China’s Foundations: Guiding Principles of

Chinese Foreign Policy

THOMAS KANE
Department of Politics and Asian Studies
University of Hull
Hull, United Kingdom

As the People’s Republic of China assumes greater prominence in world affairs, the
question of how its government will approach key issues in international politics be-
comes increasingly critical. By examining the public statements of Chinese leaders,
one can identify fundamental principles that guide Beijing’s policy. These principles
are a robust approach to sovereignty, a determination to strengthen the ruling faction,
and a continuing commitment to ideologic distinctiveness. China, in short, is deter-
mined to secure its own independence, and will seek power over all outside entities
which could have power over it.

Will Beijing precipitate a war over Taiwan? Will Beijing hamper Western humanitarian
interventions in the Balkans? Can America moderate Beijing’s international behavior
with a policy of so-called engagement? Would a more aggressive policy produce more
desirable results? As the People’s Republic of China assumes greater prominence in
world affairs, the question of how its government will approach key issues in international
politics becomes increasingly critical.
For these reasons, anyone with an interest in contemporary strategy and statecraft
must study the drives that motivate the Chinese regime. One underused source of in-
formation on China’s guiding principles is the public statements of the Chinese leaders
themselves. China’s high ofŽ cials have articulated a coherent political stance concerning
world affairs. Although Chinese politicians undoubtedly lie, disagree, and change their
minds as often as those from any other country, this stance has proven itself to be endur-
ing, in keeping with China’s cultural traditions, true to what outsiders might identify as
the national interests of the Chinese state, and compatible with Beijing’s actual foreign
policy. One can surmise that, on these subjects, China’s leaders are sincere.
This article investigates what China’s leaders have said on three general subjects,
all of which are particularly relevant to statecraft and grand strategy. These are China’s
approach to sovereignty, China’s approach to political power, and China’s post-Mao
approach to political ideology. Although this article focuses on the writings of recent
leaders, it notes that there is more continuity than commonly recognized between the
thoughts of China’s current premier, Jiang Zemin; the thoughts of his predecessor, the
reformer Deng Xiaoping; and the thoughts of China’s Mao-era revolutionaries. All have
been determined to put China in a position to determine its own destiny, all have identiŽ ed
China’s independence with the material power of the ruling political organzation, and
all have considered China’s ideologic mindset instrumental to that goal. Although China
has abandoned the  amboyant ideological fanaticism of earlier years, its leaders have not
discarded the idea that political thought is itself a tool of political power.

45
Comparative Strategy, 20:45–55, 2001
Copyright © 2001 Taylor & Francis
0149-5933 /01 $12.00 1 .00
46 T. Kane

A Chinese Invictus
China never suffered from direct European colonization on any large scale. Nevertheless,
the Chinese look back to the 200 years preceeding World War II as a time of national
weakness, when Western countries humilliated them by forcing them to accept a wide
variety of treaties on unequal terms. Since then, China’s leaders have worked to ensure
that their state will be able to determine its own destiny. As General Li Jijun of the
People’s Liberation Army said in an address at the U.S. Army War College in 1997:

Before 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was established, more than
1000 treaties and agreements, most of which were unequal in their terms, were
forced upon China by the Western powers. As many as 1.8 million square
kilometers were also taken away from Chinese territory. This was a period of
humiliation that the Chinese can never forget. This is why the people of China
show such strong emotions in matters concerning our national independence,
unity, integrity of territory and sovereignty. This is also why the Chinese are
so determined to safeguard them under any circumstances and at all costs [1].

Every nation values its self-determination, but the Chinese cherish this principle
with a passion that often seems to have faded in America and Western Europe. The
Chinese understand sovereignty as a tangible thing. To them, the theoretical recognition
of a state’s independence is meaningless unless its government actually has the ability to
act as it sees Ž t. Because, as political scientists so often observe, all nations are locked
into a state of so-called complex interdependence with the rest of the world, this means
that Beijing has accepted a formidable challenge. To achieve the kind of independence
they desire, China’s leaders must Ž nd a way to in uence whatever has the potential to
in uence them.
This means that China needs an exceptionally vigorous and far-reaching foreign
policy. Everywhere that Chinese interests are at stake—and in an interdependent world,
that means everywhere—China must assert its presence. In contemporary management
jargon, the PRC must be proactive. This concept is a staple of traditional Chinese strategic
thought [2]. Not only must China have a robust enough economy to supply its needs
and a powerful enough military to resist outside pressure, China must work to rear an
international system that favors its internal political order.
These ideas appear early in Communist Chinese political thought. During the 1930s,
many Chinese revolutionaries were concerned about the tension between China’s aspira-
tions for independence and communist principles of internationalism. Mao Zedong made
it clear that independence took precedence:

Can a Communist, who is an internationalist, be at the same time a pa-

triot? We hold that he not only can be but ought to be one. There is the
“patriotism” of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler, and there is our own
patriotism. Communists must resolutely oppose the so-called “patriotism” of
the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler. The Communists in Japan and Ger-
many are all defeatists in the wars of their respective countries. It suits the
interests of the Japanese and German people to ensure by every means that
the Japanese aggressors and Hitler are defeated in their wars, and the more
complete the defeat, the better. The Japanese and German Communists should
do this, and they are doing this. For the wars launched by the Japanese ag-
gressors and Hitler are, besides doing harm to the people of the world, doing
 Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy 47

harm to their own people as well. China’s case is different because she is
a victim of aggression. For us, defeatism is a crime, and to win the War of
Resistance is a duty that we cannot shirk. For only by Ž ghting in defence of
the motherland can we defeat the aggressors and achieve national liberation.
And only by achieving national liberation will it be possible for the prole-
tariat and the toiling masses to achieve their own liberation. The victory of
China and the defeat of the imperialists invading China will also be a help
to the people of foreign countries. Thus, patriotism is simply an application
of internationalism in the war of national liberation [3].

This passage is revealing, not only because of what Mao says about the immediate nature
of the Chinese independence movement, but because of what he says about the overall
nature of communist internationalism. Mao hoped to bring about a new international
order in which China’s interests and the interests of other ascending regimes throughout
the world have become the same. No doubt Mao sincerely believed that this society
would fulŽ l the utopian promises of communism. Nevertheless, he intended to do so by
advancing his own country Ž rst, and he expected success to rebound to his own nation’s
advantage. Mao deŽ ned China’s interests broadly and intended to pursue them around
the globe.
Over the next three decades, China continued to insist on its own independence
more strongly than ever, and its leaders remained committed to the idea that their own
sovereignty depended on the overall structure of world politics. Radicals reiterated Mao’s
points and called for China to continue its revolution on a global scale. Lin Biao, for
instance, exhorted his countrymen to “hold aloft the national banner,” even as he urged
them to carry the communist struggle beyond China’s borders [4]. Lin Biao justiŽ ed
global revolution as a way of creating a world order that would support China’s regime [5].
Less militant Chinese thinkers used similar principles to criticize both traditional
and Soviet concepts of international law. Chinese legal scholars attacked existing views
of statehood as props for Russian and Western hegemony but insisted on the importance
of absolute state sovereignty because of its utility to their own country [6]. The Chinese
cited their 1954 trade agreement with India as a model for a more just system of law,
based on the Ž ve principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity, nonaggression,
noninterference in other nations’ internal affairs, equality, and peaceful coexistence [7].
During the 1990s, Chinese military thinkers also criticized conventional views of
sovereignty. Although noting that American and Japanese deŽ nitions of military threat
do not include sovereignty as an explicit concern, they assured outsiders that theirs does
[8]. Like Mao and Lin Biao, recent Chinese thinkers have deŽ ned the defense of Chinese
sovereignty to include defense of an international order that supports China’s political
system. Writers in China’s army newspaper Jiefangjun bao states that a threat might arise
not merely from directly hostile acts, but from “fundamental contradictions or interest
con icts, such as opposing social systems and ideologies as well as disputes in economic
interests, territorial and ocean rights” [9].
Despite its insistence on independence, China has not adhered to any short-sighted
principle of autarky. Ever since the Chinese Communist Party’s alliance with the Kuom-
intang in the war against Japan, the PRC has proven itself willing to augment its native
resources by working with outsiders. Mao’s rapprochement with the Nixon administra-
tion in America provides yet another example of this point. China’s leaders have been
eager to cooperate with outside powers as long as they favor the terms under which such
cooperation takes place.
48 T. Kane

“To open to the world is a fundamental policy for China,” Mao’s successor Deng
Xiaoping noted [10]. Deng and his successor Jiang Zemin have reiterated their com-
mitment to their country’s independence, and to an international system that supports
their national aims [11]. Chinese ofŽ cials and thinkers have argued for their principles of
international relations during major events in world politics. The 1999 campaign to force
Serbia to stop persecuting ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, for instance, prompted Chinese
ofŽ cials to repeat their commitment to the principle of unlimited sovereignty in the most
vehement terms. “Peace loving countries and peoples the world over,” China’s Army
newspaper editorialized,

must be highly vigilant against [“hegemonist” threats to the concept of sover-

eignty], resolutely oppose the absurd theory that “human rights transcend
sovereignty,” and strive to defend their state sovereignty and build a fair and
rational world political and economic order [12].

What the Chinese consider “fair and rational” may seem otherwise from the perspective
of the countries they have classiŽ ed as hegemons. This suggestion goes beyond routine
skepticism. OfŽ cials in Deng-era China stated that, although the Chinese government
considered the rule of law quite important, it reserved the right to apply that law differ-
ently to different cases. As a socialist state with a dictatorship of the proletariat, China
sees law as a “tool” of that dictatorship [13]. “For the people, it means democracy, but
for the enemy, dictatorship” [14]. This philosophy is, to say the least, at odds with the
Western concept of equality before the law. China’s regime appears to see questions of
international “fairness” in much the same way.

Power to the State

The Chinese traditionally have favored the institution over the individual and the state
over all other institutions. Today’s regime is no exception to that rule. Just as the China’s
leaders take a ruthlessly practical approach to the concept of sovereignty, they are inclined
to be hardheaded about the issue of government power. The state is not an abstract concept
in Chinese political culture. People identify it with particular organizations and measure
its effectiveness in terms of those organizations’ ability not merely to maintain social
order, but to mobilize the nation on behalf of their own political agendas.
Mao captured the essence of this principle in his oft-quoted saying, “ ‘Political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun.’ Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and
the gun will never be allowed to command the party” [15]. The message here goes beyond
the truism that armed force makes one powerful. Mao is telling us about who should
control armed force, and what they should do with their power. The great revolutionary
places the gun in the hands of the Party—in other words, the organization responsible
for developing and propagating the regime’s partisan political program.
The fact that Mao was a zealot may have inspired him to be blunt about this issue, but
China’s current regime follows the same philosophy. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping committed
China to the “four cardinal principles” of the Socialist road, the dictatorship of the
proletariat, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism–
Mao Zedong thought [16]. Deng, Jiang Zemin, and editorialists in the Chinese press
have continued to stress these principles ever since [17]. As China expert Peter Moody
has observed, the key principle was and remains party leadership [18]. The other three
function to enforce or legitimize party rule [19].
 Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy 49

The declarations of Jiang, Deng, and Mao correspond to traditional principles of

Chinese political thought. China’s 1972 and 1973 campaigns to venerate the Legalist
philosophies of the Qin dynasty indicate not only the continuity in Chinese attitudes
toward state power, but the fact that China’s current rulers understand and use traditional
ideas at a conscious level. Legalism is a living political theory, and although that means
that its concepts evolve over time, it also means that its original precepts continue to
in uence contemporary ideas [20]. Legalism always has had more vitality in the political
realm than Confucianism. (Legalism is also compatible with other prominent Chinese
traditions.) The most in uential pro-Qin movements took place in the early 1970s and
appear to be subtle criticisms of the Cultural Revolution radicals [21]. In other words,
the early pro-Qin movement re ected the thought of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and
the other pragmatists who have dominated the Chinese government from the death of
Mao onward.
Shang Yang, the Ž rst great writer in the Legalist tradition, taught that war and
agriculture were the primary occupations of the state [22]. Moral and other sentiments are
dangerous distractions, because according to the Legalists the wealth and military power
of the central government precede all other political ends [23]. Shang and his followers
had great respect for the value of technical and administrative innovations that helped
states achieve those ends [24]. The Legalists waged many of their Ž ercest rhetoric battles
against those who opposed effective measures on grounds of tradition or principle [25].
The Legalists wrote caustically about those who conceived of politics in terms of
abstractions, and Shang Yang explained exactly who was supposed to wield the state’s
wealth and power [26]. The laws, he said, were to be administered by the prince and his
ministers, but the “right standard” is Ž xed by the prince alone [27]. Li Si, the Legalist
thinker who masterminded the government of the Qin empire, reiterated this advice in a
memorial to China’s Ž rst emperor, drawing upon the writings of the prominent Legalists
Shen Buhai and Han Feizi to advocate a legal system by which “the ruler will, by himself
control the empire, and will not be controlled by anyone” [28].
Unlike the Communists, the Legalists never claimed to want a government of the
people. The only beneŽ ts they promised the masses were those of living in a well-
ordered state. Nevertheless, they sought to involve every individual in their system of
government, so that the ruler could draw upon the strength of the entire population. Shang
Yang depicted the people as a stream of water that always follows the easiest course,
and advocated material rewards and punishments to channel people’s energies in useful
directions [29]. In order for the ruler to control the empire directly, his administrative
system had to be both centralized and efŽ cient [30].
After the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, many Chinese thinkers found the
pragmatism and iconoclasm of the Legalists salutary. Scholars wrote about Qin dynasty
history because they perceived such discourse to be a relatively safe way to voice ideas
about the importance of social order, the advantages of centralized administration, the
value of technical expertise, and the necessity of shielding the government from destruc-
tive criticism by ideologues [31]. The fact that they chose the Qin dynasty as their model,
however, indicates that they had sympathy with Legalist arguments as well as Legalist
conclusions. China’s history is replete with other uniŽ ers and pragmatists that they might
have selected.
One must consider the purposes of China’s economic and political reforms in this
light. Since the late 1970s, China’s regime has instituted policies that would have seemed
unthinkable under Mao. Although it would be a mistake to underestimate these changes,
it also would be a mistake to see them as a complete break with the past. Throughout
50 T. Kane

the ages, Chinese governments have instituted novel social, economic, and engineering
projects freely, often with profound consequences for the population. The building of the
Great Wall, the building of the Grand Canal, the Sung dynasty agricultural reforms, and
the Ming dynasty decision to abolish shipping come to mind. The Mao-era Communists
and the Qin-era Legalists were both notable for their exceptional readiness to introduce
dramatic change. The fact that today’s Chinese regime has adopted measures that appear
radical by the standards of its predecessors does not necessarily mean that it has aban-
doned its goals. The idea that one may experiment with dramatically different policies as
long as one remains faithful to one’s overall objectives has traditionally been an article
of faith in Chinese Communism [32].
Although the Chinese government currently permits a limited market economy, its
leaders seem to value private enterprise primarily for the beneŽ ts it can bring the state.
Shang Yang, who advised rulers to structure the economy so as to encourage enterprises
that strengthened the government, might well have approved [33]. In 1995, Jiang Zemin
spoke before the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in an address that Western
analysts see as the “agenda-setting” speech for his administration. On that occasion,
Jiang paired China’s goal of economic development with the goal of “enhancing state
capabilities” [34].
On other occasions, Jiang has been even more explicit.

The Four Cardinal Principles are the foundation of the nation, whereas reform
and opening to the outside world are means of strengthening the nation [35].

Li Peng, meanwhile, has admonished the people of China’s Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) to use their greater levels of economic freedom in this spirit.
These zones must uphold the four basic principles and put great effort into developing
socialist spiritual civilization. They engage in foreign intercourse. At the same time that
they earnestly study advanced foreign technology and management, in politics they must
maintain clear heads. They must strengthen party building and develop the function of
the party as a protective fortress [36].
China’s leaders are aware that experiments with free trade and private industry may
endanger the state’s power to regulate and exploit China’s economy, but they hope the
more fundamental instruments of control in their hands. As Deng Xiaoping re ected in
1992:

As long as we keep ourselves sober-minded, there is nothing to be feared.

We still hold superiority, because we have large and medium state-owned
enterprises and township and town enterprises. More importantly, we hold
the state power in our hands [37].

Whenever necessary, Deng implies, gun barrels can still be a source of power.
The Chinese regime also retains day-to-day control over much of China’s putatively
private enterprise. During the 1990s, the Chinese government announced that it had
privatized 10,000 state-run Ž rms [38]. Of these newly independent Ž rms, however, only
300 have been publicly listed in Shanghai and Shenzen [39]. Banks continue to lend
to these Ž rms as if they expected the state to cover their debts [40]. Perhaps most
signiŽ cant of all, the management of the privatized industries remains unchanged [41].
China’s industrialists, China’s intelligence ofŽ cials, China’s military ofŽ cers, and China’s
political leaders tend to be closely related by blood, when they are not actually the same
individuals [42].
 Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy 51

Similar observations apply to China’s political reforms. Government ofŽ cials, as well
as student demonstrators, have called for more democracy in China [43]. Although this
movement is by no means in uential, it plays a role in Chinese politics. One would be
mistaken, however, to assume that the Chinese concept of democracy is identical to the
Western ideal.
Some Chinese thinkers certainly admire European and American political models.
For many, however, the goals of democracy are not to give citizens greater freedom but to
reduce the role of individual (and thus potentially idiosyncratic) leaders in policy making
and to unite the people more solidly behind government programs. These ofŽ cials argue
that collective government is more scientiŽ c (kexue) than oligarchy, and that “the process
will lead to more correct policy, which all people could be educated to embrace and
support” [44].
Mao Zedong argued for democracy on much the same grounds. To him, democratic
life was a way to call forth “activeness” from the people [45]. This, he hoped, would
stimulate creativity, inspire people to work with greater energy, and provoke useful crit-
icism of Party policies [46]. During his struggle for power in the 1940s, he advocated
democracy quite actively. Nevertheless, Mao wished to moderate democratic institutions
with centralist ones that would prevent individuals from indulging in “licence of action”
[47]. In his view, democracy “is meant to strengthen discipline and raise Ž ghting capacity,
not to weaken them” [48]. Discipline and Ž ghting capacity, not license, characterized the
political system that Mao imposed once he actually took power.
Deng Xiaoping held similar views. In 1962, he described democracy as a necessary
tool for making the Communist Party more “centralized and uniŽ ed,” but he portrayed
it as a means to that goal, not an end in itself [49]. The China expert Murray Scot
Tanner has suggested that China’s advocates of democracy fail to appreciate the point that
there are always irreconcilable differences of opinion in a democracy [50]. Furthermore,
when Chinese ofŽ cials discuss democracy, one must always keep in mind that they
may mean something quite different from democracy as people understand it in more
liberal countries. When Deng praised democracy, for instance, he was referring to internal
democracy within the party, not universal suffrage throughout the nation [51].
Jiang Zemin, likewise, has lauded “socialist democracy” and a “socialist legal sys-
tem” on the grounds that they promote “China’s long-term order and stability” but has-
tened to add, “We must draw a clear line of demarcation between socialist democracy
and capitalist democracy” [52].
People’s democracy and the dictatorship over hostile elements and antisocialist ele-
ments are closely linked and in unity with each other. As long as class struggle remains
within a certain scope, the function of this dictatorship cannot be weakened [53].
China’s regime seeks economic growth, industrial development, and even greater
levels of political participation for its citizens. Nevertheless, its leaders do not see these
things as their ultimate goals. Rather, they see them as ways to increase the power of
the regime. They not only wish to enjoy national prosperity, they wish to have it at their
disposal. The Chinese government may continue to liberalize its policies, but there is no
sign that its deeper priorities will change.
The Chinese leadership’s attitude toward state power reinforces its commitment to a
robust deŽ nition of sovereignty. Even if the Chinese people can beneŽ t from integration
into the capitalist global markets, and even if the existing balance of power can guarantee
the safety of such markets, the Chinese regime will be unsatisŽ ed with that balance. As
long as China depends on other powers to protect its sources of wealth, it will have to
use that wealth with circumspection. Therefore, China’s leaders will wish to secure their
52 T. Kane

interests by means of their own arms. Even if they never actually challenge the existing
world order by force, they will want the potential to do so. The facts that their policies
may demand sacriŽ ces from the Chinese people and may even detract from some broader
deŽ nition of China’s national interest will not alter their outlook.

The Role of Ideology

The proposition that China has abandoned Communism in favor of some presumably
more benign philosophy of semicapitalistic paternalism has become common wisdom.
Recent expansion of foreign trade and private enterprise lends credibility to this idea. In
1985, the newspaper People’s Daily went so far as to publish an article suggesting that
it was unrealistic to expect the works of Marx and Lenin, written in the 19th century,
“to solve today’s problems” [54]. A few days later, in a rare retraction, the editors of
People’s Daily wrote that they had not meant to criticize Marxism at such a general level
and claimed that the original statement should have read merely that it was a mistake to
assume that 19th century communist writings could solve all of today’s problems [55].
China’s leaders maintain that they are as committed to the ideas of Marx, Lenin,
and Mao as ever. Premier Jiang Zemin praises Mao Zedong and the reformer Deng
Xiaoping side-by-side, saying that Mao developed the theory of revolutionary socialism
and Deng developed the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics [56].
OfŽ cials of China’s State Education Commission summarized this position in a report that
stated that China’s economic reforms are not social democratism but “a self-improvement
of socialism” [57]. In Chinese rhetoric, communism remains a goal to be sought and
“bourgeois liberalization” remains a threat to be guarded against [58]. The Sixth Plenum
of the Communist Party’s Central Committee designated the early 21st century as the
period in which China must begin to augment its economic growth by “promoting socialist
ethical and cultural progress” in order to build a new “socialist spiritual civilization” [59].
The ideas of the communist movement are powerful, and the ideals of the Communist
movement appear noble. One need not doubt that many Chinese people Ž nd them as
persuasive as ever. In 1994, when an American expert on communist thought asked Mo
Xiusong, a Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, whether his party still aimed
to achieve world communism, the Vice Chairman replied, “Yes, of course. That is the
reason we exist” [60].
There is, however, a second reason why China’s leaders stand behind their ideology,
at least in rhetoric. Beliefs are means as well as ends in politics, and Maoism helps China
to maintain its independence from potentially hostile global institutions. Communist po-
litical theory also provides principles that allow China’s government to shield people
from outside in uences and organize them on behalf of the Chinese state. “If China does
not uphold socialism,” Deng Xiaoping stated after the Tiananmen Square incident in
1989, “It will be turned into an appendage of the capitalist countries” [61]. Jiang Zemin
has echoed the same argument [62].
China’s leaders accuse the West of deliberately propagating the idea that their com-
munism is reforming itself out of existence in order to achieve that end. “The entire
imperialist Western world plans to make all socialist countries discard the socialist road
and then bring them under the control of international monopoly capital,” Deng stated
[63]. Jiang Zemin has stated the same principle in equally ringing terms.

International hostile forces will never stop using peaceful evolution against us
for a single day. Bourgeois liberalization is an internal matching force which
they use to carry out peaceful evolution. These kinds of hostile activities
 Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy 53

constitute a real threat to China’s independence, sovereignty, development

and reform. In other words, peaceful evolution and bourgeois liberalization
are aimed not only at overthrowing our socialist system but, fundamentally,
at depriving us of our national independence and state sovereignty [64].

China’s leaders see maintaining their distinct political ideology as being integral to
maintaining their distinct political identity. Although “socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics” may have evolved into something quite different from the communism Mao
envisioned, China’s rulers have no desire to conform to the liberal political order that
dominates much of the world today, much less to allow that order to change their regime.
If China’s current regime has rejected revolutionary internationalism of the sort preached
by Lin Biao as unfeasible, it has hardly embraced the global status quo.

Conclusion
China’s leaders have tangible reasons to take these positions on sovereignty, power, and
ideology. Furthermore, their policies indicate that they mean what they say. The fact
that Western pundits have shown such enthusiasm for the idea that their countries can
modify China’s system government by “engaging” it and luring it into “interdependence”
indicates that there is a core of objective reality to China’s position that its national
freedom depends on military and ideological separateness [65]. China’s government has
taken innumerable steps to build its independence, power, and ideologic purity during
recent years, ranging from programs to strengthen its armed forces to crackdowns on
religious sects. The Beijing regime is likely to stand fast on these issues as long as it
aspires to maintain its dictatorship within China, which means, in effect, for as long as
it can remain in power.
Those outside the Beijing circle of power must be cautious about predicting how
China’s leaders might apply these principles in speciŽ c cases. Nevertheless, one should
remain aware that the Chinese have such principles and are not likely to abandon them
lightly. As one Chinese proverb goes, “It takes more than one cold day for the river
to freeze three feet deep” [66]. The fact that China’s leaders are determined to main-
tain a political system that goes against the Western grain means that Westerners must
guard their own power, interests, and independence as vigilantly as the Chinese. Western
countries also must remain ready to support their allies in Asia.
One should not, however, confuse a policy of defending Western countries and their
Asian allies with a policy of being anti-China. In certain ways, the opposite is the case.
China’s leaders have been openly bitter about the arrogance of Westerners who believe
that they can cozen the People’s Republic into giving up its ambitions through a program
of peaceful evolution. To recognize China’s aspirations for what they are is a gesture not
only of prudence, but of respect.

Notes
1. Li Jijun, Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997, p. 4.
2. As an example of proactive thinking, one might consider the following excerpt from
Sunzi: “When I wish to give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep
moats, cannot help but engage me, for I attack a position he must relieve. When I wish to avoid
battle, I may defend myself simply by drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable
to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes” (Sun Tzu, Sun Tzu’s Art of War:
54 T. Kane

The Modern Chinese Interpretation, Yuan Shibing, trans. New York: Sterling Publishing, 1987,
pp. 105–106).
3. Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung Volume Two, London: Lawrence &
Wishart, 1954, p. 201.
4. Samuel B. GrifŽ th II, Peking and People’s Wars: An Analysis of Statements By OfŽ cial
Spokesmen of the Chinese Communist Party on the Subject of Revolutionary Strategy, London: Pall
Mall Press, 1966, p. 68.
5. Ibid.
6. Menno T. Kamminga, “Building ‘Railroads on the Sea’: China’s Attitude towards Mar-
itime Law,” China Quarterly, no. 59, September 1974, pp. 544–558; Suzanne Ogden, “The Ap-
proach of the Chinese Communists to the Study of International Law, State Sovereignty and the
International System,” China Quarterly, no. 70, June 1977, pp. 315–337.
7. Kamminga, “Building ‘Railroads’,” pp. 545–546.
8. Allen S. Whiting, “The PLA and China’s Threat Perceptions,” China Quarterly, no. 146,
June 1996, p. 599.
9. Ibid.
10. Richard Baum, “The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s,” in Roderick
MacFarquhar, ed, The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993, p. 376.
11. Joseph Fewsmith, “Reaction, Resurgence and Succession: Chinese Politics Since Tianan-
men,” in MacFarquhar, ed, The Politics of China, pp. 484–485.
12. Zhang Xuebin, “Two ‘isms’ on the Same Vine,” reprinted in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, February 8, 2000, FE/3758 G/2.
13. Robert Heuser, “Chinese Law of Foreign Trade: An Interview,” China Quarterly, no.
73, March 1978, pp. 159–165.
14. Ibid.
15. Mao Zedong, op. cit., p. 228.
16. Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism 1969–1982,”
in MacFarquhar, ed, The Politics of China, p. 324.
17. “Bear In Mind the Party’s Fundamental Objective: Commemorating the 69th Founding
Anniversary of the CPC,” in Peter R. Moody Jr., ed, China Documents Annual 1990 The Continuing
Crisis, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1994, p. 11; Jiang Zemin, “Report on Behalf
of the CPC Central Committee State Council at a Grand Meeting of People of Various Walks of
Life in the Capital to Celebrate the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC,” in Moody, ed,
China Documents, p. 22.
18. Li Peng, “Speech at a Reception Celebrating the 41st Anniversary of the Founding of
the PRC Held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing,” in Moody, ed, China Documents, p. 18.
19. Ibid.
20. For a discussion of this school of thought and its far-reaching in uence in Chinese
philosophy, see Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China, London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1939, pp. 199–252.
21. During the mid-1970s, the ideologues launched a countermovement, also extolling the
Qin empire but supporting a different set of leaders and policies. Merle Goldman, “China’s Anti-
Confucian Campaign 1973–1974,” China Quarterly, no. 63, Sept. 1975, pp. 435–462.
22. Wade Baskin, ed, Classics in Chinese Philosophy, New York: Philosophical Library,
1972, p. 138.
23. Ibid., p. 139.
24. Wm. Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, eds, Sources of Chinese
Tradition, vol. 1, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, pp. 129–131.
25. Ibid.
26. Han Feizi said “to refer to anything that one cannot be certain of is self-deceptive” (ibid.,
p. 125).
27. Baskin, Classics in Chinese Philosophy, p. 142.
 Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy 55

28. Bary, Chan, and Watson, Sources of Chinese Tradition, p. 142.

29. Baskin, Classics in Chinese Philosophy, pp. 141–142.
30. Ibid., p. 142.
31. Goldman, “China’s Anti-Confucian Campaign,” p. 441.
32. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy
and Diplomacy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, p. 10.
33. Baskin, Classics in Chinese Philosophy, p. 139.
34. Fewsmith, “Reaction, Resurgence and Succession,” p. 521.
35. Jiang, “Report on Behalf,” p. 22.
36. Li Peng, “Li Peng Points Out At the National Work Conference on Special Economic
Zones: The Special Economic Zones Must Serve as Windows and as Base Areas,” in Moody, ed,
China Documents, p. 120.
37. Michael Yahuda, “Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman,” China Quarterly, no. 135, September
1993, p. 557.
38. Nicholas Lardy and Kevin Nealer, “China’s Economic Prospects,” in Hans Binnendijk
and Ronald N. Montaperto, eds., Strategic Trends in China, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing OfŽ ce, 1998, p. 35.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Murray Scot Tanner, “The Erosion of Communist Party Control Over Lawmaking In
China,” China Quarterly, no. 138, June 1994, p. 386.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Mao, Selected Works, p. 210.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 211.
48. Ibid.
49. David Bonavia, Deng, Hong Kong: Longman Group, 1989, p. 193.
50. Tanner, “The Erosion,” p. 386.
51. Bonavia, Deng, p. 193.
52. Jiang, “Report on Behalf,” p. 26.
53. Ibid., p. 27.
54. Baum, “The Road to Tiananmen,” p. 371.
55. Ibid., p. 372.
56. “The 15th National Congress of the CCP,” China Quarterly, no. 152, December 1997,
pp. 906–909.
57. Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1994, p. 118.
58. “The Sixth Plenary Session of the 14th CCPCC and Seventh Plenary Session of the CCP
CDIC,” China Quarterly, no. 150, June 1997, pp. 230–231; Allen S. Whiting, “Chinese Nationalism
and Foreign Policy After Deng,” China Quarterly, no. 142, June 1995, p. 304.
59. “Sixth Plenary Session,” p. 229.
60. Anatoly Golitsyn, The Perestroika Deception: The World’s Slide Toward the Second
October Revolution (Weltoktober), London: Edward Halle, 1995, p. xxiv.
61. Fewsmith, “Reaction, Resurgence and Succession,” p. 485.
62. Jiang, “Report on Behalf,” p. 17.
63. Fewsmith, “Reaction, Resurgence and Succession,” p. 485.
64. Whiting, “Chinese Nationalism,” p. 304.
65. For a discussion of the prospects for China becoming interdependent with the West,
see David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds, China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence,
London: Routledge, 1997.
66. Roy U.T. Kim, “Sino-Soviet Dialogue on the Problem of War,” American Political Sci-
ence Review, vol. 69, no. 1, March 1975, p. 392.