Durodie 2003
Durodie 2003
Durodie 2003
According to the UK Cabinet Office Draft Civil influences. Thus “risk becomes an entity in its own right,
Contingencies Bill, resilience is the ability to handle only minimally subject to human intervention”.2
disruptive challenges, characterised as emergencies,
that can lead to or result in crisis. In particular: “The It is in this relatively passive sense that the Cabinet
aim of building resilience is to reduce susceptibility Office uses the term in much of the proposed bill.
to challenges by reducing the probability of their Hence it states that “risks of disruptive challenge
occurrence and their likely effects, responding effec- must where possible be identified”. This suggests
tively and efficiently when they occur and building that risks are inherently and implacably ‘out there’,
institutions and structures in a way as to minimise waiting to be spotted and acted upon.
the possible effects of disruptions upon them.”1
And, even though the document indicates that, in
The bill suggests that the level of resilience in the some circumstances, “it is possible to prevent disrup-
UK is already high due to the experience of Irish tive challenges occurring by taking action at an early
terrorism, which established a capability within stage”, the language used makes it clear that this is
government, and an awareness among businesses merely a case of anticipating what are considered to
and the public. This strong position is also held to be be inevitable challenges. Thus: “This cycle — antici-
due to a long-standing tradition of effective planning pation, prevention, preparation, response, recovery
and response at the local level. This is being supple- — is at the heart of resilience.”
mented, at an organisational level, by Regional
Resilience Teams located in government offices The notion that it may be possible to shape condi-
throughout the country, and Regional Resilience tions or set the agenda, with a view to obtaining
Forums to bring together the key players. desirable outcomes independently of external forces,
is not considered.
The draft bill indicates the UK government’s
approach to the resilience agenda which, in summa- The Cabinet Office is not alone in this mode of
ry, consists of: thinking. Many leading officials have referred to the
fact that, in their minds, it is “not a matter of if, but
● improved horizon scanning; when” a future terrorist attack will occur. Similarly,
● increased investment; the head of the UK security service recently advised an
● an enhanced counter-terrorism framework; audience in London that it was “only a matter of
● improved business continuity arrangements; and time”, before a crude chemical, biological, radiological
● new civil contingencies legislation. or nuclear weapon was launched on a Western city.3
Unfortunately, by framing the discussion in the fash- Such rhetoric presumes to be challenging an assumed
ionable language of ‘risk’, an element of passivity has complacency towards the issue of terrorism. It is per-
been built in from the outset. This is because, as soci- ceived of (and presented as) resolute and robust. But
ologist Frank Furedi has indicated elsewhere, the it reveals an almost resigned air of fatalism towards
concept of risk nowadays is increasingly connoted in future events — a sense that risks are simply coming
an external and reactive sense, whereby people are to us. It also runs counter to the spirit of the speech
designated as being ‘at risk’ from certain hazards or made by Tony Blair on 11 November 2002 at the
www.rusi.org ● www.janes.com 15
Monitor_Sept 8/8/2003 11:03 am Page 16
Lord Mayor’s Banquet in London, in which he coun- ● new detection equipment and protective clothing;
tenanced against actions “on the basis of a general ● alternative modes to impart appropriate informa-
warning”, which could lead the UK to “doing [the tion; and
terrorists’] job for them”.4 ● new structures of government and integrated
response systems.
In February 2003, the US Department of State issued
the Bush administration’s National Strategy for These solutions still suffer from being responsive in
Combating Terrorism.5 This noted that the best form outlook, focusing on means rather than ends. It
of defence is offence. But the very terms used in its appears as if the whole point of being alive has been
comprehensive four-‘D’ strategy — “defeat”, “deny”, narrowed down to merely staying alive. All we need
“diminish” and “defend” — reveal a remarkable do is keep safe and remain alert. Yet surely those
defensiveness. At best, what is being put forward is a who risk their lives fighting fires, or dealing with
series of reactions to the assumed actions of others other emergencies, aspire to more for ensuing gener-
in the war on terror. ations, including their own children, than simply that
they should be able to do the same again?
Beyond passing references to “freedom” and “democ-
racy”, the National Strategy provides no sense of what The technologies we introduce to handle our fears
the US stands for as a society, or how it hopes to are inevitably shaped by our vision of the future. If
promote this to the rest of the world. Rather, it is a this is a narrow, apocalyptic one, rather than an
reiteration of what the US is opposed to. It is precise- ambitious, future-oriented one, then we are likely to
ly this responsive mode that undermines the real constrain ourselves with it. Ironically, this may
meaning of resilience, which is not just to anticipate impact adversely on our ability to handle crises.
and respond, but to orientate and build. Indeed, our obsession with improbable dangers may
distract us from more mundane yet plausible risks,
and lead us to divert social resources accordingly.
16 www.rusi.org ● www.janes.com
Monitor_Sept 8/8/2003 11:03 am Page 17
0091524
ultimately disarm us in our search for real resilience.
It is also a remarkable form of self-denial and
self-deception. We live by judging what we do against
The Bush administration has published a National Strategy
the alternatives on offer. Judgment remains the basis for Combating Terrorism.
for acting as moral, conscious beings. It allows us to
push ourselves and others to improve — succeed-
ing in our aims by transcending or overcoming tive light today. It is held to lead to unforeseen or
circumstances and limitations. unintended consequences. Thus even when societies
do act, as they did in the recent conflict in Iraq, this
Engagement in the contemporary world is notice- is usually based upon a narrow risk calculus that
able by its absence or its very limited scope. seeks to weigh up the unforeseen consequences of
Participation rates in all manner of formal social not acting against the unintended consequences of
institutions appear to be in terminal decline, while at being too decisive.
the informal level one can no longer assume a com-
mon bond with others. This mode of thinking has been formalised through
the advent of the so-called ‘precautionary principle’
Critics of the UK government’s approach to civil that, despite its origins among the liberal-left in relation
protection have been quick to remark the extent to to science, has been adopted by those of a more hawk-
which the public appear to be taken as passive bene- ish persuasion in government and the military. These
ficiaries of enlightened and benevolent state protec- now speak of the need for pre-emptive action to deal
tion. Yet, the solution offered — to engage more rep- with the dangers of ‘unknown unknowns’ with all the
resentatives of differing ‘stakeholder’ groups — falls alacrity of the environmental movement.
far short of the active engagement of the population
that the Second World War witnessed. However, without restoring the centrality of know-
ing, judging, engaging and acting, real resilience will
Finally, the will to act is not as strong as one might remain a distant dream. This is not an abstract,
hope. Indeed, action is increasingly seen in a nega- philosophical imperative — it is the role and respon-
Providing protective clothing for the
civilian population may prove useful
once an attack has taken place, but it
is a more reactive than proactive
method of dealing with the problem.
Aireshelta Limited: 0552502
www.rusi.org ● www.janes.com
17
Monitor_Sept 8/8/2003 11:04 am Page 19
MONITOR
IS REAL RESILIENCE ATTAINABLE?
Printed in the UK
Email: janes.subs@rbi.co.uk
www.rusi.org ● www.janes.com
19