Case Pool
Case Pool
Case Pool
Facts:
petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the candidates for
Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. Edilito C. Martinez, a
resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for
the same position. Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate.
However, the Commission on Elections. Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate almost one (1)
month after the elections. Salimbangon was proclaimed winner
Martinez filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam the HRET granted his motion to convert the
same into a Regular Protest. The election protest is based on three hundred (300) ballots more or
less with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative which
the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was
another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same surname.
the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of
the Omnibus Election Code
Issues:
What then is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after
the elections? Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be
considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
Ruling:
In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the
likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A
nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no
bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his
sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that
ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for
either of them. The well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests
especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An
election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties
which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.
The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing... uncertainty and
confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case
at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of
candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day.
Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery
by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to
declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in
appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even
if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections.
Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" should be credited to
petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent.
Petitioner thus garnered more votes than... private respondent with a winning margin of 4,948
votes.
Principles:
"Section 69. Nuisance candidates. -- The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified
petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if
it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put... the election process in mockery or
disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered
candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no
bona fide intention to run for the office... for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed
and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."
Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as "The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987" provides in
Section 5 thereof:
"SEC. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. --
(a) A verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under
Section 69 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized
representative with the Commission by any registered candidate for the same office within five
(5) days from the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be
allowed.
"(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue summons to
the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any.
"(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within which to
file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy thereof upon the
petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised as affirmative... defenses.
"(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the case and
receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of oral testimonies, the
parties may be required to submit position papers together with affidavits or... counter-affidavits
and other documentary evidence. The hearing officer shall immediately submit to the
Commission his findings, reports, and recommendations within five (5) days from the
completion of such submission of evidence. The Commission shall render its decision... within
five (5) days from receipt thereof.
"(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.
"(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available means,
disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city or municipal election
registrars, boards of election inspectors and the general public in the political subdivision
concerned.
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II v.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
GR No. 149380, 2002-07-03
Facts: Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone congressional district of
Malabon-Navotas during the 14 May 2001 national elections... election returns yielded ninety
two thousand and sixty-two (92,062) votes for petitioner... while respondent obtained seventy
two thousand eight hundred sixty-two (72,862) votes petitioner was proclaimed duly elected
representative by the District Board... of Canvassers of Malabon-Navotas. After taking his oath
of office, he assumed the post Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against petitioner...
protest assailed the alleged electoral frauds and anomalies HRET issued the corresponding
summons for service upon petitioner HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim served the summons by
substituted service upon a certain Gene Maga who signed the process... server's copy of the
summons and indicated thereon his position as "maintenance" along with the date and time of
his receipt. HRET issued Resolution No. 01-081 which took note of petitioner Sandoval's failure
to file an answer to the election protest entered in his behalf a general denial of the... allegations
set forth in the protest. HRET also ordered the parties to proceed to preliminary conference
Petitioner received the order on 20 July 2001 as shown by the rubber stamp bearing his name and
his district office in Navotas and indicating the time and date of receipt as well as the person with
corresponding position, i.e., administrative... staff, who received the order it was only respondent
Oreta who filed the required preliminary conference brief.
HRET denied reconsideration of the assailed... resolution and admission of petitioner's answer
Sandoval filed the instant petition... assailing the HRET's jurisdiction over his person.
Petitioner was constrained to file his preliminary conference brief ad cautelam and to attend the
preliminary conference on 18 October 2001, which had been postponed several times upon his
request.
HRET also submitted a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment manifesting that as a
nominal party in the instant case it was not filing a "separate comment" from the Solicitor
General's pleading.
Issues:
Was substituted service of summons validly effected on herein petitioner Federico S. Sandoval II
in the election protest filed by herein respondent Aurora Rosario A. Oreta before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
Ruling:
agree with the Solicitor General.
this Court may very well inquire into jurisdictional issues concerning the HRET may be inferred
from Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution which has expanded judicial power to include the
determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction instant petition is intricately related to the election protest filed by
respondent Oreta with the HRET where the integrity of the election proceedings is attacked as
having been grossly manipulated to distort the people's will.
In view of the delicate nature and the gravity of the charge, the observance of the HRET Rules
of Procedure, in conjunction with our own Rules of Court, must be taken seriously.
propriety of the substituted service of summons upon petitioner Sandoval is therefore no less
pivotal, for upon it depends not simply the jurisdiction of the HRET over the person of petitioner
but also the breadth of fairness of the proceedings therein.
Issues:
1. WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.
2. WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC
En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive
suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended
the execution of the COMELEC’s Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution
was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the
winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has
invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The
party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the
HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of
the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The
use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the
OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its members.
Issues:
(1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPP's nominees motu
proprio or to cancel AGPP's registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined from
giving due course to AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010... elections, the canvassing of
AGPP's votes, and proclaiming it a winner; and (3) whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the
question of Arroyo's qualifications as AGPP's nominee after his proclamation and assumption to
office as a member of the House of Representatives.
Ruling:
For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus petitioners must comply
with Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
In the present case, the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be
"no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Under Section 2, in
relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any... interested
party may file with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against a party-list nominee.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro B. Tan
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s
COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the
petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status,
residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American
citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered
evidence and amended last exhibit. On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the
Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No.
9225. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013
the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the
May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House
of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013. On June 5, 2013, the
COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc final and executory. Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.
Issues:
1.Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of
the House of Representative.
2.Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office
Discussion/ Held:
1.Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative.
2.In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public
office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is
no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as
Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA
9225.
Lico vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 205505
The case of Lico v. Commission on Elections involves a jurisdictional dispute over the expulsion
of a party-list representative and the legitimacy of the leadership within the party-list
organization Ating Koop, ultimately ruling in favor of the Lico Group and recognizing the
Interim Central Committee as the legitimate leadership.
Facts: The case involves a dispute over jurisdiction and leadership within the party-list
organization Ating Koop. The two rival factions are the Lico Group, headed by petitioner Atty.
Isidro Q. Lico, and the Rimas Group, represented by Amparo T. Rimas. Ating Koop was
registered on November 16, 2009, with Lico as the first nominee. Lico was proclaimed as one of
the winning party-list groups by the COMELEC on December 8, 2010. On December 5, 2011,
the Interim Central Committee of Ating Koop, dominated by members of the Rimas Group,
expelled Lico for disloyalty. The Rimas Group filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking to
expel Lico from the House of Representatives and recognize the second nominee, Roberto
Mascari a, as Ating Koop's representative. The COMELEC Second Division upheld the
expulsion of Lico and declared Mascari a as the duly qualified nominee.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed this decision and recognized the Rimas Group as the
legitimate representative of Ating Koop.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a party-list representative from
the House of Representatives. Which group legitimately represents Ating Koop.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Lico Group and annulled the COMELEC's resolutions.
Ratio:
The HRET has jurisdiction over the expulsion of a member of the House of Representatives from
his party-list organization, as it involves the member's qualifications to sit in Congress.
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC.
Facts: Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. (Liberal Party) and respondents Angelina D. Tan
(National People’s Coalition) and Alvin John S. Tañada (Lapiang Manggagawa) were contenders
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon
Province in the May 13, 2013 National Elections. Wigberto filed before the COMELEC 2
separate petitions: 1 st petition – to cancel Alvin John’s CoC; 2nd petition – to declare Alvin
John as a nuisance candidate. COMELEC 1st Division dismissed both petitions for lack of merit
but Wigberto filed two Motion for Reconsiderations. On the1st Petition, COMELEC En Banc
granted the MR and canceled Alvin John’s CoC for having committed false material
representations concerning his residency in accordance with Section 7812 of BP Blg. 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (OEC). On the 2nd Petition, COMELEC En Banc
upheld the 1st Division’s ruling that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate as defined under
Sec. 69 of the OEC.
The Issues Wigberto enumerated the following grounds warranting allowance of his petition:
1.Public respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it whimsically, capriciously, and arbitrarily limited its own jurisdiction in
election protests as defined by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.
2.Public respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it whimsically, capriciously, and arbitrarily declared that an election protest is
limited to the opening of ballot boxes and the revision of ballots.
The Court's Ruling: The petition has no merit. We affirm the Resolutions of the HRET.
Wigberto committed several fatal procedural errors. First, Wigberto filed a prohibited pleading: a
motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. Section 1(d), Rule 13 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically prohibits the filing of a "motion for
reconsideration of an en bane ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense
cases." Consequently, the COMELEC En Banc ruling became final and executory,8 precluding
Wigberto from raising again in any other forum Alvin John's nuisance candidacy as an issue.
Second, Wigberto filed his petition beyond the period provided by the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. What Wigberto should have done was to file a petition for certiorari with this Court
within five days from promulgation of the 25 April 2013 resolution of the COMELEC En Banc.
Wigberto failed to timely assail before this Court through a petition for certiorari the COMELEC
En Banc resolution declaring that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate.
Velasco vs Belmonte
GR. No. 211140
Facts:
Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco filed a petition for mandamus against Hon. Speaker Feliciano R.
Belmonte, Jr., Secretary General Marilyn B. Barua-Yap, and Representative Regina Ongsiako.
Velasco seeks to compel Speaker Belmonte to administer the proper oath in his favor and allow
him to assume the position of Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque. Velasco also
seeks to compel Secretary General Barua-Yap to remove Ongsiako's name from the Roll of
Members and to restrain Ongsiako from usurping the position of Representative. Velasco claims
that he is the rightful winner of the May 13, 2013 elections based on final and executory
resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Supreme Court.
A petition was filed with the COMELEC to cancel Ongsiako's Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
due to alleged material misrepresentations.
The COMELEC First Division granted the petition and the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
decision. Despite the cancellation of Ongsiako's COC, she was proclaimed as the winner of the
elections.
Velasco filed an Election Protest and a Petition for Quo Warranto against Ongsiako.
The COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality, declaring its resolution final and
executory. Ongsiako was administered the oath of office. Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed.
Issue:
Whether Velasco has a clear legal right to the position of Representative of Marinduque.
Whether Speaker Belmonte and Secretary General Barua-Yap unlawfully neglected their duty to
administer the oath and register Velasco as a member of the House of Representatives.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of Velasco and granted the petition for mandamus.
Velasco has a clear legal right to the position of Representative based on the final and executory
decisions of the COMELEC and the Supreme Court.
The administration of oath and the registration of Velasco's name in the Roll of Members are
ministerial acts that must be performed by Speaker Belmonte and Secretary General Barua-Yap.
There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to Velasco
Ty-Delgado v. HRET
782 SCRA 117 (2016)
FACTS: Philip Arreza Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9
October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner filed a petition
for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the
Commission on Elections on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving
moral turpitude. She argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year
period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. HRET held that Pichay did not participated
the writing of the libelous articles but his conviction was in line with his duty as the president of
the publishing company. Based on the circumstances, the HRET concluded that Pichay’s
conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude.
ISSUE: WON the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving
moral turpitude
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel.
The HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction
when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude.
Since Pichay’s ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was
never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes
cast for him were considered stray votes.
Tañada v. HRET
785 SCRA 314 (2016)
Facts: Wigberto Tañada, Jr., Angelina D. Tan, and Alvin John S. Tañada filed their respective
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of Representative of the Fourth Legislative
District of the Province of Quezon in the 2013 National and Local Elections.
Wigberto filed petitions with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to seek the cancellation
of Alvin John’s CoC and to declare him a nuisance candidate.
The COMELEC dismissed the petitions for lack of merit, but later granted Wigberto’s motion
for reconsideration and cancelled Alvin John’s CoC. However, Alvin John’s name remained on
the ballots and he received 7,038 votes. Tan was declared the winning candidate with 84,782
votes, while Wigberto received 80,698 votes. Wigberto filed a petition with the Quezon
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) to correct manifest errors in the certificates of canvass
and to consolidate the votes garnered by Alvin John in his favor. The PBOC denied Wigberto’s
motion, stating that Alvin John’s votes could not be counted in his favor because the cancellation
of Alvin John’s CoC was based on material misrepresentations, not on being a nuisance
candidate.
Tan was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Wigberto filed an election protest ad cautela with
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), alleging fraud in the fielding of Alvin
John as a nuisance candidate and the miscounting of votes. The HRET dismissed Wigberto’s
election protest for being insufficient in form and substance, and for lack of jurisdiction to
declare Alvin John as a nuisance candidate.
Issue: Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing Wigberto’s election protest and refusing to declare Alvin John as a
nuisance candidate.
Ruling: The Supreme Court found that Wigberto committed procedural errors by filing a motion
for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Banc’s resolution, which is a prohibited pleading, and
by filing his petition beyond the period provided by the law.
The Court held that the HRET’s jurisdiction is limited to election protests and it does not have
the authority to review the COMELEC’s finding on nuisance candidates.
The Court affirmed the HRET’s decision to dismiss Wigberto’s election protest and upheld the
HRET’s lack of jurisdiction to declare Alvin John as a nuisance candidate.
In a separate concurring opinion, Representative Luzviminda C. Ilagan stated that Wigberto’s
election protest was sufficient in form and substance and that the HRET has jurisdiction to
determine whether Tan committed fraud by fielding Alvin John as a nuisance candidate.
However, the majority of the Court disagreed with this opinion.
Rivera v. COMELEC,
790 SCRA 443 (2016)
Facts: case involves a dispute over the legitimacy of the nominees of the CIBAC party-list in the
Philippines. The petitioners, Bibiano C. Rivera and Luis K. Lokin, filed a petition for certiorari
seeking to nullify the resolutions of the COMELEC recognizing the nominees of the CIBAC
National Council. The petitioners argued that the CIBAC National Council had become defunct
and that the nominees of the CIBAC Foundation should be considered as the legitimate
nominees.
The COMELEC conducted a summary hearing to settle the issue of which nominees should
represent CIBAC in the 2013 elections. The COMELEC recognized the nominees of the CIBAC
National Council and they were subsequently proclaimed as winners and took their seats in the
House of Representatives.
The petitioners argued that the CIBAC National Council had lost its legal existence and that the
CIBAC Foundation’s Board of Trustees should be considered as the governing body of CIBAC.
The petitioners cited previous cases where the Court had ruled in favor of the CIBAC
Foundation’s nominees.
Issue: Whether the nominees of the CIBAC National Council or the nominees of the CIBAC
Foundation should be considered as the legitimate nominees of the CIBAC party-list
Ruling: Supreme Court ruled that the HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Wigberto’s election protest and refusing to declare Alvin John as a nuisance
candidate.
The Court affirmed the HRET’s decision and dismissed Wigberto’s petition.
The Court upheld the authority of the CIBAC National Council to nominate representatives and
recognized the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in resolving
election contests.
The Court held that the petitioners had failed to provide evidence of the affiliation of the CIBAC
Foundation’s Board of Trustees to the CIBAC party-list registered with the COMELEC.
The Court emphasized that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken their oath, and
assumed office, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests ends and the jurisdiction of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins.
Abayon v. HRET
791 SCRA 242 (2016)
Facts: Harlin C. Abayon and Raul A. Daza were contenders for the position of Representative in
the First Legislative District of Northern Samar during the May 13, 2013 Elections.
Abayon emerged as the winner with a difference of 52 votes.
Daza filed an Election Protest challenging the election results in 25 clustered precincts.
Daza alleged fraud, vote-buying, intimidation, and terrorism committed by Abayon and his
supporters. Abayon filed a counter-protest, challenging the results in all 332 precincts.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) found both protests to be sufficient in
form and substance. After revision proceedings, the HRET granted Daza’s motion to withdraw
his cause of action for recount. The HRET directed the reception of Abayon’s defense on the
issue of terrorism. The HRET dismissed Abayon’s counter-protest.
In a separate decision, the HRET annulled the election results in five clustered precincts due to
terrorism. Abayon filed petitions for certiorari, arguing that the HRET exceeded its jurisdiction,
committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the elections, and violated his right to due
process.
Issue: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) exceed its jurisdiction,
commit grave abuse of discretion, and violate Abayon’s right to due process in annulling the
elections?
Ruing: The Court dismissed the petitions and upheld the legitimacy of the nominees of the
CIBAC National Council.
The Court also dismissed the petition for quo warranto filed by the CIBAC Foundation for lack
of jurisdiction, as the nominees had already assumed their seats in Congress.
The HRET had jurisdiction to annul elections based on fraud and terrorism.
However, the evidence presented by Daza was weak and insufficient to warrant the annulment of
the elections.
The HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling the elections and disregarding the
number of votes received by Abayon and Daza.
The dismissal of Abayon’s counter-protest was deemed moot and academic
Facts: The case involves two petitions filed by Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) and Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher. BANAT challenged the resolution of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denying their petition to proclaim the full number of party-list
representatives provided by the Constitution. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher challenged the
COMELEC’s use of the 2-4-6 formula for allocating additional seats to qualified party-list organizations.
Issue:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution valid?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of the Party-List System Act valid?
3. Is the two percent threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by Section 11(b) of the Party-List
System Act valid?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
Ruling: The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives is valid and in accordance with the
Constitution. The two percent threshold for additional seats is unconstitutional. Major political parties
should be disallowed from participating in the party-list elections. The Court provided a new formula for
the allocation of additional seats based on proportional representation. The Court ruled that the twenty
percent allocation for party-list representatives is valid and in accordance with the Constitution. This
allocation ensures that a significant number of representatives in the House of Representatives come from
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. However, the Court declared the two percent threshold for
additional seats unconstitutional. This threshold made it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party-list seats when the number of available seats exceeded 50. The Court
found that this threshold frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling of 20% party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives. The Court also ruled that major political parties should
be disallowed from participating in the party-list elections. The Court interpreted the constitutional
provision on the party-list system to be open to all political parties, as long as they field candidates who
come from different marginalized sectors. The Court emphasized that the party-list system is intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented, not the mainstream political parties. In determining the
allocation of seats for party-list representatives, the Court used a formula based on the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system. The Court allocated seats in proportion to the percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate. The Court also applied a three-seat cap to each qualified party-list
candidate.Overall, the Court partially granted the petition, declaring the two percent threshold
requirement unconstitutional and disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections. The Court provided a new formula for the allocation of party-list seats based on the percentage
of votes garnered by each party-list candidate.
Facts: The Supreme Court declares Republic Act 4790 unconstitutional for misleadingly incorporating
barrios from Cotabato into the Municipality of Dianaton in Lanao del Sur, violating the constitutional
requirement of transparency and nullifying the law's territorial transfer.
territorial transfer. Republic Act 4790 created the Municipality of Dianaton in Lanao del Sur The law
dismembered two municipalities in Cotabato. Petitioner is a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion
of Parang, Cotabato.
Issue:
Whether Republic Act 4790 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Republic Act 4790 is declared unconstitutional
Ratio:
The law violated the constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill must be expressed in its title
The title of the law was misleading and deceptive as it did not inform the members of Congress and the
public of the full impact of the law
The law created the Municipality of Dianaton in Lanao del Sur, but it also dismembered two
municipalities in Cotabato
The territorial transfer from Cotabato to Lanao del Sur should have been reflected in the title of the law
The argument that the law could be partially upheld was rejected by the Court
The provisions of the law were so interconnected that if one part was unconstitutional, the entire law must
fall
Giron v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013
Facts: The case involves a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of Sections 12 and 14 of the Fair Election Act.
The petitioner, Henry R. Giron, argues that these sections are unconstitutional.
The respondent, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), opposes the petition and argues that the
matter has already been resolved in a previous case.
Issue: Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act is constitutional.
Ruling: The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of Sections 12 and 14 of the Fair Election Act.
ABAKADA V. Purisima,
562 SCRA 251 (2008)
Facts: The case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act 9335, which establishes a system of
rewards and incentives for officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The petitioners, officers and members of the Abakada Guro Party List, challenged the law on the
grounds of equal protection, non-delegation of legislative power, and separation of powers.
The law creates a Rewards and Incentives Fund sourced from the excess collection of the BIR and the
BOC. The fund is allocated to the BIR and the BOC based on their contribution to the excess collection.
The law also establishes Boards in the BIR and the BOC, which have the duty to prescribe the criteria and
procedures for the grant of rewards and incentives.
Issue:
1. Whether Republic Act 9335 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
2. Whether the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether the creation of a congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act 9335, except for Section 12.
The Court held that the law does not violate the equal protection clause. The Court ruled that the law does
not unduly delegate legislative power. The Court declared Section 12 unconstitutional because it violates
the separation of powers
The Court held that the petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the
law. The law does not violate the equal protection clause because the BIR and the BOC have a distinct
primary function of generating revenues for the government. The law does not unduly delegate legislative
power as it provides sufficient standards for the grant of rewards and incentives. Section 12 of the law
was declared unconstitutional because it allows legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law, violating the separation of powers. The Court emphasized that the power to adopt
the implementing rules and regulations of a law belongs to the executive branch, and Congress can only
intervene through legislation. Legislative power is vested in Congress, consisting of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, and cannot be exercised solely by one chamber or committee. The Court cited
the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in INS v. Chadha, which declared legislative vetoes
unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers. The Court suggested alternative means for
Congress to influence the approval of implementing rules while staying within constitutional parameters,
such as being specific and limiting in the delegation of power to agencies, requiring periodic
congressional approval of delegated authority, and requiring consultation with congressional
representatives before taking executive actions.
Ruling:
The lower court found Lim and Guingguing guilty of libel. The court ruled that the publication was
libelous and that malice was present. The argument that the publication was made in self-defense was
rejected. The court emphasized that the private reputation of individuals is constitutionally protected.
The Court found that Torralba was a public figure as a broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs
aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao. The Court also found that the statements made in
the publication were true, as confirmed by Torralba himself. Therefore, the Court concluded that there
was no actual malice on the part of Lim and Guingguing. Lim and Guingguing should be acquitted of the
libel charges. Importance of Freedom of Expression and Limitations on Libel Laws
The case highlights the importance of freedom of expression. It emphasizes the limitations on criminal
libel laws, particularly when it comes to public figures. The publication of true statements about the
character and integrity of public figures is protected. The case underscores the need to balance the
protection of reputation with the public’s right to know about public figures.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, finding that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolution.
The Court held that the resolution usurped the authority of Congress, violated the requirement for an
appropriation of funds, disregarded existing laws regarding the conduct of an “unofficial” count, and
lacked a constitutional and statutory basis.
The Court emphasized that the implementation of the resolution would lead to confusion and
discrepancies between the official and unofficial counts.
Therefore, the Court declared the resolution null and void.
Atitiw v. Zamora,
471 SCRA 329 (2005)
Fact:
Nestor G. Atitiw, along with other petitioners filed this petition for prohibition, mandamus and
declaratory relief as taxpayers, and officers and members of the variousunits of the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR). They seek, among others, the declaration of nullity of par. 1 of the special
provisions of RA No. 8760, otherwise known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000, directing
that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the separation and
retirement benefits of all affected officials and employees
Nestor G. Atitiw, along with other petitioners filed this petition for prohibition, mandamus and
declaratory relief as taxpayers, and officers and members of the various units of the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR). They seek, among others, the declaration of nullity of par. 1 of the special
provisions of RA No. 8760, otherwise known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000, directing
that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the separation and
retirement benefits of all affected officials and employees
Issue:
Ruling:
In order that a provision or clause in a general appropriations bill may comply with the test of
germaneness, it must be PARTICULAR, UNAMBIGUOUS, and APPROPRIATE. It is particular if it
relates specifically to a distinct item or appropriation in the bill and does not refer generally to the entire
appropriations bill. It is unambiguouswhen its application or operation is apparent on the face of the bill
and it does not necessitate reference to details or sources outside the appropriations bill. It is appropriate
when its subject matter does not necessarily have to be treated in a separate legislation
Belgica v. Ochoa
710 SCRA 1 (2013)
Facts: Challenge to the constitutionality of allocating Priority Development Assistance Funds (PDAF)
and Malampaya Funds to members of Congress. Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO). TRO enjoined the Department of Budget and Management, the National Treasurer, the Executive
Secretary, or any persons acting under their authority from releasing the remaining PDAF allocated to
members of Congress under the General Appropriations Act of 2013, as well as the Malampaya Funds
under the phrase “for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8
of Presidential Decree No. 910.
Exception: Funds can still be released for the purpose of “financing energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the same provision
Case set for oral arguments on October 8, 2013
Ruling: Supreme Court’s decision to issue a TRO based on urgent petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by the petitioners. TRO aimed at temporarily restraining the release of PDAF and Malampaya Funds
to members of Congress due to constitutional issues raised in the case
Decision made to prevent further allocation of funds until constitutionality of such allocation can be fully
examined and determined
Oral arguments scheduled to allow for thorough discussion and examination of the issues involved in the
case
Issue: Whether the DAP violates the Constitution, specifically Section 29(1) of Article VI, Section 25(5)
of Article VI, the Equal Protection Clause, the system of checks and balances, and the principle of public
accountability
DAP infringes on the power of Congress to appropriate funds and violates the constitutional principles of
separation of powers and public accountability. Upholding the Constitution and ensuring proper use of
public funds is of utmost importance. Respondents are ordered to account for and return the funds used
under the DAP.
Issue: The main issue raised in the case is the constitutionality of the Expanded VAT Law.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the Expanded VAT Law.
The Court held that the Senate has the power to propose amendments to revenue bills and pass its own
version of the House revenue measure. The Court upheld the President's certification of the bill, stating
that it is enough for the President to certify the bill that is currently under consideration. The Court ruled
that the Conference Committee's close-door meeting does not violate the public's right to know, as the
committee submitted a report showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and
Senate.
The Court rejected the argument that the law discriminates against the press and violates religious
freedom, stating that the press is not exempt from taxation and that the burden on religious freedom is
incidental. The Court held that the law does not violate the due process, equal protection, and contract
clauses, as taxation on new subjects or increased taxes on old ones do not interfere with contracts or
impair their obligations.
YMCA vs. CA
298 SCRA 83 (1998)
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over whether the income derived from the lease of the Young Men’s
Christian Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA) real property is subject to income tax.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) argued that the income should be taxed, while the YMCA
claimed tax exemption as a non-profit institution.
In 1980, the YMCA earned income from leasing a portion of its premises to small shop owners and from
parking fees collected from non-members.
The CIR issued an assessment to the YMCA for deficiency income tax, withholding taxes, and
surcharges.The YMCA protested the assessment, but the CIR denied their claims.
The YMCA filed a petition for review at the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which ruled in favor of the
YMCA, stating that the rental income was reasonably incidental to and necessary for the accomplishment
of the YMCA’s objectives.The CIR appealed the CTA’s decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
initially ruled in favor of the CIR. Upon reconsideration, the CA reversed its decision and upheld the
CTA’s ruling, stating that the rental income was not collected for profit but was merely incidental to the
YMCA’s operation. The CIR filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether the income derived from the lease of the YMCA’s real property is subject to income tax
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the CIR and held that the income from the lease of the YMCA’s real
property is subject to income tax.
The Court applied the doctrine of strict interpretation in construing tax exemptions and found that the
exemption claimed by the YMCA was expressly disallowed by the wording of the law.
The Court emphasized that the rental income is taxable regardless of its use or disposition.
The Court noted that the YMCA failed to provide substantial evidence to prove that it met the requisites
for tax exemption as a non-profit educational institution.
Issue: Whether ether the petitioner has the right to access information regarding the ongoing negotiations
and proposals concerning the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Ruling:
The petitioner has the right to access information regarding the ongoing negotiations and proposals
concerning the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth. The General and Supplemental Agreements entered
into by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the Marcos heirs are null and
void for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
Conclusion:
The petitioner has the right to access information regarding the ongoing negotiations and proposals
concerning the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth.
The General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs are null and void for
being contrary to law and the Constitution.
Writings in the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to
the public, in line with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs.
An informed public is crucial in a democracy, allowing the people to determine whether their government
officials are performing their functions honestly and competently. The recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged
ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. Limitations on access to
information include matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence, and
other classified information. Compromises are generally encouraged in civil cases, but there are certain
matters that cannot be compromised, such as civil status, validity of marriage, and future support. A
compromise in civil cases does not automatically terminate criminal proceedings or extinguish criminal
liability.
Dispute: Assessment of real property taxes on the Lung Center’s land and hospital building.
Claim: The petitioner argues that it is a charitable institution and therefore exempt from real property
taxes
Ruling: The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
The petitioner filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court, arguing that it is indeed a charitable
institution and should be exempt from real property taxes.
The Supreme Court partially granted the petition, ruling that the petitioner is a charitable institution
within the context of the Constitution and the law.
However, the Court held that the portions of the land and hospital building that are leased to private
entities are not exempt from real property taxes, as they are not actually, directly, and exclusively used for
charitable purposes.
Executive v. Southwing
482 SCRA 673 (2006)
Facts: Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., United Auctioneers, Inc., and Microvan, Inc.
Filed a declaratory relief case challenging the constitutionality of the provision
Trial court granted their motion for summary judgment and declared the provision unconstitutional
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
Ruling:
The provision is constitutional and has both constitutional and statutory bases
The President has the authority to regulate or prohibit the importation of articles and commodities into the
country under the Constitution and relevant statutes The provision was issued in accordance with the
prescribed procedure
The President has the authority to regulate or prohibit the importation of articles and commodities into the
country under the Constitution and relevant statutes. The provision was issued in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. The provision is a valid exercise of police power to protect the domestic industry
The provision should not be applied to the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, as it is outside the customs territory
and the importation ban would not serve its purpose in that area
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156
Modified its application to exclude the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The provision has both constitutional
and statutory bases and was issued in accordance with the prescribed procedure.cThe provision is a valid
exercise of police power to protect the domestic industry.
Petitioner’s Argument
The petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals had no appellate jurisdiction over BOI decisions.
They claimed that appeals should be filed directly with the Supreme Court. They cited Article 82 of the
Omnibus Investments Code, which states that appeals from BOI decisions should be filed directly with
the Supreme Court within 30 days.
Respondent’s Argument
Mariwasa argued that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over appeals from quasi-judicial agencies,
including the BOI, as stated in the Rules of Court.
They pointed out that the Court of Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, and awards of quasi-judicial agencies, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Secretary of the Interior has the jurisdiction and authority to suspend and prefer
administrative charges against Villena.
Whether the acts of the Secretary of the Interior in suspending Villena and preferring charges against him
are null and void.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Secretary of the Interior, affirming their authority to order an
investigation and suspend Villena pending the investigation
The Secretary of the Interior is invested with the authority to order the investigation of charges against
Villena and appoint a special investigator for that purpose.
Although there is no clear and express grant of power to the Secretary to suspend a mayor under
investigation, the power of suspension is implied from the power of investigation.
The court considered the argument of ratification by the President of the Philippines but concluded that
certain prerogative acts cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification.
The department secretaries are assistants and agents of the President, and their actions are subject to the
President’s control and direction.
Issue:
Ruling:
The court held that the action taken by the Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President,
was contrary to law and should be set aside.
It was established that the Commissioner of Civil Service has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
administrative cases of personnel in the classified service, and there is no appeal to the President in such
cases.
The power of control given to the President does not extend to the power to remove an officer or
employee in the executive department, especially those who belong to the classified service.
Importance of Due Process and Protection of Tenure
The court emphasized the importance of due process and protection of tenure for civil service employees.
Allowing the President to directly remove civil service officials without following the proper procedure
would undermine the stability of the civil service system and lead to political patronage.
Limitations on the President’s Power of Control
The court concluded that the President’s power of control may extend to the power to investigate,
suspend, or remove officer
Issue: Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) violates the Constitution.
Whether or not the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in violation of the prohibition for members of
the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the constitutionality of the PET and affirming its
role as the sole judge of election contests involving the President and Vice-President. The Court held that
the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, but rather an adjunct of the Court.
The Court found that the PET’s exercise of judicial power in resolving election contests did not violate
the prohibition on performing quasi-judicial functions. The petitioner did not have standing to file the
petition, as he failed to show a direct injury as a result of the creation and operation of the PET. The
petitioner, who had previously appeared as counsel before the PET, was estopped from challenging its
constitutionality.
The PET is a legitimate institution necessary for deciding election protests involving the President and
Vice-President. The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, but rather an
adjunct of the Court. The PET’s exercise of judicial power in resolving election contests does not violate
the prohibition on performing quasi-judicial functions. The petitioner did not have standing to file the
petition, as he failed to show a direct injury as a result of the creation and operation of the PET. The
petitioner, who had previously acknowledged the jurisdiction of the PET by appearing as counsel before
it, was estopped from challenging its constitutionality.
Ruling:
No. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase “any reelection” will be premised
on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) electionas President, there is no case or controversy to
be resolved in this case.
No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.As such, one of the
essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or
controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing
controversies.
The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words,
when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable
Issue: Whether the respondent heirs of Marcos raised any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings that
would negate the summary judgment.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the negative, stating that the defenses raised by the respondents were insufficient to
tender genuine issues. The Court also ruled that the petitioner was able to prove its case for forfeiture in
accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of the law. The Court found that all the elements for forfeiture were
sufficiently established.
The defenses raised by the respondents, such as lack of knowledge, inability to recall, or lawful
acquisition of the funds, were insufficient to tender genuine issues.
Sections 2 and 3 of the law establish a prima facie presumption that a property was unlawfully acquired
and subject to forfeiture if its amount is manifestly disproportionate to the lawful income of the public
officer who owns it.
The Court found that all the elements for forfeiture were sufficiently established.
Summary judgment was proper in this case, as there were no genuine issues of fact requiring a full trial.
The respondents’ admissions and denials were not sufficient to raise genuine issues.
The foreign foundations did not need to be impleaded as parties.
The Supreme Court granted the Republic’s petition for certiorari, reinstated the earlier decision of the
Sandiganbayan granting summary judgment, and ordered the forfeiture of funds.
Issues: Whether or not Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA, while holding the position of DOTC
Undersecretary, violates the constitutional prohibition on holding multiple offices.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, declaring Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA
unconstitutional and null and void. The Court based its decision on the interpretation of Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution, which prohibits Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants from
holding any other office or employment.
The Court emphasized that the prohibition is all-encompassing and intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices.
The Court rejected the argument that Bautista’s designation was temporary and did not violate the
prohibition, stating that even temporary designations must not violate the constitutional prohibition.
The Court also dismissed the argument that the positions of DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA
Administrator are compatible, stating that the prohibition applies regardless of compatibility.
The Court further explained that Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA falls under the stricter
prohibition of Section 13, Article VII, and she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7,
paragraph 2, Article IX-B.
The Court also rejected the argument that Bautista’s designation was in an ex-officio capacity, as it was
not supported by the provisions of MARINA’s charter.
The Court concluded that Bautista’s designation as OIC of MARINA, while holding the position of
DOTC Undersecretary, violated the constitutional prohibition on holding multiple offices. Therefore, her
designation was declared unconstitutional and null and void.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared Executive Order No. 284
unconstitutional. The Court clarified that Cabinet members can hold additional positions in an ex-officio
capacity or positions necessary for their primary functions, but they cannot hold unrelated positions.
The prohibition in Section 13, Article VII applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants.
The practice of designating Cabinet members to head or sit as members of various government agencies
and corporations became prevalent during the martial law regime of former President Ferdinand Marcos,
leading to abuses and self-enrichment by unscrupulous officials.
Additional duties and functions imposed on Cabinet members must be related to their primary functions
and should not result in conflicts or inconsistencies.
The prohibition in Section 13, Article VII applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants.
Issue: Whether the votes cast for a disqualified candidate should be considered stray or counted in favor
of the bona fide candidate.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and declared her as the duly elected Vice-
Mayor of Bugasong. The Court held that the votes cast for the disqualified candidate should be counted in
favor of the bona fide candidate. The Court relied on COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, which provided
that the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly when the
nuisance candidate has the same surname as the legitimate candidate, should be counted in favor of the
latter. The Court emphasized that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 should be upheld to give effect to the
will of the electorate and to prevent confusion and frustration of the voter’s will.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Casimira S. Dela Cruz, and declared her as the duly
elected Vice-Mayor of Bugasong.
The Court held that the votes cast for the disqualified candidate should be counted in favor of the bona
fide candidate based on COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, in order to give effect to the will of the
electorate and prevent confusion among voters.
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
Bitonio vs. COA,
425 SCRA 437 (2004)
Facts: Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the DOLE.
DOLE Acting Secretary Brilliantes designated the Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Board of
Directors of PEZA. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, Bitonio was receiving a per
diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA’s
disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner pursuant to the
ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary where Executive Order No. 284 allowing
government officials to hold multiple positions in government was declared unconstitutional. Thus,
Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive compensation
therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. Bitonio filed an MR but the COA
denied the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
The petitioner maintains that he Is entitled to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916 specifically and
categorically provides for the payment of a per diem for the attendance of the members of the Board of
Directors at board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that this law is presumed to be valid;
unless and until the law is declared unconstitutional, it remains in effect and binding for all intents and
purposes. Neither can this law be rendered nugatory on the basis of a mere memorandum circular COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses that R.A. No. 7916 is a statute more
superior than an administrative directive and the former cannot just be repealed or amended by the latter.
He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil Liberties Union was
promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the prior
holdings of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916 was never challenged,
the provision on the payment of per diems remains in force notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union
case. Nonetheless, the petitioner’s position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of officials
prohibited to receive additional compensation as clarified in the Resolution of the Court dated August 1,
1991; thus, he is still entitled to receive the per diems.
Issue: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Ruling:
"1. Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any
compensation for this additional office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board
merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any
compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal, and the
fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is
not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. After all, the petitioner
attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his
representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board at all.
There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by the
Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case.
The payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members of the Board of Directors
which the petitioner is entitled to receive.
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the highest law of the land
which is the Constitution. No law can render nugatory the Constitution because the Constitution is more
superior to a statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice
may step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it that the law must conform to
the Constitution.
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is the reason why the law was
later amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amended law, the members of the Board of Directors was
increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of the different Departments who
should sit as board members of the PEZA. The option of designating his representative to
“
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the COA’s decision, citing constitutional provisions and previous
jurisprudence. The COA has the power and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to
government funds and properties. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 was issued to enforce the constitutional
prohibition on receiving additional compensation for holding multiple positions in the government.
The memorandum did not require publication because it was an internal and interpretative regulation.
Representatives of Ex Officio Members Not Exempt The representatives of ex officio members were not
exempt from the prohibition on receiving additional compensation. They were not appointed to new
positions but were merely designated to act as representatives.
Agra’s Defense
Agra claimed that he was first designated as Acting Solicitor General on January 12, 2010, before being
appointed as Acting Secretary of Justice. Agra argued that his concurrent designations were temporary
and did not violate the constitutional prohibition.
The Court emphasized that the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General were not related or
necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice, making the concurrent holding of the two
positions improper.
Marcos v Manglapus
177 SCRA 668 (1989)
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the
limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her
to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct
right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the
right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to
leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national
security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter
one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and
under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily
or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past
few years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy EO 420 violates the Constitutional
provision on equal protection of laws and results in the discriminatory treatment of and penalizes those
without ID
Ruling: The petitions are without merit. unified ID system for all these government entities can be
achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a
memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually
adopt a format... for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also
adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial
savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an... administrative matter, and
does not involve the exercise of legislative power.
The President's constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing
legislation.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the
President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws.
EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding
the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the
data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power
that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the... assailed executive issuance in Ople
v. Torres sought to establish a ""National Computerized Identification Reference System,""[19] a national
ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive... issuance. Obviously, a national ID card
system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system
where none existed before.
George Cordero, Inress Review Center's President, was then the incumbent President of the Philippine
Nurses Association. On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with
the oath-taking of the successful examinees set on 22 August 2006. Consequently, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the members of the PRC's Board of Nursing. President
Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the Nursing Board Examinations.
On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the
establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. the Review
Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked
the CHED to ""amend, if not withdraw"" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to
operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional
organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers.
EO 566- authorized ched to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers. In a letter
dated 3 January 2007, Chairman Puno wrote petitioner, through its President Jose Antonio Fudolig
(Fudolig), that to suspend the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO
566.
On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR. On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed before the CHED a
Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations praying for a ruling:
to regulate the establishment and operation of review centers and similar entities in the entire country.
With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the CHED now is the agency that is mandated to
regulate the establishment and operation of all review centers as provided for under Section 4 of the
Executive Order which provides that ""No review center or similar entities shall be established and/or
operate review classes without the favorable expressed indorsement of the CHED and without the
issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review.
Section 1. Authority to Establish and Operate - Only CHED recognized, accredited and reputable HEIs
may be authorized to establish and operate review center/course by the CHED upon full compliance with
the conditions and requirements provided herein and in other pertinent laws,... rules and regulations. In
addition, a consortium or consortia of qualified schools and/or entities may establish and operate review
centers or conduct review classes upon compliance with the provisions of these Rules.
Ruling:
The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition
upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
because this
The rule, however, is not absolute, as when exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the exercise
of this Court of its primary jurisdiction
The alleged violation of the Constitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the
exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is not precluded from brushing
aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an... action due to its importance to the public and in
keeping with its duty to determine whether the other branches of the Government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution.
The OSG justifies its stand by claiming that the term ""programs x x x of higher learning"" is broad
enough to include programs offered by review centers.
We do not agree.
Sec. 3. Creation of Commission on Higher Education. - In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the
Commission on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS), and attached to the Office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage
shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well... as degree-granting programs in
all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private. (Emphasis supplied)
Neither RA 7722 nor CHED Order No. 3, series of 1994 (Implementing Rules of RA 7722) defines an
institution of higher learning or a program of higher learning.
Article 6. Scope of Application. - The coverage of the Commission shall be both public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all post-secondary educational
institutions, public and private.
These Rules shall apply to all public and private educational institutions offering tertiary degree
programs.
Clearly, HEIs refer to degree-granting institutions, or those offering tertiary degree or post-secondary
programs. In fact, Republic Act No. 8292 or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997 covers
chartered state universities and colleges. State universities and colleges primarily offer degree courses and
programs.
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED's coverage under RA 7722. The CHED's
coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degree-
granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the
CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under
RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them,[32] and this power
is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is ""the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.""
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and... unlimited capacity, has vested
this power in the Congress of the Philippines.
Main issue relating to Art. VII
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He
has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This... means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the... maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he... can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.
""Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.""
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the
CHED's quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation
of rules and regulations.[36] The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of
its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither
institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the
operations of non-degree granting review centers.
There is no doubt that a principal mandate of the PRC is to preserve the integrity of licensure
examinations. The PRC has the power to adopt measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of
licensure examinations. However, this power should properly be interpreted to refer to the conduct of the
examinations
These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with the regulation of review centers.
However, this power has nothing to do with the regulation of review centers. The PRC has the power to
bar PRB members from conducting review classes in review centers. However, to... interpret this power
to extend to the power to regulate review centers is clearly an unwarranted interpretation of RA 8981.
Section 7(y) of RA 8981 giving the PRC the power to perform ""such other functions and duties as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions"" of RA 8981 does not extend to the regulation of review centers.
There is absolutely nothing in RA 8981 that mentions regulation by the
Similarly, the PRC has no mandate to regulate similar entities whose reviewees will not even... take any
licensure examination given by the PRC.
SO ORDERED.
SM Land v. BCDA
769 SCRA 310 (2015
Facts: For reconsideration is the Decision of this Court dated August 13, 2014, which granted the petition
for certiorari filed by SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) and directed respondent Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) and its president to, among other things,... subject SMLI's duly accepted unsolicited
proposal for the development of the Bonifacio South Property to a competitive challenge.
The gravamen of respondents' motion is that BCDA and SMLI do not have a contract that would bestow
upon the latter the right to demand that its unsolicited proposal be subjected to a competitive challenge.”
the existence of such an agreement between the... parties, respondents contend that the same may be
terminated by reasons of public interest. We are not convinced.
Article 1305 of the New Civil Code defines a contract as ""a meeting of minds between two persons
whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.""
In the case at bar, there is, between BCDA and SMLI, a perfected contract a source of rights and
reciprocal obligations on the part of both parties. Consequently, a breach thereof may give rise to a cause
of action against the erring party.
The first requisite, consent, is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing
and the cause which are to constitute the contract. In the case at bar, when SMLI submitted the first
Unsolicited Proposal to BCDA on December 14, 2009, the submission constituted an offer to undertake
the development of the subject property. to manifest their assent to the terms thereof and their respective
obligations, both parties BCDA and SMLI, represented by Gen. Narciso L. Abaya and Ms. Ana Bess
Pingol, respectively affixed their signatures on the Certification of Successful Negotiations and... had it
notarized on August 6, 2010
Cause, on the other hand, is the essential reason which moves the parties to enter into the contract. It is
the immediate, direct and proximate reason which justifies the creation of an obligation through the will
of the contracting parties. Lastly, object certain refers to the subject matter of the contract. It is the thing
to be delivered or the service to be performed.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987,[15] acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in Executive Orders (EOs)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court's August 13, 2014 Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration is accordingly DENIED with FINALITY.
Principles:
Article 1318 of the Code lays down the essential requisites of a valid contract, to wit:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and
Facts: Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a
uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later
promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment
of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959,
petitioner
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in
bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardboard producers-bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde-which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues
and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33.765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made
another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No.
1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring, that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from Said fee. Soon after the last importation of these
products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts,
the Auditor of the Bank refused to... pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde
is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2069. On appeal
taken by petitioner, fie Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: whether or not ""urea"" and ""formaldehyde"" are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee.”
Ruling: Petitioner maintains that the term ""urea formaldehyde"" appearing in this provision should be
construed as ""urea and formaldehyde"" (italic ours) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General and
the Auditor of the Central Bank have erred in holding otherwise.
In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas ""urea'"" and ""formaldehyde"" are the principal raw
materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology
has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that
""Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product
from definite proportions of urea and formaldeyhe under certain conditions relating to temperature,
acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water... solution and extended with
inexpensive fillers constitutes' a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.""
Hence, ""urea formaldehyde"" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from,
""urea"" and ""formaldehyde"", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as ""urea formaldehyde"", Petitioner contends, however, that the bill... approved, in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction ""and"" between the terms ""urea"" and, ""formaldehyde"", and that the
members of Congress intended to exempt ""urea"", and ""formaldehyde"" separately as essential elements
in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
""urea and formaldehyde"", not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements
made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do
they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term ""urea formaldehyde"" instead of
""urea and formaldehyde"" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure... passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil., I; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.""”
The respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the collusiveness on the courts of an
enrolled bill or resolution.” "That political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to
the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C. J. S., 431.)
This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of powers, If ratification of an amendment is
a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution ""consists of
only two distinct parts: proposal and ratification.""
There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other.
Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the ""Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this
power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency
scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is leas reason for
judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. we deem it unnecessary to
decide the question of whether the senators and representatives who were ignored in the computation of
the necessary three-fourths vote Mere members of Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article
XV of the Philippine Constitution.
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