Round 6
Round 6
Round 6
disclosure
A. Interpretation - Teams should disclose the cards of previously broken non identity
based TOC cases on the 2023-2024 school year on the NDCA wiki at least 15 minutes
before the round
B. Violation: They didn't - ss in the doc proves
Standards First –
1. Evidence Quality – Disclosure generates an information database that encourages
debaters to find the best evidence on the topic and allows newer debaters to have
better cards.
Nails 13 [(Jacob, NDT Policy Debater at Georgia State University), “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third Party Disclosure)”,NSDUpdate,10/10/2013EM]
I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, disclosure streamlines
research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of
knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of. Students can look through the
different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally
surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence
2. Quality engagement --- disclosure allows in-depth preparation before the round
which checks back against unpredictable positions and allows debaters to effectively
write case negs and blocks. Quality engagement is key to education.
Education – it’s the only portable skill that we take out of round and it’s why schools fund debate.
No rvis: you shouldnt win for being fair and it encourages theory baiting which chills good
norms
_____________________________________________________________________________
Case
1NC---OFF Prevent Nuclear War via. Maintainance Saudi Relations
Saudi c1
US presence in the WANA region is on the rise.
Freiman 11/6 (Jordan Freiman [Writer And Editor, CBS News], How the U.S. has increased its military presence in the
Middle East amid Israel-Hamas war, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-military-assets-in-middle-east/, 11/6/23, DA:
12/11/23, |aak|)
The U.S. has increased its military presence in the Middle East since the start of the war between Israel and Hamas. The deployment of Defense
Department assets to the region is aimed at deterring the conflict from widening into a larger regional war, U.S. officials say. Here's a look at some of the known groups and
equipment that have been sent to the area. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group The aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower arrived in the Red Sea south of
Israel over the weekend. The strike group also includes a guided missile cruiser, two missile destroyers and an entire air wing comprised of helicopters, fighter jets and 5,000
sailors. The strike group is headed toward the Persian Gulf — a clear message directed at Iran — but will most likely remain outside the gulf. Nuclear-powered submarine The
Pentagon revealed Sunday that an Ohio-class submarine — a nuclear-powered vessel — crossed through the Suez Canal.
Ohio-class subs can carry 154 tomahawk cruise missiles. Submarines, sometimes called the "silent service," operate mostly in secret and the release of
this information from the Defense Department was deliberate. Ford Carrier Strike Group The Ford Carrier Strike Group is currently in the
Mediterranean Sea after being sent to the region in late October. The group includes the USS Ford and three ballistic missile defense
ships. Other U.S. warships in the Middle East The USS Mount Whitney command ship has also been sent to the eastern Mediterranean
Sea. In the Red Sea, joining the Eisenhower Strike Group, are four warships: Bataan, Carter Hall, Hudner and Carney. The USS
Carney, a Navy destroyer, recently shot down cruise missiles and drones launched from Yemen that may have been headed toward Israel. U.S. troops in the region
The firepower from these warships is a deterrent, but it is also to help protect the 45,000 U.S. service members and contractors that are stationed in the Middle
East. Most are in Kuwait, but thousands are in Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Pentagon has also
deployed 1,200 troops to the Middle East, though not to Israel, since the war began. On Oct. 26, the Defense Department announced it was sending 900 troops, primarily for air
defense, to the region. Another 300 troops, mostly ordnance disposal, communications and other support, were announced Oct. 31.
Einhorn 23 (Robert Einhorn [is a senior fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Strobe
Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology], Will Putin’s invasion spur nuclear proliferation?,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/will-putins-invasion-spur-nuclear-proliferation/, 5/24/23, DA: 12/9/23 |aak|)
Such an Iranian posture is surely better than the alternative — a near-term decision to build nuclear weapons. But it keeps the prospect of a future nuclear-armed Iran alive. And
that means pressures
for proliferation in the Middle East would continue — nowhere more than in Saudi Arabia. We don’t need to
speculate about Saudi nuclear intentions. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, has openly declared his determination to match whatever
nuclear capability is achieved by Iran — which the kingdom has long regarded as a mortal threat. A few weeks ago, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic relations.
Each has its own reasons for wanting to reduce tensions. But profound Saudi mistrust of Iran will continue — as will Saudi interest in a matching nuclear capability. Saudi
Arabia has ambitious nuclear energy plans. It refuses to renounce enrichment or to accept the IAEA’s Additional
Protocol, which would place the kingdom’s nuclear program under much closer scrutiny. But the Saudis will have a hard time
catching up with Iran. They are many years away from having the technical and human infrastructure required to produce nuclear
weapons indigenously. They would need large-scale foreign assistance. Several countries are eager to sell them nuclear
reactors. But the Saudis would need enrichment or reprocessing facilities to produce a bomb. And I think it’s highly questionable that they could find a country willing to help
them build such facilities — or willing to sell them a fabricated nuclear weapon or the components to build one. Pakistan, which received Saudi financial support for its nuclear
program, is often assumed to be willing to reciprocate by helping the kingdom get the bomb. But if ever there was such a Pakistani commitment, I doubt Pakistan would be
willing to follow through with it under current circumstances. The Saudis are highly motivated to match Iran and clearly have the financial resources to make a go of it. But they
have a steep hill to climb, and the odds of their succeeding are not very good. Turkey would have to be fairly high on any proliferation watch list. Under President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, Turkey seeks to play a leading role in the region. Although a NATO member, it has charted an independent foreign policy that has often frustrated its allies and
strained relations with the United States. It’s buying nuclear reactors from Russia and has refused to rule out enrichment. A few years ago, Erdoğan said it was unacceptable
that some countries can have nuclear weapons and Turkey cannot. Still, the likelihood that Turkey will pursue nuclear weapons remains low. A nuclear capability would not
address its main security preoccupation, which is Kurdish separatism. Turkey considers Iran a rival for regional influence, not — as in the case of Saudi Arabia — a military
threat that might compel a Turkish nuclear deterrent. Despite frayed relations with the United States and Europe, Ankara’s economy remains heavily dependent on trade and
investment with the West, and its military remains closely tied in with its NATO allies. A nuclear program would put those links in jeopardy. We can discuss other states if you’d
like, but these are the ones most often cited as potential aspirants to the nuclear club. By focusing
on them individually — and on their particular incentives
and disincentives — the outlook for the global non-proliferation regime looks significantly less gloomy than if one focuses only on the
worrisome developments I mentioned earlier. But that doesn’t mean those worrisome factors can be dismissed. My cautious optimism is based on current circumstances, and
circumstances can change. And so, whatever the likelihood today that additional countries will pursue nuclear weapons, the United States and the rest of the international
community should do whatever they can to further reduce that likelihood. So, what should be done? In the interest of time, I won’t try to cover the full range of policies I believe
should be pursued. I’ll focus instead on a few critical priorities. Iran is key to proliferation in the Middle East. So high priority should be given to deterring Iran from breaking out
from its threshold capability and building nuclear weapons. It’s critical to impress on Iran’s leaders that attempting nuclear breakout would be extremely costly. The United
States, not just Israel, must pose a credible threat of military preemption if it detects a crash Iranian effort to produce nuclear weapons. Very importantly, Iran must be pressured
to maintain sufficient IAEA monitoring to ensure timely detection of any breakout attempt. Diplomacy appears futile for now. But the United States and its partners should keep
the door open for negotiated measures that would reduce Iran’s enrichment capacity and increase its breakout time in exchange for sanctions relief. Saudi
Arabia
should be discouraged or prevented from acquiring essential enabling technologies — enrichment or reprocessing. Potential nuclear suppliers
should be encouraged to make sales of nuclear reactors to the kingdom conditional on Saudi acceptance of limits on enrichment or reprocessing or, at a minimum, acceptance
of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Potential sources of sensitive technologies — such as China, Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea — should be
pressed not to transfer such technologies to the Saudis, either overtly or covertly. And U.S. intelligence agencies and like-minded partners should
give high priority to detection and interdiction of illicit trafficking in those technologies. Washington should also seek to reduce Saudi incentives for
pursuing nuclear weapons. It should provide military assistance that can help the Saudis defend against
threats from Iran and its proxies, particularly missile and drone attacks. The Biden administration was embarrassed that it was China, not
the United States, which helped broker the restoration of Saudi-Iranian ties. But it was a positive step, and the administration should encourage additional steps to reduce
regional tensions. Despite
frictions between Biden and MBS, the United States would be in a stronger position to
discourage Saudi proliferation by re-establishing better bilateral relations with its traditional partner. And the same can be said
Saudi accquisition of this nuclear technology causes a nuclear arms race and
undermines the non-proliferation regime.
Kahwaji, 10/02 [Riad Kahwaji is a Middle East security and defense analyst based in Dubai and founder and director
of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, 10-02-2023, Breaking Defense, “In nuclear push, Saudi
Arabia could play US, China off each other,”
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/10/in-nuclear-push-saudi-arabia-could-play-us-china-off-each-other/] ghs-ee
DUBAI — With Saudi Arabia making clear its desire for nuclear power, the Middle East could find itself on the edge of a
potential nuclear arms race — one in which the Kingdom attempts to play the great powers off each other in order to
achieve its goals.
Right now, the Kingdom is nowhere near having a operative nuclear program. But Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman raised eyebrows
in a late September interview when he said that if Iran were to get a nuclear weapon “we will have to get one.”
The timing of MBS’ statement was noteworthy for many analysts who
believe it reflected a growing concern of the advancement of the
Iranian nuclear program and to capitalize on the push by Washington and Tel Aviv to normalize relations with Riyadh
by making the establishment of a Saudi nuclear program with full fuel cycle as a conditional step.
The Saudis do not currently have an active civil nuclear program, “barring a single research reactor at the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology that remains
dormant,” said Hasan Al Hasan, a research fellow for Middle East at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
However, forSaudi Arabia establishing an advanced nuclear program is a strategic objective to bolster its status as an
Arab and Muslim power, and to achieve a power-balance with Iran. And earlier this year, Saudi officials announced that significant amounts of uranium
were discovered in the Kingdom, and they intend to establish a fuel cycle. And on Sept. 25, the Kingdom alerted the international atomic energy watchdog IAEA that it has
accepted its demands for comprehensive safeguards, which indicates Riyadh’s readiness to advance its nuclear program.
“Saudi Arabia possesses [a portion] of the global uranium reserves and therefore it has the right to have a uranium enrichment capability that fulfills the requirement for a full
peaceful nuclear program for the Kingdom,” said Hassan Alshehri, a Saudi defense analyst and retired Brig. Gen. from the Saudi Armed Forces.
The concern among nonproliferation advocates: there is no reason to think the Saudis will be content with keeping the program
purely civil, especially after MBS’ public statements about seeking a bomb.
Daryl Kimball, executive director of the US-based Arms Control Association, summed up the tenor of the discussion in a recent op-ed by stating that, “Saudi Arabia’s
brazen nuclear weapons hedging is a profound threat to the global nonproliferation regime that the United States has
led for decades… the United States must seek a legally binding Saudi commitment not to pursue or acquire enrichment and reprocessing technology. Such technology
is unnecessary for the kingdom’s future nuclear energy or commercial pursuits.”
The entire world will be blanketed via miscalc – impacts out to extinction from spread of
a global nuclear arms race. This is not a mere percent probibility, but is empirically
backed;
Cirincione ’20 [Joe; March 20; Former Vice President for National Security at the Center for American Progress;
Responsible Statecraft, “Why Letting Our Allies Get Nuclear Weapons Is A Bad Idea,”
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/05/20/why-letting-our-allies-get-nuclear-weapons-is-a-bad-idea/]
There is nothing automatic about the nuclear domino theory, and it has been successfully countered in some regions, but the theory is generally correct.
The Soviet Union got the bomb because, as Stalin told his scientists after Hiroshima, “The balance has been broken. Build the
bomb. It will remove the great danger from us.” Britain and France got the bomb because the Soviets (and the U.S.) had it. China did the same,
then India got the bomb because China did; Pakistan because India did.
Nuclear competition in Asia would not end if South Korea decided to build a nuclear arsenal. Others in the region would likely follow suit. Japan, Taiwan, perhaps
Vietnam. Similarly, a Saudi bomb would likely beget an Iranian bomb, a Turkish bomb and even an Egyptian bomb. Far from
making the region — and the United States — safer, these arms races would blanket the globe with nuclear tripwires, each primed to
unleash unprecedented destruction at the slightest twitch.
Where you stand determines what you see. Kennedy and the other presidents stood atop the chain of command, and their own experiences with that awful responsibility
(particularly with the near-miss of the Cuban Missile Crisis) colored how they saw nuclear politics. They recognized the limitations of theory in a world
characterized by imperfect information and the frictions of human interaction. They understood what the nuclear
theorists could not — that more countries having nuclear weapons would only increase the risk of their use, not
lessen it.
Three months before the Cuban Crisis, Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, gave a speech in Ann Arbor, Michigan where he laid out this danger. “The mere
fact that no nation could rationally take steps leading to nuclear war does not guarantee that a nuclear war cannot take place,” he said. “Not only do nations sometimes act in
ways that are hard to explain on a rational basis, but even
when acting in a ‘rational’ way they sometimes, indeed disturbingly often, act on the basis
of misunderstandings of the true facts of a situation. They misjudge the way others will react, and the way others will interpret what they are doing.”
Any attempt to rationalize nuclear relationships — treating adversaries like two sides of a balanced equation —
removes the human factor: the tendency towards irrationality and error. In a world with just a handful of nuclear
states, that factor has already nearly led to apocalypse. In a world with a dozen more, those risks would go up
exponentially.
It does not have to be this way. For over 50 years, since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, successful diplomacy,
security assurances, and global norms have largely kept nuclear proliferation at bay. The nightmare scenario of
dozens of nuclear states has so far been averted, in no small part through the conscious and continual effort of
American presidential administrations of both parties. Yes, there will always be those who advocate for more nuclear weapons in more hands. But the forces of restraint,
and with it, survival, have prevailed and can continue to prevail if U.S. policy leads the way.
Iran c2
US deterrence, specifically in the WANA region, is working now, prefer our evidence on recency.
Garamone 11/14 (Jim Garamone [Reporter at U.S. Department of Defense], Pentagon Official Says Deterrence in
Middle East Is Working, Pentagon Official Says Deterrence in Middle East Is Working,
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3588803/pentagon-official-says-deterrence-in-middle-east
-is-working/, 11/14/23, DA: 12/16/23 5:02 PM, |aak|)
Deterrence in the Middle East is working, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said today. She said the United States wants to
see the war between Israel and Hamas contained to Gaza and not expanded to other areas of the region. As of today, "we
have not seen this war spill over into other neighboring countries and into the region," Singh said. A woman speaks to an audience
from a podium. Iranian-backed groups in Syria and Iraq continue attacks on U.S. troops engaged in the defeat-ISIS mission, she said.
"Since Oct. 17 through today, we are tracking that there have been 55 attacks on U.S. forces," Singh said. "There have been 27 attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and 28
attacks in Syria." The Defense Department is tracking that 59 U.S. personnel received injuries in these attacks. "Approximately 27 personnel have been evaluated for TBI
[traumatic brain injuries] and 32 for other injuries," she said. "As of today, all 59 have returned to duty." Last weekend, Houthis affiliated with Iran shot down a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper
unmanned aerial vehicle. "I am not going to broadcast any response or … get ahead of any response that the secretary [of defense] or the president might want to take," she
said. U.S. forces responded to the attacks on troops with missions to hit targets in eastern Syria. "We conducted three different strikes," Singh said. "And again, we will always
reserve the right to respond at a time in place of our choosing in the future." Singh also addressed
fighting in Gaza between Hamas terrorists and
Israeli troops. She reiterated that the United States does not want to see firefights in hospitals. "We absolutely believe that hospitals
should be places where people seeking medical treatment and attention need to be, and those places should be protected," she said. "But … we do have information that
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad uses some hospitals in the Gaza Strip, including the al-Shifa hospital, as a way to conceal and support their military operations and
hold hostages." The intelligence reports indicate that Hamas has tunnels underneath hospitals and uses them as command-and-control nodes in Gaza City. "They have
weapons stored there and are epared to respond to an Israeli military operation against the facility," she said.
Austin 12/2/23 (Lloyd J. Austin III [Secretary of Defense], 'A Time for American Leadership': Remarks by Secretary of
Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the Reagan National Defense Forum (As Delivered),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3604755/a-time-for-american-leadership-remarks-by-secret
ary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-i/, 12/2/23, DA: 12/5/23, |aak|)
And so we have rushed U.S. security assistance to Israel to help it defend its people and its territory—and to help ensure that Hamas can never again
commit the atrocities that we saw on October 7th. U.S. leadership has helped in the release of dozens of hostages. And we will continue to do everything that we
can to help secure the release of every man, every woman, and every child seized by Hamas—including American citizens. [Applause] We also rapidly reinforced
our force posture in the Middle East. And that strengthens our regional deterrence, better protects our forces, and
helps defend Israel. And our presence
now includes two Carrier Strike Groups, an Amphibious Ready Group, a Marine
Expeditionary Unit, a guided-missile submarine, integrated air-defense and missile-defense forces, and more fighter
aircraft and bombers. But as we are working to stabilize the region, Iran is raising tensions. And after attacks against U.S.
personnel in Iraq and Syria, our forces repeatedly struck facilities in Iraq and eastern Syria used by Iran’s IRGC and by militias affiliated with Iran. We will not tolerate attacks on
American personnel. And so these attacks must stop. And until they do, we will do what we need to do to protect our troops—and to impose costs on those who attack them.
Chauhdry, 23 [Dr. Kinza Tasleem Chauhdry, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Lahore
College for Women, University, Lahore, Pakistan, Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University, Natural Science Edition, Volume
19, Issue 02, February 2023, “Nuclearization of Iran: A Theoretical Perspective,”
https://www.xisdxjxsu.asia/V19I02-153.pdf] ghs-ee
This article identifies that Iran is the challenge to the United States interest in the Middle East and its containment is the
United States main security policy. Both the states have contained the effect of the other by advancing their allies in the
region through the settlement of large amounts of weapons, increasing their security with the insurance of their military
presence. In this regard Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has benefitted United States by stretching the Iranian nuclear breakout time. Delaying with the Iranian nuclear
program have interlinked in several factors most importantly on the regional dynamics as seen in the regional implications of the deal. This research signifies that this deal was
in favor of the United States interest in the region as it has reshaped the policies between the states. But after the U.S withdrawal from the deal the pace on which these
states are going is taking them more towards the escalation and regional conflict. Whether it is the relation between Israel and Iran or
the Iran and Saudi Arabia, the one thing which is common is that both the states countering Iranian regime in the region have the alliance with the United States. The proxy
war dynamics with each country involved to get its own interest out of it has made this region a battleground. United
States withdrawal from the deal have built a scenario with the volatile situation in which there is a rising competition between the regional actors. This competition
involves arms race and this arms race mixed with the regional politics have escalated tensions in a way, where the
diplomacy has failed. In this context, we see the Iranian continuing struggles in the Syria and Lebanon to securitize itself and the maintenance of its presence in the
Yemen countering the possible Saudi intervention. U.S and Iranian tensions have maintained a huge new peak when the commander of Iran’s IRGC and one of the military
commanders were killed in U.S air strike in Baghdad. The countries were found on the brink of warfare as the Iranian backed groups in Iraq were being targeted. Remaining in
the deal was in the United States interest because as despite of the JCPOA there were sanctions by United States and European Union countering the Iranian terrorist
activities. For Instance, with implementation of JCPOA, European Union had an embargo on the Iranian arms and missile technology. In the result of U.S maximum pressure
strategy, Iran and Iran linked forces have seized commercial ships, destruction of Saudi infrastructure, rocket, and missile attacks on the U.S embassy in Iraq with the activities
like downing the U.S aerial vehicle and warships. Iran has shown that it will not abide by the provisions of the deal after the murder of Soleimini. Iranian support for the armed
factions has facilitated the Iranians to cause damage to the U.S allies in region for instance attack on the Saudi Aramco. This
has shut the doors for the future
negotiations between the countries. Trump’s withdrawal from the deal was the strategic mistake because the military
forces against the Iran will have consequences as there will be absence of the Congressional authorization. The
military forces of United States which were authorized for the countering of the terrorist activities and were being
deployed in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq. The presence of the forces had benefit for the United States to counter the
Iranian forces and the maintenance of presence in the region. Basically, what the withdrawal from JCPOA has done is the dilemma which involves
Iran on resuming its missile and nuclear programs while the United States is not able to encourage Iran to abandon its nuclear program and come to the Bargaining table. The
withdrawal created the ambiguity among the states to have the nuclear capability as well. Saudi Arabia and Israel are the regional competitors of Iran, and this could have
created the domino effect in the region. Settling the nonproliferation regimes, the policies of President Trump regarding the JCPOA was the bad idea indeed because it missed
the cooperation opportunities with Iran with the unnecessarily implementing the forces for the isolation of Iran and the decertification which sets upon the classical application of
the Realism as United
States for their own interest and dominance was targeting Iran for its behavior in the Middle East
not for the curtailment of the terrorism. It is being estimated from the sanctions that were being implemented before JCPOA they effected the economy, but
they didn’t affect the Iranian enrichment capability and there was increase in the Iranian enrichment from 5 % to 20 %. The increase in the stockpile was from few hundred
kilograms to over 8000 kg and its number of centrifuges from 3000 to 22000. There was the development of more advanced centrifuges from IR1 to IR8 which is at least 20
times faster with the fortified enrichment facility at Fordow and Trump with the withdrawal and imposition of sanctions is again repeating the same mistake. As Iran has
intentions for the advancement of its nuclear capabilities.
Sforza 23 (Lauren Sforza [is a breaking news reporter for The Hill. Lauren graduated with a degree in political
communication from The George Washington University], US upping Mid East presence due to risk of attacks on
American troops, Austin says,
https://thehill.com/regulation/defense/4269320-us-upping-mid-east-presence-risk-of-attacks-on-american-troops-austi
n-says/, 10/22/23, DA: 12/5/23, |aak|)
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said Sunday that the United States is upping its presence in the Middle East because of
the risk of escalated attacks on American troops. “What we’re seeing is a prospect of a significant escalation of attacks on
our troops and our people throughout the region,” Austin said on ABC’s “This Week.” “And because of that, we’re going to do what’s
necessary to make sure that our troops are in that position and they were protected and that we have the ability to
respond.” He also said that upping the military presence in the region will “send another message to those who would who
would seek to widen this conflict.” In response to potential attacks from Hezbollah in Lebanon and from Iran, the administration has told any other groups
seeking to get involved “don’t.” “If any group or any country is looking to widen this conflict and take advantage of this very unfortunate situation that we see. Our advice is
don’t,” he said. “We maintain the right to defend ourselves and we won’t hesitate to take the appropriate action.” The United States announced plans to ramp up its military
presence in the Middle East as
an act of deterrence amid the ongoing fighting between Israel and the militant group Hamas on
Saturday. Austin said in the announcement that he redirected the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower Strike Group to join the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group, which is
currently stationed in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. He said in the Saturday announcement that the U.S. will deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery in
addition to Patriot battalions that will “increase force protection for U.S. forces.” He also said that he ordered more troops to prepare for deployment orders.
Middle East war draws in great powers and goes nuclear, starting with Iran.
Pleasance 20, senior foreign news reporter with dailymail, (Chris, January 3rd, 2020, “How could Iran crisis lead to
World War Three? Tehran could hit back with cyber-attacks or terror attacks on US forces and Israel - provoking
Donald Trump to retaliate in tit-for-tat that could drag in Saudi Arabia, Russia, China and Turkey”,
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7848703/How-Iran-crisis-lead-World-War-Three.html)
Iran has vowed to exact a 'crushing revenge' on American forces in retaliation for the killing of Quds commander Qassem Soleimani - leaving the
Middle East on the brink of a conflict that could quickly spiral into World War 3. The Iranian National Security Council is currently meeting in Tehran -
chaired by Ayatollah Khamenei himself for the first time ever - to consider its response. At their disposal is the world's 13th most powerful military, a host of
militia groups spread across the Middle East, proxy-forces such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthi rebels, and allies like Syria's Bashar al-Assad.
Targets in their crosshairs are likely to include US troops and military bases in Iraq and Syria, Israeli forces in the Golan
Heights, tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, and Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure. While initial strikes are likely to be limited, they could herald a
tit-for-tat series of events - drawing in Russian forces stationed in Syria, defending a key Iranian ally in Bashar
al-Assad, and Turkish forces fighting in the country's north. China also has ships stationed in the Gulf of Oman and recently
carried out joint naval drill with both Iran and Russia, raising the prospect that they could also become involved. Saudi
Arabia is already engaged in a conflict with Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, and any escalation by Tehran would be met with a response from
Riyadh. Turkish strongman Recep Erdogan's troops are deployed in northern Syria and he is close to Russia and Iran as well as being a member of NATO - making his
actions unpredictable if a conflict escalates across the region. The US, China, Russia and Israel all have nuclear weapons - with at least
three of those possessing next-generation hypersonic missiles capable of breaching all defense systems. Israel is also armed with nuclear weapons
and is an obvious target for any Iranian attacks, but Benjamin Netanyahu and the IDF will not hesitate to defend themselves and have recently struck Iran-backed Hezbollah forces in Syria.
If Iran decides to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, as it has often threatened to do in the past, a host of world powers including European
nations which rely on the oil which flows through the waterway could find themselves having to defend their interests. Ultimately, if the
tit-for-tat exchanges between these countries escalated far enough it is conceivable but unlikely that it would end with a nuclear exchange - and
destruction on a global scale.
_____________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Their Case:
Value - Justice, promoting societal welfare. Justice is enomposed by the value of morality, as
per AU of 2023. Societal welfare - Provide beneftis to all citizens, basically just util.
Looking at their camp david evidence, we outweigh on recency, as the 2021 afghanistan
and US is far more recent and relevant than the unsuccessful 2000 camp david
cooperation between egypt and israel (note: not the US).
Their entire terror contention is cut, as they have absolutely no solvency, no impact.
C3 was stability, but once again, if we pullout othe regional factors, such as terrorists, as
shown in my Pew 21 card, will usurp power and destablaize the surrounding
communities, as my opponent has himself proven that terrorists destabalize and wreck
havoc. He says that the government would be able to combat these terrorists on their
own, but agian, my afghanistan empris prove otherwise. Onto my case.
______________________________________________________________________
Brightline – they don’t set and defend an objective standard for what is too fast –
that’s bad, invites judge intervention
No norm setting in this round - everyone spreads in tech rounds get better
Counter-interp: debaters must not spread if they dont send a speech doc, checks back
for fairness and edu.
Solves all of their fairness and education arguments.
speading allows for more arguments to be run and better education, breadth over
depth and running speed theory is generic and decks education
ASAH no date , the national professional, scientific, and credentialing association for 191,500 members and
affiliates who are audiologists; speech-language pathologists; speech, language, and hearing scientists; audiology
and speech-language pathology support personnel; and students. Childhood fluency disorders No Date
http://www.asha.org/Practice-Portal/Clinical-Topics/Childhood-Fluency-Disorders/ GDI-AS
In cluttering, the breakdowns in clarity that accompany a perceived rapid and/or irregular
speech rate are often characterized by deletion and/or collapsing of syllables (e.g., "I
wanwatevision") and/or omission of word endings (e.g., "Turn the televisoff"). The breakdowns in fluency are often
characterized by more typical disfluencies (e.g., revisions, interjections) and/or pauses in places in sentences not expected
grammatically, such as "I will go to the/store and buy apples" (St. Louis & Schulte, 2011). Although the current criteria for cluttering
include only symptoms of speech rate and fluency, other disorders may co-occur. For
example, there is
documentation of cluttered speech in children with learning disabilities (Wiig & Semel,
1984), auditory processing disorders (Molt, 1996), Tourette's syndrome (see Van Borsel, 2011,
for review), autism (see Scaler Scott, 2011, for review), word finding/language organization
issues (Myers, 1992) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Alm, 2011). These
disorders (and their features) may occur in addition to a diagnosis of cluttering (or stuttering), and cluttering has been documented
with none of these additional features or diagnoses.