2023 05 12 EBCO - Annual - Report - 2022 23

European Bureau for Conscientious Objection
European
Bureau for
Conscientious
Objection
35 Van Elewyck Street, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
www.ebco-beoc.org / ebco@ebco-beoc.org / @ebcobeoc
Annual Report
Conscientious Objection
to Military Service
in Europe
2022/23
1 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

Brussels, 12 May 2023
Researched and edited by
Derek BRETT
Georgios KARATZAS
Angelos NIKOLOPOULOS
Semih SAPMAZ
Yurii SHELIAZHENKO
Alexia TSOUNI
Jyry VIRTANEN
Zaira ZAFARANA

Foreword by Alexia Tsouni, EBCO President
The human right to conscientious objection to military service was higher in the
European agenda in 2022, as a result of the ongoing Russian war of aggression against
Ukraine and the courageous conscientious objectors and pacifists.
The continuation of the war itself constitutes a tragic failure of diplomacy and
politicians, as well as a bloody victory of militarism and war profiteers. The military
mobilisation and the prosecution of those who object the war constitutes a blatant violation
of their fundamental human rights, as well as the indiscriminate European sanctions against
all Russians, instead of granting Visas (type C and D) at least to those who object the war.
Hopefully, remarkable efforts have been made, and more and more inspiring voices are
calling for peace (voices for peace from civil society worldwide), including in the framework
of the international #ObjectWarCampaign (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine: Protection and
asylum for deserters and conscientious objectors to military service), jointly
launched by the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection (EBCO), the International
Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), War Resisters’ International (WRI), and Connection e.V..
In June 2022, 60 organisations from 20 countries sent an appeal to the European
Parliament, detailing why protection and support for deserters and conscientious
objectors on all sides of the Ukrainian war is necessary and right. On April 6, 2022,
the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, had called on Russian soldiers to
desert and promised them protection under refugee law. So far, this promise has not been
fulfilled. Within the scope of #ObjectWarCampaign, a petition has been prepared for
everyone to sign in, and it is addressed to the President of the European Commission Ursula
von der Leyen, the President of the European Council Charles Michel and the President of the
European Parliament Roberta Metsola. The petition emphasises the need to uphold the
right to asylum to conscientious objectors and deserters from Russia, Belarus and
Ukraine by hosting states.
EBCO strongly condemns the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and calls on all soldiers not
to participate in hostilities and on all recruits to refuse military service. EBCO denounces all
the cases of forced and even violent recruitment to the armies of both sides, as well as all
the cases of persecution of conscientious objectors, deserters and non-violent anti-war
protestors. The right to conscientious objection to military service is inherent in the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, guaranteed under Article 18 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is non-derogable
even in a time of public emergency, as stated in Article 4(2) of ICCPR.
EBCO calls Russia to immediately and unconditionally release all those hundreds of soldiers
and mobilised civilians who object to engage in the war and are illegally detained in a number
of centres in Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine. Russian authorities are reportedly using
threats, psychological abuse and torture to force those detained to return to the front.
EBCO calls Ukraine to immediately reverse the suspension of the human right to
conscientious objection, release and honourably discharge Christian pacifist conscientious
objectors Vitaly Alekseenko (imprisoned in the Kolomyiska Correctional Colony No. 41) and
Andrii Vyshnevetsky (held at frontline unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), as well as acquit
all conscientious objectors, including Christian pacifists Mykhailo Yavorsky and Hennadii
Tomniuk. Ukraine should safeguard the right to conscientious objection to military service,
including in wartime, fully complying with the European and international standards, amongst
others the standards set by the European Court of Human Rights.

In Europe conscription is still enforced in 18 states, including 16 Council of Europe (CoE)

Member States. They are: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Georgia (reintroduced in 2017), Greece, Lithuania (reintroduced in 2015),
Moldova, Norway, Russia (former CoE member state), Sweden (reintroduced in 2018),
Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine (reintroduced in 2014), and Belarus (candidate CoE
member state).
In 2022 Europe was not a safe place for many conscientious objectors in several
countries who faced prosecution, arrests, trials by military courts, imprisonments, fines,
intimidation, attacks, death threats, and discrimination. These countries include Russia
(where hundreds of conscientious objectors are currently imprisoned because they refuse to
participate in the war), Ukraine (where one conscientious objector is currently imprisoned,
one is held at frontline military unit, and a few more are convicted and prosecuted), Belarus,
Türkiye (the only CoE Member State who has not yet recognised the right to conscientious
objection), and consequently the Turkish-occupied northern part of Cyprus (the self-styled
“Turkish Republic of North Cyprus”), Azerbaijan (where there is still no law on civilian
service), as well as Lithuania, Estonia, Armenia, Georgia, Greece, the Republic of
Cyprus, Finland, Austria and Switzerland (in these countries the right to conscientious
objection is recognised and there is a law on civilian service, but the law and/or practice is
still not in line with the european and international human rights standards, leading to
violations and discrimination against conscientious objectors).
As for the minimum conscription age, although the Optional Protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict
encourages states to end all recruitment of persons below the age of 18, a disturbing number
of European states continues to do this. Worse, some breach the absolute prohibitions in the
Optional Protocol by placing servicemen aged under 18 at risk of active deployment, or by
allowing conscripts to enlist before their 18th birthday.
Last but not least, according to the recently published SIPRI Military Expenditure Report for
2022, military expenditure in Europe saw its steepest year-on-year increase in at
least 30 years. Even worldwide, the sharpest rise in spending by far (+13 per cent) was
seen in Europe and was largely accounted for by Russian and Ukrainian spending.
Military expenditure by states in Central and Western Europe totalled $345 billion in 2022.
In real terms, spending by these states for the first time surpassed that in 1989, as the cold
war was ending, and was 30 per cent higher than in 2013. Several states significantly
increased their military spending following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,
while others announced plans to raise spending levels over periods of up to a decade.
Therefore, EBCO urges for the decrease of military expenditure and the increase of social
spending, and for making available to citizens with conscientious objections means of
specifying that no part of the taxes which they have personally paid is directed towards
military expenditure.

Table of Contents
1. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2022 ............................................................................................................................ 7

1.1 INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND MECHANISMS........... 7
1.1.1 COUNCIL OF EUROPE ....................................................................................................................................... 7
1.1.1.1 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ...................................................................................... 7
1.1.1.2 Committee of Ministers ......................................................................................................................... 13
1.1.2 EUROPEAN UNION ........................................................................................................................................... 13
1.1.2.1 European Parliament .............................................................................................................................. 14
1.1.3 UNITED NATIONS ............................................................................................................................................. 15
1.1.3.1 Treaty Bodies – Human Rights Committee.................................................................................... 15
1.1.3.2 Committee on the Rights of the Child ............................................................................................. 18
1.1.3.3 Human Rights Council ............................................................................................................................ 19
1.1.4 WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES ............................................................................................................... 25
1.2 DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES ...................... 26
1.2.1 ALBANIA............................................................................................................................................................... 26
1.2.2 ANDORRA ............................................................................................................................................................ 27
1.2.3 ARMENIA.............................................................................................................................................................. 27
1.2.4 AUSTRIA .............................................................................................................................................................. 28
1.2.5 AZERBAIJAN ....................................................................................................................................................... 28
1.2.6 BELGIUM .............................................................................................................................................................. 29
1.2.7 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ....................................................................................................................... 29
1.2.8 BULGARIA ........................................................................................................................................................... 30
1.2.9 CROATIA .............................................................................................................................................................. 31
1.2.10 CYPRUS .............................................................................................................................................................. 31
1.2.11 CZECHIA............................................................................................................................................................ 32
1.2.12 DENMARK .......................................................................................................................................................... 32
1.2.13 ESTONIA ............................................................................................................................................................ 35
1.2.14 FINLAND ............................................................................................................................................................ 36
1.2.15 FRANCE .............................................................................................................................................................. 37
1.2.16 GEORGIA ........................................................................................................................................................... 37
1.2.17 GERMANY .......................................................................................................................................................... 38
1.2.18 GREECE.............................................................................................................................................................. 40
1.2.19 HUNGARY .......................................................................................................................................................... 44
1.2.20 ICELAND ............................................................................................................................................................ 45
1.2.21 IRELAND ............................................................................................................................................................ 45
1.2.22 ITALY .................................................................................................................................................................. 46
1.2.23 LATVIA ............................................................................................................................................................... 46
1.2.24 LIECHTENSTEIN ............................................................................................................................................. 49
1.2.25 LITHUANIA ....................................................................................................................................................... 49
1.2.26 LUXEMBOURG ................................................................................................................................................. 50
1.2.27 MALTA ................................................................................................................................................................ 51
1.2.28 MOLDOVA ......................................................................................................................................................... 52
1.2.29 MONACO ............................................................................................................................................................ 53
1.2.30 MONTENEGRO ................................................................................................................................................. 53
1.2.31 NETHERLANDS ................................................................................................................................................ 54
1.2.32 NORTH MACEDONIA ..................................................................................................................................... 55
1.2.33 NORWAY ............................................................................................................................................................ 55
1.2.34 POLAND ............................................................................................................................................................. 57
1.2.35 PORTUGAL ........................................................................................................................................................ 58
1.2.36 ROMANIA .......................................................................................................................................................... 59
1.2.37 RUSSIAN FEDERATION (former member state) ................................................................................ 60

1.2.38 SAN MARINO ................................................................................................................................................... 72

1.2.39 SERBIA ............................................................................................................................................................... 72
1.2.40 SLOVAK REPUBLIC ........................................................................................................................................ 73
1.2.41 SLOVENIA ......................................................................................................................................................... 73
1.2.42 SPAIN ................................................................................................................................................................. 74
1.2.43 SWEDEN ............................................................................................................................................................ 74
1.2.44 SWITZERLAND ................................................................................................................................................ 77
1.2.45 TÜRKIYE ............................................................................................................................................................ 80
1.2.46 UKRAINE ........................................................................................................................................................... 82
1.2.47 UNITED KINGDOM ......................................................................................................................................... 89
1.2.48 BELARUS (candidate member state)...................................................................................................... 90
2. OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL PROVISIONS .................................................................................................... 92
2.1 CONSCRIPTION ......................................................................................................................... 92
2.2 CONSCRIPTS AND CONTRACT OR PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS .............................. 95
2.3 RECOGNITION OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION...................................................... 100
2.4 COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN SERVICE ............................... 103
2.5 MILITARY EXPENDITURE .................................................................................................... 106
2.6 JUVENILE RECRUITMENT .................................................................................................... 110
2.7 SERVING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ......................................................................... 115
2.8 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS AND ASYLUM ............................................................... 116
3. NEW PUBLICATIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 123
4. RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 124
5. THANKS.................................................................................................................................................................... 125

1. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2022

1.1 INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND
MECHANISMS
1.1.1 COUNCIL OF EUROPE
1.1.1.1 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
Judgements:
Armenia:
On 22 March 2022, the European Court of Human Rights issued its judgement on the “Case
of Christian religious organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the NKR v. Armenia”.1
The case concerned the refusal of the authorities in the unrecognised “Nagorno Karabakh
Republic” (“the NKR”), when under control of Armenia, to register the Christian religious
organization of Jehovah’s Witnesses in the NKR as a religious organisation. Conscientious
objection to military service is mentioned several times,2 including the Avanesyan3 case.
Para. 79 reads:
“79. Furthermore, it is now the Court’s settled case-law that opposition to military service,
where it is motivated by a serious and insurmountable conflict between the obligation to
serve in the army and a person’s conscience or his deeply and genuinely held religious or
other beliefs, constitutes a conviction or belief of sufficient cogency, seriousness, cohesion
and importance to attract the guarantees of Article 9 (see Bayatyan, cited above, § 110). In
the case of Avanesyan (cited above, §§ 56-59) the Court confirmed this approach by finding
a violation of Article 9 of the Convention on account of a conscientious objector’s conviction
in the “NKR” for draft evasion without due consideration of his religious beliefs. The Court is
mindful of the fact that any system of compulsory military service imposes a heavy burden
on citizens and that it will be acceptable if it is shared in an equitable manner and if
exemptions from this duty are based on solid and convincing grounds (see Bayatyan, cited
above, § 125). The design of an alternative service system and the achievement of an
1
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-216366
2
Ιn paragraphs 48, 52, and 79 of the judgement.
3

acceptable balance, however, is in the hands of the national authorities and is in any case,
not a subject of the present case."
However, as for the issue of refusal to register the applicant, the Court found that there has
been a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), read in
the light of Article 11.
Lithuania:4 On 7 June 2022, the European Court of Human Rights issued an

important judgement (Teliatnikov v. Lithuania)5 in relation to the protection of the right
of conscientious objection to military service under Article 9 of the European Human Rights
Convention. The Court found a violation of the Article 9 right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion of Teliatnikov, a Jehovah’s Witness, who sought to be either
exempted from military service or enabled to undertake a civilian alternative service.
There were a number of significant points in the judgement.
1. Victim status
In order to be able to lodge a petition with the European Court of Human Rights a person
must be able to claim to be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the
Convention. The government claimed that this was not the case as although Teliatnikov had
been called up, he had not been required to do military or alternative defence service, nor
prosecuted or convicted for not doing so and, by the time of the Court’s consideration was
above the conscription age. However, the Court found that:
“While acknowledging that in the present case the applicant has never been convicted, the
Court nevertheless notes its case-law to the effect that the rejection of the applicant’s
application for conscientious objector status may be regarded as an interference with his
right to freedom of thought and conscience as safeguarded by Article 9 of the
Convention”. (para. 91).
Indeed, the applicant had been personally affected by the decisions of the military authority
and the Ministry of National Defence, which were maintained by the Supreme Administrative
Court.
2. Alternative Service
The Court found that the "alternative national defence service is intrinsically linked to military
service, and therefore cannot be seen as separate civilian service". Specifically, the Court
found that:
1) persons performing alternative national defence service are referred to as “military
conscripts” and/or “military draftees” throughout the Law on Conscription and the
Regulations;
2) the type of work to be performed is assigned by the military;
3) if no civilian work assignment is available, “the military conscript will be assigned to
perform alternative service in the national defence system institutions”;
4) the “military conscript” is taken to his assigned place of work by the military and is given
the same “provisions (except for living quarters and clothing)” as “military service soldiers”;
4
The part about the Teliatnikov v. Lithuania case is copied from the relevant article of War Resisters’
International, available at: https://wri-irg.org/en/story/2022/important-judgement-ecthr-relation-
conscientious-objection-military-service
5

5) the manager of the institution where the “military conscript” performs his work
immediately notifies the military in writing about “the [military conscript’s] appointment,
specific tasks, conditions and work time”, and provides the military with a monthly “time
roster” for the “military conscript”;
6) a “military conscript” performing alternative national defence service “cannot be
dismissed” for disciplinary violations by the manager of the institution where he is working,
without the approval of the military. Besides, under Article 26 of the Law on Conscription,
in the event of mobilisation, the “military conscript” performing “alternative national defence
service” may be “summoned to perform military service”. (para. 107).
3. Decision making
The Court also addressed the system for deciding requests to undertake the alternative
service, noting that although the Special Commission who considered applications was
comprised of civilians, it did not itself make the decisions.
The Commission’s decision is merely a recommendation which is transmitted to the national
defence system institution which administers conscription, which takes the final decision
whether the objector’s request to perform alternative national defence service is well founded
or not (para. 109).
Russian Federation:
The Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe on 16 March of
20226 and a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights as from
16 September 2022.7 However, as noted also by the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe, the Russian Federation remains under a binding international law obligation to
execute the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights delivered against it.8
Among the recent judgements (2021-2022) that need to be executed, are the following,
which are related to conscientious objection to military service and/or conscription:
Aslanian v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia:9 The case concerns the applicant’s
conviction for refusing on religious grounds military service in the self-proclaimed “Moldovan
Republic of Transdniestria” (the “MRT”). Mr Rostom Aslanian, member of the religious
community of Jehovah’s Witnesses, requested the “MRT” authorities to be assigned to civilian
service instead of compulsory military service on grounds of his religious conscience and
beliefs. In December 2010 his request was denied. On 29 March 2011 he was convicted on
charges of draft evasion and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. He was released from
detention on 29 March 2012 after having fully served his sentence.
In its judgement, issued on 13 July 2021, the Court reiterated its position that both the
Republic of Modova, as well the Russian Federation, (because of Russia’s exercise of effective
control and a decisive influence over the Transdniestrian authorities), have jurisdiction over
the region of Transdniestria. However, Moldova only has positive obligations that did not fail
to fulfil in this case. The Court found that it is not necessary to determine whether or not
Russia exercised detailed control over the policies and actions of the subordinate local
6
Resolution CM/Res(2022)2 on the cessation of the membership of the Russian Federation to the
Council of Europe, 16 March 2022. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/0900001680a5da51
7
https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/full-news/-
/asset_publisher/y5xQt7QdunzT/content/id/132810800
8
https://rm.coe.int/letter-for-the-attention-of-mr-sergey-lavrov-minister-for-foreign-
affa/1680a956f6
9
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-211020

administration. By virtue of its continued military, economic and political support for the
“MRT”, which could not otherwise survive, Russia is responsible under the Convention as for
the violation of the applicant’s rights.
The Court found that the applicant’s conviction for draft evasion amounted to an interference
with his freedom to manifest his religion, and therefore there has been a violation of Article
9 § 1 of ECHR by the Russian Federation.
Golub v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia:10 The case is about the applicant’s
compulsory military service in the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria” (the
“MRT”). He complained that his military service constituted forced labour, because it was in
the military structure of an unrecognised entity, and amounted to unlawful detention. As the
sole caretaker of his disabled mother, the applicant was entitled under the “MRT” law to the
deferral of his conscription. Nevertheless, the applicant and his mother opted for the
enrolment in a military education institution in the “MRT”, under the authority of the “MRT”
Ministry of Defence, which allowed him to obtain an education diploma and counted as
military service. After disciplinary punishment in isolation, for absence without leave, he was
excluded from the military institute and sent to a military unit to complete his compulsory
military service, where he was punished again for disciplinary reasons and put in the prison
of the military unit. He subsequently requested and granted early dismissal from military
service as the sole caretaker of his disabled mother.
In its judgement published on 30 November 2021, the Court took similar position to that in
the Aslanian case, about the jurisdiction of both Moldova and Russia, and concluded that
Moldova did not fail to fulfil its positive obligations.
As for the alleged violation of Article 4 of ECHR about forced labour, the Court discarded the
complaint, because Mr. Golub was entitled for deferral but opted instead for military service
through an enrolment in the military institution. The Court also discarded for reasons of
admissibility the part of the complaint under Article 5, related to the detentions, because it
wasn’t submitted within six months from the end of the detentions. However, interestingly,
the Court found that the restrictions of movement within the territory of the Republic of
Moldova, owing to the retention of his passport and to the restriction from leaving the military
institution and the military unit, were unlawful because “no “MRT” authority, could lawfully
order the restriction of the freedom of movement of individuals”. The Court explained that
unlike Article 4 of ECHR, Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to ECHR has a requirement of lawfulness,
and the Court found that the restrictions of movement failed to have a legal basis under
Moldovan law. Therefore, it found a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to ECHR, for which
hold responsible the Russian Federation. The Court also found a violation of Article 13 of the
ECHR, taken in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, because of lack of effective
remedies, for which the Russian Federation was also held responsible.
M.D. and others v. Russia:11 Among the main issues in this case was whether the expulsion
of the applicants, nationals of Syria, from Russia to Syria would be in breach of Articles 2
and 3 of the ECHR.
The Court, in its judgement of 14 September 2021 (rectified on 1 February 2022), took into
consideration, inter alia, the situation in Syria as for “draft evasion and its consequences”
quoting:
10
11

“45. In a Country of Origin Note of 7 May 202012 […] UNHCR stated, in particular, that men
of military age were at risk of being arrested for the purpose of forced conscription upon
return. It further stated that in Syria draft evasion was a criminal offence, the right to
conscientious objection was not legally recognised and that draft evaders would likely be
subjected to punishment beyond the relevant sanctions for the criminal offence of draft
evasion including harsher treatment during arrest, interrogation, detention, torture and other
forms of ill-treatment in detention and deployment to a frontline positions within days or
weeks of their arrest often with only minimal training.”13
The Court itself noted that: “all the applicants, being men of fighting age, have “risk profiles”
and face forced conscription into the army, with no exceptions allowed for conscientious
objectors and harsh consequences for draft evasion – such as being sent to a frontline
fighting position with minimal military training, service beyond the standard required period
of service, and ill-treatment in detention”.14
The Court found, inter alia, that “that there would be a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention in the event of the expulsion of” several applicants.
Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia:15 The case concerns the forced dissolution of
Jehovah’s Witnesses religious organisations in Russia, the banning of their religious literature
and international website on charges of extremism, the revocation of the permit to distribute
religious magazines, the criminal prosecution of individual Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the
confiscation of their property.
The case is related to conscientious objection to military service insofar Russian prosecutors
and courts have cited refusal to perform military service (or alternative “civilian” service
connected with the military), or promoting such refusal, as actions inciting citizens to refuse
to fulfil civic duties established by law. Which justified, together with other elements, the
dissolution of Jehovah’s Witnesses organisations, the ban of publications etc.16
In its judgement published on 7 June 2022, the Court noted that “Jehovah’s Witnesses agree
to carry out alternative civilian service on condition it is not connected with military
organisations”.17 The Court found that “the Jehovah’s Witnesses were entitled to seek to
persuade others that they should prefer alternative civilian service instead of taking up
weapons” and that “it is obvious that choosing one of the two legally available alternatives
does not amount to incitement to abandon the civil duties. In the absence of any evidence
of improper pressure, holding the Taganrog LRO responsible for disseminating pacifist
convictions among conscripts also amounted to an impermissible judgment on the legitimacy
of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs and means of their expression.”.18
The Court found multiple violations of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR, as well article 5 in
one case, and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It also hold “that the respondent State is to take
all necessary measures to secure the discontinuation of pending criminal proceedings against
Jehovah’s Witnesses and release of the imprisoned Jehovah’s Witnesses”.
12
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), COI Note: Participation in Anti-Government
Protests; Draft Evasion; Issuance and Application of Partial Amnesty Decrees; Residency in
(Formerly) Opposition-Held Areas; Issuance of Passports Abroad; Return and "Settling One's
Status", 7 May 2020, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5ec4fcff4.html
13
Para. 45.
14
Para. 110.
15
16
See paras. 10, 14(d), 20, 101, 103, 166, 200, 266, 271 of the judgement.
17
Para. 167.
18
Paras. 169-170, see also para. 201.

Ecodefense and others v. Russia:19 The case concerns restrictions on the freedom of
expression and association of Russian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which have
been categorised as “foreign agents” funded by “foreign sources” and exercising “political
activity”.
Among the 73 NGOs are some organisations working on the rights of conscripts, such as
Legal Mission,20 School of the Conscript, (accused inter alia about “issuing publications
on a website about the applicant organisation’s director, who had dispensed advice to a
conscript on how to avoid being conscripted”),21 and Soldiers’ Mothers of St Petersburg,22
as well an organisation, Yekaterinburg Memorial, blamed for “political activities” which
included protecting the rights of conscientious objectors.23
In its judgement published on 14 June 2022, the Court found a violation of Article 11, about
the right to freedom of association, (interpreted in the light of Article 10, about freedom of
expression), in respect of each applicant. As well, in one case, a violation of Article 34 of the
Convention about failure to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court.
Pending cases:
Lithuania: On 9 January 2023, the Court published the case Erikas Rutkauskas
against Lithuania,24 lodged on 25 March 2020 and communicated on 14 December 2022.
The applicant is a Jehovah’s Witness, he is also a religious minister. Having been called on
to perform military service in Lithuania, he refused on religious and conscientious grounds.
His request to perform civilian service instead was not answered by the military authorities.
The applicant challenged their decisions in court, but by a final ruling of 16 October 2019 the
Supreme Administrative Court upheld those decisions.
Under Article 9 of the Convention the applicant complains that despite his genuinely held
religious beliefs and his conscience, he was denied the right to refuse military service. Even
though he had never denied his civic obligations, no alternative civilian service had been
provided for by Lithuanian law.
Türkiye: The following three cases are pending against Türkiye, concerning COs
from the northern, Turkish-occupied, part of Cyprus (the self-styled “Turkish Republic of
North Cyprus”):
1. The case of Halil Karapasaoglu v. Türkiye (case number 40627/19) was accepted by
the ECtHR on 10/01/2020. 25 On 05/07/2019 Halil Karapasaoglu submitted an
application to the ECtHR against Türkiye for violations of articles 5, 6 and 9 of the
European Convention of Human Rights: (Art. 5) Right to liberty and security, (Art. 6)
Right to a fair trial, (Art. 9) Freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
2. Haluk Selam Tufanli v. Türkiye (case number 29367/15 26). The application concerns
the refusal of the applicant, a conscientious objector, to attend reservist service for
19
20
Para. 444.
21
Paras. 644-645.
22
Paras. 644-645.
23
Para. 694.
24
25
Available at: https://in-cyprus.com/echr-accepts-application-from-turkish-cypriot-conscientious-
objector/?fbclid=IwAR0ybcXl50TaU8aXuKnat0EmnN4qPOtTxilvFspEQniqEj0bg_a7paL_u4c
26
Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-208228

military mobilisation training in 2011. On 02/06/2015 Haluk Selam Tufanli submitted

an application to the ECtHR against Türkiye for violations of articles 5 §§ 1, 4 and 5,
9 and 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights: (Art. 5) Right to liberty and
security, (Art. 9) Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, (Art. 13) Right to an
effective remedy.
3. Murat Kanatli v. Türkiye (case number 18382/15 27). The application concerns the
refusal of the applicant, who is a conscientious objector and an activist, to attend
reservist service when called to attend training for military mobilisation in 2009. On
06/04/2015 Murat Kanatli submitted an application to the ECtHR against Türkiye for
violations of articles 5 §§ 1, 4 and 5, 6, 9, 13 and 14 of the European Convention of
Human Rights: (Art. 5) Right to liberty and security, (Art. 6) Right to a fair trial, (Art.
9) Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, (Art. 13) Right to an effective remedy,
(Art. 14) Prohibition of discrimination.
1.1.1.2 Committee of Ministers
Türkiye: On 17/04/2023 the Conscientious Objection Watch, War Resisters’

International, The European Bureau for Conscientious Objection, Connection e.V and
International Fellowship of Reconciliation jointly submitted to the Committee of Ministers a
Rule 9.2 Submission on the implementation of the judgments under the Ülke Group of cases
against Türkiye. 28
The Ülke group of cases pertain to violations of Article 3, the prohibition of torture, inhuman
and degrading treatment; Article 9, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
and Article 6 the right to fair trial enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights,
stemming from the applicants’ repetitive convictions and prosecutions for having refused, on
account of their religious beliefs or convictions as pacifists and conscientious objectors, to
carry out compulsory military service. There are a total of seven cases in the Ülke group
under the enhanced supervision of the Committee of Ministers (CM). The judgment on the
first case, Ülke v. Türkiye, became final on 24 April 2006.
1.1.2 EUROPEAN UNION
27
Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-184213
28
Available at: https://ebco-beoc.org/node/562

1.1.2.1 European Parliament
On 3 May 2022 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the persecution of

minorities on the grounds of belief or religion. 29 The resolution includes the following
paragraph:
“30. Stresses that states that have compulsory military service should allow for conscientious
objection, including on the grounds of religion or belief, and provide for an alternative
national service”.
However, the wording is not adequate as it does not refer to “civilian” service or to the
requirement for it to be of equal length to the military service, as it has been the usual
wording in EP resolutions for decades.
On 7 June 2022 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the 2021 Commission
Report on Türkiye.30 The resolution includes the following paragraph:
“18. Calls for the full implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights and the interim resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
regarding conscientious objection; notes, in this regard, the action plan submitted by the
Turkish authorities to the Committee of Ministers and encourages them to develop further
measures to ensure, through the necessary legislation, a fair and accessible exercise of the
right to conscientious objection to military service; expresses concern about the growing
number of applications before the Constitutional Court regarding conscientious objection
since the first application was lodged in 2017, which have been pending without any essential
communication with the applicants; urges that the necessary legal amendments be made to
cease the cycle of prosecutions and punishment as well as all the restrictions affecting
conscientious objectors”.
On 6 October 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Russia’s escalation
of its war of aggression against Ukraine.31 The resolution does not seem to refer
explicitly to conscientious objectors, however, it contains the following paragraphs:
“J. whereas on 21 September 2022, Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s first mobilisation
since the Second World War; whereas according to media reports, the mobilisation involves
between 300 000 and 1,2 million military reservists being called up to the armed forces;
whereas contrary to the official announcement that the authorities would draft citizens who
had recently served in the army and had combat experience, reports suggest that some
people are also being drafted without having had any military experience, particularly from
poorer and remote regions and ethnic minorities, and that people are being drafted as a
repressive measure, such as in occupied Crimea, where over 1 500 Crimean Tartars are being
29
European Parliament resolution of 3 May 2022 on the persecution of minorities on the grounds of
belief or religion (2021/2055(INI)). Available at:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0137_EN.html
30
European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Türkiye
(2021/2250(INI)). OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 2–18. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:JOC_2022_493_R_0002
31
European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2022 on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression
against Ukraine (2022/2851(RSP)). Available at:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0353_EN.html

called up; whereas there are also reports of forced mobilisation from the newly illegally
annexed oblasts of Ukraine; whereas there are reports of new recruits being sent to the front
almost immediately;
K. whereas the announcement of Russia’s mobilisation led to protests, with the Russian
authorities arresting more than 2 400 demonstrators so far; whereas since the
announcement of mobilisation, several hundreds of thousands of Russians have fled Russia
in order to avoid the draft; whereas the Russian authorities have set up conscription centres
at several border crossing points in order to serve call-up notices on the spot and discourage
citizens from leaving the country;
[…]
12. Condemns the mobilisation in Russia, and calls for an immediate end to involuntary
conscription; condemns the measures compelling residents of the temporarily occupied
territories of Ukraine to serve in Russia’s armed or auxiliary forces, which is forbidden under
the Fourth Geneva Convention; strongly appeals to all Russian people to avoid being dragged
into this war, which violates international law and was therefore condemned by a large
majority of countries, was only waged to assert a non-democratic kleptocratic regime in
Russia, and will ultimately destroy the Russian economy and the Russian people’s prospects
for a safe and prosperous future; urges the Member States to issue humanitarian visas to
Russian citizens in need of protection, such as those subjected to political persecution;
13. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Commission’s guidelines on general
visa issuance in relation to Russian applicants and controls of Russian citizens at the external
borders, in full compliance with EU and international law, and to ensure that every asylum
application by inter alia dissidents, deserters, draft dodgers and activists is dealt with on an
individual basis, taking into account the security concerns of the host Member State and
acting in accordance with the EU asylum acquis; calls on the Council and the Commission to
closely monitor the situation in relation to Russian visas;”
1.1.3 UNITED NATIONS
1.1.3.1 Treaty Bodies – Human Rights Committee

Jurisprudence
On 11th March 2022, the Human Rights Committee adopted its “Views” on the case of Arslan
Begenchovich Begenchov v Turkmenistan.32 The facts of this case were similar to ten earlier
ones considered by the Committee – the “author”, a Jehovah’s Witness, had been called up
in 2017 at the age of nineteen. Initially found to be medically unfit to perform military
service, he had for some reason been called up again and subjected to a second medical
examination, which contradicted the first. At that point he had declared his conscientious
objection and asked for the opportunity to perform an alternative civilian service. Such an
option not being available in Turkmenistan, he was prosecuted under Article 219.1 of the
Criminal Code for refusal to perform military service, for which he was on 18th January 2018
32
CCPR/C/134/D/3272/2018, published 5th August 2022.

sentenced to twelve months detention in a general regime penal colony. Meanwhile, two
weeks earlier he had been taken from home, arrested and placed in pre-trial detention.
The Committee had no hesitation in finding, as in the previous cases, a violation of Article
18.1 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and also, as in the Petromilidis case and one from Korea, but
for the first time in Turkmenistan, of Article 9.1, as thereby comprising arbitrary detention,
and for good measure found that the pre-trial detention, when there was no reason to expect
that the defendant might abscond, was excessive enough to constitute a breach of Article
9.3.
Consideration of State Party Reports
In its 134th Session, in March 2022, the Committee considered, among others, the reports of
Bolivia and Israel. Although a case regarding Bolivia’s failure to respect the right of
conscientious objection to military service is currently before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, the Committee did not address this issue. On Israel, through the offices of
Conscience and Peace Tax International, representatives of the Refusers’ Solidarity Network,
which unites the organisations New Profile and Mesvarot took part in the on-line civil society
briefing of the Committee, which, in its Concluding Observations:
“reiterates its concern about the predominantly military nature of the membership of the
special military committee that decides on requests for conscientious objection to compulsory
military service. It is further concerned that conscientious objectors continue to be subjected
to repeated punishment and imprisonment for their refusal to serve in the army (arts. 2, 14,
18 and 26). and its recommendations that the State party take concrete measures to
diversify the membership of the special military committee that handles requests for
conscientious objection, with a view to making it fully independent and impartial. The State
party should also put an end to the practice of repeated punishment and imprisonment of
conscientious objectors, which may amount to a violation of the right not to be tried or
punished again for the same offence.” 33
The issue of conscientious objection has been raised in civil society submissions such as
CPTI’s (Conscience and Peace Tax International) and IFOR’s for Bolivia review and again
CPTI’s and IFOR’s for Israel review34.
In its 135th Session, in June, the Committee considered reports from, among others, Ireland
and Georgia, but did not raise the issue of conscientious objection to military service,
although it could have justifiably done so with regard to the latter.
The issue of conscientious objection in Georgia has been raised in civil society submissions
such as CPTI’s.
In the 136th Session, in October, the Committee conducted in the absence of a State
delegation its twice-postponed consideration of the report from the Russian Federation.
The International Fellowship of Reconciliation participated in the briefing of the Committee
delivering a statement on October 17th with the latest updates on the violations of the right
to conscientious objection to military service in Russia, including the illegal practice of hunting
down men to be recruited for the war.
33
CCPR/C/ISR/CO/5, 5th May 2022, Paras 46 and 47
34
https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/2/11/ifor-reports-to-the-un-human-rights-committee-on-the-
violations-of-the-right-to-conscientious-objection-to-military-service-in-bolivia-and-israel

In its Concluding Observations the Committee expressed its concern on reports of arbitrary
detentions and forced conscription of civilians.35
The issue of conscientious objection in Russia has been raised in civil society submissions
such as CPTI’s and IFOR’s.
During the same session there has been as well the review of Kyrgyzstan for which the same
organizations provided a thematic submission.36
In the course of the year, the Committee also adopted “Lists of Issues” in advance of the
consideration of the reports of, among others, Egypt and Turkmenistan (Reports to be
considered in the March 2023 Session) , Colombia and Brazil (Reports to be considered in
the June 2023 Session).
On Egypt, the Committee asks “Please provide information on the legal framework ensuring
the right of conscientious objection to military service.”37
On Turkmenistan 38
“With reference to the Committee’s previous concluding observations, please report on any
steps taken or envisaged to recognize the right to conscientious objection to compulsory
military service and to provide alternatives to military service, as previously also
recommended in the Views adopted by the Committee. Please provide statistics for the
reporting period on the number of cases involving conscientious objectors to military service
and prosecutions and convictions of such individuals, including information on repeated
punishment of these individuals, in violation of article 14 (7) of the Covenant, which prohibits
repeated punishment for the same offence. Please provide information on steps taken to
expunge past convictions under article 219 (1) of the Criminal Code for conscientious
objection to military service occurring after the Covenant came into force for the State party.
“With reference to the Committee’s previous concluding observations, please report on any
steps taken or envisaged to recognize the right to conscientious objection to compulsory
military service and to provide alternatives to military service, as previously also
recommended in the Views adopted by the Committee. Please provide statistics for the
reporting period on the number of cases involving conscientious objectors to military service
and prosecutions and convictions of such individuals, including information on repeated
punishment of these individuals, in violation of article 14 (7) of the Covenant, which prohibits
repeated punishment for the same offence. Please provide information on steps taken to
expunge past convictions under article 219 (1) of the Criminal Code for conscientious
objection to military service occurring after the Covenant came into force for the State
party.”39
For Colombia, the List of Issues has at the time of writing been published in Spanish only.
Paragraph 22 reads (in Google translate):
“In view of the previous concluding observations of the Committee (para. 35), regarding the
arbitrary arrests for purposes of military recruitment, please provide information on the
measures adopted to prevent people from being subjected to arbitrary detention with military
recruitment purposes, providing statistical data on cases (number of open investigations,
35
CCPR/C/RUS/CO/8, par. 6.
36
CPTI’s and IFOR’s submissions.
37
CCPR/C/EGY/Q/5. 27th June, 2022, Para 22.
38
You can find the concerned report submitted by IFOR at https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/1/6/ifor-
reports-to-the-un-the-non-recognition-of-the-right-to-conscientious-objection-to-military-service-in-
turkmenistan
39
CCPR/C/TKM/Q/3, 25th August, 2022, para 22.

prosecutions, and sanctions imposed). Please also provide information on the measures
adopted to (a) guarantee that the right of persons to conscientious objection to military
service within the framework of Law 1861 of 2017 is respected, ensuring an agile process to
define the military situation and offering guarantees of nondiscrimination; (b) ensure the
impartiality and independence of the Evaluation Committee in the framework of decisions on
applications of conscientious objectors to the service military; and (c) integrate an alternative
civilian service to compulsory military service outside the military sphere.”40
On Brazil, the List of Issues includes the question “Please clarify whether the State party
recognizes the right to conscientious objection to military service in law and practice.”41
1.1.3.2 Committee on the Rights of the Child

Germany reported in September under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In its
Concluding Observations the Committee on the Rights of the Child followed up forcefully on
its recommendations previously made under the Optional Protocol on the involvement of
children in armed conflict:
“The Committee notes the position of the State party that voluntary recruitment of personnel
in the armed forces starting at 17 is in line with its obligations under international law, but
is of the view that children should not be recruited into the armed forces under any
circumstances. The Committee expresses concern about:
(a) Reports of advertising of and marketing for military service
aimed at children, including in schools;
(b) Reports of sexual abuse and harassment of children in the
armed forces;
(c) That a child’s actual or threatened involvement in combat
activities is not consistently considered by migration authorities as a
child-specific form of persecution in decisions granting protective status;
(d) Reports of children who are nationals of the State party residing
in camps in the Syrian Arab Republic;
(e) Insufficient information on the measures taken to identify
asylum-seeking and refugee children who may have been involved in
armed conflicts abroad, and to ensure that arms are not exported to
countries where children are known to be recruited or used in hostilities.
“Recalling its previous recommendations, the Committee urges
the State party to reconsider its position regarding the minimum
age of voluntary recruitment into the armed forces, and
recommends that the State party:
(a) Raise the minimum age of voluntary recruitment into the
armed forces to 18 years, and prohibit all forms of advertising
and marketing for military service targeted at children, in
particular at schools;
(b) Promptly investigate any reports of sexual abuse, sexual
harassment and other forms of violence against children in the
armed forces, and ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted and
sanctioned;
40 CCPR/C/COL/Q/8, 31st August 2022, Para 22.

41
CCPR/C/BRA/Q/3, 25th August 2022,

(c) Ensure the early and effective identification of all

asylum-seeking, refugee and migrant children who may have
been involved in armed conflicts abroad upon entering the State
party, and that all cases of actual or threatened involvement in
armed conflicts are considered as a child-specific form of
persecution;
(d) Consider extending extraterritorial jurisdiction for
crimes of recruitment and involvement of children in hostilities
without the criterion of double criminality;
(e) Undertake effective and urgent measures to repatriate
children who are nationals of the State party from camps in the
Syrian Arab Republic;
(f) Prohibit the export of arms, including small arms and
components for weapons systems, to countries where children
are known to be recruited or used in hostilities.”42
1.1.3.3 Human Rights Council

Report and Resolution on Conscientious Objection to Military Service
The June Session of the Council received the Analytical Report of the UN High Commissioner
on Human Rights on Conscientious objection to military service (UN document
A/HRC/50/43), which had initially been requested for 2021, but had been postponed on
financial grounds. It is a comprehensive update on standards and jurisprudence, but also
continuing challenges in implementing the right. EBCO itself, and a number of our members
and collaborators made contributions to the report. 43
The International Fellowship of Reconciliation delivered a statement in the plenary concerning
the OHCHR thematic report highlighting its benefit for the international community and
concerned individual around the world. Likewise other organizations such as CPTI took the
floor on this topic.44
Following this, in September the Council adopted the postponed “quadrennialised” resolution
on conscientious objection to military service once again tabled, like its two predecessors,
by Costa Rica, Croatia and Poland. It is worth quoting in full the text of Resolution 51/6.
“Bearing in mind that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status,
Reaffirming that it is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of person, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the right
not to be discriminated against,
42
CRC/C/DEU/CO/5-6, 22nd October 2022, paras 45, 46.
43
All contributions submitted are available under “Inputs Received” at
https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2022/ohchr-report-conscientious-objection-military-
service-50th-session-hrc
44
The list of statements delivered during the General Debate on item 3 at the 51 st session of the
Human Rights Council is available at
https://hrcmeetings.ohchr.org/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/51/Pages/Statements.aspx?SessionId
=61&MeetingDate=20/09/2022%2000:00:00

Recalling all previous relevant resolutions and decisions, including Human Rights Council
resolutions 20/2 of 5 July 2012, 24/17 of 27 September 2013 and 36/18 of 29 September
2017, and Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1998/77 of 22 April 1998 and 2004/35
of 19 April 2004, in which the Commission recognized the right of everyone to have
conscientious objection to military service as a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, as laid down in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
Human Rights Committee general comment No. 22 (1993) on the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion,
1. Takes notes of the report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on approaches and challenges with regard to application procedures for
obtaining the status of conscientious objector to military service in accordance with
human rights standards, presented to the Human Rights Council at its forty-first
session, pursuant to resolution 36/18,1 and of the analytical report on conscientious
objection to military service presented by the Office of the High Commissioner to the
Council at its fiftieth session, pursuant to resolution 20/2;2
2. Encourages States to consider implementing the recommendations of the above-
mentioned reports, where needed, in their efforts to bring or improve national laws,
policies and practices, including with regard to application procedures, alternative
service and non-discrimination of any kind, in line with States’ obligations under
international human rights law and applicable international human rights standards;
3. Notes with appreciation the progress and long-standing efforts made in several States
to take new or additional steps to recognize the right to conscientious objection to
military service in law, policy and practice, and expresses its concern at information
on human rights violations with regard to conscientious objection to military service,
including those involving arbitrary detention and other forms of punishment, including
repeated punishment;
4. Requests the Office of the High Commissioner to organize a half-day intersessional
workshop, in a hybrid format and fully accessible to persons with disabilities, on good
practices and recent developments in the implementation of the right to conscientious
objection to military service in law and in practice, to inform the preparation of a
report, in consultation with all States and relevant intergovernmental organizations,
United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the special procedures of the Human
Rights Council, the treaty bodies, national human rights institutions and non-
governmental organizations, with recommendations on legal and policy frameworks to
uphold human rights in the context of conscientious objection to military service in
accordance with States’ obligations under international human rights law and
applicable international human rights standards, and to present the report, in an
accessible and readable format, to the Council at its fifty-sixth session;
5. Invites States to consider including in their national reports, to be submitted to the
universal periodic review mechanism and to United Nations human rights treaty
bodies, as appropriate, information on domestic provisions related to the right to
conscientious objection to military service;
6. Decides to continue consideration of this matter under the same agenda item in
accordance with its annual programme of work.”
This is essentially a procedural resolution, but what is important is that like its predecessors
it was adopted without a vote, so that the entire Council endorsed its reaffirmation of the
standards already agreed. Moreover, it attracted over fifty co-sponsors, a new record. But
most importantly, it created a framework for carrying the issue forward. We look forward to
participating in the forthcoming workshop, and to seeing the resultant report.

Otherwise, in the course of the year, the relevant issues treated in the plenary sessions of
the Council were the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the aftermath and the ongoing situation
in Eritrea.
Ukraine
In the course of the year, much attention in the Council was given to the aftermath of the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. Sadly, the repercussions for conscientious objection to military
service in both countries were addressed only in NGO statements by the International
Fellowship of Reconciliation 45 and Conscience and Peace Tax International.
Resolution 49/1, adopted on 4th March after an emergency debate under Agenda item 1:
“Organisational and procedural matters” at the beginning of the 49th Council Session,
“Condemns in the strongest possible terms the human rights violations and abuses and
violations of international humanitarian law resulting from the aggression against Ukraine by
the Russian Federation; (Operational Paragraph [OP]1)
“calls for the strict observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the
protection of civilians and critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine (OP3)
“calls for the swift and verifiable withdrawal of Russian Federation troops and Russian-backed
armed groups from the entire territory of Ukraine, within its internationally recognized
borders and its territorial waters, in order to prevent further violations and abuses of human
rights and violations of international humanitarian law in the country, and stresses the urgent
need for the immediate cessation of military hostilities against Ukraine” (OP4)
“Urges immediate, safe and unhindered humanitarian access, including across conflict lines,
ensuring that humanitarian assistance reaches all those in need, particularly those in
vulnerable situations, that the independence and impartiality of humanitarian agencies are
respected, and ensuring the protection of humanitarian personnel and medical personnel
engaged exclusively in medical duties;(OP5)
“ Expresses grave concern at the documented harm to the enjoyment of many human rights,
including the rights to life, to education, and to the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health, caused by Russian shelling and bombing in populated areas;(OP6)
“Stresses the importance of maintaining free, open, interoperable, reliable and secure access
to the Internet, and condemns unequivocally any measures that prevent or disrupt an
45
IFOR’s statements at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva concerning the right to
conscientious objection and the war in Ukraine in 2022:
March 8th (on Belarus as well) https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/3/11/ifor-takes-the-floor-at-the-un-
human-rights-council-on-war-resisters-and-nuclear-threat
March 10th https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/3/11/ifor-addresses-the-un-human-rights-council-on-
the-right-to-refuse-to-kill
March 21st https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/3/29/ifor-raises-concern-at-the-un-over-forced-
conscription-in-eritrea
March 30th https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/4/2/war-should-be-abolished-ifor-speaks-up-at-the-un-
on-the-right-to-conscientious-objection-in-wartime
July 5th https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/7/5/ifor-addresses-the-un-human-rights-council-on-the-
right-to-conscientious-objection-and-the-war-in-ukraine
September 23rd https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/10/7/ifor-calls-on-the-un-to-stop-the-war-in-
ukraine-and-restates-that-according-to-international-standards-the-right-to-conscientious-objection-
cannot-be-restricted-nor-suspended
October 4th https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/10/7/ifor-speaks-at-the-un-on-conscientious-objection-
violations-and-peacebuilding-efforts-in-ukraine

individual’s ability to receive or impart information online or offline, including partial or

complete Internet shutdowns;(OP8)
“Also stresses that all those fleeing from the conflict in Ukraine should be protected without
discrimination, including on the basis of racial, national and ethnic identity.”(OP9)
It established an independent international commission of inquiry, which delivered an oral
report to the September Session of th Council and will report in writing.
The Russian Federation and Eritrea cast the only votes against the resolution.
On 12th May, the developing situation was discussed in a Special Session of the Council.
There were no new elements in the resulting resolution ; following the resignation of Russia
from the Council on 7th April (Czechia being subsequently elected to the vacant seat for the
group of Central and Eastern European States), China joined Eritrea in voting against the
Resolution.
In the June Session, Resolution 50/20 on Human Rights in Belarus included, in OP4
Expresses deep concern about the reported repression of persons exercising their right to
freedom of expression and opinion by speaking out against the aggression by the Russian
Federation against Ukraine and the support of Belarus for that aggression, and at the
repression of individuals’ freedom to seek, receive and impart information, including
regarding the State’s use of territory and infrastructure to enable the aggression by the
Russian Federation, and urges the Belarusian authorities to ensure a conducive environment
for the functioning of genuinely independent media, both online and offline, including
unhindered access to an open, interoperable, reliable and secure Internet”
In September, attention turned to the human rights situation inside Russia itself, particularly
in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine.
In Resolution 51/25 “Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation , adopted on 7th
October
“Noting with concern the findings of the recent report of the Moscow Mechanism of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the legal and administrative practices
of the Russian Federation, notably the use by the Russian authorities of propaganda,
repressive legislation and violence to create a climate of fear and intimidation for civil society
and activists, and the clear connection between domestic repression and war abroad, and
noting the recommendation made in the report that the Human Rights Council should appoint
a special rapporteur on the Russian Federation
“Regretting the repeated postponement by the Russian Federation of its review by the Human
Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and “Noting that the Russian Federation ceased to be a high contracting party to the
European Convention on Human Rights on 16 September 2022, and that 17,450 applications
directed against the Russian Federation are currently pending before the European Court of
Human Rights,” the Council:
“Calls upon the Russian authorities to uphold the fundamental freedoms of thought,
conscience, religion or belief, opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and association, in
particular by removing restrictions on diversity in ideas, criticism and dissent, as well as
associated rights to liberty and security of person, fair trial, and freedom from torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment for people exercising these
freedoms (OP2)
and “Decides to appoint a special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian
Federation for a period of one year, and requests the mandate holder to monitor the situation

of human rights in the Russian Federation, to collect, examine and assess relevant
information from all relevant stakeholders, including Russian civil society both inside and
recommendations, and to present a comprehensive report to the Human Rights Council at
its fifty-fourth session and to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session” (OP3)
The Rapporteur is to be appointed at the 52nd Session of the Council, in March 2023.
The abuses committed in the context of the Russian military mobilisation of Autumn 2022
including the denial of the right of conscientious objection, clearly come within this mandate
– it is noteworthy that the freedom of conscience is the first human right cited - and EBCO
alone or in collaboration with others will certainly be submitting material.
Unfortunately, amid the concentration on human rights abuses stemming from the Russian
invasion, the domestic human rights situation in Ukraine has been ignored. Worse, in view
of the crisis, it successfully applied to have its consideration under the Universal Periodic
Review. Provisionally until the end of the Fourth Cycle, which has just begun, ie. for up to
four years. Fortunately Russia had no excuse to apply for a postponement and will be
reviewed in Autumn 2023.
Eritrea
The resolution on Eritrea 50/2 was essentially procedural, renewing the mandate of the
Special Rapporteur. However the Special Rapporteur’s report (A/HRC/50/20) had expressed
concern at the involvement of the Eritrean armed forces in the civil war in Ethiopia, and with
regard to the situation inside the country, observed:
“The indefinite national/military service remains one of the main sources of human rights
violations in the country, and the information collected by the Special Rapporteur points to
a marked deterioration in the situation. The Special Rapporteur continued to receive reports
of grave human rights violations linked to the national/military service, including abusive
conditions, severe punishments and inhuman or degrading treatment, sexual harassment
and violence against female conscripts, and the use of conscripts in forced labour. The right
to conscientious objection is not recognized in Eritrea, and deserters and draft evaders are
subjected to severe punishment, including arbitrary detention, torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment, and extrajudicial killings.
“The Government of Eritrea has stated that the national service does not require reform,9 as
the National Service Proclamation stipulates that the programme has a duration of 18
months. However, in practice, since 1998 the authorities have created a permanent state of
general mobilization, extending the statutory period indefinitely. The Special Rapporteur
heard from relatives of Eritreans who had not been released from conscription for over 20
years.” (paragraphs 22 and 23)
The International Fellowship of Reconciliation, as other organizations, delivered a statement
in the plenary at the Human Rights Council to highlight the issue of forced conscription and
indefinite national service in Eritrea.
Of particular relevance in terms of the space available for civil society to engage in interactive
dialogues at the UN Human Rights Council on the topic of conscientious objection is the one
with the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief Mr. Ahmed Shaheed (who
concluded His mandate at the ned of 2022), which took place on March 10th at the 49th
session. On that occasion, IFOR, together with War Resisters’ International, delivered joint
statement in the plenary on the right to conscientious objection to military service.
The Human Rights Council provides indeed the opportunity to echo important appeals to
member states to comply with international standards on conscientious objection. For
example on March 23rd International Fellowship of Reconciliation made a call in the plenary

to Greece on the concerning situation of violations and discriminations of local conscientious

objectors.
Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
The third Cycle of the UPR having been completed in 2021, there was a gap until November
2022 when the first group of fourteen States were reviewed for the fourth time. They
included Finland and the United Kingdom.
In advance of the review of Finland, through the good offices of the International Fellowship
of Reconciliation, Jyry Virtanen of AKL spoke at the Presessional briefings in September 46,
with the excellent result that for no fewer than five States made recommendations to Finland.
Croatia recommended that it “Take measures to ensure that alternatives to military service
are not punitive or discriminatory in terms of their nature or duration” 47 to which Uruguay,48
Luxembourg49 and Panama50 added, respectively, that they should “remain under civilian
control”, “remain civilian in nature, outside military command”. Uruguay and Panama also
recommended ending the imprisonment of conscientious objectors – Panama’s wording was
“halt all prosecutions of people who refuse to perform military service on grounds of
conscience and release those who are serving prison sentences for that reason”. Finally,
Costa Rica recommended that it “take measures to raise awareness among the public on the
right to conscientious objection to military service, and extend the possibility to alternative
service”51
IFOR submitted a report52 in advance of the UPR session of Finland as well as AKL and CPTI.
The United Kingdom received a recommendations from Panama53 that it should “Withdraw
its interpretive declaration on Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.” This declaration states
“The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will take all feasible measures to
ensure that members of its armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not
take a direct part in hostilities.
The United Kingdom understands that article 1 of the Optional Protocol would not exclude
the deployment of members of its armed forces under the age of 18 to take a direct part in
hostilities where:
a) there is a genuine military need to deploy their unit or ship to an area in which
hostilities are taking place; and
b) by reason of the nature and urgency of the situation:
i) it is not practicable to withdraw such persons before deployment; or
ii) to do so would undermine the operational effectiveness of their ship or
unit, and thereby put at risk the successful completion of the military
mission and/or the safety of other personnel.”
46
AKL statement at the pre session is available at
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c00acde4b022a64cd0266b/t/64256dd122b6b1636113561
2/1680174546104/Statement+UPR+Finland+pre-
session+_Aseistakielt%C3%A4ytyj%C3%A4liitto+%28AKL%29.pdf
47
A/HRC/52/9, 5th January 2023, para 138.79
48
Ibid, para 138.78
49
Ibid, para 138.80
50
Ibid, para 138.81
51
Ibid, para 138.82
52
Additional info are available at https://www.ifor.org/news/2023/3/30/ifor-speaks-at-the-un-on-
the-right-to-conscientious-objection-to-military-service-in-finland?rq=Finland
53
A/HRC/52/10, 9th January 2023, Para 43.15

Montenegro made a similar recommendation54 which was not limited to Article 1 but also
covered the declaration with regard to Article 3, where (with details of process) the United
Kingdom confirmed that the minimum age for voluntary recruitment into the armed forces
remained sixteen.
In December 2022 the pre-session of the 42nd Universal Periodic Review took place in
Geneva, and the issue of conscientious objection has been raised concerning Switzerland and
Republic of Korea55. The formal session will take place in January 2023 with an expectation
for constructive recommendations to Switzerland and Korea to better comply with
international standards, with particular attention to the current punitive alternative service.
1.1.4 WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

The 11th Assembly of the World Council of Churches, which took place in Karlsruhe, Germany
in September 2022, built on the groundbreaking support for conscientious objection to
military service at the 10th Assembly in Busan, South Korea in 2013, adopting a declaration
drafted by the Public Issues Committee which inter alia: “Denounces every instance of the
violation of freedom of religion or belief, and affirms the freedom of religion or belief for all
people of faith and people of no faith everywhere, and the right of conscientious objection,
for a peaceful world. " 56
On September 6th, as part of the Ecumenical encounter programme on the occasion of the
WCC Assembly in Karlsruhe, a workshop on the right to conscientious objection took place
with contributions from IFOR in collaboration with the Protestant working group.
54
Ibid Para 43.17
55
IFOR submissions concerning Switzerland and Korea are available at
https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/7/15/ifor-submits-to-the-un-upr-reports-on-the-right-to-
conscientious-objection-to-military-service-in-the-republic-of-korea-and-switzerland
56
“The Things that make for Peace: Moving the World to Reconciliation and Unity” Document PIC
01.3 rev, available at https://www.oikoumene.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/ADOPTED-PIC01.3rev-
The-Things-That-Make-For-Peace-Moving-the-World-to-Reconciliation-and-Unity.pdf

1.2 DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES
1.2.1 ALBANIA
Suspended by law no. 9047 dated
10.07.2003 "On military service in the
No Republic of Albania", amended by law no.
Conscription: 9487 dated 06.03.2006, and by law no.
9999 dated 25.09.2008 (Article 42).
First recognised in the 1998 Constitution,

Articles 166 & 167. Provisions on
conscientious objection were included in law
no. 9047 dated 10.07.2003 "On military
service in the Republic of Albania", amended
by law no. 9487 dated 06.03.2006, and by
law no. 9999, dated 25.09.2008 (Article 42),
which determine that if a citizen, who for
reasons of conscience refuses to serve with
weapons in the armed forces, is obliged to
perform an alternative service, as provided
1998 by law. According to the Constitution and the
Conscientious objection: Law on Military Service, both religious and
non-religious grounds for conscientious
objection are legally recognized. The Law on
Military Service ensures that citizens "who
for religious or conscience reasons may not
serve armed in the military forces" may fulfil
substitute service. These provisions are
stated in articles, 18, 20, 21, 22, in the law.
The right to object due to conscience is
recognized for members of the Armed
Forces.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Conscription: - No conscription.
Minimum
- The minimum age of voluntary registration
Voluntary enlistment: 19 in the Armed Forces, in peacetime is 19
(years old) or compulsory Mobilization in
time of war, general / partial, is 18 (years

old). This is regulated by law no. 9047 dated

10.07.2003 "On military service in the
Republic of Albania", amended by law no.
9487 dated 06.03.2006, and by law no.
9999 dated 25.09.2008 (Article 9).
https://ebco-beoc.org/albania including the reply of the Ministry of Defence

More to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on
14/11/2022).
1.2.2 ANDORRA
Never existed. No regular military forces.
No Defense is the responsibility of France and
Conscription: Spain.
-
Conscientious objection:
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Minimum Conscription: - No conscription.
Voluntary enlistment: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/andorra
1.2.3 ARMENIA
Yes
Conscription:
First recognised by Law "On Alternative

2003
Conscientious objection: Service" on 17 December 2003.
Military: 24
Service
According to Article 5 of the Law "On
Alternative Service," the term of alternative
Civilian: 36
military service is 30 months, and the term
alternative labor service is 36 months.
Minimum Conscription: 18
Voluntary enlistment: 17 Under 18 for military schools: 17 for cadets

More https://ebco-beoc.org/armenia
Please check section 1.1.1.1 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
1.2.4 AUSTRIA
Yes
Conscription:
1955 First recognised by the National Service Act.

Service Military: 6
Civilian: 9
Voluntary enlistment: 17 Under 18: 17 on request
More https://ebco-beoc.org/austria
1.2.5 AZERBAIJAN
Yes
Conscription:
1995 First recognised in Constitution, Art. 76.

Service Military: 18
Civilian: - Not available.
More https://ebco-beoc.org/azerbaijan
Azerbaijan undertook on accession to the Council of Europe in 2001 that it would adopt a law
on alternative service in compliance with European standards by January 2003. It has still
not done so. To this day Azerbaijani conscientious objectors are imprisoned.

1.2.6 BELGIUM
The conscription has been suspended in
peacetime (not abolished) in Belgium for an
indefinite period by a law of 1993. But it was
not until February 9, 1995 that the Council
No
Conscription: of Ministers had decided to send back to
their homes from the following March 1 all
the militiamen still under arms. Conscription
is only possible in wartime.
First recognised by Law of 3 June 1964 on

the status of conscientious objectors.
Although military service has been
suspended, legislation relating to military
service and conscientious objectors still
exists. The procedure for being recognized
as a conscientious objector is described in
1964 the laws on the status of conscientious
Conscientious objection: objectors, coordinated on February 20,
1980. Legislation concerning conscientious
objectors falls within the competence of the
Federal Public Service Interior
(www.ibz.be/fr/contact;
www.ibz.rrn.fgov.be/fr/faq/population/object
eur-de-consciencemilice)
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Minimum Conscription: - No conscription
The minimum legal age to join the Defense

Voluntary enlistment: 18 as a soldier is 18, the age at which
compulsory schooling ends.
https://ebco-beoc.org/belgium including the reply of the Ministry of Defence

07/12/2022).
1.2.7 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
No Suspended / abolished in 2005.

Conscription:
First recognised in parallel Defence Acts in

1996
Conscientious objection: the Federation and in the Republika Srpska.
Service Military: -

Civilian: -
Voluntary enlistment: 18
More https://ebco-beoc.org/bosnia-herzegovina
1.2.8 BULGARIA
Abolished in 2008 by amendment of the

No
Conscription: Defence and Armed Forces Act.
First recognised in Constitution, Article 59

Paragraph 2.
Pursuant to Article 183 of the Republic of
Bulgaria Defence and Armed Forces Act
(RBDAFA), servicemen shall not refuse to
perform their duties for religious, atheist,
political or ideological reasons or disseminate
religious or atheist propaganda when
performing their service duties.
Pursuant to RBDAFA, enlistment for military
service occurs on the basis of a military
service contract entered into with the
1991
Conscientious objection: Minister of Defence or with an official duly
authorized thereby. The procedure, terms
and conditions regarding the conclusion and
termination of such military service contract
are laid down in the Rules on the
Implementation of the RBDAFA. It does not
contain provision for termination of the
military service contract on account of
“conscientious objection” but it provides for
an option for early termination of the
military service contract on mutual consent
of the parties or through a written
notification by the service member.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Voluntary enlistment: 18 Pursuant to Article 141 of the RBDAFA, those

subject to enlistment for military service
shall be persons who have reached the age

of majority, set at 18, and who are capable
and in good physical and psychological
condition. This is also the age of enrolment
for / commencement of wartime military
service in the event of declaration of state of
war, martial law or a state of emergency
pursuant to Article 116 of the RBDAFA.
https://ebco-beoc.org/bulgaria including the reply of the Ministry of Defence

31/01/2023).
1.2.9 CROATIA
Suspended in 2008 by a governmental

No
Conscription: decision, but remains in law.
1990 First recognised in Constitution, Art. 47.2.

Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/croatia
1.2.10 CYPRUS
Yes
Conscription:
First recognised by the National Guard Act,

1992
Conscientious objection: No. 2/1992, 9th Jan.
Civilian: 19
Voluntary enlistment: 17 Under 18: 17

More https://ebco-beoc.org/cyprus
Regarding the northern, Turkish-occupied, part of Cyprus (the self-styled “Turkish Republic
of North Cyprus”) please check section 1.1.1.1 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
about the three pending COs cases against Türkiye.
Although the right to conscientious objection is recognised by law in the Republic of Cyprus,
its existence, procedure, availability, etc is not widely known, or information is not given
openly. This is shown by the fact that during the past years only 3 persons served alternative
civillian service on ideological grounds (for objectors on religious grounds – Jehovah’s
Witnesses, the procedure is more straight forward, widely known and followed).
1.2.11 CZECHIA
Abolished in 2004 by amendment of the
No Military Act. Can be reintroduced in situation
Conscription: of threat or in wartime.
First recognised by the Civilian Service Act,

1992
Conscientious objection: No.18/1992 - in Czechoslovakia.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Conscription: - No conscription
Minimum
18 years old in all cases. Conscientious
Voluntary enlistment: 18 objection is not applied in the context of
professional armed forces.
More https://ebco-beoc.org/czechia
1.2.12 DENMARK
Highly selective conscription through a
lottery, though nobody is actually drafted,
since all used are volunteers.
Yes There are no plans to suspend/abolish

Conscription: conscription in the near future. There are
plans for female conscription. Defence
Minister Jakob Ellemann-Jensen made the
announcement in an interview with TV2. 57
First recognised by Alternative Service Act,

1917 13th Dec. The conscripts in Denmark have
the right to refuse military service and
57
www.rtbf.be/article/le-danemark-veut-introduire-le-service-militaire-pour-les-femmes-11143138

service in the Danish Emergency

Management Agency on the grounds of
conscientious objection (CO), according to
Article 1, Subsection 1, in the Act No. 226 of
13th of March 2006 of announcement of law
on conscientious objectors. CO-status is
granted to a person, who objects to military
service and service in the Danish Emergency
Management Agency based on reasons of
conscience. Objection is accepted when
based on religious or ethical reasons. An
application solely politically based will be
refused. Legislatives of the CO-service (law
and departmental order):
www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2008/995
The national law on conscientious objectors
applies only on the conscripts. So, no human
right to conscientious objection is recognized
for the professional military.
Professional military personnel are employed
on contract, which means they can be given
notice (dismissal) or they can give notice
(resignation) according to the terms stated
in their respective contracts. They have to
obey the normal demands of their contract,
which is 1-6 months’ notice to break out. No
reason need to be given. All contracted
service men in the military are since 2015 on
indefinite contracts until terminated or
pension age. Even after contracts are
finished or broken, they are still obligated as
military reserves until pension age - with no
way to say no.
The volunteers actually serve under the rules
for conscripts, and as such can apply to be
transferred to CO service. The volunteer
conscripts do not have a "contract", but an
"agreement":
https://karriere.forsvaret.dk/globalassets/pd
f/aftale_om_vpl_ans-3.pdf
The duration of the military service normally

Military: 4
varies from 4 months up to 12 months.
Service The duration of the civilian service /

conscientious objection service (CO-service)
has to be equal to the duration of the
Civilian: 4 military service, from which the conscript is
transferred. The duration of the service
normally varies from 4 months up to 12
months, so accordingly the COs have
differentiated duration of service, but to

most of them, the duration of the service is
4 months.
Minimum The legal minimum age for conscription in a

Conscription: 18
time of peace and war is 18.
https://ebco-beoc.org/denmark including the reply of the Danish Ministry of

Defence Personnel Agency to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report
More 2022 (e-mail on 26/01/2023), as well as the reply of the Danish Institute for
Human Rights (e-mail on 19/01/2023).
According to the reply of the Danish Ministry of Defence Personnel Agency to the
Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on 26/01/2023):
“In 2022 Danish Ministry of Defence Personnel Agency (MDPA) has received and approved
11 applications for CO-status.
The number of applications for CO-status in the last 5 years is described in the table down
below. There were no rejected applications.
Year Number of applications
2018 13
2019 17
2020 4
2021 17
2022 11
CO-status can only be granted if a conscript objects to both military service and service in
the Danish Emergency Management Agency on the grounds of conscientious objection (CO),
and on that ground the national laws do not recognize the selective conscientious objection.
Objection is accepted when based on religious or ethical reasons. An application solely
politically based would be refused.”
According to the reply of Aldrig Mere Krig about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mails on
01/02/2023 & 24/04/2023):
"Before 2004 the CO-Administration, Emergency Management Agency and administration of
the possible conscripts were purely civilian, and managed by Indenrigsministeriet (Home
Affairs). After 2004 all this has been transferred to the Ministry of Defense. Therefore, the
alternative social civilian service system is not purely civilian anymore, since it is solely
administrated by the military. Requests on referrals to alternative social civilian service shall
be sent to "Værnepligtssektionen" at "Forsvarsministeriets Personalestyrelse" (CO-
Administration at Danish Ministry of Defence Personnel Agency).58 The official webpage
http://www.militærnægter.dk now redirects to the military
https://karriere.forsvaret.dk/varnepligt/varnepligten/militaernaegter/
But the conscientious objection service itself is purely civilian.
58
https://karriere.forsvaret.dk/globalassets/pdf/militarnagter/hvordan-ansoger-jeg-2.pdf

Every male that turns 18 years has to attend the Defence Day, which is a rolling event
throughout the year. Volunteers serve under the rules for conscripts, and as such can apply
to be transferred to CO service. Actually most of the conscientious objectors now become
objectors during their military service (11 applied to be transferred to CO service in 2022).
Women can volunteer as conscripts, but can decide to leave the service anytime they want.
A part of the volunteers is just "technically voluntary" since they got a low lottery number,
and then were lured into voluntary conscription to be able to have a bit of influence on date
and geography for their duty. This happens though nobody is actually forced into service,
since all conscripts now are volunteers.
Since 2019 all conscripts are obligated for five more years to be loosely attached to a
mobilisation force. For those serving under contract, this obligation is not five years, but until
retirement age which is above 67 years."
1.2.13 ESTONIA
Selective conscription: approximately one
third of males serve the military service.
Yes
Conscription: There are no plans to suspend or abolish
conscription in the near future.
First recognised at a referendum in 1992

where the Constitution was approved. It is
1992
Conscientious objection: paragraph 124 that states the right to
conscientious objection.
The duration of the compulsory military

service is 8 or 11 months, depending on the
Service Military: 8
education and position provided by the
Defence Forces to the conscript.
The duration of alternative service is 12

Civilian: 12
months.
The minimum legal age for service is 18 in

Conscription: 18 all cases (during peace-time and in war
Minimum time).
When a professional member of the military

has developed a conscientious objection, he
or she can leave the service with a 60 days
note.
More https://ebco-beoc.org/estonia
Around 3,500 people are drafted per annum and serve between eight and 11 months of
national service, depending on which branch of the military they are drafted into – though
the air force (Õhuvägi) does not make use of conscripts. Current law already allows for 12
months long military service, but this has so far been limited to a maximum of 11 months
by government regulation. The Minister of Defence has proposed the government to extend

the maximum duration of compulsory service from the current 11 months to 12 months in
certain areas. 59
According to media reports, the Ministry of Defence is going to increase the number of
conscription call-ups to more than 4,000 by 2026. The number of call-up selectees is set by
the Minister of Defence and is not subject to a decision by the Estonian government or the
parliament. 60 Estonia's current defence budget totals 2.35 percent of its GDP. 61 The Ministry
of Defense supports raising it to 3 percent, as well as all the political parties expected to
clear the 5 percent threshold at the next parliamentary election. 62
1.2.14 FINLAND
Approximately two thirds of males serve the

Yes
Conscription: military service.
First recognised by Alternative Service Act,

1931
Conscientious objection: 4th June.
or ~8.5 or ~11.5 (The exact service

Service Military: ~5.5 durations in the military are 165, 255 or
347 days)
(The exact service duration in the non-

Civilian: ~11.5
military service is 347 days)
In case of partial compulsory mobilization

minimum age is 18 years. In case of
general compulsory mobilization also those
Minimum who are not yet served in military but turn
Conscription: 18
18 years that year can be called for service.
So minimum age for general compulsory
mobilization is 17 years. This includes war
time.
More https://ebco-beoc.org/finland
In 2022, there were 2418 applications to non-military service, which means a significant
increase from 1991 applications in 2021. In addition, 3808 reservists declared conscientious
59
Conscription terms to be extended to 12 months for some specialties. (07.02.2023). Eesti
Rahvusringhääling. Available at: https://news.err.ee/1608876413/conscription-terms-to-be-
extended-to-12-months-for-some-specialties
60
Estonia to raise number of conscription call-ups to more than 4,000 by 2026. (23.09.2022). Eesti
Rahvusringhääling. Available at: https://news.err.ee/1608726247/estonia-to-raise-number-of-
conscription-call-ups-to-more-than-4-000-by-2026
61
Estonian defence budget 2022. (07.07.2022). Estonia's Ministry of Defence. Available at:
https://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/en/objectives-activities/defence-budget
62
Vahur, L. (01.12.2022). Estonia's parties want to raise defense spending to 3-6 percent of GDP.
Eesti Rahvusringhääling. Available at: https://news.err.ee/1608807376/estonia-s-parties-want-to-
raise-defense-spending-to-3-6-percent-of-gdp

objection and were ordered to attend a five-day supplementary service under the command
of the Non-military Service Centre. The amount of applications to the supplementary service
reached its historical record high (e.g. in 2021 there were 435 applications and the previous
record from 2015 was only 985 applications). There were 34 prosecutions because of refusal
to perform non-military service in 2022 (total objectors). There was also one prosecution
due to refusing military service (another way to total objection).
The UN Human Rights Council
In 2022 Finland was under its fourth Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human
Rights Council. Finland received five recommendations regarding its provisions for
conscientious objection to military service, more than it has ever had before. Please check
section 1.1.3.3. Human Rights Council.
Voluntary military service for women
Finnish women aged 18 to 29 may apply to the voluntary military service if their state of
health is suitable for undertaking military training. Once the voluntary service has started,
there is a consideration period, during which women can denounce interrupting the service
without any consequences. Following this time period, they become liable for military service,
and if they declare conscientious objection, they become liable for non-military service. In
April 2022, the consideration period was shortened from 45 to 30 days.
1.2.15 FRANCE
Suspended under law 97-1019 of 1997.
However a new “Universal National Service”
No programme for 15 and 16 year-olds of both
Conscription: sexes was introduced in June 2019 (See
EBCO Report 2019).
First recognised by Act No. 1255/63, 21st

1963
Conscientious objection: December.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Voluntary enlistment: 16 Under 18: 17, 16 for Technical School
More https://ebco-beoc.org/france
1.2.16 GEORGIA
Yes Reintroduced in 2017.

Conscription:
1992 Military Service Act, Art. 12


Civilian: 18
More https://ebco-beoc.org/georgia
1.2.17 GERMANY
General conscription was suspended as of
July 1, 2011 by the 2011 Act Amending the
Law on Military Service (BT-Drs 17/4821). It
No
Conscription: remains in the Constitution and it can be
reintroduced at any time in the event of war
(Article 12a of the Basic Law / Constitution).
First recognised in principle in 1949 in the

“Grundgesetz” / Basic Law / Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Germany: "No one
may be forced to perform military service
1949
Conscientious objection: with weapons against his conscience." (Art.4
para.3 sentence 1 GG). The first provisions
in the German Democratic Republic dated
from 1964.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Under 18: 17. One can apply for recognition

Minimum as a conscientious objector at any time in
writing to the responsible career center of
the Bundeswehr. The application for
conscientious objection (KDV application) is
then forwarded to the Federal Office for
Family and Civil Society Tasks (BAFzA),
which decides on it.
https://ebco-beoc.org/germany including the reply of the German Institute

More for Human Rights (e-mail on 23/01/2023).

According to the reply of EBCO member Evangelische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für

Kriegsdienstverweigerung und Frieden (EAK) about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on
13/03/2023):
In 2022 the Federal Ministry of Economics approved the exportation of military equipment
amounting to 8,36 billion euros which after 2021 (9,35 billion euros) is the secondhighest
amount in German history.63 In the context of the war in Ukraine former political guidelines
regulating a restrictive practice of arms trade seem to be a thing of the past.
However the close collaboration uniting government and armaments industry does not find
its equivalent in the personal commitment of citizens to military institutions. Compared to
2021 when 201 requests to be recognised as a conscientious objector have been registered,
in 2022 a quintuplication of this figure had to be observed. Unlike than in previous years in
2022 the majority of applications for recognition as conscientious objectors did not come
from professional soldiers, but from non-conscripts without military experience and from
reservists. Apparently the war in Ukraine made them reflect on the possibility of personal
involvement in acts of war in case of reintroduction of conscription. According to the
information given by a spokesman of the Ministry of Defence in 2022 a total of 1.082
applications for conscientious objector status have been sent to the reponsible career centers
of the Bundeswehr. In detail 593 applications were filed by non-conscripts, 266 by reservists
and 223 by soldiers.64
It is striking that the Federal Office for Family and Civil Society Tasks (BAFzA) which is the
competent authority for the recognition of conscientious objectors indicates differing figures.
Its statistics list only 951 requests to be recognised as conscientious objectors. This
difference (of 131 applications) is due to procedural time delays arising in the transmission
of conscientious objectors‘ documents from the military submission instance to the civilian
decision authority.
Extreme retardation in the processing of applications remains a major problem for soldiers
who are obliged to hold out in their military unit after having filed their request on discharge
on grounds of conscience. The time they have to spend in a superincumbent context of
pressure and social exclusion may last 9 to 12 months especially when, as it occurs
frequently, the BAFzA recognition authority puts forward doubts or questions concerning the
applicant’s explanatory statement on his/her conscientious objection to military service.
Moreover this time frame is extended considerably if an objector refused by the BAFzA
instance must induce a judicial appeals procedure.
„Training and service at arms are reserved for soldiers of full age.“ The cited self-commitment
documented in the coalition agreement of the German government (December 2021) didn’t
lead to substantial consequences in 2022. The lack of necessary implementation provisions
continues as well as the enlistment of underaged soldiers. 65
After Putin announced a partial mobilization of Russian reservists on 21 September, several
prominent members of the German government (so the Federal Chancellor as well as the
ministers of justice and the interior) declared that Russian deserters merit the support of
Germany. Nancy Faeser, Minister oft he interior underlined: "As a rule, deserters threatened
with severe repression receive international protection in Germany."66 Nevertheless the
situation of Russian war resisters who suceed in fleeing to Germany remains equivocal in
practice. As any asylum application their request for refugee status is decided on a by-case
63
See https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/ruestung-deutsche-ruestungsexporte-
2022-leicht-ruecklaeufig/28902668.html
64
See https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/kriegsdienstverweigerer-105.html
65
Cf. EBCO Annual Report 2021 p. 35f.
66
See https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/russische-deserteure-101.html

basis. In this context the Ministry of the interior had declared in May 2022 that Russian
deserters generally comply with the requirements of refugee status (political persecution)
which however is not necessarily the case for draft dodgers.67 On the occasion of the
parliamentary session of 29 September the parliamentary group of Die Linke brought forward
the following motion: „The German Bundestag calls upon the Federal Government to take all
necessary measures at national and European level to ensure that for Russian deserters and
conscientious objectors who want to escape from the war in Ukraine by fleeing, safe entry
into the EU or Germany is possible and that they are granted safe protection and residence
status in an uncomplicated way.“68 The motion was rejected by a large majority of all other
parliamentary groups.
1.2.18 GREECE
There are no plans to suspend/abolish

Yes
Conscription: conscription in the near future.
First recognised in Law No. 2510/97, and

1998
Conscientious objection: entered into force in 1998.
Service 9 or Depending on the location of the units where

Military:
12 the conscripts fulfil their military obligations.
Civilian: 15
Conscription: 19
According to the reply of the National

Defense General Staff: “The personnel of the
Armed Forces (Officers, NCOs, Professional
Soldiers) may resign from the Armed Forces
for any reason (including reasons of belief)
at any time during their career. However,
according to law, Officers and NCOs
Minimum graduating from Military Academies and
Schools are required to serve in the Armed
Voluntary enlistment: 18 Forces for a mandatory period of twice the
years of their studies, for Officers, and five
years, for NCOs. Resigning before the end of
this period is possible, however these
Officers and NCOs must pay a compensation
to the State. Similar provisions also apply to
Military Academy and School students, as
well as for personnel who have received
leave for studies and/or have trained in
domestic or foreign schools at the Service’s
cost. No minimum mandatory service period
67
https://de.connection-ev.org/pdfs/2022-05-17_IM.pdf, cf. Statement of NGOs PRO ASYL and
Connection: https://de.connection-ev.org/article-3564
68
Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 20/3684,
https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/036/2003684.pdf

in the Armed Forces is required for

Professional Soldiers; they may resign at any
time without having to pay compensation.”
However, as it has been also highlighted by
the Greek National Commission for Human
Rights in its submission for a bill in 2019,
which resulted in law 4609/2019, “The right
of professional staff of the armed forces,
insofar their beliefs have changed, to apply
for recognition as conscientious objectors
should not be confused with any other
procedures of resignation which entail severe
financial consequences”. 69
https://ebco-beoc.org/greece including the replies of the National Defense

More General Staff to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-
mails on 15/02/2023, 01/03/2023, and 30/03/2023).
Serious deterioration concerning granting conscientious objector status

According to official data, revealed in 2022, in 2021 the percentage of recognition for
conscientious objectors who invoke non-religious grounds had fallen to 0%, while in 2018
the percentage had reached 93 %.70 The data were revealed after the National Transparency
Authority (NTA) ordered the Ministry of National Defence to provide such information to an
applicant for alternative civilian service.71
Following a similar petition by another applicant, the Ministry of National Defence recently
provided the statistics for 2022, which reveal that only 33% of applications on ideological
(non-religious) grounds were accepted.72
Furthermore, perhaps for the first time, detailed information was provided on administrative
appeals to remedy decisions of rejection. The official data show that in the last decade, until
2022, only 3 of the administrative appeals submitted by applicants claiming ideological (non-
religious) beliefs were granted (one in 2014, one in 2017 and one in 2022), while in 2021 all
3 such administrative appeals were rejected, confirming concerns that administrative appeals
are not an effective remedy for this issue.
In addition, according to Amnesty International, there has been worrying information that
the rejection of second applications for CO status and alternative service (following the
rejection of the first one) continues but with a new reasoning. This is despite the relevant
jurisprudence of the Council of State, Greece’s Supreme Administrative Court, that has ruled
in favour of individuals whose second applications have been rejected without being
examined on the merits.
69
GNCHR, Observations on articles 18, 21 and 22 of the Bill of the Ministry of National Defence
regarding the "Arrangements for Armed Forces Personnel" [in Greek], 19 March 2019, p. 11.
Available at:
https://www.nchr.gr/images/pdf/apofaseis/antirisies_suneidisis/EEDA_paratiriseis_SxN_Antirrisies%
20syneidisis_2019.pdf
70
https://enalaktiki.files.wordpress.com/2022/05/cea3cf84ceb1cf84ceb9cf83cf84ceb9cebaceac_ce91
cebdceb1ceb3cebdcf8ecf81ceb9cf83ceb7cf82_2012-2021.pdf
71
https://wri-irg.org/en/story/2022/greece-victory-transparency-reveals-zero-recognition-cos-
ideological-grounds-serious
72
https://enalaktiki.wordpress.com/2023/04/03/episima-statistika-2022/

Moreover, Amnesty International received a complaint by such an applicant, that after the
rejection of his second application without examination on the merits, he was called up to
enlist in the armed forces the following day. The next day he was given a call for enlistment
by the police, requiring him to enlist in the armed forces on the same day. Such practices
effectively reduce the margin to appeal such decisions and therefore the right to an effective
remedy, and/or put applicants in risk to be immediately declared insubordinate and face
serious criminal and administrative sanctions and risk of arrest.73
At least four appeals of rejected applicants for conscientious objector status were pending to
the Council of State at the end of the year. Among them, there are the cases of Charis
Vasileiou and Nikolas Stefanidis, which are illustrative, inter alia, of the discrimination faced
by a particular group of conscientious objectors: those who have been raised in a Jehovah’s
Witness family but are not Jehovah’s Witnesses themselves. 74 The Council of State hold a
hearing for these two cases on the 6th of June 2022 and the judgement is pending.
Another case pending at the Council of State is that of Thomas Katsaros. He applied in May
2022 for conscientious objector status, requesting to perform the (punitive) alternative
civilian service. His application was based on his ideological pacifist beliefs. His application
was rejected in August 2022 by the Minister of National Defence, after a recommendation by
a special committee with military participation, on the grounds that from the submitted
documentation it is not inferred that the claimed conscientious grounds stem from a specific
ideology, philosophical, religious or political, preventing him from fulfilling his military duties
in arms. Thomas Katsaros submitted an administrative appeal (“aitisi therapeias”) to the
Minister of National Defence in September 2022. However, due to the delay in receiving a
response for such appeal, and the risk to miss the deadline for judicial appeal, in November
2022 he also submitted a judicial appeal to the Council of State, the Supreme Administrative
Court. Throughout the years, there is a pattern of delay of response of the Minister of National
Defence to administrative appeals of rejected applicants, which entails for them a risk of
missing the deadline for judicial appeal. His administrative appeal was rejected by the same
Minister of National Defence in January 2023, after a recommendation by a special committee
with military participation. Both the special committee and the Minister summarily rejected
the appeal of dozens of pages (including new evidence, i.e., testimonies of people knowing
the applicant) with a single sentence. 75
In December, the Ministry of National Defence published for public consultation a bill which
included, inter alia, an amendment in order to increase the number of military members of
the committee examining applications for conscientious objector status, in contravention of
all international and regional human rights standards and recommendations of human rights
bodies. After reactions, inter alia, from Amnesty International76 and the Greek National
Commission for Human Rights,77 the relevant problematic provision was not included in the
bill when it was submitted and voted in the Parliament in early 2023.
Failure to implement a decision of the Human Rights Committee
73
https://www.amnesty.gr/news/press/article/26474/prosfata-stoiheia-deihnoyn-oti-oi-energeies-
toy-ellinikoy-kratoys [in Greek]
74
For more details about the cases of Vasileiou and Stefanidis see the joint public statement of
EBCO and other international organisations: https://ebco-beoc.org/node/525
75
For more details about the case of Katsaros see the joint public statement of EBCO and other
international organisations: https://www.ebco-beoc.org/node/556
76
https://www.amnesty.gr/news/press/article/26957/ellada-na-aposyrthei-arthro-62-poy-proteinei-
metarrythmiseis-toy-nomoy [in Greek]
77
https://www.nchr.gr/ta-nea-mas/1538-epistoli-ypetha.html [in Greek]

Greece has not implemented, so far, the 2021 UN Human Rights Committee decision in the
case of conscientious objector Lazaros Petromelidis,78 which found multiple violations of the
ICCPR. Greece failed to respond within the deadline of 180 days (expired in June 2022), in
July was given another 180 days, and until the end of 2022 has not sent an answer. However,
according to information from Mr. Petromelidis, Greece responded in January 2023. Its
response shows absolute disregard for the decision of the Human Rights Committee. Greece’s
response says nothing about reimbursement of all sums paid as financial penalties instead
of imprisonment, about adequate compensation or even about expunging Mr. Petromelidis’
criminal record, as the Committee has ordered. Furthermore, Greece considers that the
current relevant legislation is adequate – despite numerous recommendations by
international, regional and domestic human rights institutions. In short, Greece considers
that there is no need to take any individual or general measure.
Sentencing of a total objector
Sentencing of total objectors by military courts, for refusing to perform the military and the
(punitive) alternative civilian service, continued, in flagrant violation of international human
rights law and standards.
A total objector, P.C., was sentenced for insubordination by the Military Court of Ioannina
City to a suspended sentence of 6-month imprisonment. This was his second conviction for
insubordination, which constitutes a further violation, i.e., of the ne bis in idem principle.
Several other cases of prosecution of total objectors by military courts are pending.
Sentencing and arrests of civilians for insubordination
Furthermore, according to information from lawyers, military courts continued to sentence
other civilians for insubordination, including persons who have completed 45 years of age
and are no longer liable for military service. According to official police reports79 and relevant
media reports,80 police continued to arrest people for insubordination.
Other judicial cases
The Council of State, Greece’s Supreme Administrative Court, hold a hearing about the
appeal of the State against the decision of the Administrative Court of first instance to annul
the administrative fine for insubordination which had been imposed to a conscientious
objector, as he has later performed alternative civilian service. The judgement is pending.
Conscientious objection and personal data
In January 2022, the Hellenic Data Protection Authority (HDPA) issued an important decision
concerning the protection of personal data of conscientious objectors.81 The decision
concerns the data included in the certificate of military status issued by the military
authorities; a document usually requested to certify that someone has no military duties
anymore. The HDPA ruled in favour of a conscientious objector who had appealed to this
independent authority against the decision of the military authorities to issue a certificate
which reveals that he has been recognized as a conscientious objector and has performed
alternative civilian service instead of military service. The HDPA found that the certificate of
military status issued was illegal for containing unnecessary information and requested from
78
https://ebco-beoc.org/node/518
79
E.g. https://www.astynomia.gr/2022/08/26/26-08-2022-ektetameni-astynomiki-epicheirisi-gia-
tin-antimetopisi-tis-egklimatikotitas-stin-perifereia-peloponnisou/ [in Greek]
https://www.astynomia.gr/2022/10/05/05-10-2022-ektetameni-astynomiki-epicheirisi-gia-tin-
antimetopisi-tis-egklimatikotitas-stin-perifereia-peloponnisou/ [in Greek]
80
https://andriakipress.gr/2022/09/12/syllipsi-gia-anypotaxia-stin-andro/ [in Greek]
81
https://www.dpa.gr/sites/default/files/2022-01/3_2022%20anonym.pdf [in Greek]

the Minister of National Defence to issue a new one in accordance with the principle of “data
minimisation”. This principle means that a data controller should limit the collection of
personal information to what is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish a specified
purpose. The HDPA found that such certificate should not reveal that someone has performed
alternative civilian service (meaning he is a conscientious objector), but only that he does
not have military duties anymore. The same authority issued a similar decision for those who
have been exempted from military service for medical reasons. Such information should not
be revealed either. The only information necessary is that they do not have military duties.82
The Ministry of National Defence submitted an administrative appeal (“aitisi therapeias”)
against the decision of the HDPA, but the latter rejected it.
1.2.19 HUNGARY
Abolished in 2005 in peacetime by
No amendment of the Constitution. Can be
Conscription: reinstituted in times of emergency.

Service Military: -
Civilian: -
https://ebco-beoc.org/hungary including the reply of the Office of the

More Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary to the Questionnaire
about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on 10/02/2023).
According to the reply of the IFOR Hungarian affiliate BOCS Global Think Tank Foundation
about EBCO’s Annual Report 2021 (e-mail on 24/01/2022):
The nullification law after the 1990 regime change left out conscientious objectors, so they
are still not rehabilitated. For example, time spent in prison does not count as pensionable
service for them. Now that hundreds of Hungarian conscientious objectors are all pensioners
or approaching retirement age, it is time to stand up against the ongoing discrimination
formerly imprisoned conscientious objectors are exposed to by cutting their retirement
benefits. BOCS Global Think Tank Foundation is working for rehabilitation through both
political lobbying and legal action, see https://bocs.eu/co-rehabilitacio.
In this context it might be good to take note of a legal development to be observed in
Slovakia: Jehovah's Witness (and CO) Imrich Vajda had been sentenced under the
Communist Regime in 1959 and 1961. After the ECtHR Bayatyan Judgement the
Constitutional Court of Slovakia acknowledged on 13 March 2014 that amnesty or restitution
is a necessary legal measure for those convicted as criminals for conscientious objection to
military service. Until 2018, 51 of Jehovah’s Witnesses—most of whom were sentenced from
1948 to 1989—have been completely exonerated by Slovakian courts. Since May 2017, the
82
https://www.dpa.gr/sites/default/files/2022-01/2_2022%20anonym.pdf [in Greek]

Supreme Court of the Czechia, too, annulled the verdicts for 45 Jehovah's Witnesses who
refused to perform military service during the Communist regime and were convicted and
sentenced. 83 84
1.2.20 ICELAND
Never existed. No regular military forces. It
does maintain a small paramilitary
coastguard. Iceland is the only NATO
No member that has no standing military force;
Conscription: defence of Iceland remains a NATO
commitment and NATO maintains an air
policing presence in Icelandic airspace.
-
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/iceland
1.2.21 IRELAND
Never existed. According to article 54 of the
No 1954 Defence Act, during emergencies it is
Conscription: possible to conscript men.
-
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
83
Available at: https://www.jw.org/en/news/jw/region/global/martin-boor-exonerated-by-slovakia/
84
Available at: https://www.jw.org/en/news/jw/region/global/courts-czech-republic-slovakia-
exonerate-jehovahs-witnesses/

More https://ebco-beoc.org/ireland
1.2.22 ITALY
No Suspended in 2005 by law 226 of 2004.

Conscription:
1972 First recognised by Act No. 772/1972.

Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/italy
1.2.23 LATVIA
Abolished in 2006 by a decision of the
Latvian parliament. Since 2007 Latvia had
only professional voluntary military service.
However, the Latvian parliament (Saeima)
adopted the State Defence Service Law in
the third reading on 5 April 2023. After the
final reading, the new law will regulate the
roll out of state defence service across
Latvia.
No
Conscription: The proposed law also re-establishes
alternative service, considering the rights of
conscientious objectors.
Also, Latvia introduced a new kind of project,
called “Total Defence” in 2017, and a
National Defence Course was introduced into
the secondary school system with effect
from January 2021 (see EBCO Report 2020).
First recognised by the Law on Substitute

Service of the Latvian Soviet Socialist
Republic. It was passed in 1990, couple of
1990 months before the restoration of the
independence of the Republic of Latvia and it
introduced the Alternative Service as a
possibility to opt-out the Soviet mandatory
military service. The law stated that the

purpose of the Alternative Service is to
ensure the freedom of conscience and beliefs
of a person. Since then till 2007 (when
conscription was abolished) the Alternative
Service option was available for those who
were objecting military service.
Considering that Latvia currently has only
professional military service, a serving
member of the military can freely and at any
time terminate the service contract on the
basis of mutual agreement with the Latvian
National Armed Forces.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
The minimum age of recruitment in Latvian

Minimum National Armed Forces is 18. The same
minimum legal age applies to mobilization
during war time. However, the National
Defence Course has been developed for
students in secondary schools who are 16-18
years old, and it will be mandatory starting
from 2024-25 school year.
https://ebco-beoc.org/latvia including the reply of the Ministry of Defence to

More the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on
02/12/2022).
One of the priorities of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2022 is related to the development
of national defense training in Latvia. This lesson is already being taught in 97 schools,
including almost 4,200 students in 10th grade and almost 1,200 in 11th grade. 85
On January 13 2022, in the final reading, the Saeima adopted amendments to the Law on
National Defense Training and the Youth Guard, which entitle those serving in the institutions
of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) to become teachers of national defense training. 86
In 2024, when the national defense education is expected to be compulsory for all secondary
school students, it will cover approximately 32 to 34 thousand young people; a class of
around 8,000 young guards. This means that more than 40,000 young people need to be
trained. To do this, at least 270 instructors are needed. More than half are currently
85
https://www-lsm-lv.translate.goog/raksts/zinas/latvija/aizsardzibas-ministrija-plano-sogad-
dubultot-valsts-aizsardzibas-macibu-grupu-
skaitu.a439618/?utm_source=lsm&utm_medium=theme&utm_campaign=theme&_x_tr_sl=auto&_x
_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en
86
https://www-sargs-lv.translate.goog/lv/nozares-politika/2022-01-13/valsts-aizsardzibas-macibu-
lauj-pasniegt-ari-iekslietu-darbiniekiem?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

completed. 87
According to the reply of the Ministry of Defence to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual
Report 2022 (e-mail on 02/12/2022):
The National Defence Course is an integral part of the secondary education curriculum. The
main document specifying its content is the State education standard. The State education
standard is developed by the Ministry of Education and Science and approved by the Cabinet
of Ministers. Currently, in the State education standard the National Defence Course is
categorized as a special course, meaning that it is voluntary course, but starting from 2024-
25 school year this course will be mandatory for all secondary school students.
At the moment each secondary school voluntarily decides on introducing the National
Defence Course in their curricula. Up till now, the National Defence Course is taught in more
than 97 secondary schools. National Defence Course’s teachers are employed by the Cadet
Force Centre, a civil institution under the Ministry of Defence.
The content of the National Defence Course was developed by the Cadet Force Centre in
close collaboration with the National Centre for Education, an institution under the Ministry
of Education and Science. The content is publicly available both on the webpage of the
National Centre for Education and on the webpage of Cadet Force Centre. Additionally, the
Cadet Force Centre provides the teachers with detailed plan, instructions and guidelines for
every single lesson.
The National Defence Course consists of several modules where students are taught a range
of theoretical and practical skills. Those modules are:
 Security and defence of a nation-state, role of civil society and civic engagement;
 Resilience in crises, leadership and command;
 Skills and competencies for defence.
Additionally, students can engage in extracurricular activities (summer camps). Participation
in those camps is voluntary.
The course has been developed for students in 10'1’ and 11 1 grade (or 2nd and 3" study
year in vocational education). Usually, students in those grades are 16-18 years old. As it
was mentioned above, the National Defence Course will be mandatory for students in
secondary schools only starting from 2024-25 school year.
It is important to note that secondary education is not compulsory in Latvia, although the
proportion of the population who complete it is high.
The National Defence Course is 140 academic hours long. The course is implemented in 2
academic years.
Cadet Force Centre is a civil institution subordinated to the Minister of Defence. In addition
to higher pedagogical education and qualification to teach defence skills to qualify for
teaching the National Defence Course, the teacher has to fulfil several extra requirements
(e.g. complete the Course on the Rights of the Child etc.).
Module "Skills and competences for defence" includes the topic "Safe handling of weapons,
shooting with a pneumatic weapon". The time allocated for this topic altogether is 31
academic hours. During those lessons students learn about weapons, development of
weapons through history, operating principles of weapons, moral responsibility using
weapons and safety rules. To acquire practical skills students try out shooting with a
87
https://www-sargs-lv.translate.goog/lv/jaunsardze/2022-01-20/jaunsardzes-centra-vaditajs-
uzskats-ka-valsts-aizsardzibas-maciba-militarize?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

pneumatic weapon (a weapon that fires using air pressure).

The law on the National Defence Course and Cadet Force states that for students who, due
to their religious or philosophical beliefs or due to other objective circumstances, are unable
to participate in particular activities that are a part of the National Defence Course, the
teacher provides alternative study topics and individually adjusts the study process. There
are no consequences for this choice.
The objectives and content of the National Defence Course is in line with values and ideals
embedded in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 29 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child especially emphasizes that a child’s education should help their
personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential. It should also
build their respect for other people and the world around them and they should respect the
values of their own country. Education should prepare children for responsible life in a free
society.
The purpose of the new law is to guarantee an opportunity for a child or a young person to
acquire knowledge, skills and abilities suitable for their age and interests.
The activities included in the National Defence Course don’t lead to any obligations regarding
National Armed Forces. The minimum age of recruitment in Latvian National Armed Forces
is 18 and Latvia has fully voluntary military service (no conscription).”
1.2.24 LIECHTENSTEIN
No National Police maintain close relations with
Conscription: neighboring forces.
-
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/liechtenstein
1.2.25 LITHUANIA
Reintroduced in 2015 (following Russia's
annexation of Crimea and the start of the
war in Ukraine's Donbass; previously
Yes suspended in 2009).
Conscription:
Highly selective conscription: approximately
3,800 conscripts are called annually from the
pool of all the potential draftees (~30,000).

First recognised by the Law on Substitute

1990 Service of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist
Conscientious objection: Republic.
Military: 9
Service * Important note: The European Court of

Human Rights found that the "alternative
national defence service is intrinsically linked
Civilian: 10 to military service, and therefore cannot be
seen as separate civilian service" (judgment
on 7 June 2022 in the case of Teliatnikov v.
Lithuania).
More https://ebco-beoc.org/lithuania

The Ministry of Defence draws lists of people to be called for military conscription. In 2023,
the pool includes around 54,000 men aged 18-23 who are eligible for military service. The
number of people to be conscripted to serve in various units of the Lithuanian military in
2023 will be 3,828. The lists are drawn up randomly, using a piece of computer software. 88
The Defence Ministry has proposed to shorten the compulsory service to six months from the
current nine months and increase the number of conscripts to 5,000. The reform would
increase the number of conscripts from 3,800 to 5,000 in 2027, and the number of active
reserve soldiers from 27 000 to 40 000 soldiers in the long run. The reform would also
introduce a three-month conscription for young people who have completed their studies or,
as an alternative, a three-year service on weekends in the National Defence Volunteer Force.
89
1.2.26 LUXEMBOURG
No Abolished in 1967 by law.

Conscription:
1963 First recognised by Act of 23rd July, Art. 8.

88
Lithuania’s 2023 military conscription lists to be drawn up Thursday. (05.01.2023). Lithuanian Radio
and Television (LRT). Available at: https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1859973/lithuania-s-
2023-military-conscription-lists-to-be-drawn-up-thursday
89
Lithuania mulls shortening military service, drafting more conscripts. (05.01.2023). Lithuanian
Radio and Television (LRT). Available at: https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-
english/19/1860132/lithuania-mulls-shortening-military-service-drafting-more-conscripts

Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/luxembourg
1.2.27 MALTA
Never existed. Since Malta’s Independence in
No 1964, Maltese legislation, the Armed Forces
Conscription: of Malta Act never included conscription.
-
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
https://ebco-beoc.org/malta including the reply of the Ministry of Defence to

More the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on
23/01/2023).
According to the reply of the Ministry for Home Affairs, National Security and Law
Enforcement to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on
23/01/2023):
“As the right to conscientious objection is not a right per se but derived from an interpretation
of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, it features accordingly in the
Constitution of Malta under Article 40. Article 35 addresses conscientious objection in terms
of military personnel with regards to forced labour by stating that this exception does not
include any labour required of a member of disciplined forced in pursuance of his duties as
such or, in the case of a person who has conscientious objections to service as a member of
a naval, military or air force, any labour that that person is required by law to perform in
place of such service. It therefore would suggest that conscientious objection in this regard
is acknowledged even though Maltese legislation does not explicitly provide for it. The
lawfulness of the labour is key.
To note, Chapter 220 of the Laws of Malta titled ‘Malta Armed Forces Act’ provides for in
Article 47 ‘Disobedience to particular orders’ that wilful defiance of authority, disobedience

to a lawful command given or sent to the solider personally shall on conviction by a court
martial be liable to imprisonment. Once again this refers to the lawfulness of the labour, but
it does not explicitly refer to an order which goes against article 40 of the Constitution. One
will take it that if this situation arises, Malta would follow the international principles and
standards on the matter.”
1.2.28 MOLDOVA
The Government Decision number 601/2018
regarding the Program "Professional Army
2018-2021", which essentially stipulated for
Yes the professionalization of the National Army
Conscription: was approved, but due to the transition
period, at the moment, it is under
uncertainty.
First recognised by the Law on Religions

1992
Conscientious objection: number. 979/1992.
Service For conscripts with high education it is 6

Military: 12
months.
Civilian: 12 For citizens with high education is 6 months.
Under 18 for military schools: 17 for Military

School.
https://ebco-beoc.org/moldova including the reply of the Ombudsman to the

More Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on 08/02/2023).
According to the reply of the Ombudsman to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report
2022 (e-mail on 08/02/2023):
“The Ombudsman highlights two problems from the year 2022 arising within the People's
Advocate Office.
The first issue concerns the forced incorporation into the armed forces of people from the
Transnistrian region (unrecognized separatist territory, part of the Republic of Moldova)
whose conscience prevents them from taking part in military activities.
In fact, following the amendments of December 30, 2019, in the "Law of the Transnistrian
unrecognized region regarding alternative civil service," priority is given to incorporation into
alternative civil service within the armed forces units. Thus, persons who refuse armed
service for religious reasons are incorporated into the civil service within the military units in
the Transnistrian region. This fact goes against the religious beliefs of some denominations.
Thus, people who care for religious reasons have passed the training in civil protection
training and the voluntary sanitary training of the Red Cross on the right side of the Dniester
and are exempt according to art. 32 paragraph (1) point b) of the Law no. 1245 /20022 from
the military service within the term, upon returning with permanent living in the Transnistrian
region, they are forcibly conscripted into the "Transnistrian armed forces."

Therefore, if the person for religious confessional reasons requests to perform alternative
civilian service in civil institutions/organizations or refuses to perform alternative service as
civilian personnel in military formations for confessional reasons, he risks being convicted
according to the Transnistrian "criminal code."
Another case registered within the People's Advocate Office that requires increased attention
is the Baranov case. The Ombudsman registered the request submitted by Mr. Vitalii Baranov
(the father) in the interests of his son Maxim Baranov regarding the violation of the right to
perform civil service instead of military service within the term, manifested by his
incorporation under the conditions that he was a member of a militant religious community
for peace. The Law allowed him to perform (alternative) civil service.
In this case, the People's Advocate sent a request based on art.23. para. 1 of Law 52/2014
to the Ministry of Defense for organizing the control of all the circumstances in order to be
elucidated. Following the intervention of the People's Advocate, the responsible authorities
suspended the decision of the recruitment-incorporation commission of the municipality of
Chisinau regarding the incorporation of the recruit into military service. They released him
from military service within the deadline.
We want to mention that in 2022, 325 citizens were incorporated into the civil service for
pacifist reasons and 111 for religious reasons.”
1.2.29 MONACO

No
Conscription: Defense is the responsibility of France.
-
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/monaco
1.2.30 MONTENEGRO
Suspended in 2006 by decision of the

No
Conscription: President of Montenegro (30/08/2006).
First recognised in Constitution, Article 58 (in

Serbia & Montenegro times).Also recognised
1992
Conscientious objection: in the Constitution of Montenegro, Article 48,
which entered into force in October 2007.

Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Theoretically, conscientious objection would

Minimum violate the provisions of Article 22 of the Law
on the Armed Forces of Montenegro (full and
timely execution of military and other duties
Voluntary enlistment: 18 in the Army) and commit a disciplinary
offence under Article 157 paragraph 1 of the
Law (failure to execute orders or untimely
and negligent performance of service or duty
in the service).
More https://ebco-beoc.org/montenegro
1.2.31 NETHERLANDS
Suspended in 1997, but the law on
conscription still exists. At the age of 17, all
No citizens receive a letter stating they have
Conscription: been registered for service. They can be
called up in case of war.
First recognised by Constitutional

1922
Conscientious objection: amendment.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Voluntary enlistment: 17 Under 18: 17
More https://ebco-beoc.org/netherlands
According to the reply of IFOR about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on 08/02/2023):
“In the Netherlands we see a considerable rise of the military budget. The idea of re-
introducing the practice of conscription, now including girls, is heard in the public debate,
especially from the side of the so-called “Christian” parties.
Military education can start at the age of 15. Certain schools present courses for the physical
and technical skills the army needs. This education includes practical learning periods within
the army. Enlisting in the army can after that take place at the age of 17.”

1.2.32 NORTH MACEDONIA

Conscription:
2001 First recognised in Defence Act, Art. 8.

Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/north-macedonia
1.2.33 NORWAY
Highly selective conscription (from the pool
of around 60 000 less than 10 000 are
chosen annually). Norway introduced
Yes compulsory military service for women in
Conscription: 2015, as the first NATO member state.
There are no plans to suspend/abolish
conscription in the near future.
In 1922, Norway got an amendment to the

Military Penal Code on exemption from
1922 military service, and with this recognised
Conscientious objection: the right to conscientious objection to
military service.
Conscripts are required to serve up to 19

months of military service, cf. the Norwegian
Act relating to conscription and service in
Military: 12 the Armed Forces, etc. (Lov om verneplikt
og tjeneste i Forsvaret m.m.
(forsvarsloven)), section 18. However, basic
Service military service are usually 12 months.
Conscientious objectors get an exemption
from service in the military. Moreover,
there is no alternative civilian service for
conscientious objectors (it was abolished in
Civilian: -
2012). The process of application for
conscientious objector status is described in
Chapter 4, sections 36-42 of forsvarsloven.
Applicants, who have had their applications

approved, are granted exemption from

serving in the Norwegian Armed Forces.
Those who are approved may be ordered to
serve in the Civil Defence (Sivilforsvaret)
until the year they turn 55. They get a 3-
week start up course, and then serve 2
days a year as training. If there is a crisis,
they will be called in for service.
Norwegian citizens who are eligible for

service in the military have conscription
Conscription: 19
from the year they turn 19, cf.
forsvarsloven section 6.
There is also an extended conscription

through voluntary service and training in
the military, cf. forsvarsloven section 12.
The provision covers those who voluntarily
apply to serve or train in the military. The
minimum age for voluntary enlistment is 18
years old. Those who receive training are,
for example, vocational apprentices.
From the age of 16 people may be
admitted to the Home Guard, cf.
forsvarsloven section 24. This currently
applies to young people who are admitted
Minimum to the Home Guard Youth. They may not
enter into a contract that entails a duty to
serve in the Home Guard until they have
turned 19 years of age. In accordance with
Voluntary enlistment: 18 section 4 of forsvarsloven those under the
age of 18 who serve in the military (the
Home Guard Youth) shall not be given
training in or participate in combat-related
activities.
When Norway is at war, in the case of
imminent threat of war, or the order for
general mobilization is given, those under
the age of 18 are immediately released
from service.
If professional military personnel become
conscientious objectors during their
service, and thus wish to end their service
contract, they are free to terminate their
contract based on the regular rules of
contract law and labour law.
https://ebco-beoc.org/norway including the reply of the Parliamentary

More Ombud to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on
06/02/2023).

1.2.34 POLAND
Suspended in 2009 by amendment of the

No
Conscription: Constitution.

Service Military: -
Civilian: -
In accordance to the Article 58 point 1 of the

Minimum law about the common military service the
volunteers can report when completing 18
year of age. During mobilization and war the
Voluntary enlistment: 18 minimum age of conscripts is just like
peacetime – 18 years. The law does not
consider the human rights regarding
conscientious objection for the professional
member of the military.
https://ebco-beoc.org/poland including the reply of the Commissioner for

More Human Rights to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-
mail on 10/02/2023).
According to the reply of the Commissioner for Human Rights to the Questionnaire about
EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on 10/02/2023):
According to the case law of the Polish administrative courts, the services for defense
purposes (świadczenia na rzecz obrony) cannot be equated with military service and are not
covered by constitutional and international norms on conscientious objection90. Therefore,
no exemption can be granted from them on grounds of conscience. This position has been
lately confirmed in two rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court of Poland91. Although it
can be argued that the relationship between some national defense services and the military
sphere may be sufficiently strong to attract the guarantees arising from Article 9 of the
European Convention on Human Rights92, this line of argumentation has not been reflected
in the Polish case law yet. Taking into consideration the legal practice to date, this may
continue to pose certain problems particularly for Jehovah’s Witnesses.”
90
See more: W. Brzozowski, “Sprzeciw sumienia wobec świadczeń na rzecz obrony” [Conscientious
objection to national defence services], Przegląd Sądowy, 3/2022, pp. 35-52 (hereinafter referred to
as “W. Brzozowski 2022”).
91
II OSK 1259/18 (issued 12.03.2020) and II OSK 1434/18 (issued 1.12.2020).
92
W. Brzozowski 2022, 46 ff.

1.2.35 PORTUGAL
The conscription ended in December 2004. It
was abolished by the Law 174/99, from
September 21, which established that in
peace time military service is voluntary.
This Law provided, in article 59, that
No compulsory military service was gradually
Conscription:
eliminated within a maximum period of 4
years from its entry into force, which took
place in November 2000 with the approval
and entry into force of the regulation of
military service law.
The right to conscientious objection to

military service was recognised for the first
time in 1976, by the Portuguese Constitution
(Article 41) which established
that ”Conscientious objectors will render
unarmed military service or civil service
appropriate to their situation.”
Article 276 of the Portuguese Constitution
1976
Conscientious objection: establishes that conscientious objectors to
military service will perform civic service of
duration and hardship equivalent to that of
armed military service.
The right to conscientious objection to
military service is recognized in peace time,
in compulsory mobilization (general or
partial) and in war time.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
According to Law No. 174/99 (Military

Service Law), the minimum age for military
service in peacetime is 18. According to the
Minimum same Law, the period in which Portuguese
citizens are subject to military obligations
runs from the first day of the year in which
Voluntary enlistment: 18 they turn 18 years old to the last day of the
year in which they turn 25 years old.
Nevertheless, in time of war, the maximum
age limit set for the military duties can be
changed by law. The Constitution still
maintains the right to conscientious
objection, which allows voluntary military

personnel to exercise this right. Article 40 of

Law No. 174/99 (Military Service Law)
establishes that for citizens subject by law to
military service, it is grounds for exemption
from military duties to be recognised as
conscientious objectors.
https://ebco-beoc.org/portugal including the reply of the Ministry of Defence

06/12/2022).
According to the reply of the Ministry of Defence to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual
Report 2022 (e-mail on 06/12/2022):
“As the provision of military service is voluntary, there will be only exceptional situations in
which a military becomes a conscientious objector. Portuguese law does not establish any
limitation, and in this case the recognition of conscientious objection implies that the military
leaves the Armed Forces.
The Military Service Law establishes that all young people in the year they turn 18 have the
duty to attend the National Defense Day. The aim of this obligation is to make young people
aware of the issue of national defense and publicize the role of the Armed Forces in the
military defense of the Republic. Young people can request the application of the status of
conscientious objection in order to be exempted from the participation in the National
Defense Day.”
1.2.36 ROMANIA
Suspended in January 1st 2007 during
peacetime but not during state of siege,
mobilization or war according to Art. 2 of Act
No
Conscription: 395/2005 on delay of compulsory military
service in peace time and passing to
voluntary based military service.
First recognised in Art. 4 of Act No. 46/1996

1996 on governing preparation of the population
Conscientious objection: for defence.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
During peacetime, state of mobilization and

Minimum
war, the minimum age for a voluntary basis
recruitment is 18, for both men and women.
Voluntary enlistment: 18 During state of siege, mobilization and war,
the minimum legal age for men’s
conscription is 20.
The active duty military personnel may not

refuse to accomplish its legal obligations by

invoking the conscientious objection.
According to Act. 80/1995 on the military
personnel statute, exercising some rights
and liberties is restricted or limited to active
duty military personnel (for example, Art. 29
- point d - of this act says ”Joining religious
cults is free, except to those which,
according to la law, […] affect the pursuit of
the profession”.
More https://ebco-beoc.org/romania
1.2.37 RUSSIAN FEDERATION (former member state)
Yes
Conscription:
1993 First recognised in Constitution, Art. 59.3.

Military: 12
Service
Or 18 months for alternative service in
organizations affiliated to armed forces, such
Civilian: 21
as military factories and construction
departments.

School
More https://ebco-beoc.org/russia

A Russian citizen has the right to apply for an alternative civilian service (ACS).

According to the local Movement of Conscientious Objectors (MCO)93 statistics, in 50% of

cases people are denied ACS.94 Persons serving in the military, whether as conscripts or
professional soldiers, cannot apply for conscientious objection.
Additionally, the current persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses affects their right to
conscientious objection to military service.
The assessment of applications for conscientious objector status continues to be not entirely
under the control of civilian authorities with a lack of independence and impartiality in the
procedure.95 In addition, ACS remains punitive and discriminatory.
The so-called “hidden mobilization”, a practice which bypasses the procedure provided for by
law, continues.96
At the end of May 2022, the age limit for possible conscription of contract soldiers has been
raised to 65.97
93
The Movement of conscientious objectors (MCO) is a non-profit anti-war organization founded in
2014 to support the right for conscious objection to military service and to avoid the “hidden
mobilization” that is currently taking place.
Since the beginning of war in Ukraine MCO:
— statement on February 24, 2022 which called for an immediate end to the war unleashed by
Russia,
— collect all the cases of soldiers who refused to fight in Ukraine,
— petition against compulsory military service which got more than 25000 supporters.
94
The two most common grounds are: missing the deadline for filing an application and the fact that
the Draft commission has evidence that the recruit has no convictions against military service.
According to the law, in case of denial the Draft commission must issue a reasoned refusal. However,
such cases are isolated.
95
By the law, the decision to replace compulsory military service by an alternative civilian service or
a decision to deny such a replacement is made by the Draft commission.
The chairman of the Draft commission is the head or deputy head of the municipality but the military
commissar is also the deputy chairman of such commission.
In practice, the organizational work of the Draft commission is carried out by the Military commissariat.
Draftees file applications to the Military commissariat which conducts personal files of draftees and
carries out a calling to the draftee who submitted the application. The chairman of the Draft
commission does not control this process in any way.
The chairman and other members of the Draft commission, who do not work permanently in the
Military commissariat often, are poorly oriented in the legislation in the field of conscription and
conscientious objection and fully rely on the opinion of the military commissar and other employees
of the Military commissariat.
Furthermore, the Draft commission has no funding and its sessions are held at the premises of the
Military commissariat.
In practice, the Draft commission is dependent on the Military commissariat and cannot take impartial
decisions.
96
Draft periods in Russia take place twice a year: in spring and in autumn. It consists of a medical
examination, a meeting of the Draft commission to resolve the issue of sending to military service and
sending to military service itself. All these three events, according to the law, must be held separately
from each other, and for each of them the conscript is called by a summons. Summons must be
handed to the person personally; the conscript must sign for its receipt.
In practice, summons to conscripts are sent to the mailbox without a signature. The date of
appearance may be indicated outside the draft periods. And instead of the specific purpose of the call,
the summon indicates the general wording "clarification of data".
When visiting a Military commissariat in such a situation, a conscript can be called up for military
service immediately on the day of the visit.
97
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-raises-military-age/31867388.html

Military commissariats put pressure on recruits, telling them that asking for civilian service
is unlawful. The government proclaimed that ACS is not possible during mobilization but
according to art. 59 of the Constitution citizens have the right to ACS in the case the military
service contradicts their beliefs.98
There is currently no law that establishes the procedure for ACS during mobilisation and a
bill has been submitted to the Duma in early October99. Nevertheless the Constitutional Court
in 1996 stated that this right “is directly applicable and must be ensured regardless of
whether or not a relevant federal law has been enacted”.100
In September a new bill introduced the concepts of “mobilization, martial law and wartime”101
and stated a jail terms of up to 15 years for wartime acts, including surrendering and
desertion.102
Failure to show up for mobilisation is an administrative offence103 with a fine of 3,000
roubles.104
On September 21st, Russian President announced the start of Russia’s so-called “partial
mobilization”.105 About 200,000 Russian citizens left the country in the week after the
mobilisation alone.106
98
Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 59(3):
A citizen of the Russian Federation shall have the right to alternative civilian service if his convictions
or religious beliefs conflict with military service, as well as in other cases established by federal law.
Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 28:
Guarantees everyone freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, including the right ... to freely
choose, hold and disseminate religious and other beliefs and to act in conformity with them.
Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 29(3):
No one shall be compelled to ... renounce [his opinions and beliefs].
99
Law on ACS, Article 9: The organisation and performance of alternative civilian service during
mobilisation, martial law and wartime shall be determined by federal constitutional laws, other federal
laws and other normative legal acts of the Russian Federation adopted in accordance with them.
100
Ruling No. 63-O of 22 May 1996, explained that the right of citizens whose beliefs or religious
beliefs conflict with military service to be replaced by alternative civilian service, as well as all other
human and civil rights and freedoms, is directly applicable and must be ensured regardless of whether
or not a relevant federal law has been enacted, literally, as set forth in the said constitutional norm.
101
Previously not mentioned in the Russian Criminal Code.
102
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/09/20/russian-lawmakers-approve-long-jail-terms-for-
military-surrender-refusal-to-serve-a78843
103
Under Article 21.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
104
From the moment the medical commission is passed and the order of the military commissariat for
mobilisation is announced, the state considers the person to be a serviceman and may apply the new
amendments on evasion to him.
105
Russian authorities announced that they planned to call up about 300,000 people from the
reserves.
Dozhd TV has reported that mobilization will happen in three stages: September 26–October 10;
October 11–25; and October 26–November 10.
According to article 20 of the Federal Law "On mobilization training and mobilization in the Russian
Federation", the call for mobilization must be organized by the independent Mobilization Commissions,
which are civilian bodies. However, all decisions on mobilization are made by the Military Commissar.
According to the defense ministry’s announcement, only people who have already served, have
military specializations, and have prior combat experience will be drafted. However, information
regularly appears in Russia about people who do not meet those criteria being conscripted.
106
https://en.connection-ev.org/article-3624

Journalists and human-rights activists reported that police officers have stopped and
questioned men107, collected their data, and handed them draft letters. 108
It is also concerning that Moscow authorities demanded that hotel and hostel operators hand
over information on male guests.109
The police is extensively used to hunt down potential recruits in the streets and in the practice
of raids and arbitrary detentions.110
Caught people are threatened with criminal prosecution if they refuse to go to the military
unit.
Hundreds of military personnel are refusing to participate in combat operations in Ukraine111
and there are information about their arbitrary detention and cruel treatment. 112
107
For instance near Moscow metro stations and in St. Petersburg.
108
Moscow’s military commissariat denies reports of draft letters being handed out by subway
stations. According to the city’s military commissar Maxim Loktev, the “ambushes” had nothing to do
with mobilization and are part of regular “investigative activities” “for catching criminals.” Loktev
acknowledged, though, that draft dodgers fall within the scope of this law-enforcement work.
https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/10/14/moscow-men-ambushed-and-drafted-near-subway-
stations-draft-office-denies-these-reports
109
The administrative head of the Filyovsky Park district demanded that Moscow hotel and hostel
owners provide information on male guests between the ages of 18 and 55. Evgeny Stupin, lawyer for
the Moscow City Duma, posted a photo of the document.
The document states that data on guests “will be used to identify citizens who are not fulfilling their
military duties.” It required the information – full name, date of birth, passport data, and registered
address – by October 12.
https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/10/15/moscow-authorities-demand-that-hotel-and-hostel-
operators-hand-over-information-on-male-guests
There have been earlier reports of police raids on Moscow hostels and hotels. Mediazona reported that
on October 8, police cordoned off the Travel Inn hostel and start to check guest’s documents.
On October 14, publications Kholod and Verstka reported that an enlistment office in Moscow’s
Danilovsky district held at least 12 men, who had been brought there from hostels in the capital, for
24 hours. Three of them were residents of Bashkortosan. They were released, but instructed to return
within two days, according to Kholod. It is not known what became of the other men who were taken
in.
110
Since the beginning of the mobilization, a widespread practice in large cities is that police officers
stop men on the streets, check their documents, and try to hand a subpoena. Lately, another practice
was introduced in the form of raids. On October 9, the police came to the ‘heating center’ for the
homeless in Moscow and detained several dozen people. There were also raids at workers’ dormitories.
In St. Petersburg, police officers blocked exits of several residential buildings and handed out
subpoenas.
Summons are issued to all caught citizens without respecting the territorial principle. This means that
medical and any other documents that are in the military commissariat at the place of registration of
a citizen are simply not considered by the military commissariat, where a person is taken after a raid.
111
https://www.wsj.com/articles/documents-reveal-hundreds-of-russian-troops-broke-ranks-over-
ukraine-orders-11654094212
https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2022/07/18/sotni-voennosluzhaschih-iz-dagestana-otkazalis-voevat-
v-ukraine-a22359
https://news.doxajournal.ru/novosti/v-kurskoj-oblasti-dobrovolcy-nachali-otzyvat-dokumenty-posle-
ukrainskih-udarov-po-rossijskim-skladam/
112
On July 28, five members of the Presidential Human Rights Council (Alexander Asmolov, Nikolai
Svanidze, Alexander Verkhovsky, Alexander Sokurov, and Natalia Yevdokimova) wrote an appeal
to the military prosecutor’s office with a demand to check the information about cruel treatment
of Russian servicemen who wanted to refuse to take part in the war in Ukraine. The appeal
was drawn up based on statements by relatives of servicemen.
https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/08/12/voiska-vyshli-iz-stroia

According to the Russian Movement of Conscientious Objectors (MCO) 113:

Anti-War Action and Consequences Suffered by Protesters
The military invasion of Ukraine has prompted anti-war protests, which Russian authorities
have met with an unprecedented and escalating severity. The police and security services
have utilized a brutal and extensive repertoire of punitive measures against those expressing
anti-war sentiments, culminating in the most significant wave of political repression under
Putin's regime.
The February 2023 report from OVD-Info highlights a staggering number of arrests in 2022,
nearly 20,000, all for anti-war sentiments. This includes 177 for internet activity, 141 for
symbols, 324 made post-protest, and 26 for public statements or private conversations, even
including positions held by relatives. The authorities have expanded their surveillance and
suppression of dissent, using facial recognition technology to pre-emptively detain activists
at public events. This practice extends their previous method of tracking individuals post-
protest, with 141 people detained through facial recognition alone and authorities confirming
its use against rally participants.
The suppression of protests is both systemic and violent. At least 413 instances of police use
of force have been reported, ranging from physical violence, such as beating, strangling, and
injuring the detainees, to the use of stun guns. Disturbingly, multiple instances of sexual
violence against arrested women, who constitute 46% of individuals detained for their anti-
war stance, and non-binary individuals have been reported. The issue is compounded by the
police's refusal to provide medical assistance in many cities. The violence continues even
after arrest, with detainees frequently subjected to further abuse in departmental custody.
The Russian legal system has been manipulated to serve as a tool for repression. In the first
half of 2022, arrests for participation in actions were administrative in 22% of cases,
compared to 12.5% in 2021. The authorities have increased their use of Criminal Code
articles to prosecute anti-war protesters. For example, Article 207.3 was used against
individuals such as Aleksandra Skochilenko, a St. Petersburg painter and LGBTQ person, for
swapping store price tags with anti-war texts, and Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Moscow politician,
for his speech to the Arizona House of Representatives. Article 280.3 has been used for
"discrediting" the Russian military. This rise indicates a growing state willingness to exploit
legal mechanisms to quash dissent.
Authorities have initiated the largest mass criminal prosecution wave in Russian history, with
447 people persecuted over 363 days for their anti-war stance. Those disseminating
information contrary to the official government narrative regarding the war have been
specifically targeted. The primary categories of "fakes," or information deemed deliberately
false by investigators and courts, revolve around the war's realities, such as the murder of
Ukrainian civilians, the shelling of civilian objects, Russian military personnel deaths, and
other Russian military war crimes. Some of the harshest sentences for expressing anti-war
sentiments include:
 Ilya Yashin, a Moscow City Duma deputy, sentenced to 8 years and 6 months for an
online stream about Russian military crimes in Bucha.
 Alexey Gorin, another Moscow City Duma deputy, received a 6-year and 11-month
penal colony sentence for his comments about the impropriety of holding a children's
drawing contest amid the ongoing war and the deaths of Ukrainian children.
113
Established in 2014, the MCO is a non-profit organisation dedicated to assisting young people in
legally avoiding conscription into the army. MCO’s work encompasses the development of
informational materials for recruits, provision of consultations, and data collection on conscription.
https://stoparmy.org/en/

 Maria Ponomarenko, a journalist, was sentenced to 6 years for a post about the
destroyed drama theater in Mariupol.
 Egor Skorohodov (Igor Maltsev), a Saint Petersburg activist, was sentenced to 3 years
and 8 months in a penal colony for burning a scarecrow in camouflage with a bag on its
head saying “Take me!”
Furthermore, at least 5,846 cases under Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences
(on “discrediting the Armed Forces”) have been brought before Russian courts. Of these, a
total of 4,559 cases resulted in a punitive sentence, with fines collectively exceeding
100,000,000 rubles (based on 3,091 court decisions where the payable amount is known).
Protests have undergone a significant transformation, shifting from large-scale street
demonstrations to individual pickets, distribution of anti-war leaflets, graffiti, destruction of
pro-war symbols, anti-war sentiment expression on social networks, and the launch of anti-
war initiatives and projects. Despite this change, the authorities' response remains severe,
with protesters facing police visits, confiscation of posters and symbols, and administrative
liability, even if they evade detention.
Regardless of the severe repression, individuals continue to find ways to voice their
opposition to the conflict and challenge the government's narrative. However, the authorities'
heavy-handed approach is creating a climate of fear and intimidation, making it increasingly
difficult for people to express their views. The use of the Criminal Code to prosecute
protesters and activists is particularly concerning, indicating a concerted effort to criminalize
dissent and silence opposition voices. The sentences handed down to those expressing anti-
war sentiments are deeply troubling, with individuals receiving lengthy prison terms for
relatively minor offenses. The rising use of fines and punitive measures to silence critics has
become a common practice in Russia, with the number of cases brought under Article 20.3.3
of the Code of Administrative Offences demonstrating the government's willingness to
employ any means necessary to maintain control. It is crucial for the international community
to continue voicing its opposition to these abuses and support those fighting for their rights
and freedoms in Russia.
Changes in Legislation during Wartime
The repercussions faced by those opposing Russia's military actions through anti-war
protests highlight a disturbing trend of civic liberties and fundamental human rights
suppression in the country. Over 15,000 people were arrested within the first two months of
the invasion, from February 24 to April 23, 2023, demonstrating an unprecedented scale and
severity of consequences.
The Russian government's systematic oppression in response to anti-war protests has
featured an escalation in legal and punitive measures. The fines for violating rally laws have
skyrocketed from 1,000 to 300,000 rubles, a 300-fold increase, underlining the government's
financial attempt to squelch dissent. The addition of up to 30 days' arrests and compulsory
labor further intensifies the deterrent.
Article 212.1 of the Criminal Code, dubbed the "Dadin" clause, introduced following
significant anti-war protests against Ukraine in 2014, has become a formidable instrument
in curtailing protests. The law penalizes "repeated violation of the established procedure for
organizing or holding a meeting, rally, demonstration, march, or picket," thereby setting a
perilous precedent as it targets not only specific individuals but also potential rally and
demonstration participants.
Moreover, the expedited decision-making process has enabled the Russian government to
swiftly pass restrictive legislation. A notable example is the enactment of bills on
“discrediting” Russian military actions and “fake news” regarding the Russian Armed Forces

on March 4, the ninth day of the invasion. Despite initial claims that these measures wouldn't
target those using the "no to war" slogan, calls for peace have become a basis for both
administrative and criminal prosecution.
Critical stages of discussion and public deliberation have been bypassed in the legislative
process. For instance, amendments to Article 20.3.3 were surreptitiously appended to a bill
on fire safety rules in forests. This stealthy tactic displays a concerning disregard for open
dialogue and civic participation in legislative matters.
The enforcement of these laws has been prompt and resolute. The first reports of protocols
drafted and court trials initiated under the administrative article on discrediting the military
surfaced mere days after the bills were signed into law. This rapid action illustrates the
Russian government's grim resolve to silence dissenting voices.
New and broadened legislation on "threats to state security" further stifles civil liberties. For
example, Article 275.1 of the Criminal Code now encompasses provisions on "confidential"
collaboration with foreign states and organizations, resulting in more severe punishments
and posing a threat to international cooperation and dialogue.
Reacting to evolving protest actions, like setting military recruitment offices ablaze, the
Russian government has altered legislation. The article on sabotage now includes norms
aimed at disrupting military and defense complex activities, leading to hefty charges and
penalties.
The crackdown on digital spaces and the broadening definition of extremism has led to a
decline in space for public discourse. Online platforms, crucial for dissent and organization,
have faced intense scrutiny and censorship, further restricting freedom of expression and
association.
The most recent legislative development in Russia, involving the legalization of electronic
military summonses and the criminalization of disregarding them, has sparked serious
concerns among legal experts and human rights advocates. The bill was approved by the
State Duma on April 11th and passed through second and third readings in a single day, with
President Putin signing it into law on April 14th, 2023. The extraordinarily swift passage of
the bill by the State Duma, in just 23 minutes, has been criticized as a blatant display of the
authorities' disregard for proper legal procedures and due process. The hasty approval of a
law that broadens the scope of mass conscription without adequate debate or public input
raises alarming questions about the state of democracy and the rule of law in contemporary
Russia.
In conclusion, the actions and ensuing repercussions suffered by anti-war protesters highlight
a concerning trajectory of eroding democratic norms and escalating autocratic control in
Russia. The implications of this trend, for both domestic civil society and international human
rights standards, are deeply disconcerting and demand vigilant attention from the global
community. The accelerated changes in legislation, paired with their swift and severe
enforcement, underscore an urgent need for international bodies to closely monitor, address,
and counter these worrying developments.
Conscription and Mobilization
The conscription and mobilization processes in Russia throughout 2022 and 2023 have been
mired in numerous human rights violations and marked by significant changes to the legal
framework that impinge upon the rights of draftees. The Movement of Conscientious
Objectors has documented hundreds of individuals either seeking to withdraw their
participation in aggressive military actions or striving to avoid military service altogether.
Prior to mobilization, soldiers could request the termination of their contracts with the
Ministry of Defense, a right invoked by hundreds seeking to conscientiously object. However,

once mobilization commenced, contract termination became unattainable, leaving the MCO
dealing with thousands of individuals on the frontline either insisting on their right to
alternative civilian service or demanding demobilization on medical grounds.
In reaction to this surge of conscientious objectors, military commanders resorted to creating
illicit detention centers, colloquially known as “cellars," where those refusing frontline service
are unlawfully detained, often under torturous conditions. Notable instances of such illegal
detentions took place in Bryanka in July and Zaitsevo in November 2022, with approximately
300 individuals unlawfully held in each camp. To date, over 13 such camps, officially termed
as Psychological Rehabilitation Centers by Russian authorities, have been identified. The
conditions for alternative civilian service within Russia remain punitive and discriminatory,
typified by extended terms, poor living conditions, and low remuneration.
In theory, mobilization in Russia should be managed by independent Mobilization
Commissions, civilian entities. However, in practice, the Military Commissar makes virtually
all mobilization decisions. In most regions, civil society remains ignorant of the Mobilization
Commissions' members since the orders to form these commissions are not made public.
Following the announcement of mobilization, human rights defenders reported mass
abductions of people from hostels, subways, homeless shelters, and residential building
entrances. Caught citizens were threatened with criminal prosecution if they refused to report
to the military unit. Although the maximum penalty for evading mobilization is a modest fine
of 10 to 50 euros, fear often coerces individuals into acceptance.
Under the Russian Constitution, citizens retain the right to request the replacement of
military service with alternative civilian service during mobilization. However, Russia has not
legislated how alternative civilian service operates during mobilization, resulting in mass
applications for alternative service without the authorities' capacity to process them.
Regarding standard conscription, draftees are more legally protected than those mobilized,
as the procedure has remained relatively unchanged for the past 30 years. Still, this system
is not without its human rights infractions, with the lack of an independent civil decision-
making body being a significant concern. The Draft Commission, responsible for decisions to
replace compulsory military service with alternative civil service, is formed based on
municipalities but lacks funding and holds its sessions at the Military Commissariat. Thus, in
effect, the Military Commissariat's representatives decide on applications to substitute
military service with alternative civil service.
In April 2023, the State Duma passed amendments legalizing electronic summonses for
conscription through a personal account on "Gosuslugi." While this could streamline
mobilization, it raises concerns about citizens' rights and freedom of movement restrictions.
Penalties for failing to report to the recruitment center on the specified day are severe, with
consequences potentially affecting an individual's future ability to support themselves and
their families.
In addition, the penalties for failing to appear at the recruitment center on the specified day
are severe, including being barred from becoming individual entrepreneurs, managing real
estate, driving a car, or taking a loan. These restrictions may have long-term consequences
for individuals who fail to appear for conscription, potentially affecting their ability to support
themselves and their families in the future.
Furthermore, the creation of a register for individuals liable for military service, containing
personal information such as health and education records, residence and employment
details, and foreign citizenship or residence permits, poses data privacy and protection
concerns. The collection and use of such personal data must be stringently regulated to
prevent misuse, and citizens should be thoroughly informed about how their data is being
used and safeguarded.

Overall, the Russian process of conscription and mobilization has been riddled with issues
and human rights abuses. The unlawful detention and torture of conscientious objectors,
coupled with the absence of an independent civil decision-making body for the Draft
Commission, underscore the urgent need for reform and heightened accountability in the
conscription process. The punitive nature of alternative civilian service, as well as the harsh
penalties for failing to report for conscription, call for careful examination and revision. While
the new amendments legalizing electronic summonses for conscription may offer some
efficiency advantages, they must be introduced with proper legal oversight and protections
to ensure citizens' rights and freedoms are not unduly compromised.
Conscientious Objection during Wartime
The handling and punishment of conscientious objectors in Russia during wartime are marked
by considerable concerns, as recent reports on Russian garrison courts reveal. These courts
have dealt with 708 cases initiated under criminal articles that were made more stringent
following the start of mobilization, including unauthorized abandonment of military service,
disobedience of orders, and desertion. Judgments have been issued in 360 of these cases.
Unauthorized abandonment is the most frequent charge, accounting for 629 cases, with more
than half of these soldiers being absent for over a month. Objectors and deserters are often
subjected to show trials to intimidate other soldiers, with arrests taking place in front of their
units, verdicts being announced within military units, and judges delivering "preventive
talks."
Yet, these cases are often concealed from the public. Verdicts are frequently not published,
and sentencing details and statistics are withheld under the guise of military secrecy. This
lack of transparency around trials is alarming and poses questions about the openness and
accountability of the Russian military justice system. A significant number of service
members, over a third of the known sentences under the AWOL article, receive suspended
sentences, allowing them to be returned to the front lines. Meanwhile, those refusing to
participate in the war without deserting their units are charged with disobeying orders. The
number of such defendants is rising, with 25 cases currently pending in the courts. However,
legal experts suggest that non-compliance with orders is a preferable option for conscientious
objectors, as the penalties for not executing orders are generally less severe than those for
other mobilization-related offenses.
Despite the escalating number of cases against conscientious objectors, a high proportion of
those convicted receive suspended sentences and are reassigned to the front lines. Soldiers
who leave their units during wartime for reasons such as visiting loved ones or lack of
understanding of the implications typically face less harsh punishments than those deserting
to evade being deployed to the front lines. The courts' stance on this matter is still evolving,
with no unified position established yet.
The handling of conscientious objectors by the Russian military raises significant concerns
regarding the military justice system and soldiers' rights. The use of show trials for objectors
and deserters as an intimidation tactic, coupled with the frequent concealment of such cases
from the public eye, highlight a dearth of transparency and accountability in the military
justice system. The common practice of issuing suspended sentences and reassigning service
members to the front lines also raises questions about the efficacy of these sentences in
deterring such conduct. The increasing number of cases against conscientious objectors
underscores the challenges faced by those endeavoring to exercise their human rights while
serving in the military.
The case of Senior Lieutenant Vasiliev, who faced criminal charges under the newly enacted
law allowing the incarceration of soldiers refusing to execute orders for up to three years,
has sparked international controversy and debate. Vasiliev's case underscores the critical

importance of soldiers' rights and the necessity for military personnel to have the autonomy
to make personal life decisions. His actions have encouraged others to pursue good and
effect positive change, emphasizing the significance of empathy, kindness, and compassion
in shaping a better world for all.
In conclusion, the treatment of conscientious objectors by the Russian military remains a
contentious issue. The escalating number of cases against such individuals, the lack of
transparency in the trials, and the common practice of issuing suspended sentences and
reassigning service members to the front lines all raise concerns about the nature of the
military justice system and the rights of soldiers. The case of Senior Lieutenant Vasiliev
serves as a potent reminder of the importance of soldiers' rights and the necessity for military
personnel to exercise their human rights while serving in the military.
Obstruction to work of NGOs
The period of 2022/23 has witnessed a substantial escalation in the pressures exerted on
anti-militaristic NGOs in Russia. The Russian government has actively leveraged labels such
as "foreign agents," "undesirable organizations," and "terrorist or extremist" to target
organizations and individuals expressing anti-war sentiments and resisting governmental
actions. As of December 2022, the "foreign agents" list included over 200 individuals, 55
media organizations/journalists, and 63 NGOs, totaling 348 entities. Additionally, 25
organizations were declared "undesirable" within the year.
The tendency to label organizations as "foreign agents" and "undesirable" intensified
following the outbreak of the war. These designations were strategically employed to stifle
civil society and anti-war protests. A law enacted in June 2022 established a single register
and list of restrictions for all "foreign agents". The broad nature of the law, which lawmakers
view as an advantage, simplified its application. This gave authorities ample grounds for
adding entities to the register and a wide array of tools for controlling the activities of "foreign
agents" and obstructing their work.
The "foreign agent" label has had a detrimental impact on individuals and organizations,
resulting in numerous difficulties in their respective fields. Many have lost jobs, business
partnerships, and contacts due to the toxic connotations associated with being a "foreign
agent". The "undesirable organization" status is even more damaging, prohibiting the
continuation of the organization's activities and criminalizing any association with the
organization, including sharing posts or links, and particularly donations.
The Russian government has also targeted non-profits and other human rights groups via
means beyond the "foreign agent" and "undesirable organization" laws, including blocking
and censorship. All independent mass media websites, at least 265, have been blocked,
alongside resources associated with anti-war activists, human rights defenders, and human
rights organizations. Meta has been labeled an extremist organization, and access to
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram has been blocked in Russia. The authorities utilize
advanced mass blocking technology and expansive laws to purge the internet of any content
they deem objectionable.
Beyond labeling and blocking, the state has exploited fines and legal ambiguities to repress
civil society. The Journalists' Union was dissolved for breaching the "foreign agent" law
regulations, and the Sakharov Center was fined for an alleged absence of the "foreign agent"
marking on its videos. The Moscow Helsinki Group, despite avoiding foreign financing to elude
the register, was nonetheless ordered to dissolve by the Moscow City Court for operating
outside of its registration region. Due to legal ambiguities, such procedural justifications can
be applied extensively.

The intensified persecution of anti-militaristic NGOs has seriously impeded their operations.
Individuals and organizations face myriad difficulties in their fields of activity due to the
labeling of "foreign agents" and "undesirable organizations," as well as the blocking of
websites and resources. The legal ambiguity and procedural justifications employed to
repress civil society have hampered NGOs' operations, while the expansive terms of the law
have effectively criminalized any potential activity, work, or communication with entities
outside Russia, fostering a stigma around "foreign influence."
MCO's Efforts and Key Cases
The Movement of Conscientious Objectors (MCO) has been at the forefront of assisting
individuals to resist mobilization and abstain from participating in the war, with numerous
successful campaigns during 2022/23. In July 2022, when news broke about a concentration
camp for conscientious objectors in the Bryanka village of Ukraine's Luhansk region, MCO
initiated a public campaign for its closure. Soldiers who declined participation in the special
operation were to be sent back to their permanent deployment location, but were instead
coerced into continuing the operation. After two weeks of persistent public campaigning, the
camp was closed, marking a significant accomplishment for MCO.
In November 2022, another similar camp was discovered in the Zaitsevo village in Ukraine's
Donetsk region. Approximately 300 mobilized individuals were detained and subjected to
their commanders' violence, with no communication with the outside world. MCO promptly
launched a public campaign, urging subscribers to lodge complaints with the Military
Prosecutor's Office and providing a sample complaint. After two weeks, this camp was also
closed, mirroring the Bryanka success, which MCO perceives as another achievement.
MCO's impact is also evident in the personal narratives of two conscientious objectors. Kirill
Berezin, an orphan supported by his grandmother, publicly declared his refusal to partake in
the war and sought alternative civilian service. However, he was mobilized into the military
on September 24, 2022, without consideration of his alternative service application by the
draft board. Despite enduring mockery and threats, Kirill managed to submit his alternative
civilian service application on October 5 while in military service. A close friend of Kirill's
penned an appeal, which MCO posted on their channel, urging people to lodge complaints in
support of Kirill to the Military Prosecutor's Office. Although Kirill's legal fight was
unsuccessful, the public resonance and complaints ensured that he was not sent to the front.
He currently serves within the Russian Federation.
Mikhail Ashichev, another conscientious objector, became the first person in Russia to record
a draft commission meeting. The commission denied his request for alternative civilian
service, claiming no relevant legislative acts, and forwarded the case to the police. Mikhail
demanded a decision on mobilization and information about the commission's composition.
His recording and subsequent video publication led to attempts to hold him administratively
responsible for discrediting Russia's armed forces. After several unsuccessful attempts to
summon and mobilize Ashichev, the draft board accepted his application for alternative
civilian service and stopped pursuing him. MCO publicized this story as widely as possible,
urging their subscribers to share and distribute Mikhail's video.
Three other crucial stories showcase not only men's conscientious objection but the courage
and determination of women willing to fight for their partners, defend their rights against all
odds, and bring them home alive. On September 26, 2022, Ekaterina's husband, Vladimir
Shevtsov, was mobilized and sent to a collection point in Sevastopol on the same day without
a military medical commission. Ekaterina sought MCO's advice, and they jointly persuaded
Vladimir to apply for alternative civilian service (ACS). Despite facing significant pressure
from the command and being labeled a traitor by his colleagues, he did not withdraw his

application. On January 7, 2023, Vladimir Shevtsov was reassigned as a driver in a military

unit and returned to his hometown.
On September 27, 2022, Aygul and Ruslan Shayakhmetov received a summons at work. The
following day, they visited the military enlistment office together. Despite Ruslan's chronic
illnesses, he was immediately sent to the barracks without a medical examination.
Aygul sought assistance from human rights defenders - MCO, Conscience Call, Memorial.
Lawyers promptly joined the case, providing advice on drafting a power of attorney and filing
a statement for alternative civilian service. Aygul submitted applications to various
institutions and initiated lawsuits. Despite Ruslan being sent to a combat zone and refusing
to take up arms, her diligent efforts led to his return home on January 28, 2023, where he
is currently awaiting a medical examination.
Another instance involves Nastya, who tried to dissuade her boyfriend, Misha, from reporting
to the military enlistment office. Independently, she drafted a statement for him to apply for
alternative civilian service and sent it. However, due to pressure from relatives, Misha joined
a military unit. In desperation, Nastya sought MCO's help, and with their assistance, Misha
returned to the military enlistment office and was removed from the unit's lists. By the
evening, he was back home. MCO's psychological and legal support played a crucial role in
ensuring a positive outcome for this case.
MCO has made considerable progress in 2022/23, advocating for individuals' freedom of
conscience, and assisting them to resist mobilization and abstain from war participation. The
organization's efforts are integral in promoting human rights and fostering a culture of peace
and non-violence in Russia.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the increasingly tense situation in Russia regarding conscientious objectors
and anti-militaristic NGOs presents a significant challenge to human rights and democratic
principles. The Russian military's handling of conscientious objectors reveals a deeply
concerning lack of transparency and accountability, while the government's aggressive
targeting of NGOs illustrates an alarming assault on civil liberties and free speech.
However, amidst these challenging circumstances, inspiration is found in the resilience and
courage of individuals who are asserting their rights. The experiences of conscientious
objectors like Kirill and Mikhail, as well as the tireless advocacy by partners such as Ekaterina,
Aygul, and Nastya, are stark reminders of the personal stakes involved and the strength of
human spirit.
Bibliography
● Красно, Андрей (2023) Бегущие с фронта: суды над военнослужащими с юга
России и Кавказа, RFE/RL. Available at: https://www.kavkazr.com/a/beguschie-s-
fronta-sudy-nad-voennosluzhaschimi-s-yuga-rossii-i-kavkaza/32335917.html.
● Свободное пространство, (2022) ‘Знаю, что посадят. У меня был выбор, и я его
сделал’, Свободное пространство. Available at:
https://novaya.media/articles/2022/12/26/znaiu-chto-posadiat-u-menia-byl-vybor-i-
ia-ego-sdelal.
● How Russians see the results of 2022 (2023) LevadaCenter. Available at:
https://www.levada.ru/en/2023/01/30/how-russians-see-the-results-of-2022/.
● Summary of Russian wartime repression. One year since the full-scale invasion (2023)
ОВД-Инфо. Available at: https://en.ovdinfo.org/summary-russian-wartime-
repression-one-year-full-scale-invasion.

● When soldiers say no. Hundreds of Russian servicemen face trial in defiance of Ukraine
deployment, Mediazona Study reveals (2023) Mediazona. Available at:
https://en.zona.media/article/2023/04/11/500.
● Реестр для ‘массовых репрессий’. Почему в России станет больше ‘иноагентов’
(2022) BBC News Русская служба. Available at:
https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-63814398.
1.2.38 SAN MARINO

No
Conscription: Defense is the responsibility of Italy.
-
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/san-marino
1.2.39 SERBIA

Conscription:
First recognised in Constitution, Art. 58 (in

1992
Conscientious objection: Serbia & Montenegro times)
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/serbia

1.2.40 SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Abolished in 2005, but it is legally retained
and can be reinstituted in case of
No emergency. The relevant law is the Act No.
Conscription: 569/2005 Coll. on alterative service in time
of war or war state.
First recognised in Civilian Service Act,

1992
Conscientious objection: No.18/1992 (in Czechoslovakia times).
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Conscientious objection is not regulated

towards the professional army service.
More https://ebco-beoc.org/slovakia
1.2.41 SLOVENIA
Abolished in 2003 for peacetime, after the
No Act Amending the Military Service Act
Conscription: entered into force.
First recognised by the Military Service Act

(Official Journal of the Republic of Slovenia,
n˚18/91). With the adoption of the Act
Amending the Military Service Act (Official
Journal of the Republic of Slovenia, n˚74/95)
the right to conscientious objection was also
expanded to soldiers doing their military
1991 service and conscripts who had completed
Conscientious objection: their military service. Hence every individual
obliged to do military service – i.e.
conscripts, soldiers doing their military
service and conscripts in the reserve
component could exercise the right to
conscientious objection at any time during
the period of their military duty.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -

Professional members of the military cannot

exercise the right to conscientious objection.
Since 2010, the Republic of Slovenia has
only had professional armed forces, the
contract reserve and volunteer soldiers doing
voluntary military service.
Minimum
Persons, whose human right to conscientious
objection to military service is recognised or
Voluntary enlistment: 18 is in the process of being recognised, cannot
become contract service members of the
reserve component of the Slovenian Armed
Forces. In the event that a contract service
member exercises his/her human right to
conscientious objection to military service
during the contract period, the contract will
expire. The same rule applies for volunteer
soldiers and professional members of the
military.
https://ebco-beoc.org/slovenia including the reply of the Human Rights

More Ombudsman of the Republic of Slovenia (e-mail on 31/01/2023).
1.2.42 SPAIN
Suspended in 2002 by Royal Decree

No
Conscription: 247/2001, of 9 March.
1978 First recognised in the Constitution.

Service Military: -
Civilian: -
More https://ebco-beoc.org/spain
1.2.43 SWEDEN
Sweden reintroduced conscription in 2017
Yes with effect from January 1st 2018 (previously
Conscription:
suspended in 2010) and extended it to

women.
Highly selective conscription: most persons
serving the military service are volunteers.
First recognised by Alternative Service

1920
Conscientious objection: Schemes Act, 21st May.
Military: 11
At present there are no military services as a

conscientious objector and the civil
Service conscription in not activated, meaning that in
practical terms the individual will not do any
Civilian: - service.
Persons that have applied for unarmed
status can be called for civil defence training
later on, if/once the circumstances for the
civil defence changes.
The obligation to perform conscription into

the Armed Forces applies for Swedish
citizens from the calendar year he or she
Conscription: 19 turns nineteen.
Minimum
All inhabitants between 16 - 70 years old are
obliged to participate in national defence in
case of emergency or war.
An officer or a professional soldier has a

Voluntary enlistment: 18 contract and therefore has the possibility to
discharge or leaving for any reasons.
https://ebco-beoc.org/sweden including the reply of the Swedish Institute

More for Human Rights to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022
(e-mail on 25/01/2023).
According to the reply of Svenska Freds about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on
10/02/2023):
“The conscription law remains the same, meaning that citizens turning 18 are obliged to
provide the Swedish Defense Recruitment Agency (Plikt- och prövningsverket) with
information as well as muster and undergo military training if called to do so 114. In 2022,
5583 individuals were enrolled, out of which 84% were called in accordance with the
conscription law, while 16% applied for enrollment themselves115.
According to the Swedish Defense Recruitment Agency, 161 conscripts have been reported
to the prosecutor’s office for breaking the general law of compulsory military service in 2022.
114
The law of conscription, Lagen (1994:1809) om totalförsvarsplikt.
https://rkrattsbaser.gov.se/sfst?bet=1994:1809
115
The Swedish Defense Recruitment Agency (Plikt- och prövningsverket), Mönstring och prövning till
grundutbildningsomgång 2022/23, 2021/0856:3

The reason for this was invalid absence from the muster, i.e. military selection tryouts116. In
a survey conducted by the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency, only 53% of the
respondents were aware that attending the muster if called is mandatory117.
Furthermore, the Swedish Defense Recruitment Agency reports that 71 conscripts applied
for weapon free status in 2022. 69 out of 71 applications were approved and two were
rejected. Additionally, 36 individuals who had completed their military service and received
a war-time placement applied for weapon free status in 2022. Out of these, 33 were
approved, two were rejected, and one was written off118. In total, the Swedish Defense
Recruitment Agency received 107 applications for weapon free status in 2022, compared to
45 in 2021.
Those who receive weapon free status can be called for civil conscription, meaning that they
can be placed within the civil defense119. The civil conscription has not been active since
2010, so as of right now there is no training within the civil defense. However, during 2022
there has been increased talks on the need for civil conscription and in the beginning of 2023,
the Swedish government announced that they are planning on reactivating the civil
conscription. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och
beredskap) has been tasked with preparing reactivating the civil conscription in the municipal
rescue service120.
Currently, approximately 5000-6000 youths are undergoing military service each year.
According to the current defense decision, the number of youths called for conscription will
increase to 8000 by 2025. However, there is political unity that 8000 conscripts each year is
not enough as both the previous and current government have expressed that more youths
should be prepared to do military service. For example, the new government has argued that
8 000 is insufficient, and has altered the goal to increase the number called for conscription
each year to 10000 individuals for between 2030-2035121. Ever since compulsory military
service was reactivated in 2017, a person’s motivation to undergo military service has been
taken into consideration. However, one of the reasons to why military conscription was
reactivated had to do with the fact that the Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten) could
not cover the personnel need for the defense by voluntary recruits122, i.e youths’ interest to
undergo military training was too low. When the numbers called for military service will
increase in the coming years, there is a higher risk that youths that do not want to undergo
military training will be forced to do so by law. The Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency
has already expressed that they will have to call more unmotivated youth to meet the goal
of 8000 conscripts. Also, the Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten) announced in early
2023 that more unmotivated youths will be called to military service123. Swedish Peace and
Arbitration Society (SPAS) takes this very seriously and continues to stand up for the right
to refuse participation in the military system.
116
The Swedish Defense Recruitment Agency (Plikt- och prövningsverket), E-mail contact
117
The Swedish Defense Recruitment Agency (Plikt- och prövningsverket), Mönstring och prövning till
grundutbildningsomgång 2022/23, 2021/0856:3
118
The Swedish Defense Recruitment Agency (Plikt- och prövningsverket), E-mail contact
119
The Swedish Defense Recruitment Agency (Plikt- och prövningsverket)
https://pliktverket.se/monstring-och-varnplikt/monstring/att-vara-vapenfri
120
The Swedish Government https://www.regeringen.se/regeringsuppdrag/2023/01/uppdrag-msb-
att-genomfora-atgarder-att-forbereda-aktivering-av-civilplikten-inom-raddningstjanst/
121
The Swedish public service, news agency https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/regeringen-vill-att-
fler-gor-lumpen-kan-bli-10-000-varnpliktiga-om-aret
122
Governmental investigation on personnel supply for the military defense (2016).
https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2016/09/201663/
123
Radio Sweden https://sverigesradio.se/artikel/fler-omotiverade-behover-gora-varnplikten

Media coverage of conscientious objectors has continuously been low through 2022. There
have been a few reports of conscripts risking being punished with fines or prison up to a
year, for example, a man in his twenties who did not attend the military service124.
The domestic security political debate is increasingly militarized, and intensified after Russia’s
horrific and unlawful invasion of Ukraine and in relation to the submission of the Swedish
Nato application. Regarding a Swedish Nato membership, the implications for conscripts are
unclear. The government has appointed an investigation aiming to review the legislation, in
order to determine to what extent it is possible to send conscripts abroad. Currently, the law
states that conscripts are to be used to defend Sweden. The Minister of Defence has referred
to this as a question of definition, while ensuring that voluntariness will continuously play an
important part for conscripts in this issue125. SPAS has urged the investigation examining the
issue to determine that conscripts will not be sent to fight in Nato’s wars126. During 2022,
SPAS has received an increased number of questions regarding conscription and weapon free
status, and from people who are worried how a potential Swedish Nato membership will
affect them.”
1.2.44 SWITZERLAND
There are no plans to abolish or suspend

Yes
Conscription: conscription in the near future.
In 1992, a mandatory referendum was held

regarding the proposition to modify the
Swiss Constitution in order to create a
civilian service. Swiss voters approved by
1992
Conscientious objection: 82.5%. Hence, the Swiss Constitution was
modified by introducing the following phrase
in Art. 59 lit. 1: “Alternative civilian service
shall be provided for by law.” 127
Service Military: ~9 262 days
Civilian: ~13 390 days
https://ebco-beoc.org/switzerland including the reply of the Federal Office

More for Civilian Service to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual Report 2022
(e-mail on 06/02/2023).
124
The Swedish public service, news agency https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/orebro/dok-inte-upp-
for-att-gora-lumpen-riskerar-fangelsestraff
125
The Swedish public service, news agency https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/regeringen-vill-att-
fler-gor-lumpen-kan-bli-10-000-varnpliktiga-om-aret
126
Aftonbladet, newspaper https://www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/a/ab45lM/svenska-freds-varnpliktiga-
far-inte-tvingas-strida-for-nato
127
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html#a59

At the request of a far right-wing political party the Swiss National Council (large chamber
of the Swiss Parliament) has yet again decided on several adaptions to the civilian alternative
service (Zivildienst) law in 2022, in order to restrict access to, and worsen the conditions of
serving in alternative civilian service. This is only two and a half years after it had proposed
a package of restrictions in 2019. The declared intention of the adaptions is to prevent young
men from accessing their right to Conscientious Objector status. One proposed adaption is
to subordinate conscientious objectors under the command of the civil defence troops. The
threat to re-establish the examination of conscience is also on the agenda again. A prohibition
to apply for civilian service to those who are already in military service is supposedly to avoid
weakening the army. Furthermore, increasing the length of civilian alternative service is also
intended. This will result in an increased duration of up to 200% or more, depending on the
time of application.
The status quo is: a civilian service of 13 months in several periods in places of assignment
recognized by the Confederation. Typical areas of work are healthcare and social services,
environmental protection and research, development aid programmes and emergency relief
in catastrophes. Admission is by written request. Service duration of 150% compared to
military service is regarded as proof of a conflict of conscience.
Compulsory military service can be performed in a single 12-month period or in several
periods as before.
During the COVID-19 crisis military and civilian alternative service personnel have, as in
other countries, been deployed in large numbers to vaccination centres etc. All employers
are required to give employees leave on 80% pay while they perform military service every
year or two. Press reports indicate that a small number - about 1% of conscripts each year
are deemed fit for unarmed duty only; as with a firearm they would be a danger to
themselves and others.
According to the reply of the Federal Office for Civilian Service to the Questionnaire about
EBCO’s Annual Report 2022 (e-mail on 06/02/2023):
“The duration of the military service is determined by a conscript’s military rank. A Private
E-1, for instance, serves for a total of 245 days. In any case, civilian service duty generally
lasts 50% longer than military service. Civilian service duty lasts longer than military service
for conscripts who apply.
Prior to recruitment, all conscripts are called-up for a mandatory information day (usually at
age 18). Regarding this information day, art. 15a lit. 2 of the Federal Act on Alternative
Civilian Service (SR 824.0) as well as art. 11 lit. 3 of the Ordinance on the Compulsory
Military Service (SR 512.21) prescribe that conscripts are also to be informed about civilian
service as an option in case of conscientious objections to military service. The information
day is organized by military personnel. However, the information material (posters, film,
flyers) is provided by the Federal Office for Civilian Service (see below). Call-up papers do
not contain any information about civilian service.
The procedure for a conscript to apply for alternative civilian service remains generally the
same in all times and can be summarized as follows:
 An application may only be submitted once recruitment has been completed and ability
to perform regular military service has been established.
 Conscripts with conscientious objections may then submit an online request for
admission to civilian service. Since 2009, applicants are not required to provide
detailed evidence of their conscientious objection to military service and there is no
further enquiry. Readiness to undertake civilian service is regarded as sufficient proof
for conscientious objection.

 Within three months of submitting their application, conscripts must attend a one-day
introductory course. In this course, employees of the Federal Office for Civilian Service
inform them about the duties and rights that come along with civilian service.
 After attending the introductory course, applicants are requested to confirm their
application online within two weeks.
 Subsequently, applicants are admitted to civilian service – provided that the
application form has been correctly completed and the admission procedure has been
followed as described above.
The Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER) is responsible
for civilian service issues; its Federal Office for Civilian Service processes applications and
administers the civilian service system in general. It is composed entirely of civilian public
servants.
The following table shows the number of applications and admissions from 2018 to 2021. As
for 2022, the numbers will be available by the end of February on our website and in a press
release:
Year Applications Admissions
2021 8’239 6’148
2020 6’951 5’254
2019 8’342 6’088
2018 8’248 6’205
Please note that applications to civilian service are not “rejected” per se. The discrepancy
between the number of applications and the number of acceptances is due to uncompleted
admission procedures, e.g. because application forms were incomplete, the mandatory
introduction course was not attended or the application was not definitively confirmed.
Furthermore, conscripts may apply for civilian service as many times as they wish and at any
time. Some conscripts, thus, submit several applications, thereby increasing the total number
of applications.
The Federal Office for Civilian Service is responsible for civilian service issues. It is an entirely
non-military authority pertaining to the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education
and Research (EAER).
Alternative civilian service is performed outside the Swiss Armed Forces in public and private
civilian institutions of public utility recognized by the Federal Office for Civilian Service as
official partner organizations. Conscientious objectors serve civilian purposes and are
assigned to duties of public interest. They are mainly active in the following fields: health
and social services, nature conservation and environmental protection, education, cultural
heritage conservation, forestry and agriculture, development cooperation and humanitarian
aid.
According to the Federal Act on the Armed Forces (SR 510.10), the minimum legal age for
both con-scription and voluntary enlistment is 18 years (Article 7 of said Act). Concerning
the legal minimum age for conscription, the Swiss Conscription system does not make any
distinction between peace time and war time. However, the Swiss Government can extend
the duration of conscripted service if the situation requires this.
All conscientious objectors can apply for alternative civilian service at all times, even if they
are actively serving in the Swiss Armed Forces. The application procedure remains the
same as described above. However, conscripts who develop conscientious objections whilst
actively serving continue their military service until they are formally admitted to civilian
service.
The following table shows the number of applications to civilian service submitted by
conscripts either during recruit school or after as well as the number of admissions. As

mentioned above, applications to civilian service are not “rejected” and some conscripts
apply for civilian service several times.
during recruit school after recruit school

Year applications admissions applications admissions
2021 1’507 878 2’771 1'953
2020 1’355 731 2’199 1’596
2019 1’818 931 2’734 2’018
2018 1’740 904 2’877 2’264
There are no plans to abolish or suspend conscription in the near future.”
1.2.45 TÜRKIYE
Yes
Conscription:
-
Since 2019, there is the option of paid
Service service: if one pays around €4900, he can
Military: 6
serve for 1 month (including only basic
training).
Civilian: - Not available.
17 for the registration to the 'National

Defence University'.
More https://ebco-beoc.org/Türkiye
Please check section 1.1.1.1 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and section 1.1.1.2
Committee of Ministers.
Türkiye is the only member state in the Council of Europe that has not recognised the right
to conscientious objection to military service, or at least indicated the intention of making
alternative service available. Türkiye continues to prosecute conscientious objectors and to
ignore the judgements which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has pronounced
since 2006 in favour of Turkish conscientious objectors, in what the Committee of Ministers
has named the “Ülke group” of cases. Many different penalties are imposed on those who
refuse to perform military service. As a result, conscientious objectors face ongoing arrest
warrants; a life-long cycle of prosecutions and imprisonment, and a situation of “civil death”
which excludes them from social, cultural and economic life.
The Conscientious Objection Association in Türkiye, a member of EBCO, had to close down
at the end of 2021 due to increasing pressure on civil society organizations in Türkiye.
Following the official closure of the association, activists and experts working on the right to
conscientious objection in Türkiye started to continue their work in the field as a civil

initiative. Since early 2022, Vicdani Ret İzleme,128 an initiative working in the field of
conscientious objection, has been monitoring and reporting on the current situation of
conscientious objectors in Türkiye, the human rights violations they experience, and the
judicial processes they go through. The initiative advocates for the recognition of the right
to conscientious objection in Türkiye.
Throughout 2022, Conscientious Objection Watch produced periodic bulletins 129 for a year
to document and make visible the current situation of conscientious objectors in Türkiye.
In 2022, a total of 27 people in Türkiye declared their conscientious objection by contacting
Conscientious Objection Watch.
Human Rights Violations, Restrictions and Prosecutions of Conscientious Objectors
in Türkiye in 2022
 In January 2022, conscientious objector Şendoğan Yazıcı was sentenced 130 to 1 month
and 20 days in prison by the Borçka Criminal Court of First Instance.
 In February 2022, conscientious objector Reha Eskidir was sentenced to imprisonment
under Article 63 of the Military Penal Code No. 1632 on the grounds that he was a
"draft evader". During the hearing at Zonguldak 3rd Criminal Court of First Instance,
the court sentenced him 131 to 5 months and 18 days in prison.
 In May 2022, conscientious objector lawyer Gökhan Soysal’s bank account was
confiscated 132 due to an administrative fine imposed on him for not joining the
military. At the same time in May, Gökhan Soysal filed an individual application to the
Constitutional Court 133, stating that he had been discriminated against because he
was a conscientious objector.
 At the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers held on 23.05.2022, it's announced that
"the way to benefit" from paid military service would be opened for draft evaders and
evaders. Until this date, draft evaders and evaders, were unable to benefit from paid
military service. With the decision from the Cabinet of Ministers, paid military service
was also offered as an "alternative" for draft evaders and evaders. Conscientious
Objection Monitoring Organisation issued a statement 134 on the issue. The statement
is as follows: "The option of paid military service does not address the violations of
Article 9 found by the ECtHR due to the lack of alternative service. In addition, anyone
who wants to benefit from paid military service must fulfil one month of basic military
training. This training includes wearing a uniform, obeying orders and all the routine
requirements of ordinary military service. These conditions are unacceptable for
people who absolutely refuse military service and wearing a uniform."
 In October 2022, a previous prison sentence against conscientious objector Reha
Eskidir was finalised. Eskidir had been sentenced to 5 months and 18 days in October
128
https://www.instagram.com/vicdaniretizleme/
129
https://vicdaniret.org/category/yayinlar/
130
https://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-retci-sendogan-yaziciya-1-ay-20-gun-hapis-cezasi/
131
https://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-retci-reha-eskidire-hapis-cezasi-ve-kamu-haklarindan-
mahkumiyet/
132
https://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-retci-avukat-gokhan-soysalin-banka-hesabi-bloke-edildi/
133
https://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-retci-ayrimciliga-ugradigini-belirterek-anayasa-mahkemesine-
basvurdu/
134
https://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-ret-izleme-bedelli-askerlik-uygulamasi-vicdani-retciler-icin-bir-
alternatif-degildir/

2021 on the grounds of "being a draft evader". This sentence was finalised 135
in
October 2022 in violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
 In November 2022, conscientious objector Cemal Karakuş was sentenced again 136 by
the Çorum 3rd Criminal Court of First Instance on the same charge on the grounds
that he had previously been tried and sentenced by the Alaca Criminal Court of First
Instance for not joining the military. In the same month, conscientious objector Seyda
Can Yılmaz was sentenced 137 to 2 months by Ankara 52nd Criminal Court of First
Instance for not going to military service on the grounds that he was a draft evader.
 In December 2022, conscientious objector İnan Mayıs Aru was sentenced for not going
to military service on the grounds that he was a draft evader. Aru was sentenced 138
to a total of 10 months imprisonment and a judicial fine of 500 liras, 6 separate
sentences from 6 separate cases filed against him. In the same month, an
investigation was launched against conscientious objector Hüseyin Civan on charges
of "Opposing the Military Service Law".
All the cases, sentences and investigations in Türkiye throughout 2022 have once again
revealed the lawlessness in which conscientious objectors in Türkiye are trapped. But in spite
of everything, The European Parliament's mention of the situation of conscientious objectors
in Türkiye and the violation of the right to conscientious objection in its resolution 139 of 7
June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Türkiye was promising in terms of putting the
violation of the right to conscientious objection in Türkiye on the agenda of international
human rights mechanisms.
1.2.46 UKRAINE
Reintroduced in 2014 (earlier suspended in

Yes
Conscription: 2012).
First recognised in the Law of Ukraine “On

1991 Alternative (Non-Military) Service” № 1975-
Conscientious objection: XII of 12 December 1991.
Service Military: *Suspended 18 12 months for holders of master's degree.
Civilian: *Suspended 27 18 months for holders of master's degree.
Minimum Conscription: 18 Compulsory in the age of 18-26.
More https://ebco-beoc.org/ukraine
Conscientious objection to military service in Ukraine, insufficiently protected by Ukrainian

law before 2022, was effectively denied on disputed legal grounds (with small number of
135
https://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-retci-reha-eskidire-verilen-ceza-usule-aykiri-olarak-kesinlestirildi/
136
https://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-retci-cemal-karakusa-ayni-suclamayla-yeniden-ceza-verildi/
137
https://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-retci-seyda-can-yilmaza-askere-gitmedigi-icin-ceza-verildi/
138
https://vicdaniret.org/vicdani-retci-inan-mayis-aruya-6-ayri-davadan-ceza-verildi/
139
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:JOC_2022_493_R_0002

exceptions) by wartime policies after introduction of martial law because of full-scale Russian
invasion on 24 February 2022. Conscientious objectors risk to be forcibly conscripted,
detained, persecuted for their refusal to take arms, suffer from social stigma, lack of legal
recognition and access to alternative service, inability to leave the country.
International critique of wartime and previous human rights violations related to compulsory
military service, including EBCO’s call to release immediately and unconditionally prisoner of
conscience Vitaliy Alexeenko140, apparently, was ignored by the government of Ukraine – as
in previous years, before full-scale invasion, recommendations of international human rights
institutions and organizations regarding protection of the right to conscientious objection
were apparently ignored by the government and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine,
relevant legislation was not changed in accordance with international human rights standards
and perpetrators of arbitrary detentions of conscripts were not held accountable. In result,
harsh stopping and arrests of conscripts at the streets, their abduction and arbitrary
detention became usual and even partially legalized practice141, despite some scandalous
cases are formally investigated142143 (there is no information regarding trials on
perpetrators).
After introduction of martial law, regular term-limited conscription planned for 2022 by
presidential decree in December 2021 was cancelled by a presidential decree in April 2022.
Instead, term of service of conscripts was prolonged until the end of martial law, which
continues with no signs of ending when this report was written, and military mobilization
measures were taken (with new draftees conscripted for indefinite term) to increase size of
army four times, so its current size exceeds one million of soldiers.
Conscription in Ukraine during martial law and military mobilization engages all males in the
age from 18 to 60 with mandatory military registration of males from the age of 16 and
female professionals in medicine or pharmacy. Military registration includes medical
examination of fitness for service, and in absence of reasons for deferral, especially when
personnel is needed because of losses on frontline, anybody could be conscripted
immediately when declared fit to serve. In a number of cases military medics scandalously
failed to found unfit crippled and seriously ill people. For these reasons many people fear to
undergo military registration even when served with an order (summons) and failure to
appear could entail a significant fine. To coerce people for military registration, regulations
regarding presenting proofs of it in many spheres of civilian life are introduced. For example,
military ID is usually asked for mandatory registration of place of residence, to access
education, employment, marriage, social security benefits and other state services.
All males in age from 18 to 60 are considered subjects to military service unless exempted,
they can’t change place of residence without permission of the local military commissar and
140
Ukraine: Vitaly Alkeseenko is a prisoner of conscience and should be released immediately and
unconditionally, https://ebco-beoc.org/node/553
141
Robeyko Olga, “The lawyer commented on the video, when Ukrainians are taken by force to
military commissariats,” UNIAN, 18.03.23 (in Ukrainian),
https://www.unian.ua/society/viyskovozobov-yazanih-ukrajinciv-pakuyut-v-avto-y-tyagnut-do-
viyskkomatu-advokat-poyasniv-chi-zakonno-ce-12183474.html
142
Hard detention of a man during the delivery of conscription orders in Odesa: an official
investigation is scheduled (video), TSN 23.01.23 (in Ukrainian), https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/zhorstke-
zatrimannya-viyskovozobov-yazanogo-v-odesi-priznacheno-sluzhbovu-perevirku-video-
2249212.html
143
Tetyana Lozovenko, Valentina Romanenko. “A man from Odesa was harshly detained by the
Military Commissariat in the middle of the street. The South Operative Commandment says: the
guilty will be punished”. Ukrainska Pravda, 14 February 2023 (in Ukrainian),
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/02/14/7389339/

prohibited from leaving Ukraine, with some exceptions; as was noted by UN human rights
monitors, this policy is questionable both in its legality and reasonableness of breaching
human rights144145.
Legal recognition of conscientious objection in Ukraine is regulated by the restrictive 1991
law of Ukraine on alternative non-military service146, usually applied by the military
recruitment centers and by local administrations, responsible for organization of the
alternative service, in varying interpretations. Going beyond these restrictive regulations, it
is theoretically possible to invoke broader norms of Art. 35 (4) of the 1996 Constitution of
Ukraine, Art. 18 of ICCPR and Art. 9 of ECHR which formally are part of Ukrainian legislation,
but in the most cases such appeal to broader norms is ignored or rejected with reference to
restrictive regulations of the said law, even by courts, with very few exceptions. Ukrainian
government is not willing to comply with international human rights law in this regard and
imposed restrictions on the right of freedom of expression for public critique of Armed Forces
of Ukraine and advocacy of conscientious objection to military service in Ukraine147.
Practice of denial to recognize conscientious objection in military recruitment offices is
explained by a letter of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine of 21 August 2022 which says:
"Due to martial law, since 24.02.2022 the temporary military service in Ukraine is no longer
implemented. Therefore, the implementation of alternative service is not applicable."148
However, even Ukrainian national human rights institution recognizes illegitimacy of such
practices. According to the letter of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine Dmytro Lubinets to the Executive Secretary of the Civic Organization
"Ukrainian Pacifist Movement" Yurii Sheliazhenko No. 241.8/Ш/160.7/23/23/55 dated
03.03.2023: “legal norms according to which the right of the State to oblige its citizens to
undergo military service is not absolute and is limited to the right of every person to refuse
to perform military service, in particular for reasons of religion, are established in
international treaties, the consent to the binding legal force of which was given by the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, in particular in the article 9 of the Convention on the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Convention), as
well as Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. At the same
time, the right to refuse military service based on religious beliefs is absolute. Therefore, the
state cannot impose restrictions on the freedom to practice one's religion through compulsory
military service. Although the procedure for resolving the issue of referral to alternative (non-
military) service is regulated by the provisions of the Law of Ukraine "On Alternative (non-
144
https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/situation-human-rights-ukraine-context-
armed-attack-russian-federation
145
Amy Maguire, “Why banning men from leaving Ukraine violates their human rights,”
https://theconversation.com/why-banning-men-from-leaving-ukraine-violates-their-human-rights-
178411 ; “Sasha and Nikita are two young pacifists who don't want to fight and are now stranded in
Lviv as internally displaced persons. They are not allowed to leave the country - all Ukrainian males
between the ages of 18 and 60 are forbidden from doing so,” (in German),
https://www.instagram.com/p/CaxMFGOKfW7/c/17920321619132077/
146
Main problems of the said 1991 law are that the right to conscientious objection to military
service is not recognized for (1) those who hold non-religious beliefs incompatible with military
service, (2) those who do not belong to religious organizations of particular 10 confessions specified
in governmental decree, and (3) those who developed conscientious objection while conducting
military service. Also, it envisages disproportionate length of alternative service, 1.5 times longer
than military service, in absence of plausible explanations of such disproportion. Procedure of
application for alternative service too lacks of fairness.
147
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/2022-07-12/ukrainian-pacifist-
movement-HRC50.pdf
148
Ukraine suspended right to conscientious objection to military service. Connection e.V.
(05.09.2022). https://en.connection-ev.org/article-3614

military) Service", which does not contain legal norms regarding the conscription of citizens
of Ukraine for military service during mobilization for a special period - the Constitution of
Ukraine and international treaties have higher legal force (superiority over other domestic
legislative acts), and therefore the right of a person to alternative service (i.e., exemption
from military service upon conscription) is absolute and cannot be limited due to the absence
(lack of regulation by the laws of Ukraine) of the procedure for replacing military service with
alternative service during martial law”149
Since privileged confessions, traditionally allowed to alternative service, established special
relations with military authorities, they are not willing to advocate right to refuse to kill
publicly and almost never describe themselves as pacifist churches. In reward for such
loyalty, public support of army and war effort, humanitarian aid to army and population, and
sometimes because of corruption arrangements, such small and insular communities, or at
least members of their leading families, could be spared from some burdens of mobilization,
and their male clergy even could be allowed to travel abroad. There are signs of pressure on
religious communities by the military, for example, when recruitment center successfully
challenges in the court inaction of police in rare case when police refuses to open criminal
investigation after a crime report accusing in draft evasion a CO who belongs to one of
privileged churches.
While the army insists, that during martial law alternative service is not allowed, local
administrations (turned into local military administrations with introduction of martial law)
more or less embrace this position but may deviate from it. Using their discretion, local
military administrations in some cases: allowed some COs to continue their alternative
service under martial law (at least in 18 oblasts of 24 and Kyiv city); prolonged term of
alternative service until the end of martial law saving COs from obligation to undergo military
registration and risk to be conscripted after the end of their alternative service (Brovary
Raion of Kyiv Oblast); granted or held pending applications for alternative service under
martial law (Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv and Sumy Oblasts, Kyiv city). There are, however,
lot of cases when local administrations rejected applications of conscientious objectors or
terminated alternative service under martial law. For example, in 2022 local military
administrations of Ivano-Frankivsk region rejected 117 (i.e. 100% of) applications for
alternative service, 104 of which were lodged under martial law. In Kyiv oblast, some COs
were allowed to continue alternative service but for others it was terminated.
Annual survey of Ukrainian Pacifist Movement revealed 53% decrease at the end of 2022 in
number of conscientious objectors at alternative service among regions where local military
administrations provided relevant numbers (among those who refused, one answer was
“information became a weapon and its dissemination now could damage safety of people”).
Lacking updated information from Volyn, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Rivne, Kherson and Cherkasy
Oblasts, we can confirm that 617 COs conducted alternative service in Ukraine in 2022,
comparing to 1659 in 2021.
Number of reported COs on alternative service by regions of Ukraine in 2022,
comparing to 2021
Region / # of COs, year 2022 2021
Chernihiv Oblast 6 17
Chernivtsi Oblast 33 150
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 29 54
Donetsk Oblast 27 52
149
Letter of Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets, 3 March 2023,
https://t.me/sheliazhenko/137

Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast 78 141

Kharkiv Oblast 68 93
Khmelnytskyi Oblast 43 112
Kirovohrad Oblast 28 37
Kyiv (city) 32 46
Kyiv Oblast 24 43
Luhansk Oblast 1 11
Lviv Oblast 74 130
Odessa Oblast 37 41
Sumy Oblast 26 35
Ternopil Oblast 25 33
Vinnytsia Oblast 12 36
Zakarpattia Oblast 39 61
Zaporizhzhia Oblast 21 52
Zhytomyr Oblast 14 30
Oppressive treatment of objectors, lack of respect to human rights and peace culture in
society which allows to exist shameful stigma around refusal to serve in army are factors
that erode difference between conscientious objection and draft evasion. Without proper
peace studies, legitimization of conscientious objection and development of legal popular
peace movements, transparently financed, ethically consistent and, at least, tolerated (if not
joined) by elite, this immoral erosion is inevitable.
In such circumstances, usual ways to avoid compulsory military service, apart of picking from
tight circle of legal exemptions and deferrals (among which, perhaps only the enrolment to
higher education institutions is accessible by choice; number of male students on paid
courses increased almost twice), are evasion of military registration, any visits to recruitment
offices or any encounters with officers serving summons (some people prefer to sit home for
that purpose).
Also, there is a shadow market extorting bribes from evaders, selling corruption services
such as fraudulent exemptions and cross border smuggling.
Number of people fined for attempts to cross the border illegally increased from 2159 in 2021
to 5707 in 2022; according to the State Border Guard of Ukraine, during a year of martial
law, as on March 2023, number of people stopped when attempting to leave Ukraine
bypassing checkpoints was 11 000 and 4 000 of “evaders” additionally were stopped at
border checkpoints when trying to leave Ukraine with forged documents or in other illegal
manner. Usually, people purchase anonymous instructions how to cross the border, in that
way traffickers protect themselves, but there were 120 sentenced for trafficking in 2022
comparing to 60 in 2021. Choice in favor of black market is understandable, because the war
is breaking lives; one student prohibited from leaving Ukraine threatened to commit suicide,
other students organized regular protests at Shegyni checkpoint and were beaten by the
border guards.
In 2022 for several thousands of dollars it was possible to buy on the black market a
permission to go abroad as driver of humanitarian aid truck, even if you don’t have driver’s
license. Practices of unjust enrichment of military commissars, entitled to permit people to
go abroad at their discretion, and other officers and officials by corruption related to
conscription is well-known, and law enforcement agencies regularly report about arrests, but
nobody dares to change rules of the cruel “game” making it fairer for those who refuse to
kill.

Number of persons, sentenced by courts for crimes related to evasion of military

service in Ukraine
Art. of Criminal
Code of Ukraine / 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Year
335 (evasion of
112 152 182 313 215 136 86 38 7 22 19
conscription)
336 (evasion of
conscription during
186 2 1 11 13 45 220 935 139 0 0
mobilization, special
time, by reservists)
337 (evasion of
military registration
12 34 73 156 110 21 3 2 0 0 0
or military
gatherings)
407 (unauthorized
abandonment of 1036 1407 1506 2189 2267 2128 1937 1545 153 22 29
military unit)
408 (desertion) 154 220 152 239 224 381 307 171 29 2 1
409 (evasion of
military service by 19 8 8 3 3 6 25 92 23 11 11
self-harm or alike)
Conscientious objectors, even when their statements about beliefs incompatible with military
service are documented by investigation or the court, are usually treated as regular draft
evaders subject to Art. 336 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine: evasion of conscription during
mobilization, in special time, by reservists is punishable with three to five years of
imprisonment. Procedural law allows the court to suspend the sentence, replace incarceration
with probation or shorten it.
Vitaly Alekseenko, a Protestant Christian conscientious objector and internally displaced
person, was sentenced to one year of imprisonment for his refusal to kill and jailed after the
court of cassation upheld the sentence150. EBCO’s President Alexia Tsouni visited the prisoner
of conscience in the state institution "Kolomyiska Correctional Colony (No. 41)" and delivered
to him postcards with messages of solidarity from a series of individuals and organisations
in different countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Türkiye and
Ukraine), as well as photos of protest actions against his imprisonment at the Ukrainian
embassies worldwide.151 At the public hearing of European Parliament, EBCO’s Vice President
Sam Biesemans urged for his immediate and unconditional release, Dietmar Köster MEP
expressed support to the call152. Supreme Court scheduled hearings in Alekseenko’s case on
25th May 2023 but refused to suspend his sentence on time of proceedings.
Andrii Vyshnevetsky, a Christian pacifist, is held at frontline unit of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine despite he declared conscientious objection and asked for discharge. Commandment
of Ground Forces denied him a right of discharge on the grounds of conscience, referring to
current regulations of military service by the law and presidential decrees. He submitted a
lawsuit asking the Supreme Court to order President Zelensky to establish the procedure of
discharge from military service on the grounds of conscience, hearings in his case are
scheduled for 22nd May 2023.
Ruslan Kotsaba, a journalist and Christian pacifist accused in treason and obstruction of
army’s activities because of a YouTube blog posted in 2015 calling to boycott military
150
Felix Corley. UKRAINE: Conscientious objector now jailed. Forum 18 (27 February 2023),
https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2813
151
152

mobilization for armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, is still under a trial at the time of
preparation of this report. He was held in pretrial detention over 500 days153, proclaimed
prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International and political prisoner by U.S. Department
of State, acquitted and released in 2016, then under a pressure of armed mob higher court
quashed his verdict and ordered retrial during which violent mobs twice attacked him and
his lawyer with impunity, even after they injured his eye with a brilliant green dye. In 2022,
Kotsaba managed to leave Ukraine and participates in his hearings online from Ukrainian
embassy in United States, but he fears that the court under growing political pressure could
initiate his extradition to Ukraine. His lawyer Svitlana Novytska explains a rush to sentence
him suggesting that he, like other perceived “pro-Russian” figures, could be mistakenly
considered as valuable stock for POW exchange with Russia, despite it is unlikely to be true
since he publicly criticized Putin for aggressive war. EBCO called to drop all charges against
Ruslan Kotsaba154155.
Mykhailo Yavorsky, a Christian conscientious objector who stated that he cannot pick up a
weapon, wear a military uniform and kill people given his faith and relationship with God,
was sentenced to one-year imprisonment on 6 April 2023 by the Ivano-Frankivsk city court.
He intends to appeal; EBCO calls for his acquittal156.
Hennadii Tomniuk, a Christian conscientious objector denouncing all wars and violence in his
publications, a member of Evangelical Christian-Baptist church teachings of which are
incompatible with military service, received suspended three-year prison sentence157.
Appellate court refused both prosecutor’s complaint asking to change suspended sentence
(probation) with imprisonment and Tomniuk’s complaint asking to acquit him.
A number of other objectors were also punished by courts with probation for their refusal to
kill: Andrii Kucher, an entrepreneur who refused to kill because of his pacifist views, was
sentenced for suspended 4-year prison term; Dmytro Kucherov, a Protestant conscientious
objector, member of the Source of Life Church, Andrii Martiniuk, a Christian conscientious
objector, Oleksandr Korobko and Maryan Kapats who refused to kill were sentenced for
suspended 3-year prison terms.
During interactive dialogues regarding UN High Commissioner’s for Human Rights reports on
situation in Ukraine IFOR expressed concerns regarding violations of human right to
conscientious objection to military service in Ukraine where general mobilization to the army
is enforced without any exceptions for conscientious objectors and call-up orders are handed
out in public places including churches. IFOR reported about the current suspension of the
right to conscientious objection in Ukraine, the consequent detention sentences, the travel
ban for all men aged 18-60 and repression of student protests against the prohibition to
study abroad. Also, IFOR expressed concerns regarding forced mobilization of conscripts in
153
https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/4/15/ifor-submission-for-the-un-ohchr-quadrennial-report-on-
conscientious-objection-to-military-service
154
155
https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/7/19/ifor-joins-international-press-release-on-the-case-of-
pacifist-journalist-ruslan-kotsaba
156
157
IFOR stands up at the UN for conscientious objectors in Ukraine and refers the cases of Vitalii
Alexeenko, Hennadii Tomniuk and Andrii Vyshnevetsky March 31, 2023
https://www.ifor.org/news/2023/3/31/ifor-stands-up-at-the-un-for-conscientious-objectors-in-
ukraine-and-refers-the-cases-of-vitalii-alexeenko-hennadii-tomniuk-and-andrii-vyshnevetsky

Ukrainian occupied territories by the Russian Federation, which include imprisonment for
those who refuse to enlist158159160.
In concluding observations on the 8th periodic report of Ukraine161 Human Rights Committee
stressed that alternatives to military service should be available to all conscientious objectors
without discrimination as to the nature of their beliefs justifying the objection (be they
religious beliefs or non-religious beliefs grounded in conscience), and should be neither
punitive nor discriminatory in nature or duration by comparison with military service.
However, Ukraine took no measures to change legislation according to these
recommendations. Answering to letters of Ukrainian Pacifist Movements to Verkhovna Rada
(parliament) of Ukraine in September 2022 regarding progress in implementation of these
recommendations, parliamentary committee on human rights redirected the letter to the
Ministry of Justice which, in turn, responded the question is in jurisdiction of Ministry of
Defense, and parliamentary committee on national security, defense and intelligence
responded that proposals to change legislation to meet international human rights standards
will be disseminated among MPs. However, in February 2023 parliamentary committee on
human rights informed that questions of alternative nonmilitary service are in purview of the
committee on national security, defense and intelligence, which wrote that alternative service
could be allowed only instead of term-limited (peacetime) conscription, citing outdated
statutory law without any references to human rights.
Also, in concluding observations on the 8th periodic report of Ukraine the Human Rights
Committee expressed concern about reports that conscripts, including conscientious
objectors, are hunted down and delivered to military assembly points against their will and
about conscripts being subjected to arbitrary detention; it is also expressed concern about
the lack of information on investigations into such cases and on the prosecution of those
responsible. Ukraine failed to meet the recommendation that the State party should ensure
that cases of abduction and arbitrary detention of conscripts are promptly, thoroughly and
independently investigated, that perpetrators are prosecuted and punished and that victims
are provided with effective remedies, including adequate compensation. In response to a
request about such investigations and measures taken, Office of General Prosecutor of
Ukraine which supervises all criminal investigations in Ukraine in a letter of 10 February 2023
wrote that it has no public information regarding this question.
1.2.47 UNITED KINGDOM

Abolished in 1963. Conscription was
No legislated for via the National Service Act
Conscription: 1948 and preceding wartime legislation.
The UK has a long tradition of recognising

the right of individuals not to fight and, in
1916 1916, due to the combined efforts of
politicians and peace organisations, such as
the Quakers, the Military Service Act (27th
158
https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/7/5/ifor-addresses-the-un-human-rights-council-on-the-right-
to-conscientious-objection-and-the-war-in-ukraine
159
https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/10/7/ifor-speaks-at-the-un-on-conscientious-objection-
violations-and-peacebuilding-efforts-in-ukraine
160
https://www.ifor.org/news/2022/4/2/war-should-be-abolished-ifor-speaks-up-at-the-un-on-the-
right-to-conscientious-objection-in-wartime
161
Concluding observations of the UN Human Rights Committee regarding the Eighth Periodic Report
of Ukraine dated 9 February 2022, URL: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3957960?ln=en

Jan 1916) saw the UK become the first

country to give legal recognition to individual
conscience, which was subsequently
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The Act allowed for objectors
to be absolutely exempted, to perform
alternative civilian service, or to serve as a
non-combatant in the army's Non-
Combatant Corps, according to the extent to
which they could convince a Military Service
Tribunal of the quality of their objection.
Service Military: -
Civilian: -
Under 18: the minimum age for officer

Minimum entrants into Service is 17 and for other
ranks is 16. Parental consent must be
obtained for those under the age of 18
before an application can proceed.
All members of the Armed Forces may apply
to leave their Service on grounds of
conscience.
https://ebco-beoc.org/united-kingdom including the reply of the Equality

More and Human Rights Commission to the Questionnaire about EBCO’s Annual
Report 2022 (e-mail on 24/01/2023).
1.2.48 BELARUS (candidate member state)
Yes
Conscription:
First recognised in Constitution, Art. 57. First

1994
Conscientious objection: Alternative Service Law in 2015.
12 months for holders of higher education

Service Military: 18 and officers, 6 months for graduates of
officers' training at military faculties.
Civilian: 36 24 for holders of higher education.

Academies

More https://ebco-beoc.org/belarus
In 2022 there has been an increase of the militarization of the society, in particular through
military training programs of children and the institution of military-patriotic clubs for children
and youth.162 According to the statistics, in the summer of 2022 over 18.000 children
underwent training in militarized patriotic camps, where children as young as 6 have been
trained to use firearms, for instance. Those camps result to be under the patronage of the
Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Emergency Situations.163
Ongoing violations of the human right to conscientious objection to military service have
been registered.164 For instance, on August 18, 2022, a criminal case was brought against
two women in Vitebsk who tried to protect their son and nephew from military service. They
have been arrested and face up to seven years in prison165.
In August-December 2022, there have been at least six cases of men charged under Article
435, Part 1 of the Criminal Code (evasion of regular call-up to active military service). One
of them was fined 2,240 BYN (approximately 907 EUR)166. On September 29, 2022, a 24-
year-old man who wanted to avoid military service and went to Poland was tried. He was
detained on his return to Belarus and sentenced to a two-month arrest167.
Although in September 2022 it was stated that there would be no mobilization in Belarus,
starting from October it has been declared that Belarus would participate in a 'special
operation' and joint activities with the Russian militaries started168.
On October 12, 2022, the Belarusian parliament adopted in the first reading a draft law
which, among other things, updated the grounds for granting the right to defer conscription,
reducing the number of persons receiving deferment of conscription.
Additionally, death penalty has been reintroduced and for instance in May 2022, an
amendment to the Criminal Code introduced death penalty for attempted acts of terrorism.
162
https://president.gov.by/ru/documents/ukaz-no-160-ot-4-maya-2022-g
163
http://world_of_law.pravo.by/text.asp?RN=W21124351
http://world_of_law.pravo.by/text.asp?RN=C20400662
https://www.belta.by/president/view/v-belarusi-uregulirovana-dejatelnost-voenno-patrioticheskih-
klubov-dlja-detej-i-molodezhi-499658-2022/
https://www.sb.by/articles/kurs-molodogo-boytsa-forpost.html
164
https://news.house/43956
165
https://nash-dom.info/95234
166
https://pinsknews.by/archives/28663
167
https://nash-dom.info/112247
https://minsknews.by/minchanin-buduchi-prizyvnikom-uehal-v-polshu-no-nakazaniya-izbezhat-
emu-vse-ravno-ne-udalos/
168

2. OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL PROVISIONS

2.1 CONSCRIPTION
In 1960, conscription was almost universal in what is now the Council of Europe area.169 The
following map and table show the date on which it was abolished/suspended.
Map 1. European map of abolition / suspension of conscription
Table 1. Abolition / suspension of conscription in states within the Council of Europe

area
Time of abolition
Country / suspension Notes
(ascending order)
Andorra - Conscription never existed.

Iceland - Conscription never existed.
Conscription never existed in any part of Ireland,
Ireland - even when the entire island was park of the UK.
There is however provision in article 54 of the
169
The “Council of Europe area” includes Belarus, whose membership was suspended in 1997, and
Kosovo, which declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, and is recognised by most, but not all
CoE member states as independent. Both are included as relevant in all the analyses in this section.

1954 Defence Act, to enable male conscription

during emergencies.
Liechtenstein - Conscription never existed.
Malta - Conscription never existed.
Monaco - Conscription never existed.
San Marino - Conscription never existed.
United
1963 Conscription was abolished in 1963.
Kingdom
Luxembourg 1967 Conscription was abolished in 1967 by law.
Conscription was suspended in 1992 in
Belgium 1992
peacetime.
Conscription was suspended in 1997, but the law
on conscription still exists. At the age of 17, all
Netherlands 1997 citizens receive a letter stating they have been
registered for service. They can be called up in
case of war.
Conscription was suspended in 1997 according to
the law 97-1019. The law itself envisages the
France 1997 reintroduction when needed to defend the nation.
In 2019 a new Universal National Service for 15-
and 16-year-olds was introduced.
Conscription was suspended in 2002 by Royal
Spain 2002
Decree 247/2001, of 9 March.
Slovenia 2003 Conscription was abolished in 2003 in peacetime.
Conscription was suspended in 2004 by
Czechia 2004 amendment of the Military Act, and it can be
reintroduced in situation of threat or in wartime.
Conscription was abolished in 2004 in peacetime
Portugal 2004
according to law 174/99.
Conscription was abolished in 2005 in peacetime
Hungary 2005
by amendment of the Constitution.
Conscription was suspended in 2005 by law 226
Italy 2005
of 2004.
Bosnia &
2005
Herzogovina
Conscription was suspended in 2006 by decision
Montenegro 2006 of the President of Montenegro (30/08/2006)
following independence from Serbia.
Conscription was suspended in 2006 but it is
Slovakia 2006 legally retained and can be reinstituted in case of
emergency.
Conscription was suspended in 2007. A new kind
Latvia 2007 of project, called “Total Defence”, was introduced
in 2017.
Conscription was suspended in 2007 in peacetime
Romania 2007 by law 395/2005. During wartime conscription is
compulsory for men.

North
2007
Macedonia
Conscription was abolished in 2008 by
Bulgaria 2008 amendment of the Defence and Armed Forces
Act.
Conscription was suspended in 2008 by a
governmental decision. In 2019 a short-term
Croatia 2008 military service was introduced, but although
described as “conscriptio” this remains strictly
voluntary.
Kosovo declared independence in 2008. Since
Kosovo 2008 then conscription to the Serbian armed forces no
longer applied, and was not replaced.
Conscription was abolished in 2009 by
Poland 2009
amendment of the Constitution.
Albania 2010
Serbia 2011
Conscription was suspended in 2011 by a

parliamentary decision. It remains in the
Germany 2011
Constitution and it can be reintroduced at any
time.
In 18 of the 48 states in this area, conscription is still enforced. They are: Armenia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia (suspended but then
reintroduced in 2017), Greece, Lithuania (suspended in 2010 but then reintroduced in 2015),
Moldova, Norway, Russia, Sweden (reintroduced in 2018), Switzerland, Türkiye and Ukraine
(suspended but then reintroduced in 2014). Of former Soviet Republics, only in Latvia is
conscription currently suspended.
In most other states it has been merely suspended; the appropriate legislation remains on
the statute book, and could be rapidly reactivated in case of war or national emergency.
In practice, the meaning of conscription varies considerably between states. For example,
Sweden's reintroduced system is so selective that it is not currently envisaged that anyone
who does not volunteer will be called up. But this would rapidly change if the number of
volunteers forthcoming was not great enough to fulfil the military's manpower needs.
Sometimes the word is used in a completely meaningless fashion.
Among Council of Europe members, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino maintain
a token military for ceremonial purposes only, and Iceland has never had a military, although
it does maintain a small paramilitary coastguard. In none of these countries has conscription
ever applied. The same is also true of Malta and Ireland.
Conscription is also imposed by the de facto authorities in a number of territories which are
not internationally recognised: Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), Nagorno-Karabakh
(Azerbaijan), Transdniestria (Moldova), and the self-styled “Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus” and “Peoples Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk (Ukraine).

2.2 CONSCRIPTS AND CONTRACT OR PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS

Data on the precise number of conscripts serving in many countries are not readily available.
The latest estimates, generally from the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS),
are shown in the table below, as compared with the number of “career” soldiers. (The IISS
focuses more closely on military “hardware” than on personnel, for which its figures are
updated less often.)
Table 2. Number and percentage of conscripts 170
Total active
Of which % (descending Date of
Country strength of
conscripts order) estimate
armed forces
Switzerland 19,550 16,450 84.1% 2022
Ukraine 171 688,000 538,000 78.2% 2022
Türkiye 172 72.5% 2015
Finland 19,250 11,750 61.0% 2022
Cyprus 59.4% 2020
Estonia 7,200 3,500 48.6% 2022
Russia 173 1,190,000 550,000 46.2% 2022
Armenia 42,900 18,950 44.2% 2022
170
Except where otherwise stated, figures are for November 2022 as quoted in the Military Balance
2023, https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance
171
The number of professional soldiers in the Ukrainian army has been estimated as approximately
150,000. This is based on figures supplied by the Ministry of Defence for the EBCO Report 2021, which
showed that the number of conscripts recruited had dropped from just under 34,000 in 2019 to just
under 28,000 in 2021. Taken with the 18-month period of service this would have implied that in the
period before the Russian invasion approximately 45,000 conscripts were serving at one time.
172
Since 2015, the latest year for which we have an estimate of the proportion of conscripts, the
manpower of the Turkish armed forces has fallen from 511,00 to some 355,000, largely as a result of
purges following the failed coup attempt of July 2016. It is not known what effect this has had on the
proportion of conscripts.
173
According to the European Union Agency for Asylum’s December 2022 report: The Russian
Federation. Military Service. The number of conscripts called up in the normal manner in 2022 was
254,500 – 135,500 in the Spring and 120,000 in the Autumn. To this we have added the 300,000
called up in the “reserve mobilisation” announced in September.

Total active
Of which % (descending Date of
Country strength of
conscripts order) estimate
armed forces
Moldova 5,150 2,200 42.7% 2022
Greece 132,200 47,400 35.9% 2022
Norway 24,500 8,450 33.3% 2022
Sweden 14,600 4,000 27.4% 2022
Lithuania 23,000 5,650 24.6% 2022
Georgia 20,650 4,350 21.1% 2022
Figures for Cyprus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia refer to government forces only; we have
no estimates of the number of conscripts serving in Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus or Denmark.
For both Russia and Ukraine, we define those mobilised against their will as conscripts,
whatever their formal status. (The Russian mobilisation, for example, was officially described
as of “reservists”, who were no longer liable to conscription in the normal way, and in the
current mobilisation Ukraine has suspended its normal military service.) We also assume that
the increase in voluntary recruitment in both countries does not significantly affect the very
large numbers and general proportions reported here.
Table 3 gives an alternative measure of militarisation, comparing for each country the entire
armed forces manpower (whether conscript, contract, or professional) with the young male
population, who furnish the overwhelming majority of recruits. If conscription were truly
universal (which of course medical exemptions alone make impossible) and each conscript
served for one year, the conscript ratio would equal 100%. If the term of service were six
months, it would be 50%; if two years 200%, and so on. Likewise, an overall ratio of 100%
would be achieved if 10% of those available were to sign up on a voluntary basis for an
average of ten years each.
Where part of a State is outside effective government control, we have modified the national
population figures appropriately.174 We have also completely separated the figures for Kosovo
from those for Serbia; Kosovo’s international status remains ambiguous, but the EU firmly
guarantees its independence from Serbia.
174
The population estimates used, generally those quoted by Wikipedia in March 2023, are: Crimea
2,417,000; Donetsk 2,302,000 ; Luhansk 1,464,000 ; “TRNC” 383,000; Nagorno-Karabakh 120,000
(BBC estimate, February 2023); Abkhazia and South Ossetia 300,000; Transdniestria 469,000.

Table 3. Armed forces compared with potential number of recruits 175
Annual cohort of Total armed forces As %

Country
males reaching 18 active strength (descending order)
368.5 (conscripts
Ukraine (govt) 186,725 688,000 247.2%+)
(Donetsk & Luhansk) 18,830 34,000 (2021) 180.6 (conscript nos.
unknown)
246.5 (conscripts
Armenia 17,406 42,900
108.9%)
235.0 (conscripts
Cyprus Republic 5,107 12,000 145%?)
(“TRNC”) 2,145 3,000 140.0 (conscript nos
unknown)
224.1 (conscripts
Greece 58,990 132,200
80.3%)
Lithuania 13,420 23,000 171.4 (conscripts

42.1%)
155.2 (conscripts
Russia 766,919 1,190,000
74.3%)
114.3 (conscripts
Estonia 6,297 7,200
55.6%)
105.8 (conscript nos.
Belarus (2021) 45,317 47,950
unknown)
Bulgaria 35,740 36,950 103.4
Serbia 27,250 28,150 103.3
64,050 84.6 (conscript nos.

Azerbaijan (govt) 75,724
not known, but conscription unknown)
(Nagorno-Karabakh) 888
imposed
20,650
Georgia (govt) 25,040 82.5 (conscripts 17.4%)
not known, but
(Abkhazia, S.Ossetia) 1,612
conscription imposed
Malta 2,134 1,700 79.7
Croatia 20,945 16,700 79.7
Norway 32,213 25,400 78.9 (conscripts 26.2%)
Romania 100,008 71,500 71.5
Latvia 9,578 6,600 68.9
175
Figures for November 2022 derived from those given by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in “The Military Balance 2023”, except as modified in Table 2. Where estimates are available
for numbers in areas outside Government control these are given separately in italics.

North Macedonia 11,934 8,000 67.0
Slovakia 27,155 17,950 66.1
Slovenia 10,084 6,400 63.5
Montenegro 3,751 2,350 62.6
Poland 182,846 114,050 62.4
Hungary 52,218 32,250 61.6
Finland 31,371 19,250 61.4 (conscripts 37.4%)
Bosnia-Herzegovina 17,554 10,500 59.8
Italy 293,261 161,050 54.9

Austria 42,782 23,300
unknown)
Türkiye 664,384 355,200
unknown)
Czechia 53,525 26,600 49.7
Spain 254,680 124,150 48.7
Portugal 55,306 26,700 48.3
France 423,491 203,250 48.0
Germany 387,858 183,150 47.2
Switzerland 42,545 19,550 46.0 (conscripts 38.7%)
15,400 43.3 (conscript nos.

Denmark 35,526
unknown)
Albania 19,189 7,500 39.1
United Kingdom 393,188 150,350 38.2
Belgium 68,713 23,200 33.8
Netherlands 100.926 33,600 33.3
5,150
Moldova (govt) 16,908
not known, but conscription 30.5 (conscripts 13.0%)
(Transdniestria) 2,720
imposed

Ireland 33,760 8,200 24.3
Sweden 60,807 14,600 24.0 (conscripts 6.6%)
176
Kosovo 10,489 2,500 23.8
Luxembourg 3,640 410 11.3
177
Iceland 2,291 250 10.9
176
Paramilitary security force.
177
Paramilitary coastguards.

2.3 RECOGNITION OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

With the solitary exception of Türkiye, all Council of Europe states, which have ever had
conscription, have explicitly recognised conscientious objection.
The following map and table give the date, either in legislation or a constitutional document,
of the first reference to conscientious objection to military service. This should not be taken
as implying full recognition, or provisions in line with modern international standards. For
example, constitutional provisions in Bulgaria, Russia and Belarus were not implemented for
many years; similar provisions have still to be implemented in Azerbaijan. In many cases
the initial legislation applied only to certain religious minorities and/or merely made an
unarmed military service available. Despite legal recognition, the persecution of
conscientious objectors often persisted – and persists. It should be noted that recognition of
conscientious objection is also beginning to reach places which are not internationally-
recognised – most notably Transdniestria. 178
Map 2. European map of first recognition of conscientious objection to military
service
178
See EBCO Annual Report 2014, Chapter 1.2.6 Moldova. Available at: http://ebco-
beoc.org/sites/ebco-beoc.org/files/attachments/2014-EBCO-REPORT-EUROPE.pdf

Table 4. First Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service in States

within the Council of Europe area 179
Year
(ascending Country Provision
order)
1916 United Kingdom Military Service Act, 27th Jan.
1917 Denmark Alternative Service Act, 13th Dec.
1920 Sweden Alternative Service Schemes Act, 21st May
1922 Netherlands Constitutional amendment
1922 Norway Civilian Conscript Workers Act, 24th March
1931 Finland Alternative Service Act, 4th June

In principle in the Grundgesetz “Basic Law” of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 4. The first
1949 Germany
provisions in the German Democratic Republic
dated from 1964.
1955 Austria National Service Act
1963 France Act No. 1255/63, 21st December
1963 Luxembourg Act of 23rd July, Art. 8
1964 Belgium Act of 3rd June
1972 Italy Act No. 772/1972
1976 Portugal Constitution, Article 41
1978 Spain Constitution
1988 Poland Constitution, Art. 85
1989 Hungary Constitution, Art. 70
1990 Croatia Constitution, Article 47.2
Law on Substitute Service of the Latvian Soviet

1990 Latvia
Socialist Republic.
179
Even if Belarus is not in Council of Europe area, when available, tables indicate Belarusian
information.

Year
(ascending Country Provision
order)
Law on Alternative Service of the Lithuanian Soviet

1990 Lithuania
Socialist Republic.
1991 Bulgaria Constitution, Article 59.2
Military Service Act (Official Journal of the Republic

1991 Slovenia
of Slovenia, n˚18/91).
1991 Ukraine Law “On Alternative (Non-Military) Service”
1992 Estonia Constitution, Article 124
1992 Moldova Alternative Service Act, No. 633/91
Republic of
1992 National Guard Act, No. 2/1992, 9th Jan.
Cyprus
Czechia and
1992 (Czechoslovakian) Civilian Service Act, No.18/1992
Slovakia
1992 Georgia Military Service Act, Art. 12

Serbia (including Constitution, Art. 58 – Montenegro gained
1992 Kosovo) and independence in 2006; Kosovo declared
Montenegro independence in 2008.
Constitutional amendment by introducing the
1992 Switzerland following phrase in Art. 59 lit. 1: “Alternative
civilian service shall be provided for by law.”
1993 Russia Constitution, Art. 59.3
Constitution, Art. 57.

1994 Belarus
First Alternative Service Law in 2015.
1995 Azerbaijan Constitution, Art. 76
Bosnia & Parallel Defence Acts in the Federation and in the

1996
Herzegovina Republika Srpska
1996 Romania Act No. 46/1996, Art. 4
1997 Greece Law No. 2510/97
1998 Albania Constitution, Art. 166
2001 North Macedonia Defence Act, Art. 8
2003 Armenia Alternative Service Act

2.4 COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN SERVICE

Map 3. European map of conscientious objection to military service
For the countries which retain conscription, the relative durations are shown in the following
table. The duration of military service quoted is that of the normal basic military service in
the army, before any adjustments to reflect rank, educational qualifications, etc.
Table 5. Duration of military and civilian service (in months) in states within the
Council of Europe area
Military Civilian Ratio to military

Country service service service duration Gender
duration duration (ascending order)
No alternative service required of Men are obliged by

Norway 12
conscientious objectors. law.
Men and women are

Sweden 11 Civil conscription is not activated. obliged by law.
Men are obliged by

Denmark 4 4 1 law. Women may
participate.

Men are obliged by

Moldova 12 12 1 law.
Men are obliged by

law. The Defence
Estonia 8-11 12 1-1.5 Forces Service Act of
2013 states that
women can volunteer.
Men are obliged by
~5.5, 8.5
Finland ~11.5 1-2.1 law. Women can
or 11.5
volunteer.
10
Lithuania 9 (Νot Men are obliged by

1.1
genuine law.
civilian)
Men are obliged by

Greece 9 or 12 15 1.25-1.7
law.
19
(No 1.4
Republic of Men are obliged by
14 alternative (No alternative
Cyprus law.
(12-15) civilian civilian service
(“TRNC”)
service available)
available)
Men are obliged by
Austria 6 9 1.5
law.
Men are obliged by

Switzerland ~9 ~13 1.5 law. Women can
volunteer.
Men are obliged by

Ukraine 18 or 12 27 or 18 1.5 law.
Men are obliged by

Georgia 12 18 1.5 law.
Men are obliged by

Armenia 24 36 1.5 law.
Men are obliged by

Russia 12 21 1.75 law.
18 or 12 Men are obliged by

Belarus 36 or 24 2
or 6 law.

No alternative civilian service Men are obliged by

Türkiye 6
available. law.
No alternative civilian service Men are obliged by

Azerbaijan 18
available. law.

2.5 MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Yet another measure of militarisation is given by military expenditure. Table 6 shows the
figures for the Council of Europe area in 2022 as reported by the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 180
The biggest proportional increases in 2022 were in Ukraine (640,4%), Luxembourg (40%),
Kosovo (35,2%), Lithuania (32,6%), Russia (31,1%), Albania (29,6%), Finland
(28,5%), and Armenia (28,4%). The biggest proportional decreases in 2022 were in
Türkiye (-31,6%), Hungary (-15,9%), Austria (-13,6%), Bosnia & Herzegovina (-
12,0%), and Portugal (10,2%). (The year-on-year figures are obviously subject to variation
as a result of the timing of large capital expenditures.)
Of course, the crude expenditure figures, while giving some indication of military might, do
not indicate how dominant a part military expenditure plays in the economy. Therefore, for
each country the military expenditure per head of population and as a share of GDP are
listed. On which measure should one rely? In fact, none taken on its own provides the whole
story. The dramatic decline in Turkish military expenditure, for instance, mainly reflects the
depreciation of the Turkish Lira against the dollar. All should be seen together.
For the first time ever, SIPRI reported a figure for EU military expenditure. " In July 2022,
the European Defence Fund (EDF), the instrument announced by the Commission to foster
research and development collaboration among companies across EU member states,
announced the results of its 2021 call for proposals, with £1.3m [0.3% of GDP] being split
among 61 projects. (...) The EDF is funded through member states contributions to the EU
budget and are thus not part of the member states [own] military expenditure."
Table 6. Military expenditure in states within the Council of Europe area 181
Military Expenditure % change US$ per % of

Country
US$ million 2022 in 2022 capita GDP
Albania 288,7 29,6% 100,7 1,6%
Armenia 795,2 28,4% 267,6 4,3%
Austria 3625,6 -13,6% 399,9 0,8%
Azerbaijan 2991,0 10,6% 290,4 4,5%
Belarus 820,8 7,6% 87,0 1,2%
Belgium 6867,0 10,1% 588,5 1,2%
Bosnia &
184,5 -12,0% 56,8 0,8%
Herzegovina
180
Figures derived from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (Current USD). Available at:
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
181
Ibid


Country
Bulgaria 1336,0 4,8% 195,2 1,5%
Croatia 1308,5 -3,9% 322,4 2,2%
Republic of
494,2 -8,8% 404,1 1,8%
Cyprus
Czechia 4005,4 1,8% 373,0 1,4%
Denmark 5467,9 3,7% 937,1 1,4%
Estonia 810,9 8,3% 613,4 2,1%
Finland 4822,9 28,5% 868,2 1,7%
France 53638,7 -5,3% 817,9 1,9%
Georgia 360,3 19,9% 90,8 1,4%
Germany 55759,7 -1,3% 664,7 1,4%
Greece 8104,9 -2,4% 785,6 3,7%
Hungary 2572,2 -15,9% 267,8 1,5%
Iceland 0,0 0% 0 0%
Ireland 1164,3 -8,2% 231,9 0,2%
Italy 33489,7 -7,6% 555,7 1,7%
Kosovo 107,6 35,2% 55,0 1,1%
Latvia 848,8 3,1% 459,0 2,0%
Lithuania 1732,3 32,6% 650,7 2,5%
Luxembourg 564,6 40,0% 879,5 0,7%


Country
Malta 87,0 -1,1% 195,9 0,5%
Moldova 47,7 -8,7% 11,9 0,3%
Montenegro 98,0 7,5% 156,1 1,6%
Netherlands 15606,6 11,9% 906,8 1,6%
North
225,0 9,4% 108,1 1,6%
Macedonia
Norway 8388,4 -0,6% 1522,1 1,6%
Poland 16573,1 9,7% 439,1 2,4%
Portugal 3500,3 -10,2% 345,2 1,4%
Romania 5186,7 -2,1% 272,5 1,7%
Russia 86373,1 31,1% 592,4 4,1%
Serbia 1426,4 12,2% 164,8 2,3%
Slovakia 1994,2 -3,4% 365,2 1,8%
Slovenia 735,2 -3,6% 353,8 1,2%
Spain 20306,6 3,9% 434,7 1,5%
Sweden 7722,5 1,8% 755,7 1,3%
Switzerland 6145,2 -1,1% 700,4 0,8%
Türkiye 10644,6 -31,6% 124,4 1,2%
Ukraine 43997,7 640,4% 1018,7 33,5%
United
68462,6 1,4% 999,5 2,2%
Kingdom

Total global military expenditure increased by 3.7 per cent in real terms in 2022, to reach
a new high of $2240 billion. Military expenditure in Europe saw its steepest year-on-year
increase in at least 30 years. The three largest spenders in 2022—the United States, China
and Russia—accounted for 56 per cent of the world total.
World military spending grew for the eighth consecutive year in 2022 to an all-time high of
$2240 billion. By far the sharpest rise in spending (+13 per cent) was seen in Europe and
was largely accounted for by Russian and Ukrainian spending. However, military aid to
Ukraine and concerns about a heightened threat from Russia strongly influenced many other
states’ spending decisions, as did tensions in East Asia.
Military expenditure by states in Central and Western Europe totalled $345 billion in 2022.
In real terms, spending by these states for the first time surpassed that in 1989, as the cold
war was ending, and was 30 per cent higher than in 2013. Several states significantly
increased their military spending following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022,
while others announced plans to raise spending levels over periods of up to a decade. 182
182
Ibid

2.6 JUVENILE RECRUITMENT

The following table of recruitment ages shows that although the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict
encourages States to end all recruitment of persons below the age of 18, a disturbing number
of European States still recruit volunteers at younger ages, while others have military
educational establishments where students even aged under 18 are treated as members of
the armed forces.
Worse, some allow conscripts to enlist before their 18th birthday, arguably in itself breaching
the protocol and potentially putting them at risk of active deployment before the age of 18,
which is certainly prohibited.
Table 7. Minimum armed forces enlistment age in practice in states within the
Council of Europe area
Minimum Minimum voluntary enlistment

Country
conscription age age
Albania No conscription 19
Under 18 for military schools: 17

Armenia 18
for cadets
Austria 18 Under 18: 17 on request

Azerbaijan 18
for cadets
Belarus 18
for Military Academies
Belgium No conscription 18
Bosnia &
No conscription 18
Herzegovina
Bulgaria No conscription 18
Croatia No conscription 18
Republic of
17 Under 18: 17
Cyprus
Czechia No conscription 18
Denmark 18 18
Estonia 18 18


Country
Finland 18 18
Under 18: 17, 16 for Technical

France No conscription
School
Georgia 18 18
Germany No conscription Under 18: 17
Greece 19 18
Hungary No conscription 18
Iceland No conscription No armed forces
Ireland No conscription 18
Italy No conscription 18
Latvia No conscription 18
Lithuania 19 18
Luxembourg No conscription 18
Malta No conscription 18

Moldova 18
for Military School
Montenegro No conscription 18
Netherlands No conscription Under 18: 17
North Macedonia No conscription 18
Norway 18 18
Poland No conscription 18


Country
Portugal No conscription 18
Romania No conscription 18

Russia 18
for Military School
Serbia No conscription 18
Slovakia No conscription 18
Slovenia No conscription 18
Spain No conscription 18
Sweden 18 18
Switzerland 18 18
Türkiye 19

Ukraine 18
for cadets
United Kingdom No conscription Under 18: 16
Source: http://childsoldiersworldindex.org/minimum-ages, January 2021, updated by EBCO in

April 2023
Careful reading of the legislation in both Greece and Cyprus shows that a person is defined
as reaching the age of 18 on the first of January of the year of the 18th birthday. In Greece
the conscription age is officially 19, thus effectively 18, but voluntary recruitment is permitted
from the beginning of the year of the 18th birthday.
In Cyprus, the conscription age is 18, meaning, under the legislative definition, that all men
become liable for conscription at the age of 17. This is a clear violation of Article 2 of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children
in armed conflict (OPAC).
Worse, the age for voluntary recruitment is set at 17 – meaning potentially 16 – and as in
Austria there is provision for conscripts to opt to perform their obligatory military service
from the age of 17. In the case of Cyprus, this therefore means that some conscripts may
be enlisting at the age of 16.

It is ironic that at a time when some states claim to be reintroducing conscription, but actually
taking only volunteers, others try to pass off as volunteers those who opt to perform
obligatory service early. But if they are more logically defined as conscripts, their recruitment
below the age of 18 is a breach of OPAC.
In both the United Kingdom and Germany, all recruitment is voluntary, but recruits are
accepted – indeed sought – in the UK from the age of sixteen and in Germany from
seventeen.
In its submission for the Universal Periodic Review of the United Kingdom,183 the Child Rights
Information Network (CRIN) reports:
“In 2020–21, the UK enlisted 3,260 children aged under 18. 7 in 10 of these recruits joined
the army, making up a quarter of its intake; more soldiers are recruited at 16 than any other
age. Army recruits aged under 18 have a ‘tendency to live in poorer areas’, and are sought
‘particularly for the Infantry’; the lower-skilled, higher-risk jobs...
“Child recruits have no right to leave the armed forces during the first six weeks, after which
a 14-day notice period applies. After the first six months, a three-month notice period applies
until the age of 18, at which point the discharge window closes until the age of 22.
“In the army, once the initial discharge window closes, the minimum period of service applied
to enlisted children is up to two years longer than that applied to enlisted adults. Specifically,
whereas soldiers who enlist as adults and serve for four years may leave the army, those
enlisted as children who serve for four years cannot; they become eligible to leave only once
they turn 22.
“30% of child recruits in the army drop out of training.
“Research by Glasgow University, published in 2021, compared long-term mental health
outcomes of child recruits and same-age civilians. The study found that child recruits enlisted
from around 1995 had between two and three times the odds of long-term posttraumatic
stress disorder compared to civilians from similar social backgrounds.
“Similar research by King’s College, London, also published in 2021, found that, since
2003,soldiers recruited aged 16–17½ have had ‘twice the odds of alcohol misuse and twice
the odds of reporting episodes of lifetime self-harm’ relative to those recruited at older ages.
“The main army training centre for child recruits is subject to multiple allegations of abuse
by its staff; 60 formal complaints of violence by instructors against recruits have been
recorded since 2014. [A recent report by CRIN on this subject is referenced in “new
publications” section below.]
“Between 2015 and 2020, girls under 18 in the armed forces made 41 formal complaints of
sexual assault or rape to the police. This equivalent to a rate of 2.5%, double that found
among civilian girls of the same age.”
CRIN continues its campaign to win Parliamentary support for a raidsing of the minimum
recruitment age to 18 in all circumstances.
Parallel information for Germany is contained in the submission made by Terre des Hommes
Germany to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.
“Since 2011 till 2021, the German Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, have recruited more than
15,000 17-year-old boys and girls as soldiers. In 2021, 1239 minors (1000 boys and 239
girls) have been recruited – an increase of 8% compared to 2020 (1148 minors). The minor
soldiers receive the same military training as adults and are often housed together with
183
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/gb-stakeholders-info-s41

them; the legal protection of minors and the Youth Employment Protection Act are not
respected. Even if they are not sent on foreign missions before they reach the age of majority
and are not allowed to perform armed guard duty, they are exposed to severe risks.”
“In the three years alone from 2018 to 2020, at least eight underage soldiers were injured
in accidents, one committed suicide, and 17 reported that they had been victims of so-called
"crimes against sexual self-determination," i.e. verbal or physical sexual violence. These are
only the reported cases, the number of unreported cases is likely to be high. In almost a
third of the cases of sexual violence, superiors are suspected of the crime, which points to
abuse of power and a systemic problem by the military structures.
“In addition, according to the ministry, almost one in four Bundeswehr soldiers without
deployment experience suffers from mental illness. Data on underage soldiers is not
available, but it can be assumed that they are disproportionately affected, since scientific
studies have shown that young people are particularly mentally unstable and sensitive.”
They quote the specific case of an underage soldier who developed a stress-induced
preliminary stage of schizophrenia because of the psychological stress he suffered during his
time in the German Armed Forces.
Tellingly, they also report, quoting a radio interview, that “Due to the obvious problems with
minor soldiers, the current Military Commissioner Eva Högl is a supporter of lifting the
recruitment age to 18”.

2.7 SERVING MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY

As reported under Germany, a total of 1,082 requests from serving members of the military
for recognition as conscientious objectors were lodged in 2022, up from 201 the previous
year. Comparable statistics do not exist for other States, because none have such clearly-
defined procedures for making such requests. One has to assume that were the possibility
to become available elsewhere, a similar level of demand would be revealed.
Meanwhile, also in Germany, the appeal of former US serviceman André Shepherd against
the refusal of his asylum claim, referred back to the German authorities in 2015 by the EU
Court of Justice remains pending, as it has since 2017.

2.8 CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS AND ASYLUM

There is ample political and legal backing for the granting of asylum to conscientious
objectors to military service.
The UN Commission on Human Rights, in operational paragraph 7 of its Resolution 1998/77,
states: “[the Commission] encourages States, subject to the circumstances of the individual
case meeting the other requirements of the definition of a refugee as set out in the 1951
Convention184 (…) to consider granting asylum to those conscientious objectors compelled to
leave their country of origin because they fear persecution owing to their refusal to perform
military service where there is no provision, or no adequate provision, for conscientious
objection to military service”.
Detailed guidance on the application of refugee law in such cases, taking into account
advances in State practice, international standards, and human rights jurisprudence, has
been given by the UN High Commission for Refugees first in the “Handbook”,185 the text of
which dates from 1979, although it has twice been reissued unamended, and then in the
“Guidelines”186 published in 2014. For EU States it has been supplemented by Qualification
Directive 2004/83.
The issue first attracted wide attention at the time of the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s. Both
the European Parliament187 and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE)188 passed resolutions as a result of which many member States granted asylum to
objectors fleeing that conflict. It is worth quoting Paragraph 13 of the PACE resolution in
which member states are invited:
“a. to bear in mind, when examining requests for protection from deserters and draft resisters
from the former Yugoslavia, the serious risks of persecution these persons would run if they
returned;
b. to examine all applications for asylum submitted by deserters and draft resisters from the
former Yugoslavia with reference to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and the recommendations of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees as set out in the Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee
status;
c. to refrain from deporting, or even from threatening to deport, deserters and draft resisters
from the former Yugoslavia until such time as an amnesty has been declared and they can
return home in complete safety;
d. to consider each case involving the return of deserters and draft resisters in the light of
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that "no one shall be
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".
184
“a person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
185
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
186
Guidelines for International Protection, No. 10: Claims to Refugee Status related to Military Service
within the context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, 2014.
187
Official Journal of the European Communities, C 315, 22 November 1993 p. 234, Resolution of
28th October 1993
188
Resolution 1042, 1st July 1994

Over the subsequent years there have been numerous cases where conscientious objectors
have – sometimes with the help of EBCO – successfully sought political asylum in EU
countries. For instance, as detailed in past Reports, conscientious objectors from Türkiye
have obtained asylum in France, Germany and Italy (and one might also add Halil Savda
who obtained asylum in Cyprus having had to flee Türkiye as a result of persecution over his
advocacy of conscientious objection), objectors from Syria and Eritrea are known to have
obtained asylum in Germany, at least one South Korean in France and, before the Russian
invasion, at least three conscientious objectors from Ukraine in Italy. Sadly, there have also
been failures; most recently we had to report the case of a conscientious objector from
Azerbaijan with a strong case whose application for asylum in Belgium was refused in 2020.
In the last year, this issue has come to the fore on a scale which could dwarf the Yugoslav
precedent, with the possibility of many thousands of asylum applications from persons
avoiding service in the war in Ukraine.
Following the Russian invasion on 24th February, the Ukrainian response with regard to
conscientious objection was threefold. A general mobilisation was declared; the existing
military service provisions (which included a civilian service alternative for conscientious
objectors, although woefully inadequate, being available only to members of ten named
religious denominations, comprising in total a mere 1.3% of the national population) were
suspended, and all men below the age of 60 were barred from leaving the country – or indeed
from relocating from their usual address.
In Russia after the invasion military recruitment initially continued to rely on Spring and
Autumn call-ups of young men reaching the age of 18, with conscientious objectors able to
apply to perform Alternative Civilian Service, the conditions of which however were punitively
burdensome compared to those of military service. However on 21st September President
Putin announced a “partial reserve mobilisation” (accompanied by a postponement by one
month of the normal Autumn call-up). Although this was supposedly to be of trained military
personnel with relevant skills, all accounts indicate that it was implemented indiscriminately
and that many persons who had never performed military service found themselves called-
up. Contrary to the international standards, as this was defined as a reserve mobilisation,
no opportunity of alternative civilian service was made available.
Belarus is also affected. It has openly supported the Russian action, and made its territory
available for the launch of the invasion. So far it has not been directly drawn into the conflict,
or announced a mobilisation similar to that in Russia, but both remain a distinct prospect.
As recently as 16th February 2023, Belarussian President Lukashenko was quoted by Reuters
as saying "I am ready to fight with the Russians from the territory of Belarus in only one
case: If even one soldier comes onto the territory of Belarus to kill my people. If they commit
aggression against Belarus, the response will be the most severe, and the war will take on a
completely different nature." And already in February 2021, like Russians in the new
mobilisation, a Belarusian Jehovah’s Witness, Dimitry Mozol, was punished for refusing call-
up to reserve training when he had not previously performed military service and so been
able to apply for recognition as a conscientious objector.
As a conservative estimate, Connection e.V. calculated in September 2022, shortly after the
announcement of the new mobilisation, that more than 150,000 men subject to military
service had left Russia, more than 145,000 had left Ukraine and more than 22,000 had left
Belarus, The figure for Ukraine has of February 2023 been updated to 175,000;189 other
sources estimate that perhaps as many as 700,000 people, mainly men seeking to avoid
189
Friedrich, R. “Germany: Federal Office for Migration rejects asylum for Russian refusers: Russia,
Belarus, Ukraine: What about the protection of refusers?, 17th February 2023,
https://en.connection-ev.org/article-3736

recruitment, left Russia in the month after mobilisation was declared, so it is clear that the
150,000 figure for Russia will eventually need to be very substantially revised upwards. It
is impossible at this stage to say how many of these cases will eventually result in asylum
applications in Europe. It must however be emphasised that numbers are essentially
irrelevant. The return of anyone against his or her will to face recruitment into warring forces
is a tragedy.
Shortly after the Russian invasion, the EU issued Decision 2022/382190 which has the effect
that all displaced residents of Ukraine and their families should be given leave to remain for
one year – a period which could in the light of circumstances be twice expanded for a further
six months, in order to postpone any decisions about refugee status. It is now seems clear
that this time period will need to be extended, but such protection will continue to apply
equally to men of “military age” who have succeeded in leaving Ukraine. However,
conscientious objectors will need more than temporary protection, for even if returned only
after the end of hostilities they would still face punishment – up to three years’ imprisonment
for refusing call-up, up to twelve years where the objection was not manifested until after
enlistment. And over and above any formal penalties men who have remained outside the
country are likely to face considerable general social persecution on return.
For Russians, the biggest problem is in getting to a position from which an EU asylum
application could be lodged. By the time of the mobilisation there were no longer any direct
flights, and the member States with land borders had closed them to all Russians. To arrive
in the EU thus involves a tortuous journey usually starting typically with arrival in
Kazakhstan, Georgia or Türkiye – and for Russian citizens there is moreover no automatic
right of entry. And there is always the additional problem posed by the Dublin accords, which
require that any asylum application be lodged in the first EU State reached.
Conscientious objectors who can prove that they would be recruited on return to Ukraine,
Russia or Belarus ought to qualify automatically for asylum. They face persecution, which
according to the Guidelines (para 18), arises “where the individual would be forced to
undertake military service or participate in hostilities against their conscience, or risk being
subjected to prosecution and disproportionate or arbitrary punishment for refusing to do so”.
It is irrelevant that in Russia much, and in Ukraine all, of the current recruitment is described
as “mobilisation”, it is its obligatory nature which constitutes persecution. Nor are persons
who have indeed already undertaken military service and are recalled as reservists, nor
deserters who (as in these States) had no opportunity to apply for release from service on
grounds of conscience, excluded from protection as conscientious objectors. Paragraph 8 of
the Guidelines recalls that the right “applies to absolute, partial, or selective objectors,
volunteers as well as conscripts before and after joining the armed forces; during peace time
and during armed conflict. It includes objection to military service based on moral, ethical,
humanitarian or similar motives.”. Under Article 19 of the Guidelines, the protection extends
also to those who in Russia and Belarus might have had access to Alternative Civilian Service,
as the arrangements in both countries have been found by the UN Human Rights Committee
to be punitive.
Such persecution could almost always be defined as on the basis of religion, which under the
Qualification Directive “shall in particular include the holding of theistic, non-theistic and
atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in private or in
public, either alone or in community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view,
190
Implementing decision 2022/382 - Existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine
within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing
temporary protection, 4th March, 2022

or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any religious belief;”

(Article 10.2b).
It may however also be established that conscientious objectors are singled out for
persecution on the basis of perceived political opinion or membership of a particular social
group. “Selective objectors” to the Russian invasion of Ukraine would certainly fall into the
former category, but it is arguable that in the eyes of the State conscientious objection, or
the pacifism on which it is based is, often seen as in itself representing a political position.
As for membership of a particular social group, the EU Directive states: “a group shall be
considered to form a particular social group where in particular: — members of that group
share an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a
characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should
not be forced to renounce it, and that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country,
because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society”. In the context of the
current conflict, conscientious objectors who have left their country could surely meet all the
requirements of this definition.
“Refugee claims relating to military service may also be expressed as an objection to (i) a
particular armed conflict or (ii) the means and methods of warfare [the conduct of a party to
a conflict]. The first objection refers to the unlawful use of force [jus ad bellum], while the
second refers to the means and methods of warfare as regulated by international
humanitarian law [jus in bello], as well as international human rights and international
criminal law. Collectively such objections relate to being forced to participate in conflict
activities that are considered by the applicant to be contrary to the basic rules of human
conduct. ” (Guidelines, para 26).
The Handbook had already stated “Where (...) the type of military action, with which an
individual does not wish to be associated is condemned by the international community as
contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft evasion could
(...) in itself be regarded as persecution.” (Para 171)
Classic cases decided according to these principles were those of Ciric in Canada in 1994
regarding the Yugoslav wars,191 and, regarding the likelihood of being involved in war crimes
or crimes against humanity, Krotov in the UK in 2004, regarding a deserter from the Russian
army in the Chechnya192.
It might also be observed that where illegality is “objectively” found to exist, the objection
need not necessarily be based on grounds of conscience, although such arguments will in
practice usually strengthen the case. In particular, given that a person who commits war
crimes or crimes against humanity cannot invoke the defence of superior orders and is
automatically debarred from recognition as a refugee, it is therefore logical that those who
would face a real risk of being obliged, on threat of punishment, to participate directly or
indirectly in such crimes are entitled to refugee protection on such grounds.
Objectors to participating in the Russian invasion of Ukraine can readily cite as proof of
international condemnation, starting with the EU Council’s decision on the day of the
invasion, and followed by UN General Assembly resolutions of 2nd March 2022 entitled
‘Aggression against Ukraine’, and 23rd February 2023 “calling for an end to the war and
Russia’s immediate withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine”, and the European Parliament
Resolution 2051 of 6th October 2022 “on Russia’s escalation of its war of aggression against
Ukraine”, and ample evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity, for instance in the
191
Ciric v Canada, Canadian Federal Court, A-877-92, 13th December, 1993.
192
Krotov v Secretary of State for the Home Department, EWCA Civ69, 11th February 2004.

report of the investigative mission conducted between 1st April and 25th June 2022 by the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe193.
However, obtaining refugee status has never been easy for conscientious objectors, and
success is never guaranteed. The crucial findings of fact in individual cases and the
application of the guidelines are done by national authorities which are notoriously reluctant
to grant asylum when they can find any argument for not doing so. They may quibble about
whether the objection is “genuine”, whether the fear of persecution is indeed “well-founded”,
or about the “objective” situation with regard to legality or the likelihood of recruitment.
Particularly in a situation developing as rapidly as the present one, they may also be basing
their judgements on outdated “Country of Origin” information – for example the latest
guidance from the UK Home Office on Russia dates from August 2022, and even so contains
only limited information about developments since the invasion of Ukraine. Fortunately in
December 2022 the European Union Agency for Asylum published updated guidelines on
military service in the Russian Federation which provide invaluable evidence of the generally
indiscriminate nature of the recent mobilisation, but also of the tendency to specifically target
disadvantaged minorities and those seeking to leave the country, and also evidence that
despite official policy statements, conscripts had been widely deployed to Ukraine,
sometimes having been persuaded after after four months’ training to sign a military service
contract and then having been reclassified. They also document conditions in the Russian
armed forces, which like those in Russian prisons, can provide strong arguments against
returning anyone affected whether or not asylum is granted.
Precedents so far in the adjudication of individual cases are mixed:
At the beginning of March 2022, the Court of Cassation in Italy added to the case law there
by overturning a 2020 decision by the Court in Turin to refuse refugee status to a
conscientious objector from Ukraine who had arrived in 2017. The Court of Cassation not
only found that even the then-applicable legislation on conscientious objection (which of
course has now been suspended) was wholly inadequate; it moreover noted the evidence of
“violations and war crimes committed by both sides” in the ongoing, ostensibly civil, conflict
before the Russian invasion, and ruled that "A conscientious objector who refuses to serve
in the army in his country of origin must be granted political refugee status if his enlistment
entails the risk of involvement, even indirectly, in a conflict characterised by the commission,
or high probability, of war crimes or crimes against humanity". 194
By contrast, even before the Russian invasion German courts had refused all applications
from Ukrainian conscientious objectors. And despite the fact that the Ministry of the Interior
had declared in May 2022 that Russian deserters generally comply with the requirements of
refugee status (political persecution) this finding did not necessarily extend to draft
dodgers,195 thus at the end of January 2023, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
rejected the asylum application of a Russian who had evaded possible recruitment, writing
in the decision: “It cannot be assumed with any considerable probability that the applicant,
a (40-plus-year-old) national of the Russian Federation who, according to his statements,
has not performed any military service and thus does not have any previous military
knowledge or any other (militarily relevant) special knowledge, would be conscripted into the
armed forces against his will at all. According to § 22 of the Federal Law ’On Conscription
and Military Service’, all male Russian citizens between the ages of 18 and 27 are called up
193
OSCE, ODIHR, Report on violation of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, 14 July 2022
194
https://www.quotidianopiemontese.it/2022/03/06/la-cassazione-accoglie-la-richiesta-di-asilo-di-
un-ucraino-fuggito-dal-donbass-per-evitare-larruolamento/
195
Contribution for the EBCO Report from EAK, Germany; the text (in German) of the relevant
decision can be read at: https://de.connection-ev.org/pdfs/2022-05-17_IM.pdf,

for compulsory service in the Russian army. On the basis of the available information, it does
not appear that the Russian Federation would call up additional age groups beyond the
above-mentioned age group for the armed forces in the context of a partial or general
mobilisation, or that such a mobilisation would be imminent in the foreseeable future. Such
mobilisation is also considered unlikely in other respects, especially as it would be
incompatible with the Russian narrative of a planned, limited ’special operation’ and would
be difficult to convey domestically.”196 This risk assessment might well have seemed
reasonable on the information available a year ago, but it now seems woefully out-of-date.
It is likely that each case will painstakingly have to be argued individually. EBCO stands
ready to do what it can to give advice and support to claimants, and to persuade those
judging claims not to mislead themselves either on facts or on the interpretation of the
existing guidance.
Meanwhile, although not binding on adjudicating authorities, statements of political support
for those seeking asylum would be as helpful now as they were at the time of the Yugoslav
wars.197
From the start, EBCO has been active in advocating that no-one who has fled to avoid
involvement on either side in the war - conscientious objectors, deserters, or others – should
be in danger of being returned.
In June 2022, we joined with War Resisters’ International, Connection eV and the
International Fellowship of Reconciliation to launch an appeal, backed by over sixty
organisations in twenty countries, to the European Parliament and the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe that they to pass resolutions which, we suggested, should
call on member states to:
“- ensure that Russian and Belarusian military men and women who have evaded military
service and thus possible war deployment in Ukraine, or who have deserted, are granted
asylum in the member states in a manner in line with the Qualification Directive;
- ensure that Ukrainian conscientious objectors, who have been refused recognition in
Ukraine, aswell as to military men and women evading possible acts in violation of
international law on the side of Ukraine are granted protection;
- [and] to develop programs and projects which seek to provide possibilities for training or
further education for deserters and draft evaders.”
On 21st September, the International Day of Peace (ironically the very day on Russia chose
to announce the new mobilisation), the same four organisations publicly launched the
#ObjectWarCampaign, which calls on all citizens everywhere to join the global effort to
ensure protection and asylum to conscientious objectors and deserters from Russia, Belarus
and Ukraine involved in the current war in the region”. noting that on April 6, 2022, the
President of the European Council, Charles Michel, had called on Russian soldiers to desert
and promised them protection under refugee law – a promise which had not yet been fulfilled.
A petition has been prepared, addressed to Charles Michel along with President of the
European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Parliament
Roberta Metsola. The text reads:
“We ask you to:
Friedrich, R, Connection eV, op cit

196
It should also be remembered that, with the Yugoslav situation in mind, UN Commission on
197
Human Rights Resolution called on States to include conscientious objectors in post-conflict

amnesties. At the time of writing, however, it is hard to foresee such amnesties in either Ukraine or
Russia.

- Grant protection and asylum to deserters and conscientious objectors from Belarus
and the Russian Federation!
- Urge the Ukrainian government to stop persecuting conscientious objectors to
military service and to guarantee them a full right to conscientious objection!
- Open the borders to those who oppose war at great personal risk in their country!
“Why is this important?
“For more than half a year, the Russian Federation has been waging a war of aggression in
Ukraine, with devastating consequences. There seems to be no end in sight. Yet we know
that men and women on all sides are evading the crimes of war. Tens of thousands are
fleeing the Russian Federation and Belarus to avoid being recruited for the war. Thousands
are leaving Ukraine because they see their human right to conscientious objection in danger.
They are all our hope for overcoming violence.”
The still unfulfilled promise by the President of the European Council was echoed at the end
of September by the German Interior Minister, who was quoted as saying “Anyone who
courageously opposes the regime of President Vladimir Putin and therefore puts themselves
in great danger can apply for asylum in Germany because of political persecution,” adding
“As a rule, deserters threatened with severe repression receive international protection in
Germany.”198 France similarly indicated that it would look favourably on claims from persons
fleeing Russia because of opposition to the Ukraine war – and what opposition can be more
effective than refusing to fight?
In the German Parliament on 29th September the parliamentary group of Die Linke brought
forward the following motion: “The German Bundestag calls upon the Federal Government
to take all necessary measures at national and European level to ensure that for Russian
deserters and conscientious objectors who want to escape from the war in Ukraine by fleeing,
safe entry into the EU or Germany is possible and that they are granted safe protection and
residence status in an uncomplicated way.” It was however rejected by a large majority of
all other parliamentary groups.199
Nevertheless, so far the only reference by the European Parliament to asylum applies only
to Russia and is even so exceptionally guarded in wording - Para 13 of Resolution 2051 “Calls
on the Member States to fully implement the Commission’s guidelines on general visa
issuance in relation to Russian applicants and controls of Russian citizens at the external
borders, in full compliance with EU and international law, and to ensure that every asylum
application by inter alia dissidents, deserters, draft dodgers and activists is dealt with on an
individual basis, taking into account the security concerns of the host Member State and
acting in accordance with the EU asylum acquis; calls on the Council and the Commission to
closely monitor the situation in relation to Russian visas;”
As the #ObjectWarCampaign organisations state in a joint press release to mark the
anniversary of the Russian invasion, those trying to flee their countries to evade the crimes
of war are the hope of all of us that violence will be overcome. “Therefore, the European
Union should grant protection and asylum to all deserters and conscientious
objectors! The Union should urge the Ukrainian government to stop persecuting
conscientious objectors to military service and to guarantee them a full right to
conscientious objection! And the European Union should open the borders to those
who oppose war at great personal risk in their country!”
198
See https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/russische-deserteure-101.html
199
Contribution for the EBCO Report from EAK, Germany, quoting Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache
20/3684, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/036/2003684.pdf

3. NEW PUBLICATIONS
The Analytical Report of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights on Conscientious
objection to military service (UN document A/HRC/50/43), presented to the Human Rights
Council in June 2022, is an authoritative update on developments globally on the issue - both
in standards and practice.
In July 2022 the Child Rights Information Network in the UK published “British army: Welfare
concerns at the Army Foundation College, Harrogate” 200 compiling evidence of physical and
sexual abuse at this institution where 16 and 17 year old recruits go for training, of inadequate
investigation and remedy, and of the long-term mental health impact on juvenile recruits.”
In August Gelassenheit Publications and the World Council of Churches Press published
“Ecumenism and Peace: from Theory and Practice to Pilgrimage and Companionship”, by
Fernando Enns, Mennonite member of the WCC Central Committee, which includes an
account of the successful campaign to raising the issue of conscientious objection to military
service at the World Council of Churches in which he played a prominent role.
December saw the publication of “A Missing Piece for Peace: Bringing together the Right to
Peace ND Freedom of Conscientious Objection to Military Service”, edited by Michael Wiener
and David Fernandez-Puyana and published by the University of Peace, San Jose, Costa Rica.
Among those who contributed chapters are the new UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, Professor Nazila Ghanea, and her two predecessors, Professsor Ahmed
Shaheed and Professor Heiner Bielefeldt, and Professor Gentian Zyberi of the UN Human Rights
Committee. Rachel Brett wrote a chapter entitled “Contribution of civil society to shaping
freedon of conscientious objection to military service”, and Derek Brett one on “Human rights
advocacy and implementation of freedom of conscientious objection”. Among the individual
stories featured in short pieces entitled “voice” were those of Lazaros Petromilides and Angelos
Nikolopoulos in Greece, Murat Kanatli in Cyprus and Robin Brookes, member of the “Peacetax
Seven” in the UK who campaigned against funding military expenditure through their taxes.
In December 2022 the EU Asylum Agency produced new Country of Origin guidance on "The
Russian Federation - Military Service" 201. This is probably the most comprehensive source
available on all aspects of military service in Russia, and on deployment to Ukraine and gives
a throrough analysis of the practical implementation of the mobilisation of Autumn 2022.
In Greece, October saw the publication of a very important book by Michalis Maragkakis, the
first conscientious objector in Greece on ideological grounds, about the history of the
conscientious objectors’ movement in this country: “Άρνηση Στράτευσης: Οδοιπορικό για τους
Αντιρρησίες Συνείδησης 1986-2022” (“Refusal to enlist: A travelogue about Conscientious
Objectors 1986-2022”), Firebrand, Athens, 2022. The edition also contains texts by various
pioneers of the conscientious objectors’ movement in Greece, including Thanasis Makris,
Spyros Psychas, Dimitris St. Peroulas, Yannis Gklarnetatzis; a preface by Athanasios Kalafatis,
Associate Professor of Economic History in the University of Piraeus; texts by Michael
Tsapogas, lawyer at the Greek Ombudsman, and Alexia Tsouni, Vice-Chair of Amnesty
International Greece; a text about the anti-war struggle inside the army, by lawyer Ioannis
Papadimas; a text about the evolution of the Greek legislation on conscientious objection, by
Georgios Karatzas; and an afterword by the editor of the book, Thodoris Iliopoulos. The book
is available in Greek by the Firebrand Editions 202 and in Greek bookstores.
200
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5afadb22e17ba3eddf90c02f/t/62d93391e2e9d369325b63f9/165840168
2302/
201
https://euaa.europa.eu/publications/russian-federation-military-service
202
www.facebook.com/people/%CE%95%CE%BA%CE%B4%CF%8C%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82-
Firebrand/100060057901143/

4. RECOMMENDATIONS
EBCO will be presenting this report to the European Parliament, to the Parliamentary
Assembly and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, and to various
State authorities. In each case EBCO accompanies it with a set of targeted recommendations.
Meanwhile EBCO repeats its general recommendations, applicable to all European States:
1) if they have not already done so, to abolish all compulsory military service, and
meanwhile refrain from prosecuting or otherwise harassing conscientious objectors,
with no further action required from such persons; or - secondly – providing a non-
punitive and non-discriminatory alternative service of purely civilian nature;
2) to legally recognise the right to conscientious objection to military service
and ensure that it is possible for all conscientious objectors to avoid enlistment in the
armed forces and for all serving members of the armed forces or reservists to obtain
release without penalties should they develop conscientious objections, and that the
civil, economic and political rights of conscientious objectors are fully protected;
3) to immediately cease any recruitment into the armed forces of persons aged under
18 and stop any military-type training of such persons;
4) to accept applications for asylum from all persons seeking to escape military service
in any country where there is no adequate provision for conscientious objectors, and
especially where they are in danger of being otherwise forced to participate in armed
conflict;
5) to decrease military expenditure and increase social spending, and to make
available to citizens with conscientious objections means of specifying that no part of
the taxes which they have personally paid is directed towards military expenditure;
6) to introduce peace education in all parts of the education system.

5. THANKS
EBCO wishes to sincerely thank all governments, national human rights institutions, as well
as international and national non-governmental organisations and solidarity groups who
responded to the request of EBCO for provision of information.

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European Bureau for Conscientious Objection

1 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

Brussels, 12 May 2023

Researched and edited by

2 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

Foreword by Alexia Tsouni, EBCO President

3 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

In Europe conscription is still enforced in 18 states, including 16 Council of Europe (CoE)

4 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

1. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2022 ............................................................................................................................ 7

5 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

1.2.38 SAN MARINO ................................................................................................................................................... 72

6 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

1. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2022

1.1.1 COUNCIL OF EUROPE

1.1.1.1 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

7 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

Lithuania:4 On 7 June 2022, the European Court of Human Rights issued an

8 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

9 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

10 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

11 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

12 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

military mobilisation training in 2011. On 02/06/2015 Haluk Selam Tufanli submitted

1.1.1.2 Committee of Ministers

Türkiye: On 17/04/2023 the Conscientious Objection Watch, War Resisters’

1.1.2 EUROPEAN UNION

13 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

1.1.2.1 European Parliament

On 3 May 2022 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the persecution of

14 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

1.1.3 UNITED NATIONS

1.1.3.1 Treaty Bodies – Human Rights Committee

15 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

16 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

17 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

1.1.3.2 Committee on the Rights of the Child

40 CCPR/C/COL/Q/8, 31st August 2022, Para 22.

18 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

(c) Ensure the early and effective identification of all

1.1.3.3 Human Rights Council

19 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

20 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

21 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

individual’s ability to receive or impart information online or offline, including partial or

22 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

23 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

to Greece on the concerning situation of violations and discriminations of local conscientious

24 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

1.1.4 WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

25 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

1.2 DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEMBER STATES

First recognised in the 1998 Constitution,

26 Report on conscientious objection to military service in Europe 2022/23

old). This is regulated by law no. 9047 dated

https://ebco-beoc.org/albania including the reply of the Ministry of Defence

Minimum Conscription: - No conscription.

First recognised by Law "On Alternative

Voluntary enlistment: 17 Under 18 for military schools: 17 for cadets