TNE30009 Case Study
TNE30009 Case Study
2. Introduction
The use of home digital voice assistant (HDVA) devices has grown significantly in recent
years. Predictions show that their numbers will more than triple, rising from 1.1 million in
2015 to 15.1 million by 2020, with a compound annual growth rate of 54.74% [1]. This spike
can be attributed in large part to the continuous efforts of key manufacturers like as Amazon
and Google, as well as third-party developers such as CapitalOne, Dominos, and Honeywell.
Voice commands now allow users to perform a wide range of tasks, including playing music,
ordering food, and shopping online, as well as managing schedules, checking the weather,
making payments, and controlling smart devices such as garage doors, plugs, and
thermostats. These assistants, like Amazon Alexa and Google Home, allow users to control
smart devices and receive help through voice commands. This research focuses on the
security issues of these assistants, particularly using Amazon Alexa as a case example.
We've identified four security weaknesses related to Alexa's access control. Victims can
suffer from fraud order attacks and home security breaches. All parties involved have
responsibility for these difficulties, including the HDVA service provider (such as Amazon),
the HDVA devices themselves, and third-party voice service developers. Both the Alexa and
Google Home services use a single-factor authentication technique that involves a
password-like speech prompt (e.g., "Alexa", "Hi, Google"). Any person or machine that
correctly utters this authentication word obtains the ability to issue voice commands that the
HDVA devices will accept, independent of the presence of authorised users. Without any
type of access restriction, these devices respond to sounds with a sound pressure level
(SPL) greater than 60 dB, without any form of access control [2]. Additionally, Alexa-enabled
smart devices lack access control measures, assuming that all voice commands from the
Alexa service are benign. Consequently, they become vulnerable to security threats when
false voice commands infiltrate the Alexa service.
3. Risk Analysis
Privacy Risk
The privacy and confidentiality of acquired data are key issues in every IoT system. In the
case of Alexa, the Internet of Things (IoT) gadgets put in people's homes are continually
gathering and transmitting data about their daily routines and activities. This data can reveal
very sensitive facts about their lives, such as when they are generally at home or even their
daily habits (for example, when they typically eat, sleep, and so on). If unauthorised parties
gain access to this information, it may expose individuals to physical or cybercrime dangers.
This poses a major danger to data privacy and confidentiality [4]. Personal and sensitive
data being monitored by IoT devices is the major asset in danger.
• Severity: High. Continuous listening and accidental activation pose severe risks to
privacy and confidentiality.
• Likelihood: Medium. Accidental activations have been reported but might not occur
frequently in all scenarios.
• Impact: High. Privacy breaches due to recorded conversations being sent to contacts
can lead to embarrassment, trust issues, and legal implications.
• Severity: Medium. Insecure access control on connected smart devices could lead to
unauthorized control or manipulation of these devices.
• Likelihood: High. Default names and insecure access control are widespread issues that
increase the likelihood of exploitation.
• Impact: Medium. While the impact might not be as severe as direct access to Alexa, it
can still lead to privacy breaches and manipulation of connected devices.
No Physical Presence-based Access Control
The purpose of Alexa voice service is to assist users who are close to their Alexa device in
making service requests by speaking voice commands. Even when no one is nearby, the
device can still accept voice commands because it lacks presence-based access control. All
sounds that reach it at a sound pressure level (SPL) of 60 dB or above are effective [2]. As a
result, the Alexa device may successfully receive malicious voice commands from an
outsider outside the owner's space or a speaker device.
• Severity: High. Lack of physical presence-based access control poses a significant risk
as it allows for remote exploitation by adversaries or devices emitting the required sound
level.
• Likelihood: Medium. The potential for exploitation exists but might require specific
conditions (e.g., sound level, proximity) that might limit its occurrence.
• Impact: High. Unauthorized access can lead to similar consequences as the first risk,
enabling control over connected devices and compromising privacy.
4. Policy Formulation
1. Multi-factor Authentication Implementation
• Establish a policy requiring the use of multi-factor authentication (MFA) for Alexa
services. This policy aims to add layers of verification beyond voice-based
authentication.
• Define guidelines to integrate additional authentication factors like biometrics
(fingerprint, face recognition) or device authentication (via trusted devices) to
supplement voice-based authentication. This ensures a more robust and varied
authentication process.
The security enhancement plan for Alexa's ecosystem comprises four high-level policies to
address urgent threats:
Recommended implementation:
References
[1] D. Watkins and J. Branca, "Strategy Analytics: Amazon, Google to Ship Nearly 3 Million
Digital Voice Assistant Devices in 2017," Strategy Analytics, 5 October 2016. [Online].
Available: https://www.strategyanalytics.com/strategy-analytics/news/strategy-analytics-
press-releases/strategy-analytics-press-release/2016/10/05/strategy-analytics-amazon-
google-to-ship-nearly-3-million-digital-voice-assistant-devices-in-2017#.WQtiXeXyuUk.
[2] X. Lei, T. Guan Yu, A. X. Liu, A. Kamran, C.-Y. Li and T. Xie, "The Insecurity of Home
Digital Voice Assistants – Vulnerabilities, Attacks and Countermeasures," 2017.
[3] A. Alrawais, A. R. Alhothaily, C. Hu and X. Cheng, "Fog computing for the internet of
things: Security and privacy issue," IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 34 - 42,
2017.
[4] S. Pathak, S. A. Islam, H. Jiang, L. Xu and E. Tomai, "A survey on security analysis of
Amazon echo devices," High-Confidence Computing.