EN BANC

G.R. No. L-4302 September 17, 1952

ANDRES PITARGUE, plaintiff-appellee,

Vicente Fontanosa for appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

On July 30, 1941, plaintiff-appellee filed a miscellaneous sale application for a parcel of land known
as cadastral lot No. 2777 situated at Elang, Kidapawan, Cotabato, and paid a deposit of P5 therefor
(Exhibit F).The Bureau of Lands acknowledged receipt of his application on November 22, 1941
(Exhibit E), and informed that it had referred to the district land office of Cotabato, Cotabato. Upon
receipt of his acknowledgment he started the construction of a small house on the lot, but the same
was not finished because of the outbreak of the war. In 1946 he had another house constructed on
the lot, which he used both as a clinic (he is a dentist)and as a residence. He introduced other
improvements on the land and these, together with the house, he declared for tax purposes (Exhibit
B), paying taxes thereon in 1947 and 1948 (Exhibits C and D). He placed one Cacayorin in charge of
the house, but Cacayorin left it on December 13, 1948. Thereupon defendant-appellant herein
demolished the house and built thereon one of his own. On December 17, 1948, plaintiff went to
defendant and asked the latter why he had constructed a building on the land, and the latter gave
the excuse that there was no sign of interest on the part of the one who had applied for it.

On March 9, 1949, plaintiff-appellee instituted this action of forcible entry in the justice of the peace
court, praying that defendant be ordered to vacate the lot usurped and removed the construction he
had made thereon, with monthly damages at P10. Thereupon defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
action on two grounds, namely, (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, as the
same falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, and 92) that the action is barred
by a prior judgment, because a previous criminal action for usurpation of real property filed by
plaintiff against him had bee dismissed. The justice of the peace court denied the motion on the
ground that the issue involved is as to who was in the actual possession of the lot in question on
December 14, 1948, which issue can be resolved only after the presentation of evidence (Record on
Appeal, pp. 26-27). Thereupon defendant filed an answer denying plaintiff's possession since 1946,
and alleging as special defenses (1) that the lot is an unawarded public land, which is already under
investigation by the Bureau of Lands, and (2) that defendant was already acquitted of a criminal
charge filed by plaintiff against him for usurpation of the real property. By way of counterclaim he
demanded P2,800 from plaintiff (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-33). On June 4, 1949, the justice of the
peace court declared itself without jurisdiction to try the case for the reason that the subject matter of
the action is the subject of an administrative investigation (Ibid., p. 39). Against this judgment plaintiff
appealed to the Court of First Instance. At first this court refused to take cognizance of the case, but
upon the authority of the case of Mago vs. Bihag, 44 Off. Gaz., (12) 4934, decided by the Court of
Appeals, it proceeded to try the case on the merits. After trial it found the facts already set forth
above, and sentenced the defendant to vacate the land and indemnify the plaintiff in the sum of
P100, with costs. Against this judgment this appeal has been presented, the defendant-appellant
making the following assignments of error in this brief:

1. The lower Court erred in trying the case when the land involved is a public land and
jurisdiction of which belong to the Land Department of the Philippines.
 2. The lower Court erred in trying the case when prior to the commencement of this action an
administrative case was (is) pending between the parts over the same land in the Bureau of
Lands and, as such, the latter has acquired first jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
action.

3. The lower Court erred in trying the case when the cause of this action is barred by a prior
judgment.

4. The lower Court erred in trying the case and rendering a decision on the merits when its
duty after it had determined that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction is to reverse
the order of dismissal of the inferior court and remand to it for further proceedings.

Under the facts and circumstances of the case the question now before us is as follows: Do courts
have jurisdiction to entertain an action of forcible entry instituted by a bona fide applicant of public
land, who is in occupation and peaceful possession thereof and who had introduced improvements,
against one who deprives him of the possession thereof before award and pending investigation of
the application? Defendant-appellant contends that as the administrative disposition and control of
public lands is vested exclusively in the Lands Department, cognizance of the forcible entry action or
of any possessory action constitutes a "prejudicial interference" with the said administrative
functions, because there is an administrative case pending in the Bureau of Lands between the
same parties over the same land. The record contains a certificate of a land inspector to the effect
that the investigation of the conflict between plaintiff-appellee herein and the defendant-appellant
has been suspended because of the trial of the criminal case for usurpation filed by plaintiff against
defendant-appellant. (See Record on Appeal, pp. 25-26.) We note from the certificate, however, that
while plaintiff's application is registered as MSA 9917, defendant-appellant does not appear to have
made any formal application at all.

It must be made clear at the outset that this case does not involve a situation where the Bureau of
Lands has already made an award of, or authorized an entry into, the public land. It is purely a
possessory action by a bona fide applicant who has occupied the land he has applied for before the
outbreak of the war under the ostensible authority of his application, which was given due course for
investigation, but as to which no approval has been given because investigation has not yet been
finished.

An ideal situation in the disposition of public lands would be one wherein those alienable and
disposable are yet unoccupied and are delivered to the applicants upon the approval of their
application, free from other occupants or claimants. But the situation in the country has invariably
been the opposite; lands are occupied without being applied for, or before the application are
approved. In fact, the approval of applications often takes place many years after the occupations
began or the application was filed, so that many other applicants or claimants have entered the land
in the meantime, provoking conflicts and overlapping of applications. For some reason or other the
Lands Department has been unable to cope with the ever increasing avalanche of applications, or of
conflicts and contests between rival applicants and claimants.

The question that is before this Court is: Are courts without jurisdiction to take cognizance of
possessory actions involving these public lands before final award is made by the Lands
Department, and before title is given any of the conflicting claimants? It is one of utmost importance,
as there are public lands everywhere and there are thousands of settlers, especially in newly opened
regions. It also involves a matter of policy, as it requires the determination of the respective
authorities and functions of two coordinate branches of the Government in connection with public
land conflicts.
Our problem is made simple by the fact that under the Civil Code, either in the old, which was in
force in this country before the American occupation, or in the new, we have a possessory action,
the aim and purpose of which is the recovery of the physical possession of real property, irrespective
of the question as to who has the title thereto. Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the accion
interdictal, a summary proceed in which could be brought within one year from dispossession
(Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291); and as early as October 1, 1901,
upon the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission) we
implanted the common law action of forcible entry (section 80 of Act No. 190), the object of which
has been stated by this Court to be "to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which
would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such withdrawal would
create that some advantage must accrue to those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the
possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in
the court to assert their claims." (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, 314.) So
before the enactment of the first Public Land Act (Act No. 926) the action of forcible entry was
already available in the courts of the country. So the question to be resolved is, Did the Legislature
intend, when it vested the power and authority to alienate and dispose of the public lands in the
Lands Department, to exclude the courts from entertaining the possessory action of forcible entry
between rival claimants or occupants of any land before award thereof to any of the parties? Did
Congress intend that the lands applied for, or all public lands for that matter, be removed from the
jurisdiction of the judicial Branch of the Government, so that any troubles arising therefrom, or any
breaches of the peace or disorders caused by rival claimants, could be inquired into only by the
Lands Department to the exclusion of the courts? The answer to this question seems to us evident.
The Lands Department does not have the means to police public lands; neither does it have the
means to prevent disorders arising therefrom, or contain breaches of the peace among settlers; or to
pass promptly upon conflicts of possession. Then its power is clearly limited to disposition and
alienation, and while it may decide conflicts of possession in order to make proper award, the
settlement of conflicts of possession which is recognized in the court herein has another ultimate
purpose, i.e., the protection of actual possessors and occupants with a view to the prevention of
breaches of the peace. The power to dispose and alienate could not have been intended to include
the power to prevent or settle disorders or breaches of the peace among rival settlers or claimants
prior to the final award. As to this, therefore, the corresponding branches of the Government must
continue to exercise power and jurisdiction within the limits of their respective functions. The vesting
of the Lands Department with authority to administer dispose, and alienate public lands, therefore,
must not be understood as depriving the other branches of the Government of the exercise of the
respective functions or powers thereon, such as the authority to stop disorders and quell breaches of
the peace by the police, the authority on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction over possessory
actions arising therefrom not involving, directly or indirectly, alienation and disposition.

Our attention has been called to a principle enunciated in American courts to the effect that courts
have no jurisdiction to determine the rights of claimants to public lands, and that until the disposition
of the land has passed from the control of the Federal Government, the courts will not interfere with
the administration of matters concerning the same. (50 C. J. 1093-1094.) We have no quarrel with
this principle. The determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands is different
from the determination of who has the actual physical possession or occupation with a view to
protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A judgment of the court
ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been
deprived thereof by another through the use of force or in any other illegal manner, can never be
"prejudicial interference" with the disposition or alienation of public lands. On the other hand, if
courts were deprived of jurisdiction of cases involving conflicts of possession, that threat of judicial
action against breaches of the peace committed on public lands would be eliminated, and a state of
lawlessness would probably be produced between applicants, occupants or squatters, where force
or might, not right or justice, would rule.
It must be borne in mind that the action that would be used to solve conflicts of possession between
rivals or conflicting applicants or claimants would be no other than that of forcible entry. This action,
both in England and the United States and in our jurisdiction, is a summary and expeditious remedy
whereby one in peaceful and quiet possession may recover the possession of which he has been
deprived by a stronger hand, by violence or terror; its ultimate object being to prevent breach of the
peace and criminal disorder. (Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil., 312, 314.) The
basis of the remedy is mere possession as a fact, of physical possession, not a legal possession.
(Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil., 752.) The title or right to possession in never in issue in an action
of forcible entry; as a matter of fact, evidence thereof is expressly banned, except to prove the
nature of the possession. (Second 4, Rule 72, Rules of Court.) With this nature of the action in mind,
by no stretch of the imagination can be conclusion be arrived at that the use of the remedy in the
courts of justice would constitute an interference with the alienation, disposition, and control of public
lands. To limit ourselves to the case at bar can it be pretended at all that its result would in any way
interfere with the manner of the alienation or disposition of the land contested? On the contrary, it
would facilitate adjudication, for the question of priority of possession having been decided in a final
manner by the courts, said question need no longer waste the time of the land officers making the
adjudication or award.

The original Public Land Law (Act 926) was drafted and passed by a Commission composed mostly
of Americans and as the United States has had its vast public lands and has had the same problems
as we now have, involving their settlement and occupation, it is reasonable to assume that it was
their intention to introduce into the country these laws in relations to our problems of land settlement
and disposition. The problem now brought before us was presented in an analogous case in the year
1894 before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Sproat vs. Durland, 2 Okl. 24, 35 Pac.
682, and said court made practically the same solution as we have thus:

. . . . This question is one of vital importance in Oklahoma. All our lands are entered, and title
procured therefor, under the homestead laws of the United States. The question arising out
of adverse possession, as between homestead claimants, daily confront our courts. To say
that no relief can be granted, or that our courts are powerless to do justice between litigants
in this class of cases, pending the settlement of title in the land department, would be the
announcement of a doctrine abhorrent to a sense of common justice. It would encourage the
strong to override the weak, would place a premium upon greed and the use of force, and, in
many instances, lead to bloodshed and crime. Such a state of affairs is to be avoided, and
the courts should not hesitate to invoke the powers inherent in them, and lend their aid, in
every way possible, to prevent injustice, by preventing encroachments upon the possessory
rights of settlers, or by equitably adjusting their differences. In the case under consideration,
no adequate remedy at law is provided for relief. Ejectment will not lie. Adams vs. Couch, 1
Okl. 17, 26 Pac. 1009. And, at the time this proceeding was instituted the forcible entry and
detainer act was insufficient in its provisions to afford a remedy. The appellee was entitled to
speedy relief, and ought not be compelled to await the final and tedious result of the litigation
in the interior department, before obtaining that which he clearly shows himself entitled to
have.

The action of forcible entry was then deemed insufficient in that state to prevent acts of trespass
interfering with an applicant's possession, so that the court ordered the issuance of an injunction.
The main issue involved, however, was whether pending final investigation and award the occupant
should be protected in his possession, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma said it should, issuing
an injunction to protect said possession.

The same conclusion was arrived at by the Supreme Court of Washington in the case of Colwell vs.
Smith, 1 Wash. T. 92, when it held:
 We will not decide between two conflicting claimants, both of whom are actually in
possession of certain portions of the claim in dispute, who is in the right, so far as to
dispossess one or the other from the entire claim, which would render it impossible for him to
prove that residence the law requires, and thus contest his claim before the register and
receiver; we can and must protect either party from trespass by the other, upon such portion
of the claim as may be in the actual exclusive possession of such party.

Resuming the considerations we have set forth above, we hold that the grant of power and duty to
the Lands Department to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the courts of their duty
or power to take cognizance of actions instituted by settlers or occupants or applicants against
others to protect their respective possessions and occupations, more especially the actions of
trespass, forcible entry and unlawful detainer, and that the exercise of such jurisdiction is no
interference with the alienation, disposition, and control of public lands. The question we have
proposed to consider must be answered in the affirmative.

Our resolution above set forth answers defendant-appellant's contention. We have, however, to go
further and explore another fundamental question, i.e., whether a public land applicant, such as the
plaintiff-appellee herein, may be considered as having any right to the land occupied, which may
entitle him to sue in the courts of justice for a remedy for the return of the possession thereof, such
as an action of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, or any other suitable remedy provided by law. In
the United States a claim "is initiated by an entry of the land, which is effectual by making an
application at the proper land office, filing the affidavit and paying the amounts required by . . . the
Revised Statutes. (Sturr vs. Beck, 133 U.S. 541, 10 S. Ct. 350, 33 L. Ed. 761.) "Entry" as applied to
appropriation of land, "means that act by which an individual acquires an inceptive right to a portion
of the unappropriated soil of the country, by filing his claim." (Ibid., citing Chotard vs. Pope, 25 U.S.
12 Wheat, 586, 588.) It has been held that entry based upon priority in the initiatory steps, even if not
accompanied by occupation, may be recognized as against as against another applicant.

In Hastings & Dakota R. v. Whitney, ubi supra, an affidavit for the purpose of entering land
as a homestead was filed on behalf on one Turner, in a local land office in Minnesota, on
May 8, 1865, Turner claiming to act under section 1 of the Act of March 21, 1864 (13 Stat.
35), now section 2293 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. As a matter of fact,
Turner was never on the land, and no member of his family was then residing, or ever did
reside, on it, and no improvements whatever had ever been made thereon by anyone. Upon
being paid their fees, the register and receiver of the land office allowed the entry, and the
same stood upon the records of the local land office and upon the records of the General
land Office, uncancelled, until September 30, 1872. Between May, 1865, and September,
1872, Congress made a grant to the State of Minnesota for the purpose of aiding in the
construction of a railroad from Hastings, through certain countries, to a point on the western
boundary of the western boundary of the State, which grant was accepted by the Legislature
of the State of Minnesota and transferred to the Hastings and Dakota Railroad Company,
which shortly thereafter definitely located its line of road filing its map in the office of the
commissioner of the General Land Office. All these proceedings occurred prior to the 30th of
September, 1872. This Court Declared that the almost uniform practice of the Department
has been to regard land upon which an entry of record, valid upon its face, has been made,
as appropriated and withdrawn from subsequent homestead entry, pre-emption, settlement,
sale or grant, until the original entry be cancelled or be declared forfeited, in which case the
land reverts to the government as part of the public domain, and becomes again subject to
entry under the Land Laws; and it was held that whatever defects there might be in an entry,
so long as it remained a subsisting entry of record, whose legality has been passed upon by
the land authorities and their action remained unreversed, it was such an appropriation of the
tract as segregated it from the public domain, and therefore precluded it from subsequent
grant; and that this entry on behalf of Turner "attached to the land" in question, within the
 meaning of the Act of Congress making the grant (14 Stat. 87), and could not be included
within it. And as to mere settlement with the intention of obtaining title under the Pre-emption
Law, while it has been held that no vested right in the land as against the United States is
acquired until all the prerequisites for the acquisition of title have been complied with, yet
rights in parties as against each other were fully recognized as existing, based upon priority
in the initiatory steps, when followed up to a patent. "The patent which is afterwards issued
relates back to the date of the initiatory act, and cuts of all intervening claimants. Shepley vs.
Cowan, 91 U.S. 330, 337 (23: 424, 426).

There are compelling reasons of policy supporting the recognition of a right in a bona fide applicant
who has occupied the land applied for. Recognition of the right encourages actual settlement; it
discourages speculation and land-grabbing. It is in accord with well established practices in the
United States. It prevents conflicts and the overlapping of claims. It is an act of simple justice to the
enterprise and diligence of the pioneer, without which land settlement can not be encouraged or
emigration from thickly populated areas hastened.

Our answers to the second problem is also in the affirmative, and we hold that even pending the
investigating of and resolution on, an application by a bona fide occupant, such as plaintiff-appellee
herein, by the priority of his application and record of his entry, he acquires a right to the possession
of the public land he applied for against any other public land applicant, which right may be protected
by the possessory action of forcible entry or by any other suitable remedy that our rules provide.

Having disposed of the most important questions raised on this appeal, we will next consider the
procedural question, i.e., that the Court of First Instance, after deciding the question of jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace favorably, should have remanded the case to that court for trial. The record
discloses that upon the docketing of the case in the Court of First Instance on appeal defendant-
appellant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court of First Instance granted. However, upon motion
for reconsideration filed by plaintiff, the trial court vacated this order of dismissal, and thereupon the
defendant presented his answer. There was no need of remanding the case to the justice of the
peace court for trial, because this court had already heard and tried the case evidently on the merits.
The case was, therefore, brought before the Court of First Instance on appeal and for a new trial, not
only on the question of jurisdiction but on the merits also.

The claim of bar by a prior judgment, because the action for usurpation of real property instituted by
plaintiff-appellee against defendant-appellant was dismissed, can not be sustained, for not only are
the parties in the previous criminal action and in this action of forcible entry not identical, but the
causes of action involved are also different. 1âwphïl.nêt

The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.