Schwartz 63 5

How Governments Pay: Lawsuits,
UCLA LAW REVIEW
Budgets, and Police Reform

Joanna C. Schwartz
Abstract
For decades, scholars have debated the extent to which financial sanctions cause
government officials to improve their conduct. Yet little attention has been paid to a
foundational empirical question underlying these debates: When a plaintiff recovers in
a damages action against the government, who foots the bill? In prior work, I found
that individual police officers virtually never pay anything toward settlements and
judgments entered against them. But this finding prompts another question: Where
does the money come from, if not from individual officers? The dominant view among
those who have considered this question is that settlements and judgments are usually
paid from jurisdictions’ general funds with no financial impact on the involved law
enforcement agencies, and some have suggested that agencies would have stronger
incentives to improve behavior were they required to pay settlements and judgments
from their budgets. But, beyond anecdotal information about the practices in a few
large agencies, there has been no empirical inquiry into the source of funds used by
governments to satisfy suits involving the police.
In this Article, I report the results of the first nationwide study to examine how cities,
counties, and states budget for and pay settlements and judgments in cases against law
enforcement. Through public records requests, interviews, and other sources, I have
collected information about litigation budgeting practices in one hundred jurisdictions
across the country. Based on the practices in these one hundred jurisdictions, I make
two key findings. First, settlements and judgments are not always—or even usually—
paid from jurisdictions’ general funds; instead, cities, counties, and states use a wide
range of budgetary arrangements to satisfy their legal liabilities. All told, half of the
law enforcement agencies in my study financially contribute in some manner to the
satisfaction of lawsuits brought against them.
Second, having a department pay money out of its budget toward settlements and
judgments is neither necessary nor sufficient to impose a financial burden on that
department. Some law enforcement agencies pay millions from their budgets each
year toward settlements and judgments, but the particularities of their jurisdictions’
budgeting arrangements lessen or eliminate altogether the financial impact of these
payments on these agencies. On the other hand, smaller agencies that pay nothing from
their budgets toward lawsuits may nevertheless have their very existence threatened if
liability insurers raise premiums or terminate coverage in response to large payouts.
63 UCLA L. Rev. 1144 (2016)

These findings should expand courts’ and scholars’ understandings of the impact of
lawsuits on police reform efforts, inspire experimentation with budgeting arrangements
that encourage more caretaking and accountability by law enforcement, and draw
attention to the positive role government insurers can and do play in efforts to promote
risk management and accountability in policing.
author
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. For helpful comments and suggestions, many
thanks to participants in workshops at the UCLA School of Law and UC Hastings
College of the Law, and to Matthew Barge, Peter Bibring, Maureen Carroll, Beth Colgan,
Joe Doherty, Aziz Huq, James Pfander, John Rappaport, Tracey Roberts, Margo Schlanger,
David Sklansky, Charles Silver, and Samuel Walker. Thanks also to Thomas Cochrane,
Maxwell Harwitt, and Maggie Yates as well as the expert research staff of UCLA’s Hugh
& Hazel Darling Law Library for excellent research assistance. Finally, thanks to the
editors of the UCLA Law Review for their editorial assistance.
1145
Table of Contents
Introduction...........................................................................................................1147
I. Assumptions About the Deterrent Effects
of Suing Government....................................................................................1151
II. Methodology.................................................................................................1156
III. An Overview of Local Government Budgeting.....................................1161
IV. Variation in Law Enforcement Litigation Budgeting.........................1165
A. The Largest Jurisdictions..........................................................................1165
B. The Smaller Jurisdictions..........................................................................1170
C. Budgetary Distinctions Between Large and Smaller Jurisdictions..........1170
D. Conclusion................................................................................................1172
V. The Financial Impact of Budgetary Arrangements..............................1173
A. When Settlements and Judgments Are Paid From
the Jurisdiction’s Funds............................................................................1174
B. When the Agency Pays Settlements and Judgments
From Its Budget........................................................................................1176
C. When the Agency Contributes to a Central Fund..................................1184
D. When Jurisdictions Rely on Public Entity Risk Pools
or Outside Insurance...............................................................................1188
E. Conclusion................................................................................................1192
VI. The Effect of Financial Pressures on Law
Enforcement Behavior.................................................................................1195
VII. Implications....................................................................................................1202
A. Refining Understandings of Lawsuits’ Deterrent Effects.........................1203
B. The Role of Insurance in Law Enforcement Reform...............................1204
C. Suggestions...............................................................................................1207
Conclusion...............................................................................................................1211
Appendix A: How Governments Pay Settlements and Judgments...............1212
Appendix B: Costs of Law Enforcement Settlements and Judgments.......1224
Appendix C: Amount Paid by Departments that Pay Costs
From Their Budgets...............................................................................................1230
Appendix D: Amount of Contributions by Departments to
Central Funds in Self-Insured Jurisdictions...................................................1232
Appendix E: Amount of Payments by Law Enforcement Agencies to
Insurance Premiums................................................................................................1234
Appendix F: Potential Financial Impact of Payouts on
Law Enforcement Agency Budgets....................................................................1235
Appendix G: Source Table for Responsive Jurisdictions.................................1239
1146
How Governments Pay 1147
INTRODUCTION
For decades, scholars have debated the extent to which financial sanctions
cause government actors to improve their conduct.1 Yet, until recently, little at-
tention has been paid to a foundational empirical question underlying these de-
bates: When a plaintiff recovers damages against the government, who foots the
bill? In prior research, I found that police officers in eighty-one law enforcement
agencies across the country are virtually always indemnified.2 Officers personally
satisfied just 0.02 percent of the more than $735 million awarded to plaintiffs
over a six-year period in suits alleging constitutional violations and corresponding
state tort claims, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.3 Officers were even more likely to be indemni-
fied in cases involving auto accidents, property damage, and employment-
related disputes.4 Accordingly, when a plaintiff sues a police officer, any amount
she recovers is almost certain not to come from the pocket of that officer. In this
Article, I examine how cities, counties, and states satisfy settlements and
judgments in cases against law enforcement and whether and to what extent
law enforcement agencies have a financial stake in the resolution of cases
brought against them and their officers.
The dominant view—among the relatively few who have considered the
question—is that settlements and judgments in suits involving law enforce-
ment are usually paid not from law enforcement agencies’ budgets but from
governments’ general funds.5 Commentators have pointed to this budgetary ar-
rangement as one reason that law enforcement agencies do not have strong in-
centives to reduce the frequency of misconduct or the costs of litigation.6 And,
relying on this assumption, some commentators have suggested that settlements
and judgments should be paid out of law enforcement agencies’ budgets as a way
of pressuring agencies to reform.7 But, beyond anecdotal information about the
practices in a few large jurisdictions, there has been no empirical inquiry into
1. For a discussion of these debates, see generally infra notes 19–27 and accompanying text.
2. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014).
3. See id. at 912–13.
4. See id. at 914.
5. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
1148 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
the source of funds used by governments to satisfy suits brought against law en-
forcement.8
This Article reports the results of the first nationwide study to examine how
cities, counties, and states budget for and pay settlements and judgments in cases
against law enforcement. I sent public records requests to jurisdictions with the
seventy largest law enforcement agencies across the country, as well as jurisdic-
tions with seventy small and midsized agencies, seeking information about the
ways in which they satisfy settlements and judgments in cases against their law
enforcement agencies and officers.9 I supplemented these public records requests
with telephone interviews and email exchanges with dozens of budget personnel,
risk managers, insurers, government attorneys, and law enforcement officials in
the responding jurisdictions. I was able to gather information about budgetary
practices in sixty-two of the seventy largest jurisdictions and thirty-eight of the
smaller jurisdictions I queried. The one hundred law enforcement agencies in
these jurisdictions include fourteen of the fifteen largest agencies nationwide and
employ over 26 percent of the country’s approximately 765,000 law enforcement
officers.10 Based on the practices in these one hundred jurisdictions, I make two
novel findings regarding the financial effects of lawsuits on law enforcement.
First, settlements and judgments in suits against law enforcement agencies
and officers are not always—or even usually—paid from jurisdictions’ general
funds.11 Among the jurisdictions with the sixty-two largest agencies, twenty-
six pay settlements and judgments from central government funds with no con-
tribution by their law enforcement agencies. The remaining thirty-six, however,
require their law enforcement agencies to contribute to the satisfaction of settle-
ments and judgments in some manner. Among the thirty-eight smaller juris-
dictions in my study, twenty-four pay judgments and settlements or liability
insurance premiums out of central government funds with no contribution by
their law enforcement agencies. The other fourteen require their law en-
forcement agencies to contribute either to the payment of settlements and
judgments or to the payment of liability insurance premiums. All told, half
of the law enforcement agencies in my study financially contribute in some
manner to the satisfaction of lawsuits brought against them.

9. These are the same jurisdictions I queried in my Police Indemnification study, supra note 2; see infra
Part II for further discussion of my methodology.
11. For data supporting these findings, see generally Part IV and Appendix A.
My second finding is that requiring a law enforcement agency to pay money

out of its budget toward settlements and judgments is neither sufficient nor nec-
essary to impose a financial burden on that agency.12 Several agencies that pay
settlements and judgments from their budgets do not appear to suffer any eco-
nomic consequences of these payouts: They receive an allocation of funds for
litigation costs during the budgeting process with the city, county, or state; they
cannot use those funds for other purposes if they pay less than anticipated on
litigation; and when they spend more than anticipated on litigation, the excess
money is paid from the jurisdiction’s general fund. These overages may have
political ramifications, but they do not affect the agencies’ budgets. As a result,
many agencies feel less financial pressure associated with lawsuit payouts than
their formal budgetary arrangements suggest.
On the other hand, smaller jurisdictions that rely primarily on outside insur-
ance report that a spike in suits may cause an insurer to demand changes in law
enforcement personnel and policies as a condition of continued coverage; agen-
cies that do not comply have lost their insurance coverage and ceased to exist.13
Regardless of whether these smaller law enforcement agencies financially con-
tribute to their jurisdictions’ liability insurance premiums, high litigation costs
can nevertheless affect their operations and threaten their very existence. The
vast majority of cities and counties across the country are small and rely on lia-
bility insurance.14 Accordingly, pressures and obligations imposed by outside
insurers are an important and underappreciated consequence of liability for
smaller law enforcement agencies.
The final step in the inferential chain is the most difficult to test—whether
law enforcement agencies improve their behavior when they have financial incen-
tives to do so. Other scholars have struggled to assess the deterrent effects of liti-
gation costs in other contexts and similar difficulties apply here.15 Further study
12. For data supporting these findings, see generally Part V and Appendices C, D, and E.
13. For data supporting these findings, see generally Parts V.D and VII.B.
14. See infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
15. For efforts to measure the deterrent effects of legal liabilities in other contexts, see Gary T.
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 377 (1994) (compiling qualitative evidence of lawsuits’ deterrent effects in a variety of
settings); see also Don Dewees & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its
Alternatives: A Review of Empirical Evidence, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 57 (1992) (surveying
empirical studies about the deterrent effects of tort law); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan,
Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595,
1603–06 (2002) (surveying available evidence of lawsuits’ deterrent effects). For more recent efforts
to test the deterrent effects of civil liability, see W. Jonathan Cardi et al., Does Tort Law Deter
Individuals? A Behavioral Science Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 567 (2012); Theodore
1150 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
is necessary to better understand whether and to what extent budgeting arrange-

ments that carry financial ramifications for law enforcement agencies inspire in-
vestments in risk management and encourage efforts to improve.16 The sparse
evidence currently available suggests that at least some law enforcement offi-
cials in such agencies are motivated by liability costs to reduce risk; others have
reported that they would take steps to reduce risk regardless of whether they
had financial incentives to do so. In jurisdictions reliant on outside insurance,
insurers’ demands that agencies implement changes as a condition of continued
coverage appear to create even stronger incentives to improve.
These findings should enrich courts’ and scholars’ understandings of the
effect of lawsuits on police reform efforts, inspire experimentation with budget-
ing arrangements that may encourage more caretaking and accountability by
law enforcement, and draw attention to the positive role that local government
insurers can and do play in efforts to promote risk management and accounta-
bility in policing.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes assump-
tions about the deterrent effects of suing government and the critically important
but unexplored question of which entities bear the financial costs of settlements
and judgments in suits against law enforcement. Part II explains my methodol-
ogy and the representativeness of the one hundred jurisdictions in my study. I
offer an overview of local government budgeting practices in Part III that helps
contextualize my findings. Part IV sets out my first major finding: Jurisdic-
tions use a wide range of budgetary arrangements to satisfy their legal liabili-
ties. Part V sets out my second major finding: Paying money from a law
enforcement agency’s budget does not necessarily impose financial burdens on
that department. I examine available evidence regarding the effect of financial
pressures—when they exist—on law enforcement officials’ decisionmaking in
Part VI. Finally, in Part VII, I consider the implications of these findings for
theories of deterrence and the role of insurance in risk management, and rec-
ommend several approaches to strengthen the connection between lawsuits’
costs and police behavior.
Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, Assuring Civil Damages Adequately Deter: A Public Good Experiment,
11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 301 (2014); Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and
Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905 (2008).
16. For further discussion of available evidence of the effect of financial pressures on law enforcement
agencies, see generally Part VI.
I. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE DETERRENT EFFECTS OF SUING

GOVERNMENT
For decades, commentators have debated whether and to what extent law-
suits seeking damages deter government actors. Commentators generally seem
to agree that lawsuits can create nonfinancial pressures by generating publicity
about allegations of misconduct and by revealing previously unknown infor-
mation about the details of that misconduct.17 Commentators have also observed
that high litigation costs can create political pressures for law enforcement to im-
prove.18 But commentators disagree about the extent to which the money spent
on lawsuits creates financial pressures and the manner in which those financial
pressures—when they exist—influence government behavior.
Some believe that the financial threat associated with being sued—and the
financial repercussions of a suit when it is successful—will cause governments to
make adjustments that can help them avoid future suits and payouts.19 As Rich-
ard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer explain:
17. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 858–67 (2001) (describing the “informational”
and “fault-fixing” functions of constitutional damages actions); Margo Schlanger, Inmate
Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1681 (2003) (describing how negative publicity regarding
lawsuits “can trigger embarrassing political inquiry and even firings, resignations, or election
losses”); Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn From Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (2012)
(describing the ways in which lawsuits can reveal information previously unknown to law
enforcement agencies).
18. See, e.g., infra note 99 (describing the political consequences of large payouts); Schwartz, supra note
17, at 849 n.37 (describing a blue ribbon commission appointed to investigate the Los Angeles
Sheriff’s Department following several years of large settlements and judgments paid in claims
against the Department).
19. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 240
(2013) (arguing that making it easier for plaintiffs to recover in civil rights damages actions through
a strict liability rule “would make damages for constitutional violations routine and would thereby
heighten the disincentives for governments to engage in conduct that might result in constitutional
violations”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 496 (2011) (“If government entities routinely indemnify their officials,
they would certainly have an incentive to provide those officials with training regarding applicable
law . . . .”); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability
Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 796 (1999) (arguing
that vicarious liability “gives municipalities a greater incentive to monitor, supervise, and control the
acts of their employees,” and that “[l]ocal governments, with inherently scarce resources, obviously
want to minimize the amount of their budget that is lost to paying damages”). This is also a view
repeatedly endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S.
561, 575 (1986) (“[T]he damages a plaintiff recovers contributes significantly to the deterrence of
civil rights violations in the future.”); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307
(1986) (“Deterrence . . . operates through the mechanism of damages that are compensatory . . . .”).
1152 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Imagine a city police force that conducts racially discriminatory

searches, employs excessive force against suspects, or engages in other
forms of unconstitutional conduct. Though a damages award does not
require discontinuation of such practices, it exerts significant pressure
on government and its officials to respect constitutional bounds.20
Scholars holding this view recognize that litigation’s deterrent signal does
not necessarily reflect the magnitude or scope of government misbehavior:
Many people who have been harmed never sue and, in the constitutional arena,
legal doctrines including qualified immunity make it difficult for plaintiffs to
prevail even when their rights have been violated.21 Moreover, boundedly ra-
tional government officials will not weigh the costs and benefits of different
courses of action in the stylized manner predicted by deterrence theories.22 And,
even if they did, those government officials will not always be able to influence
the conduct of low-level government actors that interact with the public and are
most likely to be named as defendants.23 Despite these qualifications, many ap-
pear to accept the notion that government actors, required to internalize litigation
costs, will take steps to reduce the likelihood of future claims.24
Others believe that government actors respond less predictably to the fi-
nancial costs of liability, arguing that officials weigh these financial costs against
political, administrative, and bureaucratic interests when deciding which course
of action to take. As Peter Schuck explains:
[E]ven when they face governmental liability for damages, adminis-
trators feel countervailing pressures to tolerate low-level miscon-
duct. The political environment may countenance or even reward
20. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1788 (1991).
21. For descriptions of these critiques of the deterrent power of civil rights damages actions, see Karen
M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 913 (2015); Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1915–27 (2007); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of
Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1032
(2010).
22. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1070.
23. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS
126 (1983) (“[W]hen an administrator orders street-level officials to change the way in which they
go about their work, the instruction must be viewed as little more than a commencement of
hostilities (or at least negotiations), an opening gambit in a protracted and problematic struggle
over policy implementation.”).
24. See generally, e.g., supra notes 19–20; see also Jeffries, supra note 19, at 240 n.120 (“My own view is
that the deterrent effect of money damages plus attorney’s fees is sufficiently plausible to warrant
reliance on such analysis until disproved.”).
lawbreaking that appears to advance important programmatic or

ideological goals . . . . Bureaucratic needs—for example, to preserve
employee morale or maintain order within a custodial institution—
may induce agencies to wink at illegal behavior. . . . These organi-
zational incentives may on balance outweigh the fiscal ones that
governmental liability creates.25
Some believe that governments’ responsiveness to political incentives can lead to
results “as likely to be perverse as beneficial.”26 Others are more optimistic about
the deterrent effect of damages actions, even when those effects are measured in
political terms. In Myriam Gilles’s view, “constitutional damages remedies,
although denominated in dollars, clearly translate into the political currency that
moves political actors,” including negative publicity, the revelation of harmful in-
formation, and the public fixing of fault on government officials.27
This debate about the nature and extent of lawsuits’ deterrent effect on gov-
ernment actors has persisted for decades in the absence of evidence about which
government actors or agencies bear the financial burdens of liability. I recently
found that—in the law enforcement context—individual officers virtually never
pay anything from their pockets toward settlements and judgments in cases
brought against them.28 But this finding prompts another question: Where does
the money come from, if not from individual officers?
Commentators engaged in discussion about lawsuits’ deterrent effects have
relied on different assumptions about how governments pay settlements and
judgments in cases against law enforcement. The dominant view appears to be
that settlements and judgments in cases involving the police are usually paid
from governments’ general funds, not law enforcement agencies’ budgets.29
25. SCHUCK, supra note 23, at 125; see also Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets,
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345 (2000) (contending
that “government actors respond to political incentives, not financial ones—to votes, not dollars”).
26. Levinson, supra note 25, at 415.
27. Gilles, supra note 17, at 861.
28. See generally Schwartz, supra note 2.
29. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE
EVIDENCE 279 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (explaining that civil liability does
not influence police department practices because “damages in these suits are not significant in
relation to total police budgets and, more importantly, are not even paid out from the police budget
but out of general city funds”); SCHUCK, supra note 23, at 107 (“[T]he litigation, liability, and
settlement costs resulting from misconduct by agency employees are in practice borne by the
Treasury, not by the agency’s own budget.”); SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY 33 (2005) (explaining that, in most governments, “one agency of government
(the police) perpetrates the harm, another agency defends it in court (the law department), and a
third agency writes the check (the treasurer).”); Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral:
1154 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Others believe that law enforcement agencies pay settlements and judgments
from their own budgets.30 Some suggest that variation might exist in jurisdic-
tions’ budgeting practices.31 And some others debate lawsuits’ deterrent ef-
fects without expressly addressing which government entities bear the costs
of liability.32
Despite the importance of government budgeting practices to understand-
ings of lawsuits’ deterrent effects, and despite the wide-ranging assumptions
about the ways in which governments satisfy settlements and judgments, there is
very limited available evidence regarding this issue. An almost twenty-year-old
study by Amnesty International of fourteen large law enforcement agencies
found that “in most cities . . . civil settlements paid by the city on behalf of an of-
ficer usually are not taken from the police budget but are paid from general city
funds.”33 Beyond evidence about the practices in a few large law enforcement
Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453, 2468 (2014) (“[M]any agencies are not
required to pay large damage awards out of their own budgets; rather, such judgments typically are
paid from the general fund of the municipality, state, or federal government.”); see also infra note 37
(citing commentators who argue that settlements and judgments should be, but are not, paid from
law enforcement agencies’ budgets).
30. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 453, 475 (2004) (writing that police departments’ cost-benefit calculations are “not surprising
when one recognizes that even large damages awards amount to only a small part of the budget of a
large metropolitan police department”); Schlanger, supra note 17, at 1676 (“[I]n nearly all inmate
litigation, it is the correctional agency that pays both litigation costs and any judgments or
settlements . . . .”).
31. See, e.g., Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1449, 1486–87 (2009) (“For some governmental entities, litigation payments do not come from the
budget of the offending employee’s agency but from a general litigation or judgment fund.”)
(emphasis added); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the
Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 781–82 (2004) (“[T]he monetary cost of judgments
against police are not always fully or directly borne by police departments or by individual officers.
Civil judgments come out of city or county funds, or perhaps from insurance policies that the local
government purchases—i.e., from taxpayers.”) (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 20, at 1788 (describing the pressure of a damages award “on
government and its officials” without specifying which entities or individuals feel those effects).
Commentators and courts cited supra note 19 also assume that damages awards will pressure
government entities and individuals to reform without specifying who bears the costs of these
awards.
33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (1998); see also Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1047–
48 (describing New York City’s practice of satisfying settlements and judgments out of the city’s
general budget). For a similar study of corrections agencies, see Joshua J. Fougere, Paying for
Prisoner Suits: How the Source of Damages Impacts State Correctional Agencies’ Behavior, 43 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 283, 302–03 (2010) (examining fifteen state corrections agencies and finding
that five states required their agencies to pay settlements and judgments in civil rights cases from
agencies, there has been no systematic inquiry into the source of funds used by
governments to satisfy these suits.
Whether and to what extent law enforcement agencies bear the financial
costs of liability should shape understandings about lawsuits’ deterrent effects
regardless of whether one believes that government actors respond to financial
incentives, political incentives, or a combination of the two. To the extent that
law enforcement officials respond to financial incentives, paying settlements and
judgments from general funds will presumably dampen the agency’s financial in-
centives to reduce the costs of litigation.34 To the extent that law enforcement
officials respond to political incentives, paying settlements and judgments from
general funds will mean that there are no countervailing financial costs against
which those political interests are weighed.35 As Marc Miller and Richard
Wright explain, the deterrent effect of lawsuits would be lessened if money is
paid from governments’ general funds rather than police department budgets
“whether departments respond to monetary incentives, political incentives, or
both—for tort judgments to shape institutional and individual behavior the
defendants must bear the cost of the misbehavior.”36
their budgets, four states paid from a statewide fund, and six required their agencies to pay into a
central, statewide fund).
34. See, e.g.; Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 33, 46–47 (2012) (“Because police departments and their leaders are not easily forced
to internalize the costs borne by the government, it is not surprising that many departments fail to
adopt institutional reforms even after successful civil judgments impose significant costs for
misconduct.”); see SCHUCK, supra note 23, at 107 (observing that, because litigation costs are paid
from the general budget, “agencies do not bear the full cost of their wrongdoing but enjoy whatever
benefits flow from it”); Morley, supra note 29, at 2468 (writing that the practice of satisfying
settlements and judgments from general funds “further reduces the deterrent effect of such awards
on government agencies”).
35. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 30, at 475 (proposing that, “[t]o the extent that chiefs of police view a
little bit of brutality as an effective law enforcement tool, they will balance the costs of liability
against the perceived gains of aggressive policing”); Levinson, supra note 25, at 371 (imagining that
a police official will allow his officers to use unconstitutional chokeholds until “the costs of
permitting chokeholds, quantified in constitutional tort damages paid to people severely injured or
killed by the police, would exceed the crime-reduction benefits”).
36. Miller & Wright, supra note 31, at 781; see also Fallon, supra note 19, at 497 n.99 (2011) (describing
the ongoing debate about whether government actors respond to political or financial incentives,
and noting that “[i]t also might matter whether indemnifying institutions rely on insurance or self-
insurance to pay judgments against their officials and, if the latter, to what extent the consequences
of an adverse judgment against a police officer, for example, would be felt distinctively within the
police department that had failed to deter the officer’s wrongdoing, rather than being spread across
the entirety of a municipal budget”); Levinson, supra note 25, at 381–82 (imagining different
responses to payouts depending on whether money is taken from an agency’s budget).
1156 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Evidence about budgetary arrangements should also shape recom-

mendations about how best to use lawsuits to encourage reform. Several
commentators—relying on the assumptions that settlements and judgments
are paid from jurisdictions’ general funds and that this arrangement reduces law-
suits’ deterrent effects—have suggested that settlements and judgments should be
paid out of law enforcement agencies’ budgets as a way of encouraging agencies to
reform themselves.37 Yet this recommendation—along with commentators’
theories about what incentives drive government actors—has been made in the
absence of much data about how governments pay settlements and judgments
in lawsuits brought against them.
II. METHODOLOGY
In order to understand how governments satisfy settlements and judgments

in lawsuits involving law enforcement, I sought information from jurisdictions
with the seventy largest law enforcement agencies across the county and a sample
of jurisdictions with seventy small and midsized agencies. This is the same group
of 140 agencies I queried for my Police Indemnification study.38 I corresponded
directly with contacts from that project when possible. When I was unable to
correspond directly with my agency contacts, I submitted new public records
37. See, e.g., Rachel M. Cohen, City Coffers, Not Police Budgets, Hit Hard by the High Cost of Brutality,
AMERICAN PROSPECT (Sept. 26, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/city-coffers-not-police-
budgets-hit-hard-high-cost-brutality [http://perma.cc/4F56-796J] (“If settlements for police
misconduct on citizens came out of the funding for police, incidents of abuse would be reduced,
experts say.”); Frankel, supra note 31, at 1487 (“Only if the government connects the budgetary cost
of litigation to the agency employing the responsible party could there be any effect, but it is far
from clear how strong that connection is.”); Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 457
(1978) (“Placing the burden of damage awards for constitutional wrongs directly upon [police
agencies] would afford a useful incentive to monitor the performance of their employees, to insist
on observance of constitutional standards, and to exercise appropriate internal discipline when
misconduct occurs.”); SCHUCK, supra note 23, at 108 (suggesting that the “[U.S.] Congress, for
example, could require that whatever liability costs are imposed upon the United States under the
[Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)] must be charged to the budgets of the agencies whose
employees’ conduct occasioned them and that those agencies transmit the costs downward to the
budgets of the smallest subunits capable of deterring the conduct in question”). I have also
previously made this recommendation regarding New York City. See Joanna C. Schwartz,
Watching the Detectives, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (June 15, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2011/06/16/opinion/16schwartz.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/86BH-
S69P?type=source]. Others, however, foresee possible negative effects of financial liability for
governments. See infra notes 178–179 and accompanying text.
38. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 902–12 (describing the methodology of that study).
requests to the jurisdictions’ departments of budget or finance, city clerks, or

attorneys. In each instance I asked two basic questions: (1) By what means
does the jurisdiction satisfy settlements and judgments in lawsuits39 brought
against the law enforcement agency and its officers—are the payments made
from the agency’s budget, the jurisdiction’s budget, an outside insurer, or another
entity? And: (2) Does the law enforcement agency financially contribute in any
manner to those payments?40 As with my Police Indemnification study, these ini-
tial requests were often the first in a long series of letters, emails, and telephone
calls.41
After almost two years of correspondence, a total of one hundred juris-
dictions—sixty-two of the seventy largest law enforcement agencies across
the country and thirty-eight of the seventy midsized and small jurisdictions
I queried—responded to my questions. I supplemented these responses with
telephone interviews and email exchanges with finance officers, insurance per-
sonnel, risk managers, city and county attorneys, and law enforcement officials
to better understand how these budgeting arrangements affect agencies’ budgets
and decisionmaking.
I then followed up with a second round of public records requests that
sought information about total lawsuit payouts, law enforcement agency contri-
butions to central risk funds and insurance premiums, law enforcement agency
budgets, and jurisdiction budgets for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014.42 It was
39. Although I focused only on police misconduct suits in my Police Indemnification study, supra note 2,
here I sought information about budgeting practices for all types of lawsuits filed against law
enforcement agencies and officers. I did limit my requests, however, to lawsuits, so my data do not
include workers’ compensation claims or other claims for money that did not result in litigation.
40. Although many states’ Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) laws require requests for records, the
information I sought was not always (or even usually) captured in jurisdictions’ “records.” Some
rejected my requests on this ground. Some officials responded to my requests for information
even though the requests did not comply with their open records laws. And others had me restate
my requests—sometimes repeatedly—until they identified responsive records that could be
provided.
41. Officials were generally more cooperative in this study than they were in the Police Indemnification
study, which is evidenced by the fact that eighty-one jurisdictions responded to my requests in
that study and one hundred jurisdictions responded to my requests in this study. I already had
contacts in those eighty-one jurisdictions and many were willing to provide me with the
additional information I sought. I do not know why jurisdictions were more responsive in this
study, but one notable distinction is that I usually corresponded with budget and finance personnel
in this study, and in the prior study corresponded primarily with police personnel and city and
county attorneys.
42. My requests were tailored to the different budgetary arrangements in the responsive jurisdictions.
For those jurisdictions that pay settlements and judgments in law enforcement cases out of their
general funds, I requested records reflecting the total amount paid in law enforcement cases and
1158 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
more difficult to get this litigation and financial data than it was to obtain infor-
mation about how budgetary practices work in general. Seventy-two of the one
hundred jurisdictions responded to these requests; some that did referred me to
publicly available budget documents for responsive information.43
For those jurisdictions that did respond, I cannot be sure that their respons-
es are complete or accurate, or that they provided information in a manner con-
sistent with other jurisdictions.44 I know of some inconsistencies. For example,
some jurisdictions did not provide information about settlements and judgments
in all types of law enforcement cases; some jurisdictions provided me with infor-
mation about the amount paid to claimants before any lawsuits were filed and
others did not; and some smaller jurisdictions’ insurance payments include the
cost of representation while the cost of representation is separate in larger juris-
dictions. Moreover, inaccuracies in local government budgeting practices are
well known and could mean that some reported budget numbers are smaller or
larger than they should be.45 I have noted these issues when possible in Appen-
dix G. Regardless, these variations do not disturb my key findings regarding
budgeting arrangements and the frequency with which law enforcement agen-
cies’ budgets are impacted by lawsuit payouts.
records reflecting the total budget for the jurisdiction in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014. For
those jurisdictions that require law enforcement agencies to contribute to a central risk
management fund, I requested records for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014 that reflected: (1) the
total amount contributed by the law enforcement agencies to the central risk management or self-
insurance fund; (2) the total amount paid from that central risk management or self-insurance fund
to satisfy settlements and judgments in cases involving the police; (3) the total budget for the law
enforcement agency; and (4) the total budget for the jurisdiction. For those jurisdictions that
require their law enforcement agencies to pay settlements and judgments out of their own budgets,
I requested records for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014 that reflected: (1) the total amount paid
from the law enforcement agencies’ budgets to satisfy settlements and judgments; (2) the total
amount paid from any source to satisfy settlements and judgments; (3) the total budget for the law
enforcement agency; and (4) the total budget for the jurisdiction. For jurisdictions that rely
primarily on outside insurance, I requested records for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014 that
reflected: (1) the total amount paid in insurance premiums (from the law enforcement agency’s or
jurisdiction’s budget); (2) any additional amounts paid (in deductibles or amounts above coverage
limits) by the jurisdiction or law enforcement agency; (3) the total budget for the law enforcement
agency; and (4) the total budget for the jurisdiction.
43. See Appendix B and Appendix E for responsive information from these seventy-two jurisdictions.
44. I describe this same problem in more detail in the Police Indemnification study. See Schwartz, supra
note 2, at 910–11.
45. See generally THE VOLCKER ALLIANCE, TRUTH AND INTEGRITY IN STATE BUDGETING:
INITIAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT FINANCE PROJECT
(2015).
The one hundred jurisdictions that provided me with information about

their budgeting arrangements are widely representative in several respects. The
jurisdictions are located in thirty-four states and Washington D.C., in every re-
gion of the country, and include both large cities and remote rural areas. Included
are state agencies, county agencies, combined city-county agencies, and city law
enforcement agencies. These agencies vary significantly in size, ranging from
the largest law enforcement agency in the country—the New York City Police
Department, with over 36,000 employees—to a department with just one sworn
officer.46
The one hundred jurisdictions do not, however, reflect the distribution by
size of the nation’s approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies.47 Although
the vast majority of law enforcement agencies across the country are quite small,
my study is skewed toward large agencies.48 And although the vast majority of
small law enforcement agencies across the country appear to rely on some manner
of liability insurance, the majority of jurisdictions in my study are self-insured.49 I
have addressed this limitation in part by interviewing officials at three
statewide public entity risk pools and the executive director of a nationwide as-
sociation of public entity risk pools; the three statewide risk pools together insure
more than one thousand small and midsized local governments, and the nation-
wide association works with risk pools that serve 75,000 of the 93,000 local
governments in the United States.50 I have also collected information about
46. See Appendix A (setting out the number of officers in each jurisdiction in my study).
47. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf
(reporting 17,985 state and local law enforcement agencies employing “at least one full-time officer
or the equivalent in part-time officers”); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of State and Local Law
Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA), NAT’L ARCHIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA (2008),
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/27681 [http://perma.cc/2XJZ-M92U]
[hereinafter BJS LAW ENFORCEMENT CENSUS DATA] (listing the number of officers in each of
the 17,985 agencies).
48. Of the 17,985 law enforcement agencies nationwide as of 2008, 86 percent employed fewer than
fifty sworn officers, 93 percent employed fewer than one hundred officers, 98 percent employed
fewer than 250 officers, and 2 percent employed more than 250 officers. See Reaves, supra note 47,
at 2. In contrast, 9 percent of the agencies in my study employ fifty or fewer sworn officers; 14
percent employ one hundred or fewer sworn officers; 24 percent employ 250 or fewer officers; and
76 percent employ more than 250 sworn officers. See Appendix A.
49. Compare infra notes 66–67 (describing available information about the prevalence of liability
insurance in smaller jurisdictions), with Appendix A (reflecting that twenty-one of the one
hundred agencies in my study rely primarily on liability insurance).
50. See Telephone Interview with Mike Forster, Risk Manager, Mich. Mun. League (Oct. 7, 2014)
(explaining that the Michigan Municipal League provides liability insurance to 416 cities, villages,
and townships in the state of Michigan); Telephone Interview with Ann Gergen, Exec. Dir., Ass’n
1160 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
small jurisdictions’ practices from publicly available sources.51 Nevertheless, alt-

hough my study presents a robust picture of budgeting practices in the largest
law enforcement agencies across the country, it offers a less comprehensive view
of practices in the nation’s smaller law enforcement agencies.
The overrepresentation of large jurisdictions does, though, mean that my
findings reflect budgetary practices in jurisdictions that employ a disproportion-
ately large share of the nation’s officers and are likely responsible for a dispropor-
tionately large number of claims. The one hundred jurisdictions in my study are
just one-half of one percent of the nation’s law enforcement agencies but employ
over 26 percent of the country’s law enforcement officers.52 The departments are
also likely responsible for a disproportionately large proportion of liability claims
and costs nationwide. A study of government liability costs in New York State
found that its fifteen largest counties are responsible for 98 percent of
statewide liability costs and New York City alone is responsible for two-thirds
of the lawsuit and liability costs incurred by the entire state.53 The study’s au-
thors considered the concentration of suits against government in highly
populous areas unsurprising, given their “population, density, and service and
employee levels.”54 Accordingly, my study, which includes sixty-two of the sev-
enty largest law enforcement agencies nationwide, presumably captures critical
information about the budgetary practices relevant to the lion’s share of police-
related litigation across the country.
of Governmental Risk Pools (AGRiP) (June 16, 2015) (explaining that the 220 local government
risk pools that are members of her organization provide one or more services to 75,000 of the
93,000 local governments in the country); Telephone Interview with Jerry Mason, Counsel for the
Idaho Ctys. Risk Mgmt. Program (ICRMP) (Nov. 5, 2013) (explaining that ICRMP insures
forty-three out of forty-four counties in Idaho, and about 170 out of 200 cities in the state);
Telephone Interview with Peter Tritz, Adm’r, League of Minn. Cities Ins. Tr. (LMCIT) (June 5,
2015) (explaining that LMCIT insures about 800 of the 840 cities in Minnesota, about 330 of
which have police departments and employ a total of 4450 officers statewide).
51. See infra notes 72–74, 165–175, and accompanying text.
52. See BJS LAW ENFORCEMENT CENSUS DATA, supra note 47 (providing the number of sworn law
enforcement personnel nationwide and by agency); infra Appendix A (listing responsive
jurisdictions).
53. See SYDNEY CRESSWELL & MICHAEL LANDON-MURRAY, TAKING MUNICIPALITIES TO
COURT: AN EXAMINATION OF LIABILITY AND LAWSUITS IN NEW YORK STATE LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 5, 20 (2013) [hereinafter TAKING MUNICIPALITIES TO COURT].
54. Id. at 12.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETING
Before describing the ways in which local governments budget for and pay
settlements and judgments in lawsuits against law enforcement, it is worth de-
scribing in at least a cursory fashion the landscape of local government revenues,
expenses, and budgeting.
Cities, counties, and states have complex funding arrangements and diverse
expenditures. Unlike a private firm, which will presumably get most of its re-
sources from the products or services that it sells, local governments’ funding
comes from multiple sources, including property taxes; sales taxes; income tax;
utilities; charges for parking, parks, and other services; fines; interest; and federal
and state grants.55 Each year, governments allocate these revenues to various
expenditures, including public utilities, infrastructure, pensions, workers’ com-
pensation, and various government agencies (including law enforcement).56
Different jurisdictions rely on available income-generating mechanisms to
varying degrees, and spend different proportions of their income on govern-
ment agencies, projects, and services.
Lawsuits are one of local governments’ many expenses. Many types of suits
can be brought against local government—the most common include claims of
property damage and personal injury, contract disputes, and employment dis-
putes.57 Suits against law enforcement agencies and officers generally make up a
significant portion of governments’ liability costs.58 These suits generally fall into
55. For a list of government revenues organized by level of government and by state, see generally U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=COG_2012_LGF001&prodType=table
[http://perma.cc/QZB9-QJRE].
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., JOHN C. LIU, CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, CLAIMS REPORT:
FISCAL YEARS 2012, at 18, http://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/
2013_Claims-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/V4P4-4KAU] (describing the volume and various
types of tort claims brought against the city); id. at 60 (describing the volume and various types of
contract claims brought against the city, including by city employees).
58. See SYDNEY CRESSWELL & MICHAEL LANDON-MURRAY, ASSESSING THE FISCAL IMPACT
OF LAWSUITS ON NEW YORK STATE MUNICIPALITIES 4 (2011) (reporting that an official in
New York’s municipal risk pool commented that “while automobile and slip-and-fall cases are the
most frequently lodged cases against municipalities in New York State, the most expensive lawsuits
that confront municipal insurers stem from law enforcement activity”); TAKING MUNICIPALITIES
TO COURT, supra note 53, at 30 (reporting that in New York State, “the often overlapping and
related liability issues stemming from police action, correctional facilities, and civil and
constitutional rights rank among the most frequent types of liability issues dealt with by municipal
governments”); Telephone Interview with Ann Gergen, Exec. Dir., AGRiP (June 16, 2015)
(reporting that law enforcement and public safety more generally are top liability risk areas).
1162 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
one of three categories: injuries resulting from automobile accidents; claims of as-
sault, battery, unlawful detention, and other types of what would generally be
considered police misconduct; and employment-related litigation (which could
be claims of discrimination, unlawful termination, or violation of an employment
agreement).59 Jurisdictions vary in the relative amount spent on these different
types of law enforcement-related litigation and in the total dollars spent.60
Governments appear to take one of three approaches to the satisfaction of
settlements and judgments: They self-insure; purchase private insurance; or par-
ticipate in public entity risk pools with other municipalities in the state.61 It ap-
pears that, before the mid-1980s, governments relied on the first two of these
options—they were either self-insured or purchased private insurance.62 In the
59. See generally, e.g., Mark Iris, Your Tax Dollars at Work! Chicago Police Lawsuit Payments: How Much,
and for What?, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. 25 (2014) (describing the types of cases brought against the
Chicago Police Department); Email from Mike Dundas, Deputy City Attorney, City of L.A., to
author (July 17, 2015, 9:03 PST) (attaching a spreadsheet of lawsuit settlements and judgments
paid from 2012 through 2015, reflecting these three categories of claims); Email from Charles
Freiman, Police Paralegal, Police Attorney’s Office, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Dep’t, to
author (Feb. 25, 2013, 7:48 PST) (attaching a spreadsheet of lawsuits against the Department
between 2006–2011, reflecting cases in each of these three categories).
60. In my Police Indemnification study, I found a wide range in the amounts spent by jurisdictions on
different types of police-related claims. Among the nineteen large jurisdictions that provided me
with detailed payout information in that study, a median of 76.3 percent of settlement and
judgments dollars were spent on civil rights claims. The Texas Department of Public Safety spent
the least (8.5 percent) on civil rights claims; the Tampa Police Department spent the most (99.3
percent). See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 967–68. There is also a wide range in the amount
jurisdictions pay per officer: In this study, I found that the City of Albuquerque paid $11,456 in
settlements and judgments per year for each of its officers; the Tucson Police Department, with
twelve more officers, paid $379 per year, per officer. See Appendix B.
61. Some self-insured jurisdictions also have excess insurance to cover high-value claims. For the
purposes of this discussion, I have categorized jurisdictions as self-insured if they must pay
$250,000 or more per claim before insurance coverage is available. See Email from Mike Forster,
Risk Manager, Mich. Mun. League, to author (Jun 1, 2015, 9:01 PST) (explaining that “[a]n
entity is ‘individually self-insured’ if it has substantial (or total) control over claims handling,
assignment of defense counsel and settlement decisions. Communities that are typically large
enough to do that will usually have a self-insured retention of, say, $250,000 or higher, but that
number isn’t necessarily the determining factor”). Note, though, that some would not view
jurisdictions holding insurance with a $250,000 deductible as self-insured. See Telephone
Interview with Ann Gergen, Exec. Dir., AGRiP (June 16, 2015) (explaining that she would not
consider entities self-insured unless they have insurance with deductibles above $1.5 million). The
jurisdictions that have excess insurance with deductibles of $250,000 or higher are noted with an
asterisk (*) in Appendix A, and the details of these arrangements are described in Appendix G.
Note also that I have included the Texas Department of Public Safety in this category, even though
its “excess insurance” is actually coverage by the State’s general fund if the Department of Public
Safety must pay more than $250,000 on a claim.
62. See CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 95 (2009); KAREN NIXON, PUBLIC ENTITY
1970s and 1980s, the private market for government liability insurance largely
evaporated, and jurisdictions began experimenting with public entity risk pools.63
Public entity risk pools are similar to private insurers in that members pay premi-
ums into a central fund used to satisfy settlements and judgments.64 Unlike pri-
vate insurance, however, public entity risk pools are not profit-making
enterprises and will return dividends to their members if they spend less than
expected on lawsuits.65
Although there is no comprehensive data available about the number of ju-
risdictions nationwide that fall in each of these categories, experts I interviewed
offered some rules of thumb. One expert estimated that jurisdictions with more
than 100,000 residents are more likely to be self-insured; jurisdictions with
fewer than 100,000 residents generally participate in public entity risk pools or
purchase private insurance.66 Another expert estimated that most law en-
forcement agencies with fewer than fifty sworn employees purchase some form
of insurance (whether through risk pools or the private market).67 For jurisdic-
tions that do not self-insure, the availability of private insurance varies from state
to state. In some states, like Michigan, public entity risk pools compete with
POOLING-BUILT TO LAST 1 (2011), http://www.cajpa.org/documents/Public-Entity-Pooling-

Built-to-Last.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y3S9-FJKZ]; Email from Don LeMond, Dir. of Risk Mgmt.,
Dep’t. of the Treasury, Commonwealth of Va., to author (Oct. 8, 2014, 5:45 PST) (on file with
author) (describing this history in Virginia).
63. See sources cited supra note 62. For a comprehensive discussion of this shift from private insurance
to public entity risk pools and the differences between the two, see John Rappaport, How Private
Insurance Regulates Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
64. For the history and structure of one of the earliest self-insurance pools, see LMCIT History &
Overview, LEAGUE OF MINN. CITIES, http://www.lmc.org/page/1/lmcit-history-and-
overview.jsp [https://perma.cc/M3UA-J2GN] (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
65. Id.
66. Telephone Interview with Ann Gergen, Exec. Dir., AGRiP (June 16, 2015) (explaining that their
rule of thumb is that jurisdictions of 100,000 or 125,000 will at least consider self-insurance, but
that some much smaller jurisdictions do as well). Note that, among the jurisdictions in my study,
four jurisdictions with fewer than 100,000 citizens opt to self-insure (New Bedford, Massachusetts,
with a population of 95,078; Quincy, Massachusetts, with a population of 93,494; Hemet,
California, with a population of 81,750; and Avondale, Arizona, with a population of 78,882).
Population numbers are taken from Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045214/00 [https://perma.cc/R2RH-QU6N] (last
visited Mar. 26, 2016); see also Rappaport, supra note 63 (describing experts’ views that small
municipalities under 100,000 people are most likely to join pools, medium sized entities rely on
both pools and commercial carriers, and municipalities with more than 500,000 or 750,000
residents self-insure).
67. See Email from Dan Merkle, Chairman and CEO, Lexipol LLC, to author (July 27, 2011, 13:52
PST) (on file with author). This is true for the jurisdictions in my study, although jurisdictions that
employ several hundred law enforcement officers also rely primarily on insurance. See Appendix A.
1164 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
private insurers.68 In other states, there is limited or no private insurance market

for public entities.69 One report estimates that 85 percent of all public entities
are members of a risk pool to protect against some manner of liability.70
Regardless of what approach is used to pay liability costs, available evidence
indicates that those costs are a very small part of most local government budgets.
Newspaper stories and some reports by advocacy groups contend that lawsuits
have significant and detrimental effects on local governments, preventing them
from building playgrounds, hiring teachers, and repairing roads.71 Consistent
with that view, there are stories of small jurisdictions—unable or unwilling to
purchase liability insurance—that have been financially compromised by large
payouts.72 Yet liability costs appear to be relatively modest for most local gov-
ernments. One study found that total government liability costs—involving all
government activities, not just law enforcement—amount to about one percent
of annual expenditures for counties, cities, villages, and towns in New York
State.73 The executive director of a national association of over 200 risk pools
68. See Telephone Interview with Mike Forster, Mich. Mun. League (Oct. 7, 2014) (reporting that the
Michigan Municipal League, a self-insurance risk pool, competes with at least two or three
commercial carriers).
69. Id.
70. See NIXON, supra note 62, at 3.
71. See, e.g., CAL. CITIZENS AGAINST LAWSUIT ABUSE, MORE LAWYERS, LESS PUBLIC
SERVICES: THE COST OF LITIGATION TO CALIFORNIA’S CITIES AND COUNTIES 3 (“In
Oakland, the more than $7.7 million spent [on lawsuits] in 2008–2009 was greater than the city’s
museum budget. . . . In San Diego, the more than $11.1 million spent [on lawsuits] in 2010–2011
was greater than the cost of all the citywide park maintenance and citywide dance and after school
youth programs in the Park and Recreation budget. . . . In San Jose, the $2.7 million spent in 2010–
2011 on litigation was greater than the budgets of the Bascom Branch and Educational Park
Branch of the San Jose City Library System.”); LA. LAWSUIT ABUSE WATCH, DRINKING FROM
THE TAXPAYER TROUGH: THE COST OF LAWSUITS AGAINST LOUISIANA MUNICIPALITIES
9 (2011) (reporting that, “In Baton Rouge, the $10.2 million spent on litigation from 2006–2009
could have been used to hire roughly 80 new police officers over the same four year period. . . . In
New Orleans, the $14.1 million [spent in litigation] could have paid the salaries of 72 more
teachers. . . . In Lafayette, the $6.7 million [spent in litigation] could have been used to pay salary
and benefits for 30 additional firefighters”); Mark Puente, Undue Force, BALT. SUN (Sept. 28,
2014), http://data.baltimoresun.com/news/police-settlements [https://perma.cc/MN49-9U9G]
(reporting that the over $5.7 million spent in settlements and judgments in cases alleging police
misconduct could have been used to renovate forty-three playgrounds, resurface seventy-two
basketball courts, or hire 124 new police officers).
72. See infra note 96 and accompanying text (describing a police settlement in Inkster, Michigan that
caused the city to raise property taxes).
73. TAKING MUNICIPALITIES TO COURT, supra note 53, at vii. Note also that there was some
limited variation across types of jurisdictions: Litigation amounted to .87 percent of counties’
expenditures on average, but 1.1 percent of cities’ expenditures, 1 percent of towns’ expenditures,
made a similar estimation.74 Furthermore, in the jurisdictions in my study, law

enforcement liability accounts for significantly less than one percent of most ju-
risdictions’ expenditures.75 The focus of this study concerns the extent to which
local governments pass along these relatively modest liability costs to their law en-
forcement agencies.
IV. VARIATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION BUDGETING
Although commentators often assume that settlements and judgments are

paid from jurisdictions’ general funds, the one hundred jurisdictions in my study
use a variety of budgeting arrangements to satisfy settlements and judgments in
lawsuits involving law enforcement. Overall, half of the one hundred jurisdic-
tions in my study require their law enforcement agencies to contribute in some
manner toward the satisfaction of lawsuits against them and their officers.
A. The Largest Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions with sixty-two of the seventy largest law enforcement agencies

in the country provided me with information about the ways in which they budg-
et for and pay settlements and judgments in cases involving those agencies.76 The
law enforcement agencies in these jurisdictions employ from 980 officers
and 1.2 percent of villages’ expenditures. See id. at 8. Liability costs for New York City also
hovered around 1 percent of total expenditures. See id. at 9.
74. See Email from Ann Gergen, Exec. Dir., AGRiP, to author (June 23, 2015, 6:15 PST) (on file
with author) (explaining that “[c]ontributions to risk pools (or premium payments to insurers) are
minimal in a local government’s overall budget. We’re talking just a percent or two of a city’s
budget going toward contributions—if that.”). Note also that premium costs generally cover
multiple costs beyond liability, including workers’ compensation, disability insurance, and
administrative overhead for the risk pool. See id.
75. See Appendix B. Because law enforcement liability, on which I am focused, likely accounts for a
significant portion—but not all—of government liabilities, see sources cited supra note 58, total
liabilities for the jurisdictions in my study will be closer to 1 percent of expenditures (although still,
often, less than 1 percent). Note also that the few jurisdictions in my study that rely on outside
insurance pay significantly more than self-insured jurisdictions but still generally pay less than 1
percent of their total budget toward law enforcement litigation.
76. The eight large agencies that declined to provide me with responsive information include: the
Nassau County Police Department; the Suffolk County Police Department; the Baltimore County
Police Department; the Fairfax County Police Department; the St. Louis Police Department; the
New York State Police; the New Jersey State Police; and the Miami Police Department.
1166 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
(Tampa) to over 36,000 officers (New York City).77 All of these sixty-two ju-
risdictions are self-insured.78
Twenty-six of these sixty-two jurisdictions satisfy settlements and judg-
ments exclusively out of jurisdiction-wide litigation funds with no financial con-
tribution by the involved law enforcement agencies.79 Twelve require their law
enforcement agencies to pay settlements and judgments directly from their budg-
ets. Seventeen require their law enforcement agencies to contribute to jurisdic-
tion-wide risk management funds from which settlements and judgments are
paid. And the remaining seven employ hybrid approaches that draw on two of
these three budgeting arrangements.80
Among these sixty-two jurisdictions, the most common practice is to satisfy
settlements and judgments from central funds without contribution by the law
enforcement agency. The very largest of these large agencies are especially likely
to budget for and pay settlements and judgments in this manner.81 Yet when
broken down by the most salient characteristic for the purposes of this study—
whether any money is taken from the law enforcement agency’s budget (whether
by direct payment of settlements and judgments or payment to a central fund)—a
77. See Appendix A.

78. A number of these jurisdictions have excess insurance for large claims; for the purpose of this
discussion, I have designated jurisdictions as self-insured if they are responsible for at least the first
$250,000 of any claim. See supra note 61.
79. Although these departments may pay employees’ claims for back pay or overtime out of their
budgets, those I spoke with considered these types of damages to fall in a separate category because
they are, in essence, payments for employees’ time. See, e.g., Email from Thomas J. Kaiser, Chief
Trial Counsel, Dep’t of Law, City of Cleveland, to author (Oct. 7, 2013, 12:58 PST) (on file with
author) (reporting that excessive force settlements and judgments are taken from the general fund
and “do not get charged to the police department” but that “[b]ack pay awards, such as when an
arbitrator orders re-instatement of a police officer who has been disciplined, are paid out of the
police department budget”); see also Appendix G (describing similar arrangements in Nashville,
Newark, and Springfield).
80. Most settlements and judgments involving the Metropolitan Police Department (Washington,
D.C.’s police force) are paid from the city’s general funds, but the Department is responsible for
paying settlements of less than $10,000 in cases that have been pending for less than two years.
Four state law enforcement agencies—California Highway Patrol, Michigan State Police, North
Carolina Highway Patrol, and Ohio Highway Patrol—contribute to a central risk fund that is used
to satisfy auto claims but satisfy other types of settlements and judgments from their budgets. The
Louisville Police Department pays a premium to a self-insurance trust for auto liability claims, but
other types of claims are paid from the jurisdiction’s general fund with no impact on the
Department’s budget. And the Pennsylvania State Police contributes to a fund that pays the first
$250,000 of any claim, and pays any amounts over $250,000 from its budget. See Appendix G.
81. See Table 1 (reflecting that twenty-six of the sixty-two large jurisdictions in my study pay nothing
toward settlements and judgments; they represent 41.9 percent of the large jurisdictions in my
study but employ 51.4 percent of the officers in these jurisdictions).
different pattern emerges. Although paying from central funds is the most com-
mon budgetary arrangement among these agencies, 58 percent of these largest
agencies—a clear majority—are required to contribute to the satisfaction of set-
tlements and judgments in some manner.
TABLE 1: BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS IN SIXTY-TWO LARGEST

AGENCIES
Agency
Payments Agency
Pays
Without Contributes
From Its Hybrid Total
Agency to Central
Own
Contribution Fund
Budget
12
Agencies 26 (41.9%) 17 (27.4%) 7 (11.3%) 62 (100%)
(19.3%)
100,370 43,659 29,444 21,718 195,191
Officers
(51.4%) (22.4%) (15.1%) (11.1%) (100%)
TABLE 2: FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MONEY IS TAKEN FROM BUDGETS

OF SIXTY-TWO LARGEST AGENCIES
No Money From Money From Agency

Total
Agency Budget Budget
Agencies 26 (41.9%) 36 (58.1%) 62 (100%)
Officers 100,370 (51.4%) 94,821 (48.6%) 195,191 (100%)
1168 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Among these large jurisdictions, different types of governments—

cities,82 counties,83 combined city-county jurisdictions,84 and states85—rely
primarily on different budgetary arrangements. Cities and combined city-
county jurisdictions are most likely to pay settlements and judgments from
central funds without contribution by the involved law enforcement agen-
cies. Counties are most likely to require their law enforcement agencies to
contribute to a jurisdiction-wide risk management fund. And states most
often use a hybrid approach in which their agencies contribute to a central
fund for auto claims and pay other claims from their budgets.
Large cities, counties, combined city-county jurisdictions, and states also
vary in the frequency with which they require their law enforcement agencies to
contribute to the satisfaction of settlements and judgments. Almost 60 percent of
large city law enforcement agencies in my study pay nothing toward settlements
and judgments in cases brought against them, as compared with 44 percent of
combined city-county agencies, 27 percent of county agencies, and less than 10
percent of state agencies.
82. The thirty-one large city agencies in my study are in: New York City; Chicago; Los Angeles;
Philadelphia; Houston; Washington, DC; Dallas; Phoenix; Baltimore; Detroit; Boston; San
Antonio; Milwaukee; San Diego; Columbus; Atlanta; Cleveland; Memphis; Austin; Fort Worth;
New Orleans; Kansas City; San Jose; Newark; Seattle; El Paso; Cincinnati; Oklahoma City;
Tucson; Albuquerque; and Tampa. See Appendix G.
83. The eleven large county agencies in my study are in: Los Angeles County, CA; Cook County, IL;
Miami-Dade County, FL; Harris County, TX; Riverside County, CA; San Bernardino County,
CA; Orange County, CA; Broward County, FL; Prince George’s County, MD; Montgomery
County, MD; and DeKalb County, GA. See Appendix G.
84. By “city-county jurisdictions,” I refer to those law enforcement agencies that operate in
consolidated city and county jurisdictions, including the Las Vegas Metro Police Department, the
Honolulu Police Department, the San Francisco Police Department, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police Department, the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, the Denver Police Department, the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, the Louisville Metropolitan Police Department,
and the Nashville-Davidson County Police Department. See Appendix G.
85. The eleven state agencies in my study are: California Highway Patrol; Pennsylvania State Police;
Texas Department of Public Safety; Massachusetts State Police; Illinois State Police; Virginia State
Police; North Carolina State Highway Patrol; Michigan State Police; Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey; Florida Highway Patrol; and Ohio State Highway Patrol. See Appendix G.
TABLE 3: BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS IN SIXTY-TWO LARGEST

AGENCIES, BY TYPE OF AGENCY
Payments Agency Agency
Without Pays From Contributes
Hybrid Total
Agency Its Own to Central
Contribution Budget Fund
State
1 (9.1%) 3 (27.3%) 2 (18.2%) 5 (45.5%) 11 (100%)
Agencies
City
18 (58.1%) 5 (16.1%) 7 (22.6%) 1 (3.2%) 31 (100%)
Agencies
County
3 (27%) 2 (18%) 6 (55%) 0 (0%) 11 (100%)
Agencies
Combined
City-
4 (44%) 2 (22%) 2 (22%) 1 (11%) 9 (100%)
County
Agencies
All
26 (41.9%) 12 (19.3%) 17 (27.4%) 7 (11.3%) 62 (100%)
Agencies

OF SIXTY-TWO LARGEST AGENCIES, BY TYPE OF AGENCY
No Money From Money From Agency

Total
Agency Budget Budget
State
1 (9.1%) 10 (90.9%) 11 (100%)
Agencies
City
18 (58.1%) 13 (41.9%) 31 (100%)
Agencies
County
3 (27%) 8 (73%) 11 (100%)
Agencies
Combined
City-
4 (44%) 5 (56%) 9 (100%)
County
Agencies
All
26 (41.9%) 36 (58.1%) 62 (100%)
Agencies
1170 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
B. The Smaller Jurisdictions
There are thirty-eight small and midsized jurisdictions in my study, and the
law enforcement agencies in these jurisdictions employ from one officer (Water-
loo) to 702 officers (Raleigh).86 Seventeen of these jurisdictions are self-insured
and use the same three arrangements relied on by the larger jurisdictions to satisfy
payouts in lawsuits against their law enforcement agencies. Of these seventeen
self-insured jurisdictions, eleven pay settlements and judgments out of a
jurisdiction-wide litigation fund with no financial contribution from the
involved law enforcement agencies, one requires its law enforcement agency
to satisfy settlements and judgments directly from its budget, and five require
their law enforcement agencies to contribute to central, jurisdiction-wide risk
management funds.
The remaining twenty-one small and midsized jurisdictions rely on public
entity risk pools or private insurance for some or all of their legal liabilities. Be-
cause the vast majority of small law enforcement agencies rely on some form of
insurance—and my study is skewed toward large agencies—insured agencies are
significantly underrepresented.87 Yet, despite this limited sample size, there is
variation in budgetary arrangements among these jurisdictions. Three have hy-
brid arrangements; they satisfy some types of legal claims through insurance
and others from jurisdiction-wide litigation funds.88 The remaining eighteen
jurisdictions rely on public entity risk pools or private insurance for their legal
liabilities. Twelve do not require their law enforcement agencies to contribute
to insurance premiums; the other six do.
C. Budgetary Distinctions Between Large and Smaller Jurisdictions
Although I do not know to what extent the budgetary practices in these

thirty-eight smaller law enforcement agencies are consistent with those in the
many thousands of cities, counties, towns, and states nationwide with small
and midsized agencies, there are some notable distinctions between budgetary
86. See Appendix A.

87. For the underrepresentation of small law enforcement agencies in my study, see supra notes 47–51
and accompanying text. For the prevalence of insurance among smaller law enforcement agencies,
see supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
88. Two of those jurisdictions—Manatee County and New Bedford—do not require their law
enforcement agency to contribute to the central fund. One jurisdiction—Waco—does require its
agency to contribute to the fund. See Appendix A.
practices in the smaller and larger jurisdictions in my study. The jurisdictions

with the largest law enforcement agencies are the most likely to pay settlements
and judgments from central funds with no money taken from the budgets of the
law enforcement agencies; this same arrangement is also the most common for all
agencies with two hundred or more officers. Agencies in my study with fewer
than two hundred officers are most likely to rely primarily on public entity risk
pools or private insurance, with premiums paid from central funds.
TABLE 5: BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS IN ALL ONE HUNDRED

AGENCIES
Insurance
Agency Insurance
Payments Agency (Agency
Pays (Agency
Without Contributes Does Not
From Contributes Hybrid Total
Agency to Central Contribute
Its Own to
Contribution Fund to
Budget Premium)
Premium)
Agencies
With
6 23
>2000 10 (43.5%) 4 (17.4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (13%)
(26.1%) (100%)
Officers
Agencies
With
6 4 38
1000– 16 (42.1%) 12 (31.6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
(15.8%) (10.5%) (100%)
1999
Officers
Agencies
With 3 18
8 (44.4%) 1 (5.6%) 4 (22.2%) 2 (11.1%) 0 (0%)
200–999 (16.7%) (100%)
Officers
Agencies
With 21
3 (14.3%) 0 (0%) 2 (9.5%) 10 (47.6%) 6 (28.6%) 0 (0%)
<200 (100%)
Officers
Another significant distinction between the largest and smaller jurisdictions

becomes apparent when one examines whether any money is taken from the law
enforcement agencies’ budgets. The largest agencies (with more than one
1172 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
thousand officers) are almost two times more likely than the smaller agencies
in my study to financially contribute in some manner to the satisfaction of
settlements and judgments.89

OF ALL ONE HUNDRED AGENCIES, BY SIZE OF AGENCY
No Money From Money From

Total
Agency Budget Agency Budget
Agencies With
10 (43.5%) 13 (56.5%) 23
>2000 Officers
Agencies With
16 (42.1%) 22 (57.9%) 38
1000–1999 Officers
Agencies With
10 (55.5%) 8 (44.4%) 18
200–999 Officers
Agencies With
13 (61.9%) 8 (38.1%) 21
<200 Officers
D. Conclusion
Commentators who have considered the question have often assumed that
settlements and judgments in lawsuits against law enforcement agencies and
officers are usually paid from city, county, and state budgets with no financial
contributions from the agencies. My study shows that this is not the case.
Jurisdictions have a number of different budgeting arrangements by which they
satisfy their legal liabilities. Some larger jurisdictions pay suits from central
funds with no money taken from their law enforcement agencies’ budgets, but
others require their law enforcement agencies to pay settlements and judgments
from their budgets or contribute to a central fund. Smaller jurisdictions more
often rely on public entity risk pools and private insurance, sometimes passing
along premium costs to their law enforcement agencies and sometimes
paying those premiums from central funds. Although half of the law
89. For agencies with more than one thousand officers, the ratio of agencies that pay and do not
pay money from their budgets is 35/26 = 1.35:1 odds. For agencies with fewer than one
thousand officers, the ratio of agencies that pay and do not pay money from their budgets is
16/23=0.69:1 odds. The ratio of the two odds is 1.9, meaning that a large agency is 1.9 times
more likely to pay judgments from its budget. Many thanks to Joe Doherty for assisting with
this analysis.
enforcement agencies in my study pay nothing from their budgets toward

settlements and judgments in lawsuits brought against them, the other half
do require police departments to contribute in some manner. Large agencies
are more likely than small agencies and state agencies are more likely than city
agencies to be required to bear this financial responsibility, but one can find
examples of all types of law enforcement agencies, large and small, that financially
contribute in some manner to the satisfaction of suits brought against them.
V. THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS
Commentators have assumed not only that law enforcement agencies do

not satisfy settlements and judgments from their budgets but also that, if they did,
agencies would feel financial pressures to reduce the costs of litigation.90 The log-
ic of this argument goes something like this: If a law enforcement agency pays
lawsuit settlements and judgments from its budget, an increase in payouts will
mean that the agency has less money for new hires, equipment, and overtime. A
decrease in payouts will mean that the agency has more money to spend on
these other needs. Officials want to maximize the amount of money they have
available to achieve their agency’s objectives.91 Accordingly, requiring an agency
to pay settlements and judgments out of its budget should cause it to take steps
to reduce liability costs.92
My study has revealed that money to satisfy settlements and judgments
is, in fact, regularly taken from law enforcement agencies’ budgets. Yet, as I
show in this Part, the notion that law enforcement agencies will have financial
incentives to reduce claim costs if and only if lawsuits are paid from their
budgets is incorrect. Even when law enforcement agencies are required to
contribute in some manner to settlements and judgments, the particularities of
90. For examples of this argument, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
91. For a model of the “benevolent-but-resource-constrained bureaucrat,” who seeks ways to increase
his budget to achieve his agency’s goals, see Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does
Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking? An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66
VAND. L. REV. 67, 83–85 (2013). Bureaucrats might also seek to maximize their budgets for
selfish reasons—a larger salary or more power. For this view, see generally WILLIAM A.
NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38–42 (1971); THE
BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE (André Blais & Stéphane
Dion eds., 1991).
92. Some commentators believe that officials, faced with these financial pressures, will take steps to
reduce liability risk and associated misconduct; others believe that officials will take less desirable
steps to address budget outflows, like reducing trainings or patrols or engaging in less cognizable
harms. These possibilities are discussed below. See infra notes 177–179 and accompanying text.
1174 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
budgetary arrangements in many jurisdictions diminish the payments’ finan-

cial effects on the law enforcement agencies’ budgets. Conversely, some law
enforcement agencies that do not formally satisfy settlements and judgments
from their budgets may, nevertheless, experience tangible and direct financial
consequences of costly settlements and judgments. As with so much in gov-
ernment administration, and in bureaucratic administration more generally,
the devil is in the details.
A. When Settlements and Judgments Are Paid From the Jurisdiction’s Funds
Thirty-seven of the one hundred jurisdictions in my study (twenty-six large

and eleven smaller) are self-insured and pay settlements and judgments from cen-
tral funds with no impact on the law enforcement agencies’ budgets. A Deputy
Attorney for Yellowstone County reports that the county places no requirements
on the Sheriff’s Office as a condition of funding settlements or judgments and
that these payments have no impact on the Sheriff’s Office budget: “[T]here is no
taking funds away, no shifting or reallocation of Sheriff Office funding [as] the
result of adverse verdicts or settlements.”93 I received similar reports from repre-
sentatives of jurisdictions of all sizes with this budgetary arrangement.94
Of course settlements and judgments decrease the jurisdiction’s budget as a
whole, and the money to satisfy those increased costs must be taken from some-
where.95 Smaller jurisdictions will presumably feel the financial effects of lawsuits
more acutely. Inkster, Michigan, a town of 25,000, recently increased property
taxes by an average of $178 per household to satisfy a $1.37 million settlement
93. See Email from Kevin Gillen, Deputy Attorney, Cty. of Yellowstone, to author (Nov. 14, 2013,
13:15 PST) (on file with author).
94. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Ralph Blount, Assistant City Attorney, Boise City Attorney’s
Office (Oct. 9, 2013) (reporting that the police department’s budget is not reduced by the amount
of any settlements or judgments); Email from Susan Jacobucci, Fin. Dir., City of Newark, to
author (Oct. 10, 2013, 7:12 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that, “overall, no the police
department budget does not feel an impact” of lawsuit payouts); Email from Jason A. Reuter,
Associate Staff Attorney, Polk Cty. Sheriff’s Off., to author (June 23, 2015, 6:26 PST) (on file with
author) (explaining that settlements are paid from the county’s general fund and that payments
affect the sheriff’s budget only to the extent that “[m]ore claims and lawsuits may result in less
available in the general fund to be used for other expenditures, including that of the Sheriff’s
office”); Email from Patricia Via, Chief, Div. of Litig., Montgomery Cty. Attorney’s Office, to
author (Oct. 7, 2013) (on file with author) (reporting “no impact on the police department’s
budget” when claims are paid from the county’s self-insurance fund).
95. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Joe Bouchard, N.H. Budget Office (Sept. 16, 2014) (explaining
that settlement and judgment funds can only be taken from unappropriated funds but that
litigation costs can affect the budget more generally).
involving an officer.96 Yet none of the law enforcement agencies in my

study—even in smaller cities and towns—reported experiencing financial con-
sequences of lawsuits if the money to pay those settlements and judgments
came from the jurisdiction’s general fund.
To be sure, large litigation payouts may well have political consequences
for law enforcement agencies. Local newspapers may publicize settlements in
police misconduct cases and describe their budgetary impact.97 Current and
former government officials in jurisdictions that pay settlements and judgments
out of general funds have reported that city and county councils sometimes
question and criticize law enforcement officials and government attorneys when
asked to approve settlements.98 Legislators and other government officials
may also question law enforcement practices in response to large aggregate
expenditures on litigation.99 Because many of these conversations happen
96. Abby Phillip, Why the Poor Often Pay for Police Misconduct With Their Pocketbook, WASH. POST
(June 3, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/06/03/why-the-
poor-and-disadvantaged-often-pay-for-police-misconduct-with-their-pocketbooks
[http://perma.cc/9G84-PKS2]; The Detroit Free Press Editorial Board, Inkster Beating Shows Cost
of Police Brutality, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 3, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/
opinion/editorials/2015/06/02/police-inkster-beating/28357021 [https://perma.cc/S5EU-
ANGV]. Inkster is self-insured, with excess insurance only for claims above $2 million. See Inkster
Property Owners on Hook for $1.4 Million Police Beating Settlement, MACOMB DAILY NEWS (June
2, 2015), http://www.macombdaily.com/general-news/20150602/inkster-property-owners-on-
hook-for-14-million-police-beating-settlement [https://perma.cc/LG9D-56T3]. This may be
because Inkster’s claims history has made it cost-prohibitive to obtain insurance. The city’s 2015–
2016 budget indicates fourteen active lawsuits against the City, and a goal for fiscal year 2016 of
“continu[ing] to improve Inkster’s claim history to allow the City to obtain adequate insurance
coverage for a municipality with 30,000 residents.” CITY OF INKSTER, MI., CITY MANAGER’S
ADOPTED BUDGET 2015–2016 15 (2015).
97. See, e.g., Puente, supra note 71.
98. See, e.g., Interview with Arif Alikhan, Special Assistant for Constitutional Policing and Acting Risk
Manager, L.A. Police Dep’t (Oct. 6, 2014) (describing meetings with city council about the
reasons for cases and settlements); Telephone Interview with Laura Gordon, Deputy City
Attorney, City of El Paso (Oct. 22, 2014) (explaining that El Paso City Council approves
settlements and will, during the City Attorney’s presentation to the Council, ask questions about
the department’s response to the incident—whether the employee was disciplined, whether the
policy was changed, and the like).
99. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Panelist on Municipal Law Symposium: Panel IV: Viewing Litigation
Through Different Lenses: Gaining a Better Understanding of Municipal Liability and Immunities,
CHAP. U. SCH. L. (Feb. 27, 2015), http://ibc.chapman.edu/Mediasite/Play/ 96133e003359467
08b3c6f053402f8a81d [https://perma.cc/39KJ-FVA7] (commenting that governments are not
indifferent to damages liability; if they were, why, when he was Deputy Corporation Counsel at the
City of Chicago Department of Law, was “Mayor Daley always yelling at me about the size of tort
judgments?”); Email from Rita Elsner, Assistant Vill. Attorney, Schaumburg, Ill., to author (Sept.
8, 2014, 15:06 PST) (on file with author) (observing, in response to a question about whether there
are any “financial effects of suits on the police department,” that “[t]he impact on the police is that
1176 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
behind closed doors, it is difficult to measure their tenor and impact; both
likely vary depending on the jurisdiction. Regardless, these conversations and
criticisms appear not to translate into financial sanctions for these depart-
ments.
B. When the Agency Pays Settlements and Judgments From Its Budget
Nineteen law enforcement agencies in my study (eighteen large and one

smaller) pay some or all settlements and judgments from their budgets.100 I inter-
viewed or corresponded with officials in seventeen of these nineteen jurisdictions
to better understand the impact of these payouts on the law enforcement agen-
cies’ budgets.101
In seven of these seventeen jurisdictions, details of the budgetary arrange-
ments between the jurisdiction and the law enforcement agency appear to lessen
or eliminate altogether the financial impact of the payments. These seven law
enforcement agencies receive money in their budgets that is reserved for litigation
costs and is isolated from other aspects of their budgets.102 When these agencies
do not spend as much as they have budgeted for litigation, the departments may
not be able to use those funds for other purposes; the funds are sometimes
kept in litigation budgets to cover future costs and are sometimes returned to
our Village Board monitors all the litigation and if they see a spike they can question the
department causing the spike”).
100. Thirteen agencies pay all settlements and judgments from their budgets; another six have hybrid
arrangements and pay some settlements and judgments from their budgets.
101. I was unable to get details about the effect of this budgetary arrangement on the Port Authority of
New York/New Jersey or the Pennsylvania State Police.
102. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Charlotte Bible, Gen. Counsel, Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t
(Sept. 22, 2014) (explaining that there is a line item in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department budget for settlements and judgments and the costs of defense attorneys, based on an
actuarial analysis); Email from Michelle Allersma, Controller’s Office Budget and Analysis
Director, City of San Francisco, to author (Sept. 5, 2014, 18:12 PST) (on file with author) (“Each
year, the Police Department’s General Fund operating budget includes an amount to pay for
claims.”); Email from Paul Rakosky, City of Columbus, to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 6:33 PST) (on
file with author) (“Each large city department has a budget to pay claims. We will generally use
these monies first.”); Email from Carl Gutierrez, FOIA Officer, City of Chi. Office of Budget &
Management, to author (June 2, 2015, 12:45 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that money to
pay settlements and judgments is placed in the Chicago Police Department budget through a
specific allocation for settlements and judgments); see also Appendix G (describing similar
budgeting allocations for the Broward Sheriff’s Office, Memphis Police Department, and Boston
Police Department).
the jurisdictions’ general funds.103 Moreover, agencies that pay settlements and
judgments from their budgets do not necessarily suffer a financial penalty when
they spend more than is allocated. Instead, when these departments go over their
budgeted litigation costs, they can (and do) get additional funds from the gov-
ernment to satisfy those claims.104
Some agencies, like the Broward Sheriff’s Office, are regularly given suffi-
cient funds to cover lawsuits in their budget but are confident that, if they did go
over budget, they could “go to the county and ask for more!”105 Other depart-
ments are regularly given insufficient funds to pay for lawsuits yet do not experi-
ence financial consequences when they go over budget. The Columbus Police
Department received $225,000 each year of my study to satisfy police claims, yet
103. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Charlotte Bible, Gen. Counsel, Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t
(Sept. 22, 2014) (explaining that if litigation costs are under budget for the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department, the money stays in the department’s litigation fund for the next year and she
does not think it can be used for other purposes); Email from John Greene, Claims Manager, Risk
Mgmt. Div., Broward Sheriff’s Office, to author (Oct. 8, 2013, 6:51 PST) (“[I]t is my
understanding [that] if … we go under [budget,] it goes either to the general budget or back to the
county.”); Email from Melissa L. Meyer, Budget Mgmt. Specialist, Dep’t of Fin. & Mgmt., City
of Columbus, to author (Sept. 30, 2014, 4:06 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that
“[t]ypically any balances [in the police claims budget] would be returned to the general fund”);
Email from Carl Gutierrez, FOIA Officer, City of Chi. Office of Budget & Mgmt., to author
(June 2, 2015, 12:45 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that if less than the allocated amount is
spent on lawsuits the police department cannot use those funds for other purposes).
104. See Telephone Interview with Lynda Fraley, Risk Mgmt., Office of Budget Mgmt., City of Bos.
(Sept. 24, 2014) (explaining that when a department goes above the budgeted amount for litigation
costs, the remainder is paid from general funds); Email from Paul Rakosky, City of Columbus, to
author (Sept. 8, 2014, 6:33 PST) (on file with author) (“Each large city department has a budget to
pay claims. We will generally use these monies first. If these funds were to be exhausted, we
reserve an amount in a citywide account held in the Finance and Management Department to pay
claims.”); Email from Richard B. Campbell, Budget Manager, City of Memphis, to author (Oct.
21, 2014, 8:26 PST) (on file with author) (“Police has a ‘claims and lawsuits’ budget for the
payment of settlements. If the budget is insufficient the Division will return to Council to request
additional funds which will come from reserves or from other Divisions’ [sic] whose claims or other
expenditures are tracking to be below budget.”); Telephone Interview with Michelle Allersma,
Controller’s Off. Budget and Analysis Director, City of San Francisco (Sept. 15, 2014) (explaining
that San Francisco repeatedly gives the police department less than it needs to satisfy claims, but
that when its board of supervisors authorizes settlements above the police department’s litigation
budget it also authorizes the use of additional funds to satisfy those claims); Email from Carl
Gutierrez, FOIA Off., City of Chi. Office of Budget & Mgmt., to author (June 2, 2015, 12:45
PST) (on file with author) (explaining that if more than the allocated amount is spent on lawsuits
the additional money is taken from city funds); cf. Telephone Interview with Charlotte Bible, Gen.
Counsel, Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t (Sept. 22, 2014) (reporting that she does not believe the
litigation costs have ever gone above the amount set aside in the litigation fund for the
Department).
105. Email from John Greene, Claims Manager, Risk Mgmt. Div., Broward Sheriff’s Office, to author
(Oct. 8, 2013, 6:51 PST) (on file with author).
1178 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
it paid, on average, over $475,000 each year on police-related claims. The Police
Department covered the overage when it had a surplus in another area of its
budget, but otherwise city officials “would transfer money from the City-wide
account into Police to cover the claim(s).”106 Money would not be taken from
the Columbus Police Department’s budget if doing so meant compromising a
need within the budget for personnel, supplies, services, or the like.107 The Bos-
ton Police Department is given an annual allocation for litigation payouts—an
average of about $1.3 million per year—but during the three years of my study,
lawsuits involving the Department cost, on average, three times that amount and
the city, not the Department, paid the remainder.108 From 2012–2014, the Chi-
cago Police Department was allocated, on average, about $16.5 million per year
for lawsuit payouts. During these three years, an annual average of over $52 mil-
lion was paid in lawsuits involving the Chicago Police Department with the ex-
cess paid from city funds.109
Law enforcement agencies that pay settlements and judgments from their
budgets but pass along excess litigation costs appear to be as insulated from the
financial impact of lawsuits as those law enforcement agencies that pay no litiga-
tion costs at all. When faced with large police payouts, these jurisdictions have
been known to compromise other aspects of city or county services while preserv-
ing their law enforcement agency’s budget. As one former attorney for the City
of Chicago reflected:
[W]hen you had to budget more for [police] tort liability you had less
to do lead poisoning screening for the poor children of Chicago. We
had a terrible lead poisoning problem and there was a direct rela-
tionship between the two. Those kids were paying those tort judg-
ments, not the police officers.110
Chicago’s lawsuit payouts required the city to sell $1 billion in bonds in 2011 and
to issue $100 million in bonds in 2014.111 Yet the spokesman for the Chicago
106. Email from Melissa L. Meyer, Budget Mgmt. Specialist, Dep’t of Fin. & Mgmt., City of
Columbus, to author (June 10, 2015, 11:32 PST) (on file with author).
107. See Email from Melissa L. Meyer, Budget Management Specialist, Dep’t of Fin. & Mgmt., City of
Columbus, to author (June 11, 2015, 5:30 PST) (on file with author).
108. See Appendix G.
109. See Appendix G.
110. See Rosenthal, supra note 99.
111. See Jason Grotto, Hal Dardick & Heather Gillers, Mayor Seeks to Borrow Up to $900 Million More,
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-03/news/ct-met-bonds-
new-chicago-borrowing-20140204_1_tax-increases-city-leaders-finance-committee
[http://perma.cc/3EJ3-QY8H] (reporting that $100 million of the $900 sought would go to “pay
Police Department made clear to me that “the police department isn’t forced
to cut back on things like OT [overtime] or equipment purchases due to litiga-
tion costs.”112
Although these departments do not experience financial consequences of
litigation payments, there may be some nonfinancial effects of this budgetary ar-
rangement that promote caretaking. Paying settlements and judgments from law
enforcement budgets can serve as a form of information regulation.113 By requir-
ing a law enforcement agency to pay claims from its budget, a jurisdiction may
draw governmental attention and agency attention to the amount spent on suits.
This is the precise reasoning some financial personnel used when explaining to
me why lawsuit costs are paid from their agencies’ budgets—even when excess
litigation costs are paid from general funds.114 As the Budget Director for the
City of Memphis explained, lawsuits are paid from the budget of the involved
city division “because it [gives] the Divisions more perspective of what they
[are] costing and perhaps heighten[s] their efforts for prevention or changes if in
order.”115
In addition, this budgetary arrangement creates opportunities for govern-
ance conversations related to litigation costs. Most law enforcement agencies
that pay settlements and judgments from their budgets still need approval
from the city or county council, mayor, or legislature before settling a case.116
off commercial paper loans used to cover legal judgments”); Brendan A. McGrail & Matt
Robinson, Chicago Selling $1 Billion in Bonds Amid Lawsuit: Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan.
19, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-01-20/chicago-selling-1-billion-in-
bonds-amid-lawsuit-muni-credit [http://perma.cc/6HR2-8U37].
112. See Email from Roderick Drew, Freedom of Info. Officer, City of Chi. Law Dep’t, to author (Oct.
9, 2013, 14:11 PST) (on file with author).
113. For discussions of informational regulation and its effects on bureaucratic behavior, see generally
Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You
Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999). For a discussion of the
effects of information disclosure on law enforcement, see Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1067–76.
114. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Lynda Fraley, Risk Fin. Manager, City of Bos. (Sept. 24, 2014)
(explaining that she put litigation costs in the budget of every department, including the police, so
that they can be aware of the impact of their claims on the budget); Telephone Interview with
Katie Zamesnik, Bus. Process Consultant, Fin. Servs. Office, City of Austin (Oct. 22, 2014)
(explaining that, before fiscal year 2015, expenses were budgeted at the fund level and that, as of
fiscal year 2015, these costs were moved to the department level so that the government can see
what it has given to the police department to contribute to the city’s liability fund).
115. Email from Richard B. Campbell, Budget Manager, City of Memphis, to author (Oct. 21, 2014,
116. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Michelle Allersma, Controller’s Office Budget & Analysis Dir.,
City of S.F. (Sept. 15, 2014) (reporting that settlement agreements have to be approved by the
1180 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Additional pressure may be applied when a law enforcement agency seeks ad-
ditional appropriations to cover litigation costs that go beyond their budget.
But this appears to be a political pressure, not a financial one; after what might
be uncomfortable conversations about the need for increased funding, a jurisdic-
tion will give the agency the money it needs to satisfy its legal liabilities. As an of-
ficial from San Francisco explained, the police department knows that the
government has budgeted centrally for any overruns and that the city has no
choice but to pay the claims. Although a city council can threaten that it will hold
the police department accountable for its budget, the city will ultimately pay the
settlements and judgments on the department’s behalf.117
Among the nineteen law enforcement agencies in my study that satisfy
some or all settlements and judgments from their budgets, ten reported experi-
encing tangible financial effects of increases and decreases in litigation costs.118
Eight of the ten receive a budget for all expenditures, including litigation.119
board of supervisors in San Francisco); Telephone Interview with Glen Dragovich, Assistant Div.
Dir., L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t (Sept. 19, 2014) (explaining that the county board of supervisors
must approve any settlement over $100,000); cf. Email from Virginia S. Murray, Gen. Counsel,
Kansas City, Mo. Police Dep’t, to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 18:30 PST) (on file with author)
(explaining that the Department, not the City, determines “whether, or in what amounts,
settlements and judgments are paid”).
117. See Telephone Interview with Michelle Allersma, Controller’s Office Budget & Analysis Dir., City
of S.F. (Sept. 15, 2014).
118. These ten agencies include the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, the Metropolitan Police
Department, the Kansas City Police Department, the Michigan State Police, the Minnesota State
Patrol, the Illinois State Police, the North Carolina Highway Patrol, the Ohio State Highway
Patrol, the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the California Highway Patrol. Notably, seven
of the ten are state law enforcement agencies.
119. See Telephone Interview with Bill Bowerman, Associate Dir. of the Senate Fiscal Agency Gen.
Gov’t Unit, Senate Fiscal Agency, State of Mich. (June 18, 2015) (reporting that liability costs
come from state agencies’ budgets and that there is usually not a specific amount budgeted for
claims); Email from Melissa D. Baldwin, Pub. Records Adm’r, Ohio State Highway Patrol, to
author (June 11, 2015, 10:29 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that the Ohio State Highway
Patrol gets a lump sum that it must allocate to different needs, including litigation); Email from
Joseph P. Dugale, Deputy Gen. Counsel for Law Enf’t, N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to author (May
18, 2015, 10:45 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that the Department is not allocated money
to satisfy settlements and judgments and must, instead, take that money from other items in the
budget); Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Steve Lyddon, FOIA Officer, Ill. State Police
(Sept. 11, 2014) (explaining that the Illinois State Police is given a budget and the Department
breaks it down into sub-budgets, including one for litigation costs); Email from Virginia S.
Murray, Gen. Counsel, Kansas City, Mo. Police Dep’t, to author (May 17, 2015, 10:50 PST) (on
file with author) (reporting that the Kansas City Police Department receives its budget from the
City, distributes some of those funds into a risk management account, which it controls, and pays
settlements and judgments from those funds); Email from James G. Nolan, Assoc. Deputy Gen.
Counsel, Open Records Section, Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to author (June 2, 2015, 15:05 PST)
(on file with author) (“State agencies do not have any specific line item in their budget for
These departments may earmark money for certain purposes, including litiga-
tion, but they can move funds as needed. As a result, lawsuit payouts necessarily
take money away from other needs.120 As Deputy General Counsel for the North
Carolina Department of Public Safety explained, when the North Carolina State
Highway Patrol has to satisfy a settlement or judgment, that money “must be
taken from another line item . . . it is money the agency does not get to use for
other purposes.”121 The Minnesota State Patrol reported that, in recent years,
the costs of settlements and judgments have required it to put equipment pur-
chases and hiring for vacant positions “on hold.”122 Were no settlements or
judgments entered against the North Carolina State Highway Patrol or Minne-
sota State Patrol, the agencies would not have to direct any of their budget
toward litigation.
Two of the ten agencies that report tangible financial consequences of liti-
gation payments—the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and the Illinois State
Police—receive a budget for litigation costs but must take money from other
parts of their budget to make up any shortfalls.123 Both departments regularly
settlements and judgments, however [state law] . . . allows State agencies . . . to expend funds
appropriated elsewhere . . . for the purposes of paying settlements and judgments.”); Telephone
Interview with Teresa Quon, FOIA Officer, Metro. Police Dep’t., D.C. (May 19, 2015)
(explaining that the Metropolitan Police Department is required to pay settlements below $10,000
from its budget in cases that have been pending less than two years and that money is not set aside
in the budgeting process; instead, the funds are taken from the Department’s operating budget);
Telephone Interview with Nancy Silkey, Major, Headquarters, Minn. State Patrol (Sept. 10, 2014)
(reporting that the Minnesota Highway Patrol has a fixed budget from which it must satisfy
settlements and judgments and must cut back in other areas, including hiring, when faced with
high litigation costs.); Email from Matt Sokol, Major, Minn. State Patrol, to author (May 18,
2015, 8:18 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that the money used to satisfy settlements and
judgments is not allocated during the budgeting process with the state but instead, “taken from
within our budget”).
120. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Bill Bowerman, Associate Director of the Senate Fiscal Agency
Gen. Gov’t Unit, Senate Fiscal Agency, State of Mich. (June 18, 2015) (explaining that litigation
payments require the State Police to take money from other parts of its budget, although Mr.
Bowerman did not know specific choices the Police had made).
121. Email from Joseph P. Dugdale, Deputy Gen. Counsel for Law Enf’t, N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to
author (May 18, 2015, 10:45 PST) (on file with author). Note, however, that Mr. Dugdale did not
have any examples of equipment, personnel, or other expenditures the agency had to go without as
a result of litigation costs. Id. He explained that “it really doesn’t work that way, we are constantly
making adjustments based on budget cuts, fluctuations in the cost of gas, etc.” See Email from
Joseph P. Dugdale, Deputy Gen. Counsel for Law Enf’t, N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to author
(May 18, 2015, 11:22 PST) (on file with author).
122. Email from Matt Sokol, Minn. State Patrol, to author (May 18, 2015, 8:33 PST) (on file with
author).
123. See Email from Steve Lyddon, Lieutenant, FOIA Officer, Ill. State Police, to author (Oct. 10,
2014, 13:40 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that, during the budgeting process, the Illinois
1182 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
get less in their litigation budgets than they spend on lawsuits. During the
study period, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department received a budget alloca-
tion of, on average, almost $3.5 million less than it spent each year on lawsuits
and the Department had to use funds from other parts of its budget to pay the
excess litigation costs.124 In fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the Illinois State Police
received $50,000 for settlements and judgments but paid, on average, $3 million
each year in cases involving their officers.125 The Illinois State Police reports hav-
ing used money earmarked for updating cars, computers, and computer systems
to cover the difference between the amount allocated in its budget and the
amount spent on lawsuits.126
These departments can, in theory, request additional funds from the
government, yet only one of the ten—the Illinois State Police—has done so
recently.127 The Illinois State Police recently approached the state assembly’s
State Police receives $50,000 each year for settlements and judgments but that in fiscal years 2012
and 2013, the agency paid almost $2.5 million and $3.5 million, respectively, in cases involving
their officers); Email from Glen Dragovich, Ass’t Div. Dir., L.A. Cty. Sheriff, to author (Sept. 29,
2014, 11:27 PST) (on file with author) (attaching a report of budget and actual costs for judgments
and damages in cases involving the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department for fiscal years 2012, 2013,
and 2014, reflecting that the actual budget for judgments and damages went above the budget
allocation by $755,359 in fiscal year 2012, $6,213,014 in fiscal year 2013, and $3,521,865 in fiscal
year 2014—an average of $3,496,746 per year); Telephone Interview with Glen Dragovich, Ass’t
Div. Dir., L.A. Cty. Sheriff (Sept. 19, 2014) (reporting that additional money was taken from
other parts of the sheriff’s department’s budget).
124. See Email from Glen Dragovich, Ass’t. Div. Dir., L.A. Cty. Sheriff, to author (Sept. 29, 2014,
17:16 PST) (on file with author) (attaching a report reflecting the amount budgeted for lawsuits by
the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department and the amount paid during the same years).
125. See Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Steve Lyddon, FOIA Officer, Ill. State Police (Oct. 10,
2014).
126. See id.
127. See Telephone Interview with Glen Dragovich, Asst. Div. Dir., L.A. Cty. Sheriff (Sept. 19, 2014)
(reporting that the Sheriff’s Department has not sought additional money from the Board of
Supervisors); Telephone Interview with Bob Hovorka, Budget Supervisor, Fiscal Mgmt. Section,
Cal. Highway Patrol (May 19, 2015) (reporting that the California Highway Patrol has not sought
additional money from the state for lawsuits); Email from Suzanne Moser, Attorney, Cal.
Highway Patrol, to author (May 19, 2015, 14:17 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that
“extraordinarily large pay-outs (e.g., a single settlement or judgment in excess of $10 million) would
be submitted to the Legislature via the Department of Finance. Those pay-outs would be funded
directly from the Motor Vehicle Account, rather than from CHP’s budget”); Email from Virginia
H. Murray, Gen. Counsel, Kansas City, Mo. Police Dep’t, to author (May 17, 2015, 10:50 PST)
(on file with author) (reporting that the Kansas City Police Department has, to her knowledge,
never returned to the City for additional funding related to lawsuits); Email from Matt Sokol,
Major, Minn. State Patrol, to author (May 18, 2015, 8:18 PST) (on file with author) (reporting
that the State Patrol has not ever, or at least not in recent memory, gone back to the State for
additional funds if it spent more than expected on lawsuits). Note that the Kansas City Police
Department does receive up to $1 million in reimbursements per year from the state for lawsuits,
appropriations committee for additional funds to satisfy a $40 million settle-

ment in a wrongful conviction case.128 As part of this process, the Department
was required to explain why the settlement was appropriate and how the agency
had changed such that a similar event would not recur.129 Each of these ten
agencies, even the Illinois State Police, appear to view such requests for addition-
al appropriations as a last-ditch alternative to be avoided if at all possible.130 In
fact, the budgeting arrangement in Washington, D.C.—which requires all city
agencies to pay settlements and judgments of less than $10,000 from their
budgets—was specifically constructed to prevent agencies from seeking addi-
tional funds from the central government. As the law’s fiscal impact statement
describes:
The current practice of paying all settlements and judgements [sic] out
of a central fund provides little if any incentive for agencies to engage
in risk management. This amendment does not increase the number
of settlements and judgements [sic], but will encourage agencies to
improve risk management. To increase agency budgets to pay this
cost would be to remove any incentive on the agency to attempt to
control cost.131
Although similarly clear statements of government purpose are not available
from other jurisdictions, similar goals are presumably shared by jurisdictions that
require law enforcement agencies to pay settlements and judgments from their
budgets without paying overages from general funds.
Although nineteen departments in my study pay settlements and judgments
from their budgets, these payments do not appear to have any financial impact on
at least seven of these departments.132 But—as is evidenced by the practices in
but must pay any costs above $1 million each year from its own budget. See Email from Virginia
H. Murray, Gen. Counsel Kansas City, Mo. Police Dep’t, to author (Sept. 13, 2014, 13:09 PST);
see also Telephone Interview with Bill Bowerman, Associate Dir. of the Senate Fiscal Agency Gen.
Gov’t Unit, Senate Fiscal Agency, State of Mich. (June 18, 2015) (reporting that the Michigan
State Police has sought additional appropriations, but Mr. Bowerman did not remember when or
the underlying circumstances).
128. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Steve Lyddon FOIA Officer, Ill. State Police (Sept. 11,
2014) (describing the request for additional appropriations for a $40 million settlement in a
wrongful conviction case and a second time in recent memory that the department has had to seek
additional appropriations after a fatal car accident).
129. See id.
130. See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text.
131. See Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Support Act of 2000, D.C. Law 13–172, § 4303, 47 D.C. Reg. 6308,
6393 (2000).
132. Peter Schuck recognized this possibility when he contemplated requiring agencies to absorb
liability costs. As he wrote: “A decision to charge a public program’s budget with the costs of
1184 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Los Angeles County, Washington, D.C., Kansas City, and the state patrols in
California, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas—
lawsuits can have tangible financial consequences for law enforcement agencies
that pay settlements and judgments from their budgets, do not receive additional
money from the government when they go over budget, and can use litigation
savings for other department needs.
C. When the Agency Contributes to a Central Fund
Twenty-nine agencies in my study (twenty-three large and six smaller) are

required to contribute each year to a central fund maintained by the jurisdiction
to pay at least some types of settlements and judgments.133 As with the other self-
insured agencies in my study, nonfinancial pressures may be imposed on these
agencies by local government officials at several moments, including during the
budgeting process and when government officials must approve settlements. But
any financial incentive to improve performance inspired by this budgetary ar-
rangement presumably lies in departments’ interests in reducing the amount
that they must pay into the central risk fund each year. For a few agencies, con-
tributions to the central risk management fund are calculated in part based on
their number of employees—a metric that has little to do with the agencies’ per-
formance.134 But most agencies’ contributions to central risk management funds
defending claims and satisfying adverse judgments arising out of employees’ misconduct is probably
easier to evade and more difficult to enforce. Unless the liability-related charge were large enough
to be budgetarily visible and politically salient, influential legislators or administrators sympathetic
to the program’s mission or to the plight of its needy and innocent beneficiaries might well restore
that amount to its budget without calling public attention to the sanction-blunting effect of the
restoration.” SCHUCK, supra note 23, at 107.
133. Twenty-three agencies are in jurisdictions that use this arrangement for all types of cases. Another
six—the California Highway Patrol, Pennsylvania State Police, North Carolina State Highway
Patrol, Michigan State Police, Ohio State Highway Patrol, and Louisville Metropolitan Police
Department—use this arrangement for some types of cases.
134. See, e.g., Email from Jennifer Richie, City Attorney, City of Waco (Sept. 8, 2014, 6:08 PST) (on
file with author) (reporting that each department contributes to the city’s internal service fund for
risk “based upon their head count of employees in the department”); Telephone Interview with
Bryan Berea, Manager, Admin. & Fin. Mgmt., CEO/Off. of Risk Mgmt., Cty. of Orange (May
18, 2015) (explaining that the annual premium paid by county departments is determined by their
ten-year loss history (70 percent) and the number of employees in their department as compared to
the rest of the county (30 percent)); Telephone Interview with Gwendolyn Brown-Patterson,
Interim Chief Fin. Officer, DeKalb Cty. (Oct. 13, 2014) (explaining that DeKalb County is self-
insured, has a risk management fund that is used to pay for settlements, and each department
contributes to that fund based on the number of employees in the department—or the number of
vehicles for auto claims—and can be raised based on claims history).
are calculated based on their past claims exposure such that lower litigation costs
will translate into lower premiums in subsequent years, and higher litigation
costs will lead to higher premiums.135
Of the twenty-nine jurisdictions that require their law enforcement agencies
to contribute to jurisdiction-wide risk management funds, officials in fifteen ju-
risdictions were willing to comment about the impact of these payments on law
enforcement agency budgets. In five of those fifteen jurisdictions, the financial
costs and benefits of shifting premiums are not passed along to the law enforce-
ment agency responsible for paying the premium. In Raleigh, North Carolina,
each agency is required to have a flat budget, but during the budgeting process
the police department is given what it needs to pay, “dollar for dollar,” to satisfy
the actuarial-based charges for the risk management fund.136 In Tucson, no city
department funded through the general fund, including the police department,
has had to pay more to the central risk management fund because of increases in
liability payments: “During the budget process . . . any increase in premium is ac-
commodated by an increase in the budget for that department.”137 There is a
similar practice in Austin; as a senior budget analyst explained, “[t]he depart-
ments are not tasked with finding the funding for what we consider ‘corporate’ or
135. See, e.g., Email from Alexandra Bresani, Office of Pub. Info., Howard Cty. Gov’t, to author (Oct.
10, 2013, 9:45 PST) (on file with author) (“In determining the amount an agency will contribute,
the County takes into account losses that have been paid on claims or suits that arise from that
agency’s functions.”); Email from Joyce Garland, CPA, Office of Budget & Internal Audit,
Program Dir., City of Tucson, to author (Sept. 22, 2014, 13:38 PST) (on file with author)
(explaining that “[t]he Tucson Police Department does contribute to a cental [sic] fund
(Risk Management Internal Service Fund) that pays settlements and judgement [sic]” and that the
charges to each department “are dependent on the department claim costs and the expenses . . .
[a]n actuary is used to set rates charged to departments”); Email from Meghan Riley, Div. Chief,
Litig., City of Austin Law Dep’t, to author (Oct. 9, 2013, 12:08 PST) (on file with author)
(reporting that settlements and judgments in police cases are “paid out of a liability reserve fund
that is part of the City’s annually approved budget” established through individual department
contributions, and that future contributions may be determined based on the department’s prior
litigation costs); Email from Laurie Shade, Office of the Orange Cty. Counsel, to author (Oct. 7,
2013, 12:57 PST) (reporting that, in Orange County, all the departments pay into a litigation fund
and “a premium is charged based upon the history and volume of cases that arise from that
department”); see also Appendix G (describing similar calculations for the police departments in
Albuquerque, Indianapolis, Louisville, Naperville, Phoenix, Tampa, Tucson, and for the Florida
Highway Patrol and San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department).
136. See Email from Dennis Paren, Risk Manager, City of Raleigh, to author (Oct. 21, 2014, 12:03
PST) (on file with author).
137. Email from Joyce Garland, Off. of Budget and Internal Audit, Program Dir., City of Tucson, to
author (May 18, 2015, 9:37 PST) (on file with author).
1186 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Citywide allocations.”138 In Seattle, “any increase in premiums is accommodated

[by] an increased budget for the department.”139 The same is true with regard to
the Florida Highway Patrol.140 In these jurisdictions, one hand (the city or coun-
ty) essentially passes the necessary dollars to another hand (the law enforcement
agency), which then passes it off to the third hand (the central fund).
Interviewees from four jurisdictions reported that they did not have formal
policies to offset increases in premiums like those in Raleigh and Tucson but ob-
served that every effort is taken in the budgeting process so that increases in pre-
miums do not impact core law enforcement budgeting needs. In San
Bernardino, increased premiums might reduce the amount that the Sheriff’s De-
partment can spend on clerical and other support services, but other money
would be found to pay for deputies.141 When faced with increases in litigation
costs against the County of Orange Sheriff’s Department, the county board of
commissioners is “sensitive” to public protection and so will try to find additional
funding to cover necessary costs.142 In the City of Fort Wayne, “the [police] de-
partment tries to find offsets for any increases, if possible . . . with safety of all
being a consideration.”143 And when the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department pays out more than it contributed to the Legal Settlement Fund,
the Department works with the Controller to “identify surplus funds at the end
of the year to cover the overage of settlements”; when the Department has no
138. Email from Jamie Atkinson, Senior Budget Analyst, City of Austin, Tex., to author (June 8, 2015,
14:28 PST) (on file with author); see also id. (reporting that the amount charged to the Austin
Police Department for the Liability Reserve Fund “is added to their budget during the annual
budget development process”); Telephone Interview with Katie Zamesnik, Fin. Servs. Office, Bus.
Process Consultant, City of Austin, Tex. (Oct. 22, 2014) (explaining that if the Austin Police
Department contributes $1 million to the fund and there are $1.3 million in payouts involving the
police department, the remaining $300,000 will come from general funds, not police department
funds).
139. See, e.g., Email from Susan Williams, Paralegal, Seattle City Attorney’s Office, to author (May 26,
2015, 14:15 PST) (on file with author).
140. See Telephone Interview with Shannon Segers, Bureau Chief of Risk Financing and Loss
Prevention, Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Div. of Risk Mgmt. (May 26, 2015) (reporting that, if the
Florida Highway Patrol had an increase in premiums, the legislature would increase the allocation
to the Florida Highway Patrol to cover the premium).
141. See Telephone Interview with Eric Broome, Supervising Liability Claim Representative, Cty. of
San Bernardino Risk Mgmt. Office (Sept. 19, 2014).
142. Telephone Interview with Bryan Berea, Manager, Admin. & Fin. Mgmt., CEO/Off. of Risk
Mgmt., Cty. of Orange, Cal. (May 18, 2015).
143. See, e.g., Email from Valerie Ahr, Civil City Accountant, City of Fort Wayne, to author (May 17,
available funds “due to other budget issues” the money appears to be paid from
non-Department funds.144
Representatives from six of the jurisdictions reported that increased premi-
ums do have financial consequences for their law enforcement agencies. Three of
them—California Highway Patrol, North Carolina Highway Patrol, and Ohio
State Highway Patrol—have hybrid arrangements; they pay into a central risk
management fund for auto claims, but pay settlements and judgments in other
suits from their budgets. These three are among the ten agencies required to
pay settlements and judgments from their budgets that report tangible financial
impacts on the agencies’ budgets.145 In addition, a risk management official in
Albuquerque (which, during the study period, had a significant number of
high-profile and expensive lawsuits concerning officer-involved shootings)
reported that a request for additional funding to pay a higher premium to the
jurisdiction-wide risk management fund based solely on an increase of claims
is more likely to be denied; the department will be asked to cut back in other
places during the annual budgeting process.146 For the Virginia State Police,
the amount paid in premiums “[o]bviously . . . competes with other budget items.
What the state police pays risk management for its insurance comes to risk man-
agement, it does not go into the [department’s] general fund.”147 And increases
in premiums paid by the Howard County Police Department “could require the
department to cut back on other costs—hiring, equipment, overtime, if it impacts
the bottom line.”148 Because law enforcement agencies generally receive the
money they contribute to their jurisdiction’s risk management fund at the same
time that they receive the rest of their budget, it is impossible to measure the ex-
tent to which risk fund premium increases actually reduce allocations for other
law enforcement agency needs.
144. See Email from Jason Dudich, City-County controller, City and Cty. of Indianapolis, to author
(Oct. 23, 2014, 12:05 PST).
146. Telephone Interview with Peter Annen, Albuquerque Risk Mgmt. (Oct. 10, 2014).
147. Email from Don LeMond, Dir. of Risk Mgmt., Dep’t of the Treasury, Commonwealth of Va., to
author (May 18, 2015, 6:56 PST) (on file with author).
148. Email from Alexandra Bresani, Office of Pub. Info., Howard Cty. Gov’t, to author (July 2, 2015,
1188 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
D. When Jurisdictions Rely on Public Entity Risk Pools or Outside Insurance
Twenty-one jurisdictions in my study rely on public entity risk pools or

outside insurance to satisfy at least some types of settlements and judgments.
The premiums paid by jurisdictions to risk pools or outside insurers are usually—
although not always—experience rated, such that reducing the costs of litigation
will also reduce the costs of those premiums. At least some risk pools also offer
dividends to jurisdictions when claims are lower than expected and reduced
premiums if they are members of Lexipol (a risk management provider) or the
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (a voluntary
accreditation organization).149
The financial carrots and sticks built into public entity risk pools and private
insurance premiums are not always passed along to jurisdictions’ law enforcement
agencies. Fourteen of the twenty-one insured jurisdictions in my study pay
insurance premiums from their general funds such that the premiums have no
financial impact on the law enforcement agencies’ budgets. Seven of the
twenty-one agencies are required to pay part or all of liability insurance pre-
miums from their budgets, but the financial impact of these payments appears
to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The Comptroller for the Manatee
County Sheriff’s Department reports that the amount it must pay is determined
in part by its claims history, is paid out of their operating budget, and absolutely
impacts the Department’s other budgetary needs.150 The Lincolnton Police De-
partment, in contrast, is not experience-rated; instead, it is assessed a contribution
to the insurance premium based on the size of its budget.151 Lincolnton’s Chief
of Police was unaware of this budgeting arrangement, suggesting that it has
minimal impact on other aspects of the Department’s budget.152
149. See Email from Brandy McKelvey, Paralegal, Office of the Cty. Attorney, St. Mary’s, Md., to
author (Sept. 26, 2014, 13:02 PST) (on file with author) (attaching documents reflecting insurance
premium credit for membership in the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies (CALEA)); Telephone Interview with Jerry Mason, Counsel for Idaho Ctys. Risk
Mgmt. Program (Nov. 5, 2013) (reporting that it will pay half of the costs of joining Lexipol for its
member law enforcement agencies).
150. See Telephone Interview with Tom Salisbury, Comptroller, Manatee Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t. (May
22, 2015).
151. See Email from Steven Zickefoose, Fin. Dir. City of Lincolnton, to author (Sept. 22, 2014, 7:55
PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the insurance premium “is paid on a prorated basis from
each department according to the size of their budget”).
152. See Email from Chief Rodney Jordan, Lincolnton Police Dep’t, to author (Sept. 20, 2014, 12:14
PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the question whether lawsuits impact the police
department’s budget “is something I have never had to deal with . . . .”).
Regardless of whether an insured law enforcement agency is required to

contribute to insurance premiums, the insurance relationship can impose signifi-
cant pressures on agencies to improve. Public entity risk pools engage in multiple
risk management efforts to reduce their members’ liability.153 For example, the
Michigan Municipal League (MML) has a loss control department that iden-
tifies trends in claims and notifies its members of those trends.154 MML also
convenes a group of twelve to fifteen police chiefs from around the state who
work with a law enforcement specialist and defense attorney to develop model
policies for its members.155 Similarly, the League of Minnesota Cities Insurance
Trust has semiannual trainings on law enforcement issues and voluntary online
trainings used by about half of its insured departments.156
Although members of the risk pools are reportedly eager, on the whole, to
comply with these voluntary risk management efforts, risk pools do, on occasion,
threaten to limit coverage or increase deductibles unless their law enforcement
agencies make personnel or policy changes that reduce liability risk. The MML,
which insures smaller government entities in Michigan, looks for trends in claims
against insured jurisdictions and may threaten to raise deductibles or limit cover-
age accordingly.157 The Idaho Counties Risk Management Program (ICRMP),
which insures almost all government entities in the state of Idaho, including two
jurisdictions in my study, recently required that each of the jail facilities it insures
comply with eight requirements, including a policy regarding strip searches and a
policy never to have fewer than two officers on duty at one time.158 Jurisdictions
153. For a detailed and illuminating discussion of these loss-prevention techniques, see Rappaport, supra
note 63; see also EPP, supra note 62, at 241 (“Insurance companies are known to press their
organizational clients to adopt policies aimed at reducing their exposure to legal liability.”). The
representatives of public entity risk pools with whom I spoke agreed that they used a variety of
techniques to reduce their members’ liability. See Telephone Interview with Ann Gergen, Exec.
Dir., AGRiP (June 16, 2015); see also infra notes 154–163. But see Email from Kevin Gillen,
Yellowstone City Attorney’s Office, to author (Nov. 14, 2013, 13:15 PST) (on file with author)
(explaining that their excess insurer does “not really” place “any requirement on the Sheriff[’s]
Office as a condition of funding settlements and judgments”).
154. Telephone Interview with Mike Forster, Dir., Risk Mgmt. Serv., Mich. Mun. League (MML)
(Oct. 7, 2014).
155. See id.
156. See Telephone Interview with Peter Tritz, Adm’r, League of Minn. Cities (June 5, 2015).
157. Telephone Interview with Mike Forster, Dir., Risk Mgmt. Servs., MML (Oct. 7, 2014)
(explaining that, for example, if a town has a history of First Amendment claims, MML may
require it to pay a $50,000 deductible the next time a journalist is prevented from coming to a city
council meeting; MML may require a town with several officer-involved shootings to pay a
$100,000 deductible the next time it is sued for an officer-involved shooting).
158. See Telephone Interview with Jerry Mason, Counsel for the Idaho Risk Mgmt. Program (ICRMP)
(Nov. 5, 2013).
1190 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
were informed that failure to comply would cause the insurer to reduce coverage
from $3 million to $1 million as a means of limiting liability exposure to other
jurisdictions in the insurance pool.159
Available anecdotal evidence suggests that law enforcement agencies at least
sometimes respond to this type of pressure by making the personnel and policy
changes demanded by their insurers. Cities have changed police policies and
fired problem officers and chiefs in response to insurers’ demands.160 And all but
eight of the forty-four counties in Idaho that contract with ICRMP made the
policy changes to their jails required by their insurer.161 Those eight counties that
did not make the required changes did not ignore the insurers’ demands. It ap-
pears, instead, that they were unable to comply because they were “[g]enerally the
smallest and most remote,”162 and “seemed caught by antiquated buildings or
short staffing at certain times.”163
When a small department has been sued numerous times and does not take
steps to reduce future liabilities, a risk pool or private insurer may raise premiums
so precipitously—or withdraw coverage altogether—such that the jurisdiction
has to find alternative liability insurance or close down the department. Manag-
ers of risk pools report that they only take these steps rarely.164 Nevertheless, I
found several reports of police department closings caused by insurers’ premium
increases or decisions to end coverage. In 2013, the Point Marion Police De-
partment lost its insurance after settling two lawsuits brought against its two
officers, and the Department closed as a result.165 The five-officer Sorrento
159. See Email from Jerry Mason, Counsel for ICRMP, to author (Dec. 17, 2015, 21:42 PST).
160. See Radley Balko, How the Insurance Industry Could Reform American Policing, WASH. POST (Mar.
1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2016/03/01/how-the-insurance-
industry-could-reform-american-policing [https://perma.cc/Q8LZ-DFAU] (describing several
examples of policy changes demanded by insurers including “changes to policing regarding the use
of SWAT teams” in several jurisdictions and a series of reforms in the city of Irwindale, California
enacted in response to insurers’ demands); John Rappaport, An Insurance-Based Typology of Police
Misconduct, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author) (collecting press
reports of several instances in which police officers and chiefs were fired at the insurers’ insistence).
161. See Email from Jerry Mason, Counsel for ICRMP, to author (Dec. 17, 2015, 9:42 PST); Email
from Jerry Mason, Counsel for ICRMP, to author (Dec. 18, 2015, 8:51 PST).
162. Email from Jerry Mason, Counsel for ICRMP, to author (Dec. 18, 2015, 8:51 PST).
163. Email from Jerry Mason, Counsel for ICRMP, to author (Dec. 17, 2015, 9:42 PST).
164. See Telephone Interview with Peter Tritz, Adm’r, League of Minn. Cities (June 5, 2015) (noting
also that private insurers may do so more often).
165. See Marcie Cipriani, Police Department Shuts Down After Settling Lawsuits Against 2 Officers,
PITTSBURGH ACTION NEWS 4 (Nov. 20, 2013, 7:43 PM EST), http://www.wtae.com/
news/local/washington/police-department-shuts-down-after-settling-lawsuits-against-2-
officers/23074066 [http://perma.cc/KJY4-UUX9].
Police Department, in Louisiana, also lost its liability insurance in 2013; the
insurer declined to continue providing insurance because of “an excessive
number of claims.”166 After a year of police firings and disputes between the
remaining chief and town council, voters voted overwhelmingly to disband
the Department.167
Slightly larger police departments have also been disbanded after losing
their insurance. The village council in Lincoln Heights, Ohio voted to disband
its sixteen-member police department after its insurance company raised its
premium to over 10 percent of the Department’s $800,000 budget and re-
quired the village to create a $100,000 retention fund per incident for future
lawsuits.168 The insurance company’s decision was based on a series of lawsuits
filed against the Department “stemming from wage disputes, employment har-
assment, wrongful terminations, allegations of wrongful arrest and violations of
civil rights within the [D]epartment[].”169 The sixty-member Maywood Police
Department lost its insurance and was disbanded in 2010.170 The insurer con-
cluded that the Department “posed too high a risk”: “An excessive number of
claims filed against the Police Department, and the city’s failure to hire a perma-
nent city manager, were among the highest risk factors.”171 As these examples
show, even law enforcement agencies that do not pay insurance premiums
from their budgets may feel significant pressures to improve and may be dis-
solved altogether if their liability exposure climbs too high.
Even when a risk pool decides it cannot continue providing insurance and
the city or town decides to disband its police department, it is generally not left
166. Kate Stevens, Official Action Ends Lengthy Saga in Sorrento, ADVOCATE, (May 19, 2015, 7:56
PST), http://theadvocate.com/news/12407481-123/its-official-sorrento-town-council [http://
perma.cc/HA3X-X3R2]. For the size of the Sorrento Police Department, see BJS LAW
ENFORCEMENT CENSUS DATA, supra note 47.
167. See Cameron McWhirter, Louisiana Town Votes to Close Troubled Police Department, WALL
STREET J.: WASH. WIRE (Nov. 5, 2014, 12:49 PST), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2014/11/05/louisiana-town-votes-to-close-troubled-police-department [http://perma.cc/Z8K4-
5ESP].
168. Cliff Radel, Lincoln Heights Disbands Police Department, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct. 17, 2014,
5:05 PST), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/17/lincoln-heights-disbands-
police-department/17450723 [http://perma.cc/6AFV-TY7P].
169. Matt Agorist, Ohio Police Department Has Become So Corrupt They Were Forced to Shut Down, FREE
THOUGHT PROJECT (Oct. 4, 2014), http://thefreethoughtproject.com/ohio-police-department-
corrupt-forced-shut [http://perma.cc/93NV-Y6GW].
170. See Ruben Vives, Maywood to Disband Police Department, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/17/local/la-me-maywood-pd-20100617 [http://perma.cc/
944Z-3MFH].
171. Id.
1192 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
without law enforcement protection; instead, the city or town contracts with a
neighboring department, regional department, or county sheriff to fill the void.
After dissolving its police force, Point Marion contracted with the Southwest
Regional Police, a department that provides services to several communities in
nine counties.172 The town of Sorrento now relies on the parish sheriff’s of-
fice.173 The village of Lincoln Heights contracted with the county sheriff’s
department for services after it disbanded its police department.174 And the
Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department now patrols the city of Maywood.175 It may
be more difficult for jurisdictions in remote locations to find alternative law en-
forcement services, and there may be some jurisdictions that lose insurance,
disband their law enforcement agency, and are unable to find an affordable or
suitable replacement. More study would be necessary to explore this possibility.
I have not, however, seen such reports.
E. Conclusion
Some commentators have assumed that law enforcement agencies will have
financial incentives to reduce lawsuits and associated misconduct if money to pay
settlements and judgments is taken from the agencies’ budgets. My study reveals,
however, that having agencies pay money out of their budgets toward settlements
and judgments does not necessarily impose a financial burden on those agencies.
Some law enforcement agencies pay millions of dollars from their budgets for
settlements and judgments yet feel no financial consequences of these pay-
ments because they receive money during the budgeting process for litigation
payouts, overages are paid from central funds, and litigation savings are not
enjoyed by the agencies.
As a result, self-insured jurisdictions are even less likely to feel financial
pressures associated with lawsuit payouts than their formal budgetary ar-
rangements suggest. Almost 42 percent of the jurisdictions with the largest
172. See Chris Buckley, Bentleyville OKs Police Force, TRIBLIVE (May 24, 2014), http://triblive.com/
neighborhoods/yourmonvalley/yourmonvalleymore/6167892-74/bentleyville-police-
regional#axzz3gpmD5qni [http://perma.cc/667Y-LLNA].
173. See McWhirter, supra note 167.
174. See Radel, supra note 168.
175. Ruben Vives, Maywood to Lay Off All City Employees, Dismantle Police Department, L.A. TIMES:
L.A. NOW (June 22, 2010, 10:13 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/06/sheriffs-
dept-to-patrol-maywood-while-city-employees-now-face-lay-offs.html [http://perma.cc/UL7E-
7AQY].
law enforcement agencies do not require those agencies to contribute finan-

cially to settlements and judgments against them; the realities of budgeting
practices mean that at least 60 percent of the largest law enforcement agencies
experience no financial consequences of lawsuit payouts. Fifty-eight percent of
cities with the largest law enforcement agencies do not require those agencies to
contribute to settlements and judgments, but cities’ budgeting practices insulate
at least 80 percent of city law enforcement agencies from any financial effects of
payouts. Forty-four percent of the largest combined city-county agencies pay
nothing from their budgets towards settlements and judgments, but at least two-
thirds of city-county agencies feel no financial impact of lawsuit payouts.176
Moreover, the largest of the large jurisdictions appear the least likely to impose
financial pressures on their law enforcement agencies: At least 60 percent of
the largest law enforcement agencies feel no financial pressures associated with
payouts, but these agencies employ over two-thirds of the officers in the largest
jurisdictions in my study.
176. I have included Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department in the “unknown” category, given its
answer to my question about the budgetary impact of settlements and judgments on their budgets,
described supra note 144 and accompanying text. I have also put the San Bernardino County
Sheriff’s Department and the Orange County Sheriff’s Department in the “unknown” category in
Figure 2, infra, given their answers about the budgetary impact of settlements and judgments on
their budgets, described supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text.
1194 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
FIGURE 1: FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MONEY IS TAKEN FROM

BUDGETS OF SIXTY-TWO LARGEST AGENCIES
FIGURE 2: FINANCIAL EFFECT OF LAWSUIT PAYOUTS ON LARGEST SIXTY-

TWO AGENCIES
The particularities of budgeting arrangements can also insulate smaller law

enforcement agencies from the financial impact of suits. Of the seventeen
smaller agencies in self-insured jurisdictions, at least thirteen (76.5 percent)
feel no financial pressures associated with lawsuit payouts. Yet in smaller juris-
dictions that rely primarily on outside insurance, insured law enforcement agen-
cies that do not pay anything toward premiums may nevertheless experience
significant pressures—and may indeed have their very existence threatened—by

outside insurers when lawsuit costs climb too high.
VI. THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL PRESSURES ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

BEHAVIOR
I have thus far shown that liability costs in cases against law enforcement are
not exclusively taken from governments’ general funds—instead there is a wide
range of budgetary arrangements in jurisdictions across the country, some of
which require law enforcement agencies to contribute financially to the satisfac-
tion of settlements and judgments. I have also shown that these budgetary ar-
rangements are not determinative: Some law enforcement agencies that pay
settlements and judgments from their budgets feel no financial effects of these
payments, and the viability of smaller insured agencies that pay nothing towards
insurance premiums can nevertheless be threatened by a spike in claims. Further,
I have shown that a subset of the law enforcement agencies in my study do appear
to be financially impacted by lawsuit payouts in several different ways—by having
to pay settlements and judgments from their budgets, by having to contribute to a
central fund that pays settlements and judgments, by having to contribute to in-
surance premiums, and by having an insurer raise premiums or decline coverage
as a result of costly claims.
Commentators have a range of views about what effect financial pressures
might have on law enforcement agencies’ practices. The most optimistic view
is that litigation costs would prompt law enforcement agencies to gather and
analyze information about these suits, determine areas of risk and liability, and
take steps through improved hiring, training, and supervision to reduce the risk
of future claims against line officers and leadership.177 Police officials faced with
increased litigation costs might alternatively save money by reducing the num-
ber of trainings—even though trainings might prevent future suits. Police of-
ficials might respond to increased litigation costs by reducing services for those
with less political power, just as the City of Chicago apparently reduced lead
paint screening to pay settlements and judgments in cases against the po-
lice.178 Or police officials might direct their officers to engage in different
177. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

178. For a description of this possibility, see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in
Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 967–68 (2005).
1196 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
types of behaviors that do not result in legally cognizable harms.179 In this

Part, I consider the limited evidence I have been able to gather responsive to
this critical question—whether and how financial pressures, when they exist,
influence law enforcement agencies’ behavior.
Available evidence suggests that at least some small cities and towns com-
ply with specific personnel and policy changes demanded by their insurers.180 In
these jurisdictions, insurers’ pressures have led to tangible, measurable results. It
is more difficult to measure the effect of financial pressures on law enforcement
officials’ decisionmaking in self-insured jurisdictions, and in insured jurisdictions
where the insurer has not demanded specific personnel and policy changes.
Measuring the effects of financial pressures on law enforcement agencies in these
types of jurisdictions is the focus of the remainder of this discussion.
In an ideal world, one trying to measure the effect of financial liability on
law enforcement officials’ decisionmaking would compare the practices in juris-
dictions that have adopted each of the budgetary arrangements I have found.
Fewer civilian complaints, uses of force, and lawsuits in jurisdictions that place
liability-based financial pressures on law enforcement agencies would suggest at
least a correlation between those financial pressures and improved police
practices. Evidence of higher crime rates or fewer law enforcement services in
jurisdictions that place liability-based financial pressures on law enforcement
agencies would be consistent with theories that agencies respond to litigation
costs in less constructive ways.
Unfortunately, such measurements would be exceedingly challenging to
undertake for at least four reasons. First, it would be difficult to find law en-
forcement agencies comparable in all respects except for the extent of their
financial responsibility for lawsuit payments. Differences in each jurisdic-
tion’s law enforcement responsibilities, population, demographics, crime rate,
amount spent per officer on salary and training, and other factors would make it
difficult to isolate the effects of budgetary arrangements on agency behavior.
Second, even if researchers could identify comparable agencies, they may not
have data to compare. Limited data are collected by law enforcement agen-
cies; for decades, commentators have noted with concern the lack of data col-
lected about officer uses of force, civilian complaints, and other evidence of
179. For a discussion of this possibility, see Margo Schlanger, Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 517 (2006).
misconduct.181 Without such data, it is impossible to compare the practices of

different jurisdictions. Third, even when such data exist, the type of data collect-
ed and manner of collection may differ across jurisdictions. A law enforcement
agency might have comparatively more civilian complaints filed against it not be-
cause its officers engage in more misconduct, but because the agency makes it
easier for civilians to file complaints. A law enforcement agency’s officers might
file comparatively more use of force reports not because its officers engage in
more force, but because it has a broader definition of reportable force and its of-
ficers are more meticulous about filling out such reports.
Finally, it is difficult to measure and compare how much financial pressure
lawsuit payments impose on different departments. The California Highway
Patrol spends, on average, 0.09 percent of its annual budget on lawsuit payouts;
The Minnesota State Patrol spends, on average, 0.61 percent of its annual budget
on lawsuit payouts; the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department spends, on av-
erage, 1.44 percent of its annual budget on lawsuit payouts; and the Albuquerque
Police Department pays, on average, 6.66 percent of its annual budget to the cen-
tral risk fund. Based solely on these numbers, one would conclude that lawsuits
exert the greatest financial pressure on the Albuquerque Police Department and
the least on the California Highway Patrol. Yet the actual financial impact of
these payments likely depends on the generosity of other aspects of the law en-
forcement agencies’ budgets. Well-funded departments that receive generous
budgetary allotments will presumably feel less financial pressure to reduce liability
than poorly-funded departments. Both types of agencies must pay settlements
and judgments from funds otherwise earmarked for staffing, equipment, and
training, but the well-funded department will feel less of a sting associated with
that diversion of resources.182
Another way to assess the effects of financial pressures on agency deci-
sionmaking would be to examine the same data in one jurisdiction before and af-
ter its law enforcement agency became financially responsible for litigation costs.
Such an analysis would be challenging for some of the same reasons that it would
be difficult to compare departments with different budgetary arrangements. A
department that has recently begun paying settlements and judgments from its
181. See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 28–32 (2009) (describing the lack of standardized data collected about police behavior).
182. See EPP, supra note 62, at 242 (observing that “the more adequate the department’s budget to its
needs, the more likely it will be capable of adopting costly policies with minimal disruption; well-
funded departments are likely to feel less threatened by intrusive policies than departments that are
constantly trying to stretch their resources”).
1198 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
budget might not collect relevant data or may have changed the types of data it
collects in recent years, making it difficult to identify whether and how budgeting
changes have influenced department practices. Moreover, most departments in
this study that bear some financial responsibility for lawsuits have done so for
decades, making it difficult to capture information about practices before and af-
ter the budgetary shift.183 One exception is Washington, D.C., which began re-
quiring the Metropolitan Police Department to pay small settlements from its
budget in 2000. It would be difficult to isolate the effects of this budgetary ar-
rangement, however, because the Department was under investigation by the
Department of Justice at the same time and entered into a consent decree one
year later.184
To add a final layer of complication, jurisdictions that require law enforce-
ment agencies to contribute financially to settlements and judgments may oversee
those agencies through multiple mechanisms, making it difficult to pinpoint the
precise effects of financial pressures. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Depart-
ment, for example, pays settlements and judgments from its budget and regularly
must take money from other parts of its budget to satisfy these claims. Yet the
Department must additionally get approval from the county board of supervisors
before settling claims above $100,000;185 closed-door discussions regarding these
settlements can be contentious.186 The Department must also submit a Correc-
tive Action Plan for any settlement over $20,000 in which it details the policy and
personnel lessons learned from the incident and efforts taken to prevent future
similar events.187 Finally, independent government agencies—including Special
Counsel to the County Board of Commissioners, the Office of Independent
183. Memphis and Boston have recently changed their practices so that settlements and judgments
come from the police department’s budgets and so would be worth studying more closely. Yet each
of these departments report getting additional funds when liability costs go over budget; analysis of
these departments would, therefore, illustrate the effect of this budgeting arrangement when it
carries no actual financial consequences. See Appendix G for details of budgeting arrangements in
these jurisdictions.
184. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS OF LOCAL POLICE:
LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2013), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/
civil%20rights%20investigations%20of%20local%20police%20-%20lessons%20learned%
202013.pdf [http://perma.cc/5DDG-WCUG].
185. Claims Board, CTY. L.A., http://www.lacounty.gov/government/public-information-records/
claimsboard [https://perma.cc/7347-Y24A] (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
186. See Telephone Interview with Glen Dragovich, Assistant Div. Dir., L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t
(Sept. 19, 2014).
187. Minneapolis Police Must Answer for Costly Settlements, STAR TRIBUNE (June 7, 2013, 7:09 PST),
http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-police-must-answer-for-costly-settlements/210490371
[http://perma.cc/9FLP-XE6B] (describing Los Angeles County’s Corrective Action Plans).
Review and, more recently, the Office of Inspector General—have reviewed and
reported on deficiencies in the Sheriff’s Department for decades.188 With all of
these different pressures on the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, it
would be difficult to measure how financial responsibility for suits influences its
behavior.
Given the difficulties of measuring the behavior of law enforcement agen-
cies required to bear financial responsibility for legal liabilities, a more promising
approach may be to consider how law enforcement officials view the effects of
these budgeting arrangements on their behavior. This approach has its own lim-
itations: Officials’ descriptions are obviously subjective and therefore not neces-
sarily reliable; officials willing to comment about the effect of budgeting
practices might present their agency’s practices in the best possible light; and
the perspectives of officials in many departments, unwilling to comment on the
record, are unavailable. Despite the challenges of getting this information, and
its potential inaccuracies, it is comparatively easier to collect. Indeed, it is all I
have thus far been able to gather regarding the impact of financial pressures on
agency behavior.
I spoke with officials from six of the thirteen self-insured jurisdictions in my
study that report that lawsuit payouts have a financial impact on their law en-
forcement agencies’ budgets, and asked them whether and how those financial
pressures influence agency practices. Five of these officials are in jurisdictions
that require law enforcement agencies to pay settlements and judgments from
their budgets. Two of the five report that this budgetary arrangement causes
them to take steps to reduce future liabilities. As one official from the Los
Angeles Sheriff’s Department explained, this budgetary arrangement does not
influence line officers’ decisionmaking but does encourage management not to
“mess up.”189 The Budget Supervisor for California Highway Patrol’s (CHP)
Fiscal Management Section observed that CHP’s financial responsibility for
lawsuits inspires it to learn from its actions: the CHP has a risk management
office; its training academy continually reviews the relevance of its trainings;
188. See L.A. CTY., REPORT OF THE CITIZENS’ COMMISSION ON JAIL VIOLENCE 14–16 (2012)
(describing the decades-long oversight by the Special Counsel and the Office of Independent
Review); L.A. CTY., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S FIRST STATUS REPORT: THE LOS
ANGELES SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CITIZENS’ COMMISSION
ON JAIL VIOLENCE RECOMMENDATIONS AND MONITORING PLAN 2 (2014) (describing the
creation of the Office of Inspector General in 2014 and the plan for the agency to oversee the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department).
189. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Glen Dragovich, Assistant Div. Dir., L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t
(Sept. 19, 2014).
1200 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
and legal affairs reviews legal claims for lessons. As he said: “We are always
getting feedback on what happens on the street and we know that we are go-
ing to feel it in our budget if we don’t.”190
Three other officials with whom I communicated on this topic report that
paying settlements and judgments from their agencies’ budgets does not influ-
ence their risk management efforts because they are already highly motivated to
train and supervise their officers and reduce risk whenever possible. An official at
the Minnesota State Patrol explained that paying settlements and judgments
from the Patrol’s budget does not affect its practices both because its officers are
rarely sued and because it would want to train and supervise its officers well re-
gardless of whether it bore financial responsibility for liabilities.191 The Chief of
Staff for the Illinois State Police holds a similar view. The Illinois State Police, he
writes, “does attempt to manage risk as much as possible through the agency” and
impresses on its officers that their split-second decisions may “be judged by the
public and the courts for years to come.”192 Yet, he writes, he does not “believe
that the fact that we do pay some settlements ou[t] of our own budget (rather
than having to get a supplementary/special appropriation) directly impacts our
patrol or policing strategies.”193 And the public affairs commander for the Ohio
State Highway Patrol reported that “[o]ur efforts in risk management, supervi-
sion, training, disciplinary policies and decisions are more about the service we
provide to the public and the professional image of our department” and that “any
budgetary gains as a result of these efforts is an added bonus.”194
I also spoke with the risk manager in Albuquerque—a self-insured jurisdic-
tion that requires its law enforcement agency to contribute to a central risk fund
and is reluctant to increase budgetary allocations to the police department when
they are necessitated by increased risk fund premiums. In his view, requiring the
police department to contribute to a central risk management fund is valuable be-
cause it informs the department of its liability costs and creates political pressures
to reduce losses.195 He noted, though, that other mechanisms could achieve this
same goal.196
190. Telephone Interview with Bob Hovorka, Budget Supervisor, Fiscal Mgmt. Section, Cal. Highway
Patrol (May 19, 2015).
191. See Telephone Interview with Major Matt Sokol, Minn. State Police (Nov. 30, 2015).
192. See Email from Steve Lyddon, Chief of Staff, Ill. State Police, to author (Dec. 2, 2015, 8:46 PST).
193. See id.
194. Email from Lieurenant Craig S. Cvetan, Ohio State Highway Patrol Pub. Affairs Commander, to
author (Dec. 7, 2015, 7:41 PST).
195. See Telephone Interview with Peter Annen, Risk Manager, City of Albuquerque (Oct. 10, 2014).
196. See id.
Although some commentators fear that imposing financial pressures on law

enforcement agencies will impair the agencies’ work, none of the six officials with
whom I communicated on this topic expressed this concern. It is no surprise that
officials denied responding to the costs of lawsuits by reducing services to the po-
litically powerless or encouraging their officers to engage in less cognizable
harms.197 Officials would be unlikely to admit making such callous decisions. It
is noteworthy, however, that none of the six officials with whom I spoke charac-
terized paying settlements and judgments from their budgets as harmful to their
agencies; instead, they characterized this arrangement as having positive or neu-
tral effects on their risk reduction efforts.
Although I found no evidence to support the direst predictions of the im-
pact of financial responsibility for lawsuits on law enforcement agencies, I also
found no evidence to support the most optimistic views on this point. Requiring
law enforcement agencies to bear financial responsibility for settlements and
judgments is clearly not the silver bullet some hope it will be.198 Several of the law
enforcement agencies whose budgets are directly impacted by lawsuit payouts
have been subjects of high-profile misconduct allegations in recent years.199
Some have been investigated by the Department of Justice for systemic miscon-
duct.200 Requiring law enforcement agencies to bear the costs of lawsuits does
197. See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text (describing these possible responses to liability
costs).
198. See supra note 37 (citing scholars’ recommendations that money be paid out of law enforcement
agencies’ budgets as a means of improving police behavior).
199. See, e.g., Rachel Aviv, Your Son Is Deceased, NEW YORKER (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/02/son-deceased [http://perma.cc/N3LM-PAQ5] (describing
abuses by the Albuquerque Police Department); Joel Rubin, Jail Abuse Trial of L.A. County Sheriff’s
Deputies Opens With Contrasting Stories, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2015, 22:16 PST),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-jail-abuse-trial—20150616-story.html
[http://perma.cc/E83P-4UXJ] (describing the criminal prosecution of Los Angeles Sheriff’s
deputies for abuses in the Los Angeles County Jail); After California Highway Patrol Beating,
Community Wants Answers, CBS NEWS (July 5, 2014, 11:32 PST), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/after-california-highway-patrol-beating-community-wants-answers [http://perma.cc/
43LV-AMFR] (describing a videotaped beating of a woman by a CHP officer).
200. See, e.g., Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Civ. Rts. Div., to the Hon.
Richard J. Berry, Mayor, City of Albuquerque (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/spl/documents/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9C7-4LTD] (outlining the
Department of Justice’s investigation of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) and the bases
for its finding that “APD engages in a pattern or practice of use of excessive force, including deadly
force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Section 14141”); Letter from Thomas E. Perez,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Civ. Rights Div., to Leroy D. Baca, Sheriff, L.A. Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t
(June 28, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/antelope_findings_6-28-13.pdf
[perma.cc/7R6M-8QMG] (investigating the Sheriff’s Department’s Antelope Valley stations and
finding that they have “engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory and otherwise unlawful
1202 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
not eliminate misconduct by those agencies. At best, this budgetary arrangement

serves as additional encouragement to law enforcement policymakers and super-
visory personnel to understand and address their liability risks.
My sample size is far too small to reach any definitive conclusions about the
impact of financial liability on law enforcement decisionmaking. I cannot prove
that law enforcement agencies change their behavior when they become finan-
cially responsible for settlements and judgments entered against them, nor can I
predict with any certainty the ways in which their behavior is likely to change.
Closer study would be necessary to make any claims on this point; prime subjects
of such study would be law enforcement agencies as they become financially re-
sponsible for liability costs. Given the challenges I have faced when trying to
gather information from law enforcement officials about their practices, this will
be no easy task.201 But given reports by some law enforcement officials that
bearing the costs of liability motivates them to improve—and no evidence to
suggest these arrangements have had the dire consequences imagined by some
commentators—it is at least worth investing in efforts to better understand
whether and how these budgeting arrangements might inspire investments in
risk management and encourage reform.
VII. IMPLICATIONS
Thus far, I have described the budgetary arrangements in one hundred law
enforcement agencies across the county, the extent to which these budgetary ar-
rangements impact the agencies’ budgets, and some reasons to believe that re-
quiring agencies to assume financial responsibility for settlements and judgments
may encourage risk management and caretaking. I now consider the implica-
tions of these findings for current understandings of lawsuits’ deterrent effects
on law enforcement and current understandings of the role of insurance in
performance improvement efforts. I also offer some suggestions about how
searches and seizures, including the use of unreasonable force, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VI”); see also Cindy Chang & Joel Rubin,
After Years of Scandal, L.A. Jails Get Federal Oversight, Sweeping Reforms, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015,
19:10 PST.) http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-federal-jail-oversight-20150804-
story.html [https://perma.cc/7KGF-MNXC] (describing years of investigation and oversight by
the Department of Justice, and the most recent settlement agreement between the Los Angeles
Sheriff’s Department and the Department of Justice to end the abuse of inmates and improve care
of mentally ill inmates at the Los Angeles County Jail).
201. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text; see also Schwartz, supra note 2, at 903–04.
government officials and others interested in police reform might use these
findings moving forward.
A. Refining Understandings of Lawsuits’ Deterrent Effects
My findings help to refine current understandings of the ways in which law-

suits influence law enforcement decisionmaking. Commentators have long de-
bated the effects of lawsuit payouts on government actors. Some believe that
lawsuits create financial pressures for governments to improve, and others believe
that governments respond to payouts only to the extent that those payouts have
political repercussions.202 This Article asks an empirical question critical to in-
formed participation in this debate: whether involved law enforcement agencies
are financially responsible for settlements and judgments entered against them
and their officers. The answer appears to depend on the size of the jurisdiction,
the role of insurance, and the particularities of the jurisdiction’s budgetary ar-
rangement with its agencies.
For the majority of law enforcement agencies in self-insured jurisdictions,
the costs of lawsuits appear to have no financial consequences. Settlements and
judgments in cases brought against twenty-six of the sixty-two largest agencies in
my study are paid from general government funds with no impact on the law en-
forcement agencies’ budgets. Law enforcement agencies in the remaining thirty-
six large jurisdictions contribute in some manner to the payment of settlements
and judgments—by either paying those settlements and judgments from their
budgets or contributing to jurisdiction-wide risk management funds. Yet the
particularities of budgeting arrangements in at least eleven of these jurisdictions
insulate the agencies from feeling any financial impact of payouts. There is a sim-
ilar pattern among the smaller self-insured jurisdictions in my study: Seventeen of
these smaller jurisdictions are self-insured, and law enforcement agencies in at
least thirteen of the seventeen jurisdictions experience no financial consequences
of lawsuits.
In total, at least 60 percent of the sixty-two largest self-insured law en-
forcement agencies in my study and over 75 percent of the seventeen smaller self-
insured law enforcement agencies in my study feel no financial consequences of
lawsuits. Although large judgments may have political ramifications for officials
in these agencies, these agencies suffer no financial consequences when suits cost

1204 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
more than expected and enjoy no financial benefits when they reduce litigation
costs.
Thirteen self-insured jurisdictions in my study report that their law en-
forcement agencies feel financial effects of settlements and judgments entered
against them. I have no way to assess the precise ways in which these thirteen
agencies weigh the costs of litigation against other political, bureaucratic, and
administrative interests. Some officials in these jurisdictions report that financial
pressures encourage risk reduction; others report that they would be engaged in
risk reduction efforts even if these financial pressures did not exist. Ideally, one
would be able to test these assertions against objective data about law enforce-
ment agencies’ practices. Such data is not currently available.
Law enforcement agencies reliant on outside liability insurance appear to
have a different set of calculations vis-à-vis lawsuit payouts. Some of these agen-
cies are required to shoulder the costs of higher insurance premiums when lawsuit
payouts increase and these increases can have tangible financial effects on agen-
cies’ budgets in some instances. Regardless of whether a law enforcement agency
is required to contribute to its jurisdiction’s liability insurance premiums, the
agency may feel pressure to improve if such improvements are required by the in-
surer as a condition of continued coverage. Indeed, anecdotal evidence supports
the view that jurisdictions make personnel and policy changes demanded by their
insurers when possible. Representatives from public entity risk pools report that
they make such demands rarely, and that law enforcement officials in insured ju-
risdictions are generally eager to adopt the insurers’ risk management sugges-
tions. But the possibility—however remote—of restricted or discontinued
insurance coverage likely imposes an additional pressure on insured agencies to
comply with insurers’ recommendations.
B. The Role of Insurance in Law Enforcement Reform
Scholars have traditionally assumed that self-insurance will strengthen the

deterrent effects of lawsuits and that insurance dampens that deterrent effect.203
203. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,

MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 114 (1993) (arguing that
medical malpractice liability insurance dampens the deterrent effect of malpractice suits); Omri
Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111
MICH. L. REV. 197, 199 (2012) (“[O]ne of the cornerstones of the economics of information,
regarded by many as axiomatic, is the moral hazard problem—the idea that a party who is insured
against risk has a suboptimal incentive to reduce it. Rivers of ink have been spilled discussing the
Yet many commentators have found that this is not necessarily true—outside in-
surers can engage in risk management efforts that help reduce the likelihood of
future harms and, in fact, may have more data and a broader perspective from
which to understand harmful activities.204 My study shows that public entity risk
pools engage in the types of risk management efforts that have been observed in
other contexts: Risk pools price insurance to reflect prior claims history and cur-
rent exposure, use insurance limits and deductibles to limit moral hazard, offer
loss prevention services, and engage in research and education to help their in-
sureds improve practices and reduce liability risk.205
Contrary to the assumption that insurance creates moral hazard, public en-
tity risk pools may take greater efforts than self-insured jurisdictions to reduce li-
ability risk. Although this study does not attempt to measure the risk-reducing
efforts taken by risk pools and self-insured governments in this study, available
evidence indicates that few law enforcement agencies engage in the type of data
analysis and risk management efforts reported by risk pools.206 It may be that
public entity risk pools are better situated than self-insured jurisdictions to engage
in risk management efforts.207 Risk pools can gather and analyze data from scores
moral hazard problem of insurance and ways to mitigate it.”); Cardi et al., supra note 15, at 570
(“The intervention of liability insurance likely buffers the incentive effects of tort liability.”).
204. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412 (2013) (describing the role of insurers in multiple
settings); Samuel Barrows, Racing to the Top . . . at Last: The Regulation of Safety in Shipping, in THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 189, 202–06 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009)
(describing insurers’ regulatory pressures in shipping); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 203, at
217–28 (describing the regulating efforts of products liability insurers, homeowners’ insurers,
workers’ compensation insurers, auto insurers, tax liability insurers, and environmental insurers);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2063 (2005)
(describing environmental insurance agreements that vary premium rates based on compliance
with environmental regulations and insurers that “create private obligations to comply with public
regulatory standards or set more stringent standards”).
205. Commentators have observed that insurers in other settings use these strategies to reduce moral
hazard. See, e.g., Baker & Swedloff, supra note 204, at 1419–23; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note
203, at 205–16. For examples of government risk pools using these strategies, see supra notes 153–
156 and accompanying text. These findings are consistent with other examinations of government
liability insurance. See Candace McCoy, How Civil Rights Lawsuits Improve American Policing, in
HOLDING POLICE ACCOUNTABLE (Candace McCoy ed., 2010); Rappaport, supra note 63. But
see EPP, supra note 62, at 24–25, 134 (finding, in his survey of 838 police departments, support for
“common claims . . . that liability insurance blunts the impact of liability pressure”).
206. For a discussion of risk management efforts undertaken by government risk pools, see supra notes
153–156 and accompanying text. For a description of law enforcement risk management efforts
undertaken in self-insured jurisdictions, see Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1096–97 (2015).
207. For the related observation that private insurance can sometimes outperform government
regulation, see Ben-Shahar and Logue, supra note 203, at 201–02.
1206 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
or hundreds of jurisdictions in their pools to assess areas of exposure, whereas

self-insured jurisdictions can look only at claims arising from their jurisdiction.
The largest self-insured jurisdictions, like New York City, Chicago, and Los An-
geles, have hundreds or thousands of claims to analyze each year—more than
may accrue in all of the pooled insured jurisdictions in a small state.208 But small-
er self-insured jurisdictions, like Oklahoma City and Tampa, may have only a
handful of cases to analyze each year, and so may have less claims information
than a risk pool from which to assess possible liability risks.209
Moreover, public entity risk pools can place financial pressures on law en-
forcement agencies that self-insured governments may be unwilling or unable to
replicate. Although insurance companies reportedly condition low deductibles
and continued coverage on personnel and policy changes, self-insured jurisdic-
tions may consider similar limitations impossible to make for at least two reasons.
First, in many jurisdictions it would be politically unpalatable for a mayor or city
or county council to threaten a law enforcement agency’s budget in this man-
ner.210 Insurance companies, in contrast, are not elected officials and can make
purely economic decisions about the sensibility of continued coverage. Second,
in many large jurisdictions, such a threat would be empty. When a small agency
loses insurance coverage it can be replaced by a neighboring department or
county sheriff’s office.211 Large agencies cannot so easily be replaced. New
York City could not disband its police department in favor of being patrolled by
the New York State Police. Large police departments like the New York City
Police Department are essentially too big to fail.212
Although a relatively small percentage of jurisdictions in my study rely
primarily on outside insurance, a much higher proportion of the nation’s law
208. For the number of settlements and judgments in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles, see
Schwartz, supra note 2, at Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix G.
209. For the number of settlements and judgments in Oklahoma City and Tampa, see id. at Appendix A.
210. Some interviewees anticipated that union leaders would contend that requiring a police department
to pay settlements and judgments from their budget would force the department to cut back on
necessities and jeopardize public safety. Given these concerns, it is especially challenging for a self-
insured city or county to threaten to disband a law enforcement agency. For one city that did so
successfully, see infra note 212.
212. How big is “too big to fail”? That is an open question. The Camden Police Department, which
had 397 sworn officers, was disbanded—as the result of a labor dispute, not lawsuit payouts—and
the county department that replaced it has been recognized nationally as markedly improving law
enforcement in the city. See Kate Zernike, Camden Turns Around With New Police Force, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/nyregion/camden-turns-around-
with-new-police-force.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/AUX2-TV6A].
enforcement agencies do so. And some larger jurisdictions categorized here as

self-insured have excess insurance to cover large claims.213 Further research
should explore the ways in which these insurers function and the pressures they
impose on law enforcement.214 Available evidence indicates, however, that
outside insurers have a uniquely powerful position from which they can de-
mand improvements in policing.
C. Suggestions
My findings prompt five recommendations. First, I recommend that juris-

dictions that impose no litigation-related financial pressures on their law en-
forcement agencies consider adopting some of the budgetary arrangements
described in this Article to create stronger ties between law enforcement agencies
and the costs of the lawsuits brought against them. A jurisdiction could follow
the examples of Los Angeles County and Kansas City and have its law en-
forcement agency pay settlements and judgments from its budget, face
budgetary restraints when litigation is costly, and enjoy extra funds when it
decreases litigation costs. In the alternative, a jurisdiction might consider paying
settlements and judgments from central funds but promise its law enforcement
agency additional money if it is able to reduce litigation costs below a certain
amount.215
Jurisdictions that do not want to impose such direct financial pressures on
their law enforcement agencies could experiment with some of the less impactful
budgetary arrangements used by departments in my study. A jurisdiction could
follow the example of San Francisco, Boston, or Chicago and require its law en-
forcement agency to pay settlements and judgments from its budget—even if
overages are taken from the jurisdiction’s general funds—so that the agency can
better understand the amount that police-related lawsuits are costing their city,
county, or state and suffer the political repercussions of returning to government
officials to ask for more money. A jurisdiction could follow the example of
Phoenix, Riverside, or Austin and require its law enforcement agency to pay an
experience-rated premium to a central risk fund, even if the premium does not
213. See supra note 61 (describing my criteria for categorization of self-insured jurisdictions).
214. For excellent work in this vein, see generally Rappaport, supra note 63.
215. Such an arrangement would avoid the possibility that law enforcement officials would pass
litigation costs along to politically powerless constituents while rewarding officials able to reduce
their liabilities. See supra notes 178–179 and accompanying text (describing this possibility).
1208 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
affect other aspects of the department’s budget, such that underlying causes for
increased premiums can be discussed during the annual budgeting process. And
if a law enforcement agency can reduce litigation costs, the jurisdiction should
consider paying the agency a dividend, just as public entity risk pools do with
their insureds.
I do not propose a best practice regarding budgeting; we still know too lit-
tle about the effects of these budgeting arrangements on agencies’ behavior.
Moreover, the most effective approach will likely depend on the jurisdiction.
Instead, I propose experimenting with these budgeting arrangements and then
assessing their effects on law enforcement agencies’ conduct. Despite the very lit-
tle that we know, and the vast amounts we need to learn, something (in the way
of litigation-related pressures) seems better than nothing.
At least 60 percent of the largest jurisdictions in my study impose no fi-
nancial consequences on their law enforcement agencies related to payouts,
and almost 42 percent of the largest jurisdictions in my study simply pay set-
tlements and judgments from central funds. These jurisdictions have some
of the largest law enforcement agencies in the country. Many of these law
enforcement agencies have been the subject of Department of Justice investi-
gations for systemic misconduct, including departments in Cleveland, De-
troit, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Newark.216 Officers in several of these
departments—including the New York City Police Department, the Balti-
more Police Department, and the Cleveland Police Department—have engaged
in recent misconduct that has drawn national and international press coverage
and protest. I do not claim that creating financial incentives to reduce lawsuits
and associated misconduct—or other nonfinancial pressures tied to those
payouts—will, on their own, reform policing in these jurisdictions. But they are
additional tools in the arsenal that local governments should consider. If more
jurisdictions impose financial and non-financial pressures on their law enforce-
ment agencies to reduce litigation costs, we could better assess the effect of these
tools on law enforcement behavior.
Second, my findings about local government budgeting practices lead me to
affirm a recommendation I have made previously—that governments more regu-
larly impose financial sanctions on individual officers who have been sued for
216. See Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters: Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#police [https://perma.cc/P46H-DZW6] (last
updated Mar. 18, 2016).
wrongdoing and are found to have violated department policies or the law.217 My
prior research showed that individual law enforcement officers virtually never
contribute to settlements and judgments in cases brought against them.218 This
arrangement might make sense if indemnification reliably created financial in-
centives for law enforcement agencies to identify claims trends and better train,
supervise, and discipline their officers.219 Yet this study shows that at least 60
percent of the largest law enforcement agencies across the country—and at least
80 percent of large city police departments—are as insulated from the financial
consequences of liability as the officers they employ. Even in jurisdictions that do
impose liability-based financial pressures on their law enforcement agencies,
available evidence indicates that these financial pressures will not singlehandedly
improve police behavior. Additional pressures are needed, and one of those
pressures—seldom used but presumably powerful—is to financially sanction
individual officers who have violated department policies or the law.
As jurisdictions experiment with budgetary arrangements that create finan-
cial pressures for law enforcement agencies to reform, they should also consider
financially sanctioning officers who violate law or policy. A few jurisdictions, in-
cluding New York City and Cleveland, require officers occasionally to contribute
to settlements.220 Police accountability groups in Minneapolis are trying to
amend the city charter to require each law enforcement officer to have personal
liability insurance. The city could purchase the insurance for each officer, but
officers would be responsible for increased premiums necessitated by lawsuits or
other risky behavior.221 Officers who are repeatedly sued or engage in other
misconduct could be denied continued coverage.222 These approaches have
promise and should be explored. Yet, despite my recommendation that juris-
dictions more regularly impose financial sanctions on individual officers, I
217. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 952–54.

218. See generally id.
219. See id. at 954–55 (describing this possibility).
220. See id. at 954 (describing practices in New York City and Cleveland).
221. For details of this proposal, see Join the Campaign for Police Accountability and a Safer Minneapolis,
COMMITTEE FOR PROF. POLICING, http://www.insurethepolice.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
The groups failed to get enough signatures to place the initiative on the 2014 ballot, but are
working to gather signatures for the 2016 election. See City of Minneapolis Police Brutality Personal
Insurance Charter Amendment (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/City_of
_Minneapolis_Police_Brutality_Personal_Insurance_Charter_Amendment_(2016) [https://
perma.cc/6EQQ-M6MU] (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
222. See Jay Syrmopoulos, Here’s How to Force Police Accountability in Your City, FREE THOUGHT
PROJECT (Sept. 18, 2014), http://thefreethoughtproject.com/force-police-accountability-city
[https://perma.cc/N32G-KPZY].
1210 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
continue to believe that it makes most sense for governments, not officers, to
bear most of the costs of liability. Having governments primarily responsible
for paying settlements and judgments on behalf of their officers ensures that
wronged plaintiffs are compensated for their injuries, protects officers from over-
deterrence, and spreads risk.223
My third and fourth recommendations concern public entity risk pools and
private insurers. This Article’s initial look at these insurers suggests that they are
a promising source of risk management pressure: They have access to claims in-
formation that can help identify areas of risk; they are unencumbered by political
pressures not to criticize or compromise law enforcement; and they are able to
impose significant financial burdens on law enforcement agencies. Yet this risk
management pressure is not distributed to all law enforcement agencies. Indeed,
the largest jurisdictions—which have the most liability exposure—rely the least
on liability insurance.
I therefore recommend that larger jurisdictions explore using risk pools and
private insurers to insure more of their liabilities. Larger jurisdictions could rely
more heavily on excess insurance, or could purchase individual liability insurance
for their officers (as citizen groups in Minneapolis have recommended). In addi-
tion, I recommend that those with thoughts about how to reduce the costs and
frequency of police misconduct direct their advocacy efforts to private insurers
and public entity risk pools. If advocates can convince public entity risk pools and
private insurers that certain trainings, policies, supervision, or management tech-
niques can decrease liability costs, those risk pools and insurers can demand that
insured jurisdictions adopt those reforms.
Finally, I recommend more transparency about the costs of law enforcement
liability and the manner in which jurisdictions across the country budget for and
pay those liabilities. There is surprisingly little publicly available information
about the costs of law enforcement liability, the manner in which governments
budget for and pay lawsuits involving law enforcement, and the financial impact
of these arrangements on law enforcement agency budgets. This Article reports
on budgeting practices in one hundred law enforcement agencies across the
country—information about over 99 percent of law enforcement agencies across
the county has yet to be unearthed. Greater transparency about government
budgeting practices is a key step toward increasing public understanding about
law enforcement practices and encouraging public dialogue about the choices
223. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 952–54.

governments make when budgeting for and spending taxpayer dollars on legal li-
abilities.
None of these recommendations will eliminate misconduct by law en-
forcement. Far more than financial incentives is necessary to transform policing
in the United States. Yet requiring agencies to bear financial responsibility for
settlements and judgments—and enjoy increased resources when lawsuit costs
decrease—is a promising approach consistent with other ongoing efforts to re-
duce misconduct and improve accountability in policing.
CONCLUSION
Commentators have debated the deterrent effects of damages actions on

law enforcement officials for decades. Yet absent from this debate has been any
effort to understand a foundational empirical question: who pays. My research
has revealed that individual officers and enforcement agencies are often insulated
from the financial consequences of liability. Yet my research additionally reveals
that a relatively small number of law enforcement agencies do bear the costs of
payouts and at least some officials report that these arrangements encourage
caretaking. Insured agencies may feel pressures associated with payouts even
more acutely, regardless of whether they directly contribute to insurance
premiums. Local governments around the country are straining under the
burdens of increased financial obligations, decreased resources, and deep
distrust of law enforcement. Now is an opportune time for local government
officials to experiment with budgeting arrangements that might encourage law
enforcement agencies to reduce litigation exposure and risk.
1212 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
APPENDIX A: HOW GOVERNMENTS PAY SETTLEMENTS AND JUDGMENTS
Following is a list of the one hundred law enforcement agencies in my study,

noting the manner in which the jurisdictions satisfy settlements and judgments in
suits against law enforcement. The agencies are organized from largest to smallest
as measured by full-time sworn personnel, according to Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS) Law Enforcement Census Data, supra note 47. Note that some jurisdic-
tions in the study are largely self-insured but have some form of excess insurance
for especially large claims. These jurisdictions are noted with an asterisk (*); the
specifics of their arrangements are detailed in Appendix G. Other jurisdictions
rely on two or more of the budgetary arrangements I have observed. These
hybrid jurisdictions are noted with a diamond (◊); the specifics of their ar-
rangements are also detailed in Appendix G.
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Insured: Insured: Insured:
Premiums Outside
Settlements Department Department
Number Paid From Insurer:
Law and Judg- Pays Contributes
of Jurisdiction’s Premiums
Enforcement ments Paid Settlements to a Fund
Sworn General Paid From
Agency by Jurisdic- and That Pays
Officers Budget Department’s
tion Without Judgments Settlements
Without Budget
Contribution From Its and
Contribution
by PD Budget Judgments
by PD
New York
City Police 36,023 
Dep’t (NY)
Chicago
Police Dep’t 13,354 
(IL)
Los Angeles
Police Dep’t 9727 
(CA)
Los Angeles
Cty. Sheriff’s 9461 
Dep’t (CA)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
California
Hwy. Patrol 7202  
(CA)◊
Philadelphia
(PA)
Cook Cty.
Sheriff’s 5655 
Office (IL)
Houston
(TX)
Pennsylvania
State Police 4458  
Dep’t (PA)◊
Metro. Police
3742  
Dep’t (DC)◊
Texas Dep’t
Public Safety 3529 
(TX)*
Dallas Police
3389 
Dep’t (TX)
Phoenix
(AZ)*
Miami-Dade
Cty. Police 3093 
Dep’t (FL)
1214 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
Baltimore
(MD)
Las Vegas
Metro. Police 2942 
Dep’t (NV)*
Harris Cty.
Office (TX)
Massachusetts
State Police 2310 
(MA)
Detroit Police
2250 
Dep’t (MI)
Boston Police
2181 
Dep’t (MA)
Riverside Cty.
Dep’t (CA)*
Illinois State
2105 
Police (IL)
San Antonio
(TX)
Milwaukee
(WI)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
San Diego
(CA)*
San Francisco
(CA)
Honolulu
(HI)*
Columbus
(OH)
Virginia State
1873 
Police (VA)
North
Carolina
1827  
State Hwy.
Patrol (NC)◊
San
Bernardino
1797 
Cty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t (CA)*
Orange Cty.
Dep’t (CA)*
Michigan
State Police 1732  
(MI)◊
1216 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
Atlanta Police
1719 
Dep’t (GA)
Charlotte-
Mecklenburg
1672 
Police Dep’t
(NC)
Port Authori-
1667 
ty (NY/NJ)*
Jacksonville
Office (FL)*
Broward Cty.
Office (FL)
Cleveland
(OH)
Florida Hwy.
1606 
Patrol (FL)
Indianapolis
Metro. Police 1582 
Dep’t (IN)*
Prince
George’s Cty.
1578 
Police Dep’t
(MD)
Ohio Hwy.
1560  
Patrol (OH)◊
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
Memphis
(TN)
Denver Police
1525 
Dep’t (CO)
Austin Police
1515 
Dep’t (TX)
Fort Worth
(TX)
New Orleans
(LA)
Kansas City
(MO)
San Jose
(CA)
Nashville-
Davidson
1315 
Cty. Police
Dep’t (TN)
Newark
(NJ)
Seattle Police
1283 
Dep’t (WA)
1218 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
Montgomery
Cty. Police 1206 
Dep’t (MD)
Louisville
Metro. Police 1197  
Dep’t (KY)◊*
El Paso Poli-
1132 
ce Dep’t (TX)
Cincinnati
(OH)
DeKalb Cty.
(GA)
Oklahoma
City Police 1046 
Dep’t (OK)
Tucson Police
1032 
Dep’t (AZ)
Albuquerque
(NM)
Tampa Police
980 
Dep’t (FL)*
Raleigh
(NC)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
Contra Costa
Office (CA)*
Polk Cty.
Sheriff’s 600 
Office (FL)
Cobb Cty.
(GA)
Minnesota
State Patrol 530 
(MN)
Manatee Cty.
Sheriff’s 476  
Office (FL)◊
Fort Wayne
(IN)
Howard Cty.
(MD)*
Summit Cty.
Sheriff’s 393 
Office (OH)
New
Hampshire
350 
State Police
(NH)
1220 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
Boise Police
306 
Dep’t (ID)*
New Bedford
Police Dep’t 288  
(MA)◊*
Springfield
(IL)
Overland
Park Police 258 
Dep’t (KS)*
Waco Police
246  
Dep’t (TX)◊*
Tulsa Cty.
Sheriff’s 237 
Office (OK)
Quincy Police
205 
Dep’t (MA)
Naperville
(IL)
Concord
(CA) *
Pueblo Cty.
Sheriff’s 155 
Office (CO)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
Decatur
(AL)
Schaumburg
(IL)*
St. Mary’s
Office (MD)
Avondale
(AZ)
Pocatello
(ID)
Hemet Police
82 
Dep’t (CA)*
Concord
(NH)
Eden Prairie
(MN)
Yellowstone
Office (MT)*
1222 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
Town and
Country
34 
Police Dep’t
(MO)
Lincolnton
(NC)
Phelps Cty.
Sheriff’s 29 
Office (MO)
Oldham Cty.
Sheriff’s 15 
Office (KY)
Edgewood
(FL)
Evansville
(WI)
Fruitland
(ID)
Jackson
Township
5 
Police Dep’t
(OH)
Outside
Self Self Self
Insurer:
Premiums Outside
Without Budget
Contribution
by PD
Waterloo
(NE)
41 19 29 14 7
Totals 203,688
(4 hybrid) (6 hybrid) (7 hybrid) (2 hybrid) (1 hybrid)
1224 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
APPENDIX B: COSTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SETTLEMENTS AND

JUDGMENTS
This Appendix shows the amount spent by sixty-five of the seventy-nine

self-insured jurisdictions in my study on settlements and judgments in lawsuits
related to their law enforcement officers. I have received information from these
jurisdictions about their annual budgets and annual payments in lawsuits involv-
ing their law enforcement agencies for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, and
have averaged these amounts. The law enforcement agencies are organized from
largest to smallest as measured by full-time sworn personnel, according to BJS
Law Enforcement Census Data, supra note 47.
Average Annual
Percentage of
Payments in Average Paid
Number Total Annual
Law Lawsuits in Settlements
of Average Annual Budget Spent
Enforcement Involving the and Judgments
Sworn Budget for Jurisdiction on Police
Agency Law Per Officer,
Officers Settlements
Enforcement Per Year
and Judgments
Agency
New York City

Police Dep’t 36,023 $71,200,000,000 $169,100,000 .24% $4694
(NY)
Chicago Police
13,354 $8,310,066,667 $52,857,575 .64% $3958
Dep’t (IL)
Los Angeles
Police Dep’t 9727 $7,267,728,810 $29,804,106 .41% $3064
(CA)
Los Angeles Cty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t 9461 $26,099,000,000 $39,372,846 .15% $4162
(CA)
California Hwy.
7202 $139,066,000,000 $1,817,551 .001% $252
Patrol (CA)
Philadelphia
Police Dep’t 6642 $3,576,449,165 $14,895,736 .42% $2242
(PA)
Houston Police
5053 $3,367,333,333 $1,892,347 .06% $374
Dep’t (TX)
Average Annual
Percentage of
Number Total Annual
and Judgments
Agency
Pennsylvania
State Police 4458 $64,533,333,333 $792,924 .001% $178
Dep’t (PA)
Metro Police
3742 $11,706,524,667 $1,313,867 .01% $351
Dep’t (DC)
Texas Dep’t
Public Safety 3529 $95,850,000,000 $912,314 .001% $259
(TX)
Dallas Police
3389 $2,612,782,303 $2,746,977 .11% $811
Dep’t (TX)
Phoenix Police
3388 $564,376,333 $3,306,192 .59% $976
Dep’t (AZ)
Miami-Dade
Cty. Police Dep’t 3093 $535,452,667 $914,429 .17% $296
(FL)
Baltimore Police
2990 $3,116,421,949 $2,100,000 .07% $702
Dep’t (MD)
Las Vegas Metro.
Police Dep’t 2942 $4,314,935,423 $2,296,197 .05% $780
(NV)
Detroit Police
2250 $2,759,241,600 $3,463,961 .13% $1540
Dep’t (MI)
Boston Police
2181 $2,454,000,000 $4,087,716 .17% $1874
Dep’t (MA)
Riverside Cty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t 2147 $4,819,133,333 $4,311,595 .09% $2008
(CA)
Illinois State
2105 $68,400,000,000 $15,296,553 .02% $7267
Police (IL)
1226 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Average Annual
Percentage of
Number Total Annual
and Judgments
Agency
San Antonio
Police Dep’t 2020 $2,270,446,074 $1,535,107 .07% $760
(TX)
Milwaukee Police
1987 $1,457,452,457 $929,167 .06% $468
Dep’t (WI)
San Diego Police
1951 $2,757,861,637 $4,351,646 .16% $2230
Dep’t (CA)
San Francisco
Police Dep’t 1940 $7,365,626,613 $1,554,559 .02% $801
(CA)
Honolulu Police
1934 $2,016,752,326 $1,226,214 .06% $634
Dep’t (HI)
Columbus Police
1886 $1,534,928,716 $475,087 .03% $252
Dep’t (OH)
Virginia State
1873 $41,704,762,294 $416,667 .001% $222
Police (VA)
North Carolina
State Hwy. 1827 $49,590,935,190 $75,990 .0001% $42
Patrol (NC)
Orange Cty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t 1794 $5,532,169,682 $6,166,666 .11% $3437
(CA)
Michigan State
1732 $49,312,822,142 $398,445 .008% $230
Police (MI)
Atlanta Police
1719 $1,843,568,011 $1,913,714 .10% $1113
Dep’t (GA)
Charlotte-
Mecklenburg
1672 $548,500,000 $597,640 .11% $357
Police Dep’t
(NC)
Average Annual
Percentage of
Number Total Annual
and Judgments
Agency
Jacksonville
Sheriff’s Office 1662 $1,943,017,623 $3,562,312 .18% $2143
(FL)
Broward Cty.
Sheriff’s Office 1624 $2,437,020,245 $3,850,790 .16% $2371
(FL)
Cleveland Police
1616 $1,176,674,154 $2,695,712 .23% $1668
Dep’t (OH)
Florida Hwy.
1606 $71,000,000,000 $5,658,004 .08% $3523
Patrol (FL)
Indianapolis
Metro. Police 1616 $1,024,003,298 $2,377,774 .23% $1503
Dep’t (IN)
Prince George’s
Cty. Police Dep’t 1578 $3,205,198,489 $3,820,999 .12% $2421
(MD)
Ohio Hwy.
1560 $61,028,369,070 $155,643 .0003% $100
Patrol (OH)
Denver Police
1525 $2,178,592,667 $319,211 .01% $209
Dep’t (CO)
Austin Police
1515 $3,069,863,000 $1,123,820 .04% $742
Dep’t (TX)
Fort Worth
Police Dep’t 1489 $1,244,632,380 $922,240 .07% $619
(TX)
Kansas City
Police Dep’t 1421 $1,349,856,952 $2,622,753 .19% $1846
(MO)
San Jose Police
1382 $2,844,472,447 $3,218,243 .11% $2329
Dep’t (CA)
1228 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Average Annual
Percentage of
Number Total Annual
and Judgments
Agency
Nashville-
Davidson Cty.
1315 $1,702,567,767 $520,289 0.03% $396
Police Dep’t
(TN)
Seattle Police
1283 $4,121,656,667 $3,402,128 .08% $2652
Dep’t (WA)
Montgomery
Cty. Police Dep’t 1206 $4,607,833,333 $242,003 .005% $201
(MD)
Louisville Metro.
Police Dep’t 1197 $675,825,400 $4,432,236 .66% $3703
(KY)
El Paso Police
1132 $757,686,770 $508,472 .07% $449
Dep’t (TX)
Cincinnati Police
1082 $955,475,793 $241,918 .03% $224
Dep’t (OH)
Oklahoma City
Police Dep’t 1046 $913,295,230 $202,579 .02% $194
(OK)
Tucson Police
1032 $1,308,300,000 $390,876 .03% $379
Dep’t (AZ)
Albuquerque
Police Dep’t 1020 $877,359,333 $11,685,226 1.33% $11,456
(NM)
Raleigh Police
702 $681,054,073 $101,772 .01% $145
Dep’t (NC)
Contra Costa
Cty. Sheriff’s 679 $1,204,333,333 $200,916 .02% $296
Office (CA)
Polk Cty.
Sheriff’s Office 600 $1,300,181,322 $200,188 .02% $334
(CA)
Average Annual
Percentage of
Number Total Annual
and Judgments
Agency
Minnesota State
530 $36,776,378,667 $599,463 .002% $1131
Patrol (MN)
Summit Cty.
Sheriff’s Office 393 $483,665,424 $183,333 .04% $467
(OH)
New Hampshire
State Police 350 $5,177,101,243 $47,000 .001% $134
(NH)
Springfield Police
273 $211,116,955 $17,772 .008% $65
Dep’t (IL)
Waco Police
246 $202,639,604 $209,299 .1% $851
Dep’t (TX)
Quincy Police
205 $247,877,300 $0 0% $0
Dep’t (MA)
Concord Police
161 $153,882,103 $707,334 .46% $4393
Dep’t (CA)
Hemet Police
82 $66,671,474 $251,085 .38% $3062
Dep’t (CA)
Concord Police
77 $87,009,840 $100,311 .12% $1303
Dep’t (NH)
Yellowstone Cty.
Sheriff’s Office 55 $92,398,926 $134,744 .14% $2450
(MT)
1230 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
APPENDIX C: AMOUNT PAID BY DEPARTMENTS THAT PAY COSTS FROM

THEIR BUDGETS
This Appendix shows the amount paid in litigation costs by thirteen of the
nineteen law enforcement agencies in my study that pay some or all litigation
costs out of their budgets. I have received information from these agencies about
their annual budgets and annual payments in lawsuits involving their law en-
forcement agencies for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014 and have averaged these
amounts. I have also noted, when appropriate, the amount of additional money
paid by the jurisdiction to satisfy suits involving the law enforcement agency.
The law enforcement agencies are organized from largest to smallest as measured
by full-time sworn personnel, according to BJS Law Enforcement Census Data,
supra note 47.
Average Addi-
Percentage of
Average tional Amount
Agency’s
Law Agency’s Annual Paid Annually
Total Budget
Enforcement Average Total Litigation by Jurisdiction
Spent on
Agency Budget Payments by for Law
Litigation
Agency Enforcement
Payments
Litigation
Chicago Police
$1,346,854,532 $16,511,017 1.22% $36,346,558
Dep’t (IL)
Los Angeles
Cty. Sheriff’s $2,739,641,644 $39,372,846 1.44% $0
Dep’t (CA)
California
Hwy. Patrol $1,950,244,667 $1,817,551 .09% $0
(CA)
Metro. Police
$495,493,000 $285,100 .06% $1,028,287
Dep’t (DC)
Texas Dep’t
Pub. Safety $1,417,783,296 $912,314 .06% $0
(TX)
Las Vegas
Metro. Police $498,029,091 $2,296,190 .46% $0
Dep’t (NV)
Average Addi-
Percentage of
Average tional Amount
Agency’s
Law Agency’s Annual Paid Annually
Total Budget
Enforcement Average Total Litigation by Jurisdiction
Spent on
Agency Budget Payments by for Law
Litigation
Agency Enforcement
Payments
Litigation
Boston Police
$291,461,466 $1,326,397 .46% $2,761,319
Dep’t (MA)
Illinois State
$411,333,333 $1,963,220 .38% $13,333,333
Police (IL)
San Francisco
Police Dep’t $492,896,755 $1,510,234 .31% $44,326
(CA)
Columbus
Police Dep’t $289,105,299 $225,000 .08% $225,087
(OH)
Broward Cty.
Sheriff’s Office $677,935,057 $3,850,790 .57% $0
(FL)
Kansas City
Police Dep’t $219,310,762 $2,622,753 1.2% $1,000,000
(MO)
Minnesota
State Patrol $97,591,123 $599,463 .61% $0
(MN)
1232 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
APPENDIX D: AMOUNT OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY DEPARTMENTS TO

CENTRAL FUNDS IN SELF-INSURED JURISDICTIONS
This Appendix shows the amount paid by eighteen of the twenty-two law
enforcement agencies that contribute to a central risk management fund. I have
received information from these agencies about their annual budgets and annual
payments to the central risk management fund for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and
2014, and have averaged these amounts. Note that these contributions general-
ly cover all claims involving the police—not just claims of property damage,
automobile accidents, civil rights claims, and internal employment disputes,
but also workers’ compensation claims which are not otherwise included in my
study. Note also that these contributions may cover administrative costs for the
funds. The law enforcement agencies are organized from largest to smallest as
measured by full-time sworn personnel, according to BJS Law Enforcement
Census Data, supra note 47.
Average
Agency’s Percentage of Police
Law Enforcement Annual Risk
Average Total Budget Spent on
Agency Fund
Budget Contributions
Contributions
Phoenix Police
$564,376,333 $5,458,218 .97%
Dep’t (AZ)
Miami-Dade Cty.
$535,452,667 $3,113,615 .58%
Police Dep’t (FL)
Riverside Cty.
$552,000,000 $31,333,333 5.68%
Sheriff’s Dep’t (CA)
San Antonio Police
$361,514,224 $4,127,476 1.14%
Dep’t (TX)
Virginia State Police
$294,375,652 $679,698 .23%
(VA)
Orange Cty.
$509,866,667 $7,600,000 1.49%
Sheriff’s Dep’t (CA)
Jacksonville Sheriff’s
$367,299,190 $11,733,579 3.19%
Office (FL)
Florida Hwy. Patrol
$241,878,972 $6,638,216 2.74%
(FL)
Average
Agency’s Percentage of Police
Law Enforcement Annual Risk
Average Total Budget Spent on
Agency Fund
Budget Contributions
Contributions
Indianapolis Metro.
$198,305,300 $1,608,333 .81%
Police Dep’t (IN)
Prince George’s
Cty. Police Dep’t $262,985,533 $10,550,143 4.01%
(MD)
Seattle Police Dep’t
$267,990,254 $2,404,527 .9%
(WA)
DeKalb Cty. Police
$113,019,119 $1,909,956 1.69%
Dep’t (GA)
Tucson Police Dep’t
$155,861,090 $5,042,694 3.24%
(AZ)
Albuquerque Police
$154,070,000 $10,267,359 6.66%
Dep’t (NM)
Tampa Police Dep’t
$151,067,298 $1,512,478 1.00%
(FL)
Raleigh Police Dep’t
$88,190,602 $2,050,678 2.33%
(NC)
Fort Wayne Police
$53,786,546 $1,211,502 2.25%
Dep’t (IN)
Howard Cty. Police
$94,258,214 $1,675,860 1.78%
Dep’t (MD)
1234 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
APPENDIX E: AMOUNT OF PAYMENTS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

TO INSURANCE PREMIUMS
This Appendix shows the amount paid by the seven law enforcement agen-
cies that pay liability premiums from their budgets. I have received information
from these agencies about their annual budgets and annual liability insurance
premiums paid for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, and have averaged these
amounts.
Percentage of
Law Enforcement Agency’s Average Average Premium Total Budget
Agency Total Budget Payment Spent on Premium
Payment
Manatee Cty.
$103,517,000 $638,000 .62%
Sheriff’s Office (FL)
St. Mary’s Cty.
Sheriff’s Office $31,949,193 $65,699 0.21%
(MD)
Pocatello Police
$12,417,107 $150,729 1.21%
Dep’t (ID)
Concord Police
$12,023,821 $100,311 0.83%
Dep’t (NH)
Lincolnton Police
$2,868,362 $35,175 1.23%
Dep’t (NC)
Jackson Township
$8,252,736 $199,916 2.42%
Police Dep’t (OH)
Evansville Police
$949,854 $38,550 4.06%
Dep’t (WI)
APPENDIX F: POTENTIAL FINANCIAL IMPACT OF PAYOUTS ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT AGENCY BUDGETS
This Appendix shows what the impact of lawsuit payouts would be on self-
insured law enforcement agency budgets were they required to absorb the costs of
these payouts. The twenty-seven jurisdictions included in this Appendix cur-
rently pay settlements and judgments from general funds with no contribution by
the law enforcement agency. (A total of thirty-seven agencies in my study have
this budgetary arrangement; ten did not provide me with payout information.)
Note that—were law enforcement agencies required to pay settlements and
judgments from their budgets—their budgets would presumably increase to ac-
commodate this additional budgetary responsibility. Agencies are organized
from largest to smallest as measured by full-time sworn personnel, according to
BJS Law Enforcement Census Data, supra note 47.
Percentage of Percentage of
Average
Total Law
Annual
Jurisdiction’s Enforcement
Average Annual Payments in
Law Average Annual Budget Spent Agency
Law Lawsuits
Enforcement Budget for on Law Budget That
Enforcement Involving the
Agency Jurisdiction Enforcement Would Be
Budget Law
Settlements Spent on Set-
Enforcement
and tlements and
Agency
Judgments Judgments
New York
City Police $71,200,000,000 $4,909,034,000 $169,100,000 .24% 3.4%
Dep’t (NY)
Los Angeles
Police Dep’t $7,267,728,810 $1,245,079,172 $29,804,106 .41% 2.4%
(CA)
Philadelphia
Police Dep’t $3,576,449,165 $556,019,216 $14,895,736 .42% 2.68%
(PA)
Houston
Police Dep’t $3,367,333,333 $674,250,706 $1,892,347 .06% .28%
(TX)
1236 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Average
Total Law
Annual
Law Lawsuits
Budget Law
Enforcement
and tlements and
Agency
Judgments Judgments
Dallas Police
$2,612,782,303 $432,000,000 $2,746,977 .11% .64%
Dep’t (TX)
Baltimore
Police Dep’t $3,116,421,949 $398,743,989 $2,100,000 .07% .53%
(MD)
Detroit Police
$2,759,241,600 $375,688,219 $3,463,961 .13% .92%
Dep’t (MI)
Milwaukee
Police Dep’t $1,457,452,457 $239,266,014 $929,167 .06% .39%
(WI)
San Diego
Police Dep’t $2,757,861,637 $407,828,506 $4,351,646 .16% 1.07%
(CA)
Honolulu
Police Dep’t $2,016,752,326 $222,740,887 $1,226,214 .06% .6%
(HI)
Atlanta Police
$1,843,568,011 $199,260,538 $1,913,714 .10% .96%
Dep’t (GA)
Charlotte-
Mecklenburg
$548,500,000 $208,033,333 $597,640 .11% .29%
Police Dep’t
(NC)
Cleveland
Police Dep’t $1,176,674,154 $175,221,186 $2,695,712 .23% 1.54%
(OH)
Denver Police
$2,178,592,667 $197,785,786 $319,211 .01% .16%
Dep’t (CO)
Average
Total Law
Annual
Law Lawsuits
Budget Law
Enforcement
and tlements and
Agency
Judgments Judgments
Fort Worth
Police Dep’t $1,244,632,380 $199,926,019 $922,240 .07% .46%
(TX)
San Jose
Police Dep’t $2,844,472,447 $299,979,046 $3,218,243 .11% 1.07%
(CA)
Nashville-
Davidson
$1,702,567,767 $176,655,967 $520,289 0.03% .29%
Cty. Police
Dep’t (TN)
Montgomery
Cty. Police $4,607,833,333 $249,317,254 $242,003 .005% .09%
Dep’t (MD)
El Paso
Police Dep’t $757,686,770 $117,216,092 $508,472 .03% .43%
(TX)
Cincinnati
Police Dep’t $955,475,793 $133,170,153 $241,918 .03% .18%
(OH)
Oklahoma
City Police $913,295,230 $177,658,793 $202,579 .02% .11%
Dep’t (OK)
Contra Costa
Cty. Sheriff’s $1,204,333,333 $196,223,068 $200,916 .02% .1%
Office (CA)
Polk Cty.
Sheriff’s $1,300,181,322 $130,445,222 $200,187 .02% .15%
Office (OK)
1238 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Average
Total Law
Annual
Law Lawsuits
Budget Law
Enforcement
and tlements and
Agency
Judgments Judgments
Springfield
Police Dep’t $211,116,955 $38,002,485 $17,772 .008% .05%
(IL)
Quincy Police
$247,877,300 $22,833,333 $0 0% 0%
Dep’t (MA)
Concord
Police Dep’t $153,882,103 $41,941,983 $707,334 .46% 1.69%
(CA)
Yellowstone
Cty. Sheriff’s $92,398,926 $17,009,435 $133,744 .14% .79%
Office (MT)
APPENDIX G: SOURCE TABLE FOR RESPONSIVE JURISDICTIONS
The following describes the data sources for information about the one
hundred jurisdictions in my study that provided responsive information, orga-
nized from largest to smallest jurisdiction as measured by full-time sworn
personnel, according to BJS Law Enforcement Census Data, supra note 47.
New York City Police Department (NY). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from FOIL Officer, to au-
thor (Dec. 19, 2014, 19:18 PST) (on file with author) (“Please be advised that
settlements/judgments against the New York City Police Department are paid directly out
of New York City’s General Fund specifically the Judgment & Claims Account; the City is
self-insured as to its risks. Furthermore, there is no captive or independent insurer for Po-
lice claims.”). For information about the total amount paid for judgments and settlements
involving the New York City Police Department in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, see Email
from FOIL Appeals Officer, N.Y.C. Comptroller’s Office, to author (May 11, 2015, 8:06
PST) (on file with author) (reporting settlements and judgments totaling $152.3 million in
fiscal year 2012, $138.1 million in fiscal year 2013, and $216.9 million in fiscal year 2014).
For information about the total budget of the New York City Police Department for fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT ON THE
FISCAL YEAR 2015 EXECUTIVE BUDGET FOR THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (May 20,
2014), http://council.nyc.gov/downloads/pdf/budget/2015/15/eb/police.pdf [http://perma
.cc/XD87-U54F] (reporting that the police department budget was $4,867,891,000 (fiscal
year 2012); $4,892,569,000 (fiscal year 2013); and $4,966,642,000 (fiscal year 2014 as of
fiscal year 2015 Executive Budget)). For information about the total budget of the City of
New York for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see David W. Chen, City Hall Budget Deal,
for Now, Includes Few Layoffs and No Tax Increases, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/nyregion/2013-nyc-budget-has-few-layoffs-and-no-
tax-rise.html?_r=1[http://perma.cc/3U34-CYH7] (reporting $68.5 billion budget for fiscal
year 2012); Henry Goldman, Bloomberg Reaches Deal With NYC Council on $70 Billion
Budget, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 23, 2013, 20:37 EDT), http://www. bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2013-06-23/bloomberg-reaches-deal-with-nyc-council-on-70-
billion-budget [http://perma.cc/R8NE-WATB] (reporting $70 billion city budget for fiscal
year 2013); Kate Taylor, New York City Leaders Reach Accord on $75 Billion Budget, N.Y.
TIMES (June 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/nyregion/de-blasio-and-
city-council-reach-deal-on-75-billion-budget.html [http://perma.cc/MP5R-KG6A] (re-
porting $75 billion city budget for fiscal year 2014).
1240 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Chicago Police Department (IL). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Carl Gutierrez, FOIA Officer,
City of Chi. Office of Budget and Mgmt., to author (June 2, 2015, 12:45 PST) (on file with
author) (explaining that money to pay settlements and judgments is placed in the Chicago
Police Department budget through a specific allocation for settlements and judgments, that
if more than the allocated amount is spent on lawsuits the additional money is taken from
city funds, and that if less than the allocated amount is spent on lawsuits the Police Depart-
ment cannot use those funds for other purposes). For the amount allocated in the Chicago
Police Department budget for lawsuit payouts, see Email from Carl Gutierrez, FOIA Of-
ficer, City of Chi. Office of Budget and Mgmt., to author (June 2, 2015, 10:03 PST) (on
file with author) (attaching document reflecting $14,844,350 appropriated in 2012,
$14,844,350 appropriated in 2013, and $19,844,350 appropriated in 2014). For the total
payouts in lawsuits involving the Chicago Police Department, see 2012–14 Department of
Law—Judgment/Verdict & Settlement Reports, CITY OF CHI., http://www.cityofchicago.org/
city/en/depts/dol.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2016) (reporting $38,659,969 paid in 2012,
$68,605,579 paid in 2013, and $51,307,177 paid in 2014). For the total budget of the City
of Chicago and the police department, see CITY OF CHI., 2014 BUDGET OVERVIEW 1, 86
(2013) (reporting the 2013 city budget of $8,173,700,000; a proposed 2014 city budget of
$8,672,100,000; a 2013 police budget of $1,338,504,935; and a proposed 2014 police budg-
et of $1,371,563,213); CITY OF CHI., 2013 BUDGET OVERVIEW 1, 87 (2012) (reporting a
2012 city budget of $8,084,400,000 and a 2012 police department budget of
$1,330,495,449).
Los Angeles Police Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Mike Dundas, Deputy
City Att’y, City of L.A., to author (Sept. 4, 2014, 15:58 PST) (on file with author) (“The
litigation/claims are generally paid out of the city’s general fund (the City is self-insured). In
some circumstances, like with Rampart, one time use accounts are created, but those are still
funded with general fund money.”). For information about the total amount paid in law-
suits involving the Los Angeles Police Department, see Email from Mike Dundas, Deputy
City Att’y, City of L.A., to author (July 17, 2015, 9:03 PST) (on file with author) (attaching
spreadsheet reflecting payouts totaling $19,882,199 in 2012; $34,329,806 in 2013; and
$35,200,313 in 2014). For information about the Los Angeles Police Department budget
in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see CITY OF L.A., BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2011–12 R-
38 (May 25, 2011) (reporting budget of $1,167,771,840 for fiscal year 2012); CITY OF L.A.,
BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2012–13 at R-22 (May 30, 2012) (reporting budget of
$1,256,645,232 for fiscal year 2013); CITY OF L.A., BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2013–14 R-23
(May 29, 2013) (reporting budget of $1,310,820,443 for fiscal year 2014). For information
about the total budget for the City of Los Angeles, see BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2011–12,
supra, at 373 (reporting budget of $6,871,560,469 for fiscal year 2012); BUDGET FISCAL
YEAR 2012–13, supra, at 520 (reporting budget of $7,246,116,651 for fiscal year 2013);
BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2013–14, supra, at 399 (reporting budget of $7,685,509,310 for fis-
cal year 2014).
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s)
settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Jonathan McCa-
verty, Senior Deputy Cty. Counsel, Law Enf’t Serv. Div., to author (Oct. 10, 2013, 10:44
PST) (on file with author) (“Each County Department, has a budget category called Other
Charges, which includes an expenditure line item for Judgment and Damages. If the set-
tlement/judgment amount exceeds what is budgeted, the Department may either request to
carryover year-end savings to address the anticipated settlement/judgment amount or re-
quest additional onetime funding from the CEO of LA County. Sometimes, departments
are required to reimburse [] the County for any additional funding provided in response to
litigation.”). For information about the amount set aside by the Sheriff’s Department for
judgments and damages in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Glen Drago-
vich, Assistant Div. Dir., L.A. Cty. Sheriff, to author (Sept. 29, 2014, 11:27 PST) (on file
with author) (reporting that the Sheriff’s Department budgeted $36,387,900 in 2011–12;
$35,684,450 in 2012–13; and $35,555,950 in 2013–14 for lawsuit payouts, but the actual
payouts were $37,143,259 in 2011–12; $41,897,464 in 2012–13; and $39,077,815 in 2013–
14). For information about the total budget of the Sheriff’s Department, see BD. OF
SUPERVISORS, CTY. OF L.A., 2013–14 FINAL BUDGET 63 (2014), http://ceo.lacounty.gov/
pdf/portal/2013-14%20Final%20Budget%20112713.pdf [http://perma.cc/WJP4-JL6J]
(reporting that the budget was $2,608,950,531.23 in 2011–12, $2,674,224,401.33 in 2012–
13, and $2,935,750,000 in 2013–14). For information about the total budget for Los Ange-
les County, see CTY. OF L.A., 2014–15 RECOMMENDED BUDGET (2015) (reporting a total
budget of $26,099,000,000 in fiscal year 2014).
California Highway Patrol (CA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Suzanne Moser, Att’y, Cal.
Highway Patrol, to author (May 19, 2015, 14:17 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that
the California Highway Patrol does not receive a line in its budget for lawsuits, but it does
“coordinate[] with CHP’s Legal Affairs Section, and tries to anticipate and project costs as-
sociated with settlements and judgments”; if litigation expenditures exceed the estimate,
“CHP redirects internally to cover the increased total costs” although “extraordinarily large
pay-outs (e.g., a single settlement or judgment in excess of $10 million) would be submitted
to the Legislature via the Department of Finance. Those pay-outs would be funded directly
from the Motor Vehicle Account, rather than from CHP’s budget.”); see also Telephone In-
terview with Bob Hovorka, Budget Supervisor, Fiscal Mgm’t. Section, Cal. Highway Patrol
(May 19, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that CHP pays a portion of its budget to
the California Department of General Services Office of Risk and Insurance Management,
which acts as a self-insurer for auto insurance). For information about the amount paid
1242 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
from the California Highway Patrol’s budget to satisfy settlements and judgments involving
the Patrol and/or its employees, see Email from Jonathan Rothman, Special Counsel, Of-
fice of the Comm’r, Cal. Highway Patrol, to author (Nov. 5, 2014, 16:09 PST) (on file with
author) (reporting that the amount paid from the California Highway Patrol’s budget for
settlements and judgments was $2,861,763 in fiscal year 2012; $1,024,877 in fiscal year
2013; and $1,566,013 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the California Highway
Patrol’s budget, see Email from Jonathan Rothman, supra (reporting that the total budget
was $1,918,502,000 in fiscal year 2012; $1,902,487,000 in fiscal year 2013, and
$2,029,745,000 in fiscal year 2014). For the total budget for the state of California, see
CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET 2013–14 SUMMARY CHARTS 7 (2014) (reporting total fiscal
year 2014 budget of $145,300,000,000); CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET—2012–13
SUMMARY CHARTS 13 (2013) (reporting total fiscal year 2013 budget of $142,421,000,000);
CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET—2011–12 SUMMARY CHARTS 9 (2012) (reporting total fis-
cal year 2012 budget of $129,477,000,000).
Philadelphia Police Department (PA). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Rob Dubow, Dir. of
Fin., City of Phila., to author (Oct. 10, 2014, 7:25 PST) (on file with author) (“We pay our
settlements and judgments out of a central fund. They [sic] payments do not come out of
departments’ budgets and we typically don’t have insurance to pay those costs.”). For the to-
tal amount paid in lawsuits involving the police in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see
Email from Donna Mouzayck, First Deputy City Solicitor, City of Phila., to author (Oct.
22, 2014, 13:12 PST) (on file with author) (attaching spreadsheet which reveals payments
of $12,249,997.51 in fiscal year 2012; $16,034,077.04 in fiscal year 2013; and
$16,403,133.94 in fiscal year 2014). For the police department’s budget in fiscal years 2012,
2013, and 2014, see MAYOR MICHAEL A. NUTTER, CITY OF PHILA., FY 2013–FY 2017
FIVE YEAR FINANCIAL PLAN: PER COUNCIL APPROVED BUDGET 15,
http://www.phila.gov/investor/pdfs/Finance%202013_2017_Five_Year_ADDENDUM_
8812.pdf [http://perma.cc/WEQ5-SCZM] (reporting police department budget of
$550,686,244 for fiscal year 2012; $556,818,243 for fiscal year 2013; and a projected budget
of 560,553,161 for fiscal year 2014). For the City of Philadelphia’s budget in fiscal years
2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. at 13 (reporting budget of $3,470,094,630 for fiscal year
2012, $3,603,867,000 for fiscal year 2013, and a projected budget of $3,655,386,494 for
fiscal year 2014).
Cook County Sheriff’s Department (IL). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Paul A.
Castiglione, Exec. Assistant State’s Att’y for Policy, to author (Sept. 22, 2014, 9:56 PST)
(on file with author) (“[T]he County is self-insured. I recall that the County had an insur-
ance policy that applied to judgments over a very large amount (something like above $30
million) but I am not sure whether that is still in effect or the exact mechanics of how such
excess coverage works. It is also my understanding that: (1) settlements and judgments are
paid from a fund created to satisfy the County’s financial obligations from settlements and
judgments and (2) such settlements and judgments are not taken from the Sheriff’s budg-
et.”). Information about the amounts paid in suits involving law enforcement officers is not
collected by the County. See Email from Jeff Fronczak, Assistant to Special Legal Counsel,
Office of the President, Cook Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, to author (Mar. 6, 2013, 11:16 PST)
(on file with author) (reporting that their office—which is responsible for approving pay-
outs—does not maintain records regarding the instances in which the Board has approved
payments of settlements or judgments, or the amounts paid); Email from Elizabeth Scan-
nell, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Office of the Cook Cty. Sheriff, FOIA Officer/Legal Dep’t,
to author (July 8, 2015, 13:52 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that “the [Cook County
Sheriff’s Office] does not track settlements/judgments in the manner you have requested.”).
Houston Police Department (TX). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Harlan Heil-
man, Office of the City Att’y, City of Houst. Legal Dep’t (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file with au-
thor) (reporting that money to pay claims, settlements, and judgments comes from a fund
located in the Legal Department). For the amount paid in settlements and judgments in-
volving the Houston Police Department, see Email from The City of Houst. Legal Dep’t,
to author (May 13, 2015, 13:30 PST) (on file with author) (reporting payments of
$695,603.11 in 2012; $3,865,161.19 in 2013; and $1,074,775.85 in 2014). For information
about the total budget of the Houston Police Department for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and
2014, see CITY OF HOUS., TEX., FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET, at III-29 (2014) (reporting
that the budget was $621,739,407 in fiscal year 2012; $678,430,660 in fiscal year 2013, and
$722,582,051 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of the City of
Houston for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. at 17 (reporting that the budget was
$3,146,000,000 in fiscal year 2012; $3,381,000,000 in fiscal year 2013; and $3,575,000,000
in fiscal year 2014).
Pennsylvania State Police (PA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Letter from Lissa M. Ferguson, Deputy
Agency Open Records Officer, Pa. State Police, to author (Dec. 1, 2014) (on file with au-
thor) (explaining that “the ELSIP (an insurance fund, to which the PSP contributes) pays
the first $250,000.00. A payment over and above that amount comes from the Pennsylvania
State Police budget.”); see also Email from William A. Rozier, Agency Open Records Of-
ficer, Pa. State Police, to author (Dec. 19, 2014, 8:30 PST) (on file with author) (confirming
that the $250,000 ELSIP coverage is per case); Divisional Functions and Responsibilities, PA.
DEP’T OF GEN. SERV., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/risk_and
_insurance/1347/divisional_functions_and_responsibilities/258317 [http://perma.
cc/R27Q-37KJ] (last visited Nov. 3, 2015) (explaining that ELSIP is a government-
administered insurance program); Letter from Rachel Zeltman, Deputy Agency Open
1244 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Records Officer, Pa. State Police, to author (June 24, 2015) (on file with author) (explain-
ing that “PSP does not calculate the determined amount each year. It is calculated by De-
partment of General Services (DGS), Bureau of Risk and Insurance Management. PSP
does not budget for any specific amount year to year.”). For the amounts paid from the
Pennsylvania State Police budget to the insurance fund, see Email from William A. Rozier,
Agency Open Records Officer, Pa. State Police, to author (Dec. 19, 2014, 8:30 PST) (on file
with author) (explaining that $1,670,042 was paid in fiscal year 2010; $1,713,504 was paid in
fiscal year 2011; $1,679,039 was paid in fiscal year 2012; and $1,546,804 was paid in fiscal
year 2013). For the total amount paid, from any source, to satisfy settlements and judg-
ments in suits against the Pennsylvania State Police, see Letter from Lissa M. Ferguson,
supra (explaining that the Pennsylvania State Police paid $1,094,300 in fiscal year 2012;
$865,272 in fiscal year 2013; and $418,000 in fiscal year 2014 (up to October 22, 2014)).
For the total budget for the Pennsylvania State Police, see STATE OF PA., 2013–14
ENACTED BUDGET LINE ITEM APPROPRIATIONS 8–9 (2013) (reporting that the Penn-
sylvania State Police budget was $195,254,000 for fiscal year 2013; $210,102,000 for fiscal
year 2014 (enacted)); STATE OF PA., 2012–13 ENACTED BUDGET LINE ITEM
APPROPRIATIONS 9 (2012) (reporting that the Pennsylvania State Police budget was
$186,728,000 for fiscal year 2012). For the total budget of the state of Pennsylvania, see
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., 2013–2014 BUDGET IN BRIEF 4 (2013) (reporting fiscal year
2014 total operating budget of $66.7 billion); COMMONWEALTH OF PA., 2012–2013
BUDGET IN BRIEF (reporting fiscal year 2013 total operating budget of $63.3 billion);
COMMONWEALTH OF PA., 2011–2012 Budget in Brief (reporting fiscal year 2012 total
operating budget of $63.6 billion).
Metropolitan Police Department (DC). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Lisa Archie-Mills,
FOIA Specialist, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Metro. Police Dep’t, to author (Nov. 21,
2014, 6:09 PST) (on file with author) (“Settlements and judgments of cases involving the
Metropolitan Police Department are generally paid out of the Settlement and Judgment
Fund for the District of Columbia. However, settlements and judgments in the amount of
$10,000 or less are paid by the Department. See the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 2003 and
D.C. Official Code § 2-402.”). Note also that the Reorganization Plan specifies that the
settlements and judgments paid by the Department must be in cases pending less than two
years. See D.C. CODE § 2-402 (2012). For the amount paid by the Metropolitan Police
Department to satisfy settlements and judgments in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see
Email from Kim Nimmo, Risk Identification, Analysis, & Control Manager, Exec. Office
of the Mayor, Office of Risk Mgmt., City of D.C., to author (May 22, 2015, 13:01 PST)
(on file with author) (attaching spreadsheet reflecting a total of $855,298.84 paid by the
MPD over the three year period specified). For the amount paid from the City’s Settlement
and Judgment Fund to satisfy settlements and judgments involving the Police Department
in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Nimmo, supra (attaching spreadsheet reflecting a
total of $3,084,861.01 paid by the City over the three year period specified). For the total
Metropolitan Police Department budget in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see GOV’T OF
D.C., 2014 PROPOSED BUDGET AND FINANCIAL PLAN G-2, http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/ de-
fault/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/FY14_Approved_Budget.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5L7Y-38RC] (reporting an actual budget of $481,506,000 in fiscal year
2012, an approved budget of $496,206,000 in fiscal year 2013, and an approved budget of
$508,767,000 in fiscal year 2014). For the total Washington, D.C. budget, see GOV’T OF
D.C., supra, at G-6 (reporting an actual budget of $10,365,795,000 for fiscal year 2012, an
approved budget of $11,901,764,000 for fiscal year 2013, and an approved budget of
$12,852,015,000 in fiscal year 2014).
Texas Department of Public Safety (TX). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Letter from James G. Nolan, As-
soc. Deputy Gen. Counsel, Open Records Section, to author (Sept. 9, 2014) (on file with
author) (reporting that the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) is responsible for pay-
ing up to $250,000 per claim; above $250,000 the payment would come from the Settle-
ment and Judgment line item appropriation); Email from James G. Nolan, Assoc. Deputy
Gen. Counsel, Open Records Section, to author (June 2, 2015, 15:05 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (“State agencies do not have any specific line item in their budget for settlements and
judgments, however, [state law) . . . allows State agencies . . . to expend funds appropriated
elsewhere . . . for the purposes of paying settlements and judgments . . . .”). For information
about the total amount paid by the DPS in settlements and judgments in fiscal years 2012,
2013, and 2014, see Letter from James G. Nolan, Assoc. Deputy Gen. Couns., Open Rec-
ords Section, to author (Nov. 7, 2014) (on file with author) (reporting that the amount paid
by the DPS was $577,937.39 in fiscal year 2012; $1,177,768.92 in fiscal year 2013; and
$981,235.47 in fiscal year 2014; and noting that no payments have been made above
$250,000 in fiscal years 2012–14, so that all money has come from the budget of the Texas
Department of Public Safety). For information about the total budget of the Texas De-
partment of Public Safety in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, see CONF. COMM. ON H.B. NO. 1,
GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE 2012–13 BIENNIUM, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess., at
V-51 (Tex. 2011), http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/Documents/GAA/General_Appropriations_
Act_2012-13.pdf [http://perma.cc/25NX-ZFKM] (reporting that the budget for the DPS
was $1,462,386,662 in fiscal year 2012, and $1,390,193,848 in fiscal year 2013). For infor-
mation about the total budget of the Texas Department of Public Safety in fiscal year 2014,
see CONF. COMM. ON S.B. NO. 1, GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE 2014–15
BIENNIUM, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess., at V-47 (Tex. 2013), http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/ Docu-
ments/GAA/General_Appropriations_Act_2014-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/92M2-5F4X]
(reporting that the budget for the DPS was $1,400,769,379 in fiscal year 2014). For the total
budget of the state of Texas, see Texas State Budget and Finances, BALLOTPEDIA,
1246 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
http://ballotpedia.org/Texas_state_budget_and_finances [http://perma.cc/6ZHV-M5JN]
(last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (reporting 2013 budget of $91.7 billion and 2014 budget of
$100 billion).
Dallas Police Department (TX). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Doris Bridges, Office of Risk
Mgmt., City of Dall., to author (Sept. 11, 2014, 10:15 PST) (on file with author) (reporting
that “settlements and judgments are paid out of the general fund” and that “[t]he City i[s]
self-insured.”); Email from Lance T. Johnson, Open Records Coordinator, City of Dall., to
author (Oct. 7, 2013, 12:30 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that settlements and
judgments are paid “through the ‘General Budget’ and not the Dallas Police Department
Budget.”). For the amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the Dallas Police
Department and its officers, see Email from Christopher D. Bowers, First Assistant City
Att’y, Dall. City Att’y’s Office, to author (May 21, 2015, 15:59 PST) (on file with author)
(attaching a chart reflecting $8,240,932 spent between October 1, 2011, and September 30,
2014). For information about the Dallas Police Department budget, see Tristan Hallman,
Dallas Police Associations: Proposed $12 Million Budget Increase Too Low, DALL. MORNING
NEWS (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-news/20140815-police-
associations-proposed-12m-budget-increase-too-low.ece [http://perma.cc/6N5A-XP9B]
(reporting that the Dallas Police Department budget for 2015 was $438 million and $426
million in 2014). For information about the total budget of the City of Dallas, see CITY OF
DAL., ANNUAL BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014–2015 17 (2014) (reporting
$2,829,312,657 amended budget in fiscal year 2014); CITY OF DALL., ANNUAL BUDGET
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013–2014 19 (2013) (reporting $2,569,775,411 adopted budget for fis-
cal year 2013); CITY OF DALL., ANNUAL BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012–2013 21
(2012) (reporting $2,439,258,840 amended budget for fiscal year 2012).
Phoenix Police Department (AZ). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Dane Traines, Risk Mgmt.
Coordinator, City of Phx., Fin. Dep’t, to author (Oct. 7, 2013, 14:00 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (“The claims are paid from a general fund account. The account is funded by alloca-
tions taken from all City Departments, in the annual budgeting process.”); see also Email
from Colleen M. Nathans, Assistant Risk Mgmt. Admin., to author (Sept. 11, 2014, 14:57
PST) (on file with author) (reporting that settlements and judgments in cases brought
against the Phoenix Police Department and its officers “are paid out of the City’s Self-
Insured Retention Fund, which is funded by allocations from the department by way of the
General Fund Liability premium and settlement/judgment costs are allocated to depart-
ments based on claims payment history . . . . The City purchases excess liability insurance.”).
For information about the amount contributed by the Phoenix Police Department to the
Self-Insured Retention Fund, see Email from Daisy Francisco, Police Records Clerk, Phx.
Police Dep’t, to author (June 29, 2015, 9:59 PST) (on file with author) (attaching a docu-
ment reflecting payments by the police department of $5,465,483 in fiscal year 2012;
$5,517,744 in fiscal year 2013; and $5,391,426 in fiscal year 2014). For information about
the total amount paid out of the Self-Insured Retention Fund in cases involving the Phoe-
nix Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Colleen M.
Nathans, Assistant Risk Mgmt. Admin., to author (Nov. 10, 2014, 15:24 PST) (on file
with author) (reporting that the amount paid out was $3,034,308 in fiscal year 2012;
$4,547,552 in fiscal year 2013; and $2,336,716 in fiscal year 2014). For information about
the total budget of the Phoenix Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see
CITY OF PHX., PHOENIX SUMMARY BUDGET 2013–14 116 (2013) (reporting that the po-
lice department budget was $541,075,000 in fiscal year 2012; $566,141,000 in fiscal year
2013; and $585,913,000 in fiscal year 2014).
Miami-Dade Police Department (FL). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Jorge Bello, Manager
Budget & Grants, Miami-Dade Police Dep’t, Fiscal Admin. Bureau, Miami-Dade Cty., to
author (Nov. 4, 2014, 6:13 PST) (on file with author) (“Miami-Dade Police Department
(MDPD) does contribute to a central fund that pays for settlements and judgments as part
of the Budget process.”). For information about the total amount contributed by the
MDPD to the central fund that pays for settlements and judgments in fiscal years 2012,
2013, and 2014, see Email from Jorge Bello, Manager Budget & Grants, Miami-Dade Po-
lice Dep’t, Fiscal Admin. Bureau, Miami-Dade Cty., to author (Nov. 17, 2014, 15:12 PST)
(on file with author) (reporting that the amount contributed was $3,068,300 in fiscal year
2012; $2,106,700 in fiscal year 2013; and $4,165,846 in fiscal year 2014). For information
about the total amount paid from the central fund for settlements and judgments involving
the MDPD in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Bello, supra (reporting that the amount
paid was $987,114.25 in fiscal year 2012; $755,628.78 in fiscal year 2013; and
$1,000,544.69 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of the MDPD in
fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEP’T, FY 2011–12
ADOPTED BUDGET AND MULTI-YEAR CAPITAL PLAN 78 (reporting the budget as
$531,959,000 in fiscal year 2012); MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEP’T, FY 2012–13
$526,265,000 in fiscal year 2013); MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEP’T, FY 2013–14
$548,134,000 in fiscal year 2014).
Baltimore Police Department (MD). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Henry J.
Raymond, Dir. of Fin., City of Balt. (Oct. 14, 2014, 9:40 PST) (on file with author) (re-
porting that settlements and judgments are paid out of the city’s general fund with no
contributions from the Baltimore Police Department budget and no outside insurance).
For information about the total amount paid for judgments and settlements involving the
1248 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Baltimore Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Telephone Inter-
view with Henry J. Raymond, Dir. of Fin., City of Balt. (Oct. 14, 2014, 9:40 PST) (on
file with author) (reporting that the amount paid was $2.4 million in fiscal year 2012, $2.0
million in fiscal year 2013, and $1.9 million in fiscal year 2014). For information about the
total budget of the Baltimore Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see
CITY OF BALT., MD., FISCAL 2012 SUMMARY OF THE ADOPTED BUDGET 146 (reporting
that the budget was $356,899,005 in fiscal year 2012); CITY OF BALT., MD., FISCAL 2013
SUMMARY OF THE ADOPTED BUDGET 204 (reporting that the budget was $410,595,488
in fiscal year 2013); CITY OF BALT., MD., FISCAL 2014 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 169 (re-
porting that the budget was $428,737,475 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the
total budget of the City of Baltimore in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see CITY OF
BALT., MD., FISCAL 2012 SUMMARY OF THE ADOPTED BUDGET 47 (reporting that the
budget was $2,703,078,000 in fiscal year 2012); CITY OF BALT., MD., FISCAL 2013
SUMMARY OF THE ADOPTED BUDGET 95 (reporting that the budget was $3,069,661,000
in fiscal year 2013); CITY OF BALT., MD., FISCAL 2014 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21 (report-
ing that the budget was $3,576,526,848 in fiscal year 2014).
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (NV). For information about from which budg-
et(s) settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with
Charlotte Bible, Gen. Counsel, Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t (Sept. 22, 2014) (on file
with author) (reporting that settlements and judgments, insurance premiums for excess cov-
erage, and the cost of defense counsel are paid from the Department’s budget, and that the
department is self-insured with excess insurance coverage for claims resulting in payments
above $2 million). For information about the total amount paid from the LVMPD into the
Internal Service Fund in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Joni Prucnal,
Senior Analyst-Budget, Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, to author (Dec. 26, 2014, 8:10
PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the LVMPD paid $0 in fiscal year 12, $254,712
in fiscal year 13, and $5,954,949 in fiscal year 14); Email from Joni Prucnal, Senior Analyst-
Budget, Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, to author (Dec. 26, 2014, 8:28 PST) (on file with
author) (explaining that, “[t]ypically, the City and County's Contribution to the Liability
Fund is paid through LVMPD's Operating Budget” but that they did once choose “to con-
tribute directly to the Liability fund instead of it flowing through [LVMPD's] Operating
budget, at the County's request”). For information about the amount paid from the fund in
cases involving the LVMPD in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Letter from Martina
Geinzer, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Office of Gen. Couns., Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t
(Feb. 18, 2015) (on file with author) (reporting that the amount paid from the fund was
$2,834,352.05 in fiscal year 12, $2,348,789.89 in fiscal year 13, and $1,705,428.93 in fiscal
year 14). For information about the total budget of the LVMPD, see LVMPD,
AMENDED FINAL BUDGET FY 2011–2012 16 (2011), http://www.lvmpd.com/Portals/0/
FinalBudget2011-2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/4CK4-B5Z7] (reporting the budget as
$501,307,011 in fiscal year 12); LVMPD, FINAL BUDGET FY 2012–2013 17 (2012),

http://www.lvmpd.com/Portals/0/Users/Final%20Budget%202012-2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/AAN4-RG7X] (reporting the budget as $502,873,767 in fiscal year 13);
LVMPD, FINAL BUDGET FY 2013–2014 17 (2013), http://www.lvmpd.com/Portals/0/
Finance/FY2013-2014_Final_Budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/A8TM-EAD2] (reporting the
budget as $489,906,495 in fiscal year 14). Note that the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department is a city-county agency. See Clark Cty., Nev., Code of Ordinances § 2.60.010
(Municode through Feb. 18, 2015 legislation), https://www.municode.com/library/
nv/clark_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT2ADPE_CH2.60LAVEMEPO
DE_2.60.020ADOP [https://perma.cc/ YLJ6-SDHA] (“The Clark County sheriff’s de-
partment is merged with the police department of the city of Las Vegas to create the Las
Vegas [M]etropolitan [P]olice [D]epartment.”). For the Las Vegas budget, see CITY OF
LAS VEGAS, FY 2014 TENTATIVE BUDGET 7 (2013), http://www.reviewjournal.com/sites/
default/files/ field/files/CLV_budget_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/95YE-T6GW] (report-
ing a $468,800,000 fiscal year 2013 budget and a $481,800,000 fiscal year 2014 budget).
For the Clark County budget, see JESSICA L. COLVIN, CLARK CTY., NEV.
COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA: COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT 4 (2014), http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/Depts/finance/comptroller/
Documents/pdf/2014%20CAFR/Audited%20CAFR%20Year%20Ended%20June%2030
%202014-madesearchable.pdf [http://perma.cc/DJZ6-J8GB] (reporting that Clark Coun-
ty’s total expenses were $3,721,235,429 for fiscal year 2014); JESSICA L. COLVIN, CLARK
CTY., NEV. COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA: COMPREHENSIVE
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 4 (2013), http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/Depts/finance/
comptroller/Documents/pdf/2013%20CAFR/2013CAFRFinalSearchable.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N24X-BJ7J] (reporting that Clark County’s total expenses were
$3,958,035,416 in fiscal year 2013).
Harris County Sheriff’s Office (TX). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the sheriff’s office are paid, see Email from Judith Marshall, Man-
ager, Budget Servs., Harris Cty. Budget Mgmt. Dep’t, to author (Nov. 3, 2014 11:42 PST)
(on file with author) (reporting that “settlements and judgments in cases brought against the
Harris County Sheriff’s Department are not paid out of their budget. Another budget has
been set up to pay these types of cases for all County departments . . . an insurer doesn’t pay
any of these settlements.”). Harris County did not respond to multiple requests for infor-
mation about the amount spent in settlements and judgments involving the Sheriff’s Office.
Massachusetts State Police (MA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Sean W. Farrell, Deputy Chief
Legal Counsel, Mass. State Police, to author (Oct. 7, 2013, 11:52 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (reporting that “any settlement in these cases is paid from the ‘Settlement and
Judgment’ fund which is a general statewide fund. The settlement monies are not taken
1250 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
from the Department’s operations budget.”). The spokesman for the Massachusetts State
Police did not respond to multiple requests for information about the amount spent in set-
tlements and judgments involving the State Police.
Detroit Police Department (MI). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from John Naglick, Fin. Dir., City of
Detroit, Mich., to author (Sept. 22, 2014, 8:04 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that
police suits are paid “out of our risk management fund. We are self insured for such loss-
es.”); see also Email from Richard Drumb, Gen. Manager, City of Detroit Dep’t of Fin., to
author (Sept. 22, 2014, 8:31 PST) (on file with author) (“The City pays all litigation costs
from its Risk Management Fund (RMF). The City is self insured for claims, litigation and
workers compensation costs which are paid from the RMF. The Risk Management Fund
is funded by a premium from the General Fund which is based on a five-year average of his-
torical costs paid out by the RMF. The premium is contributed from a Non-Departmental
appropriation, so technically the Police Department is not directly charged for its litigation
costs.”). For the amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the Detroit Police
Department, see Letter from Monique Smith, Senior Assistant Corp. Counsel, City of De-
troit, to author (July 10, 2015) (reflecting that the total amount spent by the city for settle-
ments and judgments in cases involving the Detroit Police Department in fiscal years 2012,
2013, and 2014 was $10,391,882.30). For the budget of city and police department of De-
troit, see CITY OF DETROIT, 2011–2012 BUDGET: APPROPRIATIONS AND REVENUES,
http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/budgetdept/2011-12%20RedBook/Buget%20
Overview/RB_Appro&Revenues12.pdf [http://perma.cc/WB7X-V9XE] (reporting fiscal
year 2012 city budget of $3,108,301,412 and police department budget of $414,826,229);
CITY OF DETROIT, 2012–2013 FISCAL YEAR BUDGET-IN-BRIEF, http://www. de-
troitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/budgetdept/2012-13%20Redbook/Budget-in-Brief%2012-
13%20—%20BH%20changes_2_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/6QV2-TFWH] (reporting 2013
fiscal year city budget of $2,604,942,607 and police department budget of $339,593,842);
CITY OF DETROIT, 2013–2014 EXECUTIVE BUDGET SUMMARY B7, http://
www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/budgetdept/2013-14_Budget/Budget%20Summary_
14/EBS_Section%20B_Summary%20All%20Funds_2013_2014_stamped.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UP7Q-NFDT] (reporting 2014 fiscal year recommended city budget of
$2,564,480,780 and recommended police budget of $372,644,586).
Boston Police Department (MA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Lynda Fraley,
Risk Mgmt., Office of Budget Mgmt., City of Bos. (Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with author)
(explaining that the money for settlements and judgments comes from the Boston Police
Department budget, but the police budget is funded through the general budget, so “to say
it impacts the police budget is a bit of a misunderstanding,” and further explaining that
money for litigation is put into each department’s budget so that they are aware of the effects
of their claims on the budget, but when a department goes above the budgeted amount, the
remainder is paid out of general funds.) For information about the total amount appropriate
to the Boston Police Department for legal liabilities in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see
CITY OF BOS., FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET, PUBLIC SAFETY CABINET 214 (2014) (re-
porting the amounts as $1,508,498 in 2012, $807,575 in 2013, and $1,663,119 in 2014).
For information about the total amount paid in settlements and judgments from any source
involving the Boston Police Department, see Email from Lynda Fraley, Risk Mgmt., Office
of Budget Mgmt., City of Bos., to author (July 9, 2015, 8:13 PST) (on file with author) (re-
porting payments of $2,540,028 in fiscal year 2012, $916,367 in fiscal year 2013, and
$8,806,753 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of the Boston Police
Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see CITY OF BOS., FISCAL YEAR 2015
BUDGET, PUBLIC SAFETY CABINET 171 (2014) (reporting the budget as $283,038,027 in
2012, $290,713,391 in 2013, and $300,632,979 in 2014). For information about the budg-
et for the city of Boston, see CITY OF BOS., FISCAL YEAR 2014 ADOPTED BUDGET,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, http://www.cityofboston.gov/images_documents/01%20 Execu-
tive%20Summary_final_tcm3-37452.pdf [http://perma.cc/4WJ6-8EJY] (reporting a fiscal
year 2014 adopted budget of $2.6 billion); CITY OF BOS., FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, http://www.cityofboston.gov/images_documents/01
%20Executive%20Summary_adopted_tcm3-31756.pdf [http://perma.cc/W8PV-FZ26]
(reporting a fiscal year 2013 budget of $2.467 billion); CITY OF BOS., FISCAL YEAR 2012
BUDGET, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, http://www.cityofboston.gov/images_documents
/01%20Executive%20Summary%20A_tcm3-24766.pdf [http://perma.cc/282D-FTPG]
(reporting a fiscal year 2012 budget of $2.395 billion).
Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s)
settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Scott Forbes, Ser-
geant, Prof’l Standards Bureau/Civil Bureau Desk, to author (Oct. 8, 2013, 10:20 PST) (on
file with author) (“Each department within the County of Riverside pays into an Internal
Service Fund. Any funds paid out due to a claim or lawsuit come from that fund (up to 1
million dollars). Funds paid in excess of 1 million dollars are paid by our insurance.”); see also
Letter from Greg Fellows, Lieutenant, Riverside Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, to author (May 26,
2015) (on file with author) (“An outside actuarial firm calculates the ISF allocations to each
county department based upon exposure (20% weighting) and experience (80% weighting).
The actuary looks at the last ten years of experience in making the calculations. The experi-
ence component includes fulltime equivalent staffing, mileage, and square footage occu-
pied.”). For information about the total amount paid by the Riverside County Sheriff’s
Department to the Internal Service Fund, see Letter from Greg Fellows, Sergeant,
Riverside Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, Prof’l Standards Bureau, to author (Oct. 15, 2014) (on
file with author) (reporting that the amount paid to the fund was $32 million in fiscal
year 2011/2012, $32 million in fiscal year 2012/2013, and $30 million in fiscal year
1252 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
2013/2014). Note that the Internal Service Fund covers costs not only for litigation but al-
so for workers’ compensation, human resources and payroll services, delivery services, facili-
ties maintenance, and information technology. See id. For information about the amount
paid out of the Internal Service Fund in cases involving the Riverside County Sheriff’s De-
partment, see id. (reporting that the total amount paid out, for both property and bodily in-
jury claims, was $2,706,130.54 in fiscal year 2011/2012, $4,314,102.10 in fiscal year
2012/2013, and $5,914,551.12 in fiscal year 2013/2014). For information about the total
budget of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department, see id. (reporting that the total budg-
et was $518 million for fiscal year 2011/2012, $545 million for fiscal year 2012/2013, and
$593 million for fiscal year 2013/2014). For the total budget of the County of Riverside, see
JAY E. ORR, CTY. OF RIVERSIDE, FISCAL YEAR 2013/14 ADOPTED BUDGET 39,
http://countyofriverside.us/Portals/0/Government/Budget%20Information/2013-
2014%20Adopted%20Budget/BudgetBookfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CEP-RF5R] (re-
porting total appropriations of $4,972,300,000 in fiscal year 2013 and $4,701,200,000
adopted in fiscal year 2014); BILL LUNA, CTY. OF RIVERSIDE, FY 2011–12 ADOPTED
BUDGET 29, http://countyofriverside.us/Portals/0/Government/Budget%20Information/
2011%20-%202012%20Adopted%20Budget/Adopted_Budget_11-12.pdf [http://perma.
cc/M2X6-ZEAJ] (reporting total appropriations of $4,783,900,000 in fiscal year 2012).
Illinois State Police (IL). For information about from which budget(s) settlements and
judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Steve Lyddon, Lieutenant, FOIA
Officer, to author (Oct. 10, 2014, 13:40 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that there is
$50,000 in the Illinois State Police annual budget “earmarked for litigation costs, settle-
ments, and judgments” for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, and that “ISP Legal must re-
quest additional funds from ISP Budget to cover any new contracts for outside law firms
and any large settlements.”); Telephone Interview with Steve Lyddon, Lieutenant, FOIA
Officer (Oct 10, 2014) (on file with author) (clarifying that the $50,000 budgeted for litiga-
tion each year is usually spent covering small settlements and attorney travel costs, and that
ISP Legal requests money from the ISP internal budget office when additional funds are
needed. Money is taken from other areas of the ISP budget, including money that was
budgeted for updating cars, computers, and computer systems). For information about the
total amount paid in lawsuits involving the Illinois State Police in fiscal years 2012, 2013,
and 2014, see Email from Steve Lyddon, Lieutenant, FOIA Officer, to author (Oct. 10,
2014, 13:40 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the amount paid was $2,456,715.00
in fiscal year 2012, $3,432,945.31 in fiscal year 2013, and $40,000,000.00 in fiscal year
2014). Note that there was a $40 million settlement in fiscal year 2014 involving the
wrongful conviction of five men; the Illinois State Police got the money to satisfy the
settlement from the Illinois General Assembly. See Telephone Interview with Steve
Lyddon, Lieutenant, FOIA Officer (Sept. 11, 2014) (on file with author) (explaining
that the Illinois State Police very rarely goes to the General Assembly to seek additional
money for settlements and judgments but did for the $40 million settlement and had to
tell the appropriations committee about the case and the reason additional money should
be appropriated). For information about the total budget of the Illinois State Police in fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Steve Lyddon, Lieutenant, FOIA Officer, to
author (Oct. 10, 2014, 13:40 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the budget was
$401,200,000 in fiscal year 2012, $383,800,000 in fiscal year 2013, and $449,000,000 in fis-
cal year 2014). For the total budget of the state of Illinois, see Illinois State Budget and Fi-
nances, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Illinois_state_budget_and_finances
[http://perma.cc/LNF2-6D4Z] (last updated Feb. 2015) (reporting $66.4 billion spent in
fiscal year 2013 and $70.4 billion spent in 2014).
San Antonio Police Department (TX). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Justina Tate, Assistant
Budget Dir., City of San Antonio, to author (Dec. 10, 2014, 6:24 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (attaching responses to public records request explaining that the City of San Antonio
is self-insured and that “[s]ettlements are paid from the City’s Liability Self Insurance Fund.
This fund is funded from annual department assessments. The Police Department,
which is in the General Fund, contributes annually to the Liability Fund through an as-
sessment. . . . This Insurance Fund charges an assessment to the Departments based on his-
torical experience to cover the costs for administering the program, Insurance Premiums,
settlements, and associated expenses. Based on historical expenses, on average settlement
costs and associated costs were approximately 38% of the assessment. Premiums and ad-
ministration of the program accounted for about 62% of the total assessment.”). For the
amount contributed from the San Antonio Police Department to the Liability Self Insur-
ance Fund, see id. (explaining that the Police Department contributed $3,473,653 in fiscal
year 2012; $4,454,388 in fiscal year 2013; and $4,454,388 in fiscal year 2014). For the
amount paid from the Fund in cases involving the Police Department, see id. (explaining
that the amount paid in settlements was $1,319,988 in fiscal year 2012; $1,692,667 in fiscal
year 2013; and $1,692,667 in fiscal year 2014). For the total budget of the San Antonio Po-
lice Department, see id. (reporting that the Police Department budget was $342,651,720 in
fiscal year 2012; $360,382,596 in fiscal year 2013; and $381,508,357 in fiscal year 2014).
For the total budget of the City of San Antonio, see CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEX., FY
2014 ADOPTED ANNUAL OPERATING AND CAPITAL BUDGET 35, http://
www.sanantonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/budget/FY2014/FinalBudgetWeb.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W9GD-ULH9] (reporting a total consolidated budget of $2.3 billion for
fiscal year 2014); CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, FISCAL YEAR 2013 ADOPTED ANNUAL
OPERATING AND CAPITAL BUDGET 25, http://www.sanantonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/
budget/FY2013/FY%202013%20Adopted%20Budget%20Document.pdf [http://perma.
cc/WQ2Y-GT3H] (reporting a total consolidated budget of $2.3 billion for fiscal year
2013); CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEX., FISCAL YEAR 2012 ADOPTED ANNUAL
1254 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
OPERATING AND CAPITAL BUDGET 207, http://www.sanantonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/

budget/archive2012/2012_Adopted_Document.pdf [http://perma.cc/4238-YU2E] (re-
porting a total budget of $2,211,338,220).
Milwaukee Police Department (WI). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Letter from Mark Nicolini, Budget
and Mgmt. Dir., City of Milwaukee, to author (Sept. 8, 2014) (on file with author) (“Set-
tlements and judgment in cases brought against the Milwaukee Police Department and its
officers are paid from the city’s operating budget. The city has no insurance for these expo-
sures, the city bears all risk.”). For the total amount paid for settlements and judgments in
lawsuits involving the police department, see Email from Mark Nicolini, Budget & Mgmt.
Dir., City of Milwaukee, to author (May 19, 2015, 7:39 PST) (on file with author) (report-
ing $2,630,000 paid in 2012, $98,000 paid in 2013, and $59,500 paid in 2014). For the
budget of the Milwaukee Police Department, see Email from Mark Nicolini, Budget &
Mgmt. Dir., City of Milwaukee, to author (May 8, 2015, 10:31 PST) (on file with author)
(reporting the police operating budget as $236,229,306 in fiscal year 2012, $237,538,363 in
fiscal year 2013, and $244,030,373 in fiscal year 2014). For the total City of Milwaukee
budget, see id. (reporting the General City Budget as $590,373,797 in fiscal year 2012,
$581,262,450 in fiscal year 2013, and $590,701,755 in fiscal year 2014, and noting that
these numbers reflect the “general city” budget as opposed to “total budget,” which would
include “items such as debt service, capital, enterprise funds, etc., which are not affected by
the amount budgeted for police.”). For the total City of Milwaukee budget, see CITY OF
MILWAUKEE, 2014 PLAN AND BUDGET SUMMARY 13, http://city.milwaukee.gov/ Im-
ageLibrary/User/crystali/PublicSite/2014planandbudgetsummarywebsit.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5S4V-5PYE] (reporting that the 2014 adopted total budget is
$1,447,560,814 and the 2013 adopted budget is $1,501,978,320); CITY OF MILWAUKEE,
2013 PLAN AND BUDGET SUMMARY 11, http://city.milwaukee.gov/ ImageLibrary/ Us-
er/crystali/2013-Budget-Requests/2013adoptedbookwebsite.pdf [http://perma.cc/CXG5-
NN4Z] (reporting that the 2012 adopted total budget is $1,422,818,236).
San Diego Police Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Lea Fields-Bernard,
Program Coordinator, Pub. Records Act Requests, City of San Diego, to author (June
12, 2015, 16:57 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that settlements and judgments in
lawsuits against the police and its officers are paid from city funds, with excess insurance
for payouts over $3 million; that the police department does not contribute financially in
any way to the payment of these suits; and that settlements and judgments have no financial
impact on the police department). For the total amount spent in settlements and judgments
involving the San Diego Police Department, see Email from Marta Terrell, Claims Aide, to
author (July 28, 2015, 17:00 PST) (on file with author) (attaching spreadsheet reflecting
payments of $2,909,512.04 in 2012; $2,284,581.98 in 2013; and $7,860,843.50 in 2014).
For the total budget of the City of San Diego, see CITY OF SAN DIEGO, FISCAL YEAR
2014 ADOPTED BUDGET, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 16, http://www.sandiego.gov/fm/ an-
nual/pdf/fy14/vol1/v1executivesummary.pdf [http://perma.cc/8ULB-RAUF] (reporting
city budget of $2,726,193,049 in fiscal year 2012 (actual); $2,752,141,860 in fiscal year 2013
(adopted), and $2,795,250,003 in fiscal year 2014 (adopted). For the budget of the San Di-
ego Police Department, see CITY OF SAN DIEGO, FISCAL YEAR 2014 ADOPTED
BUDGET, FINANCIAL SUMMARY AND SCHEDULES 128, http://www.sandiego.gov/
fm/annual/pdf/fy14/vol1/v1financialsummary.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z8ER-SJQN] (re-
porting police department expenditures of $398,412,960 in fiscal year 2012 (actual);
$406,529,645 in fiscal year 2013 (adopted), and $418,542,912 in fiscal year 2014
(adopted)).
San Francisco Police Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Michelle Allersma,
Controller’s Office Budget and Analysis Dir., S.F., to author (Sept. 5, 2014, 17:47 PST) (on
file with author) (“Each year, the Police Department’s General Fund operating budget in-
cludes an amount to pay for claims. Particularly large payments beyond the scope of what
can be accommodated in the operating budget are paid from the litigation reserve—this is
true for all departments, not just the Police Department. The City is self-insured and pays
no premiums.”); Telephone Interview with Michelle Allersma, Controller’s Office Budget
and Analysis Dir., S.F. (Sept. 15, 2014) (explaining that the Police Department gets a fixed
amount for settlements and judgments each year and that when the Department goes be-
yond their allotment it will get additional money from the central budget). For information
about the total amount paid from the SFPD general budget for settlements and judgments
against SFPD and its officers in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Risa
Sandler, Citywide Budget Manager, Controller’s Office, Budget and Analysis Div., City
and Cty. of S.F., to author (Nov. 3, 2014, 17:15 PST) (on file with author) (reporting the
amount paid as $920,886 in FY 11/12, $1,607,312 in FY 12/13 and $2,002,503 in FY
13/14). For information about additional money paid from the city’s general fund in claims
involving the SFPD and its officers in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (noting that
the total paid from the general fund was $28,209 in fiscal year 2012, $80,169 in fiscal year
2013, and $24,600 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of the
SFPD, see id. (reporting the budget as $461,807,191 in fiscal year 2011/12, $489,946,208
in fiscal year 2012/13, and $526,936,867 in fiscal year 2013/14). For information about the
total budget of the city of San Francisco, see City and Cty. of S.F., Budget,
SFOPENBOOK, http://openbook.sfgov.org/openbooks/cgi-bin/cognosisapi.dll?b_action
=cognosViewer&ui.action=run&ui.object=%2fcontent%2ffolder%5b%40name%3d%27R
eports%27%5d%2freport%5b%40name%3d%27Budget%27%5d&ui.name=20Budget&r
un.outputFormat=&run.prompt=false [http://perma.cc/D6ZH-98VU] (last visited Mar.
27, 2016) (reporting net total budget of $7,908,801,656 in fiscal year 2014; net total
1256 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
budget of $7,354,311,244 in fiscal year 2013; and net total budget of $6,833,766,939 in
fiscal year 2012).
Honolulu Police Department (HI). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Connie T. Kaneshiro, Chief
Fiscal and CIP Analyst, Fiscal/CIP Admin. Div., Dep’t of Budget and Fiscal Servs., City of
Honolulu, to author (Sept. 11, 2014, 16:47 PST) (on file with author) (“Ordinary or general
liability claims including civil rights issues are paid out of the Judgments & Losses Provi-
sional account—[which] is also part of the City’s general budget, not HPD’s budget. The
City’s self-insurance covers losses up to $2M per occurrence; if the claim exceeds that
amount commercial excess insurance pays. All insurance premiums relevant to HPD claims
are budgeted in the Risk Management Provisional Account (part of the City’s general
budget), except for a very small policy funded by the federal government that is handled di-
rectly by HPD. . . . Occasionally the City’s Corporation Counsel has requested a financial
contribution from HPD if the Risk Management and Judgments and Losses provisionals
are insufficient. However, this has not happened during the past 4–5 years.”). For the
amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the Honolulu Police Department, see
Email from Jill Yamashiro, Dep’t of the Corp. Counsel, City & Cty. of Honolulu, to author
(May 22, 2015 16:01 PST) (on file with author) (attaching spreadsheet reflecting
$85,433.04 paid in fiscal year 2012, $624,503.61 paid in fiscal year 2013, and $2,968,705.60
in fiscal year 2014). For the budget of the Honolulu Police Department, see Email from
Connie T. Kaneshiro, Chief Fiscal and CIP Analyst, Fiscal/CIP Admin. Div., Dep’t of
Budget and Fiscal Servs., City of Honolulu, to author (May 15, 2015, 14:43 PST) (on file
with author) (attaching a spreadsheet reflecting a budget of $232,582,594 in fiscal year
2012, $216,534,861 in fiscal year 2013, and $219,105,207 in fiscal year 2014). For the
budget of the City of Honolulu, see id. (reporting a city budget of $1,924,917,724 in fiscal
year 2012, $1,964,211,347 in fiscal year 2013, and $2,161,127,906 in fiscal year 2014).
Columbus Police Department (OH). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Paul Rakosky, Dir., Fin.
and Mgmt. Dep’t, City of Columbus, to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 6:33 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (“Each large city department has a budget to pay claims. We will generally use these
monies first. If these funds were to be exhausted, we reserve an amount in a citywide ac-
count held in the Finance and Management Department to pay claims. The amount we
hold in the Finance Department varies from year to year and is based on discussions with
and recommendations from the Claims Division within the City Attorney’s Office.”);
Email from Melissa L. Meyer, Budget Mgmt. Specialist, Dep’t of Fin. & Mgmt., City of
Columbus, to author (June 10, 2015, 11:32 PST) (reporting that “[w]hen claims are over
the budgeted appropriation, Police would generally first attempt to cover any higher claims
with projected savings in other spending areas (personnel, supplies, services, etc.) within its
general fund amended budget. In situations where Police would not be able to cover the
higher claims costs within its amended budget[,] Finance would transfer money from the
City-wide account into Police to cover the claim(s)” and noting that, last year, the additional
money needed “was transferred from an area within Police’s budget that was projecting a
surplus to cover the claims variance.”). For information about the total claims budget of the
Columbus Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Melissa
L. Meyer, Budget Mgmt. Specialist, Dep’t of Fin. & Mgmt., City of Columbus, to author
(Sept. 26, 2014, 5:30 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the claims budget was
$225,000 in each year). For information about the total amount paid in claims involving the
Columbus Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (reporting that
the amount paid was $650,010 in fiscal year 2012 and $414,882 in fiscal year 2013); Email
from Melissa L. Meyer, Budget Mgmt. Specialist, Dep’t of Fin. & Mgmt., City of Colum-
bus, to author (May 7, 2015, 7:44 PST) (reporting that the amount paid was $360,370 in
fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of the Columbus Police Depart-
ment in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Melissa L. Meyer, Budget
Mgmt. Specialist, Dep’t of Fin. & Mgmt., City of Columbus, to author (Sept. 26, 2014,
5:30 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the budget was $279,653,878 in fiscal year
2012, $291,485,844 in fiscal year 2013, and $296,176,176 in fiscal year 2014). For infor-
mation about the total budget of the city of Columbus, see CITY OF COLUMBUS, 2015
BUDGET 27, https://columbus.gov/uploadedFiles/Columbus/Departments/Finance_ and_
Management/Financial_Management_Group/Budget_Management/2015_Budget/
PDFs/City %20of%20Columbus%202015%20Operating%20Budget%20Proposal.pdf at
27 [https://perma.cc/V5YW-PGGK] (reporting 2012 total funds of $1,493,867,175; 2013
total funds of $1,513,227,186; and 2014 projected funds of $1,597,691,787).
Virginia State Police (VA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements and
judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Michelle Vucci, Assoc. Dir. for
Admin. Servs., Va. Dep’t of Planning & Budget, to author (Oct. 1, 2014, 7:45 PST) (on file
with author) (reporting that the Commonwealth of Virginia is, for the most part, self in-
sured, and requires each state agency, including the State Police, to pay an annual premium
that is deposited into the State Insurance Reserve Trust Fund (SIRTF). Settlements and
judgments are generally paid from the SIRTF, although departments may pay for certain
claims, settlements or judgments from their own budget, should they have the funding
available); see also Email from Don LeMond, Dir., Div. of Risk Mgmt., Commonwealth of
Va., to author (May 18, 2015, 6:56 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the amount
paid in premiums “[o]bviously . . . competes with other budget items. What the state police
pays risk management for its insurance comes to risk management, it does not go into the
[department’s] general fund”). For information about the total amount paid by the Virginia
State Police into the SIRTF and the total amount paid from the SIRTF in claims involving
the Virginia State Police in the past three fiscal years, see Email from Don LeMond, Dir.,
Div. of Risk Mgmt., Commonwealth of Va., to author (Oct. 7, 2014, 11:47 PST) (on file
1258 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
with author) (reporting that the Virginia State Police paid a total of $2,039,094 into the
SIRTF and that the SIRTF paid out approximately $1,250,000 over the past three fiscal
years); see also Email from Don LeMond, Dir., Div. of Risk Mgmt., Commonwealth of
Va., to author (May 5, 2015, 6:31 PST) (on file with author) reporting that the Virginia
State Police budgets do not reflect any payments from the Police budget to satisfy settle-
ments and judgments “for the past several years”). For information about the total budget of
the Virginia State Police in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Final Budget for the 2010–
2012 Biennium, DPB Budget Appropriations Database, https://solutions.virginia.gov/
pbreports/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=dwBudgetWiz&rdAgReset=True&selTableName=Chap
terByFnd&selFieldList=AgencyCode&selTitleList=AgencyTitle&selChapterID=41&selV
alueColumns=Total%20Dollars%2cTotal%20Positions&iptSubmitted=True&chkInitial=
True&chkAmended=True&chkCaboose=True&iptFirstPageCall=False&iptShowInput=
DontShow&iptShowToggle=Show&QLinks=Agy&rdShowModes=Show [http://perma.
cc/Z9XH-DZE2] (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (reporting that the State Police budget was
$291,721,228 in fiscal year 2012); Final Budget for the 2012–2014 Biennium, DPB Budget
Appropriations Database, https://solutions.virginia.gov/pbreports/rdPage.aspx?rd Re-
port=dwBudgetWiz&rdAgReset=True&selTableName=ChapterByFnd&selFieldList=Ag
encyCode&selTitleList=AgencyTitle&selChapterID=45&selValueColumns=Total%20
Dollars%2cTotal%20Positions&iptSubmitted=True&chkInitial=True&chkAmended=
True&chkCaboose=True&iptFirstPageCall=False&iptShowInput=DontShow&iptShow
Toggle=Show&QLinks=Agy&rdShowModes=Show [http://perma.cc/ES2T-P5EN] (last
visited Mar. 27, 2016) (reporting that the State Police budget was $293,792,305 in fiscal
year 2013 and $297,613,422 in fiscal year 2014). For the total budget of the state of Vir-
ginia, see The 2011 Executive Budget Document, VA. DEP’T OF PLANNING & BUDGET,
(Dec. 17, 2010), http://dpb.virginia.gov/budget/buddoc11/index.cfm [http://perma.cc/
B87J-8RLT] (reporting total budget of $39,304,929,295 in fiscal year 2012); The 2013
Executive Budget Document, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING & BUDGET, (Dec.
17, 2012), http://dpb.virginia.gov/budget/buddoc13/index.cfm [http://perma.cc/PF26-
JR7Y] (reporting total budget of $42,670,020,849 in fiscal year 2013 and
$43,139,336,738 in fiscal year 2014).
North Carolina State Highway Patrol (NC). For information about from which budget(s)
settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Joseph P. Dugdale,
Deputy Gen. Counsel for Law Enf’t, N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to author (Oct. 13, 2014,
14:25 PST) (on file with author) (“Any settlement or judgment (other than vehicle collision
claims) must be paid from the Highway Patrol budget but there is a statutory cap of $1 mil-
lion per claimant, per incident. The State of North Carolina has a Commercial Business
Automobile policy with a cap of $1 million per person and $10 million per incident. Each
agency contributes to the cost of the policy based on prior claims history.”); Email from Jo-
seph P. Dugdale, Deputy Gen. Couns. for Law Enf’t, N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to author
(Oct. 13, 2014, 14:53 PST) (on file with author) (confirming that claims against individual
officers under Section 1983 are also resolved with payments from the State Patrol’s budget);
Email from Joseph P. Dugdale, Deputy Gen. Couns. for Law Enf’t, N.C. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, to author (May 18, 2015, 10:45 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that money is
not allocated for litigation during the budgeting process—instead, money paid in settle-
ments and judgments is “money the agency does not get to use for other purposes”). For
information about the total budget of the North Carolina State Highway Patrol in
fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Joseph P. Dugdale, Deputy Gen.
Counsel for Law Enf’t, N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to author (Oct. 23, 2014, 10:56
PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the budget for the North Carolina State Police
was $195,220,485 in fiscal year 2012, $190,443,942 in fiscal year 2013, and $191,466,961 in
fiscal year 2014). For information about the total amount paid from the North Carolina
State Highway Patrol’s budget in claims against the Patrol and/or its officers for fiscal years
2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (reporting that the amount paid for legal settlements and tort
claims was $1,445.15 in fiscal year 2012, $122,786.94 in fiscal year 2013, and $103,738.67
San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s)
settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Eric
Broome, Supervising Liab. Claim Rep., Cty. of San Bernardino Risk Mgmt. Off. (Sept. 19,
2014) (reporting that the sheriff’s department and all other county departments pay part of
their budgets to fund the self-insurance program, that the amount of payment is based on
loss experience, and that an outside insurer pays for claims in excess of $3 million). For the
total amount paid in settlements and judgments in cases involving the Sheriff’s Department,
see Email from Eric Broome, Supervising Liab. Claim Rep., Cty. of San Bernardino Risk
Mgmt. Office, to author (Dec. 11, 2015, 14:17 PST) (reporting total payments of
$3,790,277 in fiscal year 2012/13; $7,516,172 in fiscal year 2013/14; and $8,054,076 in fis-
cal year 2014/2015).
Orange County Sheriff’s Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Laurie Shade, Senior
Deputy, Off. of the Orange Cty. Counsel, to author (Oct. 7, 2013, 12:57 PST) (“[T]he
payments come from a fund that all departments pay into. Settlements and Judgments on
Sheriff’s cases affects [sic] her budget because a premium is charged based upon the history
and volume of cases that arise from that department.”); Telephone Interview with Bryan
Berea, Manager, Admin. & Fin. Mgmt., CEO/Office of Risk Mgmt., Cty. of Orange
(May 18, 2015) (explaining that the amount each department pays into the internal service
fund, operated by risk management, is calculated based on a ten-year loss history (70 per-
cent) and the number of employees in the department (30 percent)); id. (explaining that
Risk Management sets the premium for each department in December and the department
builds that amount into their yearly budget as one of the line items that is approved by the
1260 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
board of supervisors); id. (explaining that the County is self-insured for $5 million per oc-
currence, and has excess insurance for claims above $5 million). For information about the
total amount paid by the Orange County Sheriff’s Department to the fund in fiscal years
2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Bryan Berea, Manager, Admin. & Fin. Mgmt.,
CEO/Office of Risk Mgmt., to author (Sept. 24, 2014, 10:14 PST) (on file with author)
(reporting that the amount paid by the Sheriff’s Department to the fund was $4.9 million in
fiscal year 2012, $8.3 million in fiscal year 2013, and $9.6 million in fiscal year 2014). For
information about the total amount paid from the fund towards suits involving the Orange
County Sheriff’s Department for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Bryan
Berea, Manager, Admin. & Fin. Mgmt., CEO/Office of Risk Mgmt., to author (May 18,
2015, 16:14 PST) (reporting $6.2 million paid in fiscal year 2012, $10.5 million paid in fis-
cal year 2013, and $1.8 million paid in fiscal year 2014 in bodily injury and property damage
cases). For information about the total budget of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department
in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Bryan Berea, supra (Sept. 24,2014,
10:14 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the budget was $485.7 million in fiscal year
2012, $513.8 million in fiscal year 2013, and $530.1 million in fiscal year 2014).
Michigan State Police. For information about from which budget(s) settlements and judg-
ments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Bill Bowerman, Assoc.
Dir., Senate Fiscal Agency Gen. Gov’t Unit, Senate Fiscal Agency, State of Mich. (June 18,
2015) (explaining that departments pay into a statewide risk management fund that covers
automotive liability up to $1 million, and that other liability costs are paid from the depart-
ments’ budgets; there is usually not a specific amount budgeted for claims (unless there is a
very large anticipated payment) and so the department will use money from other parts of
their budget or seek an additional appropriation for a large unanticipated cost). For the
amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the Michigan State Police, see
SENATE FISCAL AGENCY, FY 2013–14 STATUS OF LAWSUITS INVOLVING THE ST. OF
MICH. (2015) (reporting state police payouts in non-auto liability judgments and settle-
ments totaling $206,952 in fiscal year 2014, $276,900 in fiscal year 2013, and $711,482 in
fiscal year 2012). The State’s litigation report does not break down auto-liability judgments
and settlements by department; total auto-liability payments were $464,963 in fiscal year
2014, $188,624 in fiscal year 2013, and $1,840,225 in fiscal year 2012. Id. Note that the
figures in Appendix B do not include the cost of vehicle liability. For the budget of the state
of Michigan, see DEP’T OF TECH., MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE BUDGET FISCAL
YEARS 2012 AND 2013 (2011), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/budget/1_345974_7.
pdf [http://perma.cc/NLR4-KERG] (reporting a fiscal year 2012 recommended budget of
$46,627,231,900.00); DEP’T OF TECH., MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE BUDGET
FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015 (2013), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/budget/
1_410735_7.pdf (reporting a fiscal 2013 budget of $49,172,685,900.00); DEP’T OF TECH.,
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE BUDGET FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015 (2013),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/budget/1_410735_7.pdf (reporting a fiscal year 2014

budget of $51,356,221,300.00).
Atlanta Police Department (GA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Linda J. Guy, Bus. Manager,
City of Atlanta Dep’t of Fin., to author (Oct. 24, 2014, 7:23 PST) (on file with author) (re-
porting that settlements and judgments in cases brought against the Atlanta Police Depart-
ment and its officers are paid from the city’s General Fund Account and that the city is self-
insured); Email from Linda J. Guy, Bus. Manager, City of Atlanta Dep’t of Fin., to author
(Oct. 24, 2014, 8:16 PST) (on file with author) (confirming that the police department does
not contribute anything from its budget to the general fund account used to pay settlements
and judgments). For the total amount spent in settlements and judgments involving the At-
lanta Police Department, see Email from Kristen Denius, Sr. Assistant City Att’y, City of
Atlanta, to author (July 20, 2015, 10:57 PST) (on file with author) (attaching spreadsheet
reflecting litigation payments involving the police department totaling $2,184,208.18 in
2012; $1,740,831.77 in 2013; and $1,816,102.07 in 2014). For the budget of the Atlanta
Police Department, see CITY OF ATLANTA, FISCAL YEAR 2014 PROPOSED BUDGET 321
(2014) (reporting actual expenditures of $194,066,028 in fiscal year 2012, an adopted budg-
et of $202,721,772 in fiscal year 2013, and a budget of $200,993,815 in fiscal year 2014).
For the total budget of the city of Atlanta, see id. at 45 (reporting total operating funds of
$1,805,883,148 in fiscal year 2012, an adopted budget of $1,849,324,774 in fiscal year 2013,
and a budget of $1,875,496,112 in fiscal year 2014).
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (NC). For information about from which budg-
et(s) settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Judith
Emken, Sr., Assistant City Att’y, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Dep’t, to author (Oct. 8,
2013, 7:10 PST) (on file with author) (“Any settlement comes out of the City funds set
aside through our Division of Risk Management—so no impact on the police budget.”).
For the total amount paid for settlements and judgments involving the police department,
see Email from W.L. Bower, CMPD Police Attorney’s Office, to author (May 6, 2015,
7:03 PST) (on file with author) (reporting $1,170,823.49 paid in fiscal year 2012;
$353,477.69 paid in fiscal year 2013, and $268,617.96 paid in fiscal year 2014, excluding
workers’ compensation claims). For the total Charlotte-Mecklenberg Police Department
budget, see id. (reporting a budget of $200,200,000 in fiscal year 2012, $211,300,000 in fis-
cal year 2013, and $212,600,000 in fiscal year 2014). For the total Charlotte-Mecklenberg
budget, see id. (reporting a total budget of $529,400,000 in fiscal year 2012, $552,600,000
in fiscal year 2013, and $563,500,000 in fiscal year 2014).
Port Authority of NY/NJ. For information about from which budget(s) settlements and
judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Tom Belfiore, First Deputy Chief
Sec. Officer, The Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J., to author (Sept. 26, 2014, 16:48 PST)
(on file with author) (“Settlements and judgments for compensatory damages in cases
1262 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
brought against Port Authority Police are routinely paid out of the PANYNJ Operational
Budget subject to the amount of the PA’s self insured retention. Settlements and judgments
amounts in excess of the self insured retention are subject to payments by our excess insur-
ers.”). On Sept. 29, 2014 and May 4, 2015, I sent FOIA requests to the Port Authority of
NY/NJ to learn the scope of the Port Authority’s self insured retention, the amount paid in
premiums to the excess insurer, and the total paid in settlements and judgments in cases in-
volving the PANYNJ and its officers in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014. To date, these
requests have not been answered.
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (FL). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Paula Shoup, Legislative Assis-
tant II, Legislative Servs. Div., Jacksonville City Council, to author (Sept. 9, 2014, 12:26
PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the Sheriff’s Office pays into a fund from which
settlements and judgments are paid, and also pays into the fund that pays insurance premi-
ums for an excess insurance policy). For the total amount paid by the Jacksonville Sheriff’s
Office to the pooled program from which settlements and judgments are paid, see Email
from Twane Duckworth, Chief of Risk Mgmt., City of Jacksonville, to author (May 8,
2015, 12:46 PST) (on file with author) (reporting $11,190,639.05 paid in fiscal year 2012;
$10,826,131.04 paid in fiscal year 2013; and $13,183,967.02 paid in fiscal year 2014). For
the total amount paid out of the pooled program in cases involving the Jacksonville Sheriff’s
Office, see id. (reporting $4,875,230.66 paid in fiscal year 2013, $3,191,521.93 paid in fiscal
year 2013, and $2,620,181.94 paid in fiscal year 2014). For the total paid by the Sheriff’s
Office in premiums for excess insurance, see id. (“The City does not currently perform an al-
location for the excess insurance premium.”); see also Email from Twane Duckworth, Chief
of Risk Mgmt., City of Jacksonville, to author (May 12, 2015, 6:25 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (“[T]he payments from the Sheriff’s office is much higher than the amount paid from
the pool because claims from those years haven’t fully developed yet. The monies submitted
for that year will eventually be used as the claim from that year develops.”). For information
about the total budget of Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, see Email from Paula Shoup, Legisla-
tive Assistant II, Legislative Servs. Div., Jacksonville City Council, to author (Sept. 30,
2014, 4:51 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the budget was $345,894,759 in fiscal
year 2012, $366,768,040 in fiscal year 2013, and $389,234,770 in fiscal year 2014). For the
city of Jacksonville budget, see JACKSONVILLE BUDGET OFFICE, CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,
FLORIDA ANNUAL BUDGET FY 2013–2014, http://www.coj.net/city-council/
docs/budget/fy14-city-of-jacksonville-annual-budget.aspx [http://perma.cc/ 3GWK-
RMJN] (reporting a fiscal year 2012 budget of $1,969,132,087.00); JACKSONVILLE
BUDGET OFFICE, CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA ANNUAL BUDGET FY 2013–2014,
available at http://www.coj.net/city-council/docs/budget/fy14-city-of-jacksonville-annual-
budget.aspx [http://perma.cc/3GWK-RMJN] (reporting a fiscal year 2013 budget of
$1,872,787,893.00); JACKSONVILLE BUDGET OFFICE, CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,
FLORIDA ANNUAL BUDGET FY 2013–2014, http://www.coj.net/city-council/

docs/budget/fy14-city-of-jacksonville-annual-budget.aspx [http://perma.cc/ 3GWK-
RMJN] (reporting a fiscal year 2014 budget of $1,987,132,888.00).
Broward County Sheriff’s Office (FL). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from John Greene, Claims
Manager, Risk Mgmt. Div., Broward Sheriff’s Office, to author (Oct. 8, 2013, 5:09 PST)
(on file with author) (reporting that Broward Sheriff’s Office gets “a number from the
County who is our funding source” and that “this year for instance we have 4.3 million [dol-
lars] to pay claims . . . our portion is part of our overall budget that the Sheriff asks for and
the County gives us (always with a bunch of drama and fighting)”); Email from John
Greene, Claims Manager, Risk Mgmt. Div., Broward Sheriff’s Office, to author (Oct. 8,
2013, 6:51 PST) (on file with author) (“[I]t is my understanding [that] if we do [go over,]
we can go to the county and ask for more! If we go under[,] it goes either to the general
budget or back to the county.”). For information about the total amount given by Broward
County to the Sheriff’s Office to pay liability claims in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see
Email from John Greene, Dir. of Risk Mgmt., Broward Sheriff’s Office, to author (Oct. 20,
2014, 8:58 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the County gave the Sheriff’s Office
$6,847,640.00 in fiscal year 2012, $5,370,300.00 in fiscal year 2013, and $4,483,490.00 in
fiscal year 2014 to pay for claims). For information about the total amount paid out of the
Sheriff’s Office budget to pay claims in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email
from John Greene, Dir. of Risk Mgmt., Broward Sheriff’s Office, to author (Oct. 20,
2014, 8:58 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the amount paid out for liability
was $3,485,734.00 in fiscal year 2012, $4,867,117.86 in fiscal year 2013, and
$3,199,518.00 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of Broward
Sheriff’s Office, see Email from John Greene, Dir. of Risk Mgmt., Broward Sheriff’s
Office, to author (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:45 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the
budget was $689,705,280 in fiscal year 2012, $667,091,850 in fiscal year 2013, and
$677,008,040 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the Broward County budget,
see BROWARD CTY., FLA. BD. OF COMM’RS, FISCAL YEAR 2012 ADOPTED
OPERATING BUDGET, http://www.broward.org/Budget/2012/Documents/Oper/ En-
tireDoc.pdf (reflecting a 2012 budget of $2,343,321,600.00); BROWARD CTY., FLA.
BD. OF COMM’RS, FISCAL YEAR 2014 ADOPTED OPERATING BUDGET,
http://www.broward.org/Budget/2014/ Documents/Op/Summaries.pdf (reflecting a re-
vised 2013 budget of $2,490,563,665.00); BROWARD CTY., FLA. BD. OF COMM’RS,
FISCAL YEAR 2014 ADOPTED OPERATING BUDGET, http://www.broward.org/ Budg-
et/2014/Documents/Op/Summaries.pdf (reflecting a 2014 budget of $2,477,175,470.00).
Cleveland Police Department (OH). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Thomas Kaiser, Chief
Trial Counsel, Dep’t of Law, City of Cleveland, to author (Oct. 7, 2013, 12:58 PST) (on
1264 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
file with author) (“All excessive force settlements & judgments on Police Department cases
come out of the general fund, specifically the law department’s budget. Those monies do
not get charged to the police department.”). For the total amount paid in settlements and
judgments involving the Cleveland Police Department, see Email from Kim L. Roberson,
Pub. Records Adm’r, City of Cleveland, Dep’t of Law, to author (July 28, 2015, 14:51 PST)
(on file with author) (attaching spreadsheet reflecting payments of $1,113,829.90 in 2012;
$1,184,904.69 in 2013; and $5,788,400 in 2014). For the total budget of the Cleveland Po-
lice Department, see CITY OF CLEVELAND, OHIO, 2014 BUDGET BOOK 361 (2014) (re-
flecting expenditures of $171,975,278 in 2012; $174,664,787 in 2013 (unaudited), and
$179,023,493 in 2014 (budgeted)). For the budget of the City of Cleveland, see CITY OF
CLEVELAND, OHIO, 2014 BUDGET BOOK 48 (2014) (reporting 2014 expenditures of
$1,243,518,910); CITY OF CLEVELAND, OHIO, 2013 BUDGET BOOK 47 (2014) (reporting
a 2013 operating budget of $1,188,825,442); CITY OF CLEVELAND, OHIO, 2012 Budget
Book 54 (2012) (reflecting 2012 operating budget expenditures of $1,167,678,111).
Florida Highway Patrol (FL). For information about from which budget(s) settlements and
judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Wanda E. Brazell, Admin. Assis-
tant III, Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Div. of Risk Mgmt., Office of the Dir., to author (Oct. 8,
2013, 7:51 PST) (on file with author) (“The self-insurance program is funded by premiums
assessed to the state agencies based on a retrospective rating process, and those premiums
are paid from the agency’s budget, but the claims are paid from the State Risk Management
Trust Fund.”); Telephone Interview with Shannon Segers, Bureau Chief of Risk Fin. &
Loss Prevention, Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Div. of Risk Mgmt. (Oct. 10, 2013) (explaining
that in 2010 the Department of Financial Services changed the rating model such that 80
percent of the premium is based on the past five years of payouts, and 20 percent is based on
current claims as a way of rewarding departments based on their current activities); see also
Telephone Interview with Shannon Segers, Bureau Chief of Risk Fin. & Loss Prevention,
Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Div. of Risk Mgmt. (May 26, 2015) (reporting that an increase in
premiums would be accompanied by an increase in appropriations from the legislature un-
less sufficient funds were unavailable, and noting that they have seen the number of reported
claims decline slightly each year since 2011, correlating with the shift in the calculation of
premiums to include current claims). For information about the total premiums paid from
the Florida Highway Patrol to the State Risk Management Trust Fund, see Email from
Wanda E. Brazell, Admin. Assistant III, Fla. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Div. of Risk Mgmt., Of-
fice of the Dir., to author (Sept. 24, 2014, 12:08 PST) (on file with author) (reporting total
casualty premiums of $5,376,481.30 for fiscal year 11–12, $6,983,455 for fiscal year 12–13,
and $7,554,713 for fiscal year 13–14). For information about the total amount paid from
the Risk Management Trust Fund in cases involving the Florida Highway Patrol, see id.
(reporting payments of $5,386,885.18 for fiscal year 11–12, $6,171,853.89 for fiscal year
12–13, and $5,415,271.83 for fiscal year 13–14). For information about the Florida
Highway Patrol’s budget in fiscal year 2012, see FLA. DEP’T OF HIGHWAY SAFETY &
MOTOR VEHICLES, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011–2012 8
(2012) (reporting the budget as $239,058,275 in fiscal year 2012); FLA. DEP’T OF
HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT: FISCAL
YEAR 2012–2013 6 (2013) (reporting the budget as $237,824,679 in fiscal year 2013); FLA.
DEP’T OF HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
REQUEST FISCAL YEAR 2014–15 2 (2014), http://www.flhsmv.gov/html/lbr.pdf.011415
(reporting the approved budget in fiscal year 2013–14 as $248,753,963). For the budget of
the state of Florida, see Bill Kaczor, Florida Budget Has Plenty of Pain to Go Around,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 6, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/florida-budget-plenty-pain-
around-205755348.html [http://perma.cc/2Q93-E9KQ] (reporting a 2011–2012 budget of
$69.7 billion); Jim Turner, House Passes $69.2 Billion Budget for 2012–13, SUNSHINE STATE
NEWS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/house-passes-692-billion-
budget-2012-13 [http://perma.cc/F2ZS-U268] (reporting a 2012–13 budget of $69.2 bil-
lion); Press Release, Governor Rick Scott, Governor Scott Signs Florida Families First Budget,
RICK SCOTT 45TH GOVERNOR OF FLA. (May 20, 2013), http://www.flgov.com/governor-
scott-signs-florida-families-first-budget [http://perma.cc/WY4X-9M63] (reporting a
2013–14 budget of $74.1 billion).
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IN). For information about from which budg-
et(s) settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Jason Dudich,
City-Cty. Controller, City & Cty. of Indianapolis, to author (Oct. 20, 2014, 14:42 PST)
(explaining that Indianapolis is self-insured, pays settlements and judgments in lawsuits
from a Legal Settlement Fund, and, each year, “budget[s] in the IMPD fund a payment
back to the Legal Settlement Fund based on past settlements and judgments”); Email from
Jason Dudich, City-Cty. Controller, City & Cty. of Indianapolis, to author (Oct. 23, 2014,
12:05 PST) (“Each year, IMPD budgets (with help from our office) as to how much should
be paid from the IMPD general fund to the Legal Settlements fund. During the year, that
budget is paid to the fund regardless of the settlements made throughout the year. In the
event during the year settlements are more than the amount budgeted, our office and IMPD
will work to identify surplus funds at the end of the year to cover the overage of settlements.
In some cases we are able to do that, in others we are not due to other budget issues. In the
event the amount of settlements is less than the budgeted amount, IMPD will pay the
budgeted amount, and in the next fiscal year we will adjust the budget for settlements based
on the fund balance of the Legal Settlements Fund.”). For the amount paid by the police
department to the Legal Settlement Fund, see Email from Samantha E. DeWester, Deputy
Corp. Counsel/City Prosecutor/Pub. Access Counselor Office of Corp. Counsel, City &
Cty. of Indianapolis, to author (May 6, 2015, 9:03 PST) (on file with author) (reporting
payments from the Police Department to the Legal Settlement Fund of $1,445,000 in fiscal
year 2012; $1,080,000 in fiscal year 2013; and $2,300,000 in fiscal year 2014). For the
1266 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the police department from the Legal
Settlement Fund, see Email from Samantha E. DeWester, Deputy Corp. Counsel/City
Prosecutor/Pub. Access Counselor Office of Corp. Counsel, City & Cty. of Indianapolis, to
author (Oct. 22, 2014, 8:19 PST) (on file with author) (reporting payments of
$1,848,572.43 in fiscal year 2012, and $3,929,253.37 in fiscal year 2013); Email from Sa-
mantha E. DeWester, Deputy Corp. Counsel/City Prosecutor/Pub. Access Counselor, Of-
fice of Corp. Counsel, City & Cty. of Indianapolis, to author (May 12, 2015, 9:22 PST) (on
file with author) (reporting payments of $1,355,496 in 2014). For the budget of the Indian-
apolis Police Department, see INDIANAPOLIS-MARION CTY, CITY-CTY. COUNCIL, 2014
ADOPTED BUDGET FOR THE CONSOLIDATED CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, MARION CTY.
(2013), http://www.indy.gov/eGov/City/OFM/SiteAssets/Pages/home/2014%20 Adopt-
ed%20BB%20-%20FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/29S4-VR4J] (reporting that the Police
Department budget was $192,008,827 in fiscal year 2012; $202,543,151 (adopted) in fiscal
year 2013; and $200,363,922 (adopted) in fiscal year 2014). For the budget of the consoli-
dated city of Indianapolis and Marion County, see id. (reporting 2012 budget of
$1,027,723,145; 2013 budget of $1,045,249,522.00; and 2014 budget of $999,037,228.00).
Prince George’s County Police (MD). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Ivy L. Kline, Admin.
Assistant, Office of Fin., Prince George’s Cty., to author (Oct. 17, 2014, 7:25 PST) (on file
with author) (“The Risk Management Fund is funded, in part, by charges made directly to
County agencies. This is accomplished through a blended Fringe Benefit rate assigned to
each County agency’s annual appropriation. In that manner, the Police Department con-
tributes to the Risk Management Fund, as there is an assigned Fringe Benefit cost in their
annual budget.”). For the total amount contributed by the Prince George’s County Police
into the Risk Management Fund, see Email from Ivy L. Kline, Admin. Assistant, Office of
Fin., Prince George’s Cty., to author (Nov. 18, 2014, 13:32 PST) (on file with author)
(“The County Police Department’s contribution to the Risk Management Fund for fis-
cal years 2012, 2013 and 2014 was $11,111,486, $10,185,174 and $10,353,768 respec-
tively . . . .”). For the amount paid from the Risk Management Fund in cases involving the
Prince George’s County Police in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (“Loss amount
payments made by the Risk Management Fund on behalf of the Police Department for Au-
tomobile Liability Bodily Injury and Property Damage and General Liability claims was
$5,930,178 in fiscal year 2012, $4,246,566 in fiscal year 2013, $1,286,254 in fiscal year
2014.”). For the total Prince George’s County Police Department budget in fiscal years
2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (“The total budget amount of the Police Department for
fiscal years 2012, 2013 and 2014 was $257,560,200, $258,844,600 and $272,551,800
respectively.”). For the total budget of Prince George’s County, see OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OVERVIEW 1 (2013), http://www.princegeorges coun-
tymd.gov/sites/OMB/Resources/Budget2014/Documents/OMB_FY14ApprovedBud
get_overview_Sept2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/A42Y-TF4D] (reporting county expend-

itures of $3,124,774,568 in fiscal year 2012; $3,227,906,700 in fiscal year 2013 (esti-
mated); and $3,262,914,200 in fiscal year 2014 (approved)).
Ohio State Highway Patrol (OH). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Paul A. Russell, Chief Legal
Counsel, Dep’t of Admin. Servs., to author (Oct. 20, 2014, 14:48 PST) (on file with author)
(“Vehicle related claims are paid out of a state risk fund. The Highway Patrol and other
state entities pay into this fund with money out of their budgets. Non-vehicle related liabili-
ties are paid out of the Highway Patrol/Department of Public Safety budget and if not pos-
sible out of other state funds.”); see also Email from Melissa D. Baldwin, Pub. Records
Adm’r, Ohio State Highway Patrol, to author (June 11, 2015, 10:29 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (explaining that the Ohio State Highway Patrol gets a lump sum in the annual budg-
eting process for various categories including equipment, maintenance, payroll, and legal;
the agency can transfer allotments to another line if there is a surplus; the agency does not
return to the state for additional funding for lawsuits; and funds will be taken from another
area of the budget if necessary; “[f]or example, budgeted equipment purchases may be de-
layed if there is a large settlement we must pay”). For information about the total amount
paid by the Ohio State Highway Patrol into the state risk fund for vehicle liability in fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Paul A. Russell, Chief Legal Counsel, Dep’t
of Admin. Servs., City of Columbus, to author (May 26, 2015, 14:26 PST) (on file with
author) (attaching a document reflecting that the amount paid into the risk fund was
$339,521 in fiscal year 2012, $384,820 in fiscal year 2013, and $345,500 in fiscal year
2014). For information about the total amount paid from the fund for vehicle liability
claims, see id. (reporting liability claim payouts of $98,927.39 in fiscal year 2012,
$62,671.62 in fiscal year 2013, and $114,577.05 in fiscal year 2014). For information
about the total amount paid by the Highway Patrol out of its budget to satisfy non-vehicle
related liabilities in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Benjamin E. Morris,
Customer Serv. Manager, Cent. Records, Ohio State Highway Patrol, to author (Nov. 4,
2014, 7:51 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the amount paid was $22,850.94 in
fiscal year 2012, $4,473.64 in fiscal year 2013, and $163,429.31 in fiscal year 2014). For in-
formation about the total Highway Patrol budget in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see
id. (reporting that the budget was $260,744,934 in fiscal year 2012, $258,365,903 in fiscal
year 2013, and $268,743,502 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the budget of the
State of Ohio, see TIMOTHY S. KEEN, OHIO OFFICE OF BUDGET & MGMT., THE JOBS
BUDGET: TRANSFORMING OHIO FOR GROWTH (2011), http://obm.ohio.gov/ Budg-
et/operating/doc/fy-12-13/bluebook/Book3-Budget_Summary-FY2012-2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8R6G-M975] (reporting a fiscal year 2012 budget of
$59,359,981,626.00); OHIO OFFICE OF BUDGET & MGMT., OHIO’S JOBS BUDGET 2.0:
BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 26 (2013), http://obm.ohio.gov/Budget/operating/doc/fy-14-
1268 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
15/bluebook/budget/Highlights_14-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/C9D4-FFSA] (reporting a

fiscal year 2013 budget of $60,024,779,508.00 and a fiscal year 2014 budget of
$63,700,346,075.00).
Memphis Police Department (TN). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Richard B. Campbell, Budget
Manager, City of Memphis, to author (Oct. 21, 2014) (on file with author) (“Our City
Budget plans for potential judgments and assigns an appropriate amount to the respective
Divisions each year based on past experience averages, and potential known cases that may
settle in the budget year . . . . Therefore Police has a ‘claims and lawsuits’ budget for the
payment of settlements. If the budget is insufficient the Division will return to Council to
request additional funds which will come from reserves or from other Divisions[] whose
claims or other expenditures are tracking to be below budget . . . . We changed to the alloca-
tion to specific divisions because it gave the Divisions more perspective of what they were
costing and perhaps heightened their efforts for prevention or changes if in order.”). For in-
formation about the total budget of the Memphis Police Department in fiscal years 2012,
2013, and 2014, see CITY OF MEMPHIS, 2013 FISCAL YEAR OPERATING BUDGET 269
(reporting that the budget was $221,557,306 in fiscal year 2012 and $232,609,495 in fiscal
year 2013); CITY OF MEMPHIS, 2015 FISCAL YEAR OPERATING BUDGET 229 (reporting
that the budget was $234,055,868 in fiscal year 2014). Repeated requests for information
about the amount spent on settlements and judgments involving the Memphis Police De-
partment went unanswered.
Denver Police Department (CO). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Brendan J. Hanlon, Budget &
Mgmt. Off., to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 14:23 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that
Denver is self-insured and that “claims are paid out of the City’s General Fund budget and
are not appropriated in the police department’s budget”). For information about the total
amount paid for judgments and settlements involving the Denver Police Department in fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Nikki Holmlund, Dir. of Admin., City Attor-
ney’s Off., City & Cty. of Denver, to author (May 5, 2015, 13:36 PST) (on file with author)
(attaching spreadsheet reflecting payments of $155,000 in fiscal year 2012; $437,634.20 in
fiscal year 2013; and $365,000 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of
the Denver Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (reporting the po-
lice department budget to be $187,686,000 in fiscal year 2012; $196,962,557 in fiscal year
2013; and $208,708,800 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of the
City and County of Denver in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (reporting the total
budget for the City and County of Denver to be $2,100,832,000 in fiscal year 2012;
$2,161,880,000 in fiscal year 2013; and $2,273,066,000 in fiscal year 2014).
Austin Police Department (TX). For information about from which budget(s) settlements and
judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Meghan Riley, Div.
Chief, Litig., City of Austin Law Dep’t (Oct. 18, 2013) (reporting that the money for law-
suits is paid out of a liability reserve fund that is part of the city’s budget and is funded
through individual department budget contributions); Telephone Interview with Katie Za-
mesnik, Bus. Process Consultant, Fin. Servs. Office, City of Austin (Oct. 22, 2014) (explain-
ing that, prior to fiscal year 2015, expenses were budgeted at the fund level and that, as of
fiscal year 2015, these costs were moved to the department level so that the government can
see what it has given to the police department to contribute to the city’s liability fund, but that
if the liabilities for the police department are more costly than the amount it contributed, the
remainder will be taken from the liability reserve fund instead of the police department’s op-
erating budget); see also Email from Kim Euresti, Controller’s Office, City of Austin, to au-
thor (June 9, 2015, 8:23 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that the required payments
from each department are made “based on an estimate of anticipated costs for claims each
year” which is “determined by the fund’s historical costs (or the prior three-year claim expens-
es) . . . .”); Email from Jamie Atkinson, Senior Budget Analyst, City of Austin, to author
(June 8, 2015, 14:28 PST) (on file with author) (“[O]nce the fund’s needs are calculated by
the Controller’s Office, that information is distributed to the relevant departments (including
APD) and the funding is added to their budget during the annual budget development pro-
cess. The departments are not tasked with finding the funding for what we consider ‘corpo-
rate’ or Citywide allocations.”). For information about the total amount paid by the Austin
Police Department to the Liability Reserve Fund, see Letter from Sandra Campbell, Admin.
Specialist, Controller’s Office, to author (Oct. 7, 2014) (on file with author) (explaining that
the amount paid “was set at the General Fund level prior to 2015 and no amount was specifi-
cally identif[i]ed with any General Fund department including the Austin Police Depart-
ment”). For information about the total amount paid out of the Liability Reserve Fund in
cases involving the Austin Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id.
(reporting that the amount paid out of the Fund was $251,934.58 in fiscal year 2012,
$176,991.54 in fiscal year 2013, and $2,942,534.74 in fiscal year 2014). For information
about the total budget of the Austin Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014,
see id. (reporting that the budget was $282,997,317 in fiscal year 2012, $301,024,790 in fiscal
year 2013, and $308,117,602 in fiscal year 2014). For information about Austin’s budget, see
MARC A. OTT, CITY OF AUSTIN, 2011–12 APPROVED BUDGET 5 (2011),
https://assets.austintexas.gov/budget/11-12/downloads/ fy12_approved_ volume1. pdf
[http://perma.cc/R68Y-JJPN] (reporting a fiscal year 2011–2012 budget of
$2,793,639,000.00); MARC A. OTT, CITY OF AUSTIN, 2013–14 APPROVED BUDGET 4
(2013), https://assets.austintexas.gov/budget/13-14/downloads/fy14_approved_volume_
I.pdf [http://perma.cc/7TM4-NNRB] (reporting a fiscal year 2012–2013 budget of
$3,145,422,000.00, and a fiscal year 2013–2014 budget of $3,270,528,000.00).
Fort Worth Police Department (TX). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Aaron J. Bovos, Chief
1270 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
Fin. Officer, Dep’t of Fin. Mgmt. Servs., to author (Sept. 18, 2014, 15:32 PST) (on file
with author) (reporting that “[s]ettlements and judgments in cases brought against the City
of Fort Worth’s Police Department and [its] officers are paid out of the City’s Risk Man-
agement Fund” and “[t]he City has an internal service fund where costs are apportioned to
all funds and operating units based upon past activity” and noting that they have outside in-
surance for some types of claims, but police misconduct cases are not included); Email from
Aaron J. Bovos, Chief Fin. Officer, Dep’t of Fin. Mgmt. Servs., to author (Sept. 19, 2014,
14:33 PST) (on file with author) (clarifying that the amounts paid into the Risk Manage-
ment Fund to cover police liability are paid from the General Fund and the Crime Control
Prevention District, not the Police Department budget—“it is calculated at the fund level
versus the department level”). For the amount spent in settlements and judgments involving
the Fort Worth Police Department, see Email from John Butkus, Acting Assistant Dir.,
Treasury & Risk Mgmt., City of Fort Worth, to author (July 27, 2015, 7:23 PST) (on file
with author) (attaching spreadsheet reflecting $1,234,578 paid in fiscal year 2012; $738,514
paid in fiscal year 2013, and $793,627 paid in fiscal year 2014). For the total budget of the
Fort Worth Police, see CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEX., FISCAL YEAR 2014 ADOPTED
ANNUAL BUDGET AND PROGRAM OBJECTIVES E-48 (2013) http://fortworthtexas.gov/
uploadedFiles/Budget_and_Management_Services/FY2014/FY2014_AdoptedBudget.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V3XX-6] (reporting police department expenditures of $195,765,003 in
fiscal year 2012; $199,787,614 in fiscal year 2013; and $204,225,440 in fiscal year 2014).
For the total budget of the City of Fort Worth, see Butkus, supra (reflecting total budgets of
$1,213,893,013 in fiscal year 2012, $1,252,602,228 in fiscal year 2013, and $1,267,401,900
New Orleans Police Department (LA). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Norman S. Foster, Dir.
of Fin., City of New Orleans, to author (Sept. 22, 2014, 9:00 PST) (on file with author)
(“The Law department has a budget for claims and judgments each year. The level of
claims and judgments in any given year may exceed the budgeted amount.”). For infor-
mation about the amount paid in lawsuits involving the New Orleans Police Department
and its officers, see Letter from Anita B. Curran, Assistant City Att’y, City of New Orleans
Law Dep’t (May 5, 2015) (on file with author) (explaining that there are “no records re-
sponsive” to my request for “records or information reflecting the amount spent by the city
for settlements and judgments in cases involving the New Orleans Police Department
and/or its officers for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014” and that, “[i]n order for the Law
Department to fulfill your request, the Department must research its files and resources to
pull together the information your requested”—something not required by the Public Rec-
ords Law). For information about the total budget of the New Orleans Police Department,
see ANDREW D. KOPPLIN, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, 2012 ANNUAL OPERATING
BUDGET 236 (2011) (reporting that the budget was $128,528,462 in fiscal year 2012);
ANDREW D. KOPPLIN, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, 2013 ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET

235 (2012) (reporting that the budget was $133,358,687 in fiscal year 2013); ANDREW D.
KOPPLIN, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, 2014 ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET 244 (2013) (re-
porting that the budget was $135,319,253 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the
total budget of the City of New Orleans, see KOPPLIN, 2012 ANNUAL OPERATING
BUDGET, supra, at 69 (reporting that the budget was $876,252,797 in fiscal year 2012);
KOPPLIN, 2013 ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET, supra, at 55 (2012) (reporting that the
budget was $835,169,987 in fiscal year 2013); KOPPLIN, 2014 ANNUAL OPERATING
BUDGET, supra, at 88 (reporting that the budget was $837,516,571 in fiscal year 2014).
Kansas City Police Department (MO). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Virginia H. Murray,
Gen. Counsel, Off. of Gen. Counsel, Kansas City, Mo. Police Dep’t, to author (May 17,
2015, 10:50 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the Department makes a budgeting
request early in the budget cycle; when it receives its budget it “line-items the money re-
ceived” and, as part of that process, funds a Department risk management account dictated
by the Department); id. (explaining that the state is additionally required to fund the
Department “1 million per fiscal year to pay for judgments, settlements, and compromis-
ing of claims”); id. (reporting that the Department has “to [her] knowledge, never gone
back to the City for additional funding to pay for a judgment or settlement”); id. (ex-
plaining that their funding and payment of claims “is different from every other agency
in the country”); Email from Virginia H. Murray, Gen. Counsel, Office of Gen. Coun-
sel, Kansas City, Mo. Police Dep’t, to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 18:30 PST) (on file with
author) (reporting that the department makes decisions about whether and when to set-
tle and for what amount); Email from Virginia H. Murray, Gen. Couns., Off. of Gen.
Couns., Kansas City, Mo. Police Dep’t, to author (Sept. 13, 2014, 13:09 PST) (on file
with author) (“The PD submits letters each quarter to the State requesting reimburse-
ment from the 1 million. If the 1 million isn’t spent in a given year it doesn’t ‘roll over’ to
the next year. Likewise there is no ‘borrowing’ against the next year’s 1 million.”); see also
Email from Scott M. Huizenga, Budget Officer, Budget Div., Fin., City of Kansas City,
Mo., to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 10:50 PST) (on file with author) (“[J]udgments and set-
tlements against KCPD are paid from the KCPD budget. Occasionally, the General
Fund of the City also may contribute to a judgment or settlement if the City is an addi-
tional defendant.”). For information about the total amount paid from the KCPD’s
budget in settlements and judgments involving the KCPD and/or its officers in fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Virginia H. Murray, Gen. Counsel, Off. of
Gen. Counsel, Kansas City, Mo. Police Dep’t, to author (Nov. 5, 2014, 8:55 PST) (re-
porting that the amount paid from the KCPD’s budget was $4,269,595.12 in fiscal year
2012, $1,316,332.44 in fiscal year 2013, and $2,282,331.96 in fiscal year 2014). For in-
formation about the total budget of the KCPD in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see
1272 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
id. (reporting that the budget was $220,400,836 in fiscal year 2012, $213,840,903 in fis-
cal year 2013, and $223,690,546 in fiscal year 2014).
San Jose Police Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Tamara Becker, Open Gov’t
Manager, City of San Jose, City Manager’s Office, to author (Sept. 11, 2014, 13:05 PST)
(on file with author) (reporting that San Jose is self-insured and “everything is paid out of
City’s General Fund”). For the total amount paid in lawsuits involving the San Jose Po-
lice Department, see Email from Tamara Becker, Open Gov’t Manager, City of San Jo-
se, to author (May 26, 2015, 12:08 PST) (on file with author) (attaching documents
reflecting that in payments made between July 1, 2012–May 6, 2015, payouts in civil
rights claims totaled $8,162,005.95; payouts in vehicle operation claims totaled
$1,480,200.06; payments in property damage claims totaled $17,459.20; and payouts in
miscellaneous claims totaled $37,570.89). For the budgets of the City of San Jose and
the San Jose Police Department, see CITY OF SAN JOSE, 2013–2014 ADOPTED
BUDGET IN BRIEF 3 (2013), https://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/23407
[http://perma.cc/BX4Y-7WBV] (reporting a 2014 adopted city budget of $2,912,584,930
and police department budget of $306,848,315); CITY OF SAN JOSE, 2012–2013
ADOPTED BUDGET IN BRIEF 3 (2012) https://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/
View/7230 [http://perma.cc/2G9K-MJZC] (reporting a 2013 adopted city budget of
$2,776,921,846 and police department budget of $294,752,941); CITY OF SAN JOSE,
2011–2012 ADOPTED BUDGET IN BRIEF 3 (2011), https://www.sanjoseca.gov/ Docu-
mentCenter/View/2885 [http://perma.cc/4FMA-A2V6] (reporting a 2012 adopted city
budget of $2,843,910,564 and police department budget of $298,335,882).
Nashville-Davidson County Police Department (TN). For information about from which
budget(s) settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Mike
Safley, Deputy Dir. of Law for the Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., to author
(Sept. 25, 2014, 13:28 PST) (on file with author) (“Judgments and settlements against the
police department are not paid out of the police department operating budget. Instead, all
judgments are paid out of reserve funds which are under the control of the Department of
Law . . . . The police department does not contribute to a separate fund for the payment of
settlements and judgments. The money in the reserve funds dedicated for this purpose
come[s] from a direct appropriation from the Metropolitan Council. . . . An insurer does
not pay any part of settlements and judgments involving the police department. The Met-
ropolitan Government is self-insured.”). For information about the total amount paid from
the reserve funds in cases involving the Nashville-Davidson Police Department in fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Mike Safley, Deputy Dir. of Law for the
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., to author (Sept. 29, 2014, 6:35 PST) (on
file with author) (reporting that the amount paid from the reserve funds for suits involv-
ing the police was $254,087.99 in fiscal year 2012, $1,098,240.00 in fiscal year 2013, and
$208,539.94 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of the Nashville-
Davidson Police Department, see METRO. NASHVILLE / DAVIDSON CTY., FY 2015
RECOMMENDED BUDGET E-31-1 (2014), http://www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/ SiteCon-
tent/Finance/docs/OMB/FY15/31_Police_Department_At_a_glance.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L339-EXVL] (reporting that the police department budget was
$172,789,100 for fiscal year 2012–13; $178,889,700 for fiscal year 2013–14; and
$178,289,100 for fiscal year 2014–15). For information about the total budget of Nashville-
Davidson County, see THE METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CTY., FISCAL
YEAR 2012–2013 OPERATING BUDGET A-4 (2012), http://www.nashville.gov/ Por-
tals/0/SiteContent/Finance/docs/OMB/citizens_budget/budgetbook/fy13/fy13_final_bud
get.pdf [http://perma.cc/2YFY-TWJ6] (reporting that the Nashville-Davidson County
budget was $1,585,778,700 for fiscal year 2012); THE METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE &
DAVIDSON CTY., OPERATING BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013–2014 A-4 (2013),
http://www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/Finance/docs/OMB/fy14Budget/Fiscal%
20Year%202014%20Operating%20Budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/DG5T-TUS6] (reporting
that the Nashville-Davidson County budget was $1,709,493,100 for fiscal year 2013 and
$1,812,431,500 for fiscal year 2014).
Newark Police Department (NJ). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Susan Jacobucci, Fin. Dir., City
of Newark, to author (Oct. 10, 2013, 7:12 PST) (on file with author) (“General litigation
matters that are insurable are taken from the insurance trust. Rarely, in New Jersey are set-
tlements taken from a police budget—you can’t anticipate it as an appropriation . . . .
[O]verall, no the police department budget does not feel an impact.”); Telephone Interview
with Jerome Morgan, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, City of Newark (Apr. 30, 2015) (ex-
plaining that the “insurance trust” is a category of funding the city uses for its budgeting
practice, and confirming that settlements come out of the police department’s funds when
they are personnel matters and if they are resolved within two years of filing). My efforts to
obtain records about payments in lawsuits involving the Newark Police Department have
been “long and fruitless.” See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1000.
Seattle Police Department (WA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Sara O’Connor-Kriss, Assis-
tant City Att’y, Gov’t Affairs, Seattle City Attorney’s Office, to author (Oct. 14, 2013,
13:10 PST) (on file with author) (“SMC 5.24.010 established a citywide Judgment/Claims
Subfund (JCF) for payment of authorized judgments, claims, advance payment claims, and
litigation expenses. Cost recovery for JCF expenditures (settlements/judgments/expenses)
incurred on behalf of SPD and other general fund supported departments is based on pre-
miums charged to individual general fund departments. Premiums are calculated based on
the average percentage of judgments, settlements and other eligible expenses incurred by
each department over the previous five years. This calculation is done each year and each
1274 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
general fund department is responsible for funding its proportionate share of the expected
payments in the upcoming budgeted year. In sum, to answer your question, settlements and
judgments don’t come directly from SPD’s operating funds, but there is a financial impact
on the department as explained above.”); see also Email from Susan E. Williams, Paralegal,
Seattle City Attorney’s Office, to author (May 26, 2015, 14:15 PST) (“[T]he money that
the department must contribute to the central fund is allocated during the budget process.
Also, any increase in premiums is accommodated [by] an increased budget for the depart-
ment.”). For the amount contributed by the Seattle Police Department into the citywide
Judgment/Claims Subfund, see Email from Marcia Nelson, Dir., Torts Section, Seattle
City Attorney’s Office, to author (Jan. 28, 2015, 15:25 PST) (on file with author) (reporting
contributions by the Police Department to the Fund amounting to $2,518,530 in fiscal year
2012; $2,294,273 in fiscal year 2013; and $2,400,777 in fiscal year 2014). For the total
amount paid from the Judgment Claims Fund in cases involving the Seattle Police Depart-
ment, see id. (reporting $2,362,715.33 in fiscal year 2012; $5,836,842.51 in fiscal year 2013;
$2,006,827.02 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total budget of the Seattle
Police Department, see CITY OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 2012 ADOPTED BUDGET
381 (2012) http://www.seattle.gov/financedepartment/12adoptedbudget/documents/
2012AdoptedBudget_002.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PMN-TDZQ] (reporting that the
budget was $252,217,249 in 2012); CITY OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 2014 ADOPTED
BUDGET 328 (2014), http://www.seattle.gov/financedepartment/14adoptedbudget/
documents/2014AdoptedBudgetBook.pdf [http://perma.cc/9SGU-9B98] (reporting
that the budget was $263,085,780 in 2013 and $288,667,732 in 2014). For information
about the Seattle city budget, see id. at 44 (reporting an adopted budget of $4,410,464,000
in 2014; and $4,066,826,000 in 2013); CITY OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 2012 ADOPTED
BUDGET, supra, at 49 (reporting an adopted budget of $3,887,680,000 in 2012).
Montgomery County Police Department (MD). For information about from which budget(s)
settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Patricia P. Via,
Chief, Div. of Litig., Montgomery Cty. Attorney’s Office, to author (Oct. 7, 2013, 11:29
PST) (on file with author) (“If there is a claim against any county employee, including a po-
lice officer, and we settle or there is a judgment arising out of actions within the scope of
employment, the money comes from the County’s self-insurance fund—not the police de-
partment’s budget or the general fund. So there is no impact on the police department’s
budget.”). For the total amount paid in lawsuits involving the Montgomery County Po-
lice Department, see Email from Patricia P. Via, Chief, Div. of Litig., Montgomery Cty.
Attorney’s Office, to author (May 11, 2015, 6:01 PST) (on file with author) (reporting
payouts of $109,010 in fiscal year 2012, $30,000 in fiscal year 2013, and $587,000 in fiscal
year 2014). For the Montgomery County Police Department Budget, see OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, FY14 OPERATING BUDGET AND PUBLIC SERVICES PROGRAM,
3-169 (2014), http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/OMB/Resources/Files/omb/
pdfs/fy14/ psp_pdf/pol.pdf [http://perma.cc/3AMJ-32ZX] (reporting total expenditures

as $236,757,642 in fiscal year 2012, $250,599,471 (budgeted) in fiscal year 2013, and
$260,594,650 (approved) in fiscal year 2014). For the total Montgomery County budget,
see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FY 2012 BUDGET 6 (2012), http://www.montgomery
countymd.gov/OMB/Resources/Files/omb/pdfs/fy12/psprec/psp-highlights.pdf
[http://perma.cc/227H-866U] (reporting $4.4 billion total operating budget for fiscal year
2012); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FY 2013 BUDGET 10 (2013), http://
www.montgomerycountymd.gov/OMB/Resources/Files/omb/pdfs/fy13/psp_pdf/psp_hig
hlights.pdf [http://perma.cc/WC9N-GU2J] (reporting total expenditures as
$4,612,300,000 in fiscal year 2013); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FY 2014 BUDGET
(2014), http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/OMB/Resources/Files/omb/pdfs/fy14/
psp_pdf/psp_highlights-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8VA-9LWS] (reporting total expendi-
tures as $4,811,200,000 in fiscal year 2014).
Louisville Metro Police Department (KY). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Leslie Faust, Risk
Manager, Louisville Metro Gov’t, to author (Oct. 22, 2014, 14:37 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (explaining that “[c]laims, settlements and judgments are principally paid through a
Risk Fund in the Office of Management and Budget,” that the Louisville Metro Police De-
partment “contribute[s] a specified amount per unit from their budget to the Risk Fund . . .
based upon actuarial recommendations,” and that “Louisville Metro Government partici-
pates in a self-insurance trust. Metro pays claims within its retained limit and the trust pays
for their portion of covered claims and maintains an excess insurance policy that will re-
spond to qualifying claims within that layer as well”); Email from Leslie Faust, Risk Manag-
er, Louisville Metro Gov’t, to author (May 6, 2015, 8:04 PST) (on file with author)
(clarifying that LMPD only pays into the fund for auto liability claims, and the “[o]ther lia-
bility claims/premiums are funded principally by an allocation of Metro’s General Fund”);
see also Email from Leslie Faust, Risk Manager, Louisville Metro. Gov’t, to author (Nov. 7,
2014, 13:30 PST) (explaining that Louisville Metro’s retained limit is $500,000 per occur-
rence). For the total paid in lawsuits involving the police, see id. (reporting $1,504,101 paid
in fiscal year 2012; $9,201,958 paid in fiscal year 2013; and $2,590,648 paid in fiscal year
2014). For the amount paid from the Police Department into the fund, see id. (reporting
that “LMPD has paid $2,137,256, $2,168,483, and $2,425,250 into the fund for auto liabil-
ity for [f]iscal years 12, 13 and 14 respectively”). For the Louisville Metro Police Depart-
ment Budget, see CITY OF LOUISVILLE, FISCAL YEAR 2013–2014 LOUISVILLE METRO
GOVERNMENT DETAIL BUDGET 45 (2013), https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/files/
management_budget/fy14budget/fy14-approveddetailbudget.pdf [http://perma.cc/7U45-
XEBF] (reporting total expenditures in fiscal year 2012 at $157,107,200; $156,749,700 (ap-
proved) in fiscal year 2013; $157,350,300 (approved) in fiscal year 2014). I spoke with
someone in the government about the allocation of money in the risk fund, but s/he was
1276 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
unwilling to comment on the record. For the Louisville Metro budget, see CITY OF
LOUISVILLE, FY 2011–2012 METRO LOUISVILLE EXECUTIVE BUDGET 22 (2011),
https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/files/management_budget/fy12budget/fy12_metro_lou
isville_executive_budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/GN3C-YPGC] (reporting a 2011–12 fiscal
year budget of $682,061,900); CITY OF LOUISVILLE, METRO GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS BUDGET SUMMARY 1 (2013), https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/files/
management_budget/fy13budget/10_-_lmg_budget_summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/
GN3C-YPGC] (reporting a 2012–13 fiscal year budget of $678,951,100.00); CITY OF
LOUISVILLE, METRO GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS BUDGET SUMMARY 1 (2014),
https://louisvilleky.gov/sites/default/files/management_budget/fy14budget/18__metro_gov
ernment_operations.pdf [http://perma.cc/XXN9-CX5G] (reporting a fiscal year 2013–14
budget of $666,463,200).
El Paso Police Department (TX). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with
Laura Prendergast Gordon, Deputy City Att’y, City of El Paso (Oct. 22, 2014) (on
file with author) (explaining that the City Attorney’s office pays settlements and
judgments in lawsuits from its budget and receives no contribution from the police de-
partment for those settlements and judgments, and when settlements or judgments ex-
ceed the amount in its budget the city council will pull the money from another fund).
For the total amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the El Paso Police
Department, see Email from Laura Prendergast Gordon, Deputy City Att’y, City of
El Paso, to author (July 15, 2015, 13:16 PST) (on file with author) (attaching a report
reflecting payouts totaling $961,655.15 for general liability in fiscal year 2014 and
$86,704.40 for auto damages in fiscal year 2014; $78,803.42 for general liability in fiscal
year 2013; and $224,844.95 for general damages in fiscal year 2012). Note that auto dam-
ages payouts were unavailable for fiscal years 2012 and 2013; in calculating average annual
payouts I have assumed that equal amounts were paid in auto damages each of the three
years in the study. For the budget of the El Paso Police Department, see Email from
Robert Cortinas, Dir. of Mgmt. and Budget, City of El Paso, to author (July 21, 2015,
11:27 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the police department budget was
$112,478,238 in fiscal year 2012, $116,626,014 in fiscal year 2013, and $122,544,024
in fiscal year 2014). For the total budget of the city of El Paso, see id. (reporting city
budget of $714,834,193 in fiscal year 2012, $756,804,795 in fiscal year 2013, and
$801,421,321 in fiscal year 2014).
Cincinnati Police Department (OH). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Monica Morton, Super-
vising Accountant, City of Cincinnati (Oct. 25, 2014, 9:57 PST) (on file with author) (“The
City of Cincinnati has a nondepartmental budget that is appropriated annually for all litiga-
tions against the City, not specific to an individual department, but is used for litigations
citywide. Therefore, any litigations against the Cincinnati Police Department are not taken
out of the CPD budget. The Cincinnati Police Department does not contribute to a central
fund that pays settlements and judgments. There is no insurer that pays any cost as well.”).
For the total amount paid in lawsuits involving the Cincinnati Police Department in fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Peter J. Stackpole, Chief Counsel, Civil Div.,
City of Cincinnati, to author (May 6, 2015, 13:00 PST) (on file with author) (reporting
payouts of $421,253 in fiscal year 2012, $88,750 in fiscal year 2013, and $127,000 in fiscal
year 2014). For the budget of the Cincinnati Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013,
and 2014, see CITY OF CINCINNATI, OHIO, FISCAL YEARS 2014–2015 ALL FUNDS
BUDGET, VOLUME 1: APPROVED BIENNIAL BUDGET 311 (2014), http://www.cincinnati-
oh.gov/finance/linkservid/D596245D-C95F-181D-7680A98A139D85C9/showMeta/0
(reporting that the Police Department budget was $135,873,350 in fiscal year 2012;
$68,827,630 in fiscal year 2013; and $125,981,850 (approved) in fiscal year 2014). For the
budget of the City of Cincinnati, see id. at 90 (reporting that the City budget was
$946,805,050 in fiscal year 2012; $460,355,200 in fiscal year 2013; and $998,911,930 (ap-
proved) in fiscal year 2014). Note that in fiscal year 2013, the city changed its budgeting
calendar, such that fiscal year 2012 ran from January 1–December 31, 2012; fiscal year 2013
ran from January 1–June 30, 2013; and fiscal year 2014 ran from July 1, 2013–June 30, 2014.
See CITY OF CINCINNATI, OHIO, 2013 APPROVED ALL FUNDS STUB BUDGET (2013),
http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/finance/linkservid/BB7EA3BD-C150-0D76-90BC94
FF079AEADF/showMeta/0. As a result, in calculating total budgets and payouts I dou-
bled all figures reported for fiscal year 2013.
DeKalb County Police Department (GA). For information about from which budget(s)
settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview
with Gwendolyn Brown-Patterson, Interim Chief Fin. Officer, DeKalb Cty. (Oct.
13, 2014) (on file with author) (explaining that DeKalb County is self-insured, has a
risk management fund that is used to pay for settlements, and each department con-
tributes to that fund based on the number of employees in the department—or the
number of vehicles for auto claims—and can be raised based on claims history). For the
amount contributed by the Police Department to the risk management fund, see Email
from Gwendolyn Brown-Patterson, Interim Chief Fin. Officer, DeKalb Cty., to author
(Oct. 16, 2014, 13:37 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that $1,514,616 was con-
tributed to the fund in 2012; $2,093,465 was contributed in 2013, and $2,121,786 was
contributed in 2014 (as of September 2014)). For the amount paid from the fund in
settlements and judgments involving the Police Department, see Email from Gwen-
dolyn Brown-Patterson, Interim Chief Fin. Officer, DeKalb Cty., to author (Oct.
16, 2014, 14:28 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that the City Attorney be-
lieves settlements fall under the attorney-client privilege and so will not disclose set-
tlement amounts). For the total budget of the Police Department, see id. (reporting
1278 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
that the budget was $103,780,209 in 2012; $115,549,570 in 2013; and $119,727,579
in 2014).
Oklahoma City Police Department (OK). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Richard C. Smith,
Litig. Div. Head, Office of Mun. Counsel, City of Okla., to author (Oct. 7, 2013, 12:29
PST) (on file with author) (explaining that the payments in police cases are not taken from
the police department’s budget but are, instead, “put on the ad valorem tax roll sheets at the
end of the year” and noting that “[t]he budget for the [OCPD] comes from sales tax”). For
the total amount paid in lawsuits involving the Oklahoma City Police Department in fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Richard C. Smith, Litig. Div. Head, Office of
Mun. Counsel, City of Okla., to author (May 11, 2015, 7:11 PST) (on file with author) (re-
porting that payouts during that period, not including automobile accidents, total
$194,000); Email from Richard C. Smith, Litig. Div. Head, Office of Mun. Counsel, City
of Okla., to author (July 13, 2015, 8:37 PST) (on file with author) (reporting payments in
lawsuits and claims involving automobile accidents to total $115,083.12 in 2012;
$87,977.54 in 2013, and $210,676.07 in 2014). For the total Oklahoma City Police De-
partment Budget, see THE CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, 2013–2014 BUDGET: FOCUSED
ON PRIORITIES 329 (2013), http://www.okc.gov/finance/FY14%20Final%20 Budg-
et%20Book.pdf [http://perma.cc/7EGK-KL2R] (reporting total department expenditures
as $150,032,105 in fiscal year 2012; $185,589,375 (adopted) in fiscal year 2013; and
$197,354,900 (adopted) in fiscal year 2014). For the total Oklahoma City Budget, see id. at
68 (reporting budget as $714,556,498 in fiscal year 2012; $997,476,711 (adopted) in fiscal
year 2013; and $1,027,852,482 (adopted) in fiscal year 2014).
Tucson Police Department (AZ). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Joyce Garland, CPA, Of-
fice of Budget & Internal Audit, Program Dir., City of Tucson, to author (Sept. 22,
2014, 13:38 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that “[t]he City of Tucson is self in-
sured for its risk management programs,” that “[t]he Tucson Police Department does
contribute to a cental [sic] fund (Risk Management Internal Service Fund) that pays set-
tlements and judgment [sic]” and that the charges to each department “are dependent on
the department claim costs and the expenses….[a]n actuary is used to set rates charged to
departments”); Email from Joyce Garland, CPA, Office of Budget & Internal Audit, Pro-
gram Dir., City of Tucson, to author (May 18, 2015, 9:37 PST) (on file with author) (ex-
plaining that “[f]or the last few fiscal years, no General Fund department [including the
police department] has had to cover the increase in either the worker’s compensation or
public liability. During the budget process, a General Fund department’s budget will in-
crease or decrease depending on the change so essentially any increase in premium is ac-
commodated by an increase in the budget for that department” but noting that “[o]ther
departments funded with revenues outside of the General Fund . . . do have to adjust their
budgets either up or down depending on the annual rate charged for worker’s compensation
and public liability”). For the amount paid by the Tucson Police Department to the Risk
Management Internal Service Fund, see Email from Joyce Garland, CPA, Office of Budget
& Internal Audit, Program Dir., City of Tucson, to author (Sept. 25, 2014, 18:15 PST) (on
file with author) (reporting workers’ compensation and public liability contributions totaling
$5,709,912.55 in fiscal year 2012; $4,745,600.18 in fiscal year 2013; and $4,672,570.55 in
fiscal year 2014). For the amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the Tucson
Police Department, see Email from Allie Matthews, Risk Manager, Finance Dep’t., City of
Tucson, to author (July 17, 2015, 16:49 PST) (on file with author) (attaching spreadsheet
reflecting that the city paid $241,117.76 in fiscal year 2012; $616,080.90 in fiscal year 2013,
and $315,430.00 in fiscal year 2014). For the total budget of the Tucson Police Depart-
ment, see id. (reporting a total operating budget of $150,038,490 in fiscal year 2012;
$155,102,080 in fiscal year 2013; and $162,442,700 in fiscal year 2014). For the total City
of Tucson budget, see CITY OF TUCSON, ARIZ., FISCAL YEAR 2014: ADOPTED BUDGET
A-11 (2013), http://mygfoa.net/budgetapp/2013/TucsonAZ.pdf [http://perma.cc/AR53-
5J62] (reflecting that the adopted fiscal year 2014 budget was $1,271,800,000 and the fiscal
year 2013 adopted budget was $1,314,300,000); CITY OF TUCSON, ARIZ., FISCAL YEAR
2013: ADOPTED BUDGET A-11 (2012), http://www.tucsonaz.gov/files/budget/13book-
op.pdf [http://perma.cc/2Z22-G72S] (reflecting that the adopted budget in fiscal year 2012
was $1,338,800,000).
Albuquerque Police Department (NM). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Lou D. Hoffman, Dir.,
Dep’t of Fin, & Admin. Servs., City of Albuquerque, to author (Sept. 23, 2014, 9:07 PST)
(on file with author) (“[T]he City of Albuquerque is self-insured . . . . Settlements for claims
against the Police department are paid from the Risk Management Fund, which is funded
by annual assessments charged to each city department on the basis of their individual
claims history. The level of overall required reserves is established by an independent actu-
ary.”). For information about the amount paid by the Albuquerque Police Department to
the Risk Management Fund in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Christine
Garcia, Exec. Assistant to Lou Hoffman, to author (Oct. 9, 2014, 13:30 PST) (on file with
author) (reporting that the amount paid by the police department to the Fund was
$11,015,661 in fiscal year 2012; $11,703,968 in fiscal year 2013; and $8,082,447.00 in fiscal
year 2014). For information about the amount paid out of the Risk Management Fund in
cases involving the Albuquerque Police in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (report-
ing that the amount paid out of the Fund was $5,756,222.20 in fiscal year 2012;
$10,882,715.83 in fiscal year 2013; and $18,416,741.23 in fiscal year 2014). For infor-
mation about the total budget of the Albuquerque Police Department in fiscal years
2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (reporting that the budget was $153,899,000 in fiscal
year 2012; $155,098,000 in fiscal year 2013, and $153,213,000 in fiscal year 2014).
1280 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
For the total budget of the City of Albuquerque, see CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, FY14
APPROVED BUDGET 24 (2013), http://documents.cabq.gov/budget/fy-14-approved-
budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/4NWB-DYYC] (reporting approved budgets of
$870,614,000 in fiscal year 2014); CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, FY 2013 APPROVED
BUDGET 22 (2012), http://documents.cabq. gov/budget/fy-13-approved-budget.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F6N8-Z7FM] (reporting a $883,401,000 budget in fiscal year 2013);
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, FY/12 APPROVED BUDGET 19 (2011), http://documents.
cabq.gov/budget/fy-12-approved-budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/66AG-3KJ3] (reporting an
approved budget of $878,063,000 in fiscal year 2012).
Tampa Police Department (FL). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Michael Laperche, Risk Man-
ager, City of Tampa, Dep’t of Human Res. Risk Mgmt., to author (Sept. 10, 2014, 7:07
PST) (on file with author) (describing a self-insurance fund with an insurer paying the ex-
cess, and reporting that each department is charged for self-insurance “based on a three year
running average of losses and cost of excess insurance”); Email from Michael Laperche, Risk
Manager, City of Tampa, Dep’t of Human Res. Risk Mgmt., to author (Sept. 10, 2014,
6:55 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that the self-insurance limit is $500,000 and
that “[s]ettled general and automotive liability and workers’ compensation claims have not
exceeded the self-insured statutory limits in any of the past five years”). For information
about the total amount paid by the Tampa Police Department into the self-insurance fund,
see Email from Michael Laperche, Risk Manager, City of Tampa, Dep’t of Human Res.
Risk Mgmt., to author (Sept. 24, 2014, 8:33 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the
amount paid was $1,107,620 in fiscal year 2012; $1,898,074 in fiscal year 2013; and
$1,531,740 in fiscal year 2014 (year-to-date)). For information about the total budget of the
Tampa Police Department for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (reporting that the
budget was $150,476,806 in fiscal year 2012; $153,832,180 in fiscal year 2013; and
$148,892,908 in fiscal year 2014).
Raleigh Police Department (NC). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Dennis A. Paren,
Risk Manager, City of Raleigh, to author (Oct. 21, 2014, 12:03 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (“Monies to pay settlements and judgments for all departments are charged to the
Risk Management liability reserve accounts for the City’s self-insurance program. . . .
The amount charged to the Police Department, as well as to all other major departments,
for expected (budgeted) general liability, auto liability and workers compensation claims,
varies each year and is calculated annually by a global accounting firm through an actuarial
valuation . . . . Should a department have a particularly large (out of the norm) claim settle-
ment in the current year, that event will adversely impact the actuary’s estimate of the
amount that department should be charged in future years. The actuary focuses on the last
six years of actual experience, so any one bad year is smoothed by taking six years and not
just one year of experience into account. . . . [In the event of] an increase in the actuaries’
estimate of losses [for a department], they receive an identical dollar for dollar credit (from
the General Fund) for the charge they receive from Risk Management.”). For information
about the amount charged to the police department for Risk Management, see Email from
Dennis A. Paren, Risk Manager, City of Raleigh, to author (May 1, 2015, 12:39 PST) (on
file with author) (reporting risk management charges paid by the police department
amounting to $1,552,784 in fiscal year 2012; $2,309,214 in fiscal year 2013; and $2,290,037
in fiscal year 2014). For the total paid in police department claims, see id. (reporting general
liability claims and auto liability claims totaling $125,815 in fiscal year 2012; $109,481 in
fiscal year 2013; and $70,567 in fiscal year 2014). For the total budget of the Raleigh Police
Department, see id. (reporting the police department budget to be $86,075,053 in fiscal year
2012; $87,968,371 in fiscal year 2013; and $90,528,382 in fiscal year 2014). For the total
budget of the City of Raleigh, see CITY OF RALEIGH ADOPTED BUDGET 2013–2014 B-2
(2013), http://www.raleighnc.gov/content/extra/Books/BudgetManagement/FY2014
Budget [http://perma.cc/XNB9-SPEF] (reporting adopted budgets of $707,834,774 in fis-
cal year 2014; $672,053,702 in fiscal year 2013; and $663,273,744 in fiscal year 2012).
Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office (CA). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Sharon Hymes-
Offord, Risk Manager, Contra Costa Cty., to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 10:11 PST) (on file
with author) (“The County is self-insured for up to $1 million dollars for General Liability
losses, sums beyond that are covered [by] our Reinsurer via a Joint Powers Association that
we are a member of with several other Counties and public entities.”); Email from Sharon
Hymes-Offord, Risk Manager, Contra Costa Cty., to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 9:54 PST) (on
file with author) (“[A]ny payments for losses for the Sheriff’s Department come from Con-
tra Costa County’s General Fund as the Sheriff is not a revenue generating department.
The insurance premium and administrative fees are taken from the General Fund and
placed into the Internal Service Fund to cover losses and insurance premiums for the Self
Insured and Excess Insurance costs.”). For information about the amount spent in settle-
ments and judgments involving the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office, see Email from
Sharon Hymes-Offord, Risk Manager, Contra Costa Cty., to author (May 6, 2015, 10:41
PST) (on file with author) (reporting a total of $602,747.67 spent in fiscal years 2012–
2014). For the budget of the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office, see CTY. OF CONTRA
COSTA, RECOMMENDED BUDGET 2013–2014 B-295 (2013), http://www.co.contra-
costa.ca.us/DocumentCenter/View/25916 [http://perma.cc/4XFZ -BWUA] (reflecting
total expenditures of $187,796,491 in fiscal year 2012, $193,410,582 in fiscal year 2013,
and a recommended budget of $207,462,131 in fiscal year 2014). For the total Contra
Costa County budget, see CTY. OF CONTRA COSTA, RECOMMENDED BUDGET 2015–
2016 vii (2015), http://ca-contracostacounty2.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/View/
35919 [http:// perma.cc/3NR9-BDDQ] (reflecting expenditures of $1,172,000,000 in
1282 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
fiscal year 2012; $1,193,000,000 in fiscal year 2013; and $1,248,000,000 in fiscal year
2014).
Polk County Sheriff’s Office (FL). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Jason A. Reuter, Associate
Staff Att’y, Polk Cty. Sheriff’s Office, to author (June 23, 2015, 6:26 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (explaining that settlements are paid from the County’s general fund and that pay-
ments impact the sheriff’s budget only to the extent that “[m]ore claims and lawsuits may
result in less [money] available in the general fund to be used for other expenditures, includ-
ing that of the Sheriff’s Office.”). For information about the amount spent in settlements
and judgments involving the Polk County Sheriff’s Office, see Email from Jason A. Reuter,
Assoc. Staff Att’y, Polk Cty. Sheriff’s Office, to author (July 1, 2015, 6:12 PST) (on file with
author) (reporting that $234,938.30 was paid in fiscal year 2012; $198,099.57 was paid in
fiscal year 2013; and $167,525.33 was paid in fiscal year 2014). For the total budget of the
Sheriff’s Office, see id. (reporting an adopted budget of $128,489,587 in fiscal year 2012;
$129,366,159 in fiscal year 2013; and $133,479,919 in fiscal year 2014). For the total budg-
et of the county, see id. (reporting a total budget of $1,332,812,964 in fiscal year 2013;
$1,307,285,766 in fiscal year 2014; and $1,260,445,237 in fiscal year 2015).
Cobb County Police Department (GA). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Robert Quigley, Dir. of
Commc’ns, Cobb Cty. Gov’t, to author (Oct. 10, 2013, 12:50 PST) (on file with author)
(reporting that payment for settlements and judgments in police cases “is taken from the
county’s general fund and does not impact funding for police operations”). My requests for
information about the amounts paid in settlements and judgments in cases involving the
Police Department went unanswered.
Minnesota State Patrol (MN). For information about from which budget(s) settlements and
judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Nancy Silkey, Major,
Headquarters, Minn. State Patrol (Sept. 10, 2014) (reporting that settlements and judg-
ments are paid out of the Minnesota State Patrol budget and that, when litigation costs are
higher, the department will have to delay hiring or cut back in other areas). For information
about the total amount paid to claimants from the Minnesota State Patrol’s budget in fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see id. (reporting that the total amount paid was $39,488 in fis-
cal year 2012; $1,754,397 in fiscal year 2013; and $4,505 in fiscal year 2014). Note that the
Minnesota State Patrol also pays the Attorney General’s costs out of its budget. See id.
For information about the total budget of the Minnesota State Patrol in fiscal years 2012,
2013, and 2014, see Email from Nancy Silkey, Major, Headquarters, Minn. State Patrol,
to author (Nov. 24, 2014, 13:33 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the budget was
$96,813,662 in fiscal year 2012; $98,776,573 in fiscal year 2013; and $97,183,133 in fiscal
year 2014). For information about Minnesota’s budget, see Doug Grow, Universally
‘Disappointing’ Deal Reached to Resolve Minnesota Government Shutdown, MINN. POST
(July 14, 2011), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2011/07/universally-

disappointing-deal-reached-resolve-minnesota-government-shutdown [http://perma.cc/
83PJ-83B3] (reporting a 2011 budget of $35.3 billion); MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET
OFFICE, END OF 2013 LEGISLATIVE SESSION, GENERAL FUND-COMPARISON TO
FEBRUARY FORECAST 2014–15 BIENNIUM (2013), http://mn.gov/mmb/images/13-fin-
leg%2520Balance% 2520Sheets.pdf [http://perma.cc/4MRY-UKBH] (reporting a fiscal
year 2013 budget of $35,441,754,000); MINN. MGMT. & BUDGET OFFICE, FY 2014–15
GENERAL FUND BUDGET FEBRUARY 2014 FORECAST (2014), http://mn.gov/mmb
/images/gen-fund-balsheets-Feb14.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UBJ-GK74] (reporting a fiscal
year 2014 budget of $39,587,382,000).
Manatee County Sheriff’s Office (FL). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Michelle
Hall (Sept. 16, 2014) (reporting that the Manatee Sheriff is insured by the Florida sheriff’s
risk management fund; the Sheriff pays annual premiums to the risk management fund for
representation and indemnification; the county pays the costs for workers’ compensation
and vehicle accidents; and the Sheriff’s Office might pay small settlements—for example,
for lost property in the jail—in some situations). For the amount paid to the fund and the
budget of the Sheriff’s Office, see Telephone Interview with Tom Salisbury, Comptroller,
Manatee Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (May 22, 2015) (reporting that his liability insurance premium
for 2016 is $638,000 and the current budget is $103,517,000 plus an additional $6 million
in federal and state grants).
Fort Wayne Police Department (IN). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Diane Brown, City of
Fort Wayne Law Dep’t, to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 8:05 PST) (on file with author) (explain-
ing that the City of Fort Wayne has a Self-Insurance Fund from which settlements and
judgments are paid); Email from Valerie Ahr, Deputy Comptroller, Civil City Accounting,
City of Fort Wayne, to Diane Brown, City of Fort Wayne Law Dep’t (Sept. 8, 2014, 12:00
PST) (on file with author) (explaining that each department contributes to that fund);
Email from Valerie Ahr, Deputy Comptroller, Civil City Accounting, City of Fort Wayne,
to author (May 17, 2015, 8:19 PST) (on file with author) (“The amount that is contributed
for the Police is determined by an actuarial firm . . . based on claims history. The amount is
included in the department’s budget and with safety of all being a consideration, the de-
partment tries to find offsets for any increases, if possible.”). For information about the to-
tal amount paid by the Fort Wayne Police Department to the Self-Insurance Fund in
fiscal years 2012, 2013 and 2014, see CITY OF FORT WAYNE, 2014 OPERATING
BUDGET 80 (2014), http://www.cityoffortwayne.org/images/stories/finance_and
_administration/controllers_office/docs/2014_budget/Police.pdf [http://perma.cc/ P36E-
VY4D] (reporting that the amount paid to the Self-Insurance Fund was $1,237,926 in
2012); THOMAS C. HENRY, CITY OF FORT WAYNE, 2015 OPERATING BUDGET 83
1284 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
(2015), http://www.cityoffortwayne.org/images/stories/2015_Budget/2015_CITY_OF_
FORT_WAYNE_BUDGET_BOOK_smartgov.pdf [http://perma.cc/P36E-VY4D]
(reporting that the amount paid to the Self-Insurance Fund was $1,344,886 in 2013 and
$1,051,695 in 2014). Officials from Fort Wayne did not respond to my requests for infor-
mation about the total amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the Fort Wayne
Police Department. For information about the total budget of the Fort Wayne Police De-
partment in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see CITY OF FORT WAYNE, 2014
OPERATING BUDGET, supra, at 81 (reporting the budget as $54,831,413 in 2012); HENRY,
supra, at 83 (reporting the budget as $54,914,179 in 2013 and $51,614,045 in 2014).
Howard County Police Department (MD). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Alexandra Bresani,
Office of Pub. Info., Howard Cty. Gov’t, to author (Oct. 10, 2013, 9:45 PST) (on file with
author) (“[T]here is an indirect cost as the County’s Risk Management fund (from which all
claims are paid) is funded by contributions from each covered agency’s budget. In determin-
ing the amount an agency will contribute, the County takes into account losses that have
been paid on claims or suits that arise from that agency’s functions.”); id. (“Infrequently,
there are cases where there may be some minor property damage but no evidence of negli-
gent or wrongful conduct (the breaching of a door, for instance) that are handled as opera-
tional matters where payment may come out of the Police Department’s budget.”); Email
from Alexandra Bresani, Office of Pub. Info., Howard Cty. Gov’t, to author (July 2, 2015,
10:16 PST) (on file with author) (“[T]he money the Department must contribute to the
central [risk] fund is allocated during the budgeting process with the county . . . [and] any
increase in premium is accommodated with an increased budget for the department; howev-
er, other things may have to be cut back if this increase impacts the bottom line.”); Email
from Raymond Wacks, Howard Cty. Budget Adm’r, to author (Sept. 22, 2014, 15:54 PST)
(explaining that “[t]he County is a member of a governmental pool (The Local Govern-
ment Insurance Trust) that serves as an excess insurer above the County’s $1,000,000 self-
insured retention” and that insurance premiums are paid from the self-insurance fund). For
information about the total amount paid by the Howard County Police Department to the
Self-Insurance Fund in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Letter from Alexandra
Bresani, Office of Pub. Info., Howard Cty. Gov’t, to author (Nov. 5, 2014) (on file with au-
thor) (reporting that the amount paid by the police department to the Fund for auto, general
liability, and property liability was $609,400 in fiscal year 2012; $604,630 in fiscal year 2013;
and $514,300 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total amount paid out of the
Self-Insurance Fund in cases involving the Howard County Police in fiscal years 2012,
2013, and 2014, see Email from Alexandra Bresani, Office of Pub. Info., Howard Cty.
Gov’t, to author (July 2, 2015, 10:18 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that Risk Man-
agement collects information for payments made for third party claims arising from acci-
dents or incidents occurring during the fiscal year, but does not have “[d]ata for payments
made during the year for all claims (without regard to date of accident) by department is not
readily available”). For information about the total budget of the Howard County Police
Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Letter from Alexandra Bresani, Office
of Pub. Info., Howard Cty. Gov’t, to author (Nov. 5, 2014) (on file with author) (reporting
that the budget was $90,354,239 in fiscal year 2012; $92,532,202 in fiscal year 2013; and
$99,888,200 in fiscal year 2014).
Summit County Sheriff’s Office (OH). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the sheriff’s office are paid, see Email from Linda
Murphy, Cty. of Summit Exec.’s Office, to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 11:58 PST) (on file
with author) (“The County does have outside insurance, however, the County must pay
the first $75,000 for each case.”); Email from Linda Murphy, Cty. of Summit Exec.’s
Office, to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 6:10 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that
“[i]nsurance premiums are paid out of the County’s general fund” and “[t]he retention
is also paid out of the County’s general fund (the County must pay the first $75,000 be-
fore the insurance will pay the remainder)”); Email from Linda Murphy, Cty. of Sum-
mit Exec.’s Office, to author (Oct. 9, 2014, 8:06 PST) (on file with author) (“The
County does not budget separately for Sheriff’s Office lawsuits. Instead, $455,000 is the
annual appropriation for lawsuits involving the County which includes other depart-
ments, not just the Sheriff’s lawsuits.”); Email from Linda Murphy, Cty. of Summit Ex-
ec.’s Office (Oct. 10, 2014, 8:32 PST) (on file with author) (“While the money is paid
from the General Fund, it still has an impact on the Sheriff’s Budget because there is less
money to allocate to the Sheriff’s Office from the General Fund. This November, there is
a ballot issue to increase the County sales tax to support the County’s general fund—with
the majority for the Sheriff’s Office.”). For information about the amount spent in set-
tlements and judgments involving the Summit County Sheriff’s Office, see Email from
Linda Murphy, Cty. of Summit Exec.’s Office (Oct. 9, 2014, 8:06 PST) (attaching
spreadsheet and explaining that in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, $400,000 was paid
in one settlement, and $75,000 was paid on two occasions for outside counsel costs).
For information about the total budget of the Summit County Sheriff’s Office, see
Email from Brian Nelsen, Dir. of Fin. & Budget, Cty. of Summit, to author (Oct. 6, 2014
10:00 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the total budget of the office was
$36,978,151 in fiscal year 2012; $38,028,669 in fiscal year 2013; and $38,498,569 in fiscal
year 2014). For the total Summit County Budget, see COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OPERATING
BUDGET 2014 51 (2013), https://co.summitoh.net/images/stories/Finance/
pdf/OperatingBudget/2014OperatingBudget.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 46ZR-QLC9] (report-
ing a budget of $478,469,500 in 2014 and $477,529,188 in 2013 (adjusted)); COUNTY OF
SUMMIT, OPERATING BUDGET 2013 53 (2012), https:// co.summitoh.net/images/stories/
Finance/pdf/OperatingBudget/2013OperatingBudget.pdf [http://perma.cc/EVS5-2SD3]
(reporting a 2012 budget of $494,997,585 (adjusted)).
1286 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
New Hampshire State Police (NH). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Thomas F. Kehr,
Adm’r, Policy & Procedures, N.H. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., to author (Sept. 12, 2014,
12:16 PST) (on file with author) (referring me to the New Hampshire code, which
provides that representation and settlement and judgment amounts are taken from pre-
viously unappropriated funds); Telephone Interview with Joe Bouchard, N.H. Budget
Office (Sept. 16, 2014) (explaining that, for any settlements or judgments, the govern-
ment draws on money not otherwise appropriated from the fund that the involved
agencies rely on for their revenues. The New Hampshire State Police is funded
through the highway fund as a matter of legislation so if there is a lawsuit involving the
troopers, the settlement will generally be paid from the highway fund. Accordingly,
these settlements and judgments do not affect the state trooper budget, but litigation
costs can affect the budget more generally.). For the total amount paid in lawsuits in-
volving the New Hampshire State Police, see Email from Karen Schlitzer, Senior As-
sistant Att’y Gen., N. H. Dep’t of Justice, to author (May 7, 2015, 13:23 PST) (on file
with author) (attaching settlements in four cases totaling $141,000). These four cases do
not include automobile-related cases; when I wrote Ms. Schlitzer asking about whether
there were payments in auto cases, her response was: “That’s all this office has.” Email from
Karen Schlitzer, Senior Assistant Att’y Gen., N.H. Dep’t of Justice, to author (May 7, 2015,
14:56 PST) (on file with author). For information about New Hampshire’s budget, see
STATE OF N.H. DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., GOVERNOR’S EXECUTIVE BUDGET
SUMMARY 17 (2014), http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/LBA/Budget/Governor's
_Executive_Budget_Summary_2014-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/FK28-8JLG] (reporting fis-
cal year 2012 budget of $4,844,170,376; fiscal year 2013 budget of $5,216,911,722; and fis-
cal year 2014 recommended budget of $5,470,221,632).
Boise Police Department (ID). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Ralph
Blount, Assistant City Att’y, Boise City Attorney’s Office (Oct. 9, 2013) (explaining
that Boise is self-insured with excess insurance for claims above $500,000, and that
the Police Department’s budget is not reduced by the amount of any settlements or
judgments). In response to my request for the total amount paid in lawsuits involving
the Boise Police Department during the study period, Mr. Blount provided me with a
list of all claims filed between January 2004 and January 2014, another document
with detailed descriptions of claims during that period, and suggested that I correlate
the claims numbers on both to determine the amount paid in suits involving the po-
lice. See Telephone Interview with Ralph Blount, Assistant City Att’y, Boise City
Attorney’s Office (May 20, 2015). Unfortunately, the claims numbers on both doc-
uments barely overlapped, and so it was impossible to determine payouts from these
numbers.
New Bedford Police Department (MA). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Lisa A. Presby,
Compliance Officer, City of New Bedford, to author (Oct. 23, 2013, 8:33 PST) (on file
with author) (“The police department does not pay for [settlements and judgments] directly
out of their budget. The City has a line item in its general budget for judg-
ments/settlements. The City also has insurance for certain types of lawsuits. If the
City is covered by our insurance premium then the deductible would be paid out of the
same judgment/settlement account.”); Email from Lisa A. Presby, Compliance Of-
ficer, City of New Bedford, to author (June 8, 2015, 6:43 PST) (on file with author)
(explaining that the city’s law enforcement liability policy “protects the City for any al-
leged wrongdoing or misconduct resulting from the operation of its police department.
As you can imagine, this is very broad coverage but examples of such claims that would
be covered under the policy are wrongful arrests, civil rights violations as well as use of
excessive force. The City currently has a $25,000 deductible on its Law Enforcement
policy. . . . The City is self-insured for all police vehicles”); Email from Lisa A. Presby,
Compliance Officer, City of New Bedford, to author (June 8, 2015, 6:53 PST) (on file with
author) (identifying Argonaut as the insurer). I asked for information about the amount
spent in settlements and judgments involving the New Bedford Police Department and was
told that the city did not collect information about payouts separated by department. See
Email from Lisa A. Presby, Compliance Officer, City of New Bedford, to author (June 26,
Springfield Police Department (IL). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Telephone Interview with Julie
Zoldegar, Head of Budget Staff, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, City of Springfield (Oct. 20,
2014) (explaining that the police department pays an annual premium for property and cas-
ualty claims—like trip and falls on police property—but that money to pay lawsuits involv-
ing police officers’ activities comes from the general budget. There has only been one suit
over a period of twenty-five years in which money was taken from the police department
budget, and that was a suit for overtime pay). For information about the amount spent in
settlements and judgments involving the Springfield Police Department and/or its officers
in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Letter from Marquita L. Trotter, Assistant Corp.
Counsel, City of Springfield (Oct. 23, 2014) (on file with author) (responding to public rec-
ords request with attachment reflecting a total of $53,315.32 spent in fiscal years 2012,
2013, and 2014) (exempting fees paid to defense attorneys). For information about the
Springfield Police Department budget, see CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, FISCAL YEAR 2014
BUDGET 19 (2014), http://www.springfield.il.us/OBM/documents/FY2014FullBudget.
pdf [http://perma.cc/X896-R7EQ] (reporting police department budgets of $37,170,699
for fiscal year 2012; $37,594,557 for fiscal year 2013; and $39,242,200 for fiscal year 2014).
For the total budget for the city of Springfield, see id. at 2 (reporting city budget of
1288 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
$184,649,184 in fiscal year 2012; $227,516,657 for fiscal year 2013; and $221,185,024 for fis-
cal year 2014).
Overland Park Police Department (KS). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from John J. Knoll, Senior As-
sistant City Att’y, Law Dep’t, City of Overland Park, to author (Oct. 15, 2013, 10:56 PST)
(on file with author) (“The City has police liability insurance, but has a $100,000 self-insured
retention, so the money generally comes from a special liability fund established pursuant to
the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101, et seq. That fund can receive money from any
city source, but is generally funded out of a transfer from the general fund of the city. See
K.S.A. 75-6110(b).”). My requests for information about the premium amounts paid and
the amounts paid in settlements and judgments in cases involving the Police Department
went unanswered.
Waco Police Department (TX). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Jennifer Richie, City Att’y,
City of Waco, Tex., to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 6:15 PST) (on file with author) (“The
City has an internal service fund for Risk . . . that pays for claims, etc. Every depart-
ment contributes to this fund based upon their head count of employees in the depart-
ment. Like many cities in Texas, we are part of the Intergovernmental Risk Pool. If
there is a settlement or judgment, the payment for that comes from the Intergovern-
mental Risk Pool when covered and from the Risk Fund when not.”). For information
about the amounts paid from the Waco Police Department into the Risk Fund and the
total budget of the Waco Police Department, see Email from June Skerik, Budget Of-
ficer, City of Waco, to author (Sept. 24, 2014, 7:45 PST) (on file with author) (report-
ing that the Waco Police Department paid to the Risk Fund $644,781 in 2012;
$668,804 in 2013; and $748,664 in 2014, and that the Waco Police Department’s
Budget was $30,254,682 in 2012; $31,205,738 in 2013; and $32,781,080 in 2014). For
the amount paid from the Risk Fund in cases involving the Waco Police Department, see
Email from Waco City Sec’y’s Office, to author (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:29 PST) (on file with
author) (reporting that the amount paid out of the Risk Fund in cases involving the Waco
Police Department was $292,617.95 in fiscal year 2012; $263,414.78 in fiscal year 2013;
and $71,863.60 in fiscal year 2014). For information about the total City of Waco budg-
et, see LARRY D. GROTH, WACO CITY MANAGER, 2011–12 ANNUAL OPERATING
AND CAPITAL BUDGET (2011),http://www.waco-texas.com/pdf/budget/BUDGET%
20IN%20BRIEF%202011-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 6Z7Q-UA5J] (reporting 2012 fiscal
budget of $205,669,723); LARRY D. GROTH, WACO CITY MANAGER, 2013-14
ANNUAL OPERATING AND CAPITAL BUDGET (2013), http://www.waco-
texas.com/pdf/budget/BUDGET%20IN%20BRIEF% 202013-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/
WM29-M2W4] (reporting fiscal year 2013 budget of $199,371,175); id. (reporting fiscal
year 2014 budget of $202,877,913).
Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office (OK). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Josh Turley,
Risk Mgmt., Tulsa Cty. Sheriff’s Office, to author (Oct. 15, 2013, 8:06 PST) (on file
with author) (“We can pay small amounts say 10,000.00 or less (depending upon the
time of year, how much we have in reserve, and the projection for the future) from our
general fund. We rarely do this. It creates a dent in the general payment of our officers
and services. All regular payments come from the County’s General Fund.”). My pub-
lic records request for information about the amount paid in settlements and judg-
ments involving the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office went unanswered.
Quincy Police Department (MA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from James S. Timmins, City Solici-
tor, City of Quincy, to author (May 4, 2015, 13:03 PST) (on file with author) (explaining
that the city is self-insured and that “[s]ettlements and judgments of Quincy Police cases
(along with costs of defense) are paid through the Solicitor’s Office, out of our Judgment
Account and our ‘Outside Counsel’ Account. The money is from the city’s general budget,
as appropriated; money does not come from the Police Department budget, and to the best
of my knowledge, any payments of this nature do not impact the Police budget whatsoev-
er.”). For the amount paid in lawsuits involving the Quincy Police Department in fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from James S. Timmins, City Solicitor, City of
Quincy, to author (May 7, 2015, 15:45 PST) (on file with author) (“[W]e have not paid a
Police claim during the three years in question . . . a good run.”). For the total budget for
the City of Quincy and the Quincy Police Department, see CITY OF QUINCY, FISCAL
YEAR 2014 BUDGET 4 (2013), http://www.quincyma.gov/CityOfQuincy_Content
/documents/2014_Budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/NEE5-L9ZA] (proposing fiscal year 2014
budget of $257,817,260 and police department budget of $24,400,000); CITY OF QUINCY,
FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET 4 (2012), http://www.quincyma.gov/CityOfQuincy
_Content/documents/City_of_Quincy_FY_13_Budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/4APT-
ANX9] (proposing fiscal year 2013 budget of $247,857,582 and police department budget
of $22,300,000); CITY OF QUINCY, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET 4 (2011), http://
www.quincyma.gov/CityOfQuincy_Content/documents/2012_Budget_Book_Web_Versi
on.pdf [http://perma.cc/8WF6-ERCY] (proposing fiscal year 2012 budget of
$237,957,058 and police department budget of $21,800,000).
Naperville Police Department (IL). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Jill G. Pelka-Wilger, Acting
City Att’y, City of Naperville, to author (Sept. 25, 2014, 9:21 PST) (on file with author)
(“The City utilizes a self-insurance fund for the payment of claims/judgments and workers’
compensation settlements. As part of the annual budget process, the City determines the
contributions necessary from various departments, including the Police Department, Fire
Department and others, based on historical values and future estimates. The transferred
1290 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
contributions are accumulated in the self insurance fund and used to pay the City’s general
liabilities and workers’ compensation settlements. In special circumstances, additional con-
tributions to the fund may be necessary, in these instances, an additional one-time transfer
may be initiated during the year.”). My public records request for information about the
amount contributed to the central fund by the police department and the amounts paid in
settlements and judgments in cases involving the Police Department went unanswered.
Concord Police Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Mark S. Coon, City
Att’y, Concord City Attorney’s Office, to author (June 5, 2015, 8:48 PST) (on file with
author) (explaining that “settlements or judgments in cases brought against members of
the Police Department are paid out of the General Fund, as are settlements involving
other City departments” and that “[a]ny settlement or judgment over [$500,000] is paid
by our Joint Powers Authority insurer”). For the total amount paid in settlements and
judgments in suits involving the Concord Police Department, see Email from Mark S.
Coon, City Att’y, Concord City Attorney’s Office, to author (July 16, 2015, 13:17 PST)
(on file with author) (explaining that in fiscal year 2012–13 “we paid $1.25 million to settle
three separate sexual harassment/retaliation lawsuits filed by Concord police officers,” in fis-
cal year 2013–14 “we paid $169,000 to settle two excessive force cases, and 98,002 to settle a
sexual harassment suit filed by a civilian working in the Concord Police Department,” and
in fiscal year 2014–15 “we paid $605,000. This amount comprised settlements in two dif-
ferent cases: one alleging excessive force/false arrest by an officer making an off duty arrest;
and the other involving a severe dog bite inflicted by a police K-9.”). For the total budget
of the Concord Police Department, see CITY OF CONCORD, PERFORMANCE BASED
BUDGET SUMMARY FOR COUNCIL 2013–2014 177 (2013) http://www.cityofconcord.
org/pdf/dept/finance/budget/budget2013_2014/BudgetSummary.pdf [http://perma.cc
/595C-7DWT] (reporting an actual fiscal year 2012 budget of $41,976,490; a fiscal
year 2013 budget of $41,589,698; and a proposed fiscal year 2014 budget of
$42,529,761). For the total budget of the City of Concord, see CITY OF CONCORD,
ADOPTED OPERATING BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2013–2014 57 (2013)
http://www.cityofconcord.org/pdf/dept/finance/budget/budget2013_2014/FY2013_20
14.pdf [http://perma.cc/8DCS-A3H5] (reporting total expenditures as $154,545,120
in fiscal year 2012; $150,604,988 (adopted) in fiscal year 2013; and $156,496,200
(adopted) in fiscal year 2014).
Pueblo County Sheriff’s Office (CO). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Aimee Tihonovich,
Controller, Pueblo Cty. Gov’t, to author (Sept. 22, 2014, 8:09 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (reporting that Pueblo County is insured through “County Technical Services” and
its “insurance contribution is paid out of the county general fund (not charged directly to
the Sheriff) and premiums paid are for all departments and offices”). County Technical
Services is a state-wide risk pool. See About CTSI, CTY. TECH. SERVS. INC.,
http://www.ctsi.org/about-ctsi [http://perma.cc/PQD7-QQ96] (last visited Mar. 28,
2016). The City of Pueblo pays insurance premiums for the city as a whole and does
not have information regarding the amount of premiums for police liability. See Email
from Daryl Payne, Mun. Records Manager, City of Pueblo, to author (July 8, 2015,
10:45 PST) (on file with author). For the total paid from the insurer in police liability
claims, see Email from Daryl Payne, Mun. Records Manager, City of Pueblo, to author
(July 8, 2015, 12:24 PST) (on file with author) (attaching document reflecting a total of
$290,500 paid between January 1, 2012 and July 8, 2015 on police liability claims).
Decatur Police Department (AL). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Wayne K. Alexander,
Jr., Assistant City Att’y, City of Decatur, to author (Oct. 21, 2014, 7:29 PST) (on file
with author) (“We have insurance coverage for all city employees and vehicles. We don’t
have a separate policy for the Police Department. The premium and the payment come
out of General Fund money and not from the Police Department budget.”). My requests
for information about the premium amounts paid and the amounts paid in settlements
and judgments in cases involving the Police Department went unanswered.
Schaumburg Police Department (IL). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Rita Elsner, Assistant
Vill. Att’y, Vill. of Schaumburg, to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 15:06 PST) (on file with author)
(reporting that the town is self-insured for the first $100,000 and has outside insurance for
amounts above $100,000; that the money for settlements and judgments comes from the le-
gal department budget; and that insurance premiums are paid from the general budget).
For the total payments in lawsuits involving the Schaumberg Police Department, see Email
from Rita Elsner, Assistant Vill. Att’y, Vill. of Schaumburg, to author (May 8, 2015, 13:59
PST) (on file with author) (attaching spreadsheet reflecting a total of $63,950.02 spent in
lawsuits in fiscal year 2012, 2013, 2014, after subtracting legal fees). During the study peri-
od, the city was insured by Lloyd’s of London; the insurance company is currently suing the
city to avoid coverage in lawsuits against officers also found guilty of criminal activity. See
Eric Peterson, Insurance Company Sues Schaumburg to Avoid Cost of Arrested-Cop Cases,
DAILY HERALD (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.dailyherald.com/article/20141031/news/
141039594 [https://perma.cc/XWR6-LWH2]. For the budget of the Village of
Schaumburg, see VILL.OF SCHAUMBURG, ANNUAL BUDGET PROPOSAL FISCAL YEAR
2015–2016 44 (2015), http://www.ci.schaumburg.il.us/Docs/Finance/Documents/
FY%202015-16%20Annual%20Budget%20Proposal%20-%20Final%2004.29.2015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9FCT-XY9C] (reporting fiscal year 2014 actual budget of
$176,702,590); VILL. OF SCHAUMBURG, ANNUAL BUDGET PROPOSAL FISCAL YEAR
2013–2014 19 (2013), http://vossire.ci.schaumburg.il.us/sirepub/cache/2/ni2wthiflnsez
4qjwiqyhjnm/ 36900406182015063049500.pdf [http://perma.cc/BMP7-2WQH] (report-
1292 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
ing fiscal year 2013 amended budget of $181,677,945); VILL. OF SCHAUMBURG, ANNUAL
BUDGET PROPOSAL FISCAL YEAR 2011–2012 3 (2011), http://vossire.ci.schaumburg.il.us/
sirepub/cache/2/ni2wthiflnsez4qjwiqyhjnm/37153106182015063334382.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ED36-6UVA] (reporting fiscal year 2012 budget of $177,577,069).
St. Mary’s County Sheriff’s Office (MD). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Michael H. Gardiner,
Lieutenant, Supervisor Office of Prof’l Responsibilities, St. Mary’s Cty., Md., to author
(Sept. 8, 2014, 5:49 PST) (on file with author) (“[I]f there should be a judgement [sic]
against the Sheriff’s our insurance company will pay. The Sheriff’s Office is responsible for
premiums paid to the insurer.”). For information about the liability insurance premiums
paid from the Sheriff’s Office budget for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Letter from
George R. Sparling, Cty. Att’y, to author (Sept. 26, 2014) (on file with author) (reporting
that the premium paid was $62,205 in 2012, $63,034 in 2013, and $71,859 in 2014). St.
Mary’s pays premiums to the Local Government Insurance Trust, a state-wide self-
insurance pool in Maryland. Homepage, LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSURANCE TRUST,
http://www.lgit.org [http://perma.cc/FTA3-BXXX] (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). For
information about payments in lawsuits in years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from
Michael H. Gardiner, Lieutenant, Supervisor, Office of Prof’l Responsibilities, St. Mary’s
Cty., Md., to author (June 18, 2015, 11:47 PST) (on file with author) (reporting no judg-
ments or settlements against the Sheriff’s Office, nor payments to any plaintiffs). For in-
formation about the total budget of the St. Mary’s County Sheriff’s Office for fiscal years
2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Michael H. Gardiner, Lieutenant, Supervisor Office
of Prof’l Responsibilities, St. Mary’s Cty., Md., to author (Sept. 24, 2014, 11:15 PST) (on
file with author) (reporting the budget as $30,717,566 in 2012, $31,728,919 in 2013, and
$33,401,095 in 2014). For the total budget for St. Mary’s County, see BD. OF CTY.
COMM’RS FOR ST. MARY’S CTY., APPROVED BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2013),
http://www.stmarysmd.com/docs/FY2014ApprovedBudgetBook.pdf [http://perma.cc/
WF5E-WEM8] (reporting total approved budget of $360,105,421 for fiscal year 2014);
BD. OF CTY. COMM’RS FOR ST. MARY’S CTY., APPROVED BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2013
(2012), http://www.stmarysmd.com/docs/FY2013ApprovedBudgetBook.pdf [http://
perma.cc/ 43PG-NJ63] (reporting total approved budget of $345,698,576 for fiscal year
2013); BD. OF CTY. COMM’RS FOR ST. MARY’S CTY., APPROVED BUDGET FISCAL
YEAR 2012 (2011), http://www.stmarysmd.com/docs/FY2012ApprovedBudget.pdf
[http:// perma.cc/ LT4Q-7ZTG] (reporting total approved budget of $329,643,362 for
fiscal year 2012).
Avondale Police Department (AZ). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Sandra Tomsic, City Clerk
Assistant II, City of Avondale, to author (Sept. 25, 2014, 16:10 PST) (on file with author)
(attaching public records response reflecting that settlements and judgments are paid from
the city’s risk management fund, that the city has a $500,000 deductible and so pays all
claims up to $500,000 and the insurer pays the remainder, and insurance premiums are
paid from the risk management budget); Email from Sandra Tomsic, City Clerk Assistant
II, City of Avondale, to author (June 16, 2015, 7:15 PST) (on file with author) (confirming
that the police department contributes to a central risk management fund from which set-
tlements and judgments are paid). My public records request for information about the
premium amounts paid and the amounts paid in settlements and judgments in cases involv-
ing the Police Department went unanswered.
Pocatello Police Department (ID). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Tiffany Olsen, Parale-
gal/Assistant to the City Att’y, City of Pocatello, to author (Oct. 22, 2014, 15:26 PST) (on
file with author) (attaching spreadsheet that “itemizes what each department of the City
[including the police department] contributes by interfund transfer to the liability budget (of
which claims and our annual premium is paid)”). For information about the amount paid
by the police department toward the liability budget, see id. (reflecting $150,728.86 paid by
the police department in 2010). For information about the total budget of the Pocatello Po-
lice Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see POCATELLO POLICE DEP’T,
2014 POLICE DEP’T REPORT 4 (2014), http://pocatello.us/ArchiveCenter/ View-
File/Item/73 [http://perma.cc/83BF-HK2P] (reporting that the budget was $12,049,820 in
fiscal year 2012, $12,169,210 in fiscal year 2013, and $13,032,290 in fiscal year 2014). Poc-
atello is part of the Idaho Counties Risk Management Program, a state-wide self-insurance
pool. See Email from Tiffany Olsen, Paralegal/Assistant to the City Att’y, City of Pocatello,
to author (Nov. 8, 2013, 8:30 PST) (on file with author) (identifying ICRMP as their liabil-
ity carrier). For the budget of the city of Pocatello, see CITY OF POCATELLO, 2014
BUDGET DIGEST 11 (2013), http://www.pocatello.us/ArchiveCenter/ ViewFile/Item/48
[http://perma.cc/YN8X-WR4R] (reporting city budget of $87,574,042 for fiscal year 2012,
$86,835,501 for fiscal year 2013, and $92,512,025 for fiscal year 2014).
Hemet Police Department (CA). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Stephen A. McEwen, to
author (Dec. 9, 2013, 16:06 PST) (on file with author) (“[S]ettlement funds in police
misconduct cases come from the City’s general liability fund. The Police Department
does not pay for the settlements. The liability fund is a general account in the City
budget set up to address all types of liability claims, including police cases, trip-and-fall
cases and other tort matters.”); see also CITY OF HEMET, CAL., ANNUAL OPERATING
BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2013–2014, at xv (2013), http://www.cityofhemet.org/ Docu-
mentCenter/View/2034 [http://perma.cc/FH5U-PJQM] (“The City is ‘self-insured’ for
the first $250,000 per incident. So, many of the claims paid out fall below the umbrella
of coverage.”). For the amount paid in excess liability insurance, see id. at R-12 (report-
ing liability insurance payments of $893,461 in fiscal year 2012, $828,500 in fiscal year
1294 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
2013, and $837,100 (projected in fiscal year 2014)). Note, though, that the liability in-
surance covers all city claims and so does not reflect the amount spent on law enforce-
ment liability insurance. For the total spent on settlements and judgments involving the
Hemet Police Department in fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, see Email from Sarah
McComas, City Clerk, City of Hemet, to author (July 22, 2015, 9:50 PST) (on file with
author) (attaching response to public records request identifying six cases that settled
during the study period with payouts of $500,000; $1,600,000; $100,000; $19,500;
$8000; and $125,756; totaling $2,353,256). Because the city is insured for payouts over
$250,000, in calculating the average annual payouts for Appendix B, I valued the first
two cases at $250,000 when calculating a total annual estimated liability payment for
the city. Note that this total understates the total spent by the city on law enforcement
liability because it does not include the costs of insurance; I could not, however, dis-
aggregate the amount spent on law enforcement liability insurance from the total insur-
ance premiums paid. For the total City of Hemet budget, see CITY OF HEMET, CAL.,
supra, at S-4 (reporting an actual fiscal year 2012 budget of $62,196,952, and approved
fiscal year 2013 budget of $66,623,171, and an approved fiscal 2014 budget of
$71,194,300).
Concord Police Department (NH). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Letter from City of Concord,
N.H., to author (postmarked July 6, 2015) (on file with author) (providing, in response
to my public record request and without cover page, police department budget docu-
ments reflecting that the Concord Police Department pays insurance from its budget).
For the amount paid by the Concord Police Department for insurance, see id. (reflecting
that the police department paid property and liability insurance totaling $74,711.50 in 2012,
$94,852.34 in 2013, and $131,367.87 in 2014). For the total budget of the Concord Police
Department, see id. (reflecting that total expenditures for the Concord Police Department
were $11,696,898.86 in 2012, $11,626,533.48 in 2013, and $12,748,031.69 in 2014).
Eden Prairie Police Department (MN). For information about from which budget(s) set-
tlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Letter from Richard F.
Rosow, Gregerson, Rosow, Johnson & Nilan, Ltd., Att’ys at Law, to author (Oct. 30,
2014) (on file with author) (explaining that the city has liability insurance and that the
police department “does not pay for insurance separately from the City’s general fund”).
My requests for information about the premium amounts paid and the amounts paid in
settlements and judgments in cases involving the Police Department went unanswered.
Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Department (MT). For information about from which budg-
et(s) settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Kevin Gillen,
Yellowstone Cty. Attorney’s Office, to author (Nov. 14, 2013, 13:15 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (explaining that payments less than $250,000 come from county funds and payments
above that amount come from an outside insurer, with the premiums for that insurance paid
from county funds); see also id. (responding “No, not really . . . .” to the question whether the
outside insurer places “any requirements on the Sheriff Office as a condition of funding set-
tlements and judgments?”). For the amount paid in settlements and judgments involving
the Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Department, see Email from Kevin Gillen, Yellowstone
Cty. Attorney’s Office, to author (June 19, 2015, 7:56 PST) (on file with author) (reporting
settlements and judgments totaling $404,232.57 in 2012, 2013, and 2014). For the budget
of the Yellowstone Sheriff’s Office, see Email from Kevin Gillen, Yellowstone Cty. Attor-
ney’s Office, to author (July 23, 2015, 12:13 PST) (on file with author) (reporting a Sheriff’s
budget of $15,771,568 for fiscal year 2012; $17,150,075 for fiscal year 2013; and
$18,106,662 for fiscal year 2014). For the budget of the County of Yellowstone, see id. (re-
porting a county budget of $92,136,963 for fiscal year 2012; $90,211,627 for fiscal year
2013; and $94,848,189 for fiscal year 2014).
Town and Country Police Department (MO). For information about from which budget(s)
settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Gary Hoelzer, City
Adm’r, City of Town & Country, to author (June 8, 2015, 12:49 PST) (on file with author)
(reporting that settlements and judgments are paid by the jurisdiction’s insurer, St. Louis
Area Insurance Trust (a self-insured pool of municipalities), the deductible is paid out of
general funds, and there is “[n]o direct financial impact” on the police department); see also
Email from Gary Hoelzer, City Adm’r, City of Town & Country, to author (June 8, 2015,
15:57 PST) (on file with author) (reporting a $2,500 insurance deductible). My requests for
information about the premium amounts paid and the amounts paid in settlements and
judgments in cases involving the Police Department went unanswered.
Lincolnton Police Department (NC). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Steven Zickefoose, Fin.
Dir., City of Lincolnton, to author (Sept. 22, 2014, 7:55 PST) (on file with author) (“The
City maintains General Liability insurance for all city employees and departments. The
premium is paid on a prorated basis from each department according to the size of their
budget. Any settlements and/or judgments would be paid from [sic] by the insurance carri-
er.”); see also Email from Steven Zickefoose, Fin. Dir., City of Lincolnton, to author (June 1,
2015, 13:36 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the city uses a private insurance com-
pany, Allied World National Assurance Company, and gets bids for insurance from differ-
ent private companies every three years). For the total amount paid by the police
department for insurance premiums, see Email from Steven Zickefoose, Fin. Dir., City of
Lincolnton, to author (July 17, 2015, 13:10 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that the
police department contributed $35,126 in 2012; $35,258 in 2013; and $35,140 in 2014).
For the total amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the Department, see id.
(reporting that there were no “claims paid to plaintiffs for those years”). For the budget of
the Lincolnton Police Department, see CITY OF LINCOLNTON, THE MUNICIPAL
CAPITAL AND OPERATING BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2014–2015 50 (2014)
1296 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
http://www.ci.lincolnton.nc.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/74 [http://perma.cc/
8N9M-X9L7] (reporting that the fiscal year 2014 police budget was $2,817,400 and the
fiscal year 2015 budget is 2,919,324). For information about Lincolnton’s budget, see
LINCOLNTON CTY. MANAGER’S OFFICE & FIN. DEP’T, FY 2013 BUDGET AND
CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM (2012), http://www.lincolncounty.org/index.
aspx?nid=1380 [http://perma.cc/8N9M-X9L7] (reporting a fiscal year 2012 budget of
$91,322,410); LINCOLNTON CTY. MANAGER’S OFFICE & FIN. DEP’T, FY 2014
BUDGET AND CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM (2013), http://www.lincolncounty.
org/index.aspx?NID=1800 [http://perma.cc/T3TM-BNCN] (reporting a fiscal year
2013–14 general fund budget of $87,865,280; and a fiscal year 2014 general fund amended
budget of $88,742,991).
Phelps County Sheriff’s Office (MI). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Carol Bennett, Phelps Cty.
Clerk, to author (Sept. 16, 2014, 12:05 PST) (on file with author) (“The only thing paid
through the county’s budget would be the insurance deductible. We do not pay settlements
or judgments from out [sic] budget.”). The insurance referenced is the Missouri Public En-
tity Risk Management Fund (MOPERM). See Email from Carol Bennett, Phelps Cty.
Clerk, to author (Dec. 9, 2013, 9:51 PST) (on file with author) (describing MOPERM as
the county’s liability insurance company). My requests for information about the premium
amounts paid and the amounts paid in settlements and judgments involving the Sheriff’s
Office went unanswered.
Oldham County Sheriff’s Office (KY). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Robert C. Noble, Chief
Deputy, Oldham Cty. Sheriff’s Office, to author (Sept. 10, 2014, 16:15 PST) (on file with
author) (“[T]he Oldham County Sheriff’s Office does not have a line item for any potential
judgments or settlements that may result from a civil action against a deputy or the agency.
In the event of an action and depending on the type of action, any settlement would be
paid by our county liability insurer, KACO, the Kentucky Association of Counties, and
the Oldham County Fiscal Court.”). My requests for information about the premium
amounts paid and the amounts paid in settlements and judgments involving the Sheriff’s
Office went unanswered.
Edgewood Police Department (FL). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Bea L. Meeks, City
Clerk, City of Edgewood City Hall, to author (Sept. 9, 2014, 10:49 PST) (on file with au-
thor) (reporting that suits are paid through insurance and premiums are paid through the
general fund); Email from Bea L. Meeks, City Clerk, City of Edgewood City Hall, to au-
thor (Sept. 9, 2014, 7:51 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that although insurance
premiums come from the general fund, the police department’s budget shows how much is
being paid for coverage). The city’s liability coverage is provided for the Florida League of
Cities/Florida Municipal Insurance Trust. See Email from Bea L. Meeks, City Clerk, City
of Edgewood, to author (June 3, 2015, 12:30 PST) (on file with author). For information
about the amount paid for liability insurance, see Email from Bea L. Meeks, City Clerk,
City of Edgewood City Hall, to author (June 29, 2015, 16:20 PST) (on file with author)
(“[T]he City of Edgewood paid approximately $30,000 for general liability in the 14/15 FY.
I have been with the City since 2011 and there have been no claims paid by the City.”). For
the budget of the city of Edgewood, see Email from Bea L. Meeks, City Clerk, City of
Edgewood, to author (Oct. 7, 2015, 7:18 PST) (on file with author) (attaching budgets re-
flecting total 2013 revenues of $3,354,930 and total 2014 revenues of $3,660,577).
Evansville Police Department (WI). For information about from which budget(s) settle-
ments and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Patrick “Ian” Rigg,
Evansville City Adm’r & Fin. Dir., to author (June 19, 2015, 14:57 PST) (on file with
author) (explaining that settlements and legal fees are paid by the city’s insurance com-
pany, that “[a]ny additional fees such as deductibles would likely come from the de-
partment budget or some other arrangement within the City’s general fund depending
on the amount and circumstances,” and that “[t]he Police Department has a budgetary
share of the insurance coverage”); see also Email from Patrick “Ian” Rigg, Evansville
City Adm’r & Fin. Dir., to author (June 22, 2015, 8:01 PST) (on file with author) (at-
taching insurance policy, which reflects the Department is insured by the Community
Insurance Corporation, a Wisconsin risk pool, that the deductible is $1,000, and the policy
premium is $38,550). For the amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the Ev-
ansville Police Department in 2012–2014, see Email from Patrick “Ian” Rigg, Evansville
City Adm’r & Fin. Dir., to author (June 22, 2015, 11:19 PST) (on file with author) (report-
ing no lawsuits, settlements, or judgments involving the Evansville Police Department dur-
ing the study period). For the Evansville Police Department budget, see CITY OF
EVANSVILLE, BUDGET WORKSHEET 5 (2014), http://www.ci.evansville.wi.gov/docu
mentlibrary/budget/2014%20Budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/BS6V-PASY] (reporting
fiscal year 2013 budget of $939,198 and fiscal year 2014 budget of $960,510). For the
total budget of the city of Evansville, see Email from Patrick “Ian” Rigg, Evansville
City Adm’r & Fin. Dir., to author (July 1, 2015, 9:16 PST) (reporting an actual budget
of $13,742,405 in 2012; an actual budget of $13,599,375 in 2013; and an actual budget
of $14,060,818 in 2014).
Fruitland Police Department (ID). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from JD Huff, Chief, Fruitland
Police Dep’t, to author (Oct. 7, 2013, 9:06 PST) (on file with author) (explaining that
the department is insured by the Idaho Counties Risk Management Program); Email
from JD Huff, Chief, Fruitland Police Dep’t, to author (June 5, 2015, 13:38 PST) (on
file with author) (explaining that there is a line item in the police department budget
for the department’s portion of the insurance premium). Requests for information about
1298 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016)
the total premiums paid by the police department and the amounts paid in settlements and
judgments in cases involving the police department went unanswered.
Jackson Township Police Department (OH). For information about from which budget(s)
settlements and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Shirley Manfull,
Legal Assistant to Gregory A. Beck & J. Dean Carro, Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley &
Mathews, to author (Oct. 10, 2013, 5:28 PST) (on file with author) (“No payment is made
by the police department. However, there is normally a small retention (deductible) that is
paid for each claim from the township general fund.”); Email from Shirley Manfull, Legal
Assistant to Gregory A. Beck & J. Dean Carro, Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley &
Mathews, to author (Oct. 15, 2013, 12:45 PST) (on file with author) (confirming that
there is no contribution by the police department toward the insurance premium); see also
Email from Michael B. Vaccaro, Law Dir., Jackson Twp. Bd. of Trs., to author (June 8,
2015, 8:28 PST) (on file with author) (attaching document identifying the Ohio Town-
ship Association Risk Management Authority as the insurer for the jurisdiction and re-
porting an insurance premium of $199,916 for 2015 that covers public officer liability, law
enforcement liability, automobile and property damage liability, and third-party liability,
with a deductible ranging from $0 to $5000 depending on the claim). For information
about the amount paid in settlements and judgments involving the Jackson Township Po-
lice Department, see Email from Michael B. Vaccaro, Law Dir., Jackson Twp. Bd. of Trs.,
to author (July 2, 2015, 13:23 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that “no settlements or
judgments were paid out in the years requested”). For the Jackson Township budget, see
JACKSON TOWNSHIP, BUDGET AND PLANNING DOCUMENT 2014, at 24 (2013),
http://www.jacksontwp.com/Downloads/JACKSON%20TOWNSHIP%20BUDGET
%202014%20-%20website.pdf [http://perma.cc/3T3S-TWAN] (reporting 2014 funds
totaling $26,753,304); JACKSON TOWNSHIP, BUDGET AND PLANNING DOCUMENT
2013, at 24 (2012), http://www.jacksontwp.com/Downloads/2013%20Budget%20and
%20Planning %20Document.pdf [http://perma.cc/TGS5-E6BE] (reporting 2013 funds
totaling $23,606,410).
Waterloo Police Department (NE). For information about from which budget(s) settlements
and judgments involving the police are paid, see Email from Tim Donahue, Chief of Police,
Waterloo Neb., to author (Sept. 8, 2014, 16:01 PST) (on file with author) (reporting that
any settlements or judgments would be paid by the insurer and that it would not come from
the Department’s budget). Requests for information about the amount of the insurance
premium and the amounts paid in settlements and judgments in cases involving the police
department went unanswered.

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How Governments Pay: Lawsuits,

UCLA LAW REVIEW

Budgets, and Police Reform

63 UCLA L. Rev. 1144 (2016)

8. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.

My second finding is that requiring a law enforcement agency to pay money

is necessary to better understand whether and to what extent budgeting arrange-

I. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE DETERRENT EFFECTS OF SUING

Imagine a city police force that conducts racially discriminatory

lawbreaking that appears to advance important programmatic or

Evidence about budgetary arrangements should also shape recom-

In order to understand how governments satisfy settlements and judgments

requests to the jurisdictions’ departments of budget or finance, city clerks, or

The one hundred jurisdictions that provided me with information about

small jurisdictions’ practices from publicly available sources.51 Nevertheless, alt-

III. AN OVERVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETING

POOLING-BUILT TO LAST 1 (2011), http://www.cajpa.org/documents/Public-Entity-Pooling-

private insurers.68 In other states, there is limited or no private insurance market

made a similar estimation.74 Furthermore, in the jurisdictions in my study, law

IV. VARIATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION BUDGETING

Although commentators often assume that settlements and judgments are

A. The Largest Jurisdictions

Jurisdictions with sixty-two of the seventy largest law enforcement agencies

77. See Appendix A.

TABLE 1: BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS IN SIXTY-TWO LARGEST

TABLE 2: FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MONEY IS TAKEN FROM BUDGETS

No Money From Money From Agency

Among these large jurisdictions, different types of governments—

TABLE 3: BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS IN SIXTY-TWO LARGEST

TABLE 4: FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MONEY IS TAKEN FROM BUDGETS

No Money From Money From Agency

B. The Smaller Jurisdictions

C. Budgetary Distinctions Between Large and Smaller Jurisdictions

Although I do not know to what extent the budgetary practices in these

86. See Appendix A.

practices in the smaller and larger jurisdictions in my study. The jurisdictions

TABLE 5: BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS IN ALL ONE HUNDRED

Another significant distinction between the largest and smaller jurisdictions

TABLE 6: FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MONEY IS TAKEN FROM BUDGETS

No Money From Money From

enforcement agencies in my study pay nothing from their budgets toward

V. THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS

Commentators have assumed not only that law enforcement agencies do

budgetary arrangements in many jurisdictions diminish the payments’ finan-

Thirty-seven of the one hundred jurisdictions in my study (twenty-six large

involving an officer.96 Yet none of the law enforcement agencies in my

Nineteen law enforcement agencies in my study (eighteen large and one

appropriations committee for additional funds to satisfy a $40 million settle-

C. When the Agency Contributes to a Central Fund

Twenty-nine agencies in my study (twenty-three large and six smaller) are

Citywide allocations.”138 In Seattle, “any increase in premiums is accommodated

D. When Jurisdictions Rely on Public Entity Risk Pools or Outside Insurance

Twenty-one jurisdictions in my study rely on public entity risk pools or

Regardless of whether an insured law enforcement agency is required to

law enforcement agencies do not require those agencies to contribute finan-

FIGURE 1: FREQUENCY WITH WHICH MONEY IS TAKEN FROM

FIGURE 2: FINANCIAL EFFECT OF LAWSUIT PAYOUTS ON LARGEST SIXTY-

The particularities of budgeting arrangements can also insulate smaller law

significant pressures—and may indeed have their very existence threatened—by