Introduction

After World War II, the idea of nations coming together as one to prevent such war against each other
again and to pool their resources of coal and steel was created out of the yearning for peace in a
continent ripped apart by conflict. With a combined population of over 500 million, the European Union
(EU) is the consensual coherence of 28 member states on issues like commerce, agriculture, and finance,
among others.

The idea that European Union law supersedes national law is left unsaid in the Lisbon Treaty. To this
effect, however, Declaration No. 17 was annexed to the previously described Treaty. Regarding the
question of whether European Union law supersedes conflicting national laws, the following view is
apparent: "under the principle of supremacy, precedence must always be given to Community law over
conflicting national law however framed and including national constitutional provisions.

EU Structure

The European Union comprises multiple organizations, including the European Parliament and the
European Council, which work together or separately to draft and approve EU legislation that are
intended for member states to follow. This ensures that the purpose of the EU treaties is fulfilled. The
European Court of Justice (ECJ), the EU's ultimate court, makes sure that each member state interprets
and adopts EU law uniformly. In addition to ensuring that EU laws are correctly applied, the ECJ has the
authority to penalize violators and those who neglect to fulfill their obligations.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty of European Union are the
basic sources of legislation from which EU law is derived. Treaties are ratified agreements between
member states, which set out rules for EU institutions, how decisions are made and the relationship
between the EU and its member state, which are binding in its entirety and directly applicable, meaning
once signed and passed it automatically has legal effect on all members states, without the need of any
national measures to implement it.

Scholars like Lorna Griffiths contend that membership in the EU and its treaties have shattered member
states' national sovereignty, raising the question of whether this was a purposeful move to diminish
member state sovereignty and replace it with an increasingly preponderant EU law system, which is now
debatable.

Historical Development of Supremacy as per ECJ

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has produced arguments supporting the conclusion that Community
law supersedes national law. Without a question, the Treaty's primary objectives were cooperation and
integration. One Member State's refusal to implement Union law, which ought to apply equally to all,
could destabilize them. As a result, the Court did attempt to create a general rule in Costa that all legally
enforceable Union law comes first.

Van Gen Loose and Direct Effect:

Van Gend en Loos stands out as one of the most highly regarded instances in the European legal canon
based on a cursory review of the published literature on the impact of EU regulations. It is commonly
believed that the ECJ's Van Gend en Loos ruling established the idea of direct impact, which is now
deeply ingrained in the EU constitutional framework. Moreover, none of the EU treaties themselves
explicitly state this theory. Rather, the European Court of Justice's reading of the treaties established that
European laws might grant individuals of member states direct rights. From a sociopolitical standpoint,
Van Gend en Loos is sometimes depicted as a turning point in the development of European integration
and As Eric Stein puts it, in Van Gend en Loos direct effect was widely perceived as taking concrete form
and ‘operationalized’ from a vague concept into practice. Concomitantly, it is viewed as having
‘transformed’ the national individual to a European subject decades before the Maastricht Treaty in 1993
formalised European Citizenship.

While it was a significant, even revolutionary, ruling at the time, the idea that it signaled the beginning of
a new legal system is controversial and somewhat dubious. Direct effect was not a novel or especially
inventive principle, as Derrick Wyatt notes, at least not in terms of doctrine. Treaty provisions were
already directly implemented by self-executing principles found in the national constitutions of the
majority of European states. In Van Gend en Loos, the justices of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
have refuted claims of judicial activism on several occasions, maintaining that their reasoning stems from
a strictly "logical" reading of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC). David
Edwards, a former member of the European Court of Justice, has contended that Van Gend en Loos only
restated a number of previously established notions in an explicit way. Edwards lists four main ideas that
influenced the Van Gend en Loos ruling, based on prior case law precedents and deductions. The first
dealt with the direct effects of treaty provisions and directives both vertically and horizontally. Second,
there was a lengthy history of this "canon of interpretation," which is the concept of effet utile, which
states that the interpretation that best ensures the practical effect of current community law would be
given precedence. The so-called "objectives-oriented" approach to treaty interpretation was a third
fundamental tenet. A law "presupposes the rules without which that treaty or law would have no
meaning or could not be reasonably and usefully applied," according to Edwards, a premise that the ECJ
has long upheld. Ultimately, it was a recognized international. Finally, it was an established practice of
international law whereby provisions of ratified treaties took precedence over national laws on issues
that directly infringed upon the ratified provisions.

Costa Enel and Supremacy:

As is generally known, the case of Costa v. Enel created and developed the idea of supremacy that is
currently under discussion. In that instance, the conflict between Italian national law and European
Community law had been examined. The European Court of Justice's (ECJ) ruling was predicated on the
transfer of competences from the States to the Community as well as the limitation of each Member
State's sovereignty. The ECJ bases its defense of the aforementioned premise primarily on the
"independence, uniformity, and efficacy" of Community law. According to this perspective, "the legal
order applicable in the territory of each of the Member States" includes European Union law as "an
integral part."

In Costa v. ENEL, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) firmly held that national governments were not
permitted to enact legislation that were in violation with the Treaty of East Africa (TEEC), following the
precedent set by Van Gend en Loos. Any national laws found to be at odds with the TEEC were declared
unconstitutional. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) effectively gave the theory of supremacy actual life
when it held that domestic courts had to accept European law as superseding their domestic laws.
Christoph Sasse contends that the case's relevance must be understood in the context of the decision's
making. At the time, it was generally believed that national courts and constitutions, not the ECJ,
ultimately controlled how European and national law interacted. The appropriate position of the ECJ was
seen, at best, as a ‘supplementary guidance mechanism’.

Morten Rasmussen claims that the ECJ did not finally address the basic problem of persuading national
courts to accept European law until Costa v. ENEL. Rasmussen argues that the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) "never addressed the key question of the extent to which the European legal order was
autonomous vis-à-vis national legal orders" and left open important questions about the general
character of European law prior to Costa v. ENEL. The TEEC was still a "fundamentally ambiguous text"
before to Costa v. ENEL. National governments oversaw compliance, but the competence and ongoing
support of member states remained essential to the implementation of European rules. The ECJ was
granted exclusive authority by the TEEC to interpret the generality and legality of European legal rules,
although it remained unclear how national courts would apply those interpretative norms. As discussed
earlier, systems like PR guaranteed neither the enforcement of European law northe uniformity of
interpretation and application.

German Case laws

The case in question upholds the fundamental principles of EU law's supremacy, as its extent and
strength were subsequently determined by court rulings. The ensuing case establishes that whether
Community law should take precedence over national measures that are inconsistent with it was not at
question. The German Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice are at odds over a significant ruling
made by the Court. Germany has never relinquished its claims, despite the ECJ's desire to avoid a direct
constitutional dispute with a national court.

The German Constitutional Court expressed worry for the preservation of fundamental rights in the
Solange I and Solange II cases. Additionally, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz theory was presented by the
same court first in Kloppenburg and then in Maastricht decision. Eventually, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, stepped back by deciding to put ‘in stand by’ its power to review secondary
community legislation. The ground for its decision can be found in protection of fundamental rights as
the level of protection in the European Union was found to be satisfactory.

Austria

In the case of Ciola, since it could jeopardize the ideas of both legal certainty and reasonable
expectations, the Austrian government disapproved of the supremacy being automatically applied to
"specific individual administrative acts" in the Ciola case. When it comes to immediately effective EU law,
the Court's decision to reject the Austrian government did affirm that the principle of primacy is equally
upheld and mandated by the ECJ. "Priority is accorded to EU norms only insofar as they do not conflict
with fundamental principles of the national Constitution," the Italian Constitutional Court declared in the
Frontini case. Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice declared that the primacy of a directly
applicable Community norm could not be contested even if it were a basic principle of national
constitutional law.

Understanding that a national court would not always be necessary to examine a final judicial decision
that clearly contradicts Union legislation makes the Kapferer case relevant. The European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has acknowledged the significance of res judicata in cases where the decision is final and cannot be
challenged. It is important to remember that the proper national procedural norms must adhere to the
effectiveness and equivalency requirements. From this angle, the idea of "unconditional supremacy"
captures the link between national and community law.

Italy

In the Simmenthal case, the idea of supremacy was further refined to provide that EU law is applicable
regardless of whether national law predates or postdates Community law. The clear message from the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) was that the Constitutional Court, being the only national court with the
authority to rule on the question of a national law's continuity, was required to grant immediate effect to
EU law. It has to happen regardless of the constitutional court's decision. The idea of supremacy was and
is crucial because it permeated national legal systems and is used by all national courts. Simmenthal
norm was utilized and extended in the Factortame case. Besides, in the case of Larsy the ECJ stated that
also the relevant agencies of administration are in duty to disapply national laws being in conflict with
Union law as to give effect to the primacy of EU law.

It is important to note that the Simmenthal principle only requires national courts to refuse to enforce a
provision that violates EU law, not to revoke it. The aforementioned legal certainty is taken into
consideration, resulting in the deduction that those who depended on the national legislation will not
face consequences should it become inapplicable.

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ) view that EU law supersedes all local laws and constitutional
provisions has sparked debate about whether the court has overreached its jurisdiction. It is evident that
the European Court of Justice's responsibility is to interpret European law, not to inquire about the
methods by which Member States resolve disputes between their own laws and union laws.

Poland

The ongoing debate between the EU and Poland over judicial reforms imposed by the Polish government
is one of the most notable examples of this tension. Concerns concerning the independence of the Polish
court have been raised by these reforms, which also include adjustments to the retirement age and
composition of the judiciary. The European Commission retaliated by launching infringement procedures
against Poland, claiming that these changes go against EU rules, including the rule of law and judicial
independence.

The Polish government, however, has rejected these arguments, claiming national law's supremacy and
its control over internal legal affairs. Polish courts have likewise reached differing conclusions on this
matter; some have upheld the government's measures, while others have asked the ECJ to clarify the
compatibility of these reforms with EU law.

Portugal

Regarding the independence of the Portuguese judiciary, the Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court
referred questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the matter of Associação Sindical dos Juízes
Portugueses (ASJP) v. Tribunal de Contas. The ECJ concluded that national measures affecting judicial
independence, such as changes to the retirement age of judges, are incompatible with EU law. Regarding
the competence of the ECJ and the degree to which EU law should supersede national laws, the
Portuguese government and certain domestic courts have voiced their doubts.
Ireland

Similar to this, the Irish Supreme Court asked the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issues regarding the
legitimacy of European Arrest Warrants issued by Poland in the case of Minister for Justice and Equality
v. LM. The Polish judiciary's independence and impartiality may be compromised by a reversal of the rule
of law, which could have an influence on the enforcement of European Arrest Warrants, according to the
Irish court. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) stressed the necessity for effective judicial protection and
respect for the rule of law, even as it reaffirmed the significance of mutual confidence and recognition
among Member States.

Scope of Treaty Articles in ensuring nations sovereignty:

In a consistent line of case law, the supremacy of Community law and the obligation that national courts
maintain its practical efficiency are thus established beyond reasonable doubt. Some may perceive
certain provisions of the EU Treaty as a partial reinforcement of the supremacy principle. For example,
Article 307 exempts Member States from the duty to guarantee the supremacy of EU law in specific
situations, and Article 297 seems to define a zone in which Member States maintain a certain level of
sovereignty. However, the ECJ's articulation of the fundamental principle of supremacy is wide and
universal, and these rules have a restricted scope.

However, since EU treaties supersede EU laws, it's possible that the divergent views of scholars and
member states have brought attention to the necessity for more clarification. In his writing, Michael
Dougan backed up this idea by questioning who truly benefited from the Treaties and describing the EU-
member states' symbiotic but confused connection as "surprisingly murky."

Legal Basis of Supremacy as per Treaties

Furthermore, Member States must take all necessary steps to guarantee that their EU commitments are
fulfilled in accordance with the concept of true collaboration, which is enshrined in Article 4(3) of the
Treaty on European Union. This entails maintaining the rule of law and making sure that ECJ decisions
are followed. If EU law contradicts domestic legal and political objectives, Member States may be
hesitant to fully apply it in circumstances of rule of law backsliding.

Five categories of legal instruments are listed in Article 288: rules, directives, decisions,
recommendations, and views. Opinions and recommendations are not legally binding, but decisions,
regulations, and directives are. This classification allows the EU institutions to be more flexible in the
kinds of legal tools they can use to accomplish their goals. But the distinction between non-binding and
binding can sometimes lead to confusion and inconsistency in their application.

Direct application, which makes regulations automatically enforceable and binding in every Member
State without the need for national legislation, is one of its special features. Although direct application
expedites the implementation process, it may also result in problems with consistency and legal
certainty because national authorities may not have as much latitude to interpret or modify legislation to
fit specific local situations.

Directives give Member States the freedom to select the form and means of implementation while
outlining the goals that they must meet. This adaptability has advantages and disadvantages. Although it
permits customization to national conditions, it might lead to disparate applications amongst Member
States, so weakening the harmonization goals of EU legislation.

Decisions apply to particular people, organizations, or Member States and are fully binding. Although the
legally obligatory nature of judgments guarantees their effective implementation, it may also give rise to
questions about the extent of power bestowed onto EU institutions and the possibility of encroachment
upon national sovereignty.

Opinions and recommendations represent the EU's perspective and offer non-binding guidance. Even
though they are not legally enforceable, suggestions and opinions can still have a big impact on how
Member States and other stakeholders act. Their non-binding character, meanwhile, can make them less
useful for getting the results you want.

The lines separating recommendations and opinions are less apparent than those separating regulations,
directives, and decisions. The efficacy of recommendations and opinions as tools of governance may be
weakened by this lack of clarity, which can lead to confusion regarding the legal standing and significance
of these documents. Consequently, a framework for the adoption and implementation of EU legislative
instruments is provided under Article 288 of the TFEU. The efficacy and validity of EU law must be
ensured by giving serious thought to the difficulties and ambiguities in its implementation, even as it
provides flexibility and a variety of options for accomplishing EU objectives.