curator,+CISSE v06 I01 p07

Journal of The Colloquium for Information System Security Education (CISSE)
Edition 6, Issue 1 - September 2018
IoTCP: A Novel Trusted Computing

Protocol for IoT
Shuangbao (Paul) Wang, Amjad Ali, Ujjwal Guin, Anthony (Tony) Skjellum
Abstract - The ability to understand, predict, secure and exploit the vast array of
heterogeneous network of things is phenomenal. With the ever-increasing threats to cyber
physical systems and Internet of Things, security on those networks of data-gathering sensors
and systems has become a unique challenge to industries as well as to military in the battlefield.
To address those problems, we propose a trusted computing protocol that employs discrete
Trusted Platform Modules and Hardware Security Modules for key management, a
blockchain-based package verification algorithm for over-the-air security, and a secure
authentication mechanism for data communication. The IoT-based Trusted Computing
Protocol implements integrated hardware security, strong cryptographic hash functions, and
peer-based blockchain trust management. We have tested the protocol under various
circumstances where devices have built-in securities while others do not. We apply the new
protocol to a SCADA system that contains more than 3,000 edge devices. The preliminary
results show that proposed protocol establishes trust, improves security, integrity, and privacy.
Keywords
Trusted Computing, IoT, IoBT, Blockchain, TPM
1
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is fed with billions of devices and trillions of sensors.
IoT networks undergird critical infrastructure, such as electric grids, transportation
hubs, and nuclear power plants. They also link to systems containing valuable and
sensitive personal information, such as hospitals, schools, and government
institutions. A failure in of one of these systems or a cascade of such failures across
systems, either in their operations or security, could lead to potentially catastrophic
consequences for the population of that region, city and beyond [15, 29]. Yet many
of the hardware and software elements used to control, monitor, and connect these
systems are not designed with built-in security, while others are outmoded and may
not interface with newer technologies. For this reason, every IoT project must
address the security and trust, and that can be hardened against tempering and
compromise [30]. The ideal IoT, Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT), and Cyber
Physical Systems (CPS) should be able to continue operating under attacks, and
provide guaranteed performance [25–28]. Therefore, it is critical to secure edge
devices and actuators, and make IoT networks resilient in the face of cybersecurity
threats [1, 2, 10, 30].
To ensuring the security and authenticity of IoT infrastructure is challenging

since the edge devices have been manufactured in an environment with limited
trust and government oversight [30]. These devices often have resource constraints
such as low power requirements, low area budget, limited memory, and/or
extremely low-cost. The attacks can originate either from the hardware or the
software. Hardware attacks against a system can occur with physical tampering of
an edge device and/or by the introduction of a cloned/counterfeit device into the
IoT system [31-35]. On the other hand, software attacks against the system can be
performed through network attacks, such as Phishing, Denial of Service (DoS), and
data spoofing [36-37].
Trusted Computing (TC) is to guarantee the trustworthy of IT systems [8, 9].

It has shown promises in research, industrial projects [22], and military
implementations. Practically, deploying a large system with Trusted Computing
2
Base (TCB) is still a challenge especially in IoT systems, where various protocols
and legacy systems exist.
This paper first discusses security issues in IoT/CPS systems and then proposes
a novel IoT-based Trusted Computing Protocol (IoTCP) that integrates hardware
security, strong cryptographic hash functions, and blockchain technology to
establish trust among devices and to secure data communications. We apply
machine learning and intelligent services to deliver adaptive cyber-physical
capability and services necessary to enable effective command and control across
IoT/CPS systems. Finally, we illustrate an implementation of a testbed SCADA
system with a dashboard and data analytics features.
2 BACKGROUND
Trusted computing is to build digital identities and increase assurance of trust

among devices that are connected to the network. It adds a level of security on top
of what is provided by the operating systems and hardware. Trusted computing base
adds a hardware device, which has non-volatile storage and cryptographic execution
engines on each device.
Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) and Hardware Security Modules (HSM) are
cryptographic hardware that improve the overall security of a system. TPM is
usually embedded into a device. For a device that do not come with a TPM, an
HSM can be added.
Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) [12] is a device-to-device IoT

connectivity protocol. It has the advantages of small code footprint, low network
bandwidth requirement, and lightweight therefore a good candidate especially for
IoT/CPS systems.
A blockchain is a distributed ledger [13]. For IoT/IoBT/CPS systems, it records

all actions and operations [6]. Each block contains the data and a hash of a previous
block. If any of the previous block is tempered with, it will affect the hash of the
current block. The temper-proof property makes it a perfect candidate to guarantee
3
packages authenticity for over the air updates. Guin et al. recently proposed to
integrate blockchain technology to authenticate resource-constrained, low-cost
edge devices [38]. SRAM-based physically unclonable functions (PUFs) were used
to generate a unique “digital fingerprints” to identify edge devices.
2.1 Trusted Platform Modules
A TPM is a robust chip that is integrated into the systems providing hardware
security and establishing trust within devices such as computers, weapons, vehicles,
robots, wearables, actuators, and storage [5]. TPM enables server, gateways, and
sensors to extend secure authentication [8, 11] and integrity with a TPM chip on
each device. Mutual authentication of devices is required at session start and signing;
and decipher are performed on the device [4].
TPMs are basic building blocks used in many specifications, for providing an
anchor of trust. They can be used for validating basic boot properties before
allowing network access, or for storing platform measurements, or for providing
self-measurement to provide anchors of trust to hypervisors (in virtualization). The
TPM 2.0 Profile Specification allows subsets of proven security to be implemented
in a variety of devices, from traditional clients to embedded and IoT systems, with
smaller footprints, lower power consumption, and lower cost [16].
2.2 TPM-based Security Systems
Bosch uses TPM in its cameras and other edge devices that act like a
cryptographic coprocessor to the device. The TPM runs its own firmware, which
is continuously maintained to provide optimal protection against possible threats
known to the threat intelligent sensors [18]. Communication between the device
firmware and the TPM chip happens via a secure agent inside the TPM. TPMs
provide application program interfaces and commands for applications. It is
impossible for the firmware or operating systems (OS) to modify anything inside
the TPM directly.
4
Chrome OS uses TPMs for a variety of tasks, including software and firmware
rollback prevention, protection of user data encryption keys, and attestation of the
mode of a device [7].
Microsoft Windows OS uses TPMs to offer features such as disk encryption,

virtual smart cards, and device health attestations [14]. During the start-up process,
the TPM releases the decryption keys only after comparing a hash of the OS
configuration values with a snapshot taken earlier. This verifies the integrity of the
Windows OS start-up process.
Virtual smart cards use TPM to emulate the functionalities of physical smart
cards, rather than requiring the use of a separate physical smart card and reader.
Virtual smart cards are created in the TPM and offer similar properties to physical
smart cards. Their keys are not exportable from the TPM, and the cryptographic
component is isolated from the rest of the system [7, 14].
2.3 Hardware Security Modules
A hardware security module (HSM) is a hardware appliance that provides secure

key storage and cryptographic operations within a tamper-resistant hardware
module [1]. HSMs provide both logical and physical protection to those devices,
including cryptographic keys, from non-authorized users and potential adversaries.
The cryptographic function handled by most HSMs are asymmetric key pairs (and
certificates) used in public-key cryptography [3, 19]. Some HSMs can also handle
symmetric keys and other arbitrary data.
2.4 Challenges with TPMs and HSMs
Though TPM provides a good level of security, abusing remote validation by

manufacturers may decide what software would be allowed to run. In addition, the
user actions may be recorded in a proprietary database without the user actually
knowing. This has happened in smart TVs, smart toys, and other voice-activated
devices. As a result, privacy becomes an issue. Modern HSMs allow disabling certain
functions in a lock-down mode to improve security. However, an attack may
5
extract a number of bits from a secret key and use the short key to launch a brute
force attack (CVE-2015-5464). Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
obfuscates private keys makes it hard to steal. However incidents such as replay
attacks may still occur, due to the fact that the hash value is a constant over time.
More cryptographic features must be added to avoid such attacks.
3 DESIGN OF A SECURE TRUSTED COMPUTING PROTOCOL
IoT devices such as IP cameras are the most exposed devices facing the most
threats. Besides cyber threats, data can be hacked and stolen. Such might happen as
the ultimate attempt by an attacker to retrieve certificates and keys to later-on
simulate an edge device by his own equipment, trying to hack deeper into the IoT
systems [3].
To build trust and secure communications, we propose a novel protocol that

uses discrete TPM (dTPM) and HSM for establishing trust and key management.
We use HMAC to generate strong cryptographic key and use MQTT protocol for
authentication and data communication.
3.1 Key Management with Discrete TPM
A discrete TPM is an isolated, separate feature chip that all necessary computing
resources are contained within the discrete chip package. A discrete TPM has full
control of dedicated internal resource including RAM, non-volatile memory, and
cryptographic logic. Due to the architecture, vulnerabilities exist.
A device without a TPM must store private keys in its file system, where it
might reside in an especially encrypted file but the key to this must also be stored
somewhere in the file system. If hacking into a device’s certificate store does not
reveal what is being looked for, a side-channel attack may do, such an attack uses
analytic hardware equipment to listen to the data of the system while performing
its tasks. When triggering the authentication process, at some point, the key will
appear unencrypted. This leaves vulnerabilities to attackers.
6
IoT systems consist of a network of devices, gateways, and sensors. Many are
not security-enabled, which run on a variety of old protocols. Since dTPMs are
only integrated into some devices, those do not have built-in dTPMs are not able
to use the security protocol. To solve this problem, we use HSM to provide
hardware security.
3.2 Package Verification with Blockchain
Private keys, if loaded with a certificate, are stored inside the TPM and then are
no longer retrievable. They can then only be used through cryptographic operations
provided by the TPM, specifically its secure agents. The private key is password
protected and is secret until safe storage within the TPM. The encryption engine
provides key handling support for symmetrical encryption such as AES with up to
256-bit key length. Once the key is delivered, the AES encryption or decryption
for communication or over payload is then done by the hardware accelerated
encryption engine in the main CPU.
We implemented a Multi-Factor Package Verification algorithm (MFPV) for

private management and over-the-air update security. MFPV has a secure
cryptographic hash (H) that hashes a message along with the key. It is
computationally difficult to create the same hash without the key. The original
message with its hash value can only be verified at an edge device with the same
key. Note that the hash is computed twice in order to resist some forms of
cryptologic analysis such as the birthday attack or Nostradamus attack [17]. Software
packages are hashed first on the gateways before sending to the edge devices. When
a package is pushed to an edge device, the device broadcasts a ledger to form a
blockchain to guarantee authenticity and to prevent modification. The detailed
package verification steps are as follows:
Step 1. A hash is computed using MFPV algorithm using the equation:
MFPV (H, key, message) = H(APPEND(message, H(APPEND(key,

message))
7
where, key is a unique ID on an edge device. The transmitting message

to be delivered as follows:
APPEND(message, MFPV (SHA3, key, message))
For SHA3-512, we can obtain equivalent security of 256 bits. Here,

the block size is 576 bits with unlimited message size. HMAC with
SHA3 [19] has been mathematically proven strong in counter attacks.
However, data leaks could still happen if a gateway is compromised.
Step 2. Each edge device serves as a sensor by broadcasting to the network

notifying a new package has been published and verified by the device.
The verification can be performed as follows:
MFPV (APPEND(message, MFPV (APPEND(key, message))
where, key is obtained directly from the Non-Volatile Memory

(NVRAM). The information (ledger) each device broadcasts forms a
blockchain, which is resistant to package modification.
Step 3. After a blockchain is verified, a confirmation is sent out to indicate the

package is trusted.
Step 4. With both a correct hash value and the confirmation from peers in
the blockchain, the edge device starts the OTA update.
3.3 Light-weight Secure Authentication
For secure communication between edge devices and actuators, we use MQTT,
a dTPM and a device SDK - client libraries to connect, authenticate, and exchange
message between devices and an actuator. MQTT enables low power usage,
minimized data packets, small code footprint, and, most importantly, low network
bandwidth. Its advantages make it a perfect candidate for sensor communication
and mobile applications. As MQTT supports TLS, mutual authentication can be
8
implemented with strong encryption. MQTT consists of three main components:

MQTT broker, MQTT subscriber, and MQTT publisher [12].
We also use device shadows to replicate all connected devices such that each
edge device has an identical shadow stored in the cloud. The device and its
corresponding shadow are constantly compared making sure the integrity of data
and interactions. In the event of a security breach, the monitoring agent will issue
an alarm indicating there is a conflict of states between the edge device and the
corresponding shadow. An action must be taken to resume communication. Adding
a device shadow can assure that a device can still interact with applications even
when they are offline. The combination of MQTT and device shadow not only
secures authentication and communication but also improves fault tolerance.
Figure 1 depicts the handshake process before a device is authenticated. The

MQTT Broker can accept or reject the connection based on device authentication
results. For secure communication, device authorization is necessary. The MQTT
Broker checks the authorization policy to determine whether the device is
authorized to publish/subscribe. When both authentication and authorization
conditions are met, the device establishes its session to start communication.
9
Figure 1: Secure Edge Device Authentication Protocol
4 CASE STUDY AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Using the newly proposed IoTCP protocol, we implemented on a water

treatment SCADA system that has more than 3,000 PLCs [21, 24]. The data
acquisition layer uses US Department of Defense developed API to collect data [20,
21]. The defense-in-depth architecture reduces the risk to CPS networks from
being hacked or data from being stolen. We connect devices that are equipped with
TPMs directly to the actuators using the newly developed security communication
protocol. We add HSM modules to legacy devices so that they can connect with
gateways with security and trust. The blockchain based package verification
algorithm ensures OTA security. Secure authentication with MQTT provides low
bandwidth requirement and enhanced data security. Initial tests show that the
proposed protocol has the advantages of easy connecting with various devices and
reducing the risks of cyber intrusions, as a result of the lightweight and low
bandwidth protocol. dTPM not only establishes trust between devices and actuators
but also provides security for OTA updates. Figure 2 is a diagram of the water
treatment SCADA system.
Figure 2: A Water Treatment SCADA System Diagram
10
IoTCP integrates dTPM and HSM to provide hardware level security, uses
blockchain to improve OTA security, and uses MQTT with HMAT key scheme
to secure authentication and communications.
We utilized the research project as a case study in our master-level cybersecurity

courses [23, 29]. Students were divided into four teams. One team focused on
overall security assessment and tested the IoTCP against a number of security
assessment tools. The team especially focused on replay attack and remote rollback
attack. The second team focused on blockchain and MFPV package verification
algorithm. The third team worked on secure communication, it verified the secure
authentication protocol. The forth team built a dashboard to monitor and display
the sensor data, service status and other data analytics results.
5 CONCLUSION
IoT, IoBT, and CPS networks connect home appliances, sensors, traffic, vehicles,
medical aids, weapons, smart grids, and industrial automation. The heterogeneous
collection of microcontrollers, sensors, data interfaces and networks makes it
difficult to establish trust and secure the data communication. IoTCP combines
dTPM and HSM to secure key management, uses blockchain for package
verification and OTA update security, and uses a low bandwidth and lightweight
protocol - MQTT to ensure authentication and communication security.
Preliminary tests show that IoTCP is especially useful for connecting heterogeneous
edge devices including legacy protocols. The device shadows add another level of
security, enhance integrity and improve privacy. We are in the process of applying
machine learning in modeling device behaviors based on the vast amount of xAPI
data we gathered. Once the model is trained with acceptable accuracy, we will use
it to predict whether a device can be trusted or actions have to be taken.
11
6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This research is funded in part by grants from US National Science Foundation

(NSF) [EAGER-1419055, DGE-1439570, 1821926, and 1755733] and National
Security Agency (NSA) [S-004-2017].
12
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Journal of The Colloquium for Information System Security Education (CISSE)

Edition 6, Issue 1 - September 2018

IoTCP: A Novel Trusted Computing

Trusted Computing, IoT, IoBT, Blockchain, TPM

To ensuring the security and authenticity of IoT infrastructure is challenging

Trusted Computing (TC) is to guarantee the trustworthy of IT systems [8, 9].

Trusted computing is to build digital identities and increase assurance of trust

Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) [12] is a device-to-device IoT

A blockchain is a distributed ledger [13]. For IoT/IoBT/CPS systems, it records

2.1 Trusted Platform Modules

2.2 TPM-based Security Systems

Microsoft Windows OS uses TPMs to offer features such as disk encryption,

2.3 Hardware Security Modules

A hardware security module (HSM) is a hardware appliance that provides secure

2.4 Challenges with TPMs and HSMs

Though TPM provides a good level of security, abusing remote validation by

3 DESIGN OF A SECURE TRUSTED COMPUTING PROTOCOL

To build trust and secure communications, we propose a novel protocol that

3.1 Key Management with Discrete TPM

3.2 Package Verification with Blockchain

We implemented a Multi-Factor Package Verification algorithm (MFPV) for

Step 1. A hash is computed using MFPV algorithm using the equation:

MFPV (H, key, message) = H(APPEND(message, H(APPEND(key,

where, key is a unique ID on an edge device. The transmitting message

APPEND(message, MFPV (SHA3, key, message))

For SHA3-512, we can obtain equivalent security of 256 bits. Here,

Step 2. Each edge device serves as a sensor by broadcasting to the network

MFPV (APPEND(message, MFPV (APPEND(key, message))

where, key is obtained directly from the Non-Volatile Memory

Step 3. After a blockchain is verified, a confirmation is sent out to indicate the

3.3 Light-weight Secure Authentication

implemented with strong encryption. MQTT consists of three main components:

Figure 1 depicts the handshake process before a device is authenticated. The

Figure 1: Secure Edge Device Authentication Protocol

4 CASE STUDY AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS

Using the newly proposed IoTCP protocol, we implemented on a water

Figure 2: A Water Treatment SCADA System Diagram

We utilized the research project as a case study in our master-level cybersecurity

This research is funded in part by grants from US National Science Foundation

[1] HP Study Reveals 70 Percent of Internet of Things Devices Vulnerable to Attack.

[12] MQTT.org. 2017. (2017). http://mqtt.org/ Downloaded March 3, 2017.

[26] Shuangbao Wang and Robert S. Ledley. 2006. Connputer - A Framework of

[32] U. Guin, S. Bhunia, D. Forte, and M. Tehranipoor, “SMA: A System-Level Mutual

[35] U. Guin, D. DiMase, and M. Tehranipoor, “Counterfeit integrated circuits:

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