DNV ENERGY

SITING HAZOP REPORT

(Final) of Phenol Plant
For: INEOS Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Company Ltd
Project no: 431H026A
Rev 2, June 2008
Report Number: 2008-431-022
Date of Issue: June 2008
Siting HAZOP Report (rev 2 )
Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

Siting HAZOP Report (Final) of Phenol Plant Det Norske Veritas AS Sdn Bhd
DNV Energy
For: Malaysia
Level 24, Menara Weld
Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Company Ltd 76, Jalan Raja Chulan
50200 Kuala Lumpur
Tel: +60-3-20502888
Fax: +60-3-20310886

Report No.: 2008-431-022 Subject Group: HAZOP

Indexing terms: SITING HAZOP FINAL REPORT

Summary: Det Norske Veritas AS Sdn Bhd has been commissioned by Ineos Phenol
(Zhangjiagang) Company Ltd to facilitate a SITING HAZOP workshop for the
planned Phenol Plant, to review the site layout of major process plant and
buildings, based on the consequence hazard ranges that may result from
equipment failures. This report consist findings and recommendations raised
during the session.
Digitally signed by Henk Herfst

Prepared by: Name and position Signature Henk Herfst DN: CN = Henk Herfst, C = MY,
OU = DNV KL
Henk Herfst, Principal Risk Engineer Date: 2008.06.20 15:51:34 +08'00'

Verified by: Name and position Signature

Jens Eirik Ramstad, Ass. Director/Head
of Section DNV Energy Malaysia
Approved by: Name and position Signature
Lee, Cho Hing, Head of Risk Section
DNV Shanghai
Date of issue: June 2008

Project No: 431H026A

Document Revision Record

Rev No: Reason for issue: Prepared by: Verified by: Quality check: Approved by:
0 Client Review Henk Herfst Jens Eirik Lee Cho Hing
Ramstad
1 Final, client comment Henk Herfst Lee Cho Hing
included
2 Final, client comment Henk Herfst Lee Cho Hing
included

No distribution without permission from the client or responsible organisational unit (however,
free distribution for internal use within DNV after 3 years)
No distribution without permission from the client or responsible organisational unit

Strictly confidential

Unrestricted distribution

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Document id.: 431H026A
Date of Issue: June 2008
Siting HAZOP Report (rev 2 )
Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

All copyrights reserved This publication or parts thereof may not be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, including photocopying or recording, without the prior written consent of Det
Norske Veritas AS Sdn. Bhd.

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Document id.: 431H026A
Date of Issue: June 2008
Siting HAZOP Report (rev 2 )
Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

Contents
Executive Summary..................................................................................................... 5
1.0 Study Objectives & Scope......................................................................... 6
1.1 Objectives .................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Scope........................................................................................................... 6
2.0 Study Methodology.................................................................................... 8
2.1 HAZOP Study Procedure ............................................................................. 8
2.2 Siting HAZOP Guide Words....................................................................... 10
3.0 SITING HAZOP Workshop ....................................................................... 13
3.1 Participation ............................................................................................... 13
4.0 FINDINGS.................................................................................................. 14
4.1 Summary.................................................................................................... 14
Appendix I HAZOP Worksheet ............................................................................ 16

Appendix II Consequence Hazard Distances ..................................................... 19

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Executive Summary
Det Norske Veritas (DNV) has been commissioned by Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Company
Ltd to facilitate a SITING HAZOP of a new planned Phenol Plant.
The objective was to review the site layout of major process plant and buildings, based on the
consequence hazard ranges that may result from equipment failures.
DNV’s consequence modelling software PHAST Version 6.51 was used to determine the
hazard ranges that may be associated with potential leak scenarios from major process
equipment items, in preparation for the meeting.
These consequence modelling results were discussed at the start of the Siting Hazop meeting,
conducted on 2nd June 2008.
The Siting HAZOP meeting resulted in a total of 17 recommendations. A main
recommendation was to consider relocating the CCR, Laboratory and Substation 2 to the
Southern boundary of the plot, and use the vacated space for parking.
All recommendations should be given due attention by the parties responsible for follow up and
close out. If for any reason a recommendation is not implemented, the justification for it should
be documented.

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1.0 Study Objectives & Scope

1.1 Objectives
The objectives of the Siting HAZOP study are as follows:
• To identify the consequence hazard ranges that may result from equipment failures to
ascertain whether equipment is optimally located to reduce risks to other operating areas
and occupied buildings;
• To evaluate the adequacy of the planned measures to prevent, control and mitigate where
appropriate.

1.2 Scope
The scope of the Siting HAZOP study was a review of the layout of Ineos Phenol Plant, with
due regard for consequence hazard ranges that may result from loss of containment accidents.
The main plot plan used in this review was the General Plot Plan, document no. D-DR-00-AA-
B001 Rev A4. The PFDs (and associated mass balances) used to perform the consequence
analysis of hazard ranges were drawing numbers:

• Technip No: 7001K-020-PFD-0010-01 Unit 20 (Rev 0);

• Technip No: 7001K-021-PFD-0010-02 Unit 21 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-021-PFD-0010-03 Unit 21 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-025-PFD-0010-04 Unit 25 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-025-PFD-0010-05 Unit 25 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-026-PFD-0010-06 Unit 26 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-026-PFD-0010-07 Unit 26 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-026-PFD-0010-08 Unit 26 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-030-PFD-0010-09 Unit 30 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-030-PFD-0010-10 Unit 30 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-030-PFD-0010-11 Unit 30 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-034-PFD-0010-12 Unit 34 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-030-PFD-0010-13 Unit 30 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-030-PFD-0010-14 Unit 30 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-030-PFD-0010-15 Unit 30 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-031-PFD-0010-16 Unit 31 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-031-PFD-0010-17 Unit 31 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-031-PFD-0010-18 Unit 31 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-032-PFD-0010-19 Unit 32 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-038-PFD-0010-20 Unit 38 (Rev 1);

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• Technip No: 7001K-041-PFD-0010-21 Unit 41 (Rev 1);

• Technip No: 7001K-040-PFD-0010-23 Unit 40 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-040-PFD-0010-24 Unit 40 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-042-PFD-0010-25 Unit 42 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-044-PFD-0010-26 Unit 44 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-045-PFD-0010-27 Unit 45 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-050-PFD-0010-28 Unit 50 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-050-PFD-0010-29 Unit 50 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-001-PFD-0010-30 Unit 1/2 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-010-PFD-0010-31 Unit 10 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-014-PFD-0010-32 Unit 14 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-070-PFD-0010-33 Unit 70 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-030-PFD-0010-34 Unit 30 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-030-PFD-0010-35 Unit 30 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-009-PFD-0010-36 Unit 09 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-008-PFD-0010-37 Unit 08 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-074-PFD-0010-38 Unit 74 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-015-PFD-0039-12 Unit 15 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-037-PFD-0010-40 Unit 37 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-080-PFD-0010-41 Unit 80 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-039-PFD-0010-44 Unit 39 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-039-PFD-0010-45 Unit 39 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-071-PFD-0010-46 Unit 71 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-075-PFD-0010-47 Unit 75 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-071-PFD-0010-48 Unit 71 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-080-PFD-0010-49 Unit 80 (Rev 0);
• Technip No: 7001K-055-PFD-0010-50 Unit 55 (Rev 1);
• Technip No: 7001K-073-PFD-0010-51 Unit 73 (Rev 0).

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Date of Issue: June 2008
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Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

2.0 Study Methodology

2.1 HAZOP Study Procedure

The Siting HAZOP is facilitated by an experienced "Siting" HAZOP leader who is expert in
applying the specialised siting methodology. Deviation/guide word lists are the Deviation lists
for Siting HAZOPs ( Table 2.2 ) and Occupied Building Review ( Table 2.3 ). Preparation for
the study includes identification of potential release scenarios and the modelling of the potential
consequences.

In preparation for the Siting HAZOP study, catastrophic events in the facility are selected,
without consideration of the likelihood for their occurrence. These events are chosen based on
potential worst case failures and previous knowledge of potential hazards of the process.
Consequence modelling is then performed by trained personnel, using computer software
designed for this purpose, to determine the potential effects for each assumed event.

An alternate approach to develop the information for the Siting HAZOP is by performing a
Concept Safety Evaluation (CSE). The CSE defines the consequence contours and provides an
estimated frequency for various consequences. The CSE also provides information to support
the safety design of occupied buildings.

The HAZOP team uses the data on each effect, the site layout drawings, and guide words to
evaluate the impact. The potential area impacted by each effect, regardless of wind direction,
becomes a "section" to be reviewed.

The Siting HAZOP study uses a different set of guide words known as the "PLOT PLAN"
guide words. This list includes such guide words as "CONTAINMENT," "FIRE PROTECTION
SYSTEMS" and "IGNITION," and is designed to help the team analyse the possible impact of
the assumed event, both on the facility and on surrounding areas. The guide words are applied
similar to the non-process guide words of the process study, in which guide word and guide
word description prompts the team to identify issues or concerns associated with the event. As
was done in the process study, if a consequence of an issue or concern is judged by the team to
be significant and there are opportunities for improvement, the team makes a recommendation
to minimise its likelihood and/or mitigate its effects. The final guide word in the PLOT PLAN
list is SOURCE OF FAILURE. After the team has analysed the possible consequences of a
catastrophic failure, it considers how the event could happen, and how likely it is to occur. This
establishes the "cause" of the event whose consequences were addressed using the previous
guide words.

Once again, the objective is to determine whether recommendations can be made to prevent the
event from occurring (or minimising the probability), and/or mitigate the potential
consequences.
The information required for conducting a Siting HAZOP is given in Table 2.1.

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Date of Issue: June 2008
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Table 2.1 Information Requirements

Minimum Information Required Team

Scope of Study Timing
For HAZOP Members

Operations expert
Review potential impacts
Process Engineer
of releases of hazardous
Proposed plot plan of chemicals. Select stage if applied for Plant Emergency
Facility site selection. Response expert
Evaluate adequacy and
requirements for: Process Safety Expert
HSE Engineer

Project process flow

Early Define stage once
diagrams, process 1. Proposed safety
listed information is
conditions, and material systems
available.
balance

MSDS and properties of 2. Emergency response

chemicals used plans,

3. Location, construction,
Process description and occupancy of process
buildings

4. Response requirements
Process chemistry
to emergencies.

Equipment information to
5. Locations of hazardous
estimate inventories of
chemicals
hazardous chemicals

Perform an API-752
analysis of occupied
Strategy for staffing and
buildings or extract
occupancy levels for
conclusions related to
buildings that can be
occupied buildings from
impacted by the process
the Concept Safety
Evaluation.

Environmental Strategy

Proposed locations of
occupied buildings

Draft control centre layout

Consequence contours
developed for selected
scenarios to be reviewed
in the study

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Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

2.2 Siting HAZOP Guide Words

The Siting HAZOP guidewords used are shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Siting Hazop Guidewords

GUIDE WORD / DESCRIPTION
DEVIATION
RESPONSE TO EVENT DETECTION: Leak/fire detection systems (automatic devices
or other means such as sight, sound, smell) – emergency
communications - alarms.

MITIGATION BY EARLY INTERVENTION: Personnel

responsibilities/actions required to mitigate - other options for
mitigation - training.

EVACUATION/SUPPORT: Escape routes - evacuation plans

- blockage of exits - exit from elevated or recessed locations -
provisions to account for personnel, including maintenance
and contractors - vehicle/personnel access/egress – Emergency
Medical Teams – Emergency Response Team - emergency
medical supplies - etc.
CONTAINMENT ADEQUACY OF CONTAINMENT: Basis for containment
design - depth of liquid pool - wave effect – secondary
containment - drainage/sewers in containment area - sources
of ignition in containment area - capability to this/other
equipment in containment area - methods of isolation - excess
inventory of hazardous chemicals - containment compromised
- stationary sources of ignition in/near containment area -
ignition from vehicular traffic or hot work - etc.
DRAINAGE/SEWERS Spill volume vs drainage capacity (including capacity for
deluge, fire fighting, etc.) - drainage direction - ground slope -
spills into ditches - drainage destination - disposal/cleanup
methods – secondary monitoring - etc.
REACTIVITY EFFECT/MECHANISM: Formation of toxic vapours –
inadvertent mixing of multiple spills - properties of material
when released and effects on surrounding
structures/equipment - reactivity with moisture
- auto ignition - phase change.

PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT:
Personnel protection available (Scott Air Packs / respirators /
breathing air stations) - egress/approach routes to personnel
protection.

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GUIDE WORD / DESCRIPTION

DEVIATION
MITIGATION TECHNIQUES: Water sprays - foam
deinventory of vessel/tank - etc.
IGNITION Static electricity - open flames - vehicle entry - hot work –
electrical classification - hot surfaces - people in area -
prevailing wind - flammability limits - etc.
FIRE PROTECTION Fire fighting strategy - impaired automatic sprinklers/deluge
SYSTEMS systems - effect on anhydrous systems - turret nozzle
location/coverage - personnel training - fire water pumps/fire
water storage affected - location of firewater headers and
isolation/activation valves – location of other emergency
equipment and building containing emergency equipment (are
they affected/encumbered, is alternate equipment available?) -
mutual aid - etc.
EFFECT ON CLOUD FOOTPRINT: Effect on control room - personnel
SURROUNDINGS routinely in area (shops, warehouses, change areas, etc.) -
detection systems - deactivation of nearby protective /
emergency shutdown systems - isolation points compromised
- domino effect on other equipment - direction of BLEVE
(Burning Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) and equipment
in path - toxicity - vapour cloud explosion - etc.
EFFECT ON Location of public receptors vs possible effects - Effect on
OTHER AREAS community - inaccessibility to emergency facilities - satellite
work areas and buildings - office/administration buildings -
laboratory - warehouse - maintenance shops - OSBL facilities
– contractor buildings - training areas/buildings -
PCC/computer buildings - emergency response plan - etc.
SOURCE OF FAILURE FAILURE OF A PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM ELEMENT: Equipment failure - metal fatigue -
high pressure gas cylinders - hot work – construction /
maintenance activities – contractor activities - guillotine of
lines - overhead lifting - fork lifts – vehicle traffic - railways -
roads - public transportation routes – unbarricaded access -
unauthorised access - start-up/shutdown - overpressure -
runaway reaction - inadvertent mixing - operating procedures -
training - etc.

FAILURE OUTSIDE OF NORMAL CONTROLS: Other

nearby chemical plants - weather conditions - natural disasters
– pre-existing manufacturing defect that cannot be inspected
or detected - phenomena previously not recognised in industry
- sabotage - etc.

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The findings of the study are to be recorded in log sheets. As with the use of non-process
parameter guide words in a HAZOP of a process, issues or concerns in a Siting HAZOP are
recorded in the CAUSE column of the log sheets.

Consequences and recommendations are recorded the same as with traditional HAZOP
methodology. These log sheets relate the guide words, causes (issues for SITING HAZOP), and
consequences to any recommendation generated. Although each recommendation should be
complete by itself, the log sheets may be used to help understand the process that resulted in the
consensus recommendations generated by the HAZOP team.

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3.0 SITING HAZOP Workshop

3.1 Participation
The HAZOP workshop was held at Ineos offices in Shanghai on the 2nd June 2008.
The findings of the study are to be recorded in log sheets. As with the use of non-process
parameter guide words in a HAZOP of a process, issues or concerns in a Siting HAZOP are
recorded in the CAUSE column of the log sheets.

Consequences and recommendations are recorded the same as with traditional HAZOP
methodology. These log sheets relate the guide words, causes (issues for SITING HAZOP), and
consequences to any recommendation generated. Although each recommendation should be
complete by itself, the log sheets may be used to help understand the process that resulted in the
consensus recommendations generated by the HAZOP team.

The Siting HAZOP team comprised the following disciplines of personnel:

Attendee Job Title Company

Aron Mar Process Eng INEOS

Bart Woumans Operations INEOS

Tom Guo HSE Eng INEOS

Barry Haughie HSE Mgr INEOS

Jaime Delgado Engineering Mgr INEOS

Chen Jiang Wei Risk Eng DNV

Ou Hong Mei Risk Eng DNV

Henk Herfst Principal Eng DNV

(Facilitator)

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Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

4.0 FINDINGS

4.1 Summary
Appendix II provides details of the Consequence Hazard Ranges for nominated process
equipment items. These data were used for decision making in the Siting HAZOP.

A total of 17 recommendations were made by the HAZOP team as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Siting HAZOP Recommendations

Rec # Recommendation Follow up By

Consider separate bunding for the phenol tanks which
R1a INOS Phenol
minimizes the surface area for vaporation.
DNV late item: The consequence modelling confirmed that
Phenol storage temperatures of 65 deg C would present a
significant toxic vapour hazard in the event of a large
R1b tankfarm spill, whereas for a storage temperature of 55 deg. INOS Phenol
C this risk virtually disappears. Hence operating procedures
should stress the need to limit Phenol storage temperature
to 55 deg C.
Refer HAZID meeting minutes, discussing oxidation reactor
R2 INOS Phenol
control system.
Review measures to control H2SO4 injection to prevent
R3 INOS Phenol
excess exothermic reaction in the cleavage unit.
Consider providing subdivisions in the acetone & cleavage
R4 product intermediate tank farm to minimize potential spill fire INOS Phenol
area and hazard escalation.
Review the likelihood and hence the need for internal foam
R5a protection on tanks, as a tank top fire is very unlikely in view INOS Phenol
of tank design.
Confirm whether dome roof tanks are provided with a
R5b INOS Phenol
frangible roof seam.
Determine if the bund foam systems meet code
R6a INOS Phenol
requirements.
Confirm with vendors the suitability / drainage time /
R6b INOS Phenol
suvivability of the foam in use with acetone and phenol.
Review the effectiveness of the foam system on phenol tank
R7 INOS Phenol
bund to suppress vapors.
Confirm there is no code requirement for foam protection
R8a INOS Phenol
equipment to protect process units.
Confirm the effectiveness of the foam system on all process
R8b INOS Phenol
chemicals under elevated temperature conditions.
Review the need for independent mobile foam stocks and a
R9 INOS Phenol
delivery system to combat process fires.

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Rec # Recommendation Follow up By

Consider relocating CCR, substation 2 and laboratory to
R10 plant southeast corner as they are located in a high risk area INOS Phenol
(i.e within the 1E-04 per year risk contour).
Review if air compressor surfaces can cause ignition of
R11 INOS Phenol
flammable gas drawn in.
Review if flare radiant heat levels are acceptable in
R12 INOS Phenol
surrounding areas.
Review the impact of PSVs on oxidation reactors relieving to
R13 INOS Phenol
atmosphere in terms of ignition by flare.
Consider providing comprehensive F&G across all process
R14 areas where operating conditions are above the flash points INOS Phenol
of process liquids.
The effect on offsite areas is to be assessed when the CSE
R15 INOS Phenol & DNV
risk results are available.
Review the impact and access route for cranes changing out
catalyst from the phenol purification section, as this may
R16 INOS Phenol
lead to accidental damage to exposed piping along the
route.
Review the need for impact protection of pipelines along
R17 INOS Phenol
public areas due to heavy duty vehicle impact.

The full minutes of the meeting are shown in Appendix I.

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Appendix I HAZOP Worksheet

Project: INEOS PHENOL PLANT

Node No: 1
Node
SITING HAZOP
Description:
Drawing
D-DR-00-AA-B001 REV A4
No:
Session
02/06/2008
Date:

POSSIBLE REC COMPLETION

DEVIATION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS ACTION REQUIRED ACTION BY SIGN
CAUSES # DATE
This will maximize
spill spreading in the
No subdivisions in Main bunds are
event of a process Consider separate bunding for the phenol tanks which
Containment intermediate tank designed to take R1a INOS Phenol
leak, causing minimizes the surface area for vaporation.
farms. volumes of largest tank.
flammable or toxic
hazards.
DNV late item: The consequence modelling
confirmed that Phenol storage temperatures of 65 deg
C would present a significant toxic vapour hazard in
the event of a large tankfarm spill, whereas for a
R1b INOS Phenol
storage temperature of 55 deg. C this risk virtually
disappears. Hence operating procedures should
stress the need to limit Phenol storage temperature to
55 deg C.
Drainage/ Phenol into drain Possible blockage as Experience shows this
Sewers system it solidfies. not to be a problem.
Potential spill in tank
farm may overflow
sump and transfer Operating procedures
Tank farm drain
over large area to keep bund drain
valves left open
causing additional valves normally closed.
flammable or toxic
vapor hazards.

3 online analysers in
Rapid exothermic
If PH of cumene recycle loop, generating
decomposition and Refer HAZID meeting minutes, discussing oxidation
Reactivity recycle is low at PHAL alarm in CCR to R2 INOS Phenol
overpressure, reactor control system.
oxidizer reactors warn of H2SO4 carry
causing rupture.
over.
Rapid exothermic 2-00-3 TAHH voting
Too much acid Review measures to control H2SO4 injection to
decomposition and system in cleavage
catalyst is added in R3 prevent excess exothermic reaction in the cleavage INOS Phenol
overpressure, recycle loop to cause
cleavage unit. unit.
causing rupture. process shutdown.

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Project: INEOS PHENOL PLANT

Node No: 1
Node
SITING HAZOP
Description:
Drawing
D-DR-00-AA-B001 REV A4
No:
Session
02/06/2008
Date:

POSSIBLE REC COMPLETION

DEVIATION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS ACTION REQUIRED ACTION BY SIGN
CAUSES # DATE
All equipment will be
Incorrect hazard Increased risk of
specified based on
Ignition area classification of ignition in the event
hazard area
ignition sources. of a process leak.
classification.
Note that this is not fire
Fire Deluge is provided Consider providing subdivisions in the acetone &
water deluge, but to
protecting on acetone tanks, R4 cleavage product intermediate tank farm to minimize INOS Phenol
reduce vapor losses
system not other tanks. potential spill fire area and hazard escalation.
during summer.
Foam systems are
Review the likelihood and hence the need for internal
provided internally Nitrogen blanketing of
Costs money. R5a foam protection on tanks, as a tank top fire is very INOS Phenol
on all but the ketone all tanks.
unlikely in view of tank design.
tank.
Confirm whether dome roof tanks are provided with a
R5b INOS Phenol
frangible roof seam.
Foam systems are
provided to cover the
Determine if the bund foam systems meet code
bunds of the Costs money. R6a INOS Phenol
requirments.
intermediate tank
farms.
Confirm with vendors the suitability / drainage time /
R6b suvivability of the foam in use with acetone and INOS Phenol
phenol.
Review the effectiveness of the foam system on
R7 INOS Phenol
phenol tank bund to suppress vapors.
The lack of foam
No foam system in systems seems
process area, only inconsistent with the Confirm there is no code requirement for foam
R8a INOS Phenol
water mains with level of protection protection equipment to protect process units.
monitors and hoses. provided in the tank
farms.
Confirm the effectiveness of the foam system on all
R8b process chemicals under elevated temperature INOS Phenol
conditions.

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Date of Issue: June 2008
Siting HAZOP Report (rev 2 ) Page 18
Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

Project: INEOS PHENOL PLANT

Node No: 1
Node
SITING HAZOP
Description:
Drawing
D-DR-00-AA-B001 REV A4
No:
Session
02/06/2008
Date:

POSSIBLE REC COMPLETION

DEVIATION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS ACTION REQUIRED ACTION BY SIGN
CAUSES # DATE
Very unlikely that
Mutual aid mutual aid carries
emergency response correct or adequate
fire equipment will be foam supplies to Review the need for independent mobile foam stocks
R9 INOS Phenol
relied on; there will response to process and a delivery system to combat process fires.
be no onsite fire fires making hazard
engines etc. escalation more
likely.
Consider relocating CCR, substation 2 and laboratory
Effection on Location of CCR and Close to process
R10 to plant southeast corner as they are located in a high INOS Phenol
surroundings laboratory area increasing risks.
risk area (i.e within the 1E-04 per year risk contour).
May suck in
flammable vapor
mixture in the event
Air compressor
of a process leak. In
Location of air discharge temperature Review if air compressor surfaces can cause ignition
the event of ignition a R11 INOS Phenol
compressors is below auto-ignition of of flammable gas drawn in.
flame front may
flammable gas.
travel into the
reactors and cause
an explosion.
Possible excess
Review if flare radiant heat levels are acceptable in
Location of flare radiant heat in R12 INOS Phenol
surrounding areas.
process areas.
Location of flare vs Review the impact of PSVs on oxidation reactors
R13 INOS Phenol
PSVs on reactors relieving to atmosphere in terms of ignition by flare.
F&G detection. Gas
Consider providing comprehensive F&G across all
Flammable hazards detectors will cover the
Flammable vapors R14 process areas where operating conditions are above INOS Phenol
if ignition occurs. acetone operating area
the flash points of process liquids.
and tank farm.
Effect on The effect on offsite areas is to be assessed when the INOS Phenol
R15
other areas CSE risk results are available. & DNV
Review the impact and access route for cranes
Sources of changing out catalyst from the phenol purification
R16 INOS Phenol
failure section, as this may lead to accidental damage to
exposed piping along the route.
Review the need for impact protection of pipelines
R17 INOS Phenol
along public areas due to heavy duty vehicle impact.

Reference to part of this report which may lead to misinterpretation is not permissible
Document id.: 431H026A
Date of Issue: June 2008
Siting HAZOP Report (rev 2 ) Page 19
Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

Appendix II Consequence Hazard Distances

JF PF VCE TOXIC
Flow Rate Hole Size FF
PHENOL PLANT Mater P T (C ) Dur (s) Rel Type Equip Type 12.5 KW/m2 12.5 KW/m2 3psi 1% fat REMARKS
(kg/s) (mm) (m)
(m) (m) (m) (m)

R2140-25L CUMENE 5.2 bara 107 8 M=300T 25 PL REACTOR 48 38 28 nil nil

R2140-100L CUMENE 5.2 bara 107 129 M=300T 100 PL REACTOR 141 96 157 nil nil
R2140-RL CUMENE 5.2 bara 107 INST M=300T RUPT PL REACTOR n/a 93 319 328 nil

V2500-25L 70/30 CUM/CHP 0.7 bara 98 3.3 M=40T 25 PL VESSEL 23 23 15 nil nil
V2500-100L 70/30 CUM/CHP 0.7 bara 98 53 M=40T 100 PL VESSEL 61 33 66 nil nil
V2500-RL 70/30 CUM/CHP 0.7 bara 98 INST M=40T RUPT PL VESSEL n/a 30 52 nil nil

V2510-25L 59/41 CUM/CHP 0.13 bara 96 1.4 M=5T 25 PL VESSEL 15 23 8 nil nil
V2510-100L 59/41 CUM/CHP 0.13 bara 96 23 M=5T 100 PL VESSEL 42 23 40 nil nil
V2510-RL 59/41 CUM/CHP 0.13 bara 96 INST M=5T RUPT PL VESSEL n/a 20 21 nil nil

26/32/42
CHP-CLEAVAGE-25L 3.5 bara 47 6.6 1200 25 PL PUMP 38 28 32 nil 0
AC/CUM/PHN
26/32/42
CHP-CLEAVAGE-100L 3.5 bara 47 13.3 1200 100 PL PUMP 50 27 45 nil 50
AC/CUM/PHN
Max=13.3

T3110-25V ACETONE 0.61 bara 72 0.02 1200 25 PV COLUMN 4 n/a 2 nil nil
At 42C, max column
T3110-100V ACETONE 0.61 bara 72 0.17 1200 100 PV COLUMN 10 n/a 5 nil nil diameter pool evap = 0.17
kg/s
PROCESS MAX=27

T3110-25L 19/81 AC/CUM 0.73 bara 66 2.3 M=43T 25 PL COLUMN 28 22 28 nil nil
T3110-100L 19/81 AC/CUM 0.73 bara 66 37 M=43T 100 PL COLUMN 71 32 47 nil nil
T3110-RL 19/81 AC/CUM 0.73 bara 66 INST M=43T RUPT PL COLUMN n/a 32 106 nil nil

Reference to part of this report which may lead to misinterpretation is not permissible
Document id.: 431H026A
Date of Issue: June 2008
Siting HAZOP Report (rev 2 ) Page 20
Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

JF PF VCE TOXIC
Flow Rate Hole Size FF
PHENOL PLANT Mater P T (C ) Dur (s) Rel Type Equip Type 12.5 KW/m2 12.5 KW/m2 3psi 1% fat REMARKS
(kg/s) (mm) (m)
(m) (m) (m) (m)

V3111-25L ACETONE 0.61 bara 41 1.7 M=10T 25 PL VESSEL 24 41 31 nil nil

V3111-100L ACETONE 0.61 bara 41 26 M=10T 100 PL VESSEL 63 64 58 nil nil
V3111-RL ACETONE 0.61 bara 41 INST M=10T RUPT PL VESSEL n/a 66 62 nil nil

At 83C, max column

T3020-25V 48/52 CUM/H2O 0.61 bara 83 0.02 1200 25 PV COLUMN 4 n/a 2 nil nil diameter pool evap = 0.018
kg/s
T3020-100V 48/52 CUM/H2O 0.61 bara 83
T3020-1200V 48/52 CUM/H2O 0.61 bara 83
PROCESS MAX=26

T3020-25L 86% PHENOL 0.93 bara 103 2.7 M=68T 25 PL COLUMN 14 23 4 nil 50
T3020-100L 86% PHENOL 0.93 bara 103 43 M=68T 100 PL COLUMN 35 37 13 nil 125
T3020-RL 86% PHENOL 0.93 bara 103 INST M=68T RUPT PL COLUMN n/a 105 18 nil 50

V3021-25L 48/52 CUM/H2O 0.61 bara 60 1.3 M=17 25 PL VESSEL 12 18 15 nil nil
V3021-100L 48/52 CUM/H2O 0.61 bara 60 M=17 100 PL VESSEL 33 22 25 nil nil
V3021-RL 48/52 CUM/H2O 0.61 bara 60 INST M=17 RUPT PL VESSEL n/a 21 28 nil nil

T3210-25L CUMENE 0.81 bara 146 1.8 M=6T 25 PL COLUMN 32 23 23 nil nil
T3210-25L CUMENE 0.81 bara 146 29 M=6T 100 PL COLUMN 94 24 96 nil nil
T3210-25L CUMENE 0.81 bara 146 INST M=6T RUPT PL COLUMN n/a 20 77 nil nil

T3040-25V PHENOL 0.9 bara 176 0.02 1200 25 PV COLUMN 4 n/a 2 nil 25
At 176C, max column
T3040-100V PHENOL 0.9 bara 176 0.08 1200 100 PV COLUMN 6 n/a 4 nil 25 diameter pool evap = 0.08
kg/s
PROCESS MAX=22

T3040-25L 25% PHENOL 1.06 bara 212 1 M=40T 25 PL COLUMN 20 21 6 nil 25

T3040-100L 25% PHENOL 1.06 bara 212 16 M=40T 100 PL COLUMN 64 26 42 nil 250
T3040-RL 25% PHENOL 1.06 bara 212 INST M=40T RUPT PL COLUMN n/a 28 107 36 125

V3041-25L 80% PHENOL 0.9 bara 169 1.3 M=8T 25 PL VESSEL 20 23 6 nil 150
V3041-100L 80% PHENOL 0.9 bara 169 21 M=8T 100 PL VESSEL 64 22 46 nil 200
V3041-RL 80% PHENOL 0.9 bara 169 INST M=8T RUPT PL VESSEL n/a 19 45 nil 125

T3411-25L PHENOL 16.7 bara 115 8 1200 25 PL COLUMN 23 49 28 nil 75

PROCESS MAX=8

Reference to part of this report which may lead to misinterpretation is not permissible
Document id.: 431H026A
Date of Issue: June 2008
Siting HAZOP Report (rev 2 ) Page 21
Ineos Phenol (Zhangjiagang) Co. Ltd DNV ENERGY

JF PF VCE TOXIC
Flow Rate Hole Size FF
PHENOL PLANT Mater P T (C ) Dur (s) Rel Type Equip Type 12.5 KW/m2 12.5 KW/m2 3psi 1% fat REMARKS
(kg/s) (mm) (m)
(m) (m) (m) (m)

BUNDED AREA = 56.8 X

V5012 BUND PHENOL AMB 65 INST 3600 RUPT
PL TANK n/a 27 n/a nil 225 33 = 1874 m2
Modelling is for pool
evaporation

BUNDED AREA = 65 X 40
V5022-BUND ACETONE AMB 27.8 INST 3600 RUPT PL TANK n/a 115 80 nil nil = 2600 m2
Modelling is for pool
evaporation

Reference to part of this report which may lead to misinterpretation is not permissible
Document id.: 431H026A
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