of the world’s 8 billion population, compared to around
2 billion Muslims and
2.4 billion Christians.
Yet relative to the size To Karl Marx, “The chimerical nation-
of their population, and ality of the Jew is the nationality of
despite having suffered the merchant, of the man of money.”
considerable oppression
and violence over centuries, Jews have achieved prominent positions of suc-
cess in many sectors of the economy.
And throughout history, Jews are the group most often accused of having
derived their wealth from keeping others down. Karl Marx despised Jews
because of their alleged materialism. He wrote:
What is the worldly religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his

worldly god? Money. . . . Money is the jealous god of Israel, in face of
which no other god may exist. Money degrades all the gods of man—and
turns them into commodities. . . . The bill of exchange is the real god of
the Jew. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange. . . . The chimerical
nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the man of
money in general. (On the Jewish Question, 1844)
One need not go back to Adolf Hitler’s infamous 1925 book Mein Kampf to
find other bold displays of this accusation. Modern examples of much-lauded
individuals who overtly state this theory include Louis Farrakhan, leader of the
Nation of Islam, who in 2018 stated, “Let me tell you something, when you want
something in this world, the Jew holds the door”—and he didn’t mean holds the
door open—or statements by artist Kanye West in recent years suggesting that
Jews exploit others for personal gain.
RETURN: This iconic photo (opposite) shows Israeli paratroopers standing in

front of the Western Wall in Jerusalem in June 1967. Israel’s survival, starting
in 1948 and continuing through several efforts to exterminate it, shocked the
Arab world. Arabs’ grievance was not the lack of a Palestinian Arab state, but
Israel’s very existence. [David Rubinger (1924–2017)]
Only a few months ago, Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud
Abbas (who also serves as the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
or PLO) gave a speech claiming that Hitler was not motivated by hatred of
Jews but by Jews’ control of money: “They say that Hitler killed the Jews
because they were Jews and that Europe hated the Jews because they were
Jews. Not true. . . . The Europeans fought against these people because of
their role in society, which had to do with usury, money.”
While it is false to downplay the role of religious hatred in the twentieth-
century extermination of European Jews and the pogroms that came
before and since, economic factors have indeed also been important.
These atrocities involved extensive expropriation. The confiscation of
Jewish property during the Nazi era is well documented, as are the eco-
nomic motivations of participants in historical pogroms to join religiously
motivated attackers for economic reasons, such as seeking the elimina-
tion of their debts.
A HATRED OF SUCCESS
The reactionary progressive response to the Hamas attacks fits directly into
this framework. Those who reject what they perceive to be unjust economic
inequality join with those motivated by religious hate. Jews have a special
and despised place in the
progressive hierarchy, as
Jews have a special and despised a living refutation of the
place in the progressive hierarchy, as a worldview that failure
living refutation of the worldview that is generally the fault of
discrimination is insurmountable. others and discrimina-
tion and systemic racism
are insurmountable obstacles that hold groups back from thriving in the
modern economy.
For hardcore progressives, Israel is the Jew of the world’s countries,
both literally and figuratively. Israel lifted itself out of poverty. A poor
country at the outset, with much difficulty Israel absorbed Jewish refu-
gees from Arab countries who were forced to flee or were expelled. Israel
would later absorb Jewish refugees from behind the Iron Curtain and
Jews from Ethiopia, and is now absorbing Jews fleeing Western Europe.
These different groups of Jews have had many cultural, religious, and
social differences. Yet Israel has built a society melding these groups
together in some respects, even while each maintains many of its own
distinct traditions.

From the beginning, Israel has consistently made the most of its oppor-
tunities, instead of making unmeetable demands, and has learned from
its experiences. Israel started as a substantially socialist country, with
significant government
involvement in the econ-
omy. Israelis realized Israel’s transformative rejection of
that this model was not socialism is further ground for pro-
working and gradually gressive hatred.
changed their economy
to a more capitalist model, with great success. Israel’s transformative rejec-
tion of socialism provides further ground for progressive hatred for Israel.
For progressives, the failure of socialism in real life can never show that
socialism does not work, but only that socialism was not attempted properly
or in pure enough form.
Israel has turned some of its biggest weaknesses into opportunities. For
example, the lack of drinkable water and fertile land has led Israel to become
a leader in desalinization and agriculture technologies. The exposure to secu-
rity threats has led Israel to become a leader in cybersecurity and defense.
As a country, it has refused the mantle of victimhood.
The progressive movement appears to attribute both the lack of a Palestin-
ian Arab state west of the Jorden River and the broader Arab-Israeli conflict
to Israel’s refusal to withdraw from all the territories captured in 1967. This
fits nicely into the oppressor-oppressed framework, but it is contradicted
by facts. From before its founding, Israel has made extensive sacrifices and
taken considerable risks to make peace with the Arab world, including the
Palestinian Arabs. The Jewish leadership in Palestine accepted the UN
Partition Plan that left just 55 percent of western Palestine to the Jews. This
was even though more than 75 percent of the League of Nations Palestine
Mandate allocated for “close settlement” by the Jews had been previously
transformed by Great Britain into the kingdom of Transjordan and was
entirely closed to the Jews.
The countries in the Arab League make up over thirteen million square
kilometers, compared to just twenty-two thousand for Israel (including the
1967 territories and excluding Sinai), but the Arab countries surrounding
Israel, and the Palestinian Arabs in 1948, refused to accept Israel at any size.
When Israel declared independence, seven Arab armies invaded to assist
Palestinian Arabs in wiping out the newly declared Jewish state. Israel’s
survival shocked the Arab world. Arabs’ grievance was not about the lack of
a Palestinian Arab state, but about Israel’s very existence.
Although portions of western Palestine were occupied by Transjordan
(which occupied an area extending from eastern Jerusalem to the Jordan
River and named it the West Bank) and Egypt (which occupied Gaza in
1948–67), neither set up an independent Arab state in western Palestine.
Instead, they initially kept the territories for themselves. Instead of reset-
tling the Palestinian Arabs (as Israel had done for a similar number of Jewish
refugees from Arab countries, and as was done after World War II for tens of
millions of displaced persons), the Arab countries generally forced them to
remain permanent refugees.
Palestinians, through their leadership, have insisted on remaining wards
of the United Nations and its Palestinian refugee agency, the UNRWA,
instead of taking responsibility for themselves. When the opportunity arose
to reconstitute the Jewish state in just a portion of the Jewish homeland and
surrounded by enemies, Israel did not declare the arrangement an “open air
prison”—the epithet often applied to Gaza—and refuse to take responsibility
for its people. Instead, Israel set to work building a state and its institutions,
building an economy, and building a society.
ABSOLUTISM AND ATROCITIES

Israel’s economic success despite this adversity, especially compared to
the Gaza Strip, compounds the progressive opposition. Palestinians liv-
ing in Gaza are worse off economically than those living in Israel, there-
fore (regardless of the reason) the progressive movement gives them the
“right to resist.” The progressive movement has no interest in examining
the underlying cause of
Gaza’s troubles, which is
Israel has rejected the mantle of the dedication of societal
victimhood. resources—and billions
in foreign aid—to seek-
ing the destruction of Israel rather than the improvement of Gaza. In fact,
Gaza’s economy grew considerably after Israel’s takeover of the territory
until Israel turned control over to the Palestinian Authority in 1993. Life
expectancy rose considerably, as did the share of households with electricity
and running water.
The progressive left is entirely untroubled by (or even celebrates) the
history of Palestinian Arab leaders rejecting offers by Israeli leaders for
nearly all of the territories Israel seized in 1967. Egypt accepted such a
land-for-peace deal when Israel returned the entire Sinai Peninsula in
1982 in exchange for a true end to hostilities. But the PLO has consistently

followed the example of Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mandate-era leader of
the Palestinian Arabs, who allied with Hitler and rejected a Jewish state
of any size. PLO leader Yasser Arafat responded to Prime Minister Ehud
Barak’s offer in 2000 of nearly all of Gaza, Judea, and Samaria by launch-
ing a war against Israel. In 2008, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert offered
Palestinian Authority President Abbas a state with land area equaling
99.5 percent of these 1967 territories, but Abbas declined, later boasting:
“I rejected it out of hand.”
And then, Israel withdrew from Gaza entirely in 2005 expelling every last
Jew, even digging up the bodies of dead Jews from Gaza’s cemeteries. Israel
handed Gaza over to the PA, including valuable agricultural infrastructure, in
the hopes that would advance peace.
What theory justifies support of Hamas’s “resistance” under these circum-
stances? Perhaps supporters are absolutists in the belief that Arab Muslims
have a right to 100 percent of the land and the Jews to none at all. If so, they
are unusually absolute on this point. We have not seen extensive calls by the
progressive left that the millions of Syrians displaced by Bashar al-Assad
be compensated for their losses or returned to their land. Nor do we hear
demands by progressives that Jews who were expelled from Europe and
the Arab countries in the twentieth century have their property returned to
them and their descendants.
Perhaps reactionary progressives simply reject Israel completely, despite
its being a country of many refugees established under a vote of the United
Nations, and on land recognized by the League of Nations as belonging to
the Jews. This clashes, of course, with progressives’ support for open-border
policies towards refugees in their own countries.
The Arab-Israeli conflict simply doesn’t fit the progressive framework.
A false narrative is required. And part of this narrative, on full view since
October 7, is reactionary support for terrorism to redress the wrongs pro-
gressives believe Israel has inflicted. Such support for terrorism against
Israel has intensified but it is not new. The PLO, once heavily aided by
the USSR, became a cause célèbre in the progressive movement after its
founding in 1964 by the Arab League for the purpose of destroying Israel.
This predated any language about “liberating” territories taken by Israel
in the 1967 war. The PLO’s original charter did not even call for an inde-
pendent Palestinian state. From its eventual headquarters in Lebanon,
the PLO helped train both Marxist and Islamist terrorists from around
the world. To the extent that the progressive movement views terrorism
against Israel and the West as a legitimate means of addressing injustice,
it views violence as justified if it moves towards the redistribution of
resources that serves its social justice goals.
The disturbing level of support in the West and America for nihilistic ter-
ror against Israel—not just killing but rape, torture, and mutilation—makes
it clear that the situation in the Middle East strikes a particular chord with
the reactionary progressive movement. On one hand, the total dedication of
large parts of Palestinian Arab society and resources to Israel’s destruction,
instead of building its own state alongside Israel, fits into the resistance nar-
rative of the oppressed. Indeed, Hamas has openly spent billions in foreign
aid on a terror apparatus for attacking Israeli civilians. On the other hand,
Israel’s economic success despite great hardship challenges the progressive
left’s oppressor narrative, so that successful nation must be condemned as
a “colonizer.” In the world’s perception of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the
entire progressive narrative is at stake.
Reprinted by permission of Liberty Lens—An Economics Substack.

© 2024 Joshua Rauh. All rights reserved.
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ISR A E L
Life or Death
Questions
Israeli commentator Daniel Gordis says October 7
obliterated Israelis’ belief that they could live in
quasi-peace among their enemies. Now comes
“a profound conversation about why Jewish
sovereignty was an important project in the first
place.”
By Russ Roberts
Russ Roberts, EconTalk: My guest’s Substack, Israel from the Inside with
Daniel Gordis, is an extraordinary window into what is happening here.
Today, we’re going to talk about two things: how the events of October 7 and
the war that followed have changed you, Danny, and your perspective on this
country; and how the country has changed in response to the war, and maybe
where it’s headed. You moved here in 1998 from Los Angeles to what shortly
after you arrived became a war zone, into what is often called the second
Intifada. So, you’ve seen a lot of chapters of this conflict, you’ve written about
them, you’ve lived through them, and I want to talk about how this one is
different, if at all. To do that, I want to start with the Intifada. What was that
about and how did you experience it?
Russ Roberts is the John and Jean De Nault Research Fellow at the Hoover Institu-
tion, host of the podcast EconTalk, and president of Shalem College in Jerusalem.
Daniel Gordis is the Koret Distinguished Fellow at Shalem College and author of
Israel: A Concise History of a Nation Reborn (Ecco, 2016), among other works.
He publishes Israel from the Inside with Daniel Gordis on Substack.
STARTING OVER: Author and commentator Daniel Gordis on the broad impli-
cations of the Gaza conflict: “This is not really about Israel and Hamas. It’s
really about whether or not the West has it in itself to defend the idea of liberal
democracy.” [Yoram Reshef Studios]
Daniel Gordis: Well, we got here in 1998. In 1999, it’s hard to believe, but this
guy named Ehud Barak won an election and beat a guy named Bibi Netan-
yahu. Everybody assumed Barak made three promises. He was going to get
out of Lebanon, he was going to make peace with Syria, and he was going
to make peace with the Palestinians. The peace with Syria went nowhere;
the Syrians had no interest in negotiating back then. He did actually get the
army out of Lebanon, after about eighteen years. It’s actually very telling that
the young men who were the last ones to come out of Lebanon and lock the
gate—they literally got off their APCs [armored personnel carriers] and they
closed the gate and they put a chain and lock on it—were born the year Israel
went into Lebanon in 1982. That seemed unbelievably positive.
What we didn’t understand then was that every Israeli pullback, whether
it’s from Gaza in 2005, whether it’s from Lebanon in 2000, wherever, it’s
always interpreted as weakness.
By the fall of 2000, Israel was involved in what at first seemed to be a
kind of series of terrorist events. The Intifada, an Arabic word which means

popular uprising or spontaneous uprising—which is, by the way, a complete
misnomer. There was nothing spontaneous or popular about the Intifada; it
was very clearly choreographed by Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority.
When Israeli troops went into Jenin and other places—Ramallah eventually—
they were able to uncover troves of documents that proved beyond the
shadow of a doubt that this was orchestrated to look like a popular spontane-
ous uprising in response to some Israeli provocation or another. It was a very
clearly planned attempt to basically end Oslo or to create a new reality in the
Middle East.
Roberts: Back up for a second and explain, for listeners who don’t know what
Oslo is.
Gordis: Oslo is an agreement. It starts in the 1980s, goes into the 1990s. It
is an agreement in which Israel, theoretically, reaches an agreement that
creates the Palestinian Authority. Israel, at first through intermediaries
and then directly, negotiates with the Palestine Liberation Organization and
agrees to a series of steps. And the thought was that Oslo would lead over
time to Israel pulling out of all sorts of areas—Jericho and Hebron and so
on—and would eventually lead to the creation of a Palestinian state.
But to come back to our story: the reason I mention all of that now is
because there’s a lot of going on in Israel in which the right wing—which
objected to pulling out of Gaza in 2005—is saying, “I told you so. We told you
eighteen years ago this was going to be a disaster.” In the summer of 2005,
when the Israeli army
went into the Jewish
towns and settlements in “Every Israeli pullback, whether
Gaza and literally pulled it’s from Gaza in 2005, whether it’s
people out of their houses from Lebanon in 2000, wherever, it’s
and then bulldozed them
always interpreted as weakness.”
a few days later, you see
people screaming, “You don’t understand what you’re doing. There are going
to be rockets on Sderot, and there are going to be RPGs coming on this kib-
butz and that kibbutz, and one day they’re actually going to come in here and
they’re going to kidnap people.” It’s unbelievable to go back and look at those
old videos, to watch these people who were totally right.
There was also a lot of “I told you so” going on in 2000 during the second
Intifada, about Oslo. They said, “Every time we give back territory, it’s per-
ceived as weakness and it results in Palestinian aggression.” It’s very hard to
argue with that claim, even though those of us who still hold out—or held out,
I think is more appropriate—some hope for peace thought, “We should prob-
ably take this chance, or that chance. Maybe it’ll be different this time.”
So, we’re here in 1998, come with three kids. It was a very scary time. It was
a very sad time. Lots of buses blew up because of suicide bombers. It was a
war of suicide bombings
in buses, and restaurants,
“We never thought for a moment and so on. But here’s what
that Israel’s existence was on the we need to understand: it
line. What’s going on now actually is was not an existential war
existential.” on Israel’s part. Nobody
ever said: “You blow up
enough buses and you destroy enough cafes, you can bring down a country.”
You can make a country miserable. You can make a country angry. You can
create a generation of young children who are going to have PTSD and vote
very differently. By the way, the people who came of age back then are the
right wing of Israel now, and that’s not incidental. But we never thought for a
moment that Israel’s existence was on the line. What’s going on now actually
is existential.
Roberts: When the Intifada ended in 2004, why did it end? What changed?
Gordis: The Intifada ended, fundamentally, because we won the war. We

destroyed the terrorist infrastructure. We started building the famous sepa-
ration barrier between Israel and the West Bank, which made it much more
difficult for Palestinians to cross. We never quite finished it, but we built
enormous portions of it. The more kilometers of the wall that were complet-
ed, the fewer terrorist attacks there were.
Unfortunately, Israelis learned that that separation barrier, even though it
was problematic in many ways and an international public relations fiasco for
Israel, stopped the war. We destroyed the terrorist infrastructure and went
back to our lives.
DEATH OF AN ILLUSION
Roberts: Your book [If a Place Can Make You Cry] chronicles it very movingly.
It was a horrible time for Israel. It was a horrible time for the Palestinians.
Israeli efforts to dismantle that infrastructure, of course, had many innocent
victims.
Gordis: Right. But it ends in 2004. Their infrastructure is fundamentally

dismantled. Arafat is going to die shortly thereafter, and the West Bank
stays more or less quiet. There were lots of terrorist attacks over the years,

but the vast majority of Israelis went about their lives and were not affected
by it. Where the spotlight moved was to the other side of Israel: not to the
east, where the West Bank is, but to the west and the south, the Gaza Strip.
Starting not long after the second Intifada, there were elections. The actual
machinations are far too complex to get into now, but after this whole elec-
tion cycle—which, by the way, the United States had pressured Israel to
allow—Hamas wins.
What we now know in 2023 is that Israel mishandled that Hamas win
entirely. Although we went to war with Hamas time and time again, and
some of them were very massive bombings of Gaza with terrible civilian
casualties on their side but significant casualties on our side as well, the
fundamental Israeli assumption for a very long time was: We can contain
Hamas. We might have to batter them periodically—and we did, and we do.
But fundamentally, there are a lot of Palestinians there, including the Pales-
tinian leadership, who just want a better life for their people. And as long as
we allow foreign money through Qatar or other organizations, and we keep
a significant military presence along the border—occasionally, we’re going
to have to go to war and destroy some of their rocket launchers—fundamen-
tally, we can live with Hamas at our side.
What started in 2005, with Hamas taking over the Gaza Strip, was a situ-
ation in which there was not a terrorist organization in Gaza but an army.
Israel did not realize that until October 7. We always had the sense, “Yeah,
they have rockets. What are they going to do with rockets? They’re going to
kill some people. But they’re not going to be able to take over our country.”
But what happened on
the morning of October 7,
of course, was that “There was not a terrorist organiza-
somewhere around three tion in Gaza but an army. Israel did not
thousand fairly well- realize that until October 7.”
trained soldiers—they’re
terrorists, but they’re soldiers—came by land, sea, and air. And for several
days, certainly October 7 and 8—and some of them survived the 9th and the
10th—Israel was actually taken over. The army had to go back and recap-
ture army bases.
We have two major areas now in which Israel is fundamentally unable to
keep its citizens safe. It has evacuated those citizens; and the citizens now
are saying, “We’re never going back until you destroy the enemy that can
rain terror on us. We’re not willing to raise our kids anymore, running to the
bomb shelters in the middle of the night. We’re certainly not willing to raise
our children in the north or in the south with the possibility that people can
come over the border again and rape and pillage and burn and murder and
do horrible things. We don’t trust the government. We don’t trust the army.”
If we cannot win this war . . . and I’m going to say something a little contro-
versial: it’s not clear that we can. The country is sobering up after the first
months of a sense of huge unity and “together, we’re going to win.”
WAR AND PEACE

Roberts: It’s important to hear your pessimism. I don’t think people outside
this country have any understanding, or have a very limited understand-
ing, of the mood. We built a wall; it helped. But we pulled out of Gaza, and
every few years, Hamas ratcheted up the unpleasantness of being an angry
neighbor, and we’d respond. It was sort of a depressing, fatal theater that was
played out over the years between Israel and Hamas.
I think the world is catching on how different it is. Tell me if I’m wrong.
Among my friends—which, of course, is not a representative sample—people
like me who have made aliyah, who’ve moved to Israel, and Israelis that I’ve
come to know through being head of the college, there’s not a desire for ven-
geance. It’s a remarkably un-angry response. It is resolve. It’s “we can’t put
up with this. We can’t sit idly by and allow our daughters to be violated and
our children to be abducted.”
This is a small country. It’s seven million Jews, it’s nine million people. It’s
a big town. It’s really more like a big family, and you have to go to Jerusalem,
but especially to Tel Aviv, and walk the streets and see how many reminders
there are of the hundreds of kidnapped people all the time.
We don’t say, “Well, that was too bad. We go on with our lives.” No. People
are desperate to get those people back. It is our greatest strength and our
greatest weakness. And I
don’t know how long we
“Certain things have happened to this can do what we’re doing
country that, at the end of the day, are in Gaza, and I don’t know
going to make us much stronger.” how long we can do it if it
doesn’t lead to anything
productive. Right now, it just looks like death, and I don’t think that’s going to
sell outside Israel, and I don’t see it selling for very long inside Israel.
Gordis: I think everything you said is exactly right. By the way, Bibi is in
a very, very bad spot because he’s articulated two goals for this war: the
destruction of Hamas and returning all of the hostages. It’s very easy to see

a world in which he accomplishes neither. And then Israelis have to look
around and say, “My God, really? Even when we decided to pull out all the
stops, we couldn’t win?” I don’t know a single Israeli who does not think we
should be fighting this.
Maybe you do, and I’m
sure they’re out there. “The Jewish world is hitting control-
Roberts: I know one. alt-delete, basically. The Jewish
world is rebooting everything.”
Gordis: Well, that’s
probably the one. By the way, I know a lot of American Jews who say to me,
“Where is the Israeli left? Where are these Israeli progressives that nor-
mally I talk to all the time and now I’m not hearing from?” I actually said to
someone, “Oh, I can tell you where they are. They’re in the cockpits dropping
bombs on Gaza.” I mean, that’s not cute, that’s actually true. The people who
were the head of the protest movement, the pilots who said they weren’t
going to fly, are now flying 24/7. They went right back to work.
Roberts: They said they weren’t going to fly because they did not feel that
Netanyahu’s coalition represented them, so they stopped doing their reserve
training in the months of judicial reform that were so contentious. And then
as soon as October 7 happened, they ran to their planes . . .
Gordis: Two and a half hours later, they were in the cockpits.
Roberts: . . . and everybody else was in their convoy and truck and car getting
to their bases and reporting. And others outside of Israel who had been anti-
Netanyahu were fighting their way to get back here to defend their country.
So, it’s an extraordinary moment.
Do you have any optimism, Danny?
Gordis: Yeah.
Roberts: Give me what you got.
Gordis: I have optimism. You said before that my pessimism is a little sur-
prising. I’m not pessimistic. I don’t know that we’re going to destroy Hamas,
and I don’t think we’re going to get all the hostages back, unfortunately. But
I think that certain things have happened to this country that, at the end of
the day, are going to make us much stronger. We have been reminded that we
did not move Israel from the Middle East to Western Europe. We pretended
in Tel Aviv that if you have enough high-tech companies and enough startups,
and a lot of fancy cafes and bars and restaurants and Tumi stores, you’ll live
that kind of a life. And you think, yeah, back in the 1940s and 1950s and 1960s
we were in the Middle East, but now we’re kind of in Western Europe.
Well, we’re not. We are, as the expression goes, in the villa that’s in the
jungle. And Israelis are recognizing, tragically, if you want to survive in the
jungle, you’ve got to act like you live in the jungle. You can’t act like you live
along the Seine or the Thames.
I think this is going to bring Israelis back to where we were seventy-five
years ago: a profound conversation about why Jewish sovereignty was an
important project in the first place. A profound conversation about what kind
of a country this needs to be.
I do not believe that all of the divisiveness that preceded October 7 has
been washed away. Polls are beginning to come out that show that just
below the surface, the resentments are still there. We’re going to have to
figure this out very carefully. If Bibi doesn’t resign, I think we’re in for a
very ugly political period, and it’s quite possible that the hundreds of thou-
sands of protesters that we saw about judicial reform are going to seem
piddly compared to the millions of people who could take to the streets at
the end of this war.
I’m not pessimistic about the future of Israel. I’m actually very optimistic
about the future of Israel and always have been. I think that this is going to
spark a renewed devotion to the project called the Jewish state.
Six months from now, a year from now, two years from now, whenever this
thing ends, Israel is going to start over. People are asking, “What should we
call this war?” A number of people have said we should call this the second
war of independence because this was the war where we had a fight—an
existential battle—for
our right to exist all over
“Israelis are recognizing, tragically, again. But not only that:
if you want to survive in the jungle, this was the war in which
you’ve got to act like you live in the society came together
jungle. You can’t act like you live determined to rebuild. We
have a lot of questions to
along the Seine or the Thames.”
ask ourselves.
I believe that the Israel that’s going to emerge from this is going to be
stronger, more determined, more Jewishly self-conscious in a positive way—
conscious that this is not just a Hebrew-speaking European country but the
country of the Jewish people. It’s even possible that we’re going to emerge
with a much deeper relationship with diaspora Jews. We’re in this together.
The Jewish world is hitting control-alt-delete, basically. The Jewish world

is rebooting everything. Four thousand years into this, our darkest periods
have always led to periods of revival and resurgence. The Holocaust led to
the state of Israel. Destruction of the Temple led to the birth of what we call
Rabbinic Judaism. And
we have a way as a peo-
ple of taking very, very “What that light and rebirth looks like
dark moments and turn- you never know in the midst of the
ing them into moments darkness.”
of light and rebirth, and
what that light and rebirth looks like you never know in the midst of the
darkness. But looking back, you can see that it happened. I believe it’s going
to happen here, too.
And at the end of the day, this is not really about Israel and Hamas. It’s
really about whether or not the West has it in itself to defend the idea of
liberal democracy. If the West allows Israel to go to a place where it cannot
defend itself as a liberal democracy, they’re coming for the rest of the West,
too. We have to win not only for Israel and the future of the Jewish people,
but we have to win somehow or another for the future of freedom, and for the
future of democracy. I believe we will.
This interview was edited for length and clarity. Reprinted by permission
from Russ Roberts’s podcast EconTalk (www.econtalk.org), a production
of the Library of Economics and Liberty. © 2024 Liberty Fund Inc. All
rights reserved.

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IR A N
Tehran Wins
Tenure
Iran wields great ideological power on American
university campuses. How could this have
happened?
By Russell A. Berman
T
he outbreak of anti-Israel sentiment in American universities
after the Hamas attack last October 7 has been widely docu-
mented. Students as well as professors rushed to celebrate the
atrocities: one Cornell professor found the murders “exhilarat-
ing,” while a Columbia colleague declared the slaughter “awesome.” Then,
when the inevitable Israeli response began, with a forcefulness that should
have surprised no one, the Hamas enthusiasts protested on campus and off,
often with violence.
This has been a sorry episode in the history of American universi-
ties, and it has contributed to the already widespread public skepticism
toward once-revered institutions of higher education. There would be
much to be said about the events of October 2023 as indicators of the
systemic anti-Semitism in American progressive culture. Another point,
far from peripheral, concerns Iranian soft power: the contrast between
Russell A. Berman is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, co-chair of

Hoover’s Herbert and Jane Dwight Working Group on the Middle East and the
Islamic World, and a participant in Hoover’s working groups on military history
and national security. He is also the Walter A. Haas Professor in the Humanities
at Stanford University.
the voluble outcry with regard to the Gaza War and the deafening silence
on American campuses concerning the repressive character of the Teh-
ran regime.
No atrocity committed by the regime in Tehran, no matter how vile, inter-
ests the idealists on American campuses. Some institutions of higher educa-
tion have turned into mouthpieces for Tehran and do their best to silence
criticism. If universities have become incubators of extremism and advocates
for America’s enemies, why should society support them?
We should first ask how we have come to this. How
has Tehran been able to impose its point of view
on American institutions? Why have schol-
ars and students, who otherwise claim

Digest]

to be keen to engage in critical thinking, fallen obsequiously silent in the face
of repression in Iran?
THREE ROADS TO MALIGN INFLUENCE

Of course, there are some brave dissidents on campus and elsewhere in our
public sphere who oppose the Tehran regime. There are plenty of protests
from the Iranian-American exile community, which is largely hostile to the
regime in Tehran, as is public sentiment in Iran itself. But campus progres-
sives who otherwise rally against every micro-
aggression have had nothing to say
about the attacks on Iranian
women who refused to
wear the hijab, just as they had nothing to say about the rapes in Israel car-
ried out by Hamas, which they may have found “exhilarating.” Nor do campus
progressives, faculty or students, speak out against the torture of political
prisoners in Iran, the intentional blinding of protestors, or the execution
of critical journalists. Even Iranian attempts to assassinate critical voices
in the United States have left the progressive community indifferent. The
soft power of the Islamic
Republic has its knee on
The Iran problem—the silencing of the throat of the academic
Iran’s critics by higher education— left, keeping it unable to
is part of a larger problem in the utter the smallest word of
academy. criticism.
Exploring this prob-
lem requires a diagnosis of the multifaceted malaise that pervades much of
higher education. Some explanations are specific to Iran and the relation-
ship of Iran specialists to the regime, and some are a function of particular
political constellations in the United States. Yet the success of Iranian soft
power in the United States is ultimately also about a much broader failure of
US higher education to live up to its mission of free inquiry, which is now too
often subordinated to ideological allegiances, vacuous virtue signaling, and
an obligatory hostility toward the United States that is embedded in curri-
cula. The Iran problem—the silencing of Iran critics by higher education—is
very much a piece of a larger problem in the academy.
One can distinguish three dynamics specific to Iranian soft power in the
academy. The first and most innocent version of scholarly silence with regard
to the policies of repression carried out by Tehran pertains to those US-
based experts whose specialized research requires them to travel to Iran
to conduct interviews or to consult archives and the like. These academics
know that if they express public criticism of the Iranian regime here, the
regime may refuse to grant them a visa, and their research would therefore
come to an abrupt halt. This pressure is similar to the problem of Western
journalists reporting in other authoritarian contexts who know that they
have to watch what they say or report, or risk expulsion. No wonder some
journalists and academics begin to sound like parrots instead of analysts: in
order to do their job, they have to do it poorly. Add to this the fact that Iran
ranks among the lowest countries for press freedom. Reporters Without
Borders ranks it 177 out of 180.
Second, there is a different kind of professional misconduct, when scholars
based in the United States, and therefore not in fear of being imprisoned

like their colleagues in Iran, nonetheless choose to adjust their accounts to
accommodate political pressure domestically. Thus, there are some schol-
ars who reportedly refrain from criticizing the Islamic Republic for fear of
appearing to agree with conservative or neoconservative policy positions. A
scholar may face pressure to suppress facts or reinterpret them fancifully in
order to come to other, more politically acceptable, conclusions.
Writing in Tablet, for example, Arian Khameneh discusses Ladan Zarabadi,
a gender studies scholar at UCLA with a focus on Iranian feminism. Not
surprisingly, her concerns reportedly put her at odds with the misogynistic
policies of the Tehran regime. Khameneh labels her “an unabashed critic.”
Her progressive colleagues were not at all welcoming. “Zarabadi found that
her colleagues in US academia were less interested in seeing Iran through
the eyes of Iranians and more prone to positioning themselves in a dichoto-
mous ideological battle between American progressives and conservatives—
one in which excessive criticism of the regime in Tehran can be perceived as
‘right-wing’ and even ‘imperialist.’ ”
Zarabadi told Khameneh: “It is not just about interpreting reality; it’s
about interpreting reality in a certain way to fulfill a specific ideology or a
specific discourse.” For Zarabadi’s colleagues—so argues Khameneh—the
fact that US conservatives criticize Tehran means that academic criti-
cism of Tehran must be prohibited. The facts concerning the repression of
women in Iran are worth far less than the political calculus in the United
States.
The political opposition of American conservatives, especially the Trump
administration, toward Iran pushed progressive academics to defend Tehran.
Yet earlier, the Obama administration’s policy of appeasing Iran acted as a
pull factor for the same
scholars: siding with
One Cornell professor found the
the Obama-Biden vision
murders by Hamas “exhilarating.”
required endorsing the
mullahs. President Obama, supported by Secretary of State John Kerry,
famously tried to move the United States away from alignment with the Arab
states and Israel and toward a model in which Saudi Arabia would “share”
the region with Iran. The so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the
“nuclear deal,” was always a key part of this effort to appease the regime in
Tehran, which otherwise had demonstrated consistent hostility toward the
United States. Underlying the Obama administration’s appeasement policy
lay the naive assumption that Iranian hostility would be reduced if Washing-
ton offered pre-emptive concessions.
The third version of Iranian soft power proceeded thanks to some
successful personnel placements. Amid the US promotion of a softer
approach to Iran, an Iran-created network of policy makers, the “Iran
Experts Initiative,” was formed. It succeeded in placing some of its mem-
bers in influential positions in the State Department and Pentagon, as well
as in key think tanks.
A DEEPER ROT
Yet these three specific factors—academics with their need for access to
Iran, the impact of political polarization on scholarly discourse, and the influ-
ence of Iran-friendly agents in government—would not have shaped academ-
ic discourse as extensively as they have if not for profound changes that had
already been taking place for decades in higher education.
The various pressures to refrain, at the least, from criticizing the Islamic
Republic fell on fertile ground in the relevant university disciplines—parts
of the humanities and the interpretive social sciences, and especially Middle
East Studies—that have embraced a fundamental hostility to the West
and an exclusively negative estimation of the role of the United States in
the world. In large swaths of these fields, the West is viewed as marked by
indelible sins, the worst moments of which are deemed to be always pres-
ent, with no regard to achievements or improvements, only permanent guilt.
European history is therefore reduced to colonialism, just as American
history is always only slavery, never a story of evolving freedom. Universi-
ties, of course, ought to be where students develop critical thinking skills,
including criticism of their own societies. That legitimate project of criticism
has morphed into indoctrination. The result is curriculums built around the
dogmatic rejection of the ideas of the Western tradition or the policies of the
United States.
This malaise pervades important parts of the university, and in this
milieu Iranian soft power finds a welcoming audience eager to have its
biases confirmed. The
propagandists of the
Because US conservatives criticize Islamic Republic of Iran
Tehran, academic criticism of Tehran present it as a revolu-
must be prohibited. tionary regime hostile
to the West, exactly
what ideology-driven scholars can view as confirming their ideological
assumptions. For those students for whom “revolution is the answer”
and who want to pursue it “by any means necessary,” the brutality of the

Iranian regime turns out to be attractive; no wonder they do not protest
when Iranian demonstrators are shot down. For campus progressives, the
aspirations of Iranian women to have the freedom to choose whether or
not to cover their hair are nothing more than an expression of a decadent
Western liberalism. Therefore, they side with the regime, recasting the
compulsory hijab as
the uniform of a heroic
revolt against the West. A previous US administration
Progressives who stand held the naive assumption that
firmly on the liberal side Iranian hostility would go away if
in our domestic culture Washington offered concessions.
wars quickly drop their
commitment to gender equality or gay rights to embrace terrorist organi-
zations like Hamas and Hezbollah or states like Iran, whose “anti-imperialism”
is more than sufficient to excuse their reactionary cultural values.
The success of Iranian soft power in US higher education is ultimately a
symptom of a wider rot, which also triggered the eruption of anti-Semitism
in the wake of the October 7 attack.
TURNING AROUND
The challenge is to figure out how to solve the problem and save our univer-
sities. That is easier said than done, given traditions of faculty governance:
ideologues get to appoint new ideologues. Curing the universities will not come
quickly. It will require leadership and vision by university leaders who can exer-
cise shaping power through appointments of level-headed department chairs
and program directors, but especially through decisions about the allocation
of funds. Resources should be withheld from units that have become irrevo-
cably politicized, new hires allowed only if the political deck is not stacked in
advance. In some cases,
new units—centers,
departments, or even Ideologues get to appoint new
schools—could be initi- ideologues.

ated, in order to bypass

the hotbeds of academic anti-Americanism. Trustees also have to pay atten-
tion when choosing presidents, and donors must be careful with the funds they
make available. There are smart ways to give that can prevent resources from
flowing in the wrong direction.
Taken together, such steps could shift embedded ideological alignments in
higher education and move American universities back toward a seriousness
of thinking and a commitment to the common good. Institutions of higher
education need to be able to withstand the malign influences of foreign soft
power, Iranian or otherwise. Our universities can be regained, but we must
fight to retrieve them.
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IR A N
Shamed and
Confused
American colleges denounce their own country
while excusing Islamicists. Iran finds this
extremely useful.
By Mariam Memarsadeghi
D
espite domestic dissent over its brutality, corruption, and mani-
fold existential crises, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to
be emboldened globally. The theocracy exerts soft power inter-
nationally as a means to ensure its survival, sustain its capacity
for terror operations and military attacks, and provide cover for its advance-
ment of a nuclear weapons program. It is a regime that regularly calls for the
destruction of the “Great Satan” and Israel. In this sense, it is a more overt
enemy to America and to freedom writ large than are the regimes of Russia
and China.
Hamas, a chief proxy for the regime’s imperial Islamist ambitions, is at war
with Israel, the Middle East’s only democracy and America’s chief ally in the
region. While denying direct involvement in the October 7 attack on Israel,
supreme leader Ali Khamenei quickly celebrated as a victory the pogrom in
which Hamas killed more Jews than have been killed in any single day since
the Holocaust.
Mariam Memarsadeghi is founder and director of the Cyrus Forum for Iran’s
Future and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
The Islamic Republic’s foreign minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, met
just days after the terror attack with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in
Doha, Qatar. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Quds
Force in particular are overseers of Hamas, providing it funding, train-
ing, intelligence, ideological backing, and global propaganda, including on
American social media platforms such as X. The IRGC is the only govern-
ment department ever
designated by the United
How does a regime so openly hostile States as a foreign
to the United States develop such a terrorist organization
robust network of influence on (FTO).
The regime’s hard pow-
US soil?
er includes attacks on US
bases and the killing of US soldiers and contractors stationed in the region,
the taking of US hostages, the attempted kidnapping and killing of US
citizens on US soil, the targeting of former US officials for assassination, and
cyberwar on US entities. The regime’s soft power abroad is more difficult to
spot than these open manifestations of nefarious power but is arguably more
potent because of its pervasive, insidious effect on American attitudes and
policy making toward a state opposed to the West’s most fundamental liberal
values.
How does a regime so openly hostile to the United States develop a
robust network of influence on US soil? How does it manage to have
American think tankers, scholars, civic groups, peace activists, media
outlets, celebrities, elected officials, and even the very diaspora it has
expunged spread its messaging? I have written elsewhere about the varied
soft-power nodes of the regime. In this article, I will focus on America’s
universities.
SELF-LOATHING IS USEFUL
An overarching strategy of the Islamic Republic is one inspired by the
USSR and its KGB, which Khamenei has been known to study and emu-
late, and not only for the need to avoid the type of reforms that brought an
end to the communist dictatorship. His regime, like other anti-American
regimes, has learned to capitalize on and reinforce America’s own inter-
nal weaknesses to thwart policies that advance the security interests and
values of the world’s democracies. America’s growing tendency for self-
loathing, division, isolationism, and cynicism toward its global leadership
and the unique capacity of liberal democracy to safeguard human freedom

may provide repressive regimes like Iran’s their greatest opportunity for
sustaining their rule.
American institutions of higher learning provide fertile ground for dis-
courses that hamper scrutiny of the world’s top sponsor of terror. The more
elite and progressive the school, the more its curriculums and culture can
resemble political indoctrination rather than open exploration and learning.
These narratives suffuse syllabi, campus organizations, and student social
networks and are the very ideas the regime teaches and propagates inside
the country to justify its totalitarian ideology.
It is impossible to know how much of this thinking is the natural output
of an open society and how much is being propelled by Iran, China, Russia,
and other undemocratic states. The federal government requires universi-
ties to report their foreign donations, and the regime’s ally Qatar tops all
other countries, giving $4.7 billion to American universities between 2001
and 2021.
Even at Brandeis, founded as a Jewish university, condemnation of Hamas
came late, and some of the most horrific footage of the persecution of Jewish
students was recorded at Harvard University, where the administration has
been criticized by the university’s former president Larry Summers, alumni,
and donors. “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free”—code for the
annihilation of Israel—is chanted and displayed on college campuses across
the country.
Students who subscribe to the progressive worldview are likely to be
highly critical of Israel and America. Iran’s revolutionary cause, because it
is anti-Israeli, anti-American, and anti-modern, is seen as authentic even as
the state grows ever more repressive, corrupt, and belligerent. Tellingly by
contrast is how Saudi
Arabia, a US ally, is sub-
jected to heavy scrutiny America’s growing tendency for self-
despite the fact that—or loathing, division, isolationism, and
perhaps because—it is cynicism plays into Tehran’s hands.
liberalizing, opening to
the West, and confronting Iran’s regime, and because it was coming close to
forging a historic peace with Israel before the Hamas attack.
The issue of the hijab plays a key role in this moral incoherence. The left
views the female covering as a matter of diversity, inclusion, and even femi-
nism, a visual rebuke to the right wing. The left self-censors to conceal the
inherent oppression of the hijab: even in the West, it is imposed on Muslim
girls from a young age as part of a larger ideology of control, subjugation,
and inequality, and is the single most important symbol of global jihad. The
reality that girls and women in Iran are being beaten to death for showing
some strands of hair does not fit the progressive narrative about the hijab,
nor does the willingness of Iranian girls and women to risk their lives to over-
throw the regime that forces them to wear it.
“Regime change” is, in the ethic of these educated elites, contemptible,
particularly for peoples of the Middle East. And yet Iran’s Woman-Life-
Freedom uprising has
forced them to face the
The Islamic Republic’s soft-power fierce power of Iranian
strategy prioritizes scholars, girls and women and the
especially those of Iranian descent. silence of Western femi-
nists about their decades-
long struggle to throw off the real-world Handmaid’s Tale that suffocates
them. It has compelled them to see, if still not admit, that in the eyes of the
Iranian people, wholesale democratic transition is the only way to solve the
problem of the Islamic Republic.
NO QUESTIONS
One reason for the dissonance between the truth of the lives of the Iranian
people and the progressive outlook is cancel culture’s shutting down of
opportunities for questioning, critical thought, and exposure to a plurality
of perspectives. In one instance at the London School of Economics, I was
shouted at incessantly by a group of angry, bearded young men while giv-
ing a public talk about the regime’s human rights abuses. They called me a
warmonger because I support international sanctions and other pressure on
the Islamic Republic, a talking point about me taken straight from the regime
itself. The men had taken seats in the auditorium like everyone else. It is
impossible to know if such agitators are paid regime agents whose job it is to
intimidate and defame dissidents abroad and to shape Western public opin-
ion, or if they are merely misguided students who have absorbed a mindset
intolerant of those insisting that regimes like Iran’s are an existential threat
to their own freedoms and way of life.
The Islamic Republic’s soft-power strategy prioritizes university scholars,
giving those of Iranian descent in particular access to regime insiders while
grooming them to provide a whitewashed version of even the most brutal
aspects of clerical rule.
The University of Maryland produces polls on Iranian public opinion
that claim the Iranian people strongly support the regime, its top officials,

its handling of the economy, and its nuclear and missile development,
while also claiming a majority have a positive view of the Taliban, Russia,
and China, and a negative view of the United States. These results are
laughable for Iranians, not least of all because they pay with their lives
to protest and strike against the regime and also to show their affinity
for the United States. The results run counter to opinion polls conducted
even inside the country, such as a famous opinion survey conducted by
regime insiders together with Gallup, which resulted in imprisonment of
the pollsters because it showed a majority of Iranians want good relations
with the United States. Other polls show high levels of dissatisfaction with
the regime, its foreign policy, its handling of the economy, and the policy of
mandatory hijab.
Scholars at America’s top academic institutions are close to those Wash-
ington think tank analysts who promote appeasement of the Islamic Repub-
lic. Recent exposés by Semafor and Iran International show how the Islamic
Republic’s foreign ministry created an “Iran Experts Initiative” to push
Tehran’s positions in Washington, particularly on its nuclear program, and
managed to have three of its top members land posts as advisers to Robert
Malley, Biden’s special envoy to Iran, who is now under State Department
and FBI investigation. Their reporting has prompted Republicans in both
the House and Senate to press the Biden administration, including the
Department of Defense, to account for the hiring of individuals to highly
sensitive US national security positions who took direction from Tehran.
For those of us who have long been sounding the alarm about the regime’s
international lobby and propaganda network, the investigative reporting sub-
stantiated with e-mail trails between the regime and the experts shows what
we had long alleged: a cadre of English-language scholars, analysts, journal-
ists, and advocates,
including at America’s
most respected institu- This is a war for the minds of young
tions, feign independence Americans.
but in fact take their
talking points straight from an evil cabal fundamentally opposed to human
liberty.
If America truly intends to counter the Islamist threat, it must become
wise to the corrosion of its own democratic values and the integrity of its
universities, and to the exploitation of its freedoms by the world’s leading
Islamist force. War between Iran’s imperial terror state and America is
already being fought on American soil—it is a war for the minds of young
Americans who will soon run our country’s national security establishment,
serve in Congress, report the news, and teach future generations.

explores the contemporary dilemmas of the greater Middle East (www.
hoover.org/publications/caravan). © 2024 The Board of Trustees of the
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is A Hinge

of History: Governance in an Emerging New World,
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IR A N
Guns and
Paranoia
Tehran built its entire revolutionary edifice on
an obsession with the “Great Satan” and all its
purported harms.
By Abbas Milani
A
li Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has shaped a foreign policy
for the Islamic Republic around several overriding concepts:
jihad, or holy war, culture wars, soft power, an enemy con-
spiracy, and a “historic turn.” They are interrelated and are at
the core of the regime’s successful effort to create an intellectual proxy in the
West to fight the purported “culture war” and facilitate the turn.
In the convoluted calculus of Khamenei’s mind, these concepts cohere into
a vision that sees the West, and particularly America, in decline; Israel in its
death throes; Asia, particularly China, on the rise; and Islam, led of course by
Khamenei, on the threshold of a historic change that would bring about an
end to the catastrophic era of Judeo-Christian Western hegemony and usher
in the apocalyptic victory of Islam.
For years, Ali Khamenei has argued that successive US administrations
have attempted to overthrow Iran’s clerical regime through coercive means.
To him, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, no less than Barack Obama, Donald
Abbas Milani is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, co-director of

Hoover’s Iran Democracy Project, and a member of the Herbert and Jane Dwight
Working Group on the Middle East and the Islamic World. He is also the Hamid
and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University.
HARD LINE: Hossein Shariatmadari, managing editor of an Iranian news-
paper and an ally of the Tehran regime, has argued that the Holocaust “was
falsely claimed by Zionist and Western governments.” Ali Khamenei, Iran’s
supreme leader, has woven together a foreign policy built on jihad, culture
wars, soft power, and an enemy conspiracy, all seasoned with “progressive
discourse.” [Foad Ashtari—Creative Commons]
Trump, and now Joe Biden, have all pursued the same policy of attempting to
destroy the regime—either with an iron fist, or the same fist clad in a velvet
glove—and have all failed. Thus, they have launched not just a “culture war”
but also created a “cultural NATO.” In a talk given as early as November 9,
2006, Khamenei for the
first time used the term
Khamenei preaches that the West “cultural NATO,” going
is attacking Islam through nihilism, on at length—as is the
materialism, individualism, and pattern in the autumn of
rationalism. every “patriarch”—about
a conspiracy, spearheaded
not only by the United States—in his neologism the “Greatest Satan”—but
also by “Zionists.” He even alluded to financier and philanthropist George
Soros in a tone that betrayed his anti-Semitism, calling him “that Jew whose

name I don’t want to mention.” Such forces are, according to Khamenei,
trying to defeat Islam through nihilism, materialism, individualism, and a
rationalism devoid of Allah and faith.
And as Khamenei often repeats, for him Iran’s negotiations with the United
States have been only a ploy to expose America’s true hypocrisy and buy
time for that “historic turn.”
THERE WILL BE WAR

While Khamenei believes that all direct political or military challenges to the
regime have failed, he fiercely believes that America, Israel, and the West
have only changed tactics. To continue their attempts at “regime change”
in Iran, and to thwart the “historic turn” towards Islam, they now primarily
use “soft power.” More than once, Khamenei has quoted Joseph Nye and his
theories, suggesting that he is now the grand theorist of American global
hegemony. All one must do to understand the extent of the culture war con-
spiracy, Khamenei grandly opines, is to read Nye himself.
Khamenei’s insistence on the necessity of fighting the ideological war
has been a central part of his political ideology. In one study, published in
a journal affiliated with the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), it
is suggested that from 2007 to 2009, Khamenei discussed the topic of the
“culture wars” in forty-three of his eighty-nine talks. The journal where the
study was published is, in an Orwellian turn of phrase, called the Scientific-
Scholarly Journal for Culturally Guarding the Islamic Revolution; it is pub-
lished by the equally Orwellian Center for Islamic Human Sciences and
Soft Power and Training of the Guards in Imam Hossein’s Officers’ College.
No less central in Khamenei’s vision is his belief in the divine inevitability
of this historic turn. The idea also played a key role in Khamenei’s manifesto,
issued in 2019 on the
fortieth anniversary of
the revolution. Since For Khamenei and his regime, war
its publication, sites and jihad are constant.
and papers close to the
regime, as well as ideologues of the IRGC, have gone out of their way to posi-
tion the paper as a seminal text and strategic gospel for the “second phase”
of the revolution. In one “scholarly” article, the authors argued that the publi-
cation of Khamenei’s manifesto was an auspicious indication of a rebirth and
reinvigoration of the revolution, the first stage in that new historic turn.
For Khamenei and his regime, war and jihad are a constant state of
affairs, and in this conflict his regime not only trains and employs armed
proxies but also opportunistically uses a whole army of “fellow travelers,”
hired guns (literally and metaphorically), “progressives” keen on defend-
ing, or “contextualizing,” any action of the regime based on the claim that
it is fighting “colonialism” and Euro-centric or Judeo-Christian hegemony.
Most ironic is the existence of some feminists in this strange alliance.
They are wary of criticizing the regime’s gender apartheid and its blatantly
misogynistic laws. The complicit silence of some parts of the feminist move-
ment about women’s restricted freedom in Iran is an example of the perni-
cious influence of Tehran’s “soft power.”
Some of the fellow travelers are faculty members of prominent universi-
ties. They sit on committees, review and pass judgment on articles or books
submitted for publication, and write articles partially validated by the names
of the institutions they are affiliated with. And through it all, they help pro-
mote or justify the regime’s ideology and actions, silence or sideline critics,
and sometimes offer “explanations” of the regime’s behavior by drenching it
in the lexicon of “progres-
sive discourse.” Mean-
Fellow travelers are eager to defend, time, a combination of
or “contextualize,” any action of the rumor and reality creates
regime, no matter how oppressive. an atmosphere of fear
among Iranian students
and faculty that Big Brother will punish dissent or disagreement and reward
consent and cooperation.
Western journalists are led to believe that harsh criticism of the regime,
even pointed questions in press conferences, will mean a denial of access or
entry visa. Obviously, many journalists are not intimidated; sadly, some are.
Hand in hand with its soft power, the Tehran regime creates a perception
that it wields an omniscient and ruthless “sharp power.” Random acts of
intimidation against returning members of the Iranian diaspora, along with a
shifting, ambiguous “red line” denoting the activity the regime will not toler-
ate, have helped Tehran extend its reign of terror to Iranians abroad.
CALCIFIED
It is impossible to track how much money the Islamic Republic of Iran
spends in creating this vast, varied, multi-pronged, multi-purposed network
that provides a muscular soft power. One estimate calculated by the Founda-
tion for Defense of Democracies puts the total budget for Iran’s ideological
activities in 2019 at around $3 billion. It is facile to think that personal gain
drives every one of the regime’s fellow travelers who support, legitimize, or

“contextualize” its nefarious activities. To those who play by the regime’s
rules, lingering belief in Islam and attachments to shibboleths of “progres-
sive” ideology are at least as powerful as the perks of power.
On Khamenei’s orders, the regime has created institutions inside Iran
whose function is to assist and engage in this culture war. Today, there are no
fewer than twenty-nine centers operating in Iran that promote the Khamenei
vision. These are only the known institutions—and known only because they
have a line item in Iran’s state budget. In 2019, the total budget for twenty-
three of these centers was $280 million USD according to the Mardom Salari
newspaper.
Among the twenty-nine institutions that assist the culture war, Jama’at
al-Mostafa al-Alamiye or the International Institute (University) of
Mostafa is by far the most influential, and well-funded. Headquartered
in Qom, it has branches in Iran and sixty other countries, and runs four
thousand weblogs and fifty magazines in forty languages. The university
claims that, since its inception, it has published a book a day in one of
twenty languages.
In its structure and praxis, Jama’at is akin to the Soviet Patrice Lumum-
ba University during the Cold War. As I have argued elsewhere, “Not only
do the Iranian and Soviet regimes bear striking resemblances in their
moribund last stages—ruled by septuagenarian men, moored to sclerotic
ideas, deluded by self-serving fantasies about the power and appeal of
their ideas, and main-
taining total control
through terror—the Western journalists worry that harsh
structure and functions criticism of the regime, even pointed
of the two institutions questions, will mean a denial of
also bear fascinating access.
similarities. While there
is no consensus on the effectiveness of the Patrice Lumumba University,
its goal was clearly to increase the Soviet Union’s “soft power” and train
cadres—whether ideologues or outright agents of the Soviet regime—to
promote Soviet ideology.”
POTEMKIN PROTESTS
Another component of Tehran’s mandate is symbolic politics; specifically,
organizing mass demonstrations and Islamic and Shiite rituals in cities
across the world. In recent years, from Sydney and Toronto to London and
Los Angeles, there have been mourning rituals during Moharram—the
month of mourning for Shiites for the battle of Karbala and the martyrdom
of Hossein, the prophet’s grandson and a revered figure in Shiism. Journal-
ists and scholars sympathetic to the regime, as well as its overt mouthpieces
in Iran, then use these rented crowds as signs and symbols of the regime’s
sustained support around the world.
Essential to Khamenei’s vision is criticism of what he calls the hypocrisy of
democracy. But his regime hypocritically uses all the liberties of a democracy
to promote an illiberal vision.
As in all its wars, the clerical regime uses a variety of proxies in an asym-
metrical battle. Its past operatives and officials, as well as new fellow travel-
ers of every hue, use the cherished liberties of a democracy to promote the
regime’s soft power strategy; yet in Iran, no possibilities exist for advocates
of democracy.

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RUSSI A A N D UKRAINE
Can Ukraine
Still Win?
If anything can break the bloody stalemate,
perhaps it’s an innovative—and overwhelming—
air attack.
By Rose Gottemoeller and Michael Ryan
U
kraine’s daring attack on a major
Russian warship in occupied Key points
» Ukraine has made
Crimea in the small hours of
progress denying Russia
December 26 was one more control of the sea and the
episode in Kyiv’s strategy to deny Russia air. But more is needed to
win.
control over the Black Sea. With most of its
» Decisive air power, using
ships driven out of its home port in Sevasto- more and better weapons,
pol, the Russian Black Sea Fleet can no longer might offer Kyiv a break-
through.
find safe haven anywhere along the Crimean
» US and European aid
Peninsula. All ports there are now vulnerable
will help Ukraine manage
to attack. operational complexity
The Institute for the Study of War tells the and combine technology,
information, and tactics.
story with data, showing that Sevastopol saw
Rose Gottemoeller is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a partici-

pant in Hoover’s Task Force on National Security. She is also the Steven C. Házy
Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Stud-
ies and its Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). She is a
former deputy secretary general of NATO. Michael Ryan is a former US deputy
assistant defense secretary for European and NATO policy.

SYNCHRONIZED: Ukrainian soldiers fire a Soviet-vintage anti-aircraft gun as
a drone carries out surveillance. Despite its determined resistance, Ukraine
cannot defeat the Russian army on the ground, nor can it defend against every
missile striking civilian targets. [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine—Creative
Commons]
a steady decline in the number of Russian naval vessels in port between June
and December 2023; by contrast, Novorossiysk on the Russian mainland far-
ther east showed a steady gain. While Russia has been going all-out to attack
Ukraine’s infrastructure, its risky move to deploy ships and submarines
armed with Kalibr missiles in the Black Sea is exposing them to potential
Ukrainian attack. It is a tacit acknowledgment that Russia can no longer
depend on Crimean ports and launch sites.
Ukraine’s success has been due to domestically produced missiles and
drones, sometimes launched using Zodiac boats or personal watercraft. But
its most potent attacks have come from the air, where Ukraine has used its
Soviet-era fighter aircraft to launch both domestically produced and NATO-
supplied missiles. These attacks have taken place with the protection of
Ukraine’s advanced air defenses—including newly supplied foreign ones—
which are regularly shooting down the majority of Russian missiles and
drones destined for Ukrainian targets.
Ukraine thus has made significant strides denying Russia control of both
the sea and airspace over and around its territory, thereby preventing the
H O O V E R D IG E S T • S p ring 2024 81
Russian navy and air force from operating with impunity. But is that enough
for Kyiv to win? To many Western observers, victory doesn’t seem possible
in the face of wave after
wave of Russian troops
Ukraine’s defeat would also mean grinding down Ukrainian
defeat for the United States and its defenders. Ukraine’s strat-
allies in Europe and Asia. egy to deny Russia free
use of its sea and airspace
may be working, but as things stand, it cannot defeat the Russian army on the
ground, nor can it defend against every missile striking civilian targets.
Indeed, the current conventional wisdom in large parts of the West is that
Ukraine is losing the ground war, leaving no pathway to victory for the coun-
try as Russia pounds Ukrainian civilians into submission. Kyiv might as well
call for a cease-fire and sue for peace.
The trouble with this scenario is that it spells defeat not only for Ukraine,
but also for the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. It would
embolden both Russia and China to pursue their political, economic, and
security objectives undeterred—including the seizure of new territory in
Eastern Europe and Taiwan.
DEADLY COORDINATION
But is the conventional wisdom right—or does Ukraine’s clever success at sea
and in the air suggest that a different outcome is possible? Perhaps the Russian
army can be defeated by making use of Ukraine’s willingness to fight in new
ways. If you ask a US military professional, the key to dislodging the Russians
is to subject them to relentless and accurate air attacks that are well synchro-
nized with the maneuver of combined arms forces on the ground. While the
Ukrainians are admirably using the weapons at hand to strike Russian forces
both strategically, as in Crimea, and operationally, as in hitting command and
logistics targets, success at the tactical level has remained elusive. To achieve a
tactical breakthrough on the ground front that leads to operational and strate-
gic success, they will need to be more effective from the air.
For power from the air to be decisive in 2024, the Ukrainian armed forces
must create temporary windows of localized air superiority in which to mass
firepower and maneuver forces. Given the Ukrainians’ success in denying
their airspace to Russia at points of their choosing, such windows are pos-
sible using the assets they already have at hand. More and better weapons
tailored to this scenario would make them more successful across the entire
front with Russia.

General Valery Zaluzhny, the former commander of the Ukrainian armed
forces, acknowledges that to break out of the current positional stalemate—
which favors Russia—and return to maneuver warfare, where Ukraine has
an advantage, Ukrainian forces need air superiority, the ability to breach
mine obstacles, better counter-battery capability, and more assets for elec-
tronic warfare. Specifically, he argues for three key components:
» Armed UAVs that use real-time reconnaissance to coordinate attacks
with artillery (which could include properly armed Turkish-built TB2s,
MQ-1C Gray Eagles, MQ-9 Reapers, or bespoke cheap and light drones
capable of employing the necessary weapons).
» Armed UAVs to suppress enemy air defenses, as well as medium-range
surface-to-air missile simulators to deter Russian pilots.
» Unmanned vehicles to breach and clear mines.
Although the technologies are new, this combination of capabilities
recalls the method US and allied NATO forces practiced during the Cold
War in West Germany to confront numerically superior Warsaw Pact
ground forces protected by layered air defenses. The Joint Air Attack
Team (JAAT) was developed to synchronize attack helicopters, artillery,
and close air support by fighter planes to ensure a constant barrage of
the enemy in case of a
ground force attack.
Pooling NATO assets in Cold War tacticians developed a plan
this way was designed to to synchronize attack helicopters,
give the alliance’s forces artillery, and close air support
the mass, maneuver- to bring down a constant barrage on
ability, and flexibility
the enemy.
needed to overcome
superior numbers, avoid a war of attrition, and escape the type of bloody
slugfest that characterizes the current stalemate in Ukraine.
In Ukraine’s case, a modernized JAAT would encompass, among many
things, armed UAVs carrying Maverick and Hellfire missiles, loitering
munitions, precision-guided artillery shells, and extended-range stand-
off missiles fired by aircraft. These systems would be coordinated in an
electromagnetic environment shaped by Ukrainian operators to dominate
the local airspace, saturate the battlefield with munitions, and clear mines
to open the way for a ground assault. This updated JAAT—let’s call it elec-
tronic, or eJAAT—would create a bubble of localized air superiority that
would advance as the combined arms force advances under the bubble’s
protection.
Given Russia’s willingness to endure significant casualty rates, the eJAAT
could be even more effective on defense: Massing firepower against advanc-
ing troops through an eJAAT might result in a stunning rout of the attackers,
opening opportunities for Ukraine to strategically exploit the sudden change
of fortunes.
BREAKING THE STALEMATE

Zaluzhny has made it publicly clear that “the decisive factor will not be a
single new invention but will come from combining all the technical solutions
that already exist.” Like all good commanders, Zaluzhny is painfully aware
that the 2023 campaign
didn’t work as well as he
Massing firepower against advancing had intended. Even so,
troops might result in a stunning rout and to their advantage,
of the attackers. the Ukrainians have clear-
ly demonstrated their
innovative talents, willingness to exploit Western methods, and total commit-
ment to victory. US and European assistance to work with them on how to
better manage operational complexity and combine technology, information,
and tactics in more dynamic ways, coupled with security assistance tailored
to the eJAAT approach, would return movement to the now-static battlefield
and give Ukraine a fighting chance.
If Ukraine can achieve the momentum in the ground war that evaded it
during its failed summer offensive, Kyiv will have a pathway to victory. That
pathway will run through Ukraine’s demonstrated prowess at sea and in the
air, joined to an embrace of a sophisticated combination of techniques on the
ground. It will be a pathway to victory not only for Ukraine, but also for the
United States and its allies.
Reprinted by permission of Foreign Policy (www.foreignpolicy.com).

© 2024 Foreign Policy Group LLC. All rights reserved.

Disruptive Strategies: The Military Campaigns of
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RU SSIA A N D U K R A IN E
The Russian Way

Wherever Russian armies march, war crimes
follow. The viciousness is the message.
By David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts
I
s there a specifically Russian way of war? The way the Russian army
has systematically flouted the Geneva Conventions in its brutal,
unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine inevitably prompts the
question.
Russia has deliberately chosen to fight a war in Ukraine that is reminiscent
of the worst aspects of World War II—the conflict that led to the develop-
ment of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The mass rapes, torture, and targeting
of residential areas for shelling are too widespread to be anything other than
the result of Russia’s high command turning a blind eye to abuses. Indeed,
the Russian officer corps seems to view civilian terror and death as inherent
to its campaign plan.
On a visit to the towns of Bucha and Irpin outside Kyiv in May 2023, we
came face to face with Russian barbarism. We saw where the mass grave in
Bucha had been dug by Russian soldiers hoping to hide the massacre that
had taken place there in late February and March of 2022. In a field behind
the church, some 458 people had been buried, many of them with their hands
David Petraeus (US Army, Ret.), was commander of the troop surge in Iraq, US
Central Command, and NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. Andrew Roberts
is the Roger and Martha Mertz Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, a mem-
ber of Hoover’s Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary
Conflict, and a member of the House of Lords. He is the host of a Hoover Institution
podcast, Secrets of Statecraft with Andrew Roberts.
tied behind their backs and showing signs of torture. Their bodies have now
been disinterred by war-crimes investigators.
It is striking, in the twenty-first century, how human rights abuses are still
an inherent part of the way that Russians fight both foreign and domestic
enemies. When Russia’s history and the psychology of its often badly led
army are taken into account, however, the exceptionally brutal Russian way
of war becomes perhaps more comprehensible.
THROWBACK
While researching our new book, Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945
to Ukraine (Harper, 2023), we immediately noted how much warfare has
evolved during that period. Developments, especially in the field of smart and
precision weaponry and unmanned systems, have enabled modern armies
to adhere better to the standards of the Geneva Conventions that seek to
limit the barbarity of war and protect civilians, medics, and those who can no
longer fight, such as the wounded and prisoners of war.
“Smart bombs” first came into major operational use during Operation
Desert Storm in 1991, and since then huge advances in microelectronics and
navigation have been made to the point that Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian
Quds Force commander, could be assassinated in January 2020 by precision
munitions fired from a US-made MQ-9 Reaper drone that destroyed his mov-
ing car without collateral damage.
True, Russia’s smart-weapon technology has been hampered by Western
sanctions since the invasion of Ukraine, but it was still more than capable
of avoiding the residential centers and shopping malls in Ukraine that have
been destroyed—and
continue to be hit.
In Ukraine, the Russian officer corps The viciousness
seems to view civilian terror and undoubtedly reflects frus-
death as inherent to its campaign tration at the failure of
the Russian offensives to
plan.
achieve a speedy victory.
Taking out such frustration and anger on unarmed civilians through torture
and rape is a response that is tragically as old as war itself.
Indeed, even when the Red Army was winning the 1944–45 campaign in
Eastern Europe and Germany, its soldiers raped several million women,
according to Antony Beevor’s book The Fall of Berlin 1945; other historians
have given higher figures. This behavior was significantly different from
every other army in that conflict, including the German army, where rape

certainly took place but was not either explicitly or implicitly condoned. By
contrast, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that in the Second World War
the Russian officers saw it as a useful and cost-free way of rewarding their
men, punishing the enemy, and terrorizing the population. Similarly, Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin today knows perfectly well what his troops have been
doing in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, Africa, and now Ukraine.
To understand why, it might help to consider the sheer savagery displayed
throughout modern Russian and Soviet history, including in the Russian
Civil War, Josef Stalin’s purges and policy of “collectivization” and starvation,
World War II, and several conflicts since.
Similarly, the Russians have demonstrated a capacity for absorbing
extraordinarily high casualty rates, ones that in Western armies would be
politically unacceptable. Again, look to the past:
“The Second World War is the dominant experience in Soviet military his-
tory,” Condoleezza Rice, who went on to become secretary of state, wrote in
1986, and that is still true
today. Putin appears to
have seen 1943—when Russian technology is more than
the Red Army started capable of avoiding the apartment
to force the Axis pow- buildings and shopping malls it has
ers out of the USSR—as
attacked in Ukraine.
the historical precedent
for his invasion of Ukraine. The analogy is ludicrous; the Russians are at
war with the people of Ukraine, not foreign invaders. Still, it ought to give
pause for thought, as merely the first of the four great battles of Kyiv cost
the Soviets more than 700,000 killed, wounded, captured, or missing. Soviet
military deaths during World War II are estimated to have been as high as
10.7 million.
So there is plenty of precedent for both the high casualties and the mis-
treatment of civilians.
MISTAKES AND RESTRAINT

While Western armies have killed civilians, too, they have not deliberately
made civilians their targets. For example, in one heart-rending error, a wed-
ding party in 2002 was bombed by the Coalition in Afghanistan when the
traditional celebratory firing of rifles in the air was mistaken for aggression.
In 2011, teenage boys collecting sticks in pre-dawn hours were misidentified
through the thermal sights of Apache attack helicopters as insurgents with
weapons deploying for an attack—and mistakenly targeted and killed.
In the main, however, US-led Coalition forces in the wars of the post-9/11
era went to considerable lengths to avoid civilian deaths, regularly curtail-
ing operations to do so. “Having seen our troops up close in repeated fights,”
assert General Jim Mattis and Bing West in their 2019 book, Call Sign Chaos:
Learning to Lead, “I doubt any military in history could match their efforts to
avoid injuring the innocent.”
Nor does the West employ essentially mercenary auxiliary units in the way
that Russia does. The Wagner Group, for example, is synonymous with war
crimes; another excep-
tionally brutal group of
Taking out frustration and anger on fighters in Ukraine and
civilians through torture and rape is Syria is commanded by
as old as war itself. Ramzan Kadyrov, Chech-
nya’s vicious, unstable,
dictatorial leader. His strongman rule has been characterized by the kidnap-
ping, torture, and murder of human rights activists, political opponents, and
their families.
It is, of course, important to differentiate between the Russian people and
the Russian armed forces when apportioning blame for “the Russian way of
war.” As the British statesman Edmund Burke rightly stated, “I do not know
the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people.” He was
writing, in 1775, about the American colonists. However, in the unlikely event
that Putin ever has to face justice at the International Criminal Court, there
ought to be a large number of his high command and henchmen standing in
the dock beside him.
Reprinted by permission of the Washington Post. © 2024 Washington

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In the Wake of Empire: Anti-Bolshevik Russia in
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RU SSIA A N D U K R A IN E
The Last Crusade

There’s only one way to grasp Russia’s hate for
a free Ukraine: listen for echoes of religion and
empire.
By Ralph Peters
T
he Russian-Orthodox jihad in Ukraine adheres uncannily to the
patterns of campaigning and giving battle that have defined the
Russian way of war since Peter the Great fielded his empire’s
first modernized army and defeated the Swedish warrior-state of
Charles XII at Poltava in 1709. Today’s pretender to the throne of the czars,
Vladimir Putin, has introduced a few new tools (such as drones) but no new
behaviors. The list of tactical and operational characteristics that follows is
as reliable as the Russian taste for vodka.
Our misunderstanding of Moscow’s latest aggression is not about hyper-
sonic missiles or the massive deployment of land mines, but about a pre-
modern state that can reach into space, a slumbering cult ever awaiting a
prophet’s call, and a friendless frontier land with a sense of divine purpose so
enduring it shapes the worldview of atheists.
The date that continues to deform the Russian soul isn’t 1917, or 1941,
or 1991, but 1453, when Byzantium, the “Second Rome,” weakened by the
assaults of other Christians, fell to the Muslim Turks, inspiring a struggling
duchy far to the north to assume the title of the “Third Rome” and the duty
to recover all that had been lost over centuries.
Ralph Peters participates in the Hoover Institution’s Working Group on the Role
of Military History in Contemporary Conflict.
We smirk at Putin’s counterfactual interpretation of history, but we would
be wiser to pay attention. He’s telling us precisely who he is and who his sub-
jects are. We merely roll our eyes because that’s far easier than attempting to
grasp the mythologized spiritual landscape of a population that looks more
or less like us but responds to events as souls from another cosmology.
Russian war crimes in
eastern Ukraine should
surprise no one. We see Russia is a premodern state that can
Ukrainians as patriots reach into space. It’s a slumbering
fighting desperately
cult ever awaiting a prophet’s call.
for their freedom. The
Russians see separatist rebels and heretical apostates. We see a struggle to
defend de jure sovereignty. Putin sees yet another uprising in a centuries-
long chain of rebellions against Moscow’s entitlement to rule the steppes. We
imagine a resolution of this crisis within the framework of twenty-first-
century diplomacy. Putin (like Stalin and many a czar) believes that the
fiction of a Ukrainian identity must be exterminated. The rapes, torture,
looting, and wanton slaughter in Ukraine are not lamentable corollaries but
means to an end.
BLOODY VICTORIES
Here are a few of the consistencies.
» Unpreparedness. Russian forces have rarely entered a conflict with a
well-prepared military. Initial reverses consistently revealed hollow forces,
faulty arms, poor training, incompetent leadership, and overconfidence.
While Putin’s Russia may be the worst grab-ocracy in all of that benighted
land’s history, extensive corruption has never been absent—it’s a primary
tool of state control, for creating dependencies. Thus, again and again, star-
tling deficiencies have had to be redeemed with an appalling (to us) sacrifice
of lives.
Yet, the Russians have also shown unexpected resilience and a knack for
recovering as wars drag on. Awful at short wars, Russians have achieved
CRUSADER: Czar Peter the Great (opposite) fielded the first modernized
army of Russia, which has been an aggressor state for half a millennium.
From the sixteenth century onward, Russia fought routine wars of expansion,
intensified by the idea of divine duty inherent in its role as the “Third Rome”
after Byzantium fell in 1453. [Pierre Gabriel Langlois (1754–1810) from original by Louis
Caravaque (1684–1754)]
“impossible” victories in longer conflicts, as the sycophants are cast aside
and the capable rise to command. For example, the Red Army’s catastrophic
losses in the first months of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) should
have finished Stalin’s regime. But under the pressures of war, a terror-
crippled military whose scrawled plans were laughably inept managed by
mid-war to produce solidly professional staff work that won battles. By the
closing phases of the war, Red Army plans were the professional equal of
those in Western armies and won campaigns. In war, Russians lose and learn.
We have already seen the pat-
tern in Ukraine, albeit still at an
In war, Russians lose and learn. early stage.
The postwar pattern, too, is
consistent: earnest reforms are implemented and real improvements made,
but over time the reform impulse dissipates and the military bureaucracy
reverts to its traditional apathy and thievery. The closest thing to an excep-
tion from the post-Napoleonic period to today was the Russo-Turkish War of
1877–78, when post-Crimean-War reforms still retained some effectiveness.
Despite superior Ottoman armaments, such as Krupp artillery and American-
designed rifles, the Russians reached the outskirts of Istanbul and were halted
only by threats of intervention on the Ottoman Empire’s behalf by European
powers. On the other hand, reforms in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War of
1904–5 did not have adequate time to recast the force before the outbreak of a
far greater war in 1914 and the Russian dash to disaster at Tannenberg.
» Clumsy offense, stalwart defense. On the attack, Russian forces are stiff
yet unsteady, and readily paralyzed by surprises (as we saw on the outskirts
of Kyiv in the present war’s first days). They rely on mass and the readiness
to suffer “intolerable” casualties. In World War II, a prevalent comment was
“we have a lot of people.” Heartless it may have been, but that attitude got
Russian forces to Berlin.
On the other hand, Russian soldiers over the centuries have shown them-
selves to be stalwart and steady on the defense when led with even marginal
competence. We are witnessing that in Ukraine, as a “broken” Russian
military nonetheless continues to prosecute an uninspiring war doggedly.
Millions of land mines help, but even if draconian punishments are part of
the equation, Russian troops continue to man their defenses and will not be
vulnerable to mass losses until they are displaced from their fortifications in
disorder.
The fatalism and resolution of Russian infantry on the defense led to
Frederick the Great’s notable—and bloody—defeats at Zorndorf (1758) and

Kunersdorf (1759), and the Russians were the toughest enemy Frederick
faced. At Prussia’s low point, Cossacks rode through the streets of Berlin,
previewing repeat visits in the future.
From Napoleon and his crippling “victory” at Borodino (1812), through the
frustrated Japanese plan for a lightning triumph at Port Arthur (1904), to the
comeuppance of Hitler and his generals at Stalingrad (1942–43), the cost of
underestimating the stubbornness of Russians on the defense has been agony
at the least, catastrophe at the worst.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 is particularly instructive: with
superior training and equipment, shorter lines of communication, fierce
confidence, and clear objectives, Japan expected to knock out Russia’s
slovenly Far Eastern forces swiftly, seizing Port Arthur in a coup de main.
Instead, the Russians defended the city and its harbor for months, inflicting
irreplaceable casualties on the Japanese. Port Arthur eventually fell, but the
Japanese then faced a painfully costly, incomplete victory at Mukden that
left Japan broke and almost bankrupt of manpower. The ensuing, American-
brokered peace left neither side satisfied, guaranteeing that the initial
assault on Port Arthur would not be the last Japanese surprise attack in the
Pacific theater.
MILITARY FAILINGS
Drastic losses in the early, botched phases of Moscow’s wars consistently
lead decision-makers to turn to firepower: first artillery and now airpower
(in one form or another).
» Reliance on massive firepower. Russia’s first gunners were European
mercenaries, present in Muscovy from at least the sixteenth century onward,
and only under Peter the
Great did Russia begin
to methodically develop In World War II, a prevalent remark
its “native” artillery arm. about Russian losses was “we have a
Ironically, the profession- lot of people.”
alization of the artillery
advanced because officers of noble birth—the handsomely uniformed
dilettantes—disdained the dirty, sweaty work of the gun crews, leaving
gunnery to the untitled but ambitious and competent. The same applied
to engineers, who would form another island of professionalism in a sea of
mediocrity. Young noblemen wanted to serve in elite cavalry regiments or, at
least, infantry regiments of the best lineage. Artillery and engineer officers
needed to prove their worth.
This tradition of strong artillery and competent engineers is manifest in
Ukraine today. Russian targeters need not be up to discriminating Western
standards (we want the Ukrainians to fight politely, of course); on the con-
trary, the unbounded readiness to inflict destruction on anything or anyone
within range is a great advantage for any military power—despite our ahis-
torical insistence otherwise.
» Poor command and control, weak coordination. Russian deficiencies—
and they are grave—in these areas are products of rivalries, distrust, and fear.
The atmosphere of trust taken for granted within Western armies simply does
not exist in Russian ranks.
Officers do not know
The Red Army of 1945 was not the whom they can trust, if
one of 1941. So too, in Ukraine, the anyone. The officer who
Russian forces of 2025 will not be acts on his own initiative
those of 2022. becomes the scapegoat for
those who wait too long
to act. The mindset is difficult for an American officer to grasp—rather than
chafing at constricting orders, Russian officers crave them.
The Russian vision for an effective military is stuck in the eighteenth
century, where clockwork drills hoped to produce military automatons.
Showpiece exercises, with an emphasis on scripts and rigid timetables, may
provide impressive visuals for foreign observers and propaganda clips, but
they do not build capable modern units and formations as free-play exercises
and rigorous gunnery practice do.
Nonetheless, we can expect to see Russian forces improve their combat
coordination under the pressures of wartime. Just as the Red Army of 1945
was not the one of 1941, so too, if the Ukraine war continues, the Russian
combat forces of 2025 will not be those of 2022.
Time is on Russia’s side, not ours.
» Poor intelligence. Those responsible for Russia’s military intelligence
completely missed Japanese preparations for war in 1904; they misread
German dispositions in 1914; they utterly misread Finnish determination in
1939 (as they did with Ukraine in 2022); terrified of annoying Stalin, they
closed their eyes to Nazi Germany’s impossible-to-hide preparations for a
multi-front invasion; they underestimated American resolve and suffered the
propaganda defeat of the Berlin Airlift; they repeated their underapprecia-
tion of American grit in the Cuban missile crisis; they expected a quick win
in Afghanistan; and they wildly erred in predicting the NATO response to
Ukraine.

It may seem incredible that the state (or the succession of states imposed
upon the Russian people) that pioneered mass surveillance and political
terror—the only fields in which Russia anticipated Europe—should have
failed so consistently to provide warnings of foreign attacks, but it’s read-
ily explicable: whether we speak of Ivan the Terrible’s Oprichniki, a merci-
less forerunner of the Soviet Union’s terror executors; of the Romanov-era
Okhrana secret police (whom we can also thank for The Protocols of the Elders
of Zion, Russia’s most enduring work of fantasy fiction); or of the Soviet
Cheka/NKVD/MGB/KGB and Putin’s FSB, Russia’s overwhelming security
concern always has been the suspicion, detection, and suppression of domes-
tic dissent. Military intelligence got the scraps, the leftovers. Today, the
assets of the GRU—military intelligence—may appear extensive, but they’re
second-rate, bureaucratized to near-uselessness, and (as we have seen in
Ukraine) whoppingly ineffective.
The timeless paranoia of Russian leaders and the relative weight accorded
to various intelligence disciplines were perfectly encapsulated by Stalin’s
continued purging of his most talented military officers as German tanks
lined up on Russia’s newly demarcated western border in 1941.
Paradoxically, the great danger for us is not the risk that Russian military
intelligence will get things right, but that it will get some grave strategic issue
tragically wrong.
» Ruthlessness. The Soviet massacre of between fifteen thousand and
twenty thousand Polish POWs at Katyn and other sites early in the Great
Patriotic War shocked even the Germans. For the Russians, it was common
sense. Crucial to the Russian way of war is the determination to win at all
costs, to shy from no barbarism, and it always includes eliminating foreign
elites. In comparison, the United States no longer has a way of war, only a
checklist for operating
under the scrutiny of a
gotcha! media. We wish The Soviet massacre of Polish POWs
to wage war morally. For at Katyn shocked even the Germans.
Russian leaders the only For the Russians, it was just common
immorality is to lose. sense.
Above all this, and
crucial, is Russia’s deeply ingrained sense of a special destiny that elevates
Russianness and assigns it a mission to expand, a physical and metaphysical
imperialism. Russia is an aggressor state and has been one for half a millen-
nium, profoundly convinced that its way is the sole right way, whether under
reforming czars or reactionaries, Soviets or “new” Russians. To a degree
today’s Western think-tank caste simply cannot imagine, let alone accept,
Russia’s behavior in Ukraine is shaped by a religious imperialism and secular
evangelism that have not progressed beyond the medieval, a faith that never
had a Reformation and a social order that never had a Renaissance.
Only during Europe’s Enlightenment did Russian rulers begin to impose
a selective veneer of Western practices, and the instigator of that, Peter
the Great, was interested in
utility, not ethics. Nor did
For Russian leaders, the only modernity make the slight-
immorality is to lose. est inroads with the general
population, which remained
mired in servitude, ignorance, and obscurantist religion that preached pas-
sive obedience and the virtues of suffering. The Soviet era merely secularized
the vocabulary. Russia’s metaphysical landscape is stuck in the Middle Ages.
With smartphones.
VIOLENCE IS DESTINY
The Russian sense of destiny, of righteousness, of entitlement, and, yes, of
divine duty more closely resembles jihad in its purest, cruelest form than it
does the mixed-motive Crusades of medieval Europe. The single thing Rus-
sians share with the most sincere of the Christian Crusaders is the conviction
that any act is acceptable if it furthers a divine destiny.
From the sixteenth century onward, Russia fought routine wars of expan-
sion in every direction—although the fiercest were waged against Turks and
Tartars, the former the power that held Byzantium, the Second Rome, cap-
tive; and the latter the remnants of the Mongol yoke.
The wars with Catholic Poles or Lutheran Swedes, Balts, and Germans,
were also intensified by the grip of faith. Polish Counter-Reformation Catholi-
cism was virtually a different religion from Eastern Orthodoxy’s dour cult of
suffering that still shapes today’s Russian mentality.
Even if Putin does not really believe in religion, his view of the world and
his mission is shaped by it. The Soviet era did not abandon that sense of
destiny but merely substituted other gods and commandments. The endless
debate over whether Russia is European or Asian misses the target entirely.
Russia is neither. Russia is Russian.
For us, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is the violation of a sovereign state. For
the Russians, the war in Ukraine is the belated suppression of yet another
Cossack uprising that began a decade ago on the Maidan in Kyiv, another
traitorous rebellion in the long tradition of Ukrainian resistance.

Heirs to endless grievances, a frustrated destiny, and ferocious envy of
Western success, Russians can find neither peace nor place in the postmod-
ern world. Ukraine faces a sullen people trapped in the Middle Ages and led
by yet another false messiah.
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C H IN A A N D TAIWAN
“It Will Be
Decided Here”
Settling the great-power rivalry between the
United States and China, analysts Dan Blumenthal
and Elbridge A. Colby argue, will come down to
American strength, confidence, and national
values.
By Peter Robinson
Peter Robinson, Uncommon Knowledge: The US Navy now numbers some

290 battle force ships, and the Biden administration’s 2023 budget would
shrink that number still further. The Chinese navy, by 2025, just a couple of
years from now, is expected to number 400 ships. Should we be worried?
We’ll come to strategy in a moment, but first a threshold question: if China
were to have its way, if President Xi Jinping were to attain every one of his
aims, how would life in this country be different?
Dan Blumenthal: First of all, the world itself would be a much more authori-
tarian, corrupt, and dictatorial place. So, it wouldn’t be a welcoming place
for Americans who cherish their freedoms and their liberties. The Chinese
Dan Blumenthal is the director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Insti-
tute. His most recent book is The China Nightmare: The Grand Ambitions of a
Decaying State (AEI Press, 2020). Elbridge A. Colby is a founder of the Mara-
thon Initiative. His most recent publication is The Strategy of Denial: American
Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (Yale University Press, 2021). Peter
Robinson is the editor of the Hoover Digest, the host of Uncommon Knowledge,
and the Murdoch Distinguished Policy Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

WE’LL MEET AGAIN: President Biden bids farewell to Chinese leader Xi Jin-
ping after a summit at the Filoli Estate in Woodside, south of San Francisco,
last November. Xi “is challenging us everywhere, all the time, and he is very
clear that this is a global struggle,” according to analyst Dan Blumenthal.
[Adam Schultz—White House]
would enforce their will, as they’ve done in Hong Kong and other places, to
make more countries authoritarian and dictatorial. Second, we would be
locked out of many of the economic arrangements inside the East Asian area,
parts of which have the potential to really boom and be the future of econom-
ic activity throughout the world. And third, our military would be reduced
to probably defending around our hemisphere and be locked out of access to
East Asia. We’ve really needed access to East Asia to secure ourselves since
the end of World War II. So, at these three levels, I think the world would be
a lot more difficult and challenging for the United States.
Robinson: Would ordinary Americans feel poorer? What difference would it

make to them?
Elbridge A. Colby: I think it would be a profound change. Americans would

be poorer and less free. And the reason is, I think that even a modest con-
ception of what Xi Jinping—and not just Xi Jinping as a person, but Beijing
as a state, and a great number of Chinese people—is pursuing in the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is a hegemonic or dominant position. Not
imperial as in the old days, but a kind of soft control over first, Asia, which,
as Dan rightly pointed out, is going to be the world’s largest market area.
China would orient the world’s largest economic area around itself. It would
have the best universities, its treasury department would enforce sanctions
against everybody, its companies would become the world-beating ones, its
stock exchange would be the world’s best, its currency would ultimately sup-
plant the dollar.
What would that mean for Americans? We know we would become a lot
poorer because the Chinese would gatekeep that large economic area, not
only against Americans
but also Europeans and
“China would orient the world’s
Middle Easterners and
largest economic area around itself.”
Latin Americans, who
would essentially be forced to play ball in the same way that today many
countries play ball with our sanctions, even though they don’t want to. And
then we become less free. Why? Because if we don’t have economic control,
or at least a significant amount of control over our own destiny, and we’re
becoming poorer, the issues are going to be settled—even your employment
is going to be settled—ultimately, in Beijing.
My favorite example of this is social media companies. Today we have a
lot of debates in our country about social media companies. I have a lot of
concerns about them, but we all assume that the issues can be solved in
Washington or Sacramento or Albany, or whatever. That wouldn’t be the
case. They would be settled in Beijing, either directly or indirectly. Today, the
Chinese are talking about Xinjiang or Hong Kong or Taiwan. But we know
it’s human nature that their ambitions and their demands will expand and
escalate.
WHAT BEIJING THINKS

Robinson: What are the outer limits of what China wants? Now, if a great big
rich China wants to dominate its own region, that’s one thing. It seems mad
to us, now that Russia is such a basket case, that in the Soviet Union, com-
munist ideology really, truly called for worldwide revolution. But it did. So,
which is it? “We can live with that. We can’t live with that.”
Blumenthal: We can’t live with either, because East Asia is just so funda-
mentally important for US national security. You’re talking about massive
economies. Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the growing economies of the

Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, parts of India. But what Xi Jinping is doing
is challenging us everywhere, all the time, and he is very clear that this is
a global struggle. He is completely supporting Russia in its war against
Ukraine. Without Chinese economic support, Russia would probably not be
able to keep carrying out this war in Europe. He’s supporting Iran now. Iran
exports more oil to China than to any other country; it’s Iran’s top trading
partner. He’s looking to build bases around the Gulf. He wants to challenge
the United States.
Xi Jinping will not be satisfied that he is safe and secure, as he told Vladi-
mir Putin, unless the world order changes. He believes the United States is
implacably hostile, ideologically hostile, trying to throw the Communist Party
out of power. And that unless the United States is a second- or third-tier
power, he won’t be safe.
Colby: I agree with Dan: the stakes are global, but the strategy is primarily
about Asia. And this gets back to something Winston Churchill very memo-
rably said, I think it was at the beginning of World War I: “Europe is the
decisive theater; if we get things right there, we can put everything else right
again.” Europe was the world’s largest market area, and it controlled vast
empires through its various countries. Churchill recognized through both
world wars, as we did, that if you defeated the Germans, you could set other
things right again. So, Asia is the decisive theater, but the implications will be
global.
We could survive in that world, but if you go back to The Federalist Papers
and the whole tradition of the American republic, we aren’t just looking for
the bare minimum. We
want a country in which
people can flourish “Taiwan is the only Chinese democ-
and grow and become racy in the world. And this drives the
prosperous and confi- Chinese Communist Party crazy.”
dent, and that creates a
certain kind of culture. What’s in jeopardy is, in a way, actually far greater in
scale than even the Axis powers.
Robinson: So, what is in this man’s head? The two models seem to be, he’s
an emperor, he’s operating in the ancient Chinese imperial tradition, or he
is a communist. And Dan, you say, in The China Nightmare, that “the CCP
is no longer a communist revolutionary party.” On the other hand, doing
my research, I discovered that shortly after becoming general secretary, Xi
Jinping gave a speech to the party in which he said, “There are people who

believe that communism is an unattainable hope. But facts have repeatedly
told us that Marx and Engels’s analysis is not outdated. Capitalism is bound
to die out.”
But when Deng Xiaoping decides to open markets a little bit, at least, in
1978 and 1979, and within the order that the United States established after
the Second World War, China flourishes as it never has in its history. Why
isn’t it delighted? They’ve brought hundreds of millions of their own popula-
tion out of abject poverty.
“East Asia is just so fundamentally There are still hundreds
of millions to go, but it’s
important for US national security.”
a different nation alto-
gether. And that has happened in this world of free trade, according to rules
established by the United States and its allies. Is it communist ideology that
requires Xi to view this as a threat? Or is it the old imperial impulse? And
why isn’t he delighted with the world as it stands?
Colby: Gratitude is not often found. As an Austrian once said, “We will shock
the world by our ingratitude.” So, that’s something to bear in mind. Also, the
mindset that the Chinese have, and I think it is true that Xi Jinping himself is
a dedicated Marxist-Leninist in some way . . .
Robinson: He is a communist?
Colby: I think so, but the project he has embarked upon is the great rejuve-
nation of the Chinese nation, which not only is not Marxist, but is something
closer to nationalism. Here’s the way I try to approach it in my book. We can
paint Xi Jinping and Beijing in the most lurid and negative light, but I think
it helps from a strategic perspective to almost give them the benefit of the
doubt. And the thing I fear is that China actually has very potent incentives
to create what I think of as a secure geoeconomic sphere. They think of us as
an existential threat. They think that we did nuclear blackmail, that we tried
to divide them, that we’ve tried to exploit them. Going back to the Opium
Wars and the Boxer Rebellion, they think of the past two hundred years as
a terrible experience in which they were ruthlessly exploited by foreigners,
Westerners, Japan, et cetera. And so, they have to be strong and dominant to
be secure. That is not just Xi Jinping, I think that’s a common view.
Blumenthal: So, ideologically, Xi Jinping is very afraid of the United States.

He does study sessions about how Gorbachev lost control of the Soviet
Union. His conclusion was that perestroika and other reforms of the kind
that China was already doing then led to the political destruction of the

Soviet Communist Party. He said: “Not on my watch. Never!” And he went
into a full-blown ideological crusade to make the party red again, more
communist. Although, as you point out, the project is essentially nationalist.
National rejuvenation. National greatness. It’s dressed up in Marxist-Leninist
language.
HARD POWER
Robinson: On to hard power. As I understand it, China has invested in two
basic areas. Its own navy. From The China Nightmare: “China has launched
more submarines, surface warships, amphibious-assault ships, and auxiliary
vessels than the total
number of ships current-
ly serving in the navies “Xi Jinping will not be satisfied that
of Germany, India, Spain, he is safe and secure . . . unless the
Taiwan, and the United world order changes.”
Kingdom combined.”
China’s second major investment is forces capable of destroying our naval
vessels. Ship-killing missiles, essentially. They want us out of the Pacific? Is it
as simple as that?
Colby: We can argue about intent. I would point out a concrete historical
example that I think has bearing. Was it rational for the Japanese to attack
the United States and the European colonial powers at the end of 1941? It did
so for reasons that are not dissimilar: the creation of a secure geoeconomic
sphere and the perception that we were trying to strangle them. There are
real echoes. Not to say that it’s an exact analogy, but strict rationality in neo-
classical economic terms is not how countries often behave.
Robinson: So, FDR was trying to deprive the Japanese of oil.
Colby: Which was critical. It’s an archipelago, right?
Robinson: And we are trying to deprive China of what?
Colby: Well, Xi Jinping apparently thinks that we are trying to contain and
suppress them. According to the Wall Street Journal, Xi personally uses
the term “strangling.” That we are trying to suppress their growth. If you
go back to the work of Robert Gilpin, I think the most compelling scholar-
ship about why wars often happen is a fear of economic slowdown. And if
you think of Xi Jinping’s incentives, they do have to grow. This is the basic
bargain of the Communist Party. I’m not saying they’re justified, just as I
wouldn’t say that the Japanese were justified, but if we’re thinking about it

from a strategic point of view, we have to keep that in mind. And the means
for them to pursue those goals are going to be military.
Blumenthal: I would say that the Chinese don’t just have a strategy to keep
us out of Asia. They use their military every day. Every day, they are intrud-
ing upon Taiwan’s airspace and Taiwan’s maritime space. They are putting
pressure on the Japanese and the Senkaku Islands to loosen Japanese con-
trol over their own administered islands. They’re using force, as we speak,
in the South China Sea, to intimidate and make excessive claims. So, this
military is not staying in garrison, it’s out every day, shaping and intimidat-
ing the region, trying to send a message to the region that the United States
doesn’t have the endurance or staying power to defend these allies. Their
grand strategy is one of coercion.
RETURN TO EMPIRE
Robinson: From Dan’s book: “Beijing is obsessed with national reunification.
Taiwan is the last Qing Dynasty territory that Communist China has not
managed to reconquer.”
The Qing Dynasty fell more than one hundred and ten years ago. Why does
the Chinese Communist Party want Taiwan now?
Colby: Two reasons. One is nationalist irredentism. I would say it’s easy for
us who’ve had a great last century to float magnanimously above these kinds
of petty disputes. But a lot of the Chinese narrative, and there’s some reason
for it, is foreign exploitation going back to the Opium Wars and the exploita-
tion of the weakness of the Qing. In Western Europe, nationalism is in bad
odor because they were the ones who imperialized everybody. But if you go to
India, people are also very nationalistic, and proudly so. Or Vietnam. And they
remember the humilia-
tions they suffered. They
“He went into a full-blown ideological don’t want a repeat of that
crusade to make the party red again, experience, so Taiwan is
more communist.” important in that context.
And as the Chinese think
about it—and I think this is genuinely felt—they do want to end the civil war,
rightly or not.
More important, though, Taiwan is the critical way for them to pursue this
geoeconomic sphere. They have to break out of the first island chain, and
they have to break apart what I call the anti-hegemonic coalition, which is
clearly forming and is part of the containment narrative that the Chinese see.

Elements of containment are happening—the Quad, AUKUS, the trilateral
relationship with Japan and South Korea, the relationship with the Philippines—
largely because of China’s own behavior. But nonetheless, this is part of the
tragedy of great-power politics. This is basically why they care about it. You
can add on the semiconductor issue, but you don’t even need to get to that.
Blumenthal: There’s one more big, big issue. Taiwan is the only Chinese
democracy in the world. And this drives the Chinese Communist Party crazy.
Before 2016, there would be tourists pouring into Taiwan from China. And
China didn’t like it, because what would they do at night? They would watch
political TV shows! The raucous democracy of Taiwan. And they would enjoy
it. And this is something Beijing just cannot countenance. They’ve been
telling people for so long that democracy is chaotic, that democracy doesn’t
work. And guess what? In Taiwan, it really does work. They held an election
a few months ago, and it was another peaceful transfer of power. It’s just
something China cannot live with.
Robinson: So, the overwhelming challenge we face is standing up to the

attempts by China to engage in military and economic coercion of us and of
our allies. And the whole game right now is Taiwan. Fair?
Blumenthal: I don’t think the whole game is Taiwan. Taiwan is a critical

part of the game. The game is to restore our military deterrent capability,
to undermine these Chinese coercion campaigns that are going on every
day, to decouple such
that we’re not subject to
China’s decisions about “The most compelling scholarship
what supply to cut us off about why wars often happen is a fear
from. Certainly not to do of economic slowdown.”
what we’re doing when
it comes to, say, the green supply chain right now, which is making ourselves
more dependent on China. We’re moving to an electric-vehicle supply chain
almost completely dependent upon Chinese processing of rare earth metals.
Robinson: One argument is that if Xi Jinping sees us take our hands off
Ukraine, he will conclude that that is the way we handle our allies, and that
will embolden him in Taiwan. That the defense of Taiwan runs through
Ukraine.
Blumenthal: The defense of Taiwan doesn’t run through Ukraine. The

defense of Taiwan runs through Taiwan. I’m just back from Japan, where I

would say the single biggest transformative factor in Japanese defense, the
ways they are modernizing their military and scaling up their defenses, is
that the Russians attacked Ukraine. They now believe it’s not abstract that
an authoritarian great
power will go to war. You
“We want a country in which people don’t have to hear it from
can flourish and grow and become me, you can hear from
prosperous and confident.” the Japanese, the Taiwan-
ese, the South Koreans,
the Australians, who are all backing resistance to Russian aggression in
the middle of Europe. It would be a catastrophe if we didn’t continue to aid
Ukraine.
But the Taiwan issue has to be dealt with. That backlog [in US weapons
deliveries] has to be dealt with. The most important thing in terms of Tai-
wan, because China is so strong and can overrun Taiwan, is our own ability
to defend Taiwan, our own ability to keep the sea lanes open. Taiwan can be
cut off. And if we’re not able to provide Taiwan with assistance, there’s not
much Taiwan can do on its own.
Robinson: Last question. George Kennan, at the beginning of the Cold War,
wrote, “The decision”—between the USSR and the United States—“will
really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American
relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a
nation among nations. To avoid destruction, the United States need only
measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation
as a great nation.” Is something like that analysis applicable now?
Blumenthal: Yes. We are a far, far wealthier country than China. We have
not used our wealth well; we haven’t translated it into power. But we have
an allied system second to none. We have a military that, if we get our act
together in the next few years, is second to none. It will be decided here.

FRO M HOOVER INSTITU TION PR E SS
SILICON TRIANGLE
The United States, Taiwan, China,
and Global Semiconductor Security
Edited by Larry Diamond, James O. Ellis Jr., and Orville Schell
A working group of industry and policy experts

contemplate the future role of semiconductors on
the security, economic prosperity, and technological
competitiveness of the United States, Taiwan, and China.

F O REI G N P OLICY
Bipolar
Disorders
An international survey shows the familiar “us
versus them” views of the world have splintered
into countless permutations. Time for new rules.
By Timothy Garton Ash
A
s the leaders of the world’s two superpowers, the United States
and China, held a summit last winter in San Francisco, many
observers harked back to grand bipolar simplicities. A new Cold
War! The West versus the rest! Democracy versus autocracy!
Let’s woo the global south! But the great Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt
warned us always to beware of the terribles simplificateurs, the frightful
simplifiers. The beginning of wisdom is to understand that we now live in
a world fragmented between multiple great and middle powers who do not
divide simply into two camps.
The results of an ambitious round of global polling, released in November,
help us to understand this new world disorder. Conducted for the European
Council on Foreign Relations and an Oxford University research project
on Europe in a Changing World that I co-direct, this is the second time we
have surveyed what we call in shorthand the Citrus countries: China, India,
Timothy Garton Ash is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and partici-
pates in Hoover’s History Working Group. He is Professor of European Studies in
the University of Oxford and the Isaiah Berlin Professorial Fellow at St. Antony’s
College, Oxford. His latest book is Homelands: A Personal History of Europe
(Yale University Press, 2023).

FREE TO CHOOSE? Hoover senior fellow Timothy Garton Ash is co-leader of
a broad survey that found startling trends in what he calls a “four-dimensional
game” of international relations. [Daniel Vegel—Creative Commons]
Turkey, Russia, and the United States. Last autumn we added to them five
other major non-European countries: Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, South Africa,
Brazil, and South Korea—as well as covering eleven European countries.
THE WORLD PICKS AND CHOOSES

Here are a few findings to keep you awake at night. More than half of those
we asked in China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey said the United States was at
war with Russia. Clear
majorities in those coun-
Multiple great and middle powers do
tries—as well as in India
not divide simply into two camps.
and Indonesia—believe
that Russia will win the war in Ukraine within the next five years. More
than half the respondents in China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia said they
thought it was likely that the European Union would fall apart in the next
twenty years. That was also the view of 45 percent in Turkey (a recognized
candidate for membership of this putatively disintegrating union) and,
rather shockingly, of no fewer than one-third of the Europeans we asked.

Interestingly, there’s a correlation between a belief that the European
Union is likely to fall apart and a belief that Russia is likely to win the war in
Ukraine. Put all this together and you see how much the credibility of Europe
and the United States is at stake in Ukraine.
Our polling was completed before the outbreak of another war, that
between Israel and Hamas, which further exacerbates the new world
disorder, but we did ask
how likely it was that,
Do people think China and the within the next five
United States will go to war? Such years, the United States
prophecies can be self-fulfilling. and China would enter
into direct military con-
frontation over Taiwan. Fifty-two per cent of those asked in China and
39 percent in the United States said it was likely. Such prophecies can be
self-fulfilling.
One other thing to disturb your sleep. Among countries that don’t already
have nuclear weapons, 62 percent of those asked in Saudi Arabia, 56 percent
in South Korea, 48 percent in Turkey, and 41 percent in South Africa favor
their countries getting access to them.
There’s some good news for the West too. Europe and the United States
win the soft-power beauty contest hands down. Asked where you would like
to live if not in your own country, clear majorities in Brazil, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey indicated Europe or the United
States. Only in South Africa did the proportion of respondents choosing
China exceed 10 percent—and almost nobody wants to live in Russia. But the
West’s attractions extend beyond that. With the exception of Russia, people
in most of these countries
choose “the United States
People in most countries say Russia and its partners” over
is not part of Europe “when it comes “China and its partners”
to its current political values.” on both human rights
and Internet regulation.
They also say that Russia is not part of Europe “when it comes to its current
political values,” clearly indicating that they associate Europe with a set of
political values.
They are distinctly underwhelmed by European hard power but impressed
by that of the United States. On trade, China is the favored partner, but
almost all of these countries prefer the United States over China when it
comes to “security cooperation.”

Then we asked a more challenging question: if your country were forced to
choose between being part of an American or of a Chinese bloc of countries,
which would you prefer it to end up in? The United States wins hands down.
If push came to shove, people in Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
South Korea, and Turkey say they would choose a US-led bloc. In Indonesia,
it’s a closer call, but on
this, as on much else, the
only clear exception is In the end, polling shows that most
Russia. countries think they can choose not
So, the rest prefer the to choose.
West? Well, maybe if
forced to choose. But what really emerges from our two rounds of poll-
ing, taken together with other evidence, is that most of these countries
think that they can choose not to choose. They can have closer economic
relations with China, security cooperation with the United States, and
simultaneously enjoy all the delights that soft-power Europe has to offer.
A world with many competing powers gives them the chance to mix and
match.
A multipolar world, in this form, enables not multilateralism, nor even non-
alignment as it was understood in the Cold War, but rather what the Indian
leader Narendra Modi has called multialignment. A great power among other
great powers, you pursue your own national interests wherever they lead
you, aligning with different partners on different issues. I and my co-authors,
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, characterize this as an à la carte world,
contrasting it with the old set menus of the Cold War, to which the US presi-
dent, Joe Biden, harks back with his binary framing of democracy versus
autocracy.
NEW GAME, NEW RULES

Many people have enjoyed (and a few friendships been broken over) the
board game Diplomacy, in which you play as early-twentieth-century Euro-
pean great powers forging sacred, perpetual alliances—and then treacher-
ously switching sides, leaving your best friend in the lurch. But in the early
twenty-first century, the real-life Diplomacy covers the entire world—and
it’s now a four-dimensional game. You can be aligned with the United States
on security while cozying up to Russia on energy and China on trade. It’s
not just major extra-European powers who are into this game. Aleksandar
Vučić’s Serbia plays it too, and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán is the ultimate cynic
at the board.

The lesson for the West is not that we should abandon our values. It’s that
we should get a lot smarter, seeing the world as it is, not as we wish it to be.
Avoid all those simplistic binary framings and instead develop targeted strat-
egies for particular great and middle powers, such as India, South Africa, or
Turkey. You’ll never win unless you understand the new rules of the game.
Reprinted from the Guardian (UK). © 2024 Timothy Garton Ash.
New from the Hoover Institution Press is New

Landscapes of Population Change: A Demographic
World Tour, by Adele M. Hayutin. To order, call

D E FE N SE
The Cost of a
Dangerous World
How can we build, deploy, and pay for tomorrow’s
military? Like this.
T
he US defense budget provides the
resources and authorities for the Key points
military to deter aggression and, » It’s widely held in na-
tional security circles that
if necessary, defeat aggressors. the world has become
Its adequacy and composition reflect Amer- increasingly dangerous.
ica’s priorities in dealing with threats to our » Democracies usually

underinvest in their mili-
national security, which are growing in poten-
taries during peacetime.
tial severity and spreading throughout the
» Fiscal issues loom
world. Yet the defense budget has experienced ever larger: the growing
wild fluctuations in recent years, from seques- national debt, the rapidly
approaching insolvency
ter starvation to sizable increases of uncertain of Social Security and
duration. Worse yet, it has often been subject Medicare, and what
those mean for defense
to significant delays beyond the start of the budgets.
fiscal year.
Michael J. Boskin is the Wohlford Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution
and the Tully M. Friedman Professor of Economics at Stanford University. He is
a member of Hoover’s task forces on energy policy, economic policy, and national
security. His latest book, co-edited with John N. Rader and Kiran Sridhar, is
Defense Budgeting for a Safer World: The Experts Speak (Hoover Institu-
tion Press, 2023), from which this essay is adapted.

The belief that the world has become increasingly dangerous has been a
staple in national security circles for some time. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
spread awareness of this harsh reality to the broader public. Adding Chinese
president Xi Jinping’s increasing assertiveness, especially toward Taiwan
but also far beyond; continued terrorist threats from multiple corners; North
Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests; Iran’s coming ever closer
to acquiring nuclear-
weapon capability and
continued sponsoring As Colin Powell says, “Show me
of terrorism, as evi- your budget, and I’ll show you your
denced now by Hamas’s strategy.”
attacks on Israel and
the regional reactions; risks in the cyber and space domains; and, of course,
the potential of an “unknown unknown” military conflict, leaves America’s
geopolitical strategy and military preparedness stretched and challenged.
The Navy cannot send ships it does not have to keep sea lanes open. The
Army cannot deploy troops it has been unable to recruit, train, and equip.
Ditto for the capacity of the Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard, Space Force,
and, if necessary, the reserves and the National Guard. And for each of the
services, in cooperation with the private sector, rapidly developing and
deploying technology and recapitalizing and equipping with surge capac-
ity have become urgent priorities—for which we have not been adequately
preparing. As former chairman of the Joint Chiefs and secretary of state
Colin Powell summarized, “Show me your budget, and I’ll show you your
strategy.”
Democracies usually underinvest in their militaries during peacetime. And
so, the great military advantage over potential adversaries the United States
has enjoyed for decades is shrinking. Adversaries have been strengthening
their military capabilities, often with sophisticated technology and directly
focused on potential conflict with the United States. Our threat evaluation
and strategy must be built on this sobering reality. At the same time, as
former defense secretary and CIA director Bob Gates says, “When it comes
to predicting future conflicts … and what will be needed, we need a lot more
humility.”
Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen concurs:
“We’re pretty lousy at predicting where we’ll go . . . the kind of warfare
we’ll be in.” My Hoover Institution colleague and former defense secretary
Jim Mattis points out: “I have never fought anywhere I expected to in all
my years.” Another Hoover colleague, former national security adviser

H. R. McMaster, says: “We have a perfect record in predicting future wars:
zero percent.”
The essays, panel presentations, and discussions in a new volume, featur-
ing contributions from many of the nation’s leading experts, address con-
cerns such as these.
COLLECTIVE WISDOM
This new book by the Hoover Institution Press, Defense Budgeting for a Safer
World: The Experts Speak, brings together and interweaves the main contem-
porary topics in national security budgeting. These include the geopolitical,
military, and fiscal context for defense budget reforms; the threats the nation
faces and might face; the strategies necessary to enable effective actions to
deal with those threats; and the technology, recapitalization, and innovation
challenges the services face and the opportunities for better harnessing new
technologies.
Also covered are personnel strengths and weaknesses, from recruiting
to training and retaining the active-duty force; to the best mix of active-
duty and reserve personnel and private contractors, including highly
technical talent. There are also overviews of reform possibilities, the
checkered history of previous reform attempts, and a discussion of the
politics of enacting defense budgets that are adequate, flexible, and incen-
tivized enough to do the job without the undue burden of non-core-mission
spending that crowds
out mission-critical
America’s geopolitical strategy and imperatives.
military preparedness are stretched Fiscal issues loom
and challenged. ever larger: the grow-
ing national debt, the
rapidly approaching insolvency of Social Security and Medicare, and the
dilemma those budgetary pressures will create for making the necessary
investments in defense. In their efforts to rightsize the defense budget, the
Pentagon and Congress will need to do a much better job of using resourc-
es for the things the military needs to do. Not just more bucks, but more
bang for the buck.
Our allies are key to our overall strategy and its execution. Former secre-
tary of state Condoleezza Rice stresses the vital role allies play in protecting
our—and their—national security through the fusion of intelligence, diplo-
macy, and the military. As Jim Mattis states, the “only thing worse than going
to war with allies is going to war without them.”

We have encountered many people who believe they need to know more
about national security and defense budgeting but seek help in assembling
a comprehensive view from disparate places and sources. In a poll jointly
coordinated by the
Hoover Institution’s
Tennenbaum Program The defense budget needs not just
for Fact-Based Policy more bucks, but more bang for the
and YouGov, respondents buck.
ranked national security
and the defense budget as among the five most important public policy topics
(out of the fifteen surveyed) about which they would most value more objec-
tive information.
We hope that bringing these commentaries and analyses from leading
experts together in one place can serve that purpose, adding to the signifi-
cant individual insights and independent value that each brings. Their collec-
tive wisdom should prove valuable not just to those in the national security
community and those interacting with it directly but also to those who would
benefit from deeper knowledge on these issues in dealing with the economy,
the budget, politics, and international relations as citizens and voters.
And we note reasons for cautious optimism on the task of rightsizing the
budget’s adequacy, flexibility, and accountability.
THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The perspectives, concerns, ideas, and solutions offered by these leading
experts form a comprehensive, readily accessible overview of the major
interrelated issues in defense budgeting upon which America’s national
security and the prospects for a safer world depend. On some issues, there is
a range of disagreement—for example, on the time frame within which China
might attempt a military takeover of Taiwan, or the need to expand active-
duty personnel and weapons systems, by how much, and for which services.
But on most issues, there is widespread, if importantly nuanced, agree-
ment among these experts, most of whom have served in key leadership posi-
tions, encompassing administrations of both major political parties.
The experts who contributed to Defense Budgeting for a Safer World agree
on these major points:
» The geopolitical environment is increasingly dangerous and complex.
» Adversaries are devoting ever-greater resources to closing the military
gap with the United States in their theaters of interest, so we must contend
with multiple adversaries in multiple theaters.

» It is important to better coordinate with allies.
» Greater adequacy, flexibility, and accountability are needed in the
defense budget.
» It is urgent that we strengthen the defense industrial base while invest-
ing in modernization to replace aging systems and equipment.
» We can and should better integrate commercial technology, and more
rapidly, in the acquisition process.
» We need more flexible, incentive-based reforms to better recruit, train,
promote, and retain people, including those with advanced technical and
business skills.
» There is considerable opportunity for reforms to lead to efficiencies and
to reductions of spending outside Pentagon core missions. These will help
free up resources for necessary topline funding.
» And finally, there is a vital need to better educate the public on the
role that its investment of tax dollars in defense plays in enabling the mili-
tary, along with intelligence and diplomacy, to keep America safe, free, and
prosperous.
There are many opportunities and options for reform to strengthen the
security of the United States and the world by combining efficiency, realign-
ment of priorities, and greater flexibility with the additional spending neces-
sary to do the job. Whether the nation has the political will to seize the best
of them, with the urgency required, is an open question. In an ever more
dangerous world, our national security in the coming years depends on doing
so. We hope the papers and presentations by leading experts in this volume
will serve as a valuable resource in that effort.
Special to the Hoover Digest.
New from the Hoover Institution Press is Defense

Budgeting for a Safer World: The Experts Speak,
edited by Michael J. Boskin, John N. Rader, and Kiran
Sridhar. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.
hooverpress.org.

D E FE N SE
Hearts and
Minds—and
Force
Counterinsurgency campaigns of the past used
harsh tactics that harmed civilians and drove
away supporters. In small wars, is there a better
way?
By David M. DiCrescenzo and Arun Shankar
O
ver the years, the United States failed to achieve its desired
objectives in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan because it followed
an inadequate counterinsurgency doctrine. This inadequacy has
still not been addressed. Failure to do so poses a national secu-
rity vulnerability that can be exploited in the coming years by both nation-
states and nonstate actors.
But developing and refining such a doctrine is never easy, and the dif-
ficulty begins with the words themselves: US military counterinsurgency
doctrine focuses on achieving the support and consent of the population,
while “successful” counterinsurgencies in the twentieth century—military
LtCol David M. DiCrescenzo (US Army) serves in the Massachusetts Army Na-
tional Guard and is an adjunct professor of homeland security studies at Endicott
College and a Massachusetts state trooper. LtCol Arun Shankar (USMC), a
2022–23 national security affairs fellow at the Hoover Institution, serves with US
Space Command.

RESISTANCE: Philippine insurgents muster in 1899. After US forces arrived
in the Philippines in 1898, Moro agitation for autonomy and against US rule
led to hostilities. The American military governor launched “punitive expedi-
tions” in which troops would kill hundreds of Moros, burn their homes and
crops, and destroy all warlike supplies. [US Army Signal Corps]
campaigns that managed to pacify populations, defeat guerrillas, and impose

order—focused on the acquiescence of the population, a distinct and crucial
difference. Of great importance, legal and moral reasons prevent the United
States from repeating the harsh tactics that were used to win that acquies-
cence in counterinsurgencies of the twentieth century. These have included
deliberately targeting civilians and their property, forced population moves,
concentration camps, starvation, summary executions, and physical separa-
tion of the population from insurgents. Yet it cannot be ignored that attempts
in the modern mold to build local capacity and win the support and consent
of populations have repeatedly failed.
We propose two solutions to help the United States fill its counterinsurgen-
cy capability gap. One is to carry out limited duration, high intensity, puni-
tive expeditions where retribution without rebuilding is used to degrade an

adversary’s ability to attack the United States while simultaneously sending
a strategic message that US interests will be protected. Alternatively, and
similar to civilian policing, we suggest establishing a continuous, well-guided,
well-supported presence of forces in areas being secured when counterinsur-
gency operations are desired or unavoidable.
A DOCTRINE AND ITS GOALS

After August 31, 2021, when the United States left Afghanistan after twenty
years of conflict, the Taliban immediately regained control. The world has
also seen the government of Iraq lose vast territories to ISIS, requiring the
United States to assist after sixteen years of combined operations and nation
building. In both cases, the United States failed, despite long and costly
attempts, to achieve its objective of creating self-governing nations capable
of securing themselves against Islamist movements and protecting US inter-
ests from attack.
Counterinsurgency will continue to matter in the future. Success in
conventional battles can shift into ongoing irregular warfare, as the United
States learned in the Philippines in the early twentieth century, and more
recently in Iraq. Future conflict may further blur the lines between irregu-
lar and conventional warfare through techniques that tightly integrate
irregular and conventional capabilities. Consider China, for instance, where
“irregular warfare activities are so fully integrated with conventional
tactics and operations that they are not identified as ‘irregular,’ ” according
to an article by David
Knoll, Kevin Pollpeter,
and Sam Plapinger. The The US military’s goal is to win
United States’ pivot the support and consent of the
toward anticipating population.
near-peer, large-scale
combat operations leaves a strategic gap that must be filled. How can the
United States modify its doctrine and strategy for irregular warfare with-
out violating its values?
Values loom large in the modern US approach to counterinsurgency. The
United States developed and followed its counterinsurgency doctrine by
focusing on the ideological separation of the population from insurgents—
providing security, food, education, democracy, medicine, religious freedom,
and women’s rights to gain consent and support. This approach assumes
the foreign population also values and supports those efforts in the face of
violence and intimidation from insurgent groups.

SCORCHED EARTH: This stereoscopic card, designed to be seen through
a special viewer, shows British prisoners marching to Pretoria in 1901 after
being released by the Boers during the Second Boer War. British forces fought
the two Afrikaner republics with a coercive strategy that forced the Boers to
choose surrender or destruction. [Columbus Metropolitan Library—Creative Commons]
Counterinsurgencies are about people, so gaining and keeping their

support is critical to success. Therefore, accurately assessing which tac-
tics and strategies are most likely to attain the desired result—based on
what those people value and how they respond to different tactics—is an
important part of planning for counterinsurgency warfare. Whereas some
populations may cower to the group wielding the greatest power, others
may be driven to fight even more aggressively. The selection of tactics
should take into account historical analysis of how different cultures react
to different strategies.
The phrase “hearts and minds” is commonly used to describe efforts to
gain popular support. The term, originally credited to Field Marshal Gerald
Templer during the Malayan Emergency, is ambiguous in its meaning for
counterinsurgency efforts. US interpretations refer to the consent and sup-
port of the population, while historical British understandings of the term
focus on its acquiescence. British Colonel I. A. Rigden, quoted in a Ministry
of Defense report, argued for a coercive interpretation of the term:
“Hearts and minds” is often mistaken to mean taking a soft approach

when dealing with the civilian population, but this is a misnomer. The
key is changing the mindset of the target audience and, sometimes, this

requires tough measures and a hard approach, i.e., mass movement of
the population, curfews, and direct military action (riot control). As the
mindset is being changed, small acts of support (i.e., medical and veteri-
nary support) and the way in which government security forces interact
with the population, combined with an effective information operations
campaign, wins over their hearts.
Ashley Jackson corroborated this interpretation in a 2006 article, “British

Counter-insurgency in History: A Useful Precedent?”: “Far from minimum
force being the keynote of British victory in colonial counterinsurgency cam-
paigns, it can be argued that victory was won by the availability, and some-
times the application, of overwhelming force.”
PACIFICATION
As mentioned above, successful counterinsurgency operations such as the
ones that follow involved tactics that are unlawful and unacceptable to modern
Americans. They also demonstrate the interplay between violence and persua-
sion, with implications for the design of modern counterinsurgency approaches.
» The Philippines. US military forces arrived in the Philippines in 1898
after the Spanish-American War. About three hundred thousand Moros
in the Sulu Archipelago and southern half of Mindanao enjoyed a fair level
of autonomy. They also held societal norms that put them at odds with US
interests. American officers were frustrated by local values, including slav-
ery, and local leaders’ inability to maintain order. After initial efforts failed
to exchange local rule
for recognition of US
sovereignty, US officers Future conflict is likely to blur the
lobbied for direct con- lines between irregular and conven-
trol. Thus, in 1903, a US tional warfare even further.
military governor was
appointed and given wide authority to bring order and modernize the area.
Major General Leonard Wood abolished slavery, installed a new legal code,
and restored a tax on every adult male. These policies resulted in increased
opposition, and hostilities followed.
The Moros used various tactics, including suicide attacks, guerrilla war-
fare, and, most commonly, the use of prepared defensive positions upon the
approach of US military forces. Moros possessed a limited number of rifles
and primarily armed themselves with edged weapons, putting them at a
disadvantage to US weaponry.

American forces relied on coercive tactics during counterinsurgency opera-
tions. Wood launched “punitive expeditions” in which US troops would kill
hundreds of Moros, burn their homes and crops, and destroy all warlike sup-
plies. These expeditions used indiscriminate violence, often resulting in the
deaths of women and children. Punitive expeditions left people without homes
or food, children without
parents, and clans without
“Winning hearts and minds” is leaders, and contributed to
ambiguous. It might mean persua- the breakdown of the Moro
sion, or it might mean surrender. social order. The popula-
tion was forcibly disarmed,
and entire towns were forced to move all their belongings to concentrated areas
that separated them from the guerrillas. An estimated eleven thousand civilians
died in these areas from disease and unsanitary conditions. Hostilities with the
Moros during Wood’s tenure as governor culminated with the 1906 attack on
Bud Dajo where hundreds of Moros were killed, including women and children,
and which effectively ended organized resistance.
Subsequent military commanders, including Brigadier General Tasker
Bliss and Brigadier General John Pershing, took more diplomatic approaches
with the Moros but agreed that the willingness of the US military to use force
contributed to peace.
» The Malayan Emergency. This 1948–60 clash was “one of the few suc-
cessful counterinsurgency operations undertaken by the Western powers
during the Cold War,” reads the website of Britain’s National Army Museum.
“It saw British and Commonwealth forces defeat a communist revolt in
Malaya.” The emergency began because the Malayan Communist Party,
made up mostly of Chinese members, opposed British colonial rule and
sought an independent and communist Malaya. Guerrillas from the Malayan
National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Communist Party, began
attacking rubber plantations, mines, and police stations, derailing trains,
and burning workers’ houses.
In response, the British military benefited from several advantages,
including deep knowledge of the area and people before the emergency, but
Britain still used coercive techniques to achieve victory. A significant British
advantage was the lack of a guerrilla sanctuary: British-controlled states
lined three borders of Malaya, and a tribe opposed to the communists lived
along the fourth. According to Paul Dixon, author of “Hearts and Minds” ?
British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq, British tactics during the
Malayan conflict including burning the homes of communist sympathizers,

indiscriminately shooting rural Chinese who could aid the insurgents, the
massacre of twenty-four unarmed civilians in Batang Kali in 1948, a death
penalty for carrying arms, the detention of over thirty-four thousand people
without trial, and a plan that forcibly resettled a half-million rural Chinese.
These tactics were used to separate the civilian population from the guerril-
las, starve the fighters, punish supporters, and gain the acquiescence of the
population.
Britain shaped its tactics by assessing what the population responded
to. It began with highly coercive, control-oriented tactics in 1948–52; force
by insurgents was met with greater force by the British in what is often
referred to as a “search
and destroy” policy. Sir
Henry Gurney, the Brit- In Malaya, a British officer noticed the
ish high commissioner tendency for people to “lean towards
in Malaya during the whichever side frightens them more.”
emergency, was quoted
as saying the Chinese were “notoriously inclined to lean towards whichever
side frightens them more, and at the moment this seems to be the govern-
ment.” (Insurgents assassinated Gurney in 1951.)
By 1953, the British had gained the upper hand militarily and, with the
arrival of Templer, Gurney’s replacement, shifted to propaganda to win over
the population. At the same time, it forced resettlement of five hundred
thousand Chinese, imposed registration cards on everyone older than twelve,
meted out collective punishment against civilians for attacks, and carried
out mass incarceration of suspect populations. Effectively separating civil-
ians from the guerrillas—denying the insurgents their base of support—was
considered significant to the success of the campaign.
In sum, the British used brutal tactics to gain the initiative in the beginning
of the conflict; once control was achieved, they had the luxury of building
government services and pursuing the willing support of the population.
» The Second Boer War. The South African War (1899–1902) was a clash
between Britain and the two Afrikaner republics, the South African Repub-
lic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State. The British under Field Marshal
Frederick Roberts began with a policy of leniency, offering amnesty for
any Boer commando who surrendered arms. After several months of little
progress and much criticism from the news media and the British govern-
ment, Roberts, and later Horatio Kitchener, who assumed command in
November 1900, moved to a more coercive strategy: burning farms, forcing
populations into concentration camps, and using flying columns to force Boer

commandos into blockhouses and barbed wire obstacles. The result was
more than thirty thousand farms and forty towns burned; millions of live-
stock seized or slaughtered; one hundred and ten thousand civilians (mostly
women and children) forced into concentration camps, where an estimated
two thousand died every month; and the overall devastation of land to the
point of inhabitability.
The British were willing to destroy the entire region and everyone in it
to win. The Boers were forced to choose between surrender and annihila-
tion. Thomas Pakenham,
author of The Boer War,
During the Boer War, the British were summarizes their deci-
willing to destroy the entire region sion: “Negotiate now
and everyone in it to win. . . . (and) keep the volk
together as a nation. Fight
on, and the volk will die (or suffer worse than death). The threat was not only
to the lives of individuals, but to the continued existence of the nation.” The
Boers chose surrender.
NEXT STEPS
If historical success in counterinsurgencies consistently involved the use of
tactics that go against US values and the rule of law, as the above cases indi-
cate, how does the United States win in future counterinsurgencies? Ameri-
can forces could pursue two strategies:
» Stay out of the counterinsurgency business. Accepting that US values
are incompatible with tactics used in successful counterinsurgencies, the
United States can avoid counterinsurgencies by carrying out limited dura-
tion, high intensity, offensive operations. For example, the United States
successfully applied military power in Afghanistan in the months after
9/11. Today, it can develop a strategy for conducting defined-term offensive
operations against groups or areas responsible for attacks on US interests.
These operations would probably demand a high level of “shock and awe” to
message adversaries that threats against the United States are dealt with
decisively. This approach requires building a robust intelligence capability
and avoiding on-the-ground post-conflict stabilization and recovery opera-
tions, which would give adversary groups the time and opportunity to draw
US forces into prolonged conflict.
» Refine current counterinsurgency doctrine to develop ways to
achieve victory without violating American values. For instance, continuity
of the security personnel in the areas they secure is critical for seeking a

population’s support and consent. The US military’s use of one-year deploy-
ments leads to a new set of security personnel arriving each year for the
same area and population. How effective would a police force of a major city
be if its entire staff were replaced each year? Significantly longer deploy-
ments, and forces assigned by geography, would address this issue. Divisions
could be assigned battalion- or brigade-sized areas and required to rotate
through those areas for the duration of the conflict, supporting the knowl-
edge, relationships, long-term goal achievement, and effects required for
stabilization.
Also, to correct a problem evident during Operation Iraqi Freedom and
Operation Enduring Freedom, operations-level staff in any counterinsurgen-
cy campaign could be reoriented toward providing better, and more relevant,
guidance to warfighters. Because of vague and poorly thought-out operation-
al guidance in those conflicts, tactical commands were left to solve massive
strategic issues without the wisdom and resources to do so.
Better knowledge of an area, continuity of processes and policies, relation-
ships between key leaders, acquisition of specialized resources, and an ability
to train for the specifics of a conflict zone would lead to increased effective-
ness of US counterinsurgency efforts in the twenty-first century.

Asia’s New Geopolitics: Essays on Reshaping the
Indo-Pacific, by Michael R. Auslin. To order, call (800)

Learn from the scholars of Hoover’s military
history working group as they analyze today’s
national security flashpoints in light of the
conflicts of the past.
Subscribe to this online journal here:

hoover.org/strategika
T E C HN OLOGY
Tech New World

The Stanford Emerging Technology Review sets
out on a journey to understand, explain, and use
tomorrow’s transformational tech.
By Condoleezza Rice, John B. Taylor, Jennifer Widom,

and Amy B. Zegart
The first issue of the Stanford Emerging Technology Review, the product of
a major new technology education initiative for policy makers, has been released.
Download it at setr.stanford.edu.
E
merging technologies are transforming societies, economies,
and geopolitics. This moment brings unparalleled promise
and novel risks. In every era, technological advances buoy
nations that develop and scale them—helping to save lives,
win wars, foster greater prosperity, and advance the human condition.
At the same time, history is filled with examples where slow-moving
governments stifled innovation in ways policy makers never intended,
and nefarious actors used technological advances in ways that inventors
never imagined.
Technology is a tool. It is not inherently good or bad. But its use can
amplify human talent or degrade it, uplift societies or repress them, solve
Condoleezza Rice is the Tad and Dianne Taube Director and the Thomas and
Barbara Stephenson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. John B. Taylor
is the George P. Shultz Senior Fellow in Economics at the Hoover Institution.
Jennifer Widom is the Frederick Emmons Terman Dean of the School of
Engineering and the Fletcher Jones Professor in Computer Science and Electrical
Engineering at Stanford University. Amy B. Zegart is the Morris Arnold and
Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

vexing challenges or exacerbate them. These effects are sometimes deliber-
ate but often accidental.
The stakes of technological developments today are especially high.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is already revolutionizing industries, from
music to medicine to the
military, and its impact
Too often, government leaders lack has been likened to the
technical expertise and technologists invention of electricity.
lack policy expertise. Yet AI is just one among
many technologies that
are ushering in profound change. Fields like synthetic biology, materials
science, and neuroscience hold potential to vastly improve health care,
environmental sustainability, economic growth, and more. We have expe-
rienced moments of major technological change before. But we have never
experienced the convergence of so many technologies with the potential to
change so much, so fast.
The goal of the Stanford Emerging Technology Review (SETR) is to help both
the public and private sectors better understand the technologies poised to
transform our world so that the United States can seize opportunities, miti-
gate risks, and ensure the American innovation ecosystem continues to thrive.
GUIDEPOSTS
Our efforts are guided by four observations:
» Policy makers need better resources to help them understand techno-
logical developments faster, continuously, and more easily.
Technology policy increasingly requires a more sophisticated understand-
ing across a broad range of fields and sectors. Indeed, policy makers today
include an expanding array of decision makers, from legislators and execu-
tive branch officials in Washington to state and local governments, inves-
tors, and corporate leaders. Too often, government leaders lack technical
expertise to understand scientific developments, while technologists lack
the policy expertise to consider and build security, safety, and other societal
considerations into their products by design.
Policy makers need to understand technological basics and new discov-
eries before crises emerge; to focus their attention on the most important
issues; to better assess the policy implications; and to see over the horizon
to shape, accelerate, and guide technological innovation and applications.
We need a new model of technology education for nontechnical leaders. This
report aims to be a first, important step.

» America’s global innovation leadership matters.
American innovation leadership is not just important for the nation’s
economy and security. It is the linchpin for maintaining a dynamic global
technology innovation ecosystem and securing its benefits.
International scientific collaboration has long been pivotal to fostering
global peace, progress, and prosperity, even in times of intense geopolitical
competition. During the Cold War, for example, American and Soviet nuclear
scientists and policy makers worked together to reduce the risk of accidental
nuclear war through arms control agreements and safety measures. Today,
China’s rise poses many new challenges. Yet maintaining a robust global
ecosystem of scientific cooperation remains essential—and it does not hap-
pen by magic. It takes work, leadership, and a fundamental commitment to
freedom to sustain the openness essential for scientific discovery. Freedom is
the fertile soil of innovation, and it takes many forms: the freedom to criti-
cize a government; to admit failure in a research program as a step toward
future progress; to share findings openly with others; to collaborate across
geographical and technical borders with reciprocal access to talent, knowl-
edge, and resources; and to work without fear of repression or persecution.
In short, it matters whether the innovation ecosystem is led by democracies
or autocracies.
» Academia’s role in American innovation is essential yet increasingly
at risk.
The US innovation ecosystem has three pillars: the government, the pri-
vate sector, and the academy. Success requires that all three remain robust
and actively engaged. America’s research universities have generated trans-
formational scientific discoveries, from the invention of the polio vaccine to
rocket fuel. Universities have also been the seedbeds of policy innovations,
from nuclear deterrence
theory to behavioral
economics. And they It matters whether the innovation
have played a vital role ecosystem is led by democracies or
in training the next autocracies.
generation.
Today, however, innovations are increasingly emerging from the private
sector, often alongside academia. The funding sources for innovation have
shifted, too—in deeply worrying ways. The US government is the only
funder capable of making large and risky investments in the basic science
conducted at universities (and national laboratories) that is essential for
future applications. Yet federal research and development funding has

plummeted since the 1960s, from 1.86 percent of GDP in 1964 to just 0.66
percent of GDP in 2016. Although private sector investment in technology
companies and associated university research has increased substantially,
it is no substitute; federal funding of university research leads universities
to study different technological challenges and opportunities than industry
funding does.
To be sure, the rising dominance of private industry in innovation brings
significant benefits. But it is also generating serious and more hidden risks
to the health of the entire American innovation ecosystem. Universities
and companies are not the same. Companies must answer to investors and
shareholders, who expect returns on their capital investments, so they
tend to focus on technologies that can be commercialized in the foresee-
able future. Research universities, by contrast, operate on much longer
time horizons without regard for profit, engaging in fundamental research
at the frontiers of knowledge that has little if any foreseeable commercial
benefit. This fundamental research is the foundation for applications that
may take years, even decades, to emerge. For instance, it took decades of
research in number theory—a branch of pure mathematics—to develop
the modern cryptography that is widely used to protect data.
Today, technology and talent are migrating from academia to the private
sector, accelerating the development of commercial products while eroding
the foundation for the future.
Research in the field is likely to be skewed to applications driven by
commercial rather than public interests. The ability for universities—or
anyone outside the lead-
ing AI companies—to
Fundamental research is the founda- conduct independent
tion for applications that may take analysis of the weak-
years, even decades, to emerge. nesses, risks, and vulner-
abilities of AI (especially
large language models recently in the news) will become more important
and simultaneously more difficult. Further, the more that industry offers
unparalleled talent concentrations, computing power, training data, and
the most sophisticated models, the more likely it is that future generations
of the best AI minds will continue to flock there—hollowing out university
faculty and eroding the nation’s ability to conduct broad-ranging founda-
tional research in the field.
» The view from Stanford is unique, important—and needed now more
than ever.

Stanford University has a unique vantage point when it comes to techno-
logical innovation. It is no accident that Silicon Valley surrounds Stanford;
the university lies at the heart of the innovation ecosystem. Stanford faculty,
researchers, and former students have founded Alphabet, Cisco Systems,
Hewlett-Packard, Instagram, LinkedIn, Nvidia, Sun Microsystems, Yahoo,
and many other companies, together generating more annual revenues than
most of the world’s
economies. Start-ups
SETR aims to provide a reference
take flight in our dorm
resource that endures.
rooms, classrooms,
laboratories, and kitchens. Technological innovation is lived every day and up
close on our campus—with all its benefits and downsides. This ecosystem’s
culture, ideas, and perspectives often seem a world apart from the needs and
norms of Washington, DC. Bridging the divide between the locus of American
policy and the heart of American technological innovation has never been
more important.
Stanford has a rich history of policy engagement, with individuals who
serve at the highest levels of government as well as institutional initiatives
that bring together policy makers and researchers to tackle the world’s
toughest policy problems. But in this moment of rapid technological change,
we must do more. We, the co-chairs of this exciting project, are delighted to
launch this unprecedented collaboration between Stanford’s Hoover Institu-
tion and the School of Engineering to bring policy analysis, social science,
science, medicine, and engineering together.
In setting out to harness the latest insights from leading scholars in ten of
the most important fields today—fields that are rapidly shaping American
society and promise to be even more important in the coming years—we
selected these ten as a starting point, not an endpoint. We wanted to begin
by leveraging areas of deep expertise at Stanford and covering technologies
widely recognized as essential for expanding American economic prosperity,
advancing democratic values, and protecting the security of the nation. But
science is always moving, and we expect that future reports may select differ-
ent areas or divide fields in different ways.
ONLY THE START

Three points bear noting. First, we offer no specific policy recommendations.
That is by design. Washington is littered with reports offering policy recom-
mendations that were long forgotten, overtaken by events, or both. We want
to provide a reference resource that endures—a report that is updated and

issued annually, a guide that can inform successive generations of policy
makers about evolving technological fields and their implications.
Second, SETR offers a view from Stanford, not the view from Stanford.
There is no single view of anything in a university. The report is intended to
reflect the best collective judgment about the state of these ten fields—guid-
ed by leading experts in those fields.
Third, this report is just the beginning. In the months ahead, SETR will
produce deep-dive reports on the ten technological areas, holding briefings
in California and Washington, DC, and launching multimedia educational
products. Our goal is to develop a new model to help policy makers under-
stand tech issues in a more real-time, continuous, rigorous, and user-
friendly way.
Ensuring American leadership in science and technology requires all
of us—academia, industry, government—to keep listening, learning, and
working together. We hope the Stanford Emerging Technology Review starts
meaningful and lasting conversations about how an innovation ecosystem
benefits us all. The promise of emerging technology is boundless if we have
the foresight to understand it and the fortitude to embrace the challenges.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is Beyond

Disruption: Technology’s Challenge to Governance,
edited by George P. Shultz, Jim Hoagland, and James
Timbie. To order, call (800) 888-4741 or visit www.
hooverpress.org.

S TA N F O R D U N I V E R S I T Y
THE STANFORD EMERGING

TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 2023
A Report on Ten Key Technologies and Their Policy Implications
CHAIRED BY Condoleezza Rice, John B. Taylor, Jennifer Widom, and Amy Zegart
DIRECTED BY Herbert S. Lin
Emerging technologies are transforming societies, economies, and geopolitics, and at a time of
great-power competition between the United States and China, the stakes today are especially
high. The Stanford Emerging Technology Review brings together scientists, engineers, and
social scientists to account for new developments at Stanford University in 10 key technology
areas, highlight their policy implications, opportunities, and risks, and identify barriers for US
government decision makers and private-sector leaders.
setr.stanford.edu
T H E EN VI RO NMENT
Wasting of the
Green
As First World groups shovel money into climate
schemes, they forgo real progress against hunger,
sickness, and poverty.
By Bjorn Lomborg
W
ell-off nations seem
to have forgotten that Key points
while they’re no longer » Climate ranks far down the
priority list of people living
plagued by poverty- in poor countries. Even the
related ills such as hunger and illiteracy, World Bank’s own polling
shows this.
most people in the world still are. Increas-
» Real development invest-
ingly, the Biden administration and leaders
ments can dramatically
of other high-income countries are putting change lives for the better
climate policy ahead of these core develop- now, while making poor coun-
tries more resilient.
ment issues.
» Developmental institu-
It’s easy to treat reducing carbon output tions should speak for the
as the world’s priority when your life is world’s poorest—not the elites
in Washington, London, and
comfortable. Things can still be tough for Paris.
people in high-income countries, but the
Bjorn Lomborg is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, president of the

Copenhagen Consensus Center, and a visiting professor at the Copenhagen
Business School. His latest book is Best Things First: The Twelve Most
Efficient Solutions for the World’s Poorest and Our Global SDG Promises
(Copenhagen Consensus Center, 2023).

16 percent of the global population who live in those countries don’t rou-
tinely go hungry or see their children die. Most are well-educated, and the
average income is in the range of what was once reserved for the pinnacle
of society.
Much of the rest of the world, however, is still struggling. While conditions
vary, across poorer countries five million children die each year before their
fifth birthday and almost
a billion people don’t get
enough to eat. More than When your life is comfortable, it’s
two billion have to cook easy to treat carbon output as the
and keep warm with pol- world’s priority.
luting fuels such as dung
and wood, which shortens their lifespans. Although most young kids are in
school, education is so dismal that most children in low- and lower-middle-
income countries will remain functionally illiterate.
Opportunity is restricted in particular by a lack of the cheap and plentiful
energy that allowed rich nations to develop. In Africa, electricity is so rare
that total monthly consumption per person is often less than what a single
refrigerator uses during that time. This absence of energy access hampers
industrialization and growth. Case in point: The rich world on average has
530 tractors per 10,000 acres, while the impoverished parts of Africa have
fewer than one.
Yet a new Group of 20 report urges the World Bank and other develop-
ment organizations to push for an additional $3 trillion annual spending and
direct most of it to climate policy. Almost as an afterthought, it suggests
that a fraction of the money should go to everything else, such as schooling,
health, and food. It’s unlikely the world will raise anywhere close to $3 trillion.
Unfortunately, experience indicates that much of what does get raised will go
toward climate. Develop-
ment funding is already
being raided for climate Almost an afterthought is the fraction
spending. of aid money that goes to everything
While climate change else: schooling, health, and food, for
is a real challenge,
instance.
the data don’t sup-
port confronting it ahead of poverty-related ills. United Nations climate
panel scenarios predict the world will dramatically improve over the next
century. Climate change will merely slow that progress slightly. Hunger
will fall dramatically over the coming decades, but with climate change

it will decline a smidgen slower. Likewise, the panel expects global aver-
age income to increase 3½-fold by 2100, absent climate change. If climate
change continues undeterred, William Nordhaus, the only climate econo-
mist to win the Nobel Prize, estimates that this would mean income would
still rise by 3.34 times.
Climate activists try to paper over these realities by arguing that poverty
and climate change are inextricably linked. Yet research repeatedly shows
that spending on core
development priorities
Spending on core development would help much more
priorities would help much more— and much faster per
and much faster—per dollar than dollar spent than put-
ting funds toward cli-
putting funds toward climate.
mate. That is because
real development investments can dramatically change lives for the better
right now and make poorer countries more resilient against climate-related
problems such as diseases and natural disasters. By contrast, even drastic
emission reductions won’t deliver noticeably different outcomes for a genera-
tion or more.
Efforts to divert development aid to climate policy also smack of
hypocrisy. Though rich nations refuse to fund fossil-fuel-related projects
abroad—either directly or through international financial institutions—
high-income countries still get almost 80 percent of their energy from
fossil fuels. This is in large part because solar and wind power remain
intermittent. To make them reliable is expensive, as they require massive
backup from batteries or fossil fuels. That makes the argument for foisting
them on poorer countries even weaker. Without access to cheap, consis-
tent energy, it is likely impossible for such nations to rise to a developed
economy’s quality of life.
It’s no wonder then that the World Bank’s own polling shows that cli-
mate ranks far down the priority list of people living in poorer countries.
Another large 2021 survey of leaders in low- and middle-income coun-
tries similarly found education, employment, peace, and health at the
top of development priorities, with climate coming twelfth out of sixteen
issues.
Instead of forcing expensive, unreliable renewables on poorer countries—
let alone sacrificing more meaningful aid to do so—those concerned with cli-
mate change should invest intelligently in long-term research that promotes
affordable and reliable green-energy innovations.

The majority of the world population that still lives in poverty deserves
a shot at a better life. We should all stand up for that right, but especially
developmental institutions. Their job is to speak for the world’s poorest—not
the political hobbyhorses of elites in Washington, London, and Paris.
Reprinted by permission of the Wall Street Journal. © 2024 Dow Jones &
Co. All rights reserved.

Human Prosperity Project: Essays on Socialism and
Free-Market Capitalism. To order, call (800) 888-4741
or visit www.hooverpress.org.

EDUC ATI O N
A Nation Still
at Risk
Forty years ago, an urgent report called for the
transformation of American schools. Stephen L.
Bowen, leader of the Hoover Education Success
Initiative, discusses how far we still have to go.
By Jonathan Movroydis
Jonathan Movroydis: Distinguished research fellow Stephen Bowen leads

the Hoover Education Success Initiative (HESI), whose new report looks at
the birth, struggles, and future of the modern education reform movement.
How was A Nation at Risk received forty years ago, and what was its impact?
Stephen L. Bowen: A Nation at Risk came out in 1983. It was produced by the
National Commission on Excellence in Education, which was chaired by Ter-
rel Bell, President Reagan’s secretary of education. People who remember the
Reagan era recall that one of the things President Reagan campaigned on was
getting rid of the Department of Education, which had been created by his pre-
decessor, Jimmy Carter. Poor Terrel Bell was tasked with getting rid of his own
department. That didn’t happen, but Bell thought, all right, at least if we’re going
to make this argument, let’s get a sense of how things are going. So, he pitched the
Stephen L. Bowen is the executive director of the Hoover Education Success

Initiative (HESI) and a distinguished policy fellow at Hoover. He is the co-editor,
with Margaret Raymond, of A Nation at Risk +40: A Review of Progress in
US Public Education (Hoover Institution Press, 2023). Jonathan Movroydis
is the senior content writer for the Hoover Institution.

AFTER COVID: Stephen L. Bowen, a distinguished research fellow at the
Hoover Institution, leads the effort to understand the challenges and build
on the successes of A Nation at Risk, the pathbreaking education report of
1983: “There is so much more to learn about what works.” [Eric Draper]
idea of a presidential commission on education. The administration was reluctant
to do that because they didn’t think there should be a significant federal role in
education, but it allowed Bell to create his own commission instead. I don’t think
anybody realized the impact it might have—it’s very brief, only thirty-some pages,
plus an appendix—but it was written in alarming language about this crisis of
public education. As it turned out, it became a huge hit. Millions of copies were
printed and ultimately it
drove a lot of reforms.
“I don’t think anybody realized the Because President
impact it might have—it’s very brief, Reagan still didn’t see a big
only thirty-some pages.” role for the federal govern-
ment in K–12 education, it
was the governors who picked up the ball and ran with it; they were convinced
by the argument in A Nation at Risk that America’s economic prosperity was at
stake, as well as our national security. If you remember, in that era there was
concern about competition from Germany, there was concern about Japan and
our economic competitiveness—those were the prominent challenges.
A lot of governors jumped aboard and started putting some of the sugges-
tions from the report into place at the state level, and over time, those grew.
Our researchers went back to the original recommendations and followed
up on the reforms that grew out of them. I don’t think anybody anticipated
it to be as much of a driver of reform as it ended up being. But we know it
generated a lot of action. The more important question is: did it have any real
impact? That was something we wanted to dig in on.
Movroydis: Since state governors were the key drivers of this reform, were
the states more or less aligned on this issue?
Bowen: I think the states understood the economic-competitiveness argu-

ment of the report, but they saw that their competition was not foreign
countries; it was the state next door. That was what they were worried about.
And so, there was a sense, particularly in the Southern states and among a
generation of Southern leaders—Bill Clinton was one, as governor of Arkan-
sas, who leaned into this space—that “we really have to focus on K–12 educa-
tion if we hope to be economically competitive.” Those Southern governors
led the way, spinning up a lot of task forces and working groups to figure out
what to do about this. And again, because there wasn’t much of a federal role
in K–12 education at a policy level, it fell to the states to respond, when, for
example, the Nation at Risk report called for more rigorous standards. That
led to the standards movement, in which we saw the states adopting these

rigorous learning standards for the main content areas like math and English
language arts. There was also a lot of focus on teacher policy. Many states
realized that they would have to pay their teachers more if they were going to
be competitive, in order to attract and retain good teachers.
A lot of the governors went through the report’s list of recommenda-
tions and changes were pretty widely adopted—you didn’t want to be the
governor who failed to act when the governors around you were all making
a big push on K–12 education. These governors also soon discovered that
they didn’t have a good sense of how well their kids were doing, since states
weren’t doing large-scale standardized testing. That eventually led to state
standardized tests, as well as to NAEP (National Assessment of Educational
Progress), the national test done on a sampling model across the country.
Movroydis: Was there opposition?
Bowen: In terms of the recommendations themselves, there wasn’t anything par-

ticularly controversial, if you look at it now. It’s a lot about improving teaching, and
improving standards, focusing on instructional time—let’s lengthen the school
day and the school year, and so on. President Reagan, of course, was advancing
his own agenda, which touched on things like school choice, education savings
accounts, prayer in school, and issues that at the time were more controversial.
The opposition was mostly around the report’s tone. It has these very mem-
orable lines, such as, “If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose
on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might
well have viewed it as an act of war.” It spoke in stark language about how bad
the schools were and what a challenge that was going to be for the nation. And
I think some folks in the school community responded with, “Look, we’ve got
problems, but this seems
a little over the top to
“Their competition was not foreign
suggest that if we don’t
countries; it was the state next door.”
do something dramatic
with our schools, our future prosperity as a nation is literally at risk.” If you
read the early press reports, that seemed to be most of the pushback—that
the commission was over the top in its critique of the existing system.
Movroydis: The new Hoover report, A Nation at Risk +40, is edited by you
and Hoover fellow Margaret Raymond. What are you and the other scholars
hoping to accomplish with this publication?
Bowen: The Hoover Education Success Initiative, which I lead, is a project that’s
really about connecting the research we’re doing with policy makers. We have

something called the Practitioner Council, a group of state education officials,
district leaders, and folks at nonprofits and advocacy organizations. We wanted
to get their sense of what we should be working on, and, as you might imagine, as
we were coming out of the COVID crisis, they wanted to know what we should
do about that. We have
this huge learning loss that
“The ultimate goal was to extract we need to make up; how
from these forty years of history some should we respond?
We don’t have a lot of
concrete recommendations.”
good data on that yet.
Instead, we thought that since we’ve reached this anniversary of A Nation at
Risk, maybe it would make sense to back up and see what reforms have been
tried in the years since and whether there were any lessons learned there that
would be of help. Was there any impact? We sat down with the report, went
through its recommendations, and then built out this collection of essays. We
said to our authors, “What’s the problem each attempted reform was trying to
solve? Why were these reforms attempted in the first place?” The second piece
was, “What happened? Did it work?” And third—this was the key part—“What
are the lessons learned? What are your recommendations for policy makers?”
The ultimate goal was to extract from these forty years of history some
concrete recommendations for policy makers for what they could do to
improve schools as we come out of the COVID crisis.
Movroydis: What kind of recommendations are you advancing?
Bowen: A lot of them are topic-specific. The paper on early childhood, for
example, says early childhood education can be really impactful, but it has to
be high quality, you have to train the staff and have strong curricula. A paper
on school choice talks about how school-choice programs are structured and
how important it is to structure them the right way. The school-finance paper
that Hoover senior fellow Rick Hanushek wrote talks about how important it is
to understand that simply spending money on schools isn’t enough, we have to
get better at figuring out which money spent in which way is having the most
impact. And Margaret Raymond wrote a concluding essay where she went
through all twelve papers to identify common themes, and she came up with
this list of “I words”: impulsive, incremental, incoherent, impatient, intransigent,
ineffective. Here’s what they mean.
Impulsive: You can see that people put the reforms in place without a lot of
planning, without thinking about how hard they were going to be to imple-
ment, and without thinking about how to sustain them over the long term.

Incremental reforms just nibble around the edges: they’re over here on
the side, taking on this tiny piece of the puzzle, and are not really systemic.
And those little incremental reforms don’t add up to much in the way of big
systems change.
Incoherent reforms were put into place with little consideration for how
they intersected with other reforms—including those that might have been
enacted at the exact same time. Each reform was just “bolted on” and often
the reforms were in con-
flict with each other.
“There is so much more to learn about
The impatient piece is
what works.”
about policy makers not
giving things time. If you’re a state legislator with a two-year term, you come in
saying, “I want to do something.” You don’t have the patience to give a com-
plicated new initiative the time it needs to get established, get under way, and
(hopefully) improve over time.
The intransigent piece speaks to the education system’s response to this
endless “churn” of reform. It’s been able to build a resistance against reform,
so it’s become really hard to change schools in any meaningful way. You have
this weird dynamic where there always seems to be some kind of new math
curriculum and new teaching practices and all these other reforms all the
time, and yet the systems never change meaningfully, especially in high-need
communities. Our advice on this score is that you have to think about systems
change and how to bring people along over the long term to make real change.
The last piece is ineffective. That’s about the education system not being
very good at researching what it’s doing. When it puts a policy in place, it
doesn’t think about how it is going to know whether it works.
There is so much more to learn about what works, and that drives our
research agenda as we look across the years to find bigger-picture recom-
mendations.
Download A Nation at Risk +40: A Review of

Progress in US Public Education, edited by Stephen L.
Bowen and Margaret E. Raymond, by visiting Hoover
Institution Press (www.hooverpress.org).

The Hoover Education Success Initiative (HESI)
seeks to inform and encourage the transformation
of America’s schools. Its goal is to elevate—at
local, state, and national levels—the impact of the
best research in education decision making.
Learn more at
hoover.org/hesi
C A LIFOR N IA
Facts Meet
Fakery
Politicians think they’re qualified to teach
California students to recognize “fake news.”
Think about that.
By Lee E. Ohanian
C
alifornia has a new requirement
for its K–12 students: learn how Key points
to recognize fake news. Assem- » California requires that
schools teach “media
blyman Marc Berman (D–Menlo literacy” in kindergarten
Park), who sponsored the bill requiring this through twelfth grade.
instruction, believes it will help combat » All schools—not just in

California—should already
misinformation. With an obvious reference to
be teaching students to
Donald Trump and his supporters, Berman think critically.
stated, “I’ve seen the impact that misinforma- » Neither more bureau-
tion has had in the real world—how it affects cracy nor more money is
helping California schools
the way people vote, whether they accept the prepare students for their
outcomes of elections, try to overthrow our future.
democracy.” The bill requires “media literacy”

be taught beginning in kindergarten and continuing through twelfth grade. It
was signed into law by Gavin Newsom in October.
Lee E. Ohanian is a senior fellow (adjunct) at the Hoover Institution. He is a pro-

fessor of economics and director of the Ettinger Family Program in Macroeconomic
Research at UCLA.

But who will teach California’s teachers how to recognize fake news? One
study found that about 75 percent of US adults overestimate their ability to
identify fake news, and the more confident they are of their limited abilities, the
more likely they are to share the misinformation with others. Another study
found that a whopping 96 percent of adults were unable to identify fake news.
A big problem with this new requirement is that today’s news is as much
about entertainment as information, particularly political enter-
tainment. Combine this with the fact that people like
to hear what they want to hear, and you

can see how these classes could devolve into “CNN good; Fox News bad” in
many California schools.
One San Francisco teacher framed the new requirement more broadly:
“If we’re just teaching kids how to read and not think critically about what
they’re reading, we’re
doing them a disservice.”
Critical thinking is Today’s news is as much enter-
paramount. But how is it tainment as information—political
possible that the state is entertainment in particular.

not already doing this?

A “fake news” law is not needed for teachers to help students learn to think
on their own. But developing critical thinking is light years away in California
schools, because California is not even teaching its kids how to read. Or do
math. Or do science. And until California succeeds in teaching the basics, it
has no business implementing new requirements like “fake news studies” or
“ethnic studies.”
Roughly 75 percent of Califor-
nia students lack proficiency in
math, reading, or science when
assessed against federal educa-
tion standards.
The proficiency bar is not par-
ticularly high. For example, in math,
only 27 percent of California eighth-
grade students could determine that the
number 1.1 is halfway between the numbers 0.8

and 1.4 on a number line, even though the number line included marks that
help students measure the distance between numbers.
California’s educational deficiencies are nothing short of a disaster. The
greatest public investment we can make is in educating those who will inherit
the future, but we are fail-
ing miserably at this task,
California isn’t even teaching its despite a school budget
kids how to read. Or to do math. Or of $128 billion. California’s
science. school budget is compa-
rable to the combined
full state budgets of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Tennessee. The population of
these states together is nearly 33 million, compared to California’s 39.2 mil-
lion population.
What future will three out of four kids have in California? Without profi-
ciency in basic subjects, most will struggle mightily. How many could afford
to purchase a future home, in a state with a current median home price of
$843,000? How many could even afford the average rent of $2,405 per month
for a two-bedroom apartment, which requires nearly $100,000 in household
income based on the industry standard of allocating no more than 30 percent
of pretax income for rent?
California parents are responding to the state’s failure to educate by pull-
ing their children out of the state’s educational system. Since 2019, the state
school system has lost more than 300,000 students. Of those who remain, an
alarming 30 percent are chronically absent, meaning that they miss at least
10 percent of school days.
The poor performance of California schools is particularly concerning
among schools outside of high-income districts, the latter of which attract
the best teachers and administrators. The median home price, averaged over
the twenty highest-ranked
school districts as rated
Lawmakers’ creation of pet require- by Niche, a popular school
ments like “fake news” classes is an and neighborhood review
affront to the millions of families with firm, is around $2 million.
children in deficient schools. It is important to note,
however, that high-per-
forming schools are not just those that are funded well. Manual Arts High
School in Los Angeles, which is one of the lowest-performing high schools
in the state, has a per-pupil budget that is about twice as high as that of
Palos Verdes High School, one of the top high schools in the state. Spending

more money is not the key to fixing California’s underperforming schools.
The state’s school budget has increased more than 40 percent, adjusted for
inflation, in the past fifteen years, but test scores are about the same now as
in 2008.
For decades, California schools have failed to teach our kids, particularly
those in low-income districts with the poorest-performing teachers: employ-
ees who are nearly impossible to fire for cause, given union protections. The
fact that lawmakers create new pet requirements including “fake news”
classes is an affront to the millions of California families whose children
attend deficient public schools, children who will become adults without the
skills to afford to live in the state, much less succeed in any career requiring
mastery of the basics that our schools should be teaching.
Read California on Your Mind, the online Hoover Institution journal that
probes the politics and economics of the Golden State (www.hoover.org/
publications/californiaonyourmind). © 2024 The Board of Trustees of the
New from the Hoover Institution Press is Who

Governs? Emergency Powers in the Time of COVID,
edited by Morris P. Fiorina. To order, call (800) 888-
4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.

I NTERVI EW
Canceling the
Cancelers
Hoover fellow Niall Ferguson probes the spread of
an insidious ideology in America’s institutions of
higher learning and offers a suggestion: start over.
By Peter Robinson
Peter Robinson, Uncommon Knowledge: A fellow at the Hoover Institu-

tion, Niall Ferguson received his undergraduate and doctoral degrees from
Oxford. Before coming here to Stanford, he held posts at Oxford, Cambridge,
NYU, Harvard, and the London School of Economics. Professor Ferguson is
the author of more than a dozen major works of history. Today, our topic is
the essay Professor Ferguson published in The Free Press just a few months
ago, “The Treason of the Intellectuals.” In it, he writes, “For nearly ten years,
I have marveled at the treason of my fellow intellectuals. Throughout that
period, friends have assured me that I was exaggerating. Who could possibly
object to more diversity, equality, and inclusion on campus? Such arguments
fell apart after October 7.” Of course, you’re playing on a famous book [by
Julien Benda], La Trahison des Clercs—
Niall Ferguson: That’s right.
Niall Ferguson is the Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution,
where he is chairman of the History Working Group and co-leader of the Hoover
History Lab. He also participates in Hoover’s task forces on military history, digi-
tal currency, global policy, and semiconductors. Peter Robinson is the editor of
the Hoover Digest, the host of Uncommon Knowledge, and the Murdoch Dis-
tinguished Policy Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

“A MARKET FOR NEW IDEAS”: Hoover senior fellow Niall Ferguson is
alarmed by what he sees as a modern version of the “Treason of the Intellectu-
als,” in which academics and other thinkers betray their integrity by falling in
line with political pressure. [Patrick Beaudoin]
Robinson: But you use the word treason for your own experience of your fel-
low academics. What exactly are they betraying?
Ferguson: When Benda wrote that book, which is usually translated as

“Treason of the Intellectuals,” in interwar France, he was talking about what
seemed to him a great betrayal of academics and intellectuals by siding
with the political right. And so, when one uses the phrase today, the initial
response is one of shock. People say, “But surely, today’s academics are on
the left. Why would you want to invoke the spirit of Benda and the interwar
period?” And the answer is that it’s a betrayal of your role as a professor, or
for that matter, a public intellectual, if you pursue a specific political goal
while pretending that you’re engaged in an academic activity.
Let me go even further back in time. Max Weber, perhaps the founder of
sociology, a great German thinker, gave a memorable lecture more than one
hundred years ago in which he argued that there should be a clear distinction
between Politik and Wissenschaft, between politics and science, or let’s call

it scholarship. And that is the betrayal: when you forget about that separa-
tion and use your privilege, which you have as a professor, to pursue a political
agenda. And it doesn’t matter whether you are leaning to the right in your
politics or to the left, it’s treason to the ideals of the university, to mottos like
Veritas [“Truth”] or Die Luft der Freiheit Weht [“The Wind of Freedom Blows”],
if you use your position to engage in political activism. And the generation of
academics in America today are as guilty of that treason as the generation of
academics between the wars who aligned themselves with the far right.
CANCELED
Robinson: You earned your doctorate more than three decades ago, and
you’ve been a public intellectual at least since the moment that first book
on the First World War [The Pity of War] became an international bestseller.
What happened ten years ago?
Ferguson: Well, it was almost ten years ago that I think my wife, Ayaan Hirsi
Ali, and I came into contact with cancel culture for the first time. That was
when she was invited to give a commencement address at Brandeis Universi-
ty, and then shortly before the event was told that she was disinvited because
a strange coalition of
progressive and Islamist
“Cancel culture began to be some- elements had signed a
thing of a recurrent phenomenon in petition demanding she be
universities in the United States.” disinvited. It was at that
stage that cancel culture
began to be something of a recurrent phenomenon in universities in the
United States. I remember digging into it and trying to understand what was
going on, and being kind of mystified by this unholy alliance between radical
leftists, gay rights activists, and Islamists who thought that somebody like my
wife should be publicly humiliated. And I think that’s when I began to worry
that something was going wrong, and I spotted it going wrong at that time
at Harvard, where I was a professor. It is in the space of about ten years that
what you might call wokeism has gone from being a fringe fashion to being
the dominant ideology of the major universities.
Robinson: Why was the response to October 7 different?
Ferguson: I think for many American Jews who had, perhaps, been at Har-
vard, or Stanford, or Yale, or Princeton, and had left many years ago and got
on with their lives, whether it was in technology or finance in the real world,

for them it was a tremendous shock to see more than thirty Harvard stu-
dent groups issue a statement condoning Hamas’s atrocious behavior—the
violence, the rape, the atrocities of October 7. And that in the wake of those
public statements, the
university authorities at
Harvard and elsewhere “Wokeism has gone from being a
seemed unable to express fringe fashion to being the dominant
anything beyond lame ideology of the major universities.”
bromides. I think that
was the moment many American Jews realized that something had indeed
gone terribly wrong. There was a new anti-Semitism that they hadn’t realized
was there, the anti-Semitism of the woke left, and this was a great shock to
people who’d not been paying attention.
And so the only good thing that came of October 7 was that people in the
United States and elsewhere—in Britain too—realized that the Anglosphere
as a whole has a major problem with a new kind of anti-Semitism, and it is
entrenched amongst young people, and it’s entrenched because the universi-
ties have been teaching a particular brand of politics and history that depicts
Israel as just the latest manifestation of settler colonialism and portrays the
Palestinians as the latest victims of white supremacy, of which, somehow, the
Jews have become the leading exponents.
ALLIES FOR ATROCITIES

Robinson: On to the heart of the essay. I quote: “It might be thought extraor-
dinary that the most prestigious universities in the world should have
become infected so rapidly with a politics imbued with anti-Semitism. Yet
exactly the same thing has happened before. Academically educated Ger-
mans were unusually ready to prostrate themselves before a charismatic
leader. Lawyers and doctors, all credentialed with university degrees, were
substantially overrepresented within the Nazi Party, as were university stu-
dents.” So, if you were looking for characteristics that predicted membership
in the Nazi Party, you would have looked at educational attainment.
Ferguson: That is correct.
Robinson: How can that have been?
Ferguson: First, let’s go back to the German universities a hundred years

ago. It’s 1924, and the greatest universities in the world are not Harvard and
Stanford and Yale; the greatest universities are Heidelberg and Marburg,

Tübingen, Königsberg, the great German universities. They were dominant
in almost every field. By comparison, the American universities were country
clubs. If you were an ambitious scientist or classicist, and you had your first
degree from Oxford, Cambridge, you had to get your PhD from Germany if
you wanted to be taken seriously.
Robinson: We see that in the movie Oppenheimer, where he feels compelled to

go to Germany to study up on the latest in the field.
Ferguson: That’s the context. Now, if you look at these institutions you see
they were already right-leaning, even before World War I. And perhaps that
shouldn’t surprise us, because it was the social elite that went to university.
It was a much narrower section of society than today. The trauma of defeat
in 1918 led to a tremendous backlash, a backlash not only against the Weimar
Republic, the successor to the imperial regime, but I think broadly, a back-
lash against many other things associated with defeat, a backlash against the
Anglo-Saxon powers that had won the war. And it was in this context that
many students and professors were highly attracted by an exciting new dema-
gogic figure, Adolf Hitler, and his National Socialist German Workers’ Party.
It wasn’t especially attractive to workers. Workers in the 1920s gravi-
tated towards either the Social Democrats or the Communists. And so, the
NSDAP, the Nazi Party, in its early phase, as it grew in the 1920s and broke
through electorally in 1932 and ’33, was a party that was very attractive to
people with university degrees. The radical right penetrated the student
body and the professorship, and anti-Semitism became institutionalized.
If you think about why an ideology spreads, there are two driving forces.
Typically, the obvious one is that people are just persuaded by it. But the
other reason ideologies spread is that there are people who gain from them.
“Who, whom?” is always the good question. Lenin wasn’t wrong about that.
And in the case of Germany in the 1930s, “who, whom?” was that the gentile
professors could screw over the Jewish ones. The Jewish professors were
removed from their jobs because professors were civil servants, in effect, in
the German system. That’s one of the earliest things the Nazis do when they
come to power: purge the civil service of Jews. That’s a terrific career oppor-
tunity if you’re not Jewish and you can avoid the purge, so you see the self-
interest that motivated certain people to become Nazis. People became Nazis
once it was clear that the Nazis really were in power; the massive increase
in Nazi Party membership after Hitler is very clearly establishing a dictator-
ship. I find this a very interesting moment in German history because it’s the
moment when the opportunists join the convinced.

Now, you might think this is an analogy too far, but I don’t think it is,
because what’s fascinating about academic life in America in the past
ten years is that the ideology of diversity, equity, and inclusion—let’s
call it wokeism for short—has been a great career opportunity for some
people, and it’s also been a terrific opportunity to kick anybody suspected
of conservatism out of academia. So, the systematic discrimination that
has been going on—and it’s quite overt in most universities now—against
people who are ideologically to the right, has, of course, been a career
opportunity for others.
Robinson: Here I want to make sure that I understand whether you’re mak-
ing a strong or weak version of the argument.
Ferguson: I tend to make strong versions.
Robinson: You do tend to, Niall, I do know that. You write, “The lesson of
German history for American academia should now be clear. In Germany, to
use the legalistic language of 2023, ‘speech crossed into conduct.’ The ‘final
solution of the Jewish question’ began as speech. To be precise, it began as
lectures and monographs and scholarly articles.” All right, German universi-
ties failed to stop Hitler. That much is clear. But are you making the much
stronger argument that the universities helped to produce the Holocaust?
Ferguson: Well, Hitler was not a tremendously sophisticated thinker. What’s

in Mein Kampf is a ragbag of ideas about race, about living space, borrowed
from various quarters, including the United States. There’s not a very clear
path in Mein Kampf to a solution of “the Jewish question.” In order to achieve
the murder of roughly
six million Jews, you
need some people to “In order to achieve the murder
articulate the mecha- of roughly six million Jews, you
nisms. And what is very need some people to articulate the
striking to me about mechanisms.”
German academia in the
1920s and 1930s, before the outbreak of World War II, before the Holocaust,
in fact, begins, is the amount of research that’s produced, for example, to
explain why you would want to annihilate the mentally ill, to explain why
you would want to drive Jews and Slavs out of Eastern Europe to create
a new German living space. And this production of the details of what we
have come to call the Holocaust is not the work of Goebbels’s propaganda
ministry. Much of it is the work of people working in departments in German

universities. There are even doctoral theses on how to make use of the gold
fillings in Jewish skulls.
I think it’s a very important feature of Nazism that is not well enough
understood, perhaps because we don’t teach the history of the Third Reich at
universities the way we used to, that what makes the Third Reich distinctive,
makes it different from the Soviet Union, is the extreme sophistication with
which a program of mass systematic murder is carried out.
Robinson: By now, I feel certain that some of our listeners will be agreeing
with your friends. They’ll be saying, “This is all fascinating as a matter of
history, but there Niall Ferguson goes again, exaggerating away. What hap-
pened there could not happen here because the cases are virtually opposite.
The German universities glorify the German state and the dominant ethnic
group, the so-called Aryan race. American universities don’t glorify America.
They’re very happy to have the borders erased. They’re one-worlders, they’re
internationalists. They’re not committed to glorifying the dominant WASP,
the old WASP ascendancy. On the contrary, they’re committed to humiliating
it on behalf of other ethnic groups. So, the cases are not just different, but
almost opposite to each other.” Why is that wrong?
Ferguson: Well, if it becomes the conventional wisdom on campus that “from

the river to the sea, Palestine shall be free” and Israel should be wiped from
the map, and that Hamas is engaged in a legitimate insurrection against the
“settler colonists,” then, at the very least, you have a significant proportion of
educated America endorsing a second Holocaust, because that’s what Hamas
has in mind. We saw a trailer for that on October 7. We should have no doubts
about the intentions of Iran and its proxies in the Middle East. They wish to
wipe Israel from the map, and they’re explicit about that and they’re setting
about achieving that objective. Anybody, Jew or non-Jew, in the Western
world, who is willing to accept that outcome is willing to accept a second
Holocaust. I think your skeptical listeners should pause for a moment and
ask themselves if they wish to live to see that happen after the horrific events
of the early 1940s and the repeated avowals of Western leaders that that
should never happen again.
We glimpsed on October 7, in the sadistic violence perpetrated against
Israeli civilians, the spirit of a second Holocaust. Don’t be under any illusions
about what that means in practice because it’s precisely illusions about what
it means in practice that persisted through the 1930s into the 1940s, leading
many people to disbelieve that the Holocaust was being committed, even as
the death camps went about their hideous work.

INTERSECTIONAL INCOHERENCE
Robinson: In recent weeks, you mentioned people who were shocked by
what had happened at their alma maters. Bill Ackman has become famous.
He’s been investigating the prevailing ethic at his alma mater, Harvard,
where not only was he an undergraduate, but to which he’s given some $50
million. Here’s from one of his posts on X: “DEI is racist because reverse
racism is racism even if it is against white people, and it is remarkable
that I even need to point this out.” Academics now holding tenure came
to their positions during a quarter of a century of unparalleled prosperity
and relative peace. How do you explain the emergence of DEI in American
universities?
Ferguson: Bill Ackman was well known to me long before you came across
him, as one of the world’s most successful activist hedge fund managers. And
he just turned his activism away from corporations that were being badly
run to the Harvard Corporation and Harvard University, and I just wish he’d
done it sooner. I think I could put it more brutally, because “diversity, equity,
and inclusion” is a kind of newspeak, in Orwell’s sense. It actually means the
exact opposite of what it says. The diversity they aspire to is uniformity—
uniformity of ideological outlook. Equity is actually entirely absent because
there’s no due process when the DEI bureaucracy goes into action. And as for
inclusion, the real objective is exclusion of those who aren’t conforming to the
ideology of the progressive left. Where did it come from? That’s quite easy,
I think, to explain.
Robinson: Is it? All right.
Ferguson: The universities in the 1960s already leaned liberal. The problem
in the 1970s and ’80s was that the liberals had a tendency to hire Marxists
over other liberals. And
then, in due course, the
Marxists would hire cul- “Identity politics is designed to be
tural Marxists, the post- hostile to individual liberty by insist-
1989 version of Marxism, ing that nobody is an individual.”
which switched econom-
ics out in favor of identity politics. When you lost the class war, as the left
did spectacularly in the 1980s, and you lost the Cold War too, what was left?
Well, it turned out that the answer was identity politics, and identity politics
is designed to be hostile to individual liberty by insisting that nobody is an
individual.

Everybody belongs to some category or other of identity—ethnic,
sexual, gender, racial, religious, you name it. And once you’ve identified
the identity category to which an individual belongs, they can then be
ranked according to their level of victimhood. What I think many Jewish
liberals hadn’t noticed
was their descent down
“Anti-Zionism was part of what the the rankings from the
Soviets did when they found that they oppressed. You would
were badly losing in the Middle East.” be hard pressed to say
that anybody in the 1940s
was more oppressed than the Jews, but strangely, the Jews were demoted
to the very bottom of the table, and they became part of the oppressor
groups.
Now, why did that happen? Two things, and this is really important; one,
this had always been a part of the leftist propaganda of the late Cold War.
Anti-Zionism was part of what the Soviets did when they found that they
were badly losing in the Middle East and were gradually being squeezed
out. Hostility to Israel, support for Arab nationalists, was part and parcel
of Soviet strategy, hence anti-Zionism was a part of the left’s propaganda
when I was a student in the 1980s. But what you added on top of that more
recently was something with a quite different intellectual origin: Islamism,
the political Islam that has become better and better represented in
universities.
In a fascinating way, the different elements of the wokeist movement
coalesced despite their obvious differences. Why on earth would you
have Queers for Palestine? How long would a group of young gay men
last in Gaza if they proclaimed their sexual orientation? Not long. But in
the weird parallel world of the American campus, Queers for Palestine
makes perfect sense. And so, we have a great realignment on campus,
and it was only really after October 7 that people like Bill Ackman real-
ized that in that great realignment, their people, their group, Jews, had
been major losers.
RESCUING ACADEMIA
Robinson: Here are two posts on X. From Konstantin Kisin: “One of the
biggest benefits of Bill Ackman’s successful campaign to dismantle discrimi-
natory practices at elite colleges is that it proves something that many of us
have been saying for a long time: all it takes is for a few people with power,
money, and influence to start standing up to this crap and it’ll be over.” And

two, Jordan Peterson: “Bill Ackman, for all his good work, appears to have no
real idea how far down the rabbit hole the universities have gone.”
Ferguson: A lot has been achieved in a relatively short time.
Robinson: Since October 7.
Ferguson: Since October 7, and not only because of Bill Ackman. Many other
people have either publicly or privately expressed their horror at the way
things have been going at the major universities. That’s good and it can only,
I think, begin the process of change, and that’s where Jordan Peterson is
right. There’s a lot here that’s wrong. Part of the problem is that when you set
aside academic standards to pursue diversity, equity, and inclusion—in other
words, you start making appointments not on the basis of ability and perfor-
mance and achievement, but on the basis of other criteria—you are essential-
ly going to start giving promotion and performance to inferior scholars. And
how do inferior scholars get by? Plagiarism is one of the ways that people
get by who are not really up to it. So, that’s part of it. But Jordan Peterson is
right that the problems are profound, and they won’t be addressed simply by
replacing presidents or even boards of trustees. They have to be addressed
by changing the way that universities are run.
One of the recommendations I have made on behalf of the new university
we are founding in Austin, Texas, is that there should be proper constitutional
protection within a university’s governance system of free speech, of academ-
ic freedom, and it needs to be enforced. It’s all very well having the “Chicago
Principles,” and they sound grand, but if they’re not enforced, if undergradu-
ates don’t feel free to speak because there may be consequences, then what
use are they? So, the University of Austin will be unique in that it will model
a new kind of academic governance in which the freedom of students and
professors alike will be protected, and that freedom will be enforced.
Robinson: Here’s what occurs to this layman’s mind. We have a tax code
which has favored universities for decades, permitting a Harvard to accu-
mulate an endowment of $50 billion; Yale and Stanford are in the multiple of
tens of billions of dollars; Princeton is not far behind. You can change the tax
code, you can point out that during the Cold War is when federal funding of
research at these institutions began to become routine, but this was in the
1950s, when the institutions were making common cause with the rest of the
nation. Now the institutions are in a world of their own, this woke DEI world,
so you could cut off the funding. What does the rest of the country do to say,
“stop this nonsense”?

Ferguson: I think the fact that the universities are not all public institutions,
as they were in Germany, but are, in substantial measure, private institu-
tions, is a good thing, and we should be wary of breaking that unique model,
which really doesn’t have a counterpart elsewhere. So, I’m wary of the argu-
ment that this is a problem for Congress to solve with new taxes. I would
say that the solution to the problem of the excessive wealth of Harvard is
for donors to stop giving it money that it clearly doesn’t need, and wastes.
I would rather they gave the money to a new institution that would make
much better use of it, and that’s why I prefer an authentically American
solution to this problem. Let’s create some new ones. That was the spirit
that produced the University of Chicago and the university that we are sit-
ting in today, at Stanford.
And so, the American solution shouldn’t be “government needs to fix
this.” The American solution should be “let’s give the money to new institu-
tions,” and those new institutions will ideally flourish without federal funds.
Remember, part of the problem here, Peter, is that the government got too
involved in the universities: it got too involved in their finances, and then it
started getting involved in their governance. There are almost as many Title
IX officers, I would guess, at this university as DEI officers, and they’re all
part of the problem.
If we succeed in Austin, if we can create a new model of university
that doesn’t work like the old ones but actually believes what it says
about pursuing truth, then, ideally, we’ll force these older institutions
to change their ways.
The simplest way to win
“The simplest way to win this fight this fight is to create a
is to create a better institution that better institution that
attracts the smartest people as attracts the smartest
students, and the smartest people people as students, and
the smartest people as
as professors.”
professors. This has
happened before. Oxford and Cambridge didn’t worry about doctor-
ates until the German universities started to, and in many ways, the
American universities were modeled off the German universities in their
heyday. Nothing stays the same. Oddly enough, academia, for all that it
appears unworldly, is a very competitive place, and there really is still,
in the end, a market for genius and a market for new ideas. The market’s
moving. It’s leaving Harvard, and oddly enough, it’s heading for Austin,
Texas. See you there.

FIRST STEPS
Robinson: In “The Treason of the Intellectuals” you write, “Only if the once-
great American universities can re-establish, throughout their fabric, the
separation of Wissenschaft from Politik can they be sure of avoiding the fate
of the German universities.” Are you more optimistic today than when you
published it?
Ferguson: Well, I’m habitually not optimistic, as you know, Peter.
Robinson: You’re a dour Scot.
Ferguson: But I’m a little bit more optimistic because I think it’s been
brought home forcibly to trustees all across the country, not just at Harvard,
that they have to change the way they go about things: that they can no
longer allow the ideo-
logues, the progressives,
to call the shots, and “We can be an institution that shows
that has to be a step in that liberals and conservatives can
the right direction. You work together on academic problems,
and I are fellows at the leaving politics at the threshold.”
Hoover Institution. The
Hoover Institution is unique in that it’s a semiautonomous republic within
Stanford University. Why is there no Hoover Institution at Harvard—ever
wondered?—or at Yale? They could use a Hoover Institution, those places.
One of the reasons that I believe passionately in what we do here at Hoover
is that we are the counterculture to DEI, and if we can continue to show that
it’s possible to engage in scholarship in a way that is not politicized, if we can
be an institution that shows that liberals and conservatives can work togeth-
er on academic problems, leaving politics at the threshold, then we’ll also be
acting as role models. So, I’m kind of hopeful, just a little bit hopeful, Peter,
that the probability of there being Hoover Institutions at other universities
just went up from zero percent to, I don’t know, maybe five.

VA LUES
Friends,
Romans . . .
Influencers?
Ancient Rome is supposedly trendy. Time for a
few untrendy lessons about the life and death of
empires.
By Bruce S. Thornton
R
ecently a trend on
TikTok had its fifteen Key points
minutes of click-fame. » Roman wisdom insists on virtue,
fealty to the gods, and moral vigilance.
It seems that some
» US foreign policy has indulged the
women are asking their men how idea that nonlethal diplomacy can
often they think about the Roman defuse conflict and restore peace.
Empire. The usual suspect experts » No matter how noble our inten-
tions, how brilliant our civilization,
were consulted, and of course they
how sophisticated and expansive
concluded that this interest in our empire, human nature never
Rome reflects modern males’ angst changes.
over, or nostalgia for, a time when
Bruce S. Thornton is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, a member of

Hoover’s Working Group on the Role of Military History in Contemporary Con-
flict, and an emeritus professor of classics and humanities at California State
University, Fresno.

patriarchy dominated and manly deeds defined the male sex—the original
“toxic masculinity.”
There’s nothing wrong per se with thinking about ancient Rome. Since
Edward Gibbon’s magisterial History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire, Rome has been
a cautionary tale of how
great empires collapse. Free governments have an idealistic
Given the abundance notion that persuasion should trump
of empirical evidence— force, words replace blood. In reality,
invasions of unvetted
this restraint is rare.
migrants, our geopoliti-
cal enemies’ increasing challenges, a looming fiscal apocalypse, and suicidal
social and cultural corruption—our country may be experiencing a fate
similar to that of Rome, making its history deserving of attention. And one
place to start is to read what one brilliant Roman thought about the empire
when it was new.
WHAT VIRGIL KNEW

There’s no greater witness than the poet Virgil, who came of age during the
last years of the Roman Republic, a century when social disorder, civic vio-
lence, and civil wars between Roman generals and their legions were chronic.
Virgil’s Aeneid (19 BC) tells a story of Rome’s beginnings in the invasion of
Italy by Trojan refugees, and also explores the tragic costs of civilization, and
the lofty idealism that some great empires have claimed to represent. That
theme is what makes Rome and its fate so significant for us Americans.
Virgil has several scenes that make Rome’s imperial idealism explicit. One
dimension of Rome’s greatness was its virtue: not just courage, the most
important virtue for every civilization, but also pietas, the duty and respon-
sibility one owes to family, the dead, the gods, and Rome itself. Virgil’s hero
Aeneas is known for this virtue, hence the honorific pius attached to his
name.
Early in the epic, Virgil uses a striking extended simile to highlight the
political importance of pietas. When Neptune calms the violent storm incited
by Juno, who hates the Trojans, Virgil writes,
Just as, all too often, some huge crowd is seized by a vast uprising, the
rabble runs amok, all slaves to passion, rocks, firebrands flying. Rage
finds them arms but then, if they chance to see a man among them, one
whose devotion and public service [pietas] lends him weight, they stand

there, stock still with their ears alert as he rules their furor with his
words and calms their passion. [Robert Fagles translation]
For Romans who had lived through the bloody chaos of the dying republic,
this scene would have been all too familiar. Note the idealism that all free gov-
ernments are predicated on: persuasion should trump force, words should
replace blood. But Virgil’s and his readers’ knowledge that such a scene of
leadership had rarely happened in the decades-long death of the republic
challenges the idealism.
This prizing of language over force has also characterized a century of
our foreign policy of moralizing internationalism, the idea that nonlethal
diplomacy can defuse conflict and restore peace. However, we predicate its
efficacy more on rational technique and transactional negotiations than on
the virtue of a great leader. And that noble idealism has also failed, as we
are witnessing today with the Biden administration’s appeasement of Iran,
another milestone on the road to decline.
The second, more important expression of Virgil’s qualified idealism comes
when Jupiter calms down his daughter—and Aeneas’s mother—Venus amid
her angry grief over
Juno’s violence against
her son and his fated To Virgil, peace doesn’t depend on
future glory. The “father material improvements. It depends
of gods and men” assures on great leaders controlling the per-
his daughter that the manent passions of men.
glorious civilization, the
Roman Empire, will indeed happen: “Then will the violent centuries, battles
set aside, grow gentle, kind,” and force be replaced by laws and a higher
civilization.
This “new world order,” moreover, as we’ve been calling it since the Ver-
sailles settlement, will create lasting peace:
The terrible Gates of War with their welded iron bars will stand bolted
shut, and locked inside the Frenzy of civil strife will crouch down on his
savage weapons, hands pinioned behind his back with a hundred brazen
shackles, monstrously roaring out from his bloody jaws.”
This is the Pax Romana that will rule the world, and that created the founda-
tions of the West.
This idealistic hope for the Roman Empire was expressed much later in
Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace” and in Norman Angell’s 1914

prediction in The Great Illusion that global trade and the expansion of the
West would make war obsolete. Both of these products of our “rules-based
international order” idealism have, of course, not come to pass, any more
than did Virgil’s predictions of Rome’s universal peace.
But notice how Virgil describes this peace as contingent not on material
improvements and progress but on great leaders controlling the permanent
passions of men—greed for honor and wealth, vengeance for dishonor, the
lust for power—passions that can be locked away for a while. But without
virtue, fealty to the gods,
and moral vigilance, they
We assume that people everywhere will break out again.
want to live just like us in a Pax The third example of
Americana, once their tyrannical idealism that for Virgil
leaders are neutralized. will characterize the
Roman Empire takes
place in the underworld, where Aeneas’s father, Anchises, who had recently
died, parades before his son the greatness of Rome with a procession of
the souls of great Romans who will be born over the next twelve hundred
years. He finishes with a statement of Rome’s moral destiny. The Greeks may
surpass the Romans in art, science, or oratory, Anchises concedes, “But you,
Roman, remember, rule with all your power the peoples of the earth—these
will be your arts: to put your stamp on the works and ways of peace, to spare
the defeated, but break the proud in war.”
These idealizations were not flattery of Augustus and his new empire.
Virgil knew the cost in blood the creation of Rome exacted—not just from
enemies like the Gauls, a million of whom by his own count Julius Caesar
killed or enslaved, but from Romans slaughtering Romans in a century of
civil wars and civic violence. And he knew that Octavian had waded through
blood to become Augustus.
But in the final lines of the Aeneid, Virgil shows the permanent reality
of human nature that challenged his idealism. The second half of the epic
describes the brutal wars between the tribes of Central Italy and the newly
arrived Trojans, in effect a civil war since Romans would arise from the
merging of the Latins and Trojans. The wars end with the death of Turnus, a
leader of the indigenous resistance, at the hands of Pius Aeneas, who inflamed
with vengeful rage forgets his father’s injunction “to spare the defeated,” and
instead kills Turnus even as he kneels in submission and begs for mercy.
With this ending, we are reminded of Rome’s original sin of fratricide in
its famous foundation myth, the murder of Remus by his brother, Romulus.

No matter how noble our intentions, how brilliant the civilization we cre-
ate, how sophisticated and expansive the empire we rule, human nature
never changes, and ruthless violence always must be the cost of our
idealism.
Yet this probe of Roman idealism should not imply that Rome’s influ-
ence was completely malign. As the old saying had it, the Romans brought
with them “peace and
taxes.” Most of the lands
the Romans conquered These lessons in impossible idealism
were scenes of endless are why we should think about the
wars and bloody com- Romans.
petitions over power,
resources, and slaves. Roman peace and her legions mostly put an end to
that disorder.
Rome also brought an advanced civilization that was open to all, Roman or
not: aqueducts, sewers, stone roads, arenas, theaters, magnificent temples
and public buildings, villas, public art and sculpture, not to mention public
laws and citizens’ rights. The ruins of all this civil and cultural infrastructure
are still visible today, from Scotland to North Africa, from the Danube to the
Euphrates. And all these advances were defended with utmost ruthlessness,
something our idealism today scorns and avoids.
HUBRIS
This lesson in impossible idealism is why we should think about the Romans,
for we still cling to the foreign policy idealism that has driven our foreign
relations for a century. Our “rules-based liberal order” and technocratic
hubris have claimed that through greater knowledge and material improve-
ment, human nature also can be improved, and conflict resolved through
diplomacy and global institutions.
Moreover, we assume that a complex diversity of peoples want to live
just like us in a Pax Americana, once their illiberal and tyrannical leaders
are neutralized. They will then embrace our political idealism of tolerance
and unalienable rights and discard their own ambitions for dominance and
power. But those passions remain, and without a credible threat of force to
deter them, they will erupt into violence against our arrogant tutelage. The
Middle East since World War II illustrates this tragic reality, as does Russia’s
brutal war against Ukraine, one fueled by Putin’s dreams of correcting the
“geopolitical disaster,” as he described the collapse of the Soviet empire, and
restoring the ethnic Russian empire.

Thinking about Rome, especially through Virgil’s eyes in his brilliant epic,
is not about “toxic masculinity” or “patriarchy,” but rather our own danger-
ous idealism that threatens our security and interests.
Reprinted by permission of FrontPage Magazine. © 2024 FrontPage

Magazine.com. All rights reserved.
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VA LU E S
Whom Can
We Trust?
Brandice Canes-Wrone, head of Hoover’s new
Center for Revitalizing American Institutions,
looks for ways to bring fresh life to American
democracy.
By Jonathan Movroydis
Jonathan Movroydis: What is the mission of the Center for Revitalizing

American Institutions (RAI), and why now?
Brandice Canes-Wrone: Confidence in American institutions has declined

for decades and continues to decline. The trend isn’t simply a partisan
phenomenon, nor explained by a particular set of presidents. This develop-
ment influences how effectively our institutions can handle an emergency
or even run day to day, thereby compromising their missions. Our purpose
is to understand the reasons for the crisis in trust, understand how institu-
tions are operating today, evaluate proposals for reform, and offer potential
alternative reforms suggested by our analysis.
Movroydis: What are the roots of the low trust and confidence in our
institutions?
Brandice Canes-Wrone is the director of the Hoover Institution’s new Center

for Revitalizing American Institutions (RAI). She is the Maurice R. Greenberg
Senior Fellow at Hoover and a professor in Stanford University’s political-science
department. Jonathan Movroydis is the senior content writer for the Hoover
Institution.

BOTH SIDES NOW: Brandice Canes-Wrone, head of the Center for Revitalizing
American Institutions, seeks to “understand the reasons for the crisis in trust”
in America: “The center is looking for solutions that extend beyond specific
parties. RAI is interested in what works.” [Eric Draper]
Canes-Wrone: There are a variety of causes, so your question entails a large

research agenda. Certainly, polarization is a factor, although, again, this is not
simply a trend whereby Republicans don’t trust Democrats when they’re in
power and Democrats don’t trust Republicans when they’re in power. There’s
been a decrease even among those whose party is in power, and a large drop
among independents.
We’re interested in investigating—and here I want to be cautious in not
prejudging the conclusion—the role of developments in the media. These
developments include a variety of changes such as the rise of social media
and the decrease in local news. Citizens used to receive a lot of information
about government, particularly their own members of Congress, from local
and state news, and there’s been a large decline in coverage as well as the

number of local outlets. Citizens aren’t receiving the same information they
were receiving thirty years ago, and in some cases, that’s been filled in by
what comes over social media.
Separately, we know that civics education in this country also has expe-
rienced a decline. The number of schools offering civics classes, as well
as the role of civics in
the curriculum, is not
what it was. And you “Citizens aren’t receiving the same
see these results. Fewer information they were receiving thirty
than one in four eighth- years ago.”
graders in the United
States are proficient in US history or civics, according to the nonpartisan
National Assessment of Educational Progress. One component of the
center will be to look at what’s happening in civics education in the country
and offer potential solutions there.
Movroydis: The center has three main themes: governmental institutions,

organization democratic practice, and democratic citizenship. Let’s talk
about what these three mean and how you distinguish them, beginning with
governmental institutions.
Canes-Wrone: The first one is about what we might think of as formal gov-
ernmental bodies—for instance, Congress, the executive branch, the courts,
state and local governmental bodies, the military, and executive agencies.
We’ll consider topics such as, how has the balance of power between the
presidency and Congress changed over time? To what extent do Congress
and our state legislatures reflect the preferences of their constituents? And
what reforms might increase the effectiveness of these institutions?
Movroydis: What about organizations and democratic practice?
Canes-Wrone: Here,
we’re thinking about “What are the most effective policies
organizations that are
and practices for ensuring the integrity
outside the government
of and participation in our elections?”
but nonetheless critical
to a well-functioning democracy and, correspondingly, the practices that
affect how the democracy operates. Examples of organizations include the
media, interest groups, and even universities, and examples of practices
include how elections are administered and what constitutes freedom of
speech. We’ll consider topics such as, what are the most effective policies

and practices for ensuring the integrity of and participation in our elec-
tions? How have developments in the media shaped public discourse? And
what role do universities have in creating a healthy democracy?
Movroydis: And democratic citizenship?
Canes-Wrone: Democratic citizenship is at the level of the individual. It’s the

individual’s political beliefs, preferences, and responsibilities in a democratic
society, particularly with respect to the individual’s relationship with demo-
cratic institutions. So, one part of the theme will consider public opinion and
participation. Another part will relate to the civic-education piece I men-
tioned earlier in terms of how citizens become informed about democratic
processes and their own rights and responsibilities.
So, if you think about the three themes, you have formal government
bodies; you have informal democratic organizations and practices that fos-
ter democratic competition and innovation; and then you have citizens—
the individual holding the government accountable by becoming active and
engaged.
Movroydis: How does the center plan to do its research and communicate it
to policy makers and other stakeholders?
Canes-Wrone: We think of the Center for Revitalizing American Institutions

as having three primary audiences. The first is the research community. We
believe strongly that research—nonpartisan, fact-based research—is vitally
important to understanding American institutions. Our second audience is
what we might call the attentive public. That would include policy makers
and those who follow policy closely, as well as the media. And the third is the
civic-education field, with a broad aim of influencing civic education.
We have a number of affiliated faculty with incredibly exciting projects.
For instance, Hoover fellow and political-science professor Justin Grimmer
and Hoover fellow Ben Ginsberg are working on a major project about trust
in elections and election administration. They have conferences and other
events planned that are designed to build on their research about how to
make our elections work as well as possible. Their goals are to influence elec-
tion administration officials in terms of adopting reforms that will build trust
in elections, as well as to influence voters in terms of understanding how
elections work and taking on myths about how the electoral process operates
in practice.
Another project, led by Hoover fellow Jack Goldsmith, focuses on the
administrative state. This project has produced a series of recently published

papers about the role of executive power in the administrative state, its
growth, and potential areas for reform.
Hoover fellow and Stanford professor Josiah Ober is leading an effort
to think about the role of civics in college curricula around the country.
He’s been very involved in that issue at Stanford and is convening oth-
ers around the country to bring what we’ve learned at Stanford to a
wide range of universities, from small liberal arts colleges to large state
institutions.
And we have a large survey being led by Doug Rivers, a Hoover fellow and
political-science professor, and Hoover emeritus fellow David Brady, which
will be a panel survey about the 2024 elections that seeks to provide new
information both to scholars and the broader public about what affects indi-
viduals’ votes and preferences.
One more: we’re co-funding a project by Robb Willer, a sociology profes-
sor at Stanford, relating to the topic of democratic practice. He’ll be working
with Governor Spencer Cox of Utah. Governor Cox is the head of the Nation-
al Governors Association and is trying to encourage gubernatorial candi-
dates to pledge in bipartisan ads that they believe in their state’s election
administration and will accept
the election outcomes. Gover-
“RAI is interested in what works.”
nor Cox himself did this with
his Democratic opponent in the previous Utah gubernatorial election. Robb
is planning to test the effects of these ads as they roll out in 2024. These are
just some of the projects under way for this year.
Movroydis: Could you talk about why multiple perspectives are important?
Canes-Wrone: The center is looking for solutions that extend beyond specific
parties. RAI is interested in what works, and one thing we haven’t talked
about yet is that the public’s trust in state and local governments is an excep-
tion to the general decline in trust. Citizens tend to be much more supportive
of their state and local governments. Amid the general crisis in confidence,
it makes sense to think about why things are working at least better in the
states and localities than at the national level.
One of the important features of RAI, consistent with bipartisanship,
is—and to me, this is always at the heart of any scholarly work—to be
very open to alternative ideas and be willing to defend your own through
discussion.
RAI is a Hoover-funded institution. We share Hoover’s commitment
to individual freedom, and that’s part of our mission. But when it comes

to a specific topic, such as the best way to revitalize Congress, that’s
something we’re studying; it’s not something for which we already know
the answer. We look forward to incorporating different ideas on this and
all our topics.
New from the Hoover Institution Press is Equality of

Opportunity: A Century of Debate, by David Davenport
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H ISTORY A N D C U LT U R E
Dependent No
More
It’s been a hundred years since the United States
granted citizenship to American Indians. Will it
take a hundred more before it frees tribes to make
their own decisions?
by Terry L. Anderson and Dominic P. Parker
I
n 1924, Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act (ICA), declaring
that “all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the
United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the
United States.” President Coolidge signed it into law on June 2, 1924.
The act, partially inspired by robust Native American enlistment during the
First World War, is celebrated as a step toward honoring American Indians—
regardless of whether they abandoned their tribal affiliations—by welcom-
ing them to US citizenship, giving them the right to vote. There is, however,
dissonance in “declaring” people as citizens who were the continent’s first
inhabitants and who were already citizens of their own nations—Iroquois,
Comanche, Osage, Sioux, Crow, and so on. Those nations long had rules of
law, boundaries, and rituals for choosing leaders and adopting others into
Terry L. Anderson is the John and Jean De Nault Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution. He is past president of the Property and Environment Research Center
(PERC) in Bozeman, Montana, and a professor emeritus at Montana State Uni-
versity. Dominic P. Parker is a senior fellow (adjunct) at the Hoover Institution
and a professor of applied economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He
and Terry Anderson direct the Hoover Project on Renewing Indigenous Economies.

their tribes. Because US citizenship brought with it subjugation to federal
laws, accepting it was controversial among some tribal leaders, who foresaw
that it would create a morass of legal questions about where and to whom
tribal laws would still apply.
The ICA came a century after the US Supreme Court declared in Chero-
kee Nation v. Georgia (1831) that tribes were “domestic dependent nations,”
making “their relation to the United States” resemble “that of a ward to
his guardian.” Before 1924, the “wards” were usually not US citizens until a
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) agent of the federal government deemed them
to be “competent and capable.” In practice, this generally meant becoming
farmers and assimilating into the white population.
This was part of a more general effort to “detribalize” Native Americans.
As trustee for Indian wards, the federal government, to this day, oversees
land use and title transfer of millions of Indian reservation acres. The US cit-
izenship announced in 1924 did not terminate this ward-to-guardian relation-
ship. On the contrary,
these terms remain part
of modern federal Indian Can someone be both a free citizen
law under the Burke Act and a ward of the state?
of 1906, which requires
that the government assess the competence of individual Indians before giv-
ing them fee-simple patent to their allotted land.
These laws help explain the theme of the book and recent movie Killers of the
Flower Moon. Because Indian “headrights” to subsurface oil in Oklahoma were
held in trust during this 1920s episode, revenues from leases were held by the
Department of the Interior and could be released to tribal members only at
the discretion of the department. Hence, Golden Globe winner Lily Gladstone,
playing the part of an Osage Tribe citizen, must grovel before her Indian agent,
stating her allotment number and declaring, “I’m Mollie Kyle, incompetent.”
LEADERSHIP: This painting of Chief Wades in the Water (opposite), a Black-

feet tribal elder shown in his regalia, is among dozens of artworks by Winold
Reiss that feature Indians living in Montana in the mid-twentieth century.
Many of Reiss’s subjects were Blackfeet who re-created traditional ways for
the benefit of tourists to Glacier National Park. The image of Wades in the
Water (1870s–1947) became widely known, along with those of other tribal
members, after the Great Northern Railway purchased it to use in promotional
materials. (Turn to page 218 to read more about this artwork.) [Winold Reiss
(1886–1953)—BNSF Railway Collection]

CITIZENS: In December 1923, the “Committee of One Hundred,” formally
known as the Advisory Council on Indian Affairs, paid a visit to President
Calvin Coolidge at the White House. A Mount Holyoke student of Cherokee
descent named Ruth Muskrat, shown here presenting Coolidge with a book,
told the president in a speech, “We want to become citizens of the United
States, and to have our share in the building of this great nation that we love.
But we want also to preserve the best that is in our own civilization.” [National
Photo Company Collection—Library of Congress]
Can a United States citizen simultaneously be a ward and a free

American?
POWER IN AUTONOMY
On the 100th anniversary of the Indian Citizenship Act, it is appropriate to
reflect that Native Americans held a status before the conquest by Europe-
ans that allowed them to be, in the words of Crow tribal citizen Bill Yel-
lowtail, “strong, self-sufficient, self-initiating, entrepreneurial, independent,

healthful, and therefore powerful individual persons. Human beings, Indi-
ans.” Yet the guardian role assumed by the federal government too often
has limited the benefits of both tribal citizenship and US citizenship, leaving
Native Americans to operate in a no-man’s land of uncertain and limited
privileges and rights.
Citizenship requires two things: territorial control by a government, and a
legal (written or unwritten) relationship between an individual and the state
that specifies rights and duties for both individuals and the state. By these
criteria, most Native Americans were citizens of nations before they were
declared to be citizens
of the United States.
Whether it is a matter of The federal guardian role too often
enforcing individual own- limits the benefits of both tribal
ership claims, protecting citizenship and US citizenship.
territorial borders, or
producing public goods such as trails, meeting halls, or irrigation systems,
tribes were organized to make and enforce laws and to produce collective
goods. In this sense, tribes were nations and members were citizens.
Consider the League of Five Nations, or Iroquois League, as the Europeans
called it. The league was a loose alliance among the Oneida, Mohawk, Sen-
eca, Cayuga, and Onondaga tribes, governed by the Great Law of Peace. The
Iroquois League was governed by a constitution that influenced language in
the US Constitution. Its constitution limited the powers of the collective and
enforced the rights of the subgroups and individual citizens. By any defini-
tion, the organization of the Iroquois League under the Great Law of Peace
constituted a nation, and its individual members were citizens of that nation.
In Lakota America: A New History of Indigenous Power, Pekka Hämäläinen
describes how the Lakota Nation evolved from an upper Great Lakes hunter-
gatherer tribe to one of the most powerful Indian nations west of the Missis-
sippi. The Lakota took control of trade in the Missouri Valley and charged
tolls to the trappers and traders, as well as to Lewis and Clark’s Corps of
Discovery, moving furs and trade goods up and down the river. Where buf-
falo were plentiful, they excluded other tribes from hunting, and they had
individual and clan property rights to cultivated land from which crops such
as corn added to their diet.
All of this required complicated governance structures, at levels ranging
from the nation to the band to the citizen. The nation was not “a formal state
or confederacy” but instead “a manifestation of deep voluntary attachments
that bound the seven fires [tribes] together . . . from the bottom up, with

language and kinship as the main cohesive,” Hämäläinen writes. At the lower
end were smaller groups in which “individuals, families, and bands moved
around constantly, arranging themselves into different constellations as
circumstances demanded . . . creating a thick lattice of kinship ties that tran-
scended local and regional
identities.” The bottom-
The Iroquois League’s constitution up structure limited the
influenced the US Constitution. power of the chiefs and
councils, but they did
have the power to organize armies, with the consent of the subgroups, to
defend or expand their territories. The Lakota enforced rules on the inside
and protected citizens from invaders from outside. The rules within the tribe
provided incentives for individuals, families, and clans to make investments
in their personal wealth that allowed them to thrive in new territories and to
trade with other tribes when gains from trade were available. Furthermore,
those investments, especially in equestrian skills, provided the human and
physical (e.g., horses) capital that could be called on by war leaders to protect
tribal territories and acquire new lands.
These are but two examples of Native American nations and the citi-
zenship of those nations. European conquest overtook tribal territories
and subjected American Indians to new rules over which they had little
control.
“DEAD CAPITAL”
Once Indians were declared to be wards of the federal government, they
became more like colonial citizens. The nature of their tribal governments,
the laws to which they must abide, the structure of their property rights,
and even their racial identity were mostly determined by a bureaucracy
unaccountable to them. The legacy consists of today’s policies regulating
everything from health care to education to reservation land use that are still
manifest in federal agencies such as the BIA, the Bureau of Indian Education,
and the Indian Health Service.
Bureaucracy went so far as to tie Native American citizenship to ethnic-
ity by inventing a pseudoscientific “blood quantum” system of enumeration
that persists to this day. Blood quantum was determined by federal Indian
agents who tracked the fraction of ancestors documented as full-blooded
Indian in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sometimes just by looking
at the person. These assessments determined eligibility for federal payments
under treaties, land cessions, and litigation settlements. Before the Indian

Citizenship Act of 1924, low blood quantum was the implicit criterion for US
citizenship and high blood quantum for federal payments and wardship. In
a nation of immigrants where the Fourteenth Amendment acknowledges
citizenship as automatic by place of birth, for Native Americans that status
depended on dubious assessments of ancestry.
This federal bureaucracy wields jurisdiction over what is known as Indian
Country. It is defined by the US federal criminal code (18 US Code § 1151):
land within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, including rights of way
through a reservation; dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States; and all
individual Indian allot-
ments, including rights Bureaucrats invented a
of way, and excluding pseudoscientific “blood quantum”
allotments for which system that p ersists to this day.
Indian title has been
extinguished. Real property in Indian Country may be owned in fee simple by
either Indians or non-Indians, but sixty-six million acres in Indian Country
are held in trust by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, meaning the bureau must
approve how the land is used and must monitor the distribution of revenues
generated from the land and minerals. In essence, the land is owned by the
federal government. American Indians are the only US citizens with such a
preponderance of their assets held in trust.
Despite the large acreage held in trust, the lands have yielded a pittance
of monetary return when compared to land and natural resources owned
by non-Indian American citizens. For example, Indian reservations have
abundant energy resources, but have profited little from these supplies.
Reservations contain almost 30 percent of the nation’s coal reserves
west of the Mississippi, 50 percent of potential uranium, and 20 percent
of known oil and gas reserves. They also contain almost 10 percent of
the nation’s wind and solar energy potential and a large stock of critical
minerals. Yet Senate committee hearings have concluded that only two
million of fifteen million acres of energy resources were developed on
reservations, and that $1.5 trillion worth of subsurface reserves remain
untapped. Commercial renewable-energy production is also lacking, with
only a handful of tribes capitalizing on the national momentum for sources
of alternative energy.
Why do reservation resources held in trust often fail to generate wealth for
the reservation? Some tribes choose not to develop their natural resources.
Others wish to develop, but stifling federal bureaucracy stands in the way.

As Ernest Sickey, the late chairman of the Coushatta Tribe, put it, federal
bureaucracy has strangled American Indian enterprise with “white tape.”
The white tape traces back to Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the 1831 Supreme
Court decision, which was not undone by the Indian Citizenship Act. Instead,
that court’s assertion that Indians “are in a state of pupilage” remains in
force as trusteeship continues to govern natural-resources use.
The result is an unparalleled regulatory burden on Native American citizens.
As the Environmental Protection Agency notes, “Activities in Indian country
. . . often require a greater
level of NEPA [National
American Indians are the only US Environmental Policy Act]
citizens with such a p reponderance involvement than the same
activities in nontribal
of their assets held in trust.
areas.” This means, for
instance, that forty-nine regulatory steps were required to get an oil lease in
Indian Country, compared to four steps elsewhere. A similar regulatory morass
awaits tribes wanting to develop wind and solar in Indian Country.
Trusteeship also helps explain why tribal members in the water-thirsty
West do not benefit from paper water rights valued in the billions annually,
and why members of North Dakota’s Three Affiliated Tribes missed out on
millions in royalties during the 2010s petroleum-fracking boom. Bureaucracy
and regulatory rules also help explain why good farmland is often left unused
despite price booms in agriculture. These valuable resources are effectively
“dead capital,” to use the phrase of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto.
And when land and natural resources are put to use, trustee management
of revenue has allowed federal bureaucrats to lose billions of dollars belong-
ing to individual Indians through poor recordkeeping and by brokering
leases of Indian land for pittances. This was documented in great detail in
the so-called Cobell litigation—named for its lead plaintiff, Blackfeet elder
Elouise Cobell—a class-action suit accusing the Departments of the Interior
and Treasury of mismanaging Indian trust funds. Despite a settlement of
$3.4 billion reached in 2009, Cobell said at the time, “There is little doubt this
is significantly less than the full accounting to which individual Indians are
entitled.” The Indian Citizenship Act did not prevent these losses because it
did not undo the guardian’s power.
LONG ROADS TO SUCCESS

The Indian Citizenship Act was a step forward in tribal and individual
Indian relations with the federal government, but as long as the historic

legal relationship remains, it is difficult for tribes to be sovereign govern-
ments and Native Americans to be sovereign citizens. Tribes refer to
themselves as “sovereign nations,” but trusteeship and federal bureau-
cracy weaken both the sovereignty of Indian nations and the benefits of
US citizenship.
Furthermore, unlike other governmental units (states, counties, cities)
beneath the federal government, tribal governments have little power to
tax and therefore few sources of revenue to produce public services such
as police protection, education, health care, and roads. Without revenue
sources, they depend on grants to produce those services or on federal agen-
cies to provide them directly.
The Southern Ute Tribe’s struggle for economic independence illustrates
the legacy of nineteenth-century Indian policy that made tribes “domestic
dependent nations,”
and it also shows a path
out of dependency. The Ultimately, citizenship is only as
Southern Ute Reser- useful as the rules that govern
vation in southwest citizens.
Colorado sits on mas-
sive energy resources, yet for most of the past century the small tribe—now
numbering fewer than fifteen hundred members—was impoverished. The
prosperous hunters and traders who once roamed the Great Basin were
forced onto a reservation spanning about one-third of what would become
Colorado, and their strength and wealth quickly dissipated. By 1895, the tribe
had been squeezed into a fifteen-by-seventy-five-mile strip consisting of a
mosaic of land tenure, including both private and trust property, the latter
under the control of the federal government.
It took more than a century, but the Southern Utes persevered, slowly
winning court judgments to reclaim their water, land, and mineral rights
and the revenue from those sources. Revenue from five tribal energy
companies is invested in the Southern Ute Growth Fund, estimated to be
worth $4 billion, and dividends from the fund are distributed annually to
tribal members.
With profits from oil, gas, and other enterprises, the tribe was able to
take control of and manage the reservation’s infrastructure. It runs a medi-
cal clinic, formerly operated by the federal Indian Health Service. It built a
state-of-the-art recreation center and introduced a Ute-language program in
its schools. The tribe’s Southern Ute Community Action Programs include
substance-abuse treatment centers, a senior citizen center, and job-training

programs. Oil and gas profits provide scholarships for every tribal member
who wants to attend college, dividends for members between twenty-six and
fifty-nine, and retirement benefits to those over sixty.
In western North Dakota, the Three Affiliated Tribes—Mandan, Hidatsa,
and Arikara—on the Fort Berthold Reservation also managed to gain more
control of their oil and gas resources. As a result, the former tribal chairman,
Tex Hall, said the tribes were gaining “sovereignty by the barrel”—making
clear the links between sovereignty, citizenship, and wealth.
Examples extend beyond oil and gas. The Salish-Kootenai Confederated
Tribes on the Flathead Reservation in Northwest Montana took over their
forest management under a special agreement with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. Not only has their management made profits for the tribe while
neighboring federal forests lost money, but the tribes’ forests have outper-
formed federal forests by virtually all environmental standards.
Sovereign control gives tribes an incentive to maximize economic returns
from their land. This is in sharp contrast to federal agencies, for which
the incentives “might be not just weak but actually perverse,” accord-
ing to a 1994 article in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
because the BIA’s budget tends to grow when it fails to fulfill its federal trust
responsibility.
There are risks to achieving economic independence, and not every tribal
project succeeds. But the data show that Indigenous self-governance suc-
ceeds over the long run. Research showed that tribes opting out of federal
oversight through the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, for instance, have
had 12 to 16 percent greater economic growth when compared to those with-
out self-governance.
A PROFOUND SHIFT
The recent landmark case of McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020) provides an opportunity
to redefine the meaning of citizenship for American Indians. The case began
over the question of whether the federal or state government had jurisdiction
over a case involving Jimcy McGirt, a citizen of the Seminole Tribe, who was
accused of sexually assaulting a non-Indian minor. Ultimately, the case was
heard by the US Supreme Court, which ruled that criminal cases belong in
federal or tribal courts if the crime was committed in “Indian Territory,” and it
concluded that this land makes up nearly half of the state of Oklahoma.
Some citizens of Oklahoma who are not citizens of the “Five Civilized
Tribes”—the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole—feared
that the new jurisdictional arrangement would stunt the state’s economy.

Governor Kevin Stitt worried that “no investment is going to come” because
the “uncertainty is huge.” The fears, however, have not come to pass, because
the “competent and capable” Indian nations understand the importance of
stable governance rules for tribal, state, and US citizens alike.
The history of tribal governance all the way up to McGirt illustrates that
citizenship is only as useful as the rules that govern citizens. Before colo-
nization, Native Americans lived under rules that limited tribal author-
ity, enhanced individual freedom, and allowed members to thrive, not just
survive. The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 should have lessened the federal
government’s guardian role because laws that consider a class of citizens to
be incompetent and incapable clash with citizenship in a free country. As
we celebrate the ICA, we should also work to recognize the continent’s first
inhabitants as free, competent, and capable citizens.

Renewing Indigenous Economies, by Terry L.
Anderson and Kathy Ratté. To order, call (800)

H I STO RY A N D CULT URE
Memorial Day:
One Life
To honor our fallen warriors, remember them as
individuals. A commander’s eulogy.
By H. R. McMaster
I
n World War II, America lost 291,557 military lives in combat. But, as
Pulitzer Prize–winning author Rick Atkinson wrote, “Each death is
as unique as a snowflake or a fingerprint. The most critical lesson for
every American is to understand, viscerally, that this vast host died
one by one by one; to understand in your bones that they died for you.”
Perhaps back then, it was easier for more Americans to feel that reality
in their bones. These days, with a relatively small all-volunteer force, the
American people are more distant from those who fight in their name.
Combat veterans suppress dreadful memories of battles, but they never
forget their comrades who fell alongside them one by one. Their countenanc-
es, often smiling or laughing, flash before our mind’s eye. I see them unex-
pectedly. Sometimes they come in waves.
This Memorial Day, in between the backyard barbecues and parades,
Americans might hear statistics of our fallen soldiers, like the approximately
H. R. McMaster (US Army, Ret.), a former national security adviser, is the Fouad
and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a member of mul-
tiple Hoover working groups including military history, Islamism, China/Taiwan,
and the Middle East. He heads the Hoover Afghanistan Research & Relief Team
and hosts the Hoover interview series Battlegrounds. He is also the Bernard and
Susan Liautaud Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

COMRADE: Ceremonies from combat zones in Afghanistan and Iraq centered
on a fallen warrior’s boots, helmet, rifle, and ID tags. “Combat veterans sup-
press dreadful memories of battles, but they never forget their comrades who
fell alongside them one by one,” writes Hoover senior fellow H. R. McMaster.
[US military]
650,000 who died in battle since the beginning of the War of Independence.
They might know that 7,054 American military personnel died in the most
recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But most are unfamiliar with the stories
of individual soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice. That is a shame.
To help our fellow Americans appreciate such a sacrifice, we who served
alongside those heroes should tell the stories of our fallen comrades as we
lost them: one by one.
A MODEL SCOUT
Today, I would like to share my memory of Private First Class Joseph Knott,
the first trooper killed in action after the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment
returned to Iraq for its second combat tour of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Even now, I still see Joseph, smiling, in my mind’s eye. Just twenty-one, from
Yuma, Arizona, he was the very model of a cavalry scout. In fact, his photo,
in silhouette standing guard in the gunner’s station of his Humvee as the sun

set behind him, was selected for the cover of our regimental magazine only a
week before his death.
The date was April 17, 2005. As always, I briefed our security detachment—
really a small scout platoon—before we departed our base in Iraq. Six of the
battalion’s soldiers had been wounded the day before. I made sure I met and
shook the hands of every soldier in the battalion task force that had been
attached to our regiment.
Our mission that day was to assess the situation in the so-called “triangle
of death” area south of Baghdad so we could refine our plans to defeat the
enemy. The area—filled with infiltration routes, or “ratlines,” from Syria
along the Euphrates River valley—was well-suited to Al-Qaeda terrorists.
Narrow roads paralleling
the canals that criss-
Today, the American people are crossed the area made
distant from those who fight in their our forces easy to spot
name. and vulnerable to attack.
It was the perfect place to
manufacture bombs and suicide vests for attacks in Baghdad. And Al-Qaeda
needed to behead only a few people in the small towns before all the locals
understood that they were to see nothing and hear nothing about the explo-
sive device factories the group had established there.
Halfway through the patrol, I switched places with our command sergeant
major, John Caldwell, a charismatic and courageous larger-than-life man
whose bad back would have more than justified him forgoing another combat
tour. But the dedication of “Big John” to his soldiers overwhelmed the con-
stant pain he endured to lead our troopers back to Iraq.
Our eight-vehicle convoy of six armored Humvees and two Bradley
Fighting Vehicles headed out on the Mullah Fayad Highway—a narrow,
two-lane road lined by tall reeds alongside a canal. Caldwell’s vehicle, con-
taining three other soldiers including Joseph, was positioned in the center
of our column.
Suddenly I sensed that tingling feeling at the back of my neck. The evil
presence of Al-Qaeda was palpable. From the front right seat, I grabbed the
hand mike and pressed the transmit button, instructing our troopers to “be
vigilant and stay low.”
A moment later, fifty yards in front of me, a large explosion washed over
Caldwell’s Humvee. A cloud of black smoke and debris obscured the road.
“Punch through it!” I told the driver. We drove to the far side as I
reported the attack, requesting medical evacuation at a secured landing

zone just ahead of us. Then I jumped out and met our platoon sergeant,
Staff Sergeant Matt Hodges, at Caldwell’s Humvee. Sergeant First Class
Donald Sparks and our interpreter, Mr. Kamel Abbo, were injured, and
Caldwell was seriously wounded. We treated him and got him to the
landing zone just as the medevac helicopter landed. But we were unable
to save his gunner, Private Joseph Knott. I held Joseph’s hand and said
a prayer. Hodges and I folded his arms across his chest and covered
his body.
A PROUD VOLUNTEER
Two days later I eulogized Joseph, surrounded by his fellow cavalry troopers
at our base in Baghdad. I wish that more Americans could witness combat
memorials to the fallen so they could understand how fortunate we are to
have selfless young men and women willing to fight and sacrifice in our
name. Eighteen years later, I welcome readers back to that ceremony, with
the speech I gave about Joseph:
“We are here to honor and say goodbye to one of our Brave Rifles broth-
ers, a great cavalry trooper and a fine man, Private First Class Joseph Knott.
Private First Class Knott, like all of you, volunteered to serve his nation in
time of war. On 17 April
during operations in the
South Baghdad area, he “Sergeant Harris said ‘he always had
made the ultimate sacri- a smile on his face and served our
fice to bring peace to this country proudly.’ ”
difficult region, defeat
the forces of terrorism and hatred, and permit children, both in Iraq and in
our own nation, to live free of fear. Our thoughts and prayers are with him
and with his family—his father, Jerry; his mother, Pamela; his sisters, Susan
and Sheela; and his brother, Jerry.”
I then shared the reminiscences of Joseph from soldiers in our platoon.
Grief shared is grief divided.
“Corporal Dillard recalled how ‘he strived for excellence in everything he
did and always kept the morale of his fellow troopers high.’
“Staff Sergeant Hodges, who I know has the highest standards, described
Joseph as an ‘exemplary soldier . . . motivated and disciplined.’
“Specialist Bruce recalled that ‘everything he did, he put all of his energy
into it and made sure it was done right.’
“Sergeant Braxton recalled that ‘he was the type of person who would do
everything he could to help the next person.’

“PFC Ryan said that PFC Knott ‘was always the one to make us laugh. He
was always singing or looked like he was posing for a picture and smiling.’
“Sergeant Harris said ‘he always had a smile on his face and served our
country proudly.’ ”
Military units conduct memorial services to renew their commitment to
each other and the mission as well as mourn the loss of their comrades.
I went on to highlight our responsibility to Joseph and his memory.
“We should also draw strength from Joseph Knott’s example. I, for one,
will do my best to follow his example—to put fellow troopers before myself,
to do my very best to win
this fight against terror-
On this Memorial Day, pledge to live ists and the enemies of
well, strengthen our republic, and freedom, to maintain my
treasure the freedoms PFC Joseph sense of humor and enjoy
Knott and all our other fallen warriors the company of my fellow
troopers. If I could sing, I
fought to preserve.
would sing louder. Today
we honor PFC Joseph Knott with words as we pray for him and his family. I
ask that tomorrow we all do our best to honor PFC Knott with our deeds as
we continue to serve our nation in this great Regiment.”
Our troopers did honor PFC Knott, and others who fell alongside him
in South Baghdad and in western Ninewa Province, as they defeated
modern-day barbarians while demonstrating compassion for the Iraqi
people. As the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment departed Iraq a year
after Joseph’s death, the mayor of the Iraqi city of Tal Afar, Major General
Najim Abed Abdullah al-Jibouri, wrote the following to the families of
our fallen troopers:
To the families of those who have given their holy blood for our land, we
all bow to you in reverence and to the souls of your loved ones. Their
sacrifice was not in vain. They are not dead, but alive, and their souls
hovering around us every second of every minute. They will never be
forgotten. . . . We see them in the smile of every child, and in every flower
growing in this land. Let America, their families, and the world be proud
of their sacrifice for humanity and life.
Combat memorial ceremonies help military units, which take on the quali-
ties of a family, communalize grief and resolve to continue the mission. At the
end of the ceremony, soldiers kneel one by one, or with their squad, in front
of the fallen soldier’s boots and helmet, which sit on top of an inverted rifle.

The soldier’s ID tags dangle from the trigger housing. At the end of the cer-
emony, each soldier grasps the ID tags for a moment to pay a personal, silent
tribute to their brother or sister.
I wonder if, on this Memorial Day, all of us might imagine reaching out,
holding those ID tags for a moment, and pledging to live well, strengthen our
republic, and treasure the freedoms that Private First Class Joseph Knott
and all of our other fallen warriors fought to preserve.
Reprinted by permission of The Free Press (www.thefp.com). © 2024 The

Free Press. All rights reserved.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is NATO

in the Crucible, by Deborah L. Hanagan. To order, call

H I STO RY A N D CULT URE
The Spirit of ’44

The men who faced death during the D-Day
landings were sure of their country—and they
knew what their sacrifice meant.
By Victor Davis Hanson
T
he June 6, 1944, invasion marked the largest amphibious landing
since the Persians under Xerxes invaded the Greek mainland
in 480 BC. Nearly 160,000 American, British, and Canadian
soldiers stormed five beaches of Nazi-occupied France. The plan
was to liberate Western Europe after four years of occupation, push into
Germany, and end the Nazi regime. Less than a year later, the Allies from the
West, and the Soviet Russians from the East, did just that, utterly destroying
Hitler’s Third Reich.
Two years earlier, in August 1942, Germany had repulsed with heavy
Canadian losses an earlier Normandy raid at Dieppe. In 1944, the Germans
also knew roughly when the Allies would be coming. They placed their best
general, Erwin Rommel, in charge of the Normandy defenses.
The huge D-Day force required enormous supplies of arms and provisions
just to get off the beaches, yet the Allies had no way to capture even one port
on the heavily fortified French coast.
To land so many troops so quickly, the Allies would have to ensure com-
plete naval and air supremacy. They would have to tow over from Britain
their own portable harbors, lay their own gasoline pipeline across the English
Victor Davis Hanson is the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution and the chair of Hoover’s Working Group on the Role of Mili-
tary History in Contemporary Conflict.

THE MISSION: Landing craft charge toward the Normandy shore. The D-Day
landings of June 1944, the long-awaited thrust at the heart of Hitler’s empire,
were the largest amphibious expedition in centuries. The warriors who went
ashore understood the risks and accepted them. [Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Forces]
Channel, and invent novel ships and armored vehicles just to get onto and
over the beaches.
More dangerous still, the invaders would need to ensure armor and tactical
air dominance to avoid being cut off, surrounded, and annihilated once they
went inland.
German Panzer units—battle-hardened troops in frightening Panther and
Tiger tanks, with over three hard years of fighting experience on the Eastern
Front—were confident they could annihilate in a matter of days the outnum-
bered and lightly armed invaders.
Such a huge force required fifty miles of landing space on the beaches.
That vast expanse ensured that some landing sites were less than ideal—
Omaha Beach in particular.

No one quite knows how many Allied soldiers, airmen, and sailors were lost
during D-Day’s twenty-four hours. Some 10,000 casualties is a good guess,
including nearly 4,500 dead. Well over 400 soldiers were killed, wounded,
or captured every hour
of the first day. Most of
No one knows how many Allied sol- the losses occurred at
diers, airmen, and sailors were lost Omaha Beach, the riskiest
during D-day’s twenty-four hours. landing area. Cliffs there
offered perfect German
lines of fire onto the landing craft below.
Concrete seawalls blocked access from the beaches. Crack German troops
had recently beefed up the fortifications. Mined hedgerows blocked entry
into the countryside.
Omaha Beach proved an ungodly nightmare, while the four other landing
sites worked like clockwork, with fewer casualties.
Nearly a quarter million Allied soldiers were killed or wounded in Opera-
tion Overlord over the ensuing seven weeks of fighting in Normandy. Com-
bined German and Allied casualties exceeded 400,000. Nearly 20,000 French
civilians were killed as well. The Allies did not secure Normandy until the
end of July, when they finally broke out into the plains of France and began
racing toward Germany.
Intelligence failures, poor coordination between airborne and infantry
troops, and mediocre leadership all plagued the Allies for most of June and
July. Yet they pulled off the impossible by surprising the Germans, securing
a beachhead, supplying that toehold in Western Europe, and then expanding
the pocket into a vast, thousand-mile front that in less than a year shattered
Hitler’s western defenses.
How and why did the
They were confident in American Americans on Omaha
know-how. They were convinced they charge right off their
fought for the right cause. landing craft into a hail of
German machine gun and
artillery fire, despite being mowed down in droves?
In a word, they “believed” in the United States.
That generation had emerged from the crushing poverty of the Great
Depression to face the reality that the Axis powers wanted to destroy their
civilization and their country. They were confident in American know-how.
They were convinced they fought for the right cause. They were not awed
by traveling thousands of miles from home to face German technological

wizardry, veterans with years of battle experience, and a ruthless martial
code.
The men at Omaha did not believe America had to be perfect to be good—
just far better than the alternative.
They understood, like their predecessors at Valley Forge, Gettysburg, and
the Meuse-Argonne, that nothing in the United States was guaranteed. They
accepted that periodi-
cally some Americans—
usually those in the The men who stormed Omaha Beach
prime of life with the did not believe America had to be
greatest futures and the perfect to be good.
most to lose—would be
asked to face certain death in nightmarish places like Omaha, in a B-17 over
Berlin, or in the horrid jungles in the Pacific.
The least our generation—affluent, leisured, and so often self-
absorbed—can do is remember who they were, what they did, and how
much we owe them.
Reprinted by permission of American Greatness. © 2024 Center for

American Greatness. All rights reserved.

Battalion Artist: A Navy Seabee’s Sketchbook of War
in the South Pacific, 1943–1945, by Janice Blake,
edited by Nancy Bellantoni. To order, call (800) 888-
4741 or visit www.hooverpress.org.

H OOVER A RCH IVES
The Last Years of

Nikola Tesla
A Hoover collection illuminates the ideas,
aspirations, and eccentricities of the “pure
scientific genius, a poet in science” who
begged the World War II Allies to help him
build a fantastical weapon to save his beloved
Yugoslavia.
By Ognjen Kovačević and Bertrand M. Patenaude
“I
’ve been honored to be asked to read a tribute to a great Ameri-
can, Nikola Tesla.” So began New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia
on WNYC radio on January 10, 1943, three days after the great
inventor’s death in Manhattan at age eighty-six. The eulogy was
written by Slovenian author and translator Louis Adamic. The half-hour broad-
cast opened with an “Ave Maria” played by Zlatko Baloković, a Croatian violinist
and friend of Tesla’s, who also played a Serbian patriotic song, “Tamo Daleko”
(“There, Far Away”). The eulogy stated that Tesla had “died in his humble hotel
room . . . . He died in poverty, but he was one of the most useful and successful
men who ever lived. His achievements were great and are becoming greater as
time goes on.” The fact that Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia were all represented in
the ceremony is testimony to Tesla’s enduring bond to his Yugoslav homeland.
Ognjen Kovačević is the metadata librarian at the Hoover Institution Library &
Archives. Bertrand M. Patenaude is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution
and a lecturer in history and international relations at Stanford University.

Digest]
A FRIEND IN NEED: Konstantin Fotić opposite, Yugoslavia’s ambassador to
the United States in 1935–44, exchanged many communications with Nikola
Tesla about his ideas and his circumstances. Fotić’s collection also holds
valuable materials related to the history of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav-US relations,
and postwar Serbian emigration to America. [Konstantin Fotić papers—Hoover
Institution Library & Archives]
BRILLIANT FLASHES: In a famous photo, the inventor sits calmly while
powerful bolts of electricity leap between poles in his Colorado Springs
laboratory. The photo is in fact a double-exposure, with Tesla’s photo
combined with that of the coil, and was published (without Tesla in it) to
accompany his long article in the Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine in
May 1900. “The scientific man does not aim at immediate result,” Tesla writes
at the end. “He does not expect that his advanced ideas will be readily taken
up. His work is like that of the planter—for the future.” [Dickenson V. Alley]
Nikola Tesla, the son of a Serbian Orthodox priest, was born in 1856 in the
Austrian Empire, the part that today belongs to the Republic of Croatia. At
the time of his birth and during his youth, the idea of South Slav unity was
gathering force. Tesla immigrated to the United States in 1884. During his
lifetime, he would witness the unification of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and
other ethno-national groups into one country, Yugoslavia (literally, the Union
of South Slavs); years of political turbulence and troubled relations between
the constituent nations of Yugoslavia; and finally, the demise of the kingdom
of Yugoslavia in the whirlwind of the Second World War. To the end, Tesla
remained loyal to Yugoslavia as well as to his adopted homeland, the United

INTO THE UNKNOWN: In 1901, Tesla began construction on Long Island of
Wardenclyffe Tower, a 187-foot-high structure intended for wireless com-
munication and power transmission, shown here incomplete. Details of its
construction and features are mysterious to this day. Tesla intended to use
the earth itself to carry the signals. Amid chronic financial struggles, he aban-
doned the project in 1906, and the tower was never operational. The structure
was demolished in 1917 and the property repossessed. Today, Tesla’s former
lab there survives as part of the Tesla Science Center at Wardenclyffe, but the
historic building was severely damaged in a November 2023 fire. [Public domain]
States. “He is a feather in the cap of the whole human race,” intoned La Guar-
dia, “and Yugoslavia and America can be proud of him.”
The eulogy lauded the scientific achievements and discoveries of the man
many consider the inventor of radio and the pioneer of modern methods for
generating and transmitting electrical power. Tesla’s first important inven-
tion came in 1888 in the form of the alternating current (AC) induction motor,
a method of converting energy to mechanical force superior in efficiency
to the use of direct current. In 1891, in his quest to develop a system for the

BATTLEGROUND: Nikola Tesla was acutely aware of Yugoslavia’s suffering
in war-torn Europe, and he devoted himself to seeking ways to defend his
homeland from abroad. In the late 1930s he desperately sought funding for
his “teleforce,” a proposed weapon that he claimed “will bring down a fleet of
10,000 enemy airplanes at a distance of 250 miles . . . and will cause armies
of millions to drop dead in their tracks.” Never one for modesty, he boasted the
weapon was “the most revolutionary technical advance in history.” [Historic
poster collection—Hoover Institution Library & Archives]
wireless transmission of energy and information, he came up with his best-

known invention, the Tesla coil, an electrical transformer that produced high
voltages with low currents. He devised an electric arc lamp, one of the hun-
dreds of patents he obtained, “as well as innumerable dynamos, transform-
ers, coils, condensers, and other electrical apparatus,” in the awed words of
an obituary in the New York Herald Tribune.
The Hoover Institution Library & Archives holds personal correspondence
and other documentation that shed light on Tesla’s final years: his last ideas,
inspirations, and eccentricities, as war clouds gathered over Europe and, after
war broke out, his beloved Yugoslav homeland was overrun and occupied by
the Axis forces. These materials can be found in the papers of Konstantin Fotić

HONORS: Vladimir Hurban, the head of the Czechoslovak mission in the
United States, presents Tesla the Order of the White Lion, his country’s high-
est medal, on the scientist’s eighty-first birthday, July 10, 1937. That same day,
Tesla was honored with the Grand Cordon of the White Eagle, Yugoslavia’s
highest order; it was the first time the award had been granted to a US citizen
for civil accomplishments. Yugoslav representative Konstantin Fotić, left,
watches. [Nikola Tesla Museum]
(1891–1959). The Serbian-born Fotić was the kingdom of Yugoslavia’s head of

mission and then ambassador to the United States in 1935–44. Fotić’s collection
contains valuable materials related to the history of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav-US
relations, and postwar Serbian emigration to America. Among these materials
are Tesla’s letters, telegrams, reports, and other items that the scientist sent
from his apartment in New York to the Yugoslav embassy in Washington.
A SECRET WEAPON
The Tesla legend has, if anything, grown stronger with time. In recent years
he has been called “the inventor of the twentieth century” and “the inventor

ALLIES: A World War II British poster, written in Serbo-Croatian, highlights
the pilots from many nations, including Yugoslavia, who are joining the
fight against Nazi Germany. Nikola Tesla sought to do his part for the war
effort by beseeching first Great Britain, then Canada and the United States,
to pay for the development of his secret weapon. Even after German troops
overran Yugoslavia in 1941, Tesla reassured his friend Fotić that he was
“preparing several discoveries for our homeland that will produce a complete
turnaround.” [Historic poster collection—Hoover Institution Library & Archives]
of the modern,” his name synonymous with bold ideas and inventions, with
cutting-edge creativity. His extraordinary achievements were accompanied
by an eccentric life, which has added to his legend. Mayor La Guardia noted
this dichotomy. Tesla retains a reputation as an eccentric genius known
for selflessly giving his ideas and inventions to the world: a pure scientific
genius, a poet in science.
The Hoover documents reveal a creative genius
working overtime and with growing
impatience—even exaspera-
tion and alarm—as he tries
to convince government
officials in the United
States, the United
Kingdom, and Canada
that he possesses the
scientific knowledge
to create a mechanism
capable of repelling

Digest]

the military threat posed by Nazi Germany. In 1934, he announced a new
invention: the “teleforce,” a defensive weapon capable of destroying enemy
forces and weapons across great distances. As reported in the New York
Times, it would “send concentrated beams of particles though the free air, of
such tremendous energy that they will bring down a fleet of 10,000 enemy
airplanes at a distance of 250 miles from a defending nation’s border and will
cause armies of millions to drop dead in their tracks.” The invention would
make war impossible,
Tesla claimed, by making
“every nation impreg- “He is a feather in the cap of the
nable against attack by whole human race,” said Mayor
airplanes or by large Fiorello La Guardia.
invading armies.”
Newspapers called it Tesla’s “death ray.” He rejected the name. His pro-
posed teleforce, Tesla insisted, would not project rays. But the name stuck,
much the same way that, in a later day, President Reagan’s Strategic Defense
Initiative was nicknamed “star wars.”
The Hoover archival documents pick up the story in 1937, as Tesla
implores British and Canadian officials to support the development of
his teleforce to defend against an attack from Nazi Germany, which Tesla
assumed was inevitable. “Even a projectile from the Big Bertha could not
penetrate the barrage of my machines without being exploded far from its
mark,” Tesla wrote to an official in the War Office in London on September
7, 1937, referring to a big German cannon. Tesla’s tone is self-assured, even
boastful, throughout these letters. The following month he appealed to
Major-General A. E. Davidson, the Director of Mechanization at the War
Office:
My discoveries and inventions for securing complete immunity

from any form of attack constitute the most revolutionary tech-
nical advance in history and will affect profoundly the future of
humanity. They will save millions of people and prevent destruc-
tion of property of inestimable value in all countries. They may
also be the means of preserving and strengthening the greatest
empire on earth.
Tesla demanded binding secrecy regarding all his communications and a

guarantee of payment, to be delivered as soon as his invention’s protective
power had been demonstrated, “without involved formalities or law-
yer’s hocus pocus.” A few weeks later, having received no immediate

CURRENT: Postwar Yugoslavia basked in Tesla’s aura, and the nations that
emerged from the violent breakup of Yugoslavia still contest his legacy.
The inventor appears on banknotes, coins, schools, and consumer goods—
even as the namesake of the international airport in Belgrade, Serbia. Here,
Serbia’s 100-dinar banknote features a familiar image of the young inventor,
along with the equation for the “tesla unit” (a measurement of the strength
of magnetic fields) and a cascade of sparks. On the back: a drawing of his
induction engine—and a dove.
reply from Davidson, he sent him another letter: “I remind you again respect-
fully that a barrage by my machines is the only possible remedy.”
Skepticism about the potential of Tesla’s proposed teleforce aside, a
major sticking point was that the inventor was asking for funds up front
in order to make good on
his promises. He believed
“His achievements were great and are that what he was asking
becoming greater as time goes on.” for was a small price to
pay in view of the expect-
ed payoff, and he grew exasperated when his proposal was not instantly
embraced. He again wrote to Davidson on February 8, 1938, to express
his incredulity that “his Majesty’s Government” could be so “amazingly
short-sighted and penurious.” If the British government failed to act, Tesla
wrote, the people will find out that Davidson and people in positions of
responsibility like him had done nothing to defend them and they will rise
up in revolution. “And I can predict, with almost mathematical certitude,”
the scientist said, “that your distinguished career would be quickly and
tragically terminated.”

Two days later, Tesla turned his attention toward the Canadian govern-
ment, appealing his case to Major General A. G. L. McNaughton, president of
the National Research Council in Ottawa. The letter’s barrage of extravagant
claims seems intended to overwhelm McNaughton’s defenses:
The system I have perfected for protection and other military

use is the result of many years of theoretical and experimental
research and happy inspiration. Its practical realization was
made possible through revolutionary discoveries I was fortu-
nate to make and [my] invention of new methods and means
for the generation, control, and transmission of non-disper-
sive energy under a tension exceeding twenty million volts I
attained in 1899 and of such intensity as to destroy attacking
aeroplanes at
great distances
and explode the The Hoover collection highlights
enemy’s shells Tesla’s last ideas, inspirations, and
while in flight. The eccentricities.
system embraces
an immense variety of subjects in the domain of mechanics,
electricity, physics, and other branches of industry and science
so that many volumes might be written in describing it.
Tesla argued that he could not make a convincing case for his invention
simply by providing a mere summary of his ideas. His scheme would have
to be spelled out in detail, which meant financing up front. “If something is
to be done I must meet your representatives well prepared to answer every
question and to prove everything, that is to say furnish, virtually, all informa-
tion to be contained in my full specifications which the disgusting stinginess
of the British Government has prevented me from producing—a vice that
may cause the fall of the Empire. To this end it would be necessary to prepare
condensed specifications, drawings, and diagrams.” The information could be
compiled within six weeks, Tesla wrote, at a cost of twelve hundred pounds
(about $150,000 in today’s dollars), “not including a reasonable compensation
for myself.”
DEFIANT FOR YUGOSLAVIA

Tesla shared the contents of the letters he sent to British and Canadian
officials with Ambassador Fotić in Washington, reiterating his sense of
exasperation about the reluctance to endorse his proposals. Throughout

this correspondence, as well as in his public statements, Tesla expressed his
concerns about the fate of Yugoslavia under the shadow of war and his desire
for his native land to draw closer to his adopted homeland.
The Yugoslav government showed its appreciation of his loyalty. On
his eighty-first birthday, July 10, 1937, Tesla was presented the Grand
Cordon of the White Eagle, the highest order of Yugoslavia, the first time
the order had been granted to an American citizen for civil accomplish-
ments. He was also, on this same occasion, the recipient of the Order
of the White Lion, the highest medal of the Republic of Czechoslovakia,
presented by Vladimir Hurban, the head of the Czechoslovak mission
in the United States.
In a letter to Fotić dated May 19, 1939, shortly after the opening of the New
York World’s Fair, where Yugoslavia was represented, Tesla conveyed his
deep sense of Yugoslav national pride. Most Americans would be “shocked”
to learn about Yugosla-
via’s extraordinary contri-
Tesla announced his teleforce was butions “to every field of
“the most revolutionary technical human activity,” he wrote.
advance in history and will affect The Axis forces invaded
Yugoslavia on April 6,
profoundly the future of humanity.”
1941. The country was
quickly overrun and surrendered after only twelve days, as young King Peter
II went into exile. The territory of Yugoslavia was divided among Germany,
Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and their protectorates, with the creation of the fas-
cist puppet Independent State of Croatia. The remains of the Royal Yugoslav
Army formed a nationalist-royalist resistance movement. After Germany
invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, Yugoslavia’s communists organized
their own resistance movement. In the beginning, the two organizations were
able to coexist. But their clashing ideologies and divergent views on politics,
national questions, and methods of fighting the occupation forces eventually
led to violent conflict between them.
Tesla remained defiant for Yugoslavia, insisting that, despite being
occupied and parceled out, the country remained whole and would ulti-
mately be victorious. As he wrote in a telegram to Fotić on May 11, 1941:
“The Germans now have 300,000 troops in Yugoslavia, but they would
need 6 million to defeat us and even then they wouldn’t succeed. I am pre-
paring several discoveries for our homeland that will produce a complete
turnaround and which will be made available immediately.” After Tesla’s
death, Ambassador Fotić recalled of him that “he was continually wor-
rying about what was happening to Yugoslavia and was distressed upon
hearing bad news from his native land. I am afraid that even though he
was advanced in years he would have lived much longer had it not been
for the terrible news of the sufferings which the war had inflicted upon all
humanity.”
WIZARD OF THE HOTEL NEW YORKER

Tesla’s personal financial situation, meanwhile, was increasingly precari-
ous. His communications with Ambassador Fotić almost always include
an urgent request for money. Even in his glory days of landmark discov-
eries and inventions, Tesla had been impractical when it came to money,
careless and luckless with protecting his patents. His lack of business
acumen enabled others to make fortunes from his inventions. Now, in his
final years, his situation
often seemed desper-
ate. He was living in the Only “the disgusting stinginess
Hotel New Yorker, near of the British Government,” Tesla
Penn Station in Mid- complained, stood between him
town Manhattan, on the and realization of his wonder
thirty-third floor, “in weapon.
one large room crowd-
ed with plans, boxes, and technical references [where] he conducts his
experiments and research,” as the New York Times reported in July 1938.
The famous inventor maintained a strictly vegetarian diet, with meals spe-
cially prepared for him by the hotel chef. Increasingly reclusive, he admitted
very few visitors. A hotel manager was quoted as saying, “He made everybody
keep at a distance greater than three feet.” Tesla’s eccentric behavior included
the daily feeding of thousands of pigeons at St. Patrick’s Cathedral and the
New York Public Library. When physical incapacity prevented him from con-
tinuing this activity, he hired a Western Union messenger boy to feed corn to
the pigeons twice daily. “Tesla probably could have become a rich man had he
chosen to become an employee of a large industrial concern,” wrote the New
York Times after his death, “but he preferred poverty and freedom.”
In these final years, Tesla’s bold promises of inventions that would defend
empires and turn back invaders became inseparable from his desperate
pleas for financial help. An outsider reading Tesla’s letters and unaware
of his tremendous accomplishments and his high self-regard might eas-
ily mistake them for the ravings of a bluffer desperate for money—never

mind that the requested assistance was intended almost exclusively to fund
his science, not himself. The incongruous coexistence of the genius and
the scrounger is best captured in a telegram he sent to Fotić in May 1942,
referring to the mortal threat posed by Hitler, which opens with a request
for $100 in one-dollar bills. “It is of unspeakable importance to the United
States, Yugoslavia, England, Russia, and other countries under the yoke of
the beast. My discover-
ies will destroy him like
“He would have lived much longer thunder out of a blue sky
had it not been for the terrible news within the year.”
of the sufferings which the war had Every July 10, Tesla
inflicted upon all humanity.” celebrated his birthday
with a luncheon at the
Hotel New Yorker, the occasion for the great scientist to unveil for the press
his newest super-invention. Reporters marveled at the spectacle, though not
all scientists were impressed, as a report in the New York Times noted on his
eighty-second birthday, in 1938:
For the last forty years Dr. Tesla has been the storm center of
scientific controversy. Recognized in the early part of his career
as the father of modern methods of generating and distributing
electrical energy, and pre-dating even Marconi in his experiments
with wireless, Dr. Tesla has been decorated by many governments
for his accomplishments. In recent years, however, it has been his
custom to announce at his annual parties the perfection of inven-
tions which some scientists have challenged as fantastic.
As the doubters pointed out, nearly all of Tesla’s major discoveries and
inventions had come in the final two decades of the nineteenth century. In
a 1934 profile of Tesla in the New York Herald Tribune, American journalist
Joseph Alsop noted that “over and over again he has been ridiculed as a luna-
tic.” After Tesla died, author Gerald W. Johnson wrote that toward the end
of his life “his eccentricity touched the very verge of sanity.” And yet even the
doubters were reluctant to dismiss him outright, conscious of the fact that he
was not some crackpot inventor but the great Nikola Tesla.
It was a point driven home by William Laurence, a Pulitzer Prize–win-
ning New York Times science reporter, in a profile published in September
1940, as the Battle of Britain was in full swing and the unrelenting German
bombardment Tesla had warned about was making headlines. Laurence,
an old acquaintance of Tesla’s, wrote that he “stands ready to divulge to the

United States Government the secret of his ‘teleforce,’ with which, he said,
airplane motors would be melted at a distance of 250 miles, so that an invis-
ible Chinese Wall of Defense would be built around the country against any
attempted attack by an enemy air force, no matter how large.” The inventor
stipulated that he would require a free hand, Laurence noted. “He would suf-
fer ‘no interference from experts.’ ”
Laurence understood the arguments of the skeptics, the idea that Tesla
had become a pathetic figure whose glory days were now long behind him. It
would require an act of faith to meet Tesla’s demand for money up front to
fund his project.
In ordinary times such a condition would very likely interpose

an insuperable obstacle. But times being what they are, and with
the nation getting ready to spend billions for national defense, at
the same time taking in consideration the reputation of Mr. Tesla
as an inventor who always was many years ahead of his time, the
question arises whether it may not be advisable to take Mr. Tesla
at his word and commission him to go ahead with the construction
of his teleforce plant.
Tesla told Laurence he needed $2 million (about $44 million today) to pro-
ceed with his project. The price might seem steep, Laurence observed, but $2
million was “a very small
sum compared with what
is at stake. If Mr. Tesla An obituary noted Tesla’s “world
really fulfills his prom- of fantasy crackling with electric
ise the result achieved sparks, packed with strange tow-
would be truly stagger- ers to receive and emit energy and
ing . . . . Considering the dreamy contrivances to give utopian
probabilities in the case
man complete control of nature.”
even if the chances were
100,000-to-1 against Mr. Tesla, the odds would still be largely in favor of taking
a chance on spending $2,000,000.” As for the notion that Tesla was over the
hill—or had wandered over the edge—Laurence countered that “he still retains
full intellectual vigor” and urged US defense officials to take his proposals seri-
ously. “The sum is insignificant compared with the magnitude of the stake.”
“POOR TESLA”
“Tesla passed away last night,” Ambassador Fotić wrote in his diary on
January 8, 1943. “The hotel maid found him dead in his bed. Poor Tesla,

was convinced that he would live 125 years.” Tesla’s death inspired reverent
tributes to the great scientist and his wondrous achievements. “If ever an
inventor satisfied the romantic requirements of a Jules Verne novel, it was
Nikola Tesla,” declared a New York Times editorial on January 9. “It was the
Jules Verne future that engrossed him, for which reason the last half of his
life was spent in the isolation of a recluse. For forty years he lived and worked
in a world of fantasy crackling with electric sparks, packed with strange
towers to receive and emit energy and dreamy contrivances to give utopian
man complete control of nature. It was a lonely life.” The elegiac tone makes
it seem as if the great Tesla had passed on long ago.
Tesla received an official state funeral under the auspices of the Yugoslav
government-in-exile, a service at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in Man-
hattan conducted in Serbian by the rector of the Serbian Orthodox Church
of St. Sava, in New York. The estimated 1,500 to 2,000 mourners included an
impressive array of inventors, scientists, government officials, and people of
distinction. Ambassador Fotić attended as chief representative of his govern-
ment. His papers contain the text of a eulogy he wrote for Tesla, which he
planned to read at the funeral:
Those of us who were privileged to be close to Tesla in his latter

days well know how hard he concentrated on his supreme task,
an invention which would transcend all other inventions, through
which he could banish war from the face of the earth. Pursuing
mankind’s endless quest to master still more of nature’s myster-
ies, Tesla spent many a long and solitary hour seeking to harness
the energy of the earth, of the sun, indeed of the whole universe
to work for the benefit of mankind . . . . His own life followed the
pattern of the world’s great poets, martyrs, and saints . . . . He was
good to his friends, to young people needing encouragement, to
the poor who needed help, but his great love was reserved for sci-
ence and for his two fatherlands.
At the end of the Second World War, Yugoslavia was restored, this time
as a federation of six “republics” under communist rule. Identification
LIGHT THE WAY: A bronze statue of Nikola Tesla (opposite) has stood at the
corner of Birch Street and Sheridan Avenue in Palo Alto since 2013. Artist
Terry Guyer created the figure, which re-enacts a Tesla experiment in wireless
light, and used crowdfunding to pay for it. True to its likeness, the statue emits
invisible energy—in this case, a wi-fi signal. [Bertrand M. Patenaude]

with Tesla remained strong there. His name was ubiquitous, used to
designate streets and squares, schools, companies, and scientific institu-
tions. His face was visible on banknotes, in textbooks, and as sculptures
along city streets. Tesla’s name was a potent common denominator for all
citizens of Yugoslavia.
Today, Yugoslavia is no more. More than twenty-five years after a vicious
ethno-national war among people in whose common future Tesla sincerely
believed, there are now separate South Slavic states—Slovenia, Croatia,
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and North Macedonia. In those
new states, historical figures—their ideas and achievements—are being
enlisted in the construction of new national historical narratives. One of the
most contested figures is Nikola Tesla, whose image appears today on both
the Serbian 100-dinar note and the Croatian euro cent coins. Belgrade’s
international airport is named for him. What would Tesla, a fervent believer
in a South Slav identity, have said about this? “I am equally proud of my
Serbian origin and my Croatian homeland,” Tesla once wrote to Dr. Vlatko
Maček, a leading Croat politician in the kingdom of Yugoslavia. “Long live all
Yugoslavs!” Perhaps his Yugoslavia was one of those inventions destined to
be regarded as fantastic.
Available from the Hoover Institution Press is War,

Revolution, and Peace in Russia: The Passages of
Frank Golder, 1914–1927, edited by Terence Emmons
and Bertrand M. Patenaude. To order, call (800)

This new exhibition from the Hoover Institution Library &
Archives tells the story of the political scandal that brought
down a president fifty years ago. Drawing on documents,
illustrations, books, and photographs, it explores how a
functioning democracy can demand accountability from
even the nation’s most powerful citizens.
Exhibitions in the Hoover Tower galleries at Stanford

University are free and open to the public.
Check here for hours and upcoming speakers:

hoover.org/events/un-presidented-watergate-and-power-america
On the Cover
G
erman-born artist and graphic designer Winold Reiss (1886–1953)
created this portrait of Wades in the Water, a leader and warrior
of the Blackfeet tribe. Reiss befriended many of the Blackfeet
beginning in 1920, when he first sojourned on their Montana
reservation. “After reading stories of the American West, my grandfather
decided to come to America with the express purpose of creating a perma-
nent living memorial to the Native culture and spiritual way of life with very
accurate portraits,” a grandson, Peter Reiss, said at a 2022 exhibit at the
Museum of the Plains Indian in Browning, as quoted in the D
aily Inter Lake.
Reiss also opened an art school and taught Blackfeet for free.
This calendar reframes the Old West for an age of steel. Starting in 1927, Reiss
painted many Indians, including Wades in the Water, for the Great Northern Rail-
way, whose “Empire Builder” Streamliners streaked across the country’s northern
edge and right through Glacier National Park, which was carved out of Blackfeet
lands. Even before Reiss came West, the railway had been using Indian imagery to
attract visitors to the park, where it operated a hotel and other amenities. Under the
slogan “See America First,” it invited travelers to see the first Americans. Blackfeet
were hired to “camp” for tourists, performing dances, songs, and ceremonies. Their
likenesses appeared on postcards, playing cards, train schedules, and menus.
Meanwhile, the Great Northern was building a future that pushed a former
way of life even further into the past. Founder James J. Hill settled waves of
immigrants along the tracks and boosted farming, logging, and shipping. He
completed his transcontinental route in 1893, the same year Frederick Jack-
son Turner declared the frontier closed. Ayn Rand wrote in 1966 that the GN
“was responsible, single-handed, for the development of the entire American
Northwest”—a mention that has endeared Hill to many libertarians, particu-
larly for his refusal to accept federal subsidies. (He also may have inspired
Atlas Shrugged.) Hill wrote a manifesto/memoir titled Highways of Progress.
Wades in the Water was a longtime Blackfeet police chief. His ordinary
chief’s attire—olive linen coat, brass buttons, red epaulets—is kept in the
Museum of the Plains Indian.
—Charles Lindsey

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FRO M H OOVER INSTITU TION PR E SS
Japanese America on the

Eve of the Pacific War
An Untold History of the 1930s
Edited by Eiichiro Azuma and Kaoru Ueda
An anthology of essays explores Japanese

American communities and US-Japan relations
in the 1930s, a vital history largely obscured by
events preceding and following the decade.

Discover how Japanese propaganda aided in fostering national identity
and mobilizing grassroots support for war in this volume of scholarly
essays and materials from the Hoover Institution Library & Archives.
This fall, don’t miss our related gallery exhibition in Hoover Tower at
Stanford University and expanded online exhibition.
Contributors include Michael R. Auslin, Toshihiko

Kishi, Hanae Kurihara Kramer, Scott Kramer,
Barak Kushner, Olivia Morello, Junichi Okubo,
Alice Y. Tseng, Taketoshi Yamamoto, and Tsuneo
Yasuda.
Essays on Socialism and
Free-Market Capitalism
from the Hoover Institution
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PROSPERITY
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Socialism or free-market capitalism: Which is better for achieving

human prosperity? The debate is long-standing—but some of
the results are in. Historians, economists, political scientists,
and other leading scholars review the evidence from multiple
perspectives, examining what it takes for a society to ﬂourish
and how well each economic and political system supports
its promises.

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HOOVER DIGEST
SPRING 2024 NO. 2
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HOOVER

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THE ROAD TO OPTIMISM

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What is the worldly religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his