Wills Doctrines

WILLS &
SUCCESSION
Case Doctrines from 2010-2022 and from
the books of Balane, De Leon, Jurado, Mison,
and Paras
Submitted by Section 3A2022 and 3D2022
Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS ........................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2. TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION ............................................................................. 5
Section 1. Wills ........................................................................................................................
5
Subsection 1: Wills in General ............................................................................................
5
Subsection 2. Testamentary Capacity and Intent ............................................................
6
Subsection 3. Forms of Wills .............................................................................................
6
Holographic Wills ...........................................................................................................
6
Signature of the Testator ..............................................................................................
7
Witnesses and Attestation ............................................................................................
8
Blind Testator ................................................................................................................
10
Pages ..............................................................................................................................
11
Joint Will .........................................................................................................................
11
Subsection 4. Witnesses to Wills......................................................................................
12
Subsection 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills .......................................................
12
Probate ..........................................................................................................................
13
Preterition .....................................................................................................................
21
Fraud .............................................................................................................................
24
Wills and Succession: Recent Jurisprudence | 1

Undue Influence ............................................................................................................
25
Section 2. Institution of Heirs ...............................................................................................
27
Section 3. Substitution of Heirs ...........................................................................................
28
Section 4. Conditional Testamentary Dispositions with a Term ........................................
29
Section 5. Legitime ................................................................................................................
32
Reserva Troncal ............................................................................................................
40
Section 6. Disinhertiance......................................................................................................
49
Section 7. Legacies and Devises...........................................................................................
50
CHAPTER 3. LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION .................................................................... 52
Section 1. General Provisions ................................................................................................
52
Subsection 1. Relationship ...............................................................................................
53
Subsection 2. Right of Representation ...........................................................................
53 Section 2. Order of Intestate
Succession ............................................................................ 55
CHAPTER 4. PROVISIONS COMMON TO TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSSIONS ...........
61
Section 1. Right of Accretion .................................................................................................
61
Section 2. Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy ......................................................
62
Section 3. Acceptance and Repudiation of Inheritance .....................................................
62
Section 5. Collation ...............................................................................................................
63
Section 6. Partition and Distribution of Estate ...................................................................
64
List of Contributors .........................................................................................................................
i
Bibliography:
BALANE, RUBEN F., JOTTINGS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CIVIL LAW (SUCCESSION), Central Books, 2010
edition.
DE LEON, HECTOR S., COMMENTS AND CASES ON SUCCESSION, Rex Book Store, 2017 edition.
JURADO., COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON SUCCESSION, Rex Book Store, 2009 edition.
MISON, SIEGFRED B., WILLS AND SUCCESSION, Rex Book Store, 2020 edition.
PARAS, EDGARDO L., CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED: WILLS AND SUCCESSION VOL. III (ARTICLES
774-1105), Rex Book Store, 2021 edition.
Wills and Succession: Recent Jurisprudence | 2

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 777: The Rights to the Succession are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent.
Do children become co-owners of the conjugal property together with the surviving spouse
upon the death of the decedent?
YES. Upon the death of one of the spouses, the conjugal partnership is dissolved and the
successional rights over the subject property is transmitted to the heirs of the decedent.
This results in an implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse and the
children. Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, 724 SCRA 280 (2014).
Are compulsory heirs deprived of their pro indiviso share in the estate if the decedent
alienated a part of the estate during his or her lifetime?
NO. While the owner is still alive, he exercises full rights over his property which includes its
disposal. Once the property is disposed, the only way under law for compulsory heirs to
claim a pro indiviso share thereto is to prove that the disposal was in effect an inofficious
donation inter vivos. If unproven, compulsory heirs cannot speak of a rightful claim over the
property alienated. Calalang-Parulan v. Calalang-Garcia, 725 SCRA 402 (2014).
When a person dies, can legal heirs automatically exercise their right over a decedent’s
properties?
NO. Although property rights are transmitted to legal heirs upon a decedent’s death, their
status as legal heirs must first be determined in a proper proceeding. A separate special
proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the protection and
enforcement of ownership rights given by the law of succession. This must take precedence
over the action for recovery of possession and ownership, precluding the RTC in an ordinary
action for cancellation of title and reconveyance from making the same. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action
as such declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon v.
Ricaforte, 700 SCRA 778 (2013).
Is there an exception to the previous answer?

Based on jurisprudence, it has been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a
special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, there is an exception that
recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if
there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse. The Court allowed exceptions to
the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already
Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 1

presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship. Rebusquillo v. Galvez, 725 SCRA 259
(2014).
Is it necessary for the legal heirs to establish/prove filiation with the decedent in a special
proceeding?
NO. If a child has long established his status as a legitimate child, there is no need to
establish his filiation in a special proceeding for declaration of heirship. Heirs of Valentin
Basbas v. Basbas, 735 SCRA 625 (2014).
Is the petitioner is entitled to the pension of the death benefits of her biological child despite
adoption?
YES. When Cornelio adopted John, the petitioner’s parental authority over John was
severed. However, one key detail the ECC was missing aside from Cornelio’s death, was that
when the adoptive parent died less than 3 years after the adoption decree, John was still a
minor, at about four years of age. John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at the bar. Under such circumstances, the parental authority
should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
The biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was
the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS-covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents
and those by adoption about the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same
way that certain rights still attach by the blood relation, so too should certain obligations,
which, we rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. Bartolome v. Social Security System, 740
SCRA 78 (2014).
Does the present Civil Code apply to the settlement of the decedent’s estate?
NO, the present Civil Code does not apply to the settlement of the decedent's estate. The
law in force at the time of the decedent's death determines the applicable law over the
settlement of his/her estate. In this case, Bishop Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment
of the present Civil Code in 1949. Hence, the correct applicable laws to the settlement of his
estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and 1901 Code of Civil Procedure. Hacbang v. Alo, 772
SCRA 38 (2015).
Does the ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death?
YES. The ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death
– not at the time the heirs are declared, partition, or distribution of properties. Art. 777 of

the Civil Code provides that rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death
of the decedent. Hacbang v. Alo, 772 SCRA 38 (2015).
Is a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special

proceeding a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession
of property?
NO. Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code that the rights of the heirs to the inheritance
vest immediately at the precise moment of the decedent's death even without judicial
declaration of heirship, and the various Court En Banc and Division decisions holding that no
prior judicial declaration of heirship is necessary before an heir can file an ordinary civil
action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession through the nullification
of deeds divesting property or properties forming part of the estate and reconveyance
thereof to the estate or for the common benefit of the heirs of the decedent, the Court
hereby resolves to clarify the prevailing doctrine. Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579 (2020).
Does a buyer have the right to seek delivery of the certificate title of the property subject of a
probate proceeding?
NO. The buyer, spouses herein, does not have yet the right to demand delivery of the OCT of
the subject property, although validly sold to them. The existence of a valid sale does not
necessarily mean that the Registry of Deeds may already be compelled to cancel the OCT
and issue a new title to the spouses-buyer. Applying together PD No. 1529 and Article 777 of
the Civil Code, while an heir may dispose and transfer his/her hereditary share to another
person, before the transferee may compel the issuance of a new certificate of title covering
specific property in his/her name, a final order of distribution of the estate or the order in
anticipation of the final distribution issued by the testate or intestate court must first be had.
Spouses Salitico v. Heirs of Resurrecion, G.R. No. 240199 (2019).
Must an adopted daughter present a judicial affidavit of heirship to prove legal standing in a
case?
NO. Under Art. 777, the successional rights are transmitted from the decedent to his/her
heirs from the moment of death of the former; that even if there were no pending
settlement proceedings for the distribution of a decedent's estate, there was no need for a
prior declaration of heirship before the heirs may commence an action arising from any right
of the deceased, such as the right to bring an action to annul a sale. Gloria-Payduan v.
Builders Savings and Loan Association, Inc. G.R. No. 202324 (2018).
Can a niece who inherited land from an uncle represent her right without providing an
affidavit of sole heirship?

YES. An affidavit of sole heirship is not required. As in this case, the niece was able to
substantially evidence her right stemmed from deeds of sale that her predecessors-in -
interest were in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the property as an owner.
Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas, G.R. No. 224144 (2017).
Will a deed of sale prevail over successional rights?

It would depend on whether or not the deed of sale was registered. If the deed of sale was
registered and the property was transferred in the lifetime of the decedent, the property
would have been disposed of by the decedent, thus it would not form part of his estate and
no right over the property would be transmitted. In such case, the deed of sale will prevail
over successional rights.
However, if the deed of sale was unregistered, then the same merely is juris tantum right of
possession. However, an unregistered deed of sale cannot defeat a Torrens Title in the name
of the descendant or his heir. As under Art. 777, Successional rights are transmitted upon
death of the decedent. With that the heirs may exercise right of ownership, even against
one who has a notarized but unregistered deed of sale, as the rights of an owner are
supreme against the entire world. Andaya v. Villaos, G.R. No. 202426 (2016).
Should the proceeds of a loan be released only upon the settlement of a decedent’s estate?
YES. Unpaid loans are considered assets of the estate of the creditor-decedent. While it is
true that a decedent’s estate has a different juridical personality than that of her heirs, they
certainly have interest in its preservation and of the recovery of its properties for at the
moment of her death, the heirs as provided for by law starts to own the property, subject to
the decedent’s liabilities. This is uniformed with what is set forth under Art. 777 of the Civil
Code which provides that, “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent.” Pasco v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 165554 (2010)
CHAPTER 2. TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

Section 1. Wills
Does the rule of indivisibility apply on mixed succession?

NO. A person having executed a will may die partially intestate. The rule of indivisibility of
the testator's will is not in force in this jurisdiction. Macrohon v. Saavedra, 51 Phil 267 (1927).
Does a conditional legatee acquire the legacy even if the event has not occurred?
NO. The conditional legatee does not acquire the legacy, if the event on which it depends
has not occurred, in which case the legacy will pass to the persons named to succeed the

testator in accordance with the law, that is to say, legal or intestate succession will take
place as to that legacy. Macrohon v. Saavedra, 51 Phil 267 (1927).
What will happen in the properties in a will executed jointly by husband and wife, if the
husband dies?
When a will executed jointly by husband and wife provides that in case of the death of the
husband before the wife certain relatives will inherit specified property, and if any of said
relatives die before the husband the survivor will inherit all, the acquisition of the property
by said relatives depends upon the husband's dying before the wife, the last part of said
testamentary provision being a substitution of legatees in case some of them die before the
husband. Macrohon v. Saavedra, 51 Phil 267 (1927).
What are the three ways in which succession may be affected?

It may be effected by the will of man, by the law, or by both at the same time. In the first
case the succession is called testamentary, because it is based on the last will and testament,
which is the orderly manifestation of the testator's will; in the second, it is called legal,
because it takes effect by operation of the law; and the third is called mixed, because it
partakes of the character of both testamentary and legal succession. Macrohon v. Saavedra,
51 Phil 267 (1927).
Is a court declaration required to establish a person presumptively dead for purposes of

claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman?
NO. The Philippine Veterans’ Affairs Office (PVAO) or the Armed Forces of the Philippines can
decide on death benefits of a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce
a court declaration of the presumptive death of a soldier. Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, G.R. No.
230751 (2018).
Subsection 1: Wills in General
Are the funeral wishes of the deceased, like the burial of his remains, absolute in nature and
partake of the nature of a testamentary disposition?
NO. The Supreme Court held that as a rule, any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased
should be established by some form of testamentary disposition which must be expressly
provided and cannot be merely inferred. The wishes of the decedent with respect to his
funeral are not absolute. The wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be
contrary to law and it must not violate the legal and reglementary provisions concerning
funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of
disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed. Valino v. Adrian, 723 SCRA
1 (2014).

Subsection 2. Testamentary Capacity and Intent
Is a will typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testatrix executed in conformity with
the law?
YES. If a will is signed by the testator or by someone else in his presence and under his
express direction, it is a matter of indifference by whom the mechanical work of writing the
will is done. Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil 427 (1904), Jurado (2009) at p. 40.
Subsection 3. Forms of Wills
Would a mere deed of donation mortis causa immediately transfer property title?
NO, a deed of execution mortis causa is insufficient in transferring property title. The Civil
Code provides that donations made mortis causa partakes the nature of a testamentary
provisions. As testamentary provisions, it is required that its form is in compliance with the
Civil Code provisions on the forms of a notarial will. Thus, if a person would like to donate
property mortis causa, the deed should still be in the form of a notarial will. Bascara v. Javier,
G.R. No. 188069 (2015).
Holographic Wills
the law?
will is done. Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil 427 (1904), Jurado (2009) at p. 53.
May a holographic be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it
and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
NO. The will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be presented to the judge, who shall
subscribe to it and require its identity to be established by three witnesses who depose that
they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written by the testator; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil 509 (1958), Mison (2020) at p. 111.
Does the three-witness rule in Article 811 of the Civil Rule, is a permissive rule rather than
mandatory rule when a holographic will is probated?
It is a permissive rule. Since the authenticity of the holographic will was not contested,
proponent was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness

of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted as to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of having the probate denied.
The resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it necessary",
which reveals that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the
will's authenticity. Azoala v. Singson, 109 Phil 102 (1960), Mison (2020) at p. 117.
Does the provision of Article 811 of the Civil Code permissive or mandatory?
It is mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested
holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will
is the genuine signature of the testator. The word “shall'' connotes a mandatory order. We
have ruled that “shall” in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall,”
when used in a statute is mandatory. Codoy v. Calugay, G.R. No. 123486 (1999), Mison (2020) at
p. 118.
Can a photostatic copy of a holographic be admitted to probate?

YES. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in
said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements
of the testator and the handwritten will. A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard
writings of the testator. Rodelas v. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16 (1982), Mison (2020) at p. 112.
Signature of the Testator

Is the requirement that the will should be signed satisfied by the signing of the testator
through his or her thumb mark?
YES. A statute which requires a will to be signed by the testator is sufficiently satisfied by
placing his or her thumb mark on each and every page of the instrument. A statement in the
attestation clause that a third person is directed to sign the testator’s name is therefore not
necessary since the testator signed in accordance with law. Payad v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 42258
(1936), Jurado (2009) at p. 56, Balane at pp. 72-73, Mison (2010) at p. 74.
Is the testator’s fingermark despite not showing the distinct identifying ridge lines a valid
signature?
YES. A thumbprint or other mark affixed by the testator satisfies the legal requisite that the
will should be signed by the testator. A statement in the attestation clause that a third

person wrote the testator's name at his request is therefore not necessary. Matias v. Salud,
G.R. No.
10907 (1957), Balane at pp. 73-77.
Is the attestation clause fatally defective for failure to state that a third person is expressly
directed to write the testator’s name despite the latter writing a cross immediately after his
name?
YES. Where the cross written by the testator on a will is not his usual signature nor one of
the ways by which he signs his name, the same cannot constitute a valid signature as
required by law. Therefore, a statement in the attestation clause that a third person is
expressly directed by the testator to write his name is necessary. Garcia v. Lacuesta, G.R. No.
L-4067 (1951), Mison (2020) at p. 82.
Is the validity of the will affected when the person instructed by a testator to write his name
did not sign his own name?
NO. The fact that the person writing the testator’s name on the will signs his own name is
immaterial to the validity of the will. It is only essential that the name of the testator was
signed at his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and in the presence of
the testator and of each other. Barut v. Cabacungan, G.R. No. L-6285 (1912), Mison (2020) at p.
82.
Witnesses and Attestation
Does a subscribing witness need to cast his/her eyes at the moment of subscription?
NO. Testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the
presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually
cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but whether at that
moment existing conditions and the position of the parties, with relation to each other,
were such that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen
each other sign. Nera v. Rimando, G.R. No. L-5971 (1911), Mison (2020) at p. 83.
Was the inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to a page of a will
fatal?
NO. The inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a
testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per
se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Icasiano v. Icasiano, G.R. No. L-18979 (1964),
Was the will in question null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally
defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will

witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and
all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another?
YES, absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to
probate. Article 805 requires that the witnesses should both attest and subscribe to the will
in the presence of the testator and of one another. Attestation is that act of the senses,
while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to
attest a will is to know that it was published as such, and to certify the facts required to
constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only
to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of
identification. Caneda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103554 (1993), Mison (2020) at p. 104.
Was the will fatally defective because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting
witnesses?
YES. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear
their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation. Cagro v. Cagro, 92 Phil 1032 (1953), Mison (2020) at p. 104.
Was the acknowledgment clause signed and the notarial seal affixed by the notary without
the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses? Did it render the codicil invalid and
ineffective?
NO. The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament
was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment itself
nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the
testatrix and her witnesses cannot be said to violate the rule that testaments should be
completed without interruption. Javellana v. Ledesma, G.R. No. L-7179 (1955).
Can the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged be considered as the third
instrumental witness?
NO. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed
the will. Moreover, the function of the notary public as guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements||would be defeated because he would be interested in sustaining the validity
of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in
an inconsistent position and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize
fraud. Cruz v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-32213 (1973), Mison (2020) at p. 97.

Does the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary
public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of
the Civil Code?
NO. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will
is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, a lawyer duly commissioned
as a notary public. This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the
validity of a will. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394 (2015).
Would a notarial will executed and acknowledged in different places be valid?

No. The acknowledgement requisite for a valid notarial will under Art. 806 Civil Code
requires that the Rules on Notarial Practice be complied with as well. The Rules state that
"No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his
jurisdiction". Thus, an acknowledgement made outside the territorial jurisdiction of a notary
public has no force and effect. Guerrero v. Bihis, 521 SCRA 394 (2015).
Where will the testator subscribe in a will?

At the logical end. When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at
the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last
testamentary disposition ends. Mitra v. Sabian-Guevarra, G.R. No. 213994 (2016).
Blind Testator
Is a testator with a vision mainly for distant objects considered blind?

YES. When the testatrix’s vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for
reading print as attested by an ophthalmologist which makes the testatrix incapable of
reading the will is already an indication that the testatrix is practically blind. Since the
testator is blind here, the will shall be read twice to him/her according to Article 808 of the
Civil Code. Garcia v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-26808 (1969).
When the vision of the testator is defective, poor or blurred, is the single reading of the will
enough for it to be valid?
"Poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is
used in Art. 808. Hence, the requirement that the will shall be read twice to blind testators
must be complied with. Alvarado v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 74965 (1993), Mison (2020) at p. 99.

0
Pages
Is a will containing a statement in the Acknowledgement portion of the subject last will and
testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written" a valid will?
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. In
Re Lopez, G.R. No. 189984 (2012),
Is the will valid if the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion
does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written?
NO. Even granting that the Acknowledgement embodies what the attestation clause
requires, we are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment
can be merged in one statement. That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment
are embodied in two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different
purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a
competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the
attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to
the execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of its execution. Echavez v.
Dozen Construction, G.R. 632 SCRA 594 (2010).
Does the failure to state the number of pages in the attestation clause is fatal to the probate
of a will?
NO. The omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause, this was supplied by the
Acknowledgment portion of the will itself without the need to resort to extrinsic evidence.
Such omission does not in any way serve as hindrance to probate. Mitra v. Sablan-Guevarra,
G.R. No. 213994 (2018).
Joint Will
Is a joint will executed by spouses and admitted in probate proceedings valid?

It is partially valid. Despite the Civil Code’s prohibition against joint wills, the final decree of
probate on the joint will is valid but affects only the estate of the deceased spouse and not
the estate of the surviving spouse, considering that a joint will is a separate will of each

1
testator. The estate of the surviving spouse should pass upon his or her death to his or her
intestate heirs. De la Cerna v. Poto, G.R. No. L-20234 (1964), Mison (2020) at p. 99.
Subsection 4. Witnesses to Wills
Is it necessary to introduce independent proof of the credibility of the witnesses?

NO. Pursuant to Art. 820 of the Civil Code, any person of sound mind and of the age of
eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a
witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this Code.
Additionally, under Art. 821 of the same code, the following are disqualified from being
witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false
testimony.
Hence, under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify as to his
good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliability, his
honesty, and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the
trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 are complied with
and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821. Such attributes are presumed
of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise. Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 90 SCRA
183 (1979), Mison (2020) at p.133.
Is it necessary to sign the attestation clause before a notary public?

YES. Art 806 states that, “Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.” An authentic attestation clause must not only contain the
names of the instrumental witnesses. Mere mention of their names in the attestation clause
will not accurately represent the fact of their attestation and subscription. Instead, the
instrumental witnesses must also sign the instrument before it is notarized by the notary
public. Constantino v. People, G.R. No. 225696 (2019).
To whom does Article 808 of the Civil Code apply?

Article 808 of the Civil Code applies not only to blind testators but also to testators who are
not capable of reading their wills. Guia v. Cosico, G.R. No. 246997 (2021).
Subsection 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills
YES. As the Supreme Court held in the case of Samson v. Naval , a subsequent will, containing

Whether or not the 1918 will is still valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed
1939 will?
a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of Section 618 of the Rules on Civil Procedure as
to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as
said revocatory clause is void.
In the case bar, there was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the
testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the
revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated
under the principle of dependent relative revocation. The doctrine applies when a testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the
intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new
disposition fails of effect for some reason. Vda. de Molo v. Molo, G.R. N. L-2538 (1951), Jurado
(2009) at p.130.
Probate
Is probate necessary for a will to be used, given as evidence, or to be given effect?

YES. Article 838 (1) of the Civil Code provides that “No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.” Moreover,
with the use of the word “shall” in both the Civil Code and the ROC, it can be concluded that
the probate of a will is mandatory. Hence, probate is necessary for a will to be used, given as
evidence, or to be given effect. Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R. No. 174489 (2012).
Is due execution of the will necessary in the probate of a will?

YES. Article 838 (3) of the Civil Code provides that “Subject to the right of appeal, the
allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be
conclusive as to its due execution. “Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains
to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law. These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of
the New Civil Code. With this, due execution of the will is necessary for it to be probated.
Baltazar v. Laxa G.R. No. 174489 (2012).
May the will executed by a foreigner abroad be probated in the Philippines although it has
not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed?
YES. Article 816 of the Civil Code provides that “The will of an alien abroad produces effect in
the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he

resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this code provides”
An alien abroad may make a will in accordance with the formalities (extrinsic validity)
prescribed by the law of:
(a) The place of his residence or domicile;
(b) His own country or nationality;
(c) The Philippines;
(d) The law of the place of execution. (Article 17, paragraph 1)
Since the rules do not require proof that the foreign will must have already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution, it may then be probated in the Philippines for
as long as it follows the formalities prescribed by the law in the Philippines. Palaganas v.
Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144 (2011).
May the probate court cover questions of the intrinsic validity of the will?
NO. Probate court may only cover issues limited on whether the testator is:
(a) of sound mind;
(b) freely executed the will; and
(c) executed the will in accordance with legal formalities.
It must be noted that the question of the intrinsic validity of the will is not within the
purview of the probate court. In The Matter of The Probate of the Will of Garcia, G.R. No.
204793 (2020).
Are lawyers disqualified from being witnesses to a will?

NO. Lawyers are not disqualified from being witnesses to a will; the subscribing witnesses
testified to the due execution of the will. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides that, "any
person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or
dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in
Article 805 of this Code." Here, the attesting witnesses to the will in question are all lawyers
equipped with the aforementioned qualifications. In addition, they are not disqualified from
being witnesses under Article 821 of the Civil Code, even if they all worked at the same law
firm at the time. All the same, petitioners did not present controverting proof to discredit
them or to show that they were disqualified from being witnesses to Consuelo's will at the
time of its execution. In The Matter of The Probate of the Will of Garcia, G.R. No. 204793
(2020).

Is failure to indicate in the attestation clause the total number of pages upon which the will
was written automatically result in a void will?
NO. When the number of pages was provided in the acknowledgment portion instead of the
attestation clause, "the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although
there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to
insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when
they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the
testator's will." Undoubtedly, such substantially complied with Article 809 of the Civil Code.
In The Matter of The Probate of the Will Of Garcia, G.R. No. 204793 (2020).
When the issue of fraud and undue and improper pressure and influence in the execution of
the will is raised, should it be proven by the one who alleges it?
YES. The burden of proof is upon the Tanchancos to show that Consuelo could not have
executed the will or that her signature was forged. As the Tanchancos failed to prove that
the same was executed through force or under duress, or that the signature of the testator
was procured through fraud as provided under Article 839 of the Civil Code, the will should
be allowed probate as it complied with the formalities required by the law. In The Matter Of
The Probate of the Will of Garcia, G.R. No. 204793 (2020).
Can a probate court examine the intrinsic validity of a will?

As a general rule, no but for practical considerations, probate courts may examine a will’s
intrinsic validity.
The court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic
validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to
be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings
— is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will,
the legality of any devise or legacy therein.
In the case at bar, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will which if remanded
for probate of the will, nothing will be gained; whereas, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on
the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. The result will be waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety - which are the practical considerations that induce us to
a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the
will in question. Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 (1966), Jurado (2009) at pp. 182-184.

Is publication of the notice of the proceedings considered a constructive notice to the whole
world?
YES. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of
hearing of the petition is required to be published. Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's
original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune". Similarly, notice of the hearing of
her amended petition for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published
in "Bagong Kasanag". The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive
notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. Solivio v. CA,
Javellana, G.R. No. 83484 (1990), Jurado (2009) at p. 255.
Can persons in interest in a probate proceeding be impleaded?

No. The proceeding by which this is accomplished is considered to be in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, and upon this idea the decree of probate is held binding on all persons in
interest, whether they appear to contest the probate or not. The proceeding is not a
contentious litigation; and though the persons in interest are given an opportunity to appear
and reasonable precautions are taken for publicity, they are not impleaded or required to
answer. Riera v. Palmaroli, Jurado (2009) at p. 135.
Can a petition for probate be filed again after a previous petition for cancelled?
NO. Petition to probate is a proceeding in rem, which means all parties become bound by
judgment. If any of them or other persons interested were not satisfied, the remedy is to
appeal to correct any injustice that might have been committed. Manalo v. Paredes, G.R. No.
24168 (1925), Jurado (2009) at p. 149.
Can the court sustain the settlement of estate on the basic of intestacy despite the existent of
a will?
NO, it is against the law. Presentation of a will for probate is mandatory because unless the
will is probated and notice thereof is given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. Guevara v. Guevara, G.R. No. L-
48840 (1943), Jurado (2009) at pp. 136-137.
Does prescription apply in probate proceedings?

NO. Reason and precedent reject the applicability of Statute of Limitations to probate
proceedings because the same are established not exclusively in the interest of heirs but
primarily for the protection of the testator's expressed wishes. Guevara v. Guevara, G.R. No.
L48840 (1943), Jurado (2009) at pp. 136-137.

the law?
will is done. Castañeda v Alemany, G.R. No. 1439 (1904).
Can the probate court settle the dispute as to the ownership?

NO. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Moreover, the prevailing rule is that
for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is
not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership
which may be instituted by the parties. Aranas v Mercado, G.R. No. L-156407 (2014).
Can a will that has been properly executed for probate be still impugned?
NO. The admission of a will to probate is conclusive as to its due execution, but it does not
determine the validity of the provisions thereof. It does not follow, however, that the
provisions of the will are not valid and effective, provided they are not called into question.
When testamentary provisions are not contested, the distribution of the estate is governed
by the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will.|||This is not the case, however, with
regard to the proper execution thereof, as in view of the fact that it constitutes the proper
and special subject-matter therefor, it acquires by virtue thereof the character of res
adjudicata, and cannot in consequence be again brought into question, all judicial question
in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. Montanano v Suesa, 14 Phil 676
(1909).
Can the intrinsic validity be opposed in probate proceedings?

NO. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or to the legality of the provisions of the will cannot
be entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the
will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the
purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child
who allegedly has been ignored in the will for such issue cannot be raised here but in a
separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive
and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after
his death. Palacios v Palacios, G.R. No. L-12207 (1959).
Does the caption “donation mortis causa” prevail over the intent of the donor?

NO. That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is
not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. Del Rosario v Ferrer,
630 SCRA 683 (2010).
Is the mere fact that the objector impugned the will (testator is allegedly not in full
possession of her mental capacity in executing a will) and objected to the probate thereof
sufficient to disallow the probate proceedings?
NO. According to the most rational principle adopted by the Civil Code, all persons who have
not been previously declared by the courts to be mentally incapacitated, are always
presumed to be of sound mind, so long as the contrary is not demonstrated by the party
alleging such incapacity. After it has been held by the court that a will was executed in
accordance with the solemnities and requisites established by section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, its admission to probate shall forthwith be ordered; the unfounded
opposition by a person who has not proven his legal capacity and title to the hereditary
succession under a competent will, shall not prevent its admission. The fact that the will was
impugned and that its probate was objected to, is not sufficient to sustain a presumption
that the objector has the legal capacity, interest or title to maintain such objection. In re:
Cabigting G.R. No. 4752 (1909).
Can a stranger intervene in probate proceedings?

NO. But the mere fact that a stranger has been permitted to oppose or contest the probate
of a will is not reversible error and does not invalidate the proceedings where no objection is
interposed by any of the parties in interest .The judgment of the court in probate
proceedings is not based on the fact that there is or is not opposition to the probate of the
will but upon the production of evidence which discloses that there are or are not sufficient
grounds for the probate of the will as propounded; and the reason for the rule excluding
strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court may be prevented from
learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the
courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of
persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation
thereto. Paras v Narcisco, G.R. No. 10959 (1916).
Can Chung Kiat Kang, a stranger, have the right to intervene in an administration proceeding
and be appointed as administrator?
NO. It is well-settled that for a person to be able to intervene in an administration
proceeding concerning the estate of a deceased, it is necessary for him to have interest in
such estate. An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a certain claim against the estate,

such as a creditor. Appellant Chung Kiat Kang does not claim of to be a creditor of Chung
Liu's estate. Neither is he an heir in accordance with the Civil Code of the Republic of China,
the law that applies in this case, Chung Liu being a Chinese citizen. The appellant not having
any interest in Chung Liu's estate, either as heir or creditor, he cannot be appointed as co-
administrator of the estate, as he now prays. Ñgo The Hua v. Chuang Kiat Hua, G.R. No. L-17019
(1963).
Whether the oppositor, Anal del Val Chan, has any interest in any of the provisions of the will,
and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is
denied probate?
NO. Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives
and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not
recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the
presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of
sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in
life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. Teotico v. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406 (1965), Balane (2010) at p. 483.
Are oppositors allowed to intervene in probate proceedings?

NO. In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding that they "have
no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore . . . are
totally (sic) strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate." They do not attempt to
show that they have some interest in the estate which must be protected. The
uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the parties' baptism and
marriage certificates, support the said court's finding in this respect. Sumilang v. Ramagosa,
27 SCRA 1369 (1967).
Is the court obliged to accept or receive evidence of the filiation of an oppositor to the
probate? NO. To allow petitioner, oppositor in the probate, to prove her filiation would be
injecting matters different from the issues involved in the probate, which in this case were
the alleged non-execution of the will, or the execution thereof under pressure or influence
or by threat, or the alleged forgery of the signatures of the testator. And if the court
permitted submission of evidence as to the filiation of the proceedings for probate, the
nature of the evidence submitted would nevertheless be only prima facie, and only to justify
her intervention in the probate proceedings, and it would not be decisive of her right to

inherit as a recognized natural child, as the final decision on the matter would be made after
hearing for the declaration of the heirs. So that no advantage could have been gained by
hearing the provisional or prima facie evidence of the petitioner on her filiation, anyway the
court was not depriving her of the right or opportunity to contest the will. Reyes v. Ysip, G.R.
No. L-7516 (1955).
Does the finality of the approval of the product of partition terminate the probate
proceedings? NO. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does
not terminate the probate proceeding. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor
has not elapsed. The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is
to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already
been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court
or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
Guilas v. Hon. Lopez, G.R. No. L-26695 (1972).
Does the probate of a will bar the criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will?
YES. In view of the provisions of Sections 306, 333 and 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly
admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction. Section 625 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will. The
probate of will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as
to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound mind
and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress,
menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery. Mercado
vs. Santos, G.R. No. 45649 (1938).
Can a will which has been duly probated be annulled?

NO, the plaintiff’s action in this case was barred by res judicata and prescription. In 1967, the
plaintiffs seek the “annulment” of a last will and testament which was duly probated in 1939
by the lower court coupled with an action to recover the lands adjudicated to the
defendants by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will which action was a
resuscitation of the complaint of the same parties that the same court dismissed in 1952. The

Supreme Court held that an action instituted in 1967 for the annulment of a last will and
testament duly probated way back in 1939 will not prosper. Moreover, the Rules of Court
does not sanction an action for “annulment of a will. After the finality of the allowance of a
will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore. The Civil
Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not prescribe
cannot be applied to last wills and testaments. Gallanosa vs. Arcangel, G.R. No. L-29300 (1978).
Can an order allowing a will to probate be reversed even after the lapse of the period fixed by
law for taking an appeal therefrom?
YES. Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Upon such terms as may be just,
the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, order, or other
proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect: Provided That application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in no case
exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken." After the lapse
of twenty-five days from the date of issuance of a decree allowing a will to probate and
declaring a “legatee,” if no appeal is taken from said decree, the same becomes final and
conclusive, and it may be set aside by the court issuing it only if within six months from the
date it was issued application therefor is made in accordance with Section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and the court granting an application for the reopening of said proceedings,
filed after the lapse of said periods, exceeds its jurisdiction and the order of judgment
rendered by it is null and void and without any legal effect. McMaster vs. Hentry Reissmann &
Co., G.R. No. 45842 (1939).
Can a petition for annulment of a will be entertained after the decree of probate had
become final?
NO. In this case, a will was admitted to probate without objection. No appeal was taken
from said order and due trial legal notice had been given to all parties. Fifteen months after
the date of said order, a motion was presented in the lower court to have said will declared
null and void on the ground that fraud had been practiced upon the deceased in the making
of his will. The Supreme Court held that under Section 625 of Act. No. 190, the only time
given parties who are displeased with the order admitting to probate a will, for an appeal is
the time given for appeals in ordinary actions; but without deciding whether or not an order
admitting a will to probate will be opened for fraud, after the time allowed for an appeal has
expired, when no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs cannot, in
subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions relating to its due execution.
Moreover, the probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution trial as to the
testamentary capacity of the testator. Austria vs. Ventenilla, G.R. No. L-6620 (1912).

Is the probate of a will by final judgment prior to that of a codicil thereof bar to the probate
of said codicil?
NO. In this case, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the codicil of a will that has
already become final and executory. The court a quo denied her petition for the probate of
the codicil on the ground that said codicil should have been presented at the same time as
the will. The Supreme Court held that the fact that a will has been probated and the order
allowing the same has become final and executory is not a bar to the presentation and
probate of a codicil, although its existence was known at the time of the probate of the will,
provided it complies with all the necessary formalities for executing a will required by
Section 614 of the Code of civil Procedure, as amended by Section 1 of Act No. 1934. Macam
vs. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-42619 (1937).
Does the failure to file opposition to the probate of a will constitute a bar to the presentation
of the codicil for probate?
NO. In this case, the oppositor opposed the probate of only the codicil and not of the will.
The court a quo ruled that she should have opposed to the probate of the will and that she
could no longer avail herself of the document in her favor. The Supreme Court held that the
failure of the oppositor to the probate of a codicil to file opposition to the probate of the
will, having knowledge of such proceedings, does not constitute an abandonment of a right,
nor does it deprive her of the right to oppose the probate of said codicil. Macam vs.
Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L42619 (1937).
Preterition
Was there preterition because Francisco allegedly received a house and lot inter vivos as an
advance on his legitime?
YES. The will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the
decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales
could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his
preterition. During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present
evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and advances on his legitime from the
decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving
her right to present evidence on the issue. The Court cannot fault the RTC for reaching the
reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is
not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir
nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being disinherited, tacitly depriving
the heir of his legitime. Morales v. Olondriz, G.R. 198994 (2016)

Was there preterition?
YES. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she
left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received
nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they
expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of
Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este
ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-
sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity
is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Nuguid v Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 (1966),
Jurado (2009) at p. 182.
Is there preterition when none of the children by the first marriage are included in the will?
YES, there is preterition. According to the court, none of the children by the first marriage
received their respective shares from the testator’s property. Even if clause of the will is
invoked wherein testator stated that the children by his first marriage had already received
their shares in his property excluding what he had given them as aid during their financial
troubles and the money they had borrowed from him, the Court can rely only on the findings
that the property of Agrapino has remained intact and that no portion has been given to the
children of the first marriage. Agrapino did not expressly disinherit his children by his first
marriage but did not leave anything to them. This fits the case of preterite according to
Article 814 of the Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and
intestate succession should be declared open. Neri vs. Akutin, G.R. No. L-47799 (1941), Mison
(2020) at p. 182.
Is the probate of the will Hilarion Ramagosa be denied?

NO, the petition for probate goes to the extrinsic validity of the will which is a compliance
with the formal requisites or solemnities required by law. The alleged sale of the property
goes to the intrinsic validity of the will and is not a ground for the dismissal of the petition
for probate. Sumilang v Ramagosa, G.R. No. L-23135 (1967), Jurado (2009) at p. 139.
Is there preterition when the legitime is incomplete?

NO, there was no preterition. The solution was that the heir to request that the legitime be
completed and not that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely. This solution is more in
consonance with the expressed wishes of the testator in the present case as may be
gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge Helen
Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that

she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume that
had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards here
would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her
and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him. The testator did not
entirely omit Helen Garcia but left her a legacy of P3,600.00. Therefore, ¼ of the estate of
the deceased which consisted of 399 shares of stocks and a certain amount of cash
descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner of her share as of
the moment of the death of the decedent, she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all
the fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing. Therefore, there is no preterition if
the heir is given a legacy or devise. Aznar vs. Duncan, G.R. No. L-24365 (1966), Jurado (2009) at
p. 177, Balane at pp. 269-275.
Is a recognized natural child entitled only to one-fourth of the hereditary property?

NO. If a natural father dies under a duly executed will, his recognized natural son who
survives him, being his general heir, is only entitled to one-third of his estate, which amount
constitutes his legal portion, but, if the natural father dies intestate, his natural recognized
son is entitled to the entire estate. Escuin vs. Escuin, G.R. No. L-4359 (1908), Jurado (2009) at
p. 175, Paras (2010) at p. 198.
May a victim of preterition seek to convert a civil case into an intestate proceedings for the
settlement of the testate estate of a deceased person?
NO. It is only allowed in special proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of a
deceased person, which, in consequence of said preterition, would thereby acquire the
character of a proceeding for the settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over
any and all properties of the deceased. However, in an ordinary civil action, and the authority
of the court having jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties described in the
pleadings. Lajom vs. Leuterio, G.R. No. L-13557 (1960).
Could Araceli claim preterition by virtue of the Confirmation Affidavit on the assumption that
the disputed two lots pertained to Perfecto's inheritance, he had only three legal heirs and he
left Araceli with no share in the two lots?
NO. In order that there be preterition, it is essential that the heir must be totally omitted.
Although Araceli was a compulsory heir in the direct descending line, she could not have
been preterited. Firstly, Perfecto left no will. As contemplated in Article 854, the presence of
a will is necessary. Secondly, before his death, Perfecto had properties in Limon, Rizal which
was almost 50 hectares, part of which was developed for residential and agricultural
purposes, and in Odiongan. Araceli could not have been totally excluded in the inheritance
of Perfecto even if she was not allegedly given any share in the disputed two lots Mayuga v.
Atienza, G.R. No. 208197 (2018).

Should the remains to be adjudged is the right of the preterited heirs to represent their
father, Policronio, and be declared entitled to his share?
NO. Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the
inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir,
omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him
anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is
mentioned in the will in the latter case. Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary
succession and requires a will. In the case at bench, there is no will involved. Therefore,
preterition cannot apply. Heirs of P. Ureta v. Heirs of L. Ureta, GR 165748 (2011). Mison
(2020)at pp. 446-447.
Fraud
Was the signature of the testator procured by fraud sufficiently established by evidence? NO,
the signature of the testator procured by fraud was not sufficiently established by evidence.
Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement or pretense by which the subject of it is
cheated. The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at
the time of execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of will only
upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. In this case, other than the self-serving
allegations of the petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented. Ortega v Valmonte,
G.R. No. 157451 (2005), Mison (2020) at p. 173.
Was there fraud because the testator was not apprised that the document he was signing
was in fact a second will which revoked the first will he made?
YES, there was fraud because the testator was not apprised that the document he was
signing revokes was in fact a second will which revoked the first will he made. Had the
testator been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he
would not have denied he made it. The testator would probably have caused it to be
probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. Revilla v Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 95329 (2000), Balane (2010) at p. 483.
Undue Influence
Can it be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion that a will was procured by undue
influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will?
No. It is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility
that it may have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was actually
exercised. Ozaeta vs. Cuartero, G.R. No. L-5597 (1956), Mison (2020) at p. 174.

Can a mere claim that the legal heirs had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix
simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and
that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her
friends for several years prior to her death is sufficient to disprove what the instrumental
witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of
the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration?
No. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by
substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of
the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather
than her own. The burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was
exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence
presented not only is sufficient but was disproved by the testimony the instrumental
witnesses. Teotico vs. Del Val Chan, G.R. No. L-18753 (1956), Balane (2010) at p. 483.
Is it absolute that any form of solicitation or request to the testator substantiate an undue
influence to avoid a will?
No. Moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the testator is not
sufficient to avoid a will. Barretto vs. Reyes, 98 Phil 996 (1956).
Does the fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof or adequate evidence of
either fraud or undue influence?
No. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the
decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary disposition that the heirs should not
inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in the will,
under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not suffice to prove fraud or
undue influence, as they appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation
which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate
being diverted into the hands of non-heirs and speculators. Fraud and undue influence are
mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as ground for opposing probate
shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will. In re. Villacorta Testate
Estate, G.R. No. L-18979 (1964).
Are the strong affections that the testator entertained for its legal heir, has enabled the
latter to assert its undue influence, which overpowered and subjugated the testator’s mind,
as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own, in
disposing his property?
NO. Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no
imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal

and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort
and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made. Such influence must be
actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the will in
question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still
operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must
result in the making of testamentary dispositions which the testator would not
otherwise have made. Coso vs. Fernandez, Deza, G.R. No. L-16763 (1921), Mison (2020) at p. 183.
Does the fact that the alleged will leave all the properties of the testator to his widow, and
wholly fails to make any provisions for his brothers and sisters, indicative of a lack of
testamentary capacity and undue influence?
NO. An admittedly genuine and authentic signature of the deceased was introduced in
evidence for comparison with the signature attached to the will, but this witness in his
anxiety to deny the genuineness of the signature of his brother to the will, promptly and
positively swore that the admittedly genuine signature was not his brother's signature, and
only corrected his erroneous statement in response to a somewhat suggestive question by
his attorney which evidently gave him to understand that his former answer was likely to
prejudice his own cause. On cross-examination, he was forced to admit that because his
brother and his brother's wife (in those favor the will was made) were Aglipayanos, he and
his other brothers and sisters had not visited them for many months prior to the one
particular occasion as to which testified; and he admitted further, that, although he lived
near at hand, at no time thereafter did he or any of the other members of his family visit
their dying brother, and that they did not even attend the funeral. If the testimony of this
witness could be accepted as true, it would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that the
subscribing witnesses to the alleged will should have falsely pretended to have joined in its
execution on the very day, and at the precise hour, when this interested witness happened
to pay his only visit to his brother during his last illness, so that the testimony of this witness
would furnish conclusive evidence in support of the allegations of the contestants that the
alleged will was not executed at the time and place or in the manner and form alleged by the
subscribing witnesses. In effect, the court do not think that the testimony of this witness nor
any of the other witnesses for the contestants is sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the
truth of the testimony of the subscribing witnesses as to the fact of the execution of the
will, or as to the manner and from in which it was executed. Bugnao vs. Ubag, G.R. No. 4445
(1909).
Does the omission or exclusion of relatives by blood in a testamentary will constitute undue
influence?
NO. Any person who has no forced heirs may dispose of by will all his property or any part of
it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it. Even ignoring the precedents of this legal

precept, the Code embodying it has been in force in the Philippines for more than a quarter
of a century and for this reason it is not tenable to say that the exercise of the liberty
thereby granted is necessarily exceptional, where it is not shown that the inhabitants of this
country whose customs must have been take into consideration by the legislator in adopting
this legal precept, are averse to such a liberty.
Therefore, there is nothing strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood
relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. In the absence of
any statutory restriction, every person possesses absolute dominion over his property and
may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon
his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will and the disposition
of his property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by
the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. However, as has already been shown,
the unreasonableness or unjustness of a will may be considered on the question of
testamentary capacity. Pecson vs. Coronel, G.R. No. L-20374 (1923).
Section 2. Institution of Heirs
How does ownership over inheritance pass to intestate heirs, legatees and devisees?
As a consequence of Art. 777 of the Civil Code, ownership over the inheritance passes to the
heirs at the precise moment of death. For intestate heirs, this means that they are
immediately entitled to their hereditary shares in the estate even though they may not be
entitled to any particular properties yet. For legatees and devisees granted specific
properties, this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and devises at that
immediate moment without prejudice to the legitimes of compulsory heirs. Hacbang vs. Alo,
777 SCRA 36 (2015).
Should the testatrix’s property be divided equally between her living sisters and children of
her deceased sisters?
YES, the testatrix’s property should be divided equally between her living sisters and
children of her deceased sisters. In the first paragraph of the testatrix’s codicil, she declared
as to who she desires shall become the owners of her property on the death of her husband.
In the last clause of the second paragraph, she declared that her heir must “take and enjoy
the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives”. Thus, it is with fair clearness that it
was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters and
nieces. Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil 72 (1914).
Were all the requisites for false cause satisfied to invalidate the institution of the heir?

NO, not all the requisites for false cause were satisfied to invalidate the institution of the
heir. The first requisite is the cause must be written on the will. In this case, the testratrix
wrote in the will that she was giving her properties to respondents as if they were her
adopted children. The second requisite is the cause must be false. In this case, the cause was
false because the respondents, in reality, were actually not adopted and the testatrix
erroneously believed that the “adopted” children were her compulsory heirs. The third
requisite was the tenor of the disposition in the will must indicate that testator would have
not made the disposition had he known of the falsity of the cause. In this case, if it was true
that testatrix was merely acting on the basis of false cause, she would have just given them
the minimum which was the required legitime. However, the testatrix gave more than what
is legally required. Thus, in all likelihood, testatrix was acting on her own free will. Austria vs.
Reyes, 31 SCRA 754 (1970), Mison (2020) p. 152. 199.
Section 3. Substitution of Heirs
Is there fideicommissary substitution?

NO. This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might
give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of the instituted heiress
before the testatrix would in the instant case give place to such substitution, inasmuch as
nothing is said of the waiver of inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. Considering the nature
of simple substitution by the heir's death before the testator, and the fact that by clause XI
in connection with clause X, the substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies
after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution.
Finally, by virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the
heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from the
moment of the death of the testatrix. Perez vs. Garchitoren, G.R. No. L-31703 (1930).
Did the will create a trust?

NO, it is fideicomissary substitution.i this case, under paragraph 8 of the Will, Ludovico
Hidrosollo was instituted as sole and universal heir to the rest of the properties not covered
by the legacies in the preceding paragraphs.
Although the word "trust" itself does not appear in the Will, the testator's intent to create
one is nonetheless clearly demonstrated by the stipulations in her Will. In designating her
husband Ludovico Hidrosollo as universal and sole heir with the obligation to deliver the
properties to petitioners and private respondents, she intended that the legal title should
vest in him, and in significantly referring to petitioners and private respondents as
"beneficiarios," she intended that the beneficial or equitable interest to these properties

should repose in them."No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust,
it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. " (Art. 1443, Civil Code of the Philippines).
However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as the surviving spouse of the testatrix,
Ludovico Hidrosollo was entitled to a legitime of one-half (1/2) of her hereditary estate. As
that portion is reserved by law for the compulsory heirs, no burden, encumbrance, condition
or substitution of any kind whatsoever may be imposed upon the legitime by the testator.
(Art. 904, second paragraph,
Ibid)
The trust created by Concepcion Mapa should therefore be, as it is hereby declared to be
effective only on the free portion of her estate, i.e., that portion not covered by Ludovico
Hidrosollo's legitime. Vda. De Mapa v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-38972 (1987).
Does a testamentary clause that show the substitution of heirs is not expressly made of the
fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during
her lifetime will have the right to enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to
her?
YES, the naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already
stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death whether this happens before or after
that of the testatrix her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix. The testator may
not only designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his death, but also provide for
substitutes in the event that said heirs do not accept or are in no position to accept the
inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him. It is clear that the particular testamentary clause
under consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner:
that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino — whether this occurs before or after that of
the testatrix — the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong
in equal parts to the testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced
heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created
what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that Consolacion
Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of the
property, but if it provided for a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing
more than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would
undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter. Crisologo vs. Singson, G.R. No. L-
13876 (1962).
Section 4. Conditional Testamentary Dispositions with a Term
Did the testator intend to impose a condition?

NO. In order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such conditions must fairly
appear from the language used in the will. In the instant case, the testatrix merely orders her
husband in her will not to marry again after her death, without attaching such order to the
legacies and devises or without stating that the failure of comply with the other shall result
in the nullity of the legacies and devises. Morente v. De la Santa, G.R. No. L-3891 (1907).
Does a husband, who violated certain conditions, lose his rights to the properties given to him
without prejudice to his legitime?
YES. In the case of Borce v. Marcallana, the husband of the testatrix violated the condition
which directed him not to remarry again, or if he desires to remarry again, he must choose
any of the testatrix’s relatives within the sixth degree. The court ruled that the husband lost
his right to properties given to him without prejudice to his legitime. Broce v. Court of
Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-12367 (1959).
Is the condition void?

YES. In this case, the testator who is a Turkish citizen, executed a will which contains a
provision that his estate shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, and if any relative should disregard his wishes would have dispositions in
favor to them be annulled or cancelled. The Supreme Court held that the said condition is
void for being contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the
one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Miciano v. Brimo, G.R. No. L-22595 (1927), Mison
(2020) at p. 68.
Should Philippine law govern over the disposition of Philippine estates?

NO. In this case, the decedent was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
The appellants argued by executing two wills (one in the Philippines), the decedent intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. The Supreme Court, citing the case of Miciano
v. Brimo, held that a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Bellis v. Bellis, 20 SCRA
358 (1967), Mison (2020) at p. 67.
Does Flora’s actuations amount to a violation of the “no-contest and forfeiture” clause of the
will?
NO. Flora, one of the devisees, interposed an opposition to the probate of the testator’s
second will on the grounds undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix in
the execution thereof. She later withdrew her opposition. The Supreme Court held that

opposition was a mistake committed in good faith because grounded on strong doubts. —
she withdrew her opposition and joined the appellee in the latter's petition for the probate
of the will. She must not now be penalized for rectifying her error. Santos v. Buenaventura,
18 SCRA 47 (1966).
Is the estate of the widow is entitled to the properties?

NO. In this case, the testator left the “use and possession” of certain specified properties to
his widow “while alive” subject to the condition that she does not marry; otherwise, said
property will go to his grandniece. In ruling in favor of the grandniece, the Supreme Court
held that, the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties,
even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased " use
and possession while alive.” Villaflor-Villanueva v. Juico, G.R. No. L-15737 (1962).
Is the estate of Nieves Cruz liable for the restitution against petitioner Rodriguez?
YES, the estate of Nieves Cruz are liable for restitution only to the extent of their individual
inheritance from Nieves Cruz. Consequently, the estate of Nieves Cruz is liable to petitioner
Rodriguez for the return to the latter of the sum of PhP 77,216 less the amount which
Atanacio Valenzuela, et al., had deposited with the trial court under the decision of the
respondent court. Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 27 SCRA 546 (1969).
Are double legacies contrary to Article 973 of the Civil Code?

YES. The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon
the happening of the event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the legatee
Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition according to Art. 873 of the Civil Code, as it
impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good customs, shall be considered as not
imposed and shall in no manner prejudice the heir, even if the testator should otherwise
provide.
All conditions imposed in a will must be observed under the express wishes of the testator if
they are neither impossible to fulfill and not contrary to law and morality. The moment the
legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to deliver the property to
the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his turn and exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the
sum of PhP 4,000, thereby fulfilling the double legacy contained in the said sixth clause of
the will, the first of these legacies being the voluntary reservation to Basilia Gabino of the
ownership of the said house, and the second, the conditional legacy of PhP 4,000 to Lorenzo
Salvador. Natividad v. Gabino, 36 Phil 663 (1917).
Is there a modal institution?

YES. Petitioner Johnny claims that this is not a modal institution, but a mere substitution
where Alejas's near descendants are only meant to substitute in the obligation to deliver
sugar to respondent Maria. It is not a modal institution where non-compliance with the
obligation merits the reversion of the lot back to the estate of Aleja.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New
Civil Code is the provision of law in point. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix
imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance
of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with,
the property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The manner of the
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is modal because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of the such institution.
Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725 (2000).
Section 5. Legitime
Is the property subject of the donation a subject of collation?

NO. The decedent left no compulsory heir who is entitled to legitime; he was at liberty to
donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to the petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation
made to a “stranger” chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
The term collation has two distinct concepts:
(1) It is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by
the testator to the value of the hereditary estate;
(2) It is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the
testator during his lifetime.
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to
determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded. Arellano v. Pascual, 638 SCRA 826 (2010).
Is the last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order
that has become final and executory still be given effect?

NO. The probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to
be probated, particularly on three aspects:
(1) Whether the will submitted is true, the decedent’s last will and testament;
(2) Compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills
(3) The testamentary capacity of the testator; and
(4) The due execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, the execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will,
and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace, or undue influence and that the will is
genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. The intrinsic validity is another
matte, and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and
testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator
provides for dispositions that deprive or impair the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions
thereof cannot be given effect. This is especially so when the courts had already determined
in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having
attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed.
Dorotheo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
108581 (1999), Paras at p. 75, Mison (2020) at p. 164.
In a reservation by the widowed spouse, what are the two stages?

The first stage is when the property goes to the widowed spouse without being reservable
and the other, when the widowed spouse contracts a second marriage whereupon the
property, which theretofore had come into his possession free of any encumbrance,
becomes reservable. If the property is sold during the first stage, it is transferred absolutely
free, and upon contracting another marriage, the widowed spouse must secure its value
with a mortgage in order to give efficacy to the reservation when the time comes for its
enforcement.
In the second stage, the property is transferred subject to the reservation, and the law does
not require such a mortgage since the property itself answers for the reservation. Dizon-
Rivera v. Dizon, G.R. No. L-24561 (1970), Paras at p. 300, Mison (2020) at p. 60.
Are the rules on reservation by a widowed spouse applicable to reserva troncal?

YES. The rules on reservation by a widowed spouse are applicable to reserva troncal
(reservation by ascendant) in so far as the latter is analogous to the former. In reservation
by an ascendant, the property passes to the ascendant already reservable and its status is,
therefore, similar to that of property subject to reservation by the widowed spouse after the
widower has contracted a second marriage and, as in this case, the widower, in selling the
property, is not under any obligation to ensure the reservation with a mortgage, neither is
the reservor in a reservation by an ascendant. Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon, G.R. No. L-24561 (1970),
Paras at p. 300, Mison (2020) at p. 60.
What is the right of completion of legitime?

If some heirs are genuinely interested in securing that part of their late father’s property
which has been reserved for them in their capacity as compulsory heirs, then they should
simply exercise their action ad supplendam legitiman, or their right of completion of legitime.
Gala v. Ellice Agro-Industrial Corp., 418 SCRA 431 (2003), Paras (2021) at p. 302.
Were the heirs of Pedro deprived of their respective shares over the disputed property when
Pedro alienated the same?
NO. Pursuant to Art. 777 of the Civil Code, “the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent.” It is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on
December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances entitling them to
their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property,
the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang.
Absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by
valuable consideration (in effect an inofficious donation inter vivos), the respondents have
no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father
deprived them of their respective shares. Calalang-Parulan v. Calalang, 725 SCRA 402 (2014).
What is the distinctive nature or characteristic of the system of legitime?

The right to enter into the possession of any inheritance commences only from the moment
of the death of the predecessor in interest. But it is undeniable that a necessary or forced
heir, according to the system of legitimes, has, by provision of law from the time of his birth,
a vested right to acquire the inheritance from his ascendants after their death and such a
vested right is inherent with his legitimate filiation. Rocha v. Tuason, G.R. No. 14254 (1919),
Paras (2008) at p.299 .
What is one of the most decisive ways to say that a father recognizes a child as his own? The
most decisive evidence of the complainant that the respondent is the father of her child is
the certificate of live birth wherein the respondent signed as the father of the child.

Normally, no person will sign a certificate of live birth as the father of the child if he is not so.
Despite the denials of the respondent, the weight of the evidence of record is that he is the
father of the child. Sanchez v. Fabillaran, Adm. Matter No. P-1175 (1979), Paras (2008) at p. 301.
When the removal of the executrix is legally justified, to whom should the letters of
administration be granted?
The “next of kin” has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent’s property. It is generally said that “the nearest of kin, whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.
Among members of a class, the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.
Ventura v. Ventura, G.R.
No. L-26306 (1988) Paras (2008) at p. 306.
Do the plaintiffs have any right in the land concerned in order to require its division?
In order to be entitled to ask for the partition of inheritance as natural children of the
predecessor in interest, such natural filiation must be proved as must also the
acknowledgment of such status by the father or mother from whom the inheritance is
derived. Tiamson v. Tiamson, G.R. No. 9692 (1915), Paras (2021) at p. 308.
Is it improper for a declaration of heirs to be made in an ordinary civil action (Case No. 4895)
in view of the pendency of case (No. 5267) for the settlement of the estate of said deceased?
NO. The matter of acknowledgment of an alleged natural child and his claim as such to a
share in the estate of the alleged natural father may be determined either in an ordinary civil
action or in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased father.
Zaldarriaga v. Marino, G.R. No. L-19566 (1964), Paras (2021) at p. 308.
Is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law?

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles
her to inherit from her mother-inlaw either by her own right or by the right of
representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision
which makes a daughter-inlaw an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms our
observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the
parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code. Rosales v. Rosales, G.R. No. L-40789
(1987), Paras (2021) at p. 308.

What are the two classifications of intestate or legal heirs?
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely: (a) those who inherit by
their own right and (b) those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an
intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession
provided for in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of
the same law. Rosales v. Rosales, G.R. No. L-40789 (1987), Paras (2021) at p. 308.
Should the probate of the court of the ownership of a property be allowed when such
decision may prejudice a third party?
NO. The determination of the subject property (fishing boat) should be determined in an
ordinary separate civil action, because it affects the lessee -- third person -- thereof. The
decedent’s son-in-law, the lessee of the boat, who, although married to the decedent’s
daughter, was still held to be a third person with respect to the estate. This case falls under
the general rule that a question as to title to property cannot be passed upon in the testate
or intestate proceeding, but should be held in a separate action. Lachenal v. Salas, G.R. No.
L42257 (1976), Paras (2021) at p. 308.
Is a testator prohibited from making his illegitimate children his heirs?

NO. Illegitimate children are not prohibited from receiving, nor their parents from giving
them, something more than support, so long as the legitimate children are not prejudiced.
del Campo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 39796 (1934), Paras (2021) at p. 309.
Do the brothers and sisters of the testator have the right to contest the will?
NO. Under Article 763 of the Civil Code, the brothers and sisters of the testator, not being
forced heirs, have no right to any part of the property left by the testator. Only forced heirs
whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to intervene in a probate proceeding. del
Campo v. Calderon, G.R. No. 39796 (1934), Paras (2021) at p. 309.
Are the brothers and sisters of the testator entitled to and should have been notified of the
probate of the will?
NO. The sister of the testator, not being an instituted nor compulsory heir, did not acquire
any successional right, therefore, did not entitle her to the notification of the probate of the
will and neither had the right to expect it. Manahan v. Manahan, G.R. No. 38050 (1933), Paras
(2021) at p. 309.
Does a testator have the right to dispose of a part of his estate by will in favor of his
adulterous son?

YES. Under Art. 845, the law does not prohibit illegitimate children from receiving, nor their
parents from giving them, something more than support. Further, by reason of blood, the
illegitimate child has a preferential right over a stranger unless, by his behavior, he has
become unworthy of such testamentary disposition. Barrios v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 203090
(1928), Paras (2021) at p. 309.
Should there be any positive act from a compulsory heir for successional rights be
transmitted to them?
NO. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent, and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law
without need of further proceedings. Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725
(2000),Paras (2021) at p. 309.
What should an illegitimate child establish in order for him or her to be entitled to the
successional rights under Articles 287 and 887 of the Civil Code?
Acknowledgement or recognition by the decedent is the basis of the right of an illegitimate
child to enjoy the successional rights. In this case, the illegitimate child only intended to
prove the naked paternity of the deceased. There was no allegation of her acknowledgment
by the alleged father in the petition to establish filiation. The petition therefore states no
cause of action and the consequent dismissal of the lower court was proper. Noble v. Noble,
G.R. No. L17742 (1966), Mison (2020) at p. 248.
When is recognition of filiation compulsory?

An illegitimate child is entitled to support and successional rights if he or she can prove his or
her filiation to his or her presumed parents. Filiation is voluntary when made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. On the other
hand, filiation is compulsory when by court action the child brings about his recognition. In
this case, there was no voluntary recognition of filiation because no allegation of
acknowledgment by the father in the action was made. There being no allegation of the
same, the action becomes a compulsory recognition of filiation which cannot be brought
after the death of the father. Paulino v. Paulino, G.R. No. L-15091 (1961), Jurado (2009) at p.
238.
When is recognition of filiation voluntary?

Under Art. 278 of the Civil Code, recognition is voluntary when made by the putative parent
in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.
In this case, there was no evidence required by Art. 278 which proves that the petitioners
were recognized by the deceased Enrique Baluyut during his lifetime as his illegitimate

children. The petitioners’ records of birth, although in the name of the deceased, were not
signed by the latter. Baluyut v. Baluyut, G.R. No. L-33659 (1990).
Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action?
YES. An action for legal separation is personal; therefore, the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself. The offending spouse’s disqualification to inherit
by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions
in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one and all other rights and
disabilities under Art. 106 of the Family Code are vested exclusively in the persons of the
spouses. By their nature and intent, such claims to such rights and disabilities are
extinguished if a party dies during the pendency of the action for legal separation. Lapuz v.
Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977 (1972).
Can an alien spouse who obtains a valid divorce decree abroad remain an heir of a Filipino
spouse he or she divorced?
NO. An alien may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized by the Philippines, as long
as the divorce is valid according to the alien’s national law. In this case, private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in Nevada, USA which dissolved his marriage with his Filipino
spouse. The private respondent should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property, because the private respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner. To maintain otherwise under our laws that petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent would be unjust. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. L-668470
(1985), Mison (2020) at p. 249.
May the parents of the deceased succeed with the surviving spouse and legitimate
descendants?
NO. Parents of the deceased, though compulsory heirs, succeed only when the latter dies
without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all
classes of heirs. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of the
surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased. Baritua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82233(1990),
Mison (2020) at p. 251.
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a
simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children? No.
Article 888, Civil Code provides that "the legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may
freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the

surviving spouse as hereinafter provided." Francisco v. Francisco-Alfonso, G.R. No. 138774
(2001), Mison (2020) at p. 253.
May the legitime of an acknowledged illegitimate children be ½ of the legitime of legitimate

children?
NO. Pursuant to second paragraph of Article 895, the legitime of an illegitimate child who is
neither an acknowledged natural, nor a natural child by legal fiction, shall be equal in every
case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. Rivera v. Villanueva
May the illegitimate children have successional rights under the new Civil Code by way of its
retroactive effect?
NO. Article 2253 provides that rights which are declared for the first time shall have
retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under
the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or
acquired right of the same origin. Uson v. del Rosario, G.R. No. L-4963 (1953), Mison (2020) at
p. 16.
May diminution of legitime of forced heir constitute preterition?

NO. Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the death of the testator or born subsequent thereto. Omission
from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must be a total omission, such that if a
compulsory heir in the direct line received something from the testator under the terms of
the will, such heir cannot be considered preterited. Reyes v. Barretto-Datu, G.R. No. L-17818
(1967), Paras (2021) at pp. 250-251.
Should donations inter vivos made by the testator to his compulsory heirs be considered in
determining the legitime?
YES. Second paragraph of Art. 908 of the NCC provides that the value of all donations made
by the testator subject to coalition shall be added to the net value of the hereditary estate. It
would be extremely difficult to ascertain whether or not such donations trenched on the
heirs' legitime so that the same may be considered subject to reduction for being inofficious.
Pagkatipunan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70722 (1991),Paras (2021) at pp. 361-363.
Should donations made to compulsory heirs be considered in determining the legitime under
Art. 908 of the NCC?
YES. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained by deducting payable obligations
and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death,
then all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus

determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established, and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof
that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the
donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor. Mateo v. Lagua, 286 SCRA 217 (1969),
Mison (2020) at p. 289.
Does the fact that a donated property, which is no longer part of the estate of the testator,
prevent its being brought to collation?
NO. As provided in Art. 752 of the NCC, a person's prerogative to make donations is subject
to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give
by will.
If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed
inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without
prejudice to its taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of
the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code).
Such a donation is, moreover, collationable, that is, its value is imputable into the hereditary
estate of the donor at the time of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of
the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the estate. Vda. de Tupas
v. RTC Negros Branch XLIII, G.R. No. L-65800 (1986), Mison (2020) at p. 290.
When are donations inter vivos collationable?

Donations are collationable only when the heirs of the deceased are forced heirs and when it
is proven that it prejudices their legitime.
In accordance with the provisions of article 1035 of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the
plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants were inofficious
in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime or hereditary portion to which they are
entitled. In the absence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or
basis therefor. Udarbe v. Jurado, G.R. No. 38499 (1933),Paras (2021) at p. 366.
What is collation?
Article 1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. Collation is the act by virtue of which
descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an
ascendant bring into the common mass the property which they received from him so that
the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only

required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property
or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. The
purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in
making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance
on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs
equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. Vizconde v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 118449 (1998), Balane pp. 427-431.
If the testator provides that a legacy must be fulfilled before the fruits of the properties are
partitioned and it is found that the amount of legacy is greater than the free portion, are
compulsory heirs obliged to fulfill the condition?
NO, they are not obliged. Art. 912 (3) provides in this case that compulsory heirs may either
comply with the wishes of the testator or merely deliver the free portion of the estate. If the
value of the legacy is greater than the disposable portion and the legacy consists of a
usufruct or life annuity, the law grants compulsory heirs the option, since the legitime of
compulsory heirs cannot be impaired. Dolar v. Bishop of Jaro, 68 Phil 727 (1916), Balane at p.
434.
Reserva Troncal
Are properties received by a collateral relative (from niece to aunt) considered as reservable
properties as contemplated by Article 891 of the Civil Code?
NO. There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by
gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a
descendant called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the
prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last
transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives
within the third degree from which the property came.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant
of the descendant/prepositus. Julia (aunt), who now holds the properties in dispute, is not
the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code. Mendoza v. delos
Santos, G.R. No. 176422 (2013), Mison (2020) p. 275.
Are first cousins of the descendant/propositus entitled to a reservation of these properties?

No, First cousins of the descendant/prepositus are fourth degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios. Relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can
never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
Mendoza v. delos Santos, G.R. No. 176422 (2013), Mison (2020) p. 275.

Are all relative of the proposit within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista?
NO. Upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to
all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant
(prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree.
Under the Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession. Hence, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed, similar
to the case at hand.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession,
the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles,
respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by
his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree
as the latter. Tioco de Papa v. Camacho, G.R. No. 28032 (1986), Mison (2020) at p. 271, Paras
(2008) at p. 526.
Is an illegitimate relative within the third degree entitled to the reserva troncal?
NO, the reserva troncal is not applicable in this case because plaintiff is not a legitimate child
of Juliana and is thus barred pursuant to Article 943 of the Civil Code which reads: “A natural
or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives
of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so
inherit from the natural or legitimated child.”
The Supreme Court held that the appellant is not entitled to the property left behind by her
natural brother, who inherited the property by operation of law, as she is expressly
prohibited to inherit pursuant to Article 943 of the Civil Code or the Iron Barrier/Curtail Rule.
Nieva v. Alcala, G.R. No. L-13368 (1920), Mison (2020) at p. 256.
Do collateral relatives, such as cousins and aunts, have a better right to succeed than a
halfsister?
NO. The main flaw in the plaintiffs’ theory is that it assumes that said properties are subject
to reserva troncal under Art 891 NCC when such is NOT the case. Art 891 is not applicable
since the conditions set forth by the article is that the ascendant inherits from the
descendant which is not the case here. The lands in dispute were inherited by a
DESCENDANT, Juan Marbebe, from an ASCENDANT, his mother Bonifacia. The transmission

of lands by inheritance was therefore in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate
succession (particularly Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines), pursuant to
which, a sister, even if by a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of
children of sisters or brothers, excludes all other collateral relatives regardless of whether or
not the latter belong to the line from which the property of the deceased came. Juan
received the properties by gratuitous title from his mother, when he died without a will, the
property was not transferred to an ascendant of Juan. His nearest heir was his half-sister
Jacoba. Thus the second transfer, contemplated by the rules on the reserva never took
place. No reserva troncal was created. Therefore, the property will pass to Jacoba under the
rules of intestate succession. Lacerna v. Vda De Corcino, G.R. No. L-14603 (1961), Mison (2020)
at p. 258.
Should the sugar quota allotment be admitted as part of the land to be reserved for the
reserves?
YES, although at the time the late Eli Rodriguez inherited by will the parcels of land from his
late father Fortunato, the sugar quota allotment was not yet in existence, still such sugar
quota allotment, in the language of the law, is "an improvement attaching to the land”.
The fact that "Mill companies and plantation owners may sell, transfer, or assign their
allotments received under the terms of this Act (Act No. 4166, Sugar Limitation Law)," is
another compelling reason which leads the Court to regard the sugar quota allotment as
part of the land to be reserved for the reservees, because if the sugar quota allotment be
sold by the reservor, the land subject to reserva troncal would greatly depreciate in value to
the prejudice and detriment of the right of the reservees. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-
9234 (1957).
Is the sale made by the reservista of the reservable property considered void?
YES. The reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant
obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came. The Court has held in
connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of
the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said
alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the
rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios
at the time of the death of the reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation,

only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable
property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of
appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana. Sienes v. Esparcia, G.R. No. L-12957 (1961), Mison
(2020) at p. 262.
Is the reservor required to annotate in the Registry of Deeds the reservable character of a real
property subject to reserva troncal?
YES, the reservor is obliged to annotate the reservable character of the property. Although
the New Civil Code has repealed provisions of the Old Civil Code regarding obligations under
reserva troncal and other forms of reserva, Art. 891 of the Civil Code still requires the
reservor to reserve the property for the benefit of the reservees. The purpose of annotation
is to afford due protection against actions of the reservor which might make the reservation
ineffective. As the duty to annotate is corollary to the duty to reserve, the reservor is
required to annotate the title of the reservable real property. Sumaya v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No.
68843-44 (1991), Mison (2020) at p. 264.
Does the reservor have the right to dispose of the reserved property?
YES, a reservor may dispose of a property subject to reserva troncal. The Civil code merely
imposes an obligation for the reservor to reserve the property in favor of reservatarios.
There being no other limitations imposed, the reservor thus exercises full ownership rights
over the property, including the right to dispose the same. Edroso v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878
(1913), Mison (2020) at p. 265.
Suppose a widow made a disposition for an instituted heir to inherit a property which she
gained from the death of a descendant. Subsequently, several relatives from the property’s
line of origin outlived the widow. Who shall inherit the reserved property?
The reservatario shall inherit. The provisions of the Civil Code on Reserva Troncal provides
that the ascendant, in this case the widow, is obliged to reserve the property for the benefit
of relatives within the third degree who belong to the line from where the property
originated.
The Reservatario shall be determined by the rules on order of succession under legitime,
where the rights of the nearest relative excludes the more remote relatives. The provisions
of the civil code on reserva troncal shall not operate as to invalidate the provisions of the
same on the order of succession under legitimes. Florentino v. Florentino, G.R. No. L-14865
(1919), Mison (2020) at p. 266.

Can the reservor choose which relatives within three degrees from the prepositus inherit?
NO, the reservor has no right to choose. The reservation obliged by the Civil Code does not
grant reservor freedom of choice because the reservees inherits the property from the
prepositus, not from the reservor. In which case, the Civil Code provisions on the order of
succession must be followed. Gonzales v. CFI of Manila, G.R. No. L-34395 (1981), Mison (2020)
at p. 268.
Do the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the
half-blood?
YES. In the case at bar, appellants Baldovino sought to have the half of the property by right
of representation whereas the appellees Paduras claimed that they are inheriting by their
own right which would give them equal shares. The lower court decided that all reservees
are to inherit in equal parts. However, the Court declared that the reservable property
should pass only to those nearest in degree to prepositus, and not to all the reservatorios as
a class, excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree. Padura v. Baldovino, G.R. No. L-
11960 (1958), Mison (2020) at p. 270.
Is the reservista’s right of ownership alienable, subject to a resolutory condition?

YES. The reserva is deemed to be subject to a resolutory condition wherein there shall be
existing relatives of the descendant within the third degree and who belong to the line from
which the property came is submitted. Said condition is merely resolutory and not a
requisite. The Court cited Morell who said that, “the ascendant acquires the property with a
condition subsequent, to wit: whether or not there exist at the time of his death relatives
within the third degree of the descendant in the line from whence the property proceeds. If
there exists no such relatives, then the ascendant can then dispose of the property. Nono v.
Nequia, 93 Phil 120 (1953).
What are the rights and obligations of a reservista?

In this case, Rufina inherited 3 parcels of land from her daughter Anacleta who died at the
age of 6. The Court discussed, citing Art 811, that Rufina was not only considered as a
usufructuary but is deemed the owner of the properties despite it having a reservable
character. Said ownership is subject to a resolutory condition wherein there must be existing
relatives of Anacleta within the third degree belonging to the line where said property came
at her death. With this, she may alienate the properties, provided she secures the right of
reservees to the same, in accordance with Articles 974 and 975 of the Civil Code in
connection with article 109 of the Mortgage Law. It shall be noted that if alienation was
without compliance with said provisions, it will be null and void as against the uncles of said
daughter who may have survived her mother. Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil 664 (1921).

Are acknowledged natural children entitled to the reservation of ½ of a hereditary portion
which Melchora Arroyo inherited from her legitimate son, Antonio Centeno, which hereditary
portion the latter had inherited from his likewise legitimate father, Isaac Centeno?
NO. In this case, Melchora Arroyo inherited properties by gratuitous title from Antonio (her
son), who also inherited the same from his legitimate father, Isaac. The defendants, them
being acknowledged natural children of Antonio, cannot be entitled to the reservation of
such portion of the inheritance. According to the doctrines as stated by the Supreme Court
of Spain, as well as the Court in the case of Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, right
of representation of the grandchildren only includes those who are in the same legal status
as the person represented, and not those who are in a different legal status. In application,
the acknowledged natural children of Antonio, being in this status, cannot represent their
deceased father. Centeno v. Centeno, 52 Phil 322 (2000).
Is the reservation established by Article 811 of the Civil Code be understood as made in favor
of all the relatives within said degree and belonging to the line abovementioned, without
distinction between legitimate, natural, and illegitimate ones not have the legal status of
natural children?
In deciding this case, the Court cited jurists such as Manresa and Sanchez Roman in stating
that Article 811, despite using generic terms such as “ascendant” and “descendant,” the law,
in an indeterminate manner, imposes the obligation to reserve only upon legitimate
ascendants. Although said article did not specify the legal status, it can be said to be applied
to legitimate ascendants because as per Sanchez Roman, the Code’s general concept of
family refers to legitimate relationships. In addition, Article 811 has been included in the part
of the Code which treats of the legitimate (legitime) of legitimate parents and ascendants.
Similar to the case of Nieva vs. Alcala, it is an indispensable requirement that all of the
personal elements (origin, propositus, ascendant-reservista and the reservatarios) must be
joined by the bonds of legitimate relationship. Reserva troncal is applied only in the
legitimate family. Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil 279 (1936).
When is a transmission of property considered gratuitous?

The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
anything in return. It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to
any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an
act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of
the recipient; and that the person receiving the property transmitted deliver, give or do
nothing in return.

The typical gratuitous titles, to which all imaginable sorts are reducible, are donation and
testate and intestate succession, which are specified as such in article 968. Cabardo v.
Villanueva. 44 Phil 186, 191 (1922).
Are intestacy proceedings still necessary before the reservatario can acquired the property?
NO. It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the
reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is not part of the estate
of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition
by the reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate
proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled
that the reservable property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own
successors mortis causa,(like appellants herein) so long as a reservatario within the third
degree from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence the property came, is in
existence when the reservista dies. Cano v. Director of Lands,105 Phil 1 (1959).
Who is entitled to the land which Anacleto Mañalac inherited from his daughter, Juliana, as
between appellees(sisters of Maria Aglibot, first wife of Anacleto Mañalac), on the one hand,
and appellants (Anacleto's second wife and their children), on the other?
It is clear from the facts of the case that the land in question is reservable property in
accordance with the provisions of Article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code (Art. 891 of the New
Civil Code). Both parties now admit that the entire parcel covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 10 belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Anacleto Mañalac and
Maria Aglibot; that upon the death of the latter on October 2, 1906, their only daughter,
Juliana Mañalac, inherited one-half of the property, the other pertaining to her father as his
share in the conjugal partnership; that upon the death of Juliana Mañalac on October 2, 1920
without leaving any descendant, her father inherited her one-half portion of said property.
In accordance with law, therefore, Anacleto Mañalac was obliged to reserve the portion he
had thus inherited from his daughter, for the benefit of appellees, Leona and Evarista
Aglibot, aunts of Juliana on the maternal side and who are, therefore, her relative within the
third degree belonging to the line from which said property came. Aglibot v. Manalac, G.R.
No. L14350 (1962).
Is the property acquired from a descendant reservable property?

The property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban,
Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he
inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree
on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant

from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does
not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the
situation covered by Article 891. Solivio v. Court of Appeals &Javellana, G.R. No. 83484 (1990),
Mison (2020) at p. 270.
Does the property have to be transmitted by operation of law to the relatives of Felix up to
the 3rd degree who survived him?
Now therefore, in upholding the rights of petitioners to the portion of Manuel Hollero and
Felix Harder, it should be stated that Manuel Hollero was entitled, upon the death of
Generoso, to one-sixth of the land (they were six brothers and sisters of Paz); but Felix
Harder, as explained, is now entitled to one-fourth of the one-sixth which his mother
Socorro inherited, i.e. 1/24 of the land. Hollero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16579 (1964).
What should the father now do insofar as the reservable property is concerned?
In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a resolutory
condition for the benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The fact that the
resolvable character of the property was not recorded in the registry of deed at the time
that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the right of the
reservees, for the reason that the transfers were made at the time when it was the
obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and the reservees did not them have
any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation. Riosa v. Rocha, G.R. No. L-23770 (1926).
Is there reserva troncal?

In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the
following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) That the property was acquired by a descendant
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) That said descendant
died without an issue; (3) That the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation
of law; and (4) That there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came. Chua v. CFI of Negros Occidental, G.R. No. L-29901 (1977), Mison
(2020) p. 270.
Is Sergia entitled to the lands as a reserve?

Where a person during minority conveys land for a valuable consideration under conditions
beneficial to himself, the contract will be given full effect after the death of such person
before reaching the age of majority, as against one who, if the conveyance had not been
made, would had a valid claim as reserve subject to the life estate of the father of such
decease minor. Maghirang v. Balcita, G.R. No. L-22066 (1924).

Is the property no longer be reached by the plaintiff upon the theory that it has been
adjudicated to the heirs free from all lien or claim whatsoever?
Although the sale of an undivided interest in the property has not been registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds, nor annotated on the Torrens title covering it, such technical
deficiency merely renders the transaction not binding against a third person because, being
a registered land, the operative act to bind the land is the act of registration. Carrillo v. de
Paz, 48 Phil 551 (1952).
Is the cause of action is barred by prior judgement and by the statute of limitations?
The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as it then becomes a right of
full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a revindicatory suit therefor.
Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised within the time for recovering real properties, can be
lost by prescription. Carrillo v. de Paz, 91 Phil 265 (1963).
Is a will valid when it is created due to false representations?

It is well-established rule of equity that all dealings with expectant heirs are presumptively
invalid; and that, if a person who stands fiduciary relation towards another intentionally
conceals a material fact with the purpose of inducing the other to enter into an agreement,
such made is not binding. Arroyo v. Gerona, 58 Phil 226, 237 (1930).
What are the two stages in reservation by the widowed spouse?

One occurs when the property is transferred to the widowed spouse without being
reservable, and the other occurs when the widowed spouse marries a second time and the
property, which had previously been transferred to him free of any encumbrance, is then
made reservable. If the property is sold during the first stage, it is given away for free, and if
the widowed spouse marries again, she or he must secure the value of the property with a
mortgage in order to give the reservation effect when the time comes for its enforcement.
In the second stage, the property is transferred subject to the reservation; however, since
the property itself satisfies the reservation, a mortgage is not required by law. Dizon v
Galang, 48 Phil 601 (1986).
Is the rules on reservation by a widowed spouse are applicable to reserva troncal ?

Insofar as reserva troncal (reservation by ascendant) is comparable to reserva by a widowed
spouse, the rules governing the former are also applicable to the latter. In a reservation by
an ascendant, the property is transferred to the ascendant already reservable, giving it a
status similar to that of property subject to reservation by a widowed spouse after the
widower enters into a second marriage. As in this situation, neither the widower nor the
reservor in a reservation by an ascendant is required to secure the reservation with a
mortgage when selling the property. Dizon v Galang, 48 Phil 601 (1986).

Is there reserva troncal?
YES. The real owner of a piece of land cannot be legally deprived thereof, and the person
who succeeds in registering it fraudulently in his own name does not acquire an irrevocable
title thereto, and the title irregularly issued should be canceled. Velayo Bernardo v Siojo, 58
Phil. 89 (1933).
Section 6. Disinhertiance
Can defendant Ramon Ching can be legally disinherited from the estate of his father? NO.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the
legal cause therefore shall be specified. For there be a valid disinheritance there must be a
valid will, it must be express, must be for a legal and true cause, the cause must be stated in
the will, such disinheritance must be total or complete, the disinherited hair must be
designated by name or in such manner as to leave no room for doubt as to who it is
intended and that the will must have been revoked insofar as the disinheritance is
concerned.
In this case, the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the
disinheritance of Ramon. There was no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the
disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's
disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not partake of the nature of a special
proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Ching
v. Rodriguez G.R. No. 192828 (2011).
Can the courts inquire why the parent disinherited a child and decide whether such ground
was valid?
YES. The Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the
causes expressly fixed by law. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance
can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or
causes for such disinheritance. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether
there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express
provisions of the Civil Code. Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a
cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven shall annul the designation of
heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited. Pecson v. Mediavillo, G.R. No. 7890
(1914), Mison (2020) at p. 297,De Leon (2017) at p. 427, Paras (2008) at p. 379.
Can an inheritance be embodied in another will separate from the will contained the
testator’s testamentary dispositions?

YES, Exhibit B embodied all the requisites of a will. In the absence of any legal provision to
the contrary, it is a general rule that two separate and distinct wills maybe probated if one
does not revoke the other and that the statutory requirements relative to the execution of
wills have been complied with. The law does not require that the disinheritance should be
accomplished in the same instrument by which the maker provides the disposition of his or
her property after his death. Under Art. 916, disinheritance can be affected only through a
will (any will) wherein the legal cause therefore shall be specified. Merza v. Porras, G.R. No. L-
4888 (1953), De Leon (2008) at p. 328, Jurado (2009) at p. 328, Paras (2021) at p. 379.
Section 7. Legacies and Devises
What is the effect of an invalid legacy?

If the condition of the legacy is not complied with, the legacy shall be disposed of in
accordance with intestate succession or by operation of law.
The condition imposed in the will as precedent to the vesting in the alleged legatees Ong Ka
Chiew and Ong Ka Jian of the right to the legacy, not having been complied with, the trial
court found that the part of said property belonging to the testatrix should be partitioned
among the persons called on to succeed her under the law. Macrohon v. Saavedra, G.R. No.
L27531 (1927).
Do the words “sus descendientes legitimos” refer conjointly to all living descendants
(children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or do they refer to the descendants
nearest in degree?
In the absence of other indication of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the instant
case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members
thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with Art. 846. Belen v. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, G.R. No. L-14474 (1960), Balane at p. 469, Paras (2021) at p. 452.
What is the effect of a legacy or devise that is conditional?

When the effectivity of the devise/legacy is conditional, it will be delivered to the devisee or
legatee upon payment of a bond. When the effectivity of the devise/legacy is not
conditional, such will be delivered to the devisee or legatee after the probate of the will,
without the need of posting of a bond. The Supreme Court said that there is a presumption
in cases of this kind that the legacy is not conditional and unless it clearly appears in the will
that it was the intention of the testatrix in this case to make the legacy conditional, the
words used must be considered as not imposing any condition. Chiong Joc-Soy v. Vano, et al.,
G.R. No. 3459 (1907), Paras (2008) at pp. 431-432, 439.

What is the effect of a legacy or devise that subsequently becomes defective?
Article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall
be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists. Following this interpretation, the Court held that the bequest was
inoperative. As such, the Riceland shall be merged into the estate. It was not no longer in
trust with the Parish Priest considering that none of the contingencies of the will were
present at the time of the death. Parish Priest of Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac v.
Rigor, G.R. No. L-22036 (1979), Balane (2010) at p. 541, Mison (2020) at p. 61.

CHAPTER 3. LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Section 1. General Provisions
Is Enri’s (deceased brother of one of the heirs) Affidavit of Self-Adjudication valid? Can it be a
valid basis of the sale of the property to Marie?
NO. Basic is the principle that “no one can give what one does not have. Title or rights to a
deceased person’s property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death. The
heirs’ rights become vested without need for them to be declared “heirs.” Before the
property is partitioned, the heirs are co-owners of the property.
In this case, the rights to Gregoria’s property were automatically passed to her sons. Since
only Ted was survived by children, the rights to the property ultimately passed to them
when Gregoria’s sons died. The children entitled to the property were Greg, Sim, Sev, and
Enri. Gregoria’s grandchildren, Greg, Sim, Sev, and Enri became co-owners of the property,
with each of them entitled to an undivided portion of only a quarter of the property.
Upon their deaths, their children became the co-owners of the property, who were entitled
to their respective shares, such that the heirs of Greg became entitled to Greg’s one-fourth
share, and Sim’s and Sev’s respective heirs became entitled to their corresponding one
fourth shares in the property. Heirs of Lopez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
193551 (2014).
Can Enri alienate the entire property without the consent of the other co-owners?
NO. Enri’s right to the property was limited to his one-fourth share, he had no right to sell
the undivided portions that belonged to his siblings or their respective heirs. Any sale by one
heir of the rest of the property will not affect the rights of the other heirs who did not
consent to the sale. Such sale is void with respect to the shares of the other heirs.
The law provides that “(e) ach co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. Heirs of Lopez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 193551 (2014).

At the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part
of the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs, is the
petitioner correct in their claims?

NO. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In
addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto
since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it
only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part
of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents
never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners
of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner
of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs
of Rufo at any given point in time. Balus v. Balus, G.R. No. 168970 (2010).
Subsection 1. Relationship
May an illegitimate child seek to nullify the marriage of an intestate decedent?

YES. The Civil Code provides the order in which intestate succession shall be complied with,
and that an illegitimate child shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in the
absence of legitimate descendants or ascendents. As the successional rights of an
illegitimate child would be prejudiced by the marital status of the deceased, an illegitimate
child would thus have an imprescriptible cause of action against the validity of the marriage.
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121 (2013).
What is the Rule of Proximity?

By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of
law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative
of the same decedent
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad
excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato the estate
of the decedent. Bagunu v. Piedad, G.R. No. 140975 (2000), Mison (2020) at p. 342, Paras
(2008) at p. 461.
Subsection 2. Right of Representation
Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is

What is a right of representation?
raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if she were living or if she could have inherited. Herein, the
representative (Crisanto Miralles) was called to the succession by law and not by the person
represented (Ciriaca); he thus succeeded Alejandra, not Ciriaca. Tumbokon v. Legaspi, G.R.
No.
153736 (2010).
From whom does a representative heir inherit from?

In this situation, representatives will be called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented; and the representative does not succeed the person represented but
the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
For such right to be available to respondents, they would have to show first that their
mother: (a) predeceased Udiaan; (b) is incapacitated to inherit; or (c) was disinherited, if
Udiaan died testate. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, nothing in the records
would show that the right of representation is available to respondents. Hence, the RTC and
the CA correctly found that respondents are not real parties in interest to the instant case. It
is well-settled that factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great
weight and respect by the Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by
the evidence on record, as in this case. Ang v. Pacunio, G.R. No. 208928 (2015).
Does the widow/widower of a compulsory heir who predeceased his/her mother/father, have
a right of representation?
NO. Art. 872 provides that the compulsory heirs are the following:
(a) Legitimate children and descendants with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(b) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(c) The widow or widower;
(d) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(e) Other illegitimate children referred to in Art. 287. In the case at bar, Sol, is not a
compulsory heir of Robert Sr. Hence, she could not inherit from Robert Sr.
Furthermore, Roberto Jr. (Sol’s husband) predeceased Roberto Sr., his father, and the
children of Roberto Jr. would succeed by right of representation from their grandfather
pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code which provides, in part that “the right of
representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending line.” Sol

is not related by blood, but only by affinity, to Roberto Sr. Tirol v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 230103
(2020).
Whether or not a person, not a compulsory heir, has a right to intervene in the probate
proceedings?
No. Sol has no right to intervene in the probate proceedings of the will of Roberto Sr. Sol,
not being the compulsory heir of Roberto Sr., has no right to intervene in the probate
proceedings of his wills. Tirol v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 230103 (2020).
The right of representation in the collateral line takes place only to whom?
Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes
place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are
her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death. They
have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this
matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters
(or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo
Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the
new Civil Code. Delgado Vda. de Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian, 480
SCRA 334 (2006), Balane (2010) at p. 523, Mison (2020) at p. 376, Paras (2008) at p. 473.
Section 2. Order of Intestate Succession
How is filiation proven?

In Accordance with the Doctrine in De Jesus vs Estate of Dizon, filiation may be proven
primarily by the following:
(1) Live birth Certificate or a Court Order
(2) Admission of Legitimate filiation either by public or private document signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of these the following may suffice:
(1) Continuous and open possession of legitimate status (2)
Any means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws.
Aguilar v. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169 (2015).
Can natural children can inherit by right of representation?

NO. Illegitimate relatives cannot inherit directly by intestate succession from legitimate
relatives as provided by Art. 992 of the Civil Code, hence a natural child cannot inherit from

legitimate members of the family and therefore cannot represent the share of his parents
share of an inheritance even if recognized by such parent. Corpus v. Administrator of the
Estate of Yangco, G.R. No. L-22469 (1978), Balane (2010) at p. 508, Mison (2020) at p.371, Paras
(2008) at p. 496.
Can an illegitimate child inherit by representing the estate of a legitimate ascendant?

NO. An Illegitimate descendant in accordance to Art 992 of the Civil Code cannot inherit
from legitimate relatives by virtue of intestate succession. Hence Leonardo cannot inherit
front the estate of his father despite proving filiation. Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA
890(1983), Balane (2010) at p. 510, Mison (2020) at p. 373, Paras (2008) at p. 496.
Can illegitimate relations inherit from other relatives ab intestate?

YES. Illegitimate relatives can inherit the estate of an Illegitimate ascendant so as long it is
not contrary to Art 992 of the CIVIL CODE, Hence illegitimate relations can inherit ab
intestato from their illegitimate mother or father or direct ancestor so as long the
relationship is based on the intestate succession is one not covered by Art. 992 of the Code.
Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 645 (1990), Balane (2010) at p. 511, 515, Mison
(2020) at p. 372, Paras (2008) at p.496.
Can illegitimate relatives inherit under Art. 994 of the Civil Code?
NO. Art. 994 does not apply since Iron curtain rule is strictly applied in cases where the
estate involved is the estate of an Illegitimate relative, hence in the case at bar legitimate
relatives cannot inherit from illegitimate relations or family members as provided for by Art
992. Manuel v. Ferrer, 247 SCRA 476 (1995), Balane (2010) at p. 523, Paras (2008) at p. 503.
As to the share of an only child and a mother as surviving heirs, will Art. 996 apply?
YES. Art 996 should apply to give the estate to both the only child and widow in equal parts,
hence when there is only one child and a widow the estate should be divided into equal
parts as it is the most logical solution in intestate succession. Art. 892 on the other hand
deals with testamentary succession, while Art. 996 applies in cases of intestate succession
between surviving children and the widow regardless if there is only one child who succeeds
in the estate. Santillon v. Miranda, 14 SCRA 563 (1965), Balane (2010) at p. 524; Mison (2020) at
p. 380; Paras (2008) at p. 508
Is the widow (the surviving spouse) of the predeceased is an intestate heir of the mother-in-
law (mother of the predeceased)?
NO. From the provisions of the Civil Code starting from Art. 978 to Art. 1014, there are no
express provisions that widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate of the mother-in-law.

There are two (2) classifications of legal heirs, namely those who inherit by their own right,
and those who inherit by the right of representation. These classifications are provided for
under Art. 980 - Art. 982 and Art. 999 of the Civil Code. None of these provisions expressly
provided that a widow of the predeceased son of the mother-in-law is an intestate heir of
the latter nor is the widow entitled to inherit by right of representation.
In this case, the contention of the widow (Irene) that she is entitled to the share of her late
husband (Carterio) upon the death of the mother-in-law (Petra) by right of representation or
as an intestate heir of Petra was not upheld by the Court. Rosales v Rosales G.R. NO. L -40789
(1987).
Are adopted children entitled to the estate of their intestate parents?

YES. Legitimate children of the deceased parents as well as their adopted children are
considered exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased in conformity with Art.
979 of the Civil Code. The second paragraph provides that “An adopted child succeeds to the
property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child”
There being no question as to the validity of the decree of adoption of the adopted children
(Delia and Edmundo) as well as the birth of the legitimate child (Doribel), they are entitled to
the estate of their deceased parents (Teodoro and Isabel). Sayson v. Court of Appeals, 205
SCRA 321 (1992), Balane (2010) at p. 495; Mison (2020) at p. 353.
Are adopted children afforded the right of representation with regard to the estate of the
grandparents?
NO. The right of representation is afforded only to the legitimate child (Doribel) and not to
the adopted children (Delia and Edmundo). The right of the legitimate child (Doribel) to
representation in the estate of her grandparents (Eleno and Rafaela) are expressly provided
for under Art. 981 of the Civil Code. The adopted children (Delia and Edmundo) are not
afforded the same right as there is th notion that the grandparents and adopted children are
total strangers to one another as the relationship created of adoption is available only
between the adopting children and the adopting parents but does not extend to the blood
relatives of either party. Sayson v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 321 (1992), Balane (2010) at p.
495; Mison (2020) at p. 353.
Is an illegitimate child barred from inheriting from the legitimate sister (deceased) of the
former’s father (deceased)?
NO. In this case the application of Art. 992 barring an illegitimate child from inheriting ab
intestato from the legitimate sister of his/her father was not upheld by the court. This was
because the entitlement of the illegitimate child (Joselito) to the estate of the deceased

legitimate sister (Evarista) stems from the formers’ entitlement to the estate of his father
(Francisco).
Since the legitimate sister (Evarista) died ahead of the father (Francisco), the latter already
inherited the estate of the former as one of her heirs. And when the father (Francisco) died,
his heirs which included the illegitimate child (Francisco) has already inherited the father’s
right to the sisters’ estate. De la Merced v de la Merced, G.R. No. 126707 (1999), Mison (2020) at
p. 370.
Is the natural daughter of the sister given the right of representation?

NO. Based on the evidence obtained by the court, there was no doubt that Ana Aquino was
the natural daughter of the sister of Ambrosio (deceased; testator) therefore she was not
entitled to the right of representation on behalf of her mother who was the legitimate sister
of Ambrosio. The only compulsory heir in this case was the surviving spouse of Ambrosio.
Anuran v. Aquino, G.R. No. 12397 (1918), Paras (2008) at p. 498.
Does the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate daughter
Jacinta Lorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess because of her death
before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same
as to their legitimate children?
NO. The fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who
acknowledged him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them, it foen
not follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the succession of legitimate
ascendants. The right of representation is not afforded to acknowledged natural children as
only the relationship between the natural child and the natural parents who acknowledged
him is formed but such acknowledgement does not extend to the parents of the
acknowledging parents, as the latter and the acknowledged child form no relation and
would not be related in any manner.
If the acknowledging natural parent (Jacinta), being one of the sole heirs of the ascendant
(Martina), survived the latter then the acknowledged natural child (Rosa) would have had
been able to inherit from the estate of the acknowledging natural parent (Jacinta) along
with the legitimate children of the latter from the day in which the succession became
operative. Llorente v. Rodriguez, 10 Phil 585 (1908), Paras (2008) at p. 499.
Whether or not the reservation referred to in Art. 811 of the Civil Code, concerns only
legitimate relationship and therefore, excludes illegitimate relationship?
Yes, it concerns only to to the legitimate relationship. Art. 992 of the Civil Code supports this
provision as it provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the

legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. The appellants are not legitimate
relatives of Romeo Santos, although, with relation to him, they are within the third degree
and belong to the same line. The fact that Lucina Guesa's ownership of the land in question
was conditioned by the provisions of article 811 and it was so stated in the transfer certificate
of title issued in her name, could not perform the miracle of creating the persons in whose
favor the reservation in question has been established by law, that is, relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant reservor has
received the reservable property, who must also be legitimate relatives, in accordance with
the legal doctrine interpreting this provision. Persons who, like the appellants herein are not
so related to said descendant cannot claim themselves alluded to by the terms of such
notation. They are in no better position than a stranger to claim any right, if any, derived
therefrom. Director of Land v. Aguas, 63 Phil 279 (1931), Paras (2008) at p. 499.
Does the reservation referred to in Art. 811 of the Civil Code, concerns only legitimate
relationships and therefore, excludes illegitimate relationship?
YES. Art. 996 provides that if a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants
are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
children. The Court ruled that hus, on the question regarding the share of the surviving
spouse in the estate of the deceased, We note that the trial court was correct in declaring
that Teodora Vda. de Arcenas is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the estate. This is in accordance
with the rule enunciated by this Court in Santillon v. Miranda, supra, to the effect that when
intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of the
deceased is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased spouse under Article 996
of the Civil Code. Arcenas v. Cinco, G.R. No. 168332 (1976), Paras (2008) at p.509.
Can an illegitimate child succeed to the entire estate of the deceased?

Yes. "ART. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate
children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased."||| The Court ruled that, These
legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the
absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and
sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do not concur, but are
excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).
That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not denied by the
oppositors; and he is so acknowledged to be in the testament, where said Francisco is
termed "son" by the testatrix. As the latter was admittedly single, the son must be
necessarily illegitimate (presumptively natural under Article 277).

The trial court, therefore, committed no error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had no
standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is ultimately probated John and
Rustico are excluded by its terms from participating in the estate; and if probate be denied,
both oppositors-appellants will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, as sole
intestate heir, by operation of law. Cacho v. Udan, 13 SCRA 693 (1965), Mison (2020) at p. 365.
May an illegitimate child have a right to inherit from his father?

NO, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother, as provided for under Article 992 of the Civil Code; in the
same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. Arado v.
Alcoran, 762 SCRA 57 (2015).
May an acknowledged illegitimate child is entitled to inherit from the estate of his father?
YES. As provided for under Art. 1000 of the Civil Code, being an acknowledged illegitimate
child (Anacleto), he is entitled to inherit from his deceased father (Nicolas). There being no
dispute as to the acknowledgement of the father (Nicolas) of the illegitimate child
(Anacleto), the illegitimate child acquires the right to inherit from the father as though he is
a legitimate child. In this case, there being no legitimate heirs, the acknowledged illegitimate
son became the sole heir of the estate. Arado v. Alcoran, 762 SCRA 57 (2015).
Is the acknowledged illegitimate child is afforded the right of representation in the estate of
the grandmother?
NO. As provided for under Art. 992 of the Civil Code, the illegitimate child is not given the
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate relatives of his mother or father. In this case,
Anacleto, being an acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas has no right to inherit from the
parents of Nicolas as such is expressly provided for by law. Arado v. Alcoran, 762 SCRA 57
(2015), Mison (2020) at p. 368.
Whether or not nonmarital children can inherit from direct ascendants?

YES. However, this ruling will only apply when the nonmarital child has a right of
representation to their parent's share in her grandparent's legitime. In a Decision penned by
Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, the Supreme Court revisited and reinterpreted Article 992
of the Civil Code which is known as the “Iron Curtain Rule”, which held that children,
regardless of their parents’ marital status, can now inherit from their grandparents and
other direct ascendants by right of representation. It held that a nonmarital child’s right of
representation should be governed by Article 982 of the Civil Code, which does not
differentiate based on the birth status of grandchildren and other direct descendants.
Aquino v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 208912 & 209018 (2021).

CHAPTER 4. PROVISIONS COMMON TO TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSSIONS
May an illegitimate child have a right to inherit from his father?

No, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother, as provided for under Article 992 of the Civil Code; in the
same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. Arado
v.Alcoron, 762 SCRA 57 (2015), Mison (2020) at p. 368.
Is a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special

proceeding a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and
possession of property?
NO. Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code that the rights of the heirs to the inheritance
vest immediately at the precise moment of the decedent's death even without judicial
declaration of heirship, and the various Court En Banc and Division decisions holding that no
prior judicial declaration of heirship is necessary before an heir can file an ordinary civil
action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession through the nullification
of deeds divesting property or properties forming part of the estate and reconveyance
thereof to the estate or for the common benefit of the heirs of the decedent, the Court
hereby resolves to clarify the prevailing doctrine. Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579 (2020).
May a testator be declared unsound of mind and incapacitated due to senile dementia? NO.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right
which a person may exercise and this right should be nullified unless mental incapacity is
established in a positive and conclusive manner. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it
is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning
faculties. Torres v. Lopez. 49 Phil 504 (1926), Paras (2008)at p. 541.
Section 1. Right of Accretion
Can a will be invalidated because of undue influence exerted by those who benefit from it in
collaboration with others?
One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the art of the beneficiary or some other person for his benefit.
Undue influence, as here mentioned in connection with the law of wills and as further

mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be defined as that which compelled the testator
to do that which is against the will from fear the desire of peace or from other feeling which
is unable to resist. Torres v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-24569 (1926), Mison (2020) at p. 368.
Section 2. Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
May a person who is guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation be
capacitated to be by will or by intestacy?
NO. Under Article 739, the following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between
persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article
1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply
to testamentary provisions. Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 (1985), Mison
(2020) at p. 410; Paras (2008) at p. 557.
May a devise or legacy still file an ordinary civil action even if the special proceeding for
declaration of heirs has already been terminated?
YES. The Court allowed the respondents to file the ordinary civil action even though the
intestate proceeding had already been terminated. It applied the second exception to the
established rule that an ordinary civil action involving the declaration of heirship can be
instituted when the special proceeding for such had been closed and terminated. The Court
underscored that the children in the second marriage of the decedent were co-owners of
the properties, hence, they may institute the ordinary civil action even as the special
proceeding for declaration of heirs was already terminated. Under Article 1040 of the Civil
Code, the action for a declaration of incapacity and for the recovery of the inheritance,
devise or legacy shall be brought within five years from the time the disqualified person took
possession thereof. It may be brought by anyone who may have an interest in the
succession. Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil 100 (1943), Paras (2008) at p. 577.
May the testator leave her entire estate to the poor and religious works?
YES. The testator, not having forced heirs, may dispose of her properties, for masses, and
pious works for the benefit of her soul as provided for in Article 1029 of the Civil Code. Under
Article 1030 of the New Civil Code, Testamentary provisions in favor of the poor in general,
without designation of particular persons or of any community, shall be deemed limited to
the poor living in the domicile of the testator at the time of his death, unless it should clearly
appear that his intention was otherwise. Villavicencio v. Quinio, 67 Phil 367 (1937).
Section 3. Acceptance and Repudiation of Inheritance

Does a relative by affinity become co-owner of a property inherited from his decedent spouse?
NO. One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter
and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect
a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s
heirs. Under the Art. 150 of the Family Code, family relations, primary basis for succession,
exclude relations by affinity. Ining v. Vega, 703 SCRA 407 (2013).
Family Code, Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Does renouncing interest in favor of designated persons over a property constitute

repudiation?
NO. In the case at bar, he “renounced” his interest in favor of designated persons, one of
whom was not an heir of his deceased parents, and for a valuable consideration. The word
“renounced”, used in the document, does not, under the terms of the document, constitute
the repudiation of an inheritance. The entire document must be considered together.
Words, phrases or clauses cannot be segregated and given a meaning which is contrary to
the terms of the entire document. Ignacio v. Martinez, 33 Phil 576 (1916), Paras (2008) at
p.584.
Can a parent or guardian repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval?
NO. Repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the court’s scrutiny
in order to protect the interest of the ward. Under Art. 1044 of the NCC, Parents or
guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
Guy v. Court of Appeals, 502 SCRA 151 (2006), Balane (2010) at p. 566; Paras (2008) at p. 594.
Section 5. Collation
Is a donation inter vivos in favor of a compulsory heir separate from their legitime?
NO. Article 909 of the NCC provides that “Donations given to children shall be charged to
their legitimes. Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the estate
which the testator could have disposed of by his last will.” Pagkatipunan v. intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70722 (1991), Paras (2008) at p. 604.

Is a property that has been donated to a sibling before the death of the decedent, be subject
to collation?
YES. Article 1003 of the NCC provides that “If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased.” Also provided under Article 1004, “should the only survivor be
brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares”. Arellano v. Pascual,
638 SCRA 826 (2010), Mison (2020) at p. 425.
In relation to collation, may the probate court pass upon in an intestate proceeding the
matter of exclusion from, or inclusion in the inventory of a piece of property?
YES, the probate court may provisionally have it done by reason of expediency and
convenience, provided that, it is without prejudice to the final determination of ownership
by way of a separate civil action, and provided further that the interested parties are all
deemed heirs to the estate. If the question is one of a collation, or assumption of jurisdiction
of the probate arising from the consent of the parties, then the probate court may resolve
the same in relation to ownership. As illustrated by the case, several subject parcels of land,
as assigned by the decedent to Mervir Reality, is deemed a transfer pursuant to Sec. 78 of
the National Revenue Code of 1977. That, the application of the aforementioned provision
enunciates that, a transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought
that the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition, and
that, the application of the aforementioned provision enunciates that the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer
in contemplation of death. Thus, it is not erring to include the subject property to collation
pursuant to such provision. Aranas v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-156407 (2014).
Is the proceeds from a sale of a property which was used to purchase a new property subject
to collation?
NO. Collation only covers properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to
his compulsory heirs. Vizconde v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118449 (1998), Balane (2010) at p.
576; Mison (2020) at p. 431.
Are properties which have been donated or received by any other gratuitous title by
compulsory heirs excluded in the partition of the estate?
NO. Article 1061 of the NCC provides that “every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or
any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the

legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Aranas v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-156407
(2014).
Section 6. Partition and Distribution of Estate
Does a free patent, validly issued, affect the donation inter vivos or the will itself?
The donation inter vivos is valid despite the absence of will because the new civil code
already allows it as shown by the fact that the new civil code speaks of person unlike in the
old civil code which speaks of testator. Therefore, even if there is no will, donation inter
vivos may prosper. Mayuga v Atienza, G.R. No. 208197 (2018).
Is an administration proceeding necessary before partition of the estate could take effect?
No, an administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased is NOT a
condition that has to be met before any partition of the estate and any distribution thereof
to the heirs could be effected.|||
Under the law, partition of the inheritance may only be effected by:
(1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially,
(2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration
proceedings,
(3) by the testator himself, and
(4) by the third person designated by the testator.
Hence, there are instances when the appointment of an executor or administrator is

dispensed with. One is through the execution of a public instrument by the heirs in an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Another, which is the focal point of this case, is
through the ordinary action of partition.
According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the heirs may resort to an ordinary action of
partition of the estate of the deceased if they disagree as to the exact division of the
estate, and only "[i]f the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose." The ordinary action for partition therefore is meant to take the place of the
special proceeding on the settlement of the estate. The reason is that, if the deceased dies
without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator
to administer the estate for the heirs and the creditors, much less, the necessity to deprive
the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.

Thus, an action for partition with regard to the inheritance of the heirs should conform to
the law governing the partition and distribution of the estate, and not only to the law
governing ordinary partition. These pertinent provisions of the law could be found in Title
IV (Succession), Chapter 4 (Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Successions),
Section 6 (Partition and Distribution of the Estate) of the Civil Code. Heirs of Morales v.
Agustin, G.R. No. 224849 (2018).
Is the partition done during the lifetime of the decedent valid?

YES, it is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as
legitimes are not prejudiced pursuant to Article 1080 of the Civil Code, which provides that
“should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.”
Zaragoza v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 309 (2000), Balane (2010) at p. 590, Mison (2020) at p.
435, Paras (2008) at p.604
If the will was disallowed for the reason that it did not contain all the essential requisites
provided by law for its validity, can the partition of the testator’s estate inter vivos be
deemed valid?
NO. It is an indispensable condition precedent to a testator partitioning his estate inter vivos
that he has made a valid will disposing of said estate among his heirs; and if this will be
declared null and void, the partition made by the testator in pursuance of its provisions is
likewise null and void, for where these provisions cease to exist, the partition made in
conformity therewith also becomes null and void, as the cessation of the cause implies the
cessation of the effect. Legasto v. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 766 (1930), Balane (2010) at p. 591, Paras
(2008) at p. 640.
Is the deed of partition, which is denominated a compromise agreement, valid?

YES. Although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is
essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that
"every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction."
Accordingly, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides that for a partition to be valid,
the following conditions must be met:
(1) the decedent left no will;
(2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid;
(3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by
their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and

(4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the
Register of Deeds.
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947 (1997), Mison (2020) at p. 434, Paras (2008) at
p.604.
Should there be a prior settlement of the decedent’s intestate estate before the properties
can be partitioned or distributed?
YES, partition is inappropriate in a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses
chargeable to the estate. Certain expenses including those related to the decedent’s final
illness and burial have to be properly settled. The heirs or distributees, however, may take
possession of the estate even before the settlement of accounts as long as they file a bond
conditioned on the payment of the estate’s obligations. Figuracion-Gerilla v Vda. de
Figuracion, G.R. No. 151334 (2013).

List of Contributors
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Chief Editor
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Wills and Succession: Case Digests |

1
Doctrine Contributors
Winona Aubry L. Alano Erika B. Lualhati

Princess Thalia K. Apostol Vicente Roman K. Mayo III
Hannah Grace I. Bahia Joseph Frederick Millado
Gabriel Jush I. Baldovino Janyn Mariella Montealegre Jamie Loren A. Biacora
Francis G. Natal
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Sherry Jane B. Pagay
Rita Marie Jacobe C. Diaz Jay G. Pedralvez
Anne Elaine L. Espeleta Marie Albert C. Pilar Charity M. Estrada Mark
Lorenz S. Raz
Shaina Isabel M. Estrella Princess Stephanie T. Reotutar
Joseph Anthony A. Fajarito Czarina Jayce S. Rivera Donn Eduard P. Garado
Emmanuel M. Rivera Jr.
Marie Angelique V. Garcia Blest G. Sabado
Julio Miguel D. Gonzales Audrey Madsel Jann B. Santos
Ken M. Kubaron Ryo S. Sano
John Adrian Laico Christian Kyle B. Siquijor
Regine Marie C. Langrio Leslie Abigail F. Tan
Princess Ainah K. Lanto French Vivienne T. Templonuevo
Ramsie Legaspi Marinel R. Villareal
Under the supervision of

Atty. Jord Jhoroah B. Valenton.
Thank you.

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WILLS &

Wills and Succession: Recent Jurisprudence | 1

Wills and Succession: Recent Jurisprudence | 2

Is there an exception to the previous answer?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 1

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 2

Is a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 3

Will a deed of sale prevail over successional rights?

CHAPTER 2. TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

Does the rule of indivisibility apply on mixed succession?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 4

What are the three ways in which succession may be affected?

Is a court declaration required to establish a person presumptively dead for purposes of

Subsection 1: Wills in General

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 5

Subsection 3. Forms of Wills

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 6

Can a photostatic copy of a holographic be admitted to probate?

Signature of the Testator

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 7

Witnesses and Attestation

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 8

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 9

Would a notarial will executed and acknowledged in different places be valid?

Where will the testator subscribe in a will?

Is a testator with a vision mainly for distant objects considered blind?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 1

Is a joint will executed by spouses and admitted in probate proceedings valid?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 1

Subsection 4. Witnesses to Wills

Is it necessary to introduce independent proof of the credibility of the witnesses?

Is it necessary to sign the attestation clause before a notary public?

To whom does Article 808 of the Civil Code apply?

Subsection 8. Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 12

Is probate necessary for a will to be used, given as evidence, or to be given effect?

Is due execution of the will necessary in the probate of a will?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 13

Are lawyers disqualified from being witnesses to a will?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 14

Can a probate court examine the intrinsic validity of a will?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 15

Can persons in interest in a probate proceeding be impleaded?

Does prescription apply in probate proceedings?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 16

Can the probate court settle the dispute as to the ownership?

Can the intrinsic validity be opposed in probate proceedings?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 17

Can a stranger intervene in probate proceedings?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 18

Are oppositors allowed to intervene in probate proceedings?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 19

Can a will which has been duly probated be annulled?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 20

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 21

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 22

Is the probate of the will Hilarion Ramagosa be denied?

Is there preterition when the legitime is incomplete?

Wills and Succession: Case Digests | 23