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536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
*

G.R. No. 82036. May 22, 1997.

TRAVELLERS INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION,

petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE
MENDOZA, respondents.

Insurance; The prescriptive period to bring suit in court under

an insurance policy, begins to run from the date of the insurer’s
rejection of the claim filed by the insured, the beneficiary or any
person claiming under an insurance contract.—We have certainly
ruled with consis tency that the pres criptive period to bring suit
in court under an insurance policy, begins to run from the date of
the insurer’s rejection of the claim filed by the insured, the
beneficiary or any person claiming under an insurance contract.
This ruling is premised upon the compliance by the pers ons suing
under an insurance contract, with the indispensable requirement
of having filed the written claim mandated by Section 384 of the
Insurance Code before and after its amendment. Absent such
written claim filed by the person suing under an insurance
contract, no cause of action accrues under such insurance
contract, considering that it is the rejection of that claim that
triggers the running of the one-year prescriptive period to bring
suit in court, and there can be no opportunity for the insurer to
even reject a claim if none has been filed in the first place, as in
the instant case.
Same; Respondent appellate court committed reversible error
in finding petitioner liable under an insurance contract the
existence of

______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

537

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VOL. 272, MAY 22, 1997 537

Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

which had not at all been proven in court.—When petitioner

asseverates, thus, that no written claim was filed by private
respondent and rejected by petitioner, and private respondent
does not dispute such asseveration through a denial in his
pleadings, we are constrained to rule that respondent appellate
court committed reversible error in finding petitioner liable under
an insurance contract the existence of which had not at all been
proven in court. Even if there were such a contract, private
respondent’s cause of action can not prevail because he failed to
file the written claim mandated by Section 384 of the Insurance
Code. He is deemed, under this legal provision, to have waived his
rights as against petitioner-insurer.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Espinas & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Carlos A. Tria for private respondent.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

The petition
1 herein seeks the review and2 reversal of the
decision of respondent
3 Court of Appeals 4affirming in toto
the judgment
5 of the Regional Trial Court in an action for
damages filed by private respondent Vicente Mendoza, Jr.
as heir of his mother who was killed in a vehicular
accident.
Before the trial court, the complainant lumped the
erring taxicab driver, the owner of the taxicab, and the
alleged insurer of the vehicle which featured in the
vehicular accident into one complaint. The erring taxicab
was allegedly covered

_______________

1 Promulgated on August 31, 1987, and penned by Associate Justice

Luis A. Javellana and concurred in by Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez
and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes; Rollo, pp. 6-19.
2 Twelfth Division.
3 Dated October 24, 1985.
4 Branch II , Manila.
5 Docketed as Civil Case No. 135486.

538

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538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

by a third-party liability insurance policy issued by

petitioner Travellers Insurance & Surety Corporation.
The evidence presented before the trial court established
the following facts:

“At about 5:30 o’clock in the morning of July 20, 1980, a 78-year
old woman by the name of Feliza Vineza de Mendoza was on her
way to hear mass at the Tayuman Cathedral. While walking
along Tayuman corner Gregorio Perfecto Streets, she was bumped
by a taxi that was running fast. Several persons witnes sed the
accident, among whom were Rolando Marvilla, Ernesto Lopez and
Eulogio Tabalno. After the bum ping, the old woman was seen
sprawled on the pavement. Right away, the good Samaritan that
he was, Marvilla ran towards the old woman and held her on his
lap to inquire from her what had happened, but obviously she was
already in shock and could not talk. At this moment, a private
jeep stopped. With the driver of that vehicle, the two helped board
the old woman on the jeep and brought her to the Mary Johnston
Hospital in Tondo.
x x x Ernesto Lopez, a driver of a passenger jeepney plying
along Tayuman Street from Pritil, Tondo, to Rizal Avenue and
vice-versa, also witnessed the incident. It was on his return trip
from Rizal Avenue when Lopez saw the plaintiff and his brother
who were crying near the scene of the accident. Upon learning
that the two were the sons of the old woman, Lopez told them
what had happened. The Mendoza brothers were then able to
trace their mother at the Mary Johnston Hospital where they
were advised by the attending physician that they should bring
the patient to the National Orthopedic Hospital becaus e of her
fractured bones . Instead, the victim was brought to the U.S.T.
Hospital where she expired at 9:00 o’clock that same morning.
Death was caused by ‘traumatic shock’ as a result of the severe
injuries she sustained x x x x.
x x x The evidence shows that at the moment the victim was
bumped by the vehicle, the latter was running fast, so much so
that because of the strong impact the old woman was thrown
away and she fell on the pavement. x x x In truth, in that related
criminal case against defendant Dumlao x x x the trial court
found as a fact that therein accused ‘was driving the subject
taxicab in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner and at a
speed greater than what was reasonable and proper without
taking the necessary precaution to avoid accident to persons x x x
con s iderin g the condition of the traffic at the place at the time
aforementioned’ x x x. Moreover, the

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Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

driver fled from the scene of the accident and without rendering
assistance to the victim. x x x
x x x Three (3) witnesses who were at the scene at the time
identified the taxi involved, though not necessarily the driver
thereof. Marvilla saw a lone taxi speeding away just after the
bumping which, when it passed by him, said witness noticed to be
a Lady Love Taxi with Plate No. 438, painted maroon, with
baggage bar attached on the baggage compartment and with an
antenae [sic] attached at the right rear s ide. The same
descriptions were revealed by Ernesto Lopez, who further
described the taxi to have x x x reflectorized decorations on the
edges of the glass at the back. x x x A third witness in the person
of Eulogio Tabalno x x x made similar descriptions although,
because of the fas t speed of the taxi, he was only able to detect
the last digit of the plate number which is ‘8.’
x x x [T]he police proceeded to the garage of Lady Love Taxi
and then and there they took possession of such a taxi and later
impounded it in the impounding area of the agency concerned. x x
x [T]he eyewitnesses x x x were unanimous in pointing to that
Lady Love Taxi with Plate No. 438, obviously the vehicle involved
herein. x x x During the investigation, defendant Armando
Abellon, the registered owner of Lady Love Taxi bearing No. 438-
HA Pilipinas Taxi 1980, certified to the fact ‘that the vehicle was
driven last July 20, 1980 by one Rodrigo Dumlao x x x’ x x x It
was on the basis of this affidavit of the registered owner that
caused the police to apprehend Rodrigo Dumlao, and consequently
to have him prosecuted and eventually convicted of the offense x x
x. x x x [S]aid Dumlao absconded in that criminal case, s pecially
at the time of the promulgation of the judgment
6 therein so much
so that he is now a fugitive from justice.”

Private respondent filed a complaint for damages against

Armando Abellon as the owner of the Lady Love Taxi and
Rodrigo D umlao as the driver of the Lady Love taxicab
that bumped private respondent’s mother. Subsequently,
private respondent amended his complaint to include
petitioner as the compulsory insurer of the said taxicab
under Certificate of Cover No. 1447785-3.

______________

6 Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 9-11. [The decision
of the Regional Trial Court was reproduced in its entirety in the decision

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of the Court of Appeals.]

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540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

After trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of

private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff, or more particularly the ‘Heirs of the late Feliza Vineza
de Mendoza,’ and against defendants Rodrigo Dumlao, Armando
Abellon and Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, by
ordering the latter to pay, jointly and severally, the former the
following amounts:

(a) The sum of P2,924.70, as actual and compensatory damages, with

interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from October 17,
1980, when the complaint was filed, until the said amount is fully
paid;
(b) P30,000.00 as death indemnity;
(c) P25,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P10,000.00 as by way of corrective or exemplary damages; and
(e) Another P10,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees and other litigation
expenses.

Defendants are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally,

the costs of this suit.
7

SO ORDERED.”

Petitioner appealed from the aforecited decision to the

respondent Court of Appeals. The decision of the trial court
was affirmed by respondent 8 appellate court. Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration
9 of September 22, 1987 was
denied in a Resolution dated February 9, 1988.
Hence this petition.
Petitioner mainly contends that it did not issue an
insurance policy as compulsory insurer of the Lady Love
Taxi and that, assuming arguendo that it had indeed
covered said taxi-cab for third-party liability insurance,
private respondent failed to file a written notice of claim
with petitioner as re-

______________

7 Id., pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 17-18.

8 Rollo, pp. 20-23.

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9 Rollo, pp. 26-27.

541

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Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

quired by Section 384 of P.D. No. 612, otherwise known as

the Insurance Code.
We find the petition to be meritorious.

When private respondent filed his amended complaint to

implead petitioner as party defendant and therein alleged
that petitioner w as the third-party liability insurer of the
Lady Love taxicab that fatally hit private respondent’s
mother, private respondent did not attach a copy of the
insurance contract to the amended complaint. Private
respondent does not deny this omission.
It is significant to point out at this juncture that the
right of a third person to sue the insurer depends on
whether the contract of insurance is intended to benefit
third persons also or only the insured.

“[A] policy x x x whereby the insurer agreed to indemnify the

insured ‘against all sums x x x which the Insured shall become
legally liable to pay in respect of: a. death of or bodily injury to
any person x x x is one for indemnity against liability; from the
fact then that the insured is liable to the third person, such third
person is entitled to sue the insurer.
The right of the person injured to sue the insurer of the party
at fault (insured), depends on whether the contract of insurance is
intended to benefit third persons also or on the insured. And the
test applied has been this: Where the contract provides for
indemnity against liability to third persons, then third persons to
whom the insured is liable can sue the insurer. Where the
contract is for indemnity against actual loss or payment, then
third persons cannot proceed against the insurer, the contract
being solely to reimburse the insured for liability actually
discharged by him thru payment to third persons, said 10 third
persons’ recourse being thus limited to the insured alone.”

Since private respondent failed to attach a copy of the

insurance contract to his complaint, the trial court could
not

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10 Guingon v. Del Monte, 20 SCRA 1043, 1046-1047 [1967].

542

542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

have been able to apprise itself of the real nature and

pecuniary lim its of petitioner’s liability. More importantly,
the trial court could not have possibly ascertained the right
of private respondent as third person to sue petitioner as
insurer of the Lady Love taxicab because the trial court
never saw nor read the insurance contract and learned of
its terms and conditions.
Petitioner, understandably, did not volunteer to present
any insurance contract covering the Lady Love taxicab that
fatally hit private respondent’s mother, considering that
petitioner precisely presented the defense of lack of
insurance coverage before the trial court. Neither did the
trial court issue a subpoena duces tecum to have the
insurance contract produced before it under pain of
contempt.
We thus find hardly a basis in the records for the trial
court to have validly found petitioner liable jointly and
severally with the owner and the driver of the Lady Love
taxicab, for damages accruing to private respondent.
Apparently, the trial court did not distinguish betw een
the private respondent’s cause of action against the owner
and the driver of the Lady Love taxicab and his cause of
action against petitioner. The former is based on torts and
quasi-delicts while the latter is based on contract.
Confusing these two sources of obligations as they arise
from the same act of the taxicab fatally hitting private
respondent’s mother, and in the face of overwhelming
evidence of the reckless imprudence of the driver of the
Lady Love taxicab, the trial court brushed aside its
ignorance of the terms and conditions of the insurance
contract and forthwith found all three—the driver of the
taxicab, the owner of the taxicab, and the alleged insurer of
the taxicab—jointly and severally liable for actual, moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses. This is clearly a misapplication of the
law by the trial court, and respondent appellate court
grievously erred in not having reversed the trial court on
this ground.

“While it is true that where the insurance contract provides for

indemnity against liability to third persons, such third persons

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can directly sue the insurer, however, the direct liability of the
insurer

543

VOL. 272, MAY 22, 1997 543

Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

under indemnity contracts against third-party liability does not

mean that the insurer can be held solidarily liable with the
insured and/or the other parties found at fault. The liability of the11

insurer is based on contract; that of the insured is based on tort.”

Applying this principle underlying solidary obligation and

insurance contracts, we ruled in one case that:

“In solidary obligation, the creditor may enforce the entire

obligation against one of the solidary debtors. On the other hand,
insurance is defined as ‘a contract whereby one undertakes for a
consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or
liability arising from an unknown or contingent event.’
In the case at bar, the trial court held petitioner together with
respondents Sio Choy and San Leon Rice Mills, Inc. solidarily
liable to respondent Vallejos for a total amount of P29,103.00,
with the qualification that petitioner’s liability is only up to
P20,000.00. In the context of a solidary obligation, petitioner may
be compelled by respondent Vallejos to pay the entire obligation of
P29,103.00, notwithstanding the qualification made by the trial
court. But, how can petitioner be obliged to pay the entire
obligation when the amount stated in its insurance policy with
respondent Sio Choy for indemnity against third-party liability is
only P20,000.00? Moreover, the qualification made in the decision
of the trial court to the effect that petitioner is sentenced to pay
up to P20,000.00 only when the obligation to pay P29,103.00 is
made solidary12 is an evident breach of the concept of a solidary
obligation.”

The above principles take on more significance in the light

of the counter-allegation of petitioner that, assuming
arguendo that it is the insurer of the Lady Love taxicab in
question, its liability is limited to only P50,000.00, this
being its standard amount of coverage in vehicle insurance
policies. It bears repeating that no copy of the insurance
contract was ever proffered before the trial court by the
private respondent, notwithstanding know ledge of the fact
that the latter’s com-

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11 Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 536, 544
[1988]. Also see Vda. de Maglana v. Consolacion, 212 SCRA 268 [1992].
12 Id., p. 545.

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544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

plaint against petitioner is one under a written contract.

Thus, the trial court proceeded to hold petitioner liable for
an award of damages exceeding its limited liability of
P50,000.00. This only shows beyond doubt that the trial
court was under the erroneous presumption that petitioner
could be found liable absent proof of the contract and based
merely on the proof of reckless imprudence on the part of
the driver of the Lady Love taxicab that fatally hit private
respondent’s mother.

II

Petitioner did not tire in arguing before the trial court and
the respondent appellate court that, assuming arguendo
that it had issued the insurance contract over the Lady
Love taxi-cab, private respondent’s cause of action against
petitioner did not successfully accrue because he failed to
file with petitioner a written notice of claim within six (6)
months from the date of the accident as required by Section
384 of the Insurance Code.
At the time of the vehicular incident which resulted in
the death of private respondent’s mother, during which
time the Insurance Code had not yet been amended by
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 874, Section 384 provided as
follows:

“Any person having any claim upon the policy issued purs uant to
this chapter shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to the
insurance company concerned a written notice of claim setting
forth the amount of his loss, and/or the nature, extent and
duration of the injuries sustained as certified by a duly licensed
physician. Notice of claim must be filed within six months from
date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be deemed waived.
Action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be
brought in proper cases, with the Commission or the Courts
within one year from date of accident, otherwise the claimant’s
right of action shall prescribe” [emphasis and italics supplied].

545

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VOL. 272, MAY 22, 1997 545

Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

In the landmark case of Summit

13 Guaranty and Insurance
Co., Inc. v. De Guzman, we ruled that the one year
prescription period to bring suit in court against the
insurer should be counted from the time that the insurer
rejects the written claim filed therewith by the insured, the
beneficiary or the third person interested under the
insurance policy. We explained:

“It is very obvious that petitioner company is trying to use Section

384 of the Insurance Code as a cloak to hide itself from its
liabilities. The facts of these cases evidently reflect the deliberate
efforts of petitioner company to prevent the filing of a formal
action against it. Bearing in mind that if it succeeds in doing so
until one year laps es from the date of the accident it could set up
the defense of prescription, petitioner company made private
respondents believe that their claims would be settled in order
that the latter will not find it necessary to immediately bring suit.
In violation of its duties to adopt and implement reasonable
standards for the prompt investigation of claims and to effectuate
prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims, and with
manifest bad faith, petitioner company devised means and ways
of stalling the settlement proceedings. x x x [N]o steps were taken
to process the claim and no rejection of said claim was ever made
even if private respondent had already complied with all the
requirements. x x x
This Court has made the observation that some insurance
companies have been inventing excuses to avoid their just
obligations and it is only the State that can give the protection
which the14 insuring public needs from possible abuses of the
insurers.”

It is significant to note that the aforecited Section 384 was

amended by B.P. Blg. 874 to categorically provide that
“action or suit for recovery of damage due to loss or injury
must be brought in proper cases, with the Commissioner or
the Courts within one year from denial of the claim,
otherwise the claim-ant’s
15 right of action shall prescribe.”
[emphasis ours]

______________

13 151 SCRA 389 [1987].

14 Id., pp. 395-396.
15 Country Bankers Insurance Corp. v. Travellers I nsurance and
Surety Corporation, 176 SCRA 523 [1989].

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We have certainly ruled with consistency that the

prescriptive period to bring suit in court under an
insurance policy, begins to run from the date of the
insurer’s rejection of the claim filed by the insured, the
beneficiary or any person claiming under an insurance
contract. This ruling is premised upon the compliance by
the persons suing under an insurance contract, with the
indispensable requirement of having filed the written claim
mandated by Section 384 of the Insurance Code before and
after its amendment. Absent such written claim filed by
the person suing under an insurance contract, no cause of
action accrues under such insurance contract, considering
that it is the rejection of that claim that triggers the
running of the one-year prescriptive period to bring suit in
court, and there can be no opportunity for the insurer to
even reject a claim if none has been filed in the first place,
as in the instant case.

“The one-year period should instead be counted from the date of

rejection by the insurer as this is the time when the cause of
action accrues. x x x
In Eagle Star Insurance Co., Ltd., et al. vs. Chia Yu, this Court
ruled:

‘The plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until his claim was finally
rejected by the insurance company. This is because, before such final
rejection, there was no real necessity for bringing suit.’

The philosophy of the above pronouncement was pointed out in

the case of ACCFA vs. Alpha Insurance and Surety Co., viz.:

‘Since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal

right of the plaintiff and a correlative obligation of the defendant but also
an act or omiss ion of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the
cause of action does not accrue until the party
16 obligated refuses,
expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty.’ ”

_______________

16 Summit Guaranty and Insurance Co., Inc. v. De Guzman, 151 SCRA

389, 397-398 [1987].

547

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Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

When petitioner asseverates, thus, that no written claim

was filed by private respondent and rejected by petitioner,
and private respondent does not dispute such asseveration
through a denial in his pleadings, we are constrained to
rule that respondent appellate court committed reversible
error in finding petitioner liable under an insurance
contract the existence of which had not at all been proven
in court. Even if there were such a contract, private
respondent’s cause of action cannot prevail because he
failed to file the written claim mandated by Section 384 of
the Insurance Code. He is deemed, under this legal
provision, to have waived his rights as against petitioner-
insurer.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is HEREBY
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 09416 and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. 135486 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as Travellers Insurance & Surety
Corporation was found jointly and severally liable to pay
actual, moral and exemplary damages, death indemnity,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in Civil Case No.
135486. The complaint against Travellers Insurance &
Surety Corporation in said case is hereby ordered
dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Padilla (J., Chairman), On leave.

Petition granted. Judgment reversed and set aside in

part.

Note.—It is settled that the terms of the policy

constitute the measure of the insurer’s liability. (Fortune
Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 244
SCRA 308 [1995])

——o0o——

548

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