Weci Presentation
Weci Presentation
- Price competition
- Or non price competition.- Firms compete on the basis of product differentiation, advertising, or other
factors.
In a competitive market producer look to produce goods and services at the lowest possible cost.
Moreover, competition can also promote innovation, as firms compete to develop new products or improve
existing ones to gain a competitive edge.
Competition is a key aspect of a common market, as it drives higher productivity, lower prices, and greater
consumer welfare.
2.- Competition Theories
Competition theories in economics refer to different perspectives on how competition affects economic
outcomes. We will briefly explained the key competition theories.
1. Perfect Competition Theory
The number of seller and buyers in the market is very large. Independently they cannot influence the
market. It has a very intense competition between firms. There is no barriers to entry or exit the market
Under perfect competition, firms are price takers, meaning they accept the market-determined price
and adjust their production accordingly.
All participants produce the same kind of product, there are no differences
Small enterprises produce a very small amount of products and independently do not affect the
production capacity of other participants;
There will be no legal, organizational, financial and technological restrictions to enter the network.
2. Imperfect Competition
The opposite of perfect competition and in nature is limited, the competition is between companies with a large
market share or it can be a monopoly.
2.1. Monopolistic Competition. With the characteristics:
The number of companies not so large.
Firms have some market power but is limited.
Product differentiation allows firms to remain price setters.
There can be a differentiation of quality: raw materials, quality, design, production, durability;
The entry and exit barriers are not so high
- Market power of large companies was not seen as bad now the focus was on the efficiency that was
the goal so in the end the consumers would get low prices. If you let the market work and self-regulate,
event monopolies would not endure as other companies enter the market and compete.
Competence .The Chicago School saw no evil in market power per se as dominant firms may be more
efficient. And as long as there was some competition, consumers will enjoy the benefits of both efficient
markets and competition.
The purpose of antitrust laws is that prices are as low as possible.
The theory use the perfect competition model as a starting point.
For the Chicago School not every conduct that increased prices would be unlawful. Rather, only the
most terrible forms of anticompetitive conduct – e.g., price-fixing, market division – that distorts the
functions of the market and prevents market self-correction would be condemned
4.- Merger Control: Over time, the EU expanded its competition law framework. In 1989, the Merger Regulation
(Regulation No. 4064/89) was adopted, establishing a centralized European Community merger control
system. It required companies to notify and gain approval from the European Commission for mergers and
acquisitions meeting certain thresholds.
gives the Community the objective of instituting 'a system ensuring that competition in the common market is
not distorted';2
5- Modernization of EU Competition Law: In 2004, a process of modernizing EU competition law began.
Regulation No. 1/2003 replaced Regulation No. 17/1962, decentralizing enforcement and granting national
competition authorities concurrent powers. It aimed to enhance cooperation between the European
Commission and national authorities.
IV.- EU MERGER CONTROL
Main legal framework:
Regulate mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures that may have an impact on competition within the EU's
single market.
Implementing Regulation
Investigation:
1
EUR-Lex - 32003R0001 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)
2
EUR-Lex - 31989R4064 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)
The Commission conducts a detailed investigation to assess whether the transaction could significantly
prevent effective competition in the EU market.
Potential impact on competition, market shares, barriers to entry, and the creation of dominant market
positions.
Phase II review, additional information, input from market participants, and evaluates potential
remedies
The Commission has the authority to either approve the merger or prohibit it altogether
Companies that fail to comply with the EU merger control requirements can face significant penalties,
including fines of up to 10% of their global turnover.
The ruling of the European Commission was that the transaction will likely result in a significant impediment of
effective competition.
The transaction raised competition concerns, as it would have allowed Wieland to eliminate the competitive
pressure exercised by ARP and become a dominant player in the markets for rolled products in the European
Economic Area ("EEA")
The sole control over Schwermetall would result in vertical effects (that would further reinforce alleged
horizontal effects), namely through access to sensitive information about Schwermetall's customers (Wieland's
competitors on the downstream market) and likely price increases in the downstream market.