Governance in complexity

Sustainability governance under highly uncertain

and complex conditions

EEA Report 05/2024

European Environment Agency
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Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2024

ISBN 978-92-9480-662-8
ISSN 1977-8449
doi: 10.2800/597121

Cover design: EEA

Cover photo: © EEA
Layout: Formato Verde/EEA
Contents

Foreword  5

Acknowledgements  6

Executive summary 7

1 The evolving context: sustainability in turbulent times 9

1.1 Multiple environmental and societal crises as signs
of turbulent times 9
1.2 Insufficient progress towards sustainability 11

2 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges 17

2.1 A typology of challenges 17
2.2 Conceptual frameworks for systemic and complex challenges 20
2.3 Uncertainty and action: insights from post‑normal science 24

3 What form of governance to choose for sustainability? 27

3.1 Normative frameworks of sustainability governance 27
3.2 Emerging governance challenges and tensions  30

4 Moving towards 'governance in complexity' 35

4.1 What is 'governance in complexity'? 35
4.2 Principles of governance in complexity 38
4.3 Governance in complexity practices 44
5 Is sustainability governance changing in Europe?
Insights from selected cases 47
5.1 Setting the scene 47
5.2 RePowerEU from the perspective of governance
in complexity 48
5.3 COVID‑19 responses from the perspective of governance
in complexity 51
5.4 Responses to nature degradation and biodiversity loss
from the perspective of governance in complexity 58
5.5 Responses to unsustainable economic growth from the
perspective of governance in complexity 61
5.6 What picture emerges for Europe? Between governance
of complexity and governance in complexity 65

6 Enabling governance in complexity: the science‑policy interface 68

6.1 Enabling governance in complexity at the individual level  68
6.2 Enabling governance in complexity at an organisational level 69
6.3 Enabling governance in complexity at the institutional level 70
6.4 Broader societal change: power and governmentality 72

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 3
 Contents

7 Conclusion: from 'solving problems' to 'resolving challenges' 73

References75

Annex 1 Diagnostic tool for systemic and complex challenges 94

Annex 2 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity  97

Annex 3 Diagnostics on cases studies of short‑term and

long‑term crises 112

4 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
Foreword

More than 50 years have passed since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the
Environment in Stockholm, the first global conference to explicitly acknowledge the
intrinsic value of the natural environment. Since then, our activities have intensified,
expanded and become more harmful to the environment. This poses fundamental
questions about our capabilities to halt or reverse these trends by 2030 and meet the
United Nations' sustainable development goals.

In today's world, terms like complexity, volatility and crisis are increasingly used to
describe the context and conditions we live in. The dramatic effects of biodiversity
loss, climate change and pollution create an almost existential sense of urgency to
act. At the same time policymakers also grapple with crises like war, pandemics,
rising cost‑of‑living, deteriorating mental health, and disinformation. These
challenges are visibly interconnected and complex, and most of the time impossible
to disentangle and solve. This may feel overwhelming and paralysing. However, this
is our reality: social, economic and environmental dimensions have been and will
always be tightly intertwined in complex and unpredictable ways.

This raises questions regarding the types of knowledge and governance models
needed to transform societies towards sustainability. The EEA has produced
knowledge on the systemic drivers of environmental challenges in Europe for over
three decades. When identifying challenges across key societal systems like food,
mobility, energy and the built environment, it is also our job to understand why there
is not more progress. Issues related to environment, climate and sustainability are
often complex and ridden with uncertainty. For this reason, experts in our field know
well that what to measure and how to measure are not always clear‑cut questions.
Models and predictions are essential but never perfect. Some issues are notoriously
complex and can open existential questions of philosophical nature, like the
relationship between humans and nature.

Only by truly understanding and appreciating the nature of sustainability challenges

can we meaningfully respond. Such an understanding is essential for the upcoming
2025 edition of our flagship assessment The European environment — state and
outlook and to provide actionable knowledge in support of sustainability transitions.

As a minimum, the gravity of a situation that talks of multiple crisis and existential
risks calls for an attitude of openness in responding to them. This report should not
be understood as a blueprint approach to governing sustainability challenges. It is
instead an invitation to develop knowledge that acknowledges the many legitimate
perspectives that exist on issues of sustainability and reflect on the ways society can
navigate and resolve them.

Leena Ylä-Mononen
Executive Director, European Environment Agency

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 5
 Acknowledgements

The European Environment Agency (EEA) would like to thank its Scientific Committee,
the European Commission's Joint Research Centre and the European Commission's
Directorate-General for the Environment for their valuable feedback.

In particular, the EEA would like to acknowledge the contributions from the European
Centre for Governance in Complexity.

6 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
Executive summary

The triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution is just one
of many interconnected and mutually exacerbating socio‑economic crises currently
challenging European and global societies.

These accelerated and deeply interconnected crises challenge the conventional

approach to governance in several ways. Firstly, previously well‑tested and effective
tools and practices of problem‑solving are less suited to providing systemic
solutions. This is demonstrated by the lack of progress towards sustainability:
European policies have yet to produce more than mixed progress towards the
UN sustainable development goals (SDGs). Similarly, the outlook for reaching the
EU's long‑term vision of 'living well within the limits of the planet' is not encouraging.
Secondly, failing to acknowledge and absorb the many different understandings
of complex problems — and the inherent difficulties of governing multi‑faceted
and systemic challenges — weakens the legitimacy of any transition toward
sustainability. This can strain societal stability and cohesion, as is visible in several
parts of Europe already.

This report outlines an alternative concept of 'governance in complexity', based on

an evolving understanding of sustainability challenges and how to govern them.
The approach of governance in complexity is targeted to deal with complex and
systemic challenges by recognising that each has many possible framings, where
uncertainty will always be present. If there are always competing and irreconcilable
understandings, as was the case with COVID‑19 measures, working to resolve
challenges is the only realistic approach. If solving problems is impossible, including
more perspectives and extending the basis on which to draw resolutions from
is the best solution. In contrast, presenting 'win‑win strategies' when there are in
fact underlying trade‑offs would only conceal issues that need to be mitigated and
navigated towards a compromise.

Governance in complexity should be understood as a perspective and frame of mind

rather than a set of tools. This is most evident when applying the six principles that
are central to the governance in complexity approach: experimentation, systems
thinking, participation, precaution, anticipation and care. Without accepting
uncertainty, the principle of anticipation in sustainability governance can become a
futile attempt at predicting the future, rather than a way to adjust current behaviours.
The same is true for the principle of precaution, which becomes especially
contested and challenging to uphold if the ever‑present existence of uncertainty is
not recognised — as demonstrated by the difficulties of applying the precautionary
principle as formulated by the European Union's legislation. Without acknowledging
that different perspectives and framings of sustainability challenges are legitimate,
participation can similarly be perceived as a meaningless exercise. Governance
approaches to complex sustainability issues require reflexive mindsets which
emphasise experimentation, trial and removal of error.

Several real‑life examples of governance of sustainability issues — from the local

to the European level — illustrate that new approaches are already emerging that
are better adapted to the complex nature of sustainability transformations. These
best‑practice examples help refine what governance in complexity looks like in reality
and serve as inspiration.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 7
 Executive summary

Similarly, at the EU‑level, the context of uncertainty, complexity and crises are
already encouraging governance in complexity. Four examples of governance
processes in the EU policy context to mitigate complexity and crisis — the energy
crisis caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the COVID‑19 pandemic, biodiversity
loss and discussions of the environmental impacts of sustained economic
growth — demonstrate that principles of systems thinking, anticipation, precaution
and care are present in EU policy responses.

To shift dominant governance approaches towards a governance in complexity

approach would require changes at individual, organisational, institutional and
broader societal levels. At the individual level, governance in complexity mindsets can
be cultivated through contemplative practices and experiences with nature, as well
as knowledge from social sciences and the humanities. At the organisational level,
governance in complexity means allowing and accepting many forms of knowledge
and perspectives — including those seen as radical and which challenge the very
foundation of the organisation. At the institutional level, it is necessary to explore
barriers to change, acknowledging that transformative change runs counter to power
structures and widely‑accepted discourses of economic growth and material wealth.

As demonstrated by the already shifting landscapes of governance presented in

the report, social norms and discourses in transitioning societies would change
organically. Governance in complexity is first and foremost a tool to shed light on and
enhance such expanding and complementary practices.

8 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
1 The evolving context: sustainability
in turbulent times

Key messages

• Interconnected environmental and societal crises put severe pressure on

life‑sustaining systems, human health, economic prosperity and social welfare,
leading to a transgression of critical planetary boundaries.

• The current 'polycrisis' of multiple, deeply interconnected economic, social and

political challenges is a symptom of 'systemic unsustainability'.

• There may be no all‑encompassing, optimal solution to overcome or

recover from crises without tackling underlying political, social and
environmental challenges.

• The types of measures needed to protect the environment may have to be

revised to be more responsive to complex, evolving and emerging challenges.
Well‑tested practices of problem‑solving and conventional modes and
instruments of governance might not be enough to provide systemic solutions.

Today's challenges of environmental governance and sustainable development seem

increasingly complex and multidimensional. There is robust scientific basis behind
the claim that several interconnected environmental and societal crises put severe
pressure on life‑sustaining systems, human health, economic prosperity and social
wellbeing. This Chapter explores the context of addressing sustainability challenges,
which in this report has been termed as 'turbulent times'.

1.1 Multiple environmental and societal crises as signs of turbulent times

The period since the 1950s — known as 'the Great Acceleration' — has seen
unprecedented and accelerating human‑induced global change (Steffen et al., 2015).
This time brought extraordinary improvements in living standards but also caused
massive pressures on Earth's life‑support systems (EEA, 2019b, 2020b).

Pressure has increased to the extent that Earth is now well outside of what has been
considered the tentatively safe operating space for humanity (Richardson et al., 2023).
According to the latest planetary boundaries framework update, six out of nine
boundaries that are critical for maintaining stability and resilience in Earth systems
have been transgressed (Richardson et al., 2023). In addition, transgression has
increased for all boundaries that were already overstepped. While boundaries related
to climate change are the most discussed, transgression is even more pronounced in
genetic and functional biosphere integrity, biogeochemical phosphorus and nitrogen
flows and for novel entities in the environment.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), human‑induced

climate change 'has caused widespread adverse impacts and related losses and
damages to nature and people' (IPCC, 2023). This includes impacts on ecosystems,

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 9
 The evolving context: sustainability in turbulent times

food and water security, human health, livelihoods, infrastructure and economic
activity. Equally, the annual extraction of materials has more than tripled since 1970
and continues to rise. This increasingly impacts the environment and human health,
and the effects are unevenly distributed across countries and regions (UNEP, 2024).
As a direct consequence of human actions, nature and its contributions to people are
deteriorating worldwide, with biodiversity declining faster than at any other time in
human history (IPBES, 2019).

In 2022, the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development (OECD)

reported the highest number of extremely fragile (1) contexts in the world since 2005,
the first year it published a States of Fragility study (OECD, 2022). The OECD
concluded that the scale and severity of ongoing crises are 'putting the achievement
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at risk'.

At the same time, the UN Human Development Report of 2021/2022 noted for the
first time a decline in the Human Development Index (HDI) for two years in a row
(UN, 2022). Acknowledging the impacts of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the report also
describes a new 'uncertainty complex' created by the entanglement of dangerous
planetary change, sweeping societal transformations and increased societal
polarisation. This polarisation is seen as one of the largest risks globally, today and
over the next 10 years (WEF, 2024). According to the UN, this uncertainty complex
threatens livelihoods and well‑being across the planet, leading to increased insecurity
and distress among people, in affluent societies as well (UN, 2022). The 2023/2024
Human Development Report documented that recovery after COVID‑19 was unequal
and uncertain. This brought into question whether a permanent (negative) shift in the
human development index was taking place (UN, 2024).

Moreover, despite remarkable economic growth and improvements in living

standards over recent decades, the World Social Report 2020 warned of high and
rising inequality within and across countries (UN, 2020). Circumstances beyond
the control of an individual, such as gender, ethnicity and race, being a migrant, and
socioeconomic and disability status continue to affect one's chances of succeeding
in life. Rising inequality creates discontent, jeopardises trust in politics and public
institutions, and can lead to violent conflict (Stiglitz, 2013).

Socio‑economic challenges are also increasingly visible in European policy

priorities (EC, 2023b). Extreme climate events, the COVID‑19 pandemic, Russia's war
against Ukraine, high inflation and the sweeping polarisation caused by the current
Israel‑Gaza war (and the conflicting Member State responses to it) have all entailed
new and significant risks to the well‑being of European residents. Such vulnerabilities
might exacerbate and multiply in the future due to multiple drivers of change of a
civic, political, technological, economic, environmental and geopolitical nature, each
interacting and compounding each other across levels and scales (Spain's National
Office of Foresight and Strategy, 2023; EEA, 2020).

Multiple and mutually exacerbating challenges are the result of complex interactions
between environmental and social systems, each undergoing different degrees of
destabilisation, breakdown or collapse (EEA, 2021a; Heinberg and Miller, 2023).
Several attempts have been made to capture and describe such complexities:
concepts like a VUCA world (VUCA stands for volatility, uncertainty, complexity
and ambiguity), polycrisis, systemic risks, multiple shocks, drivers of change and
the uncertainty complex have been used to make sense of the evolving context of

(1) According to the OECD (2022), fragility 'is the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacities of the state, system and/or
communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. It occurs in a spectrum of intensity across six dimensions: economic, environmental, political,
security, societal and human'.

10 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 The evolving context: sustainability in turbulent times

various crises. For example, the concept of polycrisis (Morin and Kern, 1999) became
widespread in the 2010s and 2020s, often with reference to the financial crisis in
2008‑2009. In a polycrisis, the consequences of each crisis interact and typically
(though not necessarily) reinforce each other into escalation.

Interdependencies and feedbacks within and between systems and sectors can give
rise to systemic risks (Sillmann et al., 2022). Such risks can propagate within and
between systems and sectors, creating multi‑hazards and cascading impacts. Complex
systems may have tipping points that make 'safe operating spaces' exceedingly
difficult to identify and operate in. While the exact definition of tipping points in
environmental and social systems remains unclear, there is growing consensus around
their importance (EEA, 2019b; Pörtner et al., 2022; Moore, 2018; Lenton et al., 2023).

The theoretical knowledge that the planet is a complex socio‑ecological system is not
new. Socio‑economic systems are deeply dependent on ecosystems, both as providers
of materials and energy and as sinks for emissions and pollution. Calls for forceful and
urgent action to change the dynamics of human‑induced environmental and climate
change have also been made for decades, based on the scientific understanding of
systems. What is different in the 2020s, is that the humanitarian effects of destruction,
such as polarisation, instability, precariousness, insecurity and distress, are becoming
more evident worldwide, also in affluent parts of the world (UN, 2022).

It is entirely possible that the situation of multiple crises is one that will not pass
and that for the foreseeable future, we are now living instead in turbulent times
(Felt et al., 2013) with a wounded earth (Haraway, 2016) — a period described by
some as 'the Great Unravelling' (Heinberg and Miller, 2023). New future shocks should
therefore be anticipated (EP et al., 2023b). The concept of 'turbulent governance'
(Ansell et al., 2016) has been proposed to describe the EU's European Green Deal (EGD)
policy framework as a response to turbulent times and the shifting context in which
governance occurs (Dupont and Torney, 2021). There may be no shortcuts out of this
predicament. Yet this does not preclude the possibilities of finding dignified pathways
within it through fundamental changes to human economic activities and their
governance (EEA, 2023g). This would address the drivers of the situation rather than
searching for easy ways out (Spangenberg and Kurz, 2023).

1.2 Insufficient progress towards sustainability

The 17 interlinked Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) lie at the heart of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by all United Nations (UN) member
countries in 2015. The 2019 Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR) concluded
that the world was unlikely to achieve the SDGs by 2030 (UN, 2019). In 2023, halfway
to 2030, the situation was already much more dire due to slow SDG implementation
and a convergence of interrelated crises such as the COVID‑19 pandemic, the
cost‑of‑living crisis, extreme weather events, unrest and armed conflict in many regions
(UN, 2023). Only two of the 36 targets assessed are on track to be achieved: access
to mobile networks (indicator 9.c.1) and internet access among individuals (indicator
17.8.1). Progress on eight targets is deteriorating, including on achieving food security
(indicator 2.1.2), reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (indicator 13.2.2)
and preventing the extinction of species (indicator 15.5.1) (UN, 2023) (Figure 1.1). In
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) region (2), just 20 of
the 117 SDG targets measured are on track for 2030 (UNECE, 2024). While this lack
of progress is universal, it is the world's poorest and most disadvantaged who are
suffering disproportionately from the impacts.

(2) The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) is one of five regional commissions of the United Nations and today includes
56 member States in Europe, North America and Asia.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 11
 The evolving context: sustainability in turbulent times

Figure 1.1 Current state of progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals
based on selected targets
DISTANCE FROM
TARGET (2023)1
1 Very far from target
2 Far from target CHANGE IN TREND
3 Moderate distance to target OF SDG PROGRESS
4 Close to target TREND OF SDG BETWEEN 2020
GOAL INDICATOR 5 Target met or almost met PROGRESS (2023)1 AND 20232

1.1.1 Eradicate extreme poverty Limited or no progress Backward

1
1.3.1 Implement social protection systems Fair progress but acceleration needed N/A

2.1.2 Achieve food security Deterioration None

2
2.2.1 End malnutrition (stunting) Fair progress but acceleration needed None

3.1.2 Increase skilled birth attendance Fair progress but acceleration needed Backward

3.2.1 End preventable deaths under 5 Fair progress but acceleration needed Backward
3
3.3.3 End malaria epidemic Limited or no progress None

3.b.1 Increase vaccine coverage Deterioration Backward

4 4.1.2 Ensure primary education completion Limited or no progress Backward

5.3.1 Eliminate child marriage Fair progress but acceleration needed None
5
5.5.1 Increase women in political positions Fair progress but acceleration needed None

6.1.1 Universal safe drinking water Limited or no progress None

6
6.2.1 Universal safe sanitation and hygiene Fair progress but acceleration needed None

7.1.1 Universal access to electricity Fair progress but acceleration needed Backward
7
7.3.1 Improve energy efficiency Fair progress but acceleration needed None

8.1.1 Sustainable economic growth Deterioration Backward

8
8.5.2 Achieve full employment Limited or no progress None

9.2.1 Sustainable and inclusive industrialization Limited or no progress None

9 9.5.1 Increase research and development spending Fair progress but acceleration needed Forward

9.c.1 Increase access to mobile networks Substantial progress/on track None

10 10.4.2 Reduce inequality within countries Fair progress but acceleration needed N/A

11 11.1.1 Ensure safe and affordable housing Fair progress but acceleration needed Forward

12.2.2 Reduce domestic material consumption Limited or no progress N/A

12
12.c.1 Remove fossil fuel subsidies Deterioration Backward

13 13.2.2 Reduce global greenhouse gas emissions Deterioration None

14.4.1 Ensure sustainable fish stocks Deterioration N/A

14
14.5.1 Conserve marine key biodiversity areas Limited or no progress N/A

15.1.2 Conserve terrestrial key biodiversity areas Limited or no progress None

15 15.4.1 Conserve mountain key biodiversity areas Limited or no progress N/A

15.5.1 Prevent extinction of species Deterioration None

16.1.1 Reduce homicide rates Limited or no progress Backward

16 16.3.2 Reduce unsentenced detainees Deterioration None

16.a.1 Increase national human rights institutions Fair progress but acceleration needed None

17.2.1 Implement all development assistance commitments Fair progress but acceleration needed Forward

17 17.8.1 Increase internet use Substantial progress/on track None

17.18.3 Enhance statistical capacity Limited or no progress None

1
Distance from target (2023) and trend of Sustainable Development Goasprogress (2023) refer to current level and trend information for the latest available data utilizing the calculation methodology
from the Sustainable Development Goals 2022 Progress Chart Technical Note. Latest available data as of May 2023 from the SDG global indicator database. Please note that information for indicators
1.1.1, 10.4.2, 13.2.2, 17.2.1 and 17.18.3 are from the Sustainable Development Goals Progress Chart 2022.
2
To capture the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on progress of the Sustainable Development Goals, a comparison of the trend assessment from the Sustainable Development Goals 2020 Progress
Chart and the trend of progress of the Goals (2023) was made, with some indicators showing reversal or slowed progress.
N/A: trend comparisons unavailable due to: i) lack of trend analysis from insufficient data; ii) indicator not included in the 2020 Progress Chart; or iii) indicator has changed between progress charts.
Source: Calculations based on United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2023b.

Source: UN, 2023.

12 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 The evolving context: sustainability in turbulent times

The EU is committed to delivering on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

and its SDGs (EC, 2023b). Sustainable development is a core principle of the Treaty
on European Union and a priority objective for the EU's internal and external policies.

Since 2015, the EU has made progress across all SDGs, albeit unevenly. The latest
monitoring report shows that while good progress was made towards many
socioeconomic goals, trends in the environmental domain were less favourable over
the five‑year period until 2022/23 (Eurostat, 2024a) (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2 Overview of EU progress towards the SDGs over the past five years, 2024

8
Decent work and
economic growth

10
Reduced
inequalities

12 2 1
Responsible
consumption Zero No poverty
and production 9 hunger
Industry,
13 innovation
Climate and
action infrastructure

14
Life below significant
11 16
water progress
Sustainable
cities and Peace, justice
4
and strong Quality
communities
institutions education
5
Gender
3 equality
Good health
and well-being
7 17
Partnerships
Affordable
and clean for the goals
energy

6
15 Clean water
and
Life on sanitation
land

moderate moderate
movement progress
away

Source: Eurostat, 2024a.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 13
 The evolving context: sustainability in turbulent times

The report presents a mixed picture related to the spillover effects of EU

consumption on other global regions (Eurostat, 2024a). EU consumption continues to
affect environmental conditions in the rest of the world, as illustrated by increases in
the EU's net imports of CO2 emissions and by its global cropland footprint.

Despite progress on many socioeconomic SDGs, 21.6% of the EU population (95.3 million
people) were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2022 (Eurostat, 2024a). Moreover,
several regions in the EU have been stuck in the so‑called 'development trap' and are
unable to retain economic dynamism in terms of income, productivity and employment,
leading to political discontent, polarisation and support for populist parties (EC, 2023g).

This picture suggests that achieving the SDGs in Europe remains challenging. Further
implementation efforts are needed for many goals — both socioeconomic as well as
those related to the protection and sustainable use of natural resources.

From an environment and climate entry point, a similar conclusion was put forward
by The European environment — state and outlook 2020 (EEA, 2020b), which stated
that Europe and the world face urgent, unprecedented sustainability challenges that
require systemic solutions. This report painted a bleak picture of the EU's prospects
for meeting its policy objectives (EEA, 2019b).

With the introduction of the EGD (EC, 2019), the EU has confirmed the gravity
of the situation and committed to action. The 8th Environmental Action
Programme (8th EAP) (EU, 2022b) confirms the high ambitions set by the EU to stop
and reverse environmental degradation, as did its predecessor, the 7th Environmental
Action Programme (EC, 2013). A significant difference between the 8th EAP and its
predecessors is its emphasis on the systemic character of sustainability challenges
and the resulting need for similarly systemic solutions.

The first annual report on progress towards the objectives of the 8th EAP emphasises
'the need for decisive and urgent action to protect and restore Europe's environment,
mitigate climate change and prepare for better adaptation to changing conditions'.
It points to the necessity of profoundly transforming core societal systems that are
driving environmental pressures, such as the systems in place to meet Europe's
demand for food, energy, mobility and housing (EEA, 2023b) (Table 1.1).

The insufficient progress towards sustainability has at least two important implications
for governance, explored in more detail in Chapter 3. Firstly, there may be no
all‑encompassing, optimal solution to overcome or recover from crises without tackling
the underlying political, social and environmental challenges that lie behind them.
Secondly, the types of measures needed to protect the environment may need to be
revised to be more responsive to complex, evolving and emerging challenges. Well‑tested
practices of problem‑solving and conventional modes and instruments of governance
might not suffice to provide systemic solutions (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Head, 2022;
Strand, 2002; Oliver et al., 2021). The topic of this report is one possible approach that
can contribute to a paradigm shift in environmental governance.

14 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 The evolving context: sustainability in turbulent times

Table 1.1 8th Environmental Action Programme monitoring scoreboard

results, 2023

8TH EAP PRIORITY OBJECTIVES AND ENABLING CONDITIONS

8th EAP indicators Outlook of meeting the targets by 2030

Monitoring targets It is It is It is It is
very likely but unlikely but very
likely uncertain uncertain unlikely

CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION

Greenhouse gas emissions

Reduce net GHG emissions by at least 55% by 2030 from 1990 levels

GHG emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry ​

Increase net GHG removals by carbon sinks from the LULUCF sector to -310 million
tonnes CO2 equivalent by 2030

CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION

Climate-related economic losses

Reduce overall monetary losses from weather and climate-related events

Drought impact on ecosystems

Decrease the area impacted by drought and loss of vegetation productivity

A REGENERATIVE CIRCULAR ECONOMY

Raw material consumption

Significantly decrease the EU's material footprint, by reducing the amount of raw
material needed to produce the products consumed in the EU

Total waste generation

Significantly reduce the total amount of waste generated by 2030

ZERO POLLUTION AND A TOXIC FREE ENVIRONMENT

Premature deaths due to exposure to fine particulate matter

Reduce premature deaths from air pollution by 55% (from 2005 levels) by 2030

Nitrates in groundwater
Reduce nutrient losses by at least 50% in safe groundwater resources

BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEMS

Designated terrestrial protected areas

Legally protect at least 30% of the EU's land area by 2030

Designated marine protected areas

Legally protect at least 30 % of the EU's sea area by 2030

Common bird index

Reverse the decline in populations of common birds

Forest connectivity
Increase the degree of connectivity in forest ecosystems with a view to creating
and integrating ecological corridors and increase climate change resilience

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE PRESSURES RELATED TO EU PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION

Energy consumption
Reduce by 2030 the primary and the final energy consumption levels to respectively
992.5 and 763 million tonnes of oil equivalent

Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption

At least 42.5% of energy from renewable sources in gross final energy consumption
by 2030

Circular material use rate

Double the ratio of circular material use by 2030 compared to 2020

Share of buses and trains in inland passenger transport

Increase the share of collective transport modes (buses, coaches and trains)

Area under organic farming

25% of EU agricultural land organically farmed by 2030

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 15
 The evolving context: sustainability in turbulent times

8TH EAP PRIORITY OBJECTIVES AND ENABLING CONDITIONS

8th EAP indicators Outlook of meeting the targets by 2030

Monitoring targets It is It is It is It is
very likely but unlikely but very
likely uncertain uncertain unlikely

ENABLING CONDITIONS

Share of environmental taxes in total tax revenues

Increase the share of environmental taxes in total revenues from taxes
and social contributions

Fossil fuel subsidies

Reduce environmentally harmful subsidies, in particular fossil fuel subsidies,
with a view to phasing them out without delay

Environmental protection expenditure

Increase spending by households, corporations and governments on preventing,
reducing and eliminating pollution and other environmental degradation

Share of green bonds in total issued bonds

Increase the issuance of green bonds to boost public and private financing
for green investments

Eco-innovation index
Increasing eco-innovation as a driver for the green transition

LIVING WELL, WITHIN PLANETARY BOUNDARIES

Land take
No net land take by 2050

Water exploitation index plus

Reduce water scarcity

Consumption footprint
Significantly decrease the EU's consumption footprint, i.e. the environmental
impact of consumption

Employment in the environmental goods and services sector

Increase the share of green employment in the whole economy

Gross value added of the environmental goods and services sector

Increase the share of the green economy in the whole economy

Environmental inequalities
Reduce environmental inequalities and ensure a fair transition

Source: EEA, 2023b.

Note: The 8th EAP indicators and monitoring targets were outlined in the European Commission
Communication on the 8th EAP monitoring framework (COM(2022)357).

16 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
2 The evolving understanding of
sustainability challenges

Key messages

• Environmental and sustainability challenges can be classified as specific,

diffuse, systemic or complex.

• Complex challenges are systemic challenges that are also characterised by

uncertainty. Various actors often have different ways of characterising them,
in terms of their framing, knowledge base and uncertainties.

• Many conceptual frameworks have been developed to describe and diagnose

systemic and complex challenges. The frameworks of systemic risks, Cynefin
and VUCA, are most useful in situations where challenges are systemic but
uncertainties are limited. The concept of 'wicked problems' and the framework
of post‑normal science are most useful in very uncertain situations where
controversy or indecision persists.

• These frameworks offer heuristics to diagnose and understand the challenges

and inspirational ideas for action, such as uncertainty management and
deliberative approaches to knowledge production.

As described in Chapter 1, the understanding of environment and sustainability

challenges has evolved significantly since they were first introduced as core
principles of EU development. The complexity of sustainability challenges has
become especially visible in the context of recent crises. This is clearly illustrated
by the concept of the 'triple planetary crisis', referring to the challenges of climate
change, pollution and biodiversity loss. This clearly demonstrates the interconnected
nature of various dimensions of environmental degradation (UNEP, 2022). This
Chapter looks more closely at the characteristics of systemic and complex
challenges. It also presents some key frameworks developed to meet the specific
character of such problems.

2.1 A typology of challenges

The insight that sustainability challenges are systemic and complex (Allen et al., 2003;
Giampietro, 2021; Kovacic and Di Felice, 2019) is now widely acknowledged by
international organisations at the science‑policy interface (Pörtner et al., 2022;
Sillmann et al., 2022; UNEP and IRP, 2015) as well as in policymaking. The recognition
of sustainability challenges as systemic and interlinked also lies at the core of the
European Green Deal (EGD) (EC, 2019). Several of the EU's main policy packages
deliberately adopt a systems‑based framing (e.g. Farm‑to‑Fork Strategy; Fit for 55).

In parallel with the evolving understanding of challenges, the need for 'sustainability
transformations' has been increasingly recognised as a more fundamental,
cross‑cutting and systemic form of change (EEA, 2021a). This is clearly reflected
in the Global Sustainable Development Report 2023 (UN, 2023), the ongoing

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 17
 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges

'transformative change assessment' developed by IPBES and the focus of the EU's
8th EAP on 'systemic change'. The 8th EAP calls for 'fundamental, transformative
and cross‑cutting form of change that implies major shifts and reorientation in
system goals, incentives, technologies, social practices and norms' as well as a
'transformation of production and consumption patterns' (EU, 2022).

This call for sustainability transformations is now also evident at a global scale. The
current design of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN, 2015) reflects the
evolving understanding of sustainability. While the UN development agenda used to be
more narrowly focused on economic and social development and on less‑developed
countries, the SDGs speak to a broader understanding of the interconnectedness of
sustainability and development challenges for the whole world.

Recognising a need for systemic change also entails changes in knowledge and
governance practices (EC, 2022b; Visseren‑Hamakers et al., 2021; Turnhout et al., 2021).
As an example, since the approval of the EGD in 2020, shocks and multiple, interrelated
crises have made concepts like anticipation, foresight, preparedness, responsiveness
and resilience more central to knowledge and governance systems in Europe and around
the world. The concept of resilience refers especially to a system's ability to recover after
adversity, be it sudden shocks or long‑term stressors (de Smedt et al., 2018). Resilience
can refer to ecosystems that sustain human and other life, or the socio‑economic
system. It is connected to objectives like making non‑sustainable economic systems
more resilient (de Smedt et al., 2018).

The systemic character of policy and governance issues has been recognised for
several decades (von Bertalanffy, 1968). The rapid growth of environmental system
sciences such as ecology and climate science in this period was in itself a response
to this recognition. Since the 1990s, environmental science has increasingly
integrated human, social and political dimensions into the study of socio‑ecological
systems (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994a).

When describing sustainability challenges, terminologies like polycrisis, systemic

risks, drivers of change, uncertainty and complexity have two key characteristics
in common: (1) 'uncertainty' understood as a lack of predictability with consequent
surprises; and (2) 'complexity' understood as inextricable multi‑causality between
factors, perceived as interconnectedness.

Over the years, the EEA (2019a, 2021b) has referred to environmental
and sustainability challenges as specific, diffuse, systemic and — most
recently — complex (Table 2.1). In its original form, this typology contained
the categories specific, diffuse and systemic (EEA, 2010, 2015b, 2019b). The
fourth category of complex (originally called 'sustainability') was added in
2021 (EEA, 2021c). It had nevertheless been acknowledged for a long time, as
witnessed by the following quote:

…the situation policymakers are facing when having to decide on cases

concerning the environment where the stakes are high and the issues are
complex. Uncertainty regarding the eventual effects on the environment,
considerable social and economic interests, and value laden arguments being
used by stakeholders are common features (Domingo Jiménez Beltrán, in EEA,
1999, p. 4).

18 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges

Table 2.1 Evolving understanding of environmental and sustainability challenges

at the EEA

Key Key features In policy Policy approaches (examples) Assessment approaches and
challenges since tools (examples)

Specific Linear cause‑effect, point 1970s Targeted policies and single‑use Data sets, indicators
source, local instruments

Diffuse Cumulative causes, multiple 1990s Policy integration, market‑based As above; and DPSIR,
sources instruments, raising public awareness environmental accounts, outlooks

Systemic Systemic causes, interlinked 2010s Policy coherence, systemic focus As above; and STEEPV,
sources (e.g. mobility system), long‑term and practice‑based knowledge,
multi‑dimensional goals (e.g. SDGs) systems assessment, stakeholder
participation, foresight

Complex As above; and wicked problems; In focus As above; and open governance, As above; and post‑normal
VUCA; intertwining nature and today public participation, co‑creation, science, response‑oriented,
culture; urgent and large‑scale innovation, experimentation collaborative

Source: Adapted from EEA 2019a, 2021b.

While these terms are sometimes used almost interchangeably in policy and
public discourse, the distinction between 'systemic' and 'complex' deserves proper
attention (see Box 2.1). There is no scientific consensus on definitions for these
terms (Chu et al., 2003; Chu, 2011). Variations in the understandings of complexity
are largely aligned with differences in views of how suitable conventional and
established knowledge and governance systems are for dealing with sustainability
challenges (Strand, 2002).

Box 2.1
What are systemic and complex challenges?

Sustainability challenges perceived as systemic would typically be those where

identifying a system or a set of systems is thought to be possible. Systems can be
defined through informal or formal models that include elements, causal factors,
pathways and dynamics of the system, their possible nonlinearities, interdependencies,
systemic risks, attractor patterns, paradoxical effects and other systemic features.
Any definition of a system definition requires a deliberate process of setting its
boundaries — what to include and what to exclude. A main feature with respect to
governance is the reliability and validity of the model.

Complex challenges are systemic and imperfectly known (i.e. characterised by high
uncertainty, see Sections 2.2‑2.3). Two main features of complex challenges are how
the challenge is framed by different actors and the nature of the knowledge base and its
uncertainties. The knowledge base and its degree of uncertainty are again dependent
on how the challenge is framed i.e. on how the boundaries and the dynamics of the
problem are characterised. For example, so‑called 'unknown unknowns' may escape
proper attention. All of these phenomena of knowing and framing belong to human,
social, political and even philosophical realm. Hence, a proper treatment of complex
sustainability challenges cannot do without social sciences and the humanities.

It is important to bear in mind that the categories of systemic and complex challenges are
concepts with strengths and limitations. From an operational perspective it may not be
straightforward to distinguish between systemic and complex challenges. A diagnostic
framework has been developed with that aim in Annex 1. This framework is based on
the definitions provided in this Chapter and it is articulated in guiding questions. In the
context of this report, it was used to analyse the four major crises presented in Chapter 5.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 19
 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges

In the current circumstances, which are characterised by multiple interlinked crises,

it seems that knowledge and policy approaches designed for specific and diffuse
challenges are beginning to fail more often, as they do not properly account for
nonlinearities, interlinkages and uncertainties. As reviewed by Oliver et al. (2021),
a wealth of studies reveals insufficiencies and inadequacies in knowledge systems
that address contemporary environmental and societal challenges.

Yet the need for different knowledge and governance systems should not be
confused with the idea that the world and the sustainability challenges we are facing
have become more complex, as discussed in Box 2.2.

Box 2.2
Has the world become more complex?

The recent focus on complexity in sustainability science, policy and governance could
be taken as an indication that the world is now more complex than before. This report
cautions against that interpretation. In the real world, all biological and social systems
are open. They experience and depend on nonlinear interactions for their existence
(Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). Furthermore, economic systems (Knight, 2014) and
societies (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994a) cannot be deterministic and fully known. In
terms of real‑world socio‑ecological systems, all challenges are complex. We may choose
to believe that a system can be perfectly known and controlled and that a challenge is
specific or diffuse. However, this choice may turn problematic as oversimplification may
overshadow underlying complexities and make governance ineffective at best.

Humans create order by means of technology, infrastructure, institutions and social

practices (Latour, 1993; Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). These typically work by
simplifying, linearising and delimiting systems; for example by building factories,
cultivating landscapes and disciplining behaviour. Examples include markets or political
states, but also systems in nature such as natural reserves or single species populations.
In periods of order and stability, the systems may be governed without too much failure
as if they were simple and under control. Individual, collective and institutional actors may
then feel that the systems are linear and challenges are not systemic nor complex. In fact,
the systems may appear to be easily controllable because the perceived level of control
so far has been good. However, this feeling is little more than a psychological habit
(Hume, 2013). The current experience of polycrisis and turbulent times could indicate that
old habits and feelings of control are becoming dysfunctional.

2.2 Conceptual frameworks for systemic and complex challenges

Since the 1990s, developments in environmental sciences have given rise to an

abundance of conceptual frameworks and tools for the analysis of systemic and
complex challenges. These include integrated environmental assessments, the
Driver‑Pressure‑State‑Impact‑Response (DPSIR) framework, system dynamics,
complex adaptive systems theory, multi‑scale integrated analyses of societal and
ecosystem metabolisms, nexus methodologies and multi‑criteria evaluation
(Toth and Hizsnyik, 1998; EEA, 1999; Rammel et al., 2007; Munda, 2008;
Giampietro et al., 2009; Spangenberg, 2011; Endo et al., 2020). Governance
approaches to systemic and complex challenges have also multiplied over the same
period. To some extent, descriptions, analytical tools and governance approaches
develop in conjunction. However, the relationship is not one‑to‑one (see Urbinatti et
al., 2020). A selection of key conceptual frameworks for describing systemic and
complex challenges is presented in Table 2.2.

20 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges

Understandings of complexity

The key differences between the frameworks introduced in Table 2.2 are related to the
understanding of complexity, which can be understood on a scale from thin and thick
complexity (Strand, 2002). Thin/reductionist complexity concepts assume a complex
'reality' out there, which is independent of the observer. A system would accordingly
be defined as complex if it is differentiated and changing, presenting non‑linearity and
emerging properties that challenge predictability. This concept is not too different from
the 'systemic' understanding of challenges introduced in Table 2.1.

Thick complexity concepts, on the other hand, include the role of the observer and their
analytical choices in the definition of complexity. In this view, complexity requires the
use of multiple scales of analysis as well as perspectives, which cannot be reduced
to one another (Ahl and Allen, 1996; Kovacic, 2017; Kovacic and Giampietro, 2015;
Rosen, 1985; Zellmer et al., 2006).

Thin complexity approaches take some uncertainty, nonlinearity and

interconnectedness into account and continue to uphold the belief that the system
can be governed to some extent. Attempts to govern by using complex system
models or 'digital twins' (i.e. digital replicas of a given system) is one example of
that type of approach. In the context of sustainability challenges, systemic risk
frameworks are another prominent example, such as those of The Knowledge‑Action
Network (KAN) on Emergent Risks and Extreme Events (Risk‑KAN) and the
International Risk Governance Council (Sillmann et al., 2022; Renn and Walker,
2008). Both are examples where the diagnosis of a problem is developed in close
conjunction with advice related to action. In both, complexity is seen as a feature of a
reality 'out there' independent of the observer.

Another frequently cited framework is the Cynefin model (Rancati and Snowden,
2021; Kurtz and Snowden, 2003). 'Cynefin' is a Welsh word for habitat. In short, it
postulates that decision‑making processes can be classified as belonging to one
of five domains (or habitats) along a scale of increased complexity (currently called
clear, complicated, complex, chaotic and confusion), each with their characteristics
and recommendations for good practice. With thick complexity, where the person
observing and/or acting on the system is unable to characterise it, confusion is a
key feature. With this framework, however, the expectation is that knowledge will
accumulate over time and decisions will move to increasingly benign contexts, from
chaos to stability.

The VUCA framework has a similar expectation. Developed in 1987 by the US Army
War College based on an empirical study of leadership (Bennis and Nanus, 1985),
VUCA is an acronym for the words volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. Each
is seen as a characteristic of challenges for which there is a designated response.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 21
 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges

Table 2.2 A selection of conceptual frameworks for systemic and

complex challenges

Framework Main concepts and features Understanding of complexity

Systemic risk/ Systemic risks can only be understood and Thin complexity, close to the EEA concept of systemic
Risk governance characterised at the systemic level. Scientific challenges, focuses on the reduction of uncertainty.
characterisation of such risks is emphasised to However, within the literature, systemic risk can also be
reduce the gap between data on systemic risks and seen as socially constructed and therefore indicates thick
policy making. This concept is well connected with complexity (Maskrey et al., 2021).
elaborated guidelines for risk governance.

Cynefin Cynefin presents a typology of decision‑making There is an element of thick complexity as the possibility
contexts (clear, complicated, complex, chaotic, of chaos and confusion exists. However, the theory is thin
confusion) and corresponding strategies for complexity as it posits that contexts objectively exist,
decision‑making within each one. rather than being constructs themselves, and furthermore
challenges will become easier to deal with as knowledge
accumulates.

VUCA The VUCA framework originated in the military context While VUCA concepts are flexible and in principle could
at the end of the Cold War and later gained traction be compatible with thick complexity, they are frequently
in other contexts. VUCA is an acronym for volatile, combined with the understanding that volatility etc. are
uncertain, complex and ambiguous. objective properties of an external (social) world, to be
understood and governed. This makes VUCA concepts
ones of thin complexity.

Wicked problems The theory of wicked problems aims to account for Thick complexity as there is no definitive formulation of a
the failure to solve or resolve planning and policy wicked problem.
problems. It focuses on interlinkages between
problems and a lack of consensus on what counts
as a solution. Solution requirements are diverse and
variable and the solution of one problem may create
or exacerbate another problem.

Post‑normal The post‑normal science (PNS) framework developed Thick complexity, as post‑normal problems may have
science from analysing the governance of environmental multiple legitimate but internally incoherent descriptions
problems and technological risk. PNS accounts for and because humans change the world by knowing it.
the persistence of controversies at the science‑policy
interface and focuses on characterisation and
management of uncertainty. As knowledge and values
are not independent, knowledge production should be
extended beyond certified experts accordingly.

Because global sustainability challenges are seen as especially difficult to contain,

thick complexity approaches are of particular interest to this report. The concept
of wicked problems, developed originally in the field of urban planning (Rittel
and Webber, 1973), is one example of thick complexity that has gained traction
in sustainability studies as a realistic description of governance problems. A
main feature of wicked problems — extended in the concept of super‑wicked
problems (Box 2.3) — is that there is no consensus on how to frame the problem and
what counts as a solution. Moreover, more knowledge about the problem does not
necessarily translate into knowledge about how to solve it.

22 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges

Box 2.3
Wicked and super‑wicked problems

Ten features of wicked problems (from Rittel and Webber, 1973):

1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.

2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule.
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true‑or‑false, but good‑or‑bad.
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a 'one‑shot operation'; because there is no
opportunity to learn by trial‑and‑error, every attempt counts significantly.
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of
potential solutions, nor is there a well‑described set of permissible operations that
may be incorporated into the plan.
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in
numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's
resolution.
10. The planner has no right to be wrong.

Four additional features of super‑wicked problems (Lazarus, 2009; Levin et al., 2012):

• Time is running out. The longer it takes to address the problem, the harder it will be
to do so.
• No central authority. The absence of an existing institutional framework of
government with the ability to develop, implement and maintain the laws necessary
to address a problem of climate change's tremendous spatial and temporal scope.
• Those seeking to solve the problem are also causing it and are also those with the
least immediate incentive to act within that necessary shorter timeframe.
• Policies irrationally discount the future.

Post‑normal science

The concept of post‑normal science (PNS) was originally developed in relation to the
analysis of the science‑policy interface on issues of environmental and technological
risk (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1985, 1993). This concept includes not only a definition
of the problem, but also the practice and understanding of science and governance.
The term 'post‑normal' refers to Thomas Kuhn's characterisation of normal science
as puzzle‑solving science, where putting pieces together will eventually lead to a final
answer (within its paradigm) (Kuhn, 1962). However in reality, the knowledge base does
not always 'stabilise' and uncertainties are not always reduced. In fact, in some cases
uncertainties continue to exist over time or even increase in tandem with political
controversy. Such 'post‑normal' conditions are often marked by: (1) uncertain facts,
(2) values in dispute, (3) high stakes and (4) the perception that decisions are urgent
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). These four features are linked intrinsically.

In post‑normal conditions, controversies fail to be resolved by appealing to normal

science or technical expertise per se. This is because there is no clear‑cut separation
between facts and values (e.g. cultural, moral) under such circumstances, as broadly
recognised in the fields of history, philosophy and sociology of science. The relevance
and meaning of facts are instead only judged in processes that are value‑based, like

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 23
 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges

in policy making (Kuhn, 1962; Ravetz, 1971). Therefore, facts depend on how the
issue is defined and how system boundaries are drawn, which again depends on
the value‑system of the observer. As an example, in situations where groups hold
different claims that are each seen as legitimate, acknowledging the interactions
between technical and political dimensions of the issue is the best approach.

While governmental discourse has been slow to incorporate such understandings,

advances are being made (Scharfbillig et al., 2021; Strand, 2022; DEFRA, 2021).
In the context of environmental conflicts and biodiversity issues, values and how
they are expressed is receiving increasing attention (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994b;
IPBES, 2022; Martinez‑Alier, 2003; Unai et al., 2017).

Insights and principles provided by frameworks like wicked problems and

post‑normal science correspond well with the contemporary experience of
polycrisis, turbulent times and a general lack of satisfactory progress towards
sustainability. While acknowledging the legitimacy and value of all presented
frameworks, this report places emphasis on post‑normal science and its insights on
sustainability governance under conditions of high uncertainty and complexity.

2.3 Uncertainty and action: insights from post‑normal science

Because of the gravity related to sustainability challenges like the 'triple planetary
crisis', the sense of urgency is one of the most defining features of such problems.
In scientific terms, urgency means that there is no time to wait for full scientific
certainty or even for more information to be produced. From a post‑normal
perspective, acting on systemic and complex challenges cannot be dependent on
waiting for better knowledge. Instead, seeking ways to act and make decisions
within uncertainty, complexity and controversy are the norms of environmental
governance — acknowledging that urgency may create tensions with the soundness
and legitimacy of the decisions (see Chapters 3 and 5).

To understand the level of uncertainty connected to a problem, there are many

typologies available to help characterise and analyse the available knowledge for
sustainability challenges (Bevan, 2022). Knight (2014) distinguishes between risk,
(strict) uncertainty and ignorance. Strict uncertainty can be defined as the incapacity to
rigorously and credibly quantify probabilities or likelihoods of specific events. Ignorance
denotes the lack of full knowledge of the outcome. The presence of ignorance may be
known, suspected or unknown to the decision‑maker (so‑called 'unknown unknowns').
Moreover, in principle, causal systems are open. System boundaries can be challenged
and the framing of the decision problem changed according to the observer and their
values. This phenomenon is called indeterminacy (Wynne, 1992).

Different conceptual understandings of uncertainty favour different governance

regimes. Framing uncertainty as risk, defined as a quantifiable probability of harm,
means that the logical response is to try and reduce it. If uncertainty cannot be
reduced (at least not in the timeframe of the decision), one might need to move
beyond uncertainty reduction as a response and search for responses that can
help the system thrive in the context of uncertainty and complexity. For this
reason, definitions of uncertainty and responses are better understood together, as
reviewed in Table 2.3. Situations described in the table are not mutually exclusive,
nor do they exist objectively. In any real situation, there will be elements of risk,
uncertainty and ignorance. Their characterisation will be relative to the system
definition, which again depends on the problem framing.

24 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges

Table 2.3 A selection of types of partial knowledge

Situation State of knowledge Examples of governance approaches

Risk 'Known' impacts and 'known' probabilities Risk management

Uncertainty 'Known' impacts and 'unknown' probabilities Precautionary approaches that do not require
certainty or risk to act

Ignorance 'Unknown' impacts and therefore 'unknown' Anticipatory and adaptive approaches that try
probabilities — 'unknown unknowns' to manage ignorance, reduce vulnerability and
enhance resilience

Ambiguity 'Known probabilities' but 'unknown impacts' as one cannot Extending the peer‑community and working
predict which of the possible impacts will be realised and deliberatively within imperfections; precaution;
how it will unfold disaster preparedness

Indeterminacy Impacts are unknown and their identification depends In general, governance in complexity approaches
strongly on the choice of system boundaries because (see Chapter 3)
cause‑effect relations are open‑ended

Sources: Source: EEA's compilation based on the work of Douguet et al., 2009; EEA, 2001; Stirling, 2017;
Wynne, 1992.

A state of strict uncertainty, ignorance or indeterminacy would mean that rigorous,

quantitative risk assessments and risk‑cost‑benefit analyses are invalid or
impossible (EEA, 2001). Such situations should be addressed through deliberation
within imperfection rather than forced quantification.

Post‑normal science provides a number of recommendations for how to resolve

persisting controversies, focusing on uncertainty management and the extension of
peer communities (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Post‑normal approaches have been
tested extensively since the 2000s (Silva and Teixeira, 2011; Turnpenny et al., 2011;
Buschke et al., 2019).

In the post‑normal science framework (see Figure 2.1), both uncertainties and
the stakes of various decisions can vary from low to high. Each level generates
different challenges both for science and the science‑policy interface. As
uncertainty and/or decision stakes increase, it becomes less clear which type of
expert should be consulted and solution be pursued, as each solution will have a
different trade‑off. In this context, different experts could be called on and a variety
of problem framings should be considered.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 25
 The evolving understanding of sustainability challenges

Figure 2.1 The post‑normal science diagram

High

Post-normal
Decision stakes

science

Professional
consultancy

Applied
science

Low
Low High
Systems uncertainty

Source: Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993.

At very high levels of uncertainty (e.g. in case of ignorance, ambiguity and

indeterminacy), even the definition of expertise becomes problematic. Problem
definitions will differ, so the effects of different courses of action are never fully
understood. Definitions and suggestions for solutions will therefore always be
problematic and the use of scientific expertise becomes political in itself. This has
been well‑documented (Dupont et al., 2023). Because complex challenges involve
multiple and interconnected natural, technical, social, economic and political
domains — and relate to many dimensions, scales and domains — governing these
challenges will inevitably produce winners and losers, trade‑offs and compromises.

In this context, the way challenges are understood cannot be seen as independent
of how they are managed or governed. To respond adequately, the post‑normal
science literature suggests extending the peer communities. This requires opening
up the processes of knowledge production beyond science to include different types
of knowledge, ranging from practical, to tacit, to local and indigenous. This also
includes the knowledge of actors that are ultimately affected by the decisions made.
This proposition has fundamental implications for the governance of sustainability
challenges, as illustrated in the following chapters.

26 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
3 What form of governance to choose
for sustainability?

Key messages

• Normative frameworks for environmental and sustainability governance

are emerging. Most of them coincide on the need for change to the
socio‑economic system but differ on the theories they use.

• While the call for transformative change is clear from environmental sciences,
systemic and complex challenges highlight questions around the ability to
govern the socio‑economic system and tensions between substantive and
procedural values in good governance.

• To tackle sustainability challenges, focusing on both substantive and

procedural dimensions (the what and the how) are necessary. Dealing with
systemic and complex challenges requires a shift away from 'solutions',
meaning the action to be taken, towards 'resolutions', focusing more on
process. The latter includes drawing on the agency and creative resources of
citizens and civil society.

This Chapter presents an overview of sustainability governance frameworks and

presents key issues when governing sustainability challenges, building on the
understanding of sustainability issues as systemic and complex problems
(see Chapter 2). It highlights tensions between substantive and procedural goals and
principles as cause for new approaches to governance.

3.1 Normative frameworks of sustainability governance

Against the backdrop of multiple environmental and social challenges and

insufficient progress towards sustainability, there is a clear need to reflect on current
practices and policies. This reflection raises several questions: should the current
socio‑economic system be made more resilient to crises or should production and
consumption practices be made more sustainable? If sustainability requires systemic
change and the phasing out of unsustainable practices, how should the inherent
trade‑offs be handled?

On a more philosophical level, debate is growing around the definition of

sustainability and the values that should guide sustainability governance.
Sustainability of what? For whom? For how long? These questions will define what is
an intrinsically normative debate about how to respond to environmental challenges.

The question of how to understand and manage environmental and societal challenges
has risen in prominence since the mid‑2010s (EEA, 2015b) and led to a growing
field of emerging normative frameworks for sustainability governance. Table 3.1
summarises the main perspectives on how governance models could change and how
these shifts could take place. The literature on sustainability transitions has been the
basis of several EEA and Eionet publications (Eionet, 2016; EEA, 2017, 2019a, 2021c),

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 27
 What form of governance to choose for sustainability?

which draw directly on emerging research on academic sustainability transitions and

transformations. Different perspectives are based on disparate theories of change.
Some see the key to a more sustainable future in technological change and innovation;
to others it lies in the reconfiguration of the relationship between society and the
environment; others think it requires in changes to the economic system; and some
favour procedural aspects related to the justice system.

Table 3.1 Transition and transformation theory clusters

Transition and Core ideas and Characterisation of key Theory of change Practical examples
transformation concepts challenges
theory clusters

Sociotechnical Sociotechnical systems Systemic challenges Top-down stimulation by Sustainability

transitions include technologies, that are interdependent governments as well as horizontal transitions
infrastructure, with (Western) lifestyles, coordination between sectors. (Kemp et al., 2007;
regulations, norms and technologies, infrastructure Loorbach and
Transition governance emphasises
discourses. and cultures. Rotmans, 2010;
phasing out unsustainable
Raven et al., 2010)
Multi-level perspective practices; diffusion and upscaling
(Raven et al., 2010): of (technological) innovations;
interactions between incremental improvements at the
innovation niches, niche level; and radical system
regimes and landscapes. change at the regime level.

Socio-ecological Social metabolism. Misalignment between Fundamental re-orientation Degrowth

transformations biophysical and social or transformation of society (D'Alisa et al., 2015;
Socio-ecological systems
processes. and economy beyond mere Escobar, 2015)
as complex, adaptive and
'technological fixes'.
resilient systems. Humanity has become
the major driver of global
Alternative development
environmental change
trajectories and
('the Anthropocene').
pathways.

Socio-economic Production and Materialism and Changes in economic paradigms Circular economy
perspectives consumption patterns consumerism as drivers of can shift values, mindsets and (Stahel, 2016)
as drivers of the sustainability challenges. lifestyles.
economic system. This includes unsustainable
Socio-economic perspectives
resource use and lifestyles.
Fundamental role of emphasise the role of market
values and worldviews forces in driving the diffusion of
in enabling or new technologies.
hindering systemic
transformation.

Action-oriented Governance of Challenge of allowing Community-based civic society led Adaptive

perspectives the commons, for self-management of bottom-up transformation. governance of the
polycentricity, practice ecosystems in diverse commons
Initiatives may be replicated (scaling
theory. and dynamic landscapes, (Folke, 2007)
out); they may be institutionalised
taking into account
at higher levels or influence policy
context‑specificity and
(scaling up); or they may become
community needs.
more deeply embedded in social
norms and values (scaling deep)
(Moore et al., 2015).

Just transitions Distributional and Consequences of Empowering and giving Social

procedural justice, sustainability transitions voice to indigenous peoples, movements
environmental justice, on marginalised actors and social movements led by for environmental
recognitional justice. minorities: how vulnerable socioeconomically disadvantaged justice
groups are impacted and marginalised communities, (Martinez‑Alier,
differently by sustainability acknowledging that fights for 2023)
transitions. human rights and environment are
often inseparable.

28 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 What form of governance to choose for sustainability?

Normative discussions of governance and sustainability are mainly connected

to two elements: the gravity of crises, in association with the scale and pace of
the change needed to address them, and the governability of the transformation
towards sustainability.

The extent to which socio‑economic regimes need to change to be sustainable

relates to the question of change itself. Can sustainability be achieved through
incremental changes like efficiency improvements, redirecting consumption to
sustainable goods, green energy and fair trade, fiscal incentives and taxes that
promote corporate social responsibility? Or is fundamental change required, meaning
radically different societies and economies?

The theoretical framework of sustainability transitions combines the incremental and

fundamental change perspective, claiming that systemic change starts in 'innovation
niches' that can be scaled up and, as they accumulate, lead to a larger change at the
system level (Geels and Schot, 2007). Others warn against the dangers of 'regulatory
capture' from the way transitions are sometimes described and envisioned within
this framework. Stirling (2014, p. 84) states that 'novel 'transitions' may readily end
up concealing what are in actuality deeper realignments with existing structures.
In other words, the realised forms of 'transformation' may be more discursive and
superficial than material and substantive.'

The EEA (2017, p. 6) has previously called for Europe to 'go beyond incremental
improvements in environmental performance. Instead, it must find ways to achieve
fundamental transitions or transformations in core systems' and that 'fundamental'
signifies profound changes of 'institutions, practices, technologies, policies, lifestyles
and thinking'.

Within the sustainability transitions framework, the call for deep change demands
rethinking and remaking society:

According to these new perspectives, transitions are non‑linear, society‑wide

processes, with a central role for bottom‑up processes of innovation,
experimentation, learning and networking. Change occurs through
interdependent adjustments in technologies, business models, behaviours,
rules, values and so on, producing non‑linear and highly unpredictable results.
Public policies and institutions are part of the regime structures, implying that
they too need to be transformed (EEA, 2019, p. 8).

Discussions around the gravity of systemic and interconnected crises mainly

come from framings in literature on climate change, where environmental crises
are understood as global and urgent issues that constitute an existential threat.
Here, the concept of 'tipping points' signals that conditions for (human) life may be
compromised. There is a growing literature on the notion of collapse, based both on
historical analysis and awareness that societies have collapsed before (Tainter, 1990;
Lenton et al., 2023; Centeno et al., 2023) and doing forward‑looking assessments that
explore how to respond to collapse (Diamond, 2011).

The framing of environmental challenges as existential risks invites several

reflections about the need for inner transformation related to consciousness,
mindsets, values, worldviews, beliefs, spirituality and human–nature connectedness
(Woiwode et al., 2021), as well as the interdependence of individuals, collectives
and systems (Ives et al., 2023). Changes in mindset are seen as fundamental to turn
vicious cycles into virtuous cycles, which spill from inner understandings to policy
and decision making (Wamsler and Bristow, 2022; Oliver et al., 2022).

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 29
 What form of governance to choose for sustainability?

Secondly, the literature on socio‑ecological transformations raises questions around

the extent to which transformations are governable. The question of directionality
becomes a key issue, as there is 'no clear vision of the make‑up of the resulting
society' (Haberl et al., 2011, p. 11).

The question of transition governability is prominent in the sustainability transitions

literature. This acknowledges complexity and the fact that transitions cannot
be deliberately planned but still can be managed by nurturing the right kinds
of innovation. Governance is framed as 'coordination', 'alignment of visions' or
'convergence' (Geels and Schot, 2007, p. 402).

Approaches like integrated assessment modelling similarly represent a narrow view

of governance, premised on the idea that governance is hierarchical and operating in
a system that is essentially stable. Here the role of governments is to define targets,
set rules of how they are to be achieved and create incentives through regulating
markets and other social sectors.

Proponents of transformation and broader transition theories instead favour

approaches of network governance (EEA, 2017) and call for change within the
institutions responsible. The EEA (EEA, 2017, p. 27) states that 'tackling complexity
and achieving transitions will depend in part on overcoming silos and enabling
information to flow freely across government and across scales. It will also require
the development of adaptive governance frameworks that operate via iterative cycles
of planning, implementing, monitoring and learning.'

3.2 Emerging governance challenges and tensions

In this report, governance is understood as a broad societal phenomenon. This

differentiates from that of government, which is often described by governmental
agendas and the ecosystem of surrounding actors and institutions, as reflected
above. The definition of governance proposed by the Commission on Global
Governance (CGG, 1995) is the starting point:

Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions,

public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process
through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and
co‑operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes
empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that
people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.
(CGG, 1995, p. 2).

Governance as 'the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions manage
their common affairs' includes market interactions and most activity in civil
society, including community life and political debate. In governance literature, a
distinction is frequently made between: (1) governmental (hierarchical/vertical)
action by intervention logics and means of formal rules, regulation, taxation, laws
and standards; (2) market governance and (3) network (horizontal) governance by
informal social systems (Meuleman, 2020).

An overview of environmental and sustainability governance in the EU is offered in

Box 3.1.

30 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 What form of governance to choose for sustainability?

Box 3.1
Environmental (and sustainability) governance within the EU

A sophisticated system of governance exists within the governmental institutions

of the EU. This includes institutional structures, processes and mechanisms for
decision‑ and policymaking. It also incorporates the broad regulatory framework
encompassing all the legislation, treaties, case law and international agreements
that the EU has adopted and developed since its inception — the EU acquis — which
dovetails for all EU policy areas.

The foundation of the EU's approach to governing the environment (and later
sustainability) is laid out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
which together with the Treaty on European Union form the basis of the EU
constitution and EU law. In its consolidated version the Treaty specifies that EU policy
on the environment shall contribute to:

• preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment;

• protecting human health;
• prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources; and
• promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide
environmental problems and in particular combating climate change.

It indicates that EU policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection on
the basis that 'the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action
should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source
and that the polluter should pay'.

In the context of the EU policy and law‑making cycle, the Better Regulation
agenda defines a set of initiatives and principles geared towards improving the
quality of the EU legislative process (EC, 2024a). While applicable to processes
across various policy areas, its key principles are clearly relevant for environmental
policymaking: it stresses the importance of evidence‑based policymaking and
therefore encourages the use of scientific evidence, data and impact assessments
in policymaking. In addition, the Better Regulation Package — through the REFIT
programme — intends to simplify EU legislation by reducing administrative burdens,
encouraging compliance. These measures aim to improve the efficiency of regulatory
frameworks. They also promote transparency and accountability, the conduct of
both ex‑ante and ex‑post evaluations and the involvement of citizens, businesses
and stakeholders in decision‑ and policymaking processes throughout the entire
policy lifecycle. The principles of proportionality and subsidiarity guide the EU in its
endeavour to ensure policies are implemented and laws are complied with.

Overall, the EU's approach to environmental and sustainability governance includes a

great number of policies and laws on 'water, nature, air and waste', commitment to the
UN Sustainable Development Goals, and crosscutting (e.g. sustainable finance) and
high‑level initiatives (e.g. greening of the European Semester). These are continuously
developed in tandem with governance mechanisms by improving the whole policy
cycle from the process of planning and proposing laws to implementation, monitoring
compliance and — where necessary — legal enforcement.

Public participation is envisaged across the policy cycle by means of thematic

(e.g. the Water Framework Directive) and cross‑cutting legislation (e.g. Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive (EU, 2014) and the Strategic Environmental
Assessment (SEA) Directive (EU, 2001)), as well as through initiatives like the 'Have
Your Say' portal. Together they constitute key opportunities for vertical and horizontal
knowledge integration, as they allow for local, regional and lay knowledge to be
included in policymaking.

Recently, citizen engagement and participation in policy‑ and decision making on

sustainability matters has received renewed attention (see e.g. the Conference on the
Future of Europe), especially on questions around the governance of sustainability
transitions and on the modalities and goals of public participation (EEA, 2023c).

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 31
 What form of governance to choose for sustainability?

In this context, multi‑level governance models, 'intended as models of governance

which may embrace international, supranational, cross‑border, national and subnational
(regional, intermediate and local) levels of governance, delivered with participation
of the people, civil society, and other organisations and stakeholders' (Dunoff, 2021),
have grown in prominence. The Urban Agenda for the EU is a very relevant example
(EC, 2021a). It presents itself as an 'umbrella' for all urban policy initiatives, helping
to strengthen urban policy at all levels, from city to Member State to the EU level. It
also provides a place to integrate multiple EU programmes and initiatives addressing
sustainable urban development, strengthening the importance of the local level within the
EU environmental governance framework.

3.2.1 Substantive goals versus procedural principles

The Commission's White Paper on European Governance (EC, 2001) defines

governance as 'rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers
are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation,
accountability, effectiveness and coherence'. The EU white paper therefore defines
good governance largely in terms of procedural principles.

This aligns with the common view in political philosophy that a decision should be
judged on the procedure of arriving at the decision — the process of resolution and
handling of trade‑offs — rather than the resulting outcome, because the outcome will
always be influenced by elements outside the decision maker's control.

In the area of environmental, climate and sustainability policy advice, expertise

has traditionally been dominated by natural science disciplines. Viewed through
the natural scientists' lens of data and measurement, the appropriateness of a
decision would typically be evaluated in substantive terms, asking if the outcome has
achieved a pre‑defined goal. As described in Chapter 2, views on what are good or
desirable goals can always be disputed in post normal conditions characterised by
complexity. The corollary is that purely substantial goals would be challenged.

Tensions around what determines a good decision are magnified when dealing
with the complex and systemic character of sustainability challenges. Scientific
uncertainty, indeterminacy, ambiguity and framing plurality means that conventional
evaluation instruments like model predictions, cost‑benefit‑analyses or risk
assessments are increasingly unsuitable for evaluating decisions. As a result, public
decision‑makers may fail to receive sufficient public endorsement to go forward with
policy and implementation. Otherwise the implementation may become contested
and reversed in the political process. This tension is helpful to better understand
the insufficient progress towards sustainability: the result of trying to balance
substantive goals (outcome) and procedural principles (process) is neither sufficient
as judged by scientific advice nor legitimate as rendered by the political process.

3.2.2 Challenges to legitimacy and transformation

In democratic modern states, the division of labour between public administration

and democratic institutions is fundamental and the people are seen as the only
legitimate source of political power. Accordingly, decisions in public administration
must be informed by the best available science as well as value choices that have
been determined through democratic processes.

32 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 What form of governance to choose for sustainability?

This tension becomes critical when insights of sustainability transitions are

translated into policy recommendations, as done with the ten policy messages
distilled in the report Sustainability transitions: policy and practice (EEA, 2019a):

1. Promote experimentation with diverse forms of sustainability innovation and build

transformative coalitions;

2. Stimulate the diffusion of green niche innovations;

3. Support the reconfiguration of whole systems, phase out existing technologies and
alleviate negative consequences;

4. Leverage and strengthen the role of cities in sustainability transitions;

5. Reorient financial flows towards sustainable and transformative innovations;

6. Promote clear direction for change through ambitious visions, targets and
missions;

7. Align policies between different domains to improve policy coherence for

transitions;

8. Promote coherence of actions across EU, national, regional and local governance
levels;

9. Monitor risks and unintended consequences and adjust pathways as necessary;

10. Develop knowledge and skills for transitions governance and practice.

As reflected in the above, uncertainty and complexity are often reduced to technical
problems that can be solved through innovation, coherence and new skills (Kovacic
and Benini, 2022). Kovacic and Benini (2022) point to three tensions and related
'balancing acts' when bridging academic research and policy.

The first tension lies in the issue of governability, which is impacted by the
complexity and gravity of contemporary societal challenges, as explained in
Chapter 2 of this report. The acknowledgment that governability is limited must be
balanced against the legitimacy of governing institutions. A second tension is related
to the social contract of agencies and other organisations in the science‑society
interface, as well as their relationship both to policy and the public. On the one
hand, the legal mandate of such organisations may be to provide evidence for
policymaking and thus 'speak truth to power' (Waterton and Wynne, 2004). On
the other hand, expert advice and governmental decision‑making could become
contested because major sustainability challenges display the characteristics of
post‑normal conditions. In these cases, stakes are high, facts are uncertain, values
are in dispute and decisions are urgent (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). In such
conditions, the legitimacy of public administration becomes destabilised and unclear.
Dealing with complex environmental challenges instead calls for the inclusion of a
more diverse set of actors and different ways of knowing by involving an 'extended
peer community' (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993).

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 33
 What form of governance to choose for sustainability?

The third and related tension concerns issues where uncertainty and complexity
prevail. Here a balance needs to be found, between answering questions related to
pressing policy‑ or decision‑making and raising new questions — or at least ensuring
that they have the space in which to be raised. In the context of such uncertainty,
it becomes crucial to expand the range of possible inputs to debates around policy
to include narratives, future visions among others as well as to create spaces for
reflexivity (Strand et al., 2018).

For instance, in the case of climate change, de facto governance responses can
either be close to no action or deem climate less important than other issues.
Seemingly, this might even be the result of open, fair, transparent, participatory and
accountable processes. One unsolved problem for democracies, however, is that
the representation of future generations' concerns (and those of non‑human life)
are not included.

Solutions that are neither fair nor just, or processes that are not open, participatory
and accountable, are not only problematic in terms of good governance and ethical
grounds but are also unlikely to succeed as they will fail to mobilise agency in civil
society. Views within the sustainability transitions literature argue that transformative
change will need to be deep and involve the creative resources and agencies of
citizens and civil society.

Following the principles of the EU White Paper on Governance, the quality of

governance lies not so much in the targets it sets, the missions it defines or the
innovation niches it chooses to support and nurture, but in the principles it adheres to
while living through complexity and uncertainty.

To solve our most pressing issues, it might be crucial to shift focus merely from
the 'what' to also include the 'how' of governance, as reflected in the EU white
paper — even when urgency might suggest otherwise. Experiences conveyed in
sustainability transitions literature suggest that focusing on both substantive and
procedural dimensions (the what and the how) are necessary. To respond to this
need, Chapter 4 presents the approach and concept of 'governance in complexity'.

34 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
4 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

Key messages

• The report explores the concept of 'governance in complexity'. It is defined as

the attempt to govern a system while being aware that it cannot be perfectly
known or controlled, and actors of governance are themselves part of or
interconnected with the system.

• Key principles of governance in complexity include experimentation, systems

thinking, participation, precaution, anticipation and care.

• Governance in complexity should be cultivated as a mindset defined in terms of

the level of awareness by its practitioners, not as a set of procedures or tools.

Based on the evolving understanding of sustainability challenges and sustainability

governance (Chapters 2 and 3), this report arrives at the concept of governance in
complexity. This approach to governance was developed as a response to the specific
complex nature of sustainability challenges. This Chapter offers a first attempt at a
definition of governance in complexity, alongside a set of suggested principles. Both
are developed from academic literature and refined by real‑life examples illustrations
and actual governance of sustainability practices (see Annex 2).

4.1 What is 'governance in complexity'?

The definition of governance in complexity is less important than its practice

and what follows should not be understood as a blueprint. To understand what
could be gained from this approach, it is perhaps best to consider it in contrast to
the existing — or what it is not. As will become evident, this does not imply that
conventional approaches are not needed.

Most characteristically, governance in complexity is different from governance of

complexity. This aligns with a view of governance as a broader societal phenomenon,
as presented in Chapter 3, relating to more than the ecosystem actors and institutions
that surround government. Traditionally, public decision‑makers tend to somehow
see themselves as outside and 'independent of the system that is being governed'
(Rip, 2006). As argued in previous chapters, such simplifications are inadequate
for challenges that are systemic and complex and could help explain the lack of
progress on sustainability issues. Therefore, a reflexive mindset is at the core of the
working definition brought in this report, which should be tested and improved through
experimentation and learning:

Governance in complexity is the attempt to govern a system, while being aware

that (a) the system cannot be perfectly known or controlled and (b) actors of
governance are themselves part of or interconnected with the system.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 35
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

As the framings of problems and challenges are dependent on a complex set of

political, cultural and moral values and knowledge claims (Wynne, 1992), so too are
the practices of governing them. In any given case, the governance approach to some
challenge would implicitly or explicitly amount to considering it as either specific,
diffuse, systemic and/or complex, always with the risk of failure. To reflect on and
discuss choices of descriptions and framings, it might be helpful to distinguish
between two attitudes towards knowledge and governance: adaptive and assertive.

These opposing postures can be thought of along the lines of the Chinese pair of
concepts yin and yang (Table 4.1). These correspond respectively to the notions of
thick and thin complexity (Strand, 2002) (see also Section 2.2).

Table 4.1 'Assertive' and 'adaptive' thinking in knowledge and governance

for sustainability

Aspect and focus Knowing (and not‑knowing) Acting

Assertive It is ... (nonlinear, complex It ought to work to ... / We should

adaptive systems, with feedback go towards ... (achieve policy
loops, multilevel, with path coherence, aim for systemic
dependencies, lock‑ins, rebound solutions)
effects...)

Adaptive It is more than ... (linear, nonlinear, It may be not enough to ... / We
complex adaptive systems...) should go beyond ... (we should
aim for deep and radical change,
It is un‑certain and ‑predictable,
transform, experiment, develop
in‑deterministic and ‑determinate
new and unknown social practices)

When considering systemic and complex challenges, the characterisation of their

features can be ordered from an adaptive to an assertive pole, corresponding to
yin and yang respectively. Assertiveness takes the form of having a high degree of
belief in the characterisations of the system(s) (Figure 4.1). Claims of nonlinearity,
interdependencies and systemic risks are in this sense more assertive, while claims
or suspicions of ignorance and indeterminacy are closer to an adaptive and
receptive pole.

Most essential — and just as with yin and yang — we will always need a combination
or balance between these two attitudes. The awareness of uncertainty and
complexity — and the search for societal transformations which are necessarily
unknown — must be coupled and balanced with assertive and directive thinking in
knowledge and governance to be translated into action. Governance in complexity is
about progressing within such inevitable tensions and imperfections.

36 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

Figure 4.1 Descriptors of systemic and complex challenges, ordered in a

fish‑shaped yin‑yang taiji map

indeterminacy

ignorance
power

radical openness systemic risk

uncertainty
paradoxical effects

nonlinear systems
contextuality
framing plurality

values in dispute

interdependencies

Source: EEA.

The assertive yang posture provides positive, affirmative characterisations and

knowledge claims, actions and governance approaches: the world is a huge, complex
adaptive system with multiple, interrelated drivers of change. If we improve our
scientific understanding of this system, there is – there ought to be – a way of
governing it that surely is prone to imprecision and error but that gets the job done
of improving sustainability. In its focus on knowing, it is optimistic. In its focus on
acting, it is solutionist. It values agency, strength and instrumental rationality and
asks for 'solutions' and knowledge that is 'actionable'. It imposes its own goals on
what is being governed, using force to create impact (Haraway, 2016).

The adaptive, intuitive and receptive yin posture attends to uncertainties and what
cannot be known, including knowledge that the world is too complex to be represented
in models. Accordingly, it will not act as if the absence of evidence of harm equates to
evidence of absence of harm. Some adaptive yin concepts for descriptions may sound
affirmative but their meaning is to say: 'it is more than...'. This is sometimes revealed
by negative prefixes such as in uncertain and indeterministic. With some concepts, it
is less obvious. Other concepts from the yin domain, like emergence, chaos, tipping
points and free will, all describe that something else and something more than what we
have imagined and prepared for may happen.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 37
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

As for action, adaptive yin concepts point beyond business‑as‑usual, towards radical
change, deep transformation, institutional change, public participation and new social
practices. These are all concepts that call for something new and unknown. A yin
action resembles the way water creates caves and shapes valleys: finding its way
through obstacles rather than eliminating them, while leaving the unmistakable mark
of its work.

This type of action departs from the dominant policy discourse, such as calls to
boost innovation. Such calls are often requests for something already well known,
namely products and services that may have novel details but with similar economic
and social functions to the old.

The assertive aspect assumes much from non‑systemic linear thinking, while the
adaptive aspect is radically different. The latter has been traditionally associated with
less prestige or symbolic and institutional power. More assertive ways of knowing
and acting have dominated institutional discourse.

Governance in complexity is a matter of trying to put both aspects into action:

the adaptive and intuitive as well as the assertive and affirmative. This requires
experimentation, humility and respect for the magnitude of the challenge.

4.2 Principles of governance in complexity

Characterising the principles and features that fit into the mindset of governance in
complexity can help clarify governance approaches to sustainability issues. In any
particular case of real‑world governance, however, features will interact, mutually
stimulate each other, and even exist in slight tension. It is therefore important to note
that governance would not be better if it satisfies more of the principles presented
below rather than few. However, such principles are helpful to understand choices
made in governance approaches, such as the current EU‑level policies of crisis
presented in Chapter 5.

The selection of the six principles presented in this Section is built on academic
literature of normative frameworks for sustainability governance. It was refined
through a co‑creation process at the EEA (see Figure 4.2) and informed through
key features from a broad range of examples of sustainability governance across
multiple levels in Europe and beyond (Annex 2 and Figure 4.4).

The EEA held a workshop with governance experts in June 2023, in which
participants explored characteristics of governance in the context of complexity and
uncertainty, sharing the associations presented in Figure 4.2.

38 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

Figure 4.2 Wordcloud: what do you associate with governance in complexity?

values and consensus

high-leverage points
interlinking interconnectivness
signals above noise experimentation
uncertainty inclusion epistemological pluralism creativity
international

non-finite
flat porous organisations emergent solutions
adaptiveness different mind-set systems awareness
system change
interdisciplinary tipping points
co-creation
entanglement fairness path dependency vuca
people awareness
participation power
humility
reflection

deep adaptation
connections

multi-dimentionality
multi-actor

multi-level openness
flexibility

uncertainty
wise governance
reflexivity

observation

learning
systems thinking foresight

multi-scale
values
nimbleness experimentation failure
confusion non-linear relation
contested frameworks
knowledge sharing feedback thinking democracy
worldviews stochastic relationships
out of box thinking

Source: Answers provided by 20 experts on sustainability governance during a EEA webinar in July 2023.

4.2.1 Experimentation as a transversal principle

Experimentation means to learn by trial and error, therefore accepting that error is a
necessary and legitimate part of the process. It also means allowing and boosting
creativity (Wolfe, 2020). American scholars have underlined the long‑standing role
of experimentation in EU governance (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2010). For example, the
European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) SciArt (science and art) project
explicitly expresses that in order to make progress, one cannot be afraid to fail.

From the perspective of governance in complexity, experimentation can be seen

as a fundamental principle. In systemic and complex challenges, there is no
blueprint or control. Accordingly, governance in complexity is a largely uncharted
terrain and approaches must be invented, improved, and tested by trial and error.
To some extent all reviewed good cases of governance in complexity display
experimentation (see Annex 2).

To accept failure and error as key elements along the path to sustainability is in
itself part of experimentation and a practice of humility. This contrasts with the
expectation of win‑win solutions that might conceal trade‑offs and contestation.
Creativity can be seen as the essence of the adaptive approach. In the European
context, experimentation is most noticeable in initiatives to increase participation
and less visible in technocratically‑inclined public administration. Experimentation
could in this sense consist of gathering new actors together to work towards a local
common goal, such as is evident in the example of climate streets in Finland. It could
be trying out institutional innovations at the national level, for instance in national
citizen assemblies in Ireland and Austria. Or it could mean forms of tinkering to
gradually introduce new elements of governance at the EU level, such as with the
Conference on the Future of Europe and the Commission's Competence Centre on
Participatory and Deliberative Democracy.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 39
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

The Catalan strategy for smart specialisation RISCAT2030 is a particularly

comprehensive case of experimentation. It sets out to implement third generation
innovation policy frameworks to transform its research and innovation ecosystem
towards sustainability. Finally, experimentation may also address political culture
itself, as in the Mindfulness Initiative that originated in the UK. Its advocates argue
that progression towards sustainability requires a cultivation of compassion and
emotional intelligence in public and political discourse.

4.2.2 Systems thinking

Systems thinking is a set of cognitive approaches and strategies developed in what

is often referred to as three or four 'waves' (Cabrera and Cabrera, 2019; Midgley and
Rajagopalan, 2020). In the context of sustainability governance (Voulvoulis et al., 2022),
systems thinking focuses on interactions between causal pathways in and across
systems, feedbacks and other interdependences (Ackoff, 1994), as well as
interlinkages between governance issues (Checkland, 1999). System sciences such as
ecology or climate science and specialised fields of systems research (such as system
dynamics or the study of complex adaptive systems) form part of the knowledge base.
One example of systems thinking is seeking knowledge from different disciplines
and domains to perform integrated environmental assessments. In this sense,
systems thinking is already represented in the knowledge base of environmental and
sustainability governance and through established principles of nexus governance, for
example, predominantly in the shape of thin complexity approaches (see Section 2.2).

Governance is a systemic endeavour. One implementation of systems thinking is to

seek interactions and collaborations across levels and scales ('multilevel', 'adaptive'
and 'polycentric' governance). An example is the Catalan smart specialisation
strategy (RISCAT2030) smart specialisation strategy, which attempted to make
governance processes contribute to self‑organised institutional change, so that
institutions could better adapt to challenges. Similarly, frameworks such as
meta‑ and trans‑governance form part of systems thinking (Meuleman, 2013, 2020).

Systems thinking can be theoretical as well as practical and applied to both

biophysical and socioecological systems, as well as systems of governance. Among
recent initiatives, the Commission's strategic foresight reports explicitly implement
systems thinking to imagine and develop transition pathways. Systems thinking can
be demanding, however. For example, designated programmes to educate and train
public servants in systems theory and practice have been launched in both in the UK
and Ecuador.

4.2.3 Participation

As presented in Chapter 3, the value and importance of public participation in

European policymaking and government is clearly established in the Commission's
White Paper on Governance (EC, 2001). This recognition was most recently confirmed
in the Commission's recommendation on promoting engagement and effective
participation (EC, 2023b). Fundamentally, the right to access to information and to be
able to participate in public decision‑making is a basic democratic right. With respect
to environmental matters, this right was established by the Aarhus Convention
in 1998. Thousands of experiences with public participation are found across the
globe (OECD, 2023).

In the context of governance in complexity, however, the interest in participation goes

beyond this fundamental aspect and sees participation as an essential condition
for achieving deep and transformative change. As presented in Section 3.2, a key

40 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

feature of governance in complexity is to move from the quest for 'solutions' (what
to do) to 'resolutions' (focusing on the process of deciding what to do). This calls
for an extended peer community (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). A plurality of actors
with different needs, concerns, perspectives, and sources and forms of knowledge
and values are actively sought and included in the governance process. This is
exemplified in a number of the cases in Annex 2, including the Austrian Klimarat and
the Conference on the Future of Europe. Their participation improves the chances
that resolutions, even if imperfect, are transparent and just. However, the success
of participatory processes and fora depend on their path of uptake being clear and
transparent, such as in the case of the Irish Citizens' Assembly. The Knowledge
Network on Climate Assemblies has systematised lessons from a number of such
experiences (Smith, 2023).

Active forms of participation such as co‑design and co‑creation are encouraged and
developed, which can lead to new local sustainable practices. Participation leads to
multiple ways of knowing and sources of knowledge (such as local knowledge, lay
knowledge, practical knowledge, tacit knowledge) which can hold significant value
and should not be dismissed as non‑scientific. Such knowledge sources can be
instrumental to technical outcomes, as in the reviewed case of the UNDP Accelerator
Labs, as well as to social innovation, such as with the instrument of shared agendas
(RISCAT 2030).

4.2.4 Precaution

In general, precaution means giving attention to uncertain potential for causing

harm. The Rio Declaration of Environment and Development and the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union both give legal status to the precautionary
approach and the precautionary principle in environmental governance (EU, 2020).
However, the application of precaution in courts and in public decision‑making
remains unsettled. This is partly due to tensions with other legal principles such
as proportionality and with the political objective of fast technological innovation
(EP, 2016; Röttger‑Wirtz, 2020; De Smedt and Vos, 2022).

As presented in Chapter 2, risk and uncertainty are fundamentally different

expressions of imperfect knowledge. The balance of the yin‑yang adaptive and
assertive postures in governance in complexity would perhaps call for stronger and
broader versions of the precautionary principle (Drivdal and van der Sluijs, 2021). This
is better aligned with the understanding of precaution proposed by the EEA:

The precautionary principle provides justification for public policy and other
actions in situations of scientific complexity, uncertainty and ignorance, where
there may be a need to act in order to avoid, or reduce, potentially serious or
irreversible threats to health and/or the environment, using an appropriate
strength of scientific evidence, and taking into account the pros and cons of
action and inaction and their distribution (EEA, 2013, p. 649).

Post‑normal science offers practical knowledge tools to inform the use of positive
versions of the precautionary principle. Such tools can be used to perform
comprehensive uncertainty assessments to distinguish between a range of different
types of uncertainty. However, governance instruments to support positive versions of
the precautionary principle are few. One rare example is the Norwegian Gene Technology
Act, which places the burden of proof on innovators to ensure safety, sustainability and
ethical acceptability of the release of genetically modified organisms.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 41
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

4.2.5 Anticipation

To anticipate is 'to take before' or to look forward, imagine possible, desirable or

undesirable future developments and act in ways that take such developments
into account. On the most fundamental level, all living organisms can be seen as
anticipatory systems (Rosen, 1985). All biological organisms have the ability to act
in the present on the basis of a (cognitive or other) model of the future. However in
the context of transformative change for sustainability, the concept of anticipation
is linked to the literature on governance of new and emerging technologies. Here the
concept of anticipation is contrasted with prediction (Vervoort and Gupta, 2018).
Anticipatory governance (of emerging technologies) has been defined as
'a broad‑based capacity extended through society that can act on a variety of inputs
to manage emerging knowledge‑based technologies while such management is still
possible' (Guston, 2014).

The contrast between anticipation and prediction is based on the recognition of

imperfect knowledge. Firstly, the presence of uncertainty and ignorance implies
that predictions of the future have limited value. A model used to predict the future
might be wrong. Taking anticipated developments into account is not a question
of getting the future right, but to include expectations about the future in present
behaviour. Attention is given to potential long‑term effects of action, bearing in mind
that prediction may be impossible or implausible. For example, the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) carried out 'futures impact assessments' with
questions such as: 'could this policy restrict choice or opportunity for the target
population in the future?' (UNDP, 2022).

Secondly, the pervasive presence of indeterminacy implies that looking forward is

not an objective activity that is independent of the operator. Choices of how to frame
future outlooks, scenarios, forecasts and predictions are loaded with social, political
and ethical values (Selin, 2011; Muiderman et al., 2022). In fact, imagining desirable
(or undesirable) social and technological futures is a highly political element of the
governance system that, depending on the societal sector in question, may play
a significant role in public decision‑making (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015). The term
'foresight' is often used in a more general way than anticipation. In future studies and
futurology, foresight typically signifies an approach. Sometimes, 'foresight' means
an interest in possible long‑term futures, for instance by use of scenario approaches
(Kuosa, 2011; Voros, 2017). Foresight and anticipation activities in sustainability
governance vary according to recognition of uncertainty and indeterminacy
(Muiderman et al., 2022). As a result, scenario and foresight exercises risk becoming
essentially futile attempts of prediction and governance of complexity. Several of
the cases in Annex 2 illustrate how strategies of reflexivity and participation can
be practised to mitigate this risk. In the Commission's strategic foresight reports
and EEA‑Eionet's Imaginaries for a Sustainable Europe in 2050, expert practitioners
of anticipation acknowledged that future‑making is never a neutral activity but
a way to exert value choices. In other cases, the risk was mitigated by the very
design, including the participation of a diversity of actors with different interests,
concerns and values. The inclusion of strategic foresight as one of the tools of the
Commission's Better Regulation toolbox illustrates the importance of foresight in
improving policy design and ensuring that short‑term actions are consistent with
long‑term objectives (EC, 2024).

Finally, in Annex 2, two of the cases chosen to illustrate the six principles of
governance in complexity have interesting anticipatory features. In spite of
their differences, the Norwegian Gene Technology Act and the Catalan smart
specialisation strategy (RISCAT2030) both display a combination of reflexivity and
participation, as they devise institutional procedures that orchestrate a diversity of
values in their inputs.

42 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

4.2.6 Care

While care is an everyday word, in the context of ethics and political science, it is
often connected to Gilligan's (1982) research on the differences between gender
roles and expectations with respect to moral development. This difference can be
summarised as follows: young males are socialised into general and impersonal
ethics of justice, while young females are socialised into a relational, interpersonal
ethics of care. Within feminist and post‑colonial scholarship on ethics of care, it
is often held that modern Western societies give preference to 'masculine' virtues
as upholding impersonal, objective, universal standards and equivalently devalue
personal relationships of care.

This trait of modern societies is also naturally reflected in European institutions of

governance, both in their preference for standardised procedures and in their implicit
view on scientific knowledge as objective and value‑free (Strand, 2022). As presented
in Section 3.2, sectoral governance frequently exists in the tension between the norm of
impartiality and objectivity on one hand and the care for its particular sector on the other.

In the UK's Mindfulness Initiative, the emphasis on strengthening and cultivating care,
compassion and general emotional intelligence in contemporary political culture is
similar to Gilligan's perspectives on gender. Several scholars are engaged in how
care perspectives could be better incorporated in institutional logics (The Care
Collective, 2020).

The distinction between logics of choice and logics of care describes contrasting views
on decision‑making. This makes it an exercise in selecting from predefined decision
options (choice) or attending to the issue at hand and those affected by it — rather than
applying universal principles or standard procedures (care) (Mol, 2008). In this sense,
care means continuing to attend to the issue at hand in the absence of a solution, also
referred to as 'staying with the trouble' (Haraway, 2016).

In this report, care is among the principles that most directly responds to
indeterminacy and the need to develop adaptive responses to systemic and complex
challenges. While concepts such as indeterminacy may at first sound elusive, care
is concrete. Typically, a care approach would not focus on making a plan, model or
a set of standards but instead directs efforts towards doing something for humans,
animals, plants, places and other elements that we care for. The UNDP Accelerator
Labs is a clear case of this, pursuing clearly defined needs. The Catalan RISCAT2030
shows how such direct efforts can be constructed through collective agenda‑setting.

Care is not neutral nor objective, as caring for something may imply caring less
for something else (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017). In the context of governance in
complexity, the principle of care is accordingly also a matter of managing and
possibly including a plurality of perspectives and stakeholders, dealing with multiple
values and ways of valuating through participatory initiatives.

In Annex 2, the citizens' assemblies in Ireland and Austria and the Conference of
the Future of Europe are examples that clearly illustrate that care is important in
the framing of the issue for several reasons: firstly, framing is important for the
identification and scope of policy options/action. Secondly, it instructs the choice
of a knowledge base and the prospects of coordinated action and success. Thirdly,
as stated above, framing itself depends on a complex set of knowledge claims
as well as political, cultural and moral values (Wynne, 1992). Caring could imply
the avoidance of reductionist approaches or recognising that different values
are sometimes inherently contradictive. Among the cases reviewed in Annex 2,
anti‑reductionist approaches can be seen in the Ecuadorian example of adopting

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 43
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

multi‑scale integrated analysis in a political context of Buen Vivir (Good Living) as

well as in the Norwegian Gene Technology Act.

Caring also means recognising that different groups are impacted differently from
sustainability transitions. For instance, sustainability transitions also mean phasing
out unsustainable practices and economic activities, which may cause 'transition
pains' that need to be acknowledged as legitimate.

4.3 Governance in complexity practices

When looking at governance approaches to sustainability issues, the principles of

governance in complexity explained above partially correspond to the characteristics
of systemic and complex challenges (presented in Chapter 2). For example,
uncertainty and ignorance correspond to precaution. Furthermore, plurality of values,
perspectives and problem frames correspond to participation. This is illustrated by
placing the principles within the yin‑yang diagram for the descriptors, as presented
in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3 An approximate correspondence between descriptors of systemic and

complex challenges and principles of governance in complexity

Care
indeterminacy

ignorance

Anticipation power

systemic risk
uncertainty
radical openness
paradoxical effects

Experimentation as a transversal principle

nonlinear systems
Precaution framing plurality

Participation
contextuality
values in dispute

interdependencies

System thinking

Source: EEA.

44 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

Similarly, examples of governance in complexity (Annex 2) can be placed in the same

diagram in combination with these principles, illustrating their possible approximate
domain by colour shades, as presented in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4 The six principles of governance in complexity and a selection of

practical examples (reviewed in Annex 2)

The Mindfulness Initiative

Care Irish Citizens’ Assembly

UNDP Accelerator Labs

Conference on the Future
of Europe
Anticipation
Imagining sustainable futures
for Europe in 2050 Austrian Klimarat

Competence Centre on
Participatory and Deliberative Experimentation as a transversal principle EC Strategic Foresight
Democracy reports

Precaution
RIS3CAT in Catalonia
Participation Climate streets in Finland

Norwegian Gene
Technology Act Systems thinking in DEFRA

Post-normal science tools

System thinking Good Living and MuSIASEM

Source: EEA.

For practitioners of sustainability governance, visualisations like the above can help
improve understanding of principles from normative governance theory and the
unique characteristics of complexity and uncertainty. They should not be seen as
maps to instruct thinking or approaches. As is clear from its definition, governance in
complexity is determined in terms of the level of awareness by its practitioners. It is
a way of thinking or a mindset from which principles and practices follow. A minimal
requirement for governance in complexity is to admit the possibility of failure and
search for some combination of adaptation and assertiveness.

What constitutes good governance is a matter of details and context in each

case. Governance in complexity does not reject other normative frameworks
of sustainability governance, such as U Theory (Scharmer, 2018), meta‑ or
trans‑governance (Meuleman, 2020) or sustainability transitions, nor does it
determine the validity or applicability of these frameworks.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 45
 Moving towards 'governance in complexity'

This report explores real‑life approaches to sustainability governance through the lens
of governance in complexity, to illustrate and exemplify a governance in complexity
mindset. Such explorations and analysis of examples are also necessary if we are
to learn from past and current practices and approaches. In such situations, the six
governance in complexity principles from sustainability governance can be especially
useful. Similarly, the understanding of assertive and adaptive postures presented in
this Chapter can help to better understand barriers to sustainability governance.

As presented in Chapter 3, the current mode of operation in institutions of

governance corresponds to an assertive posture. Efforts to strengthen the adaptive
posture would ensure more balance by demonstrating principles of experimentation,
care, anticipation and precaution. This corresponds better to the characteristics
of the issue at hand. It would align with the understanding of governance needs in
Figure 4.2, as described by invited governance experts in connection with the making
of this report.

46 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
5 Is sustainability governance changing in Europe?
Insights from selected cases

Key messages

• Four selected cases (REPowerEU, COVID‑19 responses, biodiversity loss and

the Beyond GDP debate) are analysed to understand how current EU policy
responses are adapting to the systemic and complex nature of challenges.

• In all cases, emerging elements of de facto governance in complexity are

identified. The six principles (experimentation, systems thinking, participation,
precaution, anticipation and care) were all present to varying degrees.

• From the perspective of governance in complexity, the four selected cases

illustrate that public participation could be strengthened and a plurality of
perspectives employed.

In this Chapter, five current approaches to complexity and crisis at the EU level are
explored to highlight changes in governance that are already emerging.

5.1 Setting the scene

The current 'turbulent times' with their set of entangled systemic and complex
challenges include many environmental crises such as biodiversity loss, soil
degradation and climate change, which are closely interlinked with health, economic,
social and political crises. This Chapter takes a closer look at four different crises and
at the governance responses that have emerged to them in EU institutions. The aim of
the examination is twofold. On the one hand, these crises are examples of the systemic
and complex nature of the governance challenges related to the environment; on the
other hand, the analysis of the four case studies shows that many of the principles of
governance in complexity emerge spontaneously in the governance of and through
the many crises. Therefore, discussing governance in complexity sheds light on some
practices that may otherwise go unnoticed and become marginalised.

It should be noted that the declaration of a 'crisis', an 'emergency' and a call to 'urgent'
action is itself an outcome of processes of governance. These processes may include
many elements including scientific advice, political judgement and negotiation.
The sense of urgency often associated with environmental crises and the call for
'immediate' action is not a neutral descriptor. Rather, it has in itself performative power
(Lakoff, 2017) and tends to pose strains and tensions in the space for deliberative and
participatory processes. There are different ways to read a crisis and, importantly, to
govern in a situation of perceived crisis, including exacerbating crises by well‑intended
but hasted action. When there is little or no possibility of 'solving' or eliminating the
crises, this highlights the need to act ethically through them.

The four case studies are all examples of systemic and complex challenges. The
energy crisis induced by the war in Ukraine highlights the interdependencies between
geopolitical stability, energy security and energy transitions. The COVID‑19 pandemic

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 47
 Is sustainability governance changing in Europe? Insights from selected cases

started as a health emergency and developed important economic and environmental

consequences. Biodiversity loss is a long‑term process, which among its many
negative consequences makes visible the fundamental dependence of socio‑economic
systems on natural ecosystems. Debates about the unsustainability of economic
growth have emerged both from environmental movements and from concerns about
the adverse social effects of unequal economic growth. They have materialised in
efforts to move beyond GDP indicators and growth as the main driver of economic
policy. This Chapter visits these four examples of governance processes in the EU
policy context. It asks to what extent these examples show changes in governance
practices that acknowledge systemic nature and complexity of the challenges they
address. The analysis was guided by use of the diagnostic tool presented in Annex 1
to characterise the systemic and complex features of the selected cases. The resulting
details of this are included in Annex 3. The six principles of governance in complexity
introduced in Chapter 4 were used to inform the analysis of the cases. In what follows,
the main points of the analysis are presented.

5.2 RePowerEU from the perspective of governance in complexity

Gas imports from Russia are critical to the EU, oscillating between 50% and 30%
of total imports. Natural gas imports from Russia have been stable at 40% of total
imports since 2016 (see Figure 5.1). Cuts in gas supply from Russia pose a serious
threat to energy security in the EU.

Figure 5.1 Natural gas imports (million cubic metres) to the European Union
(1990‑2021)

Million m3

500,000 100%

450,000 90%

400,000 80%

350,000 70%

300,000 60%

250,000 50%

200,000 40%

150,000 30%

100,000 20%

50,000 10%

0 0%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2021

Total Russia Percentage of natural gas imports from Russia

Source: Eurostat, 2024b.

48 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Is sustainability governance changing in Europe? Insights from selected cases

The REPowerEU plan was published in response to Russia's 'unprovoked and

unjustified military aggression against Ukraine' (EC, 2022b) and the subsequent
cuts in natural gas deliveries to the EU. The plan supports the transition towards
'affordable, secure and sustainable energy for Europe' and has four main pillars:

1. saving energy, through measures such as improvements in energy efficiency and

behavioural change, with campaigns that encouraged lowering the thermostat for
heating during the winter;

2. producing clean energy, whereby the gas crisis is turned into an opportunity to
accelerate the transition towards renewable energy;

3. diversifying the energy supply of the EU by reducing reliance on Russian gas and
importing gas from other countries, as well as increasing the types of energy
carriers used to include liquified petroleum gas and hydrogen;

4. supporting investment plans by partially redirecting funds from the Recovery

and Resilience Facility, the Common Agriculture Policy, the Cohesion Policy and
Innovation Fund.

The following sections apply the diagnostic questions for systemic and complex
challenges onto the challenge addressed by REPowerEU while identifying elements
of governance in complexity.

5.2.1 How does REPowerEU address a systemic and complex challenge?

An energy system refers to the complex network of production, distribution and

consumption of primary energy sources into multiple energy carriers. Primary energy
sources include fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas), renewable resources (solar, wind,
hydro, geothermal) and nuclear energy. Energy carriers transport energy or store it for
later use. They can be divided into three main types: electricity, fuels (such as gasoline,
diesel or biofuels) and heat. End uses refer to the final applications of energy carriers in
various sectors such as residential, commercial, industrial and transportation.

This is where energy is ultimately consumed to perform specific tasks or provide

services. Different energy carriers serve different purposes or end uses. Coordinating the
interactions between energy sources, carriers and end uses is at the core of managing
energy systems. The transition to cleaner and more sustainable energy systems involves
integrating renewable sources across these interconnected components.

A systemic feature that is particularly challenging in the energy system is the

presence of rich interconnections between the parts of the system. The dependence
on natural gas has increased with the transition towards renewable energy sources
(He et al., 2018). To produce electricity from intermittent energy sources such as solar
radiation and wind power requires a cascading set of adaptations. Either demand
adapts to the availability of electricity, both in regard to when things can be powered and
to how much power there is; or, as has been the route so far, an excess capacity has to
be built to guarantee a base load when electricity production from renewables is low.

Excess capacity ideally needs to come from a power plant that can be switched on
and off on demand. Nuclear power plants take two or three days to be switched on or
off and cannot compensate for the daily variation of solar radiation, for instance. This
is why natural gas has become such a strategic resource in Europe: power plants that
use gas to produce electricity can easily chip in to the energy supply when needed
(Nunes and Brito, 2017; He et al., 2018). As stated in the EEA/ACER Report (2023),
'currently, peak generation gas plants provide much of the flexibility but with the clean

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 49
 Is sustainability governance changing in Europe? Insights from selected cases

energy transition, other types of flexibility resources are needed'. The unintended
consequence of managing such a richly interconnected energy system is that the
transition towards renewable energies has made the European energy system more
dependent on natural gas.

Both the International Energy Agency and Johnston et al. (2022) identified opportunities
to reduce gas consumption in the EU. This includes switching to heat pumps for heating,
improving energy efficiency and promoting behavioural change, such as lowering the
thermostat. While these measures are sensible, they improve the system 'as is' and do
not clearly take into account changing causal pathways. Fossil fuels contributed more
than two thirds (69%) of heat production in 2020 (EEA, 2023a). Hence switching to heat
(the energy carrier) does not necessarily contribute to the energy transition, unless heat
from renewable energy sources is explicitly set as a target.

Complexity can be seen in the multiple framings that are at play. The dominant
framing of the REPowerEU plan is the geopolitical framing. The plan is a direct
response to the war in Ukraine and political tensions with Russia. Solutions include
diversifying imports, both in the sense of importing from different countries
and importing different energy carriers, such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG),
liquefied natural gas (LNG) and hydrogen. The trade‑offs that may emerge from the
diversification of imports are also framed in geopolitical terms, such as the creation
of new import dependencies and tense relations with China.

Multiple legitimate framings exist in this debate, from the exacerbation of problems
such as energy poverty to the immediate reaction to the shortage of Russian gas
that led each Member State to turn to available safety nets like coal or nuclear
power. As Kuzemko et al. (2022) argue, 'reframing energy as a geopolitical security
concern has, in acute crisis, tended to obfuscate and/or downplay other energy policy
goals,' especially those related to sustainability and equity (Kuzemko et al., 2022).
The more technical framing of the energy transition challenge that considers
lock‑ins and the rich interconnectedness of the energy system has only recently
been acknowledged (EEA, 2023h). Consequently, while increasing the penetration
of intermittent renewable energy sources has led to higher demand for gas, the
REPowerEU plan calls for an increased use of intermittent renewable energy sources
as a means of phasing out natural gas. As in any systemic transformation, conflictive
trade‑offs may emerge during the transition towards renewable energy, including with
regards to knock‑on effects in the Global South (Kuzemko et al., 2022).

5.2.2 REPowerEU as governance in complexity

Several elements of governance in complexity can be recognised in REPowerEU. The

plan supports policymaking based on anticipation and long‑term thinking — aspects
that were lacking in the energy policy realm. As Kuzemko et al. (2022) argue,
'despite various Russia‑Ukraine gas transit disputes and Russia's invasion of the
Crimea in 2014, the EU has maintained high levels of dependency on Russian natural
resources.' In the REPowerEU plan, the energy crisis was interpreted not as an
exceptional event, but as the first of a series of energy‑related challenges that will
play out in the future. The current crisis serves as a stepping stone to accelerate the
transition to renewable energies, a necessarily long process. Systems thinking is
also clearly part of the diagnosis of the problem: geopolitical crises have impacts on
energy security, while future projections of the EU's energy security take into account
the role of China in the demand for LPG. Systems thinking is also present in the
solution proposed, which for the first time includes curbing energy consumption as
a direct goal and not just as a desired effect of improved efficiency. This therefore
takes a systemic view that goes beyond changes in primary energy sources and
efficiency improvements. The Re Power EU plan targets multiple components of
the energy system.

50 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Is sustainability governance changing in Europe? Insights from selected cases

There is scope for improvement with regard to the application of the principle of
precaution. In its political communication, the REPowerEU is presented as a win‑win
plan in which there are seemingly clear solutions to the problem of dependence
on Russian gas and fossil fuels more in general. Upon closer inspection, it's clear
there are contested framings about the role of coal, nuclear energy and LPG in the
transition. Some trade‑offs are communicated, such as the increasing demand for
critical minerals for renewable energy and electricity storage technologies. The
Critical Raw Materials Act and the Net‑Zero Industry Act respond to the risks created
by the energy transition by diversifying EU imports and scaling‑up manufacturing of
key net zero technologies within the EU (EC, 2023e, 2023f). Nonetheless, the Critical
Raw Materials Act is presented as a reliable solution that will 'ensure EU access to a
secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, enabling Europe to meet its
2030 climate and digital objectives'. Precaution may inspire a move away from the
'win‑win' style of communication and create a more open dialogue about the need to
accept imperfect solutions.

Recognising trade‑offs and identifying who may be on the losing end of each
trade‑off is also important when applying the principle of care. The call to consider
that 'all Member States are in this together, ready to share gas with their neighbours
in case of need' rests on the principle of care. However, care in this narrative is
almost dictated from the urgency posed by the geopolitical crisis. A complementary
route may be to establish solidarity mechanisms that come into effect not only in
case of crisis as is currently done (security in gas supply), but as an anticipatory
exercise that embraces the idea of governance in complexity and builds resilience
towards times that are permanently turbulent.

Finally, the principles of participation and experimentation are not as prominent in

REPowerEU as governance. This is not surprising given a framing of the challenge
as an urgent problem where policy cannot afford to fail (ZOE Institute for Future‑fit
Economies, 2023).

In summary, the systemic view of energy challenges invites systemic responses,

as exemplified by the multiple angles from which energy governance is tackled.
The REPowerEU plan foresees actions that span from consumption (saving energy)
to diversifying supply, and finance and regulatory action such as fast‑tracking
renewable energy permitting. EU plans combine measures that are adaptive
(lowering energy consumption through behavioural change) and more conservative
(using technological advances to keep business running as usual). The diversity
of measures can be seen as a step towards dealing with complexity. On the other
hand, the idea of turning the conflict with Russia into an opportunity to accelerate the
energy transition shows that the EU communicates its governance strategies through
win‑win ideas. However, acknowledging trade‑offs and imperfect solutions — and
hence the need to prepare for unforeseen shocks, turbulence and increasing crises
despite temporary solutions — may improve the EU's resilience. Describing necessary
energy transitions as troubled rather than seamless may improve anticipatory
capacity and preparedness.

5.3 COVID‑19 responses from the perspective of governance in complexity

The COVID‑19 pandemic has been described as a crisis, a human tragedy, a great
challenge, a wicked problem and even a unique opportunity. What it 'is' for a given
individual or collective actor depends on the context, or what these actors intend
to or must do. The nature of the challenge and the content and orientation of the
governance response cannot be defined independently of each other. In the context
of EU policy and governance, COVID‑19 is an illustrative example of both systemic
and complex challenges.

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From the very beginning (early 2020), it was treated at least as a systemic challenge
or indeed two systemic challenges on two different levels. The first level was the
'Coronavirus response', that is, the monitoring and response to the spread of the virus
and the infectious disease it caused with a focus on the public health sectors. The
second level was the socio‑economic impact of the pandemic including the impacts
of the coronavirus response itself.

5.3.1 COVID‑19 as a systemic and complex challenge

Already in 2020 it was clear that COVID‑19 posed an immediate threat of the
infectious disease itself but also posed challenges to a number of other sectors,
such as food systems, education, city infrastructure and security, among others
(Lambert et al., 2020). These all experienced impacts from response measures to
COVID‑19. Framings of the challenge developed during the pandemic are presented
in Table 5.1 and illustrated below.

Table 5.1 Two different categories of framings of the COVID‑19 challenge

COVID‑19 as multiple public COVID‑19 as a socio‑economic challenge

health challenges

First, COVID‑19 posed an immediate In the EU, COVID‑19 was also treated as a
threat of infectious disease, illness socio‑economic challenge from the start
and death that called for an immediate of the pandemic, taking into account the
coronavirus response. innumerable interlinkages between COVID‑19,
COVID‑19 measures, and production
Subsequently, the public health challenge
and consumption systems across all
was reframed in many countries to the
economic sectors.
challenge of achieving a sufficient level of
vaccination within the population. Furthermore, the socio‑economic challenge
of crisis recovery was proactively connected
Finally, COVID‑19 also posed a systemic and
to other policy goals, such as the green and
complex challenge because of the many
digital transitions.
uncertain linkages and trade‑offs between
COVID‑19, COVID‑19 measures and other
health issues.

At the level of the coronavirus response, the threat of the virus was framed with
elements both of a specific challenge and a systemic challenge. In its simplest
definition, the system consisted of the populations of virus and hosts, respectively.
The classic SIR model contains three variables that correspond to the human
population in three states (susceptible, infected, resistant) (Kermack et al., 1997)
(see Figure 5.2). It is given by a set of three first‑order differential equations:

dS dI dR
= βIS ; = βIS γI ; = γI
dt dt dt

The so‑called basic reproductive number (R0) is equal to the fraction β/γ. This system
definition suggests typical responses that were seen in the COVID‑19 pandemic
as well as in previous outbreaks: either to quench the epidemic by changing
behaviours to stop the propagation of the virus (decreasing β and thereby reduce the
reproductive rate R0); to strengthen the health services and let the virus run through
the population so that it reaches the 'recovered' state; or to 'flatten the curve', which
means letting the epidemic propagate but at an R0 only slightly higher than 1 to avoid
health services becoming overwhelmed, for instance by social distancing.

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Figure 5.2 The SIR model

Epidemics dynamics

Time Time

Infectious Susceptible Recovered

Mathematical modelling predicts dynamics

Without intervention With social distancing

Time Time

Source: Adapted from Xavier et al., 2022.

An epidemic remains a specific, non‑systemic challenge only to the extent that

this highly idealised model accounts well enough for real problems, choices and
dilemmas. First, there was the uncertainty about the status of being recovered, how
long the immunity would hold or if a second infection would be more dangerous
(Altmann et al., 2020). Furthermore, from the history of epidemics it was also
known that strong measures of social distancing and lockdowns may face declining
compliance, which called for careful timing of the measures (Tognotti, 2013;
Taylor, 2022). These uncertainties made the challenge complex in the sense that
it was unclear to what extent one could trust the model. The evidence is mixed
(Adams et al., 2023), but there are indications that European expertise succeeded
in many instances in communicating the presence of uncertainty. This suggests
model‑based predictions should not be taken too literally and that such transparency
was well received (Warren and Lofstedt, 2022; Wegwarth et al., 2020). Furthermore,
the system displayed natural selection and evolution. Ever‑new variants of the virus
emerged and propagated through populations, with differing transmissibility and
virulence (Markov et al., 2023).

Even when framed only as a public health challenge, COVID‑19 was also a complex
challenge because the radical openness to other health problems was evident
from the beginning, for example health loss due to unemployment caused by
lockdowns (Zala et al., 2020). Notably there were trade‑offs between the need
for social distancing and lockdowns to reduce propagation on one hand and the
need for health services and other critical services to continue to operate on the
other (Norheim et al., 2021).

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Emergencies like the COVID‑19 pandemic 'amplify pre‑existing conditions'

(Jasanoff et al., 2021). This means that crises tend to reinforce already existing
economic disparities and distrust, yet can also reinforce pre‑existing solidarity where
this was already strong.

In the EU context, as in general in the Global North, the uncertainty and complexity
of the host‑pathogen interactions was amplified by the uncertainty and complexity
of the capacity of health services, as well as acceptability and compliance with
restrictive social measures. Such uncertainties were managed by introducing
vaccines and vaccination programmes. First, the vaccination programmes offered a
medical technology as vaccination reduced the severity and mortality of the disease
for vaccinated individuals (ECDC, 2023). Secondly, the vaccination programmes
offered a political technology in the sense that they offered a way out of the
pandemic state of emergency (Bahl et al., 2021). The existence of the vaccination
programmes implied that citizens and civil society could expect a relief in the
restrictive measures and return to normality, which may have contributed to high
compliance and political stability.

The complex challenge was domesticated and governed again as more of a

specific challenge in 2021. This time, the main focus was not the propagation and
reproductive number of the epidemic or the number of COVID‑19 mortalities, but
a focus on vaccination compliance (Boëlle and Valdano, 2023). Indeed, excess
mortality statistics even within the EU varied a lot in the course of the pandemic and
between countries, both in amplitude and sign. In the presence of this complexity,
the vaccination programmes and the question of compliance made the challenge
governable again. As the pandemic faded out, this work was continued in the HERA
incubator, the EU‑initiated bio‑defence preparedness plan against new COVID‑19
variants (EC, 2021b). This normalised research processes, health technology
development and ordinary operation of the public health sectors.

From the start of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the EU treated the direct responses to
it and its socio‑economic impacts as a systemic challenge. By 8 April 2020, the
Commission had already communicated its 'Team Europe' approach to the European
Parliament and the European Council (EC, 2020). Team Europe consisted of a
collaboration between the EU and Member States (including implementing agencies
and development banks at the state level and the European Investment Bank and
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) to coordinate action to
mitigate the socio‑economic impacts (as well as COVID‑19 emergency responses)
(Burni et al., 2022). With the challenge defined as the threat of societal and economic
collapse due to direct and indirect consequences of the pandemic, the systemic
perspective included a number of societal sectors and aspects, including the health
sector, the economic sector, the transport sector and so on. Eurostat's COVID‑19
dashboard is illustrative (see Figure 5.3).

54 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
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Figure 5.3 Screenshot from Eurostat's COVID‑19 dashboard

Source: Eurostat, 2023.

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Indeed, the challenge is more complex than systemic because there is no closure
to the definition of the system: all policies were COVID‑19 policies and they could
target any sector. Mitigation and recovery from COVID‑19 transformed from crisis
management into a frame of opportunities and development policy through the
installation of the temporary budget instrument NextGenerationEU (EC, 2023c).

Thus, COVID‑19 recovery was identified with other policy goals that existed prior to
the pandemic, such as making Europe 'greener' and 'more digital'. This instrument
was coordinated with the EU's long‑term budget for 2021‑2027 and can be seen as
indication of a change in European governance towards governing in complexity in two
ways: first, it represents novelty and experimentation in that it is unprecedented and
that it is a step in‑between emergency measures and what was considered normalcy, in
terms of the normal budget procedures. Secondly, it represents system thinking in that
interdependencies are acknowledged and even framed as opportunities.

NextGenerationEU, originally a COVID‑19 recovery plan, thus became a policy

instrument directed towards the ambitions of the EU's Green Deal and the digital
transition (Maucorps et al., 2023) — indeed with the explicit slogans 'Make it Green'
and 'Make it Digital', among others (see https://next‑generation‑eu.europa.eu).

5.3.2 COVID‑19 responses as governance in complexity

To summarise, the COVID‑19 pandemic shows many if not all of the features of
systemic and complex challenges: nonlinearity and paradoxical effects, uncertainty,
framing plurality and not the least indeterminacy. While it is too early in 2024 to
write a history of how COVID‑19 was governed and how it contributed to change
governance systems, a multitude of governance elements can be noted, including
those that are characteristic of governance in complexity.

Precaution was critical during the first phase of lockdowns and social measures.
Indeed, the early response can be considered a paradigmatic case of the application
of the precautionary principle in that lack of scientific certainty was not used as
a reason to postpone COVID‑19 measures. Anticipation can be noted as a main
principle of the EU's governance of the socioeconomic impacts of COVID‑19 by the
formation of Team Europe and the development of the recovery policies.

On a more general level, the COVID‑19 crisis in 2020 gave force to already ongoing
developments introducing resilience as 'a new compass for EU policies', as described
in the 2020 Strategic Foresight Report (EC, 2020b; JRC et al., 2017).

Care and experimentation can be observed in the unusual, indeed unprecedented,

amount of attention given to COVID‑19 and its impact, to the extent that new types
of social measures, new types of regulations and new forms of budgeting were
developed. European COVID‑19 governance is in that sense a strong example of
continuous adaptation and experimentation. Again, while it is too early to make
historical conclusions, one can see COVID‑19 as a case of how the distinction
between 'crisis' and 'normalcy' is becoming blurred in governance. This is so not
only because COVID‑19 develops from an acute emergency to an endemic viral
disease but also because the extraordinary, acute economic measures are being
consolidated into longer‑term economic policies that help redirect the EU towards
additional policy goals (such as sustainability and the digital transition).

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In Chapter 3, governance in complexity was defined as the attempt to govern

a system, while being aware that: (1) the system cannot be perfectly known
or controlled and (2) oneself is part of or interconnected with the system. In
this minimal sense, EU governance of COVID‑19 can be seen as governance in
complexity. Scientists and policymakers were also considerably open in expressing
the lack of certainty and control.

One may speculate that a considerable part of the citizenry appreciated this
openness and that this was part of the explanation for a high degree of compliance
with often painful measures. The unsolved question is how to foster and find
the space for participation, in particular public participation, in the styles of
governance that developed with COVID‑19. Indeed, throughout the pandemic, there
was ample use of centralised power and a focus on national and international
harmonisation of policies that resulted in a hegemony of problem framings. The
framings changed over time — notably from 'flattening the curve' to vaccination
as a political technology — but at any given time, governments enforced their
dominance at the expense of fostering a multitude of perspectives and extending
the peer communities. This came at the possible expense of the quality of the
system thinking, anticipation and care exerted (Jasanoff, 2003). Indeed, differing
views among citizens were at times criticised and sanctioned for being irresponsible
(Bardosh et al., 2022).

There could be room for improvement in acknowledging the uncertainties that emerge
from using different and non‑equivalent framings of issues, about questions of
vulnerability that derive from how different groups are affected by the distribution of risks
and consequences and about alternative modes of learning that are needed when expert
knowledge that is supposed to guide policies becomes a moving target itself. Collective
experimentation in this sense is not to be confused with large‑scale experiments in which
societies serve as guinea pigs but as an extension of the scientific‑inspired mode of
learning by trial and error. Here, society is involved so as to ensure that the consequences
of errors are fairly distributed and transparently managed.

While the pandemic can be regarded as a showcase for our society's potential for
collective action when faced with an emergency (EEA, 2022a), the way, shape and form
of these actions — i.e. governance interventions — varied greatly and their outcomes
are yet to be fully understood. This is especially important in light of potential future
crises (or crises that will be acknowledged as such only in the future).

COVID‑19 has been referred to as a 'dress‑rehearsal' for the challenges to come

(Guterres, 2020). A picture is already emerging of how different governance
responses were grounded in local contexts, collectively shared perceptions of global
and national pasts and desired futures and ideas about the relation between science,
(bio‑)technology, politics and society. A global group of experts led by Harvard,
Cornell and Arizona State University produced a comparative analysis of various
(mostly) national governance responses to the epidemic (Jasanoff et al., 2021).

This report points to a number of common approaches to governance of interest to the

topic of governance in complexity. Among other points, the study shows that 'playbooks'
grounded in previous crises‑response did not function well in dealing with a global
pandemic. There is a need for collective experimentation and constant adaptation.

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5.4 Responses to nature degradation and biodiversity loss from the perspective
of governance in complexity

Biodiversity has been steadily declining over several decades but only recently has it
been recognised as a crisis (UNEP, 2021). The decline in pollinators, for instance, has
triggered the alarm and made visible how agriculture — and hence food security for
humans — is dependent on pollinator health. The biodiversity crisis has thus greatly
contributed to mainstreaming the understanding of socio‑economic systems as
embedded in and dependent on natural ecosystems, with calls for overcoming the
conceptual separation between culture and nature.

In the EU, the view that we humans are part of nature is becoming part of policy
responses, as stated in the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 (EP, 2021a). This
case study thus illustrates very clearly the complexity linked to framing and the
governance responses that aim to include multiple framings. Governance in
complexity can be here understood as the effort to stay open to multiple framings
and to challenge existing framings.

In the context of EU policy, eight environment action programmes (EAPs) setting out
multiannual goals and an extensive body of environmental laws (or acquis) have been
adopted by the EU since 1973. Conservation and restoration are currently the subject
of renewed attention of EU policy. Starting with the EU Biodiversity Strategy in 2020,
a series of new proposals have been set forward, which foreground the importance
of biodiversity, nature restoration and soil health (see Figure 5.4).

The EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 states that 'at least EUR 20 billion a year
should be unlocked for spending on nature' (EC, 2020a, p. 17) and that positive
results are expected if that target can be reached. Likewise, the legal requirement for
large‑scale nature restoration set by the proposed EU Nature Restoration Law could
lead to important, positive results. Furthermore, it should be noted that ecological
thinking has also permeated other policy areas, such as the Farm to Fork Strategy
of the European Green Deal (EP, 2021b). While these developments are encouraging,
the situation is very serious and challenging: Europe is currently nowhere near its
own goals for protecting, conserving, restoring and maintaining nature, despite
its advanced legislation on the matter (EEA, 2019b). Moreover, the emergence of
backlash against environmental policies is fuelling environmental deregulation and
the rollback of legislation and policies proposed under the European Green Deal.

Figure 5.4 Timeline of laws and regulations proposed under the EU Biodiversity
Strategy for 2030

Proposal for a
regulation
establishing an
Proposal for a EU forest
EU biodiversity nature Proposal for a monitoring
strategy for 2023 restoration law soil health law framework

2020 2022 2023 2023

Source: EC, 2024b.

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5.4.1 Biodiversity loss as a systemic and complex challenge

Ecosystems are systems by definition and are often described in terms of

emerging properties, multiple causality, feedback processes and non‑linearity. The
interconnections between biodiversity loss and climate change are well recognised.
The understanding of biodiversity loss as a socio‑ecological challenge is sharpening,
as the interconnections between the health of non‑human species and the health of
humans are made visible through the pollinator crisis and the rising emergence of
zoonotic diseases.

The interdependence between species and organisms has been the source of quite
different understandings of evolution. Evolutionary biology developed from the
concept of survival of the fittest and a fine‑grained scale of analysis — namely that
of gene mutations — and is understood as disconnected from the environment as
changes in genes are held to be serendipitous. Contemporary biology conceptualises
evolution as a multi‑species process, in which species live in symbiosis, closely
interdependent on each other, and evolve in symbiosis (Margulis, 1971; Margulis
and Sagan, 2000). Evolution is thus recast in relational terms from a systems
perspective. Similarly, biodiversity loss can be understood by counting the number
of species that are going extinct or indirectly by studying the health of ecosystems
(Lomas and Giampietro, 2017). The concept of biodiversity is not uncontroversial.
Considering invasive species, for example, some may welcome non‑native species as
increasing biodiversity while others may worry about how alien species may alter the
host ecosystem.

Framing is perhaps the most crucial matter in understanding biodiversity as

a complex challenge and in thinking of governance approaches that may halt
biodiversity loss. The Intergovernmental Science‑Policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has been trying to shift away from a problem framing
and promote a more values‑based framing. The assessment published in 2022
(IPBES, 2022) notes that both people and societies have a number of different ways
of framing human‑nature relationships.

In the words of the IPBES, the excessive reliance on the life frame of
living from nature has been the main culprit behind the massive degradation of
ecosystems and biodiversity loss (IPBES, 2022). This needs to change. There
must be a better balance with other frames, such as living in, with and as nature, in
assessing and evaluating actions and in driving policies (EEA, 2023g).

Figure 5.5 reproduces IPBES' example of the different ways to see and relate to a
river. People can perceive themselves as living from nature (i.e. where the river is
valued for the natural resources and ecosystem services it provides); living in the
landscape formed by the river and living with the other species that inhabit the
riverine landscape; or living as nature (i.e. where the river is perceived as sacred and
a part of themselves).

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Figure 5.5 Different ways to see a river

Different ways
to see a river

Living from Living as

river resources River as part
of us

Living in Living with

riverine riverine species
landscape and habitat

Source: EEA, 2023g; adapted from IPBES, 2022.

5.4.2 Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 as governance in complexity

The response of the EU to the biodiversity crisis includes a broad range of measures,
directives and strategies, such as the Birds Directive (the oldest piece of EU
legislation on the environment adopted in 1979), the Habitats Directive from 1992
and the Natura 2000 network of protected areas (Langlet and Mahmoudi, 2016).
Here, we focus on the Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 (EP, 2021a). The Strategy
provides continuity to previously existing policy efforts and acts as a catalyst
for new actions, such as the Soil Health Law (EC, 2023h). It may be worth noting
that although the EU has a long history of nature conservation efforts backed by
legislation, biodiversity loss, pollution and environmental degradation continue to
be in a state of crisis. According to a recent EEA briefing, 81% of protected habitats,
39% of protected birds and 63% of other protected species are in a poor or bad state
(EEA, 2023d). The ongoing crisis speaks both to the difficulty of the challenge and to
the fact that in some cases, action is not taken until tipping points are reached, as in
the case of the pollinator collapse.

The Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 is a good example of care, firstly because it
creates a space to reflect about what the EU should care for — and the risks of
omitting biodiversity, forests and soils from the list. Secondly, among measures
taken under the auspices of the strategy is the adoption of the Soil Health Law,
which mainstreams the concept of soil health and expands the notion of health to
non‑human entities. Similarly, the publication of values‑assessment by the IPBES
illustrates how the debate about what to value and care for is central to biodiversity
governance, within and beyond the EU.

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Participation is a natural consequence of increasing the number of entities for which

governance should care. In the case of the Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, participation
so far has been limited to a 'public consultation' held from January to April 2021 by
means of an online questionnaire. By contrast, in the case of IPBES, participation of
experts and country representatives from the Global South has been central to the
decision to undertake a values assessment. This has been an effort to resist the
reductionism of dominant framings of biodiversity as a resource to be used and of
interdependencies with the embedding ecosystem and services provided by nature.

Systems thinking is still underdeveloped regarding governance measures. Some

measures of the Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 perpetuate the 'us versus nature'
separation and set targets for natural areas to be protected on land and sea. While
the conservation of natural areas is important, it may run the risk of creating areas
in which the environment is cared for and areas in which less care is needed. Other
measures strive for a more relational understanding of humans in nature and set
goals such as organic farming, which reduces harmful impacts on ecosystems.
Organic farming is not a panacea: it is mentioned here as an example of an approach
that considers the impacts of human activity on nature.

5.5 Responses to unsustainable economic growth from the perspective of

governance in complexity

The negative implications of economic growth have been widely acknowledged

by debates about the 'Anthropocene', with an emphasis on human‑made climate
change. The 'Limits to growth' report (Meadows et al., 1972) brought to the public
debate the idea that limitless economic growth is not possible on a finite planet. It
anticipated the long‑term environmental crisis that would ensue from the depletion
of natural resources and the unchecked emission of greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere. The need for economic growth has been defended on the grounds that
economic growth is strongly correlated with wellbeing and development. The social
benefits of economic growth, however, have been questioned, too. Piketty (2014) has
shown that economic growth is generally correlated with growing inequality. Piketty's
findings point to the failure of the classic idea of neoliberal economic thinking that
economic growth is like 'a tide that raises all boats' and even if growth does not
correct inequalities, it improves the wellbeing of all.

The association of economic growth with wellbeing is reflected in the indicators used
to set policy targets and monitor progress. GDP is the dominant indicator worldwide
and the reference against which policies are measured and discussed. GDP does
not specify where economic growth comes from (whether from a resource‑intensive
and high polluting sector) and does not measure the depletion of natural resources
and pollution (EP et al., 2023a). As indicators exert a strong influence on policy
targets, the critique of the negative environmental effects and questionable social
benefits of economic growth has seen a surge of efforts to move 'beyond GDP'
(Costanza et al., 2014; Fioramonti et al., 2022).

The case can be made that the 'beyond GDP' and the beyond‑growth debates are
both a response to: (1) a long‑term and on‑going crisis related to the sustainable use
of scarce natural resources and to excessive pollutants and (2) a related crisis of
governance, which stems from the criticism of the dominance of one single metric
(Kaufmann, Raphael et al., 2023).

In the European context, initiatives that engage with the call to move beyond GDP
include the 'Beyond GDP Conference' organised by the Club of Rome, the European
Commission, the European Parliament, the OECD and the WWF in 2007; the public
debate entitled 'Beyond GDP: Measuring people's well‑being and societies' progress

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organised in 2019 by the European Economic and Social Committee in collaboration

with the OECD; and the 'Beyond Growth' conference organised at the European
Parliament in May 2023.

Calls to go beyond GDP have been operationalised, for instance, through the
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress
(also known as the Stiglitz Commission), created by then‑French president Nicolas
Sarkozy in 2008. Other recent policy‑relevant documents include the 2022 briefing
This is the moment to go beyond GDP published by WWF, the Wellbeing Economy
Alliance (WEAll) and the European Environmental Bureau (WWF et al., 2022), along
with the report Mainstreaming wellbeing and sustainability in policymaking: technical
and governance levers out of the institutional GDP lock‑in, published in 2023 by the
ZOE institute (Kaufmann, Raphael et al., 2023).

The challenge is that despite decades of academic debates and policy responses
to unsustainable economic growth, no country in the world has managed to achieve
the social thresholds of meeting the needs of its citizens without transgressing
biophysical boundaries (see Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6 Number of social thresholds achieved versus number of biophysical

boundaries transgressed for different countries (scaled by population)

Social thresholds achieved

12

Germany Netherlands Austria

France
10 Japan Belgium Finland
Sweden Denmark
Ireland United States
Czechia
Slovenia

United Kingdom
8 Slovakia
Estonia Spain

Hungary Poland
Portugal
Croatia Cyprus

Italy
6 Vietnam
Bulgaria
Brazil Greece

China
Romania
Lithuania
Ukraine
Syrian Arab Armenia Albania
4 Algeria
Republic Latvia

Sri Lanka Indonesia Colombia Egypt Mongolia Türkiye

India Iran
Peru
Russia
Dominican
2 Republic

Bangladesh Tanzania Pakistan South Africa

Bolivia
Angola
Philippines Mozambique Lesotho Eswatini
0

-2
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Biophysical boundaries transgressed

Notes: Only countries with data for all 7 biophysical indicators and at least 10 of the 11 social indicators
are shown (=109). EU Member States are represented in yellow.

Source: Adapted from O'Neill et al., 2018.

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The Global Resources Outlook 2024 published by the International Resource

Panel (IRP) of the UN Environment Programme reports that 'Chile, Argentina, Costa
Rica and Ecuador achieved a high inequality‑adjusted life expectancy (more than
70 years) and education (more than 10 years) while keeping climate impacts
comparably low' (our emphasis, UNEP, 2024, p. 64). Nevertheless, the upper left
quadrant of high social threshold and low environmental impact remains empty.

While 'beyond GDP' and post‑growth critiques share some elements, notably the
preoccupation with the negative environmental impact of economic growth and the
resulting social inequality, their prescriptions are quite different. Efforts to move
'beyond GDP' often call for additional indicators and/or composite indicators that
include GDP. For instance, the Human Development Index developed by the UN is a
composite indicator of development and is based on GDP per capita (as a proxy of
living standards), life expectancy (as a proxy for health) and years of schooling (as a
proxy of education). Post‑growth critiques, on the other hand, question the very need
for economic growth.

5.5.1 How does the 'beyond GDP' debate address a systemic and
complex challenge?

The call to move beyond GDP — endorsed by international organisations such as

the UN (UNEP, 2024) and the Commission — and the more niche call for post‑growth
societies by some corners of academia (D'Alisa et al., 2015; Hickel, 2021) can be
interpreted as a response to the 'triple planetary crisis' of climate change, pollution
and biodiversity loss created by unsustainable economic growth. It may too have
been spurred by the legitimacy crisis of a governance system that struggles to
change its means of governing and whose response to the triple planetary crisis has
had, at best, mixed results.

Both the 'beyond GDP' and beyond‑growth debates address a double lock‑in. On the
biophysical side, prevailing economic models are heavily dependent on resource
consumption which, in turn, is responsible for a large share of environmental
pressure. Whether or not this can be is a matter of heated controversy (EEA, 2021b;
EEA, 2021). While some have proposed optimistic scenarios in which future
economic growth and resource demand are decoupled (UNEP, 2024), it is contested
whether an economic model based on green growth could deliver on global
climate mitigation targets and reverse biodiversity loss (Parrique et al., 2019;
Hickel and Kallis, 2020; Wiedmann et al., 2020). The lack of absolute decoupling
between economic growth and resource consumption observed in the EU and
globally, combined with the recognition that achieving a 100% circular economy
is impossible (EEA, 2021b), raises fundamental questions about the viability of
green growth. Current estimates suggest the EU's material footprint remained
stable between 2010 and 2022 (EEA, 2023f), pointing to a relative decoupling from
economic growth. Changing these dynamics would require a major reconfiguration of
systems of production and consumption and of the broader socio‑economic model.

On the governance side, there is a lock‑in regarding the path dependency generated
by the GDP indicator and the associated dominance of the economic logic in
policymaking. Many beyond‑GDP metrics have already been developed and used; for
example, the SDG indicators and the EU Resilience Dashboards. There is a challenge
in their lack of prominence, as alternative metrics are not part of the 'overarching top
level narrative'. The financial crisis of 2008 and the economic crisis that followed
in the eurozone triggered a reckoning with legitimacy in EU institutions, which
culminated in the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU.

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The criticism of GDP and the call for a more systemic view create a situation of
irreducible pluralism, which makes explicit that decisions about what to measure
and how are fundamentally value‑laden and post‑normal. Divergences about 'how' to
measure economic progress can be seen in the juxtaposition of GDP and net savings,
which emphasises how GDP does not distinguish between assets and debt. Proposals
such as the happiness index and the ecological footprint (which measures the land
use equivalent of the natural resources used by a country, a person or a product) open
the debate about what to measure. In all cases, there are important controversies
about the quality of the indicators being proposed. Standardised and widely‑adopted
indicators such as GDP, along with more recent indicators such as the ecological
footprint, rest on questionable assumptions (Giampietro and Saltelli, 2014).

They also face critical data gaps and are the result of negotiations about what
to measure and how, rather than objective representations of a reality 'out there'.
Controversies also exist regarding the desirability of using metrics and reducing
policy debates to what can be quantified, especially when discussing intrinsic and
non‑marketable values such as the value of nature. Some authors argue that it is
problematic to quantify the worth of a songbird (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994b),
that quantification leads to a reduction of different languages of valuation
(Martinez‑Alier, 2009), and that monetary valuation commodifies environmental
resources (Corbera, 2012) and leads to the highly controversial governance model by
which resource scarcity is managed through market mechanisms.

In broader terms, beyond the challenges of measurement, there are discussions

about the desirability of economic growth. In the background paper prepared
for their 'Beyond Growth' conference in 2023, the European Parliament explains
that economic growth does not alleviate inequality and that GDP growth may
be driven by undesirable events, such as war or responses to natural disaster
(EP et al., 2023a). The reflection on the drivers of economic growth opens
fundamental questions about what progress is and the need to consider types of
growth beyond merely economic (EEA, 2021b).

5.5.2 Beyond GDP as governance in complexity

We discuss the extent to which responses to unsustainable growth patterns present

elements of governance in complexity by focusing on the 'beyond GDP' indicators.
This is mainly due to the fact that there are no EU‑level, post‑growth policies at the
time of writing this report.

Attempts to move beyond GDP are clearly a case of experimentation with different
metrics and the use of different indicators for governance, which can lead to setting
alternative policy targets. In most cases, experimentation happens at the level of
indicators and conferences about the need to go 'beyond GDP', but in a few cases,
there are examples of experimentation in governing institutions. For example, Bhutan
produces a yearly Gross National Happiness index. At the EU level, the debate is still
taking place in conferences. The Stiglitz commission is one of the few cases in the
EU in which 'beyond GDP' ideas have moved past the conference and debate stage
and onto a scoping of possible indicators. Experimentation could be taken further:
one could think, for example, of public policies aiming at improving the happiness
of a country's population instead of aiming for a GDP growth rate of 7%, as set by
Agenda 2030 (UN, 2015). If post‑growth policies were put in place, those would be
an experimentation with regard to previous policies. Experimentation does entail the
risk of failure. However, non‑experimental policies that do not adapt to the changing
global economic, geopolitical and environmental context are also set for failure.

64 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Is sustainability governance changing in Europe? Insights from selected cases

The 'beyond GDP' and post‑growth debates are debates about which values
governments, institutions and statistical agencies should care about. The critique
of GDP as insufficient to measure wellbeing, happiness and sustainability points to
the need to care for humans and nature. The debate operationalises the long‑held
understanding within studies of science that indicators are not just neutral tools that
inform policymaking, but also carry agency and determine what policymakers see and
focus on. Similarly, the suggestion to move beyond economic growth hails from the
observation that economic growth does not benefit all those that should be cared for.

Some argue that the participation principle is weakly mobilised. The Conference for
the Future of Europe, a citizen‑led series of debates, included the beyond GDP debate.
The OECD report 'Beyond GDP' mentions the importance of citizen engagement
in developing indicator frameworks (Stiglitz et al., 2018). Participation is seen as
relevant, yet it remains a marginal exercise.

The debate about what to measure takes indicator production outside of the
exclusive realm of statistical agencies and turns it into a public and political debate.
On the other hand, the 'beyond GDP' debate has been dominated by experts, such
as Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen in the French case, along with hegemonic
international institutions, including the OECD, the Club of Rome, and the European
Economic and Social Committee.

One issue is that the 'beyond GDP' debate tends to suggest alternative indicators that
focus on issues that are often equally one‑dimensional (e.g. focusing on net savings),
or aim at aggregating multiple dimensions under one single composite indicator
(e.g. ecological footprint and happiness index). In most cases, alternative proposals
produce equally flat indicators which provide binary information. From a systems
thinking perspective, an alternative approach would be to use indicators which can
visualise trade‑offs and synergies. Examples of this exercise are the EU Voluntary
Review on progress in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (EC, 2023b), which
presents an analysis of synergies and trade‑offs for each Sustainable Development
Goal, and the UN Our Common Agenda's beyond‑GDP initiative (UN‑DESA 2022).

The analysis of trade‑offs steps away from the idea of solutions, moves beyond the
focus on targets and acknowledges that all actions have both positive and negative
consequences. Measuring trade‑offs in addition to 'progress' is a way to embrace the
mindset of governance in complexity and uncertainty. The lack of system thinking
entailed by the reliance on a single indicator, be it mono‑ or multi‑dimensional, also
reduces the anticipatory capacity. Nonetheless, the strategic foresight reports
published by the JRC can be seen as an example of systemic and anticipatory
thinking. The 2023 report (Matti et al., 2023) specifically discusses the 'possible and
necessary changes in European social and economic systems' needed to transition
towards a sustainable economic model.

5.6 What picture emerges for Europe? Between governance of complexity and
governance in complexity

Across the four selected cases, the analysis revealed the presence of some
elements of governance in complexity. Chapter 3 discerned a set of six principles of
governance in complexity, which to varying degrees could be identified in the cases.
In what follows, general observations for each principle are made:

• Experimentation can be taken up by necessity or design. The COVID‑19 case

illustrates a situation in which experimentation was a necessity because of the lack
of predefined responses to a global pandemic. In the case of 'beyond GDP' debates,
experimentation is part of the efforts to go beyond the growth imperative and the

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 65
 Is sustainability governance changing in Europe? Insights from selected cases

use of GDP metrics. In the context of governance in complexity, experimentation is

an alternative to the predict‑and‑control mindset that may accompany hierarchical
governance. All policies could be seen as a case of experimentation in as far as
policies need to be reviewed, adjusted and adapted. In general terms, embracing
this principle could mean increasing the periodicity with which EU policies are
reviewed. The recent reviews of energy and biodiversity policies are a promising
step towards fostering reflexivity.

• Systems thinking is increasingly present across EU policymaking. The

interconnected nature of the multiple crises we face is increasingly recognised
and there are efforts to break governmental 'silos' and coordinate policy action.
In the cases analysed, systems thinking can be observed in the association of
energy policy with geopolitical considerations, of public health with economic and
social considerations, and of economic growth with environmental and equity
considerations. The uptake of systems thinking is an important step forward, not
least because it enables a deeper dive into the reflections that this report raises.

• Anticipation exists in the analysed responses in varying degrees. Perhaps the

clearest case is with REPowerEU, in which the response to the gas supply crisis
goes beyond the solution of the immediate problem and looks at the energy
transition the EU aims to support in the coming decades. At the same time, this
is a principle that can be strengthened across the board, as policy is often forced
to respond to emergencies, while long‑term thinking is not always valued and
resourced. Efforts to embed strategic foresight into EU policy‑making are definitely
an important step also for anticipatory thinking.

• Precaution is perhaps more visible in the COVID‑19 responses, especially with

regards to measures that aimed at containing the spread of the virus early‑on in the
onset of the pandemic.

• Participation is the principle least identified in the analysis. None of the

selected cases showed strong elements of participation as a part of governance
in complexity.

• Elements of care were identified in all four cases, though not always fully reflecting
the mindset of governance in complexity, which calls for recognising the inevitability
of trade‑offs. The policy discourse of 'win‑win solutions' represents a possible lock‑in
and barrier for transformative change in this sense: it may appear necessary for
political legitimacy while at the same time being a barrier to proper care.

Governance in complexity requires a difficult balancing act. An emphasis on

uncertainty and complexity may be misleadingly considered an excuse for postponing
or abstaining from action. Claims of uncertainty have been made strategically — and
still are — to obfuscate environmental issues and counteract legitimate action (Oreskes
and Conway, 2011). On the other hand, action considering challenges as specific or
diffuse increasingly fails because of actual, real‑world complexity.

The call for governance in complexity is hence not one of passivity or acting less,
but acting differently, and learning by trial and removal of error. One may speculate
whether some degree of urgency or perception of crisis is needed or at least
conducive to the willingness to move out of the comfort zone and develop new
governance strategies, as was seen both in the REPowerEU and COVID‑19 cases.

66 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Is sustainability governance changing in Europe? Insights from selected cases

In the latter case, it was noted how 'playbooks' grounded in previous crises response
did not function well in dealing with a global pandemic. There was a need for
collective experimentation and constant adaptation. One way of doing this is through
practicing governance as (collective) experimentation. This means allowing for
epistemic pluralism and knowing through difference, by means of transparent public
debate about which perspectives are included in the decision‑making process.
Ideally a plurality of actors is given opportunity to make their needs, concerns and
perspectives matter. In that way, different sources and forms of knowledge as well as
values are actively integrated into the governance process.

Overall, the picture that emerges is that governance in complexity approaches are
evolving in Europe as a direct result of turbulent times. Since systemic and complex
challenges call for experimentation and learning by trial and removal of error, it
seems natural that such adaptations to traditional governance approaches are
piece‑meal, partial and imperfect. Elements of emerging institutional change can be
identified, like the budget mechanism of NextGenerationEU, but are otherwise rare.
To the same effect, most practical examples of governance in complexity chosen to
inspire in Chapter 4 came from the local and regional level. The questions of how to
scale‑up the application of sustainability governance to the national and EU level is
therefore presented in Chapter 6.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 67
 6 Enabling governance in complexity:
the science‑policy interface

'You have learnt something. That always feels at first as

if you had lost something.'

George Bernard Shaw, Major Barbara

Key messages

• Governance in complexity should be cultivated as a mindset, defined in terms

of the level of awareness by its practitioners and not as a set of procedures or
tools.

• At the individual level, governance in complexity can be cultivated by

diversified training activities and widening roles and ways of interaction.

• At the organisational level, governance in complexity can be cultivated by

allowing for double‑loop learning, that is, learning that modifies goals as well
as decision‑making rules and procedures, and learning that allows and applies
inconvenient or uncomfortable knowledge.

• At the institutional level, governance in complexity requires considering

institutional barriers.

• Inevitably, calls for transformative change towards sustainability can conflict

with interests, power structures, and the dominant discourses of economic
growth and material wealth.

This Chapter looks more closely at the need for scaling up and enabling good
governance of sustainability issues at the EU level, overcoming the barriers in
conventional governance approaches identified in Chapter 3.

6.1 Enabling governance in complexity at the individual level

The principles of governance in complexity need to be adapted case‑by‑case, for

which individual skills and competencies are required (JRC, 2022).

Without devaluing non‑scientific ways of knowing, it should be recognised that

governance in complexity (especially the adaptive attitude) is closely aligned with
the scientific mindset as defined in classic philosophy of science. Specifically, it
is a process of conjectures and refutations, a systematic approach to trial and the
removal of error, and attention to the possibility of being wrong (Popper, 1963).

68 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Enabling governance in complexity: the science‑policy interface

As shown throughout this report, the primary scientific knowledge base for
governance in complexity belongs to the humanities and interpretative social science,
including political science, governance studies, environmental social science and
science‑and‑technology studies. The very definition of governance in complexity
describes the internalisation of theoretical insights from governance studies
(Rip, 2006). This knowledge base can and should be taught and disseminated.
For example, there is extensive literature on the different roles and approaches
that scientific experts may take when providing scientific advice into a policy
process, including the roles of science arbiters, issue advocates, stealth issue
advocates and knowledge brokers (Pielke, 2007; Phipps and Morton, 2013). The
introduction of the mindset of governance in complexity into evidence‑centred
advisory ecosystems may require an expansion of this set of roles in a way that
enables experts to exert reflexivity, modesty and humility and a willingness to engage
in co‑creation of knowledge (Strand and Cañellas‑Boltà, 2006; Jasanoff, 2007;
Duncan et al., 2020; Strand, 2022).

Additionally, each of the six principles involved in governance in complexity are

informed by their own body of scientific knowledge. For example, good cases
numbers three and four in Annex 2 showed how appropriate training can deliver
systems thinking. Similarly, training in the tools and techniques of participation,
uncertainty assessment, transdisciplinarity and co‑creation, foresight and
anticipation may be valuable practically and also conducive of the mindset of
governance in complexity.

6.2 Enabling governance in complexity at an organisational level

Many normative governance frameworks for sustainability, change, uncertainty or

complexity include in their theory of change (see Table 3.1) some prescription or
proposed mechanism for learning at the organisational level. In this sense, they can
in themselves be seen as de facto experimentation — as proposals that can and
should be subjected to trial and learning by removal of error in a variety of contexts
(Oliver et al., 2021).

For governmental organisations promoting or participating in sustainability

governance, two robust lessons can be drawn from literature. First, enabling
governance in complexity at the organisational level requires organisational cultures
that promote and facilitate double‑loop learning, which is learning that modifies goals
as well as decision‑making rules and procedures (Argyris and Schön, 1978).

Organisational cultures depend on both external factors as well as internal

(including strategy, structure, communication, etc.) (Argyris, 2002; Dauber et al.,
2012). Governmental organisations are typically heavily dependent on external
factors on the institutional level (see Section 6.3). Several of the self-assessments
or independent reviews of the good cases presented in Section 4.2 concluded that
initiatives were successful at the local level but failed to be scaled up or to have
lasting effect. One important enabler of governance in complexity is double‑loop
learning related to the uptake of uncomfortable knowledge (Giampietro and
Funtowicz, 2020).

To illustrate, Toyota Production System emphasises elements of uncomfortable

knowledge in their organisational culture, including encouraging workers to stop
production process, make independent judgements, and point out problems and
errors upwards in the organisational hierarchy (Liker, 2004). In this specific case,
more of these examples would in themselves be positive, making uncomfortable
knowledge more comfortable.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 69
 Enabling governance in complexity: the science‑policy interface

One should not expect that the mindset of governance in complexity can be
successfully introduced in organisations unless there is a simultaneous commitment
to develop organisational culture. Governmental organisations involved in
environmental and sustainability governance experience tensions between
acknowledging uncertainty and complexity, while presenting knowledge that is
simple, self‑consistent and manageable enough to fulfil their institutional mandate to
act (or give advice) (Rayner, 2012).

6.3 Enabling governance in complexity at the institutional level

There is no consensus in social science on the exact definition of institutions and

organisations. For this Chapter, we distinguish between organisations as groups
of actors working towards a shared goal or purpose (e.g. a company, think tank or
governmental agency) and institutions as a category that also includes structures,
rules, regulations, norms and belief systems that inform and constrain behaviour
and agency in individuals and collectives. Some governmental entities will by that
definition count as both organisations and institutions.

As presented in Section 3.1, the call for transformative change runs counter to the
dominant discourse in modern societies that give high value to materialist wealth
and high levels of consumption and production. The notion that materialism,
consumerism and excessive consumption among affluent groups and individuals
are obstacles to sustainability has been promoted not only by the EEA but also
NGOs, civil society organisations, and spiritual and religious leaders around
the world. Similarly, emphases on experimentation, learning and the adaptive
posture of governance in complexity stand in contrast to dominant institutional
discourses, which reflect the assertive posture of prediction, control and 'win‑win'
solutions. Solutionism is a barrier against governance in complexity and against
transformative change (Kovacic et al., 2019). However, history has repeatedly
shown that hegemonic discourses may fracture and change abruptly if the
historical conditions are right (Arendt, 1973; Foucault, 1994).

As first presented in Chapter 3, the EU, as in many governance systems, also

has institutional barriers to governance in complexity related to the legitimacy of
public decision‑making. These barriers are well‑characterised in the case of the
precautionary principle, which stands in tension with the principle of proportionality
(De Smedt and Vos, 2022). This tension is even inherent to versions of the
precautionary principle that require that precautionary measures are cost‑effective.

Governance in complexity and its various principles may also face tensions with norms
of modern bureaucracies, including legal certainty, predictability and proportionality, as
well as practices of cost‑benefit analysis and other quantitative impact assessments.
The ideas of transformative change towards sustainability and governance in
complexity are based on a scientifically robust diagnosis of multiple environmental
and social crises, and a systematic lack of progress. At the same time, governmental
institutions were established in the context of the opposite assumption: that
challenges are governable by business‑as‑usual. The first step towards transformative
change is to acknowledge that business‑as‑usual may no longer be an option.

The Commission's White Paper on Governance (EC, 2001) was in that sense an early
recognition of a crisis of legitimacy, reflected in its first paragraph: 'Today, political
leaders throughout Europe are facing a real paradox. On the one hand, Europeans
want them to find solutions to the major problems confronting our societies. On the
other hand, people increasingly distrust institutions and politics or are simply not
interested in them'.

70 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Enabling governance in complexity: the science‑policy interface

More inclusion and public participation in environmental and sustainability

governance is not just a means to widen the space for resolutions to sustainability
challenges, but also an attempt to address the legitimacy crisis and revitalise
democracy. However, the principle of participation is not practically nor politically
simple to scale up. Changes in European governance described in Chapter 5 illustrate
the tension between 'inclusiveness and effectiveness' (EEA, 2015a), which can
challenge legitimacy.

The framing of political challenges as crises and emergencies has made it possible
to turn to innovative and unusual governance measures, like the emergency laws
as part of the coronavirus response, as well as budgetary mechanisms such as
NextGenerationEU. As sustainability problems are likely to aggravate throughout
the 21st century, part of the challenge of transformative change will be to avoid
ecosystem collapse while also confronting a permanent state of exception
in authoritarian or semi‑authoritarian political regimes and so‑called illiberal
democracies (Agamben, 2005).

Governance in complexity provides resources for navigating such situations but its
principles are not new. Participation and openness correspond with EU principles
of good governance. The principles of precaution and care for the environment
are already enshrined in European legislation, although work towards institutional
change is needed to strengthen precaution. Experimentation, systems thinking and
anticipation are all well‑aligned with the enlightened scientific mindset which defined
European identity and values.

Table 6.1 summarises lessons of governance in complexity at the individual,

organisational and institutional level.

Table 6.1 Lessons at different levels of governance in complexity

Levels of Description Insights and learnings

governance

Individual Single actors (with agency) Be aware and make use of different roles and repertoires of interaction within
embedded in networks knowledge‑intense organisations: science arbiters, issue advocates, knowledge
of social relations such brokers. These roles and repertoires need to be expanded to include reflexivity,
as e.g. organisations and modesty and humility.
institutions.
Training activities need to be diversified according to the six principles of governance
in complexity: tools and techniques of participation, transdisciplinarity and co‑creation,
foresight and anticipation, and uncertainty assessment.
Adopt a mindset of experimentation, anticipation and care.

Organisational Groups of actors working Enable organisational cultures that allow for double loop learning: learning that
towards a shared goal or includes goals as well as decision‑making rules and procedures.
purpose, governed by rules
Double loop learning is a way for organisations — especially those involved in
and procedures.
environmental or sustainability governance — to incorporate uncomfortable knowledge,
i.e. knowledge that challenges an organisation's premises for operating.

Institutional Structures, rules, Calls for transformative change towards sustainability run counter to the dominant
regulations, norms and discourse in modern societies.
belief systems that inform
There are important institutional barriers to transformative change and governance
and constrain the behaviour
in complexity, such as tensions between different principles of governance
and agency of individual
(e.g. precaution and proportionality).
and collective actors.
Promoting inclusion and public participation in environmental and sustainability
governance accordingly is an attempt to revitalise democracy by introducing elements
of direct participation.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 71
 Enabling governance in complexity: the science‑policy interface

6.4 Broader societal change: power and governmentality

The specific context of systemic and transformative change and its implications for
legitimacy require a broader perspective on political power in modern societies than
the one presented by conventional studies of governance. In modern states, citizens
are governed through subtle social control in public institutions such as schools and
hospitals. In contemporary societies, this 'governmentality' can also be the result of
private actors that shape discourse, often commercial actors. The result is that citizens
discipline themselves to be productive, abide by public health recommendations,
be 'good consumers' and so on. The notion of 'flygskam' (flight shame), which
emerged in Sweden, is a striking example of this kind of self‑governance that replaces
disciplinarian exercise of power with willing participation or pre‑emptive obedience
(Gössling, 2019). Self‑governance is however ambiguous, as it can be seen as
both constraining and empowering for citizens (Rose et al., 2009).

The close link between power and knowledge has led to the term 'power/knowledge'
(Foucault, 2011). To illustrate, producers who understand consumer patterns and
desires could exercise power through advertising and other means of influencing social
and cultural norms and values, often in ways that are elusive. Because of its dynamic
and intangible character, power/knowledge may be difficult to resist or protest.

Although eco‑movements and ecological discourse have gained strength across

many Western societies, the dominant discourse emphasises the connection
between progress, growth, happiness and consumption (EEA, 2021b). In other words,
the call for transformative change asks citizens to radically depart from our collective
way of making sense of and acting in the world. Responsible citizens concerned with
sustainability may choose to redirect consumerist values and buy 'fair', 'recyclable'
and 'organic' products.

However, to engage with a more radical departure from being a good consumer, such
as getting involved with subsistence agriculture or establishing networks to share and
exchange goods outside of the market, runs against the dominant discourse — thereby
creating cognitive dissonance. As a result, governmentality acts with initiatives like
ecological modernisation and governance responses like policy coherence and
the vision of a circular economy. Such measures affirm and stabilise the dominant
discourse of growth and material wealth, and support the flow of power.

Naturally, novel ideas for governance that depart from Western and modern beliefs
in mass consumption, capitalism, scientific control, technological innovation and
so on are harder to establish. Initiatives like citizen assemblies, extended peer
communities, simple living, degrowth, co‑creation of knowledge with scientists
and indigenous people, and futures impact assessments are all initiatives that
logically follow from the various conceptual frameworks for systemic and complex
challenges. However, they all run counter to dominant discourse of prediction
and control. Without a mindset of governance in complexity that allows for more
ways of knowing, such initiatives risk being simplified and considered irrational or
inappropriate, reduced to small‑scale experiments or oddities.

Acknowledging the power of discourse as power/knowledge or governmentality

offers optimism, because it means that power flows and shifts together with
discourse. Like there are tipping points in ecosystems, there might also be tipping
points in social norms. To this effect, Chapter 7 includes some possible pointers on
how perspectives could be widened.

72 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
7 Conclusion: from 'solving problems' to
'resolving challenges'

Key messages

• Systemic and complex challenges may not have perfect solutions or

'fixes'. In such situations, a more realistic option is to work towards resolve
by broadening the knowledge base and gathering concerned parties to
collectively find a practical way forward.

• Resolving implies a need to abandon false hopes for perfect solutions and
'win‑win strategies', aiming instead for overlapping consensus and preparing
for inevitable compromises and painful trade‑offs.

• Progress towards sustainability appears unlikely unless sustainability

advocates find ways of constructively engaging with those who resist.
There must be a mindset of experimentation, trial and the removal of error.

Central to the argument in this report is the characterisation of systemic and complex
challenges as having many possible framings. Such framings are crucial for the
choice of policy and governance approaches, as well as for defining what knowledge
base our chosen actions should be based on. As a result, with complex and systemic
challenges, there are neither unique definitions nor solutions.

Therefore, a more suitable approach to sustainability challenges is to aim for

resolution, bringing contested issues to the table, gathering differing parties and
finding a practical way forward. To resolve implies abandoning false hopes of
perfect solutions and 'win‑win' strategies that conceal inevitable trade‑offs, instead
aiming for an overlapping consensus and a preparation for compromise. This way,
the plurality of perspectives, values and ideas are not considered as obstacles
to overcome, but rather as a fundamental and necessary condition and resource
(Nature, 2022; King et al., 2023). When our current model of governance is faced with
a context of urgency and multiple interrelated crisis as presented in this report, such
resources might paradoxically be all the more demanding but necessary to include.

In the context of the science‑technology‑policy interface in Europe, the principles of

governance in complexity presented in Chapter 3 are not new. The EU White Paper on
Good Governance reflects many of the same intentions. Several practical examples
have been implemented throughout the last decades. Chapter 5 demonstrates how
a movement towards de facto governance in complexity is also currently visible
in European policy. This is becoming increasingly evident in the discourse of the
European Commission. For instance, the Strategic Foresight Report 2023 (EC, 2023b)
and its underpinning science for policy report (Matti et al., 2023) point to concepts
and practices like systems thinking, anticipatory governance and capabilities,
experimentation and innovation in policy as key opportunities for dealing with the
evolving nature of the challenges.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 73
 Conclusion: from 'solving problems' to 'resolving challenges'

More fundamentally, a renewed social contract, where democracy and democratic

engagement at local, regional, national and international levels are strengthened,
is seen as a precondition for advancing sustainability in Europe. Yet two possible
explanations and barriers to scaling such approaches into the mainstream,
demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 6, are the tensions within governance and the power
of societal discourse that run counter to sustainability.

As presented throughout this report, framing problems and challenges is in itself

a complex phenomenon that stretches far beyond the realm of environmental
sciences. Dealing with sustainability challenges therefore requires a broadening
of the knowledge base to also include social sciences and the humanities, such
as literature, history and philosophy. In philosophy, the mindset of governance in
complexity was succinctly described already in Laozi's Tao Te Ching, approximately
2500 years ago: 'Trying to control the world? I see that you won't succeed'.

In contrast, in our current situation, it is almost as if the strength of our evidence has
paralysed action. It is our duty, Latour and Schultz (Latour and Schultz, 2022, p. 18)
write, 'to diagnose the sources of this paralysis and to seek a new alignment between
anxieties, collective action, ideals and the sense of history'.

If science is the art of the soluble and politics is the art of the possible
(Medawar, 2021), control might be impossible but progress is not. There is much
inspiration to draw from. If we look to cultures outside Europe throughout history,
traditional societies have used adaptive governance strategies over millennia.
Without our reliance on technological fixes and solutions, we are simply left to stay
with the trouble (Haraway, 2016).

The complexity of sustainability challenges has been diagnosed before and

sensitive solutions have been proposed and implemented. It is within this context
that governance in complexity is emphasised as a mindset. In this mindset,
many different perspectives are sought to collectively find resolution through
experimentation, trial and the removal of error.

74 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
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(DOI: 10.1016/0959-3780(92)90017-2).

Xavier, J. B., et al., 2022, ‘Mathematical models to study the biology of pathogens
and the infectious diseases they cause’, iScience, 25(4), p. 104079 (DOI: 10.1016/j.
isci.2022.104079).

Zala, D., et al., 2020, ‘Costing the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Exploratory Economic
Evaluation of Hypothetical Suppression Policy in the United Kingdom’, Value in Health,
23(11), pp. 1432-1437 (DOI: 10.1016/j.jval.2020.07.001).

Zellmer, A. J., et al., 2006, ‘The nature of ecological complexity: A protocol for
building the narrative’, Ecological Complexity, 3(3), pp. 171-182 (DOI: 10.1016/j.
ecocom.2006.06.002).

ZOE Institute for Future-fit Economies, 2023, By Disaster or by Design? (https://zoe-

institut.de/en/publication/by-disaster-or-by-design) accessed 3 July 2023.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 93
 Annex 1 Diagnostic tool for systemic and
complex challenges

The following presents a diagnostic tool for identifying key features of systemic and
complex challenges. These features are accompanied by a set of corresponding
guidance questions. The list of descriptors should not be seen as a definition, in
the sense that a challenge would have to fulfil all or a certain number of conditions
to qualify as systemic or complex. Rather, the set is to be seen as a heuristic to be
used by scientists, extended peer communities and scientific advisors to policy,
for diagnostics and (at the science‑policy interface) for deliberation, to clarify the
perceived features of a given challenge. When stakes are high and values are in
dispute, it is not infrequent that different actors (experts and stakeholders) hold
different opinions about the features of a challenge. Diagnostic heuristics should
accordingly not be seen as tools to enforce agreement by objectively determining
such features. Rather, their purpose is to increase the conceptual precision into
deliberative processes.

In governance challenges that appear as systemic, it may be possible to identify a

system or a definite set of systems involved in the challenge. The two main features
are the description and the definition of the system(s). Especially for challenges in
which biophysical causal networks are important, system sciences may offer mature
models of the system(s). Climate models, hydrological models and population
ecology models are examples. In such cases, key features may be described by
main model properties, such as the structure of causal networks (interdependencies,
rebound effects etc) and the structure of the phase space (attractor patterns,
instabilities, bifurcations and tipping points etc).

The system definition is the formal or informal model of the system. While there are
multiple ways of characterising models, a main feature with respect to governance
is the degree to which the model has been shown to be reliable and valid. Degrees of
reliability and validity are relative to the use of the model and the error tolerance for
that use. Furthermore, they may vary across phase space and parameter space and
are sensitive to the properties of data sources. Methods of sensitivity analysis and
sensitivity auditing can to some extent elicit such properties.

Moreover, models may be characterised in terms of radical openness and sources of

contextuality (Chu, 2011; Chu et al., 2003). Radical openness is a consequence of the
absence of natural boundaries of a system. More precisely, it is defined as the failure
of the modelling process to draw systems boundaries that makes the system closed
with respect to efficient causation. One may try to solve the problem by redrawing the
boundaries and expanding the system. Typically however, this just introduces new
interactions with the surroundings. Contextuality is the analogous problem that the
entities within the system may have an indefinite number of properties and therefore
interact in indefinite ways.

94 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Diagnostic tool for systemic and complex challenges

Table A1.1 Diagnostic guidance questions for systemic challenges

Is the challenge defined in terms of the presence or

Systemic nature future danger of an undesirable state of a complex
system?

Which are the known/important/relevant causal

Interdependencies interdependencies in the system corresponding to
the challenge framing?

What is known about the phase space and the

System Attractor patterns attractor patterns of the system? Are there lock‑ins,
description instabilities, opportunities or risks of transitions?

Are there upward and downward causal pathways

across levels and scales? Is the system richly
Causality
connected? Are there important nonlinearities? Are
cascades of impacts expected?

Which paradoxical effects (such as rebound effects)

Paradoxical effects
are expected or suspected?

Did the system definition/modelling process arrive

Radical openness at closure with respect to system boundaries and if
so, how?

System Did the system definition/modelling process

Sources of
definition arrive at closure with respect to the set of relevant
contextuality
variables of its elements and if so, how?

How much should descriptions and models of the

Validity and plausibility
system be trusted?

Models of socio‑ecological systems will as a rule experience radical openness or

contextuality, as well as unclarity or doubt about the validity and reliability of the
model. If so, the challenge is not only systemic but complex, in the sense that there
is uncertainty, ambiguity and indeterminacy. The two main features in that respect
are how the challenge is framed by different actors and the characterisation of
the knowledge base and its uncertainties. The knowledge base and its degree of
uncertainty is dependent on the framing of the challenge. Conversely, the framing may
depend on the available knowledge base. Approaches from post‑normal science can
be used to characterise the knowledge base and its degrees and types of uncertainty.
The guidance questions on framing plurality and stability may be thought of as
questions that practitioners can reflect upon. However, they can also be pursued
rigorously by social sciences such as sociology, political science and science and
technology studies. Hence, a proper treatment of complex sustainability challenges
requires an expansion of the knowledge base that includes social sciences.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 95
 Diagnostic tool for systemic and complex challenges

Table A1.2 Diagnostic guidance questions for complex challenges

Descriptor Example of guidance questions

Are there alternative framings of the challenge? Who advocates them,

Framing plurality and what are their matters of concern and care? Who advocates the main
framing and with what matters of concern and care?

Is the main framing dominant, hegemonic, contested, in development,

Framing stability stable? Which types and sources of power are important in the framing
process?

What are the sources of technical, methodological and epistemological

uncertainties in the knowledge considered relevant to the challenge? What
Uncertainty
is their significance? Is the knowledge contested? What is the knowledge
pedigree?

Are values in dispute? How do values contribute to the framing of the

Plurality of values
challenge and the definition of the system?

Stakes Are stakes high, for whom and why?

Is the challenge deemed urgent? By whom and why? What are the
Urgency
implications of deeming it urgent?

How would the system definition and the relevant knowledge body change
Indeterminacy
with a reframing of the challenge?

96 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Annex 2 Collection of good cases of
governance in complexity

The following is an inventory of selected good examples of the mindset of

governance in complexity and the six related principles highlighted in this report. As
emphasised in Section 4.2, the examples are chosen to illustrate and inspire — many
more could have been selected and the absence of a particular regional or EU‑scale
development does not imply that it is inferior to the chosen examples chosen.

Box A2.1
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
experimentation – participation

Commission's Community of Practice: Competence Centre on Participatory and

Deliberative Democracy

The European Commission has taken a number of initiatives that could be

understood as experiments with different forms of governance and thus as
knowledge or governance responses to systemic and complex challenges. One of
these initiatives are the so‑called Communities of Practice (CoP). Within the ecology
of the Commission and in particular its Joint Research Centres (JRC), a CoP is one
of several approaches to knowledge management. Beyond the Commission, the CoP
facilitates partnering with different organisations to address common challenges
about a particular topic.

One of these CoPs focuses on citizen engagement and deliberative democracy. This
is a collaborative project at the JRC which involves different units and policy DGs of
the EC. It aims to map, build capacity, innovate, and implement citizen engagement
at all stages of the EU policy cycle, from design through to implementation and
evaluation. It is situated within attempts to develop and institutionally stabilise citizen
engagement/public participation approaches within Commission policymaking
mechanisms – this has been an ongoing process for at least two decades.

The aim of this project is to establish different forms of participation and citizen
engagement as a so‑called transversal activity' within the JRC. This means that the
objective is to establish citizen engagement as a standard element in the process of
producing knowledge and making decisions within EC activities.

In parallel to the negotiations surrounding the establishment of this particular

Community of Practice, a new Competence Centre was launched in 2022: the
Competence Centre on Participatory and Deliberative Democracy (CC DEMOS). The
establishment of this CC is a further step in institutionalising forms of experimenting
with different modes of governance. The CoP is now a part of this Centre.

The self‑understanding of CC DEMOS is to support policymaking. It does so through a

number of activities described on the website of the Competence Centre:

• enriching the EU knowledge base on participatory and deliberative practices;

• providing guidance for researchers and policymakers;
• building capacity on methodologies;
• developing dedicated public spaces for citizen engagement;
• experimenting with new methodologies.

To reach these objectives the centre organizes internal trainings, conferences,

contributes their methodological know‑how and experiences and engage in projects
beyond the confines of the JRC.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 97
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

In addition the JRC Makerspace is a physical space dedicated to 'tinkering' and allows
JRC researchers to engage 'Makers', the DiY (Do it Yourself) community and citizens
more broadly.

As with other Competence Centres of the JRC, this is seen mainly as an internal service
for policymaking. However — and this is why it is a nice exemplar — by doing this work
this Centre is showing that 'things could be otherwise', thus pointing to contingency and a
plurality of approaches and understandings of governance responses.

Already the aim to make policies more robust is a challenge to ideas of robustness that
focus exclusively on expertise and evidence as criteria of robust advice. In addition to
validity as a criterion for the evidence policies are imagined to be informed by, 'social
robustness' becomes increasingly important as a principle in developing policies.

Also, as briefly mentioned above, there is an explicit focus on small scale

experimentation and 'tinkering'. This is an explicit reference to Knorr Cetina's 'Tinkering
towards success' from 1979 – one of the first lab studies and theories of scientific
practice and thus a call to focus on the practices of doing democracy: the mechanisms
ruling the progress of research are more adequately described as successful 'tinkering'
rather than as hypothesis testing or cumulative verification (Knorr, 1979).

There are still several challenges to this kind of work towards governance in complexity,
which include institutionally stabilised rationales, repertoires and habitual ways of doing
things There are deeply entrenched roles and modes of interaction that define what can
be imagined as being possible in engagement settings, i.e. what Jasanoff (2003) calls
'institutionalised habits of thought' in her call for relying more on technologies of humility.

The work of this Competence Centre deliberately stresses the need for novel modes of
governance such as different forms of public participation and citizen engagement. This
often leads to critiques of hegemonic discourses. It employs co‑creation methodologies
and is based in post‑normal science maxims, most notably the integration of 'extended
peer communities'. The set‑up of the Competence Centre as well as the negotiations that
led to it together with a range of parallel activities can be seen as a broader experiment
with new social, institutional and in some instances also personal practices.

Box A2.2
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
experimentation – participation

Climate Streets in Finland

Within a mindset of experimental climate governance, there are various examples of

attempts to make urban neighbourhoods climate‑neutral at a very local scale, in fact,
street by street. Such examples obviously illustrate the principles of experimentation
and participation but also systems thinking insofar as the underlying model is that of
multi‑level governance (Grönholm, 2022).

One such example is the the Ilmastokatu/Climate Street Project that aimed to
transform into climate neutrality the streets Iso Roobertinkatu in Helsinki and
Tikkuraitti and Asematie in Vantaa (Finland), which was funded by the European
Regional Development Fund (2014‑2020). In all, 52 experimental initiatives were
developed, both for climate mitigation and adaptation. The experiments included a
wide variety of business, civil society organisations and citizens, and the content of
the experiments addressed all parts of daily life, including food, mobility, housing,
physical exercise and so on. The project was evaluated as a success in the sense that
it produced a number of new local practices and raised knowledge and awareness
of climate change (Juhola et al., 2020). However, the evaluation also showed a
resemblance to other, similar initiatives in that it was difficult to document that the
project led to systemic change.

98 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.3
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:​
systems thinking

Integration of systems thinking into the UK's Department of Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (DEFRA)

In 2019, the United Kingdom's Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) launched a systems research programme to inform DEFRA policymaking.
One of the outputs of this programme is a suite of guidance documents, toolkits and
training resources for civil servants to encourage and facilitate 'systems thinking
journeys' (DEFRA, 2021).

2.
Pig
model 3.
1.
Context
Rich
diagrams
picture

Confirm 4.
11.
the goal Behaviour
Monitoring
over time
and evaluation
graphs
strategy

Implement Systems Understand

monitor and
evaluate
thinking the system
journey
10. 5.
Theory Enablers
of change and
maps inhibitors

Co-design
and test
9. 6.
Stock Systems
and flow mapping
diagrams
8. 7.
Identify Map
leverage analysis and
narrative

Source: UK Government Office for Science, 2022 (UK Open Government License).

The programme has developed a standardised systems approach for application in

DEFRA and across UK government, taking a broad systems approach that includes
aspects of framing and the concept of wicked problems (Rittel and Webber, 1973).
It concludes: 'systems approaches do not always provide hard answers but can be
invaluable in exploring issues and asking 'what if?'. In systems, the journey is as
important as the destination. Approaches should be people‑centred, co‑designed and
co‑owned with participants' (DEFRA, 2021). In parallel, the Systems Thinking Interest
Group has been created as a network that counted more than 300 UK government
officials as members in 2020 (Jones, 2020).

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 99
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.4
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
systems thinking – care

Good Living and multi‑scale integrated analysis of societal and ecosystem

metabolism (MuSIASEM)

In 2008, the Ecuadorian government introduced the concept of Good Living in its
constitution and has been publishing four‑year National Plans of Good Living (Plan
Nacional del Buen Vivir) ever since. The concept of 'Good Living' is a translation of
the Quechua concept of Sumak Kawsay, which refers to a way of life that allows
for happiness and for the permanence of cultural and environmental diversity. Its
principles are harmony, equity, equality and solidarity. The institutionalisation of Good
Living is a notable example of care, enacted through the attempt to integrate cultural
pluralism in the constitution by giving voice to indigenous worldviews.

The third version of the National Plan of Good Living, in vigour during 2013‑2017,
stressed that Good Living is not something that can be improvised but needs
preparedness. To this purpose, from 28 April–16 May 2014, the Ecuadorian
Secretariat for Planning and Development (SENPLADES) sent a team of sixteen
experts to Barcelona to take part in an intensive training course in Multi‑scale
Integrated Analysis of Societal and Ecosystem Metabolism (MuSIASEM). The
two‑week course was aimed at strengthening human and institutional capacities
in designing and evaluating future development scenarios within the context of the
Ecuador's National Plan for Good Living. MuSIASEM is an integrated assessment
methodology that has system thinking at its heart: it integrates societal and
ecosystem metabolism and is based on a multi‑scale relational representation of the
system that serves to describe complexity.

Source: MuSIASEM.

This example shows an attempt to institutionalise system thinking by training policy

officers and technicians, rather than relying on external experts and on policy briefs that
necessarily reduce the complexity of the issues being governed through the exercise of
distilling clear messages for governance. Moreover, the MuSIASEM accounting framework
makes it possible to identify the trade‑offs of different courses of action and is thus best
suited to support deliberative processes than to identify solutions to complex challenges.

100 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.5
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
experimentation – participation – care

Irish Constitutional Convention and subsequent Citizens' Assemblies

The Irish Citizens' Assembly is among the model cases of participation and much
has already been written about it (see e.g. OECD, 2020). It is an independent body
with a government‑appointed chair, consists of 100 randomly selected citizens who
deliberate on pressing societal issues and provides reports and recommendations to
the Houses of the Oireachtas (the Irish parliament). The Assembly convened for the
first time between 2016 to 2018 to deliberate on five legal and policy issues:

• the 8th amendment of the constitution on abortion;

• ageing populations;
• referendum processes;
• fixed‑term parliaments;
• climate change.

The recommendations of the Assembly were submitted to parliament for further

debate. Following the recommendations, the Irish government organized a
referendum an amending the 8th amendment on abortion. Furthermore, a climate
emergency was declared. The Citizen's Assembly has since convened on other
occasions to deliberate on the issues of gender equality (2020‑2021) and biodiversity
loss (2022). In addition, the Dublin Citizens' Assembly was established in 2022.

The establishment of the Irish Citizens' Assembly was preceded by the initiative
'We the Citizens' in 2009 and the Irish Constitutional Convention, which ran from
2013 to 2014 and consisted of 66 randomly selected citizens, 33 politicians and an
independent chair. This Convention led to a referendum on marriage equality, which
passed with a majority of 62.1%.

The rationale for establishing such a permanent deliberative body was to give citizens
more say in government decisions and to create a culture of political participation
of all members of Irish society. This is reflected in the principles of the Assembly:
openness, fairness, equality of voice, efficiency, respect and collegiality.

The Irish Citizens' Assembly is special as it is an independent and permanent

deliberative body. Because of this status and the continued support of the Irish
Parliament, there is a consequentiality to the recommendations of the Assembly that
is often missing in other examples. There is a clear path from the deliberations of
the Citizens' Assembly to recommendations and decisions to be made. In addition
to being a good illustration for the principles of participation and experimentation,
it is also a fitting exemplar for the principle of care. The integration of different
perspectives and the possibility to address the framing of issues through deliberation
clearly speaks to an ethics of care.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 101
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.6
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
experimentation – participation – anticipation – care

The Austrian 'Klimarat'

Was a national climate assembly organized in 2022. It was commissioned by the

Federal Ministry for Climate Action, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and
Technology, on behalf of the Austrian Parliament in response to a citizens' initiative
(Volksbegehren) on climate protection.

The Klimarat consisted of around 80 participants selected by a two‑stage

civic‑lottery. The citizens deliberated over a period six weekends between January
and June 2022, supported by a scientific board consisting of 15 scientists from
different disciplines. Importantly, also a stakeholder advisory board was involved.
This board involved members from the social partnerships, such as the Chamber of
Commerce, labour unions, and NGOs.

The aim of this assembly was to propose measures to reach climate neutrality
in Austria by 2040. The following broad questions were guiding the discussions
of this assembly: How do we want to move? Where do we get our energy from?
How do we need to feed ourselves to protect the planet? Finding answers to these
questions meant to develop ways of ensuring a climate‑healthy future (klimagesunde
Zukunft). The questions were worked on along five themes: mobility; housing; energy;
production and consumption food and land use. Two transversal issues were also
developed in the discussions: global responsibility and social justice.

The assembly delivered its report, which entailed 93 recommendations, in July

of 2022. There are no formal mechanisms for a response in place beyond a
commitment of the Minister at the start of the process.

This example shows how modes of governance that build on experimentation

and participation can develop out of more mainstream tools of representative
democracy — a Volksbegehren in this case. This climate assembly also represents
a form of anticipation, as one of its core aims was to work towards more
'climate‑healthy futures'.

102 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.7
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
experimentation – participation – anticipation – care

Conference on the Future of Europe

The Conference on the Future of Europe was a series of debates between April 2021
and May 2022 organized as a joint undertaking of the European Parliament, the
European Council and the Commission together with the EU's member states. It was
organized in the form of different citizens' panels on national and European level
involving randomly selected citizens. Recommendations from the citizens' panels
were discussed by the conference plenary. Conclusions were presented to the
Executive Board. The Conference ended when the report on the final outcome of the
Conference was presented to the joint presidency. The slogan for the conference was
'The future is in your hands'.

One of the key elements of the Conference on the Future of Europe were four
European citizens' panels involving 800 randomly selected citizens. These panels
were organised by theme:

• stronger economy, social justice, jobs, education, culture, sport, digital

transformation;
• EU democracy, values, rights, rule of law, security;
• climate change, environment, health;
• EU in the world, migration.

This example shows how citizen assemblies can be organized on a supra‑national

level and can be embedded within policymaking processes on a European level.
It is an example for experimentation and participation but in its future‑orientation
importantly also for anticipation and care.

Box A2.8
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
precaution – anticipation – care

The Norwegian Gene Technology Act

Act of 2 April 1993, No 38 Relating to the Production and Use of Genetically Modified
Organisms etc., hereafter referred to as 'the Norwegian Gene Technology Act', is a
case of precaution in the strong and broad sense (Genteknologiloven, 1993). A legally
non‑binding translation into English by the Norwegian government is found here.

In its preamble (Article 1), the Norwegian Gene Technology Act states its purpose as
'to ensure that the production and use of GMOs and the production of cloned animals
take place in an ethically justifiable and socially acceptable manner, in accordance
with the principle of sustainable development and without adverse effects on health
and the environment.' The strong version of precaution is formulated in Article 10:
'The deliberate release of genetically modified organisms may only be approved
when there is no risk of adverse effects on health or the environment.' However,
sustainability governance in the shapes of anticipation and transformative change
is also present, as Article 10 continues: 'In deciding whether or not to grant an
application, considerable weight shall also be given to whether the deliberate release
will be of benefit to society and is likely to promote sustainable development.' While
Norway complies with European Union directives within the field of biotechnology and
GMOs, the Norwegian practice adds a strong element of precaution, sustainability
and ethics (Hvoslef‑Eide, 2012) which has led to several rejections of release of
GMOs that have been approved in other European countries (Myhr et al., 2020).

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 103
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

To develop the knowledge base on risks and uncertainties while contributing to safer
use of biotechnologies, GenØk, the Norwegian Centre for Biosafety, was founded in 1998
as a publicly funded, non‑commercial foundation. Furthermore, an extensive apparatus
of guidelines for environmental impact assessment and ethics self‑assessment has
been put in place by Norwegian authorities to operationalize Article 10 of the Gene
Technology Act. The guidelines for ethics self‑assessment includes checklists of
questions that the applicant should consider, including:

Section III. The precautionary principle:

• Is there a reasonable degree of doubt about existing risk assessments, and is there a
danger that the risk may be higher than these assessments indicate?

• Is there a reasonable degree of doubt about existing probability assessments, and is

there a danger that the probability of adverse effects is higher than these assessments
indicate?

• Is there a reasonable degree of doubt about existing impact assessments and is

there a danger of even more serious effects on health and the environment than these
assessments indicate?

• Is there a reasonable degree of doubt about possible serious cumulative effects on

health or the environment?

• Is there a reasonable degree of doubt as to whether proposed mitigating measures and

instruments will function as intended?

The guidelines state the following: 'If the answer to one or more of these questions is
yes, this indicates that the application can be refused with reference to the precautionary
principle'. The ethics guidelines also include a checklist for sustainability, then not
construed as just as environmental impact assessment, but more broadly about the
future envisaged by the technology, in terms of biodiversity, ecosystem functioning,
energy and natural resource use, emissions, basic human needs, distribution between
generations and distribution between rich and poor countries.

The Norwegian Gene Technology Act has been contested throughout its existence. The
Norwegian government is currently preparing its revision. The Norwegian Biotechnology
Advisory Board, which is a permanent independent institution appointed by the
Norwegian government, recommended in 2023 a significant 'softening' of the regulations,
in the sense of lowering the regulatory threshold for release of GMOs.

104 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.9
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
precaution

Post‑Normal Science Tools for Precautionary Uncertainty Assessment

Within the field of post‑normal science, techniques and tools have been developed for
qualitative and quantitative uncertainty assessments beyond the tools of statistics.
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) created NUSAP, a notational system to describe
and deliberate on technical, methodological and epistemological uncertainties.
NUSAP stands for numeral, unit, spread, assessment and pedigree. Pedigree means
information about the origin and production of the information being assessed,
as well as its anticipated use, typically expressed by the use of matrixes or spider
diagrams (van der Sluijs et al., 2005).

NUSAP has so far been used more by academic researchers at the science‑policy
interface than by policymakers and civil service. One example of a research‑driven but
collaborative endeavour is the NUSAP workshop used to assess uncertainties in the
UK energy systems model ESME (Energy Systems Modelling Environment)
(Pye et al., 2018).

The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL and its predecessor

RIVM/MNP) put NUSAP and similar uncertainty assessment techniques developed
from post‑normal science already into use in 2003 (Petersen et al., 2011), following
a public controversy around the use of simulation models in environmental
assessments. In 2013, PBL published its second version of the uncertainty
assessment guide (Petersen et al., 2013), which includes elements of participation as
well as the use of an uncertainty matrix, see illustration below:

Level of uncertainty
(from ‘knowing for certain’
Value-ladenness of
UNCERTAINTY MATRIX (deterministic knowledge) to ‘not even Nature of uncertainty knowledge base
choices
knowing what you do not know’ (total (backing)
ignorance))
Scenario
Statistical uncertainty
Recognised Knowledge- Variability-
uncertainty (range Weak Fair Strong Small Medium Large
ignorance related related
Location (range+ indicated as
uncertainty uncertainty
chance) ‘what-if’ – + – +
option)

Assumptions on system
boundaries and ecological,
Context
technological, economic,
social and political context

Narrative;
Expert
storyline;
judgement
advice
Model
Relations
structure
M
o Technical hardware
d model implementation
e Model parameters
l Input data; driving
Model
forces; input
inputs
scenarios
Data
Measurements;
(in a
monitoring;
general
surveys
sense)
Indicators;
Outputs
statements

The use of post‑normal uncertainty assessment techniques is endorsed by the organisation

and has to some extent found their way into practical use. Petersen et al. (2011) pointed
out barriers and challenges but concluded that 'we can conclude that an openness to other
styles of work than the technocratic model has become visible in PBL's practice.'

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 105
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.10
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
systems thinking – anticipation

Strategic Foresight reports

Starting in 2020 and in the wake of the COVID‑19 pandemic, the European Commission
launched a series of annual strategic foresight reports on the following themes:

• Charting the course towards a more resilient Europe (2020);

• The EU's capacity and freedom to act (2021);
• Twinning the green and digital transitions in the new geopolitical context (2022);

The series 'seeks to embed foresight into European Union policy‑making' (https://
commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategic-planning/strategic-foresight_
en#strategic-foresight-reports) and aim at a change in institutional culture and
policy‑making practices. Strategic foresight builds on systems thinking and collective
intelligence, with the double aim to 'better develop possible transition pathways' and
'prepare the EU to withstand shocks'. The reports depart from the 'win‑win' narrative
that permeates many EC policy documents and acknowledge a broad range of
solutions as well as challenges and trade‑offs.

The Strategic Foresight reports create an avenue through which risks and
uncertainties may be discussed in‑depth. The 2022 Strategic Foresight Report, for
instance, focuses on the tensions between the green and the digital transitions –
these are at the heart of the European Green Deal. The 2022 report warns that the
digital and green transitions can reinforce each other but can also clash. Tensions
include, to name a few, the issue of the growing energy demand of data centres
and cryptocurrencies; possible rebound effects by which improvements in energy
efficiency make technologies cheaper to use and more accessible leading to greater
energy consumption in the long term; the risk of increased dependence on imports
of critical materials such as lithium and cobalt, which are scarce and may create new
geopolitical tensions; and the increased production of e‑waste as new technologies
require the replacement of old equipment (EC, 2022a). Policy documents such as
the European Green Deal set the framework for the policies that will be designed
in the following 10 years. They are written in a promissory tone, which sets the
ambitions of the EU and produces a future vision that, among other functions,
legitimises the EU project. The Strategic Foresight reports are thus very unique in
their approach and focus. Rather than producing future visions, the reports take an
anticipatory approach and assess the challenges that the EU may face in the future to
improve preparedness.

106 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.11
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
participation – anticipation

Imagining sustainable futures for Europe in 2050

The following text is an abbreviated version of the EEA online report Imagining
sustainable futures for Europe in 2050 (2022): In 2020, the foresight group within
the EEA's country network (Eionet) initiated 'Scenarios for a sustainable Europe in
2050'. This co‑creation project, developed and implemented jointly with the EEA,
aimed to produce a set of imaginaries offering engaging, plausible and clearly
contrasting images of what a sustainable Europe could look like in 2050. The project
primarily focused on creating imaginaries for desirable European futures, considering
them separately from global developments that could influence the transition to a
sustainable Europe. While this separation of European and global futures is artificial,
it makes it possible to assess the viability and resilience of the different European
imaginaries in varying external conditions (e.g. global shocks or trends) that are
largely outside Europe's control. The imaginaries were developed through a participatory
workshop process, involving EEA staff, experts from the Eionet Group on Foresight,
and external stakeholders. The project employed the methodology of 'key factor' and
consistency‑based scenario construction. The overall result of this process was a set
of four distinct imaginaries that capture some of today's most prominent discourses
on sustainability and explore their implications. In doing so, they highlight different
approaches, strategies and measures to achieve sustainable development. The main
features of the four imaginaries are summarised in the illustration below:

In ‘Technocracy for the common good’, In ‘The great decoupling’, innovative companies are
sustainability is achieved through state control at the central actors. They succeed thanks to
the national level, which prioritises society’s technological breakthroughs, especially in the
collective interests. Information and bioeconomy, enabling the decoupling of gross
communication technologies enable domestic product (GDP) growth from adverse
unprecedented monitoring and control of social environmental impacts.
and ecological systems.

In ‘Ecotopia’, stakeholders from civil society have In ‘Unity in adversity’, Europeans respond to severe
brought about a shift in collective thinking and environmental, climate and economic crises by
action. Local communities reconnect to nature empowering the EU to use stringent, top-down
while technology is used sparingly to enable regulatory and market-based measures to set
sustainable lifestyles. Consumption and resource rigorously enforced boundaries for economic
use are being scaled back markedly. activity.

It is certain that none of the imaginaries will be fully realised. In the best case, the
future may combine elements from the different imaginaries. Yet they can provide a
valuable tool to inspire thinking about future pathways for innovation, policy, finance
and society‑wide participation that can drive the fundamental transformations
needed in Europe and worldwide. For example, in 2022, the EEA began to use the
imaginaries to support more detailed analysis of sustainable futures for Europe's key
production‑consumption systems (i.e. food, energy, mobility and built environment),
which will feed into the 2025 edition of EEA's flagship report 'The European
environment — state and outlook'.
Source: EEA, 2022b.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 107
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.12
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
experimentation – systems thinking – participation – anticipation – care

RIS3CAT 2030 and transformative innovation policy: promoting sustainable and

inclusive development pathways in Catalonia

As part of EU's cohesion policy, regions are expected to develop their own strategies
for smart specialisation (S3). S3 strategies are expected to develop further the
competitive strengths of regions to develop innovation capacity and strengthen
economic sectors of the regions. Regional S3 plans, so‑called RIS3 plans, can be
supported by the European Regional Development Fund.

The regional S3 plans of Catalonia (RIS3CAT) adopted the conceptual framework of

third generation innovation policy (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018), which focuses on how
to overcome transformation failures in the research and innovation ecosystem. Several
characteristics of governance in complexity can be found in RIS3CAT: experimentation,
system thinking, anticipation, participation and care. Central to the approach is the
recognition of a plurality of values and framings and careful consideration of framing
processes. An important element of RIS3CAT is its ability to fund local and regional
initiatives for transformative change. While funding organisations must choose between
different proposals and applicants, RIS3CAT is characterised by logics of care in the
sense that its approach is to nurture existing, concrete, intentions and initiatives created
by local and regional actors rather than formulated substantive goals by a hierarchical
process. In its most recent strategy, the RIS3CAT 2030, the Generalitat de Catalunya
emphasises that they support social innovation 'in its broadest sense'.

The following description of the instrument of 'shared agendas' is an excerpt of the

CC‑0 licensed paper RIS3CAT Shared Agendas as platforms for synergies (Generalitat
de Catalunya, 2023), with permission from the authors:

RIS3CAT 2030 revolves around the notion of Shared Agendas. Shared Agendas are
initiatives established via participatory governance models to articulate collective
action towards common challenges. Shared Agendas are conceptually inspired by
the literature and practice of Transformative Innovation Policy, as well as by Systems
Thinking. The Catalan government offers methodological guidance and support for
stakeholders to develop Shared Agendas and, through RIS3CAT 2030, supports the
transformative initiatives emerging from them.

In a nutshell, the first step for a Shared Agenda is to devise a shared vision of the future
aligned with the SDGs; secondly, it must arrive at a shared diagnosis of the problems
and limitations of the current socio‑technical system; this second step allows the Shared
Agenda to identify opportunities and solutions emerging from the transformation
being pursued. These opportunities and solutions are then articulated by identifying
initiatives that offer potential solutions to the common challenges through intersectoral
collaboration and the generation of knowledge between diverse actors. Such solutions
require the participation of all actors affected by the challenge, regardless of their traditional
engagement in research and innovation activities. In other words, in Shared Agendas, it
is not sufficient to involve only the research, business and public sector; citizens and civil
society are critical in shaping both the visions and the path to achieve them.

Shared Agendas aim to identify the solutions and initiatives that have the most
potential to produce positive changes in the local system, with the aspiration of
replicating them on a larger scale, beyond their territory or sector. Indeed, the Shared
Agenda of Lleida, Pyrenees and Aran, which is explored in this document, seeks to
become a benchmark in the field of bioeconomy in Southern Europe.

Needless to say, within this context, consensus‑building processes are very slow
and require a lot of work and many meetings, as well as a participatory governance
structure. Within this context, conflict is not avoided, rather, it is recognised and
managed using participatory approaches to navigate the expectations from the
diverse stakeholders. This is done through the definition and implementation of

108 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

a governance model that is accepted by all the actors involved in order to translate
the vision and potential transformative actions into actual initiatives. By default, this
governance system is dynamic, flexible and participatory and has the necessary
mechanisms in place to allow all actors to have their say at all times.

Typically, the governance is structured around:

• the strategic committee;

• the technical office;
• stakeholders' task forces.

At the early stages of development, the strategic committee is composed of the actors
who promote the shared agenda. As the agenda grows, the committee's roles and
functions, as well as its structure and composition, must be defined. The committee
provides the strategic direction and leads efforts to involve and align the actors in the
territory towards the shared future vision.

The technical office facilitates and promotes the active participation of the actors. In
other words, its function is to guarantee the participatory governance model. For this
reason, this role must be assumed by a respected, neutral and trusted body in the area.
The functions of the technical office include, but are not limited to:

• guiding and coordinating efforts and actions aimed at achieving the shared future
vision;
• supporting the actions framed in the agenda;
• defining and managing the evaluation system focused on learning and adaptation;
• working toward strengthening the commitment and responsibility of local actors;
• lobbying political agendas;
• fundraising;
• communication.

It is the technical office that practically facilitates the dialogue among stakeholders,
taking responsibility for the complementarities and synergies between the various
elements of the ecosystem by anticipating the needs of the Shared Agenda and being on
the lookout for funding, resources, and investors. To this end, the office must also be an
effective communicator. On the one hand, it must effectively pitch the shared vision to
funding agencies, foundations, and investors in general, as this is key to gaining external
support. On the other, it must also know how to tell the story to keep up the momentum
and engage further stakeholders.

As the diverse actors in the Agenda seek solutions from different perspectives, these actors
are organised into smaller, more focused task forces according to their different lines of work,
expertise and skills. For actors to interact and develop the Shared Agenda as a whole, it is
necessary to have physical spaces for co‑creation and experimentation, where ideas can be
shared, explored, developed and tested. (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2023, pp. 7‑8)

The Generalitat has published a set of interviews with individual actors who have worked
within the Shared Agendas. One of the questions was as follows: 'shared agendas
understand forced consensus as an obstacle to progress. This clashes with the current
vision held by society, by which the need to move forward with initiatives relies on forging
overall agreement. How is this apparent contradiction resolved?'

One informant answered:

Big agreements on paper are all well and good. However, depending on the type of agenda,
they can end up obstructing the process. If you wait to have full consensus before taking
action, you'll be late. The Lleida agenda has a strong institutional component. The promoting
group includes the Diputació de Lleida, the Paeria de Lleida, the Government of Catalonia, the
two Chambers of Commerce in the region, and the University of Lleida. Are we all there? No.
But we had to start moving, given the strategic importance of the challenge. Gradually, other
actors have joined. Depending on the type of challenge and actors involved, you may need
more or less courage when seeking minimal consensus.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 109
 Collection of good cases of governance in complexity

Box A2.13
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
experimentation – care

The Mindfulness Initiative

The Mindfulness Initiative is an NGO and advocacy group that promotes and supports
the deployment of contemplative practice within society in general and within public
policy in particular, with the aim to shift political culture towards wiser, less polarised
and more compassionate decision‑making. Based in the UK since 2013, its actions
have gradually spread to other countries and into international collaborations. Its
report Reconnection – meeting the climate crisis inside out (Bristow et al., 2022)
lays out arguments and evidence in favour of contemplative practices such as
mindfulness as an approach to wiser climate governance. This view has considerable
support, e.g., within the field of ecological economics (see e.g. Ericson et al., 2014;
Wamsler and Brink, 2018).

The arguments presented in favour of mindfulness align closely with arguments in

favour of ethics and logics of care. Mindfulness and contemplative practice may
strengthen the ability to observe and internalise the sustainability challenges and 'stay
with the trouble' rather than escaping into denial, fatalism or cognitive dissonance.
It may strengthen one's compassion and emotional intelligence, a prerequisite for
care. Furthermore, it may lead to 'wiser wanting' of personal growth rather than
material consumption (EEA, 2021b). Indeed, Occidental advocacy for mindfulness and
contemplative practice can be seen to share the Oriental philosophical roots of deep
ecology and simple living (EEA, 2023g). The Mindfulness Initiative is an interesting case
in that instead of organisational reform, its actions directly target the individual and
cultural enablers of the shift in mindset that governance in complexity would constitute.

110 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
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Box A2.14
Good case of governance in complexity that illustrates:
participation – anticipation – care

UNDP Accelerator Labs

The UNDP Accelerator Labs is a social innovation network created in 2019 to

facilitate communication and learning across 91 accelerator labs in 115 countries,
mainly in the Global South, and with the global innovation system. The network
supports local, grassroot innovation to tackle wicked sustainability challenges, with
an ethos of seeing citizens and communities as knowledge holders and experts on
their own challenges. While this case as every other case portrayed in this report,
could be seen as an example of experimentation – each Lab indeed employs a
dedicated Head of Experimentation – the principles of participation, anticipation and
care are particularly prominent, as explained below in the words of Alberto Cottica at
UNDP:

• Participation and Care. All Accelerator Labs employ a 'Head of Solution Mapping'.
These are people who have some kind of ethnographic expertise. The idea is to
build a deep listening muscle; and indeed, the Labs turn out to be very good at
empathy, which enhances the quality of the participatory processes they set up.
For example, the Labs study and support (by providing digital tools) forms of 'folk'
community saving to avoid relying on professional financial operators, who in the
Global South may have high or even predatory interest rates of 50%.

• Anticipation. UNDP's Executive Office, which hosts the Labs, also hosts a Strategy
and Futures Team. This team works mostly by collecting 'signals' of possible future
trends by UNDP staff members who volunteer for the task. More than half of these
'signal scanners' work at the Accelerator Labs; indeed the third role common to all
Labs is called Head of Exploration. This attention to weak signals is built into the
Labs (Alberto Cottica, 2024, direct correspondence).

A striking feature of the UNDP Accelerator Labs is their approach to the challenge of
scaling up. A challenge for any set of local innovation initiatives is that of isolation
and fragmentation. Rather than trying to scale up local, place‑based solutions into
universal tools or technologies, the UNDP has taken a network approach that focuses
on flow of knowledge and learning across local innovation ecosystems:

Perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of executing a network‑of‑ecosystems

approach is learning from local solutions, generalising them, and then (where
appropriate) relocalising them for other geographies. This process of innovating
from the edges can be complicated because even if two locations face the same
problem, local geography, culture, regulations, and other norms may limit the ability
to implement the same solution in both places. Therefore, from the lessons learned
one can conclude in general terms that the satellites must be in close touch with
both the local stakeholders (to understand their demands and needs) and the parent
organisation (to understand the limitations of existing solutions and technologies)
(Altman and Nagle, 2020, p. 29).

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 111
 Annex 3 Diagnostics on cases studies of
short‑term and long‑term crises

Chapter 5 presents analyses of a set of four short‑term and long‑term crisis in

European governance. Each analysis was supported by the diagnostic tool presented
in Annex 1. For reference purposes, Annex 3 shows how the tool was used in the
analyses, featuring the questions that were applied and a summary of the answers.

Table A3.1 Examples of diagnostic guidance questions for the systemic nature of
the challenge addressed by REPowerEU

System description

Is the challenge defined Yes, danger derived from the war in Ukraine and from Russia's cuts natural gas
in terms of the presence supply to the EU.
Systemic nature or future danger of an
undesirable state of a
complex system?

Which are the known/ Interdependencies are clear: 'The human tragedy caused by Russia's invasion
important/relevant causal of Ukraine shocked the world and upended the lives of millions of Ukrainians.
Interdependencies interdependencies in the The human costs of war are immeasurable and grow with each passing day. In
system corresponding to the the wake of the first shock, also other impacts started emerging. The threat to
challenge framing? Europe's steady and affordable supply of energy is one of them' (EEA, 2023e).

Lock‑ins in the energy system are well‑known and acknowledged, both with
regard to: (1) the lock‑ins inherited from the past which have resulted in the
What is known about the current dependence on fossil fuels, on an electric grid that requires a stable
phase space and the attractor electricity supply and is ill‑equipped to integrate intermittent energy sources such
patterns of the system? Are as solar radiation and wind, on transport infrastructure that relies on hard to
Attractor patterns
there lock‑ins, instabilities, decarbonise sectors such as aviation and waterborne;
opportunities or risks of (2) the lock‑ins that current choices will create for the future. 'Europe needs
transitions? to react quickly but also in the right direction to avoid lock‑ins on solutions
that are not compatible with what we want to hand over to future generations'
(EEA, 2023e).

The double challenge of reducing dependence on gas and transitioning

Is the system richly
Causality towards renewable energies, as envisioned by the REPowerEU plan, faces rich
connected?
interconnections.

Measures such as improved efficiency are notoriously subject to rebound

effects. The Jevons paradox was formulated by looking at increases in energy
consumption following increases in efficiency, based on the observation
Which paradoxical effects
that improvements in the efficiency of coal‑powered steam engines made it
Paradoxical effects (such as rebound effects)
possible for a wide variety of industries to adopt such technology. The risk of
are expected or suspected?
a rebound effect in energy consumption is acknowledged in EU policy and is
tackled by promoting behavioural change and aiming for the reduction of energy
consumption.

System definition

Did the system definition/ The boundaries of the 'energy system' are hard to define, because energy is used
modelling process arrive for transport, in buildings, industry, construction, agriculture. Energy may be
Radical open‑ness
at closure with respect to considered transversal to most environmental and economic policies.
system boundaries, and how?

Did the system definition/ Modelling the energy system involves dealing with non‑equivalent metrics
modelling process arrive at for primary energy sources and for energy carriers. Different types of primary
Sources of
closure with respect to the energy sources are measured with different units (Joules, tonnes, m/s), creating
contextuality
set of relevant variables of its conversion challenges. Different transformation processes heighten the
elements, and how? complexity of accounting exercises.

112 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Diagnostics on cases studies of short‑term and long‑term crises

Table A3.2 Examples of diagnostic guidance questions for the complex nature of
the challenge addressed by REPowerEU

Framing plurality can be observed regarding nuclear energy, for

Are there alternative framings of the
instance, which some countries have phased out or are phasing
challenge? Who advocates them, and what
Framing out, while other countries are promoting both at home and abroad.
are their matters of concern and care? Who
plurality Nuclear power plants could play a critical role as base‑load providers
advocates the main framing, and with what
of electricity to help stabilise the electric grid in the transition towards
matters of concern and care?
renewable energy.

The framing of the gas crisis as an EU‑level challenge is an emerging

Is the main framing dominant, hegemonic, framing that the EC strongly advocates for: 'while it is true that some
Framing contested, in development, stable? Which Member States historically imported more Russian gas than others,
stability types and sources of power are important in the consequences of possible disruptions would be jointly suffered
the framing process? by all. This is why it is imperative that all Member States are in this
together, ready to share gas with their neighbours in case of need.'

Uncertainties are ubiquitous. In the present predicament, with Europe

still relying heavily on gas for heating, there is high uncertainty with
respect to winters, as exemplified by the publication 'Natural gas
supply‑demand balance of the European Union in 2023. How to
prepare for winter 2023/24' by the International Energy Agency (2023).
What are the sources of technical,
Warm weather and reduced demand of Liquefied Petroleum Gas from
methodological and epistemological
China created a relief in the winter 2022‑23, but the situation is highly
uncertainties in the knowledge considered
Uncertain‑ty unstable. The transition to renewable energies is also fraught with
relevant to the challenge, and what is their
uncertainties, as greater reliance on intermittent renewable energies
significance? Is the knowledge contested?
will require greater storage capacity (EPRS, 2023). 'Reaching our clean
What is the knowledge pedigree?
energy goals will require increasing amounts of various raw materials,
e.g. a 3500% increase in the use of lithium, a key component for
electric mobility. Chile currently holds 40% of lithium deposits, while
China hosts 45% of its refining facilities worldwide' (EC, 2022a). The
energy transition is thus also vulnerable to geopolitical changes.

At the wake of the crisis, energy security was given priority over
Are values in dispute? How do values
Plurality sustainability principles, leading to a supposedly temporary return
contribute to the framing of the challenge and
of values rather than giving preference to clean energy sources and rolling out
the definition of the system?
nuclear energy.

New challenges have emerged with the energy crisis derived from the
war in Ukraine, such as talk of energy poverty within the EU. According
Stakes Are stakes high, for whom and why? to Eurostat, the annual inflation rate for energy in the EU was 27% in
January 2022, with price increases of 67% in Belgium and 58% in
the Netherlands.

Urgency is at the core of the REPowerEU plan, which responds to 'the

urgency to address the lack of reliability of Russian energy supplies'.
Is the challenge deemed urgent? By whom
Given the sense of urgency with which the situation was handled,
Urgency and why? What are the implications of
as illustrated by the call for 'rapid' action, there was no time for new
deeming it urgent?
technologies to be developed, leading to a return to coal and
nuclear energy.

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 Diagnostics on cases studies of short‑term and long‑term crises

Table A3.3 Examples of diagnostic guidance questions for the systemic nature of
COVID‑19 as a public health challenge

System description

Is the challenge defined in terms of As a pandemic, the COVID‑19 was classified as a public health emergency
Systemic the presence or future danger of an that threatened not only individual health and lives but also the disruption
nature undesirable state of a of health services.
complex system?

Are there upward and downward Disruption and collapse of hospital services and other public health
causal pathways across levels services was one of the important cascades of impacts considered during
and scales? Is the system richly the pandemic.
Causality
connected? Are there important
nonlinearities? Are cascades of
impacts expected?

In both main framings – the SIR model and the vaccination programmes
– there are rebound effects to be governed. From the SIR model, the more
Which paradoxical effects (such as extensive measures of social distancing and lockdowns are more effective
Paradoxical
rebound effects) are expected in 'flattening the curve' but are also known historically to lead to lower
effects
or suspected? compliance in the long run (Taylor, 2022). Vaccines may contribute to direct
virus evolution towards vaccine resistance; however, the importance of such
paradoxical effects is contested (Lobinska et al., 2022).

System definition

Did the system definition/modelling COVID‑19 as a public health issue was in 2020‑2022 mainly defined as
Radical process arrive at closure with health loss and death directly caused by the COVID‑19 disease itself,
open‑ness respect to system boundaries? and to a much less extent health loss and death caused by COVID‑19
If so, how? measures such as lockdowns.

One example of contextuality in the COVID‑19 case is statistics of

COVID‑19 related mortality. It is not straightforward to define clinically
Did the system definition/
what constitutes a death caused by COVID‑19, especially in the presence
modelling process arrive at closure
Sources of of high age and comorbidities. Accordingly, closure emerged around the
with respect to the set of relevant
contextuality concept of overall excess mortality rates (Juul et al., 2022). Such rates
variables of its elements?
avoid biases due to clinical definitions but introduce error especially in
If so, how?
the short term, since excess mortality in frail population groups one year
tends to be a negative driver of mortality in a neighbouring year.

114 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
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Table A3.4 Examples of diagnostic guidance questions for the complex nature of
COVID‑19 as a public health challenge

Are there alternative framings of the The framing developed over time in 2020 and 2021, from the SIR
challenge? Who advocates them, and what model and the idea of 'flattening the curve' to the re‑framing of
Framing
are their matters of concern and care? Who COVID‑19 as governable by vaccination.
plurality
advocates the main framing, and with what
matters of concern and care?

Because COVID‑19 was declared as an emergency, power could be

Is the main framing dominant, hegemonic,
and was centralized to a large extent. Alternative perspectives and
Framing contested, in development, stable? Which
framings were to less extent a part of the public decision‑making
stability types and sources of power are important in
process and were more relegated to the margins and framed as
the framing process?
irresponsible or uninformed protests (Bardosh et al., 2022).

COVID‑19 was declared a public health emergency of international

Is the challenge deemed urgent? By whom concern by the WHO in 2020, implying the highest level of alarm
Urgency and why? What are the implications of (WHO). The implications of the emergency were legion, including the
deeming it urgent? use of emergency powers and laws across Europe and in most parts
of the world.

The relevant knowledge body is highly dependent on the definition

How would the system definition and the of the main parameters – health loss and deaths directly caused
Indeterminacy relevant knowledge body change with a COVID‑19; short‑term (annual) excess deaths; or long‑term health
reframing of the challenge? loss and mortality caused by COVID‑19 and the measures for its
management.

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 Diagnostics on cases studies of short‑term and long‑term crises

Table A3.5 Examples of diagnostic guidance questions for the systemic nature of
the biodiversity loss challenge

System description

Is the challenge defined in terms 'Biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse are one of the biggest
of the presence or future danger threats facing humanity in the next decade. They also threaten the
Systemic nature
of an undesirable state of a foundations of our economy and the costs of inaction are high and
complex system? are anticipated to increase' (EC, 2020a).

Which are the known/ 'The pandemic is raising awareness of the links between our own
important/relevant causal health and the health of ecosystem.' (EC, 2020a).
Interdependencies interdependencies in the system
corresponding to the challenge
framing?

What is known about the Biodiversity collapse and the idea of a tipping point are invoked.
phase space and the attractor
patterns of the system? Are
Attractor patterns
there lock‑ins, instabilities,
opportunities or risks of
transitions?

Are there upward and downward Biological systems are richly interconnected at multiple levels:
causal pathways across levels 'humans' can be seen as a rich ecosystem made of multiple
and scales? Is the system richly co‑evolving microbes; Margulis argued that species co‑evolve
Causality
connected? Are there important in close symbiosis; according to the Gaia hypothesis the planet
nonlinearities? Are cascades of as a whole can be seen as behaving like an organism due to the
impacts expected? interdependencies between all species and ecosystems.

System definition

System boundaries are a point of contention. If 'the environment' is

Did the system definition/
seen as separate from 'human systems', biodiversity is a matter of
modelling process arrive at
Radical open‑ness managing the environment. The formulation of concepts such as
closure with respect to system
that of 'socio‑ecological systems' collapses this boundary and sees
boundaries? If so, how?
human and environmental action as part of the same effort.

Did the system definition/ The last few years have seen as resurge in interest in theories
modelling process arrive at of symbiosis and in 'nexus' modelling (for instance, with the
Sources of
closure with respect to the water‑energy‑food nexus). Both trends point to an intensification of
contextuality
set of relevant variables of its 'relevant variables' to be considered.
elements? If so, how?

116 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
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Table A3.6 Examples of diagnostic guidance questions for the complex nature of
the biodiversity loss challenge

Are there alternative framings of the challenge? Alternative framing of humans and nature as one are emerging
Framing Who advocates them, and what are their matters of from academia and are long‑standing in many indigenous
plurality concern and care? Who advocates the main framing, cultures, such as Sumak Kawsay (Quechua tribes, Ecuador),
and with what matters of concern and care? Suma Qamaña (Bolivia) (EEA, 2023g).

Dominant framing of nature as capital and of the market as

Is the main framing dominant, hegemonic, contested,
Framing the means to manage natural resources through monetary
in development, stable? Which types and sources of
stability valuation and the concept of 'ecosystem services' provided to
power are important in the framing process?
humans.

Are values in dispute? How do values contribute to The value of nature and how to value nature (whether through
Plurality
the framing of the challenge and the definition of the monetary valuations or by assigning it constitutional rights) are
of values
system? central to the understanding of governance of biodiversity.

Biodiversity loss aggravates climate change, and a healthy

Stakes Are stakes high, for whom and why? ecosystem is paramount in mitigating climate change. Stakes
are high for life on earth, human and non‑human.

Is the challenge deemed urgent? By whom and why? Biodiversity loss can be described as a long‑term crisis but in
Urgency
What are the implications of deeming it urgent? need of urgent action.

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 Diagnostics on cases studies of short‑term and long‑term crises

Table A3.7 Examples of diagnostic guidance questions for the systemic nature of
the challenge addressed by the 'Beyond GDP' debate

System description

Is the challenge defined in terms The need to go 'Beyond GDP' is presented as a response to the
of the presence or future danger undesirable state of resource depletion and the impossibility of
Systemic nature
of an undesirable state of a long‑term sustained (resource intensive) economic growth in a
complex system? finite planet.

Which are the known/ There is abundant scholarship on the dependence of economic
important/relevant causal growth on energy consumption (Giampietro et al., 2013; Hall,
Interdependencies interdependencies in the system 2018) and resource consumption, as studied by the ecological
corresponding to the challenge footprint (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996) and virtual water
framing? (Hoekstra, 2003).

The 'beyond GDP' debate addresses a double lock‑in: (1) on the

What is known about the
biophysical side, the economic model is heavily dependent on
phase space and the attractor
resource consumption and there are numerous criticisms to the
patterns of the system? Are
Attractor patterns idea that economic growth can be decoupled from energy and
there lock‑ins, instabilities,
resource consumption; (2) on the governance side, there is a
opportunities or risks of
lock‑in with regard to the reliance on the GDP indicator, which
transitions?
reinforces governance by prediction and control.

Are there upward and downward The economic system is understood as being embedded in a
causal pathways across levels larger ecosystem, which acts as supplier of natural resources
and scales? Is the system richly such as energy, water and raw materials and as sink for
Causality
connected? Are there important emissions and waste – this interconnection is captured by the
nonlinearities? Are cascades of reference to the concept of socio‑ecological systems.
impacts expected?

The relative decrease in energy consumption per unit of GDP

observed in EU countries over the last 20 years is 'the effect
of the increasing share of the services sector in the GDP of
mature neo‑liberal economies combined with the outsourcing
Which paradoxical effects
of industry and agriculture to developing countries' (Kovacic
Paradoxical effects (such as rebound effects) are
et al., 2018). This means the relative decoupling of resource
expected or suspected?
consumption from GDP in the EU comes at the cost of an
increase in resource consumption in countries that export goods
to the EU and a re‑location of environmental impacts to less
developed countries.

System definition

Did the system definition/ There are multiple alternative indicators that have been
modelling process arrive at developed with the aim of moving 'beyond GDP' and that show
Radical open‑ness
closure with respect to system a wide variability in the definition of system boundaries (with
boundaries? If so, how? some indicators zooming out of the economic system to include
the ecosystem and other zooming in to focus on individual
Did the system definition/ wellbeing) and in the definition of relevant variables (which
modelling process arrive at range from economic, to social and environmental dimensions).
Sources of
closure with respect to the See Table A3.8 below for an overview.
contextuality
set of relevant variables of its
elements? If so, how?

How much should descriptions There are strong criticisms both of GDP and of alternative
Validity and plausibility and models of the system be indicators such as ecological footprint (Giampietro and Saltelli,
trusted? 2014) and the Human Development Index (Klugman et al., 2011).

118 Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
 Diagnostics on cases studies of short‑term and long‑term crises

Table A3.8 Examples of diagnostic guidance questions for the complex nature of
the challenge addressed by the 'Beyond GDP' debate

Are there alternative framings of the There are many alternative framings. Matters of care range
challenge? Who advocates them, and what from happiness to environmental sustainability. Advocates
Framing plurality are their matters of concern and care? Who of alternatives include a growing list of actors, including EU
advocates the main framing, and with what institutions.
matters of concern and care?

Is the main framing dominant, hegemonic, The use of GDP is the dominant framing and the 'beyond GDP'
contested, in development, stable? Which initiatives represent the plurality of attempts at contesting the
Framing stability
types and sources of power are important in dominant framing.
the framing process?

Epistemological uncertainty is central to the debate, which

What are the sources of technical,
aims to define wellbeing and progress independently of GDP.
methodological and epistemological
Methodological uncertainty is prominent in all attempts to measure
uncertainties in the knowledge considered
Uncertain‑ty 'hard to quantify' variables, such as happiness, wellbeing and
relevant to the challenge, and what is their
sustainability. Technical uncertainty is likewise ubiquitous as
significance? Is the knowledge contested?
efforts directed towards alternative quantification are fraught with
What is the knowledge pedigree?
data gaps.

The 'beyond GDP' debate is a debate about values: measuring

Are values in dispute? How do values
Plurality GDP gives value to a monetary understanding of wellbeing and
contribute to the framing of the challenge and
of values sustainability. The effort to change language of valuation is an
the definition of the system?
effort to prioritise different values.

Stakes are high both for people and nature, who would benefit
from alternative indicators that help make visible issues such
Stakes Are stakes high, for whom and why? as inequality and environmental degradation and for governing
institutions, which would be equipped with statistical tools that
make issues beyond GDP legible.

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions 119
European Environment Agency

Governance in complexity — Sustainability governance under highly uncertain and complex conditions
2024 — 119 pp. — 21 x 29.7 cm

ISBN: 978-92-9480-662-8
doi: 10.2800/597121

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