NOTE: WHETHER A PERSON FROM ONE RELIGION CAN CLAIM THE RIGHT TO ENTER INTO THE

RELIGIOUS PLACE OF ANOTHER RELIGION?

NOTE 1:

 The right of entry into a temple or the rights under Articles 25 and 26
presumes the existence of the same sets of believers seeking entry into the
temple or any religious place.
 Any other interpretation of Articles 25 and 26 would render the right to
freedom of religion nugatory as it would mean any person of whichever
faith would be able to claim the right to enter into any religious place to
which he does not belong. This would be a violation of the right to
freedom of religion and an interference with the right to practise religion
freely.
 For instance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nar Hari Sastri (infra) stated
that since the worshippers seeking entry were both Hindus, there was
nothing wrong with their entry into the temple in question.

RELEVANT CASE: Nar Hari Sastri and Ors. v. Shri Badrinath Temple Committee,
1952 SCR 849, (Pages 860-862)

“It seems to us that the approach of the court below to this aspect of the case has
not been quite proper, and, to avoid any possible misconception, we would desire
to state succinctly what the correct legal position is. Once it is admitted, as in fact
has been admitted in the present case, that the temple is a public place of worship
of the Hindus, the right of entrance into the temple for purposes of ‗darshan‘ or
worship is a right which flows from the nature of the institution itself, and for the
acquisition of such rights, no custom or immemorial usage need be asserted or
proved. As the Panda as well as his client are both Hindu worshippers, there
can be nothing wrong in the one‘s accompanying the other inside the temple
and subject to what we will state presently, the fact that the pilgrim, being a
stranger to the spot, takes the assistance of the Panda in the matter of ‗darshan‘ or
worship of the deities or that the Panda gets remuneration from his client for the
services he renders, does not in any way affect the legal rights of either of them.

This right of entry into a public temple is, however, not an unregulated or
unrestricted right. It is open to the trustees of a public temple to regulate the time
of public visits and fix certain hours of the day during which alone members of
the public would be allowed access to the shrine. The public may also be denied
access to certain particularly sacred parts of the temple, e.g., the inner sanctuary
or as it is said the ‗Holy of Holies‘ where the deity is actually located. Quite apart
from these, it is always competent to the temple authorities to make and enforce
rules to ensure good order and decency of worship and prevent overcrowding in a
temple. Good conduct or orderly behaviour is always an obligatory condition of
admission into a temple [Vide Kalidas Jivram v. Gor Parjaram, I.L.R. 15 Bom. p.
309; Thackeray v. Harbhum, I.L.R. 8 Bom. p. 432], and this principle has been
accepted by and recognised in the Shri Badrinath Temple Act, section 25 of which
provides for framing of bye-laws by the temple committee inter alia for
maintenance of order inside the temple and regulating the entry of persons within
it [Vide Section 25(1)(m)].
 The true position, therefore, is that the plaintiffs‘ right of entering the temple
along with their Yajmans is not a precarious or a permissive right depending for
its existence upon the arbitrary discretion of the temple authorities; it is a legal
right in the true sense of the expression but it can be exercised subject to the
restrictions which the temple committee may impose in good faith for
maintenance of order and decorum within the temple and for ensuring proper
performance of customary worship. In our opinion, the plaintiffs are entitled to a
declaration in this form.

NOTE 2:
 There is a presumption that entry to temples only for “Hindus as such”.

RELEVANT CASE:

a. Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and Ors. v. State of
U.P. and Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 606

33. Thus, it could be seen that every Hindu whether a believer of Shaiva form of
worship or of panchratna form of worship, has a right of entry into the Hindu
Temple and worship the deity. Therefore, the Hindu believers of Shaiva form of
worship are not denominational worshippers. They are part of the Hindu religious
form of worship. The Act protects the right to perform worship, rituals or
ceremonies in accordance with established customs and practices. Every Hindu
has right to enter the Temple, touch the Linga of Lord Sri Vishwanath and himself
perform the pooja. The State is required under the Act to protect the religious
practices of the Hindu form of worship of Lord Vishwanath, be it in any form, in
accordance with Hindu Shastras, the customs or usages obtained in the Temple. It
is not restricted to any particular denomination or sect. Believers of Shaiva
form of worship are not a denominational sect or a section of Hindus but they
are Hindus as such. They are entitled to the protection under Articles 25 and 26
of the Constitution. However, they are not entitled to the protection, in particular,
of clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 as a religious denomination in the matter of
management, administration and governance of the temples under the Act. The
Act, therefore, is not ultra vires Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution

NOTE 3:

 In the Devaru case (infra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court again used the
word “Hindu public” to refer to those who may seek entry into a Temple
and not just any person or merely the “public”.
 That Articles 25 and 26 do not envisage any right of entry of a person from
one religion into the religious place of another is clear from the text of the
provisions.
 Even Article 25(2)(b), which throws open a public temples to all classes
and sections of Hindus does not admit of an unhindered and expansive
interpretation. This right of entry is not absolute and unhindered.

RELEVANT CASE:
a. Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, 1958 SCR 895: AIR 1958 SC 255

28. And lastly, it is argued that whereas Article 25 deals with the rights of
individuals, Article 26 protects the rights of denominations, and that as what the
appellants claim is the right of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins to exclude those
who do not belong to that denomination, that would remain unaffected by Article
25(2)(b). This contention ignores the true nature of the right conferred by Article
25(2)(b). That is a right conferred on “all classes and sections of Hindus” to
enter into a public temple, and on the unqualified terms of that Article, that
right must be available, whether it is sought to be exercised against an
individual under Art 25(1) or against a denomination under Article 26(b). The
fact is that though Article 25(1) deals with rights of individuals, Article 25(2) is
much wider in its contents and has reference to the rights of communities, and
controls both Article 25(1) and Article 26(b). (Emphasis supplied)

31. We agree that the right protected by Article 25(2)(b) is a right to enter into a
temple for purposes of worship, and that further it should be construed liberally
in favour of the public. But it does not follow from this that that right is absolute
and unlimited in character. No member of the Hindu public could, for example,
claim as part of the rights protected by Article 25(2)(b) that a temple must be kept
open for worship at all hours of the day and night, or that he should personally
perform those services, which the Archakas alone could perform. It is again a
well-known practice of religious institutions of all denominations to limit some of
its services to persons who have been specially initiated, though at other times,
the public in general are free to participate in the worship. Thus, the right
recognised by Article 25(2)(b) must necessarily be subject to some limitations or
regulations, and one such limitation or regulation must arise in the process of
harmonising the right conferred by Article 25(2)(b) with that protected by Article
26(b).

32. We have held that the right of a denomination to wholly exclude members of
the public from worshipping in the temple, though comprised in Article 26(b),
must yield to the overriding right declared by Article 25(2)(b) in favour of the
public to enter into a temple for worship. But where the right claimed is not one
of general and total exclusion of the public from worship in the temple at all times
but of exclusion from certain religious services, they being limited by the rules of
the foundation to the members of the denomination, then the question is not
whether Article 25(2)(b) overrides that right so as extinguish it, but whether it is
possible — so to regulate the rights of the persons protected by Article 25(2)(b) as
to give effect to both the rights. If the denominational rights are such that to give
effect to them would substantially reduce the right conferred by Article 25(2)(b),
then of course, on our conclusion that Article 25(2)(b) prevails as against Article
26(b), the denominational rights must vanish. But where that is not the position,
and after giving effect to the rights of the denomination what is left to the public
of the right of worship is something substantial and not merely the husk of it, there
is no reason why we should not so construe Article 25(2)(b) as to give effect
to Article 26(b) and recognise the rights of the denomination in respect of matters
which are strictly denominational, leaving the rights of the public in other
respects unaffected.

NOTE 4:
  The right of administering a temple will always vest with the religious
denomination.
 Under this right, the denomination can legitimately set conditions of entry.

RELEVANT CASES:

a. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra

Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005. (Pages 1028-1029)

“As we have already indicated, freedom of religion in our Constitution is not

confined to religious beliefs only; it extends to religious practices as well subject
to the restrictions which the Constitution itself has laid down. Under Article
26(b), therefore, a religious denomination or organization enjoys complete
autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential
according to the tenets of the religion they hold and 13 no outside authority has
any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters. Of course, the
scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with these religious observances
would be a matter of administration of property belonging to the religious
denomination and can be controlled by secular authorities in accordance with
any law laid down by a competent legislature; for it could not be the injunction of
any religion to destroy the institution and its endowments by incurring wasteful
expenditure on rites and ceremonies. It should be noticed, however, that under
Article 26(d), it is the fundamental right of a religious denomination or its
representative to administer its properties in accordance with law; and the law,
therefore, must leave the right of administration to the religious denomination
itself subject to such restrictions and regulations as it might choose to impose.”

b. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay and Ors., 1954 SCR 1055 (Page
1062)

“…In regard to affairs in matters of religion, the right of management given to a

religious body is a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation can take
away. On the other hand, as regards administration of property which a religious
denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has undoubtedly the right to
administer such property but only in accordance with law. This means that the
State can regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly
enacted; but here again it should be remembered that under Article 26(d), it is the
religious denomination itself which has been given the right to administer its
property in accordance with any law which the State may validly impose. A law,
which takes away the right of administration altogether from the religious
denomination and vests it in any other or secular authority, would amount to
violation of the right which is guaranteed by Article 26(d) of the Constitution.