Atlantic Council

Report Part Title: US Assumptions and Lessons Learned

Report Title: US-China Lessons from Ukraine:

Report Subtitle: Fueling More Dangerous Taiwan Tensions
Report Author(s): John K. Culver and Sarah Kirchberger
Published by: Atlantic Council (2023)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep51352.5

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US-China Lessons from Ukraine: Fueling More Dangerous Taiwan Tensions

US Assumptions and Lessons Learned

While dealing with the Russian aggression against Ukraine, on military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific or Europe.21
the US government has not reduced its attention on the This sends a strong message that the world is actively con-
strategic challenge posed by China. At the time of the in- tested now, and that the Department of Defense and all
vasion, the Biden administration was aggressively focused of the US government are not just preparing for potential
on continuing and expanding Trump-era strategic compe- kinetic conflict, but engaged already in active operations
tition with China. Even as Washington openly warned of to disadvantage China—tantamount to a new Cold War.
intelligence regarding Moscow’s intentions, it continued Moreover, the NDS’ emphasis on “integrated deterrence”
adversarial policies and alliance building directed at Chi- with allies and partners will underscore the threat to China
na. It has since announced multiple rounds of technology of the US designating Taiwan as a “key non-NATO ally,”
restrictions on Chinese companies, and signed the CHIPS potentially breaking existing US policy barriers to a virtual
and Science Act to revitalize US semiconductor leader- defense guarantee.
ship.20 Moreover, the president has personally eroded US
The US is likely to apply the following lessons learned from
strategic ambiguity on US military commitments to Tai-
the Ukraine war as it prepares for potential future conflict
wan—despite National Security Council (NSC) staff “clari-
with China.
fications” after each repeated instance that US policy has
not, in fact, changed. The US sees public intelligence disclosures of Russian
plans to invade Ukraine since November 2021 as a ma-
In its National Defense Strategy (NDS) released last year,
jor success, despite failing to deter Russia or realize major
the Biden administration focused on homeland defense
pre-war Alliance (or Ukrainian government) preparation for
challenges posed by Russia and China, rather than simply

U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) announces that he will unveil a new package of legislation to address competition with China
on Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S. REUTERS via Craig Hudson

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US-China Lessons from Ukraine: Fueling More Dangerous Taiwan Tensions

the attack.22 The credibility that Washington gained when  “Economic sanctions work, imposing a heavy bur-
Russia invaded in February helped drive the immediate den for Moscow, thereby increasing regime insecu-
post-invasion international reaction (the reverse of the rity, which can deter Beijing from taking action on
2003 Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) fiasco) and Taiwan.”24
resulted in even more comprehensive sanctions than were The key lesson Washington probably finds applicable to a
threatened pre-invasion to deter Russia. Senior US military Taiwan 2027 scenario is the importance of providing both
and administration warnings of Beijing’s “2027 plans” echo conventional and non-conventional support, including
US intelligence warnings about Ukraine, albeit without the intelligence sharing and equipment, in the runup to, and
same specificity and high confidence.23 during, any conflict. In the case of Ukraine, Kyiv’s ability to
Similarly for the US, a Russian military “paper tiger” percep- blunt Moscow’s invasion was enabled by the strengthen-
tion can be applied to the PLA in a Taiwan scenario that ing of Ukraine’s resilience and resistance post-2014. While
draws on the usual tropes. the US and its NATO allies have not directly intervened in
Ukraine, they maintain military equipment, intelligence,
 “China hasn’t fought a major war since 1979” and, and economic/communications lifelines that have helped
therefore, its military operational abilities may be deny Russia its original war aims. Specifically, deliveries of
more limited than expected. new weapons (Javelin, Stingers, artillery/HIMARS, antiship
 “Amphibious invasion across 100NM Taiwan Strait missiles), near-real-time battlefield intelligence and target-
is far more challenging than Russian land invasion ing, and initial success in the public-relations/propaganda/
of Eastern Ukraine,” due to the enormous inherent information domain seemed to have blunted Russian hy-
complexity of a Normandy-style amphibious land- brid warfare and aligned developed world/Global North
ing and the PLA’s insufficient lift capacity for the opinion behind Ukraine and NATO. However, it is far from
task. clear how well Taiwan could be resupplied in the event

U.S. President Joe Biden talks to workers as CEO of TSMC C. C. Wei and Chairman of TSMC Mark Liu look on during a visit to TSMC AZ's first Fab
(Semiconductor Fabrication Plant) in P1A (Phase 1A), in Phoenix, Arizona, U.S. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
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US-China Lessons from Ukraine: Fueling More Dangerous Taiwan Tensions

of a blockade, if at all. As an island nation, Taiwan has no the attack, deterrence was arguably weakened rather than
cross-border sanctuaries for stockpiling and delivery of key strengthened. Rather than appreciating the transparency
military and civilian supplies. And while Russia has been and reliability displayed by the US, and accepting the olive
restrained from striking NATO members on Ukraine’s west- branch it represents, an authoritarian aggressor might see
ern and southwestern borders, US bilateral allies in the preemptive self-constraint as a weakness to be exploited.
Pacific have no NATO-like structure for collective defense.
The more the US talks up the prospect of a 2027 Taiwan
A lesson the US so far seems resistant to learning from war scenario, the more it will turn to buttressing Taiwan’s
Ukraine is that nuclear deterrence by the aggressor (Russia “resilience”—regardless of whether Taiwan wants this, giv-
in the case of Ukraine, China in Taiwan) enables convention- en the island’s failure to buttress its own defense during
al war and blunts outside major-power intervention.25 The twenty-five years of rapid PLA modernization and growing
US and its NATO allies are strongly united in resisting pres- tensions on the strait.28
sure from pundits to enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine,
So far, the drumbeat in US media, from Congress, and
break the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports,
among some members of the current administration is to
or other ideas that could risk direct NATO-Russian war. Chi-
be prepared for direct US military intervention to defend
na could very well conclude that inducing self-deterrence
Taiwan from a Chinese military attack. The US, and its al-
in Western capitals has worked well in Ukraine, and is a
lies and partners, should assume that China would be at
promising approach for Taiwan.26 On the other hand, nu-
least as determined as Russia to wield its rapidly expand-
clear deterrence works both ways. One could speculate
ing nuclear-capable forces (and space/counterspace and
how things would stand today had Ukraine been given a
cyber capabilities) to deter direct US intervention. China
security guarantee akin to NATO’s Article Five in time, and
has stated numerous times that it would be prepared to
whether this would not have effectively deterred a Russian
declare a state of war today if it saw Taipei, Washington, or
attack.27 When President Biden conversely ruled out mili-
Tokyo violate the understandings that have preserved the
tary intervention on behalf of Ukraine during the lead-up to

Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen meets U.S. Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley,
California, U.S. April 5, 2023. REUTERS/David Swanson

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US-China Lessons from Ukraine: Fueling More Dangerous Taiwan Tensions

peace since at least 1979. The main potential triggers for into the US alliance sphere through actions such as inviting
this are: Chinese perceptions that Taiwan is moving irre- it to participate in regional or bilateral military exercises or
vocably away from the possibility of unification and toward in Alliance intelligence-sharing arrangements. At the same
the founding of a new state under the moniker “Taiwan” at time, China itself through its threatening actions has been
some future point; a renewed Taiwanese effort to acquire doing the most to upend the understandings that consti-
nuclear weapons; or a return to a quasi-formal US mili- tuted the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait, forcing
tary-security relationship with Taiwan, including through Taiwan, other regional actors such as Japan, and the US to
stationing US forces on the island or integrating Taiwan reposition themselves.

8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
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