1 BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW,

LINCENBERG, DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP

2 John V. Berlinski (State Bar No. 208537)
jberlinski@birdmarella.com
3 Julia B. Cherlow (State Bar No. 290538)
jcherlow@birdmarella.com
4 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Fl.
Los Angeles, CA 90067
5 Telephone: (310) 201-2100
Facsimile: (310) 201-2110
6
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
7 Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
8 Won S. Shin (pro hac vice application forthcoming)
Jessica L. Layden (admitted pro hac vice)
9 Ioannis D. Drivas (admitted pro hac vice)
51 West 52nd Street
10 New York, NY 10019
Telephone: (212) 403-1000
11 Facsimile: (212) 403-2000

12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants

William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC and
13 Cross-Defendant Warren Grant

14
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
15 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

16
WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual, and Case No. 22STCV06081
17 MONDO BONGO, LLC, a California limited
liability company, WILLIAM B. PITT AND MONDO
18 BONGO, LLC’S NOTICE OF
Plaintiffs, DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO
19 CROSS-COMPLAINT OF TENUTE DEL
v. MONDO B.V.; MEMORANDUM OF
20 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
ANGELINA JOLIE, et al., SUPPORT THEREOF
21
Defendants. Filed concurrently with Request for Judicial
22 Notice, Declaration, and Proposed Order

23 and RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS. Judge: Hon. Lia Martin

Dept: 3
24 Date: April 30, 2025
Time: 9:00 a.m.
25
Reservation ID: 814483696267
26 Action Filed: February 17, 2022
Trial Date: Not yet set
27

28

NOTICE OF PITT AND MONDO BONGO’S DEMURRER AND

DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT OF TENUTE
 1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on April 30, 2025, at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as
3 counsel may be heard, in Department 3 of the above-captioned Court, located at 111 North Hill

4 Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants WILLIAM B. PITT and

5 MONDO BONGO, LLC will and hereby do demur to the Cross-Complaint filed by Defendant and

6 Cross-Complainant TENUTE DEL MONDO B.V. pursuant to Sections 430.10, et seq., of the

7 California Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the pleading fails to state facts sufficient to

8 constitute any cause of action.

9 This demurrer is based on the attached demurrer, memorandum of points and authorities,

10 the accompanying declaration, the request for judicial notice and accompanying exhibits, all of the

11 pleadings, filings, and records in this proceeding, all other matters of which the Court may take

12 judicial notice, and any argument that may be presented to or considered by the Court prior to its

13 ruling.

14

15 DATED: August 13, 2024 By: /s/ John V. Berlinski

BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW,
16 LINCENBERG, DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP
John V. Berlinski
17
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
18 Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
19 Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
Won S. Shin (pro hac vice application forthcoming)
20 Jessica L. Layden (admitted pro hac vice)
Ioannis D. Drivas (admitted pro hac vice)
21
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants
22
William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC
23

24

25

26

27

28

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NOTICE OF PITT AND MONDO BONGO’S DEMURRER AND
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 1 DEMURRER
2 Pursuant to Sections 430.10, et seq., of the California Code of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs

3 and Cross-Defendants WILLIAM B. PITT and MONDO BONGO, LLC, jointly and severally,

4 hereby generally demur to the Cross-Complaint filed by Defendant and Cross-Complainant

5 TENUTE DEL MONDO B.V. on each of the following grounds:

6 DEMURRER TO FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

7 (Penal Code § 496 against Pitt and Mondo Bongo)

8 Cross-Complainant Tenute’s First Cause of Action for Violation of Penal Code § 496 is

9 subject to demurrer because the statute does not apply to the extraterritorial conduct alleged. Cal.

10 Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).

11 Cross-Complainant Tenute’s First Cause of Action for Violation of Penal Code § 496 is

12 also subject to demurrer because the pleading fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of

13 action. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).

14 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants PITT and MONDO BONGO pray that:

15 1. The Demurrer be sustained as requested; and

16 2. The Court grant such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

17

18 DATED: August 13, 2024 By: /s/ John V. Berlinski

BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW,
19 LINCENBERG, DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP
John V. Berlinski
20
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
21 Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
22 Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
Won S. Shin (pro hac vice application forthcoming)
23 Jessica L. Layden (admitted pro hac vice)
Ioannis D. Drivas (admitted pro hac vice)
24
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants
25
William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC
26

27

28
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NOTICE OF PITT AND MONDO BONGO’S DEMURRER AND
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 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 8

4 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................... 9

5 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 10

6 I. Cal. Penal Code § 496 does not apply to the extraterritorial conduct alleged. ................ 11

7 A. Section 496 does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. .................. 11
8 B. Tenute’s claim is based on extraterritorial conduct. ............................................... 13
9 II. Tenute fails to plead a violation of Section 496(a). ......................................................... 15
10
A. Tenute fails to plead the embezzlement of Château Miraval’s assets. .................... 16
11
B. Tenute fails to plead the requisite criminal intent to steal....................................... 17
12
C. Tenute fails to plead receipt, concealment, or withholding of stolen property. ...... 20
13
III. Tenute fails to plead proximate causation of non-speculative damages. ......................... 22
14
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 22
15

16

17

18
19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

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 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2 Page(s)
3 Cases

4
Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC,
5 198 Cal. App. 4th 396 (2011) .................................................................................................. 22

6 Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,

171 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2009) ...................................................................................................... 22
7
Daramola v. Oracle Am., Inc.,
8 92 F.4th 833 (9th Cir. 2024) .............................................................................................. 11 n.4
9 Ferrick v. Santa Clara Univ.,

10 231 Cal. App. 4th 1337 (2014) .......................................................................................... 16, 17

11 Formic Ventures LLC v. SomaLogic, Inc.,

2023 WL 6037899 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2023).................................................................. 19, 21
12
Garrabrants v. Erhart,
13 98 Cal. App. 5th 486 (2023) .................................................................................................... 17
14 GEC US 1 LLC v. Frontier Renewables, LLC,

15 2016 WL 4677585 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016).......................................................................... 19

16 Hawkins v. TACA Int’l Airlines, S.A.,

223 Cal. App. 4th 466 (2014) ............................................................................................ 10, 14
17
Imperial Merchant Servs., Inc. v. Hunt,
18 47 Cal. 4th 381 (2009)............................................................................................................. 12
19 In re Albert W.,
240 Cal. App. 4th 411 (2015) ............................................................................................ 11, 12
20

21 In re Wood’s Estate,
137 Cal. 129 (1902) ................................................................................................................. 11
22
Miller v. McColgan,
23 17 Cal. 2d 432 (1941) .............................................................................................................. 21
24 MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich,
21 Cal. App. 5th 167 (2018) .............................................................................................. 18, 20
25
Monster Energy Co. v. Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
26
2019 WL 2619666 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2019)......................................................................... 20
27
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd.,
28 561 U.S. 247 (2010) .................................................................................................... 11, 12, 15
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NOTICE OF PITT AND MONDO BONGO’S DEMURRER AND
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 1 Motivo Eng’g, LLC v. Black Gold Farms,
2023 WL 3150099 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2023) .................................................................. 19, 21
2
N. Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury,
3 174 Cal. 1 (1916) ..................................................................................................................... 13
4
People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
5 116 Cal. App. 4th 1253 (2004) .......................................................................................... 11, 12

6 People v. Stewart,
16 Cal. 3d 133 (1976) .............................................................................................................. 18
7
People v. Tufunga,
8 21 Cal. 4th 935 (1999)....................................................................................................... 18, 19
9 People v. Whitney,

10 121 Cal. App. 2d 515 (1953) ................................................................................................... 16

11 Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’ Serv.,

81 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2000) ...................................................................................................... 10
12
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,
13 579 U.S. 325 (2016) .......................................................................................................... 11, 12
14 Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour,

15 13 Cal. 5th 333 (2022)...................................................................................................... passim

16 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,

538 U.S. 408 (2003) .......................................................................................................... 12, 15
17
Sullivan v. Oracle Corp.,
18 51 Cal. 4th 1191 (2011)..................................................................................................... 11, 14
19 Tim Cross, LLC v. Associated Adjusters Network, Inc.,
2023 WL 9005635 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2023) ............................................................. 18-19, 21
20

21 Statutes and Rules

22 Cal. Civil Code § 3333 .................................................................................................................. 22

23 Cal. Penal Code § 27(a)(2) ...................................................................................................... 12, 14

24 Cal. Penal Code § 484(a)............................................................................................................... 16

25 Cal. Penal Code § 496 ............................................................................................................ passim

26 Cal. Penal Code § 497 ............................................................................................................. 12, 14

27 Cal. Penal Code § 503 ................................................................................................................... 16

28
Cal. Penal Code § 511 ............................................................................................................. 18, 19
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 1 Cal. Penal Code § 789 ............................................................................................................. 12, 14

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18
19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

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 1 INTRODUCTION
2 In 2008, Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie purchased the French estate and vineyard, Château

3 Miraval, as a family home and family business. That was how they operated it for years. That all

4 changed in 2021 when Jolie purported to sell her stake in Château Miraval to Cross-Complainant

5 Tenute, a subsidiary of the Russia-affiliated Stoli Group. Jolie did so in secret, without Pitt’s

6 consent or knowledge. Pitt has challenged the sale transaction in this Court. In retaliation, Stoli

7 and Tenute—through Nouvel (the shell entity that Tenute purchased from Jolie)—brought a $350

8 million lawsuit against Pitt and his entity Mondo Bongo, extending a European litigation

9 campaign to Los Angeles. Their objective: bully Pitt into forgoing his rights and handing over the

10 keys to the family home and profitable business he built.

11 The recently filed Cross-Complaint by Tenute now takes it up a notch. Tenute, a Dutch

12 entity, brings a claim under Cal. Penal Code § 496(c), which creates a claim for treble damages for

13 persons injured by the crime of receiving stolen property. Tenute claims that Pitt and Mondo

14 Bongo embezzled property in violation of the California Penal Code by secretly diverting Château

15 Miraval’s assets in France to “vanity projects” also located in France that allegedly had no

16 “business purpose.” The claim fails as a matter of law for three independent reasons.

17 First, § 496 does not apply to the extraterritorial conduct alleged by Tenute: the

18 embezzlement of assets of a French company (Château Miraval) owned by a Luxembourgish

19 company (Quimicum), through spending on construction at the Château’s French estate and

20 diversion to another French entity. California law presumes its statutes do not apply

21 extraterritorially, and nothing in the text or history of § 496 overcomes that presumption.

22 Second, Tenute fails in its attempt to shoehorn what, at best, is a shareholder dispute into a

23 Penal Code violation: it fails to plead that Pitt stole Château Miraval’s assets; acted with the

24 necessary criminal intent; or received, concealed, or withheld the stolen property from its owner.

25 Third, Tenute fails to plead proximate causation of non-speculative harm.

26 Inflammatory rhetoric aside, the Cross-Complaint reflects nothing more than a misguided

27 and improper effort to exploit the California Penal Code in an unprecedented manner that makes

28 no sense on its face. The demurrer should be sustained.

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 1 BACKGROUND
2 In 2008, Pitt and Jolie, who were then in a committed relationship, acquired Château

3 Miraval, a French estate and vineyard. ¶ 16.1 They did so through their purchase of Quimicum, a

4 Luxembourgish LLC and the holding entity of Château Miraval. ¶¶ 11, 17. Pitt and Jolie owned

5 their interests in Quimicum, and thus Château Miraval, through their respective California LLCs,

6 Mondo Bongo and Nouvel. ¶¶ 8, 10, 16-17. They “got to work investing in the business and

7 making improvements to the property.” ¶ 18. Through a series of loans to Quimicum, Pitt and

8 Jolie, via Mondo Bongo and Nouvel, provided “much-needed money . . . to fund improvements”

9 at Château Miraval and its then-unprofitable wine business. ¶ 18. The couple agreed that Pitt

10 would bear the “responsibilit[y]” of “overseeing the couple’s investment in Chateau Miraval,” and

11 Pitt identified directors and officers, including CEO Roland Venturini. ¶ 23.

12 In 2013, Château Miraval entered into a joint venture with Familles Perrin, one of France’s

13 most highly regarded winemaking families, led by Marc Perrin. ¶ 20. Under the stewardship of

14 Pitt and Perrin, the profits of the venture, named Miraval Provence, have “steadily increased year

15 after year” “from around €1 million in 2013 to around €15 million in 2022.” ¶¶ 21, 55.

16 In 2016, Jolie filed for divorce, after which she decided to become more involved in the

17 Château’s operations. ¶¶ 24-25. According to Tenute, Jolie had concerns that Château Miraval

18 was “spending large sums of money on projects that did not appear to have a legitimate business
19 purpose.” ¶ 25. Jolie sought more information about and input into the estate’s activities at a

20 Quimicum shareholders meeting in September 2020. ¶ 26. Meanwhile, based on the “incredibly

21 successful” and “enormously profitable” wine business led by Pitt and Perrin, Château Miraval

22 grew more valuable, receiving about €45 million in Miraval Provence dividends from 2013-2022.

23 ¶¶ 31-32. Pitt helped “build the Miraval brand into the highly profitable business it is today.” ¶ 2.

24 In 2020, Château Miraval spent about €8 million on “construction at a nearby house that is

25 owned by Chateau Miraval,” “renovations for a swimming pool,” and “garment works.” ¶¶ 3, 34.

26 Pitt oversaw the spending, with Château Miraval CEO Venturini’s “authorization,” knowledge,

27

28 1
Citations to ¶ are of Tenute’s Cross-Complaint. Exhibits referenced herein are attached to the
concurrently filed Declaration of Julia B. Cherlow (“Decl.”).
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 1 and participation. ¶¶ 36, 72. Pitt has stayed at the family home under a “personal lease on the

2 property,” which Tenute does not allege is below fair-market value. ¶ 34.

3 Mondo Bongo, Château Miraval, and a third party also established Miraval Studios, a

4 French LLC and recording studio, at the property; they own 40%, 10%, and 50%, respectively.

5 ¶¶ 39-41.2 Château Miraval spent approximately €200,000 toward construction of studio space

6 and €162,000 in management fees, and loaned Miraval Studios €750,000 at a 0.2% interest rate.

7 ¶¶ 69-71. Venturini was involved in these outlays. ¶¶ 40, 68-71.3

8 In October 2021, Tenute, the Dutch company and Stoli subsidiary, announced that it had

9 purchased Nouvel from Jolie. ¶¶ 6, 10, 46. Since then, Stoli has pushed for governance and

10 structural changes to Quimicum, ¶¶ 50-51, and launched a multijurisdictional litigation campaign

11 against Pitt and Mondo Bongo, including civil lawsuits in Luxembourg, discovery actions in

12 France, a criminal action in France, and Nouvel and Tenute’s cross-actions in this Court.

13 ARGUMENT
14 In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court “treats the demurrer as admitting all

15 material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.”

16 Rakestraw v. Cal. Physicians’ Serv., 81 Cal. App. 4th 39, 43 (2000). The complaint must allege

17 “facts sufficient to establish every element of each cause of action. If the complaint fails to plead,

18 or if the defendant negates, any essential element,” the cause of action fails as a matter of law, and
19 the demurrer is sustained. Id. Where “statutory remedies are invoked, the facts must be pleaded

20 with particularity.” Hawkins v. TACA Int’l Airlines, S.A., 223 Cal. App. 4th 466, 478 (2014).

21 Tenute fails to meet its burden for three independent reasons. First, Tenute improperly

22 attempts to apply a criminal statute that does not reach extraterritorially to an alleged violation in

23 France. Second, Tenute fails to plead an underlying violation of § 496 of the Penal Code. Third,

24 Tenute fails to plead the alleged conduct proximately caused it non-speculative damages.

25
2
26 It is undisputed that Miraval Studios is a French LLC and Venturini resides in France. Those
facts are alleged in a cross-complaint filed by Tenute’s subsidiary, Nouvel, which has sued
27 Miraval Studios and Venturini. Ex. A (Nouvel First Amended Cross-Complaint) ¶¶ 45, 50.
3
Tenute cites an email and attachment regarding the budgeted expenses for Miraval Studios, ¶ 69,
28 but a second attachment to the email shows that Château Miraval was slated to receive the
majority of projected profits from the business. Ex. C (Sept. 20, 2021 email and attachments) at 4.
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NOTICE OF PITT AND MONDO BONGO’S DEMURRER AND
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 1 I. Cal. Penal Code § 496 does not apply to the extraterritorial conduct alleged.
2 Cal. Penal Code § 496 does not apply extraterritorially. As Tenute asserts a statutory claim

3 for conduct that allegedly occurred outside California, the demurrer should be sustained.

4 A. Section 496 does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.

5 California courts “presume the Legislature did not intend a statute to be operative, with
6 respect to occurrences outside the state, . . . unless such intention is clearly expressed or

7 reasonably to be inferred from the language of the act or from its purpose, subject matter or

8 history.” Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal. 4th 1191, 1207 (2011) (internal quotation marks

9 omitted). Reinforcing this presumption is the “rule” that a State “does not have a legitimate

10 concern in imposing” punishment for “acts committed outside of the State’s jurisdiction.” People

11 ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 116 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1290 (2004) (internal

12 quotation marks omitted). Where a party seeks to apply state law to conduct in another country,

13 the presumption “serves to avoid the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied

14 to conduct in foreign countries.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 335 (2016).4

15 Tenute’s claim relies on two provisions of § 496: subdivision (a), defining the criminal
16 offense of receiving stolen property, and subdivision (c), authorizing a treble damages claim for

17 certain violations of (a). Tenute must rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality as to each.

18 Section 496(a) does not apply extraterritorially. Nothing in § 496(a)’s text or history
19 suggests extraterritorial reach. The text defining the offense of receiving stolen property is silent

20 as to theft or receipt of stolen property outside the State. That “silence means no extraterritorial

21 application.” Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010); see also In re

22 Wood’s Estate, 137 Cal. 129, 135 (1902) (state marriage statute that was “silent as to marriages

23 abroad” “ha[d] no extraterritorial operation”).

24 Section 496(a) contrasts sharply with other penal provisions that expressly reach out of
25 state. In re Albert W., 240 Cal. App. 4th 411, 418 (2015) (provision not extraterritorial when

26 “statutory scheme is viewed as a whole”). A neighboring section criminalizes embezzling

27

28 4
California’s presumption against extraterritoriality is “[a]nalogous to the federal presumption.”
Daramola v. Oracle Am., Inc., 92 F.4th 833, 843 (9th Cir. 2024).
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 1 property “in another state or country,” or knowingly receiving such property, and “bring[ing] the

2 same into this state.” Cal. Penal Code § 497. Another Penal Code section creates jurisdiction to

3 prosecute embezzling property “in any other state,” or knowingly receiving such property, and

4 “bringing the same into this State.” Id. § 789. And another section provides for criminal

5 punishment of those who commit, “without this state,” an offense that would be embezzlement “if

6 committed within this state,” and “bring” or “are found with” it “within this state.” Id. § 27(a)(2).

7 The Legislature clearly “knows how to give a statute explicit extraterritorial effect—and how to

8 limit that effect to particular applications.” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 n.8. The lack of similar

9 language in § 496 shows that the Legislature did not intend the statute to reach extraterritorially.

10 Section 496(c) does not apply extraterritorially. Even if § 496(a) were deemed to apply
11 out of state, Tenute would need to show the same as to § 496(c). RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 350

12 (“presumption against extraterritoriality must be applied separately to both RICO’s substantive

13 prohibitions and its private right of action”). But § 496(c) is silent as to its geographical reach.

14 And it specifies a remedy—treble damages—that forecloses extraterritorial application. “Treble

15 damages are punitive in nature.” Imperial Merchant Servs., Inc. v. Hunt, 47 Cal. 4th 381, 394

16 (2009). A State “does not have ‘a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a

17 defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State’s jurisdiction.’” Lockyer, 116 Cal.

18 App. 4th at 1290 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003)).
19 Nor does § 496(c)’s purpose or history suggest extraterritorial reach. Section 496(c) “was

20 introduced at the request of the California Trucking Association” and targeted a local concern:

21 “eliminating markets for stolen property, in order to substantially reduce the incentive to hijack

22 cargo from common carriers.” Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour, 13 Cal. 5th 333, 348

23 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute was designed to “reach fencing operations

24 on an intrastate basis” as part of a 50-state effort to enact “comparable laws to curb intrastate

25 fencing within the several states,” which would operate alongside proposed federal legislation

26 “designed to reach only interstate thievery.” Ex. D (Letter from U.S. Sen. Bible to 39 Governors

27 and 10 Governors-Elect (Dec. 14, 1972)) at 2. Thus, an intent that § 496(c) apply extraterritorially

28 cannot reasonably be inferred from its purpose or history.

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NOTICE OF PITT AND MONDO BONGO’S DEMURRER AND
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 1 B. Tenute’s claim is based on extraterritorial conduct.

2 Tenute alleges that Pitt and Mondo Bongo embezzled from Château Miraval, a French
3 company, by diverting funds toward construction on property “owned by Chateau Miraval” in

4 France and to Miraval Studios, a French LLC and recording studio located at the estate. ¶¶ 3, 9,

5 34, 39-41, 69-72. Tenute also alleges that Pitt and Mondo Bongo received, concealed, and

6 withheld property, but that allegation is based on the underlying alleged embezzlement in France.

7 ¶ 74. Tenute nowhere alleges that Pitt and Mondo Bongo embezzled, received, concealed, or

8 withheld the assets in California. As Tenute itself has urged the Court, this case concerns “a

9 dispute over a Luxembourgish business entity, Quimicum, that owns a French wine business,

10 Chateau Miraval.” Ex. B (Tenute Motion to Quash Service of Summons (Oct. 3, 2022)) at 5. And

11 any alleged injury to Tenute, a Dutch entity, likewise occurred abroad. See N. Alaska Salmon Co.

12 v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 4 (1916) (statute had no extraterritorial reach where there was “nothing to

13 indicate that [it was] intended to apply to injuries occurring in foreign jurisdictions”).

14 Tenute intends to argue that Pitt and Mondo Bongo violated § 496 in California based only
15 on the “concealment” prong of § 496(a). Decl. ¶ 5. But to the extent the alleged concealment

16 occurred at all, it occurred abroad. Tenute alleges that Pitt concealed “wrongful uses of Chateau

17 Miraval’s resources,” ¶ 3, by “refusing to supply . . . information about the business’s operations

18 and finances,” ¶ 67. But that information was in France: the Château is located in France and the
19 allegedly wrongful uses (construction at the manor house and spending at Miraval Studios) took

20 place in France. ¶¶ 3, 9, 34, 39-41, 68-72. Moreover, Nouvel or Jolie’s entitlement to such

21 information arose, if at all, from their interests in Château Miraval, a French entity, or its

22 Luxembourg holding company, Quimicum. ¶ 26. Indeed, Tenute alleges that Pitt and Mondo

23 Bongo “have been able to conceal their conduct” by “imposing a shareholder deadlock” at

24 Quimicum, the Luxembourgish entity, precisely to avoid oversight of his activities at the Château

25 in France. ¶¶ 27-28, 67. The alleged concealment thus necessarily occurred overseas.

26 Tenute, nonetheless, claims the messages described in a single paragraph of the Cross-
27 Complaint suffice to establish domestic conduct. Decl. ¶ 5. It points to a June 13, 2021 email

28 attaching a construction budget for Miraval Studios, in which Venturini said, “[o]f course none of

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 1 these info have gotten to [Jolie] for now”; and a June 28, 2021 message in which Pitt wrote to

2 Venturini about the studio budget, “I believe we should no longer send [Jolie] reports as she is

3 trying to shop her shares.” ¶ 68. These messages do not plead a domestic violation of § 496.

4 First, the messages Tenute cites fail to show that Pitt concealed Château Miraval’s funds.
5 Venturini sent the June 13 email, and is not alleged to have sent it to Pitt. And Pitt’s June 28

6 message is not an order or directive on its face—Tenute frames it as “support” for a decision that

7 Venturini, Château Miraval’s CEO, had already made, weeks earlier, not to send the studio budget

8 to Jolie. If these messages show any concealment at all, it was by Venturini, not Pitt, and it took

9 place in France, consistent with the fact that the source of the information was in France.

10 Second, the allegations fail to show concealment by Pitt in California. Tenute does not
11 allege that Pitt sent his message to Venturini from California. To be sure, Pitt is a California

12 resident. ¶ 7. But Tenute admits that Pitt has varied business ventures in France and leases the

13 Château Miraval estate, ¶¶ 34, 39-40, 42, and it is indisputable that Pitt’s career takes him across

14 the country and around the globe. There is no basis on which to infer that Pitt sent this particular

15 message from California, let alone a particularized basis of the kind required to plead a statutory

16 violation. Hawkins, 223 Cal. App. 4th at 478. To make that leap would impermissibly treat the

17 extraterritorial conduct alleged by Tenute as if it were a domestic § 496 violation based on mere

18 speculation. See Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1208 (refusing to “speculate about the place of” asserted
19 conduct where pleading “d[id] not speak to [its] location”).

20 Third, and regardless, there is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended § 496 to

21 apply to extraterritorial embezzlement based solely on domestic concealment. The Legislature has

22 enacted several Penal Code provisions that explicitly apply to out-of-state embezzlement and

23 receipt of embezzled property. Two such statutes apply only if the embezzler or recipient of

24 embezzled property “brings” the property “into this state.” Cal. Penal Code §§ 497, 789. A third

25 statute, which applies to embezzlers but not recipients of embezzled property, applies if the

26 defendant “bring[s]” or is “found with” the property “within this state.” Id. § 27(a)(2). Thus, the

27 Legislature has finely delineated the precise circumstances in which the Penal Code applies to out-

28 of-state embezzlement or receipt of property embezzled out-of-state—and those circumstances

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 1 have no application here. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 n.8 (the legislature “knows how to give a

2 statute explicit extraterritorial effect—and how to limit that effect to particular applications”). If

3 the Legislature intended § 496 to apply to foreign embezzlement based solely on domestic

4 concealment, it easily could have said so—but it did not.

5 Fourth, § 496(a) applies to concealing stolen property only “from the owner,” and the

6 owner of the allegedly diverted funds here is Château Miraval, not Jolie or, for that matter, Tenute.

7 See infra at § II.C. Alleged concealment from Jolie or Tenute of funds spent by Château Miraval

8 cannot establish a domestic violation.

9 Finally, applying § 496 here threatens to flout the principle that a State “cannot punish a

10 defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421.

11 Section 496(c) requires a violation of § 496(a), the elements of which include that property was

12 obtained in a “manner constituting theft.” Cal. Penal Code § 496(a). Whether the alleged conduct

13 was “lawful where it occurred,” i.e., in France, depends entirely on French law. State Farm, 538

14 U.S. at 421-22 (“proper adjudication of conduct that occurred outside” a state ordinarily requires a

15 court “to apply the laws of the[] relevant jurisdiction”). But Tenute has submitted nothing on

16 French law in support of its claim, and this Court has also made clear that it will not entertain

17 foreign law causes of action. Mar. 8, 2024 Ruling on Defendant Angelina Jolie’s Demurrer at 9

18 (sustaining Jolie demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Luxembourgish law claim). And tellingly, Tenute has
19 already tried and failed to pursue a similar claim in France. French authorities dismissed a

20 criminal complaint filed by Nouvel, Tenute’s subsidiary, against Venturini alleging misuse of

21 corporate assets related to some of these same projects, finding insufficient evidence to initiate

22 criminal proceedings. Ex. E (Letter from Office of the Public Prosecutor (Sept. 20, 2023)) at 3.

23 II. Tenute fails to plead a violation of Section 496(a).

24 Section 496(c) requires a violation of § 496(a), the elements of which are: (i) property was

25 “stolen” or “obtained in any manner constituting theft”; (ii) the defendant “know[s] the property to

26 be so stolen or obtained”; and (iii) the defendant “receives” the property or “conceals” or

27 “withholds” it “from the owner.” Cal. Penal Code § 496(a). Theft includes larceny,

28 embezzlement, and theft by false pretense. Siry, 13 Cal. 5th at 350 n.11. Tenute relies only on

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 1 embezzlement, which is “the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been

2 [e]ntrusted,” Cal. Penal Code § 503; accord id. § 484(a). ¶ 73 (“Their conduct amounts to

3 embezzlement.”); Decl. ¶ 6. Tenute must thus show that Château Miraval’s property was obtained

4 by embezzlement, that Pitt and Mondo Bongo knew as much, and that they received it or

5 concealed or withheld it from the owner. Not surprisingly, given Pitt’s undisputed role in

6 overseeing the estate and its purpose as both a family home and family business, the Cross-

7 Complaint fails to do so for numerous independent reasons.

8 A. Tenute fails to plead the embezzlement of Château Miraval’s assets.

9 The essence of embezzlement, assuming California law is determinative, is that the person
10 to whom property was entrusted “exceeded his authority” in his use of the property. Ferrick v.

11 Santa Clara Univ., 231 Cal. App. 4th 1337, 1348 (2014) (emphasis added). Tenute fails to allege

12 that Pitt used Château Miraval’s assets in any manner that Château Miraval did not authorize.

13 Thus, Tenute fails to plead embezzlement, which means it fails to plead a violation of § 496(a).

14 Tenute alleges that Pitt had significant authority to use Château Miraval’s assets. Pitt was
15 “responsib[le]” from the outset for “overseeing the . . . investment in Chateau Miraval,” and he

16 worked with its directors and officers, including Venturini, its CEO and director. ¶ 23; see ¶ 36

17 (alleging Venturini’s “authorization of” unspecified “spending”). Pitt “invest[ed] in the business

18 and ma[de] improvements to the property,” working for years to grow Château Miraval into a
19 flourishing business and brand. ¶¶ 2, 18, 32. This history, pleaded by Tenute itself, undercuts any

20 claim that Pitt exceeded his authority. People v. Whitney, 121 Cal. App. 2d 515, 521 (1953)

21 (reversing embezzlement conviction where “defendant had been given very broad powers” over

22 property, as evidenced by “the manner in which the business was conducted for several years,

23 most of it with the knowledge of [the owner] and without objection”).

24 As for the renovations to the family home that Tenute complains of, Tenute fails to allege
25 that Pitt exceeded his authority in connection with those projects. Tenute alleges that “Pitt himself

26 directed all this spending” but acknowledges that Venturini was involved and “authoriz[ed]” it

27 himself, ¶¶ 36, 72, negating this element of embezzlement. Ferrick, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 1348

28 (complaint failed to plead embezzlement where it did not allege that accused “lacked authority to

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 1 use” subject property for complained-of purpose or that spending “exceeded his authority”).

2 And while Tenute claims that Pitt “is effectively charging personal expenses to the

3 Chateau Miraval business” by “stay[ing] at the manor house,” it negates that conclusory assertion

4 by acknowledging that Pitt has a “lease on the property,” ¶ 34—a lease that it does not allege is

5 below fair-market value. In any event, the renovations plainly benefited Château Miraval, as they

6 were “improvements to the property” that Château Miraval owned (independent of its interest in

7 the wine business joint venture) and the value of which the entity retained. ¶ 18.

8 Tenute also fails to allege that Pitt exceeded his authority in the use of funds for Miraval

9 Studios.5 Tenute acknowledges Venturini’s involvement in the spending, ¶¶ 68-69, establishing

10 Château Miraval’s authorization. Ferrick, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 1348. Moreover, this constitutes

11 further “invest[ment] in the business” toward “buil[ding] the Miraval brand.” ¶¶ 2, 18. Château

12 Miraval is also an owner of Miraval Studios, ¶¶ 39-40, and retains a stake in the value of the

13 spending; indeed, it was allocated a majority of the studio’s projected profits, Ex. C at 4.

14 B. Tenute fails to plead the requisite criminal intent to steal.

15 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “not all commercial . . . disputes alleging that a
16 defendant obtained money or property through fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of a contractual

17 promise will amount to a theft.” Siry, 13 Cal. 5th at 361. Rather, to prove theft under § 496, “a

18 plaintiff must establish criminal intent on the part of the defendant,” id.—that is, “an intent to
19 steal,” id. at 368 (Groban, J., concurring). “[W]ithout the requisite specific intent,” there is no

20 § 496(a) violation “as a matter of law.” Garrabrants v. Erhart, 98 Cal. App. 5th 486, 504 (2023).

21 The intent requirement “prevents [o]rdinary commercial defaults from being transformed into a

22 theft,” Siry Investment, 13 Cal. 5th at 362 (internal quotation marks omitted), and § 496(c) thus

23 does “not allow for the recovery of treble damages in all, or even most, . . . commercial disputes

24 involving tort or breach of contract claims,” id. at 367 (Groban, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

25 If the law were otherwise, it could “transmogrify the law of remedies in a wide range of tort or

26 breach of contract cases alleging that the defendant improperly obtained diverted, received, or

27
The Cross-Complaint also alleges diversions of Château Miraval’s assets to two other French
5

28 LLCs, ¶¶ 42-45, but Tenute disclaimed reliance on them as a basis for its claim during the parties’
meet and confer on this demurrer, Decl. ¶ 6.
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 1 withheld the plaintiff’s money.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).6 Indeed, criminal intent is

2 so fundamental that its absence negates two elements of a § 496 claim: that property was obtained

3 by theft and that the defendant knew the property was so obtained. MMM Holdings, Inc. v. Reich,

4 21 Cal. App. 5th 167, 185 (2018) (applying same intent analysis to both elements).

5 A defendant’s “good faith belief, even if mistakenly held, that he has a right or claim to

6 property” of another “negates the felonious intent necessary for conviction of theft.” People v.

7 Tufunga, 21 Cal. 4th 935, 938 (1999) (emphasis added); accord Cal. Penal Code § 511. Theft also

8 requires “the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the property.” MMM Holdings, 21 Cal.

9 App. 5th at 185 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); see also Siry, 13 Cal. 5th at 368

10 (Groban, J., concurring). Tenute fails to allege the necessary criminal intent under this settled law.

11 Good faith. Tenute fails to allege that Pitt acted with anything other than a good-faith
12 belief that he had the right to put Château Miraval’s funds to the uses alleged. Pitt had significant

13 responsibility to oversee the use of Château Miraval’s assets to grow the business and brand, and

14 he did so for years by selecting and working with Château Miraval’s officers and directors. ¶¶ 2,

15 18, 20-21, 23, 32. The complained-of uses of Château Miraval’s property were not only

16 authorized by Venturini but also consistent with this history. The couple purchased Château

17 Miraval and were married there. ¶ 22. Spending on construction at the Château Miraval manor

18 house was in keeping with prior efforts to “mak[e] improvements to the property.” ¶ 18.
19 Investment in Miraval Studios represented further “investing in the business” and “buil[ding] the

20 Miraval brand.” ¶¶ 2, 18. Thus, Pitt acted with a “good faith belief” that he “ha[d] a right” to put

21 Château Miraval’s assets to the uses alleged. Tufunga, 21 Cal. 4th at 938. Tenute’s § 496 claim

22 accordingly fails as a matter of law. People v. Stewart, 16 Cal. 3d 133, 139 (1976) (“[W]here an

23 individual honestly believes that he is authorized to appropriate and use property which he is

24 accused of embezzling, the fraudulent intent which is a necessary element of that crime is

25 absent.”); Tim Cross, LLC v. Associated Adjusters Network, Inc., 2023 WL 9005635, at *5 (C.D.

26 Cal. Nov. 30, 2023) (dismissing § 496(c) claim for failure to allege intent where contract permitted

27

28 6
Tenute’s subsidiary Nouvel brought and is pressing claims based on alleged breaches of contract
and related tort claims. Ex. A (Nouvel First Amended Cross-Complaint).
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 1 deduction of fees claimed to be “misappropriated”). Tenute’s belief that the funds could have

2 been better spent is a matter for ordinary business litigation, not the Penal Code. Motivo Eng’g,

3 LLC v. Black Gold Farms, 2023 WL 3150099, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2023) (dismissing § 496

4 claim; noting that putative victim could pursue contract claim).

5 Nor does Tenute show criminal intent by alleging that Nouvel “object[ed]” to unspecified

6 expenses and asked Quimicum at a shareholders meeting to distribute profits or repay loans, ¶¶ 26,

7 35; accusing Venturini of being “beholden to Pitt,” ¶ 29; or labeling the challenged uses as

8 “wasteful vanity projects,” ¶ 31. These allegations reflect a shareholder’s disagreement about how

9 to use corporate assets. But a defendant lacks criminal intent when he and the plaintiff simply

10 dispute rights over property—that is an “[o]rdinary” business dispute, not a Penal Code violation.

11 Siry, 13 Cal. 5th at 361-62. Thus, a complaint failed to plead a § 496 claim when the defendant

12 had “a contrary understanding of its obligations” to start paying funds alleged to be due, Formic

13 Ventures LLC v. SomaLogic, Inc., 2023 WL 6037899, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2023), or when

14 the defendants “misconstrue[d]” their ownership of a joint venture over which they allegedly

15 assumed control, GEC US 1 LLC v. Frontier Renewables, LLC, 2016 WL 4677585, at *9 (N.D.

16 Cal. Sept. 7, 2016); see Siry, 13 Cal. 5th at 369 (Groban, J., concurring). Here, Pitt had every

17 reason to believe he had the legal right to put the Château’s assets to the complained-of uses, given

18 Venturini’s authorization and Pitt’s history of overseeing the estate and growing the Miraval
19 business and brand, as well as his personal lease to the property. Pitt used the assets in good faith

20 even if he was “mistaken[]” as to that authority. Tufunga, 21 Cal. 4th at 938; see Cal. Penal Code

21 § 511 (even “untenable” claim of right negates embezzlement). Tellingly, Tenute nowhere alleges

22 that Pitt believed he lacked such authority. Tenute thus fail to plead the requisite criminal intent.

23 No intent to deprive owner permanently. Tenute also fails to allege Pitt’s intent to deprive
24 Château Miraval permanently of its property. With respect to construction at the manor house,

25 Château Miraval continued to own the estate and resulting improvements. ¶ 34. It likewise

26 retained an ownership stake over the value of spending on Miraval Studios, which must repay its

27 loan with interest. ¶¶ 40, 70. And Château Miraval was allocated a majority of projected profits

28 from Miraval Studios, Ex. C at 4, further negating any putative intent to deprive it permanently of

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 1 property. MMM Holdings, 21 Cal. App. 5th at 185 (retention of property for “limited purpose”

2 “d[id] not support the specific intent” to deprive owner permanently for § 496 claim); Monster

3 Energy Co. v. Pharms., Inc., 2019 WL 2619666, at *14 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2019) (dismissing

4 § 496 claim for failure to allege intent to deprive permanently).

5 At bottom, Tenute’s claim is that these investments were “vanity projects” that lacked a

6 “business purpose.” ¶¶ 25, 31. But there is no basis to infer that Pitt believed the projects would

7 not create value at Château Miraval, including by enhancing the Miraval brand, or that they were

8 inconsistent with his long-term oversight of and vision for the estate. Indeed, Stoli itself initially

9 praised the investments and Pitt’s vision for Miraval Studios before deciding to sue him instead.7

10 C. Tenute fails to plead receipt, concealment, or withholding of stolen property.

11 Tenute claims Pitt “received” the funds spent on construction at the manor house,
12 purportedly “[j]ust like” Siry. ¶ 72; Decl. ¶ 7 (disclaiming receipt theory for Miraval Studios

13 spending). The Siry defendants received stolen partnership funds by funneling them into a new

14 entity they had created and by charging personal expenses to the partnership, depriving the limited

15 partner of its share of contractually required cash distributions. 13 Cal. 5th at 339-40, 361. Here,

16 the funds were used on renovations that are tied to the estate. Pitt has access through his lease,

17 ¶ 34, but he has not removed any fixtures from the estate or otherwise deprived Château Miraval

18 of the assets, which remain fully within its control. This case is nothing like Siry.
19 Tenute also claims Pitt “concealed” and “withheld” the funds spent on Miraval Studios and
20 construction at the manor house. ¶¶ 3, 67, 68, 74. Tenute’s theory is that Pitt hid “wrongful uses”

21 of Chateau Miraval’s funds by refusing to provide “information about the business’s operations

22 and finances.” ¶¶ 3, 67. The claim is contradicted by allegations Jolie and Nouvel knew “the

23 business was spending large sums of money on projects,” “renovations,” and other “expenses,”

24 prompting them to register “objection[s],” challenge Venturini’s “authorization of spending,” and

25 complain to Quimicum. ¶¶ 25-26, 35-36. Likewise, Tenute bases its claim about Miraval Studios

26
7
As Stoli’s CEO told Le Figaro: “I think Brad Pitt contributes to the vineyard through his taste
27 in art, as evidenced by the restoration of studio Miraval. That’s what makes this partnership
interesting.” He added, “Our agreement with Brad Pitt is to turn the château into a place where art
28 and wine come together as one, along with the most incredible recording studio.” Ex. F (Le
Figaro article) at 10-11 (emphasis added).
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 1 from “published financial accounts.” ¶ 70. Regardless, the claim also fails because § 496 applies

2 to concealing or withholding stolen property only “from the owner.” Cal. Penal Code § 496(a).

3 Jolie, Nouvel, and Tenute did not own Château Miraval’s funds—the Château did—and Tenute

4 does not allege that Pitt concealed or withheld the funds from their owner, Château Miraval.

5 Any attempt, particularly in this context relying on the Penal Code, to twist that plain

6 reality fails. Tenute alleges that the Château’s profits “should have been paid out as dividends and

7 loan repayments,” ¶ 31, but it points to no contract or corporate bylaw requiring it to do so. Decl.

8 ¶ 9. It is well established that shareholders have no right to a company’s earnings when dividends

9 have not been declared. Miller v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 432, 436 (1941). Nor has Tenute pleaded

10 that its loan will not or cannot be repaid or even that it has sought repayment and been refused. In

11 any event, Tenute’s loan was to Nouvel, ¶ 46, and that is the entity to which it has recourse.

12 Tenute does not allege some legal right under its loan agreement to funds at Château Miraval.

13 * * *

14 The Cross-Complaint relies entirely on Siry, a case in which default judgment was entered

15 against the defendants. ¶¶ 58-61. In so doing, Tenute underscores its failure to plead a claim.

16  In Siry, the defendants took funds out of a partnership for themselves and charged
personal expenses to the partnership, depriving a limited partner of its share of
17 mandated cash distributions. 13 Cal. 5th at 339-40. Here, Château Miraval was not
deprived of its funds; they were used to benefit the Château by improving the estate
18 and investing in a business to grow the brand—uses entirely consistent with the estate’s
history and Pitt’s oversight role, and that the Château authorized.
19
 In Siry, diversion of rental income and personal charges were clearly not consistent
20 with the purposes of the partnership: they amounted to blatant stealing. Id. at 339-40.
Here, the so-called “vanity projects” are consistent with Pitt’s more than decade-long
21 oversight of the family home and business.

22  In Siry, the diverted funds “belong[ed] to” the plaintiff because it was contractually
entitled to a defined share of cash distributions under the governing partnership
23 agreement. Id. at 339-40, 361. Tenute shows no similar right to the Château’s funds.

24 The Court and Justice Groban admonished in Siry that § 496(c) should be used in business matters

25 only in uncommon circumstances and not for ordinary business disputes. 13 Cal. 5th at 362; id. at

26 367 (Groban, J., concurring). Courts have heeded that admonition in dismissing § 496(c) claims

27 on the pleadings even after Siry. E.g., Tim Cross, 2023 WL 9005635, at *5; Formic Ventures,

28 2023 WL 6037899, at *1; Motivo Eng’g, 2023 WL 3150099, at *9. The Court should reject

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NOTICE OF PITT AND MONDO BONGO’S DEMURRER AND
DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT OF TENUTE
 1 Tenute’s invitation to ignore the Supreme Court’s directive here.

2 III. Tenute fails to plead proximate causation of non-speculative damages.

3 Section 496(c) requires the statutory violation to proximately cause the claimed injury.

4 Cal. Penal Code § 496(c) (plaintiff must be “injured by” violation); Citizens of Humanity, LLC v.

5 Costco Wholesale Corp., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1, 17 (2009); Cal. Civil Code § 3333 (requiring

6 proximate cause when measuring tort damages). It also requires “actual damages,” or harm from

7 which the plaintiff “currently suffer[s]” or “is certain to suffer in the future.” Citizens of

8 Humanity, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 19. Tenute fails to plead that the alleged diversion of Château

9 Miraval’s assets proximately caused it non-speculative injury.

10 Tenute does not allege that the entity it owns, Nouvel, is any less valuable because of the

11 alleged misconduct. It admits that the “enormously profitable” business Nouvel owns through

12 Quimicum—Château Miraval—has grown in value under Pitt’s oversight. ¶¶ 23, 31-32. Tenute

13 instead improperly relies on “potential,” “hypothetical,” and “speculative”—not “existing or

14 certain”—harm. Citizens of Humanity, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 19. Its theory is that Château

15 Miraval’s funds “would have been paid” to Quimicum as dividends and loan repayments, which

16 would have flowed to Nouvel and ultimately Tenute, if the funds had not been diverted. ¶¶ 3, 54-

17 55. But it is speculative to presume that absent the alleged misconduct, Château Miraval would

18 have paid dividends rather than reinvest the funds—or that such payments would exceed the value
19 created through the investments into the estate. Nor does Tenute allege that the loan on which it

20 primarily relies for its damages claim, ¶ 75, would not be repaid if Tenute were to request as

21 much. Tenute fails to plead “the causal link between the [alleged violation] and the injury” with

22 the requisite “particularity, in accordance with the pleading rules governing statutory claims.”

23 Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC, 198 Cal. App. 4th 396, 407 (2011) (internal

24 quotation marks omitted).

25 CONCLUSION
26 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should sustain the demurrer and dismiss the claim

27 against Pitt and Mondo Bongo with prejudice.

28

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NOTICE OF PITT AND MONDO BONGO’S DEMURRER AND
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 1 DATED: August 13, 2024 By: /s/ John V. Berlinski
BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW,
2 LINCENBERG, DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP
John V. Berlinski
3
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
4 Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
5 Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
Won S. Shin (pro hac vice application forthcoming)
6 Jessica L. Layden (admitted pro hac vice)
Ioannis D. Drivas (admitted pro hac vice)
7
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants
8
William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC
9

10

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17

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19

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NOTICE OF PITT AND MONDO BONGO’S DEMURRER AND
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 1 PROOF OF SERVICE
2 Pitt v. Jolie
Case No. 22STCV06081
3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1875 Century
Park East, 23rd Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561.
6
On August 13, 2024, I served the following document(s) described as WILLIAM B.
7 PITT AND MONDO BONGO, LLC’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO
CROSS-COMPLAINT OF TENUTE DEL MONDO B.V.; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
8 AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF on the interested parties in this action as
follows:
9
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
10
BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused the document(s) to be
11 sent from e-mail address kminutelli@birdmarella.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed
in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any
12 electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.

13 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
foregoing is true and correct.
14
Executed on August 13, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.
15

16
/s/ Karen M. Minutelli
17 Karen M. Minutelli
18
19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PROOF OF SERVICE
 1 SERVICE LIST
Pitt v. Jolie
2 Case No. 22STCV06081
3 Paul D. Murphy Laura W. Brill
Daniel N. Csillag Daniel Barlava
4 MURPHY ROSEN LLP Matthew Bernstein
100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1300 KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP
5 Santa Monica, CA 90401 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 1725
Telephone: (310) 899-3300 Los Angeles, CA 90067-4013
6 Email: pmurphy@murphyrosen.com Telephone: (310) 556-2700
Email: dcsillag@murphyrosen.com Email: lbrill@kbkfirm.com
7 Counsel for Defendant and Cross- Email: dbarlava@kbkfirm.com
Complainant Angelina Jolie Email: mbernstein@kbkfirm.com
8 Counsel appearing specially to challenge
jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants
9 Roland Venturini and Gary Bradbury
10 Joe Tuffaha Keith R. Hummel
Prashanth Chennakesavan Justin C. Clarke
11 LTL ATTORNEYS LLP Jonathan Mooney
300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 1400 CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
12 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Worldwide Plaza
Telephone: (213) 612-8900 825 Eighth Avenue
13 Email: joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com New York, NY 10019
Email: Telephone: (212) 474-1000
14 prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com Email: khummel@cravath.com
Counsel for Defendant and Cross- Email: jcclarke@cravath.com
15 Complainant Nouvel, LLC and Defendant Email: jmooney@cravath.com
Tenute del Mondo B.V., and specially Counsel for Defendant and Cross-
16 appearing to challenge jurisdiction on behalf Complainant Nouvel, LLC and Defendant
of Defendants Yuri Shefler and Alexey Tenute del Mondo B.V., and specially
17 Oliynik appearing to challenge jurisdiction on behalf
of Defendants Yuri Shefler and Alexey
18 Oliynik
19 Mark Drooks S. Gale Dick
Debbie Throckmorton Phoebe King
20 Assistant to Mark Drooks Randall Bryer
BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW, LINCENBERG, COHEN & GRESSER LLP
21 DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP 800 Third Avenue
1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor New York, NY 10022
22 Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561 Telephone: (212) 707-7263
Telephone: 310 201-2100 Email: SGDick@CohenGresser.com
23 Email: mdrooks@birdmarella.com Email: PKing@CohenGresser.com
Email: dthrockmorton@birdmarella.com Email: rbryer@cohengresser.com
24 Counsel appearing specially to challenge Counsel appearing specially to challenge
jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants
25 Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence, Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence,
Familles Perrin, SAS Petrichor, Vins et Familles Perrin, SAS Petrichor, Vins et
26 Domaines Perrin SC, SASU Le Domaine, and Domaines Perrin SC, SASU Le Domaine,
SAS Distilleries de la Riviera and SAS Distilleries de la Riviera
27

28

PROOF OF SERVICE
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