Marielle S.

Aquilod

Asia's rise and the steady decline of the West

When the history of the 2020s is written, this past year may be regarded as marking the end of what has
been loosely called the post-colonial era in Asia. The defining measures of this transition are the definitive shift
in economic power from the former colonial powers in the West, toward the former colonies of the East, and an
accompanying erosion of western geopolitical and moral influence. Not only have the United States and Europe
lost economic ground to Asia, in terms of volumes of trade, investment and growth, but the capacity to guide
and influence political developments, serve as a moral yardstick and ultimately use military power to influence
events has been severely eroded.

In 2019 China exported more than $2.6 trillion in goods and services, slightly ahead of the U.S. figure of
$ 2.5 trillion. The U.S. may still have an edge on China in terms of military spending and capability, but experts
warn that China is catching up fast and that a conflict in the Asian region is not a sure win for the U.S. Asia's
response to the pandemic was palpably more effective. Economically weak and -- for the first time since the end
of World War II -- unsure of the integrity of a common democratic political culture because of the loss of
American leadership, the western powers that have set the parameters of global governance and trade since
1945, have simply lost their legitimacy as guardians of the way the world should work. Incoming U.S. President
Joe Biden has proposed hosting a summit of democracies, prompting some to argue that the U.S. needs to fix its
own democracy first.

The essence of this new reality is captured by the unstoppable rise of China, which has defied all efforts
to contain its growing technological edge, limit the expansion of its military reach and suffer the consequences
of curbing the freedoms of its citizens. Not only, has China broken free of the normative and strategic restraints
of the old post-colonial order, but it has forced the former colonial powers for the first time to shape policies
and trade deals that serve China-dominated Asian ends, rather than the other way around.

The question is: how will Asia fill the vacuum in terms of thinking about how to harness its economic
power to the greater human good, and frame normative values to accompany and reinforce the region's growing
influence. To listen to the panicked foreign policy establishment in the U.S. and some European countries, the
prospect of a world dominated by the Chinese Communist Party looms large.
But all the fear-mongering about China loses sight of the fact that the next two largest economies in Asia, Japan
and South Korea, are democracies. So are the two largest countries after China, India and Indonesia. Hong
Kong may have lost its freedoms, but Taiwan thrives and Singapore is slowly shedding the heavy-handed
engineering of social and economic life to become a viable platform for entrepreneurial energy in the wider
Sino-sphere.

The region's political landscape has changed significantly since the mid-1990s when all the hubris of
rapid economic growth and development saw some countries promote the idea of so-called Asian values to
justify paternalistic authoritarian government. The democratic transitions of the last two decades of the 20th
century have matured and stood the test of time, even if there have been setbacks. There is a vibrant and more
active civil society, a more alert and aspirational younger generation connected by means of social media.
Technological and entrepreneurial innovation grows apace. Assuming the continued regression of western
power and influence, what would mid-21st century Asian-led norms focus on and highlight?

Environmental concerns come close to the top of the list. The impact of climate change is much more
keenly felt across Asia: a proximately dangerous mix of rising sea levels, changing weather patterns and rising
temperatures. At the same time, there is less of the institutionalized and corporate resistance to embracing the
need to address the problem, especially compared to the U.S.

Transparent governance and an urgent need to address inequality comes next. Much of Asia's growth
and development has benefited elites and severe inequality needs to be addressed. The legacy of the pandemic
in the region will be that governments must spend more on safeguarding public health and providing social
welfare. Unlike the U.S. and Europe, Asia's larger states have less overstretched budgets and deeper reserves, as
well as the collective social impulses to become models of effective public spending.

Constructive nonalignment will be an important bedrock of regional security for the foreseeable future.
The post-colonial order was built on alignment and alliance. The U.S. and Europe thrived on alliances forged in
the embers of World War II and the subsequent Cold War. Much of Asia suffered from the extension of this
ideological divide to the region. Consequently, there is a natural allergy to great power alignment and this will
help foster peace and cooperative development, even as the waning western powers try to divide and polarize
the regions in an effort to counter China's rise. None of this will be easy to achieve. To reach these goals and
contribute to the greater global good, Asia needs to invest in bold, creative diplomacy and adjust a collective
mindset about their place in the world that has long looked to the West for leadership. India, Indonesia,
Japan and South Korea all have tremendous convening potential, but they must shed their inward-looking
preoccupation with narrowly defined interests focused on trade protection and sovereignty.
 The greatest challenge of all, however, will be how to manage China in this new power equation. Much
of China's truculence and aggressive intransigence feeds off the historical memory of colonial predation and
indignity. Leaving the post-colonial era behind will help attenuate this neuralgia. With the former colonial
powers in the back seat, it might be easier for Asia's mid-sized powers to collectively persuade China to support
a more open and constructive set of norms that adheres to the rule of law.

Analysis of the Situation

The fall of the West has been endlessly forecast, but while it may not quite be imminent, decline is
readily apparent. It would be difficult to point to an era when such a fall in faith in the West’s governance and
systems has coincided with such a surge of power and confidence in the forces arrayed against it.

Its core members certainly inhabit the Western Hemisphere – notably, Western Europe and North America. But
it is not simply a geographic descriptor, it is also a dense soup of institutions and values. “Western” countries
broadly sync democratic governance, market capitalism and rule of law with prosperous lifestyles, civic society
and liberal values.

Given this, many countries in Eastern Europe and certain parts of the Anglosphere – notably Australia and New
Zealand – would be considered “Western.” For the same reason, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan could,
arguably, be “Western” nations, albeit they are geographically, culturally and racially “Eastern.”

Why the West can’t win? It started in the East, with the Vietnam War and its associated era. The American
failure to prevail generated massive national trauma, compounded by Watergate. A people who once respected
government switched to distrust. The distrust extended to multiple pillars of “the arsenal of democracy” – the
military, the military-industrial complex and the intelligence community.

Vietnam made apparent the limits on American power. Today, it is no longer just the US, but the wider West –
which unsuccessfully fielded multinational coalitions, after September 11, 2001 – that suffers from defeatism.

Iraqi and Afghan resistance proved more resilient than anticipated. Fighting spirit trumped the excellence of the
West’s arms and professional, high-tech militaries. Chaos generated new enemies, such as ISIS. Western
publics’ inability to tolerate casualties, their refusal to prosecute ruthless operations, together with a reluctance
to implement long-term strategies, such as post-combat nation-building, indicates that the West’s war-winning
days are over. And confidence has plummeted in sectors that extend well beyond strategy/security.

Financial failure and manufacturing’s eastward shift The 2008 global financial crisis, a devastating but
unnecessary event, was ignited from deep within the richest but worst-monitored sector of the US economy:
high finance. Moral damage was massive. The GFC compounded extant distrust in governance by undermining
faith in global capitalism itself. The shock came amid a much wider, long-term trend: the hollowing out of the
Western industrial base as manufacturing shifted eastward. That created a long-simmering anger toward a
political class that promoted the benefits of globalism to the middle class, at the perceived expense of the
working class.
This shift was not universal – Germany, for example, maintained a powerful manufacturing base rather than
shifting to services – but it still gave rise to the trans-Atlantic phenomena of Trumpism and Brexit, both in
essence anti-globalism dynamics. Bizarrely, the two movements are led by leaders in Washington and London
who, despite being highly privileged individuals themselves, champion the working class and raise the dreams
of a return to brighter, pre-globalization days.

Still, the long-term eastward trend in metal bashing gave the West new allies – or arguably, new members.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As Asian economies and governments continue to gain power, the West needs to find ways to adapt to the new
global order, says author and diplomat Kishore Mahbubani. In an insightful look at international politics, Mahbubani
shares a three-part strategy that Western governments can use to recover power and improve relations with the rest
of the world.

As Asian economies and governments continue to gain power, the West needs to find ways to adapt to the new
global order, says author and diplomat Kishore Mahbubani. In an insightful look at international politics, Mahbubani
shares a three-part strategy that Western governments can use to recover power and improve relations with the rest
of the world. Now having transformed the world through the sharing of Western wisdom with the rest of the world, the
logical and rational response of the West should have been to say, "Hey, we have to adjust and adapt to this new
world." Instead, the West chose to go to sleep. Why did it happen? I believe it happened because the West became
distracted with two major events. The first event was the end of the Cold War. Yes, the end of the Cold War was a great
victory. The West defeated the mighty Soviet Union without firing a shot. Amazing. But you know, when you have a great
victory like this, it also leads to arrogance and hubris. And this hubris was best captured in a very famous essay by
Francis Fukuyama called "The End of History?" Now, Fukuyama was putting across a very sophisticated message, but
all that the West heard from this essay was that we, the liberal democracies, we have succeeded, we don't have to
change, we don't have to adapt, it's only the rest of the world that has to change and adapt. Unfortunately, like a
dangerous opiate, this essay did a lot of brain damage to the West because it put them to sleep just at precisely the
moment when China and India were waking up and the West didn't adjust and adapt.

REFERENCES

Kishore Mahbubani: How the West can adapt to a rising Asia | TED Talk

Asia’s rise doesn’t necessarily mean the West’s decline | The Japan Times

Asia's rise and the steady decline of the West - Nikkei Asia