Farah 1998

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I slam, Democracy and the State in

North Africa

John P. Entelis, Editor


Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. 228
pages. $35.00 (ISBN 0-253-33303-2);$15.95 (ISBN 0-
253-21131-x) paperback.

Review by
Caesar E. Farah, Ph.D.
University of Minnesota
farahOOl@maroon.tc.urnn.edu

T his work consists of nine topics, contributions of well-estab


lished authorities on the subject they discuss. I t was the
result of a two-year lecture and publication project on “The
Crisis of Authoritarianism in North African Politics: Transition to
Democracy?’ funded by the United States Institute of Peace. By way
of background it was assumed in the late 1980’st h a t th e principal
states of North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, a n d Tunisia would experi-
ence a trend toward economic liberalization a n d political democra-
tization following the period of decolonization, i n keeping with
trends afoot i n Eastern Europe and elsewhere. However, misguided
economic policies, bureaucratic mismanagement, political corrup-
tion, a nd cultural alienation combined to create a popular demand
for change. Instead of the expected more open politics to transform
the region, the result was authoritarian sta te s mobilized to repress
the populist opposition which passed eventually under the leader-
ship of politicized Islamist movements.
This anthology purports to survey developments in th e region
over the past two decades, and to t h a t e n d experts on the subject

Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa-Farah 55


Fall 1998 Volume 7. Number 4

were enlisted to contribute their research a n d findings a s they


analyze “the progression from socioeconomic crisis to democratic
promise to authoritarian stasis” (back cover). Drawing from th e
perspectives of political culture an d political economy, the contrib-
utors provide insight into the region’s continuing political crisis.
The benign authoritarianism th at followed independence soon wid-
ened its control through the police state it instituted to control th e
whole of society, suffocating all forms of independent political
expression. The increasing tension between state repression a n d
expanding populist aspirations, consequently, reached unbearable
proportions when by the mid 1980’snational, regional a n d global
economies suffered simultaneous failures which seriously compro-
mised the so-called “welfare contracts” t h a t h a d regulated state-
society relations since independence. (ix-x)
I n his chapter “Sultans, Saints, an d Presidents: th e Islamic
Community a n d the State in North Africa,” J o h n Voll claims t h a t
the struggle over tactics or conflict within the existing politically
elite does not explain alone the crisis of authoritarianism. He
asserts t ha t i t is, rath er, a p a r t of a much broader, global s e t of
transformations in which the very nature of the basic structures is
involved. He claims t h a t the crisis of authoritarianism i n North
Africa is a crisis of Westernizing, modernizing authoritarianism.
While Tunisia an d Algeria were exhibiting failures i n the ideal
models of the gradualist an d nationalist-radical revolution, the
political system of the Moroccan monarchy was emerging a s th e only
political system to survive intact since independence. National
failures coupled with global an d regional transformations, cast
doubt on the whole discourse of modernization a n d Westernization
a n d gave rise to populist movements affirming Islam a n d democracy
a s a substitute discourse. Hence Islamic movements have emerged
a s a force contesting the statu s quo created by authoritarian re-
gimes a n d propounding a viable political conceptualization for the
s t a t e s of t he Maghrib.
The next article by Eickelman titled “Muslim Politics: th e
Prospects for Democratic i n North Africa a n d the Middle East,”
posits t he notion that there is a powerful background understand-
ing among both Westerners and Muslims that Islam determines th e
identity a n d conduct of Muslims in a way in which other world
religions do not. I t is alleged t h a t this implicit assumption came to
t he fore during th e crisis t h a t culminated in the forced resignation
ofAlgeria’s President Chadli Benjedid on Jan u a ry 11, 1992, a n d the
military’s cancellation of elections the next day.

56 D@est of Middle East Studies


Islam

Objectification of Islam a s a religion a n d as a civilization


permeates U.S. policy, an d public discourse, argues Eickelman. A
political scientist adopting arguments cu r r e n t in the 1930’s h a s
maintained t h a t non-Western civilizations have increasingly be-
come political actors. Dan Quayle i n a speech in 1990 p u ts th e rise
of Islamic fundamentalism in the same category as that of Nazism
a nd Communism-implying a political t h r e a t to U.S. interests.
“The fact is they have become political actors, b u t th e arguments
employed deflect attention from internal a n d historical differences
among the carriers of traditions in a civilization a n d th e often
vigorous internal debate among the carriers. Civilizations, like
cultures, are better seen as contested, temporal, a n d emergent.”(p.xii)
The issue of contested cultures an d civilizations is especially
important, according the author, in assessing the prospects for
democracy in the Arab world. Few maintain t h a t being Arab inhibits
democracy, but some readily impute antidemocratic sentiments to
those who a r e Muslim. Politics are deemed “Muslim” when they
relate to a widely shared, although not doctrinally defined, tradition
of ideas a nd practice. Muslim groups calling for democratization in
such countries as Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, an d Morocco indicate how
some Muslims, a s self-conscious religious actors, use t h e instru-
ments of existing political systems to magnify their political voice
a nd intensify pressures for reform. In spite of the fascination of
Western commentators with “Islamist” discourse, th e r e is a rising
tide of Muslim moderates responding to wh a t they see as th e
bankruptcy of traditional religious and political discourse.
The impact of mass education and mass communication is
discussed i n th e context of how people think about political a n d
religious authority by facilitating conceptual innovations a n d creat-
ing new networks for communication an d action. The expansion of
mass education h a s created profound changes in th e images a n d
vocabulary by which politics are conceived.
I n North Africa an d the Middle East, assessing th e prospect for
democracy entails listening to voices other t h a n those of a Western-
ized elite a nd paying attention to the rich debates a n d arguments
through which ideas of just rule, religious a n d otherwise, are re-
imagined a nd re-formed throughout the Arab a n d Muslim worlds.
Entelis argues i n the chapter “Political Islam in the Maghreb:
The Nonviolent Dimension” that the salafiyya (return to the righ-
teous fore fathers’ ways) movements emerged i n all three countries
in response to external aggression an d perceived threats to indige-
nous culture an d belief. The nonviolent Islamic-based political

Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa-Farah 57


Fall 1998 Volume 7 . Number 4

movements of today a r e merely following i n a recognized tradition


of defying a n authority t h a t is demonstrably unjust, unresponsive,
a nd undemocratic. They use the power of the mosques a n d th e
streets to challenge the authority of regimes viewed a s illegitimate.
Prayer a nd preaching empower such movements to mobilize
popular support for a political program t h a t promotes their ideas for
the j ust a nd good society as defined by Islamic teaching. Debates at
youth centers, pamphlets distributed in poor neighborhoods, a n d
work i n the community all contribute to the propagation of their
agenda. Their impressive organizational abilities a r e reflected i n
the way they sponsor mass rallies, large demonstrations, a n d public
assemblies.
Entelis breaks down Islamically based political opposition move-
ments i n North Africa into three separate but at times overlapping
categories. One, comprised of individuals an d groups th a t reject th e
authority of official or state-sponsored Islam and promote nonpolit-
ical action in education, culture, an d social activities, emphasizing
the religious training an d education of the young in order to ensure
a devoutly Muslim political future. The second group is committed
to the goal of a more “authentic” Muslim society a n d calls, instead,
for direct political action to attain it. Its members advocate th e use
of democratic an d electoral means-political organization, mobili-
zation, a nd participation-to bring about a nonviolent transfer of
power i n the nation. Reform of both state a n d society is at th e h e a r t
of their political agenda. The third group embraces militant h a r d
liners who seek to transfer power quickly by any means, political or
military, including violence, terrorism, an d assassination. I t s mem-
bers favor the imposition of Islamic law, strictly interpreted. I t is to
this group that the label “Islamic fundamentalism” best applies,
according to the author.
Different personalities make up these three broad categories;
but their tactics converge in t h a t through pursuing a n activist
course they all aim to change the political landscape of their
societies. Entelis dwells on the second group of Muslim oppositional
activists. H e claims tat this group subscribes basically to a nonvio-
lent transfer of national power. I n justification thereof he points to
the three most popular and influential movements a s represented
by AbdessalamYassine’s Justice an d Charity inMorocco, Rachid al-
Ghannouchi’s an-Nahdah (Renaissance) in Tunisia, a n d Abassi
Madani a n d Ali Benhadi’s Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria.
Though politically moderate, nevertheless all three movements are
banned. Yet neither government oppression (in Tunisia), state

58 D,igest of Middle East Studies


terrorism (in Algeria), nor monarchical intimidation (in Morocco)
has extinguished support for these groups, especially among people
living on the margins, a s well as among elites
According to Entelis, were incumbent governments to succeed
in eliminating nonviolent Islamist groups, they will face a serious
vacuum t h a t can only result i n greater political instability a n d social
uncertainty. Popular support for nonviolent Islamists i n North
Africa is holding, however, it is challenged daily by recalcitrant
officials from above an d by fringe groups prone to violence from
below. The author concludes th at i n view of the resistance to any
change in the name of Islam persists, neither stability nor democ-
racy a r e achievable i n the foreseeable future.
I n her “The Politis of Human Rights i n the Maghreb,” S u s a n
Waltz describes the origins an d functioning of security agencies, s e t
up right after independence in the three states under consideration,
to silence political opponents and under grid authority of the new
regimes. To be sure Maghrebi regimes acceded to emerging interna-
tional h u m a n rights mechanisms by ratifying international cove-
na nt s a nd participating in international h u m a n rights review
procedures, but a t home they have not refrained from such practices
as torture, “disappearances,” political killings, a n d the imprison-
ment of dissidents, which effectively curtail political participation.
Waltz argues t h a t pressures exerted by domestic h u m a n rights
groups were matched, and reinforced, by influential actors abroad.
Local h u m a n rights found support from a number of international
agencies a nd groups, all concerned by abuses a n d lack of me a n s to
assess fully their extent. The author suggests t h a t there a r e two
vantage points from which reforms retain much significance. First,
i n taking up t he discourse of human rights a n d secondly, for h u m a n
rights to become p art of the lexicon of nearly all active social
movement in North Africa. Only if the ideals of h u m a n rights a r e
supported by influential actors a t home and abroad a r e they likely
to remain on the political agenda of the Maghreb countries.
Tessler’s chapter, “The Origin of Popular S u p p o rt for Islamist
Movements: A Political Economy Analysis,” posits t h a t support for
Islamist movements i n many countries of No rth Africa and the
Middle E a s t lie primarily in the political a n d economic circumstanc-
es of these countries and only secondarily in th e religious a n d
cultural traditions of their inhabitants. Islamists themselves, on the
other hand, have alleged that the motivation for such support is
religious. The only way to cause the dissipation of support for such
movements, according to the author, is for Arab governments to

Islain, Democracy and the State in North Africa-Farah 59


Fall 1998 Volume 7 . Number 4

display greater vision and dedication in addressing the grievances


of ordinary m en a n d women.
I n he r chapter, “Prospects for Liberalism in North Africa:
Identities a nd Interests in Pre-industrial Welfare States,” Ander-
son explores t he role of international political economy i n th e onset
of liberal political reform i n North Africa a s well a s the factors t h a t
impeded its realization. She claims t h a t it was primarily the need
for revenue in the North African states t h a t induced changes from
the despotic to the multiparty systems, but t h a t the reversal of the
latter trend in the 1990’sresulted mostly from government fears of
the st r e ngt h of Islamic political movements. When revenues were
ample in the 1980’53, deriving from external sources, attention to
citizen needs helped keep them i n line; but when such revenue
diminished the regimes turned to domestic sources, which were not
ample. Political liberalization essentially was intended to win over
Western aid donors as well a s domestic constituencies likely to be
targeted for taxation. But the targeted bourgeoisie did not respond.
The growth among Islamists alarmed the elite a n d caused them to
crack down, most severely in Algeria i n 1992. Anderson concludes
that if economic and political reforms are not met, there is little
likelihood that democracy will take root i n this region.
Waterbury’s article “From Social Contracts to Extraction Con-
tracts: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism a n d Democracy,”
is seen a s a complement to Anderson’s arguments a n d reflects th e
shift brought on by decreases in oil prices, worker remittances, a n d
substituting industrialization built around a large public sector.
The author argues th at political liberalization should support th e
necessary process of economic reform by breaking down th e state’s
monopoly on the allocation of resources and spreading th e pain of
adjustment. The political economy of authoritarianism, h e argues,
does not stop a t a given country’s border but is connected to
international markets, sources of credit an d arms, investment flow,
strategic rents, and the instruments of international clientage a n d
dependency. He discusses also the role of the military a n d th e level
of a r me d conflict that has made it entitled to political a n d economic
advantages a n d the single most important variable i n determining
the political economy of authoritarianism and democracy. This is
true, he claims for all but Israel an d Turkey in the Middle East, a s
well a s North Africa.
I n “Crises of Money an d Power: Transitions to Democracy?”
Henry observed t h a t the political crises of North African regimes
have been accompanied by international debt

60 Dgest of Mid&&?East Studies


Islam

Crises reminiscent of the nineteenth century. He postulates


t h a t t h a t the current economic crises may pave the way for political
reform. And the business community, he argues, may could just
exercise enough pressures to bring about more effective govern-
ment a nd greater political contestation. . i n his analysis h e focuses
upon a n independent variable-the structure of th e commercial
banking system, which h as been little studied i n th e conventional
comparative politics and political economy literature on political
transitions. The financial reforms encouraged by th e International
Monetary F un d and the World Bank a r e designed to develop
banking systems th at are autonomous an d competitive a n d t h a t
feature substantial component of privately owned banks. Such
reforms, should they succeed, will seriously endanger the patrimo-
nial politics currently prevailing i n the countries of the Maghreb.
The book ends with a n analysis of “The International Politics of
Democracy in North Africa” by Zartman who defines democracy a s
self-reliance, which would exclude international cooperation in its
own support. Nationalist movements, which cooperated in the
region to free their countries from foreign rule, gained thereby self-
determination an d self-government.But a s the state grew i n impor-
tance, procedures for choosing governors and their performance
disappointed the populace, which began to find th e Islamist alter-
native attractive. Each such movement is a national product, which
developed its own international politics of support. According to
Zartman, the efforts of the government to keep their Islamic ex-
tremists under control were a major motif in the creation of the Arab
Maghreb Union i n 1989. He concludes with the observation t h a t
various pressures paradoxically have increased pressure for democ-
ratization a n d greater inter-Maghrebi cooperation.
This book overall is rich in data casting light on th e developmen-
tal trends i n North Africa and the political changes accompanying
them. I can think of no other work that can match w h a t it h a s to offer
by way of information, analysis of important trends, a n d intelligent
observations by competent experts for both the uninformed reader
a nd the scholar. It is recommended as a primary source of reference
for those doing research in modern North Africa.

Islam, Deriiocracy and the State in North Africa-Farah 61

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