Scott - Judgment of History

ON THE JUDGMENT OF HISTORY
RUTH BENEDICT BOOK SERIES

RUTH BENEDICT BOOK SERIES
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With Series Committee Members Nadia Abu El-Haj, Vanessa Agard-Jones,
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Named after one of the founders of American anthropology and the Columbia
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retical problems of the twentieth century but places them in the global condi-
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cuts across the critical humanistic and social sciences.
Secular Translations: Nation-State, Modern Self, and Calculative Reason, Talal Asad
I Am the People: Reflections on Popular Sovereignty Today, Partha Chatterjee
ON THE
JUDGMENT OF
HISTORY
JOAN WALLACH SCOTT
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Scott, Joan Wallach, author. " Scott, Joan Wallach.
In the name of history.
Title: On the judgment of history / Joan Wallach Scott.
Description: New York : Columbia University Press, 2020. " Series: Ruth
Benedict book series " See also: In the name of history by Joan Wallach Scott.
" Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020004401 (print) " LCCN 2020004402 (ebook) "
ISBN 9780231196949 (cloth) " ISBN 9780231196956 (paperback) "
ISBN 9780231551908 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: History—Philosophy. " Historiography. " Nationalism—
History. " Racism—History. " Nuremberg Trial of Major German War
Criminals, Nuremberg, Germany, 1945–1946—History. " South Africa.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission—History. " Reparations for
historical injustices—United States—History.
Classification: LCC D16.9 .S427 2020 (print) " LCC D16.9 (ebook) "
DDC 901—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020004401
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020004402
Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable

acid-free paper.
Printed in the United States of America
Cover design: Chang Jae Lee

But whatever this new understanding of the past holds to be
irrelevant—shards created by the selection of materials, remain-
ders left aside by an explication—comes back, despite everything,
on the edge of discourse or in its rifts and crannies; “resistances,”
“survivals,” or delays discretely perturb the pretty order of a line
of “progress” or a system of interpretation.
—Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History
CONTENTS
P R E FA C E : Histor y, Race, Nation ix
1. The Nation-State as the Telos of History:

Nuremberg, 1946—1
2. The Limits of Forgiveness: South Africa’s Truth and

Reconciliation Commission, 1996—23
3. Calling History to Account: The Movement for Reparations

for Slavery in the United States—51
EPILOGUE: Revisioning History—79
A C K N OW L E D G M E N T S —89
N O T E S —91
I N D E X —109
P R E FA C E
History, Race, Nation
The current amazement that the things we are experiencing

are “still” possible in the twentieth century is not philosophical.
This amazement is not the beginning of knowledge—unless it is
the knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is
untenable.
—Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, XIII
I began to think about the notion of the judgment of history

in 2017 during the Charlottesville riots, when Confederate
flags flew and swastikas appeared in large numbers and then
when heil Hitler salutes welcomed white supremacist Richard
Spencer’s inflammatory orations on campuses across the coun-
try. Hadn’t the Nazis been declared losers of World War II,
and morally out of bounds? Wasn’t “never again”—the vow of
democratic citizens and leaders alike—the promise of the
Nuremberg (and later Eichmann) trials? What had become of
the idea that the evil of Nazism was banished forever from the
political stage? Listening to the chants of the torch-bearing Ku
Klux Klan reenactors, I thought: Didn’t the Civil War end slav-
ery not only as a practice, but as an acceptable idea? Hadn’t the
civil rights movement made racial equality a national aspira-
tion, if not a reality? Then how to explain then Attorney Gen-
eral Jeff Sessions’s evident preference for segregation or the
Senate candidate and white supremacist Roy Moore’s comment
that the last time America was great was during slavery? The
lack of any shame at the public avowal of these ideas suggests
x—Preface
not just defiance, but refusal of what was supposed to have been
history’s judgment.
This became more apparent to me while following the Muel-
ler hearings in the summer of 2019. Special Counsel Robert
Mueller’s report on Russian interference in the 2016 election
and the Trump administration’s collusion with it was, in effect,
a judgment of history—or at least it was anticipated to be one.
Many had looked to Mueller as a savior: he would expose the
crimes of the Trump administration, correct the record of lies
we had been enduring, and bring justice to the land. Instead, as
soon as the report was issued, its contents were misrepresented
by Attorney General William Barr. Misrepresented is the wrong
word, flatly denied is better; Barr offered a conclusion that the
report, which stated clearly that it could not exonerate the presi-
dent of the charge of obstruction of justice, had declared him
innocent of that crime. Worse, few Americans read the hun-
dreds of pages of the report, members of Congress included. Its
careful delineation of issues, and its indictment and conviction
of Trump associates for any number of illegal activities, did not
reverse the disastrous course of things; it surely did not convince
most Republican legislators of the dangerous path they had cho-
sen to follow. They spent their time during the hearings attack-
ing the veracity and objectivity of the report and its author, even
as they rarely disputed the conclusions it had reached. Their cra-
ven submission to Trump, their willingness to condone crime in
the interests of political ambition, was horrifying to behold. As I
lamented this situation to a friend, she sought to console me by
pointing out that, if nothing else, these corrupters of democracy
would be condemned by the “judgment of history.”
As a historian, I know that there is no closure for history, no
single story that can be told. I am aware of the number of histo-
ries being written that challenge the validity and coherence of
the master narratives with which we have been schooled. Still, I
Preface—xi
think like my friend, I naively (reflexively?) held to the popular

belief that there is a certain moral impeccability about history’s
judgment. It is a secular version of the biblical day of reckoning
at the End of Times, serving the same phantasmatic function,
providing transcendent reassurance for one’s moral positions.
We often use the words “the judgment of history,” or we suggest
that we need to be “on the right side of history,” projecting onto
“history” confirmation of our wishes for the future. Fidel Cas-
tro, standing before the court that would send him to prison in
1953, challenged the judges to “Condemn me. It does not mat-
ter. History will absolve me.”1 Telford Taylor, an assistant pros-
ecutor at the Nuremberg Trials, writing a critique of the Viet-
nam War many years later, noted that “it may be unlikely that
our leaders will be called upon to answer at the bar of some
future international tribunal, but there is also the bar of his-
tory.”2 Barack Obama, citing Martin Luther King citing the
abolitionist Theodore Parker, was certain that “the arc of the
moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”3 As I write
this there are, almost daily, comments in newspapers and other
media that “history will be the judge” of some person or event
whose unacceptable behavior seems otherwise immune to pun-
ishment. To take some examples, here is the journalist Michael
Luo writing in the New Yorker about the scandal of Trump’s
immigration policy: “It is up to Cucinnelli, others in the Trump
Administration, and potential enablers in the Republican Party
to decide how they wish history to judge them, even as they
carry on a shameful legacy that American democracy has strug-
gled to escape.”4 Or, there are the comments of Representative
John Lewis on the Democrats’ decision to launch an impeach-
ment investigation of Donald Trump. Lewis explained that
they were “moved by the spirit of history to take action to pro-
tect and preserve the integrity of our nation.”5 Yet another is
from the former FBI director James Comey, justifying his
xii—Preface
decision to make public the investigation of Hillary Clinton’s

emails: “He predicted that history would judge him kindly for
prizing disclosure over concealment.”6 We tend to draw a mea-
sure of comfort from the idea that, in the long run, history
(History?) is an autonomous moral force that can motivate
action and set straight the record of human deeds and misdeeds.
A young peasant in hiding from Franco’s forces at the end of the
Spanish Civil War created a document intended for the “Court
of History,” where, the anthropologist Susana Narotzky tells
us, “the Future is imagined as a place where Truth reigns
supreme.”7 Writing in 1934, Max Horkheimer put it this way:
“When you are at the lowest ebb, exposed to an eternity of tor-
ment inflicted upon you by other human beings, you cherish, as
a dream of deliverance, the idea that a being will come who will
stand in the light and bring truth and justice for you. You don’t
even need this to happen in your lifetime, nor in the lifetime of
those who are torturing you to death, but one day, whenever it
comes, all will nonetheless be repaired. . . . It is bitter to be mis-
understood and to die in obscurity. It is to the honour of histori-
cal research that it projects light into that obscurity.”8 In these
examples, the judgment of history is assumed not only to con-
firm moral stands taken, but it is also based on the belief that
truth will out in the end; history is the final arbiter of that truth.
My friend’s echo of these appeals to the judgment of history
made me realize how powerful a fantasy the notion is, how
strong its messianic promise holds even for skeptical secularists
like myself, even in an age when “the end of history” has been
declared, and when belief in reassuring progressive master nar-
ratives ended sometime in the twentieth century. After all,
there is no history (or History), apart from what we make of it;
no higher court of judgment than our own moral compass; no
way to disentangle moral argument from political purpose. The
invocation of history’s judgment suggests an external force at
Preface—xiii
work. It is projection in two senses. One psychic: our own

wishes attributed outward, in this case to a seemingly extrahu-
man, necessarily progressive force—History. The other tempo-
ral: assessing actions—our own and those of others—from the
perspective of an imagined redemptive future that we will have
had a hand in creating.
The persistence of references to the judgment of history
seemed to me worth thinking about critically: Was it a motive
for action or a form of consolation for political impotence? How
had the notion of history’s judgment functioned in the past?
How did its explicit moral message relate to a politics being
addressed? Was there a relationship between past, present, and
future being presumed that needed interrogation?
Those were the thoughts simmering in my head when I was
invited to do the Ruth Benedict Lectures at Columbia Univer-
sity. The occasion seemed a good moment to try to sort them
out. Little did I realize not only that when I chose “The Judg-
ment of History” as my topic I would be exploring the survival
of an idea of history in popular discourse long after its presumed
death, but also that I would be pushed by my colleagues to think
about the politics of history in new ways. Having written a great
deal about gender and the politics of history, this was a chal-
lenge: to think about the relationship between the state, the
moral, and the political as it involved uses of the concept of his-
tory itself. 9 And to think about it in Benjamin’s terms, as requir-
ing a different view of history than the one conventionally
brought to bear on this topic.
“World History Is the World’s Tribunal”
The moral stance implied in “the judgment of history” draws

enduring distinctions between good and evil, justice and injustice,
xiv—Preface
equality and inequality, right and wrong, truth and falsehood—

as if in her wisdom, Clio will rescue us mortals from the errors
of our ways. As if History were the ultimate demonstration of
the inherent moral goodness of human reason, a reason divorced
from power. We can find this belief articulated by Hegel, who,
writing of the “dialectic of the finite nature of these minds [of
states],” proposed that “out of it arises the universal mind, the
mind of the world, free from all restriction, producing itself as
that which exercises its right—and its right is the highest right
of all—over these finite minds in the ‘history of the world which
is the world’s court of judgment.’ ”10 Hegel was perhaps echoing
Friedrich Schiller, who, in 1784, had declared that “world his-
tory is the world’s tribunal.”11 Reinhart Koselleck notes that
“Since the French Revolution, history has become a subject fur-
nished with divine epithets of omnipotence, universal justice,
and sanctity.”12
Koselleck distinguishes the tribunal of history from earlier
Christian forecasts of the Last Judgment—it is a matter of both
a different temporality and a different agency. On the question
of time, apocalyptic prophecy was replaced by more immediate
“rational” prognoses. As a result, the sense of time accelerated
and the experience of change (even in one’s lifetime) became
fundamental. In place of the “multitude of individual histories”
that characterized earlier notions, modernity’s history was con-
ceived to be unitary and linear, “always constrained by a temporal
sequence.”13 (Walter Benjamin referred to this as “homoge-
neous empty time.”)14 The agency is at once human and tran-
scendent: humans make history, but History is also conceived as
an autonomous force that is, however, the culmination and
expression of an inevitably progressive, universal human reason.
History is the realization (the projection into the future) of the
best that rational humans can be. Writes Koselleck, “Wherever
the ‘makeability’ of history might be implied, it was lent redoubled
Preface—xv
emphasis as soon as the actor invoked a history which, at the

same time, objectively indicated the path he should take.”15 Michel
de Certeau puts it this way: “In every history a process of mean-
ing can be found which always aims at fulfilling the meaning of
History.”16
The standard of judgment expected of that History is asso-
ciated with the Enlightenment belief that there is but one
History, which moves in an ever-improving direction: forward,
upward, cumulatively positive. Kant’s “Idea of a Universal His-
tory” talked of the “regular course” of “the play of liberty of the
human will.” Despite individual variations, he wrote, there was
for the whole species “a continually progressive, though slow,
unfolding of its predispositions . . . that happen . . . according to
constant laws of nature.”17 Progress was the prevailing master
narrative from the eighteenth century onward. It was derived
from the idea of history as inherent in the very being of human
and animal species; evolution was our teleology, reason and civ-
ilization were its manifestations. By the nineteenth century,
writes Michel Foucault, “History . . . is certainly the most eru-
dite, the most aware, the most conscious, and possibly the most
cluttered area of our memory; but it is equally the depths from
which all beings emerge into their precarious, glittering exis-
tence. Since it is the mode of being of all that is given us in
experience, History has become the unavoidable element in our
thought.”18 That History—conceived as it was in evolutionary
terms—was as much about the future as the past; to this day, it
gives rise to what Koselleck calls “a concept of historical hope.”19
There is an unmistakable moral dimension to this notion of
history; Koselleck, referring to Kant, says the philosopher offers
“history as a temporalized house of correction for morality.”20 If
the direction of history is necessarily progressive, then the
moral value of our actions must be measured by their contribu-
tion to that end.
xvi—Preface
State and Nation
The notion of the judgment of history rests on a progressive lin-

ear view about the necessary superiority, in every domain, of
the future as compared to the past, but also—crucially—about
the state as the political embodiment of that future. Massimil-
iano Tomba puts it nicely: “When Hegel made use of the con-
cept of universal history, he placed the modern state at the tip of
the historical-temporal arrow and worked backward, ordering
every age in relation to the modern Western conception of free-
dom.”21 As articulated by Hegel, the “autonomy of the state” was
“the ethical whole itself ”—the modern state was at once the ful-
fillment and the embodiment of the telos of history. Tomba
adds that the “state mechanism attempts to synchronize these
temporalities,” reducing multiple histories to a single, linear
trajectory.22 Koselleck connects the actions of the modern state
to the eventual emergence of that new history. In its early for-
mations, “the state enforced a monopoly on the control of the
future by suppressing apocalyptic and astrological readings.”23
The political theorist Carl Schmitt, reflecting on politics and
war, notes that for Hegel’s epoch, “the state was the spatially
concrete, historical organizational form, which, at least on
European soil, had become the agency of progress.”24 He adds
approvingly that “after the merciless bloodletting of religious
civil wars, the European state and its bracketing of European
land war into purely state war was a marvelous product of
human reason.”25
In Foucault’s genealogy (a critique of Hegelian idealist rep-
resentations), the modern state becomes a mode of being for
itself and for its population; raison d’état constructs institutions
of governmentality and subjects of the state: “To the great prom-
ise of the pastorate, which required every hardship, even the
voluntary ones of asceticism, there now succeeds this theatrical
Preface—xvii
and tragic harshness of the state that in the name of its always
threatened and never certain salvation, requires us to accept
acts of violence as the purest form of reason and of raison d’Etat.”26
With raison d’état comes a new temporality: “It is an indefinite
temporality, the temporality of a government that is both never-
ending and conservative. . . . The art of government and raison
d’Etat no longer pose a problem of origin: we are always already
in a world of government, raison d’Etat, and the state.”27 I would
add that raison d’état is legitimated by its definition as (a humanly
created) agency of progress, as the telos of history. And not just
the telos (the internal directional drive of history), but its immu-
table instrument: “we are always already in a world of govern-
ment, raison d’Etat, and the state.”28
“ ‘Statehood,’ ” Schmitt wrote, “is not a universal concept,
valid for all times and all peoples. Both in time and space, the
term described a concrete historical fact. The altogether incom-
parable, singular historical particularity of this phenomenon
called ‘state’ lies in the fact that this political entity was the
vehicle of secularization. The conceptual elaborations of inter-
national law in this epoch had only one axis: the sovereign ter-
ritorial state.”29 The state, a “marvelous” accomplishment of
human reason, is the instrument that subsumed religion to its
secular will, thereby giving rise to order among the “civilized”
states of Continental Europe. I have written elsewhere of the
ways in which the subsumption of the religious to the political
was conceived in terms of gender: women were to religion what
men were to politics. 30 In this view, the state, progress, and the
necessary direction of history are as one, with white European
men in the lead.
The presumption that the state was the ultimate culmina-
tion of history’s forward-moving path characterized postcolo-
nial political organization as well. Gary Wilder describes the
way in which alternative visions of political organization at the
xviii—Preface
end of the French empire—federated entities of different but

equal partners—were defeated by proponents of state sover-
eignty and, as a result, were lost to view in subsequent unilinear
historical narratives. 31 The resulting story, say Nicola Perugini
and Neve Gordon (writing of sovereign self-determination as
the goal of emergent postcolonial nation-states), presumes that
“only after the collective enters the framework of the state does
it become an active agent of history.”32 The conflation of the
state and history, Judith Butler notes, is “the temporal frame-
work that uncritically supports state power, its legitimating
effect, and its coercive instrumentalities.”33 The military and
the police are examples of such instrumentalities, but so is the
administration of law and justice as both domestic and interna-
tional matters. From this perspective, it is the state that serves
as the last resort for appeals to justice: law, courts, and judges
adjudicate—that is, as they weigh matters of right and wrong,
their rulings are equated with the delivery of justice itself. The
judgment of history, then, becomes inseparable from the judg-
ments of the designated juridical/legal institutions of the state.
Historical agency is located in these institutions of state power;
alternative sources of history—the actions of dissenting or
rebellious groups and individuals, actions that often forced the
hand of state power—are subsumed in the master narrative that
privileges the state and attributes progress to its laws.
When European states became nations around the time of
the French Revolution, their history took on a new dimension.
A nation was defined as a people, united by some essential com-
monality (language, history, skin color, culture). This new defi-
nition, Hannah Arendt argues, was a way to overcome internal
divisions—of class or social status, especially. Arendt points out
that the designation of France as a nation in 1789 made appar-
ent a fundamental contradiction between the declaration of
universal human rights and their restriction to a specific peuple,
Preface—xix
located within the boundaries of a sovereign nation-state. Non-

members of the state, whether deemed enemies or merely non-
nationals, did not have recourse to the protection of law; in
effect, they had no rights, they were stateless and, as a result,
maintains Samera Esmeir, effectively nonhuman. 34 People
without a nation were people without history. Writes Arendt:
While consciousness of nationality is a comparatively

recent development, the structure of the state was derived
from centuries of monarchy and enlightened despotism.
Whether in the form of a new republic or of a reformed
constitutional monarchy, the state inherited as its supreme
function the protection of all inhabitants in its territory
no matter what their nationality, and was supposed to act
as a supreme legal institution. The tragedy of the nation-
state was that the people’s rising national consciousness
interfered with these functions. In the name of the will of
the people, the state was forced to recognize only “nation-
als” as citizens, to grant full civil and political rights only
to those who belonged to the national community by right
of origin and fact of birth. This meant that the state was
partly transformed from an instrument of the law into an
instrument of the nation. 35
The concept of the nation, premised as it was on the homoge-

neity of a people, was expressed as nationalism, characterized
by what Arendt calls “race-thinking,” distinctions that made
some “essential” difference a ground for exclusion from the
national body. The racist dimension of nationalism solidified
and amplified, she argues, with capitalist expansion into impe-
rialist outreach. Us/them distinctions took the form of a more
explicit racism. “Imperialism would have necessitated the
invention of racism as the only possible ‘explanation’ and excuse
xx—Preface
for its deeds, even if no race-thinking had ever existed in the

civilized world.”36 It was indeed in the name of “civilization,”
deemed the highest achievement of human history (a moral as
well as a political and economic concept), that imperial powers
justified their conquests. (“The White Man’s Burden” and “the
civilizing mission” were among the many justifications offered.)
The concept of the nation introduces a conflict into the
vision of the state as the telos of history because nations carry
with them different temporalities, different reasons for being
(raisons d’être). As Arendt notes, the universalist premise of law
that claims to rest on principles of human rights was necessarily
compromised by the need to respect law’s now nationally based
(racist) sovereign specificities. International law, respecting the
principle of nation-state sovereignty (in Schmitt’s words, the
“marvelous product of human reason”), was the attempt to
resolve the conflict. The task of international law was to medi-
ate the relations of sovereign states, but also to distinguish good
states from bad. The bad were defined as aberrations or anach-
ronisms, the good exemplified the ongoing progress of civiliza-
tion. In this way, the operations of international law at once pre-
sumed and confirmed the state as the universal agent of history.
Organization of the Book
In the chapters that follow, I take up three cases to explore the

different ways in which the idea of the state as the embodiment
and enactment of the judgment of history operated. Political
actors have understood themselves to be implementing or
demanding a judgment of history. The cases are the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany, in 1946; the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa
Preface—xxi
in 1996; and the centuries-long, ongoing demand for repara-

tions for slavery in the United States.
In each of these cases, the role of the state as the ultimate
source of history’s judgment is in play. There is a similar logic
operating in two of the cases in which an evil power (the
National Socialist regime in Germany, apartheid in South
Africa) is called to the bar in the name of its victims by a benev-
olent power or set of powers. The action takes the form of a
judicial (Nuremberg) or quasi-judicial (TRC) procedure; the
victims’ claims are adjudicated for them in the only place where
justice can be dispensed. When the focus is on the retributive or
redemptive power of state institutions, the agency of the “vic-
tims” is entirely erased. In contrast, the reparations movements
refuse this logic, taking the nation-state to account for its
repeated failures to bring justice to the enslaved and their descen-
dants. They expose the nation-state as complicit in the perpet-
uation of injustice and call for a rewriting of its history to docu-
ment that fact. In the case of reparations, the agents of the
judgment of history are not states, but those who have endured
enslavement and its legacies.
The three cases do have in common the question of race as it
defines a nation: the Holocaust is the paradigmatic evil—the
crime against humanity—that unites the three. US Associate
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the chief prosecutor at
Nuremberg, promised to document and punish the “sinister
influence” of National Socialism in a way that would make it at
once unforgettable and unrepeatable. Desmond Tutu, head of
the TRC, denounced apartheid as “so utterly evil, immoral,
unbiblical and unchristian that it can only be compared with
that equally evil system—Nazism.”37 One of the advocates for
reparations for slavery, Randall Robinson, called slavery “an
American holocaust” worse in the extent of its carnage than
xxii—Preface
what the Nazis had wrought. 38 If the Holocaust has been ruled
an unspeakable evil, these instances ought to be as well. They
all belonged in the proverbial dustbin of history. In the progres-
sive narrative presumed by these actors, the past marks the
morally unacceptable and, in evolutionary terms, the errors or
failures of “immature” or “uncivilized” human rationality are
on display there as lessons for the present about what must be
avoided in the future. Although the evil took different forms
historically, it had in common race as the marker of national
identity. Indeed, it is racism and its relation to the nation-state
that are at the heart of all three cases.
Could the nation exist without racism at its core? At Nurem-
berg the issue was avoided by depicting the Nazis as anachro-
nistic or extreme, a state like no other. In this way, the ethnon-
ationalism that characterized those other nations lived on
unchallenged in the wake of the Tribunal. Even as its members
looked to a nonracial future in a new South Africa, the TRC
was unable to address the structural issues—economic especially—
upon which state-sponsored racial oppression had rested,
thereby permitting inequality (a racialized capitalism) to per-
sist despite the political enfranchisement of the majority black
population. The reparations movements offer a counterpoint to
these two cases. In contrast, they take racial inequality as foun-
dational to American national identity, and call for a rewriting
of US history attentive not to singular linearity or homogeneity,
but to the plural operations of power and difference.
My aim is not to rehearse the entire contexts in which these
cases are situated, but to explore the ways in which the
appeal—at once moral and political—to the judgment of history
was associated with the nation-state. If justice were to be real-
ized, it was by means of juridical action; some notion of a state-
sanctioned rule of law was tied up with the realization of the
judgment of history. Nuremberg was a formal international
Preface—xxiii
tribunal whose role was literally defined by the chief prosecutor

as enacting the final judgment of history. Victory in war had
established the rightness of the cause; the tribunal’s role was to
document the evil that must now be forever consigned to the
past. The TRC was a quasi-judicial body whose role was to
bring to light the suppressed history of apartheid and thereby to
create the shared memory upon which a new, nonracial nation
would be based. In both cases, the juridical mode was employed
to achieve justice. The movement for reparations for slavery in
the United States refuses the juridical mode, calling instead for
a different kind of accounting. Demands for reparations date to
well before the Civil War and have endured (with more and less
visibility) to the present. Indeed in just the past few years they
have acquired new attention and influence. Their existence
exposes not only the repeated failures of demands for justice
from the nation-state, but also the association of law and vio-
lence at its core. This exposure insists not on an alternative to
the institution of the nation-state, but on a revision of what has
been taken to be the progressive story of American history.
Reparations movements (in the United States, as elsewhere)
provide a radical challenge to progressive views of history and of
the nation-state as history’s highest achievement; instead, they
demand a history that attends to regress, inequities of power,
disappointment and loss, and the fractured experience—the
plural temporalities of that experience—of a nation’s diverse
peoples. They suggest as well the need to rethink what it is we
mean when we look to the redemptive power of history as con-
solation or motive for action. I will take up that challenge for
my own thinking about history in the epilogue.
ON THE JUDGMENT OF HISTORY
1
The Nation-State as the Telos of History
Nuremberg, 1946
Yes, it would be worthwhile to study clinically, in detail, the steps

taken by Hitler and Hitlerism and to reveal to the very distin-
guished, very humanistic, very Christian bourgeois of the twenti-
eth century that without his being aware of it, he has a Hitler
inside him, that Hitler inhabits him, that Hitler is his demon, that
if he rails against him, he is being inconsistent and that, at bottom,
what he cannot forgive Hitler for is not crime in itself, the crime
against man, it is not the humiliation of man as such, it is the
crime against the white man, the humiliation of the white man,
and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures
which until then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of
Algeria, the coolies of India, and the niggers of Africa.
—Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism
T he International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was the

formal judicial inquiry that began in 1946 into the actions
of former Nazi officials and some National Socialist organiza-
tions. The trial (one of several conducted at the time) was a lit-
eral enactment of a judgment of history that had come with vic-
tory in war; the war had delivered the verdict, the role of the
Tribunal was to put it into effect. In the words of the chief
prosecutor, US Associate Supreme Court Justice Robert Jack-
son, “This trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling
humanity’s aspirations to do justice.”1 It not only meted out ret-
ribution to the evildoers, but also, by establishing a record of
2—The Nation-State as the Telos of History
their crimes, aimed to render Nazi “sinister influences” politi-

cally and morally unacceptable forever. But there was some-
thing of a contradiction between the injunction to remember
and the need to forget, between securing the memory of Nazi
crimes in order to prevent their recurrence and the work of clo-
sure sought by the Tribunal’s proceedings. If the dustbin of his-
tory was a closed book, how might certain forms of memory
nonetheless keep the book open—and with what effects? Was it
only Nazi crimes and their victims that constituted that memory?
Where and how did the actions of those who resisted figure in
the repository of memory assembled by the Tribunal? The
deliberations of the Nuremberg Tribunal featured benevolent
nations delivering a judgment against an evil regime in the
name of its victims. The advance of history is secured by those
benevolent nation-states.
The Nuremberg trials “for the first time called history itself
into a court of justice.” So argues Shoshana Felman in an essay
on Walter Benjamin. “The function of the trials was to repair
judicially not only private but also collective historical injustices.”2
Their judgment would bring the revelation of the “meaning of
history,” forcing it to “take stock of its own flagrant injustices.”3
History, in this view, was both subject and object of judgment at
Nuremberg. The death sentences handed down were meant
symbolically to confirm that justice had been delivered by the
victorious nations, even if no ultimate compensation were pos-
sible for the crimes that had been committed or any guarantee
established that their underlying causes had been eradicated.
The Tribunal was the joint effort of the triumphant powers
(Britain, France, USSR, United States), conceived as a demon-
stration of the effectiveness of international law to provide the
basis for cooperative relations among sovereign nation-states.
Every step in the process was meant to illustrate what “civilized”
The Nation-State as the Telos of History—3
legal proceedings looked like. “We must never forget that the
record on which we judge these defendants today is the record
on which history will judge us tomorrow,” Jackson said in his
opening statement. 4 By adhering to the technical requirements
of the rule of law, the Tribunal would establish its moral cre-
dentials. Jackson was adamant about holding a proper trial,
despite objections from other world leaders, some of whom
would have preferred summary executions. Citing Woodrow
Wilson, he stated that the trial aspired to “give international
law the kind of vitality which it can only have if it is a real
expression of our moral judgment.”5 International law was the
collective demonstration of the reason of state, universalist in
its claim to prosecute crimes against humanity. Law was the
expression of morality, the means by which justice was to be
realized. The word justice carries connotations of both the jurid-
ical and the moral; here the two were conflated.
The court was tireless in establishing an “objective” histori-
cal record in order to deliver the “ultimate verdict of history.”
“We must summon . . . detachment and intellectual integrity to
our task,” Jackson exhorted his colleagues, pointing to reams of
documents as well as live testimony detailing Nazi crimes. The
aim was to disclose the evil in a way “so painstakingly and with
such clarity that the world could never forget.”6 The documents
established the indisputable record of individual guilt, the legal
basis upon which punishment would be administered, even as
Nazi organizations were also on trial and even as state institu-
tions were deemed responsible for criminal policies. “The idea
that a state, any more than a corporation, commits crimes is a
fiction. Crimes always are committed only by persons.”7 The
distinction between states and individuals may well have looked
ahead to a rehabilitated Germany in the postwar era, a poten-
tial ally in the coming Cold War. It was not the German people,
Jackson said, but their leaders who were on trial. Yet despite
the careful distinction between states and individuals, the
court could not escape a certain ambiguity; it could not refrain
from attributing the evils it was adjudicating to the German
nation-state, even as those punished were its individual repre-
sentatives. It was Germany, after all, that had violated the cov-
enants of international law, Germany whose deeds needed to be
exposed and condemned to prevent their return, Germany that
had lost its place in the family of “civilized” nations.
The contrast between evil and civilized recurred in the
course of the trial, reflecting the presumption that the forward
march of history resulted in a civilization somehow free of all
evil. “Germany” was the antithesis of the victorious nation-
states; a collective guilt was attributed to its people. Ironically,
this image of Germany—as a homogeneous totality—echoed
the National Socialist representation of the state and its volk.
Here the Tribunal’s view of history as ultimately embodied in
nation-states operated to occlude the fact that there were Ger-
mans who resisted or opposed Nazi oppression, who tried to
stop the disaster that Hitler and his coconspirators were impos-
ing. 8 If there were glimpses of such people and their actions in
the documents assembled by the Tribunal, they were more
often described as victims than as agents of history; they were
victims on whose behalf the jurists had assembled to enact some
form of retribution. This was a story of states as totalities, not as
sites of perpetual political conflict.
Historians and political theorists have written a great deal
about Nuremberg as it involved the technicalities of interna-
tional law, the origin of theories of human rights, and the defini-
tion of crimes against humanity. They have parsed the language
of “aggressive warfare,” a term left deliberately vague in the Lon-
don Charter (1945), which established the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Many have concluded, with the political theorist Judith Shklar,

that the evidence of genocide (plans for the extermination of
the Jews, films of concentration camps, horrific descriptions of
medical experiments) became “the moral center of the case.”9
The court was acting in the name of these victims of Nazi evil.
“The logic of law will never make sense of the illogic of geno-
cide,” concluded the historian Lawrence Langer. 10
All of that may be true in retrospect, though it was precisely
the logic of law that the Tribunal sought to follow. Indeed, one
of the fascinating things in the trial record is the anxiety
expressed by Justice Jackson and his colleagues about the prec-
edents being set for the legal issues of nation-state sovereignty
and raison d’état (the prevailing meanings of the rule of law). His
impressive opening speech made up in eloquence what it lacked
in coherence. Was Nazi Germany a nation-state by conven-
tional historical standards? Yes and no. Were Nazi crimes
against the Jews unique (a new category of “crimes against
humanity”), or were they extreme variations of ordinary nation-
alism and militarism? What made them different? How is the
line drawn between acceptable and unacceptable nation-state
behavior in order to justify punishment? The various answers
Jackson offered show that the line was anything but clear and
that moral considerations took second place to the need to pro-
tect the sovereign rights of (European and American) nation-
states, to insist on their standing as the source of justice for
those deemed victims and as the sole instrument of the direc-
tion of history. In the end, the only certainty that could be
offered was that a victory in war had established the right of the
victors to impose history’s judgment.
Jackson’s preoccupation with national sovereignty rested on
a long-standing belief that the state was the culmination—the
end in the sense both of aim and of final destiny—of history.
This view took for granted that the (now) democratic nation-
state was the apex of historical evolution and the instrument of
justice. We might call it the unconscious underpinning of the
way in which judgment was articulated at Nuremberg. How to
reconcile the evils of the National Socialist state with this view
of history?
Was the Nazi Regime a Nation-State?
Jackson had different answers to that question. Sometimes, he

treated the Nazi state as a sovereign German nation. It was only
because it transgressed the international order of nations (vio-
lating their sovereignty) that its actions became unacceptable.
The international order was, historically, meant to regulate
relations among “civilized” nations; at the end of World War I,
the Kellogg-Briand pact attempted to establish norms for their
interactions and for the disciplining of “savage” political enti-
ties. At other times, Jackson described the Nazis as one of those
savage entities that had been transformed by outlaws into a
criminal enterprise. Yet again, he described the Nazis as repre-
senting an anachronism that didn’t warrant the same treatment
as “civilized” (by which he meant European and American)
nation-states. It was as if the Nazis had fallen into a state of
nature, outside the boundaries of law. In all of this, his overrid-
ing concern was with the rights and rules of existing nation-
states in the international order—it was the protection of their
integrity and their future that was finally at stake in this trial. To
the extent that the Tribunal itself was delivering the judgment
of history, it served not only to indict the Nazi state, but also to
represent the victorious nations as the incarnation of justice
and morality (even when a realistic assessment of their limits
was occasionally conceded).
WAS THE NAZI REGIME A NATION-STATE?

YES (AN EXTREME EXAMPLE)
If the Nazis were a national state, Jackson wanted it clear that

the Tribunal’s intervention did not violate respect for national
sovereignty in general and did not involve moral judgments of
their internal affairs. The principle of sovereignty outweighed
concerns for human rights. (Here is an example of the contra-
diction Arendt noted, which I cited in the preface, between
declarations of universal human rights and the need to respect
the sovereign particularities of nations.) Early in his speech, he
referred to the National Socialist party program, which, in the
name of the German people, “made a strong appeal to that sort
of nationalism which in ourselves we call patriotism, and in our
rivals, chauvinism.”11 This was especially true in relation to
minorities. “How a government treats its own inhabitants gen-
erally is thought to be no concern to other governments or of
international society. Certainly, few oppressions or cruelties
would warrant the intervention of foreign powers.”12 Jackson
even acknowledged “some regrettable circumstances in our
country in which minorities are unfairly treated.”13 Indeed, he
went on, there would have been no interfering with the Nazi’s
treatment of the Jews had it not been for their external aggres-
sions. “Let there be no misunderstanding about the charge of
persecuting Jews. What we charge against these defendants is
not those arrogances and pretensions which frequently accom-
pany the intermingling of different peoples and which are likely,
despite the efforts of government, to produce regrettable crimes
and convulsions.”14 Indeed, Jackson ruled out consideration of
Nazi prewar atrocities on these grounds. As Elizabeth Borg-
wardt comments, “There was no principle available that could
capture the crimes of Kristallnacht in Germany and yet spare
from scrutiny the lynching of thousands of African-Americans
in the American south.”15 In fact, the man who coined the term
genocide at the time of the Tribunal refused its application to the
US treatment of African Americans. When a group presented a
petition to the United Nations in 1951 titled “We Charge
Genocide: The Crime of the Government Against the Negro
People,” Raphael Lemkin insisted that “racist legislation and
the social practice of lynching had nothing to do with his con-
cept of ‘genocide’ ” and he dismissed the authors of the petition
as “un-American” and probably communist. 16
In this connection—and in contradistinction to it—a book
by the law professor James Q. Whitman documents in stun-
ning detail the importance for Nazi jurists and policy makers of
American race law. America served as a model for addressing
immigration, miscegenation, second-class citizenship, and seg-
regation. Its “distinctive legal techniques” were carefully stud-
ied and, in some cases, implemented—although the Germans
considered the one-drop rule for determining racial identity
too harsh. 17 The treatment of Native Americans during the
American conquest of the West was, however, a model for the
German pursuit of lebensraum in the territories of Eastern
Europe. 18 Whitman concludes that “American white suprem-
acy, and to some extent Anglophone white supremacy more
broadly, provided. . . . some of the working materials for the
Nazism of the 1930’s. . . . But in Nazi Germany supremacist
traditions and practices acquired the backing of a state appara-
tus far more powerful than anything to be found in the world of
the daughters of British Imperialism and far more ruthless than
any that had ever existed in Europe west of the Elbe.”19 There
was surely a difference between racial discrimination per se and
“racial persecution carried to the point of extermination,”20 but
did that make the Nazi state an extreme example, or an excep-
tion to the policies and practices of other nation-states? Was
Nazism a “historical parenthesis” (as Benedetto Croce had
deemed Italian fascism), an unfortunate “accident” (as Fried-

rich Meinecke described it), or was it something else?
The opening speech of François de Menthon argued that
racism was a peculiar characteristic of National Socialism. He
condemned the “diabolical barbarism” of the Nazis: “This
monstrous doctrine is that of racialism:. . . Race is the matrix of
the German people. . . . The individual has no value in himself
and is important only as an element of the race.”21 Racialism
was “the gulf that separates members of the German commu-
nity from other men. The diversity of the races becomes irre-
ducible, and irreducible, too, the hierarchy which sets apart the
superior and the inferior races. The Hitler regime has created a
veritable chasm between the German nation, the sole keeper of
the racial treasure, and other nations.”22 Race or “racialism,” in
other words, characterized only Nazi Germany; the hierarchy
of difference that underwrote French colonialism (to take only
the example of Menthon’s nation) had nothing to do with race!
What Menthon referred to as “the common heritage of western
humanism” was defined as civilized and free of racism in con-
trast to the “barbarity” of the National Socialist regime.
Jackson made the case for National Socialism as both
extreme example and exception in his opening remarks to the
Tribunal. The treatment of the Jews was criminal, he said:
“History does not record a crime ever perpetrated against so
many victims or one ever carried out with such calculated cru-
elty.”23 But although “the avowed purpose [of Nazi action] was
the destruction of the Jewish people as a whole, as an end in
itself,” it was also “a preparation for war, as a discipline of con-
quered peoples.”24 The destruction of the Jews “enabled the
Nazis to bring a practiced hand to similar measures against
Poles, Serbs, and Greeks” and so prepared the way for “the pre-
cipitation of aggressive war.”25 “The reason that this program
of extermination of Jews and destruction of the rights of
minorities became an international concern is this: it was a part

of a plan for making illegal war.”26
The violation of other nations’ sovereignty was a central
issue. In this thinking, crimes against humanity and aggressive
warfare become synonymous—the nation-state was the unit
under attack. German designs on European countries—the
conquest of lebensraum—were taken to be the goal of Nazi plans
to exterminate the Jews. Léon Poliakov, an assistant to the
French diplomat Edgar Faure at Nuremberg, wrote (in 1951),
“As soon as one surveys the whole ensemble of Nazi racial pol-
icy and practice, one perceives the true significance of the exter-
mination of the Jews: as a warning sign of greater and more
general holocausts to come.”27 These holocausts, in Eastern
Europe, the Tribunal concluded, “were part of a plan to get rid
of whole native populations by expulsion and annihilation, in
order that their territory could be used for colonization by Ger-
mans.”28 Poliakov was appalled at the German designation of
“conquered peoples” as “so-called ‘inferior races,’ ” and the Rus-
sian representatives at Nuremberg denounced German “impe-
rialism,” but (as Aimé Césaire reminds us in the epigraph to
this chapter) no connection was made, indeed none was per-
ceived, to European conquests of “inferior races” in other parts
of the world.
Jackson tacked back and forth between justifying and
denouncing the monumental “savagery” of the Germans. There
was a moral dimension that compelled other nations to act, lest
by their “silence [they] would take a consenting part in such
crimes.”29 But he quickly returned to the argument that it was
preparation for aggressive warfare that constituted the crime,
not the domestic treatment of minorities. Here we see him
grappling with the fact—at once acknowledging and denying
it—that, as Robert Meister puts it, state sovereignty “assumes
the continuing existence of territorial rule by national states. . . .
[It] rests on the simultaneous existence and repression of the

genocidal thoughts, both active and passive, that founded the
nation.”30 Meister cites Michael Mann’s thesis that “genocide is
the dark side of the notion that legitimate rule by the people over
territory presupposed the absence (physically or culturally) of
other peoples occupying that territory.”31
By associating genocide (crimes against humanity) with
aggressive warfare, Jackson attributed the dark side of national-
ism exclusively to Nazi evil. Repeatedly invoked during the tri-
als, aggressive warfare was never clearly defined (the Kellogg-
Briand pact of 1928 wasn’t considered a binding-enough legal
document), although it was a necessary concept for distinguish-
ing German incursions across national borders from the legiti-
mate violence of raison d’état. Jackson acknowledged that “it is
perhaps a weakness of this Charter that it fails to define a war
of aggression.”32 He offered “civilized warfare” as its acceptable
counterpart; indeed, it was the contrast between criminal and
civilized warfare that established the definition. If the Nazi
nation-state was a nation-state, it had lost its claim to sover-
eignty by violating international conventions; planning and
waging “aggressive” warfare were criminal. The implied antith-
esis of aggressive was defensive. Said Jackson, “honestly defen-
sive war is not a crime.”33 But he also sanctioned something
beyond defensive war when he wrote: “War necessarily is a cal-
culated series of killings, of destructions of property, of oppres-
sions. Such acts unquestionably would be criminal except that
International Law throws a mantle of protection around acts
which otherwise would be crimes, when committed in pursuit
of legitimate warfare.”34 By definition, legitimate warfare was
“civilized,” “aggressive warfare” was not. Or, to put it another
way, the warfare of “civilized” states was legitimate, that of
“barbarians” was not. This is the rationalization of warfare that
Carl Schmitt attributed to the emergence of European states.
“Such wars,” he wrote approvingly of these state wars regulated

by international law, “represent the highest form of order within
the scope of human power.”35
The London Charter listed aggressive warfare as one of the
counts against the Nazis. It was signed by the Allies on
August 8, 1945, the day the United States bombed Nagasaki,
two days after the bombing of Hiroshima; in February, the
British and Americans had firebombed the city of Dresden—
many thousands of civilians were killed in those raids. As for
intervention in another sovereign nation, the Soviets had
invaded Finland, Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states; Britain
had invaded Norway. (Nothing was said about the long history
of unprovoked imperialist incursions into Africa, Asia, Latin
America, and the former Ottoman territories. Imperialism was
assumed to be a right of these nations, the forward motion of
the civilizing process.) Were these defensive operations or
instances of aggressive warfare? And was it possible to insist
that all war was a crime? The French prosecutor, François de
Menthon, didn’t think so; perhaps recalling Clausewitz (“poli-
tics is war by other means”) he pointed out that “war was what
states do.”36 The historian A. J. P. Taylor, referring to the docu-
ments assembled by the prosecution, noted that they “were cho-
sen not only to demonstrate the war-guilt of the men on trial,
but to conceal that of the prosecuting Powers.”37 It is in that
light that we might read Jackson’s distinction between civilized
and criminal warfare, the one attributed to the victors, the
other to the losers; the one the prerogative of legitimate states,
the other outside the boundaries established by custom and
covenant. It is in that light, too, that we might read the omis-
sions necessary to constitute the moral certitude and the inher-
ently progressive nature of the judgment of history being ren-
dered by the nations staffing the International Tribunal.
WAS THE NAZI REGIME A NATION-STATE?

NO: IT WAS AN ANACHRONISM
Even as he insisted that no precedent was being set for the treat-
ment of other nations, Jackson also denied that Germany under
Nazi rule was a nation-state at all; it was not an extreme exam-
ple, but an exception—for a number of reasons. First, the
authentic German nation had been captured by a band of
criminals—among them the individuals whose cases were
before the Tribunal. 38 The National Socialist party was not in
any sense a political party, even if its leader had been elected to
office: “In discipline, structure, and method . . . [it] was not
adapted to the democratic process of persuasion. It was an
instrument of conspiracy and of coercion”—in short a criminal
organization comprising “overlords” and their followers. 39
The question of individual responsibility for state crimes
became a precedent of the Nuremberg trials, although it raised
difficult challenges to ideas about the limits of obedience to
national rule—When did that rule become criminal and who
was to judge? When did the sovereign autonomy of the nation-
state demand respect? When did it exceed its boundaries? For
the purposes of Nuremberg, the planning and implementing
of aggressive warfare—violations of the sovereignty of other
nation-states, allied with crimes against humanity—became the
test; the scale was international, not domestic. But what counted
as acceptable applied only to other established “civilized”
nation-state entities; the colonial appropriation of nonstate ter-
ritories didn’t count as unacceptable “aggressive warfare”—even
though the violent appropriation of land and people was cer-
tainly aggressive, as is evident in Schmitt’s description: “The
power of indigenous chieftains over completely uncivilized
peoples was not considered to be in the public sphere; native use
of the soil was not considered private property. . . . The land

appropriating state did not need to respect any rights to the soil
existing within the appropriated land unless these rights some-
how were connected with the private property of a member of a
civilized state belonging to the order of interstate, international
law.”40 Imperialism was a matter of civilizing the natives, bring-
ing them into the forward march of history. 41
When the state-ness of Nazi Germany was denied, brigand-
age was a frequent description, evoking gangsters operating
outside the law. Brigandage suggested that it was not states but
only individuals (or gangs of them) who committed crimes.
“The principle of individual responsibility for piracy and brig-
andage, which have long been recognized as crimes punishable
under International Law, is old and well established. That is
what illegal warfare is.”42 Here, by definition, legitimate nation-
states cannot commit criminal warfare; the violence associated
with raison d’état and the rule of law remains intact.
Individual responsibility was a major theme of the trial:
statesmen who had “used their powers of state to attack the
foundations of world peace” had to be brought before the law
and made to “pay for it personally.”43 The theme was taken up
dramatically in the film Judgment at Nuremberg (1961), released to
coincide with the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem. With a star-
studded cast (Spencer Tracy, Burt Lancaster, Richard Wid-
mark, Marlene Dietrich, Judy Garland, Maximilian Schell,
William Shatner, Werner Klemperer, Montgomery Clift), the
question of individual responsibility is at the heart of the drama
that focused on the Nazi lawyers who wrote and enforced the
Nuremberg Laws of 1935. After all the complexities of cause
and culpability are explored, clips of concentration camp vic-
tims shown, and the argument aired many times by the defense
that patriotism required obedience to the laws of the nation,
one German jurist acknowledges his guilt, but insists he never
knew it would “come to this” (the Holocaust). The chief prose-

cutor’s reply sums up the film’s message: “Herr Janning, it came
to that the first time you sentenced a man to death you knew
to be innocent.” In the end, individual men are responsible for
their acts; the rule of law can be applied only to individuals.
Echoing Jackson’s words at the first of these trials, the movie
prosecutor (Spencer Tracy) says that “civilization is the real
complaining party.” If individuals were responsible, nation-
states were not; the rule of law thus stood inviolate. Putting the
onus for violence on individual criminals, whose moral compass
should have made them act otherwise, allowed the question of
raison d’état to be put aside.
The failure to take responsibility was attributed to the
abnormality of the Nazis: they were depicted as demented,
deluded, psychotic. The pathology of individuals was at once
cause and effect of a perverse regime. Lecturing to a popular
audience, Hans Morgenthau noted that “Germany has been
compared to a mental patient, a problem child, . . . a case of
retarded development, or a young girl led astray.”44 Jackson
referred to “diabolical barbarism,” an evil that he said was fun-
damentally anti-Christian. 45 Christianity, in his view, was asso-
ciated with a commitment to moral conduct and to peace; Chris-
tianity was taken to be the moral underpinning of modern
secular European nation-states.
Yet another explanation offered for the rise of National
Socialism was historic underdevelopment (as in Morgenthau’s
reference to “a case of retarded development”). It was the most
frequent explanation given for the pathology of Nazi Germany;
Germany could not be considered a modern state by the stan-
dards of the evolution of civilization. Some of the prosecutors
pointed out that there were traces in Nazi character of the
“youthful primitivism of the German spirit,” and of “the primi-
tive barbarity of ancient Germany.”46 In this they were an
archaic remnant of another age, a relic of the state of nature for

which the founding of states and nations had been a cure.
Whitney Harris, who had served on the staff of the US prose-
cutor, noted in his history of the trial, published in 1954: “Des-
potism no longer has any place in civil society. . . . It is archaic, and
of other times. . . . The age of empires has passed. And the time
of emperors is gone”—thereby ruling out Western imperialism
(by no means long passed) in the catalogue of despotisms. 47
Despotism belonged to the East: Jackson considered that Ger-
many was “more Oriental than Western”; it had engaged in a
“despotism equaled only by the dynasties of the ancient East.”48
Its alliance with Japan proved the Eastern connection: “they were
brothers under the skin.”49 It was now time to relegate this rem-
nant of past times to the dustbin of history; with the conviction
of the Nazi defendants, evil would be permanently left in the
past and the future progress of humanity (the defense of human
rights as the expression of justice) would be assured by the laws of
existing nation-states. There was no need to await a future judg-
ment of history; the Tribunal was enacting it in the present.
Interestingly—and not surprisingly—the argument about
German underdevelopment was echoed by some historians and
commentators attempting to account for the Nazi state as an
anomaly, a deviation from the normal process of state forma-
tion. This is not the place to go into the details of the Sonderweg—
the argument that Germany had followed a special path, some
maintained since the time of Luther, others only since the nine-
teenth century. Its deviation from the linear direction of his-
tory only served to confirm what was the true path. William
Shirer, for example, wrote that Germans were predisposed to
militarism and to the call of authoritarian leaders: “the course
of German history . . . made blind obedience to temporal rulers
the highest virtue of Germanic man and put a premium on ser-
vility.”50 There were historians who diagnosed the Third Reich
as a symptom of the rejection or failure of modernity, those who

pointed to the persistence of preindustrial economic norms or
to the discrepancy between industrial development and the
emergence of a substantial middle class, those who cited the
absence of a successful bourgeois revolution. Max Weber wrote of
the “feudalization” of the upper bourgeoisie. Ralph Dahrendorf
put it this way: German society “did not become bourgeois, but
remained quasi-feudal. Industrialization in Germany failed to
produce a self-confident bourgeoisie with its own political aspi-
rations. . . . As a result, German society lacked the stratum that
in England and America, and to a lesser extent even in France,
had been the moving force of a development in the direction of
greater modernity and liberalism.”51 This depiction of Germa-
ny’s deviant development (as compared to the United States,
France, and Britain) contributed to and followed the lines of
distinction evident in the Nuremberg trial. There is one path
that history takes: whether called civilization or modernity, its
highest form is the (liberal democratic) nation-state. In this
story, nation-states are treated as totalities rather than as prod-
ucts of political conflicts and contests. The results of these con-
tests become reified as stages of historical development, rather
than what they are—contingent instantiations of relationships
of power. Moreover, these histories set aside what Jackson at
least glancingly acknowledged: the role of nationalism in the
process of state formation. The phenomenon of nationalism,
the ways in which national identities are constituted as modes
of inclusion and exclusion, did not figure prominently—if at
all—in the analyses offered by these commentators.
Critiques of nationalism did figure, of course, in the writing
of many others, Hannah Arendt a key theorist among them.
She wrestled with distinctions between “mere nationalism and
clear-cut racism.” Genuine nationhood she deemed a belief
in “the equality of all peoples” who shared some geographic
frontier or history. The view of a history, she wrote, for which

“every race is a separate, complete whole was invented by men
who needed ideological definitions of national unity as a substi-
tute for political nationhood.”52 In her account of it, what we
now call ethnonationalism was a perversion of “genuine [politi-
cal] nationhood,” and the Germans were not the only source of
the racial thinking it inspired.
The Survival of Ethnonationalism
I have been arguing that Nuremberg’s treatment of Nazism—as

a remnant of an earlier barbaric age—sought to protect a moral
vision of the nation-state as the realization and agent of the
judgment of history that nonetheless carried with it the possi-
bilities for its recurrence. In the wake of the trials, important
commentators had suggested as much. For example, Adorno
pointed out in 1959 that “national socialism lives on, and even
today we still do not know whether it is merely the ghost of
what was so monstrous . . . or whether it has not yet died at all,
whether the willingness to commit the unspeakable survives in
people as well as the conditions that enclose them.”53
Among those “conditions that enclose them,” I would argue,
is the form legitimated by the trial itself: the nation-state as the
highest achievement of human political organization; raison
d’état as the expression of sovereignty; “civilized” violence as the
expression of sovereign state reason; and, especially, ethnon-
ationalism as an exclusionary principle of membership in the
nation-state. It may be that there are different types of
nationalisms—benign as well as malignant—but a pernicious
ethnonationalism seems to be increasingly the dominant one
that accounts for the uncanny return of a banished “evil” in
Charlottesville and elsewhere (including Germany).
Arendt was prescient about the dangers of “race-thinking”

for “political nationhood” when she wrote critically of the
founding of the state of Israel:
After the war it turned out that the Jewish question, which
was considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved—
namely by means of a colonized and then conquered
territory—but this solved neither the problems of the
minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually
all other events of our century, the solution of the Jewish
question merely produced a new category of refugees, the
Arabs, thereby increasing the number of stateless and
rightless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people. And
what happened in Palestine within the smallest territory
and in terms of hundreds of thousands was then repeated
in India on a large scale involving millions of people.54
Writing about the postwar regime of human rights (one of the

direct results of the Nuremberg trials), Nicola Perugini and
Neve Gordon endorse Arendt’s view: “The same form of politi-
cal organization that was historically responsible for the most
egregious human rights violation was, in turn, elevated to the
protector of human rights.”55
Even with the caveat that the rules of international law are
meant to restrain the worst impulses of nations, that nation
continues as an autonomous entity enforcing its domestic (pri-
vate) rules. The particular concern of Perugini and Gordon
(like Arendt) is Israel, where they demonstrate that the protec-
tion of Jewish human rights has come at the expense of Arab
human rights. During the Eichmann trial—which asserted the
sovereignty of the new nation of Israel, acting in the name of
the long history of the victimized Jewish people—“the Holo-
caust’s threat was projected into Israel’s current present and
into a new territorial setting different from the one in which it

had originated.”56 With the subsequent “nazification” of Arabs,
Israel’s “conquest and colonialization were normalized and
legitimized as a sort of preemptive measure against the remate-
rialization of Auschwitz.”57 Even as “never again” justified these
measures, Jews were defined as potential victims in need of the
protection of the Israeli security state. And, in an ironic twist,
the achievement of their place in history came, for the Jewish
victims of the Nazi genocide, in the form of an ethnically defined
nation-state, which (as the quotation from Michael Mann I
cited earlier maintains) rests on “the notion that legitimate rule
by the people over territory presupposed the absence (physically
or culturally) of other peoples occupying that territory.”58
This insistence on ethnic homogeneity as the fulfillment of
a people’s history is not peculiar to Israel but is, as Wendy
Brown has shown, increasingly the way in which national iden-
tity is being defined in the face of globalization. She explains
the frenzied building of walls by states across the world as a
response to declining political sovereignty in the new global
capitalist economic order, and she notes that this decline has
unleashed the powers of “capital and religiously legitimated vio-
lence.”59 I would add ethnic and nationalist legitimated violence
to that list: the desire to secure sovereignty by protecting and
delimiting the homogeneity that establishes who counts as a
member of a nation seems to have returned with a vengeance in
the face of the so-called crisis of immigration confronted by the
nation-states of the West.
The legacy of Nuremberg, then, was not only the docu-
mentation and denunciation of the worst ways in which the
nation-state form could be realized (and I want to be clear
here that, unquestionably, genocide constitutes an extreme
form of ethnonationalism), but also a refusal to question the
ethnonationalism (the racism) at the heart of the form itself.
The difference established between past and present was for-

mulated in terms of different state forms: the one morally unac-
ceptable (and so consigned to the past); the other taken to be
the fruit of a progressive history (and so the fulfillment and the
agency of history’s judgment). In the framework of Nuremberg,
the enduring fact of the nation, of a world of nations, was indis-
putable; the belief that law was a reliable instrument of moral
justice was confirmed; the representation almost exclusively as
victims of those who experienced Nazi rule underscored the
importance of “good” nation-states and their laws as the primary
agencies of history and justice; and the ongoing practices of rac-
ism were occluded by ascribing them to Nazi extremism, which,
with the execution of its enactors, would—it was expected—
finally be laid to rest. At Nuremberg, the defense of human
rights was established as the job of “progressive” nation-states.
In the juridical logic that prevailed, benevolent nation-states
rescued or protected victims from evil, thereby establishing
themselves as the agents of the judgment of history.
2
The Limits of Forgiveness
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1996
One could never, in the ordinary sense of the words, found a poli-
tics or law on forgiveness.
—Jacques Derrida, Forgiveness
W hen the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)

was established in 1996, its mandate explicitly rejected
the “Nuremberg model.” Although any number of commenta-
tors likened apartheid’s implementation of ideologies of racial
supremacy to those of the Nazi regime, they all rejected the
idea that criminal trials were an option. The end of apartheid
did signal a clear judgment of history: an evil regime was to be
replaced by a more progressive democratic government. But
retributive justice was simply not conceivable when there were
no winners and when key institutions of the state were still in
the hands of the oppressors. In the difficult negotiations that
followed, what I referred to in the last chapter as a juridical
logic, in which the victims of evil states are redeemed by the
institutions of a benevolent state (or states), characterized the
TRC’s attempt to enact the judgment of history. The terms of
negotiation, however, limited the possibilities for what could be
done.
24—The Limits of Forgiveness
Negotiated Settlement
The period between 1989–90—the unbanning of the African

National Congress (ANC) and the release from prison of Nel-
son Mandela—and Mandela’s election as president in 1994 was
the most violent in the history of apartheid. 1 Agents of apart-
heid remained in place at all levels of government and they did
not give up power easily. Even as they negotiated an interim
constitution, the National Party (NP) leadership unleashed its
forces in the townships and the cities and enlisted the Inkatha
Freedom Party (IFP) to attack its ANC rivals, claiming that
black-on-black violence was the real threat to the nation. Chris
Hani, head of the armed struggle branch of the ANC (which
had called off its warfare now that a new order was at hand),
was assassinated in 1993 by two white activists, who hoped, they
said, to foment race war and thus prevent what they believed
would be a communist takeover of the country.2 Still control-
ling the parliament, the NP legislators passed a series of indem-
nity acts; some of them covered all parties to the conflict, oth-
ers, secretly decreed by the president, applied only to state
agents who were granted impunity for actions that had exceeded
the bounds of legality even under the old regime. 3 At the same
time, there were revelations of the torture and killing of sus-
pected spies at ANC camps in exile.
“While the Allies could pack up and go home after Nurem-
berg, we in South Africa had to live with one another,” explained
the Anglican bishop Desmond Tutu, the chair of the TRC.
“Neither side could impose victor’s justice because neither side
won the decisive victory that would have enabled it to do so,
since we had a military stalemate.”4 The state security forces,
Tutu noted, “still had the guns . . . and never would have negoti-
ated if they had to face trial.”5 A negotiated settlement between
the enforcers of apartheid and the resistance movements thus
The Limits of Forgiveness—25
required pragmatic measures that would enable the two war-

ring sides to find some common ground.
Although the TRC report referred to its moment as the last
chapter in the struggle for African decolonization, it faced a dif-
ferent scenario from the one encountered earlier by many other
national liberation movements. In South Africa, the colonizer
remained on the scene with no intention to leave, having relin-
quished political domination but neither military nor economic
power. The state form was in place, an institutional given that
had to be reformed, but not overthrown. Yet its organs of justice
were so corrupted that they could not be used to render judg-
ment. There was no possibility of bringing the apartheid leaders
to trial, no possibility of punishment, even if, in the eyes of the
world, their actions constituted crimes against humanity. The
defeat of apartheid was clearly a progressive historic accomplish-
ment, but how to enact a judgment of history in these circum-
stances? That was the challenge the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission faced.
The name of the Commission offered something of an
answer: it would summon witnesses—victims—to recount their
experiences and in that way document the truth of the old
regime: history’s truth would ultimately provide a memory and
a moral judgment meant to serve a political end. Part of that
end was to present the successor state to apartheid as the benev-
olent advocate/protector of apartheid’s victims. It was their suf-
fering at the hands of an evil regime (and not their agency as
resisters) that was emphasized. The exposure of truth would set
the terms not for retribution (as at Nuremberg), but for recon-
ciliation; forgiveness in the light of the truth revealed was seized
upon as the alternative to punishment. It would redeem the
nation and ensure that South Africa’s future was in step with
the progress of history. The TRC was established to ensure the
memory of apartheid—the things that had happened must not
be forgotten. Yet its call to victims to forgive what they had suf-
fered implied the need to forget. If forgiveness did imply forget-
ting, some argued, they would be experiencing a double loss:
first, the death in struggle of their family or comrades and, now,
the loss of that death to history.
The Commission adhered scrupulously to the rule of law,
demonstrating the contrast between its commitments and those
of the oppressive apartheid regime. In this way it operated as a
quasi-judicial body. On the one hand, the TRC functioned like
a court when it deposed witnesses, and when it considered and
granted requests for amnesty. On the other hand, since it lacked
the ability to punish, its authority was limited to moral counsel:
forgiveness was endorsed as an individual response to the
crimes being exposed. Jacques Derrida described the TRC as
exhibiting a “confusion between the order of forgiveness and the
order of justice,” the one an individual’s unconditional offering,
the other the prerogative of the state or its representatives.6 For
forgiveness to be meaningful, Derrida says, it must be uncondi-
tional, beyond any sovereign power and with no instrumental
purpose; forgiveness can have nothing to do with judgment. It
is not a matter for law or the state. “Forgiveness remains hetero-
geneous to the order of politics or of the juridical as they are
ordinarily understood.”7 He cites Tutu’s account of the testi-
mony of a woman who refused the Commission’s request to for-
give the murderers of her husband. “A commission or a govern-
ment cannot forgive. Only I, eventually, could do it. (And I am
not ready to forgive.)”8 Derrida goes on to point out that the
woman may also be suggesting that it is not her place to forgive;
only her dead husband has that right. If forgiveness means some-
how forgetting the sin, her action amounts to his double death.
As a survivor, she cannot substitute for him, even if she is a
victim as well. “Pure and unconditional forgiveness,” he writes,
cannot be reduced “to amnesty or amnesia, to acquittal or pre-

scription, to the work of mourning or some political therapy of
reconciliation.”9
The confusion Derrida diagnoses “between the order of
forgiveness and the order of justice,” I think, was symptomatic
of the impossible task the TRC faced: to effect national
reconciliation—a political imperative—by moral means alone.
The proceedings of the TRC were meant to enact a judgment of
history and, in one sense, it succeeded in definitively establishing
the criminality of the apartheid regime. But, in another sense, its
focus on the rule of law applied to individuals and on forgiveness
to be granted by individual victims limited the analysis of the
very operations of history, and so the solutions it could offer.
Gramscian Catharsis or Christian Forgiveness?
Among the TRC’s proponents there were two different con-

ceptions of how to shape the new South Africa, one Marxist,
the other Christian. Both rested on the idea that subjective
transformation was a prerequisite to social, economic, and polit-
ical change, but one sought to produce collective conscious-
ness of oppressive structures, the other appealed to individual
psychology.
The idea for the TRC came from Kader Asmal, a human
rights scholar and political activist. Inspired by Latin American
precedents from the 1980s and by Gramsci’s notion of cathar-
sis, Asmal saw the Commission as a means of effecting collec-
tive subjective transformation. 10 For Gramsci, catharsis was
“the starting point for all the philosophy of praxis.” The politi-
cal theorist Peter Thomas notes that according to Gramsci, “the
philosophy of praxis was not concerned to exercise ‘hegemony
over subaltern classes,’ but, on the contrary, to encourage the

subaltern classes ‘to educate themselves in the art of govern-
ment,’ thus making the ‘ruled’ intellectually independent from
the rulers.”11 Not the production of victims, but of agents—that
was the goal of catharsis. It was in this sense that Asmal wrote
that “the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should be a
final cathartic dam-burst, unleashing tides of reconstruction.”12
The process worked by recounting the lived experiences of the
system’s victims in order not to confirm their victimhood but
to expose in concrete detail the “truth” of a history, holding
accountable the white minority that either denied or did not
fully comprehend it. “The gist of genuine reconciliation is that
apartheid’s beneficiaries must be persuaded to accept unwel-
come facts about their past.”13 “In the political context, reconcili-
ation is a shared and painful ethical voyage from wrong to
right, and also a symbolic settling of moral and political indebt-
edness.”14 The testimony would come from “the previously
excluded [who] speak at last for themselves and . . . join the South
African family for the first time.”15 Their testimony would pro-
vide insight into the structural operations of power as they were
practiced under apartheid. “The South African Truth Com-
mission is only one of the structures through which we should
hope to dismantle the old regime of truth in order to replace it
with new and multiple narratives.”16 The point was to create a
collective understanding of the structures that produced indi-
vidual experience. “Reconciliation, accurately conceived, must
bring about a rupture with the skewed ethics of apartheid, and
so upset any possibility of smooth sailing on a previously
immoral course.”17 Asmal’s goal was to expose the inequalities
of power that had led to the liberation struggles and that those
struggles had challenged. He expected that the TRC’s revela-
tions would enable the now enfranchised black majority to
“make history,” finding its way to a new “reason articulating
system” that would redress the imbalance, enabling the creation

of alternative forms of politics and law. For Asmal, this would
be a “heterotopia” of “multiple idealisms forged from the diverse
narratives that together produced a shared memory.”18 “The cre-
ation of shared memory . . . is not post-apartheid volk or a sti-
fling homogeneous nationhood; nor a new Fatherland. . . . Shared
memory, in the intended sense, is a process of historical account-
ability.”19 Historical accountability meant assigning responsibil-
ity for past injustice, recognizing the agency of opponents of the
system, and changing the structures of power that enabled it in
order to prevent its recurrence.
Asmal’s vision was quickly eclipsed (and lost to many subse-
quent histories) by the teachings of the Anglican archbishop
Desmond Tutu, who became the dominant voice of the TRC.
Tutu’s emphasis on individual responsibility contrasted sharply
with Asmal’s notion of collective consciousness. In his writings
and in the Commission’s Report, Tutu stressed individual
experience; he talked (in the language of medicine and psycho-
analysis) of the trauma victims had suffered, of the need to heal
their psychic wounds. In the definitions established by the
TRC under his leadership, victims were those with direct expe-
rience of harm in the time frame of the Commission’s delib-
erations (1960–94), not the collective targets of apartheid’s
oppressive social and political rule.
For Tutu, the TRC was a “deeply theological and ethical ini-
tiative.”20 He defined the work of the Commission as promot-
ing forgiveness—the forgiveness exemplified by Jesus, and also
(to strike a culturally appropriate note) the forgiveness inherent
in the African notion of ubuntu, an understanding of the self as
inextricably bound up with others: forgiveness is offered by the
victim to redeem the sinners of their sins. Although the crimes
to be forgiven were unforgiveable—those murdered and tortured
could never be restored or made whole—Tutu’s forgiveness
confused (in Derrida’s words) “a judicial logic of amnesty” with

a “therapy of reconciliation.”21 It was symptomatic of the
dilemma the TRC faced.
Under Tutu’s leadership, forgiveness was indeed therapeutic;
it was promoted as a work of mourning that sought to establish
normality in a country rent by civil war. As an instrument of
politics, it was profoundly depoliticizing, turning attention away
from Asmal’s structures of power to the status of individual
souls. Tutu maintained that “the act of telling one’s story” had a
“cathartic, healing effect.”22 But his notion of catharsis had less
to do with establishing political agency than it did with purging
individual passions of anger and sorrow—those passions that
had, in fact, fueled the political agency of the liberation move-
ment. When a judge granted amnesty (in effect forgiveness) to
the murderers of the ANC activist Steven Biko, he defended
the action by pointing to the need to construct a “historic
bridge” to democracy: “If the Constitution kept alive the pros-
pect of continuous retaliation and revenge, the agreement of
those threatened by its implementation might never have been
forthcoming and, if it had, the bridge itself would have remained
wobbly and insecure, threated by fear from some and anger
from others.”23
The TRC publicized dramatic moments of forgiveness (e.g.,
the mothers of murdered boys forgiving their police assailants)
as a way of stressing the imperative to staunch the desire for
vengeance with the balm of forgiveness.24 “We cannot go on
nursing grudges even vicariously for those who cannot speak for
themselves any longer,” Tutu warned.25 Here he implies the
need not only to forgive, but to forget. “Forgiveness is letting go
of your right to retaliation. It is like opening a window to let
the fresh air rush into a dank closed room, it is drawing the
curtains apart to let the light stream into a dark room.”26 (The
idealization of Mandela exclusively as a man of peace and
forgiveness—and not, at one time, the supporter of armed

struggle—was an effect of this kind of thinking.) The patholo-
gization of anger not only aims to calm agitated spirits, but
implies as well the need to forget its object: the injustices and
unpunished crimes of agents of apartheid. It also delegitimizes
the anger that was one of the motives for the liberation struggle
and its historic role in securing the end of the evil regime.
But justifiable anger was, after all, what had helped fuel the
liberation movement; for some of its members the call to for-
giveness seemed a call to forget. A woman named Kalu criti-
cized the TRC this way:
What really makes me angry about the TRC and Tutu is

that they putting pressure on me to forgive. . . . I don’t know
if I will ever be able to forgive. I carry this ball of anger
within me and I don’t know where to begin dealing with it.
The oppression was bad, but what is much worse, what
makes me even angrier, is that they are trying to dictate my
forgiveness.27
If forgiveness cancels anger, she suggests, it also denies its justi-

fication and so the memory of the history she has lived.
Despite objections of this kind, the TRC Report insisted on
the importance of forgiveness. It concluded with these words:
“It is only by recognizing the potential for evil in each one of us
that we can take full responsibility for ensuring that such evil
will never be repeated.”28 In this comment, the need to forgive
the sinner refuses any structural account of how evil’s potential
is elicited, and it equates perpetrators and victims as equally
vulnerable—differentials of actual power are beside the point.
Asmal’s notion of collective political consciousness becomes, in
this representation, a series of horrific reminiscences that indi-
vidual victims, and the nation as a whole, are asked to recall and
to forgive (and then forget?), in order to move on. In the moral-

ity play staged by the TRC, the punishment dealt out to indi-
viduals at Nuremberg becomes the redemption (and so the rec-
onciliation) of victimized and corrupted individual souls.
Historical Accountability
The reconciliation the TRC sought rested on the exposure of

the truth of apartheid’s brutal past. Truth emerged in the
accounts of victims and the confessions of perpetrators. But
would these constitute a consensus, a collective memory of a
past (a history) that must be repudiated as a precondition for a
more just future? Asmal thought so. Collective memory, he
maintained, involved an analysis of apartheid as a system that
produced its agents, its challengers, and its victims, an account
of ideological and institutional struggles and structures of
oppression. He cited the case of Bram Fischer to make his point.
Born into an Afrikaaner family, Fischer eventually became one
of the lawyers representing Mandela. His conversion from a
“young apostle of segregation” to “a towering figure in the anti-
apartheid movement” involved an analysis of the system of
racial oppression, a recognition of the painful truth of apart-
heid. Asmal took Fischer to demonstrate the possibilities of a
future nonracialist South Africa: here was a white man who
“placed himself vigorously on the correct side of history at a
time when that was a dangerous thing to do.” That understand-
ing of history would have to be imposed on those who had once
supported the apartheid state: “In no sense can his [Fischer’s]
example be equated with the individual and collective responsi-
bility that is borne by South Africa’s passive beneficiaries and
practitioners of apartheid. For them, coming to terms, after the
fact, with their gainful complicity in the past will necessarily be

a different process. But it remains an imperative.”29
What would that process of “coming to terms” entail? Asmal
wasn’t clear about it and neither was the TRC. Was “historical
accountability” the same as individual accountability? Yes and
no. The TRC took as its mission the creation of the under-
standing that would encourage forgiveness (of the self and of
others) and this revealed an often-contradictory notion of
historical causality. Despite its evocations of the individual pro-
pensity to evil as the source of historical abuses, the Commis-
sion also repeatedly gestured to apartheid as a “system” of rule.
“The apartheid system in South Africa was a crime against
humanity, in spite of the fact that it was perfectly legal within
that country, because it contravened international law.”30
The Commission’s Report began with an account of the his-
tory of apartheid, depicting it as colonialism’s legacy and its
excess. The testimonies it solicited added up to an indictment
of the laws and customs of the white supremacist state. The
TRC vision of the state of the future conceived it as the antith-
esis of the apartheid state, the fulfillment of justice as both a
morally driven and an innovative legal/juridical project. Its rec-
ommendations, calling for the nurture and implementation of
“a human rights culture,” extended across the gamut of societal
institutions both public and private.
Yet when it came to assigning responsibility for gross human
rights violations, the “policies of apartheid” were gestured to
only as “the broader context within which specifically defined
gross human rights violations had taken place.”31 The emphasis
instead was on the need for individual victims to forgive their
oppressors and for individual perpetrators to avow their crimes.
Few perpetrators came forward, certainly not the leadership of
the apartheid state. This left it to the victims to forgive. The
report put it this way: “A key pillar of the bridge between a

deeply divided past of ‘untold suffering and injustice’ and a
future ‘founded upon the recognition of human rights, democ-
racy, peaceful co-existence, and development opportunities for
all’ is a wide acceptance of direct and indirect, individual and
shared responsibility for past human rights violations.”32 The
structures within which “crimes against humanity” had been
legitimated were not, as Greg Grandin (writing of earlier Latin
American commissions) put it, “presented as a network of causal
social and cultural relations but rather as a dark backdrop on
which to contrast the light of tolerance and self-restraint.”33
PERPETRATORS
In pursuit of historical accountability, the Commission sought

to document the criminality, the lawlessness, and the vicious
racism of the individuals who formulated and delivered the vio-
lent policies of the apartheid state. In the absence of official
records (most either had never been kept or were destroyed as
the end neared), the testimony of victims provided evidence, in
horrific detail, of the human rights violations they had endured:
their property stolen, their children slaughtered, their bodies
defiled. The (very few) accounts by perpetrators (most of whom
were minor figures in the state apparatus) were no less horrify-
ing, even when (and often because) they were delivered with lit-
tle or no affect, and even when they were justified as being in
compliance with the orders of the apartheid state. All of this was
televised to reach the widest possible audience—a guarantee, it
was hoped, of the production of shared historical memory.
But the nature of that memory—as well as the notion of cau-
sality upon which it rested—was disputed by some of those des-
ignated as perpetrators. The chief enforcers of apartheid
objected to the accusation that their past actions were crimes
against humanity. The former president D. W. de Klerk insisted

on this during the negotiations and again when he successfully
petitioned a court to suppress parts of the Commission Report
that documented his criminal actions. 34 He asserted that the
future unity of the nation required “non-condemnation of past
history” and “understanding” of the fact that diverse perspec-
tives had informed the motives of the conflicting sides in the
struggle. 35 De Klerk’s moral relativism was echoed by the for-
mer NP member Wynand Malan, the one person on the TRC
to dissent from its final report. He denounced the report for its
“lack of empathy with certain groups living within traditional
or nationalistic value systems who were party to the conflict.”36
They could not be blamed, he insisted, for adhering to the rules
of another “value system.” For de Klerk and Malan, there could
be no judgment of (by? for?) history—that was an unacceptable
moralizing. The only acceptable position was pragmatic adapta-
tion to the present state of things. Adam Ashforth (writing
about the political resonance of ideas of witchcraft) notes that
for many South Africans watching this process, “the fact that
the leadership of the NP failed to confess their full activities
(including their secret activities) and their malicious motives is
more than just a galling reminder of their stubborn shameless-
ness. The evil source of suffering remains alive and ready to
strike again.”37 Put another way, history’s judgment could not do
the work of closure in these circumstances.
In the light of the resistance to historical accountability by
some of the key players, the TRC turned ever more insistently
to the importance of victims’ forgiveness and to the need to
stem the anger this resistance would inevitably produce in
apartheid’s victims. Even if they failed to acknowledge their
crimes, a generous population, recognizing its own propensity
to evil, might forgive them. History, after all, had already deliv-
ered its judgment of their crimes.
BENEFICIARIES
The TRC’s attention to individual criminal responsibility drew

a sharp distinction, as Robert Meister points out, between the
passive beneficiaries of the system and its active enforcers. With
it, the question of what counted as historical accountability
came to the fore: Was it required only of those who actually
killed and maimed, or also of those who assented to and bene-
fited from the system of white minority rule? Did the preva-
lence of a different “value system” exempt individuals from cul-
pability (as de Klerk and Malan insisted)? The TRC response
(reflecting its refusal to directly take up the impact of struc-
tures on individuals) was exemplified by its explicit rejection of
one woman’s appeal for amnesty on the grounds of her acknowl-
edged “apathy,” that is, her “a lack of necessary action in time of
crisis,” her failure to actively oppose what she knew to be a
criminal regime. 38 In the eyes of the Commission, there was no
actual crime for which she could be forgiven.
In effect, the distinction between beneficiaries and perpe-
trators enacted the very general amnesty the ANC had opposed
in negotiations with the NP, absolving of criminal responsibil-
ity those who had accepted pass laws and property confiscations
as their legal entitlements, but who had committed no “gross
violations,” that is, no excessive or discernable harm to black
bodies. 39 Since these people were said to have no victims, there
could be no justified claims made against them. The criminal-
ity of the systemic violations against which the liberation move-
ment had fought for decades and which were acknowledged
(morally, abstractly) by the TRC was, in this way, in practice
(legally, formally) denied since only individuals were held
responsible for it.
And the motivation of the revolutionaries—to reverse their
collective victimhood once and for all—was denied as well.
Writes Meister, “By accepting the distinction between individual

perpetrators and collective beneficiaries of injustice as essential
to the ‘rule of law,’ the formerly revolutionary victim becomes
‘reconciled’ to the continuing benefits of past injustice that fellow
citizens still enjoy. He would thus appear ‘undamaged’ in the
sense that he has now put his victimhood firmly in the past.”40
But it is not only his victimhood that is relegated to the past, but
his heroic resistance as well. When resisters are defined primarily
as victims, their agency (past and future) is compromised, if not
lost. Meister argues that the repair of these damages meant relin-
quishing (or at the least infinitely deferring) some of the goals
that revolutionary justice had sought to attain. “The rule of law
in the aftermath of evil is expressly meant to decollectivize both
injury and responsibility and to redescribe systemic violence as a
series of individual crimes.”41 In this way some of the structures
of inequality were left untouched, even as the wheels of a more
equitable system of justice had begun to turn.
The Rule of Law
Adherence to the liberal ideal of the rule of law was a guiding

principle for the TRC. The description of apartheid as a crime
against humanity defined it as a violation of standards of inter-
national law. This had long been understood by observers and
institutions such as the United Nations and the International
Labor Organization; the liberation movements were not alone
in their condemnation. 42 It thus was crucial that the juridical
practices of the new South Africa restore the legitimacy of legal
institutions, many of which had come to be associated with pro-
tecting the criminal violence of the apartheid state.
The rule of law, once openly violated by the white minority,
was now invoked to acknowledge the humanity of the black
majority by making them citizens of the new South Africa.

Indeed, as Samera Esmeir argues (referring to postcolonial
Egypt), in this way humanity and citizenship come to define
each other; political rights are human rights. In South Africa,
black citizens were now subjects of the law, effectively enfran-
chised by but also bound to the powers of the state. Esmeir
points out that other ways of organizing justice disappear with
the introduction of the modern rule of law: “The coloniality of
the law is found in the forceful elimination of past legal tradi-
tions, in the conquest not only of a territory and it inhabitants
but also of the past.”43 In the case of South Africa, many past
practices of communal justice were put aside with the extension
to black citizens of the rule of law. Although some alternative
juridical forms in township communal deliberations have per-
sisted to this day, the nation-state is the final arbiter of law and
justice: in effect, the telos of history.
The TRC’s mandate was addressed to “conflicts of the past,”
specifically to the years from 1960 to 1994, the period between
the Sharpeville Massacre and the inauguration of Nelson Man-
dela as president. This was a long, thirty-year struggle pitting
the liberation movements against an increasingly militarized
and punitive regime; the narrow emphasis on these years of
political conflict drew attention away from the longer history of
apartheid (it dated at least to 1948) and the political, economic,
and social structures it had put in place. Within the defined
period of the TRC’s mandate, there was also a narrow defini-
tion of what constituted political conflict. In the assessment of
amnesty claims, for example, amnesty was offered only to those
individuals said to have been acting on behalf of organizations
explicitly advocating political conflict. The assassins of Chris
Hani thus were refused amnesty on the grounds that the Con-
servative Party to which they had belonged and on whose behalf
they had apparently acted did not have a policy advocating

violence.
The liberal premises of the rule of law also required ignoring
the power differentials (political and economic) established
and enforced by state violence, that is, ignoring what Asmal had
defined as the underlying “truth”—the structural truth—of
apartheid. In the deliberations of the TRC, the infractions
of ANC members were equated with those of the enforcers of
apartheid. Tutu described this as the “even-handed” determi-
nation of victims, “because the political affiliation of the perpe-
trator was almost a total irrelevance in determining whether a
certain offense or violation was a gross violation or not.” It was
the individual act that established the guilt. “Thus, there was
legal equivalence between all, whether upholders of apartheid
or those . . . who were seeking its overthrow.”44 Legal equiva-
lence, he insisted, was, of course, not the same as moral equiva-
lence; nevertheless, the condemnation of apartheid as a crime
against humanity and the endorsement of the liberation strug-
gle as a “just war in a just cause” did not obviate the need to
enforce the rule of law as embodied in the Geneva Conven-
tions. “A just cause must be fought by just means; otherwise it
may be badly vitiated.”45
But legal equivalence (between agents of the apartheid state
and those who resisted it) effectively denied the history that the
TRC was trying to document and the agency as resisters of the
opponents of apartheid. Asmal, who had by now become a critic
of the TRC, pointed out that the power imbalance in the apart-
heid state was the source of all the violence: “While decades of
white supremacist violence assaulted the very ideas of the rule
of law and constitutionalism, the anti-apartheid resistance was
the dutiful safe-house of these ideals.”46 Moreover, he said, any
violence committed by the ANC was a function of the apartheid
state and not of criminal individuals. “It needs to be empha-

sised again that the oppressed majority had no access to normal
democratic channels, no vote and no right to peaceful protest.
In these conditions, armed struggle was not a choice but a
necessity, a burden taken up with reluctance, but also with
integrity and dignity.”47 The occasional lapses that occurred, he
insisted, had to do with a few rogue members of the movement
and could not be compared with the systemic violence of the
apartheid state. Asmal was sharply critical of what he deemed “a
flexible book-keeper’s version of history [that] would produce a
suspect balance sheet of alleged facts and opinions, a product of
free-form addition, subtraction or multiplication towards con-
venient conclusions, without deference to relevant realities.” By
giving equal weight to “the Great Men who ran the system,
rather than to the perspectives of the victims and of those who
resisted the system on the ground,” this approach “would sacri-
fice truth itself.”48
Despite these objections, the Commission refused to locate
blame for all the violence in the state apparatus and its agents; it
held the liberation movements equally culpable, demanding
that they “issue a clear and unequivocal apology to each victim
of human rights abuses” and that they “seek to reconcile with
and reintegrate the victims of [their] abuses.”49 Richard Wilson
deemed this a “moral equalizing of suffering,” and it followed
from strict application of the rule of law. “In the hearings, com-
missioners repeatedly asserted that all pain was equal, regard-
less of class or racial categorization or religious or political affil-
iation. Whites, blacks, ANC comrades, IFP members, and
others all felt (or caused) the same pain. No moral distinction
was drawn on the basis of what action a person was engaged in
at the time.”50
In this way, reconciliation came to mean a minimizing, if not
a denial, of the unequal relations of power that characterized
the parties to the conflict. And it made all parties to the conflict
responsible for their victims; the members of the liberation
struggle and the agents of the apartheid state were deemed
equally culpable. As history moved progressively from an evil
past to a redeemed future, the focus was less on power dynamics
and more on the shape and behavior of the state. The logic of
evil state/victims/benevolent state prevailed. The conflict was
decontextualized and depoliticized: the defenders and resisters
were, in effect, denied their different histories. The imposition
of the rule of law, taken to be objectively unconcerned with
inequalities of power, was here at odds with the particular judg-
ment of history that the repudiation of apartheid was meant to
achieve. It also removed from the table scrutiny of the ongoing
power imbalances and political differences within the new
regime, especially in relation to the racialized capitalist organi-
zation of the economy.
LEGAL CONTINUITY 1: INDEMNITY AND AMNESTY

In the transitional period during which the TRC operated,
continuities of law seemed inevitable, as the ANC parliamen-
tarian Johnny de Lange explained: “Since our transition entailed
a gradual, though marked shift from one legal order to another,
it necessitated the acceptance of legal continuity. In constitu-
tional, legal and practical terms this meant that the apartheid
legal order remain the law of the land, even if unconstitutional,
until amended by the democratic parliament, or declared uncon-
stitutional by the Constitutional Court.”51 In order to maintain
the state form there could be no alternative to this kind of
transition; the rules of governance might be rewritten, but—
leaving aside the issue of the necessity of political compromise—
the existence of the state as a sovereign entity had to be
maintained.
Continuity, at least in the period of transition, required

acknowledging past practices of indemnity, that is, accepting
the way in which legality had been conferred on patently illegal
acts. Adam Sitze describes it this way: “Indemnity acts did not
so much legalize occasional illegalities as illegalize legality itself,
allowing ‘race war’ to be prosecuted in the name of the ‘rule of
law.’ ”52 This meant that many of those known to have commit-
ted “gross violations of human rights” could never be charged;
they had already been legally excused. But there were others
whose actions could be examined if they chose to recount them,
and they might appeal for forgiveness to the Amnesty Commit-
tee of the TRC. In the negotiations, the ANC refused to grant
blanket amnesty to apartheid’s agents, insisting that individuals
apply for it by confessing to their crimes—in this way the Truth
would be established and, at the very least, the families of those
killed, tortured, or disappeared might learn what had actually
happened to them.
But there was an undeniable link between the apartheid
state’s indemnity and the TRC’s amnesty, according to Sitze,
and this had to do with “the jurisprudence of emergency” or
necessity. Under apartheid, declarations of martial law in the
name of national security were accompanied by acts of indem-
nity, exempting the illegal actions of “certain classes of per-
sons . . . from criminal and civil liability.” Amnesty was justified
in the TRC by a similar necessity to keep the state intact (“but
for an amnesty agreement, South Africa would have dissolved
into civil war”). Writes Sitze, “Both genres of jurisprudence
refer to situations in which the very existence of the state itself
is in question and in which ‘the necessity of saving the state
from destruction’ authorizes a swerve from or suspension of the
normal procedures and practices of the rule of law.”53 Sitze sug-
gests that the adoption of the necessity argument by the TRC
was risky; in the name of healing the victims of apartheid, it

imported into the new South Africa the very “discourse of mar-
tial law, which both authorized and incited many of the gross
human rights abuses the TRC was mandated to investigate.”54
At the same time, what he terms the “genius” of the move might
be realized if this was the last time such state powers were to be
deployed. “It is whether or not the TRC’s reiteration was suffi-
ciently felicitous to institute a new mode of juridical reason—
one capable of completing the crisis of colonial jurisprudence that
occasioned the invention of the TRC to begin with.”55 Whether
the new constitution’s provisions, which explicitly ruled out
indemnity for “the police or other security forces” “even under a
state of emergency,” would be enough to do this in the face of
raison d’état—justifiable state violence in the name of stability,
prosperity, and security—remained to be seen.56
LEGAL CONTINUITY 2: PROPERTY RIGHTS

A more discernable and lasting continuity had to do with prop-
erty ownership. As part of the negotiated settlement, the bill of
rights in the new constitution left in place established property
rights. Their recognition was taken to be an instance of fealty
to the rule of law, enshrined in the new constitution. But the
assumed universal applicability of the rule of law clashed with
the particular circumstances of its enforcement. Was property
that had been acquired under apartheid laws which sanctioned
theft, dispossession, and discrimination legitimately protected
in the new regime? Asmal argued for an interpretation of the
new constitution that would take this history into account. “We
must keep in mind that property in the strict sense of a legiti-
mate and settled entitlement, is very different from the pillaged
belongings that many people took under apartheid. The right
to property now has a place in the final constitution. But prop-

erly understood the ideas of rectification and redress, not stasis,
are at the heart of the new, legitimate, concept of property.”57
The TRC’s final recommendations on this matter did not
follow Asmal’s thinking. Instead, they defined the problem and
the solution in individual terms and they left the capitalist
organization of society in place. The TRC called upon the busi-
ness community and local and regional governments working
with the Land Commission to “undertake an audit of all unused
and underutilised land, with a view to making this available to
landless people. Land appropriated or expropriated prior to
1994 should also be considered in the auditing process, with a
view to compensating those who lost their land.”58 But the Land
Commission (established in the 1990s) not only worked with
the idea of private property as a test of ownership (when com-
munal property had often been the rule among local groups),
but was massively underfunded. The head of the commission
complained that “we are the Cinderella of the commissions. . . .
If the government will deny me the 20 million rand I need to do
my job . . . then they are not taking [land] restitution seriously.”59
The result of this was, as Mahmood Mamdani puts it concisely:
“Where property rights clashed, as in the case of white settlers
and black natives, the former received constitutional protec-
tion, the latter no more than a formal acknowledgment in
law.”60 No amount of forgiveness could rectify this continuing
injustice.
The TRC did recognize an imperative of redistribution: “It
will be impossible to create a meaningful human rights culture
without high priority being given to economic justice by the
public and private sectors.”61 But redistribution could only come
from voluntary actions. The means of achieving “a meaningful
human rights culture” was ultimately a matter of individual
responsibility at the moral and material levels: “It is up to each
individual to respond by committing ourselves to concrete ways

of easing the burden of the oppressed and empowering the poor
to play their rightful part as citizens of South Africa.”62 Here
the question is one not of securing economic equality, but of
“easing the burden” and “empowering the poor” as citizens—
that is, accepting the fact that the poor are “always with us”
even when they have achieved formal political emancipation—
the perfect neoliberal conceptualization. This state of things
led one critic to comment that “Reconciliation was the Trojan
horse used to smuggle unpleasant aspects of the past . . . into the
present political order, to transform political compromise into
transcendent moral principles.”63
Here it might be useful to recall Karl Marx’s critique of for-
mal political equality based on abstract individualism, as at
once the refusal and the reproduction of social inequality.
The state abolishes, after its fashion, the distinctions

established by birth, social rank, education, occupation,
when it decrees that [these] are, non-political distinctions,
that every member of society is an equal partner in popu-
lar sovereignty. . . . But the state, more or less, allows private
property, education, occupation, to act after their own
fashion, namely as private property, education, occupa-
tion, to manifest their particular nature. Far from abolish-
ing these effective differences, it only exists so far as they
are presupposed; it is conscious of being a political state
and it manifests its universality only in opposition to these
elements.64
In South Africa, we can see this concretely: the extension of

political rights to the black majority left in place (“presup-
posed”) long-standing social and economic inequalities. And
race, as Wilson argues, was also taken to be not a structural
problem, but a matter of individual attitude. Violence, he writes,

was not defined as “the product of state structures and social
inequality, but of ‘political intolerance.’ The Report also appealed
to ‘racism’ as an explanatory category, but racism was not con-
ceptualized in both institutional and experiential compo-
nents, but instead as a set of values and sentiments held by
individuals.”65
Metaphors of the Bridge
Forgiveness was offered as the instrument of redemption, the

way of equalizing the terrain upon which compromise and rec-
onciliation would be achieved. It was often referred to as creat-
ing the conditions for a “bridge” to the future. “Forgiveness
declares faith in the future of a relationship and in the capacity
of the wrongdoer to make a new beginning on a course that will
be different from the one that caused the wrong.”66 The bridge
of forgiveness was the edifice in the present that would enable
the coming into being of a new and better future. It was the
state’s instrument of reconciliation, the means of realizing and
implementing the judgment of history.
The TRC’s metaphor of the bridge described a one-way
route, like a linear vision of history itself, from past (the apart-
heid state) to future (a new South African nation). Once it was
crossed, those traversing it would arrive at the promised land.
Asmal had spoken glowingly of a “heterotopia” of “multiple ide-
alisms,”67 forged from diverse narratives, that was not “a new
Fatherland” of “stifling homogeneous nationhood.”68 Tutu cited
Jesus: “ ‘And when I am lifted up from the earth I shall draw
everyone to myself.’ . . . There is no longer Jew or Greek, male
or female, slave or free—instead of separation and division, all
distinctions make for a rich diversity to be celebrated for the
sake of the unity that underlines them.”69 A nonracialist, rain-

bow nation awaited these tired time-travelers. But the bridge,
the edifice of salvation, was not yet finished; it was under
construction.
The TRC Report described its job as putting in place pillars
that were part of a “process of bridge building.”70 Dullah Omar,
the minister of justice in the interim government, described the
legislation that created the TRC, the Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, as
a pathway, a stepping stone, towards the historic bridge of

which the Constitution speaks whereby our society can
leave behind the past of a deeply divided society charac-
terised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice,
and commence the journey towards a future founded on
the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful
co-existence, and development opportunities for all South
Africans irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.71
Amnesty—the forgiveness of individual criminal action in indi-

vidual cases—was, in the words of the judge I cited earlier (who
defended the procedure against claims by the family of the
murdered ANC activist Steven Biko that it was unwarranted
and unconstitutional), the mechanism by which the “historic
bridge” to democracy would be constructed.
In effect, the bridge was the concrete embodiment of history,
a history whose direction was necessarily emancipatory, though
it required human action (the construction now taking place)
for its realization. That idea of history had informed the libera-
tion movements, not only in South Africa, but everywhere on
the globe. It inspired leaders and their followers to dream of and
act to achieve a better world. In South Africa, the bridge enabled
the TRC to assume that the idealized nation it imagined would
come about as a result of its efforts; but it also minimized the

weakness of forgiveness as bridge-building material. In the
metaphor of the unidirectional bridge, the future was in some
sense assured by History; current difficulties would be resolved
in the long run when the work of construction was complete.
The full implementation of the judgment of history might be
deferred for the moment in the light of the political realities of
the negotiated settlement, but it would eventually prevail. After
all, apartheid was over, a new political democracy was taking
shape. This history was about the difference between past, pres-
ent, and future.
But that notion of history assumes a starker separation
between the time frames than is ever actually the case. And it
underestimates not only the persistence of the past into the pres-
ent and future, but also the enduring effects of political compro-
mise and the structures that support it. The experience of the
TRC and the impact of some of its actions seem to me to call for
a different metaphor of the bridge as an operation of history.
The one I want to offer comes from Michel de Certeau:
The bridge is ambiguous everywhere: it alternatively welds

together and opposes insularities. It distinguishes between
them and threatens them. It liberates from enclosure and
destroys autonomy. As a transgression of the limit, a dis-
obedience of the law of the place, it represents a departure,
an attack on a state, the ambition of a conquering power or
the flight of an exile; in any case, the betrayal of an order.
But at the same time as it offers the possibility of a bewil-
dering exteriority, it allows or causes the re-emergence
beyond the frontiers of the alien element that was con-
trolled in the interior, and gives objectivity (that is expres-
sion and re-presentation) to the alterity that was hidden
inside the limits, so that in re-crossing the bridge and
coming back within the enclosure the traveler henceforth

finds there the exteriority that he had first sought by going
outside and then fled by returning. Within the frontiers,
the alien is already there, an exoticism or sabbath of the
memory, a disquieting familiarity. It is as though delimi-
tation itself were the bridge that opens the inside to the
other.72
The bridge, in this depiction, is not unidirectional; travelers

move back and forth across it. It permits the “betrayal of an
order” by readmitting exiles and aliens, by opening “the inside
to the other.” The inside is profoundly altered by this opening
but, at the same time, elements of its prior existence remain
intact. The “exteriority” of the other remains even in its re-
presentation. There is stability and instability in this feat of
engineering. The singular linearity of historical progress is con-
founded by the fact that these insiders and outsiders have lived
very different histories, which conflict and recombine (not
always harmoniously, not always with the same temporality) in
relation to one another as the bridge is repeatedly traversed.
I think that de Certeau’s notion of a bridge that is a site of
movement back and forth is a better characterization of
history—and of what the TRC was engaged with—than the lin-
ear one that they espoused and that imagined a one-way path to
a better future. The confusion and messiness of the Commis-
sion’s deliberations, what Sitze has called its “incommensurable
epistemic demands,” resulted from having opened the inside,
the minority white supremacist nation-state, to its majority
black others, bringing those “exiles,” that “alien element,” back
into the fold. To this day, their “disquieting” presence carries
with it their “exteriority,” even as they are now considered to be
“inside,” in the sense of being admitted “within the frontiers”
that had once excluded them. Those brought back from exile
did not entirely lose their “exteriority,” and elements of the past
(structures of inequality based on race, on the racialization of
class) retain their “disquieting familiarity.”
The clear distinction between past and present as a way to
the future was impossible to establish within the practical lim-
its imposed on the TRC. But the distinction operated nonethe-
less and in two contrary ways. It gave the TRC’s insistence on
forgiveness a strong moral claim (as a necessary bridge to the
future), and—at the same time—it undermined attention to
the enduring consequences of the political and economic com-
promises that were being made (and that the TRC had no abil-
ity to control). The end of apartheid did signal a historical
event; as at Nuremberg crimes against humanity were attrib-
uted to an evil regime now declared past. But the full extent of
a judgment of history (an analysis of the structural roots of the
evil and of the importance of contests for power and the role of
the protagonists in those contests) was not realized; in fact, it
was indefinitely deferred.
3
Calling History to Account
The Movement for Reparations for Slavery in the United States
Social democracy thought fit to assign to the working class the

role of redeemer of future generations, in this way cutting the
sinews of its greatest strength. The training made the working
class forget both its hatred and its spirit of sacrifice, for both are
nourished by the image of enslaved ancestry rather than that of
liberated grandchildren.
—Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, XII
T here is a long history—dating back to well before the Civil

War—of the demand for reparations for slavery and the
slave trade in the United States and elsewhere. 1 The demand
sometimes came in the form of an itemized request for payment
of an overdue obligation, as was the case in an exchange in 1865,
between a plantation owner and his now-freed slave. Replying
to an inquiry from the former master about his interest in
returning to work, Jourdon Anderson wrote asking for a sign of
good faith:
We have concluded to test your sincerity by asking you to

send us our wages for the time we served you. This will
make us forget and forgive old scores, and rely on your jus-
tice and friendship in the future. I served you faithfully
for thirty-two years and Mandy twenty years. At $25 a
month for me, and $2 a week for Mandy our earnings
would amount to $11,680. Add to this interest for the time
52—Calling History to Account
our wages has been kept back and deduct what you paid
for our clothing and three doctor’s visits to me, and pull-
ing a tooth for Mandy, and the balance will show what we
are in justice entitled to.2
Anderson, who was living in Ohio, sent the letter to the New
York Daily Tribune, thus making clear the ironic intent of his
writing. More was at stake than monetary payment; this was an
attempt to publicly expose the continued blindness of a former
slaveholder to the wrongs he had committed. It was a way of
calling to account the institution of slavery itself.
Calling to account in a broad sense is what I think the repa-
rations movement is about—account in the sense of a tally of
what is owed, but also in the sense of being answerable, being
held accountable. Even when represented in monetary terms, it
is not only financial compensation but historical accountabil-
ity—a judgment about history—that is ultimately at stake. The
need for historical reckoning is enormous for a country that has
neglected the role of slavery in its very creation. A growing
number of historians have shown that cotton cultivation and
the enslaved labor that supported it were the key to the Indus-
trial Revolution, to the creation of financial institutions, man-
agement techniques, and global markets—all of which enabled
the rise of American capitalism and its international economic
ascendancy. Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman write that “Amer-
ican slavery is necessarily imprinted on the DNA of American
capitalism.”3 Ta-Nehisi Coates, whose article from 2014 in the
Atlantic helped reopen the conversation on reparations, adds
that “racism remains, as it has been since 1776, at the heart of
this country’s political life.”4 The reparations movements say it
is time to take account of these facts.
But how to account for wrongs so destructive, for practices
that have now been condemned as “crimes against humanity,”
Calling History to Account—53
and that have taken a lasting toll on those subjected to them,

and on their descendants as well? Citing a British abolitionist
writing in 1787, Stephen Best and Saidiya Hartman point out
that “in his account, justice is beyond the scope of the law, and
redress necessarily inadequate. . . . How does one compensate
for centuries of violence that have as their consequence the
impossibility of restoring a prior existence, of giving back what
was taken or repairing what was broken?”5 The impossibility of
repair was also the issue, of course, at Nuremberg and for the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but in
those instances the evil being addressed was taken to belong to
the past. Forms of financial compensation were eventually
offered to victims of the Holocaust and of apartheid; they were
meant to provide historical closure for irreparable damage.6
The slavery reparations movements are different; they are not
about closure and not about victims. The juridical logic of a
benevolent state taking up the cause of victims of past evil
doesn’t operate in these movements’ demands. For one thing,
the evil is not past; for another, closure for a minority popula-
tion within the nation cannot easily take the form of a new sov-
ereign state—although there have been recurring calls for a
separate black nation from within some of the movements for
African American emancipation. In addition, the enslaved and
their descendants are represented as agents (however exploited
and oppressed) demanding their due in the form not of state
benevolence, but of national accountability for a persisting evil
that it is their job to describe. They charge that the continuing
legacy of slavery is the racism that still lies at the very heart of
American democracy; that is the history that must be held to
account.
The historian Aaron Carico writes that the Civil War did
not close the books on the question of slavery. “The freedom
entailed by abolition did not denote an account that was to be
marked ‘paid in full’ by the state to the ex-slave in 1865, and

much less did it denote an account centuries in arrears (in such
arrears that it could never hope to be repaid).”7 Reparations
movement advocates point out that subsequent decades of legis-
lative and judicial pronouncements have not come near to
acquitting the debt. The nation-state has been unable to com-
pensate those oppressed by the system; the juridical model has
failed to bring justice to those who deserve it. I will argue in
what follows that even as they demand some form of financial
restitution, the reparations movements recognize that the full
debt “could never hope to be repaid.” The point is to draw atten-
tion (and sometimes funding) to an ongoing problem, but also
to hold the nation to account in the form of a rewritten history—
not a linear story of gradual progress, but a record of an ongo-
ing, unfulfilled struggle to achieve justice. David Scott calls this
“a moral and reparatory history,” “a history of the fundamental
claim that unrequited wrongs remain wrongs still, that they do
not fade with the mere passage of time.”8 This form of history is
more explicitly political than that usually practiced by profes-
sional historians:
Reparatory politics . . . is a demand for neither equality nor

fairness. It is a demand that includes the recognition that
the unforgivable wrong of generations of enslavement has
given rise to a permanent racial debt that, while it can never
be fully discharged has necessarily to be honored before any
common future of freedom can begin. 9
The appeal for reparations, unlike the imposition of retribution

or the call for a redeeming forgiveness, does not assume the past
is past. Coates puts it clearly: “The sins of slavery did not stop
with slavery. On the contrary, slavery was but the initial crime
in a long tradition of crime, of plunder even, that could be

traced to the present day.”10 It is the recognition of this history
that renders “untenable” the progressive narrative of American
democracy, putting in its place a more complicated, uneven
story in which time and place have multiple valences and in
which debt is a central figure. Debt as not a monetized obliga-
tion (though it is, of course, that), but something in excess,
something closer to the biblical sense of the word: a type of
offense requiring expiation—a sin. This resonates with German
usage in which the word schuld denotes both debt and guilt.
Debt
The enslavement of African Americans effectively came to an

end in the United States in 1863, the third year of the Civil
War; Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation declared the
enslaved free in many of the Confederate states and invited
those fit to do so to join the armies of the North. Slavery con-
tinued, however, in many parts of the United States, including
all of the Union slave states. At the end of the war, in 1865,
slavery was abolished throughout the land with passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. That amendment
was followed by two more “Reconstruction Amendments”: the
Fourteenth in 1868, which grants citizenship to anyone “born
or naturalized in the United States” and stipulates equal pro-
tection of the law for them; and the Fifteenth (1870), which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”11 Yet these formal pronouncements,
while declaring illegal the institution of slavery and discrimina-
tion based on race, did not signal the end of the oppression of
black Americans. As a minority of the country’s population,
their fate was subsumed to other considerations, primarily the

reconciliation of the opposing forces in the war. The vision of
a reunified nation did not include black people as primary cit-
izens; indeed many proponents of emancipation—Lincoln
included—thought black men and women should be given their
own state or sent back to Africa. (This theme of a separate black
nation echoes down the century in the projects of black nation-
alists, who take homogeneity to be the defining trait of nations
and so call for a sovereign nation of their own from which they
could not be excluded. It is not the position held by reparations
movements; they take it as their task to expose and undermine
the white supremacy at the heart of American democracy.)
After the Civil War, local and national legislation addressed the
needs of white southerners first; these were the slaveholders
who had lost the human capital upon which their wealth was
built. The evils associated with slavery did not come to an end,
but continued in new forms, debt being chief among them.
Following the period of Reconstruction, which opened a
brief window of opportunity for some freed women and men to
participate in government, reaction set in. W. E. B. DuBois,
Eric Foner, and others have detailed the amazing accomplish-
ments of Reconstruction, the postwar, postenslavement eupho-
ria in which black churches and schools flourished. In as many
as twelve states coalitions of white and black candidates led to
biracial state legislatures. 12 But even as these developments
unfolded, the reaction was strong and harsh. At the official
level, gains were reversed when Andrew Johnson succeeded to
the presidency after Lincoln’s assassination. He overturned
General Sherman’s order to distribute confiscated Confederate
lands to the formerly enslaved (four hundred thousand acres to
forty thousand formerly enslaved—which gave rise to the expec-
tation that newly freed laborers would be granted “forty acres
and a mule”) and instead gave the land to soldiers who had
served the Confederate cause. Former slaveholders were com-

pensated for their lost property, with little attention to the eco-
nomic plight of their now-freed slaves. The Bankruptcy Act of
1867 allowed property owners to retain land despite financial
insolvency. And crop-lien laws established terms of contract
that favored planters and that enabled them to borrow against
anticipated harvests—the debt incurred to be repaid by exploit-
ing the labor of now “free” men and women. Many southern
states passed laws restricting voting; this was the period, too, of
the founding of the Ku Klux Klan and of violent attacks on the
lives and property of the African American population. By the
late 1870s what came to be known as Radical Reconstruction
was over; and by the 1890s the southern states had enacted “Jim
Crow” laws in the form of poll taxes and literacy and character
tests; property ownership requirements were supplemented by
extralegal forms of intimidation to subjugate black Americans—
the violence of lynching prime among them.
Arguably, what was most damaging from a long-term per-
spective was the transformation of the formerly enslaved into
debtors, usually as tenant farmers or sharecroppers and as cus-
tomers forced to buy on credit in local stores. (In some of these
stores, Carico shows, African Americans were coerced at gun-
point into setting up charge accounts!)13 In this way, those once
enslaved were trapped anew—this time in financial relation-
ships that they could not escape and that provided a measure of
economic compensation to their former owners. Carico has
brilliantly theorized this indebtedness, which he calls “a meta-
morphosis in the value-form of the slave.”14 “Though technically
exchange value was no longer engraved in black flesh as a com-
modity form, this value re-attached to a number of those bodies
in the red ink of the merchants’ ledgers—like a kind of ghost
conjured by law and capital, constantly haunting the freed and
compelling their labor.”15 The American dream of accumulated
wealth and generational prosperity could not be shared by these

black sharecroppers and tenant farmers. Writes Carico:
Their and their families’ lives were to be plotted not as a

line, like an arrow, but as a circle, like a cell. The horizons
of their expectations were the breadth of a field of cotton
and the length of its growing season, hemmed in by the
annual cycles of having credit furnished and having debt
tallied, and of never having that arithmetic add up to
another future. Here, the quagmire of debt becomes the
inertia of history . . . and that stuckness gets limned as
blackness. To be or to become swamped in poverty and debt
is to be or to become black. . . . Debt, poverty, stasis—in
America, these have been the features of a political econ-
omy that formulates race.16
Carico’s conclusion asserts that there has never been closure on

the evil of slavery. “As a matter of historiography,” he writes,
“1865 marks an ideological cover-up that erroneously calls slav-
ery’s time of death.”17 From the perspective of those demanding
reparations, the time of slavery’s death has not yet arrived; these
are the ghosts (the zombies?) haunting all subsequent Ameri-
can history.
Indebtedness was not relieved by progressive legislation in
subsequent eras. Even as some measure of reform was achieved,
“debt, poverty, stasis” continued to mark most African Ameri-
can lives. I do not want to deny the importance of reforms that
have made legal structures more susceptible to claims against
racism and thus have achieved a measure of institutional change,
some of it permanent. But the story of black lives in America is
one of progress followed by backlash. In that story the precari-
ous economic existence of most African Americans, which is an
effect of enduring racism, persists.
The egalitarian promise of Reconstruction was withdrawn

by the end of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth, New Deal
measures, which addressed the impoverished “one-third of the
nation,” effectively excluded black people. In order to secure
Southern senators’ support of FDR’s Social Security insurance
(for the old and the unemployed), agricultural workers and
domestics—jobs in which African Americans predominated—
were not covered. 18 The list goes on and on. The GI Bill (1944),
which supported veterans returning from World War II in
areas such as education and housing, was seemingly color blind,
but it did not address or seek to correct long-standing discrimi-
natory policies of educational institutions, banks, and realtors.
Similarly, government-supported housing initiatives, which
enabled home ownership and so a rise into the middle class for
many Americans, engaged in discriminatory practices. 19
In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the Supreme Court
declared that segregation in public schools was a violation of
the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
thereby overturning an earlier ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896),
which had permitted “separate but equal” accommodations
under that same amendment. 20 Supreme Court Associate Jus-
tice Robert Jackson (he was the chief prosecutor at the Nurem-
berg tribunal, who maintained that state sovereignty precluded
international intervention in the domestic treatment of minori-
ties) had worried in a private memo about the impact of the
decision on “social custom” and on the “fears, prides and preju-
dices which this Court cannot eradicate, and which even in the
North are latent, and occasionally ignite where the ratio of col-
ored population to white passes a point where the latter vaguely,
and perhaps unreasonably, feel themselves insecure.”21 Jackson
insisted that it was up to Congress, not the Court, to enforce
the ruling and to carry out the detailed restructuring of schools
it called for. His comment that “constitutions are easier
amended than social customs, and even the North never fully
conformed its racial practices to its professions” proved pre-
scient (although he was persuaded to join the unanimous opin-
ion of the Court in the end). 22 The ability of law (coming from
legislators or the courts) to enact justice in its moral sense was
limited. Brown did unleash a host of important actions to imple-
ment the ruling, including the tremendous gains of the civil
rights movement in the years that followed, but it also did not—
could not—address the geographic segregation, in cities espe-
cially, that even after Brown held school segregation in place. As
Coates puts it: “For a century after emancipation, quasi-slavery
haunted the South. And more than half a century after Brown v.
Board of Education, schools throughout much of the country
remain segregated.”23 The results of this segregation served to
compound the poverty and indebtedness in which much of the
black population finds itself still today.
The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 are important landmarks in the history of antidiscrimina-
tion law in the United States. They brought the problem of dis-
crimination to the center of American politics and provided the
means for enforcement in individual and collective cases and
the grounds for legal redress in the areas of public accommo-
dation, employment, education, and voting rights. But their
impact has been less thoroughgoing than anticipated—the lat-
est example is the impact of the Supreme Court decision in
2013 ending federal oversight of voter-suppressing states, which
had the effect of unleashing voter suppression in those states in
2016 and 2018.24
Affirmative action was a complement to the antidiscrimi-
nation legislation, aimed particularly at integrating the work-
force and higher education. Arguably it has had a measure of
success in higher education, increasing the numbers of so-called
“diverse” students and faculty and drawing attention to the
importance of heterogeneity for any educational mission—

although the determined backlash to it continues to this day. 25
In the labor force, the results were more mixed. Indeed, there
was a cynical calculation by President Richard Nixon when he
endorsed the Philadelphia Plan in 1969 (the Plan concerned
allocating jobs based on race in the construction industry). The
sociologist John David Skrentny shows that, among other things,
Nixon sought to undermine the Democratic Party’s constituen-
cies, aiming to split black and white workers and to pit civil rights
groups against the organized labor movement, race against class.
In this—only one example in a long history of the workings of
racial capitalism—he was successful in the long run.26
If the long run is what we look at, systematic inequality con-
tinues to characterize the white/black wealth divide in the
United States. A recent report from the Center for American
Progress, which called for policies to address the deepening
divide between white and black households, noted that the
divide has only increased since the Great Recession of 2008–
2009, when subprime mortgages disproportionately targeted
black homeowners and black communities lost 53 percent of
their wealth.27 The introduction to the Report summarizes the
reasons:
Black households . . . have far less access to tax-advantaged

forms of saving, due in part to a long history of employment
discrimination and other discriminatory practices. A well-
documented history of mortgage market discrimination
means that blacks are significantly less likely to be home-
owners than whites, which means they have less access to
the savings and tax benefits that come with owning a home.
Persistent labor market discrimination and segregation
also force blacks into fewer and less advantageous employ-
ment opportunities than their white counterparts. Thus,
African Americans have less access to stable jobs, good

wages, and retirement benefits at work. 28
It is not surprising then that “African Americans are burdened

with more costly debt.”29
The authors don’t take up the question of mass
incarceration—but the fact that black men are five times more
likely to be imprisoned than white men means less access to
decent jobs for them and greater poverty for their families. 30
Although the Center for American Progress report found that
black families are slightly less likely to owe money than their
white counterparts, their “debt payments . . . were more than
twice as costly.” The study concludes with a group of recom-
mendations for “intentional systematic policy choices” that
echoes proposals we have heard for over a century. “Maintain-
ing the status quo,” the authors conclude, “translates into another
200 years before African Americans have the same level of
wealth as their white counterparts.”31
Accounting
I cite these instances because the theme of debt runs through

the long history of demands for reparations. But it is not a debt
contracted by African Americans; it is one they are owed. It is
the bad debt the nation has incurred for ever having allowed
them to be enslaved. If “debt, poverty, stasis” (to use Carico’s
terms) have come to characterize the condition of slavery’s
descendants, it is not a failure of their will or agency, but a con-
sequence of enslavement and its aftermath, say those calling for
reparations. African Americans are “slavery’s contemporary
victims,” writes Randall Robinson, whose book arguing for
reparations is titled The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks. 32 Debt,

as Carico pointed out, is enslavement in another form. It is not
any longer the theft of wage labor that is operative, but a tax on
so-called free labor that effectively renders freedom null. The
theft continues in new form.
In the view of its advocates, reparations might begin to can-
cel the indebtedness that traps African Americans in cycles of
poverty; and, as importantly, it would acknowledge the debt
owed by a nation that has yet to recognize its obligation. The
double play on the notion of debt (our financial indebtedness is
a result of a moral and financial debt you owe us) moves the
diagnosis away from “the culture of poverty” (blaming African
Americans for their poverty and purported family dysfunction)
to the structures that have kept racial inequality in place. As
Martha Biondi puts it, “reparations changes the discursive image
of African Americans from victims to creditors and revises the
dominant narrative of American social, political, and economic
history.”33 The demand for restitution of lost earnings turns
African Americans into creditors who are calling due the
accounts; it gives them agency, not as victims, but as people right-
fully claiming what they are owed. At the same time, the demands
for reparations, even when sums are specified, make clear that
the debt can never be fully discharged. It is impossible to close
the books on slavery and its legacy. The debt is a “bad debt,” in the
sense given to it by Stefano Harney and Fred Moten. It is a “debt
that cannot be repaid, the debt at a distance, the debt without
creditor, the black debt. . . . Excessive debt, incalcuable debt . . .
debt as its own principle.”34 Although in the case of reparations,
there is a creditor—the heirs to the legacy of American slavery.
Well before Emancipation, ex-slaves petitioned their masters
for reimbursement for unpaid wages; as in the case I cited at the
beginning of this chapter, they might be able to specify the
value of the labor that had been stolen from them, but money
could not compensate for other losses (family members, human
dignity, life itself ). The black abolitionist David Walker (1829)
insisted that “the greatest riches in all America have arisen from
our blood and tears”;35 a generation later (1854) another black
abolitionist, Martin Delany, called for a “national indemnity . . .
for the unparalleled wrongs, undisguised impositions, and
unmitigated oppression, which we have suffered at the hands
of this American people.”36 Delany did not specify what this
indemnity amounted to—he couldn’t, given the wrongs he enu-
merated. After slavery ended white and black groups organized
to demand pensions for the formerly enslaved, sometimes as a
practical measure (to assure support for elderly freed women
and men), but also as a statement of principle (now that enslave-
ment was recognized as an illegal practice, those subjected to it
were owed some form of restitution). Attempting to discredit
the very idea that pensions were legitimate, the federal govern-
ment pressed fraud charges against some of the organizers of
these pension societies, and even jailed a few of them. There was
an unsuccessful lawsuit (1915) by the formerly enslaved that
claimed as recompense taxes the United States had levied on
cotton. The court refused the claims on the grounds of the sov-
ereign immunity of the nation; the judges referred the plaintiffs
to their former masters for compensation (suggesting that it was
individual “contractual” relationships and not a state-sanctioned
system of enslavement that were at issue). 37 In all of these efforts
the theme not of victimhood but of stolen labor predominated.
Here was Sojourner Truth in 1868: “We have been a source of
wealth to this republic. Our labor supplied the country with cot-
ton, until villages and cities dotted the enterprising North for its
manufacture. . . . Beneath a burning Southern sun have we
toiled, in the canebrake and the rice swamp, urged on by the
merciless driver’s lash, earning millions of money.”38
But how to claim some of those millions? A century after

Sojourner Truth, Martin Luther King appealed for “a massive
program by the government of special compensatory measures”
for repayment to the “Negro [who] was, during those years,
robbed of the wages of his toil.”39 Audley Moore (1963) made
the generational connection, demanding “fair and just compen-
sation for the loss of property rights in the labor of our forepar-
ents, for which no payment of any kind has ever been made.”40
James Forman’s dramatic “Black Manifesto,” delivered at the
Black National Economic Conference in 1969, included a long
list of demands to white Christian churches and Jewish syna-
gogues for their active participation in the enslavement of black
Americans. The monetary compensation he asked for ($15 a
head for every black person in the United States—he calculated
there were thirty million of them and so asked for $500 mil-
lion) constituted a claim as much moral as practical—$15 a head
could hardly begin to erase the debt. 41 Randall Robinson called
for a “virtual Marshall Plan of federal resources” to repay “white
society’s debt to slavery’s contemporary victims.”42 “The value
of slaves’ labor went into others’ pockets. . . . Where was the
money? Where is the money? There is a debt here. I know of no
statute of limitations either legally or morally that would extin-
guish it.”43 This is a debt owed that no amount of money could
ever repay.
The debt, in these calls for reparations, stands as the unfin-
ished business of slavery, a history of evil that continues despite
gestures made to relegate it to the past. It is, moreover, a collec-
tive debt, not one owed to individuals. Although it is expressed
in financial terms and demands recognition as such, it exceeds
any sum that can be named. David Scott makes this point about
the Caribbean “politics of reparations.” What it seeks, he says,
“is not economic aid (with its disciplining technologies and
moral hubris), not help in the subservient sense of a mendicant
seeking assistance, but what is owed . . . by former slave-trading

and slave-owning nations as a matter of the justice of redress.”44
Although there has been litigation in the United States
demanding reparations, no court can finally adjudicate the sin.
From this perspective, the idea that DNA will establish the
rightful heirs to wages owed to those previously enslaved is a
literalizing (and a minimizing) of the aims of the reparations
movements. 45 It is those subjected to racism, not only the
descendants of individuals who were enslaved, who are demand-
ing redress.
In the 1960s, the moment of decolonization, another theme
was added to these reparations claims—that of the debt the
nation owed to Africa as well as to African Americans. This
was a way of establishing a certain national (or transnational)
identity, a black majority reply to the white supremacy upon
which the American nation was based. When Forman issued
his manifesto, he referred to American blacks as a “colonized
people inside the United States, victimized by the most
vicious, racist system in the world.” This enabled him to make
a connection between antiracist movements in the United
States and African liberation movements—they were of a piece.
Some of the reparations money he demanded, he said, ought to
go to establish cooperative businesses not only in the United
States, but also in Africa, which he referred to as “our mother-
land.” “We are so proud of our African heritage and realize
concretely that our struggle is not only to make revolution in
the United States, but to protect our brothers and sisters in
Africa and to help them rid themselves of racism, capitalism
and imperialism by whatever means necessary, including armed
struggle.”46
Randall Robinson also emphasized Africa in his book on
reparations. For Robinson, reclaiming Africa was a way of
restoring African American pride. “To be made whole again,
blacks need to know the land of their forebears when its civili-
zations were verifiably equal to any in the world.”47 They needed
to know this history in order to become agents of their own his-
tory. Reclaiming the history and culture of Africa required
coordination with those nations. Robinson cited a declaration
on reparations from a meeting of the Organization of African
Unity in 1993 that pointed to “the damage done to Africa and to
the Diaspora by enslavement, colonialism and neo-colonialism.”48
The authors of the declaration state that they are “fully per-
suaded that the damage sustained by the African peoples is not
a theory of the past but is painfully manifested from Harare to
Harlem and in the damaged economies of Africa and the black
world from Guinea to Guyana, from Somalia to Surinam.” The
declaration calls for economic reparations and cites historic
precedents—German reparations to Jews, US compensation to
Japanese-Americans interned during the Second World War—
but it also recognizes the limits of that claim.
Cognizant of the fact that compensation for injustice need

not necessarily be paid entirely in capital transfer but could include
service to the victims or other forms of restitution and re-
adjustment of the relationship agreeable to both parties;
Emphasizing that an admission of guilt is a necessary
step to reverse this situation;
Emphatically convinced that what matters is not the
guilt but the responsibility of those states whose economic
evolution once depended on slave labour and colonialism
and whose forebears participated either in selling and buy-
ing Africans, or in owning them, or in colonizing them;
Convinced that the pursuit of reparations by the Afri-
can peoples on the continent and in the Diaspora will be a
learning experience in self-discovery and in uniting political and psycho-
logical experience;
Calls upon the international community to recognize that

there is a unique and unprecedented moral debt owed to the African
peoples which has yet to be paid—the debt of compensation
to the Africans as the most humiliated and exploited
people of the last four centuries of modern history.” (my
emphasis added)
In this declaration, as in Forman’s and Robinson’s texts, the

demand for reparations becomes a full-fledged analysis of the
place of slavery in the organization of a world system of haves
and have nots, with racism at its very core. Racism is “not a the-
ory of the past,” but a continuing disaster, a fact of present his-
tory. “This black holocaust,” Robinson insisted, “produces its
victims ad infinitum, long after the active stage of the crime has
ended.”49 The system of enslavement may be confined to the
past, but there has been no closure to the crimes it committed
and unleashed. Repayment of the debt is long overdue; those
who are owed must hold the nation to account.
Loss
A current of loss runs through this literature on reparations,

and it is not just loss of the value of labor and of the material
requirements for a good life. It is expressed sometimes as the
loss of dignity and humanity, the loss of connection to the rich
culture and history of Africa, and the (existential) loss of trust
in the possibility for a better future. “I was coming to under-
stand,” writes Ta-Nehisi Coates, “that losing things, too, was
part of the journey.”50 Coates refers with these words to his per-
sonal journey, but like his collection of essays, We Were Eight
Years in Power: An American Tragedy (2017), it is meant to stand as a
comment on the long history of black people in America. I
think the book can be read as allegory: Coates’s awakening to

the history of his people and to his place in that history is the
story not only of African Americans, but of America itself—a
form of David Scott’s “moral and reparative history.” Coates
tells us that large story as he recounts his own coming to full
consciousness of the power, the extent, and the endurance of
white supremacy in democratic America. “The Case for Repa-
rations” is a central chapter of the book, the culmination of his
journey in the course of the eight years of the Obama presi-
dency. That essay and the others in the book (one for each year
of the Obama presidency) give us rich material for thinking
about how the call for reparations addresses the experience of
loss, above all loss of faith in the moral promise associated with
the judgment of history. It is reparative in two senses: first, it
corrects the myth of American democracy with an account that
represents an “other” history; and, second, it exposes the psy-
chic, physical, and material damage incurred by those others as
they repeatedly lost out on the promise held out by the myth.
The title of the book refers both to the years of the Obama
presidency and to the post–Civil War period of Reconstruc-
tion. It is taken from the words of the South Carolina congress-
man Thomas Miller, who, in 1895, appealed to the state consti-
tutional convention for recognition of the accomplishments of
freed men and women (“we were eight years in power”) that
had helped reconstruct the state and “placed it upon the road to
prosperity.”51 The subtitle of Coates’s book refers to the unhappy
outcomes of both eras; the story is of unending tragedy, recur-
ring disappointment, the mourning of an unending loss.
Loss is Coates’s unrelenting theme—promise followed by
loss: The foundational promise of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence contradicted by constitutional rule that counted an
enslaved individual as 3/5 of a person (in the determination of
the number of state representatives in the congress). The
violent denial of the promise of Reconstruction. The promise of

the New Deal and the GI Bill, and the exclusion of most black
people from those opportunities. The promise of Brown v. Board of
Education followed by the murder of Emmett Till. The failures of
school busing and housing desegregation in city after city. The
gains of the civil rights movement and the promise of affirma-
tive action, weakened by one court decision after another. The
refusal of Congress year after year even to entertain Representa-
tive John Conyers’s bill (HR40, named for the unfulfilled
promise of “forty acres and a mule”), first introduced in 1989, to
study the effects of slavery on “living African Americans.”52 The
unpunished murders of so many black men. And then the Obama
election and Coates’s initial naive belief that “it now seemed
possible that white supremacy, the scourge of American history,
might well be banished in my life-time. In those days I imagined
racism as a tumor that could be isolated and removed from the
body of America, not as a pervasive system both native and essen-
tial to that body.”53 It takes the election of Donald Trump (“The
First White President”) to finally and fully disillusion him.
Coates’s own emergence as a writer is an effect of the Obama
presidency: “the doors swung open” for black people like him.54
It seemed possible—his portrait of Michelle Obama illustrates
this wish—that black people, black culture, black history would
henceforth be seen as just another branch of the pluralist Amer-
ican tree. “It seemed possible that our country had indeed, at
long last, come to love us.”55 If the president were black, this
must mean that racial difference had ended as the organizing
principle of national identity. But the backlash against Obama
(recounted in “The Fear of a Black President,” chapter 5), the
outraged reactions to any sign of his identification with other
African Americans (as when he says that the murdered Tray-
von Martin could have been his son), the need for him to con-
tain his better instincts awaken Coates to the illusion of linear
progress: “I had been wrong about the possibility of Barack

Obama. . . . I might be wrong about a good deal more.”56 And it
sends him on a quest for understanding, from history books—
where he discovers the deep roots of American racism—to Civil
War battlefields, where he learns that he lives in a country “that
will never apologize for slavery, but will not stop apologizing for
the Civil War.”57 Coates’s insights are not new for many histori-
ans of the United States (indeed they are old news), but his
discovery—his personal journey, a naive sense of discovery—is a
powerful call to a larger public to learn this history with him and
to share its emotional impact.
For Coates the revelations are stunning, as he recounts his
own disillusionment—his willingness over and over again to
believe what he calls the American story of progress—as a
haunting by history. “And now the lies of the Civil War and the
lies of these post-racial years began to resonate with each other,
and I could now see history, awful and undead, reaching out from the
grave.”58 There is no possibility of mourning the horrors of slav-
ery, of mourning the enslaved dead, because they live on as
zombies or ancestral spirits in the very souls of their descen-
dants (all black Americans); their time has not passed. This is
not a wholly pessimistic state of things, as Sarah Juliet Lauro
points out in her work on “Zombie Dialectics.” Tracing the ori-
gin of the myth of the zombie to Haitian slave plantations, she
notes that there the zombie was “a slave raised from the dead to
labor, who revolts against his masters.”59 The zombie at once sig-
nifies the social death of the slave (“biologically alive, but
‘socially dead’ ”) and its living potential for rebellion (which can
bring the ultimate freedom associated with a martyr’s death).
The zombie is the “frozen image of [these] irresolvable
opposites”—death in life, life in death.60 We might say that for
Coates, too, there is something enabling about the history of the
undead—it leads to his own conviction that he needs to act.61
But, in order to act, he needs to mourn the death of his belief

in the promise of democracy. “Mourning,” Freud wrote, “is reg-
ularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of
some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s
country, liberty, an ideal, and so on.”62 Grieving the loss of his
belief in the inevitable triumph of the good leads Coates to a
new realization: “it was slavery that allowed American democ-
racy to exist in the first place.”63 There was nothing “accidental”
about the “hypocrisy of a nation founded by slaveholders extol-
ling a gospel of freedom.”64 For Coates there is no closure to this
loss of the ideal of American democracy. In either form—slave
zombies or democracy’s lie uncovered—the past lives on. At
best, Coates experiences that insurmountable form of grief that
Freud calls melancholia, an inability to let go of the lost object(s),
an identification with them that deeply (and, for Freud, nega-
tively) affects one’s sense of self.
But Coates’s melancholia, if that is what it is, has a resolution
that comes in the form of a demand for reparations.
All the threads I had been working on . . . came together

in “The Case for Reparations”: the critique of respectabil-
ity politics, the realization that history could be denied but
not escaped, the understanding of the Civil War’s long
shadow, the attempt to discover my own voice and lan-
guage and, finally the deeply held belief that white
supremacy was so foundational to this country that it
would not be defeated in my lifetime, my child’s lifetime,
or perhaps ever. There would be no happy endings, and if
there were, they would spring from chance, not from any
preordained logic of human morality.65
In other words, the inevitable forward march of history offers

neither hope nor incentive to action.
What do offer inspiration, however, are examples of defiance

in the history of African American life—defiance of the kind
Coates associates with the “repeated acts of self-creation” of
Malcolm X.66 “If freedom has ever meant anything to me per-
sonally,” he writes of Malcolm and other resisters, “it is this
defiance.”67 Perhaps, too, there is here an echo of the defiance of
the zombie, the rebellious figure who will not accept enslave-
ment in any form. The call for reparations implies the need for
defiance, for collective action on the part of African Americans
and their allies to demand the long-overdue recognition of the
sin of enslavement so as to bury once and for all the racism of
which slavery was both effect and cause. Conyers’s filing of HR
40 year after year can also be seen as an act of defiance in the
very body of the nation that refuses to recognize that it is
infected by the racist legacy of slavery.
Reparations, then, is less a literal demand for financial repay-
ment of debt (though for some it surely also is that) than it is
a defiant rereading of the history of the United States. It is a
rereading that extends beyond the black experience to a con-
demnation of predatory capitalism that has made race a primary
instrument of its rule. In this connection, Coates writes, “I have
never seen a contradiction between calling for reparations
and calling for a living wage, or calling for legitimate law
enforcement and single-payer health care. They are related—
but cannot stand in for one another. I see the fight versus sex-
ism, racism, poverty, and even war finding their union not in
synonymity but in their ultimate goal—a world more humane.”68
Here he joins an earlier call (1967) by Martin Luther King and
his associates for the enactment of a “Freedom Budget” that
would “abolish the scourge of poverty” for whites and blacks in
the nation as a whole. And he echoes the more recent work of
the Reverend William Barber, whose “Moral Mondays” movement
aims to rid the entire nation of poverty, greed, militarism, and
racism. The unveiling of the role of race in the economic history

of the United States explodes long-standing, congratulatory
progressive histories as myth. “For Americans, the hardest part
of paying reparations would not be the outlay of money. It
would be acknowledging that their most cherished myth was
not real.”69 This acknowledgment is a form of restitution and it
opens the possibility for reclaiming the lost promise of justice,
the messianic hope of the judgment of history.
Here, the rereading by David Eng and his collaborators of
Freud’s understanding of melancholia is useful to think with.
They argue that rather than a pathological state (incomplete
mourning resulting in distortions of the ego and libido), melan-
cholia’s “continuous engagement with loss and its remains . . .
generates sites for memory and history, for the rewriting of the
past as well as the reimagining of the future.”70 Dana Luciano,
reading a novel by Pauline Hopkins, an African American
writer at the turn of the last century, notes that in her work,
“melancholia . . . comes to seem less a pathology, than a realistic
response to racial conditions in the U.S.”71 This ought to recall
the citation from Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of His-
tory that is the epigraph for this chapter. Although Benjamin
was referring to the mobilization of workers, his words apply
equally to the reparations movements. They are refusing to
forget, indeed they are motivated by, “hatred and [a] spirit of
sacrifice . . . nourished by the image of enslaved ancestry.”
From this perspective, we can see a larger purpose to the
moral outrage in the calls for reparations. In this literature, moral
outrage is a means of achieving the psychic disposition that is a
condition of possibility for political mobilization. The self-hatred
that is clinically associated with melancholia and that Coates
addresses at several points in his book is turned outward to the
structural conditions that created it. Reparations are depicted
as functioning to refuse the abjection of the enslaved and their
descendants, and not only by enabling them to rise out of material

poverty. The movements represent the continuing refusal—over
centuries—of African Americans to accept enslavement as
their fate.
It is in this sense that we can read the Organization of Afri-
can Unity declaration of 1993 (cited earlier): its authors were
“convinced that the pursuit of reparations by the African peo-
ples on the continent and in the Diaspora will be a learning
experience in self-discovery and in uniting political and psy-
chological experiences.”72 Robinson waxed eloquent on the
restorative effects of reparations:
Even the making of a well-reasoned case for restitution will

do wonders for the spirit of African Americans. It will
cause them at long last to understand the genesis of their
dilemma by gathering, as have all other groups, all of their
history—before, during, and after slavery—into one story
of themselves. To hold the story fast to their breast. To
make of it, over time, a sacred text. And from it, to explain
themselves to themselves and to their heirs. Tall again, as
they had been long, long ago.73
Robinson’s point is that political subjectivity depends on a con-

nection to history. Not a conventional history, I imagine, but
one that uncovers hidden stories, temporalities that don’t reflect
the linear national model. Beyond empowering black Ameri-
cans, Robinson wrote, a history that acknowledged crimes pres-
ent and past would benefit all Americans. “We could disinter a
buried history,” Robinson wrote, “connect it to another, more
recent and mistold, and give it as a healing to the whole of our
people, to the whole of America.”74 These reparative histories,
reclaiming what has been stolen, buried, and long denied, would
not only announce but also enable an outlet for melancholia by
understanding it not as individual pathology but as a historical

condition: as Luciano puts it, “the very condition, indeed, of
being historical.”75 For Coates the stakes are high: “What I’m
talking about is a national reckoning that would lead to spiri-
tual renewal. . . . Reparations would mean a revolution of the
American consciousness, a reconciling of our self-image as the
great democratizer with the facts of our history.”76
The “facts of our history,” revealed in the case for repara-
tions, will—it is hoped—bring into being a judgment of history.
It is in this sense that Coates turns to the Yale president and
Congregational minister Timothy Dwight to make the case for
reparations. Writing in 1810, Dwight condemned the institu-
tion of slavery and insisted that his generation hold themselves
responsible for it. “It is in vain to alledge, that our ancestors brought
them hither, and not we.” “We inherit our ample patrimony with
all its encumbrances; and are bound to pay the debts of our
ancestors. This debt, particularly, we are bound to discharge: and,
when the righteous Judge of the Universe comes to reckon with
his servants, he will rigidly exact the payment at our hands.”77
Coates, writing some two hundred years later, is still awaiting
the final judgment that will exorcise the hold of the evil of rac-
ism on the American nation, sending the undead to their eternal
rest. But in the meantime, the melancholy attached to the con-
templation of that experience becomes a motivation for collec-
tive political action.
The righteous Judge of the Universe is, in our secular age,
understood to be History itself. But, I would argue, it is not
History, conceived as an autonomous movement whose infalli-
ble judgment will right all wrongs, that is wanted. What is
called for is a humanly written account that unflinchingly takes
cognizance of “the facts of our history,” exposing their struc-
tural and ideological supports and their varying and conflicting
temporalities. It is never a question, in these movements, of an
alternative to the nation; the point is that minorities have a

claim on citizenship and on the founding principles as well as
the treasured story of the Republic.
Facing “the facts of our history,” the reparations movements
insist, will force the nation to recognize a debt that can never be
repaid. Paradoxically, the acknowledgment of the impossibility
of repayment calls upon us to imagine the creation of more just
futures. The recognition of that impossibility is an opening to
possibility. And it is reparatory, not only psychically but politically
as well. This, I suggest, is the ultimate import of the reparations
movements: they call history (defined as human action, past,
present, and future) to account. David Scott’s characterization is
apt in this regard: “Reparatory justice responds . . . to a retempor-
alization of history; it attunes itself to a reenchanted past understood
as a time not yet past that continues to disfigure the present and
foreclose the future.”78
There is some evidence that the movements’ call to rewrite
history has gone beyond the work of some critical historians (who
have long been doing just that) to the popular/public realm. On
August 20, 2019, the New York Times Magazine devoted a special
issue to “1619.” In it the editors argued that the real beginning
of America was not 1776, but 1619, when chattel slaves first
arrived in the land. “This is sometimes referred to as the coun-
try’s original sin, but it is more than that: it is the country’s very
origin.” The goal of the 1619 project, they said, was to reframe
American history, with slavery at its core. “By acknowledging
this shameful history . . . perhaps we can prepare ourselves for a
more just future.”79 The “perhaps” is important in that sentence;
it holds out no guarantee, no utopian plan, just a wish that his-
tory retold might inaugurate change.
Epilogue
Revisioning History
It is because redemption is impossible that there is a demand for

justice and an imperative of justice. . . . Judgment Day is both
concrete (particular, political, historical) and doomed to remain
historically, eternally, deferred.
—Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious
I began the research that has become this book by expressing

my amazement in the wake of the Charlottesville demon-
strations that “the things we are experiencing”—proud identifi-
cation with Nazis and Klansmen—were “still possible” in the
twenty-first century. Even as I understood as naive and fantas-
tic my expectation that the “judgment of history” would have
long ago ruled these things out of order, I somehow held to the
idea that it should have been possible. And, as the examples I
cited in the preface indicate, I was not alone in this belief. There
seems to be an abiding faith (at least for the general public and
for some professional historians) that “in the end” we will be
vindicated by History. The notion of history this evokes is mul-
tiple: it is at once the universal (and progressive) direction of
life, the human actions that take place in unilinear time and
whose Truth will eventually be recognized, and the record com-
piled of those actions by historians.
Although judgment implies interpretation, indeed the possi-
bility of more than one interpretation, there is a certain finality
assumed for the judgment of history. The case is closed, the guilty
80—Epilogue
condemned, the innocents vindicated—this is the consoling

fantasy we have inherited from the Enlightenment. That it is no
longer, indeed never was, tenable has been the argument of this
book. This does not mean that appeals to history’s judgment,
along with actual attempts to enact it, do not exist. They do.
They rest on a notion of temporality that dates to the eighteenth
century: a single line of change that divides time neatly into past,
present, and future; traditional (or primitive) and modern;
superstitious (religious) and secular. And they take the nation-
state to be the “tip of the arrow” of the direction of history. This
idea of history, I have tried to show, constitutes a politics that
needs to interrogated. That is a politics in which the seeming
resolution of moral questions (the assignment of some evil to the
past, the certainty that truth will prevail in the future) over-
shadows or denies persisting structures of power—structures of
power that are, in effect, naturalized as the inevitable products
of the necessary telos of history. The focus on the nation-state as
the telos of history (and so the ultimate source of justice) also
obscures the conflicts that challenge and change those struc-
tures of power. It renders invisible dissenting agencies that pro-
vide alternative visions of how life might be lived together.
At Nuremberg, I argued, the racism that Hannah Arendt
associated with nationalism and imperialism was obscured by
exclusive attention to aberrant Nazi crimes against humanity.
The judgment of history that assigned Nazism to the barbaric,
uncivilized past represented the victorious nation-states as
avatars of the progress of history, even as their treatment of
domestic minorities and colonial subjects went unremarked.
The trial was meant to affirm the international covenants upon
which rested the future of their status as individual sovereign
nation-states. History’s judgment was said to lie in the hands of
the victorious nation-states, which meted out retribution in the
name of the victims of National Socialism. In South Africa, the
Epilogue—81
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, unable in the context

of a negotiated settlement to achieve the kind of closure the
Nuremberg judges imposed, brought to light in the testimony
of witnesses the truth of apartheid’s brutality. Indeed, the word
truth in the Commission’s title was meant to be the synonym for
history and thus the basis for a judgment of history. But there,
the call to the victims of white minority rule to forgive their
oppressors—in the name of a higher morality—foreclosed an
analysis (demanded by some critics of the TRC) of the structures
of racial capitalism, and the alternatives posed by dissidents to
those structures, on which the system of domination had been
based. The quasi-judicial status of the TRC established the state
as the arbiter of truth and justice; in the process it was as victims
rather than as resisters that those oppressed by the system came
to be defined. I would say that the moral judgment—that apart-
heid was an evil system rightly relegated to the dustbin of
history—prevailed, but that the judgment about what had enabled
and challenged its power relations was occluded. The emphasis
on moral closure drew attention away from the structural bases
for white supremacy; despite the electoral enfranchisement of the
black majority, the egalitarian future imagined by the nation’s
freedom fighters has yet to be realized.
In both cases—at the Nuremberg Tribunal and for the
TRC—the belief that the nation was the agent of history’s judg-
ment went unquestioned, although, of course, in South Africa,
the aim was to produce a nonracial “heterotopia of rich diver-
sity,” not a “stifling homogeneous nation.” Still although the
constitution enshrined gender equality as one of the founda-
tional principles of the new nation, it has yet to be realized in
the hierarchies of politics. In addition, the success of this non-
racialist vision has lately been called into question by xenopho-
bic attacks on black non-South Africans in disputes over the
status of migrant laborers from outside the country.1 The citizens
82—Epilogue
of South Africa may be black and white, but an exclusionary

politics nonetheless has been mobilized in the name of the
homogeneity of national identity.
The movements for reparations for slavery in the United
States present a different, critical perspective, one that acknowl-
edges the failure of successive judgments of history to address
the nation’s “original sin” of slavery. In this example, it’s not so
much judgment that’s called for—in the sense of a ruling that
will consign evil to the past. Rather, it’s precisely an accounting,
a demand for the recognition that the past has not passed, that
progressive linear narratives are untenable because they mis-
represent American history. The nation as the unit of history
remains unquestioned, but the conception of that history is
radically revised. This is a demand not only for a different his-
tory, but, in Benjamin’s sense, for “a different view of history.” It
is a view that abjures history’s redemptive function, instead tak-
ing history to be a record of discontinuity and multiple tempo-
ralities (the lived times of the enslaved and their descendants
are different from those of white Americans), a process of con-
tention and conflict, a story of struggles with and for power,
with no sharp boundaries between past, present, and future.
My reading of the reparations movements as calling for a dif-

ferent view of history is made possible by ongoing discussions
among philosophers, political theorists, and historians about
the impact of the end of the master narratives of modernity. For
even as appeals to the judgment of history continue to mark
public discourse, they function more as consolatory polemic in
the present than as evidence of deep confidence in the future.
Our condition of postmodernity, as Wendy Brown has
described it, is marked by “the loss of historical direction, and
with it the loss of futurity characteristic of the late modern
age.”2 “We know ourselves to be saturated by history, we feel the
Epilogue—83
extraordinary force of its determinations; we are also steeped in

a discourse of its insignificance, and, above all, we know that his-
tory will no longer (always already did not) act as our redeemer.”3
For Brown, as for many other commentators, the question is
about what this “loss of futurity” portends for politics, what
substitute visions are possible to nurture the desire for progres-
sive change. The answers vary: Brown, seeking an alternative to
the resentment-driven identity politics of the 1990s (which
have returned with even greater intensity in our twenty-first
century), suggests that the individualizing, essentializing lan-
guage of “I am” be supplanted with the language of “I want this
for us.” By substituting the language of collective wanting for
the language of individual being, she writes, the common good
could become the object of political desire, thus “forging an alter-
native future.”4 Jacques Derrida, looking to reclaim something
of a Marxist spirit to counter the conservative publicist Francis
Fukuyama’s declaration of the end of history, refuses to relin-
quish “a certain experience of the emancipatory promise, . . . a
messianism without religion, even a messianic without messian-
ism, an idea of justice—which we distinguish from law or right or
even human rights—and an idea of democracy—which we dis-
tinguish from its current concept and from its determined pred-
icates today.”5 The key for Derrida is the notion of promise, “as
promise and not as onto-theological or teleo-eschatological pro-
gram or design. Not only must one not renounce the emancipa-
tory desire, it is necessary to insist on it more than ever . . . and
insist on it, moreover, as the very indestructibility of the ‘it is
necessary.’ This is the condition of a re-politicization, perhaps
of another concept of the political.”6 Fredric Jameson finds in
utopian imaginings a disruption of the notion that “there is no
alternative to the system”; utopias serve to negate the sense of
immutability in the present and so enable our “ability to imag-
ine a different future.”7 Gary Wilder finds in the Frankfurt
84—Epilogue
School (Adorno, Benjamin) an alternative to the old idea of his-

tory as progress because, as he puts it, “relations of domination
are mediated by the idea and the reality of progress itself.” The
concept of “anticipation” is his analytic proposal: “a kind of
political disposition whereby radical actors cultivate a state of
readiness for any possibility at every possible moment.” This,
combined with “a positive vision of what a better society might
look like,” sets the stage for action when the moment arrives or
seems right. Wilder recognizes that anticipation involves main-
taining “a balancing act between identifying concrete possibili-
ties through utopian imagination while not foreclosing out-
comes through predictive naming.” It’s a tricky balance to
maintain. And he deems anticipation a dialectical conception:
it is “a calling for that is also a calling forth, an enacted idea that may
bring into being what it desires through the performance itself
(even as that very image of future possibilities only arises
through such performative acts).”8 Mark Fisher says that “polit-
icization requires a political agent who can transform the taken
for granted into the up-for-grabs.”9 It’s precisely the up-for-grabs
(no telos, no predictive naming) that anticipates the future for
the present in ways we cannot prefigure. In a similar vein,
Michael Löwy writes of history as an “open process, not deter-
mined in advance, in which surprises, unexpected strokes of
good fortune and unforeseen opportunities may appear at any
moment.” We need to be prepared, he continues, “to grasp the
fleeting moment in which revolutionary action is possible.”10
Despite important differences among these writers (and I
have chosen only a few of the many writing on these topics),
they share the notion that it is possible to think the future with-
out the telos of history. One doesn’t have to know what the end
will look like in order to seek to change the present; political
desire can be provoked by utopias, driven by collective desire,
enthralled by the messianic promise of an abstraction called
Epilogue—85
justice, or expressed in terms of the anticipation of possibility,

but it never follows predestined routes.
In fact, thinking (desiring, anticipating) the promise of the
future may not always be the initial incentive to action, although
the action taken itself may lead to change. Here it is useful to
remember some of Michel Foucault’s writings. Foucault thought
that resistance and refusal did not come from outside, but were
built in to relations of power; they did not depend on a vision of
an alternative future as much as on a refusal of present condi-
tions of rule, usually in the name of prior principles for organiz-
ing life together. The rise of governmentality (and, with it, raison
d’état), he wrote, produced not only obedient subjects, but insub-
ordinate ones, those who objected to being governed “like that.”
I do not mean that governmentalization would be

opposed, in a kind of face-off by the opposite affirmation
‘we do not want to be governed and we do not want to be
governed at all.’ I mean that, in this great preoccupation
about the way to govern, . . . we identify a perpetual ques-
tion which would be: how not to be governed like that, by
that, in the name of those principles, with such and such
an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not
like that, not for that, not by them. 11
“Not to want to be governed like that also means not wanting

to accept these laws because they are unjust because . . . they
hide a fundamental illegitimacy.”12 These refusals are articu-
lated in the name of different legal regimes: a communally
based system of justice that is the antithesis of proprietary capi-
talist individualism, refusals that seek to hold on to some set of
present practices against the seemingly relentless tides of
change. As I noted in chapter 3, Ta-Nehisi Coates says he is
inspired by the defiance of African Americans like Malcolm
86—Epilogue
X—defiance is another form of refusal. 13 So was the unwilling-

ness to forgive (cited in chapter 2), expressed by some of the
witnesses before South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.
Massimiliano Tomba takes some of these observations to
their radical conclusion as he reconceptualizes history and poli-
tics. In his work on Insurgent Universality, and more recently on the
concept and political practice of sanctuary, he refuses moder-
nity’s singular time line, suggesting that certain past practices
of refusal constitute “arsenal[s] of possibility” for contemporary
“innovative political action.”14 If they are to be considered
anachronisms because they harken back to some past, he says,
they nonetheless have contemporary political uses, reminding
us that the reason of state is an instrument of power, not a fact
of nature, that what Foucault referred to as “illegalisms” were
only so because they defied the state’s definition of law and jus-
tice. Tomba’s insurgents refuse the domination inherent in the
statist/capitalist relationships of modern nation-states; they rely
on other authorities to offer alternatives to the oppression they
experience. At many moments in the past, particularly moments
of crisis (when things were up for grabs), alternative legal regimes
have been invoked, different standards of what counted as jus-
tice insisted upon. “Those who disobey the legal regime of mod-
ern property relations do so not simply against it, but because
they obey a different order of duties and rights based on differ-
ent customs and traditions.”15 When we discard the “unilinear
conception of history that culminates in European modernity,”
he writes, “the Middle Ages do not find a necessary outcome in
capitalist and state modernity, but appear as an arsenal of pos-
sibilities, a clump of roads not taken and historical layers that
continue to run alongside the dominant trajectory of Western
modernity.”16 In other words, there are multiple temporali-
ties whose time is not exhausted, whose possibilities are not
Epilogue—87
foreclosed by their (politically motivated and arbitrary) assign-

ment to “the past.”
This kind of thinking about politics—the exploration of
alternatives to the judgment of history—has important reso-
nances for historians, those of us charged with making sense for
the present of the past. In this view, there is no guarantee that
progress is the necessary condition (direction) of life, but there
is evidence to be found in the archive of human endeavor that
actions taken can bring about change, that there have been
things worth fighting for even if success was not assured, that
the refusal and resistance to domination are motivated as much
by ethical notions of justice as by hope, and that messianic prom-
ises may offer inspiration but no reliable roadmap to the future.
In this book, I have not for the most part (in the chapters on
the Nuremberg Tribunal and the TRC) provided histories of
these “illegalisms,” of alternative routes to the main highway of
modernity that “continue to run alongside” it. My focus has been
on the ways in which invocations of the judgment of history have
provided simple moral justifications for complex political mat-
ters, and have assumed the nation-state (the telos of history) to
be the ultimate source for rectifying the suffering of victims of
injustice. In so doing, this vision of history occluded the vital
role played by those who “refuse to be governed like that,” and
whose self-definition has been not as victims, but as judges
themselves. The appeal to the judgment of history does not have
to operate only as a consoling fantasy, seemingly deferring action
to a force (History) outside our control.
The chapter on the reparation movements provides a differ-
ent usage, a counterexample, one in which the demand for a
judgment of history is a demand for accountability in the form of
a radically reconceived history of the United States. The move-
ments recall and enact the agency of their forebears, exposing
the “bad debt” (the original sin) at the heart of the American
88—Epilogue
nation. If it rests on a belief that progress is possible, it also

refuses the idea that the juridical processes of the state can
ensure that progress.
When I gave these lectures at Columbia University, my inter-

locutors pressed me for my own vision of history. If there is no
guarantee of a better future, they asked, what view of history
can we/do you work with? My answer is that we can depend
neither on an autonomous redemptive force (History) nor on
the ultimate good sense of some putative universal human rea-
son to implement regimes of equality and justice. I cited
Shoshana Felman as the epigraph for this chapter because, like
her, I believe that Judgment Day, in the sense of a final reckon-
ing, is “doomed to remain eternally, historically deferred.” It is
precisely the impossibility of its realization that moves us to
action nonetheless. That action is inspired by ethical principles
(forged in time) and by history’s evidence of refusals (defiance)
to accept the rule of the powerful, evidence of human actors
proposing alternative roads to travel. With these we can think
history differently, as plural modes of being whose relationships
we inhabit, at least in part as a consequence of the actions that
we take. Walter Benjamin, writing of the “professional conspir-
ator . . . Blanqui,” insisted that his activities “certainly do not
presuppose any belief in progress—they merely presuppose a
determination to do away the present injustice.”17 It is not the
fear or promise of history’s ultimate judgment that moves us, but
the sense that—in the face of what we deem to be injustice—we
have no other choice.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
T he occasion of the Ruth Benedict Lectures was a chance to

clarify and expand my thinking on the questions raised in
this book. I had explored some of the ideas earlier, in the Natalie
Zemon Davis lectures at the Central European University (sub-
sequently published as a book), but I knew I needed to think
harder about some of the issues I had raised. The group that
assembled at Columbia in the spring of 2019 was the ideal forum
for me. A core of friends and colleagues attended all three lec-
tures, enabling the conversations to deepen, the limits and pos-
sibilities of my arguments to be revealed. Some even followed
up with long, thoughtful emails, pushing me to think along
lines I hadn’t before considered.
For their generous and rigorous questioning, I thank David
Scott, Gary Wilder, Judith Surkis, Mischa Suter, Grace Davie,
Rosalind Morris, Mara de Gennaro, Nadia Abu El Haj, Joseph
Massad, Gil Anidjar, Maggie Hennefeld, Zahid Chaudhary,
Hannah Chazin, Alexa Stiller, Jim Dingeman, Claudio Lom-
nitz, and Michael Levine. Conversations with Gayle Salomon
and Robert Post were most helpful. Early versions of the lec-
tures were read by Brian Connolly, Andrew Zimmerman,
90—Acknowledgments
Andreas Ekert, David Bond, Daniel Aldana Cohen, and Adam

Ashforth, all of whom provided leads to more reading and sug-
gestions for rethinking some of my assertions. Max Tomba read
the manuscript just before I submitted it and prodded me to
make more explicit my thinking about justice and the nation-
state. Jennifer Crewe has been a supportive and encouraging
editor. My experience with these lectures confirmed for me an
insight I’ve long had about academic work: the production of
critical knowledge is a collective enterprise, it takes a seminar
(or a series of them) to expand the thinking of any lone
individual.
NOTES
Preface
1. www.marxists.org / history/cuba/archive/castro/1953/10/16 .htm.
Thanks to Julie Skurski for reminding me of this.
2. Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (Chi-
cago: Quadrangle, 1970), 184.
3. www.researchgate.net/post/ The_arc_of_the_moral_universe
_is_long_but_it_bends_toward_justice.
4. Michael Luo, “American’s Exclusionary Past and Present and the
Judgment of History,” New Yorker, August 17, 2019.
5. John Lewis comment cited by Timothy Egan, “The Smoking
Gun Is Trump Himself,” New York Times, September 28, 2019.
6. “Citizen Comey Is Fretting Over Vote: I Feel Stuck,” New York
Times, October 12, 2019.
7. Susana Narotzky, “ ‘A Cargo del Futuro’ Between History and
Memory: An Account of the ‘Fratricidal’ Conflict During Revo-
lution and War in Spain (1936–39),” Critique of Anthropology 27,
no. 4 (2007): 425.
8. Heinrich Regius [Max Horkheimer], Dawn and Decline, cited in
Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of
History,” trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2016), 32.
92—Preface
9. Although there isn’t much explicitly about gender in the pages

that follow, analyses of constructions of difference play a big part
in my reading of the materials I’ve worked with. And, to the
extent that the question of the modern state and its relationship
to history is at the center of my concern, I’m dealing with an insti-
tution whose implicit masculinity is assumed, albeit in different
ways in the cases I study.
10. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M.
Knox (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), §340.
11. Cited in Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Histori-
cal Time, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2004), 38.
12. Koselleck, 33.
13. Koselleck, 103, 106.
14. Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, XIII, in Benja-
min, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken,
1968), 261.
15. Koselleck, Futures Past, 199.
16. Michel de Certeau, The History of Writing, trans. Tom Conley
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 41.
17. Immanuel Kant, “Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopoli-
tan Point of View,” in Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political, and Various
Philosophical Subjects, vol. 1 (London: William Richardson, 1798),
412–13.
18. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sci-
ences (New York: Vintage, 1994), 219. See also Ed Cohen, “A
‘Special’ Difference: For a Foucauldian/Feminist Genealogy of
Freud,” History of the Present 9, no. 1 (2019): 1–26.
19. Koselleck, Futures Past, 40–41.
20. Koselleck, 198.
21. Massimiliano Tomba, Insurgent Universality: An Alternative Legacy of
Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 3.
22. Massimiliano Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities, trans. Peter D. Thomas
and Sara R. Farris (Chicago: Haymarket, 2013), 168.
23. Koselleck, Futures Past, 16.
1. The Nation-State as the Telos of History—93
24. Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, trans. G. L. Ulmen (Candor,
NY: Telos, 2006), 149.
25. Schmitt, 131.
26. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège
de France, 1977–78, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador,
2007), 266–67.
27. Foucault, 259.
28. Foucault, 259.
29. Schmitt, Nomos, 127.
30. Joan Wallach Scott, Sex and Secularism (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2018).
31. Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of
the World (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015).
32. Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, The Human Right to Dominate
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 30.
33. Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso,
2009), 134–35.
34. Samera Esmeir, Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2012).
35. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Har-
court Brace, 1966), 230.
36. Arendt, 184.
37. Cited in Adam Ashforth, Witchcraft: Violence and Democracy in South
Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 365.
38. Randall Robinson, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks (New
York: Penguin, 2001), 33, 216.
1. The Nation-State as the Telos of History

1. Robert H. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi War Criminals: Opening
Statement for the United States of America (New York: Knopf, 1946), 7.
2. Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the
Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2002), 11.
3. Felman, 15.
94—1. The Nation-State as the Telos of History
4. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi War Criminals, 7.

5. Cited in Michael R. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945–
46: A Documentary History (Boston: Bedford, 1997), 43.
6. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi War Criminals, vi.
7. Jackson, 82.
8. On this, see the work of Tim Mason, “National Socialism and the
German Working Class, 1925–May 1933,” New German Critique 5,
no. 11 (1977): 49–93; and Mason, “Worker’s Opposition in Nazi
Germany,” History Workshop Journal 2 (1981): 120–37.
9. Cited in Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s
Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge MA: Harvard University
Press, 2005), 242.
10. Borgwardt, 242.
12. Jackson, 47.
13. Cited in Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 45.
14. Marrus, 33.
15. Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 229–30. She cites Mississippi
Senator John Rankin, who saw exactly the dangers of the prece-
dent Jackson was hoping to avoid: “If we people of the Southern
States had been treated in the same manner after the War
between the States as those people [the Germans] have been
treated under pressure of a certain racial minority, you would not
have heard the last of it until doomsday.” He went on to urge that
the United States “treat the people of Germany . . . with human-
ity and decency and . . . not permit racial minorities to vent their
sadistic vengeance upon them” (233–34).
16. Alexa Stiller, “The Mass Murder of the European Jews and the
Concept of ‘Genocide’ in the Nuremberg Trials: Reassessing
Raphael Lemkin’s Impact,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Inter-
national Journal 13, no. 1 (2019): 167.
17. James Q. Whitman, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the
Making of Nazi Race Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2017), 77.
18. Whitman, 9.
1. The Nation-State as the Telos of History—95
19. Whitman, 145.

20. Whitney Harris, Tyranny on Trial (Dallas: Southern Methodist
University Press, 1999), 511.
21. François de Menthon, “Opening Address” (January 17, 1946), in
Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 91–92.
22. de Menthon, 92.
24. Jackson, 119.
25. Jackson, 48.
26. Cited in Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 229.
27. Léon Poliakov, Harvest of Hate: The Nazi Program for the Destruction of
the Jews of Europe (1951; New York: Holocaust Library, 1986), 263–64,
cited in Stiller, “The Mass Murder of the European Jews,” 166.
28. Stiller, “The Mass Murder of the European Jews,” 160.
30. Robert Meister, After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011), 40.
31. Meister, 131–33.
33. Jackson, 76.
35. Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, trans. G. L. Ulmen (New
York: Telos, 2006), 149.
36. Menthon, “Opening Address.”
37. A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Ath-
eneum, 1962), 13.
38. Walter Ulbricht, the future leader of the German Democratic
Republic, had put it in these terms well before the Tribunal.
“The tragedy of the German people consists in the fact that they
obeyed a band of criminals. . . . The German working class and
the productive parts of the population failed before history.”
Cited in Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New
York: Penguin 2005), 59.
39. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi War Criminals, 16–17.
40. Schmitt, Nomos, 199.
96—1. The Nation-State as the Telos of History
41. “And here we have to see—as Adorno cautioned us—that vio-

lence in the name of civilization reveals its own barbarism, even
as it ‘justifies’ its own violence by presuming the barbaric subhu-
manity of the other against whom that violence is waged.” Judith
Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso,
2009), 93.
43. Jackson, 88–89.
46. Menthon, “Opening Address,” 91–93.
47. Harris, Tyranny on Trial, xx.
48. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi War Criminals, 17, 6.
49. Jackson, 59.
50. William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi
Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), 1080.
51. Cited in David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of Ger-
man History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 73. Blackbourn and
Eley offer a compelling critique of the Sonderweg in this book.
52. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Har-
court, Brace, 1973), 165–66. For an extended discussion of these
issues, see Judith Butler, Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique of
Zionism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
53. Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords,
trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1998), 89.
54. Arendt, Origins, 290.
55. Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon, The Human Right to Dominate
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 20.
56. Perugini and Gordon, 36. See Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A
Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 1983) on the
question of Israel’s jurisdiction for crimes committed before it
became a nation. See also Adam Shatz: “After the Eichmann
trial the Holocaust would increasingly supply the state with a
2. The Limits of Forgiveness—97
narrative to justify its policies, especially vis-à-vis the ‘Arab

Nazis.’ In effect, the Jewish state would ‘Israelise’ the Holocaust,
much as it would conquer and ‘Judaise’ the land.” Shatz, “We Are
Conquerors,” London Review of Books 41, no. 20 (2019), www.lrb.co
.uk/v41/n20/adam-shatz/we-are-conquerors.
57. Perugini and Gordon, The Human Right to Dominate, 37.
58. Meister, After Evil, 131–33. See also Butler, Parting Ways, on critics
of this form of nationhood.
59. Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignties (New York: Zone,
2010), 71.
2. The Limits of Forgiveness

1. Some forty thousand people died in political violence in this
period, more than in the entire period of the TRC’s mandate
(from 1960 on). Adam Ashforth, Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy
in South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 276.
2. See the moving account in the novel by Nadine Gordimer, None
to Accompany Me (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1994),
241. “With his assassination the meaning of the position of the
young leader in negotiations becomes clearer than it has ever
been; his presence carried the peculiar authority of the guerrilla
past in working for peace. If men like him wanted it, who could
doubt that it was attainable? If a man like him was there to con-
vince his young followers, could they fail to listen to him?”
3. These acts were overturned in 1995, but the protection from
prosecution of former agents of the apartheid state remained in
effect. Adam Sitze, The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Afri-
ca’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2013), 26–27.
4. Desmond Mpilo Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York:
Doubleday, 1999), 21.
5. Tutu, 20.
6. Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. Mark
Dooley and Michael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001), 43.
98—2. The Limits of Forgiveness
7. Derrida, 39.
8. Derrida, 43.
9. Derrida, 45.
10. Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 193–200.
11. Peter Thomas, “Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism:
Catharsis,” Historical Materialism 17 (2009): 263.
12. Kader Asmal, Louise Asmal, and Ronald Suresh Roberts, Recon-
ciliation Through Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid’s Criminal Governance
(Cape Town: David Philip, 1997), 208.
13. Asmal, Asmal, and Roberts, 49.
20. Desmond Mpilo Tutu, foreword to To Remember and to Heal, ed.
H. Russel Botman and Robin M. Peterson (Cape Town: Human
and Rousseau, 1996), 7–8.
21. Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 43.
22. Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, 279.
23. D. M. Davis, “The South African Truth Commission and the
AZAPO Case: A Reflection Almost Two Decades Later,” in
Anti-Impunity and the Human Rights Agenda, ed. Karen Engle, Zinaida
Miller, and D. M. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2016), 129.
24. Alejandro Castillejo-Cuéllar, “Knowledge, Experience, and
South Africa’s Scenarios of Forgiveness,” Radical History Review 97
(2007).
26. Tutu, “Speech: No Future Without Forgiveness (Version 2),”
2003, Archbishop Desmond Tutu Collection Textual 15, https://
digitalcommons.unf.edu/archbishoptutupapers/15.
27. Cited in Jill Staufer, Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of Not Being Heard
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 121.
2. The Limits of Forgiveness—99
28. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC),

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report
(1998–99), 7 vols., Johannesburg. See also Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission of South Africa, www.justice.gov.za/trc/report
/index.htm, 1:133.
29. Asmal, Asmal, and Roberts, Reconciliation Through Truth, 165–66.
30. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, 1:133.
33. Greg Grandin, “The Instruction of the Great Catastrophe: Truth
Commissions, National History, and State Formation in Argen-
tina, Chile, and Guatemala,” American Historical Review (2005): 48.
34. Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, 212. Much to the distress of the
Commission, the ANC also demanded that the culpability of its
members for crimes against humanity be deleted from the report.
35. de Klerk cited in Asmal, Asmal, and Roberts, Reconciliation
Through Truth, 213–14.
37. Ashforth, Witchcraft, Violence and Democracy, 278.
38. Jacqueline Rose, On Not Being Able to Sleep at Night (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003), 217.
39. Mahmood Mamdani talks about this in terms of “willed versus
structural outcomes.” See Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremberg,” in
Engle, Miller, and Davis, Anti-Impunity, 345. See also Richard Wil-
son, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing
the Post-Apartheid State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 93.
40. Robert Meister, After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011), 24.
41. Meister, 28.
42. “The TRC, by looking to the wisdom of international precepts as
a guide to its conclusions, will bolster its own domestic authority
along with the authority of those global precepts that were a fea-
ture of the country’s deliverance from what went before.” Asmal,
Asmal, and Roberts, Reconciliation Through Truth, 205.
100—2. The Limits of Forgiveness
43. Samera Esmeir, Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 2012), 11.
45. Tutu, 107. On the determination of the ANC’s failure to use “just
means,” see Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, 2:325.
46. Asmal, Asmal, and Roberts, Reconciliation Through Truth, 114.
50. Richard Wilson, “Reconciliation and Revenge in Post-Apartheid
South Africa,” Current Anthropology 41, no. 1 (2000): 80.
51. Cited in Sitze, The Impossible Machine, 39.
52. Sitze, 84.
53. Sitze, 125–26.
54. Sitze, 126.
55. Sitze, 127.
59. David Johnson, “Theorizing the Loss of Land: Griqua Land
Claims in Southern Africa,” in Loss: The Politics of Mourning, ed.
David Eng and David Kazanjian (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 2003), 290.
60. Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremberg,” 339.
63. Wilson, The Politics of Truth, 97.
64. Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” in The Marx-Engels Reader,
ed. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton, 1978), 33.
65. Wilson, The Politics of Truth, 93.
3. Calling History to Account—101

72. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Ren-
dall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 128.
3. Calling History to Account

1. The best history of these demands is Ana Lucia Araujo, Repara-
tions for Slavery and the Slave Trade: A Transnational and Comparative His-
tory (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).
2. Araujo, 91.
3. Sven Beckert and Seth Rockman, eds., Slavery’s Capitalism: A New
History of American Economic Development (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 3.
4. Ta-Nehisi Coates, We Were Eight Years in Power: An American Tragedy
(New York: One World, 2017), 347.
5. Stephen Best and Saidya Hartman, “Fugitive Justice,” Representa-
tions 92 (Fall 2005): 1–2.
6. Beginning in 1952, Germany paid compensation to Holocaust
victims. The TRC recommended $360 million for the nineteen
thousand victims who had testified before the Commission. It
was not until 2003 that a one-time payment of about $3900 was
offered by government of Thabo Mbeki, much to the distress of
the victims who thought it was too little too late. Ginger Thomp-
son, “South Africa to Pay $3900 to Each Family of Apartheid
Victims,” New York Times, April 16, 2003, www.nytimes.com
/2003/04 /16/ world/south-africa-to -pay-3900 -to -each-family
-of-apartheid-victims.html.
7. Aaron Carico, “Freedom as Accumulation,” History of the Present 6,
no. 1 (2016): 24–25.
8. David Scott, “Preface: A Reparatory History of the Present,”
Small Axe 52 (March 2017): x.
9. David Scott, “Evil Beyond Repair,” Small Axe 55 (March 2018): x.
10. Coates, Eight Years, 158.
102—3. Calling History to Account
11. US Senate, “Landmark Legislation: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and

Fifteenth Amendments,” www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ history
/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.htm.
12. At the beginning of 1867, no African American in the South held
political office, but within three or four years about 15 percent of
the officeholders in the South were black. On the history of
Reconstruction, see W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in Amer-
ica, 1860–1880 (New York: Free, 1998); and Eric Foner, Reconstruc-
tion: America’s Unfinished Revolution (New York: Harper, 2014).
13. Carico, “Freedom as Accumulation,” 1.
14. Carico, 4.
15. Carico, 6.
16. Carico, 23–24.
17. Carico, 11.
18. Indeed, after passage of the act in 1935, 65 percent of African
Americans nationally and 70 percent to 80 percent of them in
the South were ineligible for support, leading an NAACP
spokesman to describe this new American safety net as “a sieve
with holes just big enough for the majority of Negroes to fall
through.” Coates, Eight Years, 186.
19. In Chicago, for example, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA)
openly endorsed segregated housing, leading one commentator to
note that “the FHA adopted a racial policy that could well have
been called for in the Nuremberg laws.” Coates, Eight Years, 169.
The area of housing was a particularly stark example of racial
exclusion; from government-backed loan agencies (which adhered
to restrictive covenants for sales and rentals) to local enforcement
that protected white privilege, housing markets maintained not
only geographic segregation but all that went with it, including
segregated schools.
20. History.com, “Brown v. Board of Education Ruling,” www
.history.com/topics/ black-history/ brown-v-board-of-education
-of -topeka. In the wake of Brown, schools in the South were inte-
grated, even as many white parents enrolled their children in pri-
vate (typically Christian) academies. Black teachers and principals
were often demoted or lost their jobs entirely since white teach-
ers were given priority in newly integrated schools.
21. “Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson,” unpublished, 2. See
David O’Brien, “Justice R. H. Jackson’s Unpublished Opinion
in Brown v. Board of Education,” SCOTUSblog. I am grateful to
Robert Post for this reference.
22. “Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson,” 1. Jackson succumbed to
the pressure for a unanimous decision. This may have had to do
with Cold War imperatives: the USSR was using racial injustice
in the United States as an indictment of capitalist democracy.
24. Despite dogged resistance from those (especially in the South)
who sought to undermine the laws if they could, both acts opened
a period of heightened expectation and significant change. More
African Americans voted and won office, even in the South,
where federal oversight of states with long records of voter sup-
pression led to important reform. In reaction, racial gerryman-
dering of electoral districts intensified and party realignments
(the Democrats became the face of liberal policies, the Republi-
cans of white conservatism) sharpened political divides based on
race.
25. Some critics argue that when affirmative action is redefined in
terms of “diversity,” it takes the inclusion of blacks (and other
minorities) to be not so much for their benefit—as a form of rep-
aration or compensation—as for the benefit of white majorities
who will become more accepting of “others” when exposed to
them.
26. John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Cul-
ture, and Justice in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1996).
27. Angela Hanks, Danyelle Solomon, and Christian E. Weller,
“Systematic Inequality: How America’s Structural Racism
Helped Create the Black-White Wealth Gap,” Center for Amer-
ican Progress website, www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/re
ports/2018/02/21/447051/systematic-inequality/3.
28. Hanks, Solomon, and Weller, 3.

29. Hanks, Solomon, and Weller, 19.
30. Blacks are 12 percent of the US population and 33 percent of the
prison population. A study in 2003 of the effects of felony con-
victions on job applicants “showed that blacks who said they had
a criminal record had a callback rate of 5 percent, and blacks who
said they did not had a rate of 14 percent. For whites, the rates
were 17 percent . . . and 34 percent.” Deborah Pager, Marked: Race,
Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass Incarceration (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2008). The citation appears in her obit-
uary in the New York Times, November 9, 2018.
31. Hanks, Solomon, and Weller, “Systematic Inequality,” 34.
32. Randall Robinson, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks (New
York: Plume, 2001), 107.
33. Martha Biondi, “The Rise of the Reparations Movement,” Radical
History Review 87 (Fall 2003): 9.
34. Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive Plan-
ning and Black Study, www.minorcompositions.info/wp-content/
uploads/2013/04/undercommons-web.pdf.
35. In 1848, Walker’s pamphlet was republished by Henry Highland
Garnet with a more explicit call for slaves to demand wages or go
on strike (using violence if they had to). David Walker and Henry
Highland Garnet, Walker’s Appeal, with a Brief Sketch of His Life by
Henry Highland Garnet and Also Garnet’s Address to the Slaves of the United
States of America (New York: J. H. Tobitt, 1848). Thanks to
Andrew Zimmerman for this reference.
36. Araujo, Reparations for Slavery, 42, 52.
37. Araujo, 104.
38. Araujo, 94.
39. Araujo, 142.
40. Araujo, 140.
41. James Forman, “Black Manifesto,” New York Review of Books,
July 10, 1969.
42. Robinson, The Debt, 107.
43. Robinson, 207.
44. David Scott, “Preface: Debt, Redress,” Small Axe 18, no. 1 (2014): ix.
45. See Alondra Nelson, The Social Life of DNA: Race, Reparation, and
Knowledge After the Genome (Boston: Beacon, 2016), chap. 4, for a
discussion of the ways DNA has been used to fortify reparations
claims.
46. Forman did not rule out armed struggle in the United States
either. In his Manifesto peaceful demands for a Southern land
bank, black publishing houses, black TV networks, and skill-
training centers as well as a Black Anti-Defamation League sat
alongside declarations of war, in the form of calls for disruptions
of church services, sit-ins, and other unspecified means of self-
defense and national liberation.
48. Robinson, 218–20.
49. Robinson, 216.
51. Coates, xiii.
52. US Congress, HR 40, Commission to Study and Develop Repa-
ration Proposals for African-Americans Act, 115th Congress
(2017–18), www.congress.gov/ bill/115th-congress/ house-bill/40.
54. Coates, 43.
55. Coates, 138.
56. Coates, 68.
57. Coates, 80.
58. Coates, 69 (my emphasis).
59. See Sarah Juliet Lauro, The Transatlantic Zombie: Slavery, Rebellion and
Living Death (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
2015), especially “Introduction: Zombie Dialectics—‘Ki Sa Sa
Ye?’ (What Is That?),” 4.
60. Lauro, 4.
61. Here I want to disagree with Adolph Reed’s dismissal of Coates’s
arguments as suggesting that racism is “an intractable, transhis-
torical force. . . . [that] lies beyond structural intervention.” In
contrast, I read Coates not as an “exhortation to individual
conversion and repentance as a program,” but as a call for collec-

tive political action—for the kind of blasting open of conventional
history that Walter Benjamin called for. Adolph Reed, “The
Trouble with Uplift,” Baffler, September 2018, https://thebaffler
.com/salvos/the-trouble-with-uplift-reed.
62. Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in The Standard
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans.
James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1995), 14:243.
63. Coates, Eight Years, 109, 66.
64. Coates, 64.
65. Coates, 159.
66. Coates, 104.
67. Coates, 112.
68. Coates, 367.
69. Coates, 159.
70. David L. Eng and David Kazanjian, eds., Loss: The Politics of Mourn-
ing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 4.
71. Dana Luciano, “Passing Shadows: Melancholic Nationality and
Black Critical Publicity in Pauline E. Hopkins Of One Blood,” in
Eng and Kazanjian, Loss, 149.
73. Robinson, 232.
74. Robinson, 243.
75. Robinson, 149.
77. Coates, 180.
78. Scott, “Preface: Debt, Redress,” x.
79. “The 1619 Project,” New York Times Magazine, August 14, 2019, 5.
Epilogue
1. Human Rights Watch, “South Africa: Attacks on Foreign
Nationals,” April 15, 2019, www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/15/south
-africa-attacks-foreign-nationals#.
Epilogue—107
2. Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 74.
3. Brown, 71.
4. Brown, 76.
5. Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of
Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New
York: Routledge, 1994), 59.
6. Derrida, 75.
7. Fredric Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia,” New Left Review 25
(2004).
8. Gary Wilder, “Anticipation,” Political Concepts, 5. https://www.political
concepts.org/anticipation-gary-wilder/. See also Massimiliano
Tomba, “Justice and Divine Violence: Walter Benjamin and the
Time of Anticipation,” Theory and Event 20, no. 3 (2017): 579–98.
9. Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (United
Kingdom: Zero, 2009), 79.
10. Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of
History,” trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2016), 105.
11. Michel Foucault, “What Is Critique?,” in The Politics of Truth:
Michel Foucault, ed. Sylvére Lotringer and Lysa Hochroch (New
York: Semiotext[e], 1997), 44.
12. Foucault, 46.
13. Ta-Nehisi Coates, We Were Eight Years in Power: An American Tragedy
(New York: One World, 2017), chap. 4, “The Legacy of
Malcolm X.”
14. Massimiliano Tomba, “Sanctuaries as Anachronism and Antici-
pation,” History of the Present 9, no. 2 (2019): 222. See also Tomba,
Insurgent Universality: An Alternative Legacy of Modernity (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2019).
15. Tomba, “Sanctuaries,” 223.
16. Tomba, 219.
17. Walter Benjamin, “Central Park,” cited in Löwy, Fire Alarm, 84.
INDEX
accountability: in reparations post–Civil War racism and

context, xxi, xxiii, 51–54, discrimination against,
62–68, 77, 82; in TRC 56–57; segregation aimed at,
context, 28, 29, 32–37 59–60, 61, 70, 102nn19, 20;
Adorno, Theodor, 18, 84, 96n41 separate nation for, 53, 56.
affirmative action, 60–61, See also slavery reparations
103n25 African National Congress
Africa, slavery reparations for, (ANC), 24, 36, 39, 42, 99n34
66–68 Anderson, Jourdon, 51–52
African Americans: African apartheid: acknowledgments
heritage of, 66–68; sought from beneficiaries
citizenship of, 55, 69; culture of, 28, 32–33, 36–37; as
of poverty ascribed to, 63; alternative value system, 35,
economic burdens of, 52, 36; as crime against humanity,
56–59, 61–65; incarceration 37, 39; history of, 33;
of, 62, 104n30; losses suffered indemnity acts related to,
by, 64–65, 68–74; persistence 42–43; Nazi racist ideology
of racism and discrimination compared to, xxi, 23;
against, 52–62, 68–77; perpetrators’ role in, 34–35;
post–Civil War political systemic character of, 32–33,
participation of, 56, 102n12; 39–40, 81; TRC’s
110—Index
apartheid (continued) Civil War (US), ix, 53, 55–56,

engagement with, xxiii, 70, 72
25–27, 32–33, 37–46; violence Coates, Ta-Nehisi, 52, 54–55,
under, 24, 39–40, 97n1 60, 68–74, 76, 85, 105n61
Arendt, Hannah, xviii–xx, 7, Conservative Party (South
17–20, 80 Africa), 38
Asmal, Kader, 27–33, 39–40, Conyers, John, 70, 73
43–44, 46 crimes against humanity: in
Nuremberg context, 3–5, 10;
Bankruptcy Act (1867), 57 in South Africa, 34–35, 37,
Barber, William, 73 39, 99n34; US slavery as,
Beckert, Sven, 52 52
Benjamin, Walter, ix, xiii, xiv, 2, Croce, Benedetto, 8–9
51, 74, 82, 84, 88
Biko, Steven, 30, 47 Dahrendorf, Ralph, 17
black nationalism, 56 Declaration of Independence,
Borgwardt, Elizabeth, 7, 94n15 69
Brown, Wendy, 20, 82–83 de Klerk, D. W., 35, 36
Brown v. Board of Education, 59–60, de Lange, Johnny, 41
70, 102n20 Delany, Martin, 64
Butler, Judith, xviii, 96n41 Democratic Party, 61, 103n24
depoliticization, resulting from
Carico, Aaron, 53–54, 57–58, TRC actions, 30, 41
62–63 Derrida, Jacques, 23, 26–27, 30,
catharsis, 27–28, 30 83
Center for American Progress, despotism, 16
61–62 Du Bois, W. E. B., 56
Certeau, Michel de, v, xv, 48–49
Charlottesville riots, ix, 18, 79 Eichmann trial, ix, 19
civilization, as evaluative Emancipation Proclamation,
standard, 2, 4, 6, 11–15, 17, 55
96n41 Eng, David, 74
Civil Rights Act, 60, 103n24 Enlightenment, xv, 80
civil rights movement, 59–60, Esmeir, Samera, xix, 38
70 ethnonationalism, 18–20
Index—111
evil: Nazi Germany as, xxi–xxii, Grandin, Greg, 34

3–4, 6, 11, 15–16; of racism, Great Recession (2008–2009),
xxi–xxii, 76; slavery 61
reparations and, 53, 56, 58,
65; TRC and, 25, 31, 33, 35, Hani, Chris, 24, 38, 97n2
37, 41, 50, 81 Hegel, G. W. F., xiv, xvi
history: anticipatory/promissory
Federal Housing Authority character of, 83–87; bridge
(FHA), 70 metaphors applied to, 46–50;
Felman, Shoshana, 2, 79, 88 concepts of, ix, xiii–xiv, xxiii,
Fifteenth Amendment, 55 79–80, 82–83; constructed
Fischer, Bram, 32 nature of, xii; linear
Fisher, Mark, 84 conception of, xiv–xvi, xviii,
Foner, Eric, 56 xxii, 16, 46, 49, 54, 70–71, 75,
forgiveness: impossible for 79, 82, 86; the state as
slavery, 54; in TRC context, fulfillment of, xvi–xviii, xx,
23, 25–27, 29–33, 35–36, 42, 5–6, 80; teleological character
44, 46–48, 50 of, xiv–xv, 4, 79–80, 84, 87;
Forman, James, “Black temporalities associated with,
Manifesto,” 65, 66, 68, xiii–xv, 80, 82–83, 86–87;
105n46 truth of, 25, 28; underlying
Foucault, Michel, xv, xvi–xvii, conceptions of, for political
85, 86 action, 83–88; underlying
Fourteenth Amendment, 55, 59 conceptions of, in slavery
Frankfurt School, 83–84 reparations movement, xxii,
Freud, Sigmund, 72, 74 xxiii, 54–55, 72–77, 82;
underlying conceptions of, in
Geneva Conventions, 39 TRC deliberations and
genocide, 5, 8, 11, 20 actions, 25–26, 31–32, 35, 38,
GI Bill, 59, 70 40–41, 46–50; universal
globalization, 20 character of, x, xii, xiv–xv, 79,
Gordimer, Nadine, 97n2 86. See also judgment of history
Gordon, Neve, xviii, 19 Hitler, Adolf, ix, 1, 4
governmentality, 85 Holocaust, xxi–xxii, 15, 19, 53,
Gramsci, Antonio, 27–28 96n56, 101
112—Index
Hopkins, Pauline, 74 Jews: and founding of Israel,

Horkheimer, Max, xii 19–20; genocidal plans
human rights: Israel and, 19; against, 5, 9–10, 20;
justice associated with, 16; international intervention on
national sovereignty in behalf of, 7, 10
conflict with, xx, 7, 19; Johnson, Andrew, 56
nation-states as protectors of, Judgment at Nuremberg (film), 14
19, 21; in Nuremberg trials, 4, judgment of history: appeals to
7, 16, 21; in South Africa, moral authority of, ix–xv,
33–34, 40, 42–44; universalist 79–80, 82, 87; finality
premise of, xviii, xx imputed to, 79–80;
Nuremberg trials and, 1–3,
identity politics, 83 16, 21, 80; refusals of, ix–x,
imperialism, xix–xx, 10, 12, 35; slavery reparations and,
13–14 52, 74, 76; the state’s
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), enactment of, xviii, xx–xxi,
24 xxii–xxiii, 6, 18, 21, 81; TRC
International Labor and, 23, 25, 27, 48, 50; truth
Organization, 37 to be revealed by, xii, 79; uses
international law: apartheid as of the concept of, xiii, 76–77
violation of, 37; imperialism justice: alternative standards of,
not restrained by, 14; and 86; forgiveness in relation to,
nation-state sovereignty, xx; 26–27, 30; in Nuremberg
in Nuremberg context, 2–4; trials, 1–3, 5–6, 21; slavery
protective function of, 19; and reparations and, 53, 54, 74; in
warfare, 11 South Africa, 37–38; the
International Military Tribunal, state identified with, xviii, 6,
Nuremberg, Germany. See 80, 87; in TRC context,
Nuremberg trials 23–27, 33
Israel, 19–20, 96n56
Kant, Immanuel, xv
Jackson, Robert, xxi, 1, 3–7, Kellogg-Briand pact, 11
9–13, 15–17, 59–60, 94n15, King, Martin Luther, xi, 65, 73
103n22 Koselleck, Reinhart, xiv–xvi
Jameson, Fredric, 83 Ku Klux Klan, ix, 57, 79
Index—113
Last Judgment, xi, xiv, 79 nationalism: black, 56; in context

Lauro, Sarah Juliet, 71 of Nuremberg trials, 7, 10–11;
law, xviii. See also international dark side of, 7, 11; ethno-,
law; justice; rule of law 18–20; globalization and, 20;
lebensraum, 8, 10 Israel and, 19–20; in Nazi
Lemkin, Raphael, 8 Germany, 7, 11; and racism,
Lincoln, Abraham, 55, 56 xix–xx, 9, 17–19; and state
London Charter, 4, 12 formation, 10–11, 17, 20
Löwy, Michael, 84 National Party (NP), 24, 35
Luciano, Dana, 74, national sovereignty: concept of,
lynching, 7–8, 57 xviii–xix; globalization and,
20; human rights in conflict
Malan, Wynand, 35, 36 with, xx, 7, 19; of Israel, 19;
Mamdani, Mahmood, 44 mistreatment of minorities
Mandela, Nelson, 24, 30, protected by, 7, 9–10; in
32, 38 Nuremberg context, 2, 5, 7,
Mann, Michael, 11, 20 10–13; war as violation of,
Marx, Karl, 45 10–12
Mbeki, Thabo, 101n6 nations: concept of, xviii–xx;
Meinecke, Friedrich, 9 race in relation to, xix–xxii;
Meister, Robert, 10–11, 36, 37 racism’s role in, xxii; the state
melancholia, 72, 74–76 in relation to, xviii–xx;
memory: forgiveness in relation temporalities associated with,
to, 26, 30–31; of Nazi crimes, xx. See also nationalism;
2; TRC and the creation of national sovereignty;
collective, xxiii, 25–26, 29, nation-state
32, 34 nation-state: Nazi Germany’s
Menthon, François de, 9, 12 status as, 5–18; role of, in
minorities, nations’ treatment Nuremberg trials, 2–6, 10,
of, 7, 9–10, 77, 94n15 17–18, 21, 80. See also
modernity, xiv, 17, 82, 86–87 nationalism; national
Moore, Audley, 65 sovereignty; nations; the state
Morgenthau, Hans, 15 Nazi Germany: aggressive
Moten, Fred, 63 (illegal) warfare conducted
Mueller, Robert, x by, 4–5, 9–14; anomalous
114—Index
Nazi Germany (continued) victims’ role in, xxi, 2, 4–5,

character of, xxii, 5–18; as 21, 53
evil, xxi–xxii, 3–4, 6, 11,
15–16; German resistance to, Omar, Dullah, 47
4; and nationalism, 7, 11; Organization of African Unity,
psychological and social 67, 75
explanations for, 15–17; race
and racism in, 8–10; trial Perugini, Nicola, xviii, 19
evidence against, 3; US race Philadelphia Plan, 61
law as model for, 8 philosophy of praxis, 27–28
New Deal, 59, 70 Plessy v. Ferguson, 59
New York Times Magazine, 77 Poliakov, Léon, 10
Nixon, Richard, 61 political action, concepts of
NP. See National Party history conducive to, 83–88
Nuremberg trials, ix, xx, 1–21; progress, xv–xviii, 79, 84
arguments for and against, 3; Promotion of National Unity
charter establishing, 4; and Reconciliation Act, 47
“civilization” as standard in,
2, 4, 6, 11–15, 17; death race/racism: imperialism and,
sentences in, 2; and human xix–xx, 10; as instigator
rights, 4, 7, 16, 21; on illegal of evil acts, xxi–xxii;
warfare, 4–5, 9–14; judgment nationhood in relation to,
of history enacted by, 1–3, 16, xix–xxii, 9, 17–19; in Nazi
21, 80; justice as basis and Germany, 8–10; TRC and,
goal of, 1–3, 5–6, 21; legacy 45–46; in United States, 7–8,
of, 20–21; and national 52–62, 66, 68–71, 94n15,
sovereignty, 2, 5, 7, 10–13; on 103n22
nation-state status of Radical Reconstruction, 57
Germany, xxii, 5–18; purpose raíson d’état, xvi–xvii, 5, 11, 14, 18,
of, xxiii, 1–2; responsibility as 43, 85
conceived in, 3–4, 13–15; role reconciliation, 28, 40–41, 45
of the nation-state in, 2–6, Reconstruction, 55–57, 59,
10, 17–18, 21, 80; and rule of 69–70
law, 3, 5, 14–15; TRC’s reparations. See slavery
rejection of model of, 23; reparations
Index—115
responsibility: in Nuremberg judgment of history, 52, 74,

trials, 3–4, 13–15; in TRC 76; and justice, 53, 54, 74; loss
context, 33–34, 36–37, 40–41 as theme in, 64–65, 68–74;
Robinson, Randall, xxi, 62–63, moral impetus for, 54, 63,
65–68, 75 65–66, 68, 69, 73–75;
rule of law: judgment of history persistence of racial injustice
linked to, xxii; in Nuremberg as motivation and focus of,
trials, 3, 5, 14–15; TRC and, 52–62, 68–77; precedents
26–27, 37–46 for, 53, 67, 101n6; restorative
effects sought through,
Schiller, Friedrich, xiv 74–77; victims’ role in, xxi,
Schmitt, Carl, xvi, xvii, xx, 53, 62–63
11–14 Social Security, 59
Scott, David, 54, 65–66, 69, 77 South Africa. See Truth and
“separate but equal” principle, 59 Reconciliation Commission
Shirer, William, 16 (TRC), South Africa
Shklar, Judith, 5 sovereignty. See national
Sitze, Adam, 42, 49 sovereignty
Skrentny, John David, 61 the state: as fulfillment of moral
slavery reparations, xxi, 51–77; direction of history, xvi–xviii,
accountability as goal of, xxi, xx, 5–6, 80; historical
xxiii, 51–54, 62–68, 77, 82; contingency of, xvii;
for Africa, 66–68; challenges judgment of history enacted
faced by demand for, 53–55; by, xviii, xx–xxi, xxii–xxiii, 6,
conceptions of history 18, 21, 81; justice determined
underlying, xxii, xxiii, 54–55, by, xviii, 6, 80, 87; nation in
72–77, 82; debt as issue for, relation to, xviii–xx; religion
54–68, 73, 76–77, 87; subsumed in, xvii;
defiance expressed through temporalities associated with,
demand for, 73–75; economic xvi–xvii. See also national
basis of, 52, 56–65; evil to be sovereignty; nation-state;
addressed by, 53, 56, 58, 65; raíson d’état
government resistance to, 64,
70; historical demands for, Taylor, A. J. P., 12
xxiii, 51–52, 64; and Taylor, Telford, xi
116—Index
Thirteenth Amendment, 55 forgiveness as desired

Thomas, Peter, 27–28 outcome of, 25–27, 29–33,
Till, Emmett, 70 35–36, 42, 44, 46–48, 50;
Tomba, Massimiliano, xvi, 86 goals of, xxiii, 25–26; and
TRC. See Truth and human rights, 33–34, 40,
Reconciliation Commission 42–44; and indemnity acts,
(TRC), South Africa 24, 42–43; and judgment of
Trump, Donald, x, xi, 70 history, 23, 25, 27, 48, 50;
truth: revealed in judgment mandate of, 38; perpetrators’
of history, xii, 79; TRC’s role in, 31–37, 39; and
goal of, 25, 28, 32, 40, property rights, 43–47;
42, 81 quasi-judicial character of,
Truth, Sojourner, 64 xxi, xxiii, 26, 81; race and
Truth and Reconciliation racism as issue for, 45–46;
Commission (TRC), South reconciliation as conceived in,
Africa, xx–xxi, 23–50; 28, 40–41, 45; and
accountability as goal of, 28, reparations payments, 101n6;
29, 32–37; and amnesty, 26, Report of, 29, 31, 33, 35, 46,
30, 36, 38, 42, 47; anger 47; resistance to apartheid as
as issue for, 30–31; and subject of, 25, 37, 39–41;
beneficiaries of apartheid, 28, responsibility as conceived in,
32–33; bridge metaphor used 33–34, 36–37, 40–41; and
in, 30, 34, 46–50; challenges rule of law, 26–27, 37–46;
faced by, 24–27, 30, 49; truth sought by, 25, 28, 32,
collective memory as goal of, 40, 42, 81; victims’ role in,
25–26, 29, 32, 34; collective xxi, 23, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33–37,
vs. individual perspectives in, 53, 81
27–33; conceptions of history Tutu, Desmond, xxi, 24, 26,
underlying, 25–26, 31–32, 35, 29–31, 46
38, 40–41, 46–50; criticisms
of, 39–40, 45; depoliticizing United Nations, 8, 37
effects of, 30, 41; equality as United States: critique of official
issue for, 28, 31, 37, 40–41, history of, xxii, xxiii, 69, 71,
45, 81; evil to be addressed by, 73–77, 82; race and racism in,
25, 31, 33, 35, 37, 41, 50; xxii, 7–8, 52–62, 66, 68–71,
Index—117
103n22; segregation in, Walker, David, 64, 104n35

ix, 8, 59–60, 61, 70, warfare, aggressive (illegal) vs.
102n19, 102n20; treatment defensive (legal), 4–5, 9–14
of minorities in, 7–8, Weber, Max, 17
94n15. See also slavery white supremacy: in South
reparations Africa, 23, 33, 39, 49, 81; in
United States, ix, 8, 56, 66,
victims: in Nuremberg context, 69–70, 72
xxi, 2, 4–5, 21, 53; in Whitman, James Q., 8
reparations context, xxi, Wilder, Gary, xvii–xviii, 83–84
53, 62–63; in TRC context, Wilson, Richard, 40, 45–46
xxi, 23, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33–37,
53, 81 X, Malcolm, 73, 85–86
voter suppression, 60, 103n24
Voting Rights Act, 60, 103n24 zombies, 71, 73

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ON THE JUDGMENT OF HISTORY

RUTH BENEDICT BOOK SERIES

JOAN WALLACH SCOTT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS ––New York

Publishers Since 1893

Copyright © 2020 Columbia University Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable

Printed in the United States of America

Cover design: Chang Jae Lee

P R E FA C E : Histor y, Race, Nation ix

1. The Nation-State as the Telos of History:

2. The Limits of Forgiveness: South Africa’s Truth and

3. Calling History to Account: The Movement for Reparations

EPILOGUE: Revisioning History—79

The current amazement that the things we are experiencing

I began to think about the notion of the judgment of history

think like my friend, I naively (reﬂexively?) held to the popular

decision to make public the investigation of Hillary Clinton’s

work. It is projection in two senses. One psychic: our own

“World History Is the World’s Tribunal”

The moral stance implied in “the judgment of history” draws

equality and inequality, right and wrong, truth and falsehood—

emphasis as soon as the actor invoked a history which, at the

State and Nation

The notion of the judgment of history rests on a progressive lin-

end of the French empire—federated entities of different but

located within the boundaries of a sovereign nation-state. Non-

While consciousness of nationality is a comparatively

The concept of the nation, premised as it was on the homoge-

for its deeds, even if no race-thinking had ever existed in the

Organization of the Book

In the chapters that follow, I take up three cases to explore the

in 1996; and the centuries-long, ongoing demand for repara-

tribunal whose role was literally deﬁned by the chief prosecutor

Yes, it would be worthwhile to study clinically, in detail, the steps

T he International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was the

their crimes, aimed to render Nazi “sinister inﬂuences” politi-

Many have concluded, with the political theorist Judith Shklar,

Was the Nazi Regime a Nation-State?

Jackson had different answers to that question. Sometimes, he

WAS THE NAZI REGIME A NATION-STATE?

If the Nazis were a national state, Jackson wanted it clear that

deemed Italian fascism), an unfortunate “accident” (as Fried-

minorities became an international concern is this: it was a part

[It] rests on the simultaneous existence and repression of the

“Such wars,” he wrote approvingly of these state wars regulated

WAS THE NAZI REGIME A NATION-STATE?

of the soil was not considered private property. . . . The land

knew it would “come to this” (the Holocaust). The chief prose-

archaic remnant of another age, a relic of the state of nature for

as a symptom of the rejection or failure of modernity, those who

frontier or history. The view of a history, she wrote, for which

The Survival of Ethnonationalism

I have been arguing that Nuremberg’s treatment of Nazism—as

Arendt was prescient about the dangers of “race-thinking”

Writing about the postwar regime of human rights (one of the

into a new territorial setting different from the one in which it

The difference established between past and present was for-

South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1996