Blas v.

Santos, 1 SCRA 899

FACTS

The plaintiffs sued to obtain a declaration that half of the properties left by Maxima Santos
were promised to them and should be adjudicated to them. The alleged promise was in a
document attached to the complaint.

ISSUE

Whether the heirs can acquire the properties promised to them by Maxima.

HELD

Yes, the heirs can acquire the properties promised to them by Maxima, as the promise made
before her death is a valid contract for future inheritance, expressly authorized by law.

Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil 185

FACTS

The testator left all his property to his children from his second marriage, omitting the children
from his first marriage, believing he had already given them their share through a land and
money which the second marriage children owed him.

ISSUE

Should the will be cancelled due to the omission of heirs, and is there disinheritance in this
case?

HELD

Yes, the Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared total intestacy, as the testator left
all his property to the second marriage children, mistakenly believing he had already given
enough to the first marriage children. This is a case of preterition, which annuls the institution
of heirs.

Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety, 100 Phil 388

FACTS
Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H. Hemady based on indemnity agreements,
but the lower court dismissed the claim, stating that after Hemady's death, he ceased to be a
guarantor.

ISSUE

Are obligations transmissible upon the death of the decedent, and are contingent claims
chargeable against the estate?

HELD

Yes, obligations are generally transmissible upon the death of the decedent, unless the law
expressly states otherwise. In this case, the contracts of suretyship were not rendered
intransmissible by nature, stipulation, or law, so Hemady's liability passed to his heirs.
Contingent claims, such as the one from Luzon Surety, are provable against the estate and must
be settled when the contingent liability becomes real.

Sicad v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 183

FACTS

Aurora Montinola executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" in 1979 in favor of her
grandchildren, but with a provision that the donation would be effective only 10 years after her
death. She later revoked the donation, claiming acts of ingratitude by the grandchildren, and
sold the property to the spouses Sicad.

ISSUE

Whether the "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" is actually a donation mortis causa.

HELD

Yes, the deed is a donation mortis causa because Montinola reserved for herself all the fruits of
the property and withheld from the grandchildren the right to dispose of the property during
her lifetime. This withholding of the right of disposition is a characteristic of a donation mortis
causa, which is essentially a will. Since the formalities of a will were not complied with, the
donation is void.

Heirs of Satramdas Sadhwani v. GOP Sadhawani, G.R. No. 217365. August 14, 2019.
FACTS

The dispute involves conflicting claims of ownership over a parcel of land in Makati (Bel Air
Property) and a condominium unit (Ritz). The properties were allegedly purchased by the
spouses Satramdas and Sadhwani and titled in the name of their son, in trust for the family.

ISSUE

Whether the case was validly dismissed.

HELD

The case was validly dismissed. The spouses Sadhwani, being Indian nationals, were absolutely
disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines or transmitting any right over them to their
children by succession. As the petitioners claimed ownership over the Bel Air Property as heirs
of their parents, they failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action, as they did not have a legal
right to the property.

In re Will of Rev. Abadia, 50 O.G. #9, p. 4185

FACTS

Father Sancho Abadia executed a holographic will in 1923, which was admitted to probate in
1952. Some cousins and nephews, who would inherit if there was no will, opposed.

ISSUE

Which law should apply to the validity of the holographic will: the old Civil Code when the will
was made or the new Civil Code which could have validated the will?

HELD

The old Civil Code should apply. The validity of a will as to its form depends on the law in force
at the time it is made. The holographic will, being invalid under the law at the time of its
execution, should be treated as if the testator died intestate.

It seems like you're doing a lot of legal research and analysis! If you need any help with specific
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Fleumer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610

FACTS

An application for probate of Edward Randolph Hix's will was filed, alleging it was executed in
West Virginia. The trial court denied probate. On appeal, the special administrator submitted a
petition with unverified documents.

ISSUE

Was the will duly executed?

HELD

No, the due execution of the will was not established, and the testator's domicile was not
proven to be in West Virginia.

Estate of Giberson, 48 O.G. #7, 2657

FACTS

Lela G. Dalton applied for the probate of the holographic will of William R. Giberson, a citizen of
Illinois, USA, dated April 29, 1920, in San Francisco, California. Spring Giberson, William's
legitimate son, opposed the probate, claiming the will is apocryphal and not executed according
to the law.

ISSUE

Whether wills executed outside the Philippines may be probated without being first probated in
the country of its execution.

HELD

Yes. Section 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows wills made outside the Philippines to be
proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippines without being probated first in the country of
execution. This provision is still in force and has not been repealed by Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court. The Court ruled that Section 635 is substantive and cannot be repealed by procedural
rules.

Dela Cerna v. Potot, 12 SCRA 576

FACTS

Spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will leaving two parcels of
land to their niece, Manuela Rebaca, as they had no children. The will was probated in 1939
after Bernabe's death.

A petition for the probate of the same will concerning Gervasia was filed in 1952 but was
dismissed in 1954 due to petitioner Manuela's failure to appear.

The Court of First Instance (CFI) declared the probate of Bernabe's will null and void, but the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, holding the 1939 probate decree conclusive.

ISSUE

Whether the will is valid.

HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision, stating that a final decree of probate is conclusive
as to the due execution of a will. Despite the Civil Code invalidating joint wills at that time, the
final probate decree from 1939 remains conclusive, as it has become final and unappealable.

Estate of Rodriguez, No. 1627-R. July 1, 1948

FACTS

Petitioner Araniego, widow of the deceased, filed a petition for probate of the latter’s will
before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Respondents opposed the petition. They
contended that since the deceased named Araniego as his universal heir and the latter having
likewise named the deceased as her universal heir, making them reciprocal beneficiaries of
each other, both testators violated the prohibition on joint wills under the Civil Code, and the
probate must be denied.

ISSUE

Whether the wills executed by testators reciprocally making the other as beneficiary is a joint
will prohibited by law.

HELD

NO. Article 669 of the old Civil Code (Art. 818 of the new Civil Code) prohibits the making of a
will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person. In other words, it is making such will conjointly or in the same document that is
prohibited. Here, the two testators, who were husband and wife, instructed the other as
universal heir in their respective wills, said wills are not conjoint because they are made in
different instruments. Hence, there is no joint will to speak of and the prohibition in the Civil
Code is inapplicable.

Estate of Christensen, 61 O.G. # 46, p. 7302

FACTS

Edward Christensen was born in New York but migrated to California where he resided. Later,
the Philippines became his domicile until the time of his death. In his will, he acknowledged
Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of sum of money to Maria Helen
Christensen. Helen posits that California law is clear that the matter is referred back to the law
of the domicile and therefore Philippine Law is applicable. Lucy contends that the national law
of the deceased must apply hence Helen is not compulsory heir and so Edward could freely
dispose his property.

ISSUE

Which is the relevant law insofar as the amount of successional rights of Helen and Lucy are
concerned?

HELD

It is ultimately the Philippine Law. The California law has two rules on the matter. The internal
law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California and the conflicts rule which
should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. Edward being domiciled outside
California (in the Philippines) follows that the law of his domicile. The validity of the provisions
of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, Helen, should be governed by the
Philippine law in determining the successional rights of Helen.

Estate of Amos Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

FACTS

Amos G. Bellis, a resident of Texas, executed a will in the Philippines dividing his assets, with a
portion going to his wife and the remainder to his children from his first and second marriages,
including three illegitimate children. Maria Cristina and Miriam, two of the illegitimate children,
opposed the will, claiming deprivation of their legitimes.

ISSUE

Whether Article 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code prevails over Article 16, paragraph 2.

Whether the will executed in the Philippines shall be governed by Philippine law.

HELD

No. Congress intended for the second paragraph of Article 16 to be a specific provision applied
in testate and intestate succession, as shown by its deletion of the phrase "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when incorporating Article 11 of the old Civil
Code as Article 17 of the new Civil Code. Congress also added a new provision under Article
1039, indicating that the capacity to succeed is governed by the decedent's national law.

No. Even if Bellis intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate by executing a separate
will, such provision is illegal and void under Miciano v. Brimo. The national law of a foreigner
cannot be ignored in matters governed by Article 16 of the Civil Code. As there are no forced
heirs or legitimes under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to Bellis'
testate succession.

Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 524

FACTS

The testatrix, an American citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., died in Manila, where
she temporarily resided with her sister. She executed her last will and testament according to
Pennsylvania law, which was probated and registered in Philadelphia, U.S.A. An opposition to
the reprobate of the will was filed, claiming nullity of its intrinsic provisions and divestment of a
legitime reserved for the petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether Philippine law applies to determine the intrinsic validity of a will executed by a
foreigner.

Whether Philippine law applies to determine the capacity to succeed of the testatrix's heirs.

HELD
No. The national law of the decedent must apply to the will's intrinsic validity. Congress did not
extend Philippine public policy or customs to the succession of foreign nationals, leaving the
amount of successional rights to the decedent’s national law, as specified in Article 16(2) and
1039 of the Civil Code.

No. Capacity to succeed is governed by the decedent's national law, as stated in Article 1039 of
the Civil Code. Even if Pennsylvania law, the testatrix's national law, does not provide for
legitimes, it still governs the will's provisions, which cannot be overridden by Philippine law

Parish Priest of Victoria v. Rigor, 89 SCRA 493

FACTS

Father Rigor's will left a riceland to his nearest male relative who would pursue priesthood,
administered by the local priest until then. Disputes arose over the bequest, with the lower
court initially declaring it inoperative but later granting it to the parish priest as trustee. The
Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether the bequest of the riceland to Father Rigor's nearest male relative pursuing
priesthood was valid.

HELD

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the bequest was intended for the testator's nearest male
relative living at the time of his death, making the bequest inoperative as no qualifying relative
existed then.

Reyes v. CA, S.C. L-5620 July 31, 1954

FACTS

Benedicto delos Reyes, during his lifetime, sold some of his properties to the heirs of his
executor. The said sale was challenged by the heirs of the decedent, contending therein that
said properties cannot be legally disposed by the decedent because it forms part of his estate
to be inherited by petitioners, the decedent heirs. Both the trial court upheld the validity of the
sale between decedent and the heirs of the executor having said that the sold properties were
sold before the death of the decedent and can no longer be part of the inheritance.
ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled of the property sold by the decedent during his
lifetime.

HELD

It depends. The general rule is that the heirs cannot validly claim ownership over the properties
in question if alienated prior to the decedent’s death. The rights to succession are transmitted
at the moment of death of the decedent (Art. 777 of the Civil Code) Exception is when said
alienation is subsequently declared void as when there is intent to defraud and to deprive the
heirs of their legitimes. In such case, said alienation is void. Here, the sale was declared void for
being absolutely simulated and because of intent to defraud heirs of their legitimes. Hence, said
properties still form part of the inheritance of the deceased.

Guinto v. Medina, 50 O.G. # 1, p. 199, Oct. 7, 1953\

FACTS

Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry against Santiago Medina alleging that he has been
in possession of the said parcel of land since 1934 and that Medina by means of force and
intimidation deprived him of his possession thereof. The trial court ruled in favor of Guinto but
it dismissed the prayer for damages. Pending appeal, Medina died. Medina was substituted by
his heirs. The Court awarded the damages appealed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the heirs of Medina are liable for damages, and if in the affirmative to what
extent.

HELD

YES. The action to recover damages survives notwithstanding the death of the adverse party
whom damages are sought to be recovered. In this case, the heirs of Medina are liable to pay
the damages as they are merely substituted in the place of Medina upon his death. However,
their liability is only to the extent of the value of the property, which they might have received
from the deceased defendant.

Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil 531

FACTS

Maria Uson, the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, filed a case to recover ownership and
possession of five parcels of land in Pangasinan from Maria del Rosario and her children. Del
Rosario, Nebreda's common-law wife, claimed the lands based on a deed of separation from
1931, where Uson renounced her right to inherit Nebreda's future property in exchange for a
parcel of land as alimony.

ISSUE

Whether the deed of separation, where Uson renounced her inheritance rights, is valid.

Whether the illegitimate children have successional rights over the disputed lands.

HELD

No. Renunciation of future inheritance rights cannot be the subject of a contract or

renouncement.

No. The new rights granted to illegitimate children under the Civil Code cannot prejudice the
vested rights of the lawful wife over the lands in question.

De Borja v. Vda. De Borja, 46 SCRA 577

FACTS

Francisco de Borja sought probate of his wife Josefa's will and was named executor. Their son,
Jose de Borja, became co-administrator. Francisco later married Tasiana.

ISSUE

Whether a compromise agreement between Tasiana and Jose de Borja, settling Tasiana's
hereditary share in Francisco and Josefa's estates, is valid without first probating Francisco's
will.

HELD

The agreement is valid. Since there was no prior attempt to distribute Francisco's estate before
probate, Tasiana could dispose of her hereditary share immediately after Francisco's death,
even though the share's extent was not yet determined. The agreement was limited to what
Tasiana would ultimately receive as her hereditary share.

Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 490

FACTS

Fortunata Barcena filed an action to quiet title over parcels of land. Pending the proceeding,
she died. The counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the
minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother,
but the court denied the counsel’s prayer for lack of merit, and dismissed the complaint on the
ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue.

ISSUE

Whether or not a court action survives, through the heirs, after the death of the plaintiff.

HELD

YES. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent.” From the moment of the death of the
decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and
obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to
the parcels of land in litigation, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her
heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and
became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court
not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

Go Ong v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 270

FACTS

After Alfredo's death, his wife Julita was appointed administratrix of his estate. Julita
mortgaged one of the parcels of land to Allied Banking Corp. to secure a loan for JK Exports. The
mortgage required mortgagee's consent for subsequent alienation or encumbrance of the
property.
ISSUE

Whether the mortgage over the parcel of land under Julita's administration is null and void for
lack of judicial approval.

HELD

The contract is valid. Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, requiring judicial approval for
certain actions related to property under administration, does not apply to mortgages made in
a personal capacity, not as an administratrix. Julita's conjugal share and her hereditary rights in
the property were validly mortgaged without judicial approval. The reference to judicial
approval in Rule 89 cannot adversely affect Julita's substantive rights to dispose of her share in
the co-heirship and/or co-ownership of the property.

Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, 4 SCRA 526

FACTS

Jose V. Ramirez owned a 1/6 undivided share of a property in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Upon his death,
the property was bequeathed to his children and grandchildren, with 1/3 of the free portion
going to Mrs. Angela M. Butte. Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez, widow of Jose V. Ramirez,
sold the property, including the 1/6 share, to Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., and notified the Bank of
the Philippine Islands, the administrator of Jose V. Ramirez's estate, of the sale.

ISSUE

Whether Mrs. Angela M. Butte, as a co-owner and heir of Jose V. Ramirez, has the right of legal
redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda de Ramirez.

HELD

Yes, Mrs. Angela M. Butte has the right of legal redemption over the share sold by Mrs. Marie
Garnier Vda de Ramirez. According to Article 1620 of the Civil Code, a co-owner may exercise
the right of redemption when the shares of all or any of the co-owners are sold to a third
person. If the price of the sale is excessive, the redemptioner pays a reasonable price. If
multiple co-owners wish to redeem, they must do so in proportion to their shares.

Reganon v. Imperial, 22 SCRA 80

FACTS
The heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint against Rufino Imperial for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land. After the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
they sought an alias writ of execution to enforce the judgment. The Deputy Provincial Sheriff
issued a notice of garnishment on the defendant's share in the residuary estate of the late
Eulogio Imperial, deposited in the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch.

ISSUE

Whether the money accumulated in the guardianship proceedings and deposited in a bank,
upon the death of the ward, is still considered in custodia legis and therefore cannot be
attached.

Whether the residuary estate of a U.S. veteran, consisting of the aggregate sum from monthly
allowances given by the United States Veterans Administration (USVA) during his lifetime, is
exempt from execution.

HELD

No, the money accumulated in the guardianship proceedings and deposited in a bank is no
longer considered in custodia legis upon the death of the ward. The new Rules of Court provide
for the attachability of such property, subject to the procedure set forth in the rules. The
guardianship proceedings cease upon the death of the ward, and the rights to his succession
are transmitted to his heirs, making the property attachable.

The residuary estate of a U.S. veteran, consisting of monthly allowances from the USVA, is not
exempt from execution. Such pensions are aimed at providing for the veteran's old age or
disability, and upon the veteran's death, the necessity for the pension ceases. Additionally, the
heirs of Eulogio Imperial, including the defendant-appellant, have already executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, which settles the entire estate of the decedent, making the property no
longer part of the estate but of the individual heirs.

Ramirez v. Baltazar, 24 SCRA 918

FACTS

Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged real estate to spouses Baltazar. Upon her death, the
mortgagees filed for intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, with plaintiffs Felimon and
Monica Ramirez as alleged heirs. Felimon was appointed administrator but did not qualify, so
Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator. The mortgagees foreclosed on the
property, bought it at the sale, and the court confirmed the sale. Felimon sued to annul the
foreclosure proceedings, claiming the judicial administrator failed to protect their interests.

ISSUE

Whether the plaintiffs have the cause of action against the defendants.

HELD

Yes. The rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the
decedent's death. While normally, judicial confirmation is required for these rights, under
special circumstances, the rights can be protected from encroachments before the judicial
declaration. In this case, where the judicial administrator failed to act, the heirs may act in his
place to protect their interests.

Noceda v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 504

FACTS

Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo settled a parcel of land in Zambales. Directo
donated a portion to Noceda, her nephew. However, a subsequent settlement gave Arbizo a
larger share, and Noceda and Directo received smaller portions. Disputes arose when Noceda
occupied and fenced off Directo's land without her consent.

ISSUE

Whether Noceda's actions constitute ingratitude sufficient to revoke the donation.

HELD

Yes. Noceda's occupation and fencing off of Directo's land without her consent are considered
acts of ingratitude, as they are offenses against the donor's property. The law does not require
the donee's conviction; proof of the offense in the action for revocation is sufficient.

Nufable v. Nufable, 309 SCRA 692

FACTS

Edras Nufable owned land in Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, which he bequeathed to his four
children. After his death, the heirs agreed to keep the land undivided for community
ownership. However, one heir, Angel Custodio Nufable, mortgaged the entire property to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) without the other heirs' consent. DBP foreclosed
the property in 1973, and Nelson Nufable, Angel's son, bought the property from DBP in 1980.

ISSUE

Whether the probate of Edras Nufable's will and its settlement among the heirs affect Nelson
Nufable's ownership of the property.

HELD

The Court of Appeals held that Angel Custodio Nufable had no right to mortgage the entire
property, only his 1/4 share. The other heirs had acquired rights to their shares upon Edras
Nufable's death. When Nelson Nufable bought the property from DBP, he acquired its rights
and obligations, subject to the existing co-ownership with the other heirs. DBP was not an
indispensable party, so its interests did not need to be included in the case. The petition to
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision was denied.

Balus v. Balus, G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010.

FACTS

Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land to the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte, as security for a
loan. The property was foreclosed and sold to the Bank. Rufo died after the sale, and an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate was later executed by the petitioner and respondents,
dividing a specific portion of the property among themselves.

ISSUE

Whether the disputed land is part of Rufo's estate.

HELD

No, the land is not part of Rufo's estate. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted
from the moment of his death. Since Rufo lost ownership of the property during his lifetime, it
was no longer part of his estate at the time of his death. Therefore, the petitioner and
respondents did not inherit the land from their father.

Ferrer v. Diaz, G.R. 165300, April 23, 2010.

FACTS
Comandante obtained a loan secured by a mortgage. Before the loan, she waived her
hereditary rights over a property to the petitioner. The loan was not repaid, so the petitioner
sued Comandante and her parents.

ISSUE

Is a waiver of hereditary rights for a future inheritance valid?

HELD

No. Waivers of hereditary rights for future inheritances are generally prohibited unless
expressly allowed by law. Since the succession had not yet opened at the time of the waiver,
and the property was expected to be inherited, the waiver was considered a contract upon
future inheritance, which is not valid.

Pasco v. Heirs of Filomena De Guzman, G.R. No. 165554, July 26, 2010.

FACTS

The Pasco brothers borrowed money from Filomena de Guzman, securing the loan with a
chattel mortgage over a vehicle. After Filomena's death, her heirs attempted to collect the loan
proceeds from the Pasco brothers. The heirs authorized one of their co-heirs, Cresencia, to act
as their attorney-in-fact through a Special Power of Attorney. The Pasco brothers contested
Cresencia's authority, arguing that Filomena's estate had its own legal personality.

ISSUE

Do the heirs of Filomena have the capacity to sue for the collection of the loan proceeds
obtained by the Pasco brothers on behalf of the estate of the deceased?

HELD

Yes. Unpaid loans are considered assets of the estate of the deceased creditor. While
Filomena's estate has a separate juridical personality from that of the heirs, the heirs have an
interest in preserving the estate and recovering its properties. According to Article 777 of the
Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the decedent's
death. However, the court ruled that the loan proceeds should be released to Filomena's heirs
only after the settlement of her estate, as releasing the funds directly to the heirs would
amount to distributing the estate before paying off all debts, charges, expenses, and taxes of
the estate.
Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010.

FACTS

Memoracion claimed ownership of a parcel of land in Manila acquired during her union with
her common-law husband, Architect Guido M. Cruz. She discovered that the title to the
property was transferred to the appellee and his wife through a Deed of Sale, which she alleged
was executed through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation, and simulation. Despite her demands,
the appellee refused to reconvey the property, leading her to file a complaint before the
barangay office, which issued a certification to file an action in court. Memoracion passed away
on October 30, 1996, and her counsel notified the trial court of her death.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruz's Petition for Annulment of Deed
of Sale, Reconveyance, and Damages is a purely personal action that did not survive her death?

HELD

Yes. The survival of an action depends on the nature of the action and the damages sought. If
the wrong primarily affects property and property rights, with injuries to the person being
incidental, the action survives. In this case, Memoracion's action involved property rights,
specifically the alleged fraudulent transfer of the property. Her death did not extinguish the
action, as her heir, Edgardo Cruz, formally substituted her through a Manifestation filed by her
counsel.

De Belen vda. De Cabalu v. Tabu, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tarlac City,

FACTS

Faustina owned land covered by TCT No. 16776. She died without children, leaving a
holographic will distributing her property to nephews and nieces. Benjamin, one of her heirs,
died, leaving Domingo as his heir. Domingo sold a portion of the land to Laureano. The heirs
later executed a deed giving Domingo 9,000 sqm. Domingo then sold 4,500 sqm to Elazar. After
Domingo's death, a deed was executed in favor of Tabu, subdividing the land.

ISSUE
Whether the sale by Domingo to Laureano is valid.

Whether the sale by Domingo to Tabu is null and void.

HELD

The sale by Domingo to Laureano is null and void because at the time, the inheritance was not
yet opened, and Domingo did not have sole rights to the property.

The sale by Domingo to Tabu is null and void because it was executed after Domingo's death,
making the contract simulated and false.

Alcazar v. Arante, G.R. No. 177042, December 10, 2012.

FACTS

Crisanto Alcazar filed a petition to reconstitute the lost owner's duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 169526, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased parents who
left a property covered by the title. He alleged that the duplicate was lost in April 2003 and
sought the issuance of a new duplicate.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the reconstitution petition.

HELD

The Court of Appeals (CA) nullified the RTC's decision, stating that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
because the TCT was not lost but in the possession of another person. The CA also awarded
damages to the respondent for malicious acts by Alcazar. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's
decision, upholding that reconstitution can only be done for a lost original certificate and that
the RTC had no jurisdiction. The Court also upheld the damages awarded by the CA.

Ining v. Vega, G.R. No. 174727.

FACTS
Leon Roldan owned a parcel of land in Kalibo, Aklan. After his death, his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, inherited the property. Leonardo Vega, claiming to be Romana's heir, sought a share
in the property. The court initially dismissed Leonardo's claim, citing prescription.

ISSUE

Whether Leonardo Vega is entitled to a share in the property inherited by Romana and
Gregoria.

HELD

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that Leonardo Vega is entitled to
a share in the property. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision, stating that prescription
does not apply in this case, as there was no clear repudiation of co-ownership. Therefore,
Leonardo is entitled to a share in the property.

Pacaña-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., G.R. No. 168979.

FACTS

Regino Banguilan owned a parcel of land in Caritan Norte, Tuguegarao City. The Department of
Education (DepEd) occupied a portion of the land to establish a school.

ISSUE

Whether DepEd had legal basis for occupying the land owned by Regino Banguilan and whether
the heirs of Banguilan are entitled to recover possession of the land.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the heirs of Regino Banguilan, holding that DepEd failed to
establish any legal basis for its occupation of the land. As a result, the heirs were entitled to
recover possession of the land.

Gago v. Mamuyac, 49 Phil. 902 Casiano v. CA, 158 SCRA 451

FACTS

On 1918, The decedent executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A) which was probated on
1922. The probation was opposed by the herein respondents upon the ground that the
deceased had on 1919, executed a new will and testament.
ISSUE

W/N the will has been revoked

HELD

Yes, Exhibit A is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of the deceased
testator, who revoked it before his death as per testimony of several witnesses who saw that
the Original Exhibit A was actually cancelled by the Testator.

The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be
preserved. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the
testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that
the same was cancelled or destroyed. However, it may be overcome by proof that the will was
not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.

The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will
and it cannot be found after his death.

In view of the fact that the original will cannot be found after the death of the testator and in
view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled and the lack of evidence of the
petitioner that it was not cancelled. The decision should be in favor of the presumption of
revocation.

Molo v. Molo, 90 Phil. 37

FACTS

Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any
forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the
probate were his nephews and nieces.

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of
the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the
petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again
the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They
contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and
thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.
ISSUE

Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will

HELD

Yes. The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,
containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was
not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void. [Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation]

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle
of dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a
will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for
some reason.

Agtarap v. Agtarap, G.R. No. 177099 and 177192, June 8, 2011

FACTS

Eduardo filed a petition for the judicial settlement of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap's
estate, alleging Joaquin died intestate and left properties. Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, leased
and improved the properties, appropriating P26,000.00 per month. After several proceedings,
the CA affirmed the RTC's resolution appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquin's
estate and issued an order of partition.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction over the estate of Milagros G. Agtarap and err in
distributing her inheritance from the estate of Joaquin Agtarap despite her last will and
testament, violating the doctrine of precedence of testate proceedings over intestate
proceedings?

Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the decision appealed from for lack of merit and in
affirming the RTC's resolution holding that the parcels of land belong to the conjugal
partnership of Joaquin Agtarap married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta despite their registration
under their existing certificates of title as registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap married to
Caridad Garcia?

HELD

The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the estate of Milagros and did not err in distributing
her inheritance from Joaquin's estate. The RTC, as an intestate court, has jurisdiction to resolve
issues on ownership if the interested parties are all heirs of the deceased and no rights of third
parties are impaired.

The CA did not err in dismissing the decision appealed from and in affirming the RTC's
resolution. The registration of the properties under Joaquin's name married to Caridad Garcia
does not conclusively prove their conjugal nature. The properties were acquired during
Joaquin's first marriage to Lucia, making Lucia's heirs, including Milagros, entitled to a share.
However, Milagros' share should not be distributed until her alleged will is probated and
approved.

De Borja v. De Borja, 46 SCRA 577

FACTS

Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa, filed for the probate of her will. When the
will was probated, Francisco was appointed as executor and administrator and herein appellee,
Jose de borja, their son was appointed as co-administrator. Subsequently, Francisco took upon
himself, a second wife, Tasiana (Vda de Borja). Even before the estate of Josefa was settled,
Francisco died. Tasiana instituted testate proceedings wherein she was appointed special
administratrix.

The relationship between the children of the first marriage and the second wife,had been
plagued with numerous suits and counter-suits and in order to put an end to all these litigation,
a compromise agreement was entered into between Jose, in his personal capacity and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa and by Tasiana, as the heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Jose agreed and obligated himself to pay
Tasiana the amount of 800k as full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary
share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa, and to any
properties bequeathed or devised in her favor b the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.
When Jose submitted the compromise agreement fior court approval with the CFI of Rizal
(probate of the first wife) and the CFI of Nueva Ecija (probate of will of Francisco), Tasiana
opposed in both instances. She claims among others, that the heirs cannot enter into such kind
of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de borja

ISSUE

W/N there should be a probate of the will first before compromise

HELD

No, the Decision of the Court in Guevara where in it held the view that presentation of a will for
probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy when the decedent left a will being against the law and public policy is not applicable
in this case. There was here no attempt to settle or to distribute the estate of Francisco among
the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the
estate of Francisco and Josefo. Since a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such predecessor in interest, there is no
legal bar to a successor disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately
adjudicated to the vendor heir.

Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil 509

FACTS

Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila.

Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a petition for the
probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.

The will was not presented because Felicidad’s husband, Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What
was presented were witness accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to make a will and
allegedly saw it as well. According to the witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know
about it, but she had made known to her other relatives that she made a will.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not
left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to probate the
alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts. For one thing, it is strange
that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her relatives when she wanted to keep it a
secret and she would not have carried it in her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband
may have access to it. There was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.

In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor’s evidence that
Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.

ISSUE

May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen
it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.

HELD

1. No. The will must be presented.

The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. “A person
may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.”

This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Act 190,
which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed by the testator and
three credible witnesses in each and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of
sheets used and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed in
the presence of the testator and of each other. Authenticity and due execution is the dominant
requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that
purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no
opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. From the testimony
of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the
genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.

With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since
as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are “entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself.”
“In the probate of a holographic will” says the New Civil Code, “it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare
that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at
least three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar
with decedent’s handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to.”

The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they must be
familiar with the decedent’s handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these
means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only
guaranty of authenticity — the testator’s handwriting — has disappeared.

The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed
will by secondary — evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet
such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly made
here. Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills? (NO)

Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will is that
it may be lost or stolen — an implied admission that such loss or theft renders it useless.

As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by
himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above
article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they
know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it.
Obviously, this they can’t do unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them.

This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the basis
of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.(According to the Fuero, the will itself must
be compared with specimens of the testators handwriting.)

All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in
accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature.

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and
the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.

At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike
holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed.
The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is
the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses
(and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of
proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.

In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary)
deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and
acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their
intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator
they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but
not least, they can not receive anything on account of the will.

Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one man could
engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and
signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and
read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they
would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost — the
forger may have purposely destroyed it in an “accident” — the oppositors have no way to
expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that
the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one of them need be signed,
the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go
undetected.

If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature —

feasibility of forgery — would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills listed by
Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and
teachers of Civil Law.

One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses
would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the
will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their
opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in
court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.

In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will,
we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and
inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77,
sec. 6.
2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will,
we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and
inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77,
sec. 6.

Rodelas v. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16

FACTS

Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of
and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he
bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease
him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro &
Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his
protege.

The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed
an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of
res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of
the will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court
set aide the 1939 decree of probate.

ISSUE

Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled

HELD

No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution
means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that
he was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed
in accordance with the formalities provided by law.

The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only
be set aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the
judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4
years from the discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

Azaola v. Singson, 109 Phil. 102

FACTS

Testator Yance died. Petitioner Francisco Azaola submitted for probate her holographic will, in
which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew, respondent Singson.

Francisco Azaola, was also the sole witness presented to testify on the handwriting of the
testatrix. He testified that he had seen the holographic will about one month before the death of
the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife and that he recognized all the signatures
appearing in the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix. Francisco presented
presented documents to reinforce his statement.

The probate was opposed. Subsequently, the probate was denied on the ground that under
Article 811 of the Civil Code the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that
the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested and
because the lone witness presented “did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was
written in the handwriting of the testatrix.”

Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness
because the will’s authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not
mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature
of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE

WON Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD

Permissive since the authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to
produce more than one witness. But even if the genuineness of the holographic will
were contested, Article 811 can not be interpreted to require the compulsory presentation of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator in holographic wills. This is because no
witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.

As such, if there are no competent witness available, the court may resort to expert evidence.
The law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed. Hence, the rule requiring production
of three witnesses in holographic wills must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are
to be avoided.

Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called upon to
construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served, in our opinion,
by giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert
witnesses, should the Court deem them necessary.
Codoy v. Calugay, 312 SCRA 333

FACTS

Respondent Calugay et al., devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde, filed a petition for probate of the said will with the RTC. They attested to the
genuineness and due execution of the will. Petitioner Codoy et al. filed an opposition claiming
that the will was a forgery and illegible. Calugay presented 6 witnesses and various
documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer to
evidence. RTC granted the Demurrer to evidence and denied the petition for probate of
respondents. CA reversed the RTC’s ruling citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson
which essentially states that witnesses are not needed in probate of holographic wills.

ISSUE

WON Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or directory for probate of a
holographic will.

HELD

Mandatory if the holographic will is contested. Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory since
the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.

The reason is that we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
adjudged as the will of the testator. Which is why if the holographic will is contested,
the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the
deceased.

Uy Kiao Eng v. Nixon Lee, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010

FACTS

Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus against his mother, petitioner Uy Kiao Eng,
before the RTC to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that
probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Respondent had already
requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal
heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.
In her answer, petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and
that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were
given to respondent and to his siblings.

After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner demurred,
contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will.
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this latter
order was denied. Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Respondent appealed to CA who initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. Respondent
moved for reconsideration. The appellate court granted the motion, issued the writ of
mandamus, and ordered the production of the will. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUE

WON mandamus is the proper remedy of the respondent.

HELD

No, Mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Mandamus is not used for
the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. Hence, writ of
mandamus cannot be used to enforce the production of a will.

Also, Mandamus, being a prerogative writ, can only be availed of if there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy under the ordinary course of all. There is still remedy under the
Rules of court since the respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the
production of the original for purposes of probate but the rules of Court does not prevent him
from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his
possession of not.

Palaganas v. Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011

FACTS

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner
although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

Ruperta Palagnas, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and childless. In
the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the US.
Respondent, Ernesto, another brother, filed with the RTC a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s
will. However, Petitioners, nephews, opposed he petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S where she executed it.

Petitioners content that will executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed
in the country of its execution before it can be probated here.

ISSUE

w/n a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has
not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed

HELD

Yes, our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign
will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 826 of the CC states that the will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.

Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
RTC of the providence where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such
state.

Our rules merely require that the petitioner must show :

1. Jurisdictional facts (fact of the death of decedent)

2. Names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees and devisees
3. The probable value of the property
4. Name of the person for whom letter are prayed; and
5. If the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of
it.

The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in
the country of its execution.

Gallanosa .v. Arcangel, 83 SCRA 676

FACTS
Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 whenhe was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcel of
land. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his borther Leon. In his will, he bequeathed his ½
share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predeceases him, like what
happened, the said share shall be assigned to the Spouses Perdro and Corazon gallanosa who
are Tecla’s son by her first marriage. He also have 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protégé.

That said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1951, the legal heirs filed
an action for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of
res judicata. Then, 28 years after the probate, another action against Gallanosa for annulment
alleging fraud and deceid. As a result, the lower court set aside the 1939 decree of probate.

ISSUE

W/n a will which has been probated may still be annulled.

HELD

No, – a final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of he will. Due execution
means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that
he was not acting duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in
accordance with the formalities provided by law.

The period for seeking relief under Rule 18 has already expired. The judgment may only be set
aside on the ff grounds; lack of jurisdiction; judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic fraud
(must be filed within 4 years from discovery)

Art 1410 cannot aply to wills and testament. The action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.

De la Cerna v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 33

FACTS

The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave
two (2) parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When
Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.
Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in
1952 but due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in
1954.

The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While
the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a
court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this
appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not the will is valid

HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of probate becomes
final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final decree of probate
entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact
that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on
the court but the decree has now become final.)

The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but
which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final
decision. A decision which is binding upon the whole world.

Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the
disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not within
the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her, must be on her
death, be re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a separate will
of each testator.

Roberts v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 33

FACTS

Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by his second wife
(Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage
(Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.

Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959. One will disposed of
his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second
will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented
for probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the
intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the two
wills and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation
between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.

Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila,
entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.

As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On March

1978, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground
of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s
will. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and
the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record.The estate was
partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated in
Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of
administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account
for the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they
were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal
and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to
the decedent’s wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of
merit.

ISSUE

W/N PROBATE IS MANDATORY

HELD

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec.
1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died
testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.
Nepomuceno v. Ca, 139 SCRA 206

FACTS

Martin Hugo passed away in 1974, leaving behind a will in which he named Sofia Nepomuceno
as the sole executor. The will also stated that he was married to Rufina Gomez, with whom he
had three children.

Sofia, the petitioner, sought the probate of the will. However, Martin's legal wife and their
children opposed this, claiming that the will was obtained through improper and undue
influence, and alleging an admission of concubinage with Sofia.

The lower court rejected the probate, citing the testator's admission of cohabitation, which
rendered the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals overturned this decision, ruling that
the will was valid except for the provision in favor of Sofia, which was deemed null and void
under Article 739 and 1028.

ISSUE

HELD

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to
do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a
practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only
since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its
provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty
of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

Pascual v. de la Cruz, 28 SCRA 421

FACTS
Catalina de la Cruz, without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89. A
petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the CFI by Andres Pascual, who was
named in the said will as the sole heir of he decedent

Pedro dela cruz contested the validity of the will on the grounds that the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the
signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud

CA held that a will made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof that the same was obtained
through fraud and undue influence for there have numerous instances where strangers are
preferred to blood relatives in the institution of heirs.

ISSUE

w/n there is undue influence

HELD

No, to be sufficient to void a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers
and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the
will of another rather than his own; that the exercise of improper pressure and undue influence
must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.

The circumstances marshaled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue
influence or improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the proponent. Their main relation
is on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the deceased “did not like
to sign anything unless I knew it” which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything
that proponent desired. The evidence of contestants, that proponent purchased a building in
Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but casued the name “catalina de la cruz”
to be painted thereon in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that
proponent’s influence was not such as to overpower to destroy the free will of the testatrix.

Rosales v. Rosales, 148 SCRA 69

FACTS

Petra v Rosales died intestate, leaving behind her husband and her children. One of her child,
who died before her, left behind a child and a widow, Irenea Rosales. Magna Acebes, one of
Petra’s children, initiated the proceedings for the settlement of the estate and was appointed
as the administratrix of the estate.
ISSUE

W/N the widow is considered an intestate heir of her mother in law

HELD

No, legal heirs may either be those who inherit by their own right and those who inherit by the
right of representation. The Civil code does not provide for a widow to inherit from her mother
in law. The provision in Article 887 of the Code, which designates the widow or widower as a
compulsory heir, applies to the estate of the deceased spouse and not the estate of a parent-in-
law. The surviving spouse is considered a third person with respect to the estate of the in law.

With regards to the child of the widow, The right of representation allows the child of the
deceased child of Petra, is based on blood relationship since it is her grandson. Irenea Rosales
(widow) has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. Thus, she cannot assert right of
representation.

Santiago v. Santiago, et. al., G.R. 179859, August 9, 2010

FACTS

Basilio Santiago contracted three marriages the first to Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene
Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene
and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano,
and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas,
Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed
Santiago. Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and
Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.

One of the provisions of the will states that the house in Manila should be transferred to Ma
Pilar and Clemente for administration so that heir heirs has a place to live if they should decide
to live in Manila.

After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in
Accordance with the Will, the probate court approved the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and
directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila to register the certificates of title
indicated therein. The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for
completion of legitime against the heirs of the second and third marriages.

ISSUE
Whether or not the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio should remain undisturbed
HELD

The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he intended the house and lot in
Manila to be transferred in petitioners names for administration purposes only, and that the
property be owned by the heirs in common. But the condition set by the decedent on the
propertys indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with
the ruling of the appellate court: “ For this Court to sustain without qualification, petitioners’s
contention, is to go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the
Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only
last for twenty (20) years. Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a
property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction
coownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code

Arellano v. Pascual, G.R. No. 189776, December 15, 2010

FACTS

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely:
petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes)
and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition
for “Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration” filed by
respondents on April 28, 2000, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the
donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation,
transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed,
“may be considered as an advance legitime” of petitioner. Respecting the donated property,
now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the
Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited
that it “may be considered as an advance legitime” to petitioner, the trial court, acting as
probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.
ISSUE

WON the property is subject of collation

HELD

NO. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its
purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir,
there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and,
therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he cannot
dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The decedent not having left
any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his
properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to
petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a “stranger,” chargeable
against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.

Gregorio v. Madarang, G.R. No. 185226, February 11, 2010

FACTS

Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr died intestate leaving real and personal properties. He was survived
by his wife Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Corazon, Ramiro, and the
petitioners Vicente and Jose. Dolores was appointed as the administratrix and subsequently
submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedents estate but omitted six
lots including Lot 829-B-4-B, the land in question. She omitted the land in question for the
reason that it was donated in favor to Vicente during the lifetime of Casimiro

ISSUE

Whether or not the exclusion of the property is proper.

HELD

No, the exclusion is not proper. In cases of collation or advancement Article 1061 of the Civil
Code expressly provides Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from
the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the
account of partition. in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides
Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or alleged
to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been donated by the decedent and his wife to their
son-respondent Vicente, should not be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the
decedent.

Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon, 33 SCRA 554

FACTS

Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died leaving a last will dividing her estate among her seven
compulsory heirs and seven other legitimate grandchildren. The lower court approved the
executrix's project of partition, stating that the testatrix's choice to favor certain heirs in her will
was legally permissible within the limitation of the law.

ISSUE

Whether the use of the words "I bequeath" in the testatrix's assignment or distribution of her
real properties to the respective heirs is in the nature of devises of real property.

HELD

No, the use of the words "I bequeath" does not convert the assignments into devises of real property.
The testatrix's clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will, and the use of the
words "I bequeath" does not change the nature of the testamentary dispositions. The testatrix's intent
that her dispositions were on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly
stated in her will. The dispositions do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, and Article 842 of the Civil Code allows a testator with compulsory heirs to dispose of his
estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of the Code regarding the legitime of said heirs.
The dispositions constituted a partition by will, which must be respected as long as they do not prejudice
the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.

De Roma v. CA, 152 SCRA 205

FACTS

Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died intestate, and Buhay was
appointed administratrix of her estate. Rosalinda opposed the inventory filed by Buhay, claiming that
certain properties donated by their mother to Buhay were not included. The total value of the parcels of
land donated to Buhay is P10,297.50. The Trial Court initially ruled in favor of Buhay, interpreting the
deed of donation as prohibiting collation and stating that the legitimes of the two daughters were not
impaired. On appeal, this decision was reversed.

ISSUE

Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.

HELD

Yes, the lands are subject to collation. Art. 1061 of the Civil Code states that every compulsory heir who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
received from the decedent by way of donation or any other gratuitous title. Collation shall not take
place among compulsory heirs if the donor expressly provided for it, or if the donee repudiates the
inheritance, unless the donation is reduced as inofficious. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate
court's decision, stating that the deed of donation merely described the donation as irrevocable and did
not include an express prohibition to collate. Absent such indication of intention, the rule, not the
exemption, should be applied.

Locsin v. CA, 206 SCRA 383

FACTS

Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina Jaucian Locsin, as
the sole and universal heir of all his properties. After Don Mariano's death, Catalina began transferring
properties to their respective nephews and nieces based on their agreement. Catalina made a will
affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's and her
own relatives. Some of Catalina's Jaucian nephews and nieces filed an action in 1989 to recover the
properties she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were
inofficious, without consideration, and intended to circumvent succession laws.

ISSUE

Whether the nephews and nieces of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin are entitled to inherit the properties she
had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death.

HELD

No, they are not entitled. The properties that Catalina had transferred during her lifetime did
not form part of her hereditary estate at the time of her death. The rights to a person's
succession are transmitted from the moment of death, and property transferred or conveyed
during their lifetime no longer forms part of their estate at the time of death. Even if the
transfers were treated as donations, the right to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not apply to the respondents since they are not
compulsory heirs. The respondents had only an expectancy, which did not restrict Catalina's
freedom to dispose of her estate. The respondents cannot invoke Article 750 of the Civil Code
since they are not affected by any breach of its provisions.

Heirs of Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Ureta, G.R. No. 165748 and 165930, Sept. 14, 2011

FACTS

Dispute among heirs of Alfonso Ureta over lands sold to son Policronio but not transferred.
Alfonso executed deeds of sale for tax purposes, but no actual transfer occurred. After
Alfonso's death, heirs, including Policronio's, executed extra-judicial partition, leading to a legal
dispute.

ISSUE

w/n preterition can apply

HELD

Preterition cannot apply. The absence of the Heirs of Policronio in the partition or the lack of
authority of their representative results, at the very least, in their preterition and not in the
invalidity of the entire deed of partition. Assuming there was actual preterition, it did not
render the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition voidable. Citing Article 1104 of the Civil Code, a
partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, but the
heirs shall be proportionately obliged to pay the share of the person omitted. Thus, the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition should not have been annulled by the CA. Instead, it should have
ordered the share of the heirs omitted to be given to them. Preterition, as defined, is a concept
of testamentary succession and requires a will, which is not involved in this case. Therefore,
preterition cannot apply.

Aznar v. Duncan, 17 SCRA 590

FACTS

Edward E. Christensen, a California citizen with domicile in the Philippines, left a will executed
on March 5, 1951, which was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao on
February 28, 1954. The court declared Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (Helen Garcia) as his
natural child. In another incident, the trial court approved the project of partition submitted by
the executor, dividing the estate equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (Lucy
Duncan), recognized as his daughter in the will, and Helen Garcia. The estate consisted of stocks
and cash. Lucy Duncan appealed, arguing that Helen Garcia should only receive her legitime,
equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the estate, and not an equal share.

ISSUE

Whether Helen Garcia should receive an equal share of the estate with Lucy Duncan, or only her legitime,
which is one-fourth (1/4) of the estate

HELD

Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the estate. The court held
that there was no complete omission of Helen Garcia in the will, as she was left a legacy of P3,600.00. The
will also expressly denied her relationship with the testator. The court applied Article 906 of the Civil Code,
which allows a forced heir to demand the full satisfaction of their legitime if left less than what is due to
them. The court noted that while Helen Garcia was declared a natural child after the testator's death, his
subjective attitude towards her, as reflected in the will, indicated that he would not have intended to leave
her an equal share of the estate with Lucy Duncan. The court also mentioned the substitution of heirs in
the will, but did not delve into it as it was not a raised issue. The court ordered the estate to be
partitioned anew, giving Helen Garcia her legitime, and noted that she is entitled to the fruits or
increments of her share of the estate.

Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449

FACTS

Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir
of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of
administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct
ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one
of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
ISSUE

WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited
the compulsory heirs.

HELD

Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced
heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly
disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the
parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir.

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by
law”.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits
the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal
institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

Reyes v. Barreto-Datu, 19 SCRA 85

FACTS

Tirso T. Reyes appealed the dismissal of his complaint by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
which ordered him to deliver properties received by his deceased wife under the will of Bibiano
Barretto to Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu. The properties included lots in Manila, Rizal,
Pampanga, and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000.

The dispute arose from the estate of Bibiano Barretto, who was married to Maria Gerardo.
Upon Bibiano's death, Maria was appointed administratrix and prepared a project of partition
for the estate, which was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila. Salud Barretto,
widow of Tirso Reyes and guardian of minors who were heirs of Salud Barretto, received her
share of the estate, including a fishpond in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Maria Gerardo, upon her death,
was found to have executed two wills, with the latter leaving all her properties to Milagros
Barretto alone, revoking the earlier will that included Salud Barretto as a heir.

ISSUE

The main issue is whether the project of partition and distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate,
which included properties received by Salud Barretto, was valid and whether Milagros Barretto
has a claim to these properties.

HELD

The Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, affirming that the partition
between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the settlement of Bibiano Barretto's estate was not void. It held
that Milagros Barretto's action to contest the partition and decree of distribution was barred by the
statute of limitations. The Court also rejected Milagros Barretto's claim that Tirso Reyes, as guardian,
should account for the fruits received from the properties inherited by Salud Barretto, stating that this
claim was legally untenable. The Court instructed the lower court to proceed with the action for partition
of the fishpond and for the accounting of its fruits.

Escuin v. Escuin, 11 Phil. 332

FACTS

Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos executed a will in 1899, stating he had no lawful
descendants. He named his father and wife as heirs if he had no registered successor. Emilio
Escuin de los Santos died in 1899, and his will was admitted to probate. Claims against the
estate were considered, and one claim was allowed. A proposed partition of the estate was
submitted, indicating a total amount of P8,268.02, with deductions for claims and expenses,
leaving a balance of P5,014.81.

ISSUE

The main issue is the proper distribution of the estate of Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos, considering
his will and the legal rights of his heirs.

HELD

The court ruled that Emilio Escuin y Batac, recognized as a natural child of the deceased, is entitled to
one-third of the estate as his general heir. The designation of heirs in the will, which excluded Emilio
Escuin y Batac, was annulled to the extent that it impaired his legal portion. The will was valid insofar as it
disposed of two-thirds of the estate freely, with the remaining one-third being subject to the legal portion
of Emilio Escuin y Batac. The estate should be partitioned accordingly, with one-third going to Emilio
Escuin y Batac, one-half of the remaining two-thirds to the widow, Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and the
other half of the two-thirds to the father, Francisco Escuin. The orders of the lower court regarding the
partition were reversed, and the court was directed to proceed with the distribution in accordance with
the law and the decision.

Balanay v. Martinez, 64 SCRA 452

FACTS

Leodegaria Julian died in 1973, survived by her husband and six children. Her son filed for the probate of
her notarial will, which included provisions regarding her properties and their division among her heirs.

ISSUE

Whether the will should be voided, leading to intestate proceedings, based on certain provisions
regarding conjugal lands and a renunciation of hereditary rights.

HELD

The court ruled that the will should not be voided. The illegal declaration regarding conjugal lands does
not nullify the entire will. Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights but subject to
limitations. The will is intrinsically valid, and its partition may be given effect if it does not prejudice
creditors or impair legitimes. The preterition of the surviving spouse did not result in intestacy, as he had
renounced his hereditary rights and signified conformity to the will.

Solano v. CA, 126 SCRA 122

FACTS

Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano Meliton died
during the pendency of the petition and his daughter substituted him while asking for the
probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified the legal issues as 1) the recognition of
Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of the
probated will. In deciding, RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the
institution of Sonia as sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the
estate CA affirmed.

ISSUE

Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole heir
from decedent's will.
HELD

That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton's will, and as a result,
Sonia's institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854

"The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid...

The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the
testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the
property that the testator could freely dispose of Sonia's share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of
the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all
together.

preterition of illegitimate children should annul the institution of the heir "only insofar as the
legitime of the omitted heirs is impaired".

Acain v. CA, 155 SCRA 100

FACTS

Nemesio Acain's will left all his shares in the conjugal property to his brother Segundo Acain, with a
provision that if Segundo predeceased him, the shares would go to Segundo's children, including the
petitioner. When Segundo died before Nemesio, the petitioner filed for the probate of the will. The wife of
Nemesio, Rosa, and a legally adopted daughter, Virginia, moved to dismiss the petition, claiming
preterition, but their motion was denied. The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) later granted the petition
and ordered the dismissal of the probate petition, leading to the current appeal.

ISSUE

Whether Rosa, the wife, has been preterited.

HELD

No. Rosa was not preterited under Article 854 of the Civil Code, as she does not ascend or descend from
the testator. While she is a compulsory heir, preterition only applies to direct descendants and ascendants.
However, Virginia, the adopted daughter, was preterited. Adoption gives the adopted person the same
rights as a legitimate child, and Virginia was omitted from the will without being expressly disinherited.
The preterition of a legally adopted child annuls the institution of an heir and opens the entire inheritance
to intestate succession. The will's provision leaving the entire inheritance to the petitioner and his siblings
by universal title results in intestacy, as no other testamentary disposition was made. The legacies and
devises in the will are respected, except concerning the legitimes.

Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295

FACTS

Marcelina Edroso inherited two parcels of land from her son, Pedro Sablan, who inherited them
from his father, Victoriano Sablan. Marcelina's inheritance was opposed by Victoriano's two
brothers, claiming that the lands should be reserved for them under the law. The trial court
denied the registration of Marcelina's ownership, leading to an appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the lands, subject to the application for registration, are required by law to be
reserved.

HELD

Yes. Article 811 of the Old Civil Code provides that an ascendant who inherits property without
a valuable consideration from another ascendant must reserve it for relatives within the third
degree who belong to the line whence the property came. Marcelina inherited the land from
her son, who inherited it from his father, without any valuable consideration involved. Thus,
Marcelina is obligated to reserve the land for the relatives within the third degree of the line
from which the property originated. The lands are considered required by law to be reserved.

Seinnes v. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750

FACTS

Appellants sought to nullify a sale of a property and demanded its reconveyance to them. They
claimed ownership through a sale by Francisco Yaeso's mother, Andrea Gutang. The sale was
opposed by the Esparcia spouses, who claimed ownership through a sale by Paulina and
Cipriana Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco Yaeso. The property was originally owned
by Saturnino Yaeso and inherited by his children. Francisco Yaeso inherited the property from
his father and upon his death, it passed to his mother, Andrea Gutang. Andrea Gutang was
obliged to reserve the property for relatives within the third degree, but upon her death, the
lone reservee, Cipriana Yaeso, also died, leaving no surviving reservees.

ISSUE
Whether the property in question was reservable and if the sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of the
appellants was valid.

HELD

Yes, the property was reservable. The Court held that reservable property creates two resolutory
conditions: the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and the survival, at the time of their death, of
relatives within the third degree from whom the property came. The sale made by Andrea Gutang to the
appellants was subject to the condition that the appellants would acquire ownership only if Andrea
Gutang died without any surviving reservees. Since Cipriana Yaeso was alive when Andrea Gutang died,
the sale to the appellants became ineffective, and the property passed to Cipriana Yaeso. The sale made
by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso to the Esparcia spouses was also subject to the same condition, and since
Cipriana Yaeso survived Andrea Gutang, she became the absolute owner of the property. The decision
ordering the reversion of the property to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso was upheld, as the Esparcia spouses
did not appeal.

The ruling is in accordance with Article 811 of the Old Civil Code, which imposes an obligation on an
ascendant who inherits property acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant to
reserve such property for relatives within the third degree and belonging to the line from which the
property came. The Court interpreted this provision to mean that the reservista has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition, which is the survival of the
reservees at the time of the reservista's death.

Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480

FACTS

Apolonio II died testate in February 1890, leaving two wills dividing his properties equally
among his children from both marriages. Upon Apolonio II's death, his estate was partitioned
accordingly. In this partition, Apolonio III, his posthumous son, received various items.
However, Apolonio III died in 1891, and his mother, Severina, inherited all his property.
Severina died in 1908, leaving a will instituting her daughter, Mercedes, as her universal
heiress. Mercedes took possession of all her mother's property, including that inherited from
Apolonio III. The properties Severina inherited from Apolonio III are considered reservable
property, with Severina as the reservist. Despite this, Severina instituted Mercedes as her sole
heir, ignoring the reservation in favor of complainants who were also entitled to a share.

ISSUE

Whether the property inherited by Severina from her son Apolonio III is considered reservable property
and if Mercedes, as the heir of Severina, should respect the reservation in favor of complainants.
HELD

Yes, the property inherited by Severina from her son Apolonio III is considered reservable
property under Article 811 of the Civil Code. This property did not become Severina's own
property but only the right of usufruct or fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and deliver it
to the reservatarios, one of whom is Mercedes Florentino. Therefore, Severina could not dispose
of this property in her will to reduce the rights of other reservatarios, including Mercedes. The
property should be delivered to the other relatives of Apolonio III within the third degree, as
well as to Mercedes, who are entitled to such reservable property. The reservation does not
reduce or impair Mercedes's legitime, as she does not own the property absolutely. The prayer
for damages was denied, but the fruits or rents of the land were granted to the complainants.

Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065

FACTS

Agustin Padura had two marriages and several children. Upon his death, his properties were
bequeathed among his children and surviving spouse, Benita Garing. Fortunato Padura, one of
his children, died unmarried, and his properties were inherited by Benita Garing. Candelaria
Padura, another child, died, leaving four legitimate children. Manuel Padura, another child, also
died, leaving legitimate children.

ISSUE

In a case of reserva troncal where the surviving reservatarios (reservees) are nephews of the
whole blood and nephews of the half blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned
equally among them, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as
that of the nephews of the half blood?

HELD

The Supreme Court held that the position of the appellants is correct. The purpose of reserva
troncal is to assure the return of the reservable property to third-degree relatives belonging to
the line of origin and to avoid its dissipation by relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
However, once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin, there is
no further application of the reserva troncal. Therefore, the respective share of each
reservatario in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession.
The Court further ruled that the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole
blood should apply in this case. The reserva troncal determines the group of relatives to whom
the property should be returned, but within that group, the individual right to the property
should be decided by the rules of ordinary intestate succession, which includes the rule that
whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of half-blood.

Additionally, the Court noted that even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who
are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can assert their right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right. The reservable property is not part
of the estate of the reservista and may not be disposed of by will as long as there are
reservatarios existing.

The Court rejected the trial court's opinion, stating that the reservable property should be
succeeded by the reservatario who is the nearest in degree, according to the basic rules of
intestacy. The argument that the reservatarios are called by law to take the reservable property
because they belong to the line of origin, and not because of their relationship, would lead to
the conclusion that the property should pass to any and all the reservatarios, as a class, and in
equal shares, regardless of lines and degrees. This view was rejected, and the reservable
property should be succeeded by the reservatario who is the nearest in degree, according to
the basic rules of intestacy.

Chua v.CFI, 78 SCRA 406

FACTS

Ignacio, Dominador, and Remedios filed a complaint seeking the declaration of one-half portion
of Lot No. 399 as a reservable property, originally owned by Juanito Frias but passed to
Consolacion de la Torre upon Juanito's death, alleging that it was subject to reserva troncal.

ISSUE

Whether the property of Jose, inherited by his son Juanito and later by Consolacion, became
reservable for the sons of Jose from his first marriage upon Consolacion's death.

Whether the transfer of the property was gratuitous.

Whether the claim of the reserves had prescribed.

HELD
Yes, the property is subject to reserva troncal. Article 891 of the Civil Code states that a
property acquired by a descendant from an ascendant by gratuitous title, and inherited by
another ascendant by operation of law, becomes reservable for relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came.

Yes, the transfer was gratuitous. Transmission by hereditary succession, even with obligations
imposed on the recipient, is considered a gratuitous transfer.

No, the claim had not prescribed. The claim of the reserves arose upon the death of the
reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, in March 1966, and their complaint filed in May 1966 was
within the prescriptive period.

The partition of the property was as follows: Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion;
Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4
undivided portion.

Gonzales v. CFI 104 SCRA 161

FACTS

Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II) died, leaving behind his widow, Filomena, and their seven
children. The real properties left by his deceased father, Benito Legarda y Tuazon (Benito I),
were partitioned among Benito II's sisters and his heirs pro-indiviso. One of Benito II's
daughters, also named Filomena, died without issue, and her sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena vda de Legarda. Mrs. Legarda later executed documents disposing of the properties
inherited from her daughter to her 16 grandchildren, the children of her sons. Mrs. Legarda and
her surviving children then partitioned the co-owned property. After Mrs. Legarda's death,
Beatriz Gonzales, one of her daughters, filed a motion to exclude the properties inherited from
Filomena in the inventory of Mrs. Legarda's estate, claiming they were reservable and should
be inherited by Filomena's siblings, not her grandchildren.

ISSUE

Whether the properties could be conveyed by will to the 16 grandchildren (reservees within the
third degree) to the exclusion of the 6 children (reservees within the second degree).

HELD

No, Mrs. Legarda could not convey the reservable properties inherited from her daughter to
her grandchildren in her holographic will. The reservable properties did not form part of her
estate, and she could not select the reservees to whom the properties should be given,
excluding others. According to Article 891, the reservable properties should be inherited by all
the nearest within the third degree from the prepositus, which in this case are Mrs. Legarda's 6
children. Reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservor. The reservation could only be extinguished by
the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death, which was not the case. The
disputed properties should be disposed of in accordance with Article 891 and Mrs. Legarda's
holographic will.

De Papa v. Camacho, 144 SCRA 281

FACTS

Appellees and appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino
Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of appellees and great
grandfather of defendant. During her lifetime, Romana gratuitously donated four parcels of
land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of appellees). When Toribia died, she was
survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children Faustino and
Trinidad (mother of Dalisay). The 4 parcels of land were left as inheritance of Toribia‟s two
children in equal pro-indiviso shares. They too inherited 3 parcels of land which was supposed
to be the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco from her father Balbino. However, when Faustino
died intestate, single and without issue, the ½ pro-indiviso share in the 7 parcels of land was left
to his father Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to
a reserve troncal. Subsequently, Trinidad died intestate and her rights and interests in the
parcels of land were inherited by her only legitimate childe, appellant Dalisay. Eustacio
thereafter died intestated, survived by his only legitimate defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho.

The lower Court declared that the appellees as well as appellant Dalisay were entitled as
reservatarios to ½ of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions.

ISSUE

Whether or not all relatives of the prepositus (Faustino) within the third degree in the
appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the
reservista.

HELD

No. Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession,
the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles,
respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his
niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the
latter. As held in the case of Abellana v. Ferraris, under the Article 1009, the absence of
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. Hence, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may
not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing
and qualified to succeed, similar to the case at hand.

Banawa v. Mirano, 97 SCRA 517

FACTS

Defendants Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza cared for Maria Mirano, treating her like
their legally adopted child. They bought land for Maria, but she died, leaving surviving siblings
who claimed the land as her legal heirs. The Banawas argued they should inherit under a court
rule, but courts ruled in favor of Maria's siblings because she was not legally adopted

ISSUE

Whether or not, Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court applicable to the instant case?

HELD

NO. It is very clear in the rule involved that specifically provides for the case of the judicially
adopted child and does not include extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule in statutory
construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken
to mean exactly what it says.

Teotico v. del Val, 13 SCRA 406

FACTS

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre left a will, bequeathing her properties to her niece
Josefina Mortera. Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Maria's siblings, sought
to intervene in the probate proceeding.

ISSUE

Does Ana del Val Chan have the right to intervene?

Has the will been duly admitted to probate?

Did the probate court err in determining the inheritance of Dr. Rene Teotico's portion?

HELD

Ana del Val Chan has no right to intervene as she is neither a legal heir, executor, nor
administrator, and is not designated as an heir or legatee in the will. As an illegitimate child, she
is prohibited by law from inheriting from the legitimate relatives of her natural father.

The will was properly attested to and executed, as evidenced by the signatures of the testatrix,
witnesses, and notary public.

The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the legacy to Dr. Rene Teotico invalid
and in determining the disposition of the estate to other relatives, as the court's role is limited
to determining the formalities of the will, not its validity or the inheritance rights of the parties
involved.

Seangio vs. Reyes, G.R. 140371-72, Nov 27, 2006

FACTS

Private respondents initiated intestate proceedings for the estate of Segundo. Petitioners
opposed, asserting the existence of a holographic will disinheriting Alfredo. The probate court
dismissed the petition for probate primarily on the ground of preterition.

ISSUE

Does the holographic will comply with the formalities required by law? (Yes)

Does the disinheritance of Alfredo constitute a testamentary disposition? (Yes)

Is there preterition warranting implied revocation of the holographic will? (No)

HELD

The petition is granted, and the RTC order is set aside. The holographic will of Segundo complies
with the formalities required by law and constitutes a valid testamentary disposition. The
document, although titled "Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana," is considered a holographic will as
it is entirely written, dated, and signed by Segundo himself. The disinheritance of Alfredo is a
valid act of disposition. Preterition does not apply as the document intended all compulsory
heirs, except Alfredo, to inherit. The probate of the holographic will cannot be dispensed with,
as it is the testator's last expression of testamentary intent.
In Re Tarlo’s Estate, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1934. 315 Pa. 321, 172 A 139.

The case discussed involves the interpretation of Section 23 of the Intestate Act of June 7, 1917,
P. L. 429, which states that no person finally adjudged guilty of murder shall inherit any part of
the estate of the person killed. The case at hand concerned a man, Albert Tarlo, who killed his
wife and daughter before committing suicide. The question was whether his daughter's estate
should be distributed to his father's administrator or to her maternal grandfather, Louis Koch, if
inheritance through the father was not allowed.

The court determined that the phrase "finally adjudged guilty" meant convicted and sentenced
in a court of competent jurisdiction. Since Albert Tarlo had committed suicide and thus could
not be tried and convicted, his daughter's estate could not be inherited by his father's
administrator. The court emphasized that the legislative intent, as shown by the history of the
enactment and the report of the commission appointed to codify the law, supported this
interpretation. The court affirmed the decision of the orphans' court to award the estate to the
administrator of the daughter's father.

The dissenting opinions disagreed with this interpretation, arguing that the court should
consider equity and prevent a murderer from benefiting from his crime, even if the statute did
not explicitly cover cases like Albert Tarlo's. They suggested that the court should treat the killer
as holding the property in a constructive trust for the benefit of the victims' relatives.

Austria v. Reyes, 31 SCRA 754

FACTS

Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll
have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children.

During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the
petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was
allowed.

In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the
nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.
The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It
held that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed
free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.

ISSUE

Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

HELD

Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does
not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity
will set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will
be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in
the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover,
testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.

Vda. De Kilayko v. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600

FACTS

Mana Linares y Aluran died in 1988, leaving her estate in the possession of her niece, Eusiquis
Lies. Eusiquis filed a petition for the settlement of the estate before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Branch V, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452. A project of partition
was filed by Eustaquis, which was granted by the probate court in 1971. Subsequently, an
Agreement of Partition and Subdivision was executed by the heirs, terminating their co-
ownership over several lots. Despite this, certain heirs filed a motion to reopen the proceedings,
which was denied by the court. They then filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property against other heirs.

ISSUE

Whether the partition agreement and the subsequent denial of the motion to reopen the estate
proceedings preclude the heirs from attacking the validity of the partition.

HELD

The petition is impressed with merit. In estate proceedings, there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated. The authentication of a will decides no other question than
such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with the requirements for the validity
of a will. The records show that a project of partition was submitted by Eustaquis Les before the will was
probated. While there was a contention regarding the nature of certain provisions in the will, it was held
that there was no fideicommissary substitution, but rather a simple substitution under Art. 850 of the Civil
Code. As such, the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties involved was deemed
proper, as it was not necessary to protect the rights of the claimants.

Palacios v. Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704

FACTS

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir.
His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X. The
administratrix of the estate submitted a project of partition giving one part of the estate to the
widow “en pleno dominio” in satisfaction of her legitime while the other part of the “free
portion” to his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez. Furthermore, one third of the
free portion is charged with the widow’s usufruct and the remaining two thirds (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wanda Wrobleski.

Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed the project of partition, as well as the substitutions
provided by the testator as to the usufructs of the widow and of Wanda. Nonetheless, the
lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 1967. Jorge and Roberto
appealed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the usufruct over real property in favor of Wanda violates the Constitutional
prohibition against ownership of lands by alien.

HELD

The Court upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law, but also testamentary succession.
Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine
landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land. In the present case, the usufruct in favor
of Wanda, although a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary. It is the
vesting of title in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Crisologo v. Singzon, 49 SCRA 491

FACTS
Spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo filed a partition suit against Manuel Singson
regarding a residential lot in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The lot was originally owned by Dona Leona Singson, who
died in 1948, leaving a will that was admitted to probate. The will provided for a partition of the property,
with Consolacion owning half and Manuel owning the other half. However, Manuel refused to comply
with the partition, leading to the lawsuit.

ISSUE

Whether the testamentary provision in Dona Leona Singson's will constituted a fideicommissary
substitution or a simple substitution.

HELD

The court held that the testamentary provision established a simple substitution (substitucion
vulgar) and not a fideicommissary substitution. The provision did not expressly state that
Consolacion was to have only usufructuary rights over the property, with the naked ownership
vested in the brothers of the testatrix. Instead, it merely provided that upon Consolacion's death,
her share would belong to the brothers of the testatrix. Therefore, the substitution of
Consolacion by the brothers was to be effective upon her death, whether it occurred before or
after that of the testatrix.

Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428

FACTS

The late Benedicta de los Reyes had left a will instituting Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, as
the sole heir of her estate. Later, Dimagiba petitioned for the probate of the will but Dionisio
Fernandez, et. Al, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the
probate asked on the ground of forgery, estoppel by laches of the proponent, and among
others. After trial, the CFI found that the will was genuine and properly executed and also
overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will. The
oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but said Court held that the decree
admitting the will to probate had become final for lack of opportune appeal. Oppositors then
appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1) Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had
become final for lack of appeal
2) Whether or not the order of the CFI, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-
appellants had likewise become final

HELD

1) It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.

As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions
of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order or judgment... where such order or judgment: (a) allows or
disallows a will. There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not
appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive.

Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon
which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly
dismissed.

2) As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phill. 249, that
the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily
designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a
consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.

Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and
the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non
sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the
order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently
unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.

Belen v. Bank of P.I., L- 14474, 31 Oct. 1960

FACTS

Benigno Diaz executed a will and a codicil, with the codicil containing provisions regarding the
distribution of his estate. After his death, the estate was placed under the administration of BPI
as trustee for the benefit of the legatees. One of the legatees, Filomena Diaz, died, leaving two
legitimate children, Milagros and Onesima. Onesima filed a petition seeking her share of the
inheritance under the will and codicil, arguing that it should be divided between her and
Milagros, to the exclusion of Milagros' children.
ISSUE

Whether the share of Filomena in the codicil forms part of her estate so that it pertains to her
legitimate descendants.

Whether the share of Filomena should be distributed between her children only or also among
her other legitimate descendants.

HELD

The court held that the share of Filomena in the codicil forms part of her estate, and thus,
pertains to her legitimate descendants. The codicil provided for a simple substitution with a
plurality of substitutes for each legatee, which is authorized by Article 860 of the Civil Code.

The court ruled that the share of Filomena should be distributed among all her legitimate
descendants, including her children and grandchildren. The provision in the codicil referring to
"sus descendientes legitimos" (their legitimate descendants) should be understood as referring
to all living descendants of the legatee as a class, not just the descendants nearest in degree.
Applying Article 959 by analogy, which provides for distribution in favor of the testator's
nearest relatives, would not be appropriate in this case since it applies to the testator's
relatives, not the legatee's relatives. Therefore, the inheritance should be divided equally
among Filomena's surviving children and grandchildren.

Rosales, v. Rosales, 148 SCRA 69

FACTS

Petra v Rosales died intestate, leaving behind her husband and her children. One of her child,
who died before her, left behind a child and a widow, Irenea Rosales. Magna Acebes, one of
Petra’s children, initiated the proceedings for the settlement of the estate and was appointed
as the administratrix of the estate.

ISSUE

W/N the widow is considered an intestate heir of her mother in law

HELD

No, legal heirs may either be those who inherit by their own right and those who inherit by the
right of representation. The Civil code does not provide for a widow to inherit from her mother
in law. The provision in Article 887 of the Code, which designates the widow or widower as a
compulsory heir, applies to the estate of the deceased spouse and not the estate of a parent-in-
law. The surviving spouse is considered a third person with respect to the estate of the in law.

With regards to the child of the widow, The right of representation allows the child of the
deceased child of Petra, is based on blood relationship since it is her grandson. Irenea Rosales
(widow) has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. Thus, she cannot assert right of
representation.

De los Santos v. De La Cruz, 37 SCRA 555

FACTS

The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la Cruz)is a
nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia
de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece who predeceased said Pelagia de la
Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute
the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.

ISSUE

What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir of
the deceased?

HELD

The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.

Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: “A partition which includes a person believed to be a
heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.” Partition of property
affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and another
person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice
of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void. A
fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms
enforced.

Teotico v. Del Val, supra

FACTS
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre passed away leaving properties and a will that
named Josefina Mortera as the sole heir to her estate, among other provisions. Vicente B.
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will, which was opposed by Ana del Val Chan,
claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of Maria Mortera, as well
as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of Maria Mortera.

ISSUE

Whether Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in the probate proceedings.

Whether the will has been duly admitted to probate.

Whether the probate court erred in determining the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of a
legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico.

HELD

Ana del Val Chan has no right to intervene in the probate proceedings as she has no interest in
the estate, either as a legal heir or as a designated beneficiary in the will. Being an illegitimate
child, she is prohibited by law from inheriting from the legitimate relatives of her natural father
under Article 992 of the Civil Code. Therefore, she has no legal standing to intervene in the
probate proceedings.

The court held that the will has been duly admitted to probate, as it was properly executed and
attested to in accordance with the law. Claims of improper pressure and influence were not
substantiated by evidence.

The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction in determining the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of the will. The purpose of probate proceedings is to establish the formalities of the will's
execution and the testator's capacity to make a will, not to pass judgment on the validity of
specific provisions within the will. The court cannot declare certain legacies void or valid; its
role is limited to determining the formalities of the will. Thus, the pronouncements regarding
the invalidity of a legacy to Dr. Rene Teotico and other dispositions of the estate in favor of
certain relatives should be set aside.

Diaz v. IAC, 150 SCRA 645

FACTS
It is undisputed: that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate child of the spouses Felipe
Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero
and the mother of Pablo Santero; that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents;
that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; that
Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children
with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE

Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or
her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

HELD

Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance
therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a
general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one:
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus.

The term relatives in “Article 992 of New Civil Code” in more restrictive sense than it is used
and intended; is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, when the law intends to
use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

De los Santos v. Ferraris- Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986

FACTS

Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived
only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent’s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all
surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia’s only brother of
full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent).
ISSUE

Whether or not nephews and nieces exclude aunts and uncles?

HELD

Yes. Art 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. The
Supreme Court ruled that under our laws of succession, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.

Corpuz v. Corpuz, 85 SCRA 567

FACTS

Ramona Arguelles, after being widowed by Tomas Corpus, married Luis Rafael Yangco and had several
acknowledged natural children, including Teodoro Yangco. Teodoro Yangco, upon his death, left a will
naming specific legatees, including his half brother Luis Yangco, half sister Paz Yangco, and other
relatives. Juanita Corpus, the mother of Tomas Corpus, claimed a share in Teodoro Yangco's estate as a
legal heir.

ISSUE

Whether Juanita Corpus, as the mother of Tomas Corpus, a presumed legitimate child of Ramona
Arguelles, has a legal basis to claim a share in Teodoro Yangco's estate.

HELD

No, Juanita Corpus, as the mother of Tomas Corpus, does not have a legal basis to claim a share
in Teodoro Yangco's estate. The Philippine Civil Code (NCC) stipulates that an illegitimate child
has no right to inherit from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother, and vice
versa. This provision is based on the theory that there is often animosity between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives, and the law seeks to avoid further grounds for resentment. Since Teodoro
Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child of Ramona Arguelles,
Juanita Corpus, as the mother of a presumed legitimate child, has no legal standing to claim a
share in Teodoro Yangco's estate.

Leonardo v. CA, 120 SCRA 890

FACTS
Francisca Reyes died intestate in 1942, leaving two daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson,
Sotero Leonardo, the son of her deceased daughter Pascuala Cailles. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, and
Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any children. Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of Sotero
Leonardo, filed a complaint seeking to be declared one of the lawful heirs of Francisca Reyes and entitled
to a share in her estate.

ISSUE

Whether Cresenciano Leonardo can claim a share in Francisca Reyes's estate by right of representation.

HELD

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that Cresenciano Leonardo failed to prove
his filiation, a fundamental requirement for claiming inheritance. Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines governs the inheritance rights of illegitimate children, stating that they have no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of their father. The birth certificate he submitted
did not prove that he was the child mentioned in the document. Even if he were the child of Sotero
Leonardo, he would still be an illegitimate child, and under Article 992 of the Civil Code, illegitimate
children have no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of their father.
Therefore, Cresenciano Leonardo cannot claim a share of Francisca Reyes's estate by right of
representation.

Santillon v. Mirandan, 14 SCRA 563

FACTS

Pedro Santillon died intestate in 1953, leaving behind his wife, Perfecta Miranda, and their son, Claro
Santillon. After his death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration, which was opposed by
Perfecta Miranda and other parties claiming interests in the estate. Perfecta Miranda was subsequently
appointed as the administrator of the estate.

In 1961, Claro filed a motion to declare the share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims. He
argued that under Article 892 of the New Civil Code, after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal
properties for Perfecta's share, the remaining 1/2 should be divided with 1/4 for her and 3/4 for
him. Perfecta, however, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Article
996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half, resulting in her claim of 1/2 of
the inheritance.

The court ruled that in the intestate succession of Pedro Santillon, Perfecta Miranda shall
inherit one-half (1/2) share, and the remaining one-half (1/2) share shall go to Claro Santillon,
after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties.
ISSUE

Whether the word "children" in Article 996 can also be interpreted as "child" in accordance with
Article 892.

HELD

Yes. It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in the plural include the singular.
Therefore, Article 996 should be read and applied to include the singular form, "child." This
means that if the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the
same share as that of the child. The omission in Article 996 to provide for the situation where
the widow or widower survives with only one child indicates the legislator's intention to
promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

Bicomong v. Almanza, 80 SCRA 421

FACTS

Simeon Bagsic had two marriages and a total of five children. From his first marriage to
Sisenanda Barcenas, he had Perpetua, Igmedia, and Ignacio Bagsic. After Sisenanda's death,
Simeon remarried Silvestra Glorioso and had two more children, Felipa and Maura Bagsic.
Simeon and Silvestra died, as did Ignacio, leaving Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia also
passed away, survived by Dionisio, Maria, and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua had heirs, including
Gaudencio, Felicidad, Salome, and Gervacio Bicomong.

From the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died without heirs, and Felipa had a daughter, Cristeta
Almanza, with her husband Geronimo Almanza. However, Cristeta died, leaving her husband
Engracio Manese and her father Geronimo Almanza. The case involves the recovery of Maura
Bagsic's share in certain properties she inherited from her mother, Silvestra Glorioso. Plaintiffs,
including the Bicomongs, Tolentinos, and Francisco Bagsic, filed a complaint against Geronimo
Almanza and Engracio Manese to recover their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura
Bagsic.

ISSUE

WON the nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right.

HELD

Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,

Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her
husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of
her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the
New Civil Code. By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are
entitled to inherit in their own right.

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or
nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their
relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the
deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in their
right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code
(supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of
the nephews and nieces of half blood.

Bacayo v. Borromeo, 14 SCRA 986

FACTS

Melodia Ferraris was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and
distributing her estate among her heirs. She left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third
share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less. The deceased
Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived
only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of
decedent’s father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all
surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia’s only brother of
full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her. These two classes of heirs claim to be the
nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.

ISSUE

WON a decedent’s uncles and aunts may succeed ab intestato while nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

HELD

No. in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals from
the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Under Art. 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces
of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to
the succession. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession are
the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are,
however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is
hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives
beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes. Article
1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be understood in
connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of
the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed
without distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood
relationship.

Neri v. Heirs of Spouses Uy, G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

FACTS

Anunciacion had seven children, 2 from her 1st marriage and 5 from her 2nd marriage. After
Anunciacion's death, her husband Enrique, in his capacity as guardian of their two minor children, and
their other children executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale, selling
homestead properties to the spouses Uy. This sale was later challenged by the children from
Anunciacion's first marriage, alleging deprivation of their legitimes.

ISSUE

Whether Enrique had the authority to sell the shares of his minor children in absence of judicial
authority.

Whether the action for the annulment of sale has prescribed.

HELD

No. The sale was void because all heirs of Anunciacion should have participated in the
settlement and sale, including Eutropia and Victoria from her first marriage, and the minor
children Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented. Enrique, as natural guardian, could
not dispose of his minor children's shares without judicial authority.

Civil Code Articles 979 and 980 require equal inheritance shares. Parents must apply for judicial
guardianship to sell their children's properties, and even then, they must post bond. The sale was
unenforceable without proper judicial authority, as per Civil Code Articles 1317 and 1403(1).
No. The action did not prescribe because the heirs were deprived of their lawful participation in
the estate. An action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe
under Civil Code Article 1410.

The prescriptive period of 2 years from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement did not apply to the
heirs who were deprived of their participation. The ratification by Rosa did not apply to Douglas due to
lack of evidence.

Alsua Betts v. CA, 92 SCRA 332

FACTS

Don Jesus Alsua and his wife executed an Extra-Judicial Partition in 1949, dividing their properties among
their children. They also executed holographic wills with similar terms, naming each other as executor
without a bond. After Doña Florentina's death, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will and made a new
notarial will, collating all properties previously donated to his children and devising specific properties to
them. The children then submitted a deed of partition to the probate court, confirming the 1949 partition
and the wills of their parents.

ISSUE

Whether the Extra-Judicial Partition is null and void.

Whether the oppositors are in estoppel to question the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.

Whether Don Jesus can revoke his previous holographic will and codicil.

HELD

Yes. The Extra-Judicial Partition is null and void because it involved future inheritances, which can only be
the subject of a contract inter vivos to divide an estate, not an extrajudicial partition. No. The principle of
estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings because they involve public interest. Public policy and
interest in ensuring that testamentary dispositions are executed in accordance with the law.

Doromal v. CA, L-36083, 2 Sept. 1975

FACTS

Private respondent Javellana filed an action for redemption of a co-owned property against
petitioners Doromal, et al. The Court of First Instance (CFI) dismissed the action as time-barred.
The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that Javellana was not notified in writing of the actual
execution and registration of the deed of sale.

ISSUE

Is a notice to co-owners of a perfected sale a sufficient notice for the counting of the 30-day
right of redemption period by a co-owner?

HELD

No. The notice required for the co-owner’s right of redemption must inform not only of a
perfected sale but also of the actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale. This is to ensure
that all terms and conditions of the sale are definite and in writing to avoid controversy.

Alonzo v. IAC, 150 SCRA 517

FACTS

Five siblings equally inherited pro indiviso* land from their deceased parents. Sibling 1 sold his
share to Alonzos. Sibling 2 also sold his share to Alonzos a year after. Alonzos built a house and
a fence in their bought land. Sibling 3 lived in inherited land, which was next to the Alonzo’s
house. Sibling 2 lived there with her. Sibling 3 is friends with Alonzos in that their children went
to school together. 13 years after, Sibling 4 filed for redemption but revoked because he is
American citizen. Year after, Sibling 3 filed complaint for redemption.

Trial court dismissed complaint saying that 30-day period for filing after notice of sale had
lapsed. Art. 1623 of the Civil Code which states that “the right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor/s.” Since 13 years has passed, the court presumes that at some point, the
siblings have been informed and that the prescription has passed. Though no written notice
was served to the siblings, court held complainants had actual knowledge given that they are
neighbors.

ISSUE

Did the lower court interpret and apply the relevant law correctly? -Yes

HELD

Yes, the lower court was correct in its application of the law because the facts prove the
likelihood of the notice happening at one point.The relevant law is Art. 1623 of the Civil Code
which states that “the right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor/s.” (1) One of the issues
here is whether notice was given the complainants. Even if we grant that there was no written
notice, it is impossible to deem there being no notice at all. They live next to each other. (2)
When did the notice begin? The Court does not know but it assumes that it had begun and
elapsed in the 13 years.

Regarding the prescription of the right of redemption, the law specifically states that it should
be 30 days after notice. Given the 13 years, the court assumes that the prescription has as well
lapsed.

Bautista v. Grino- Aquino, 166 SCRA 760

FACTS

On January 6,1976, the parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts dated December 15,
1975. Some stipulations are as follows: (1) Parties admit that petitioner Manuel Bautista
married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo; (2) that Parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his
second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, born on April 29,1949; (3)
that the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property on
December 22,1966, among the heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel
Bautista; and (4) Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiffs. On appeal, a decision was
rendered in due course by the Court of Appeals on August 3, 1987, affirming the decision of the
trial court.

ISSUE

Whether the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial partition of
the estate of the deceased wife

HELD

NO. The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court that the
signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as
examined by the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even
granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of Partition
is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted and proven facts renders the
document fatally defective. The extrajudicial partition was supposed to be a partition without
court intervention of the estate of the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista,
constituting the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista appears to have
waived his right or share in the property in favor of private respondents. However, the property
subject matter of said extrajudicial partition does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera.
It is the exclusive property of Manuel Bautista who inherited the same from his father Mariano
Bautista, which was registered in his name under T.C.T. No. 2210.

Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies
only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the
heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the
property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject
matter of an extrajudicial partition.

De los Santos v. De la Cruz, supra

FACTS

Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la Cruz, alleging
that they executed an extrajudicial partition agreement over a portion of land. Despite demands, Maximo
refused to develop the estate as agreed.

ISSUE

Is the extrajudicial partition agreement null and void with respect to Gertrudes de los Santos,
depriving her of a cause of action against Maximo de la Cruz?

Is Maximo de la Cruz estopped from questioning Gertrudes de los Santos' right to enforce the
agreement?

Should Maximo de la Cruz pay actual damages to Gertrudes de los Santos, and should his
counterclaim be granted?

HELD

Yes, the agreement is void with respect to Gertrudes de los Santos because she is not an heir of
Pelagia de la Cruz, as required by law.

No, estoppel cannot be based on a void contract or acts against public policy.

Gertrudes de los Santos may not assert estoppel, and Maximo de la Cruz is absolved from any
liability. However, Gertrudes de los Santos is sentenced to restore Maximo de la Cruz's
corresponding share of the property she received under the void partition if it has not already
been disposed of.
Guilas v. Judge, L-026695, 31 Jan. 1972.

FACTS

Jacinta Limson de Lopez, a resident of Guagua, Pampanga, was married to Alejandro Lopez y
Siongco, with no children. On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will naming Alejandro as her
sole heir and executor.

In 1953, Juanita Lopez, now married to Federico Guilas, was legally adopted by the spouses
Jacinta and Alejandro. Despite this adoption, Jacinta did not amend her will to include Juanita
as an heir.

After Jacinta's death, her will was admitted to probate, and Alejandro was appointed executor.
A project of partition was executed in 1960, recognizing Juanita's right to inherit from Jacinta,
and allocating certain properties to her.

Juanita later filed a separate action to set aside the project of partition, alleging lesion,
preterition, and fraud. She also filed a petition in the probate court to direct Alejandro to
deliver her share of the estate.

Alejandro opposed Juanita's petition, arguing that the probate proceedings had been closed
and terminated, and that Juanita's delay in filing her petition constituted laches.

ISSUE

Whether the probate proceedings had been validly closed and terminated, and whether
Juanita's delay in filing her petition bars her claim.

HELD

The court ruled in favor of Juanita Lopez-Guilas, finding that the probate court had not lost
jurisdiction over the estate as long as the distribution of the estate had not been completed.
The finality of the approval of the project of partition did not terminate the probate
proceedings, and Juanita had the right to demand her share through the proper legal process.
The court also found that Juanita's delay in filing her petition did not constitute laches, as it was
within the prescribed period for the execution of judgment by motion.

The court set aside previous orders of the lower court and directed the Register of Deeds to
transfer the titles of the properties in question to Juanita Lopez-Guilas. Alejandro Lopez was
ordered to deliver the possession of the properties to Juanita, as well as to pay her the rents,
crops, or income collected from the properties. Alejandro was also ordered to pay the costs of
the proceedings.

De los Santos v. de la Cruz, 37 SCRA 558

FACTS

The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la Cruz)is a
nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia
de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece who predeceased said Pelagia de la
Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute
the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.

ISSUE

What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir of
the deceased?

HELD

The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.

Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: “A partition which includes a person believed to be a
heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.” Partition of property
affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and another
person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice
of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void. A
fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms
enforced.

Agustines v. CFI, 45 O.G. Supp #9, p. 184 April 3, 1948.

FACTS

In August, 1934, Generosa Agustines died leaving a will which was subsequently submitted for
probate in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in special proceedings No. 4944. Having no
children, she named her surviving husband Severo Valenzuela the universal heir, but she
specified some be quests. There was opposition to the approval of the will; however, after
some negotiations, the sister (Josefa) and the nephews and nieces of the decedent (the other
petitioners in this special civil action) executed on February 8, 1935, an extrajudicial partition
with the respondent Severo Valenzuela, expressing conformity with the probate of the
testament and dividing the properties of the deceased. Years passed. Severo Valenzuela failed
to transmit the lot or part thereof to the parish church of Polo or to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila. Then he hastened to submit in September, 1944, in the testamentary
proceeding No. 4944, a motion in which he represented that under the will he had discretion to
determine the area of land to be conveyed to the Polo church and that, exercising such
discretion, he elected to assign that tract actually cultivated by the tenant named Benito Salazar
in Quiririt (admittedly one hectare more or less). He asked that this assignment be declared full
compliance with the testamentary directions. The other parties to the testementary proceeding
were not given due notice of this petition. It was approved.

ISSUE

Whether or not the share of the church of Polo under the will and the extrajudicial partition is
not exceeding nine hectares

HELD

YES. It will be recalled that the will of Generosa Agustines contained a provision directing her
husband to donate a portion of her Quiririt farm not exceeding nine hectares to the Polo
church. After examining and analyzing the circumstances of this litigation, we reach the
conclusion that, as contended by petitioners and the intervenor, the extrajudicial partition
definitely alloted a nine hectare parcel to the Polo church. Supposing, that under the will
Valenzuela's discretion included the determination of the area to be transferred - and not
merely the selection of the site where the nine hectare portion is to be segregated - still it
seems clear that in the partition he elected or agreed that a nine hectare portion shall be
conveyed to the Polo church for masses.

Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010

FACTS

Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate on June 4, 1990, survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico
Suntay, and five grandchildren: three legitimate and two illegitimate. The illegitimate
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were raised by the spouses. The legitimate grandchildren,
including respondent Isabel, lived with their mother following their parents' separation. Emilio
I, Cristina's and Federico's son, predeceased them.
Federico later adopted Emilio III and Nenita. Isabel filed a petition for letters of administration
over Cristina's estate, which Federico opposed. After Federico's death, Emilio III was appointed
as administrator of Cristina's estate, a decision later reversed by the Court of Appeals, which
appointed Isabel as administratrix. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision,
appointing Emilio III as co-administrator.

ISSUE

Whether Emilio III, as an illegitimate grandchild, is qualified to act as co-administrator of

Cristina's estate, given the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration and
his alleged adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate.

HELD

The Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision and ruled that Emilio III should serve as co-
administrator with Isabel. While there is an order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration, the paramount consideration is the prospective administrator's interest in the
estate. Co-administration is allowed as an exception to the rule. Emilio III demonstrated an
interest in the estate, and the appointment of co-administrators is beneficial when there are
opposing parties or factions to be represented. The Court found that Emilio III's interest in the
estate justified his appointment as co-administrator, even though he was an illegitimate
grandchild.

However, upon further review, the Court found that Emilio III was unsuitable as an
administrator. He omitted properties from the inventory, failed to act against Federico's
settlement of the estate, and demonstrated hostility towards Isabel. The Court concluded that
it would be impractical and detrimental to the estate to appoint Emilio III as co-administrator
due to his adverse interest and hostility towards Isabel, who is immediately interested in the
estate. Therefore, the Court revoked Emilio III's appointment as co-administrator, leaving Isabel
as the sole administratrix.

Manungas, v. Loreto, G.R. No. 193161, August 22, 2011

FACTS

Spouses Engracia and Florentino Manungas did not begot a child. Thus, they adopted Samuel
David Avila. Florentino died intestate while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother and survived
by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas. Engracia filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the
intestate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. She stated
therein that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino except for herself, Avila
and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino. Thereafter,
a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate proceedings of Florentino distributing
the properties to surviving heirs, Engracia and Ramon. The RTC appointed Florencio Parreño,
the niece of Engracia as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent
aunt. Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
over the Estate of Engracia in his favor before the RTC with the allegation that he, being an
illegitimate son of Florentino, is an heir of Engracia. Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencio
opposed the petition alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate
of Manungas. Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Thus, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and
ordering the revocation of its earlier appointment of Florencio as the administrator of the
Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CA committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment of
Diosdado as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of Florencia as special
administrator?

HELD

No. The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino does not mean that he is
entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of the court. However, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal
principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is
to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed as stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of
the Rules of Court Further, evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late
Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latter's estate. On the other hand,
Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also
the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt
Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent's
estate.