Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy

Author(s): Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram

Source: The American Political Science Review , Jun., 1993, Vol. 87, No. 2 (Jun., 1993),
pp. 334-347
Published by: American Political Science Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2939044

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 2 June 1993

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TARGET POPULATIONS:

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICS AND POLICY
ANNE SCHNEIDER Arizona State University
HELEN INGRAM University of Arizona

1 A4 7e argue that the social construction of target populations is an important, albeit

|fjj \ overlooked, political phenomenon that should take its place in the study of public policy by
V v political scientists. The theory contends that social constructions influence the policy
agenda and the selection of policy tools, as well as the rationales that legitimate policy choices.
Constructions become embedded in policy as messages that are absorbed by citizens and affect their
orientations and participation. The theory is important because it helps explain why some groups are
advantaged more than others independently of traditional notions of political power and how policy
designs reinforce or alter such advantages. An understanding of social constructions of target
populations augments conventional hypotheses about the dynamics of policy change, the determina-
tion of beneficiaries and losers, the reasons for differing levels and types of participation among target
groups, and the role of policy in democracy.

C ontemporary political scientists consider many studies of agenda setting, legislative behavior, and
variables to be significant political phenomena policy formulation and design, as well as to studies of
that previously were viewed either as irrele- citizen orientation, conception of citizenship, and
vant or as the proper domain of another discipline. style of participation.
The importance of gender in understanding political Our theory contends that the social construction of
behavior and the role of money and media in politics target populations has a powerful influence on public
are examples. Although the question of who benefits officials and shapes both the policy agenda and the
or loses from policy has long been interesting to actual design of policy. There are strong pressures for
political science, most other dimensions of policy public officials to provide beneficial policy to power-
designs have been considered the purview of econo- ful, positively constructed target populations and to
mists, lawyers, and other specialists. With the emer- devise punitive, punishment-oriented policy for neg-
gence of public policy as a major subfield of political atively constructed groups. Social constructions be-
science, however, attention has turned to new as- come embedded in policy as messages that are ab-
pects of the policy process, such as agenda setting, sorbed by citizens and affect their orientations and
formulation, implementation, and consequences, participation patterns. Policy sends messages about
(Arnold 1990; Ingram and Schneider 1991; Kingdon what government is supposed to do, which citizens
1984; Lipsky and Smith 1989; Mazmanian and Sabat- are deserving (and which not), and what kinds of
ier 1983; Rose 1991; Smith and Stone 1988; Pressman attitudes and participatory patterns are appropriate
and Wildavsky 1973) as well as additional elements of in a democratic society. Different target populations,
policy design, such as goals, tools, rules and target however, receive quite different messages. Policies
populations (Ingram and Schneider 1992; Linder and that have detrimental impacts on, or are ineffective in
Peters 1985; Ostrom 1990; Schneider and Ingram solving important problems for, certain types of tar-
1990a, 1990b; Stone 1988). We argue that the social get populations may not produce citizen participation
construction of target populations is an important, directed toward policy change because the messages
albeit overlooked, political phenomenon that should received by these target populations encourage with-
take its place in the study of public policy by political drawal or passivity. Other target populations, how-
scientists. ever, receive messages that encourage them to com-
The social construction of target populations refers bat policies detrimental to them through various
to the cultural characterizations or popular images of avenues of political participation.
the persons or groups whose behavior and well-being The theory is important because it helps explain
are affected by public policy. These characterizations why some groups are advantaged more than others
are normative and evaluative, portraying groups in independently of traditional notions of political
positive or negative terms through symbolic lan- power and how policy designs can reinforce or alter
guage, metaphors, and stories (Edelman 1964, 1988). such advantages. Further, the theory resolves some
A great deal has been written (mostly by sociologists) long-standing puzzles political scientists have en-
about social constructions of social problems (Best countered in attempting to answer Lasswell's ques-
1989; Spector and Kitsuse 1987). The more specific tion, "Who gets what, when, and how?" (Lasswell
topic of social construction of target populations is 1936). The theory returns public policy to center-stage
important to political science because it contributes to in the study of politics, offering an alternative that

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 2

goes beyond both the pluralist and the microeco- drivers or teenage drivers, however, have identified a
nomic perspectives. subset that carries a negative valence.
The actual social constructions of target groups, as
well as how widely shared the constructions are, are
matters for empirical analysis. Social constructions of
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF target populations are measurable, empirical, phe-
TARGET POPULATIONS nomena. Data can be generated by the study of texts,
such as legislative histories, statutes, guidelines,
A theory that connects social constructions of target speeches, media coverage, and analysis of the sym-
populations to other political phenomena needs def- bols contained therein. Social constructions also can
initions of target populations and of social construc- be ascertained from interviews or surveys of policy-
tions, an explanation of how social constructions makers, media representatives, members of the gen-
influence public officials in choosing the agendas and eral public, and persons within the target group
designs of policy, and an explanation of how policy itself.
agendas and designs influence the political orienta- One of the major contentions of some social con-
tioxis and participation patterns of target populations. structionists (sometimes called strict-constructionists)
is that there is no objective reality but only the
construction itself (Spector and Kitsuse 1987, J.
Schneider 1985). Those who make this argument
Conceptualizing Targets and Constructions
contend that research should focus on the construc-
Target population is a concept from the policy design tions, not on the reasons the constructions have
literature that directs attention to the fact that policy arisen or how constructions differ from objective
is purposeful and attempts to achieve goals by chang- reality. The point of view adopted here, however, is
ing people's behavior (see our earlier work, Ingram more like that expressed by Edelman (1988) and
and Schneider 1991). Policy sets forth problems to be Collins (1989). Target populations are assumed to
solved or goals to be achieved and identifies the have boundaries that are empirically verifiable (in-
people whose behavior is linked to the achievement deed, policies create these empirical boundaries) and
of desired ends. Behavioral change is sought by to exist within objective conditions even though
enabling or coercing people to do things they would those conditions are subject to multiple evaluations.
not have done otherwise. By specifying eligibility One of the important issues for analysis is to under-
criteria, policy creates the boundaries of target pop- stand how social constructions emerge from objective
ulations. Such groups may or may not have a value- conditions and how each changes.
based cultural image, however. Therefore, they may
or may not carry out any social construction.
Social Constructions and Elected Officials
The social construction of a target population refers
to (1) the recognition of the shared characteristics that Research has uncovered a number of important mo-
distinguish a target population as socially meaning- tivations for elected officials (Arnold 1990; Kelman
ful, and (2) the attribution of specific, valence-ori- 1987; Kingdon 1984). Two of the most important are
ented values, symbols, and images to the character- to produce public policies that will assist in their
istics. Social constructions are stereotypes about reelection and that will be effective in addressing
particular groups of people that have been created by widely acknowledged public problems. Social con-
politics, culture, socialization, history, the media, structions are relevant for both of these consider-
literature, religion, and the like. Positive construc- ations.
tions include images such as "deserving," "intelli- Social constructions become part of the reelection
gent," "honest," "public-spirited," and so forth. calculus when public officials anticipate the reaction
Negative constructions include images such as "un- of the target population itself to the policy and also
deserving," "stupid," "dishonest," and "selfish." anticipate the reaction of others to whether the target
There are a wide variety of evaluative dimensions, group should be the beneficiary (or loser) for a partic-
both positive and negative, that can be used to ular policy proposal (Wilson 1986). Thus, the electoral
portray groups. implication of a policy proposal depends partly on
Social constructions are often conflicting and sub- the power of the target population itself (construed as
ject to contention. Policy directed at persons whose votes, wealth, and propensity of the group to mobi-
income falls below the official poverty level identifies lize for action) but also on the extent to which others
a specific set of persons. The social constructions will approve or disapprove of the policy's being
could portray them as disadvantaged people whose directed toward a particular target.
poverty is not their fault or as lazy persons who are The convergence of power and social constructions
benefitting from other peoples' hard work. On the creates four types of target populations, as displayed
other hand, not all target populations even have a in Figure 1. Advantaged groups are perceived to be
well-defined social construction. Motor vehicle poli- both powerful and positively constructed, such as the
cies identify automobile drivers as a target popula- elderly and business. Contenders, such as unions
tion; but these persons have no particular social and the rich, are powerful but negatively con-
construction, at this time. Policies directed at drunk structed, usually as undeserving. Dependents might

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 Construction of Target Populations June 1993

small number of persons who might disagree with

them. Other constructions, however, are in conten-
Social Constructions and Political Power: Types of tion. Officials develop maps of target populations
Target Populations based on both the stereotypes they themselves hold
and those they believe to prevail among that segment
Constructions of the public likely to become important to them.
Positive Negative Competing officials champion different constructions
of the same groups. Some view minorities as op-
Advantaged Contenders
pressed populations and argue for policies appropri-
The elderly The rich
ate to dependent people, whereas others portray
0 Business Big unions minorities as powerful special interests and not de-
Veterans Minorities
serving of government aid. Political debates may lead
Scientists Cultural elites
elected officials to make finer and finer distinctions,
Moral majority
thereby subdividing a particular group into those
who are deserving and those who are not. Immigra-
X Dependents Deviants tion policy, for example, distinguishes among illegal
Children Criminals
aliens, refugees, migrant workers, those seeking asy-
co Mothers Drug addicts
lum, and highly skilled workers who receive waivers.
Disabled Communists
There has been no research on the social construc-
Flag burners
tions of target populations from the perspective of
Gangs elected officials; thus, there is no way to speculate on
how Figure 1 actually should be drawn and how
much agreement there would be about the placement
of various groups.
Public officials are sensitive not only to power and
include children or mothers and are considered to be social construction but also to pressure from the
politically weak, but they carry generally positive public and from professionals to produce effective
constructions. Deviants, such as criminals, are in the public policies (Arnold 1990; Kelman 1987; Quade
worst situation, since they are both weak and nega- 1982). Public officials must explain and justify their
tively constructed. Public officials find it to their policy positions to the electorate by articulating a
advantage to provide beneficial policy to the advan- vision of the public interest and then showing how a
taged groups who are both powerful and positively proposed policy is logically connected to these widely
constructed as "deserving" because not only will the shared public values (Arnold 1990; Habermas 1975;
group itself respond favorably but others will ap- Offe 1985). They need to have a believable causal
prove of the beneficial policy's being conferred on logic connecting the various aspects of the policy
deserving people. Similarly, public officials com- design to desired outcomes.
monly inflict punishment on negatively constructed Social constructions of target populations become
groups who have little or no power, because they important in the policy effectiveness calculus because
need fear no electoral retaliation from the group itself elected officials have to pay attention to the logical
and the general public approves of punishment for connection between the target groups and the goals
groups that it has constructed negatively. Figure 1 that might be achieved. Elected officials may empha-
shows other examples of how a hypothetical elected size some goals rather than others because target
official might array a variety of target populations populations that they wish to benefit or burden have
within these dimensions. credible linkages to the goals (Edelman 1988; King-
Some social constructions may remain constant don 1984). On the other hand, elected officials are
over a long period of time, as have the prevailing able to construct several different policy logics for
constructions of criminals or communists; but others almost any problem they wish to solve. For example,
are subject to continual debate and manipulation. For most would agree that reduction in the infant mor-
instance, persons with AIDS are constructed by some tality rate in the United States is a worthy goal.
as deviants, little better than criminals who are being However, to achieve this, the United States could
punished through disease for their sins. The identi- provide direct health care benefits to high-risk preg-
fication of children, hemophiliacs, heterosexuals, and nant women, it could mandate reductions in carcin-
Magic Johnson as victims, however, has made possi- ogens that presumably increase risk, or it could
ble a different construction. Public officials realize criminalize drug and alcohol use by pregnant
that target groups can be identified and described so women. All of these could be justified as contributing
as to influence the social construction. Hence, a great to a reduced infant mortality rate; but they have very
deal of the political maneuvering in the establishment different implications for target populations, espe-
of policy agendas and in the design of policy pertains cially pregnant women who could either be the
to the specification of the target populations and the beneficiary of the policy or could bear exceptional
type of image that can be created for them. costs because of it. Economic vitality is another ex-
Social constructions may become so widely shared ample of a widely shared public goal for which a
that they are extremely difficult to refute even by the credible case could be made for policies that serve

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 2

ants will receive too little beneficial policy. Burdens

will become oversubscribed especially to deviants
Variations in How Policy Treats Target and undersubscribed to the advantaged groups. For
Populations: Allocation of Benefits and Burdens public officials to realize their ambitions of reelection
and the development of effective, public-oriented
Constructions policy, they have to take into account not only the
Positive Negative
power and social constructions of target populations
/ Advantaged Contenders
but also the logical connection of the potential target
/ High control; Some control; :
Z . Burdens are Burdens are / groups to the goals. Most of the time, public officials
trek @ undersubscribed symbolic and overt try to bring these three factors into congruence. It is
/ 0 important to notice that congruence is possible only
/1 - ;:;; tODependents DeviantW
0 No control; No control in two segments of the policy box shown in Figure 2.
/ Burdens are Burdensyery I
One is to provide beneficial policy to powerful,
O'Yco : 0 oversubscribed oversubscribed positively viewed groups who are logically connected
4Q?/~~~~ to an important public purpose. The second area of
//^ X: ::Constructions 0 0 l. . .> g D congruence is found at the back of the box: to provide
Positive/ Negative punishment policies to negatively constructed, pow-
erless groups, who are linked logically to a broader
Advantaged Contenders
public purpose. All other areas produce noncongru-
e High control; Low control; /
ence of some type.
in Benefits are Benefits are
@. oversubscribed sub rosa Powerful segments of the population who also
0 have relatively consensual positive social construc-
tions (the advantaged groups) have considerable con-
Dependents Deviants
w Low control; No control; trol and will find it easy to get their issues on
3 Benefits are Benefits very legislative agendas. They will be the recipient of
undersubscribed undersubscribed much beneficial policy. Advantaged groups have the
resources and capacity to shape their own construc-
tions and to combat attempts that would portray
Note: Benefits are shown on the front part of the box to each type of target, them negatively. The easiest problems for elected
burdens are shown at the back of the box.
officials to address will be those for which advan-
taged segments of the population are the logical
recipients of beneficial policy. These groups will
receive beneficial policy, however, even if the causal
widely divergent interests. Some policy options linkages to some ostensible common or public pur-
would give direct benefits to jobless or low-income pose lack credibility or are entirely absent. The ad-
persons, whereas other options would redistribute vantaged groups will often be chosen as first-order
wealth to the poor, thereby increasing demand for (proximate) targets even when others would be more
products. Others would offer tax breaks, loans, or logical or efficient. Direct government subsidies to
outright grants to the owners of businesses to in- large corporations, for example, have been granted
crease their competitive position or to entice them to by governments for the ostensible purpose of increas-
move into a location (or to retain those who are ing the number of jobs in the community, although
threatening to leave). In almost any policy area there such funds may have created more jobs if directed
are multiple logics that involve different target pop- toward public-sector agencies with lower manage-
ulations and/or different roles for target groups. ment salaries and overhead. Beneficial policy for the
Thus, even when public officials are pursuing widely advantaged groups will be oversubscribed in the
held public interest goals, they are commonly able to sense that there will be more positive rules and more
provide benefits to powerful, positively constructed expenditures in this area than can be justified either
groups and burdens to less powerful, negatively on technical grounds of policy effectiveness or on
constructed ones. representational grounds of policy responsiveness
that is proportional to the group's size and other
political resources.
Benefits, Burdens, and Target Populations
The attractiveness of policy directed toward pow-
The dynamic interaction of power and social con- erless people with negative images (the deviants) is
structions leads to a distinctive pattern in the alloca- surprisingly similar except that the deviants are pun-
tion of benefits and burdens to the different types of ished and have almost no control over the agenda or
target groups (Figure 2). The front of the box shows the designs. Policies will be high on the legislative
how benefits are allocated, and the back shows the agenda, especially during election campaigns. Nega-
allocation of burdens. Benefits are expected to be- tively constructed powerless groups will usually be
come oversubscribed to advantaged populations (i.e., proximate targets of punishment policy, and the
these groups will receive more beneficial policy than extent of burdens will be greater (oversubscribed)
is warranted either in terms of policy effectiveness or than is needed to achieve effective results. The neg-
representativeness), whereas dependents and devi- ative social constructions make it likely that these

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 Construction of Target Populations June 1993

groups will often receive burdens even when it is the policies. In the United States, women and chil-
illogical from the perspective of policy effectiveness. dren have dominated this category, with women
The highly predictable popularity of tough criminal moving more toward a position of power (and less
justice statutes over which deviants have no control, positively viewed) as they have become more orga-
such as the 1991 federal crime bill, are vivid illustra- nized and more active in the economic sector; and
tions of the political attractiveness of punishment people in these groups have been viewed as the
directed at powerless, negatively viewed groups. responsibility of families, churches, and the private
Important public issues do not always permit sector. Feminist writers, in fact, view the artificial
elected officials to find congruence among social separation of the public and private spheres as one of
constructions, power, and logical connections to the key problems faced by women in advanced
goals; and problems cannot always be solved so industrial democracies (agger 1983).
straightforwardly. Many officials care about out- Another type of noncongruence occurs when leg-
comes and fear widespread public reaction against islators are attempting to inflict regulations or costs
ineffective policy, lack of attention to important prob- on powerful, popular groups. These situations also
lems, and too much favoritism to special interests. will be undersubscribed and highly contentious. For
They may confront these contradictions through example, it is difficult to generate support for burden-
strenuous efforts to keep such issues off the agenda, some regulations of positively viewed businesses
or they may manipulate the image of target groups in because the proximate target groups will oppose the
an effort to change their social construction. In some policies vigorously and argue that the chain of effects
instances, they simply bear the political costs of is not likely to produce the desired results anyway; or
inflicting burdens on positively viewed groups or they may argue that other groups are more logical
granting benefits to those who are negatively viewed. targets and would have a greater impact and if
Not uncommonly, public officials engage in private chosen. The secondary or remote target groups that
politics or outright deception. will presumably benefit from the regulations may not
The case of powerful but negatively viewed groups provide as much support as expected, because of the
(the contenders) presents numerous problems. Public uncertainty that the cause-and-effect logic within the
officials will prefer policy that grants benefits noticed policy is correct (Arnold 1990). In a similar way, it is
only by members of the target groups and largely difficult for elected leaders to provide beneficial pol-
hidden from everyone else. They will prefer policies icy to the powerless, negatively viewed groups (such
that the public and media believe inflict burdens on as providing rehabilitation programs for criminals),
powerful, negative groups but that actually have few, despite the fact that these policies may be more
if any, negative effects. Contenders have sufficient effective than those that involve punishment or may
control to blunt the imposition of burdens but not be less costly than the death penalty, given the
enough power to gain much in terms of visible extensive appeals that ensue. The electoral costs are
benefits. Statutes directed toward these contending extensive, as it is a simple matter to accuse a public
groups will be complex and vague. It may be difficult official of being "soft on crime." Much of the benefi-
to discern from the statute who the policy favors or cial policy achieved by the powerless, negatively
hinders because discretion and responsibility will constructed target groups has been through court
often be passed on to lower-level agencies and gov- actions and court mandates to ensure their rights.
ernments. Context will become especially important.
For example, policy characteristics for contending
Social Constructions and Policy Tools
groups may depend on the extent of media and
public attention, as well as variation in the cohesive- The emerging literature on policy design emphasizes
ness and activity of the target group. During times of that the attributes of statutes, guidelines, implemen-
low public attention and high levels of group activity, tation structures, and direct service delivery pro-
policy will tend to be beneficial, although relatively cesses are important to an understanding of the
low in visibility and still undersubscribed in terms of policy process. There is considerable interest in why
what might be needed to actually solve particular some designs are chosen, rather than others, and
problems. When public attention increases (as it is what differences these choices make in policy impacts
likely to do when an unpopular group is cohesive and on target populations (Dryzek 1990; Ingram and
active), then policy may shift more toward the bur- Schneider 1991; Linder and Peters 1985; Lipsky and
densome side. Smith 1989; Salamon and Lun 1989; Schneider and
For the dependent groups, such as children or Ingram 1990a; Smith and Stone 1988). The theory
mothers, officials want to appear to be aligned with advanced here contends that some elements of de-
their interests; but their lack of political power makes sign (especially the policy tools and the policy ration-
it difficult to direct resources toward them. Symbolic ales) will differ depending on the social construction
policies permit elected leaders to show great concern and political power of the target population.
but relieve them of the need to allocate resources. Policy tools refer to the aspects of policy intended
Policies in this area tend to be left to lower levels of to motivate the target populations to comply with
government or to the private sector. The benefits policy or to utilize policy opportunities (Schneider
dependents receive are passed down by other agents, and Ingram 1990b). For groups that are constructed
and dependents have little control over the design of as deserving, intelligent, and public-spirited (as we

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 2

expect the powerful, positively viewed groups to be), directly' was an example of the more paternalistic
the policy tools will emphasize capacity building, attributes of policy directed at dependent popula-
inducements, and techniques that enable the target tions. Information tools are likely to be used, even
population to learn about the results of its behavior when direct resources are needed (as in AIDS pre-
and take appropriate action on a voluntary basis. vention programs). Public officials simply do not like
When delivering beneficial policy to the advantaged to spend money on powerless groups and will use
groups, certain types of capacity-building tools are other tools whenever possible.
expected to be commonly used, especially direct The dominant tools for deviants (the target popu-
provision of such resources as entitlements or non- lations whose constructions place them in the pow-
income-tested subsidies, and also of free information, erless, negatively viewed part of the matrix) are
training, and technical assistance. The political pay- expected to be more coercive and often involve sanc-
offs for providing beneficial policy to these groups is tions, force, and even death. In contrast with the
such that outreach programs will be common: the kinds of regulations used when advantaged popula-
agencies will seek out all eligible persons and encour- tions are burdened, groups constructed as deviants
age them to utilize the policy opportunities that have will be, at worst, incarcerated or executed. At best,
been made available (Ingram and Schneider 1991). they will be left free but denied information, discour-
When burdens, rather than benefits, are directed at aged from organizing, and subjected to the authority
the advantaged groups, the tools will be less predict- of others-including experts-rather than helped to
able and more likely to change; but self-regulation form their own self-regulatory organizations. For
that entrusts the group to learn from its own behavior example, gangs are more likely to be punished for
and voluntarily take actions to achieve policy goals congregating than encouraged to direct their energy
will be preferred, along with positive inducements. toward constructive activities.
When these are not effective in inducing the desired When beneficial policies are directed at deviant
behavior, policies may shift toward "standards and groups, such as rehabilitation programs, they ordi-
charges," which do not stigmatize the organization narily attempt to change the person through author-
for its activities but simply attempt to discourage itarian means, rather than attack the structural prob-
certain actions (such as pollution) by charging for it. lems that are the basis of the problem itself. Drug
Sanctions and force are not likely to be used in diversion programs, for example, will usually require
connection with powerful, positively viewed groups. attendance and drug testing, and threaten partici-
Policy tools for dependent groups (such as mothers pants with heavy penalties for failure to comply with
or children) are expected to be somewhat different. the rules.
Subsidies will be given, but eligibility requirements
often involve labeling and stigmatizing recipients.
Social Constructions and Policy Rationales
Subsidies to farmers do not require income tests, for
example; but college students must prove that they Rationales are important elements of policy design
are needy and without resources. Outreach programs because they serve to legitimate policy goals, the
will be less common, and many programs will require choice of target populations, and policy tools. As
clients to present themselves to the agency in order to Habermas and Offe have noted, modern govern-
receive benefits. Welfare programs even for persons ments have a legitimation crisis and must explain
perceived as deserving, such as college students, the why democracies concentrate wealth and power in
disabled, or the unemployed, usually do not seek out the hands of the few rather than the many (Habermas
eligible persons but rely on those who are eligible to 1975; Offe 1985). Governments attempt to resolve this
make their case to the agency itself. crisis through legitimation rationales that explain
Symbolic and hortatory tools will commonly be how policies serve common rather than special inter-
used for dependent groups even when the pervasive- ests (in spite of appearances). Rationales justify the
ness of the problem would suggest that more direct agenda, policy goals, selection of target populations,
intervention is needed. Groups in the dependent and the tools chosen. The kinds of rationales differ
category will not usually be encouraged or given depending upon the social construction of the target
support to devise their own solutions to problems but population and can be used either to perpetuate or to
will have to rely on agencies to help them. For change social constructions.
example, battered women still must rely mainly on For powerful, positively viewed groups, the ration-
the police for assistance, rather than having self-help ales will commonly feature the group's instrumental
organizations that are eligible as direct recipients for links to the achievement of important public pur-
government grants. poses, currently conceptualized in terms of national
Another policy tool, the use of authority (defined defense and economic competitiveness. Justice-ori-
as statements that grant permission, prohibit action, ented rationales (e.g., equality, equity, need, and
or require action) will be more common than with the rights) will be less common for this group. Efficiency
powerful, positively viewed groups, because depen- as a means for achieving the instrumental goals of
dents are not considered as self-reliant. The so-called policy will be emphasized as the reason for the
gag rule imposed by the Bush administration that selection of particular target groups and particular
prohibited family planning clinic personnel from pro- tools. For example, federal science and technology
viding information about abortion even when asked policy, which distributes more than $75 billion annu-

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 Construction of Target Populations June 1993

ally to large corporations and universities, is justified competitiveness (and in spite of the logic of this
on the grounds of national defense and/or economic position), political leaders in the 1980s tended to
competitiveness. The groups chosen are said to be an ignore this connection. Public education has been
efficient mechanism for ensuring the United States justified in terms of equal opportunities-a rationale
maintains its technological edge vis-A-vis other coun- that currently does not carry the same status as
tries. instrumental ones. The values of American society
Similar rationales are used even when burdens are simply seem to favor instrumental goals over justice-
being distributed. The close association of the welfare oriented goals. It may be the case that instrumental
of these groups with the public interest is not chal- goals are given primacy mainly because this permits
lenged. Instead, groups may be told that they are not policy to continue distributing benefits to those who
being made relatively worse off, compared with their are more powerful. Similarly, elected officials may
competitors and that all will gain in the long run. not want to use instrumental justifications for policies
Policies to control common-pool resource problems, that benefit less powerful people, even when it
such as water and air, usually claim that it will protect would be perfectly logical to do so, as this would then
the resource for everyone and that the regulations require larger expenditures on such groups. Benefits
will prevent a single firm within their group from conferred on negatively viewed powerless groups,
gaining advantages and depleting the resource. In such as criminals, are frequently argued as unavoid-
those cases where it is impossible to construe a able in order to protect important constitutional prin-
burden as a benefit, then the rationale may claim that ciples that confer rights on everyone. Sometimes
it is technically unavoidable if the common-interest claims will be made, however, that beneficial policies
goals (e.g., national defense) are to be served. The (e.g., rehabilitation for criminals) are efficient mech-
burden impinges on everyone, and it is not practical anisms for achieving public safety. This argument is
to make an exception for the advantaged groups. The difficult to sustain, however, because the public be-
advantaged are not being singled out, and they are lieves that these people deserve to be punished and
sacrificing for the public good. that rehabilitation policies will not work to reduce
For contending groups (those that are powerful but crime. Part of the social construction of these groups
have negative constructions), the rationale is sharply is that they respond mainly to punishment.
different, depending on whether they are receiving Burdens for powerless groups who are positively
benefits or burdens. When they are receiving costs, constructed, such as children, may be justified as an
the public rationale will overstate the magnitude of efficient mechanism to protect the individual from
the burden and will construe it as a correction for harm or to achieve public purposes. For powerful
their greed or excessive power. On the other hand, groups, choices are limited only when there is no
private communications may suggest that the burden other way to achieve certain goals. Persons in the
is not excessive or will have little impact. In situations powerful groups are constructed as intelligent and
where the burden is real, the group may be led to able to make good choices. Powerless groups are not
believe that they did not have enough power or made usually constructed this way but are viewed as need-
errors in their strategies. They may be told that the ing direction., "For her own good" is a common
policy was inevitable once public attention was di- reason given for incarcerating girls who have run
rected to their privileged, powerful position. When away from home or who are living with a boyfriend.
contending groups receive benefits, the rationales Child labor laws that removed choices from children
will understate the magnitude of the gain, which is and their families were done to protect the children.
made easier because the gains often are cloaked as
procedures that enable the group to have privileged
Messages, Orientations, and Participation
access to lower-level agencies or governments where
the elected officials will not be held accountable for The agenda, tools, and rationales of policy impart
the groups' gains. When the benefits are obvious and messages to target populations that inform them of
can credibly be linked to instrumental goals, such as their status as citizens and how they and people like
national defense, arguments will be made that it themselves are likely to be treated by government.
would not be possible to achieve the goal without Such information becomes internalized into a concep-
also benefiting the group. tion of the meaning of citizenship that influences
Rationales for providing beneficial policy to pow- their orientations toward government and their par-
erless groups seem to emphasize justice-oriented ticipation. Policy teaches lessons about the type of
legitimations, rather than instrumental ones. During groups people belong to, what they deserve from
the past two decades, the interests of dependent government, and what is expected of them. The
populations have seldom been associated with im- messages indicate whether the problems of the target
portant national purposes. The association of justice- population are legitimate ones for government atten-
oriented rationales to dependent populations seems tion, what kind of game politics is (public-spirited or
to hold even when a case can be made linking the the pursuit of private interests), and who usually
policy to national goals such as economic develop- wins.
ment or national defense. Education is a good exam- Citizens encounter and internalize the messages
ple. In spite of strenuous efforts by educators to claim not only through observation of politics and media
that education is the fundamental basis for economic coverage but also through their direct, personal ex-

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American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 2

Policy Design Impacts on Different Target Populations

TYPES OF TARGET POPULATIONS

TYPES OF IMPACTS ADVANTAGED CONTENDERS DEPENDENTS DEVIANTS

Messages
Personal good, intelligent controversial helpless, needy bad
"Your" problems are important public in conflict with the responsibility of your own personal
problems others' interests the private sector responsibility
Government should treat with respect with fear or caution with pity with disrespect or
you hate
Orientations
Toward government supportive suspicious, vigilant disinterested passive angry, oppressed
Toward own interests coincide with the conflictive with private responsibility personal
public interest others responsibility
Toward other's claims not legitimate competitive rivals more important simply privileges
on government
Toward political game open, fair, winnable involving raw use of hierarchical and abusive of power
power and elitist and fixed
crooked
Participation
Mobilization potential
for conventional forms high moderate low low
(voting, interest
groups)
for disruptive forms low moderate low moderate
(strikes, riots)
for private provisions high moderate low low
of services
Citizen-agency agency outreach targets subvert client-initiated avoidance
interaction implementation contacts

periences with public policy. These experiences tell burdens are equitably allocated and whether their
them whether they are viewed as "clients" by gov- sacrifice is truly necessary for a public purpose. When
ernment and bureaucracies or whether they are other groups are singled out for benefits, especially
treated as objects. Experience with policy tells people those who are less powerful or negatively con-
whether they are atomized individuals who must structed, they tend to believe that the government is
deal directly with government and bureaucracy to on the wrong track. Advantaged groups are quick to
press their own claims or participants in a cooperative sense favoritism whenever groups other than them-
process joining with others to solve problems collec- selves receive benefits.
tively for the common good. Citizen orientations Advantaged groups are positively oriented toward
toward government impinge on their participation policy and politics, so long as government continues
patterns. to be favorable toward them (which becomes difficult
The personal messages for the positively viewed, in a troubled economy). Experiences with policy
powerful segments of society are that they are good, teach them that government is important, politics is
intelligent people (Table 1). When they receive ben- usually fair, government can be held responsible for
efits from government, it is not a special favor or producing beneficial policy, there are payoffs from
because of their need but because they are contribut- mobilizing and supporting government officials. The
ing to public welfare. For these groups, reliance on game can be won within the rules. The powerful,
government is not a signal that they cannot solve popular groups are active participants in traditional
their own problems. Government appears responsive ways, such as voting, interest group activity, cam-
to them, and a clear message is sent through the tools paign contributions and so forth. When policies are
and rationales that their interest coincide with the ineffective, especially when there are sustained peri-
public interest. Policies often involve outreach and ods of economic problems, they blame government
seldom require needs tests; thus the advantaged do rather than themselves and they mobilize for change.
not see themselves as claimants or as dependent on When government no longer benefits them, these
government. Instead, they are a crucial part of the groups are likely to organize and devise private
effort to achieve national goals, such as national alternatives to public services, such as private
defense or economic vitality. When they are regu- schools, security systems, mental health services,
lated, they examine rationales closely to see whether and so on. And, they object even more strenuously to

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 Construction of Target Populations June 1993

government regulation or to government providing contrast with the advantaged groups, the powerless
benefits to others. As they increasingly provide ser- (even when positively constructed) do not see their
vices for themselves, they withdraw support for interests as coinciding with an important public goal
government provision of such services to others, and, instead, tend to buy into the idea that their
thereby contributing to an ever-widening gulf in the problems are individual and should be dealt with
quality of life experienced by the haves and have-nots through the private sector. They may view the claims
in modern American society. of others, especially the powerful advantaged
Contenders receive different messages. Policy tells groups, as being more legitimate than their own. The
them that they are powerful, but they will be treated game of politics is a bureaucratic game where they
with suspicion rather than respect. Their power is wait in line and eventually get what others want
meaningful only when accompanied by a strategy them to have. Participation is low and conventional,
that will hide the true effects from public view. but their primary form of interaction with govern-
Politics is highly contentious; no one will take care of ment is as applicants or claimants who are applying
them except themselves. Thus, they must use power for services to a bureaucracy.
to pursue their own interests. Contenders realize that Persons who are both powerless and negatively
conflict is common. They must be constantly vigilant constructed will have mainly negative experiences
and calculating to insure that government serves with government, but differences in the tools and
their ends. They believe that government is not really rules will lead to different messages from those
interested in solving problems but in wielding power. received by other groups. The dominant messages
The difference between the public and private mes- are that they are bad people whose behavior consti-
sages that government sends to these groups teaches tutes a problem for others. They can expect to be
them that government is not to be trusted. Private punished unless they change their behavior or avoid
power is more important than public interests and contact with the government. Accordingly, these
rationales are simply subterfuge rather than valid people often fail to claim government benefits for
arguments justifying the distribution of benefits and which they are eligible. On the other hand, govern-
costs. Politics is a corrupt game; winners have suc- ment often is unable to catch them for their misdeeds
cessfully used power and may have not stayed within and commonly fails to punish even when individuals
the rules of the game. Participation patterns tend are apprehended. Thus, government appears to be
toward the use of informal means, such as the use of arbitrary and unpredictable. The rule of law and
influential connections and campaign contributions. justice have no meaning. Orientations will be those of
Participation may disregard the rules or laws; manip- angry and oppressed people who have no faith in
ulation and subterfuge are common. government's fairness or effectiveness. They see
The messages to dependents are that they are themselves as alone and as individual players who
powerless, helpless, and needy. Their problems are have no chance of winning in a game that they view
their own, but they are unable to solve them by as essentially corrupt. Conventional forms of partici-
themselves. Policy teaches them that it is not in the pation such as voting, running for office, and interest
public's interest to solve their problems, and they get group activity will be viewed as irrelevant (even if
attention only through the generosity of others. To be they are eligible) because government belongs to
forced to depend upon a safety net means one is not someone else. Participation, when it occurs, is likely
much of a player. The tools and rationales imply that to be more disruptive and individualized, such as
government is responsive to them only when they riots and protests. As with the contenders, the devi-
subject themselves to government and relinquish ants are more inclined to break the rules of participa-
power over their own choices. Income testing and the tion.
typical requirement that they must apply to the
agency for benefits (rather than being sought out
through outreach programs) require them to admit
The Dynamics of Social Constructions
their dependency status. Even when beneficial policy
is provided, it is accompanied by labeling and stigma. Social constructions are manipulated and used by
Policy sometimes attempts to overcome negative public officials, the media, and the groups them-
stereotyping by replacing one label with another, selves. New target groups are created, and images
such as using disabled instead of handicapped, which, are developed for them; old groups are reconfigured
itself, was used as a replacement for crippled. Unfor- or new images created. One of the most interesting
tunately, stigma often catches up with the new label. questions is whether inherent contradictions within
Information programs that rely on propaganda and the policy process itself will lead to cyclical patterns of
stereotypes for effectiveness primarily reinforce the corrections in the over- and undersubscription to
prevailing social constructions. Efforts to reduce the different target groups.
spread of HIV by appealing to young black males One possibility is that beneficial policy becomes
through sport figures such as Magic Johnson may increasingly oversubscribed to the advantaged
reinforce the image of young blacks as sexually pro- groups, with a corresponding decline in resources
miscuous. available for policy that actually will be effective in
The messages result in orientations toward govern- achieving public purposes. Government can be ex-
ment characterized by disinterest and passivity. In pected to continue putting forth justifications claim-

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 2

ing that providing benefits to advantaged groups ative social constructions, mobilize, and engage in
serves broader public interests, but the credibility of widespread political participation, including conven-
these explanations will decline for several reasons. tional forms, as well as disruptive behavior such as
First, personal experiences of ordinary citizens will demonstrations or riots. The cycles of disruptive
lead many to realize that policy is ineffective in politics in the United States such as occurred in the
solving problems, or important problems are not 1930s and 1960s may be explained by this dynamic
even being addressed, or that the designs of policies process.
are illogical and not actually intended to serve the In a relatively open, democratic society, these phe-
stated goals. Personal observation and experience nomena might produce pendulumlike cycles of policy
will also verify that the democratic image of equality that distribute benefits and burdens to differing seg-
is too far at odds with the actual distribution of ments of the population, so that the advantages
benefits, influence, power, and the like. It becomes enjoyed by the powerful, positively viewed groups
difficult to continue constructing groups that are do not escalate in a linear fashion but are occasionally
overly advantaged in a positive light; similarly, it pulled back. Similarly, the oppressiveness of policy to
becomes difficult to continue pretending that the deviant groups may not continually escalate but may
most important goals of society exclude benefits to reverse direction toward more benign postures.
the growing numbers of seriously disadvantaged On the other hand, there may be no inherent
groups, particularly when ordinary citizens encoun- dynamic that produces a cyclical pattern. Changes
may be unrelated to the prevailing distribution of
ter these people, such as the unemployed, in their
daily routines.
advantages and, instead, depend upon opportuni-
ties, unexpected dramatic events, and the skills of
In addition to personal experiences, another impe-
those who manipulate images and constructions. Still
tus for doubting the prevailing rationales may be
a third possibility is that the advantaged continue to
forthcoming from the images portrayed by the media,
gain at the expense of others and that more and more
movies, literature, music, and other carriers of social
groups are constructed as deviants and subject to
constructions. These respond to many stimuli, in-
punishment. This process is not self-correcting, be-
cluding the creative imaginations and critical skills of
cause social constructions become increasingly im-
artists, writers, journalists, academics, and others.
portant and difficult to refute (Edelman 1988). Thus,
Carriers of social constructions may begin to portray
they are manipulated and used to build support for
the advantaged segments as greedy, rather than
the increasingly uneven allocation of benefits and
deserving. Dramatic events will often serve as cata-
burdens by government.
lysts for changes in social constructions. When pow-
erful, positively viewed groups become construed
negatively, the dynamics of policy change dramati- IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
cally. Some of the previously advantaged groups are
displaced into a negatively constructed group that An understanding of social constructions makes im-
will not be able to garner as much beneficial policy. portant contributions to many different issues in
Other groups that were previously negatively con- political science, three of which will be discussed
structed or who had not previously exercised power here: Who benefits and who loses from government
proportionate to their size (because of the social action? Who participates? and What is the effect of
constructions) may move into the positively viewed, policy on democracy?
powerful segment. If so, understandings of the pub-
lic interest may shift to those closer to the interests of
Beneficiaries and Losers
previously disadvantaged persons.
The political advantages for inflicting punishment The framework makes an important contribution to
upon powerless, negatively viewed groups are so the issue of which groups will benefit from policy-
great that this area also will become oversubscribed why powerful groups do not always win-and offers
and extended to ever-larger segments of the popula- a compelling explanation for the prominent role
tion. It is likely that certain kinds of behavior, such as played by punishment in the United States political
the use of alcohol or other drugs, will be proscribed process. A great deal of research by political scientists
simply because the groups who are heavy users are has verified that policy often reflects the interests of
negatively constructed and lack sufficient power to powerful constituent groups. Theories of self-inter-
oppose the policies. As these prohibited behaviors ested behavior by the groups combined with reelec-
spread to more powerful and more positively con- tion motivations by elected officials offer possible
structed groups, however, they will eventually reach explanations. As a number of authors have pointed
a number of people whose experiences will not out, however, policy often serves public interests
permit them to buy into the messages that they are (more commonly than is usually acknowledged by
bad and undeserving people. When common behav- political science), which is far more difficult to explain
iors of large numbers of ordinary people become (Arnold 1990; Kelman 1987). Arnold's theory is that
subject to negative stereotyping and punishment is public officials develop strategies based on expecta-
threatened, the expected acquiescence is unlikely. tions of how the public will react and that they
Instead, these groups may refuse to accept the neg- believe that their opponents and the media can easily

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 Construction of Target Populations June 1993

arouse the inattentive publics by focusing on policy occur. Policy is an important variable that shapes
failures or other errors in judgment. Thus, policy citizen orientations and perpetuates certain views of
directed solely to the benefit of powerful groups citizenship that are in turn linked to differential
could become a major campaign liability. Arnold participation among groups. Groups portrayed as
anticipates the importance of social constructions of dependents or deviants frequently fail to mobilize or
target populations when he notes that politically to object to the distribution of benefits and burdens
repellent options "also include programs for which because they have been stigmatized and labeled by
citizens have little sympathy for the affected groups" the policy process itself. They buy into the ideas that
(1990, 80). Kelman simply asserts that public spirit- their problems are not public problems, that the goals
edness is as important a motivation for behavior as that would be most important for them are not the
self-interest. Thus, elected officials are motivated most important for the public interest, and that
sometimes by self-interest, producing policies bene- government and policy are not remedies for them.
fiting powerful groups in the constituency but some- They do not see themselves as legitimate or effective
times by public spiritness, producing good public in the public arena, hence their passive styles of
policy that serves general interests (Kelman 1987). participation. In contrast, the advantaged groups are
Social constructions make an important contribu- reinforced in pursuing their self-interests and in
tion to these explanations. Social constructions of believing that what is good for them is good for the
target populations help explain the kinds of issues country. They can marshal their resources and use
that opponents and media can exploit, namely, any them to gain benefits for themselves, all the while
policy that confers benefits on negatively constructed portraying themselves as public-spirited. Others do
groups (as is illustrated in the Willy Horton ads) or not object, and in fact, support such policies, because
policies that confer burdens on positively constructed they accept the goals that benefit the advantaged
groups. The tensions created by noncongruity among groups and believe these groups are deserving of
social constructions, power, and logical relationships what they get. Social constructions enhance their
create many situations in which elected leaders will power, whereas it detracts from the power of the
distribute benefits and burdens outside the dictates of disadvantaged groups.
power. Furthermore, social constructions are essen-
tial to an explanation of the politics of punishment,
which wins no votes among the recipients of punish-
Policy and Democracy
ment and appears to accomplish few, if any, positive
purposes. Social constructions of target populations are crucial
variables in understanding the complex relationship
between public policy and democratic governance.
The theory presented here is an extension of the work
Who Participates?
of Lowi, Wilson, and others who are interested in
One of the enduring issues in political science is why how policy affects democracy. It offers explanations
participation is so low and uneven. Many have for some of the incorrect predictions from Lowi and
pointed out that the groups who stand to gain the Wilson's typologies and implies different prescrip-
most from political action, such as the poor and tions about what is needed for policy to serve dem-
ocratic roles in society (Barber 1984; Lowi 1964, 1972,
minorities, often fail to mobilize and, in fact, have the
lowest rates of participation. Some theorists have 1985; Wilson 1973, 1986).
examined the importance of structural impediments, Lowi popularized the idea that "policy creates
such as voting registration rules; others have empha- politics," turning political science away from its al-
sized that the typical political agenda may be irrele- most exclusive attention to how "politics creates
vant to the disadvantaged groups or that the disad- policy." His concern was to identify the attributes of
vantaged may find it difficult to recognize their own policy that encourage affected people (or groups) to
interests as being sufficiently distinct to warrant ac- mobilize, to make their preferences clear, and to
tive participation (Gaventa 1980; Piven and Cloward ensure that policy reflects compromises among com-
1988). Some critical theorists have suggested that the peting interests rather than the influence of a small
wants and desires of disadvantaged groups are ma- number of elites. Lowi's typology was based on two
nipulated by the powerful through appeals to sym- dimensions: whether the probability of coercion is
bols, thereby leading to quiescence (Gaventa 1980; low (benefits distributed) or high (costs distributed)
Luke 1989). Others have advanced the theory that and whether the policy identifies specific targets or
politics becomes increasingly technical and that gov- consists of general rules that impinge on the environ-
ernment offers complex, technical explanations for ment of the target groups. These two dimensions
policy designs that are beyond the comprehension ofproduce four types of policy-distributive, regulatory,
everyone except the experts (Fischer 1990; Habermas redistributive, and constituent-of which only one,
1975; Hawkeswork 1988). The result is a depolitiza- regulatory, produces political activities resembling an
tion of society and a withdrawal of citizens from open, competitive model of pluralist democracy. All
political discourse and activity. of the others, he argued, encourage some type of
The concept of social construction of target popu- elitism. Wilson's typology also was developed to
lations helps explain how and why these linkages explain how and why different kinds of policies

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 2

produce different kinds of politics. His typology can effectively challenge arbitrary and unjust treat-
accounted for four types of politics: majoritarian, plu- ment (1990, 564-65). Powerful, positively constructed
ralist, elitist, and client, depending on whether the groups continue under such policies to be reinforced
benefits and costs are concentrated or dispersed in the belief in their own deservedness and associa-
(Wilson 1986). tion of their self-interest with the general interest.
Social constructions add to both these theories in Groups negatively socially constructed will continue
several ways. Lowi was especially opposed to distrib- to see government as a source of problems, rather
utive policy arenas, which are characterized by dis- than solutions, and participation as an irrelevant
tribution of beneficial policy directly to constituent activity. True empowerment and equality would oc-
groups, because these tend to produce a pattern of cur only if all target populations had social construc-
mutual noninterference and sub rosa decision mak- tions that were positive and only if all have power
ing in which only the few participate and only the relatively equal to their numbers in society.
few are served (Lowi 1979). Social constructions add A theory of the social constructions of target pop-
to this by explaining why some groups are regularly ulations is also relevant to an understanding of policy
singled out for distributive policy, whereas others are failure in the technical sense of policy that is not
not. It is not simply a matter of power, assessed in effective or efficient. Policy scientists have typically
traditional ways such as size, wealth, cohesion, and blamed policy failures on illogical linkages in the
the like. Nor is it simply a matter of concentrated
policy design and have blamed these illogical connec-
benefits and dispersed costs, as Wilson's typology
tions on elected officials who pay too much attention
suggests. Distributive policy is most likely to be
to powerful interest groups and not enough attention
directed at target populations that are both powerful
to experts (Brewer and deLeon 1983; Quade 1982). A
and positively constructed. When unpopular groups,
theory of the social construction of target populations
including those that are powerful, are targeted for
makes it clear that policies are not technically illogical
distributive policy, Lowi's predictions of low conflict
simply because of political power considerations.
and mutual noninterference are usually incorrect.
Social constructions are crucial to understanding
Instead, opposition emerges, so that the policy arena
which policies are most likely to be illogical. Social
resembles the one Lowi characterized as redistribu-
constructions impinge on all aspects of design, in-
tive or regulatory. When groups that lack power but
cluding selection of goals, targets, tools, and imple-
have positive constructions are targeted for distribu-
mentation strategies. Experts do not escape social
tive policy, opposition also will emerge. In addition,
constructions, either; and the constructions they hold
some regulatory policy does not produce opposition
color which goals they think are important and which
(as Lowi's theory suggested) but is met instead with
targets they believe are the most logically connected
general approval. Lowi's typology clustered social
to the goals. The tools that experts think will motivate
regulation (e.g., crime policy) with business regula-
the targets rest on assumptions about behavior that
tion because both inflict coercion on general catego-
are influenced by social constructions. The rationales
ries of people. Yet, punishment-oriented crime poli-
that the experts believe will make the policy palatable
cies are almost never met with the type of pluralist
to affected groups imply particular social construc-
opposition that characterizes business regulatory pol-
tions of those groups. Thus, social constructions (as
icy.
well as power) influence the logic of policy, and
Social constructions also help explain anomalies in
expertise does not negate the influence of construc-
predictions from Wilson's theory. For example, wel-
tions on policy design even in highly nonpolitical
fare policies are characterized by concentrated bene-
contexts.
fits and dispersed costs-the type of policy that
One of our fundamental contentions is that policies
Wilson contended will continually expand, because
that fail to solve problems or represent interests and
those who benefit will mobilize, whereas those who
that confuse, deceive, or disempower citizens do not
pay (the taxpayers) will not. Thus, elected officials
who are motivated by reelection will be unable to cut serve democracy. Policy designs that serve democ-
or reduce these kinds of policies. Social constructions racy, then, need to have logical connections to im-
help explain why (and when) elected officials will portant public problems; represent interests of all
find it easy to cut welfare policies, as has happened in impinged-on groups; and enlighten, educate, and
many states during the past decade when the poor empower citizens. Policy should raise the level of
were constructed as lazy or shiftless and were often discourse. Given the electoral dynamics described
believed to be minorities who were responsible for here, however, it is not likely that policy will be
their own plight. designed to achieve all three of its democratic roles
For Lowi, policies that serve broad public purposes unless the power of target populations is made more
contain a clear rule of law applicable to broad catego- equal and social constructions become less relevant or
ries of people and contain clear and consistent direc- more positive. In other words, the only groups in the
tives are most likely to produce an environment in policy typology for which policy is likely to serve
which democracy can flourish. Yet as Ginsberg and democratic roles are the powerful, positively con-
Sanders point out, such laws dignify and empower structed groups. Until all groups are so situated,
only the individuals who know what the law is and policy will continue to fail in its democratic mission.

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 Construction of Target Populations June 1993

CONCLUSION Barber, Benjamin. 1984. Strong Democracy. Berkeley: Univer-

sity of California Press.
Best, Joel. 1989. Images of Issues: Typifying Contemporary Social
Political scientists should include the social construc-
Problems. New York: de Gruyter.
tion of target populations among the political phe- Brewer, Garry D., and Peter deLeon. 1983. The Foundations of
nomena to which they devote their research. Social Policy Analysis. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
constructions are political in the sense that they are Collins, Patricia Hill. 1989. "The Social Construction of Invis-
related to public discourse and are manipulated ibility: Black Women's Poverty in Social Problems Dis-
through hortatory and symbolic language generally course." Perspectives on Social Problems 1:77-93. JAI Press.
Dryzek, John. 1990. Discursive Democracy. Cambridge: Cam-
regarded as political. Further, while not discussed in
bridge University Press.
detail here, social constructions are measurable
Edelman, Murray. 1964. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana:
through familiar survey methods, as well as historical University of Illinois Press.
and textual analysis. Edelman, Murray. 1988. Constructing the Political Spectacle.
Social constructions of target populations help pro- Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
vide better answers to Lasswell's (1936) enduring Fischer, Frank. 1990. Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise.
Newbury Park: Sage.
question, Who get what, when, and how? Conven-
Gaventa, John. 1980. Power and Powerlessness. Urbana: Univer-
tional political science hypotheses about the charac-
sity of Illinois.
teristics that determine groups' influence in setting Ginsberg, Benjamin, and Elizabeth Sanders. 1990. "Theodore
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Anne Schneider is Professor of Political Science and Dean of College of Public

Programs, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-0803.

Helen Ingram is Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ

85721.

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