ABNORMAL PSYCHIC PHENOMENA 93

state, the_ ~ind'.s eye and th~ sati~fact~on derived from the meaning of the apparition-
he was ridmg m the opposite direction back to Sesenheim-he will return.
2. A schizop?renic patient of Menninger-Lerchenthal complained that 'she sees
herself from behmd, .naked; she has the feeling that she is not dressed and sees her-
self naked a?d feels ~old t_oo; it is her mind's eye that sees'.
3. A schizophrenic patient ~Stau?enmaier) said: 'During the night while I walked
up and down m the gar~en I imagined as vividly as possible that there were three
other people present besides me. Gradually the corresponding visual hallucination
took shape. ~here app~ared before me three identically clothed Staudenmaiers who
walked along m step with me; they stopped when I did and stretched out their hands
when I stretched out mine.'
4. A patient of Poetzl with a hemiplegia and diminished self-perception felt the
hemiplegic side did not belong to him. While looking at his paralysed left hand he
explained it by saying that it probably belonged to the patient in the next bed; during
nocturnal delirium he affirmed that another person lay on his left side in the same bed
and wanted to push him out.
We can see that we are dealing with phenomena that are really not the
same although they are superficially similar. They may occur in organic brain
lesions, in deliria, in schizophrenia and in dream-like states, never at least
without a mild alteration in consciousness; day-dreaming, intoxication, dream-
sleep or delirium. The similarity consists in the fact that the body-schema gains
an actuality of its own out in external space.

§ 4. DELUSION AND AWARENESS OF REALITY

Since time immemorial delusion has been taken .as the basic characteristic
of madness. To be mad was to be deluded and indeed what constitutes a
delusion is one of the basic problems of psychopathology. To say simply that
a delusion is a mistaken idea which is firmly held by the patient and which
cannot be corrected gives only a superficial and incorrect answer to the problem.
Definition will not dispose of the matter. Delusion is a primary phenomenon
and the first thing we have to do is to get it into a proper focus. The experience
within which defusion takes place is that of experiencing and thinking that
something is real.
Awareness of reality-logical and psychological comment. Things that are for the
moment most self-evident are also the most enigmatic. Thus it is with Time, the Self
and Reality. If we have to say what we think reality is we find ourselves answering
something like this: it means things in themselves as compared with how they appear
to us; it means what is objective in the sense of something generally valid as opposed to
subjective error; it means underlying essence as distinct from masking effects. Or we
may call reality that which is in time and space, if we want to differentiate it from the
theoretically valid objectivity of ideal Being-that for instance of mathematics.
These are the answers of our reason and through them we define to ourselves a
concept of reality. But we need somethi~g more than this pur~ly logi~al conc~p~ of
reality; there is also the reality we experience. Conceptual reality carnes conviction
 94 SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA OF PSYCHIC LIFE

only if a kind ot presence is experienced, provided by reality itself. As Kant says 1

imaginary dollars cannot be distinguished from a 100 real dollars so far as the a~tu~
concept goes; the difference is only noted in practice. a
7
What the experience of reality is in itself can hardly be deduced nor can we com.
pare it as a phenomenon with other related phenomena. We have to regard it as a
primary phenomenon which can be conveyed only indirectly. Our attention gets
drawn to it because it can be disturbed pathologically and so we appreciate that it
exists. If we want to describe it as a phenomenon, we shall have to take the following
points into account:
1. What is real is what we concretely perceive. In contrast with our imaginings,
perception has a quality not determined by the particular sense-organ, e.g. the eye or
ear, but rooted in the actual mode of what is sensed, which is something absolutely
primary and constitutes sensory reality (normally connected with external stimuli).
J We can talk about this primary event, name and rename it, but we cannot reduce it
any further. 1
2 . Reality lies in the simple awareness of Being. Awareness of reality may fail us,
even when we concretely perceive. For instance it is lost in 'derealisation' and 'de-
personalisation'. Awareness of reality must therefore be a primary experience of
existence and as such Janet called it a 'fonction de reel'. Descartes' 'cogito ergo sum'
holds even for the person in a state of derealisation who says paradoxically: 'I am not
but have to go on being nothing for ever'. Descartes' phrase therefore cannot con-
vince us by logic alone; in addition it requires the primary awareness of Being and
the awareness of one's own existence in particular. 'I exist and thereby the things in
the world outside me are experienced as equally existent.'
3. What is real is what resists us. Whatever may inhibit our bodily movements or
prevent the immediate realisation of our aims and wishes is a resistance. The achieve-
ment of a goal against resistance or defeat thereby brings with it an experience of
reality; all experience of reality, therefore, has a root in the practice of living. But the
reality itself which we meet in practice is always an interpretations, a meaning, the
meaning of things, events or situations. When I grasp the meaning, I grasp reality.
The resistance we meet in the world gives us the wide field of the real which extends
from the concreteness of tangible objects to pei;ceived meanings in things, behaviour
and human reaction. This brings to us awareness of the reality with which in practice
we have to reckon and deal, to which we have to accommodate every moment,
which fills us with expectation and which we believe in as something which is.
Awareness of this reality pervades us all more or less clearly as a knowledge of the
reality with which we are individually most concerned. This individual reality is
embedded in a more general reality that has been structured and amplified for us
through the traditional culture in which we have grown up and been educated. What
. is real for us in all this has many grades of certainty and usually we are not comp!etely
11
clear about it. We only need to test how much we would risk in our ordinary Judg-
ments of what is real or not for us to see the measure of this certainty.
We have to distinguish between immediate certainty of reality and reality-judg-
ment. A vivid false perception may be recognised as a deception and judged as such
1
Gerhard Kloos, Das Realitiitshewusstsein in der Wahrnehmung und Trugwahrnehmung (Leit
I
II[ I
zig, 1 938). This is an excellent survey of all the efforts made at definition hitherto and make~ its
( jt' I
own f~esh contribution, but an unsuccessful one in my opinion, though it helps us to appreciate
the prunary nature of the phenomenon.
 ABNORMAL PSYCHIC PHENOMENA 95
and yet continue to ~e what it is, as happens with simple after-images and sometimes
in the case of hallucinated mental patients. Even when the deception is recognised
the patient may still act unawares as if the content were real. For instance, an amputee
has a phantom limb, steps on it and falls; or there was the case of the famous botanist
Naegeli~;vho wanted to put a glass of water on a hallucinated table. Reality-judg-
ment is ·the result of a thoughtful digestion of direct experiences. These are tested
out against each other; only that which stands the test and is confirmed in this way is
accepted as real; and hence only that is real which is commonly identifiable and acces-
sible to others and not merely a private and subjective matter. A judgment of reality
can itself be transformed into a new direct experience. We live continuously with a
knowledge of reality acquired in this way but not always made fully explicit in the
form of a judgment. The characteristics of this reality as evinced by our judgments I:
(implicit or explicit) are: that reality is not a single experience 'per se' but only as it is
there in the context of the experience and ultimately in the experience as a whole;
reality is relative in so far as it is recognised only up to the point at which it has dis-
closed itself; it can alter; reality discloses itself; it rests on insight and how certain
this is; it does not depend on concreteness nor on an immediate experience of reality
as such; the latter are only supporting features for the whole, they are indispensable
but have constantly to be checked. Hence, the reality of our reality-judgments is a
flexible reality-a movement of our reason.
If now we want to characterise the field of delusion, we shall have to make
some distinctions. There is first diminished awareness of Being and ofone's own
existence, which were discussed under derealisation of perception and which
we shall meet again among the disturbances of self-awareness. Then there is
hallucinatory vividness, which was discussed under false ·perceptions. Delusion
proper, however, ·implies a transfomuztion in our total awareness of reality
(including that secondary awareness which appears in the form of reality-
judgments). This builds itself up on judgmental experiences as well as on the
world of practical activity, resistance and meanings, in which, however,
hallucinatory vividness plays only an accidental and relatively minor part be-
side the transformation of basic experience which we have such great difficulty
in grasping. 1

(a) The concept of delusion

Delusion manifests itself in judgments; delusion can only arise in the process
of thinking and judging. To this extent pathologically falsified judgments are
termed delusions. The content of such judgments may be rudimentary but
take a no less effective form as mere awareness. This is usually spoken of as
a 'feeling' that is also an obscure certainty.
The term delusion is vaguely applied to all false judgments that share the
following external characteristics to a marked, though undefined, degree: ( 1) I
I

they are held with an extra.ordinary conviction, with an incomparable, suhjective

certainty; ( 2 ) there is an imperviousness to other experiences and to compelling
1 Gerhard Schmidt, 'Der Wahn im deutschsprachigen Schrifttum der letzten 25 Jahre' ( 1914_
29), Zbl. Neur., vol. 97, p. u5.
 PHENOMENA OF PSYCHIC LIFE
SUBJECTIV E
6
9 heir content is impossihle. If we want to get heh·
1nd
counter-argument; (Jh) t cteristics into the psychological nature of delu .
externa1 c ara h . s1on
these mere_ . . l h original experience from t e ;udgment based on it . '
we must d1stml guts 1 ttse as presented data from the fixed judgment whic'h1.~.
I iona conten . . 1s
t he de us d d disputed dissimulated as occasion demands. We
h merely repro uce , ' . d' h . can
t en . . .h large groups of delus10n accor mg to t e1r oriain· 0
h n d1stmgu1s tw O . rr fi h . o . ne
t e J tandahlv from preceding auects, rom s attering mon·
g roup emerges unaers ;., . £ r. , 1-
. . oki'ng or other such experiences, rom ialse-perception 0
fymg gm1t-prov d . r
'h · ce of derealisation in states of altere consciousness etc The
from t e experien . . . . ·
is for us psyckologzcally zrreduczhle; phenomenologically it is
0 th er grou P , , . ,.k · J , h fi
something final. We give the ,rerm d~,uswn-a e iaeas to t e rst group; the
latter we term 'delusions proper . In their case we must now try and get closer to
the facts of the delusional experience itself, even though a clear presentation
is hardly possible with so alien a happening.
With every hallucination proper, a need is experienced to regard the hallucinated
object as real. The need remains even when the fal~e judgment of reality has been
corrected in the light of the total context of perception and subsequent knowledge.
But should the patient, although such a correction is feasible, retain his false judg-
ment of reality in spite of the known objections, in spite of reflection and with abso-
lute certainty-overcoming indeed any initial doubts he may have had-then we are
dealing with delusion proper: such a belief is no longer understandable in tenns of
hallucination alone. With delusion-like ideas that originate from hallucinations we
only find a tendency towards false judgment of reality (or a quite transient certainty)
but with delusion proper all doubt has ceased. Some other psychic factors than mere
hallucinations must be at work and these we will now try to explore.
The content of the delusions which the patient may disclose to us in the
course of an interview is always a secondary product. We are faced with a
customary formulation of a judgment, which simply differs from other judg-
ments perhaps in having a different content. When investigating, therefore,
we are always confronted with the question-what is the primary experience
traceable to the illness and what in the formulation of the judgment is secondary
and _understandable in terms of that experience? There are three existing points
of vzew: the first denies that there is any experience at all of delusion proper;
all delusions are understandable in themselves and secondary. The second
believes that lack of critical capacity due to poor intelligenc~ allows delusion to
emerge ~rom any kind of experience; the third requires the singular phenomenon
of delusional. exp erience,
Th · w h..1ch it
• regards as the essential patholog1ca
• l e1emen t·
t
e firS . point of view is represented by Westphal. t According to him the
6rst step 1s an awar
.
f '.)r instance . eness o f ch ange m . one ,s personality much as one mtg · h t feel '
1 fO h d ' • s
So pa . ' th ne a put on a uniform for the first time and felt conspicuou ·
rano1cs ink th h h . · te
is also noticed b ~t t e ange m themselves, which they alone apprectam~
noticeable • Ytetr environment. From this delusion that one has beco
arises t e delusion that one is watched and from that the delusion
1
\Vestphal, Alig z p .
• • sycl11atr., vol. 34, pp. ,. ff.
52
 ABNORMAL PSYCHIC PHENOMENA 97

that one is being persecuted. It is true such understandable connections do

play a part, particularly i? paranoid developments of personality, and in
psychoses so far as conten~ is c~ncerned. We can thus understand over-valued
ideas and secondary delusions m general, but we are still without an explana-
tion of the essential nature of delusion. The same may be said for the attempt
to derive delusion from preceding affects, the affect of distrust, for instance.
There is no clear delineation here of the specific phenomenon, the actual
delusional experience; we are only offered an understandable context for the
emergence of certain stubborn misconceptions. If these misconceptions turn
into delusion, something new has to arrive, which as an experience can also
be grasped phenomenologically. The second point of view holds that the
cause-or perhaps more modestly the precondition-for delusion lies in weak-
ness ofintelligence. We always tend to look for the logical errors and blunders
in the paranoid patient's thought in order to prove some such weakness. Sand-
berg,1 however, pointed out quite rightly that paranoics have by no means a
poorer intelligence quotient than healthy persons and in any case the mentally
ill person surely has as much right to be illogical as the healthy one. It is
wrong to consider the failure in reasoning a morbid symptom in one case but
normal in the other. Actually we find every degree of mental defect without
delusions of any kind and the most fantastic and incredible delusions in the
case of people of superior intelligence. The critical faculty is not obliterated
but put into the service of the delusion. The patient thinks, tests arguments and
counter-arguments in the same way as if he were well. A highly critical attitude
is as rare in paranoics as in healthy people, but if it does occur it naturally
colours the formal expression of the delusional content. For any true grasp of
delusion, it is most important to free ourselves from this prejudice that there
has to be some poverty of intelligence at the root of it. Any dependence on the
latter is purely formal. We have to assume some specific alteration in psychic
function, not a failure of intelligence, if after some delusional experience an
individual, who is fully conscious 'and-as occasionally happens-quite free
from any other morbid symptom, maintains a delusion that everyone else
recognises as such, and if he simply declares: 'Well, that is how it is; I have
no doubts about it, I know it is so'. With delusion proper there is material
falsification while formal thinking remains intact. Where there is formal
thought disturbance, then misapprehensions, confused association and (in acute
conditions) the wildest notions may follow, which as such do not have the
character of delusion proper. The third point of view, that there is some
phenomenologically peculiar delusional experience, sets out to find what this
basic primary delusional experience may be.
Methodologically delusion can be viewed from a number of standpoints: phenom-
enologically it is an experience; from the point of view of psychological performance it is
a disturbance of thinking; as a psychological product, it is a mental creation: from the

1
Sandberg, Alig. Z. Psychiatr., vol. 52·
 SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA OF PSYCHIC LIFE
98
. f . of meani-~'ul connections, it is motivated, dynamic content
pomt o view ''t5J• . l d k ; and ·
osolo,gical-biographica stu y we may as whether we are t in the
firamework of n •l' • I o co
. break in the normal lue-curve or s1mp y as a part of the co . lllpre,
hend 1t as a nt1nuurn
personality development. of

(b) Primary delusions

If we try to get some closer understanding
11 ·
of these primary expe .
. h . r1ences of
deIusion' we soon find we cannot rea y appreciate t ese qmte alien m d
rience. They remain largeIy incompre
. hens1.ble, unreal and bey odes of
9 Pe
understanding. Yet some attempts have been made. 1 We find that ther .
. . . . l r . e arise
in the patient certain prtmary sensations, vita 1ee1ings, moods, awareness .
'Something is going on; do tell me what on earth is going on', as one patie~;
of Sandberg said to her husband. When he asked what she thought was goin
on, the patient said, 'How do I know, but I'm certain something is going on~
Patients feel uncanny and that there is something suspicious afoot. Everything
gets a new meaning. The environment is somehow different-not to a gross
degree-perception is unaltered in itself but there is some change which
envelops everything with a subtle, pervasive and strangely uncertain light. A
living-room which formerly was felt as neutral or friendly now becomes
dominated by some indefinable atmosphere. Something seems in the air which
the patient cannot account for, a distrustful, uncomfortable, uncanny tension
invades him (Sandberg). The use of the word 'atmosphere' might suggest
psychasthenic moods and feelings perhaps and be a source of confusion; but
with this delusional atmosphere we always find an 'objective something' there,
even though quite vague, a something which lays the seed of objective validity
and meaning. This general delusional atmosphere with all its vagueness of
content must be unbearable. Patients obviously suffer terribly under it and to
reach some definite idea at last is like being relieved from some enormous
burden. Patients feel 'as if they have lost grip on things, they feel gross un-
certainty which drives them instinctively to look for some fixed point to
which they can cling. The achievement of this brings strength and comfort,
and it is brought about only by forming an idea as happens with healthy people
· anaIogous circumstances. Whenever we find' ourselves depressed, iear
m r ful or
at a loss, the sudden clear consciousness of something whether false or r_rue,
immediately has a soothing effect. As judgment gains' in clarity, the feehnf
loosed by the situation will (ceteris paribus) dwindle in their force. Conve:e
no dread is worse than that of danger unknown' (Hagen). Experiences ~u 0af
these gi · . . . · d crune,
. ve rise to convictions of persecution of having committe ••
bemg cl ' · n sane0
. accuse or, by contrast, of some golden age, transfiguratio '
fication, etc.
It •is doubtfiuI w hether th e foregoing
. . . d . 11 cases. Content
analysis will hol m a . ranees,
S0 meumes seem · d. h r mer ins
s 1mme 1ately present, vividly clear. In t e ior
1 18~
Hagen, Fixe Ide . . J. (ErJangen,
Sandberg All z en i~: St udien auf dem Gehiete der iirt{lichen Seelenkun e
' g. • Psychiatr., vol. 52.

2
 ABNORMAL PSYCHIC PHENOMENA 99
however, it is certainly possible to wonder whether the patients have found
any content adequate for their actual experience. We will try therefore to
explore the original experience further, with its feelings and sensations rather
than the content itself, though it is true our exploration can only be a limited
one. The content in these cases is perhaps accidental; it is certainly not meant
literally and is quite differently experienced from similar content in the case
of a person whom we can fully understand.
Let us now try to imagine what the psychological significance is of this
delusional experience of reality in which the environment offers a world o{new
meanings. All thinking is a thinking about meanings. If the meaning is perceived
directly with the senses, if it is directly present in imagination and memory,
the meaning has the character of reality. Perceptions are never mechanical
responses to sense-stimuli; there is always at the same time a perception of
meaning. A house is there for people to inhabit; people in the streets are
following their own pursuits. If 1 see a knife, I see a tool for cutting. If I look
at an unfamiliar tool from another culture, I may not see its precise meaning
but I can appreciate it as a meaningfully shaped object. We may not be ex-
plicitly conscious of the interpretations we make when we perceive but never-
theless they are always present. Now, the experiences ofprimary delusion are
analogous to this seeing of meaning, but the awareness of meaning undergoes
a radical transformation. There is an immediate, intrusive knowledge of the
meaning and it is this which is itself the delusional experience. If we distin-
guish the different sense-data in which meaning of this sort can be experienced,
we can speak of delusional perception, delusional ideas, delusional memories,
delusional awarenesses etc. In fact there is no kind of experience with a known
object which we could not link with the word 'delusion' provided that at the
level of meaning, awareness of meaning has become this experience of primary
delusion (Kurt Schneider, G. Schmidt). 1
We will now look more closely at delusional perceptions, delusional ideas,
and delusional awarenesses:
(aa) Delusional perceptions. These may range from an experience of some
vague meaning to clear, delusional observation and express delusions of
reference.
Suddenly things seem to mean something quite different. The patient sees people
in uniform in the street; they are Spanish soldiers. There are other uniforms; they are
Turkish soldiers. Soldiers of all kinds are being concentrated here. There is a world
war (this was before 1914). Then a man in a brown jacket is seen a few steps away.
He is the dead Archduke who has resurrected. Two people in raincoats are Schiller
and Goethe. There are scaffoldings up on some houses; the whole town is going to
be demolished. Another patient sees a man in the street; she knows at once he is an
old lover of hers; he looks quite different it is true; he has disguised himself with a
1
Kurt Schneider, 'Eine Schwierigkeit im Wahnproblem', Nervenar{t., vol. 11 (1938), p. 46 2 •
He recognises only delusional perception as a two-stage phenomenon and spceifically distinguishes
this from other sources of delusion, the 'delusional notions'.
 100 SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA OF PSYCHIC LIFE

·g nd there are other changes. It is all a bit queer. A male patient says of h
w1 a d . h f . sue
experiences-'everything is so dea certain t at no amount o seeing to the contrary
will make it doubtful'.

These are not ~onsidered _interpretations but direct experiences of meaning

while perception itself remains normald~nddunchanged • In other cases, par.
ticularly at the beginning of process 1sor ers, no c1ear, definite meanin
·
accompanies the perceptions. Ob"Jects, persons an d events are simply
· eeri g
horrifying, peculiar, or they seem remarkable, mystifying, transcendenta~:
Objects and events signify something but nothing definite. Delusional sig.
ni{icance of this sort appears in the folowing examples:
A patient noticed the waiter in the coffee-house; he skipped past him so quickly
and uncannily. He noticed odd behaviour in an acquaintance which made him feel
strange; everything in the street was so different, something was bound to be happen.
ing. A passer-by gave such a penetrating glance, he could be a detective. Then there
was a dog who seemed hypnotised, a kind of mechanical dog made of rubber. There
were such a lot of people walking about, something must surely be starting up against
the patient. All the umbrellas were rattling as if some apparatus was hidden inside
them.
In other cases patients have noticed transfigured faces, unusual beauty of land-
scape, brilliant golden hair, overpowering glory of the sunlight. Something must be
going on; the world is changing, a new era is starting. Lights are bewitched and will
not bum; something is behind it. A child is like a monkey; people are mixed up, they
are imposters all, they all look unnatural. The house-signs are crooked, the streets
look suspicious; everything happens so quickly. The dog scratches oddly at the door.
'I noticed particularly' is the constant remark these patients make, though they can-
not say why they take such particular note of things nor what it is they suspect. First
they want to get it clear to themselves.

The patients arrive at defining the meaning more clearly when there are
delusions ofreference. Here the objects and events perceived are experienced as
having some obvious relation to the patient himself:

Gestures, ambiguous words provide 'tacit intimations'. All sorts of things are
being conveyed to the patient. People imply quite different things in such harmless
remarks as 'the carnations are lovely' or 'the blouse fits all right' and understand these
meanings very well among themselves. People look at the patient as if they had some•
thing special to say to him.-'lt was as if everything was being done to spite me;
everything that happened in Mannheim happened in order to take it out of m:.'
People in the street are obviously discussing the patient. Odd words picked up 10
passing refer to him. In the papers, books, everywhere there are things which are
specially meant for the patient, concern his own personal life and carry warnings or
insults. Patients resist any attempt to explain these things as coincidence. These
'devilish incidents' are most certainly not coincidences. Collisions in the street are
obviou~ly int~ntional. The fact that the soap is now on the table and was not there
before 1s obviously an insult.

The following is an account extracted from the report of a patient who

,1
p

ABNORMAL PSYCHIC PHENOMENA IOI

went on working, while finding throughout the day all sorts of imaginary
connections among otherwise quite real perceptions:
'I was hardly out of the house when somebody prowled round me, stared at me
and tried to put a cyclist in the way. A few steps on, a schoolgirl smiled at me en-
couragingly.' He then arrived at his office and noticed leg-pulling and ragging by his
colleagues ••. 'at I 2 o'clock there were further insults, the time when the girls came
from school; I tried hard to confine myself to just looking at them; I simply wanted to
see a bevy of girls, not to make any gesture •.• but the lads wanted to make out I
was after something immoral and they wanted to distort the facts against me but
nothing could be further from my mind than to be a nuisance staring and frightening
•.. in the middle of the street they imitated me and laughed straight in my face and
in a hateful way they pushed humorous drawings my way. I was supposed to read
likenesses to third persons from the faces •.• the lads talked about me afterwards
at the police station ... they fraternised with the workers .•. the nuisance of being
stared at and pointed at went on during meals .•. before I entered my flat somebody
always had to annoy me with some meaningless glance but the names of the police
and the private people involved I did not know .. .' The patient objected to 'eye-
language' used even by the judge who examined him. In the street 'the police tried to
stalk me several times but I drove them away by my looks .•. they became a kind of
hostile militia ... all I could do was to stay on the defensive and never take the
offensive with anybody.'
A fine example of delusional reference is provided by a 17-year-old patient
reported by G. Schmidt.1 She was suffering from a schizophrenic psychosis
and rec·overed after a few months. There is a mass of detailed self-reference:
'My illness first showed itself in loss of appetite and a disgust for "serum". My
periods stopped and there came a kind of sullenness. I didn't speak freely any more; I
had lost interest; I felt sad, distraught and was startled when anyone spoke to me.
My father, who owned a restaurant, said to me the cookery examination (which
was to take place next day) was only a trifle; he laughed in such an odd tone that I.
felt he was laughing at me. The customers were looking oddly at me too as if they
had guessed something of my suicidal thoughts. I was sitting next to the cash desk,
the customers were looking at me and then I thought perhaps I had taken something.
For the last five weeks I had had the feeling that I had done something wrong; my
mother had been looking at me sometimes in a funny, piercing way.
It was about 9.30 in the evening (she had seen people whom she feared would
take her away). I got undressed after all. I lay in bed rigidly and made no move so
they wouldn't hear me; I was listening hard for the least noise; I believed the three
would get together again and tie me up.
In the morning I ran away; as I went across the square the clock was suddenly
u_psid_e down; it had stopped upside down. I thought it was working on the other
side; Just then I thought the world was going to end; on the last day everything stops;
then I saw a lot of soldiers on the street; when I came close, one always moved away;
ah, I thought, they are going to make a report; they know when you are a 'wanted'
person; they kept looking at me; I really thought the world was turning round me.
In the afternoon the sun did not seem to be shining when my thoughts were bad
1
Gerhard Schmidt, Z. Neur., vol. 171 (1941), p. 570.
 102 SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA OF PSYCHIC LIFE

but came back when they were good. Then I thought cars were going the wro
when a car passed me I did not hear it. I thought there must be rubber undng Way;

,I
• • J J •
7i erneath•
large lornes did not ratt e a on~ a_ny mo~ej as so~n a car approached, I seemed t~
send out something that broug tdi~dto a a t k. • • re err~df ehverything to myself as if
it were made for ~el .. 1· pekop1e i not 1oo at me, as i t ey wanted to say I Was
' I

altogether too aw1u to oo at.

At the police station I had the impression that I wasn't at the station hut • h
Other World; one official looked like death himself. I thought he was dead and ~n; e
write on his typewriter until he had expiated his sins. Every time the hell r a t~
believed chey were fetching away someone whose lifetime had ended. (Later /ngl
. . h d h rea.
ised the ringing came from th e typew~ter as it reac t end of the line.) I waited
for them to fetch me also. A young policeman had a pistol m his hand; I was afraid h
wanted to kill me. I refused to drink the tea t~ey brought me as I thought it we
poisoned. I was waiting and longing to die .•. it was as on a stage, and marionett:
are not human. I thought they were mere empty skins .. • the typewriter seemed up-
side down; there were no letters on it, only signs which I thought came from the
Other World.
When I went to bed I thought someone else was in it already because the eider-
down was so bumpy; the bed felt_ as if people were lying in it already; I thought
everybody was bewitched; I mistook the curtain for Aunt Helena; I found the black
furniture uncanny; the lampshade over the bed moved continuously, figures kept on
swirling round; towards morning Iran out of the bedroom and shouted 'What am I?
I am the devil!' •.. I wanted to take my nightdress off and run out into the street, but
my mother just caught me •..
The illuminated signs of the town were very scanty-for the moment I did not
think of the blackout due to the war; it seemed to me extraordinary; the glowing
cigarette-ends of people were uncanny •.. something must be the matter; everything
was looking at me; I felt I was brightly illuminated and visible when others were
not ..•
At the clinic I found everything unnatural; I thought I was going to be used for
something special; I felt like a guinea-pig; I thought the doctor was a murderer,
because he had such black hair and a hook nose. Another man outside pushing
an apple-cart seemed like a puppet. He was walking so hurriedly, just like in the
pictures....
Later at home things were changed, partly they were smaller; it was not so homely
as before, it had become cold and strange. My father had got me a book; I thought it
had been written specially for me; I did not think I had lived through all the scenes it
described but it was more that they seemed meant for me. I was annoyed that now
they knew all this.
Today I can see clearly how things really are; but then I always thought some-
Ii
thing unusual was up, even on the most trivial occasion. It was a real illness.'
!I
Ideas of reference can also be experienced during hashish intoxication,
and in a remote way resemble schizophrenic ideas of reference:
'Fee1·mgs o f uncertamty
· ·
spread; thmgs lose th e1r
· seIf-evi"d ent nat ure· The intoxi-
cated person feels defeated and finds himself in a situation of distrust and defence.
Even the most banal question sounds like an examination or an inquisition, and harm-
less laughter sounds like derision. An accidental glance leads to the reaction-"Stap
 ABNORMAL PSYCHIC PHENOMENA IOJ
gawping at me"• One constantly sees menacing faces, one senses traps, hears allu-
sions. New powers seem to grow under the intoxication and ideas of reference
spread to the inflated ego (F raenkel and Joel). What then h~ppens, happens because
of oneself, not to one's detriment, but purely for one's benefit.'
(bh) Delusional ideas. These give new colour and meaning to memory or
may appear in the form of a sudden notion-'! could be King Ludwig's son'-
which is then confirmed by a vivid memory of how when attending a parade
the Kaiser rode by on his horse and looked straight at the patient.
A patient wrote: 'It suddenly occurred to me one night, quite naturally, self-
evidently but insistently, that Miss L. was probably the cause of all the terrible things
through which I have had to go these last few years (telepathic influences, etc.). I
can't of course stand by all that I have written here, but if you examine it fairly you
will see there is very little reflection about it; rather everything thrust itself on me,
suddenly, and totally unexpectedly, though quite naturally. I felt as if scales had fallen
from my eyes and I saw why life had been precisely as it was through these last
years .•.'
(cc) Delusional awarenesses. These constitute a frequent element particularly
in florid and acute psychoses. Patients possess a knowledge of immense and
universal happenings, sometimes without any trace of clear perceptual ex-
perience of them, and when there is sensory experience, pure awarenesses will
often intermingle among the forms in which the actual content is given. When
there is delusional experience of some emotional depth, content will usually
appear for the most part in the form of awareness. For example:
A girl was reading the Bible. She read about the waking of Lazarus from the dead.
She immediately felt herself to be Mary. Martha was her sister, Lazarus a sick cousin.
She vividly experienced the events about which she read just as if they were her own
experience. (The vividness was a feeling rather than a sensory vividness) (Klinke).
From the phenomenological point of view the delusional experience is
always the same: besides sensory experience of illusory, hallucinatory or
pseudo-hallucinatory contents, there is a kind of experience where sensory
richness is not essentially changed, but the recognition of certain objects is
linked with an experience totally different from normal. The mere thinking
about things gives them a special reality-which does not have to become a
sensory experience. The new and special significance may be associated as
much with thoughts as with things perceived.
All primary experience of delusion is an experience of meaning, and simple,
'one-stage' delusional notions do not exist. For example, a patient suddenly
has the notion that a fire has broken out in a far-away town (Swedenborg).
This surely happens only through the meaning he draws from inner visions
that crowd in on him with the character of reality?
A basic feature of the first experience of delusional meaning is 'the establish-
ment of an unfounded reference' (Gruhle). Significance appears unaccountably,
suddenly intruding into the psychic life. Later the identical experience of
104 SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA OF PSYCHIC LIFE

significance is repeated, though in other contexts. The trail is blazed and the
preparedness for the significant experience then permeates almost all perceived
contents. The now dominant delusion motivates the apperceptive schema for
all future percepts (G. Schmidt).

(c) lncorrigihility of delusion

Delusional experiences proper, false perceptions and all the other primary
experiences we have so far described give rise to errors of judgment. They
are the source for the great variety of delusional syndromes which we encounter
in individual patients. After the creation of the primary delusion from his
experiences, the patient often takes afurther step, and holds on to his delusion as
truth. He will maintain it as such in the face of all other experiences to the
contrary and against all argument. He does this with a conviction far beyond
normal, even perhaps stamping down on any occasional, initial doubt he may
have himself.
Psychological digression. Normal convictions are formed in a context of social
living and common knowledge. Immediate experience of reality survives only if it
can fit into the frame of what is socially valid or can be critically tested. Experience
of reality leads us to judgments of reality. Individual experience can always be cor-
rected but the total context of experience is something stable and can hardly be cor-
rected at all. The source for incorrigibility therefore is not to be found in any single
phenomenon by itself but in the human situation as a whole, which nobody would
surrender lightly. If socially accepted reality totters, people become adrift. What is
left to them? A set of habits, survivals, chance events? Reality becomes reduced to
an immediate and shifting present.
Incorrigibility however has another source as well. The fanaticism with which
opinions are held in a discussion or over long periods of time does not always prove
that their content is really believed in, but only that in the holder's judgment such
opinions will have some desired effect, sometimes no more than his personal advan-
tage, to which his instinctive drives unconsciously direct him. It is the behaviour
which will show clearly enough what is held to be reality; since only the reality that is
actually believed will compel to action. Fanatic opinions that are not believed in can
be dropped at any time and in this sense .they become corrigible. But genuine reality
judgments which are the expression of a believed-in reality and according to which
people in fact conduct themselves (e.g. belief in hell) are extremely difficult to correct.
Should they be so, it will mean a revolution in the individual's whole conception of
life. ,
Normal mistakes are also very largely incorrigible. It is astonishing how moSr
people tend to maintain the realities they believe in during a discussion, although the
mistakes they are making seem to the knowledgeable person little else but 'sheer
delusion'. 'Delusions' on a national scale as commonly discussed are not really delu-
.
sions but mass-beliefs that change with the
' times and are typical illusions.
' On!~ those
that reach the highest ranks of absurdity deserve the term delusion-belief in witches,
for example-and even that need not be a delusion in the psychopathological sense.
Speaking methodologically, the concept of incorrigibility does not belong
to phenomenology but to the study of psychological performance and tbe
 ABNORMAL PSYCHIC PHENOMENA IOS
psychology of meanin~ful connections. Phenomenologically, we have only to
decide whether there ts more than one kind of incorrigibility which may
indicate different phenomena as the source.
We may sum up the position briefly as follows: Errors in normal people
are the errors common to their social group. Conviction has a root in the fact
that all believe. Correction of belief comes about not on the ground of any
logical argument but through historical change. Delusion-like errors on the
part of individuals always imply some segregation from what all believe \I.
'I

(i.e. 'what one believes') and in this case the incorrigibility cannot be distin- i, i
guished psychologically from the unwavering force of a true insight, asserting
itself against a whole worl<!: Delusion proper is incorrigible because of an
alteration in the personality, the nature of which we are so far unable to describe,
let alone formulate into a concept, though we are driven to make some such
presupposition. The decisive criterion seems to be not the 'intensity' of the
direct evidence, but the maintaining of what is evident to the patient in the
face of subsequent reflection and external criticism. Delusion cannot be grasped
as a change in one of the thought processes nor as an alteration in any one of
our activities, nor as mere confusion, nor is it the same as the normal fanaticism i
of dogmatic people. One need try only to suppose an ideal case of a paranoic
with a high level of critical insight-a born scientist, perhaps-who shows \
incorrigibility as a pure phenomenon in the midst of his general scepticism- II
well, he would no longer be a paranoic! Patients are in a state of clear con- I
Ii
sciousness and have continual possibilities for testing their ideas but correction
of their delusion does not come. We cannot say the patient's whole world has
!

changed, because to a very large extent he can conduct himself like a healthy
person in thinking and behaving. But his world has changed to the extent that
a changed knowledge of reality so rules and pervades it that any correction
would mean a collapse of Being itself, in so far as it is for him his actual
awareness of existence. Man cannot believe something that negates his existence.
Such formulations,however,are only trying to make us understand what in its
essence cannot be understood-i.e. the specific schizophrenic incorrigibility.
We can only hold on to the fact that it is found where formal thinking is
maintained, the capacity for thought undamaged and where there is not the
slightest clouding of consciousness. ,I
On the other hand we should look at what it is that is actually incorrigible. '

The patient's behaviour will show this more readily than any conversation
with him. Reality for him does not always carry the same meaning as that of \

normal reality. With these patients persecution does not always appear quite
like the experience of people who are in fact being persecuted; nor does their
jealousy seem like that of some justifiably jealous person, although there is
often some similarity of behaviour. Hence the attitude of the patient to the
content of his delusion is peculiarly inconsequent at times. The content of the
delusion strikes one as a symbol for something quite different; sometimes
content changes constantly though the delusional meaning remains the same.
106 SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA OF PSYCHIC LIFE

Belief in reality can range through all degrees, from a mere play with possi-
bilities via a double reality-the empirical and the delusional-- --to unequivocal
attitudes in which the delu~i~~~I content ~eig~1~ as the sole and absolute reality.
During the play of poss1b1ht1es, each md1v1dual content may perhaps be
corrected but not the attitude as a whole and once the delusional reality has
become absolute, incorrigibility is also absolute.
Once we are clear that the criteria for delusion proper lie in the primary
experience of delusion and in the change of the personality, we can see that a de-
lusion may be correct in content without ceasing to be a delusion, for instance
-that there is a world-war. Such correctness is accidental and uncommon-
mostly it appears in delusions of jealousy. A correct thought ordinarily arises
from normal experience and is therefore valid for others. Delusion however
arises from a primary experience not accessible to others and it cannot be
substantiated. We can recognise it only by the way in which the patient
subsequently tries to give it ground. A delusion of jealousy, for instance, may
be recognised by its typical characteristics without our needing to know
whether the person has genuine ground for his jealousy or not. The delusion
does not cease to be a delusion although the spouse of the patient is in fact
unfaithful-sometimes only as the result of the delusion.

(d) Elaboration of the delusion

Thinking accompanies the first step which brings delusion about. This
may be no more than the unsystematic, blurred thinking of the acute psychoses
and states of chronic defect, yet even here patients look for some kind of
connection. Or the thinking may be more systematic as in the case of better-
preserved chronic conditions. Here the thought works over the delusion on
the basis of the primary experiences, trying to link them harmoniously with
real perceptions and the patient's actual knowledge. To do this sometimes
calls for the full strength of an intelligent personality. In this way a delusional
system is constructed which in its own context is comprehensible, sometimes
extremely closely argued and unintelligible only in its ultimate origins, the
primary experience. 1 These delusional systems are objective meaningful struc-
tures and methodologically we can assign them to the psychology of creativity.
(Werkpsychologie).

(e) Delusion proper and delusion-like idea

The term delusion should properly only be given to those delusions which
go back to primary pathological experiences as their source, and which demand
for their explanation a change in the personality. As such, they constitute
a group of primary symptoms. The term delusion-like ideas is reserved by
us for those so-called 'delusions' that emerge comprehensibly from other
1
E:xamples of closely argued delusional systems may be found ~n ~olla~, Erlcliirungen der
Tol'.lie,_ten von Haslam (Leipzig, 188?), pp. 14 ff. Schreber, Denlcwiird,glceiten emes Nervenlcranlcen
(le1pz1g, 1903).
 11
II

ABNORMAL PSYCHIC PHENOMENA 107

psychic events and which can be traced back psychologically to certain affects,
drives, desires and fears. We have no need here to invoke some personality
change but on the contrary can fully understand the phenomenon on the basis
of the permanent constitution of the personality (Anlage) or of some transient
emotional state. Among these delusion-like ideas we put the transient de-
ceptions due to false perception, etc.; the 'delusions' of mania and depression
('delusions' of sin, destitution, nihilistic 'delusion', etc.) 1 and over-valued ideas.
Over-valued ideas are what we term those convictions that are strongly
toned by affect which is understandable in terms of the personality and its
history. Because of this strong affect the personality identifies itself with ideas
which are then wrongly taken to be true. Psychologically there is no difference
between scientific adherence to truth, passionate political or ethical con-
viction and the retention of over-valued ideas. The contrast between these
phenomena lies in the falsity of the over-valued idea. This latter occurs in
psychopathic and even in healthy people; it may also appear as so-called
'delusion'-'delusions' of invention, jealousy, or of querulant behaviour etc.
Such over-valued ideas must be clearly differentiated from delusion proper.
They are isolated notions that develop comprehensibly out of a given person-
ality and situation. Delusions proper are the vague crystallisations of blurred
delusional experiences and diffuse, perplexing self-references which cannot be
sufficiently understood in terms of the personality or the situation; they are
much more the symptoms of a disease process that can be identified by the
presence of other symptoms as well.

(f) The problem of metaphysical delusions

Patients may display their delusions in some supra-natural mode and such
experiences cannot be adjudged true or untrue, correct or false. Even when
empirical reality is concerned it is difficult enough to be decisive, though some
evaluation can usually be made. We can study the metaphysical experience
in its schizophrenic manifestations as it is conditioned by the morbid process
and yet realise that the metaphysical intuitions (the images themselves, the
symbols) that have arisen in the course of these experiences have acquired
cultural significance in the minds of normal people for quite different reasons.
For us reality is the reality of time and space. Past, present and future are real for
normal people in the form of 'no longer', 'not yet' and 'now' but the constant flux of
time makes everything seem unreal, the past is no longer, the future is not yet and
the present disappears irresistibly. Temporal reality is not reality itself. This reality
lies athwart time and all metaphysical awareness is experience and affirmation of this
reality. Where it is truly felt, we call it faith. When it is externalised into something
tangibly existing in this world (where it becomes mere reality again) we talk of super-
stition. We can tell how much people need this absolute hold on the reality of the
world when we see the abysmal despair into which they fall should they lose it.
1
Depressive delusions can only be attributed to affect comprehensibly if we presuppose in
severe melancholia a temporary change in the psychic life as a whole.
10,8 SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA OF PSYCHIC LIFE

Superstition we might say is the 'delusion' of n_o~mal p~ople. Only f~ith, transcending
in the world can by virtue of its own uncond1uoned ltvrng and actrng be sure of the
7
Being which all our existence symbol~ses. Only faith can hover above both without
fear of falling into bottomless confusion.

The shattering of the self is said to be mirrored in the schizophrenic

experience of the end of the world. This is not sufficiently explicit. Experi-
encing the end of the world and all that this implies involves a deep religious
experience-of a symbolic truth that has served human existence for thousands
of years. We have to regard this experience as such and not merely as some
perverted psychological or psychopathological phenomenon if we really want
to understand it. Religious experience remains what it is, whether it occurs in
saint or psychotic or whether the person in whom it occurs is both at once.
Delusion is the morbid manifestation of knowledge and error in regard
to empirical reality, as it is of faith and superstition in regard to metaphysical
reality.

§ 5. FEELINGS AND AFFECTIVE ST ATES

Psychological Preface. There is fairly general agreement as to what we mean by

sensation, perception, image, thought, also perhaps what we mean by instinctual
urge and act of will. But confusion still reigns regarding the word and concept
'feeling'. We may still ask what is meant by it in any individual case. Commonly the
term 'feeling' is given to any psychic event that does not clearly belong to the phen-
omena of object-awareness, nor to instinctual excitation and volitional acts. All
undeveloped, undefined psychic manifestations tend to get called 'feeling'. That is,
everything intangible, analytically elusive, everything for which we can find no other
name. Someone feels he does not care, or that something is not right. He feels that
the room is too small or that everything is clear or he feels uneasy, etc. This diverse set
ofphenomena which we term 'feelings' has never been satisfactorily analysed from the
psychological point of view. We do not know what constitutes the basic element or
elements nor do we know how to classify, whereas with sensation the basic elements
have been both well examined and classified. There are very few scientific investiga-
t~ons into feeling and we will mention them when necessary. On the other hand there
is an extensive literature on the pathological phenomena of object-awareness as well
as on the perversion of instinct.
It is difficult to know how we should set about it. However, psychologists1 have
laid some foundations for the analysis of feelings and we can get an orientation from
the leading schools of thought, a methodological approach which will help us to
evaluate more precisely what has been established so far. Extensive analysis of every
different kind of feeling would only end in a vast array of trivialities. 2 First therefore
we will review the different ways in which feelings have been classified:
1G. 'D
. eiger, as Bewusstsein von Gefiihlen', Munch. phi!. Ah. (Th. Lipps zum 6o Geburtstag
gew,dmet). 'Ober Stimmungseinfiihlung', Z. Asth. (19II). Kulpe, 'Zur psychologie der Gefiihle',
6 Psycho!. Kongr. Genf. (
1909).
J d;· For psychological discussion on feelings generally, at a superficial level, see Hoffding and
( ~ ans,
'. Nahlow~ky, Das Gefiihlslehen, 3rd edn. (Leipzig, 1907); Ribot: Psychologie der Gefiihle
18 96) (in German, 1903). ·