Rights of The Accused

TIMBANGAN, RAIHANA S.
JD106 - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RULE 115: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
MONICO V. JACOB and CELSO L. LEGARDA, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010]
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division gave the following reasons for overruling Justice
Nario’s verbal order dismissing the criminal cases against the accused in the alleged tax credit
scam:
In the present case, there is already a delay of the trial for more than one year now; (2) but it is
not shown that the delay is vexatious, capricious and oppressive; (3) it may be that, as stated in the
herein dissented Resolution, "at the hearings conducted in these cases, the defense orally, openly
and consistently asked for the dismissal of these cases"; however, these oral manifestations were
more of "knee-jerk reactions" of the defense counsel in those hearings everytime the prosecution
requested for postponement than anything else as said defense counsel did not seriously pursue the
dismissal of these cases, such as by reducing their "request" in a formal written motion to dismiss
and/or insisting that the court formally rule on their request for dismissal and go on certiorari if
denied; and (4) considering the nature and importance of the cases, if there is any prejudice that
may have resulted as a consequence of the series of postponements, it would be more against the
government than against any of the accused; however, be that as it may, none of the herein accused
has come out to claim having been thus prejudiced.
he Sandiganbayan Fourth Division ruled in the prosecution’s favor and denied all the motions filed
by the accused, to wit:
Wherefore, premises considered, this court issues an Omnibus Resolution denying all the above-
described Motion to Quash for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Won the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying petitioners’ right to speedy trial.
RULING:
Yes.
An accused’s right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases
by Section 14, Article III of the Constitution.
Here, there had been no other significant development in the cases since the prosecution repeatedly
requested for deferment or postponement of the scheduled hearings as it awaits the result of the
reinvestigation of the Office of the Ombudsman. Judge Nario verbally ordered the dismissal of
said cases during the hearing on August 20, 2001. Thus, the criminal cases had been pending for
about a year and four months by the time they were dismissed by Justice Nario.
EDGAR CRISOSTOMO, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
[G.R. NO. 152398, April 14, 2005]
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Only Crisostomo and Calingayan stood trial. The other accused, dela Cruz, Perez, Anggo, Lumabo
and Norberte were at large. The Sandiganbayan found sufficient circumstantial evidence to
convict Crisostomo and Calingayan of murder. The Sandiganbayan relied on the autopsy and
exhumation reports in disregarding the defense theory that Renato committed suicide by hanging
himself with a blanket. The Sandiganbayan thus held:
Premises considered, accused Edgar Crisostomo and Mario Calingayan are hereby found guilty of
the crime of murder.
xxx
There being no attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the case of accused Edgar
Crisostomo, and taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the period from twelve (12) years, five (5) months and
eleven (11) days of prision mayor, minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, maximum.
xxx
As to the other accused, Dominador C. Dela Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A.
Lumabo and Rolando M. Norberte, considering they are still at-large up to the present time, let
an alias warrant of arrest be issued against them. In the meantime, the cases against them are
hereby ordered archived.
ISSUE:
Whether or not even assuming arguendo that the respondent court has jurisdiction, whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it ruled that Crisostomo is guilty of having conspired in the murder of renato despite the
Sandiganbayan's admission in its decision that there is no direct evidence that will show the
participation of Crisostomo in the death of the victim.
RULING:
YES.
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomo's non-
appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on
such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates.62 Section 1(c) of Rule 115 clearly states that:
xxx The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of
which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When
an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed
to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody
is regained.
Here, the Sandiganbayan's error is obvious. Strictly speaking, Crisostomo failed to appear only on
the 22 June 1995 hearing. Crisostomo's appearance on the 21 June 1995 hearing would not have
mattered because the hearing on this date was cancelled for lack of quorum of justices in the
Sandiganbayan's Second Division.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ADONES ABATAYO, appellant.
[G.R. No. 139456, July 7, 2004]
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
The appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution, Juanito Gutang, considering that his counsel was not able to
continue cross-examining the witness. He strongly argues that his constitutional and procedural
right to confront the witness against him was thereby impaired. Citing Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa
German Airlines32 as the case in point, the appellant faults the trial court for relying on Juanito’s
testimony despite the warning it made during the trial of January 23, 1995, that it would consider
the entire testimony of Juanito stricken off the record for lack of proper cross-examination.33
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that while the appellant has the
constitutional right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, he waived such right when he
failed to invoke the same after his initial cross-examination of Juanito.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not ordering the striking out of the entire testimony of the
prosecution[’s] alleged eyewitness Juanito Gutang anent the crime charged in view of his
unjustified failure to allow himself to be further cross-examined pursuant to its order dated January
23, 1995.
RULING:
No..
In Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, we ruled that the right to confront
the witness may be waived by the accused, expressly or impliedly.
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial

litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals
with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However,
the right is a personal one which may be waived, expressly or impliedly, by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to cross-
examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying the
application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for
reasons attributable to himself alone.
Here, we are convinced that the appellant waived his right to further cross-examine Juanito. The
records show that Juanito testified for the prosecution on direct examination on November 22,
1994. Thereafter, the appellant’s counsel cross-examined the witness on the corpus delicti. He then
moved for a resetting as he still had many questions to ask the witness. Juanito failed to attend the
trial on January 23, 1995 for the continuation of his cross-examination because he had a fever. The
appellant did not object to the deferment of Juanito’s cross-examination; neither did he object to
the public prosecutor’s presentation of Apolonio Quilag as its second witness. The trial was reset
to March 2, 1995 for the continuation of Juanito’s cross-examination.39 However, no subpoena ad
testificandum was issued to Juanito for the said trial. There is, likewise, no showing whether
Juanito was in court on March 2, 1995 when the case was called. Furthermore, the appellant did
not object when the public prosecutor presented PO2 Andales and Silvina Basalan as witnesses.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN
alias "WESLEY;" ALBERT CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG;
DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias 'TISOY TAGALOG;" JAMES ANTHONY UY alias
"WANGWANG;" and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM," Appellants.
[G.R. Nos. 138874-75, January 31, 2006]
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the Uy brothers, together with Francisco
Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag of the crimes
of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape;
and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused James Andrew s. Uy was, like his younger brother James Anthony s. Uy,
a minor at the time the offenses at bar allegedly happened last July 16, 1997
RULING:
Yes.
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the offender
is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph
next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower than
the statutory penalty. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion
perpetua.5 On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion temporal.6 There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James Andrew is reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced
to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
MIKE ALVIN PIELAGO y ROS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013]
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
In its Decision9 dated May 31, 2010, the RTC stated that it is necessary to determine the actual or
proper crime against the accused in view of the discrepancy between the crime charged in the
Information and the factual allegations contained therein. On its face, the Information charged the
crime of acts of lasciviousness against Pielago. However, the factual allegations contained in the
Information and the provisions of existing laws pertain to the crime of rape by sexual assault
defined and penalized under Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8353.10 The trial court explained that the testimony of AAA merits full credit
despite her tender age. Her clear, candid and straightforward testimony categorically narrated how
Pielago successfully ravished her innocence when he inserted his finger into her vagina and anus
that caused her to feel pain in her genital parts. Indeed, AAA’s positive identification of Pielago
as her molester convinced the trial court to believe her version of what indeed transpired between
them.
ISSUE:
Whether the honorable ca erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of rape by sexual assault
despite his being charged in the information for acts of lasciviousness only.
RULING:
NO.
It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.24
Apparently, in the instant case, Pielago failed to prove the alleged ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses that led to the false charges against him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ESPERA Y
CUYACOT, Accused-Appellant.
[G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013]
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
This an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-
CR-H.C. No. 000923 denying the appeal of the appellant Michael Espera and affirming (with
modification of the damages awarded) the Omnibus Decision2 dated September 21, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52 in Criminal Case Nos. 99-511 and 99-
512, which found the appellant guilty of the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual
intercourse.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant’s guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Yes.
An accused enjoys the presumption of innocence until and unless his/her guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The fundamental law guarantees him/her that right. The presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused behooves the People of the Philippines, as the plaintiff in
criminal cases, to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only each element of the crime but also the
identity of the accused as the criminal.
Here, the prosecutionï¿½s evidence on the identity of the appellant as the offender is clear and
unmistakable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
CESAR CANTALEJO y MANLANGIT, Appellant.
[G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009]
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
In a Decision dated 28 April 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103
found appellant guilty of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, CESAR CANTALEJO y

MANLANGIT, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, R.A.
9165 (drug pushing) as charged and he (sic) sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and ordered to
pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The plastic sachet of shabu involved in this case is ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru the DDB
for proper disposition per R.A. 9165.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting him as the constitutional presumption of
innocence in his favor had not been overthrown;
RULING:
Yes.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent
and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.27 The presumption of
regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.28
All told, the totality of evidence presented in the instant case does not support appellant’s
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. Following the constitutional
mandate, when the guilt of the appellant has not been proven with moral certainty, as in this case,
the presumption of innocence prevails and his exoneration should be granted as a matter of right.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS BARASINA y LAYNEZA, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 109993 January 21, 1994]
MELO, J.:
FACTS:
The cross examination of prosecution witness Felipe Hamtig was not completed because he did
not return despite the issuance of subpoena and a warrant for his arrest. Hamtig testified on direct
examination on May 10, 1989. A partial cross-examination was conducted. Because of the failure
of Hamtig to return for the completion of the cross-examination, accused through counsel moved
to strike out the records the entire testimony of Felipe Hamtig. The principal basis of the Motion
is the right of the accused to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against as mentioned under
Sec. 14, Article III of the Constitution of the Philippines; as stated under paragraph F of Rule 115
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and as listed in paragraph 6 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. This was opposed by the Public Prosecutor in his Memorandum of August 4,
1989.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite insufficient evidence adduced by the
prosecution.
RULING:
No.
Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution dealing with the rights of a person undergoing
investigation reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of a counsel.
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial
Fiscal of Isabela, respondents.
[G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929]
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
FACTS:
There is no question as to the facts alleged in the complaint filed in these proceedings; but the
respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the
order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and again which the
instant action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code
and on the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718); United States vs.
Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145); United States vs. Ong Siu Hong (36 Phil., 735), cited by counsel for the
respondents, and in the case of Villaflor vs. Summers (41 Phil., 62) cited by the judge in the order
in question.
Of course, the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon
motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime or
misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of
persons cited to appear.
ISSUE:
RULING:
As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or
furnishing of evidence.
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision that no man accused of
crime shall be compelled to be a witness against himself is so sacred, and the pressure
toward their relaxation so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence
obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to construe the prohibition in favor of personal
rights, and to refuse to permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the
well-established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving
of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by
word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold
secret. (28 R. C. L., paragraph 20, page 434 and notes.)
RULE 116: ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
ESTRELLA TAGLAY, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY and LOVERIE
PALACAY, respondents
[G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012]
FACTS:
On June 19, 2001, a Criminal Complaint for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling was filed against
petitioner Estrella Taglay with the 5th MCTC of Sta. Maria-Malita-Don Marcelino, Davao del Sur.
After finding probable cause, the Public Prosecutor assigned to handle the case filed an
Information against Taglay on November 19, 2001.
Upon arraignment on June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial conference was set on
August 13, 2002.
However, on August 15, 2002 the MCTC issued an order transferring the trial to Branch 20,
Regional Trial Court, Digos City since private complainant was still a minor when the incident
happened. Hence, the case was transferred to the RTC of Digos City where the petitioner was
brought to trial.
Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the presentation of the final witness for
the prosecution, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner contended that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because the MCTC
erroneously transferred the case to the RTC instead of dismissing it. Petitioner also argued that the
RTC’s lack of jurisdiction was further aggravated when she was not arraigned before the RTC.
On March 9, 2004, the RTC issued a ruling that it acquired jurisdiction over the case when it
received the records of the case as a consequence of the transfer effected by the MCTC; that the
transfer of the case from the MCTC is authorized under A. M. No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No.
11-99; that there is no doubt that the offended party is a minor and, thus, the case falls within the
original jurisdiction of Family Courts pursuant to R.A. 8369. The RTC also held that even granting
that there was defect or irregularity in the procedure because petitioner was not arraigned before
the RTC, such defect was fully cured when petitioner’s counsel entered into trial without objecting
that his client had not yet been arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC noted that petitioner’s counsel
has cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should have been arraigned anew before the RTC and that her
arraignment before the MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted therein were
void.
RULING:
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. Considering that the MCTC has no
jurisdiction, all the proceedings conducted therein, including petitioner’s arraignment, are null and
void. Thus, the need for petitioner’s arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the
RTC.
It is also true that petitioner’s counsel participated in the proceedings held before the RTC without
objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the RTC to rely on
the case of People v. Cabale, because the accused therein was in fact arraigned, although the same
was made only after the case was submitted for decision. In the similar cases of People v. Atienza
and Closa and People v. Pangilinan, the accused in the said cases were also belatedly arraigned.
The Court, in these three cases, held that the active participation of the counsels of the accused, as
well as their opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses during trial without objecting
on the ground that their clients had not yet been arraigned, had the effect of curing the defect in
the belated arraignment. Moreover, the accused in these cases did not object when they were
belatedly arraigned. The same, however, cannot be said in the instant case. There is no arraignment
at all before the RTC. On the other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and
void. Thus, there is nothing to be cured. Petitioner’s counsel also timely raised before the RTC the
fact that her client, herein petitioner, was not arraigned.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment
is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm
of the State is mobilized against him. As an indispensable requirement of due process, an
arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily. Otherwise, absence of
arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD, Accused-Appellant.
[G.R. No. 171020, March 14, 2007]
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 9 June 1999, the trial court, having discovered that appellant had not yet been arraigned,
scheduled his arraignment. On 17 June 1999, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.11 Since the prosecution adopted all the evidence it
adduced during the hearing for the petition for bail as part of its evidence-in-chief, which evidence
the trial court admitted, the trial court deemed the cases submitted for decision.
In its Decision dated 9 September 1999, the trial court convicted appellant of two counts of rape
and imposed on him the capital punishment for each count.
ISSUE:
Won the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of rape
despite the fact that he was not properly arraigned, and was not informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him before the evidence for the prosecution was presented.
RULING:
NO.
In People v. Cabale22 and People v. Atienza23 where the same issue was raised under similar
circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of appellant was conducted after the cases had
been submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since appellant’s
rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follows that his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not
violated.
Appellant’s belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his
counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.
In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active
participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against
him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder. Moreover,
no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the
procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two
death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is already too
late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it.
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008]
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute
the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of
guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal
is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime
of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to
the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in
the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a
plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
ISSUE:
WON Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer.
RULING:
Yes.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner
and the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the
public. The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize
the seriousness of the charges against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public
office that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would
have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities
far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of
the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government."
NURULLAJE SAYRE Y MALAMPAD @ "INOL", PETITIONER,
VS.
HON. DAX GONZAGA XENOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PANABO CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 34;
HON. MENARDO I. GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020]
CARANDANG, J.:
FACTS:
Sayre was charged with violation of Sections 5, 11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9165,6 in three separate Information.
On November 9, 2017, Sayre filed a Proposal for Plea Bargaining11 and manifested as follows:
Today, he wanted to plea bargain Section 5 and 11 to a lesser offense under Section 12, which
carries with [it] a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and 1 day to four (4) years. Moreover,
for Section 12, penalty of compulsory 6-month rehabilitation. These proposals are without
prejudice however to the guidelines on plea bargaining yet to be released by the Supreme Court,
whichever is most favorable and beneficial to the accused; x x x12
Pursuant to Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 90-2018, adopting the Court
En Banc Resolution dated April 10, 2018 in Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 18-03-16-SC
(Adoption of the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases), Sayre filed a Motion for Approval
of Plea-Bargaining Proposal with Modification.
ISSUE:
Whether the provision in DOJ Circular No. 27 pertaining to plea-bargaining under Section 5 to
Section 11 of R.A. 9165, penalized with imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, is unconstitutional
as it repealed, altered, or modified the more favorable plea bargaining provision under OCA
Circular No. 90-2018, a procedural rule promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc, in violation
of the rule-making power of the Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
RULING:
NO.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court expressly states:
Sec 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Emphasis supplied.)
Taking into consideration the requirements in pleading guilty to a lesser offense, We find it proper
to treat the refusal of the prosecution to adopt the acceptable plea bargain for the charge of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs provided in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as a continuing objection that should
be resolved by the RTC. This harmonizes the constitutional provision' on the rule making power
of the Court under the Constitution and the nature of plea bargaining in Dangerous Drugs cases.
DOJ Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No.
18-03-16-SC.
BERT PASCUA Y VALDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
[G.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020]
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations8 filed before the RTC, docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 18805 and 18806, respectively charging Pascua with violations of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165 for selling 0.024 gram and possessing 0.054 gram of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.9 Upon arraignment, Pascua pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged.
However, he later filed a Motion to Allow Accused to Enter into Plea Bargaining
Agreement wherein he offered to enter a plea of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of
Section 12,10 Article II of RA 9165 for both criminal cases.11 The prosecution filed its Comment
and Opposition thereto, stressing that, per Department of Justice Department Circular No. 027-
18,12 the State's consent is necessary before the accused can plead to a lesser offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding
that Pascua is ineligible for probation in Criminal Case No. 18805 after pleading guilty to the lesser
offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING:
Yes.
In A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the Court enumerated, in table format, several violations of RA 9165
which could be subject to plea-bargaining.38 Included therein is violation of Section 5, Article II
thereof, particularly for the sale, trading, etc. of shabu weighing less than 1.00 gram. The rationale
for this particular exception was explained by the Court in its Resolution dated April 2, 2019 in Re:
Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta on the Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework
Submitted by the Philippine Judges Association.
In this case, the CA construed the aforementioned remark in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as
disqualifying persons originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 but
were convicted of the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law – such
as Pascua – from applying for probation.
However, the CA is mistaken as the said remark should be simply regarded as a recognition and
reminder of the general rule provided in Section 24 that "[a]ny person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under this Act"41 shall be ineligible for probation. Moreover, the CA's view
is not supported neither by the very wording of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 nor the provisions
of the Probation Law. It likewise disregards the legal consequences of plea bargaining.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. EDWIN REAFOR Y COMPRADO,
RESPONDENT.
[G.R. No. 247575, November 16, 2020]
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions2 dated December 17, 2018
and May 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 158535, which dismissed the
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rule 65
Petition) filed before it due to several procedural infirmities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it.
RULING:
YES.
Plea bargaining to a lesser offense is governed by Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which reads:
Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused, with the consent of the offended party
and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of
whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser
jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
In this case, the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting respondent's motion to plea bargain
notwithstanding the prosecution's opposition to the same which is grounded on DOJ Circular No.
27. Effectively, respondent's plea of guilty to a lesser offense (to which he was convicted of) was
made without the consent of the prosecution. Since respondent's plea of guilt and subsequent
conviction for a lesser offense clearly lack one of the requisites of a valid plea bargain, the plea
bargaining is void. Resultantly, the judgment rendered by the RTC which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple
reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception.28 Thus, since the judgment of
conviction rendered against respondent is void, it is only proper to resume with the trial of Criminal
Case No. 2017-0053 - which prior to respondent's filing of his motion to plea bargain, was at the
stage of the prosecution's presentation of evidence - without violating respondent's right against
double jeopardy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDO P. PAGAL, A.K.A.
"DINDO," ACCUSSED-APPELLANT.
[G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020]
GESMUNDO, J.:
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision3 promulgated on May 8, 2018 by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01521, which annulled and set aside the October 5, 2011 Order4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC) that found Brendo P. Pagal (accused-
appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder solely based on his plea of guilty. Accused-
appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the CA did not rule
on the merits of the case but remanded it to the RTC for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in convicting him on the sole basis of his guilty plea despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES.
Thus, when accused-appellant pleaded guilty during his arraignment, he pleaded to a capital
offense. Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules is relevant, viz.:
SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and [shall] require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
The reason behind this requirement is that the plea of guilt alone can never be sufficient to produce
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It must be remembered that a plea of guilty is only a supporting
evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an
accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted
just the same as if no such plea was entered. The court cannot, and should not, relieve the
prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability
by the requisite quantum of evidence. The reason for such rule is to preclude any room for
reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility
that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty,
and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which may justify or
require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties.75
Thus, as it stands, the conviction of the accused no longer depends solely on his plea of guilty but
rather on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
vs.
VICENTE FLORES y MONDRAGON, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 137491, November 23, 2000]
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
When arraigned on 8 January 1999, VICENTE, in the presence and with the assistance of his
counsel, pleaded guilty to the crime charged.3 The trial court inquired into the voluntariness of the
plea and VICENTE’s comprehension thereof. It informed VICENTE that the offense with which
he was charged and which he admitted carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; but
VICENTE was firm in his plea of guilty.
As a result of VICENTE’s voluntary plea of guilty, the trial court on 12 January 1999 promulgated
an Order,4 the pertinent portion of which reads:
In view therefore of the spontaneous and voluntary plea of guilty entered by accused Vicente
Flores y Mondragon, the Court finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9,
Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and
appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentence
him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment, however, in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
ISSUE:
Whether or not considering the court a quo’s finding that the case at bar involves a capital offense,
it gravely erred in not properly observing the provisions of section 3, rule 116 of the rules of court.
RULING:
NO.
Section 3, Rule 116 provides that when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.
In the present case, VICENTE, as previously discussed, stands charged in the information of an
offense in which the maximum penalty imposable is only prision correccional considering that the
quantity of marijuana involved is only 230 grams. As to whether the offense charged is capital or
not, the only determinant factor is the information itself. A cursory reading of the information
herein will show that VICENTE is being charged of a non-capital offense.
Perforce, the applicable rule should be Section 4 of Rule 116, which provides that when the
accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to
determine the penalty to be imposed. While the present Rules of Court makes it mandatory for the
court, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, to take additional evidence as to the
guilt of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime after the
entry of plea of guilty, that is not so in non-capital offenses.
In the latter, the reception of evidence is discretionary with the court.18 It cannot then be said that
the trial court erred when it failed to require the prosecution to present evidence in order to have
some basis for the decision. At any rate, records will show that herein accused was asked in open
court searching questions by the trial judge to determine the voluntariness and the full
comprehension of his plea.
[G.R. No. 123161, June 18, 2003]

vs.
LIBERATO "DUKDUK" SOLAMILLO and JULIAN SOLAMILLO, Accused-Appellants.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Upon arraignment with the assistance of counsel, appellant Liberato "Dukduk" Solamillo and
Edgardo Ebarle pleaded not guilty, while appellant Julian Solamillo entered a plea of guilty.3 Eddie
Trumata was not arraigned as he has been at large.
The prosecution filed a motion praying that Edgardo Ebarle be discharged as an accused to be
utilized as a state witness. However, he died before he could testify
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and in
imposing upon them the death penalty
RULING:
NO.
Section 5, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that "(a)t
any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident
plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of not guilty." The tenor of the quoted
provision is clear. There should be a categorical declaration from the accused that he is
withdrawing his plea of guilty and substituting it with a plea of not guilty.
There is nothing in the records to show that Julian filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty or
that he, in any manner, manifested unequivocally that he was withdrawing his plea. He contends
though that he made such manifestation when he testified on April 26, 1995.
NOTES:
The above testimony is not a positive and categorical declaration that appellant Julian was
withdrawing his plea of guilty. Without any unequivocal act on his part, the trial court could not
assume that he was withdrawing his original plea. Furthermore, by appellant’s own admission, he
went to Dumaguete City with the intention of surrendering to the authorities. This belies his
contention that he was threatened into entering a guilty plea for if he was truly innocent, why is it
that his first instinct was to surrender?
Even assuming that Julian made an improvident plea of guilty and subsequently withdrew it, such
fact does not operate to automatically exculpate him from criminal liability. Convictions based on
an improvident plea of guilty are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the
trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be
sustained because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence
proving his commission of the offense charged.32
In the instant case, the trial court, in determining the guilt of appellant Julian Solamillo, relied on
the extensive evidence of the contending parties, not merely on his plea of guilty. Indeed his
conviction can be sustained based on independent evidence other than his plea. Thus, whether or
not his plea of guilty was improvidently made is inconsequential for the simple reason that his
conviction was based on other evidence proving his culpability for the offense charged.
G.R. No. 152259 July 29, 2004
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
WON the Information itself is also unconstitutionally vague, because it does not specify the acts
of intervention that he supposedly performed.
RULING:
NO.
When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a
motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.50 The pertinent provision in the Rules of
Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote:
"Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify
the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired."
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements of a violation of
Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations describe the offense
committed by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to prepare an intelligent defense.
Details of the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.
NOTES:
The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to
apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to enable the court to pronounce
judgment. 51 The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately
know what is meant by the information.52
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the
information,53 matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the
offense -- need not be averred.54 Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are
to be determined by reference to the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.
G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M.

CABOTAJE-TANG, HON. SAMUEL R. MARTIRES, AND HON. ALEX L. QUIROZ OF
THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Enrile responded by filing before the Sandiganbayan (1) an urgent omnibus motion (motion to
dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad cautelam motion for
bail),4 and (2) a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
Information,5 on June 10, 2014, and June 16, 2014, respectively. The Sandiganbayan heard both
motions on June 20, 2014.
On June 24, 2014, the prosecution filed a consolidated opposition to both motions.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied Enrileï¿½s motions and ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused.6redarclaw
On July 8, 2014, Enrile received a notice of hearing7 informing him that his arraignment would
be held before the Sandiganbayanï¿½s Third Division on July 11, 2014.
On July 10, 2014, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars8 before the Sandiganbayan. On the
same date, he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment9 since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
On July 11, 2014, Enrile was brought to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayanï¿½s
order and his motion for bill of particulars was called for hearing. Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza), Enrileï¿½s counsel, argued the motion orally. Thereafter, Sandiganbayan Presiding
Justice (PJ) Amparo Cabotaje-Tang (Cabotaje-Tang), declared a ï¿½10-minute recessï¿½ to
deliberate on the motion.
When the court session resumed, PJ Cabotaje-Tang announced the Courtï¿½s denial of Enrileï¿½s
motion for bill of particulars
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
RULING:
YES.
In criminal proceedings, the motion for a bill of particulars is governed by Section 9 of Rule 116
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars
to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects
of the complaint or information and the details desired.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an
accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly
plead and prepare for trial.
We likewise find no complete congruence between the grounds invoked and the details sought by
Enrile in his motion for bill of particulars, and the grounds invoked in opposing the warrant for his
arrest issued, so that the Sandiganbayanï¿½s action in one would bar Enrile from essentially
invoking the same grounds.
G.R. No. 197813 September 25, 2013

vs.
EDWIN IBANEZ y ALBANTE and ALFREDO (FREDDIE) NULLA y IBANEZ, Accused-
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Appellants Edwin and Alfredo, with Jesus Monsillo y Taniares (Jesus), were all charged in an
Information for Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Jesus Montisillo y Taniares @ Dodong,
Edwin Ibañez y Albante and Alfredo(Freddie) Nulla y Ibañez of the crime of murder, penalized
under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 2004, in the municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a soil digger (bareta) and with intent to kill one Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with
the said soildigger (bareta) the said Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog, hitting the latter on his head,
thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death.3
During arraignment, Edwin and Alfredo pleaded not guilty. Jesus, on the other hand, remained at
large; the case against him was archived. Thereafter, trial ensued.
ISSUE:
THE LOWER COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVINGWEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO

THE DEFENSE‘S EVIDENCE.
RULING:
NO.
In People v. Caraig,19 we have drawn two exceptions to the rule that "documentary evidence should
be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity," and have thus
awarded damages where there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that in the victim's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws."
Although Wilfredo’s occupation as a doormat vendor may fall under the first exception, the
minimum wage for Region III, which includes the province of Bulacan, is below ₱400.00 as per
the National Wages and Productivity Commission Regional Daily Minimum Wage Rates as of
August 2013.20 Regrettably, except for the bare assertion of Rowena, Wilfredo's spouse, we have
nothing to anchor the award for loss of earning capacity. Thus, we delete the award for loss of
earning capacity in the amount of ₱1,946,180.00.
G.R. No. 110436, June 27, 1994
ROMAN A. CRUZ, JR., petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner contends that respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion:
1. In not dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsman’s approval of

the order dismissing the complaint did not state the factual or legal basis therefor;
2. In not requiring the production of the record of the preliminary investigation in

wanton disregard of petitioner’s right to due process;
3. In not dismissing the information considering that, as found by the investigating

prosecutor, the money received by petitioner was a cash advance; and
4. In not requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in not requiring the
production of the record of the preliminary investigation in wanton disregard of petitioner’s right
to due process;
RULING:
No.
Section 11 of Rule 116, which provides:
Sec. 11. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution.

— On motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to all parties, the
court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the
prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, of
any written statements given by the complainant and other witnesses in any
investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or any other investigating
officers, as well as of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not otherwise privileged, which constitute
or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case, and which are in
the possession or under the control of the prosecution, the police, or any other law
investigating agencies.
Here, respondent court in this case has failed to sufficiently justify its refusal to have the records
of the preliminary investigation produced before it so that petitioner may use them for his defense,
either in its resolutions denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion and Motion for Reconsideration, or
in the pleadings and Memorandum filed by herein respondents before this Court. Consequently,
we find no reason to deny petitioner the right to avail of such mode of discovery. If only for the
reason that petitioner should be given the opportunity to inspect the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation solely for the purpose of enabling him to prepare for his defense and for
trial, this questioned resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan should be modified.
G.R. No. 176033, March 11, 2015
FELILIBETH AGUINALDO AND BENJAMIN PEREZ, Petitioners, v. REYNALDO P.

VENTUS AND JOJO B. JOSON, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
On December 2, 2002, private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a
Complaint-Affidavit3 for estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila. Claiming to be business partners in financing casino players,
private respondents alleged that sometime in March and April 2002, petitioners connived in
convincing them to part with their Two Hundred Sixty Thousand (P260,000.00) Pesos in
consideration of a pledge of two motor vehicles which the latter had misrepresented to be owned
by Aguinaldo, but turned out to be owned by one Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC
Rent-A-Car.
On August 9, 2003, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment, pending
resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. Upon the prosecution's
motion,13 the public respondent ordered the proceedings to be deferred until the resolution of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.14
Acting on the prosecution's recommendation for the denial of petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and withdrawal of the information, and its motion to set the case for trial, the public
respondent issued an Order18 dated March 15, 2004 directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for arraignment.
On March 26, 2004, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Arraignment and Suspend
Further Proceedings,19 until their petition for review before the DOJ is resolved with finality.
Petitioners reiterated the same prayer in their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration20 of the Order
dated March 15, 2004.
On April 16, 2004, the public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to cancel arraignment
and suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a procedural technicality that the suspension allowed for arraignment is already
beyond the 60-day period may be relaxed in the interest of an orderly and speedy administration
of justice.
RULING:
NO.
In Samson v. Judge Daway,34 the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition for review
is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign
the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
Here, with the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July 16, 2003, the
public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the August 23, 2005
Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their arraignment, pending the
final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. In fact, the public respondent had been
very liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits
the suspension of arraignment to a 60-day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with
more than eleven (11) years having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners
have yet to be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the
criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the petition for review with
the DOJ had long lapsed.
G.R. No. 192898 January 31, 2011
SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD and CECILIA TRINIDAD, Petitioners,

vs.
VICTOR ANG, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings and Hold
in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest5 praying, among others, for the deferment of their
arraignment in view of the pendency of their petition for review before the DOJ.
The MTCC, in its Order6 dated May 28, 2009, granted the motion, "subject x x x to paragraph c[,]
Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure." On August 10, 2009, the MTCC
reconsidered this order, and set the petitioners’ arraignment on September 10, 2009.
The RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting the arraignment of the petitioners after
the lapse of one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the petition for review with the
DOJ. It explained that the cases cited by the petitioners were decided before the amendment of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. After the amendment of the Rules on December 1, 2000,
the Supreme Court applied the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in case of a pendency
of a petition for review with the DOJ.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari essentially claiming that the
60-day limit on suspension of arraignment is only a general rule. They cited several cases to show
that the arraignment of an accused should be deferred until the petition for review with the DOJ is
resolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order was stated in the petition. The
petitioners further state that they filed the motion for reconsideration on January 2, 2010.
RULING:
Yes.
EC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007.
When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months
had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules.
G.R. No. 156394 January 21, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION and SERGIO F. EMPRESE,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 22 June 1998, private complainants in the above case, i.e., Ariel A. Castro, Ramon B. Lustanas,
Julia F. Avelino, Butche P. Reyes, Jurly L. Reta, Jr., Rene L. Dadace, Ramon Isidro U. Reyes, Jr.,
Judith B. Montero and Anastacia V. Edar, were appointed by the then Mayor of the Municipality
of San Andres, Quezon, Francisco de Leon, Jr., as Agricultural Technologist, Utility Worker II,
Utility Worker II, Construction and Maintenance Man, Construction and Maintenance Man, Utility
Worker II, Utility Worker II, Clerk II and Utility Worker II, respectively, for the Municipality of
San Andres, Quezon.
On 01 July 1998, when private respondent assumed office, he revoked the appointments of private
complainants.
Aggrieved, private complainants filed with the Civil Service Commission, Regional Office No.
IV, Quezon City (CSCRO-IV) a complaint for illegal termination and nonpayment of
salaries.l^vvphi1.net
On 09 May 2002, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash with the Sandiganbayan on the
grounds that the acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of Section 3(e)
of Rep. Act No. 3019 and that the Information does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form pursuant to Section 3(d) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.12
On 13 June 2002, private respondent manifested before the Office of the Ombudsman that private
complainants had been reinstated to their former positions and that they have been receiving partial
payments for their back wages as evidenced by the Allotment and Obligation Slip dated 23 May
2002 and the Payroll for the month of May, 2002.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or

with grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information.
RULING:
No.
Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set
forth.
It must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is inappropriate. Considering that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which quashed the
Information was a final order that finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy therefrom is a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010
HILARIO P. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), PHILIPPINE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ANTONIO
C.BUAN, and STATE PROSECUTOR ALBERTO R. FONACIER, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP), through its officers,8 transmitted a letter9 dated March 27, 2000 to Jovencito
Zuño, Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The letter attached as annexes
five affidavits,10 which would allegedly serve as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689,11 and
for Violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795,12 against, inter alia, petitioner
herein Hilario P. Soriano. These five affidavits, along with other documents, stated that spouses
Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of ₱8 million with the Rural Bank
of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for nor received such loan; that it
was petitioner, who was then president of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and received the
proceeds of the loan; and that the ₱8 million loan had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of
Directors and no report thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural Banks,
Supervision and Examination Sector of the BSP.
In an Order26 dated August 8, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Quash for lack of
merit. The lower court agreed with the prosecution that the assailed OSI letter was not the
complaint-affidavit itself; thus, it need not comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court.
The trial court held that the affidavits, which were attached to the OSI letter, comprised the
complaint-affidavit in the case. Since these affidavits were duly subscribed and sworn to before a
notary public, there was adequate compliance with the Rules. The trial court further held that the
two offenses were separate and distinct violations, hence the prosecution of one did not pose a bar
to the other.
Anent the second ground, the CA found no merit in petitioner's argument that the violation of the
DOSRI law and the commission of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents are
inherently inconsistent with each other. It explained that the test in considering a motion to quash
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, is whether the facts alleged, when
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense charged.
ISSUE:
Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy against an Order denying a Motion to
Quash?
RULING:
No.
The second issue was raised by petitioner in the context of his Motion to Quash Information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.43 It is settled that in considering a
motion to quash on such ground, the test is "whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court
may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information.
Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioner[s] against the charge under the information must
be proved by [him] during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for
a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the
offense"
G.R. Nos. 71404-09 October 26, 1988
HERMILO RODIS, SR., petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE
Quisimbing & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
On May 22, 1985, petitioner Hermilo v. Rodis, Sr., former President of the Philippine Underwriters
Finance Corporation (PHILFINANCE) together with some other persons, was charged before the
Sandiganbayan in separate informations docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 10389, 10390,
10391, 10393 and 10394 with five (5) counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act.
On May 31, 1985, petitioner filed a motion to quash said informations as against him on the ground
of lack of preliminary investigation, with the alternative prayer that the "issue and/or enforcement
of the warrant of arrests as against him be held in abeyance while he seeks a reinvestigation by the
Tanodbayan pursuant to his right of (sic) preliminary investigation. 2
In its opposition to said motion, the Prosecution cited as basis therefor Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerating the grounds for a motion to quash. It argued that since
lack of preliminary investigation is not among those enumerated thereunder, the motion to quash
on this ground should be denied for lack of merit and instead, petitioner should be ordered to file
his Petition for Reinvestigation and/or Motion for Reconsideration in accordance with Section 13
of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Tanodbayan. 3
On July 15, 1985, while petitioner's petition for reinvestigation was pending action by the
Tanodbayan, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution denying petitioner's motion
to quash for lack of merit, stating:
... this Court is of the considered opinion that the alleged absence of preliminary
investigation with respect to the accused movant (herein petitioner) or his inability
to participate in the preliminary investigation for the reason that he was not duly
served with a subpoena is not a proper ground for a motion to quash. If the accused
was not afforded due preliminary investigation, the proper remedy for him is to file
a Petition for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, pursuant to
Section (13) of Administrative Order No. 111 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of
the Tanodbayan, promulgated on December 1, 1979.
ISSUE:
Whether or not andiganbayan had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction
RULING:
No.
It is worthwhile repeating that the avowed purposes of a preliminary investigation are "to secure
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of' a public trial, and also to
protect the state from useless and expensive trials 9 and while the "absence of preliminary
investigations does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case (n)or do they impair the validity
of the information or otherwise render it defective, but, if there were no preliminary investigations
and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the
court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to
conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted.
Thus, although the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the absence of a preliminary
investigation is not a ground for quashing an information, it should have held the proceedings in
the criminal cases in abeyance pending resolution by the Tanodbayan of petitioner's petition for
reinvestigation, as alternatively prayed for by him in his motion to quash.
G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009
ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial Olympia, SPO1
Rocky Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
JOEL R. PEDRO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written authorization
from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local
elections.
Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted.7 The preliminary
investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash,
arguing that the Information "contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification8 and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense."9 Pedro attached to his
motion a Comelec Certification dated September 24, 2001 that he was "exempted" from the gun
ban. The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion.
The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the seized
articles to Pedro.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was in
order.
RULING:
Yes.
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity
of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face
in point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the Information.
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments which,
if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the
records that the Information duly charged a specific offense and provides the details on how the
offense was committed.28 Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. Significantly, no
hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC
certification.
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to present
evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed.
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do
not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The
RTC held that the facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid marriage between
respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted
a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court16 before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact
that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the
bigamy case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash
and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
RULING:
No.
To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on
its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that
another complaint or information be filed30 except when the information is quashed on the ground
of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the
purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an
offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent
in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the
allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the
presentation of evidence.
G.R. No. 93021 May 8, 1991

vs.
MARIANO UMBRERO, ALFREDO COSTALES alias PIDO, JIMMY AGLUBA and LEON
CERIA, accused. MARIANO UMBRERO, ALFREDO COSTALES @ Pido, and JIMMY
AGLUBA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Alfredo J. Donato for accused-appellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On or about November 29, 1980, in the Municipality of Lallo, province of Cagayan, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo
Costales alias Pido, Jimmy Agluba and Leon Ceria, together with Eugenio Rigon alias Inyong,
Bartolome Tangonan and Danny Costales who are still at-large and not yet arrested, armed with
guns, conspiring together and helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation
and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot
one, Alfonso Urbi, inflicting upon the latter wounds on his body which caused his death. he case
as against Leon Ceria was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
INFORMATION AS AGAINST THE ACCUSED MARIANO UMBRERO, THERE BEING NO
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN THE MUNICIPAL
COURT OR WAS THERE A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN THE OFFICE OF THE
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, THUS DENYING HIM THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.
RULING:
No.
People v. Casiano (1 SCRA 478, [1961]), that:
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the
case. Nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If
there was no preliminary investigation and the defendant, before entering his plea, calls the
attention of the court to the absence of a preliminary investigation, the court, instead of
dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct
it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted. (pp. 7-8)
The appellant never asked for or called the attention of the court before entering his plea, as to the
absence of a preliminary investigation. His right to preliminary investigation, then is deemed
waived as he failed to invoke such right prior to or, at least, at the time of the entry of his plea in
the court of first instance. (People v. Casiano, p. 483, supra) The entry of their plea constituted a
waiver of their right to preliminary investigation and any irregularity that attended it. (See People
v. La Caste, 37 SCRA 767, 773 [1971])
G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698
was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed
at P15,000.00.
Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure
order against petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has
neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not
validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court.
RULING:
Yes.
It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest
of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to
the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.12 The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash
or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of
the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid
posting of bail bond.
G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
In October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued a
Resolution ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and
placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
PDIC took all the assets and liabilities of OCBC. PDIC began collecting OCBC’s due loans by
sending demand letters from the borrowers. Among these borrowers are Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have loan in the amount of 10 million each. Both Corporation
denied the allegation. Because of this, the PDIC conducted an investigation and found out that the
loans purportedly for Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of
manager’s check deposited in the account of the private respondents.
PDIC filed two counts of Estafa thru falsification of Commercial Documents against the private
respondents. After finding probable cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila
filed Information against the private respondents. Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC
in Manila, the private respondents pleaded not guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A
pre-trial was conducted. Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued and the prosecution presented its
evidence. After the presentation of all of the prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents filed
a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of RTC Judge erred in granting the Motion
for Leave to File Demurrer of Evidence.
RULING:
No. CA grossly erred in affirming the trial court’s Order granting the respondent’s demurrer,
which Order was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and
manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public interest.
The Court found that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment
for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and that respondents appear
to be the perpetrators thereof. What the trial and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that the
OCBC funds ended up in the personal bank accounts of respondent Go, and were used to fund his
personal checks, even as he was not entitled thereto. These, if not rebutted, are indicative of estafa.
Hence, the Petition is GRANTED. Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The July 2, 2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 49 in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and the
said cases are ordered REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings.
G.R. No. 216920, January 13, 2016
GIRLIE M. QUISAY, Petitioner,

vs.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued
a Pasiya4 or Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610,5 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal6 or Information was
filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging petitioner of such crime.
In an Order11 dated May 8, 2013, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It
found the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with Section
4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by, among
others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations.
In a Decision16 dated October 10, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly held that the R TC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing petitioner's motion to quash.
RULING:
No.
People v. Garfin22 firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the
requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by
silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.
In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the grounds
that: (a) the City Prosecutor ofMakati may delegate its authority to approve the filing of
the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No.
32; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its filing before the RTC was
with the prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor.
In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as
the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed
the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed,
resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
GINA VILLA GOMEZ, Petitioner,
versus
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 216824, November 10, 202
FACTS:
Police operatives from the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group of Makati City
arrested the petitioner.[5]
On September 19, 2010, a Complaint was filed against the petitioner for corruption of public
officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[6] The same Complaint was received
for inquest by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City.[7]
On September 21, 2010, a Resolution[8] was issued by the OCP of Makati City finding probable
cause that the petitioner may have offered P10,000.00 to both PO2 Ronnie E. Aseboque and PO2
Renie E. Aseboque in exchange for the release of her companion Reynaldo Morales y Cabillo @
"Anoy."[9] The relevant portions10 of the said Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Gina Villa Gomes y AiuSayan @ Gina is ndedto be

prosecuted: for violation of The Revised Pmal Code art. 212 in rel. to art. 211-A. The attached
Information is recommended to be approved for filing in court. No bail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part.
RULING:
Yes.
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided
for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
G.R. No. 152259 July 29, 2004
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The accused filed his first 'MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT' claiming
that no valid preliminary investigation was conducted in the instant case. He asserts that if a
preliminary investigation could be said to have been conducted, the same was null and void having
been undertaken by a biased and partial investigative body.
The [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a Motion to Quash.
Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second 'MOTION TO QUASH AND TO
DEFER ARRAIGNMENT'.
"On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its discretion amounting
to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736
despite clear and incontrovertible evidence.
RULING:
No.
There is no substantial distinction between a "motion to quash" and a "motion to dismiss." Both
pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case. Such motions are employed to raise
preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity of proceeding to trial. A motion to quash is
generally used in criminal proceedings to annul a defective indictment. A motion to dismiss, the
nomenclature ordinarily used in civil proceedings, is aimed at summarily defeating a complaint.
Thus, our Rules of Court use the term "motion to quash" in criminal,17 and "motion to dismiss" in
civil, proceedings.18
In the present case, however, both the "Motion to Quash" and the "Motion to Dismiss" are
anchored on basically the same grounds and pray for the same relief. The hairsplitting distinction
posited by petitioner does not really make a difference.
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second motion to quash.
A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar or different, by installment. The Rules
abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to preliminary objections, and trial
would never commence. A second motion to quash delays the administration of justice and unduly
burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that grounds not raised in the first motion to
quash are generally deemed waived.19 Petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" violates this rule.
G.R. No. 225595, August 06, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ROLANDO SOLAR Y

DUMBRIQUE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
CAGUIOA, J.:
FACTS:
An Information was filed against Rolando and Mark Kenneth Solar (Mark Kenneth) for the murder
of Joseph Capinig y Mato (Joseph), the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of March 2008, in the City of Las Piï¿½as, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and aiding each other, without justifiable motive, with
intent to kill and with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there knowingly,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one JOSEPH CAPINIG
y MATO, by then and there hitting and beating his head with a baseball bat, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal injury which caused his death.
The killing of the aforesaid victim is qualified by the circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rolando waived his right to question the defects in the Information filed against
him.
RULING:
Yes.
it behooved the accused to raise the issue of a defective information, on the ground that it does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form, in a motion to quash said information or a motion
for bill of particulars. An accused who fails to take this seasonable step will be deemed to have
waived the defect in said information. The only defects in an information that are not deemed
waived are where no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged, extinction of
the offense or penalty and double jeopardy. Corollarily, we have ruled that objections as to matters
of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
In the case at bar, appellant did not raise either in a motion to quash or a motion for bill of
particulars the defect in the Information regarding the indefiniteness of the allegation on the date
of the commission of the offense.
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
RULING:
Yes.
People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular
collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following
his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accused’s claim and dismissed the second case.
G.R. No. 205952 February 11, 2015
ATTY. SEGUNDO B. BONSUBRE, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
ERWIN YERRO, ERICO YERRO and RITCHIE YERRO, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
In the course of the proceedings, the counsel on record, private prosecutor Atty. Norberto Luna,
Jr.7 (Atty. Luna), manifested that there was an on-going settlement between petitioner and
respondents, and that they would file the necessary motion relative thereto.8 Thus, in an
Order9 dated September 12, 2000, the prosecution was given 10 days from said date to submit such
motion and directed the prosecution to furnish the accused’s (i.e., respondents’) counsel a copy of
the same for their comment; after which, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.10
Although a Compromise Agreement11 was reached between petitioner and respondents relative to
the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution failed to furnish the RTC a copy of the same and file
the necessary motion as manifested. As a result, the RTC, in an Order12 dated September 18, 2001
(September 18, 2001 Dismissal Order), dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to comply
with the court’s directive, as well as to take any further step to prosecute the case, in view of the
accused’s (i.e., respondents’) constitutional right to speedy trial.13
On June 15, 2004, or more than 2 years from the issuance of the September 18, 2001 Dismissal
Order, petitioner, through a new collaborating counsel, Atty. Bernarditto M. Malabago (Atty.
Malabago), filed a motion for reconsideration,14 claiming that he learned of the September 18,
2001 Dismissal Order only on June 7, 2004,and that he believed in good faith that the case was
merely archived in accordance with the terms of the Compromise Agreement.15 Several hearings
were conducted on petitioner’s pending motions, including an amended motion for reconsideration
and second amended motion for reconsideration.16
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC’s ruling denying due course to petitioner’s
notice of appeal with respect to the criminal aspect of the case.
RULING:
No.
The provisional dismissal of a criminal case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to the
reinstatement thereof,47 is governed by Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.– A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Under the afore-cited provision, a case is provisionally dismissed if the following requisites
concur:
(a) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for
a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for its provisional dismissal;
(b) The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(c) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
and
(d) The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional dismissal of the
case.48
In the case at bar, none of the foregoing requisites were met. While it may appear that the
respondents consented to a provisional dismissal of the case under the Compromise Agreement,
the prosecution neither presented the same for the court’s approval nor filed the required motion
to that effect such that no order was in fact issued granting the provisional dismissal of the case.
Hence, petitioner’s assertion that the respondents are estopped from invoking their right to speedy
trial is without basis.
G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,

vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the
MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were
provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).7 Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order on
July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.8 On July 2, 2004, Uy,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding
Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co’s motion
for reconsideration.10 When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling
the criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005.11 The cases were, thereafter, raffled to the
MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal
cases.12 It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005.13 Co’s motion for
reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005.14 Co then filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No.
171096.15 We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.16 There being no
motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS COMPUTED FROM

ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;
RULING:
No.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-
bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the
accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is
notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting
the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a
copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.31
In this case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon
which was served on the private complainant at least three days before said hearing as mandated
by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules.32 The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for
provisional dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to
pursue her complaint."
G.R. No. 173588 April 22, 2009
ARIEL M. LOS BAÑOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial Olympia, SPO1
Rocky Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
JOEL R. PEDRO, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written authorization
from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a day before the May 14, 2001 national and local
elections. The Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, in [S]itio
Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac, Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100 loaded with
six (6) ammunitions, with Serial No. 173-56836 outside his residence during the election period,
without authorization in writing from the Commission on Election[s].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated
reopening.13 He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to
situations where either the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to, or where the
prosecution alone moved for, the provisional dismissal of the case; in rejecting his argument that
the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code14 or Act No. 332615 find no
application to his case as the filing of the Information against him stopped the running of the
prescriptive periods so that the prescription mandated by these laws became irrelevant; and, in
setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial conference, despite being barred under Section 8 of
Rule 117.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the CA found. If it applies, then
the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision
reopening the case should prevail.
RULING:
The case should be remanded to the trial court for arraignment and trial.
SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur:
1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves for a
provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for its provisional dismissal;
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case.2
G.R. No. 164268 June 28, 2005
ARTEMIO T. TORRES, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO & NELIA T. TORRES-AGUINALDO, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Manila,4 a complaint against petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (Torres) for falsification
of public document. They alleged that titles to their properties covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-93596, T-87764, and T-87765, were transferred without their knowledge and consent
in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale5 dated July 21, 1979.
Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to
him6 as evidenced by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale.7
Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an information for falsification of
public document against Torres,8 which was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
(MTC), Branch 8, on October 3, 2001.
Torres moved for reconsideration9 but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the motion to withdraw the
information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for the purpose of
reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the alternative, whether the
rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies.
RULING:
No.
There is provisional dismissal22 when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies with the
following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and (2) There
must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to
dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on provisional dismissal does
not apply in the present case.
In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss.
Hence, Bañares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw
information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal
becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent
one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving
a penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
RULE 118: PRE-TRIAL
G.R. No. 128046 March 7, 2000

vs.
RAMON CHUA UY, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
Ramon Chua Uy (hereafter RAMON) appeals from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Branch 170, Metro Manila, in Criminal Cases No. 16199-MN and No. 16200-MN,
which decreed him guilty of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Article III, R.A. No. 6425,2 as
amended, for the illegal sale of 5.8564 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," and
possession of 401 grams of the same drug, respectively.
RAMON was arrested in the evening of 11 September 1995 by the elements of the Anti-Narcotics
Unit of the Philippine National Police in Malabon, Metro-Manila, in the course of a buy-bust
operation3 and a follow-up search of his residence, and was subsequently charged in three cases,
namely, Criminal Case No. 16199-MN, Criminal Case No. 16200-MN and Criminal Case No.
16201-MN.
In Criminal Case No. 16201-MN, RAMON was charged with the illegal possession of "traces" of
shabu found on three (3) plastic scoops and other drug paraphernalia which were seized from his
supposed residence in a follow-up search.
No bail was recommended. When arraigned, RAMON pleaded not guilty in each case.6 During the
pre-trial, the parties agreed on a joint trial and to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist
Loreto F. Bravo.7 They also agreed on the marking of the exhibits for the prosecution.
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Alberto G. Nepomuceno, Jr., who acted
as the poseur-buyer, and SPO4 Eddie Regalado, another member of the buy-bust team, as rebuttal
witness. The defense presented RAMON and Maritess Puno.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but his counsel as well
RULING:
Yes.
Sec. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and
signed and his counsel. 35
Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but his
counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the accused
against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may have
entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial
conference; 36 eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon. 37
Nevertheless, RAMON cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsel's signatures
on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution formally offered in evidence what it had marked in
evidence during the pre-trial, RAMON did not object to the admission of Bravo's Preliminary
Report (Exh. "B"), Final Report (Exh. "C"), another Final Report (Exh. "F"), and of the plastic
bags (Exhibits "D" to "D-4" inclusive, and "E").
XI. RULE 119: TRIAL
[ G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458. July 31, 2018 ]
CESAR MATAS CAGANG, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION,

QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. Nos. 210141-42]
CESAR MATAS CAGANG, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIFTH DIVISION,

QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan's denial to quash the Informations and Order of Arrest
against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman's alleged inordinate delay in the termination
of the preliminary investigation.
On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging
that Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice Governor's Office,
Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by diverting public funds given as grants or
aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as "dummies." The complaint was docketed as CPL-
M-03-0163 and referred to the Commission on Audit for audit investigation. A news report of Sun
Star Davao dated August 7, 2003 entitled "P61M from Sarangani coffers unaccounted" was also
docketed as CPL-M-03-0729 for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.
Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest while
Macagcalat and Mangalen separately filed their own Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void
and Set Aside Order of Arrest. Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years
in the filing of the Informations. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan[34] and Roque v.
Ombudsman,[35] he argued that the delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to
speedy disposition of cases.[36] The Office of the Ombudsman, on the other hand, filed a
Comment/Opposition arguing that the accused have not yet submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and that there was no showing that delay in the filing was intentional,
capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed his
Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him violated his constitutional rights
to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.
RULING:
The defense must also prove that it exerted meaningful efforts to protect accused's constitutional
rights. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, the failure of the accused to timely invoke the right to speedy
disposition of cases may work to his or her disadvantage, since this could indicate his or her
acquiescence to the delay.
Petitioner was definitely not unaware of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him by
the indication of this Com1 as a complementary sanction in its resolution of his administrative
case. He appears, however, to have been insensitive to the implications and contingencies thereof
by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter, which inaction
conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to have been without his objection
hence impliedly with his acquiescence.
G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 45399 entitled "Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb v. Hon. Amelita Tolentino, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, People of the
Philippines and Lauro Vizconde" which set aside the order of respondent judge therein denying
herein respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb's request to take the depositions of five (5) citizens and
residents of the United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in Washington
D.C. and California, as the case may be.1âwphi1.nêt
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take
the deposition of the witnesses for petitioner.
RULING:
Yes.
To be sure, a reading of the rules on criminal procedure, specifically Section 4, Rule 119 vis-à-
vis Section 1, Rule 23 would reveal no inconsistency so as to exclude the application of the latter
rule in criminal proceedings. Section 4, Rule 119 refers to the conditional examination of witnesses
for the accused before trial, while Section 1, Rule 23 refers to the taking of deposition
witnesses during trial.
While petitioner had invoked Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rule of Court, which is found under the
general classification of the Civil Procedure, it does not prevent its application to the other
proceedings, provided the same is not contrary to the specific rules provided therein. Indeed, the
Rules of Court is to be viewed and construed as a whole, and if the Supreme Court had
compartmentalized the same into four divisions, it was, as petitioner had claimed, for the purpose
of organization and expediency and not, for exclusivity.
G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA,

JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B.
BONJE, respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal information dated October
27, 1999, which was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-52248,5 arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage
allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the
mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence,
the criminal case.
In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CA
added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is
the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court
likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the situation was
adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.19
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to the instant case,
RULING:
No.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of
the judge.25 This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses face to face.26 It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of
said witnesses.27 Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.28
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide
for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules
are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal
proceedings, Sections 12,29 1330 and 15,31 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the
petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus
comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears
that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by
the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith
be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination,
in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that
the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to
waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that
it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and
answer.
[ G.R. No. 240053. March 21, 2022 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA CRISTINA P. SERGIO AND

JULIUS L. LACANILAO, RESPONDENTS.
HERNANDO, J.:
FACTS:
Recall that Mary Jane Veloso (Mary Jane) was arrested upon her arrival at Adisucipto
International Airport in Yogyakarta, Indonesia for carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin in her travel
luggage. She was tried and later convicted for drug trafficking under Indonesian jurisdiction and
sentenced to death by firing squad. Mary Jane traveled to Indonesia upon Maria Cristina Sergio
(Cristina) and Julius Lacanilao's (Julius) false promise of work abroad.
Cristina and Julius were eventually charged before a Philippine court with Qualified
Trafficking in Persons under Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042,
and Estafa under the Revised Penal Code. Believing Mary Jane to be an essential witness, the
Philippine prosecutors made a daring move — they requested the Indonesian government to
suspend the execution of Mary Jane's sentence in order to take her testimony in Cristina and Julius'
Qualified Trafficking in Persons case. The move succeeded. Indonesia, however, required that
Mary Jane remain within the confines of their territory, and that the questions to be propounded to
her be put in writing.
RULING:
There was no inadvertent omission. The Decision was issued upon full consideration of all the
documents submitted. From the trial court, through the CA, and up to this Court, records state in
consistent terms that the only conditions set by the Indonesian authorities were that (1) Mary Jane
shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia; (2) no cameras may be used in the taking of
her testimony; (3) none of the lawyers in the case shall be present during the taking of her
testimony; and (4) the questions to be propounded must be in writing. These conditions were the
ones prevailing before the Court upheld them in the October 9, 2019 Decision. It was only now in
the Urgent Omnibus Motion that it was made known to this Court, or daresay to all the parties
here, that the Indonesian government sent a letter on December 4, 2020 making new and specific
proposals as to the conduct of Mary Jane's deposition.
The Court, even being the highest court of the land, cannot alter what is already rendered
absolute. The case has already been completely put to rest — Mary Jane is allowed by our law to
give her testimony in Cristina and Julius' case by deposition through written interrogatories under
Rules 23 and 25 of our country's Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013
DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO,
as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF
THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent
civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province.
Among the principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on November 26,
2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to Manila and detained
at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became
aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the
196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre.
RULING:
No.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and
desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by
the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are
present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised
Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he
may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court
may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of
this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a
State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state
witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the
successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by
Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission
of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection
Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty.
Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre,
as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in
accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now
charged for the crimes.
G.R. No. 143093 May 21, 2007
RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
FACTS:
On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945. The Court of Appeals
discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information in Criminal
Case No. TM-1730 for Murder, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City,
to become state witnesses. The appellate court likewise cancelled the bail bond of petitioner
Rimberto Salvanera.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS

ERROR IN RENDERING THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS
DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE THEREON WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
"SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 9, RULE 119 OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT WAS SATISFIED BY THE PROSECUTION DESPITE
THE FACT THAT -
A. THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT MUST BE

SATISFIED THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION
WITNESSES WHO ARE NOT AN (sic) ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED
AS STATE WITNESS, NOT BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE SOUGHT TO BE
DISCHARGED.
RULING:
No.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions
must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and
Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no
other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of the state witness."5 The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have
to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We
have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any
other method.
G.R. NO. 160619
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JESSIE CASTILLO, MELENCIO ARCIAGA
and EMERENCIANO ARCIAGA, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
FACTS:
Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the May
1998 elections. On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo charging him
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,3 in relation to the alleged illegal
operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. According to the
Information, Castillo, while in the performance of his official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave
unwarranted benefits to his coaccused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter
to operate the Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) and permit from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, on August 21, 2001, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
Motion to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings.7 He argued that the case against him had been
decriminalized by Section 37 of Republic Act No. 90038 and invoked the decision of the Court of
Appeals absolving him of administrative liability. His motion was initially denied by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated September 6, 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan's application of the Llorente ruling in this case is misplaced.
RULING:
Yes.
Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must be specified, quantified and proven to the point
of moral certainty."30 The validity and sufficiency of the Information, however, was not an issue
in Llorente. The import of the ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established by
the prosecution during the trial and not when the Information is filed. Nowhere in Llorente did we
require that undue injury be specified, quantified and proved to the point of moral certainty at the
time of the filing of the Information. Such an interpretation would effectively require the
prosecution to include all the relevant evidence in the Information and to present such evidence of
undue injury even prior to arraignment. Moreover, under the Sandiganbayan 's interpretation of
Llorente, the accused would be required to face (and even rebut) the evidence as soon as the
Information is filed and even before he pleads. This runs counter to the function of a motion to
quash as a remedy afforded an accused before he proceeds to trial.
Further, such an interpretation would undermine the value of the Information as a tool for an
accused to understand the crime for which he is being charged as it requires that the Information
already contain a long and detailed list of other matters not necessary in informing the accused of
the charge. It will also be prejudicial to the prosecution who will then be forced to present evidence
even before the trial proper. This interpretation cannot be countenanced.
G.R. No. 220598
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 220953
BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts
Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO
Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio 0. Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors,
namely: Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes;
Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of
Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder.
However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia, holding that
there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder; and that the
Prosecution had sufficiently established a case of malversation against Valencia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
RULING:
Yes.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order
issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of
law.17 Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory
order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was
to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign
the denial as among the errors to be reviewed.
XII. RULE 120: JUDGMENT
ABC DAVAO AUTO SUPPLY, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ABUNDIO T.

MERCED, doing business under the name and style of SOUTHERN ENGINEERING
WORKS, Respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime on May 1987, Judge Marasigan acted on private respondent’s motion for extension of
time to file memorandum. On June 9, 1987 decision penned by Judge Agton was rendered in favor
of petitioner. Private respondent moved to reconsider said decision, but the same was denied in an
order dated March 1, 1988, issued by Judge Marasigan. Private respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA) which nullified Judge Agton’s decision on the ground that at the time he rendered
the judgment, he was neither the judge de jure nor the judge de facto of RTC Branch XVI, and
correspondingly remanded the case to the lower court. 5 Hence, this petition on the sole issue of
whether or not the decision of Judge Agton is valid.chanroblesvirtuallawlibr
ISSUE:
RULING:
It is a rule that a case is deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading, brief
or memorandum required by the rules, or by the court. Records disclose that this case was
submitted for decision sometime on March 1987 after the parties’ submission of their memoranda
as required by the court, at which time Judge Marasigan was already presiding in Branch XVI.
Thus, the case was submitted for decision to Judge Marasigan and not to Judge Agton who by then
was already transferred to another branch. Judge Agton’s decision, therefore, appears to be tainted
with impropriety.
Moreover, for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the
incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon.
G.R. No. 166326 January 25, 2006
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA, Petitioners,

vs.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing garbage in front of
their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben banged
the gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to shoot him. His brother
Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben what the problem was. A fist fight ensued.
Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to the ground. When he stood
up, he pulled at Edgardo’s shirt and hair, and, in the process, Ruben’s head hit the lamp post.7
On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the RTC decision.
RULING:
No.
In People v. Delim,12 the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the intent
of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows. Even as
Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and sustained assault of
petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo tried to hit Ruben on the
head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal area, resulting in a lacerated
wound and cerebral contusions.
G.R. No. 155309 November 15, 2005
JOSEPHINE M. SANCHEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,1 Respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
The resolution of this case hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Since
the factual findings of the lower courts are disparate, this Court painstakingly
reviewed the records. It found no sufficient reason to disbelieve the well-explained findings and
equally logical conclusions of the trial court. The evidence proffered by respondent even
corroborated relevant portions of those of petitioner. Thus, the evidence supported the ruling of
the trial court that the acquittal of petitioner was based on its reasonable finding that she had not
committed the crime imputed to her. Consequently, she incurred no civil liability for the alleged
offense.
In an Order12 dated March 20, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration. Quoting portions of its
Decision, the RTC said in its Order that the acquittal of the accused "was not exactly on the ground
of ‘reasonable doubt,’ but that she was not the author of the frauds allegedly perfpetrated (sic)."
Thus, it held that "no civil liability against her may properly be made."
Granting respondent’s appeal, the appellate court ruled that the trial court’s judgment of acquittal
did not preclude recovery of civil indemnity based on a quasi delict.13 The CA held that the
outcome of the criminal case, whether conviction or acquittal, was inconsequential in adjudging
civil liability arising from the same act that could also be considered a quasi delict.
ISSUE:
Whether an appeal on the civil aspect may be made from a decision in a criminal case acquitting
the accused for being not the author of the crime?
RULING:
Yes.
Clearly, the extinction of the penal liability does not always carry with it the extinction of the
civil.36 According to Article 29 of the Civil Code, if the acquittal is made on the ground that the
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused may be held civilly liable for
damages arising from the same act or omission constituting the offense. As in any ordinary civil
case, the liability may be established by a mere preponderance of evidence.
It is settled that the private offended party may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the
acquittal of the accused.
[G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003.]
ANAMER SALAZAR, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y.

BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, Respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure
of the Order 1 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5, 2 dated
November 19, 2001, and its Order 3 dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the said court on the civil aspect thereof and to allow her to present evidence
thereon.chanrob1es
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime
charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment
for her purchase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have been
first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
RULING:
Yes.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the
case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused
was acquitted.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect
of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place
the accused in double jeopardy.
NOTES:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in
the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed
upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to
be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
REMEDIES AGAINST JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
G.R. No. 161330 February 20, 2007
RENE CABARLES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
That on or about the 25th day of April, 1999, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable motive with
intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with a deadly weapon (fan knife) one Antonio
Callosa, which directly caused his death.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HONORABLE JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS

DISCRETION WHEN HE ISSUED THE QUESTIONED ORDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE
OF A FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION.
RULING:
Yes.
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence
stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality
of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon
motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be
terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.
However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section
24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order
without notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to
manifest their position on the matter. This failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion
and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution which requires notice and opportunity
to be heard.30 The issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the
express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
G.R. No. L-4934 November 28, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, Judge of the First
Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and FIDEL SALUD, Jr., Respondents.
FERIA, J.:
FACTS:
After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the provincial fiscal of Batangas has filed this
petition for certiorari against the respondents on the ground that the respondent judge acted in
excess of the court's jurisdiction in amending his original judgment promulgated on April 17, 1951,
upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant on the grounds above set forth, citing in
support of his contention the decision of this Court in the case People vs. Tamayo, * G.R. No. L-
2233, promulgated on April 25, 1950, wherein it was said that "the period at the end of which a
judgment becomes final, which is fifteen days, is never, under any circumstances, suspended
except by the filing of a motion for new trial by the defendant under section 1 of Rule 117," and
that "the judgment in a criminal case may be revised or modified only within the period to appeal
or fifteen days from the date of its promulgation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge did not act in excess of the court's jurisdiction in amending
its former judgment
RULING:
Yes.
The motion for reconsideration in the case of People vs. Romero, 89 Phil., 672, we have already
laid down the ruling, in which the two dissenters concurred, that in criminal cases a motion for
reconsideration on the ground of errors of law in the judgment is equivalent to a motion for new
trial, and interrupts the period of fifteen days for the perfection of an appeal.chanroblesvirt
If a motion for a new trial of reconsideration is filed within the period of 15 days from the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction of the defendant, as the motion filed in the present
case, it may be decided or passed upon validly at any time thereafter by the court. Because,
although the granting, after said period, of a motion for new trial would place the defendant in
double jeopardy, he waived his right not to be placed therein by the filing of such a motion. And
section 6, Rule 118, provides that "this period for perfection of an appeal shall be interrupted from
the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have
been served upon the defendant.
[G.R. No. 120387-88. March 31, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDUARDO

GARCIA y DULAY, Accused-Appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
During arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by Counsel de Oficio Jesse Tiburan, pleaded not
guilty to both charges.6 The trial court consolidated the two cases and, after due trial, promulgated
on August 9, 1994 its assailed Decision.
Hence, this appeal.9 After the promulgation of the assailed Decision, appellant filed before the trial
court a motion for a new trial. In its order dated April 21, 1995, the court a quo held that the Motion
for New Trial should be addressed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the affidavit of desistance can be the basis for granting a new trial or an acquittal.
RULING:
No.
Sec. 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. -- The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities have been committed during the trial
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could
not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which
if introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment.
To warrant a new trial, Joylyns affidavit of desistance must constitute a recantation and not
a mere withdrawal from the prosecution of the case. Although the affidavit of Joylyn states
that [i]t is not true that my father, Eduardo Garcia, raped me at our house, it is bereft of
details or any other badge of credibility, not to say of truth.
RULE 122: APPEAL
G.R. Nos. 166794-96 March 20, 2009
CESAR P. GUY, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
TINGA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners also question the propriety of the guilty verdict handed down by the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that the prosecution failed to prove petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal
cases, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors or even reverse the trial court’s decision on grounds other than those that the parties raise as
errors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in its decision.
RULING:
No.
We have examined the records of the case and find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings
of the Sandiganbayan. We find that the evidence on record amply supports the findings and
conclusions of the respondent court. The elements of the offense charged have been successfully
proven by the prosecution.
[G.R. Nos. 131856-57, July 9, 2001]

vs.
WILLIAM MONTINOLA, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
On 24 April 1996, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment5 finding WILLIAM guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges filed against him. It sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for the
robbery with homicide and to the penalty of death for illegal possession of firearm. It also ordered
him to pay the family of the victim the amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity; P191,835 for the
burial and wake expenses; and P39,000 for the unrecovered part of the money taken from the
victim and to pay the victim’s wife P100,000 as moral damages.
On 19 May 1997, WILLIAM filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal6 stating that he was
appealing the decision to the Court of Appeals. In an order dated 15 May 1997, the trial court
directed the transmission of the records to this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether in light of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8294 to P.D. No. 1866 he could be
prosecuted for, and convicted of, the separate crimes of robbery with homicide and illegal
possession of firearms.
RULING:
He therein stated that he was appealing the trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals. It must
be noted that it is the Supreme Court, and not the Court of Appeals, that has appellate jurisdiction
over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.10 As to
judgments in which death penalty is imposed, such as the judgment in Criminal Case No. 47169,
no notice of appeal is necessary, as the same is subject to automatic review11 pursuant to Article
47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. But as to judgments
imposing reclusion perpetua, such as that in Criminal Case No. 47168, the appeal to this Court
shall be by filing a notice of appeal with the trial court.12
WILLIAM’s notice of appeal from the judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 47168-69, albeit
erroneous since it was directed to the Court of Appeals, may nevertheless be given due course. For
even without that or even if he did not appeal from said judgment, we would nevertheless review
the same conformably with our ruling in People vs. Alitagtag,13 as affirmed in People vs.
Contreras.14 We ruled therein that where cases have been consolidated and jointly tried, and only
one decision is rendered sentencing the accused to death in one and to reclusion perpetua in the
others, he would be deemed to have appealed from the judgment in the latter cases.

Rights of The Accused

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TIMBANGAN, RAIHANA S.

JD106 - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 115: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

MONICO V. JACOB and CELSO L. LEGARDA, Petitioners,

[G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010]

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

[G.R. NO. 152398, April 14, 2005]

[G.R. No. 139456, July 7, 2004]

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial

[G.R. Nos. 138874-75, January 31, 2006]

Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

[G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013]

[G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013]

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

[G.R. No. 182790, April 24, 2009]

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, CESAR CANTALEJO y

[G.R. No. 109993 January 21, 1994]

[G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929]

[G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012]

[G.R. No. 171020, March 14, 2007]

[G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008]

HON. DAX GONZAGA XENOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF

[G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020]

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court expressly states:

[G.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020]

[G.R. No. 247575, November 16, 2020]

[G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020]

[G.R. No. 137491, November 23, 2000]

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M.

WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

THE LOWER COURTS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVINGWEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO

ROMAN A. CRUZ, JR., petitioner,

Petitioner contends that respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion:

1. In not dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsman’s approval of

2. In not requiring the production of the record of the preliminary investigation in

3. In not dismissing the information considering that, as found by the investigating

4. In not requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct further proceedings.

Section 11 of Rule 116, which provides:

Sec. 11. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution.

FELILIBETH AGUINALDO AND BENJAMIN PEREZ, Petitioners, v. REYNALDO P.

SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD and CECILIA TRINIDAD, Petitioners,

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or

HILARIO P. SORIANO, Petitioner,

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

HERMILO RODIS, SR., petitioner,

Quisimbing & Associates for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

People v. Casiano (1 SCRA 478, [1961]), that: