Police Facts - Merged

http://JUDIS.NIC.
IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 14

PETITIONER:
THE SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL PRISON,FATEHGARH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RAM MANOHAR LOHIA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
21/01/1960
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
BENCH:
SUBBARAO, K.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
SHAH, J.C.
CITATION:
1960 AIR 633 1960 SCR (2) 821
CITATOR INFO :
APL 1962 SC1106 (8)
APL 1962 SC1166 (15)
R 1963 SC 812 (10)
MV 1966 SC 740 (49,66)
RF 1967 SC1110 (16)
RF 1971 SC2486 (14)
RF 1973 SC1091 (6)
R 1974 SC 911 (2,4)
R 1987 SC 998 (4)
RF 1989 SC 371 (9)
ACT:
Fundamental Right-Infringement of-Enactment imposing
restrictions on freedom of speech-Constitutional validity-
Test-"In the interest of Public order". Meaning of-Doctrine
of severability-Applicability-Constitution of India, Arts.
19(1) (a), 19(2)U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932 (U.P. XIV Of
1932) s. 3.
HEADNOTE:
Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932 (XIV Of
1932), provided as follows:-
"Whoever, by word, either spoken or written, or by signs or
by visible representations, or otherwise, instigates,
expressly or by implication, any person or class of persons
not to pay or to defer payment of any liability, and whoever
does any act, with intent or knowing it to be likely that
any words, signs or visible representations containing such
instigation shall thereby be communicated directly or
indirectly to any person or class of persons, in any manner
whatsoever, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may
extend to six months, or with fine, extending to Rs. 250, or
with both."
The appellant, who was prosecuted under the section for
delivering speeches instigating cultivators not to pay
enhanced irrigation rates to the Government, applied to the
High Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground,
amongst others, that the said section was inconsistent with
Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and as such void. The
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 14
makes the ambit of protection very wide. A law may not have
been designed to directly maintain public order and yet it
may have been enacted in the interests of public order."
The learned Chief Justice again in Virendra v. The State of
Punjab (3) observed, at p. 317, much to the same effect:
"As has been explained by this Court in Ramji Lal Modi v.
The State of U.P. (1), the words "in the interests of" are
words of great amplitude and are much wider than the words
"for the maintenance of." The expression "in the interests
of" makes the ambit of the protection very wide, for a law
may not have been designed to directly maintain the public
order or to directly protect the general public against any
particular evil and yet it may have been enacted "in the
interests of" the public order or the general public as the
case may be."
We do not understand the observations of the Chief Justice
to mean that any remote or fanciful connection between the
impugned Act and the public order
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 860. (2) A.I R. (1954) Pat 254
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 308.
835
would be sufficient to sustain its validity. The learned
Chief Justice was only making a distinction between an Act
which expressly and directly purported to maintain public
order and one which did not expressly state the said purpose
but left it to be implied therefrom ; and between an Act
that directly maintained public order and that indirectly
brought about the same result. The distinction does not
ignore the necessity for intimate connection between the Act
and the public order sought to be maintained by the Act.
Apart from the said phrase, another limitation in the
clause, namely, that the restrictions shall be reasonable,
brings about the same result. The word "reasonable" has
been defined by this Court in more than one decision. It
has been held that in order to be reasonable, "restrictions
must have reasonable relation to the object which the
legislation seeks to achieve and must not go in excess of
that object". The restriction made "in the interests of
public order" must also have reasonable relation to the
object to be achieved, i.e., the public order. If the
restriction has no proximate relationship to the achievement
of public order, it cannot be said that the restriction is a
reasonable restriction within the meaning of the said
clause. A full bench decision of the Federal Court in Rex
v. Basudeva (1) contains some observations which give
considerable assistance to construe the words. In that
case, the appellant was detained in pursuance of the order
made by the Government of U.P. under the U.P. Prevention of
Black-Marketing (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947. The question
was whether the preventive detention provided for in s. 3(1)
(i) of the said Act was preventive detention for reasons
connected with the maintenance of public order. The
argument in that case ran on the same lines as in the
present case. The learned Advocate General there urged that
habitual black-marketing in essential commodities was bound
sooner or later to cause a dislocation of the machinery of
controlled distribution which, in turn, might lead to
breaches of the peace and that, therefore, detention with a
view to prevent such black marketing was covered by the
(1) A.I.R. (1950) F.C. 67
836
entry. Answering that argument, Patanjali Sastri, J.,as he
then was, pointed out, at p. 69:
"Activities such as these are so remote in the chain of
relation to the maintenance of public order that preventive
detention on account of them cannot, in our opinion, fall
within the purview of Entry I of List II...........The
connection contemplated must, in our view, be real and
proximate., not far-fetched or problematical."
The decision, in our view, lays down the correct test. The
limitation imposed in the interests of public order to be a
reasonable restriction, should be one which has a proximate
connection or nexus with public order, but not one far-
fetched, hypothetical or problematical or too remote in the
chain of its relation with the public order.
We shall now test the impugned section, having regard to the
aforesaid principles. Have the acts prohibited under s. 3
any proximate connection with public safety or tranquility ?
We have already analysed the provisions of s. 3 of the Act.
In an attempt to indicate its wide sweep, we pointed out
that any instigation by word or visible representation not
to pay or defer payment of any exaction or even contractual
dues to Government, authority or a landowner is made an
offence. Even innocuous speeches are prohibited by threat
of punishment. There is no proximate or even forseeable
connection between such instigation and the public order
sought to be protected under this section. We cannot accept
the argument of the learned Advocate General that
instigation of a single individual not to pay tax or dues is
a spark which may in the long run ignite a revolutionary
movement destroying public order. We can only say that
fundamental rights cannot be controlled on such hypothetical
and imaginary considerations. It is said that in a
democratic set up there is no scope for agitational approach
and that if a law is bad the only course is to get it
modified by democratic process and that any instigation to
break the law is in itself a disturbance of, the public
order. If this argument without obvious limitations be
accepted, it would
837
destroy the right to freedom of speech which is the very
foundation of democratic way of life. Unless there is a
proximate connection between the instigation and the public
order, the restriction, in our view, is neither reasonable
nor is it in the interest of public order. In this view, we
must strike down s. 3 of the Act as infringing the
fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution.
The learned Advocate General then contended that the section
is severable and that if so severed, the section may be made
to function within the limited field that stands the test of
Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. He asks us to read the
section as follows :
"Whoever, by word, either spoken or written, or by signs or
by visible representations, or otherwise, instigates,
expressly or by implication, any class of persons not to pay
or to defer payment of any liability, and whoever does any
act, with intent or knowing it to be likely that any words,
signs or visible representations containing such instigation
shall thereby be communicated directly or indirectly to any
class of persons, in any manner whatsoever, shall be
punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months,
or with fine, extending to Rs. 250, or with both."
By so doing he argues that instigation of a class of persons
only is made liable and thereby the section is rid of the
vice of unconstitutionality.
The doctrine of severability vis-a-vis the fundamental
rights is sought to be supported on the basis of the wording
of Art. 13(1) of the Constitution. Under that Article laws,
in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of
SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 10 Saturday, March 09, 2024
Printed For: Pranchal Rathi, Nirma University
SCC Online Web Edition: http://www.scconline.com
© 2024 Eastern Book Company. The text of this version of this judgment is protected by the law
declared by the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 paras 61, 62 &
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jolly George Verghese & Anr vs The Bank Of Cochin on 4 February, 1980
(2) Where appearance is not made in obedience to the notice, the Court shall, if the
decree-holder so requires, issue a warrant for the arrest of the judgment-debtor.
Right at the beginning, we may take up the bearing of Art. 11 on the law that is to be applied by an
Indian Court when there is a specific provision in the Civil Procedure Code, authorising detention
for non-payment of a decree debt. The Covenant bans imprisonment merely for not discharging a
decree debt. Unless there be some other vice or mens rea apart from failure to foot the decree,
international law frowns on holding the debtor's person in civil prison, as hostage by the court. India
is now a signatory to this Covenant and Art. 51 (c) of the Constitution obligates the State to "foster
respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one
another". Even so, until the municipal law is changed to accommodate the Covenant what binds the
court is the former, not the latter. A. H. Robertson in "Human Rights-in National and International
Law" rightly points out that international conventional law must go through the process of
transformation into the municipal law before the international treaty can become an internal law.
From the national point of view the national rules alone count.. With regard to interpretation,
however, it is a principle generally recognised in national legal system that, in the event of doubt,
the national rule is to be interpreted in accordance with the State's international obligations.
The position has been spelt out correctly in a Kerala ruling on the same point. In that case, a
judgment-debtor was sought to be detained under O. 21, r. 37 C.P.C. although he was seventy and
had spent away on his illness the means he once had to pay off the decree. The observations there
made are apposite and may bear exception:
The last argument which consumed most of the time of the long arguments of learned
counsel for the appellant is that the International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights are part of the law of the land and have to be respected by the Municipal
Courts. Article 11, which I have extracted earlier, grants immunity from
imprisonment to indigent but honest judgment-debtors.
The march of civilization has been a story of progressive subordination of property

rights to personal freedom; and a by-product of this subordination finds noble
expression in the declaration that "No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground
of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation." This revolutionary change in the regard
for the human person is spanned by the possible shock that a resuscitated Shylock
would suffer if a modern Daniel were to come to judgment when the former asks the
pound of flesh from Antonio's bosom according to the tenor of the bond, by flatly
refusing the mayhem on the debtor, because the inability of an impecunious oblige
shall not imperil his liberty or person under the new dispensation proclaimed by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Viewed in this progressive perspective we
may examine whether there is any conflict between s. 51 CPC and Article 11 of the
International Covenants quoted above. As already indicated by me, this latter
provision only interdicts imprisonment if that is sought solely on the ground of
inability to fulfil the obligation. Section 51 also declares that if the debtor has no
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1741605/ 6

means to pay he cannot be arrested and detained. If he has and still refuses or
neglects to honour his obligation or if he commits acts of bad faith, he incurs the
liability to imprisonment under s. 51 of the Code, but this does not violate the
mandate of Article
11. However, if he once had the means but now has not or if he has money now on
which there are other pressing claims, it is violative of the spirit of Article 11 to arrest
and confine him in jail so as to coerce him into payment..........
The judgment dealt with the effect of international law and the enforceability of such law at the
instance of individuals within the State, and observed:
The remedy for breaches of International Law in general is not to be found in the law
courts of the State because International Law per se or proprio vigore has not the
force or authority of civil law, till under its inspirational impact actual legislation is
undertaken. I agree that the Declaration of Human Rights merely sets a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations but cannot create a binding
set of rules. Member States may seek, through appropriate agencies, to initiate action
when these basic rights are violated; but individual citizens cannot complain about
their breach in the municipal courts even if the country concerned has adopted the
covenants and ratified the operational protocol. The individual cannot come to Court
but may complain to the Human Rights Committee, which, in turn, will set in motion
other procedures. In short, the basic human rights enshrined in the International
Covenants above referred to, may at best inform judicial institutions and inspire
legislative action within member-States; but apart from such deep reverence,
remedial action at the instance of an aggrieved individual is beyond the area of
judicial authority.
While considering the international impact of international covenants on municipal

law, the decision concluded:
Indeed the construction I have adopted of s. 51, CPC has the flavour of Article 11 of
the Human Rights Covenants. Counsel for the appellant insisted that law and justice
must be on speaking terms-by justice he meant, in the present case that a debtor
unable to pay must not be detained in civil prison. But my interpretation does put law
and justice on speaking terms. Counsel for the respondent did argue that
International Law is the vanishing point of jurisprudence is itself vanishing in a
world where humanity is moving steadily, though slowly, towards a world order, led
by that intensely active, although yet ineffectual body, the United Nations
Organisation. Its resolutions and covenants mirror the conscience of mankind and
insominate, within the member States, progressive legislation; but till this last step of
actual enactment of law takes place, the citizen in a world of sovereign States, has
only inchoate rights in the domestic Courts under these international covenants.

While dealing with the impact of the Dicean rule of law on positive law, Hood Phillips
wrote-and this is all that the Covenant means now for Indian courts administering
municipal law The significance of this kind of doctrine for the English lawyer is that it
finds expression in three ways. First, it influences legislators. The substantive law at
any given time may approximate to the "rule of law", but this only at the will of
Parliament. Secondly, its principles provide canons of interpretation which express
the individualistic attitude of English courts and of those courts which have followed
the English tradition. They give an indication of how the law will be applied and
legislation interpreted. English courts lean in favour of the liberty of the citizen,
especially of his person: they interpret strictly statutes which purport to diminish that
liberty, and presume that Parliament does not intend to restrict private rights in the
absence of clear words to the contrary.
The positive commitment of the States Parties ignites legislative action at home but
does not automatically make the Covenant an enforceable part of the corpus juris of
India.
Indeed, the Central Law Commission, in its Fifty Fourth Report, did cognise the
Covenant, while dealing with s. 51 C.P.C.:
The question to be considered is, whether this mode of execution should be retained
on the statute book, particularly in view of the provision in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibiting imprisonment for a mere
non-performance of contract.
The Law Commission, in its unanimous report, quoted the key passages from the
Kerala ruling referred to above and endorsed its ratio. 'We agree with this view' said
the Law Commission and adopting that meaning as the correct one did not
recommend further change on this facet of the Section. It is important to notice that,
interpretationally speaking, the Law Commission accepted the dynamics of the
changed circumstances of the debtor :
However, if he once had the means but now has not, or if he has money now on which
there are other pressing claims, it is violative of the spirit of Article 11 to arrest and
confine him in jail so as to coerce him into payment.
This is reiterated by the Commission:
Imprisonment is not to be ordered merely because, like Shylock, the creditor says:
"I crave the law, the penalty and forfeit of my bond."
The law does recognise the principle that "Mercy is reasonable in the time of
affliction, as clouds of rain in the time of drought."

Jolly George Verghese & Anr vs The Bank Of Cochin on 4

February, 1980
Equivalent citations: 1980 AIR 470, 1980 SCR (2) 913, AIR 1980 SUPREME
COURT 470, 1980 UJ (SC) 379, (1980) 1 APLJ 27, (1980) LS 18, ILR 1980 1
KANT 273, 1980 (2) SCC 360, (1980) 1 KANT LJ 193, (1980) 3 MAH LJ 153,
(1980) KER LT 375, (1980) 1 SCWR 396
Author: V.R. Krishnaiyer
Bench: V.R. Krishnaiyer, R.S. Pathak
PETITIONER:
JOLLY GEORGE VERGHESE & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE BANK OF COCHIN
DATE OF JUDGMENT04/02/1980
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
BENCH:
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
PATHAK, R.S.
CITATION:
1980 AIR 470 1980 SCR (2) 913
1980 SCC (2) 360
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1984 SC1213 (7)
R 1986 SC 180 (39)
RF 1990 SC 605 (20)
ACT:
Code of Civil Procedure-Section 51, Order 21, rule 37-
Scope of-Debtor, if could be imprisoned for failure to pay
his debts-Imprisonment when could be ordered.
HEADNOTE:
The appellants were the judgment-debtors while the
respondent-bank was the decree-holder. In execution of the
decree a warrant for arrest and detention in civil prison
was issued to the appellants under section 51 and order 21,
Krishna Kumar Singh & Anr vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 2 January, 2017
of those dates for the purposes of this clause.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which would not be valid if
enacted in an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, it shall be void:
Provided that, for the purposes of the provisions of this Constitution relating to the
effect of an Act of the Legislature of a State which is repugnant to an Act of
Parliament or an existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent
List, an Ordinance promulgated under this article in pursuance of instructions from
the President shall be deemed to be an Act of the Legislature of the State which has
been reserved for the consideration of the President and assented to by him.” 27 The
authority which is conferred upon the Governor to promulgate Ordinances is
conditioned by two requirements. The first is that an Ordinance can be promulgated
only when the state legislature is not in session. When the legislature is in session, a
law can only be enacted by it and not by the Governor issuing an Ordinance. The
second requirement is that the Governor, before issuing an Ordinance has to be
satisfied of the existence of circumstances rendering it necessary to take immediate
action.
The existence of circumstances is an objective fact. The Governor is required to form a satisfaction
of the existence of circumstances which makes it necessary to take immediate action. Necessity is
distinguished from a mere desirability. The expression “necessity” coupled with “immediate action”
conveys the sense that it is imperative due to an emergent situation to promulgate an Ordinance
during the period when the legislature is not in session. The Governor may then promulgate an
Ordinance “as the circumstances appear to him to require”. Both these requirements indicate a
constitutional intent to confine the power of the Governor to frame Ordinances within clearly
mandated limits. The first limit describes the point in time when an Ordinance may be promulgated
: no Ordinance can be issued when the legislature is in session. The second requirement conditions
the Ordinance making power upon the prior satisfaction of the Governor of the existence of
circumstances necessitating immediate action. The power conferred upon the Governor is not in the
nature of and does not make the Governor a parallel law making authority. The legislature is the
constitutional repository of the power to enact law. The legislative power of the Governor is
intended by the Constitution not to be a substitute for the law making authority of duly elected
legislatures. The same position would hold in relation to the Ordinance making power of the
President. Article 213(1) also specifies the circumstances in which the Governor cannot promulgate
an Ordinance without the instructions of the President. The three situations where the instructions
of the President are required are:
Where a Bill containing the same provisions requires the previous sanction of the
President, for its introduction into the legislature;
Where a Bill containing the same provisions would be deemed necessary by the
Governor for being reserved for consideration of the President; and Where a law
enacted by the state legislature containing the same provisions would require the

Krishna Kumar Singh & Anr vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 2 January, 2017
Krishna Kumar Singh & Anr vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 2

January, 2017
Author: Madan B. Lokur
Bench: L. Nageswara Rao, D Y Chandrachud, Uday Umesh Lalit, Adarsh

Kumar Goel, S.A. Bobde, Madan B. Lokur
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5875 OF 1994
KRISHNA KUMAR SINGH & ANR. .....APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

....RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5876-5890 OF 1994
WITH
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 580 OF 1995
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3533-3595 OF 1995
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. Having carefully read the erudite judgment prepared by brother Chandrachud, I regret my
inability to agree that laying an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor of a State before the State
Legislature is mandatory under Article 213(2) of the Constitution and the failure to lay an Ordinance
before the State Legislature results in the Ordinance not having the force and effect as a law enacted
and would be of no consequence whatsoever. In my opinion, it is not mandatory under Article

63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
63.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PETITIONER:
BHAGUBHAI DULLABHABHAI BHANDARI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA& OTHERS(with connected petiti
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
08/05/1956
BENCH:
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
BENCH:
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ)
JAGANNADHADAS, B.
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
CITATION:
1956 AIR 585 1956 SCR 533
ACT:
Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Bombay Act XXII of 1951), s. 56-
Constitutional validity-Order of externment-Restrictions-
Reasonableness-" Witness", scope of the word in the section-
Whether ,not applicable to members of the police force or
customs department Constitution of India, Art. 19.
HEADNOTE:
Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, is not
unconstitutional and does not contravene the provisions of
Art. 19 of the Constitution.
Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay ( [1952] S.C.R. 737),
followed.
In order to attract the operation of the section the Officer
concerned should be satisfied that the witnesses are not
willing to come forward to give evidence in public, but it
is not necessary to show that all the witnesses are
unwilling to give evidence. The terms of the section do not
justify any restricted meaning being given to the word
"witnesses" and it is applicable to members of the police
force and employees and officers of the Customs Department
also.
Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay ( [1952] S.C.R. 737),
explained.
Under the provisions of s. 56 of the Bombay Police Act,
1951, an order of externment was passed against the
petitioner by which he was directed to remove himself
outside the limits of Greater Bombay and not to enter the
said area for a period of two years without the prescribed
permission; and subsequently he entered Greater Bombay in
order to attend Court in a case pending against him in which
a warrant of arrest had been issued. He was convicted for
committing the breach of the externment order and he
contended that his conviction was in itself an indication of
the unreasonableness of the restriction.
Held, that the restrictions cannot be said to be
unreasonable, as the petitioner could have avoided the
prosecution. and the conviction by obtaining the previous
permission of the prescribed authority.
of the public residing therein".
The words "no witnesses" have been emphasized as supporting
the argument that unless all the witnesses before the police
are unwilling to give evidence in open court the provisions
of section 56 cannot be taken recourse to. In our opinion,
it is reading too much into the observations of this Court
quoted above, made by Mukherjea, J. (as he then was). The
learned Judge did not mean to lay down, and we do not
understand him as having laid down, that unless each and
every witness is unwilling to give evidence in open court,
the provisions of section 56 are not available to the
police. The words of section 56 quoted above do not lend
themselves to that extreme contention. If such an extreme
interpretation were to be put on that part of section 56, it
is not difficult to imagine a situation where it will become
almost impossible to apply that section to any case.
It was next contended on behalf of the petitioner in this
case that the section contemplates witnesses other than
members of the police force and employees and officers of
the Customs Department. It is said that it is the duty of
the police force as of the employees of the Customs
Department to brave all danger and to come out in the open
even against desperate criminals to give evidence against
them in court and to subject themselves to cross-
examination. That is a counsel of perfection which every
member
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 787.
71
548
of the police force or every employee of the Customs
Department may not be able to act up to. Furthermore, the
terms of the section do not justify any such restricted
meaning being given to the word "witness". Hence, in our
opinion, there is no justification for the contention that
members of the police force and employees and officers of
the Customs Department must always come in the open and give
evidence against criminals or potential criminals. If the
officer concerned is satisfied that witnesses of whatever
description they may be, are not willing to come out in the
open, one of the essential conditions of the application of
section 56 is fulfilled and it is no more necessary for them
to stop to consider as to which class of persons those
witnesses may come from.
In Petition No. 440 of 1955 the learned counsel for the
petitioner had a more uphill task in view of the fact that
this very order impugned bad been examined in the criminal
prosecution against the petitioner by the Presidency
Magistrate and by the High Court on appeal and the petition
for special leave to appeal to this Court had been refused.
But it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that section
56 itself wag invalid as contravening the provisions of
article 19 of the Constitution-an argument which has already
been dealt-with by this Court in Gurbachan Singh v. State of
Bombay(1) referred to above. In that case, Mukherjea, J.
(as he then was) delivered the judgment of the court after
examining the constitutionality of section 27(1) of the City
of Bombay Police Act, (Bombay Act IV of 1902). The
operative words of that section are almost exactly the same
as those of section 56 of the Act. It is not therefore
necessary to re-examine the constitutionality of those very
provisions in this case. It is enough to point out that no
attempt was made in this Court to ;bake the authority of
that decision.
Shri Dadachanji, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner in
this case faintly suggested that the petitioner had been
proceeded against under the penal sec-
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 737.
549
tion of the Act notwithstanding the fact that he had entered
Greater Bombay in order to look after the case pending
against him in which a warrant of arrest had been issued.
But that is a closed chapter so far as the courts including
this Court also are concerned inasmuch as his conviction
stands conformed as a result of the refusal of this Court to
grant him -special leave to appeal from the, judgment of the
Bombay High Court. He further contended that his conviction
for his’ having entered Greater Bombay itself is an
indication of the unreasonableness of the restriction and of
the law under which the order of externment had been passed
against him. But if the petitioner had only taken the
course indicated by the law, namely, of obtaining the
previous permission of the prescribed authority, he could
have avoided the prosecution and the conviction. It must
therefore be held that there is no merit in this contention
also.
For the reasons aforesaid it must be held that section 56 of
the Act is not unconstitutional -and that the orders passed
against the petitioners are not invalid. These applications
must stand dismissed.
JAGANNADHADAS J.-In view of the decision of this Court in
Gurbachan Singh v. The State of Bombay(1), I agree that
these petitions should be dismissed.
But I think it right to add that if the matter were res
integra I should have felt difficulty in upholding the
validity of section 56(b) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951
(Bombay Act XXII of 1951) in so far as it did not demarcate
the application thereof to the more serious classes of
offences falling within the specified Chapters, serious
either because of the nature of the offence contemplated or
the circumstances under which it is to be committed and so
forth. I should also have felt difficulty in holding a
provision to be reasonable which clothes the executive
officers with an authority to extern a person for so long a
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 737.
550
period as two years. it has been said that there is a power
of cancellation at any time vested in the officer concerned.
Even so, I should have thought that the vesting of a power
to extern, a person out of his home for so long a period
without the obligation to review the order at some stated
periodical intervals, say once in three months or six
months, is prima facie unreasonable. Externment might
appear on the surface -not to be as serious an interference
with personal liberty as detention. But in actual practice
it may be productive of more serious injury to the person
concerned-or the rest of his family if he is the earning
member. An externed person is virtually thrown on the
streets of another place where be has got to seek his
livelihood afresh. He has to start in a new society with
the black-mark -of externment against him and may be driven
thereby to more criminality. On the other hand, in the case
of a person under detention, the State normally takes or is
bound to take care of him, and in appropriate cases provides
also for his family.
In view, however, of the previous decision of this Court
which is binding on me, I am prepared to accept the validity
of section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, and of the
orders of externment passed thereunder in these two cases.
Petition dismissed.
551

Police Facts - Merged

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Police Facts - Merged

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Police Facts - Merged

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

http://JUDIS.NIC.

IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 14

The march of civilization has been a story of progressive subordination of property

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1741605/ 6

While considering the international impact of international covenants on municipal

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1741605/ 7

This is reiterated by the Commission:

"I crave the law, the penalty and forfeit of my bond."

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1741605/ 8

Jolly George Verghese & Anr vs The Bank Of Cochin on 4

Author: V.R. Krishnaiyer

Bench: V.R. Krishnaiyer, R.S. Pathak

of those dates for the purposes of this clause.

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/107225908/ 36

Krishna Kumar Singh & Anr vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 2

Author: Madan B. Lokur

Bench: L. Nageswara Rao, D Y Chandrachud, Uday Umesh Lalit, Adarsh

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5875 OF 1994

KRISHNA KUMAR SINGH & ANR. .....APPELLANTS

STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5876-5890 OF 1994

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 580 OF 1995

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3533-3595 OF 1995

Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/107225908/ 1

You might also like

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.